



## 1. Project Data

<b>Project ID</b> P152821	<b>Project Name</b> GLR:Displaced Persons and Border Comm	
<b>Country</b> Africa	<b>Practice Area(Lead)</b> Urban, Resilience and Land	
<b>L/C/TF Number(s)</b> IDA-58150,IDA-D2300	<b>Closing Date (Original)</b> 31-Dec-2021	<b>Total Project Cost (USD)</b> 401,761.03
<b>Bank Approval Date</b> 27-May-2016	<b>Closing Date (Actual)</b> 31-Dec-2021	
	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>
Original Commitment	0.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	335,376.85	0.00
Actual	401,761.03	0.00

<b>Prepared by</b> Maria Vanessa Corlazzoli	<b>Reviewed by</b> J. W. van Holst Pellekaan	<b>ICR Review Coordinator</b> Christopher David Nelson	<b>Group</b> IEGSD (Unit 4)
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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

The objective of the Africa Great Lakes Region: Displaced Persons and Border Communities project for US\$20 million IDA credit was to improve access to livelihoods and socio-economic infrastructure for displaced people and host communities in target areas of the territory of the Republic of Zambia (PAD, pg.11).

As part of an Additional Financing (AF) in June 2017, a second objective was added to the original parent project. Therefore the project had two objectives: (i) improve access to livelihoods and socio-economic infrastructure for displaced people and host communities in target areas of the territory of the Republic of



Zambia, and (ii) support regional learning on development (Financial Agreement IDA-D2300, 2017, pg. 5 and Project Paper, para 5a). This second objective was financed by a US\$3 million IDA grant for the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in order to extend regional capacity building and learning activities on development responses to forced displacement to government (Project Paper, para. 1).

The parent project, however, experienced several setbacks. The Government of Tanzania withdrew from the project during appraisal process shortly before project negotiations (ICR, para 10). The Government of Zambia withdrew from the project in March 2018 prior to it being declared effective (ICR, para 14). The parent project was officially closed on March 29, 2019. While no activities were implemented under the first objective because the parent was never declared effective, the IDA grant to ICGLR grant proceeded and was declared effective in November 2017 (ICR, para 13). That said, with the decision to close the parent project in March 2019, this left the ICGLR IDA grant orphaned. As a result, in June 2019, it was also decided that the IDA grant to ICGLR would be closed and unspent funds were cancelled (ICR, para 17).

It is not necessary to conduct an ICR on a project that failed to become effective. The parent project in this case never became effective and there is no legal agreement. The legal agreement for the ICGLR grant from IDA was signed on August 16, 2017. While this agreement was an amendment to the parent grant agreement, it had two objectives but it only funded activities to support the second objective, namely the ICGLR grant. As a result, this ICRR will only focus on the achievement of the second objective. During this review, the Additional Financing Project Paper was used as the primary reference document as opposed as the PAD that was prepared for the parent project.

**b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?**

Yes

**Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?**

Yes

**Date of Board Approval**

25-Jul-2017

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

**Component 1: Regional Learning** (Appraisal cost was estimated at US\$717,000. At closing the cost was US\$68,773). This component aimed at bringing together key representatives through a range of events in order to raise awareness, capacities, identify challenges, and durable solutions to forced migration (Project Paper, para 25). The relevant stakeholders were to be gathered to share knowledge, experience and good practices regarding developing processes to respond to forced displacement (Financial Agreement, pg. 6). The second part of this component was to provide technical assistance to support the existing ICGLR Technical Sub-Committee of experts on land. This committee was tasked with establishing reporting systems, research land and displacement topics, and conduct future subcommittee meetings (Financial Agreement, pg. 5, and Project Paper, para. 27).



**Component 2: Regional Research** (Appraisal cost was estimated at US\$1,084,000. At closing there were no expenditures for this component). This component sought to conduct regional research through studies and data collection activities aimed to fill knowledge gaps for enabling evidence-based policy making (Financial Agreement, pg. 5; Project Paper, para 28)

**Component 3: Project Management and Institutional Capacity Building** (Appraisal cost was estimated at US\$1,199,000. At closing the cost was US\$321,434). This component aimed at strengthening management skills and institutional capacity of the ICGLR through the provision of technical advisory services in order to implement the following: day-to-day planning, implementation and supervision of project activities, support the Project Advisory Group, administration and financial management, and project monitoring and evaluation (Financial Agreement, pg. 5).

