101151 i The World Bank Group A Response to Global Forced Displacement Staff Working Paper November 20, 2015 The World Bank Group A Response to Global Forced Displacement Staff Working Paper November 20, 2015 This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank Group. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank Group, the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank, or the governments they represent. The World Bank Group does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this note. Contents I.  Introduction  1 II.  Challenges of Global Forced Displacement  3 III.  Economic and Social Impacts  5 IV.  World Bank Group Assistance  8 V.  Potential Opportunities and Agenda Going Forward  13 VI.  Conclusions and Next Steps  18 ANNEX I.  Macroeconomic and Sectoral Issues and Entry Points  19 A.  Macroeconomic Impact and Fiscal Issues  19 B.  Sectoral and Thematic Perspectives and Issues  20 C.  Entry Points and Options for Intervention  22 ANNEX II.  Assistance Provided and Evidence of Impact  26 A.  Middle East and North Africa  27 B.  Africa  28 C.  Europe and Central Asia  30 D.  South Asia Region  31 E.  World Bank Group Financing  32 F.  The Roles of Other Selected Institutions  33 G.  Evidence of Impact  34 iii iv Contents ANNEX III.  Key Lessons and Future Action Agenda  36 A.  A New Development Diplomacy for Crisis Prevention  36 B.  Support to Domestic Policy Reform and Institutions  37 C.  Innovation for More Financing and New Ways of Delivery  38 D.  Strengthening Social Services for IDPs, Refugees, and Host Communities  38 E.  Building Economic Opportunity  39 F.  Adapting Existing Risk Management Approaches and Tools  39 G.  Project Delivery  40 H.  A Better Knowledge and Evidence Base  40 I.  The Need to Embrace New Technologies and Social Media  42 J.  More Sustained Support for Refugees Wishing to Return  42 ANNEX IV.  Potential WBG Support Related to El Niño  44 ANNEX V.  Selected Country and Regional Profiles  46 A.  Chad  46 B.  Europe and Central Asia  48 C.  Kenya  51 D.  Lebanon-Jordan  53 E.  Turkey  55 F.  Afghanistan  57 Abstract At this moment in time, the world faces a com- clear assignment of responsibility for owning bination of serious risks immediately ahead: the and financing these risks among the public worst El Niño since 1997–98 (which we know and private sectors, host governments, and caused global displacement of 20–30  million donor agencies; people, more than today’s Syrian crisis), climate • reform of peace operations and diplomatic change, increased food insecurity, escalating engagement, led by the UN and others, to conflict in countries like Syria and Afghanistan, prevent and resolve conflicts and help sus- violent extremism, a slowing global economy, tain peace; and a humanitarian system that is stretched • increasing government leadership where beyond its capacity. Any of these factors can possible, and greater use of national sys- contribute to forced displacement; together, tems for delivery; they could make current humanitarian crises • ending the “camp” mentality (i.e., refugees in even worse. protracted displacement are not adequately supported because of a “care and mainte- Forced displacement today is a global prob- nance” approach, and the impact on host lem and at present, is being driven mostly by communities goes unaddressed); conflict. It causes tremendous human suffer- • greater use of cash in places where it can ing, tends to be protracted and has significant purchase needed goods and services, and is short-term financial costs. However, once it adjusted to reflect inflation; and has occurred and under certain circumstances, • collaborating with the private sector and so- it can also result in long-term gains to both cial entrepreneurs to ensure that most refu- displaced persons and their hosts. Strong gees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) humanitarian-development linkages would have mobile phone and possibly Internet help smooth this path, reducing the short-term connectivity as platforms for information costs and helping capture the long-term gains. gathering, service delivery (including mobile Ideas for strengthening such linkages include: cash), and data gathering that gives them greater economic opportunities. • up-front collaboration in advanced and inte- grated risk assessment and preparation; The objective is to adopt reforms that are • a complete rethink of the risks faced by (a)  comprehensive—ranging from prevention those who are forcibly displaced in middle- and preparedness to timely development re- and low-income countries—by environmen- evidence- sponse; (b) credible—that is, targeted, ­ tal vulnerabilities, natural disasters, conflict, based interventions that produce measur- food price shocks, pandemics, etc.—and able results and represent value for money; v vi A Response to Global Forced Displacement (c) customized—with appropriate instruments, insurance) and burden-sharing (such as financ- clear accountabilities and ownership of risks ing for host countries providing a global public (e.g., between households, governments, good); and (d) coherent and coordinated among private sector, international community), partners, including the UN and state and non- and suitable funding instruments (including state actors. Abbreviations and Acronyms AFR Africa Region KRG Kurdistan Regional Government CAR Central African Republic M&E Monitoring and Evaluation CEB Council of Europe Development MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Bank Agency DRC Democratic Republic of Congo MNA Middle East and North Africa ECA Europe and Central Asia Region Region EIB European Investment Bank NGO Nongovernmental Organization EU European Union PEF Pandemic Emergency Facility GDP Gross Domestic Product PER Public Expenditure Review G7 Group of Seven (industrialized PV Photovoltaic democracies) OECD Organisation for Economic IBRD International Bank for Co-operation and Development Reconstruction and Development SAR South Asia Region ICT Information and Communication SuTP Syrians under Temporary Technologies Protection IDA International Development UN United Nations Association UNDP United Nations Development IDP Internally Displaced Person Programme IEG Independent Evaluation UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner Department for Refugees IFAD International Fund for Agricultural UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Development Coordination of Humanitarian IFC International Finance Corporation Affairs IFI International Financial Institution UNRHC United Nations Regional IMF International Monetary Fund Humanitarian Coordinator IOM International Organization for WBG World Bank Group Migration vii Acknowledgments This working paper was prepared by the staff Dimitriadou, Mariam Sherman, Mark Sundberg, of the World Bank Group. The lead authors Markus Kostner, Mary Morrison, Maryam Sa- were Colin Bruce and Andrew James Roberts. lim, Natalia Cieslik, Nina Bhatt, Ozan Sevimli, The publication was made possible by many Quy-Toan Do, Raja Rehan Arshad, Richard rapidly prepared contributions and helpful Hogg, Richard Scobey, Robert J. Saum, Ro- comments from Aakanksha Pande, Abebe berta V. Gatti, Robin Mearns, Samuel Munzele Adugna, Ana Revenga, Anton Baare, Apurva Maimbo, Shantayanan Devarajan, Sima  W. Sanghi, Ayat Soliman, Bella Bird, Benjamin Kanaan, Stephen Hutton, Sumati Rajput, Su- Burckhart, Bernard Harborne, Bianca Adam, sanne Holste, Ted Haoquan Chu, Tekabe Belay, Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Caroline Mary Verney Toby Linden, Toshiya Masuoka, Varalakshmi Sergeant, Charles E. Di Leva, Chisako Fukuda, Vemuru, Vikram Raghavan, William F. Maloney, Cordelia Chesnutt, Cristina Otano, Daniel Kull, William Wiseman, Xavier Devictor, Xiaoqing David Warren, Diarietou Gaye, Dilip Ratha, Yu, and Yonatan Yehdego Araya, as well as col- Eavan O’Halloran, Fionna Douglas, Francis leagues from the International Monetary Fund. Ghesquiere, Haneen Sayed, Hanspeter Wyss, We acknowledge the contribution of the teams Holly Benner, Hugh Riddell, Ismail Arslan, Jan that supported the work of these colleagues. Weetjens, Jennings Ray Salvatore, Jeremy The paper benefited from discussions with Andrew Hillman, Joanna  P. De Berry, Joel de Yvonne Tsikata, John Donnelly, Ferid Belhaj, Reyes, Johannes Zutt, Juergen Voegele, Julia Steen Jorgensen, Selina Jackson, and Pilar Nielson, Julie Dana, Kirsten Schuettler, Kostya Maisterra. Thanks also to Patricia Rogers for Atanesyan, Lauren Kelly, Lotte Pang, Maninder her help with editing the publication. S. Gill, Manjula Luthria, Maria A. Gomes, Maria viii I. Introduction The world may be entering a very challenging phase are causing might be just the tip of a potential in which to end extreme poverty and boost shared iceberg. Addressing the humanitarian crises prosperity. While the Global Monitoring Report1 that could result will require much greater forecasts that poverty in 2015 may have dipped collaboration among diplomatic, humanitar- below 10 percent for the first time ever, several se- ian and development actors, and affected rious risks (some of which are correlated) seem to governments in an expanded, coordinated, and be increasing: conflict, violent extremism, climate sustained campaign. change, El Niño,2 pandemics, and food insecurity. Fragility and conflict are growing in intensity in This is an urgent and ambitious call to action. It specific middle-income and low-income countries, matches the growing scale of the problem and and economic growth has been slowing. the increasing risks associated with it, the am- bition of the recently adopted Sustainable De- These risks, several of which are immediate, are velopment Goals, and recent evidence that as detrimental to the twin goals of the World Bank global poverty falls even more of the extremely Group (WBG), and the forced displacement3 they poor will be concentrated in areas affected by fragility and conflict, and thus vulnerable to 1. Global Monitoring Report. Development Goals in an Era of forcible displacement. Demographic Change. A joint publication of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, 2015/2016. 2. A mature and strong El Niño is now present in the tropical The WBG is already involved in many areas of Pacific Ocean. The majority of international climate outlook work related to these risks, and is scaling up models suggest that it is likely to strengthen further before the end of 2015. El Niño probabilities remain over 90 percent further. For example: into spring 2016, falling rapidly by May–July 2016. It is expected to be among the four strongest El Niño events since 1950 (1972–73, 1982–83, 1997–98). During the 1997–1998 • A recent WBG report entitled “Shock Waves: El Niño, which was similar in magnitude to the current one, Managing the Impacts of Climate Change at least 20–30 million people were displaced by extreme weather events and damages exceeded $33 billion globally. on Poverty”4 concludes that climate change Discussion of El Niño is beyond the scope of this paper, but represents a significant obstacle to the sus- Annex IV provides some additional information, including information on the type of support the World Bank Group tained eradication of poverty. Thus, address- could provide. ing climate change is a major priority for the 3. While both migration and forced displacement may entail large-scale population flows, it is important to recognize WBG and includes mitigation, adaption and the different character of these movements. Economic disaster risk management. We are working migrants voluntarily choose to leave their home areas in search of improved economic opportunities. The forcibly with governments to end harmful fossil fuel displaced are driven from their homes by critical shortages subsidies and reinvest the savings in growth of life-sustaining resources such as water or food, large-scale conflict, localized violence, persecution, or human rights producing investments like people’s health violations or other well-founded fear of physical harm. When the forcibly displaced cross an international border they become refugees. When they are displaced within their own 4. Shock Waves. Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on country they are internally displaced persons (IDPs). Poverty. A publication of the World Bank, 2015. 1 2 A Response to Global Forced Displacement and education. In October 2015, the Bank This paper, however, focuses on the work of the pledged to provide up to $29 billion dollars WBG related to forced displacement arising annually by 2020 for climate finance to de- from conflict because it is arguably one of the veloping countries. most difficult and topical, and there's a major • The WBG is exploring a concept that would opportunity to advance these issues in next rapidly disburse health-related financing year's World Humanitarian Summit (WHS).7 It called the Pandemic Emergency Facility also comes as the institution expands its work (PEF). In the event of an outbreak, it would programs on the topic. The overarching theme immediately fund national governments and is that forced displacement today is a global responding agencies to support a surge in problem. It tends to be protracted, causes tre- health capacity. mendous human suffering, and has significant • The WBG has been supporting the re- short-term financial costs. However, in the settlement of displaced people through months after someone is forcibly displaced, Disaster Risk Reduction programs.5 Preven- there are known development interventions tive resettlement of populations located in that can help both those who are displaced and high-risk areas is a corrective measure in their generous hosts. The role of the WBG and which all or part of a community is relocated other partners is to use knowledge, financial because of the high risk of disaster. Since assistance, convening power, and partnerships the 1990s, the government of Argentina to help smooth this path, reducing the short- has conducted several programs with sup- term costs and helping to capture the long- port from the World Bank and the Inter- term gains. American Development Bank. The largest or most notable has been: (a) the Flood The paper stresses as well that the problem of Emergency Rehabilitation Program, a multi- refugees and other forcibly displaced persons sector emergency loan for reconstructing reaches well beyond Europe and the Middle East. infrastructure and housing for low-income The World Bank, with its development man- populations affected by water emergencies; date, has been receiving and responding inno- and (b) the Flood Protection Program which vatively to requests for technical and financial was designed to protect the lives and assets support from a growing number of affected of 5.5 million people, guarantee the normal countries, while piloting large-scale regional and unrestricted performance of economic and subregional efforts aimed at addressing activities in the drainage area of the Paraná, the root causes of displacement. Paraguay and Uruguay Rivers, and ensure uninterrupted use of communications and transportation routes.6 7. At its most recent meeting on October 10, 2015, the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of the Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries (i.e., the Development Committee) 5. See Annex III, Section F and Annex IV for more information on made the following request in its communique: “Given the disaster risk management, including disaster risk financing. scale of the current refugee and migrant crisis, we call for 6. See Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of targeted support, in collaboration with the UN and other Disaster Experiences from Latin America, a publication of partners, in addressing the challenges for countries and the World Bank, 2011 and Populations at Risk of Disaster. A regions in turmoil, especially in the Middle East and North Resettlement Guide. A publication of the World Bank, 2011. Africa, but also in other fragile and conflict states.” II. Challenges of Global Forced Displacement Global forced displacement is arguably the de- worldwide come from Syria, Afghanistan, and fining humanitarian/development challenge of Somalia; other countries that account for large this generation. The number of displaced people numbers are Sudan, South Sudan, the Demo- is growing: by the end of 2014, wars, conflict, cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Myanmar, and persecution had forcibly displaced a cumu- Iraq, and Eritrea. Not surprisingly, neighboring lative total of 59.5 million persons—19.5  mil- countries host the overwhelming majority of lion refugees, 38.2 million internally displaced the refugees—for example, Turkey, Lebanon, persons (IDPs), and asylum seekers. The total and Jordan, Pakistan and Iran, Ethiopia and represents the biggest leap ever seen in a single Kenya. Recent events in Europe are but the lat- year—there were 51.2 million displaced people est manifestation of this global crisis. at the end of 2013 and 37.5 million a decade ago—and the highest level of forced displace- Countries in Europe and Central Asia (ECA)10 ment since the aftermath of WWII.8 Only currently host 6.1 million people who have been 126,800 refugees were able to return to their displaced as a result of war and conflict. Of home countries in 2014—the lowest number in these, 64 percent are IDPs, and the rest are 31 years. refugees (see Annex V B, Table 1). The largest groups of refugees and IDPs are in Turkey The global crisis of forced displacement remains (1.94  million refugees from Syria11), Ukraine largely concentrated in developing countries, (1.46  million IDPs), Azerbaijan (622,892 especially in Africa, the Middle East, and South IDPs), Georgia (262,704 IDPs) and Russia Asia.9 Although more than 160 countries hosted (238,835 refugees). The numbers of displaced displaced people in 2014, a small number bear people in ECA have doubled over the last five the greatest burden: 52 percent of all IDPs years, largely because of the conflicts in Syria are located in four countries (Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria), while 50 percent of all refu- 10. The Europe and Central Asia Region (ECA) of the World Bank gees are in seven countries in the Middle East Group comprises Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR (Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Syria, and Turkey). Over half of the refugees Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 11. This refers to the total number of registered Syrian refugees 8. World at War. UNHCR Global Trends. Forced Displacement in in Turkey. The total number of Syrian refugees is agreed to 2014. be much higher, and is estimated by the Government to be 9. The South Asia Region (SAR) of the World Bank Group 2.2 million. This paper will henceforth refer to Syrian refugees comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, in Turkey by their Turkish legal designation as Syrians under Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. temporary protection (SuTP). 3 4 A Response to Global Forced Displacement and Ukraine. While conflicts in the Balkans Forced displacement is a challenge for all people have been stabilized, unresolved issues of dis- but particularly for the vulnerable (including ex- placement and social tensions are still relevant tremely poor people), youth, women and children, in Bosnia/Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo. and transit and host countries. In ECA, there are The Caucasus is marked by “frozen conflicts,” indications of greater vulnerability among dis- in which no military and political solution has placed people compared to the non-displaced: been agreed. In the absence of formal peace in Ukraine, the IDP population includes 60 processes, the displaced live in limbo—unable percent elderly people, 13 percent children, and to return home, but without full integration in 4 percent persons with disabilities; in Azerbai- the places they have settled. jan, the poverty rate among IDPs is around 10 percent12 or approximately twice the official In the first nine months of 2015, approximately overall poverty rate; in Bosnia/Herzegovina, 530,000 asylum seekers arrived in the Euro- 32  percent of refugee and IDP households are pean Union, and according to UNHCR, another single-parent households; and in Turkey, 51 per- 700,000 are expected by the close of the year. cent of Syrian refugees are under 18 years of This compares to 219,000 in 2014. Since not all age. In Lebanon and Jordan 65 percent of the migrants and refugees register to claim asy- refugees are younger than 25 years of age, 19 lum, and many are still on the move, the total percent are under 4 years old, 50–73 percent number of new arrivals is likely much higher. are poor, and 80 percent do not have more than Because of the complex interplay of triggers in a primary education. In Afghanistan, displace- the decision to move, it is difficult to distinguish ment places women at disproportionate risk how many of the arrivals are migrants and as they face challenges accessing education, how many are refugees. However, 70 percent health and employment13 and where domestic of those arriving in the EU are from countries violence is a reality for many. affected by conflict. The arrivals in 2015 so far originate from the following countries (in order of magnitude): Syria, Kosovo, Afghanistan, 12. Most recent government estimates. 13. “Listening to women and girls displaced in urban Albania, Iraq, Pakistan, Eritrea, Serbia, Ukraine, Afghanistan.” Norwegian Refugee Council / The Liaison Office, and Nigeria. 2015. III. Economic and Social Impacts Impact on the Sending A.  Public schools are running double shifts, with Countries the afternoon shift in Jordan reserved for Syrian students. Across both Lebanon and Jordan, the The refugee crisis implies a dramatic decline volume of solid waste has increased—in some in human capital in home countries. Refugee cases doubled. Electricity and water shortages outflows and large numbers of IDPs result in a are common. In labor markets, the share of in- massive reduction in working-age population, formal employment is rising, in particular when human capital, and therefore potential growth refugees are not allowed to work legally, while of home countries. For instance, assuming the the additional supply of low-skilled workers current crisis comes to an end, at an average exerts downward pressure on wages at the low growth rate of 3 percent it would take 20 years end of the wage distribution (e.g., in Lebanon for Syria, whose population is estimated to and in rural areas in Turkey). Refugee inflows have shrunk by 20 percent in addition to the have resulted in upward pressures on food and 40 percent internally displaced, to recover to housing prices (e.g., in Lebanon, Jordan, Paki- its 2010 GDP level. stan and, to some extent, Chad and Turkey). In Afghanistan, with 76 percent of the population affected by displacement, the economic and Impact on Receiving B.  social impacts are huge. There are also positive Countries: Emerging effects: although the economic dimension of Markets and Low- returning refugees and IDPs is understudied, income Countries many generate remittance flows and cross- border exchanges, and provide a market and a Large inflows of refugees are straining public workforce for local economic actors. services and affecting labor markets in emerg- ing markets and low-income countries. The Refugees have a macro impact on economic size of refugee inflows relative to the total activity, balance of payments, and fiscal ac- population can be substantial. For example, counts. While the increase in consumption registered refugees from Syria and Iraq now brought by refugees has generally contributed represent about one-tenth of Jordan’s popula- positively to economic activity, rising imports tion and one-fourth of Lebanon’s. Such mas- to meet the needs of the increasing population sive increases in population size have caused have worsened external balances. Although crowding and congestion in public services. difficult to assess, the fiscal costs of receiving 5 6 A Response to Global Forced Displacement refugees might be substantial for neighboring influence and capital in host communities as a countries. For example, the direct budgetary major factor preventing their access to jobs.14 costs associated with spending on health, education, infrastructure, and social programs are estimated at about 1–1.4  percent of GDP Impact on Receiving C.  for Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Both Jordan Countries: High Income and Lebanon are funding these expenditures Countries partly through a decline in access to and qual- ity of public services. In Iraq, the challenge of Despite the rapid increase in refugee flows to caring for refugees and IDPs is compounded by Europe, the numbers remain relatively modest the fact that the Government’s ability to pro- in hosting countries.15 Refugee numbers are vide basic public goods and services is already small relative to European recipient countries’ extremely limited. However, net fiscal balances populations, and especially relative to those of tend to turn positive over the longer term as much poorer Middle Eastern countries. some refugees arrive with their savings and Studies of past immigration in high income financial assets, and as the tax base and social countries indicate that the overall effect on the contributions increase if they remain and enter labor market could be relatively minor. the formal labor force. At the local level, the large influx of refugees • Immigrants tend to integrate slowly in the recipient countries’ labor markets. They into communities that were already vulner- initially earn lower wages and have lower able and marginalized is leading to rising ten- participation and employment rates than sions in the hosting countries. In the Northern native workers, and these differences tend Jordanian governorates of Irbid and Mafraq, to decline only slowly over time. This process 20 percent of communities reported tensions is likely to take longer if the refugees are linked to lack of affordable housing, educa- equipped with lower skills than past gen- tion, and income-generating opportunities. In erations of immigrants. High unemployment Lebanon, the refugee crisis, coupled with the rates in several countries in Europe at the infiltration of militants across the borders, has moment may further slow refugees’ absorp- caused several security incidents; refugees in tion into the labor market. some towns and villages now outnumber local residents, fueling tensions as they compete for • The effect on native workers’ wages and employment prospects is often marginal. access to basic resources and services such as Some recent studies have found that an water, electricity, healthcare and education. The displaced can also face discrimination, particularly if they are perceived to be aligned 14. Other factors that make it less likely for refugees to integrate with a political opposition group, are from a successfully include a new context that is vastly different from where they come from, dependency on aid, lack of different ethnic group, or are perceived to be human capital for their new life (such as language and skills), in competition for already stretched services depleted assets, insecure shelter, physical isolation, limited freedom of movement, and psycho-social trauma. and jobs in host communities. IDPs in Georgia 15. Numbers can be high relative to population size in some and Azerbaijan perceive their lack of social European transit countries. Economic and Social Impacts 7 influx of immigrants has prompted native they stay, and how quickly they integrate into workers (especially those with higher skills) the host country’s labor market. to specialize in more complex occupations, thus raising their productivity and wages. However, refugees could have an important Nonetheless, there can be negative effects positive demographic impact in the longer term. on groups of workers who most directly Europe’s population is expected to age rapidly compete with immigrants, particularly in the over the next few decades, as a result of low short run. birthrates and greater longevity. According to UN projections, Europe’s dependency ratio— The overall net fiscal impact also tends to be the number of children and retirees per 100 small. The OECD has reported that the aver- working-age people—will rise steeply from age net fiscal contribution of immigrants in about 50 in 2015 to about 77.5 in 2050, in the high income economies tends to be positive, absence of any migration. This will lower poten- but relatively small, at about +/–1 percent of tial growth and place a large burden on public GDP. The short-term impact from the current finances, pensions and benefits schemes, and wave of refugees is negative, given the cost health care provision. An influx of relatively of receiving, caring for, and integrating them. young refugees, if they stayed for the longer The longer-term effect on public finances will term and were allowed to enter the workforce, depend on how many refugees arrive, how long could help remedy the situation. IV. World Bank Group Assistance In keeping with its mandate, the WBG has been and citizens, promoting regional cooperation providing support at the global, regional, subre- and integration, building resilience (including gional, and country levels. among refugees and IDPs), and supporting reconstruction and recovery. Given that • Global approaches. The WBG hosts the Global hosting refugees is a global public good, the Program on Forced Displacement, which has strategy also involves innovative financing produced several knowledge products and options: (a) donor guarantees to issue special provides some operational support to coun- bonds for large recovery and reconstruction try teams. The WBG also chairs the Global projects or to open up space on the IBRD bal- Migration Group, an 18-agency coalition ance sheet to increase lending; and (b) donor that looks at migration and development grants to reduce the cost of financing to issues. In addition, the WBG is supporting more concessional levels. The WBG President preparation for the WHS through analytic and the United Nations Secretary General work (including a planned flagship report co-hosted a meeting of MNA Stakeholders on AFR,16 ECA, and MNA), and it is providing on October 10, 2015, during the WBG/IMF technical assistance to the High Level Panel Annual Meetings. Stakeholders attending, on Humanitarian Financing, including on in- such as the Ministers of Finance from the G7 novative financing. and the MNA Region or their representatives, • Regional approaches. The Regional strategy gave strong support for implementing the recently adopted by the WBG’s Middle East strategy, including developing the financing and North Africa Region (MNA)17 is prob- mechanisms. To identify opportunities for ably the WBG’s most comprehensive and new approaches to return and reintegration, ambitious attempt to address the problem the WBG and UNHCR are undertaking a re- of displacement at the source. It explicitly view to better understand the key data gaps states that the Bank will no longer take con- in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, which are flict as given; instead, it will seek to prevent hindering the formulation of durable devel- conflict by supporting the establishment of opment solutions. a new social contract between governments • Subregional approaches. Since 2013, the United Nations Secretary General and the 16. The list of countries comprising the AFR region is found at President of the WBG have launched three http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr. regional initiatives in Africa—in the Great 17. The MNA Region of the World Bank Group comprises Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Lakes, the Sahel, and the Horn—­ targeting Syria, Tunisia, West Bank & Gaza, and Yemen. regional drivers of fragility and conflict in 8 World Bank Group Assistance 9 18 countries with a population of about services, jobs, education, social cohesion, 463 million people.18 A similar effort will be infrastructure, and business development). made in MNA in 2016. There are also plans Many of the World Bank’s initial responses to further link the Great Lakes spatially and to assist countries with a humanitarian economically to the Horn of Africa and the crisis have important human development Sahel through initiatives for Lake Chad19 and components. In Ukraine, for example, the Niger River Basin that will be proposed for WBG is engaging on health and education. support under the 21st Conference of the In Western Europe, the WBG is engaging Parties to the UN Framework Convention on with prominent European foundations and Climate Change.20 networks, such as the Bertelsmann Foun- • Country approaches. WBG country engage- dation, EuroCities, and Cities Alliance, to ments are customized to fit the country foster dialogue on city-level initiatives to context. promote migrant and refugee integration. • Activities in the ECA Region have focused In Azerbaijan the Bank is carrying out a on working with governments to help them project designed to improve IDPs’ living plan, implement, and monitor responses to conditions and increase their economic displacement and identify the socioeco- self-reliance. nomic impacts of displacement. The WBG • As early as 2013, the Bank rapidly ap- has used its operations, analytic work, proved an emergency US$150 million “cash and technical assistance to quantitatively injection” loan to Jordan to offset the fiscal and qualitatively “cost” the impact of impact of the crisis on the country’s bud- refugee crises in socioeconomic terms (for get as a result of extending subsidies and example, in terms of welfare, municipal health services to refugees. In Lebanon and Jordan, the Bank is using a municipality- based development operation to address 18. Activities financed under the initiatives so far include cross- border investments that address “trade for peace,” women’s the impact of the refugee influx on local empowerment and sexual and gender-based violence, health, service delivery, with two multidonor trust pastoralism, connectivity, hydroelectricity, agriculture, transportation and capacity building of selected regional funds that leveraged grant financing from institutions. The pipeline includes projects on IDPs and the Bank’s State- and Peace-building Fund. irrigation. The initiatives also triggered innovative analytic work and technical support in areas such as investment In addition, the Bank is supporting the conflict sensitization, and indicators and methods for health, education, and social protection monitoring peace and development on the ground. See also Annex 2 Section B. sectors in Lebanon to ensure a balance in 19. The World Bank will support climate-resilient development the benefits to vulnerable communities of in the Lake Chad basin through technical work, investment financing, policy dialogue, and resource mobilization. The both Syrians and Lebanese. basin is home to approximately 50 million people, among • In Afghanistan, where the return of some the poorest in the world. Over the past 50 years, the Lake Chad area has experienced significant climate, hydrological, 5  million refugees since 2002 has in- ecological, and social changes. creased the population by 20 percent, the 20. The World Bank will also support climate-resilient development in the Niger River Basin through the preparation role of the World Bank has been to both of a Climate Resilience Investment Plan and the co-financing (a) understand and provide critical analysis of its implementation. The Basin is shared by 10 countries, 7 of which are among the 20 poorest countries in the world. of the push and pull factors that lie be- Food security and social well-being depend mostly on hind migration, and (b) learn lessons from unpredictable and extreme rainfall patterns, particularly in the Sahel part of the basin. These challenges are exacerbated hosting countries on social and economic by climate change. inclusion, the provision of basic services, 10 A Response to Global Forced Displacement and the impact of refugees and displaced ­ ountries—Djibouti, DRC, Ethiopia, Tan- c groups on local and country economies. zania, Uganda, and Zambia—are turning The Bank’s perspective is ­ developmental— to institutions like the WBG to help them to balance immediate humanitarian address the problems of protracted dis- responses with medium- and longer-term placement, including the impact on host development plans and interventions that communities. Over the next 10 months, would include both the private and public operations totaling about $270 million sectors in generating jobs, revenues, and that are designed to address protracted growth as well as in delivering services. An displacement in these countries will be sent example is the service delivery program, a to the WBG Board for consideration. community-driven development initiative financed by the WBG and the National Between 1992 and 2014, the Bank undertook in Solidarity Program that is supporting ac- sub-Saharan Africa about 60 activities—includ- cess to primary education and health care ing 53 investment operations—that explicitly for communities, and the returned refugees addressed forced displacement in different and IDPs that they host. ways. These operations have been varied in their • In Pakistan, from 1984–1996 the WBG, on objectives and focus: roughly half of the Bank’s behalf of UNHCR, managed a number of operations have targeted the needs of IDPs, donor-funded projects designed to address refugees, and their host communities during the needs of Afghan refugees and their displacement, and half have addressed issues host communities. Within the framework of returning IDPs and refugees. Until recently of the regional Solutions Strategy for Af- there were no operations focused explicitly on ghan Refugees, the projects provided an issues of protracted displacement and none estimated 11 percent of the employment that explicitly targeted cross-border drivers. needed by the refugee labor force and While much of the immediate response to crises improved skills in areas such as forestry falls in the domain of public support, private management. They also created sustain- sector-driven economic opportunities for both able assets for the hosting communities, refugees and host populations will help to pro- including irrigation and flood control works. mote stability in the medium to longer term. • In 2011, the Bank financed an emergency The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is project to help the People’s Republic of Ban- currently addressing the refugee crisis in MNA gladesh to: (i) repatriate about 30,000 of its as part of the joint WBG MNA Strategy through migrant workers, who had fled the conflict in indirect interventions in two ways: (i) indirectly Libya (“the emergency”), from refugee camps helping host countries build resilience to IDP/ in neighboring countries in a timely manner; refugee shocks by increasing opportunities and (ii) provide a one-time cash grant as a for jobs and livelihood through infrastructure/ transitional safety net measure to help them ICT development, improving food security, and meet immediate basic needs and commence increasing access to finance for small entre- the process of livelihood restoration. Interna- preneurs—all of which may benefit refugees/ tional Organization for Migration (IOM) was IDPs in host countries; and (ii) creating fiscal the implementing agency. space for governments in the region to address • As part of the three subregional initia- humanitarian needs by attracting investors tives in Africa, a growing number of host World Bank Group Assistance 11 to provide private financing and services that the fiscal space for providing basic services would otherwise need to be financed through and humanitarian relief to the influx of public funds. Two examples of IFC’s recent proj- refugees. ects in Iraq and Jordan illustrate this approach: MIGA has significant exposure in ECA and MNA • Providing power to people and industries in countries that host large numbers of displaced Iraq—Unit Zahko project: IFC, along with people, in projects that support jobs and liveli- MIGA, is financing the construction of a hoods to build resilience, and in projects that large greenfield natural gas fired inde- bring in private funds to free up public resources. pendent power plant which is expected to MIGA’s outstanding exposure in Turkey is sub- indirectly benefit the populations affected stantial and includes projects in infrastructure, by ongoing conflict by: (i) minimizing the manufacturing and health services. MIGA also energy demand and supply gap and in- has significant exposure in Ukraine, providing creasing access to reliable power supply; support to strengthen its financial sector and (ii) fostering sustained economic growth to facilitate investments in manufacturing and and job creation by making Iraq’s industrial other projects that create jobs and contrib- sector more competitive; and (iii) short- ute to local development. MIGA’s exposure in term job creation during the construction Lebanon and Jordan is largely in infrastructure, phase. The number of Syrian refugees and manufacturing and services. MIGA also pro- the internally displaced Iraqis reached over vides support to originating countries both by 1.5 million in Kurdistan, located in over 20 promoting investment and protecting assets refugee camps. The Kurdistan Regional on the ground. Government (KRG) has been providing electricity without any charges to these The WBG has been strengthening its partner- camps, which has created a great strain on ships around forced displacement. A global the system. The sudden increase in popula- partnership with UNHRC has resulted in a tion due to the influx of refugees and IDPs number of regional forced displacement stud- has widened the electricity gap in KRG, and ies and technical support to operations in hence the construction of the Zakho power Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, DRC, Zam- station with IFC and MIGA assistance is a bia, and Tanzania. The Bank has been working key strategy of the KRG for addressing the closely with UNOCHA in the Horn of Africa to prevailing severe power shortages. pilot innovative risk-based geospatial map- • Private sector financing of solar power to re- ping to facilitate better alignment and priority lieve fiscal pressures in Jordan-7-Sisters Solar setting across the humanitarian-development photovoltaic (PV) renewable energy program. nexus; this effort has particularly focused on IFC arranged a $208 million debt financing remote borderland regions, many of which package to fund construction of 91MWac host significant numbers of refugees. In Jordan composed of seven independent PV solar the Bank is collaborating with United Nations projects that supports the Government Development Programme (UNDP) on capacity- of Jordan’s first round of PV projects that building support to municipalities, including were awarded Power Purchase Agreements by tapping the UN-World Bank Trust Fund; in 2014. While the investment may not and in the ECA region (Ukraine and Georgia) benefit refugees directly, it helps create it is actively collaborating with the EU and UN 12 A Response to Global Forced Displacement agencies on knowledge products and technical were actively involved in the establishment of assessments. The Afghanistan Reconstruc- the Solutions Alliance in Copenhagen in April tion Trust Fund (over $8 billion since 2002) 2014 as a coalition of humanitarian actors, continues to enable a joint approach between development organizations, affected states, government and development partners, in donor nations, academics, the private sector, addition to being a very tangible way that civil society, and others. Chaired by UNHCR, Bank funding can be leveraged. For the three UNDP, International Rescue Committee, and subregional initiatives in Africa, the WBG and the Danish and Turkish Governments, the a number of UN agencies broadened the coali- Solutions Alliance is working to promote and tion of partners to include the African Union enable displaced persons’ transition away from Commission, the African Development Bank, dependency towards increased resilience, self- the EU, and the Islamic Development Bank. reliance, and development. The World Bank has also partnered with the IOM to do analytic work and plans to explore In keeping with its mandate, the IMF has other such opportunities. started to closely monitor the economic impact and spillovers of the crisis for the affected Partnership is a key element of the work of the countries. The Fund has been reflecting the WBG’s Global Program on Forced Displacement. impacts of conflicts and refugee crises in pro- The program continues to engage with a range gram conditionality. In Jordan, for example, in of partners—bilaterals, UN agencies, nongov- the context of the Stand-by Arrangement that ernmental organizations (NGOs), and research expired in August 2015, fiscal targets in 2013 institutions—collaborating on (a) developing and 2014 were revised upward by the full direct new operational solutions, (b) mobilizing joint costs borne by the public sector—including resources for new activities, (c) coordinating for increased security outlays and health care strategies and global policy development, and needs—estimated at about 1 percent of GDP (d) undertaking joint analytical work. Many per year. of the Global Program’s bilateral partners V. Potential Opportunities and Agenda Going Forward Forced displacement entails significant human by the Council of Ministers; however, many and fiscal costs. However, once it has occurred Syrians under temporary protection (SuTP) and refugees stay for the longer term, the WBG are already working in the informal labor and partners should work closely with host market. countries to help create economic upsides for • In the Horn of Africa, many of the displaced those who have been forcibly displaced and are in border areas where poverty rates their new communities. In principle, the suc- already exceed 80 percent. A number of cessful integration of refugees can benefit the governments have approached the WBG for receiving economies—for example by boosting assistance to improve basic services for host longer-term growth and by filling demographic communities and stimulate development in gaps in aging societies. International experi- these previously neglected regions. ence shows that rapid inclusion in the labor • South Asia has the opportunity to restate market is critical in this regard. The fiscal net the core development dimensions of forced impact of displaced individuals can be positive displacement so as to reduce risk and miti- or negative but tends to be small, in part re- gate future crises. This would mean enacting flecting the support required during the arrival reforms