**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Cost.** At appraisal, the total cost for the parent project was estimated at US\$20 million, of which all would be allocated by the World Bank (PAD, pg. i). At appraisal, the estimated cost for the ICGLR project was US\$3 million (ICR, pg. 43). If both the parent and the ICGLR project had been implemented then the total appraised cost would have been US\$23 million.

**Financing.** The total of US\$23 million was financed through two different legal agreements.

A total of US\$20 million from an IDA credit was approved for the parent project. When the project was closed none of the credit had been disbursed.

An additional US\$3 million grant was provided by IDA grant in 2017. The actual disbursement of this grant at the end of the project was US\$401,761 (ICR, pg. 2).

**Borrower Contribution.** There were no provisions in the PAD or in the legal agreement that indicated that the Borrowers committed to making a financial contribution to the project.

**Dates.** The parent project was approved on May 27, 2016. In March 2016, shortly before the project negotiations, the Government of Tanzania withdrew from the project (ICR, para 10). The Government of Zambia withdrew from the project in March 2018 and the IDA credit portion of the project never became effective. It was officially closed in March 2019 (ICR, para 14).

As noted already above, on July 25, 2017 an additional financing was approved for the parent project. It consisted of an IDA grant to fund activities in the ICGLR (ICR, para 12). An additional objective was added to the parent project. PDO indicators and components were not changed throughout the life of the project (ICR, pg. 16). On the other hand outcome and intermediate outcome indicators were added to the project during implementation. The IDA agreement for the ICGLR became effective on November 13, 2017 (ICR, para. 13). Since the level of ambition for the project that was declared effective was not reduced there was no justification for a split rating of objectives.

On June 25, 2019, the project closing date was changed from December 31, 2021 to June 20, 2019 (ICR, para 17).



### 3. Relevance of Objectives

#### Rationale

At the time of appraisal, within the Great Lakes Region, there were more than 4.3 million refugees and internally displaced persons. Individuals that were displaced tended to have lower incomes, lower employment rates, and greater dependency on direct transfers than non-displaced (ICR, para 2). Hosting displaced persons also had considerable strains on services and environmental degradation (ICR, para 2).

At the time of appraisal, most interventions related to displaced persons in the Great Lakes Region were humanitarian in nature. In order to adequately address forced displacement it necessitated a regional and collaborative approach. While regional institutions had strong mandates to address forced displacement they lacked a permanent regional platform to sustain policy dialogue and knowledge sharing (ICR, para 3).

**Previous Sector Experience:** While the World Bank's role historically tackled the medium-term socio economic dimensions of forced displacement, it had experience supporting regional platforms in the Horn of Africa Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Regional Secretariat for Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration (ICR, para 1 and 3).

**Alignment with World Bank Assistance Strategy:** The project's objective closely aligned with the World Bank Assistance Strategy, in particular, the World Bank's Great Lakes Regional Initiative (GLRI). This initiative was designed to work in support of peace, security and cooperation through regional projects (ICR, para 4). Forced displaced persons were identified as a vulnerable group under the first pillar of the GLRI (ICR, para 4). The project was conceived to operationalize a development response to forced displacement in the Great Lakes Region as part of the GLRI (ICR, para. 5).

**Alignment with Development Goals:** The ICGLR project's objective did not have an explicit alignment to the World Bank Development twin goals of reducing extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity. That said, implicitly the objective of this project would eventually be able to support the World Bank's goals if the project was able to increase knowledge and support regional learning on how best to address issues related to forced displacement.

**Alignment with Government Development Strategy:** The project aligned with the Government of Tanzania and Zambia's government development strategy while it was being conceived. However, both countries held elections and new governments were formed. Both the Government of Tanzania and Zambia withdrew from the project, which indicated that implementing the project and subsequently achieving the objectives was not a priority that had the support of political forces across political parties in those countries.

Furthermore, the project's objective did not align with the Government of Zambia's priority as outlined in the Country Partnership Strategies (CPS) at the project's start or closure. For example, the Country Partnership Strategies (CPS) of Zambia (CP FY2013-2017 and CPS FY 2019-23) did not explicitly seek to address or collaborate on issues related to forced displacement.

The objective of the project was more closely aligned with one of the focus areas outlined in the Country Partnership Strategy for Tanzania. In the CPS 19-22, the CPS acknowledges the regional priority to work



on issues related to refugees and forced migrants. The CPS showcases one project aimed at dealing with refugee issues along the Tanzania/Burundi border (CPS19-22, pg. 34). However, support for regional learning on development or on forced migration was not a central theme of the CPS at project closure.