for more private sector job creation, and initial integration phase. providing access to quality services, launch- ing macro and fiscal reforms that promote Better policies, preparedness, and public the needs of the poorest and most excluded, spending could help countries cope with forced addressing the drivers of fragility, and car- displacement. rying out governance reforms to enhance effectiveness and results. • Turkey,21 which has the most Syrian refugees, • Forced displacement also presents an op- has given those who are registered unlimited portunity to prepare and rebuild better: in stay, protection against forced return, free- Colombia it triggered better risk assessment, dom of movement, access to health care, early warning, and emergency response, and and increasing access to education, social reduced mortality rates per natural phe- services, and the labor market. Formal ac- nomenon from 4,025 in the 1970s to 2,180 cess to the labor market via the issuing of in the 2000s. work permits is currently under discussion The international community must increase its attention to the source of the forced displace- 21. In 2014, Turkey was the country hosting the largest number of refugees at 1.59 million. ment problem by making much bolder diplomatic 13 14 A Response to Global Forced Displacement efforts, and by rebalancing and increasing displacement. Forced displacement raises development spending. The changing scale and several development issues—macroeconomic geography of poverty, disasters, and conflict impact, disaster preparedness in the short to demand more innovation and risk-taking by medium term, climate change adaptation and both humanitarian and development commu- mitigation in the longer term, design and sus- nities, and much greater collaboration between tainability of systems for basic service delivery, them. As the number of conflict-caused crises and resilience building. Several development grows and situations become more protracted, institutions are providing support in some of there must be a greater focus on prevention these areas for (a) research and knowledge and political resolution.22 Thinking on how the generation; (b) dialogue, advocacy, and part- international community can better respond to nerships; and (c) operational interventions such conflict-related crises seems underdeveloped— as scalable social safety nets. There is now an for example, in Somalia, the international urgent need to take this work to scale. community, including donor partners, spends roughly US$8.5 billion per year on counter- We need better data on the demographics of piracy and counterinsurgency,23 but only about displaced populations, and on trends, incen- $700 million and $360 million, respectively, in tives, skills sets, and needs. Partners can development and humanitarian aid. work better together to use these data and analytics to deploy humanitarian assistance, Development actors have an increasingly development resources, and diplomacy in a significant role to play in promoting develop- more coordinated way to prevent and respond ment approaches to the challenge of forced to crises, particularly those related to conflict. Other priorities include issues such as the macroeconomic, social, safety net, and labor market dimensions of the refugee crisis; filling 22. UN peacekeeping comprises the deployment of about 106,000 forces (military and police), costing some knowledge gaps to help client countries craft $8.3 billion/year to 16 conflict-affected countries (in 2015). better regulations and move toward successful Criticism of peacekeeping varies from lack of civilian protection, high cost, predominance of political-economic integration; and, given the growing urbaniza- interests over peacemaking ones, and sexual abuse of tion of displacement, addressing urban aspects citizens. Most research, however, suggests that peacekeeping has a positive impact on reducing violence in conflict- such as housing and service provision. settings—both for the duration of a peace-support mission as well as afterwards (see e.g., Sambanis, 2008. “Short-Term and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations” The Another area of focus is improving the evidence World Bank Economic Review 22:9–32 and Hegre, Hultman base on what currently works, what more should and Nygard, “Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peace-keeping operations,” Paper prepared for the European be done in this overlooked area, and how to do it Political Science Association Convention, Berlin, 2012). The cost-effectively. According to recent analytical High-level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations released its review of UN peacekeeping—The Challenge of work, development responses to protracted Sustaining Peace—in June 2015. The report is a call for the forced displacement should be led by hosting UN to move away from a response that assumes that the transition from conflict and fragility is linear and to shift from governments and their partners. Such re- “peacebuilding” to “sustaining peace,” while recognizing that sponses and their delivery mechanisms could the “UN cannot succeed alone.” It also calls for much closer collaboration with institutions like the WBG in prevention and range from extending existing social safety net response. programs and policy changes that allow the 23. Some of the anti-piracy measures are borne by private commercial maritime traffic as well as the public sector naval displaced to use their skills to boost the local cordon. economy, to investing in market infrastructure Potential Opportunities and Agenda Going Forward 15 that facilitates cross-border trade and builds Refugees and Resilience Plan require $4.5 bil- social cohesion. lion (2015–2016 response to the Syria crisis), but only $1.38 billion had been received by the Current financing is inadequate to address end of May 2015. The World Food Program the displacement crisis. As refugee numbers halved its support in 2015. With the value of increase, essential services are being cut be- food vouchers reduced, most refugees are now cause of financing constraints. However, cur- living on around 50 cents a day. rent financing structures do not account for the complex and prolonged nature of today’s The Bank will continue to support the High Level crises. Domestic resources can be put under Panel on Humanitarian Financing. It agrees strain, at times significantly, by the fiscal on the need to (a) identify new and additional demands stemming from the displacement sources of humanitarian funding (e.g., the ex- problem. Host countries do not have access pansion of Sharia-compliant Islamic finance to to significant grant-based financing from provide financing for small and medium-sized international financing institutions when they enterprises; (b) promote stronger engage- face a crisis. Thus they have to rely on the UN ment with the private sector (e.g., through humanitarian system, which has significant “green bonds” and the IFC for climate-friendly limitations when crises become prolonged and projects, including those related to resilience); progressively morph into development crises.24 (c)  adapt financing instruments to meet pro- Traditional development financing mecha- tracted crises (examples of past innovations nisms rely on loans, but for host countries it include IDA Crisis Response Window, IDA Im- is politically difficult to take on debt to service mediate Response Mechanism, and the WBG the needs of refugees. New, innovative financ- response to Ebola); pioneer risk-financing ing mechanisms are needed to address the gap solutions that help governments access quick between funding structures for humanitarian liquidity in the immediate aftermath of a disas- and development needs. ter (e.g., the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, the African Risk Capacity, and the new Complex and chronic crises require a more Pandemic Emergency Facility), as well as mul- diverse and sophisticated set of financial tiyear financing and innovative aid modalities; mechanisms than the current process, which (d) promote innovative delivery mechanisms relies largely on annual appeals. Over the last to improve how funding goes from “pocket to decade, the demand for humanitarian aid person” (e.g., scalable safety nets and mobile has risen dramatically. Global humanitarian payments); and (e) improve data availability. financing has surged from $2 billion in 2000 to nearly $25 billion in 2014, and it continues These issues are being discussed and proposals to rise. UN appeals are underfunded by nearly are being developed as part of a UN-led process 40 percent. The programs implemented by UN leading up to the first World Humanitarian agencies and NGOs under the Third Regional Summit, to be held in Istanbul in May 2016. The Summit was announced in 2013, well be- fore the current crisis gripped Europe and the 24. In 2014 UN appeals totaled $18 billion of which $7.3 billion Mediterranean, and now assumes added ur- was unmet requirements. In 2015 $19.5 billion has been requested of which $10.5 billion is still needed. Financial gency because of it. The WBG, working within Tracking Service, UNOCHA, November 2015. its mandate, is assisting in this preparatory 16 A Response to Global Forced Displacement process. Ideas for transforming humanitarian- and preparedness to timely development re- development linkages include: sponse; (b) credible—that is, evidence-based interventions that produce measurable results • up-front collaboration in advanced and inte- and represent value for money;25 (c) custom- grated risk assessment and preparation; ized—with appropriate instruments, clear • a complete rethink of the risks faced by accountabilities and ownership of risks (e.g., those who are forcibly displaced in middle- between households, governments, private and low-income countries—by environmen- sector, international community), and suitable tal vulnerabilities, natural disasters, conflict, funding instruments (including insurance) and food price shocks, pandemics, and so on— burden-sharing (such as financing for host and clear assignment of responsibility for countries providing a global public good); and owning and financing these risks among the (d) coherent and coordinated among partners, public and private sector, host governments, including the UN and state and non-state and donor agencies; actors. • reform of peace operations and diplomatic engagement, led by the UN and others, to The IFC will continue to play its role in mitigat- prevent and resolve conflicts and help sus- ing risks for private investors with appetite for tain peace; investing in fragile and conflict countries with • increasing government leadership where large numbers of refugees and IDPs. Advisory possible, and greater use of national sys- work in supporting investment climate and tems for delivery; regulatory reforms will be a key ingredient for • ending the “camp” mentality (i.e., refugees in ensuring commercially viable private invest- protracted displacement are not adequately ments that will create jobs and livelihood op- supported because of a “care and mainte- portunities over the long term in such fragile nance” approach, and the impact on host environments. By helping attract private communities goes unaddressed); investment into these countries, IFC may indi- • transferring a significant share of protracted rectly benefit refugees/IDPs by: (i) facilitating displacement caseload to national social increased employment opportunities for both protection systems, if host governments host country populations and refugees through and donors agree; the private sector in commercially viable op- • greater use of cash in places where it can erations; and (ii) increasing the fiscal space for purchase needed goods and services, and is host governments to dedicate public resources adjusted to reflect inflation; and to dealing with immediate humanitarian • collaborating with the private sector and needs. Wherever possible, IFC’s engagements social entrepreneurs to ensure that most in delivering services (especially infrastructure refugees and IDPs have mobile phone and and social services) through the private sector possibly Internet connectivity as plat- forms for information gathering, service 25. Humanitarian assistance appears not to be covered in delivery (including mobile cash) and data standard diagnostic instruments such as public expenditure reviews (PERs) and public expenditure tracking surveys. gathering. A PER, for example, typically analyzes government expenditures over a period of years to assess their The objective is to adopt reforms that are consistency with policy priorities, and what results were achieved. There is also no evidence that humanitarian (a)  comprehensive—ranging from prevention agencies routinely conduct such reviews. Potential Opportunities and Agenda Going Forward 17 could be targeted in regions where there is an regulatory framework prevails. IFC could also adequate mix of host communities and refu- explore opportunities for investing with ICT/ gees to ensure that the operations will be both telecom companies that might be interested commercially viable and inclusive for lasting in providing e-services or mobile services to impact. IFC will use its advisory instruments displaced populations. Finally, IFC will leverage to help build entrepreneurship/business skills its partnerships with large global and regional among the communities to support viable clients to encourage creative Corporate Social job creation, as well as provide greater ac- Responsibility engagements that could help al- cess to finance for micro, small, and medium leviate some of the pressures on public financ- enterprises which could be set up by refugees ing when addressing the urgent humanitarian and host communities assuming the legal/ issues resulting from the refugee crises. VI. Conclusions and Next Steps Durable development solutions to protracted The WBG, working within its mandate and forced displacement will require courageous areas of comparative advantage, is respond- political decision-making, especially to address ing with a great sense of urgency and purpose the root causes of conflict. While these chal- to the crisis of forced displacement, which is lenges are worked through, there are multiple being driven by unresolved conflicts, whose entry points for a much stronger collaboration reach is extending from the affected regions between humanitarian and development actors: to Europe and beyond. As the Bank seeks to supporting policy dialogue with governments; respond to growing client country demand, strengthening social safety nets in hosting it will also continue to work with the rest of countries; increasing our knowledge and evi- the international community, in the context of dence base; engaging with refugees and host preparing for the WHS, on broader systematic communities on the design and implementa- opportunities to transform and maximize tion of operational interventions; ramping up humanitarian-development synergies. engagement with the private sector and civil society; and continuing work on financing and delivery mechanisms. 18 Annex I. Macroeconomic and Sectoral Issues and Entry Points Macroeconomic Impact A.  Protection (SuTP) access to the labor mar- and Fiscal Issues ket. However, the secondary legislation operationalizing formal access to the labor Forced displacement is often a regional phe- market by issuing work permits is awaiting nomenon—the spillovers affect the countries approval by the Council of Ministers. directly neighboring those experiencing conflict • Access to government transfers and services. and disaster. As a result, assessing the mac- The provision of health care, education, and roeconomic and fiscal costs of displacement social services could already be under pres- is usually complicated by the presence of sure or deficient, especially in developing multiple shocks: the direct effects of disaster countries—and the addition of thousands of and conflict on growth and trade in neighbor- refugees only exacerbates the problem. ing countries, and effects attributable to an • Interaction with goods and housing markets. increased population of displaced individuals. As refugees settle in host countries, they af- The size of any macroeconomic gains depends fect the costs of housing and goods. Refugee on how well the migrants are integrated in the inflows have resulted in upward pressures on host country; gains tend to be larger if the mi- food and housing prices (e.g., in Lebanon, Jor- grants’ skills are complementary to the skills in dan, and, to some extent, Chad and Turkey). the host country. While the increase in consumption brought by refugees has generally contributed posi- The macroeconomic impacts of refugee inflows tively to economic activity, rising imports to depend on a number of factors: meet the needs of the increasing population have worsened external balances. Kenya, • Access to host country labor markets. Large Ethiopia, and Djibouti experienced inflation population inflows have affected host coun- of 16.7 percent, 39.2 percent, and 5.2 per- try labor markets, increasing the share of cent, respectively, as food prices rose after informal employment—particularly when the large inflows of Somali refugees. refugees are not allowed to work legally— • Taxation. Refugees increase the commu- and the supply of low-skilled workers, exert- nity’s tax base by purchasing goods and ser- ing downward pressure on their wages. In vices from the local community. Refugees’ Lebanon, practically all Syrian refugees are contributions in terms of taxes depend on informally employed. Turkey passed addi- whether or not they live in a refugee camp tional legal guidelines for “Foreigners under (i.e., whether they are in the formal or infor- Temporary Protection” in October 2014 that mal economy). guarantees the Syrians under Temporary 19 20 A Response to Global Forced Displacement • Private assets and remittances. Refugees While the focus tends to be on host countries, may be able to draw on financial assets or there are also important macroeconomic con- mobilize private transfers from their home siderations for the countries from which refu- countries—sources that can help finance gees are fleeing. Refugee outflows and large spending and bolster output in the host numbers of IDPs can result in a massive reduc- countries. tion in the working-age population, in human capital, and therefore in the potential growth of Preliminary estimates and previous experience home countries. Syria’s population is estimated provide lessons about what to expect from to have shrunk by 20 percent in addition to the the current refugee crisis in final destination 40 percent internally displaced; at an average countries. The OECD has reported that the growth rate of 3 percent, it would take 20 years average net fiscal contribution of immigrants for the country to recover to its 2010 GDP level. in high income economies, while subject to A dramatic deterioration in living conditions considerable uncertainty, tends to be positive and increases in unemployment in Syria have but small, at about +/–1 percent of GDP.26 The resulted in a significant rise in poverty and short-term impact from the current wave of need for humanitarian assistance.28 refugees is negative—for instance, additional fiscal costs in 2015 and 2016 are estimated at about 0.2–0.3 percent of GDP each year Sectoral and Thematic B.  for Italy and Germany. The longer term effect Perspectives and Issues on public finances will depend on how many refugees arrive, how long they stay, and how 1. Institutions and Policy quickly they integrate into the host country’s Forced displacement can be a symptom of gov- labor market. In general, refugee inflows can ernance gaps: interstate, intrastate, and proxy provide a demographic opportunity for aging forms of conflict; elite capture; lack of protec- societies, representing a positive labor supply tion of social, economic, and political rights; shock and raising potential output in the longer poor public financial management systems; term. For example, the Australian migrants’ weak delivery of public sector services; lack of fiscal impact model (2008) found that, while public sector transparency and accountability; the fiscal impact of refugees tends to be less weak governance of natural resources, includ- positive than that of other migrants, the con- ing land; and ineffective dispute resolution tribution of refugees becomes positive after mechanisms. 12 years.27 In the USA, the Migration Policy Institute finds that refugees’ incomes rise with In refugee-hosting countries, institutions and length of US residence. governance largely determine the overall de- velopment outcomes of forced displacements and the efficacy of the development responses. 26. These numbers summarize the experience of the years The range of relevant institutional issues 2007–09. They include estimates of indirect contributions in this context is wide: core administrative (e.g., through corporate taxation) but exclude fiscal costs that are not easily attributable (e.g., public goods). See OECD (2013), “The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in OECD Countries,” in International Migration Outlook 2013. Paris: OECD Publishing. 28. In Syria the poverty rate has more than doubled since the 27. Access Economics (2008), “2008 update of the migrant fiscal start of the conflict to 83 percent in 2014. Two-thirds of impacts model,” a report commissioned by the Department Syrians are living in extreme poverty, and one-half, including of Immigration and Citizenship, Government of Australia. 5.6 million children, are in need of humanitarian assistance. Annex I. Macroeconomic and Sectoral Issues and Entry Points 21 institutions and government systems at the the capacity and financing to meet the needs central/national and local levels; political, legal, of both the host population and the growing and justice institutions; social institutions; and number of refugees. institutions to foster trust of and by the dis- placed people and their possible engagement 2. Human Development with the local communities. Human development interventions are essential to addressing short- and long-term challenges. International, regional, and domestic legal In the short term, interventions are needed to frameworks are not well geared to adequately alleviate the strain on service delivery systems, address the global challenges and complexities support living conditions and provide safety of refugee movements. A number of countries, nets, and prevent negative effects on the hu- particularly in MNA, have not signed interna- man capital and health of refugees and of tional treaties on the treatment of refugees host populations. Longer-term approaches are and migrants, and have no comprehensive in- needed to help connect displaced people to ternal frameworks regulating the treatment of productive opportunities in their host countries such people. This has led to ad hoc approaches (or in their origin countries eventually, if return in terms of protections and rights to public is a possibility) and continue to strengthen services. The current European refugee crisis service delivery systems.29 has demonstrated that host nations need to cooperate effectively to address together the There is a strong youth and gender dimension to challenges of securing the safety, well-being, the provision of services. The recently completed and human dignity of refugees. World Bank-UNHCR report on Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon finds that registered Refugees and IDPs the world over increasingly refugees are more likely to be younger, female, seek sanctuary in urban settings, where they and unmarried than the pre-crisis Syrian popu- are particularly vulnerable, as most countries lation. Data from a new wave of displacement do not recognize their legal status outside of in Iraq induced by the Islamic State shows the camps. Those countries that do recognize the overwhelming impact of the conflict on females. legal status of urban refugees often find the Overall, 15 percent of IDP households reported process of identifying and documenting them having at least one family member who suf- difficult and resource-intensive. Thus, refugees fered death, kidnapping, injury, or persecution; who reside in cities often lack legal documen- shockingly, more than 70  percent of these tation and may be denied the opportunity to members were female adults. work. When the displaced come from rural set- tings they often have inadequate knowledge, 3. Social Issues and Labor skills, and social networks to adapt to the urban The strains of hosting displaced people and the environment, so they are quickly marginalized. added demands on services and facilities often Improving the delivery of public sector services affect host communities the most. Tensions in refugee-hosting and transit countries is key. Many communities are finding that as the in- 29. Community-based programs supporting conditional and unconditional cash transfers as well as social and economic flow of refugees continues to increase, educa- integration are priority modalities to deliver on joined-up tion, health, and social protection systems lack actions under the humanitarian-development nexus. 