The Government of Burundi is the host country of the ICGLR. During the ICGLR project inception, one of Burundi's CPS pillars was regional integration (CPS 2013-16, para 51-52). As a result the project's objective was relevant to achieving Burundi's development priorities. At project closure, the CPS (2019-2023), acknowledges the need for regional cooperation with its neighbors on a range of issues, including forced displacement (CPR 19-23, para. 5).

Overall, the project's objective was relevant given the context. The World Bank also had experience supporting regional forums. However, the objective of the project only implicitly supported the World Bank's Twin Development Goals. There was also limited evidence to indicate that the objective was a priority of the Government of Tanzania or Zambia. The objective was, however, relevant to the priorities of the Government of Burundi. On balance, the relevance of the project objective is rated as modest.

## Rating

Modest

## 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

### OBJECTIVE 1

#### Objective

To support regional learning on development.

#### Rationale

The project aimed at achieving the objective by identifying means to support displaced people and improve community resilience, promote regional integration, and support the ICGLR's Humanitarian and Social Issues sector (ICR, para 19).

The **theory of change** assumed that there would be an increase in awareness of the long-term responses to forced displacement by bringing together key policy makers and facilitating ongoing regional processes. It also assumed that by increasing the capacity of the ICGLR technical Subcommittee it would be better able to establish reporting systems on key protocols related to land for displaced people. Lastly, it assumed that by commissioning regional research initiatives it would lead to more evidence-based policies (ICR, para. 20).

The theory of change also tackled key leverages that could lead to evidence-based policy making (gatherings, research, capacity strengthening). However, the approach was technocratic and to be successful it would have needed to account for political sensitivities that prevent the implementation of best-practices. The ICR outlined several other important assumptions and risks that the project team was aware of including: political risks of governments to pursue development responses that may not be supported by public opinion,



volatile regional and domestic political developments, and unknown or limited knowledge of whether a regional learning platform could influence "on-the-ground" interventions (ICR, para 21a).

The logical framework stressed the importance of implementation of knowledge and research by introducing strong indicators on uptake and use. That said, there were limitations to uptake beyond the scope of the ICGLR grant that needed to be holistically addressed. While uptake and use were important, there were no activities to support uptake and use of the research as outlined in the Project Paper. As a result, by project design, the uptake of the new knowledge was limited.

**Outputs (Targets were not provided):**

- One Project Advisory Group (PAG) meeting was held in July 2018 and was attended by 7 government officials (ICR, para. 39).
- One workshop was held in January 2019 (ICR, para 40). It was attended by 40 participants (ICR, para 41).
- No research outputs were developed under the Regional Research component (ICR, para 45).
- No evidence was provided in the ICR of capacity strengthening or support to the ICGLR Technical Sub-Committee of Experts on Land

**Outcome**

A year after the project implemented its first activity, the project was closed. In that year, the project was able to convene one workshop "Government, Institutional and Governance Arrangements for Development Responses/Solutions to Forced Displacement in the Great Lakes Region." Participants in this workshop were able to share information through peer-presentations and short briefs (ICR, para 41). Workshop participants stated that they found the meeting useful because it was "interactive, allowed for cross-fertilization of ideas for better working methods, people with different expertise shared views freely, there was improved knowledge of development solutions...and participants were able to identify weaknesses and good practices" (ICR, para 42).

Government officials from different countries noted that they used the information provided in the workshop. For example, the Government of Zambia stated that they used the information to strengthen and institutionalized coordination among ministries (ICR, para. 43). The Government of DRC noted that it was motivated to host its own workshop focused on four provinces most affected by forced displacement (ICR, para 43). Meanwhile, the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) used the information to inform their Great Lakes regional strategy (ICR, para 43).

In March 2019, the Governments of the Great Lakes Region re-affirmed their commitment to seeking regional solutions to forced displacement. During a high-level meeting among Ministers in charge of refugee issues, that was co-hosted by the Director of the Humanitarian and Social Issues Sector, participants stated that the ICGLR was a valuable collaborative vehicle. They recommended that the ICGLR develop a Regional Strategy for Durable Solutions for the Great Lakes Region, and an action plan (ICR, para 35). These statements by the different government officials indicated that there was a need for the project and appreciation for the work



that was taking place. According to World Bank staff, the project gave ICGLR additional legitimacy and profile at this Forum (World Bank Staff Interview 2020).