22 A Response to Global Forced Displacement between refugees and host populations can in Asia and Africa and in countries that are erode social cohesion and stability by exacer- fragile and conflict-affected. The MNA region bating inter-ethnic or political tensions and in- is the most water-scarce region of the world, crease rates of gender-based violence or issues and droughts and water scarcity have forced around idleness (particularly for youth). These people to leave their homes looking for safer stresses can lead to repeated cycles of conflict access to water elsewhere. and fragility, the potential for recruitment to future violence, and spillover effects across Climate change is a threat multiplier. There is borders and communities. Host governments growing evidence that climate change, climate- rarely give priority to communication and mes- induced events, and environmental factors are saging to reduce tension. likely to play an increasingly important role in influencing migration, particularly within the Limited economic opportunities are available developing world. While environmental stresses to refugees, and insertion into the labor market are not the sole cause of violent conflict, they is often difficult, especially in host countries are considered to be “threat multipliers” that where unemployment is high and refugees are interact with other risk drivers and sources of perceived as competition. Most host countries vulnerability. Drought and internal migration are do not allow refugees to seek work, a stance thought to have helped fuel the Syrian civil war.30 that prolongs their dependency and erodes their skills, motivation, and possibilities for Degradation of the environment in rural longer-term economic integration. Therefore, refugee-hosting communities is a challenge and ­ refugees primarily operate in an informal can exacerbate social tensions. Many countries economy, where returns to work are so low are facing growing challenges with managing that there is no observable welfare difference environmental and renewable natural re- between those who work and those who do not. sources—challenges that may be compounded Outside of urban centers, constrained access to by the presence of large refugee communities, land limits the livelihood options of most refu- which put additional pressure on land, water, gees and IDPs; this is especially detrimental for forests, fish, and the ecosystems on which those who have come from a rural background. they and host communities depend. Access to natural resources can trigger conflict between Refugees can facilitate trade and investment host communities and refugees. operations with their host countries. His- torically, the experience of Jordan points to the gains from an integrative approach. Jordan Entry Points and   C.  was able to absorb a huge Palestinian popula- Options for Intervention tion (2 million in 2014), most of whom are now thriving citizens. Given the key sectoral and thematic perspec- tives and issues described above, the following 4. Environment and Climate Change areas of potential entry points should be con- sidered high priority. Natural hazards are important triggers for forced displacement. Between 2008 and 2013, 30. “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications on average 27.5 million people annually have of the recent Syrian drought.” Proceedings of the National been displaced by disasters, most of them Academy of Sciences, March 2015. Annex I. Macroeconomic and Sectoral Issues and Entry Points 23 1. Policy and Institutional Support the WBG’s crisis and emergency response poli- cies and procedures have evolved for greater A strong domestic legal framework for refugees flexibility, speed, and effectiveness. The Crisis is the basis for effective and sustainable social Response Window in IDA16 complemented the protection. It is essential to provide assistance emergency financing framework with a dedi- to host governments as they develop policies cated funding mechanism that has enhanced concerning residency and documentation, IDA’s ability to respond to emergencies. Finan- service provision, labor market access, and cial solutions will need to involve credit lines, so on.31 There is a need for continued policy credit guarantees, risk pooling mechanisms, dialogue with government counterparts and revolving funds, matching grants, start-up fi- development partners to identify policy, regu- nance, insurance, derivatives, and capital mar- latory, and operational priorities for assisting ket solutions. There is rarely a “one-size-fits all” displaced populations and to explore possibili- instrument, so diversity of tools and partners is ties for enhancing coordination and joint action important. Many of these instruments will need at the regional level. The political context is to involve crowding in the private sector. also important: without sufficient political will, refugees and IDPs are less likely to integrate On financial delivery, solutions need to be cus- and make a positive contribution. Policy sup- tomized to meet the needs of affected popula- port needs to extend beyond the immediate tions. One powerful mechanism is social safety “protection” of refugees to job and growth pro- nets, which can strengthen the resilience of motion, to promote private sector participation vulnerable households during a crisis. New and possibly attract direct foreign investment. mechanisms are needed for social protection schemes so that policymakers and partners It is important to enhance the effectiveness, re- can make quick decisions in such areas as sponsiveness, and inclusiveness of government Where to scale up? Whom to target? For how institutions: core administrative institutions long? And by how much? Such mechanisms and government systems at both national and need to be complemented by prearranged local levels; political, legal, and justice institu- financing strategies that can be triggered im- tions; social institutions; and institutions that mediately when problems become apparent. can help foster trust between refugees and Where social protection systems already ex- IDPs and local communities. ist, they can be strengthened to more readily 2. New Financial Tools and Delivery adapt to crises. Remittances are also a power- Mechanisms ful way to deliver resources. In 2014 total funds transferred through remittances were US$583 The WBG will need to develop a broader menu of billion, compared to official development as- instruments that can be deployed quickly and sistance of US$135 billion. The costs of remit- in coordination with partners. In recent years tance transfer for migrants and their families need to be reduced. 31. “Jobs are instrumental to achieving economic and social development. Beyond their critical importance for individual well-being, they lie at the heart of many broader societal 3. Education objectives, such as poverty reduction, economy-wide productivity growth, and social cohesion.” Jim Yong Kim, Education for displaced children and youth, President, World Bank Group, World Development Report, who represent a large percentage of the forc- “Jobs,” 2013. 24 A Response to Global Forced Displacement ibly displaced,32 is a priority. Without relevant addressing the health care needs of refugee pop- services a full generation will be left without ulations. In Lebanon, for example, the Govern- education opportunities. Early childhood, ment has a restrictive policy regarding health primary, secondary, and tertiary education coverage of refugees. In Pakistan, refugees who are all required. Children under five years of are outside of the camps can access the “free age represent a large percentage of displaced care” that is available to citizens, adding pres- populations (e.g., 28% of those displaced in sure on an already overcrowded public health Nigerian Northeastern states). Early childhood system. Health service provision within camps education responses are needed to address is largely left to humanitarian organizations, trauma, nutrition, and other detrimental notably the UNHCR, which applies restrictive impacts in their present and future learning. criteria for eligibility. Furthermore, countries Adolescents and youth are also vulnerable to often do not have a health workforce with the trauma, risks of different forms of violence, right skills to address the specific health needs including gender-based violence, and risks of of refugees, especially in the areas of mental losing future education and work opportunities health, violence, and the increased health risks (e.g., 25% of asylum seekers to the EU 28 are of women and girls (high levels of sexual and under 18; almost 40% of females are under 17). gender-based violence, including rape, assault, Increasingly, displaced populations include harassment, and intimate partner violence; young adults who were entering or in tertiary early marriage; early age at pregnancy; and programs in their own countries and who could complications during pregnancy). Use of family represent a loss of future leaders, intellectuals, planning falls among refugees, increasing the and professionals. maternal and child health challenges as well as challenges related to birth registration and Education support is also needed for host com- refugees’ eligibility. For example, while close to munities that take in most of the displaced 60 percent of the general population of Syrian populations. Social services in these communi- women reported using contraceptives before ties have limited absorptive capacity and need the conflict, only 34.5 percent were doing so to be supported. Often education systems in during displacement. host countries suffer from their own political and economic tensions that need to be over- There is also an increased risk of disease trans- come. And most refugee children face language mission. The conflicts that lead to refugee cri- barriers and cultural differences that put them ses usually also increase the risk of emergence further at risk in host regions/countries. of previously eradicated diseases, such as polio. In countries like Pakistan, IDPs are identified as 4. Health System Strengthening being one of the reasons for the endemic status Host countries need support with the technical, of polio. In active conflict countries where im- financial, and political challenges of develop- munization services are significantly reduced, ing and implementing national strategies for the risk of polio and its transmission to host populations is significant. 32. An estimated 65 million children aged 3–15 are most directly affected by humanitarian emergencies, including 5. Social Protection and Labor displacement (ODI, “Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises: Toward a Strengthened Response.” Background Labor-intensive public works have strong po- Paper for Oslo Summit on Education for Development, 6–7 July 2015). tential as a source of employment for refugees, Annex I. Macroeconomic and Sectoral Issues and Entry Points 25 though if the host country did not have any Host government policies often hinder the labor such works in place before the crisis it will re- market integration of refugees. When refugees quire some time to develop them. For example, do not work upon arrival, it is usually because in Tunisia the Bank mobilized $5 million to pilot they are not allowed to do so, their skills atro- social assistance programs and temporary em- phy as they await asylum approval, they face ployment opportunities in fragile communities employer biases, or their qualifications are not in regions bordering Libya, which faced social recognized. Asylum-seekers and potential em- unrest because of an influx of refugees and ployers face prohibitive bureaucratic hurdles returning Tunisian migrants. The program had in applying for provisional work permits, and 6,000 beneficiaries, mostly semi-skilled and labor agencies do not provide qualification veri- unemployed. Quick employment opportunities fication services for asylum-seekers. were developed, meeting local needs without requiring heavy civil works. Special economic Supporting municipal and community resil- zones in affected areas are another potential ience. Local authorities represent the first point development approach that would have em- of contact with communities that feel directly ployment benefits for refugees and overall affected by the presence of refugees or IDPs economic benefits to the host country. amongst them and by the pressure on their limited resources. Consequently, supporting lo- Measures to expand economic opportunity are cal authorities in augmenting their services to needed. In countries where productivity is low, cope with the increased demand and empow- policies that invest only in training are unlikely ering local communities are critical (see also to succeed if they are not accompanied by Box II-2). In many situations, working through comprehensive measures to create economic local authorities and nongovernmental and opportunities. Where the creation of quality community-based organizations offers a more jobs is already robust, policies that support efficient way to get the resources down to the job search and the acquisition of targeted community level than working through central skills can help refugees obtain jobs. Moreover, systems. This applies as much to supporting strengthening asset-based capacity and the livelihood initiatives and informal education, as human capital endowments of the local hosts, to community spaces for unemployed youth and especially the poor, is effective in improv- and conflict mediation between the host com- ing household-based coping strategies. munities and refugees. Annex Ii. Assistance Provided and Evidence of Impact WBG-supported operations to address forced than 10 percent addressed the development displacement have to date mostly involved needs of IDPs or refugees in situations of pro- support for return and reintegration; far fewer tracted displacement. Moreover, all of these efforts have been directed toward the develop- activities were focused on individual countries. ment needs of IDPs or refugees in situations of There have been a few successful cases of re- protracted displacement. A report by the Global patriation (Cambodia, Uganda, and Sudan). In Program for Forced Displacement at the WBG33 2002, the Afghanistan Comprehensive Solution studied broader WBG engagement from the Plan repatriated 5 million Afghans, but in 2008, 1980s through FY09 and found that 84 World there were still 2.1 million Afghan refugees in Bank-supported operations addressed forced Pakistan and 900,000 in Iran. A growing number displacement during this period. More than 90 of Afghans are also seeking asylum in Europe. percent of these operations involved support for Opportunities offered to Syrian refugees now return and reintegration (see Box II-1), while fewer ought to be seen also as ensuring that a future post-conflict and peaceful Syria can attract back refugees who have the skills, experience, assets, 33. “Sustainable Refugee Return: Triggers, Constraints, and and businesses to contribute constructively to Lessons on Addressing the Development Challenges of Forced Displacement,” August 2015. the country’s long-term post-conflict recovery. Box II-1. Sustainable Refugee Return The WBG Global Program on Forced Displacement case studies show that access to livelihood assets in recently finalized a report, “Sustainable Refugee Re- the country of origin, such as land, financial resources, turn: Triggers, Constraints, and Lessons on Addressing and social networks, together with the prospects for the Development Challenges of Forced Displacement.” recovering these assets, is a key factor that influences The report identifies key conditions that influence and facilitates refugee households in their decisions to the decisions by refugees in protracted displacement return, even when they appear to be integrated in the regarding return to their home country or other coping host country, and even when the overall security and strategies, and examines how these decisions are af- developmental conditions in the home country are far fected by life in exile and by the situation in the coun- from optimal. try of origin. Preliminary findings from eight country 26 Annex Ii. Assistance Provided and Evidence of Impact 27 Over the past couple of years, however, the cope with the strain refugees place on public World Bank’s approach to forced displacement services and ensure refugee protection. has changed. More recent interventions are This project provides legal information, being designed to address the development counseling, and representation for refugees, dimensions of displacement, with a focus on migrants, and poor Jordanians. It also sup- IDPs, refugees, and host communities. And our ports strengthening court and other services development solutions are increasingly regional strained by the presence of refugees in poor in nature. communities. • As early as 2013, the Bank rapidly ap- proved an emergency US$150 million “cash A. Middle East and North injection” loan to Jordan to offset the fiscal Africa impact of the crisis on the country’s budget as a result of extending subsidies and health The WBG Regions are customizing their re- services to refugees. sponses; resilience to refugee and IDP shocks • The Bank continues to lead on innovative as- is one of the four pillars of MNA’s new strategy. sessments to measure the impact of refugee There are more than 15 million displaced people crises on neighboring countries and that of in the Region, and MNA’s strategy recognizes ongoing conflicts on local population and the issue of displacement as one of the biggest infrastructure (Yemen, Iraq, and Syria). In risks to the Region’s stability and long-term 2013, in collaboration with the EU, UN, and development. The strategy adopts a resilience- IMF, the WBG prepared a landmark study34 based development approach that is premised on the economic and social impact of the on four principles: the need to address existing Syrian conflict on Lebanon, which served as vulnerabilities and risks (e.g., focus on mar- the basis of a multidonor effort to support ginalization, youth, etc.); the need to preserve that country. (See Annex IV for more details the protection space of refugees; the need to on Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.) protect the development outcomes of host communities; and the need to leverage oppor- To support developing middle-income countries tunities for growth. affected by refugees and IDPs, the WBG is ex- ploring innovative financing options: (a) donor • In Lebanon and Jordan, the WBG is helping guarantees to issue special bonds for large to address the impact of the refugee influx recovery and reconstruction projects or to open on local service delivery by providing fiscal up space on the IBRD balance sheet to increase transfers that enable municipalities to ex- lending; and (b) donor grants to reduce the cost pand services; the choice of investments is of financing to more concessional levels. Many based on consultations with communities. In of the MNA countries that are coping with large addition, the Bank is supporting the health, inflows of refugees are middle-income, and education, and social protection sectors in thus do not have access to highly concessional Lebanon to ensure a balance in the benefits financing. to vulnerable communities of both Syrians and Lebanese. • Also in Jordan, the Bank is helping govern- 34. “Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the ment entities and civil society organizations Syrian Conflict,” WBG, September 2013. 28 A Response to Global Forced Displacement B. Africa which called on the WBG to act “regionally and globally to reduce external stresses on fragile Africa hosts more than a third of the world’s states,” including through “cross-border devel- displaced population, accounting for more than opment programming.” a quarter of the global total of refugees and the largest number of IDPs. Five countries—DRC, Conflict and insecurity in Africa are driven by Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, and Central African a complex and interrelated set of economic Republic (CAR)—have generated more than and political factors at both the national and 80 percent of those displaced, while 60 percent regional levels. The Great Lakes Initiative, like of refugees in the Region are hosted by just five similar initiatives in the Sahel and Horn of Af- countries: Kenya, Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan, rica, seeks to complement national programs and Uganda. The great majority of African by focusing on these regional drivers of fragility refugee movements happen within Africa, and conflict. The central rationale behind these with the burden of care falling on neighboring initiatives is that the WBG cannot effectively countries. Most of the countries in Africa gen- support the elimination of extreme poverty erating and hosting displaced persons are IDA and boost shared prosperity without engaging countries. For example, Ethiopia, which shares more intensively and creatively in addressing borders with Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, very difficult development problems, including and Eritrea—all grappling with conflicts—has those linked to insecurity and vulnerability. In been hosting refugees since the 1990s. In 2011, both the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa the country had eight refugee camps with there has been strong client demand for sup- some 90,000 refugees; as of June 2014, it had port to address forced displacement; two 23 camps and over 650,000 refugees. (See An- regional programs are now under preparation nex IV for further details on Chad and Kenya.) (see Box II-2). The WBG is implementing regional initiatives These ambitious and challenging initiatives targeting the regional drivers of conflict and have the participation of other partners, who fragility in Africa. In 2013 the President of the are making significant development contribu- World Bank Group and the Secretary-General tions of financial support, technical expertise, of the United Nations made a historic visit to and development diplomacy. The EU pledged the Great Lakes Region of Africa in support of about $11 billion over seven years for the Sahel the regional Peace, Security and Cooperation and the Horn of Africa, including a $50 million Framework that 11 countries had signed in pilot project to support refugee returns from Addis Ababa in March of that year. Security, Kenya to Somalia. The African Development peace, and development can be mutually Bank committed $1.8 billion for the Horn of self-reinforcing, and the WBG and the UN Africa. The Islamic Development Bank and can promote such synergies by working in the Arab Coordination Group committed up to closer partnership within their complementary $3  billion for the Horn of Africa—the largest mandates. This cooperation was part of the financial collaboration ever between IDA and vision of the founders of the UN and Bretton Islamic Finance—including dedicated finance Woods institutions. It also puts into action to support refugee returns from Kenya to So- the guidance of the 2011 World Development malia. Together, the initiatives target 18 coun- Report on Conflict, Security and Development, tries with a population of about 463 million Annex Ii. Assistance Provided and Evidence of Impact 29 Box II-2. Regional Operations in Africa in Support of Durable Solutions to Forced Displacement Great Lakes Region Displaced Persons integration process and to provide a demonstration of and Border Communities Project the benefits for governments and host communities of offering full local integration. This $100 million regional project in DRC, Zambia, and Tanzania aims to increase the socioeconomic services Regional Operation on Development to displaced persons and their host communities in Response to Displacement in Horn targeted countries and to strengthen the systems of Africa of participating governments to deliver programs for displaced persons. Joint analytical work and regional policy dialogue with UNHCR has created a new platform for dialogue on The project will target the 2.6 million displaced people future approaches to displacement challenges—a new in the east of DRC with the aim of increasing com- way of doing refugee business, taking the dialogue munity services, especially in areas where schools and from the country level to the regional level for compre- clinics have been destroyed. It offers cash transfers hensive approaches to displacement solutions. Some and livelihood support programs for IDPs and their hosting governments in the Horn now acknowledge hosting communities. In Tanzania, the WBG is working that, given protracted displacement, it is necessary to closely with the Government in support of its recent develop long-term policies that recognize the economic initiative to grant citizenship to 200,000 former potential of refugees and facilitate their contribution refugees from Burundi who have been living in refugee to local economy so that the affected host population settlements for 42 years. And in Zambia the project views their presence as an asset rather than a liability. will support the recent Government initiative to grant full residency rights to 10,000 former refugees from The project is a US$170 million regional operation that Angola, along with a resettlement process to move the is being prepared in close collaboration with UNHCR former refugees from refugee camps into newly desig- in Djibouti, Uganda, and Ethiopia. It is designed to nated resettlement areas where they will have full land address and mitigate the impacts of the refugee pres- rights and improved socioeconomic opportunities. The ence on host communities through investments in resettlement process will be designed to also bring social and economic infrastructure, sustainable liveli- benefits for local hosting communities. hoods, local environmental management, community engagement and voice, and local government capacity The global significance of the project is that Tanzania building. The primary project beneficiaries will be the and Zambia are the only two refugee-hosting countries host communities in the refugee hosting areas who in the world to offer a full legal and policy framework have experienced displacement impacts, and the for the durable local integration of former refugees. secondary project beneficiaries will be the displaced Support by the WBG aims to achieve a successful local persons (refugees and returnees). people, where poverty rates range from 20 to Sahel—for example, via initiatives for the Lake 74 percent. In the Great Lakes, the World Bank Chad and Niger River Basins. Group pledged $1 billion in incremental regional IDA funds, and it made similar commitments to Elsewhere in Africa: the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. There are also plans to further link the Great Lakes spatially • The Mali Reconstruction and Economic Recovery Project ($100 million) seeks to and economically to the Horn of Africa and the 30 A Response to Global Forced Displacement mitigate the stress on basic services in the countries currently host over 6 million people communities hosting IDPs in the south and who have been displaced as a result of war and at the same time augment basic service conflict—64 percent of whom are IDPs and the delivery and economic activities in the IDP rest refugees and asylum seekers. The largest return areas to help rebuild the society in the groups of refugees and IDPs are in Turkey (1.94 conflict-affected north of the country. million refugees from Syria), Ukraine (1.46 mil- • The regional IDA operation on Borderlands lion IDPs), Azerbaijan (622,892 IDPs), Georgia and Lagging Regions in the Horn of Africa (262,704 IDPs), and Russia (238,835 refugees). ($300 million) seeks to stabilize border While conflicts in the Balkans have been sta- areas in select countries through social and bilized, unresolved issues of displacement and institutional development and promotion of social tensions are still relevant in Bosnia and economic activities. Many of these border Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo. regions host significant numbers of refugees. • In the context of analytical and operational In the first nine months of 2015, approximately work, the Bank is working with governments 605,000 asylum seekers have arrived in the EU; of refugee and IDP-hosting countries—for according to the UNHCR, another 700,000 are example, Tanzania and Zambia—to revise expected by the close of the year. Of those ar- and define policy frameworks for responses riving in Western Europe, 70 percent are from to forced displacement. In Kenya, in collabo- countries affected by conflict. The arrivals in ration with UNHCR, the Bank is undertaking 2015 originate from the following countries (in a socioeconomic assessment in Turkana— decreasing order of cohort size): Syria, Kosovo, “The Dynamics of the Kakuma Refugee Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Pakistan, Eritrea, Camp: An Economic and Social Impact Serbia, Ukraine, and Nigeria. Analysis”—to assess the macro, micro, and WBG activities in ECA have focused on helping social impacts of the presence of refugees governments plan, implement, and monitor on the host communities in Turkana County. responses to displacement and identify the The work is intended to inform (a) policy socioeconomic impacts of displacement. The discussions on integrating refugee and host WBG has used its operational and analytic community economies, and (b) the WBG work and technical assistance to quantitatively development response to displacement- and qualitatively assess the impact of refugee induced macro-fiscal, environmental, and crises in socioeconomic terms (for example, social impacts. in terms of welfare, municipal services, jobs, C. Europe and Central Asia education, social cohesion, infrastructure, and business development). This type of informa- The numbers of displaced people in ECA35 have tion on both refugee and host communities has doubled over the last five years, largely because helped both clients and international partners of the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine. ECA manage their responses. Many of the World Bank’s initial responses to assist countries with 35. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, the humanitarian crisis have important human Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, development components. In ECA and MNA Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, alike, and from the start of the Syrian conflict, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. teams have been able to respond to emergency Annex Ii. Assistance Provided and Evidence of Impact 31 requests by client countries affected by the • In Georgia, the WBG took the lead on the crisis. (See Annex IV for further details on the displacement chapters for the 2008 post- refugee crisis in Europe.) conflict Joint Needs Assessment, together with UN agencies and the EU, and is provid- Ongoing interventions include the following: ing support on (a) the constraints and op- portunities for IDP livelihoods, (b) increasing • In Turkey, the Bank is partnering with the IDPs’ access to land through innovative land Government on analysis to identify and rental contracts, (c) aspects of gender-based quantify the impact of the Syrian crisis on violence in the IDP population, and (d) sup- host communities. The assessment focuses port to the Government in implementing its on the health, education, social services, and State Strategy on IDPs. labor markets sectors and on housing and • In the Western Balkans, the high number of municipal services. refugees from Kosovo, Albania and Serbia • In Ukraine, the Bank is engaging on health reflects high level of unemployment, particu- and education in two regions with high con- larly youth unemployment, in these coun- centration of IDPs. The first project aims to tries. The IFC in coordination with the Bank, improve health facilities and services used by has been engaged in an intensive dialogue both IDPs and the host population. The sec- on the government’s reform program, focus- ond (under preparation) includes a compo- ing on addressing economic legacy issues in nent to invest in the rehabilitation of schools stabilizing the financial sector and designing and preschool facilities in communities with an approach to raise competitiveness and a high influx of IDPs, to improve the physical create jobs, especially for youth, women learning environment for and access by IDP and marginalized groups. In addition, IFC’s and host community children. The WBG also indirect support will include the engagement provided support through an initial ‘Displace- with selected banks to support SMEs and in ment Analysis’ as well as documenting the infrastructure through its investments as impacts of the displacement crisis as part well as advisory support on public-private of the joint WBG-EU-UN Ukraine—Recovery partnerships. and Peacebuilding Assessment. The WBG re- cently approved a grant to provide technical D. South Asia Region assistance to the Government of Ukraine on its displacement strategy. Since 2002 more than 5.8 million Afghan refu- • Latvia’s Ministry of Health has requested the gees have returned home—the largest volun- Bank to assess how to provide psychosocial tary return program in history, accounting for and mental health services to refugees. around 20 percent of the country’s population. • In Azerbaijan, a comprehensive economic Elsewhere in SAR, Pakistan remains one of the and sector work study was used to explore world’s main refugee-hosting countries, while the poverty status, assets, and economic India, Bangladesh, and Nepal also offer asylum constraints of IDPs (one of the largest IDP to a considerable number of refugees. At the per capita populations globally) and laid end of 2014 UNHCR recorded that Afghanistan the analytic foundation for the first (and so hosts 300,000 refugees and has over 800,000 far only) IBRD lending operation focused on IDPs, Pakistan 1.5 million refugees and over 1.2 displaced people. million IDPs, Bangladesh 230,000 refugees, 32 A Response to Global Forced Displacement India 200,000 refugees, and Nepal 39,000 World Bank Group E.  refugees. Financing WBG activities in South Asia have supported Over the past 15 years the WBG has learned forced returnees: in Bangladesh they have sup- important lessons about how to deliver finan- ported workers returning from Libya; in Paki- cial resources to countries in crisis, and its stan they have provided income-generating emergency response policies and procedures activities for refugees, and in Afghanistan have evolved for greater flexibility, speed, and they have provided broad support to service effectiveness. The Crisis Response Window in delivery and drivers of fragility and poverty. In IDA16 complemented the Bank’s emergency Afghanistan multiple stakeholders are making financing framework with a dedicated funding significant efforts to support the new Govern- mechanism that has enhanced IDA’s ability to ment in creating an environment conducive for respond to emergencies. There is high demand return and sustainable reintegration. The WBG from client countries for new instruments to is working with the Government on an imme- address the complexity of sustainable devel- diate “jobs stimulus” response to address the opment and the need to manage uncertainty growing numbers of poor and excluded people. and volatility. Financial solutions will continue This program will scale up existing interven- to involve credit lines, credit guarantees, risk- tions and support the development of new ap- pooling mechanisms, revolving funds, matching proaches targeted at the vulnerable. Support grants, start-up finance, insurance, derivatives, for basic service delivery—health, education, and capital market solutions. There is rarely a rural roads, community development—con- “one-size-fits all” instrument, so we want to tinues and is being increased, especially to diversify the tools in the toolbox and the actors support immediate challenges in the fragile that can support them. environment. Many of these instruments involve crowding in The leveraging of IDA funds through multidonor the private sector, for example to provide insur- trust funds has been particularly effective in ance against catastrophic risks. Regional risk bringing together governments, donor partners, pooling facilities like the Caribbean Catastrophe and the WBG for an integrated response. By Risk Insurance Facility, the Pacific Catastrophe focusing on core macroeconomic, fiscal, and Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative, and governance issues, SAR has recognized the the African Risk Capacity help to do this, while importance of addressing drivers of fragility also creating a platform for strengthening re- and supporting private-sector-led job creation gional collaboration and response capacity. and service delivery. Partnership with NGOs will continue to be a critical element in service We are working with partners to design a new delivery, especially in areas with limited ac- Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility as a cess. Programs directed at women and chil- global financing facility that would channel dren—through social safety nets, health care, funds to governments, multilateral agen- education, and employment ­ opportunities—are cies, NGOs, and others to contain epidemic central to the Region’s response to the most outbreaks before they turn into pandemics. vulnerable. The facility would ensure coordination with Annex Ii. Assistance Provided and Evidence of Impact 33 development partners, allow for quick mobili- European Commission is also working to zation and deployment, and leverage private decrease the number and scale of refugee sector and domestic resources and political crises—for instance, through its work on and diplomatic efforts. disaster preparedness and prevention, which aims to reduce the vulnerability of disad- vantaged communities and prevent their F. The Roles of Other displacement. Selected Institutions • European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB has begun to consider the risks of forced dis- • International Monetary Fund (IMF). The placement under its new “conflict sensitivity” Fund has a capability to provide emergency approach, to ensure that it does contribute financing assistance to address urgent bal- to forced displacement. ance of payments needs. More generally, • Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB). the Fund has a set of concessional and non- The CEB is proposing the establishment of concessional facilities for use when shocks a new grant facility to finance reception and compound the medium-term balance of transit centers in CEB member countries36 payments needs. for migrants and refugees. The CEB will pro- • European Union (EU).The European Union vide the first €5 million as seed money and and its Member States play a leading role is trying to attract another €15–20 million in global humanitarian and development af- from the CEB member countries as a first fairs. In 2014 the European Commission gave emergency support. The CEB will coordinate more than €854 million, or some 71 percent in this respect with the Council of Europe, the of its annual humanitarian aid budget, to EU, and UNHCR and will liaise with financial projects helping refugees and IDPs, and in institutions and NGOs. the early months of 2015 it gave over €1 • International Fund for Agricultural Develop- billion. It also gave €200 million in develop- ment (IFAD). IFAD works on climate and social ment assistance for projects that help in and economic inequality as factors driving access to shelter, protection, food, and other migration. Like the EIB, IFAD generally sees basic services such as health, nutrition, forced displacement as a consequence to be water, sanitation, hygiene, and education. avoided. The European Commission’s Humanitarian • Asian Development Bank. The Asian Devel- Aid and Civil protection department invests opment Bank is forward-leaning on climate- heavily in assisting displaced people and induced forced displacement but thus far is currently responding to crises such as has not created a line of effort or produced the following: Syrian refugees in Jordan, analytics on this issue. Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq; Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan; Somali refugees in Kenya and Yemen; Congolese refugees in the 36. Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Great Lakes region; Colombian refugees in Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ecuador and Venezuela; Myanmar refugees Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, in Thailand; Rohingya refugees in Bangla- Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, desh; and Sahrawi refugees in Algeria. While Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, supporting the victims of displacement, the Switzerland, Turkey. 34 A Response to Global Forced Displacement • European Bank for Reconstruction and of development responses. Many humanitarian Development. The European Bank for Re- organizations now provide a combination of re- construction and Development remains lief and longer-term development, and to sup- traditionally focused on forced displacement port better outcomes and reduce inefficiency as a development-induced risk. A recent ex- they also accept that there is a need to develop ception to this is their lending in Ukraine for a common agenda for evidence to which dif- political stabilization support, which condi- ferent stakeholders can align. Operations and tions investment of up to €5 billion through policy recommendations need to be supported 2020 on, among other things, addressing by strong analytics and economic analysis. the needs and requirements of the forcibly displaced in the country, including livelihood The best refugee responses are those that use activity. the arrival of refugees as an entry point to ad- • Islamic Development Bank. The IsDB and dress vulnerability and disenfranchisement in the WBG recently teamed up to launch an the wider hosting community. Analysis carried innovative initiative to mobilize funds for re- out by the WBG and UNHCR, which is informing construction and recovery in MNA countries, regional development responses in the Great with additional concessional resources for Lakes and Horn of Africa, suggests that refugee countries hosting large numbers of refugees. responses should (a) enhance social cohesion Over the last decade there have been a num- between displaced and host communities and ber of significant collaborations with the increase their self-reliance by building on their WBG which will be further deepened through skills and capital (human, social, and financial); a recently signed Strategic Partnership (b) improve the quality of social and economic Framework. ties between displaced and host communities; • The African Development Bank, East African (c) strengthen the resilience of host communi- Development Bank, and West African Devel- ties while preparing the displaced for durable opment Bank each have poverty reduction solutions; (d) equip refugees to secure liveli- goals that have led to investments in the hoods, resources, and assets so as to have a energy sector, agriculture, the environment, better chance of returning and also contribut- and the social sector that have arguably ing to host economies; and (e) incentivize local had indirect integration, livelihood, and government authorities to include refugee other impacts on the displaced—but these populations in their planning, budgeting, and institutions do not have units or portfolios investment processes, and to invest in build- that look expressly at prioritizing funding ing social cohesion between the displaced and for specific projects that address the linkage their host communities. Additionally, domestic between conflict and fragility and forced laws and regulations fall along a continuum displacement. that allows or prohibits refugees the freedom of movement, right to work, and ownership G. Evidence of Impact of property, issues that define the options for durable solutions. The evidence base of what works, and what does not, to address forced displacements is very Sustainable solutions for refugee returns are underdeveloped, reflecting the nascent nature challenging. The findings of a recent WBG re- Annex Ii. Assistance Provided and Evidence of Impact 35 port37 conclude that the record of assistance to in the country of origin, such as land, financial returning refugees is very uneven and generally resources, and social networks, along with the has been inadequate to support their sustain- prospects for recovering these assets, is a key able reintegration. The international commu- factor that influences and facilitates refugee nity’s current paradigm of “durable solutions” households in their decisions to return, even for returning refugees—voluntary return, local when they appear to be integrated in the host integration in the host country, or resettlement country, and even when the overall security to a third country—is too limited to capture and developmental conditions in the country of the complexities and dynamics of refugee return are far from optimal. The analysis also decision-making. Access to livelihood assets suggests that the extent to which life in exile provides space to pursue livelihoods and build up assets is significant for the ability to reinte- 37. Sustainable Refugee Return: Triggers, constraints, and lessons on addressing the development challenges of forced grate and re-establish livelihoods for those who displacement, GPFP, WBG, August 2015. choose to return. Annex III. Key Lessons and Future Action Agenda Today’s forced displacement challenges are of global, regional, national, and subnational enormous. They need to be matched with bold institutions. Such diplomacy would not only action, which will require much greater col- focus on current issues but would also look laboration among diplomatic and humanitar- ahead and prepare for new ones. Many of the ian actors, international financial institutions global fragility, conflict, violence, and related (IFIs), and affected governments in a greatly humanitarian issues would benefit from a expanded, coordinated, and sustained cam- better shared problem definition and greater paign that targets root causes and provides collaboration of this kind across the diplo- durable customized solutions. The welfare matic and development communities. This of refugees, IDPs, and host communities is a would have practical implications for WBG and global public good; if it can be improved, the IFI engagement on the ground with national whole world benefits. Solutions demand a more and subnational governments, UN (including holistic humanitarian/development response— Special Envoys), regional organizations, and including innovative “development diplomacy,” humanitarian organizations. In both DRC and systems reform, some policy shifts, more flex- Kenya, for instance, this kind of diplomacy led ible and innovative financing instruments, and recently to revisions to the WBG operational more tailored development and project delivery programs to include project priorities that solutions. better support peace and stability, and these revisions were guided in part by joint analytic work done with UN colleagues.38 A. A New Development Diplomacy for Crisis Ultimately, the most effective way to deal Prevention with crises is to prevent them in the first place. Natural disasters have cost $2 trillion over the Using development diplomacy means that for- last two decades. As huge as this figure is, it eign policy is better “development-informed” is dwarfed by the cost of wars; last year alone and that development assistance is better co- conflicts cost the global economy an estimated ordinated with diplomacy to support and sus- tain peace. The goal of enhanced development 38. Before visiting the Great Lakes in May 2015, Sri Mulyani diplomacy would be to build, incentivize, and Indrawati, Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer of the World Bank, penned an op-ed—“The Difference between facilitate coalitions of governments, the pri- Peace and Lasting Peace is Regional Integration”—that gives vate sector, civil society, and affected people an idea of how development interventions can support peace. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2015/05/08/ to prevent, contain, and respond to humani- world-bank-managing-director-coo-sri-mulyani-indrawati- tarian crises, using the existing architecture difference-peace-lasting-regional-integration. 36 Annex III. Key Lessons and Future Action Agenda 37 $14.3  trillion—more than 13 percent of world has offered citizenship to 200,000 former GDP. It is critical to address the root causes of refugees from Burundi and is currently setting conflict. The High-level Independent Panel on up a Strategic Plan for Local Integration, offer- Peacekeeping Operations released its review ing socioeconomic rights and assets. of UN peacekeeping—The Challenge of Sustain- ing Peace—in June 2015; recommendations on In many countries, institutions and systems are how UN peace operations can be strengthened unable to meet the demands of new arrivals. A to better meet today’s challenges included: humanitarian response to forced displacement (a)  prevention and mediation need to be pri- often includes the creation of parallel service oritized if the international community is to delivery systems and marginalization of the break the cycle of responding too late and too displaced from mainstream government pro- expensively; (b)  the planning and conduct of vision. Line ministries with mandates on dis- UN peace operations need to be faster, more placement issues are often weak and sidelined responsive, and more accountable to countries from broader interministerial decision-making. and people in conflict; and (c) a global-regional Host countries that have never experienced a framework to manage today’s peace and secu- refugee influx often lack legal and regulatory rity challenges is required.39 frameworks to define how refugees can ac- cess services and obtain rights. The displaced face widespread insecurity—for example, in B. Support to Domestic their housing tenure, as they do not have the Policy Reform and legal status for a secure contract or property Institutions rights—and as a result, they often end up in settlements with unclear tenure status. The Africa’s relatively progressive and advanced WBG and IFIs could consider a broader facility legal framework in support of displaced people to provide just-in-time technical assistance to offers lessons for countries in other areas. Africa host governments in developing legal and policy is the only continent to further the implemen- frameworks and sustainable strategies, and to tation of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal support strategic communication efforts for Displacement through the “Kampala Conven- displacement response. This could also include tion.” In addition, some countries in Africa are options for cross-country and cross-regional setting a global precedent for displacement re- learning and exchanges to support govern- sponses: Government-led policy and programs ments in strengthening their policies and in Uganda promote the self-reliance of refugees fulfilling their obligations under the UN Geneva in the context of their host communities; Zam- Convention. bia has offered full legal and socioeconomic in- tegration to former Angolan refugees with the Political resistance can be mitigated by target- provision of residency status and entitlement ing pro-poor programs inclusively, to all affected to resettlement and land under the Strategic populations—both refugees and host nationals. Framework for Local Integration; and Tanzania Since impoverished host populations often have the same needs as impoverished refugees, 39. In sustaining peace, the report also explicitly calls for “closer specifically targeting refugees can create fur- strategic and operational partnership with the International ther backlash against and resentment of their Financial Institutions and with regional and sub-regional organisations.” presence. Structuring programming to allocate 38 a response to global forced Displacement resources to both populations can not only It is critical to explore ways to provide grant decrease political and social risk but also help funding to low-income countries that are bear- build cohesion between the new arrivals and ing a disproportionate burden of refugees so their hosts. that they are better able to also extend develop- ment opportunities to refugees and nationals. Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan, for example, which C. Innovation for More are major sources of refugees, have limited Financing and New Ways financing options due to the accumulation of of Delivery arrears. Somalia and Sudan also have large IDP populations who are potential refugees. The international community has recognized the importance of disaster risk management Scaled up cash assistance and food voucher strategies and, in particular, disaster risk as- programs are quick and cost-effective mecha- sessment and risk financing. In the face of nisms of support, though their sustainability is the rising frequency and intensity of disaster- at risk. Humanitarian aid is increasingly being related losses in low- and middle-income administered on a cash basis, with strong re- countries, efforts have been made to increase sults: for example, UNHCR-administered cash the efficiency of responses. In other crisis con- assistance programs for Syrian refugees in texts a greater understanding of the totality of Jordan have successfully reduced the number financial flows—for example, official develop- of recipient households under the poverty ment assistance, remittances, donations—in threshold by 20 percent.40 The debate still con- addressing need, and of the efficiency of such tinues over whether assistance should come in interventions, is needed to inform the design of the form of cash, vouchers, or in-kind transfers, new policy and financial responses. and the answer depends largely on program objectives (e.g., income support or addressing Financial resources from traditional donors are micronutrient deficiencies), local markets (e.g., limited, and there is a need to crowd in resources cost of food on markets, inflation), and other from the private sector—not only to create effi- contextual factors (e.g., implementation ca- ciencies and help bridge gaps, but also to enhance pacity, security). investment in hosting countries in support of job and wealth creation. Since many governments are understandably reluctant to borrow from D. Strengthening Social IDA and IBRD for refugee response, the WBG Services for IDPs, and other IFIs need to expand their financing Refugees, and Host tools to respond to displacement. Options could Communities include hybrid arrangements that combine in- ternational support with national contributions Addressing situations of protracted displace- and access to analytical and technical support. ment requires both short-term approaches There is also a need for more flexible and respon- and longer-term planning—in the short term sive funding modalities—for example, rapid re- to alleviate the strain on social service sys- sponse mechanisms, the ability to deliver funds tems, and in the longer term to help connect through nongovernmental and other partner institutions, and the ability to easily finance 40. Living in the Shadows. Jordan Home Visits Report, UNHCR, regional and cross-border initiatives. 2014. Annex III. Key Lessons and Future Action Agenda 39 refugees to productive opportunities in their and hugely expanded ICT instruments, a more host countries. It is important to recognize the ambitious, harmonized, sustained, and cost- benefits of mainstreaming domestic service effective approach is possible provision rather than depending on parallel ex- ternal providers, and of providing for continu- ous independent monitoring of the provision E. Building Economic of social protection to refugees, through either Opportunity civil society or quasi-governmental monitor- ing agencies. Local autonomy to devise local It is important to take a development approach service solutions, and to engage both the host that invests in and promotes the upgrading of a and displaced communities in the process, country’s systems and structures, and creates can also significantly contribute to symbiosis, jobs and livelihood opportunities for both refu- resilience, and opportunities. Mayors and city gees and hosts. In countries where productivity leaders have shown leadership in integrating is low, policies that invest in training alone are migrants and refugees at the local level; such unlikely to succeed if they are not accompanied approaches should be scaled up and applied by comprehensive measures to create economic in the appropriate contexts. Another area for opportunities—for example, labor-intensive work is on incorporating refugee communities public works, grants and technical training for in the design of urban spaces, as this is increas- productive self-employment, and even special ingly where they are clustered. economic or industrial zones that create jobs for both refugees and host communities. It is Education settings can provide a protec- important both to know the skills base, and tive healing and learning space for displaced to be aware of the enabling conditions of the children, but only if services are relevant and target markets for the special economic zone address security, well-being, and learning output. Attracting private sector investment— (academic and skills). While local education including by providing the right incentives to sector policies and laws often affect how much “anchor” companies that bring, among other displaced students and teachers can integrate things, management expertise, production, and in the host country, communities and families cost know-how and can also facilitate access are crucial actors that can provide protection, into the target markets—would be an impor- well-being, and relevant education to displaced tant success factor. Job creation and business children and youth. relocation will require resources, and their eco- nomic return may be limited; however, it is still IDPs are tomorrow’s refugees. Stabilizing and important to get people into jobs working for providing targeted support to IDPs is another a future, while ensuring that local communities important part of addressing the global refugee also benefit. crisis. For example, mainstreaming IDP issues into broader government systems for social safety nets, employment strategies, and access F. Adapting Existing Risk to land can help reduce IDPs’ vulnerabilities. Management Approaches Geospatial mapping can enhance analysis and and Tools facilitate better alignment and priority setting. Efforts to coalesce around vulnerability maps As the international community designs solu- are not new, but in an era of finite resources tions that help institutionalize better responses 40 a response to global forced Displacement to crisis complexity, lessons learned about the a rapid response. Intensive supervision is im- fundamentals of risk management, which run portant, and implementation should be flexible as a common thread throughout WBG and IMF to ensure responsiveness to community needs responses to numerous shocks/crises over the and rapidly changing conditions in the field. past 10 years, can be used as a base. As an ex- ample, the framework developed by the Global The WBG and some other IFIs are not able to op- Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, erate in conflict situations, so some situations combines risk identification, risk reduction, may require an adjustment in their policies and preparedness, financial protection, and resil- procedures. The practical difficulties and op- ient recovery in a manner now widely accepted tions for both humanitarian and development as best practice for building resilience against actors operating in insecure regions will require disaster shocks. The framework is based on new partnerships for project implementation fundamentals of professional risk manage- and monitoring.41 Related research topics ment that are applicable to other shocks and include what works best in obtaining and risks. It can be also used as a platform to deliver maintaining safe access, in effective remote solutions that crowd in a wider set of public management, and in delivering quality aid in and private actors (Box III-1 provides indicative situations of reduced oversight. examples of how to build such an approach). H. A Better Knowledge G. Project Delivery and Evidence Base Project design should be simple, developed There is an urgent need to strengthen the data with local participation, and adjusted for local and evidence base on the development challenges capacity. Reallocating resources from existing and impacts of forced displacement. There is projects has been less effective than provid- little quantitative evidence on the characteris- ing specific financing in some areas, such as tics and welfare of displaced populations. These the food crisis response and Haiti reconstruc- populations have distinct socioeconomic and tion. While shifting resources from existing demographic characteristics, which can differ programs may be justified—for example, for across contexts. In particular, there is a need to response speed—new financing can be more ensure that studies, assessments, and surveys effective if it is well designed and is managed on sectoral topics include displaced populations by special units authorized to respond quickly. in their sample and are capable of generating Project design should limit the number of disaggregated data on the situation of the implementing agencies and sectors involved displaced vis-à-vis the non-displaced. There and reduce the number of conditions on lend- is a particular need to monitor how hosting ing. Because procurement can be complicated displaced persons exacerbates existing vulner- and time-consuming, it is essential that abilities within the hosting population, to inform implementing agencies have strong institu- the design of mitigation measures. tional capacity to fast-track procurement and manage project implementation. The design 41. The UK’s Department for International Development, through of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system its Secure Access in Volatile Environments (SAVE) research program, has started to look at these issues, though mainly should not be neglected in the rush to provide through a humanitarian lens. Annex III. Key Lessons and Future Action Agenda 41 Box III-1. Indicative Examples of a Broad-Based Risk Management Approach Current State Future State Risk Assessment • Analyzing disaster hazards, assessing exposure, • Adapt risk assessment methodologies to other quantifying fiscal & economic impact of disaster hazards and shocks shocks • Better use of social media, technology, to crowd in • Establishing OPEN Data for Resilience Initiative local information, actors, and solutions (OPEN DRI) and GEO NODE • Greater use of open data platforms across actors • Analytical work understand demographics of • Established processes for dynamic, broad-based, displaced populations, trends, incentives, skills shared risk assessment and early warning sets, needs systems • Improved planning for DRM • Better building practices • Investment in early warning systems • Strengthening civil protection agencies and communities Preparedness • Growing menu of disaster risk transfer tools (insur- • Expand set of contingent financing tools (i.e. ance, derivatives, capital market instruments) CAT-DDO) • Growing evolution of WBG crisis and emergency • Broader use of shared national/regional response policies and procedures (IDA16 Crisis contingency plans and funds (government and Response Window) donor-supported) • Regional risk pools for disaster risk management • Broader use of budget reserves and contingent (CCRIF, PCRAFI, ARC), now expanding to pandem- budget lines ics (PEF) • Expand regional contingency funds and/or risk • IBRD Capital-at-Risk Notes to support bond pools for other shocks issuance to fund specific purposes (i.e. reinsurance • Expanded use of WBG, IFC, MIGA guarantee of CCRIF, MNA regional project) products (including trade finance guarantees for • IMF Rapid Credit Facility, Rapid Financing Instru- private sector actors providing services to critical ment, and concessional facilities for shocks populations) • Structure incentives for risk reduction Response • Implementation of mobile payment systems for • Adapt existing needs assessment and recovery crisis-response methodologies to other hazards and shocks • Scalable social safety nets (starting in • Increase investment in, and widen scope for, crisis- 3–5 countries) responsive social safety nets • Post-disaster assessments and recovery planning, • Incentives for expanding and lowering cost of with increasing engagement in fragile and conflict remittance mobile payment systems situations • Implementation of shared contingency plans (across donors, programs, governments) • Incentives and systems to strengthen private sector role in service provision 42 a response to global forced Displacement Refugees’ poverty and welfare status changes transparency and accountability of government rapidly, so that the typical income and expendi- institutions, delivering services and payment, ture surveys—which take a significant amount of and empowering refugees and migrants to hold time to design, implement, and analyze—are not transition and host countries accountable, the suitable. Such surveys also slow programming use of ICT is key. Today’s European refugee response times. The WBG should standardize/ crisis has demonstrated that access to infor- invest in rapid assessment and household sur- mation and the use of new ICTs (cell phones, vey tools that “cost” the socioeconomic dimen- social media sites, mapping tools) have become sions of displacement and that accurately map essential for refugees and migrants. The WBG the skills, needs, and demographics of host and and other IFIs need to recognize the importance displaced communities as a foundation for in- of deploying appropriate technology (Box III-2 formed policymaking. This work could also con- describes good recent examples). sider recent innovations in the use of cell phones and tablet-based technologies that suits the needs of mobile populations, while making bet- J. More Sustained Support ter use of NGO networks and the private sector. for Refugees Wishing to Creating and maintaining relevant shared data Return and M&E systems in dynamic and complex situations will be challenging. Support to returning refugees is often uneven and is generally inadequate to achieve sustain- The exchange of knowledge on best practice is es- able reintegration. The international commu- sential. Given many countries’ lack of experience nity’s response often depends on a paradigm with refugee accommodation and integration, of “durable solutions”—voluntary return, local there will be a great need for lessons learned integration in the host country, or resettle- from elsewhere. MNA’s Mashreq countries and ment to a third country. Recent WBG analysis countries in the Horn of Africa have amassed suggests that this paradigm is too limited to a large body of experience over the past four capture the complexities and dynamics of refu- years. Mutual learning should take place across gees’ decision-making and coping strategies, regions. Some excellent experiences and pro- since it rests on the idea that durable solutions grams are being brought into the host countries are found when movements stop—that is, that by donor/UN agencies and international NGOs. they are a finite event. I. The Need to Embrace New Technologies and Social Media For data collection and M&E, enhancing coordination on the ground, increasing the Annex III. Key Lessons and Future Action Agenda 43 Box III-2. WBG Use of Technology in Emergency Responses and Conflict-affected Countries • In Somalia, the Mogadishu High Frequency Survey Leone have a mobile phone than a bank account is a WBG-supported survey pilot to help fill the (66% vs. 15%), and there are more mobile money gaps in data required to manage the economy paying agents (950) than bank branches (91), and inform an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy especially in rural areas. This arrangement was Paper. Security conditions in Mogadishu constrain relatively expensive (5% of transferred amounts “normal” development work, and a traditional plus a fixed amount for the establishment of approach to data gathering involving lengthy face- paying agents). An important outcome has been to-face interviews would be too risky. The survey the ability to shift between three complementary team is using a mix of smartphone technology, payment modalities (cash, mobile money, and open-source software applications, real-time field bank transfers). While mobile payments allowed management from a remote command center, for a quick response on scale, the migration to multilayered quality assurance and security pro- bank transfers has saved an estimated $200,000. tocols, and cutting-edge econometric techniques. • The use of infographics and maps is important The survey is implemented by a multidisciplinary to facilitate understanding of complex problems. team staffed from the Ministry of Planning, the Ongoing efforts in the Horn of Africa by UNOCHA WBG, and the private sector (an international and and the WBG on vulnerability mapping using a a Somali firm). subnational risk-based analysis demonstrate what • In Sierra Leone the WBG helped set up a mobile is possible and serve as a powerful advocacy tool payment system to ensure that payments to Ebola with both governments and partners for better response workers and health workers would be targeted assistance. made in a timely fashion. More people in Sierra Annex IV. Potential WBG Support Related to El Niño Technical Assistance disaster response. Box IV-1 shows the lines of action that could potentially help governments A particularly forceful El Nino is forecast for address disaster risks. 