Unfortunately, there were only 2 activities implemented in this project, implementing one preparatory meeting and one workshop. While the activities were well implemented and there is some evidence of preliminary use of the information exchanged, the project was unable to generate a sufficient outcome to achieve its objective. For example, no research initiatives were undertaken during the life of the project. As a result, the outcome of this objective is rated negligible due to the lack of activities implemented during the life of the project.

**Rating**  
Negligible

## OVERALL EFFICACY

### Rationale

The project had a short duration and it was only able to implement two activities. While the workshop organized was useful to the participants and there is some evidence of uptake, its reach is probably limited due to the fact that it was a one-off-event. Moreover, there were numerous other activities outlined in the Project Paper that were not implemented, including research initiatives. While the project was able to support a high-level forum of government officials in March 2019, the project was unable to implement the majority of planned activities. The overall efficacy of the project's achievements is therefore rated negligible.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**  
Negligible

**Primary Reason**  
Low achievement

## 5. Efficiency

**Scope of Analysis:** A financial and economic analysis was not carried out during the additional financing of the project (Project Paper, pg. 16). The Project Paper stated that this analysis was not undertaken because the activities focused on technical assistance, learning events, and research rather than implementation of works and field-level activities (Project Paper, pg. 16). Instead, efficiency would be achieved through: (a) using the staff of the existing PCU within the ICGLR and augmenting their salaries to enable full-time positions, rather than recruiting new staff members; and (b) use of financial proposals (alongside technical proposals) to comply with least cost criteria in the selection of consultants and firms (Project Paper, pg. 16).

**Economic Analysis:** At project closure, only 18% of the funds were disbursed (ICR, para 53). This is an indication of poor operational efficiency. Moreover, 82% of the funds that were disbursed were used under project management and institutional capacity building components.



**Operational Efficiency:** There were a few other factors that negatively affected the project's efficiency. According to the ICRR, "tremendous amount of time and effort was spent by the World Bank team in reprocessing the project internally." (ICR, para. 49). The project was closed prematurely, and as a result activities were not implemented and outcomes not achieved. The project also faced a number of bureaucratic hurdles related to: (i) preparing a stand alone project, (ii) retro-fitting it to an Additional Financing process, (iii) delays in setting up a new P-code, (iv) delayed negotiations due to administrative errors, (v) acquiring waiver for an AF for a non-effective project, (vi) deferring requirements for re-structuring the parent project (vii) delays in appealing to regional VP to secure approval not having a waiver to clear the AF (ICR, para 49). As the ICR reflected, the ineffective "processes and time spent largely reflected and inflexible bureaucracy which took time and energy away from the client, yet nonetheless did not prevent the final outcome of the ICGLR having to halt activities prematurely." (ICR, para 49).

Overall, the project had grave operational inefficiencies. Processes required to implement the project were cumbersome and time-consuming. The project also closed prematurely and as a result the time invested to set up the project was not a productive investment. As a result of the operational inefficiencies, the efficiency of the project is rated as negligible.

### Efficiency Rating

Negligible

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

### 6. Outcome

The project's objective was relevant given the context. In order to resolve forced displacement a regional approach was needed. The World Bank also had experience supporting regional forums. However, the objective of the project only implicitly supported the World Bank Development Goals. There was also limited evidence to indicate that the objective was a priority of the Governments of Tanzania or Zambia. As a result, the relevance of the objective is rated as modest.

The project had a short duration and it was only able to implement two activities. While the workshop organized was useful to the participants and there is some evidence of uptake, its reach is probably limited due to the fact that it was a one-off-event. Moreover, there were numerous other activities outlined in the Project Paper that



were not implemented, including research initiatives. The efficacy of the project's achievements was rated negligible by this review.

The project also had grave operational inefficiencies. Processes required to implement the project were cumbersome and time-consuming. The project also closed prematurely and as a result the time invested to set up the project was not a productive investment. Considering the pervasive operational inefficiencies, the efficiency with which the project was implemented is rated as negligible.

The overall outcome of this project is therefore rated highly unsatisfactory due to severe shortcomings in its efficacy and efficiency (both rated negligible), and a major shortcoming in the relevance of the project's objective (rated modest).

**a. Outcome Rating**  
Highly Unsatisfactory

## 7. Risk to Development Outcome

There is one main risk to the development outcome:

**Perceived lack of donor support for regional approach to forced displacement.** Due to the abrupt closure of the project, countries may perceive that the World Bank is not committed to a regional platform on development responses to forced displacement (ICR, para 75). This perception may affect stakeholder's willingness to invest in safe regional platforms that enable difficult conversations to take place.

## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

**a. Quality-at-Entry**

The design of the project was based on a series of identification missions to the region. The Government of DRC, Tanzania and Zambia each identified their priorities. The ICGLR was also consulted and submitted a letter of request in 2015 (ICR, para 6). By 2016, the ROC had endorsed that the ICGLR component be a stand-alone project. However, in the course of 2016, the position of the World Bank's Regional Vice President had changed towards portfolio consolidation and this project became part of the parent-project (ICR, para 12).

The design of the project included lessons learned from other projects, including work done by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The lessons learned included building capacity of the existing Project Coordination Unit and initiating research and events based on country priorities (ICR, para. 65). previous regional projects. It also included extensive consultations

The ICGLR grant fits nicely into the parent project as it complemented its objectives and desired outcomes. The ICGLR grant's theory of change was ambitious, yet simultaneously commendable, for



trying to ensure that research and events were implemented. The team was aware of the various potential risks that could impact the project and upon reflection it recognized that the mitigation measures could have been strengthened (ICR, para 67).

The project team had to go through numerous time consuming mandatory bureaucratic processes to have the ICGLR grant approved, which led to operational inefficiencies at the design stage.

Overall, the quality of entry is rated as moderately satisfactory.

### **Quality-at-Entry Rating** Moderately Satisfactory

#### **b. Quality of supervision**

The World Bank team provided ongoing support to the ICGLR and ensured that it maintained a clear communication through the different project stages. Unfortunately, the project suffered several set-backs as a result of a lack of proper political economy analysis and internal bureaucratic rigidity. For example, a proper political economy analysis may have better identified political risks and interests of political actors that were not supportive of the Bank's financing of refugee/host community interventions. This could have helped to create a broader coalition that would support the parent-project given the inevitability of elections in Tanzania and Zambia. The Bank's internal bureaucratic rigidity led to the project being closed despite the team's various efforts to re-process the grant in order to continue activities while also achieving portfolio consolidation (ICR, para 69). For example, the team explored different options such as integrating the project into an existing project or incorporating it into new projects (ICR, para. 16). These efforts were not successful. The Bank task team responded by working with the ICGLR to identify EU-funding and World Bank Trust Funds to continue to implement activities with alternative financial support (ICR, para 73). On balance, the quality of supervision is rated moderately satisfactory.

### **Quality of Supervision Rating** Moderately Satisfactory

### **Overall Bank Performance Rating** Moderately Satisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The project aimed to support regional learning on development as it related to forced migration by identifying means to support displaced people and improve community resilience, promote regional integration, and support the ICGLR's Humanitarian and Social Issues sector (ICR, para 19).



The theory of change assumed that there would be an increase in awareness of the long-term responses to forced displacement by bringing together key policy makers and facilitating ongoing regional processes. It also assumed that by increasing the capacity of the ICGLR technical Subcommittee it would be better able to establish reporting systems on key protocols related to land for displaced people. Lastly, it assumed that by commissioning regional research initiatives it would lead to more evidence-based policies (ICR, para. 20).

The theory of change tackled key leverages that could lead to evidence-based policy making (gatherings, research, capacity strengthening). However, the approach was technocratic and to be successful it would have needed to overcome for political sensitivities that prevented the implementation of best-practices. The project document outlined governance risks such as geopolitical tension, host country sensitive operating environment, and historical conflict between member countries (Project Paper, para. 18). The ICR outlined several other important assumptions and risks that the project was aware of including: political risks of governments to pursue development responses that may not be supported by public opinion, volatile regional and domestic political developments, unknown or limited knowledge of whether a regional learning platform could influence on-the-ground interventions (ICR, para 21a).

The logical framework stressed the importance of implementation of knowledge and research by introducing strong indicators on uptake and use. During the Additional Finance, the project paper introduced new indicators. The new indicators aimed to measure not only the reach of the research initiatives (number of participants, number of research pieces created), but also the perceived usefulness of the events (% of participants that found the event or research useful) (Project Paper, pg. 20). To measure the full impact of the project, outcome related indicators could have measured changes in policy, processes, institutional reform, and application of research findings. Some of these impacts would have been outside the reach of the project given the limited size of the grant. As a result, it was sufficient that the results framework intended to measure the use of knowledge and how stakeholder used the new knowledge (ICR, para. 59).