2015-2016, and it could mean serious flood- ing in many parts of the world. The greater Some of these activities could be financed impacts on the economy and people that such through a grant from the Global Facility for flooding would bring, as well as the indication Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction (GFDRR) that countries and people are increasingly at the WBG if resources are available. By bring- vulnerable, means that countries and their ing the best science into the conversation, the development partners need to take urgent ac- WB can help to make the case on the possible tions toward better disaster preparedness and impacts of El Niño and the best ways to prepare. Box IV-1. Ways to Assist Governments to Address Disaster Risk Rapid Response Technical Assistance • Emergency response protocols (potential resources mobilization, potential resources allocation, process • Providing global know-how to a country from for reconstruction contracting and prioritization) around the world • Early warning systems (planning, procurement, • Bringing in the best lessons learned on reconstruc- implementation and operation) tion that are relevant to the potential disaster context Recovery Support Revision of Contingency Plans • Assessment of damages and losses • Support for recovery and reconstruction planning • Revision of the national and subnational contin- • Mobilization of international experts with disaster gency plans recovery pratical experience • Provision and/or revision of sectoral contingency • Convening of donors and development partners plans (e.g., transport, energy, health) around selected government reconstruction plans 44 annex Iv. Potential WBG Support Related to El NiÑo 45 Financial Assistance component is included (for instance, through design of a positive list of imported or locally The WBG can provide emergency financing in a manufactured goods, eligible government number of different ways: extraordinary expenditures). Other project components implement following similar Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) processes as other IPFs. (post-disaster)42 • Project preparation process: Same as for ERL • Preparation Time: About 3 months from re- above. quest to Board approval. • What we could finance: Same as for ERL • First disbursement: On average 9 months af- above. ter disaster occurs (time from Board to first disbursement, mainly needed for country Contingent Project procedures for effectiveness, and to a lesser • Preparation Time: About 9–12 months from extent for procurement). Project implements request to Board approval. following similar processes as other IPFs. • First disbursement: Depending on project • Project preparation process: Follows emer- design, could disburse large amounts within gency processing procedures under OP days after an eligible request, for parts de- 10.00, paragraph 12: one decision review signed as a financial hedge with objectively meeting, safeguard instruments can be verifiable triggers, or if design links with developed after Board approval, normally al- well-functioning social protection schemes. lows for higher procurement thresholds, and A quick-disbursing goods procurement com- can allow for up to 40% retroactive financing. ponent could disburse within approximately • What we could finance: Works, goods, ser- 1 month after disaster. Other project compo- vices, and eligible extraordinary government nents implement following similar processes expenditures. as other IPFs. • Project preparation process: Follows regular Emergency Recovery Loan IPF guidelines. (pre-disaster) • What we could finance: Similar to ERL, + cash • Preparation Time: About 6 months from re- transfer programs, + financial hedges. quest to Board approval. The World Bank has a variety of other finan- • First disbursement: Approximately 1 month cial instruments that could be discussed with after disaster occurs if a quick-disbursing clients in anticipation of impacts from El Niño 42. The rules for this type of operations, now formally called and in preparation for other disasters. Projects of Fragility, Conflict, Capacity Constraint, and Emergency, are described in WBG Operational Policy 10.00, paragraph 12. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/ 0,,menuPK:4564185~pagePK:64719906~piPK:64710996~ theSitePK:502184,00.html. Annex V. Selected Country and Regional Profiles A. Chad reach 525,000 people by the end of 2015. When retournés are included, the country is hosting Context a total of at least 750,000  displaced people, according to the UN Regional Humanitarian Chad is a large, landlocked, poor country whose Coordinator for the Sahel. recent history has been one of local, national, and regional conflicts. Chad also faces rapid Additionally, armed conflict, inter-ethnic vio- climate change and population growth, ag- lence, and attacks by criminal groups known gravating pressure on natural resources and as coupeurs de route forced tens of thousands bringing associated conflict. In addition, the of people to flee their homes in Chad between twin shocks of an oil price collapse and a costly 2006 and 2008. There are around 85,000 in- fight against terrorism to secure the region ternally displaced persons (IDPs) from this have exacerbated the situation. Against this conflict and subsequent cross-border attacks backdrop, Chad is hosting significant numbers from Darfur and recent Boko Haram attacks. of refugees from the protracted conflict in Some 41,666 Chadian refugees are living in Su- neighbouring Sudan, CAR, and now Nigeria. dan. Thousands of Chadian returnees who fled There were also spillovers from the Libyan cri- fighting in CAR also remain displaced in Chad: sis and more recently from Boko Haram. in mid-September 2014, there were more than 113,000 such returnees. With 475,000 refugees, Chad is the third- largest host of refugees in Africa, after Legal and Policy Framework Kenya and Ethiopia. The largest group of refu- gees—361,244—is from Sudan. During the 2011 On July 11, 2011, Chad ratified the Kampala Libya crisis, 51,000 Chadians and 800  third- Convention on IDPs,43 which came into force in country nationals crossed the southern border 2012. However, by the end of 2013, the coun- of Libya into Chad. There are 92,118 refugees try had yet to develop the legal framework from CAR, most of whom live in a state of for ensuring the protection and assistance of protracted displacement, and 18,000 Nigerian IDPs to which it committed in ratifying the refugees are now in Chad following the Boko Kampala Convention. Specific information on Haram attacks. The refugee numbers are the application of the Kampala Convention and equivalent to over 4 percent of the population, on refugee policies and legislation in Chad is the third-highest level in the world, according to UNHCR. With the continuing influx from 43. African Union convention that provides for the protection and Nigeria, the refugee population in Chad should assistance of IDPs in Africa. 46 Annex V. Selected Country and Regional Profiles 47 unclear. The Commission Nationale d’Accueil, on the economy. In particular, the construction de Réinsertion des Réfugiés et des Rapatriés and services sectors are substantially affected is the responsible agency. On September 10, by the deterioration of security conditions, 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted contributing to underperformance in non-oil the signing of a tripartite agreement between fiscal revenue. Disruptions to cross-border UNHCR, the Chadian Government, and the trade flows with Cameroon and Nigeria have CAR Government on CAR refugees’ participa- led to upward pressures on domestic prices, tion in elections in their country’s forthcoming and the annual average inflation rate increased elections. from 1.7 percent in 2014 to 4 percent at the end of August 2015. Impacts, Stresses, and Risks Forced displacement has had social costs— The protracted presence of refugees and IDPs increased insecurity, with rising crime and has led to severe humanitarian and social violence, including rape and theft, with par- cohesion challenges in Chad. The host commu- ticularly adverse consequences for women and nities are living in precarious conditions, with girls—and economic costs, with increased cost significant developmental and service delivery of living in refugee-concentrated areas. There- deficits and a fragile natural environment. fore, there is a real possibility of conflict over For example, Bethel, with a native population resources, environmental degradation, and of 695 people, now hosts 3,475 arrivals from inequalities, with disproportionate impact on elsewhere. This has put pressure on the local the poor households that have limited coping ­ infrastructure—for example, the only water capacities. point or the six available classrooms. Women and children stand in line during the whole day Protracted conflict in the region, especially for water, and every class has 60 to 90 chil- the instability in Nigeria, has affected trade dren. The village also lacks latrines, meaning a corridors, pastoralists’ movements, and cattle serious risk of outbreaks of waterborne disease. exports. It is estimated that because of con- The only health facility is 20 kilometers away. flict, the formal trade between Chad and Nige- ria declined by 75 percent between 2012 and The direct economic impact—and particularly 2014 and a similar order of magnitude could be the fiscal costs—of hosting refugees is difficult expected for informal trade, leading to lower to assess. There is no specific allocation in total export revenues (US$100–200 million) the country’s budget, and most expenses are and lower prices for livestock on the Chadian extra-budgetary and directly financed by in- domestic market. ternational partners and NGOs. That said, the Government is supporting efforts to seek al- Donor Assistance ternatives to camps, granting refugees access to arable land for agricultural production and The UNHCR budgets for Chad have gone down allowing them to settle in host communities since 2011, from around US$200 million per and access basic community services, which year to US$162.5 million in 2015. That said, the necessarily entails fiscal cost. 2015 budget was set before the new inflow of refugees from Nigeria, so additional support In addition, the regional security situation lead- could be provided before the end of the year. ing to the inflow of refugees has a clear impact The total humanitarian aid from the European 48 a response to global forced Displacement Commission is €40–50 million per year (€42.8 among displaced people than among the million in 2015), with a significant part of this non-displaced: help intended to meet the urgent needs aris- ing from the protracted refugee crisis and the • In Ukraine, the IDP population includes recent influx of refugees and returnees from 60  percent elderly people, 13 percent chil- Nigeria and CAR.44 dren, and 4 percent persons with disabilities. • In Bosnia/Herzegovina, 32 percent of refu- gee and IDP households are single-parent B. Europe and Central Asia households. • In Turkey, 51 percent of Syrian refugees are Context under 18 years of age. ECA countries currently host over 6 million people who have been displaced as a result of Legal and Policy Framework war and conflict. Of these, 64 percent are IDPs, The European decisions to host refugees in the while the rest are refugees and asylum seekers immediate and longer term will require quick (See Table V-1). The largest groups of refu- action, as well as technical/financial support gees are in Turkey (1.94 million refugees from from the international community. Since the Syria), Ukraine (1.46 million IDPs), Azerbaijan September 2015 decision of the European (622,892 IDPs), Georgia (262,704 IDPs) and Justice and Home Affairs to accept refugees, Russia (238,835 refugees). The numbers of the and to implement a quota system to do so, displaced in ECA have doubled over the last five many EU Member States will accommodate years, largely because of conflicts in Syria and refugees. Such a clear signal by the EU will Ukraine. likely attract more refugees, which will mean that eastern neighbors will see an increase in Data on the demographic composition and vul- refugees transiting through their borders. It is nerability of the displaced people across ECA also likely that EU countries will face the chal- are incomplete. But where data are available, lenge of organizing a medium- to long-term there are indications of greater vulnerability solution for integrating refugees. With some exceptions (Turkey, Greece, FYR Macedonia, 44. Other international and bilateral partners present in Chad Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia), which with direct financial and logistical assistance include US, have already seen significant transit of refu- France, AFD, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International gees, many Member States have not yet had Cooperation - GIZ), FAO, Good Neighbors, IOM, OCHA, to deal with receiving large numbers of forced OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, World Food Program, World Health Organization, World Bank. migrants or providing semi-permanent ser- NGOs include African Initiatives for Relief and Development, vices to refugees. Most have limited expertise Association pour la Promotion des Libertés Fondamentales au Tchad, Association pour le Développement Economique et managing the integration process—in particu- Social de Kobe, Associazione di Cooperazione Rurale in Africa lar as it relates to service delivery, particularly, e America Latina, Bureau d’Appui Santé et Environnement, CARE, Centre de Support en Santé Internationale au Tchad, in housing, education, health, and access to Christian Outreach for Relief and Development, Croix-Rouge employment—and, unless they receive techni- du Tchad, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Jesuit cal assistance, will likely struggle to do so suc- Refugee Service, Lutheran World Federation—Action by cessfully, even for relatively small numbers of Churches Together, Refugee Education Trust, Secours Catholique pour le Développement. refugees. Annex V. Selected Country and Regional Profiles 49 Table V-1. Displacement Figures in ECA Refugees + Aslyum Seekers Originating from IDPs Armenia 17,711 18,146 Azerbaijan 1,693 14,923 622,892 Bosnia Herzegovina 6,900 20,458 84,500 Croatia 845 40,240 Cyprus 7,593 10 212,400 Georgia 2,114 14,541 262,704 Kyrgyz 689 4,274 Kosovo 49,089 17,100 FYR Macedonia 2,434 9,559 Montenegro 6,531 1,883 Russia 238,836 96,976 25,378 Serbia 43,751 91,707 223,139 Turkey 1,938,999 75,177 Not available Turkmenistan 35 1,242 Ukraine 9,127 252,731 1,460,000 Uzbekistan 125 6,789 Source: UNHCR and Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Impacts, Stresses, and Risks live in a single-room dwelling.45 Across ECA, ap- proximately 400,000 IDPs still live in “collective Across ECA, the housing and living conditions centers”—former university dormitories, hospi- of the displaced are generally worse than those tals, and schools—often overcrowded, and with of the non-displaced. In Azerbaijan 43 percent poor infrastructure. In Ukraine, up to 10 percent of IDPs live in one-room accommodation, of IDPs live in substandard “collective centers”; compared to only 9 percent of non IDPs, and those that rent are often unhappy with their rates of access to electricity, hot water, and accommodation in exile, face high rents and/or bathrooms are worse among IDPs (World Bank discrimination in the housing market, or move 2011). In Turkey, 25 percent of Syrians are living several times before finding appropriate hous- in makeshift accommodation, only 25 percent ing. High rents also contribute to overcrowding have access to heating, and only 35 percent in some housing units (WB Ukraine Displace- have easy access to toilets and shower fa- ment Brief, 2014). cilities (Alliance, 2014). Of the refugee families surveyed in Hatay, Urfa, and Kilis, 84 percent 45. Support to Life, 2014. 50 a response to global forced Displacement Depending on the country of entry, refugees to to be the largest host country in the EU. They the EU face several challenges: suggest that Germany could spend €25 billion (US$28.5 billion) to provide assistance to 1 mil- • Prevention of and penalties against illegal lion existing and new refugees over the next two crossings. In Italy, illegal crossings are years. This is equivalent to about 0.4 percent of punishable by fine or jail. In Greece, asylum Germany’s GDP per year. seekers are sometimes detained. For his- torical reasons, former socialist countries This impact could be mitigated if refugees have more restrictive policies on the influx quickly find employment so they can start of refugees, while Germany and the Nordic contributing. Current estimates for refu- countries have more generous resettlement gee inflows in 2015 and 2016 suggest that policies. In Hungary, new emergency laws new refugees in Germany would increase make illegal border crossings and aiding the working-age population by about 1.3 migrants punishable by prison time. percent, and they may complement the • Access to social protection. Asylum seekers existing skills mix—although some uptick in are eligible for accommodation and subsis- frictional unemployment is to be expected tence in cash or in kind in most European in the short run. countries, although the generosity of such support varies significantly across countries. Research by Credit Suisse suggests that If the request for asylum is rejected, in most the influx of refugees could lift EU growth by countries the person has the right to appeal 0.2  percentage points through both demand- in court. However, the backlog of asylum ap- side effects in the short run and supply-side plications currently exceeds 500,000. effects in the longer run. • Access to work. In most European coun- The so called Western Balkans route is increas- tries, access to a work permit for an asy- ingly used by migrants/refugees moving from lum seeker varies significantly, with the Turkey to Greece and then principally to FYR average wait being nine months. Germany Macedonia and Serbia en route to Europe: it has recently reduced that period to three is less deadly to cross by sea from Turkey to months. However, many employers appear Greece than from Libya to Italy. Such life-or- reluctant to hire refugees as they are un- death decisions are likely to trump any poten- sure how long the person can legally stay tial EU border closures, at least in the short in the country. term: refugees have adapted to closed borders • Integration. Because of their transient situa- by moving through neighboring countries (such tion as well as language and cultural barriers, as away from Hungary and through Croatia) refugees everywhere face larger obstacles rather than rerouting away from Greece. At- to economic integration than do other im- tempts to block refugees at EU borders have migrant groups. heightened tensions between Serbia and The initial fiscal impact in Europe is negative neighboring countries. According to UNHCR es- but is likely to remain manageable. Available es- timates, 3,000–5,000 migrants are expected timates come mainly from Germany, which—in to cross from Greece into FYR Macedonia every both absolute and relative terms—is expected day in the coming months (between September Annex V. Selected Country and Regional Profiles 51 9 and 15 the average daily influx was more C. Kenya than 5,000 per day, with a peak of 10,400 on September 11). According to some estimates, Context as many as 500,000 people are fleeing Syria in Migration and population displacement issues 2015; and Germany expects 800,000 requests in Kenya are politically sensitive because they for asylum this year, with some credible reports are closely related to issues around national pushing the estimates to even 1.5 million. As a security, land, unequal access, and social griev- result, Western Balkan countries might face ances. These issues can be traced back to the further increases in transit flows and possibly colonial period and its practices of eviction (i.e., increased transit time; or eventually migrants forced migration) and unequal development. might settle in those countries if EU borders They underlie the violence and conflict-induced close. This would increase the need for expand- displacement following elections in 1992, 1997, ing hosting infrastructure and related services, and 2007. This legacy conditions how the so- especially as winter is approaching. It might cial, economic, and security stresses of forced eventually require more permanent refugee displacement are addressed, including in the support. specific context of climate change and environ- mental stresses. To date, the main pressure points in Western Balkans have been in FYR Macedonia and After Ethiopia, Kenya is Africa’s second-largest Serbia, with other Western Balkan countries receiving country of refugees. By the end of minimally affected. Following FYR Macedo- August 2015, Kenya was host to over 591,000 nia’s temporary border closure in late August refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia, 2015, the situation gradually improved when South Sudan, Ethiopia, and other countries FYR Macedonia’s Government opened a re- in the region. These figures include more than ception center near the Greek border, giving 420,000 Somali refugees in protracted dis- assurances to UNHCR that it will be open placement and over 93,000 South Sudanese to refugees fleeing conflict, and asking for refugees. Somali refugees are mainly located in EU assistance. With a renewed increase in Dadaab camp—the largest refugee settlement transit movements, further bottlenecks are in the world, with a population corresponding to developing to support such transit, and con- Kenya’s fourth-largest city—and the Kakuma straints on trains and on reception center/ refugee camp in Turkana County, which hosts border-crossing capacities are reappearing. 181,000 refugees (15% of the county’s popula- Serbia has been relatively well organized, tion) from 15 countries. with a border-transit center in Mitrovac and another transit center in Presevo in the south In addition to refugees, at the end of February and a policy of letting people through. To 2015 there were about 309,200 IDPs in Kenya, date other Western Balkan countries are not displaced by ethnic and political violence and main transit points, and thus have not been land disputes since the 1990s. This conserva- significantly affected, although the situation tive figure also includes 220,000 new displace- changes daily. Western Balkan countries ments in 2014 caused by inter-communal themselves have also seen a large source of clashes. These figures do not include people asylum seekers in recent months. displaced by natural hazards, development 52 a response to global forced Displacement projects, and pastoralist IDPs. Nor do they restricted since December 2012, when, fol- include any of the estimated 300,000 people lowing a series of security incidents in Nairobi, who fled post-election violence in 2007–08 and the Government of Kenya issued a directive who are usually described as “integrated” IDPs; outlining an encampment policy. After legal that is, IDPs who found shelter with host com- challenges, including from the Urban Refugee munities or in rented accommodations in urban Projection Network, the Kenyan High Court is- and peri-urban areas.46 sued an order stopping the Government from implementing this directive. Subsequently, an Nairobi has seen an urban population explo- encampment order was issued in March 2014. sion of refugees and IDPs in search of greater Since April 2014, the Government has started security, including a degree of anonymity, to relocate refugees and asylum seekers from better access to basic services, and greater urban areas, including by forced relocations, economic opportunities. However, Government to either Dadaab or Kakuma refugee camps. and public perceptions were shaped by cases Article 16 of the 2006 Kenyan Refugee Act ef- of insecurity, experienced not only in Dadaab fectively limits the refugees’ right to work by camps but also in urban areas such as Nairobi imposing the same restrictions and conditions and Mombasa, where recent grenade attacks as are applicable to aliens. have taken place. In November 2013 UNHCR, the Government of Legal and Policy Framework Kenya, and the Somali Government signed the The Kenyan Constitution provides some level “Tripartite Agreement Governing the Voluntary of rights protection for displaced persons. Repatriation of Somali Refugees Living in However, Kenya has struggled to incorporate Ken­ ya,” which sets the standards for safe, dig- the rights-based norms of the Guiding Prin- nified, and sustainable return and outlines the ciples and the more recently proposed national responsibilities of each party to the Agreement guidelines on IDPs into its national legal or to ensure compliance with its provisions. Since normative frameworks. Kenya is also a State December 2014 UNHCR has assisted 3,758 party to the 1951 Convention relating to the refugees to return home to Somalia in a pro- Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organiza- cess that has been gradual and incremental. tion of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Impact, Stresses, and Risks Africa. The 2006 Refugees Act and the 2009 The refugee presence in Kenya has had both Refugees Regulations—both pieces of national positive and negative social, economic, and legislation—contain specific provisions on refu- environmental impacts. Among the positive gees and asylum seekers. social impacts are the increased ties between the refugees and host communities, including The 2010 Constitution provides for the right incidents of intermarriage. Negative impacts to free movement and guarantees freedom include perceptions of insecurity, such as blam- to all to enter, remain, and reside anywhere ing refugees for criminal activities. In terms of in the country. However, urban refugees’ economic impacts, remittances into refugee freedom of movement has been significantly camps, often from the expansive Somali di- aspora networks, have increased refugee pur- 46. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015. chasing power, stimulating the host economy Annex V. Selected Country and Regional Profiles 53 and providing working capital for refugees to about possibilities and ways to develop a new engage in small business activities. However, refugee settlement in Kalobeyei Site in Turkana inflation and competition for unskilled labor County that will enable (a) better livelihood op- are also reported. For both Dadaab and Ka- portunities for refugees and host communities, kuma, competition for scarce environmental and (b)  service delivery in a manner that is resources like cooking fuel has led to significant integrated with local development planning. environmental degradation. The changing asylum space in Kenya has been D. Lebanon-Jordan characterized by a key debate on the balance between protecting refugees and asylum seek- Context ers and security management in the context of Of the 5 million refugees from the Syrian civil changing security dynamics, in both Kenya and war, 1.2 million are in Lebanon and 630,000 the region. The Westgate Mall attack in Sep- in Jordan, representing 30 and 20 percent of tember 2013 increased the sense of insecurity in those countries’ populations, respectively.47 Kenya. In April 2015, following the attack at Ga- Only 15 percent of the refugees are in camps rissa University, there was a movement to close (mostly in Jordan); the rest live in host commu- Dadaab within three months and return 350,000 nities, relying on humanitarian assistance for Somalis to Somalia. After a meeting between the their food. More than half live in substandard President of Kenya and the United Nations High accommodation, with challenges related to Commissioner for Refugees on May 6, 2015, it tenure, privacy, physical security, sanitation, was announced that Dadaab would not be closed, and overcrowding. In Jordan, 98 percent of although the program to repatriate the Somali refugees living outside the camps rent their refugees from Dadaab would be enhanced to accommodation at rates that typically equal include new areas that are considered safe. more than half their income. Proposed Solutions Using a poverty line of 50 Jordanian dinar per The WBG is providing support to devolution person a month, it is estimated that 69.2 percent and lagging counties to reduce the fragility and of the refugees in Jordan are below the poverty violence stresses that are related to develop- line.48 UNHCR’s 2014 Vulnerability Assessment ment deficiencies and (perceived) marginaliza- of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon estimated that tion. This includes supporting Kenyan priorities 71 percent of Syrian refugees cannot meet their on regional integration within the IGAD and basic needs without engaging in negative cop- EAC membership, including on such issues as ing strategies.49 Of the refugees, 80 percent regional IDA borderlands, lagging regions, and have no more than a primary education. Almost cross-border cluster investment in FY17. half of the 950,000 registered school-age Syr- ian refugee children are not enrolled in school. The World Bank and UNHCR are carrying out an interdisciplinary economic and social impact 47. For Lebanon, this percentage is the same as if the entire population of Mexico moved to the United States, or the study to assess the macro, micro, and social entire population of Nigeria moved to Europe. impacts of the presence of refugees in Ka- 48. “How Poor are Refugees?” A Welfare Assessment of Syrians living in Jordan and Lebanon, World Bank Group and UNHCR, kuma. In addition, the World Bank is providing 2015. UNHCR technical advice on creatively thinking 49. Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, UNHCR, 2015. 54 a response to global forced Displacement The refugees face both economic and politi- increased—in some cases doubled. Electricity cal constraints. On the political side, there is and water shortages are common. resistance to granting refugees work permits and in general providing them with benefits Rents in the northern governorates of Jordan that host communities do not share. The have increased significantly, forcing many lo- UK, the World Bank and the Government cals to leave their apartments for Syrians, who of Jordan are proposing the establishment often fit many families in single apartments. of “Development Zones” in some of the lag- There is some evidence that low-skilled Jorda- ging regions of Jordan to create jobs for nians and Lebanese are facing lower earnings both refugees and Jordanians, while allowing because of competition from Syrians who are goods produced in these zones to receive willing to take jobs at lower wages. greater access to European markets. A joint The large influx of refugees into communities team from these three institutions has pre- that were already vulnerable and marginalized pared a proposal that will be issued shortly. is leading to rising community tensions in the A visit of CEOs of potential investing com- hosting countries. In the Northern Jordanian panies is being planned for later this year. On governorates of Irbid and Mafraq, 20 percent the economic side, Jordan and Lebanon are of communities reported tensions linked to middle-income countries with limited fiscal lack of affordable housing, education, and space. These governments may not want to income-generating opportunities. In Lebanon, borrow at non-concessional rates to finance the refugee crisis, coupled with the infiltration programs for refugees. Grant resources have of militants across the borders, has caused been limited. Therefore, the World Bank has several security incidents. proposed an international grant mechanism that could be used by these countries to buy- The median time a person spends as a refugee down the interest costs of non-concessional is 17 years. Surveys of Syrian refugees in the loans that are used to support refugees and region suggest that up to 20 percent of forcibly host communities. displaced Syrians have no intention of return- ing home. In addition, the civil war does not Impacts, Stresses, and Risks seem to be abating. The impact of the Syrian crisis in general has been estimated to be about 2.6 percentage points of GDP per year in Lebanon and about World Bank Group Response 1  percent of GDP in Jordan. The influx of The Bank prepared a landmark study on the refugees has increased public expenditures by economic and social impact of the Syrian crisis about US$1.1 billion in Lebanon, and by about on Lebanon (about 2.6 percentage points of 1 percent of GDP in Jordan. GDP growth each year), which served as the basis of a multidonor effort to support the Crowding and congestion in public services are country. becoming common. Public schools are running double shifts; in Jordan, the afternoon shift is As early as 2013, the Bank rapidly approved reserved for Syrian students. Across both Leb- an emergency US$150 million “cash injection” anon and Jordan, the volume of solid waste has loan to Jordan to offset the fiscal impact of Annex V. Selected Country and Regional Profiles 55 the crisis on the country’s budget as a result against forced return, and provision of immedi- of extending subsidies and health services to ate needs. The TP extends to all Syrian refugees, refugees. whether or not they are registered. In October 2014, Turkey passed additional legal guidelines In Lebanon and Jordan, the Bank is addressing for “Foreigners under Temporary Protection” the impact of the refugee influx on local service that guarantee registered refugees access to delivery through a municipality-based devel- health care, education, social services, and the opment operation, with two multidonor trust labor market. Regulation on access to the labor funds that leveraged grant financing from the market through work permits is under discus- Bank’s State and Peace-building Fund. In addi- sion with the Council of Ministers. tion, the Bank is supporting the health, educa- tion, and social protection sectors in Lebanon Overall, the Government of Turkey is setting to ensure a balance in the benefits to vulnerable a global precedent for a refugee response. communities of both Syrians and Lebanese. Implementation of the Government response is marked by two key characteristics. First, the approach does not depend exclusively on E. Turkey camps. Of the total number of SuTP, 259,187 (12%) are living in 30 shelters;52 the rest (88%) Context who live outside camps are mainly settled in ur- Turkey now hosts the largest refugee population ban areas, where they seek their own location, in the world. According to a recent statement by accommodation, and informal work opportuni- Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus, the ties. Second, the response is Government-led. total number of registered SuTP has reached The Government of Turkey has spent about 2,225,147.50 UNHCR51 puts the figures at more $8 billion on its response to Syrian refugees, than 1,938,990. The largest concentrations including the extension of health care services of refugees are in Istanbul (20% of the overall and humanitarian assistance. refugee population) and the southern provinces of Gaziantep (14%), Hatay (12%), and Sanliurfa The Turkish response to Syrian refugees (10%). Of all refugees, 51 percent are children includes much more than the macro Govern- under 18 years of age (AFAD 2013). ment-led legal framework and humanitarian expenditure. It also includes many acts of in- Legal and Policy Framework dividual kindness at the local level: very many The Government of Turkey defined its response Turkish families and civil society organizations to the arrival of refugees from Syria through have made donations and extended help to the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International their new Syrian neighbors. One survey (HUGO, Protection, setting out a Temporary Protection 2014) across a large sample in 18 provinces in- regime (TP) for the Syrian refugees. The TP dicates that 31 percent of Turkish respondents includes rights to unlimited stay, protection had made a financial contribution to support Syrian refugees. 50. http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1130284-numan- kurtulmus-turkiyede-kayitli-2-milyon-225-bin-147-suriyeli- var. Accessed on 9/22/2015. 52. https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetay1.aspx?ID=16& 51. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224. IcerikID=848. 56 a response to global forced Displacement Impacts, Stresses, and Risks The quality of the housing stock used by the refugees has also been raised as a concern, with The SuTP have had a potentially positive effect one assessment reporting that only 25 percent on the Turkish economy. Further gains have of respondents have access to heating and come from the expansion of local markets in 35  percent have easy access to toilets and areas with high SuTP concentration, continued shower facilities. Very few refugees have the receipt of remittances from within Syria, the protection of a formal rental contract, and the benefits of government SuTP expenditure for provision of housing is entirely unregulated. local suppliers, and labor contribution from SuTP. WBG analysis shows that while Turkish In the absence of work permits, refugees are workers have been displaced from the informal working mainly in the informal sector and in labor market by SuTP informal labor—with low-skill jobs such as seasonal agricultural stronger negative effects for women and work, construction, manufacturing or textiles, youth—there are also some positive effects: and waste picking and sorting. Some have also greater formalization of Turkish labor, in- been absorbed into the service industry. There creased average wages, and Turkish workers are reports of exploitative working conditions: choosing retraining. Together these trends may long hours, unsafe conditions, lack of guar- account for a preliminary finding that poverty anteed payment, and low wages. Begging is rates are falling faster in regions hosting SuTP also increasing as a way of seeking household than in other regions in the country. income. But the strains of hosting refugees are being World Bank Group Response felt in multiple ways, especially in cities in the southeast: increased rental costs, strains on The World Bank aims to support the Govern- municipal services, perceived increase in wait- ment in mitigating the potential negative ing times and overcrowding at hospitals, and impacts of hosting SuTP while building on the perceived competition in the labor market. positive economic contributions the refugees Rental prices, for example, have doubled along can make. In recognition of the developmental the Syrian border over the last two years. And approach taken by the Government, the World these strains are contributing to a growing Bank position is to support what Turkey is al- tension among Turkish communities about the ready doing by strengthening Government sys- SuTP presence. tems. Currently the greatest need is for stronger data to inform policy ­implementation—a need Registered SuTP are entitled to free health care the WBG is helping to fill. at national Turkish facilities, but there are re- ports that Syrian refugees are reluctant to use The WBG is partnering with the Government of the free health care because of an inability to Turkey to undertake the analysis to strengthen communicate their health concerns in Turkish the identification and quantification of the im- and the need for translators. School enrollment pact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host com- and attendance for children outside the camps munities. A nationally representative household is low—only about 24 percent. The Government survey is planned for early 2016 to generate is working to address the situation by drafting the quantitative data to address these issues. the legal framework and support to allow SuTP There has been particular demand for the as- children to access mainstream Turkish schools. sessment from the Ministry of Labor and Social Annex V. Selected Country and Regional Profiles 57 Services, which would benefit from information and intimidation—and many are increasingly on the skills and labor preferences of Syrian looking to escape to Europe. The total number refugees to ensure a smooth implementation of IDPs who were profiled by the IDP task forces of the proposed awarding of work permits for stands at 1,013,553 as of end-August 2015. SuTP. The Ministry of Education (MoNE) has expressed demand for rigorous information, The basic driver of population displacement in which would allow it to assess the education Afghanistan is violent conflict. In recent years, preferences of Syrian refugees and the pos- many people feel a growing disenchantment sibilities for integrating Syrian children into the about the prospect for peace after the large- Turkish schooling system. scale withdrawal of international forces at the end of 2014, a concomitant decline in aid flows, The working relationship between the Govern- and an extended election period that led to ment of Turkey and the World Bank has been widespread political instability. As a result, eco- formalized by setting up a Steering Committee nomic growth has suffered and poverty levels for the assessment. The Steering Committee have stagnated. Many Afghans see no prospect will give technical input into the design of the of getting jobs and being able to adequately assessment and its sampling, and will ensure support their families. Increasingly, many are coordination with the Government policy direc- also fearful of state collapse and a return of tions in regard to the refugees. Recently, the the Taliban. Recent events in the north of the WBG also received a request from the Govern- country in Kunduz, where the Taliban briefly ment for grant funding to extend education captured the city, will only have reinforced this services to Syrian children. fear: some 8000 families are reported by the UN to have fled the city in September 2015. F. Afghanistan UNHCR Afghanistan does not maintain figures for the numbers of Afghans who have left. Context The following figures were collected in various Nearly four decades of conflict in Afghanistan countries (“entry points”) along the Mediter- has resulted in large numbers of displaced ranean coast. In the first eight months of 2015, people. The armed conflict triggered by the So- 322,500 individuals arrived by sea in Europe, viet invasion in 1979 led to the largest coerced and 12 percent of the arrivals by sea were Af- movement in recent times. At its peak some ghans. Of the total number of arrivals, 115,500 7.7  million people were displaced—3.2  million arrived in Italy and 204,954 arrived in Greece as refugees in Pakistan, 2.35 million in Iran, by sea. In addition, 104,915 individuals were and an estimated 2 million internally displaced. registered in Serbia. In the Yugoslav Republic of After the collapse of the Taliban in 2001 Macedonia, 53,571 individuals were registered many refugees in Pakistan and Iran returned between June 19 and September 1, 2015, alone. to Afghanistan. According to UNHCR, some 5  million refugees have returned since 2002, Following Syrians (49%), Afghans present the increasing Afghanistan’s population by 20 per- second-largest group on the move, making up cent. Today, as a result of ongoing conflict, 12% of the arrivals in Europe. They are followed by families continue to move to escape violence Eritreans (9%), Nigerians (4%), and Somalis (3%). 58 a response to global forced Displacement World Bank Group Response pointing out the impact on growth and lack of fiscal space for civilian and development spend- The role of the World Bank is to both (a) under- ing, and the increasing share of budget going stand and provide critical analysis of the push for security expenditures (2013, Afghanistan in and pull factors that lie behind migration, and Transition). This work strongly reinforced the (b) learn lessons from hosting countries on so- message about the need for a more inclusive cial and economic inclusion, provision of basic growth path that emphasizes job creation services, and the economic impact of refugees and agricultural development, as well as for and displaced groups on local and country long-term and predictable donor support to economies. The Bank’s unique perspective is ensure that the Government has the finances developmental—to balance immediate human- to deliver basic services to the population. The itarian responses with medium- and longer- Bank’s analysis pointed out that the principal term development plans and interventions that constraint on growth is the ongoing conflict. would include the private and public sectors in In these circumstances, a more interventionist generating jobs, revenues, and growth as well approach may be necessary in the short term as in delivering services. to stimulate the creation of jobs and even cash In Afghanistan between 2010 and 2012 the transfers to the poor, to provide a necessary Bank analyzed the economic and fiscal im- safety net for more vulnerable segments of the plications of international troop withdrawal, population.