The Additional Finance outlined a straightforward monitoring and evaluation system. It was designed with the aim to track activity outputs and measure indicators associated with outcomes. These activities were meant to (a) confirm that the timing and nature of activities were consistent with the project design and implementation; (b) make mid-course corrections if any issues were found to hamper implementation; (c) gauge progress towards intermediate outcomes; and (d) better understand any specific needs and dynamics that may become apparent over time (Project Paper, para 31). One of the key measurement tools was a perception survey to be administered one year after the end of the event. Other key monitoring tools included (a) quarterly progress reports and (b) a midterm and end-of-project independent evaluation (Project Paper, para 32).

## **b. M&E Implementation**

The project was able to implement evaluation surveys to measure qualitative outcome indicators at the PAG meeting and the workshop (ICR, para 60). The project also collected feedback from workshop participants, and interviews were conducted to validate findings (ICR, para 60). Due to the closure of the project, a quantitative survey to collect data against indicators six months after the learning event was not sent (ICR, para. 60). According to the ICR, this affected the evidence base for justification of outcome achievements (ICR, para. 60).



### **c. M&E Utilization**

According to the ICR, “potential project re-processing and closure was initiated before M&E could be sufficiently utilized.” (ICR, para 60). The ICR also reflected that “not much time was available to implement M&E.” (ICR, para. 61)

The overall rating of quality of M&E is rated as modest. The M&E design was strong as it attempted to measure the reach, usefulness, and utility of the gatherings and knowledge products. The implementation of the M&E system was rolled out during the handful of events that were organized. Unfortunately, the qualitative survey was not implemented due to the early closure of the project. Due to the short implementation period of the project the M&E data collected was not readily used.

#### **M&E Quality Rating**

Modest

## **10. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**

The project was classified as a Environmental Category “B” Partial Assessment, as per the Additional Finance. Despite the Partial Assessment “B” category, the activities did not trigger any safeguards because there were no physical works and no direct social impacts (Project Paper, pg. 17). The project anticipated indirect positive social impacts through regional dialogue and improved responses for forced displacement (Project Paper, pg. 17). The project was expected to implement principles to support social inclusion, including gender, and conduct consultative research ethically. At project closure, no safeguard policies had been triggered (ICR, para 61).

### **b. Fiduciary Compliance**

The project submitted FMR quarterly reports on a timely matter. Audit reports were submitted before the respective deadlines. The project received an unqualified audit opinion for December 2017, June 2018, and June 2018-2019 (ICR, para. 63). Procurement of goods and services funded followed Bank procurement procedures (ICR, para 63).

### **c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

None.



**d. Other**

None.

**11. Ratings**

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Unsatisfactory	Highly Unsatisfactory	According to IEG guidelines a modest rating for relevance, and negligible ratings for efficacy and efficiency indicate severe shortcomings in the operation's achievements and an overall Development Outcome rating of highly unsatisfactory.
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

**12. Lessons**

The following two lessons were extracted from the ICR:

- 1. Institutional rigidity and internal administrative objectives can be harmful to implementing regional projects.** For example, to have this project approved it needed to go through several administrative processes and waivers to avoid having a stand-alone project. When the parent project was closed, the associated IDA grant was prematurely closed. Throughout the application process, agile principles were not applied (ICR, para. 77)
- 2. Political Economy Analysis is necessary to understand client countries and mitigate risks.** For example, forced displacement is inherently a political issue. Prior to beginning a project, the World Bank would do well to assess and fully understand political actors' motivations and interests. When it came to the parent project for this operation both Zambia and Tanzania withdrew due to changes in the political alignments of their newly elected governments. A strong political economy analysis could have signaled the different priorities of political parties, and provided the World Bank an opportunity to address all actors' interests in the project's design.

The following lesson was extracted by IEG:



3. **Regional forums are able to bring together key stakeholders to discuss politically sensitive topics.** For example, while the project was only able to implement one workshop of stakeholders, preliminary data indicate that there was some use and uptake of information shared at the workshops. Furthermore, there has always been a regional commitment to discuss and share emerging best practices among neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region.

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR was clear and well written. The ICR adequately described the limitations of the project's implementation as a result of the Bank's rigid procedures. It provided detail of what was and was not achieved in the different areas of the review, although Annex 3 was incomplete and misleading. It is generally insightful, reflective, and provides useful lessons learned for future regional projects. Overall, the quality of this ICR is rated as Substantial.

- a. **Quality of ICR Rating**  
Substantial