Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2586 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT ON ONE GRANT AND TWO CREDITS IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 67.4 MILLION (US$ 107.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER FOR THE GROWTH POLICY REFORM GRANT 1 (GPRG-1) SECOND GROWTH POLICY REFORM CREDIT (GPRC-2), AND SUPPLEMENTAL CREDIT TO THE SECOND GROWTH POLICY REFORM CREDIT February 4, 2013 Sector Department: AFTP4 Country Department: AFCW3 Africa Region REPUBLIC OF NIGER GROWTH POLICY REFORM GRANT 1 (GPRG-1) SECOND GROWTH POLICY REFORM CREDIT (GPRC-2), AND SUPPLEMENTAL CREDIT TO THE SECOND GROWTH POLICY REFORM CREDIT FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective as of January 08, 2013) Currency Unit = F CFA US$ 1.00 = 500F CFA FISCAL YEAR ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AIPU Agricultural Inputs Procurement Unit BCEAO Central Bank of West African States CAFER Autonomous Road Maintenance Fund CAIMA Agricultural Inputs and Materials Center CAS Country Assistance Strategy CEM Country Economic Memorandum DGPP Government Declaration on Population Policy CNE National Savings Bank CNDP National Council of Political Dialogue CWIQ Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire survey DHS Demographic and Health Survey DPO Development Policy Operation EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FINAPOSTE Postal Bank of Niger FNR National Retirement Fund GPR Growth Policy Reform GPRG-1 Growth Policy Reform Grant1 GPRC-2 Growth Policy Reform Credit2 ICA Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) ICRR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association ISB Business Income Tax ISR Implementation Status Report IMF International Monetary Fund PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability PEMFAR Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review i PRODEM Multi-sector Demographic Program PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper NGOs Non-governmental organizations UNFPA United Nations Population Fund WAAPP West Africa Agricultural Productivity program WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Sector Manager: Miria A. Pigato Task Team Leader: Robert Johann Utz ICRR Team Leader: Abdoulahi Garba ii Contents 1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design......................................................................... 12 1.1 Context at Appraisal ......................................................................................................................... 12 1.2 Original Program Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators ........................................... 13 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators ..................................................................................................... 13 1.4 Original Policy Areas Supported by the Program ............................................................................. 13 1.5 Revised Policy Areas ........................................................................................................................ 14 1.6 Other significant changes .................................................................................................................. 14 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ........................................................................... 15 2.1 Program Performance ....................................................................................................................... 15 2.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation ......................................................................................... 17 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization .................................. 20 2.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation ...................................................................................... 20 3. Assessment of Outcomes ........................................................................................................................ 20 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ..................................................................... 20 3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives .......................................................................... 21 3.3 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating .......................................................................................... 27 3.4 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ........................................................................ 27 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ....................................................................................... 28 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance.................................................................................... 29 5.1 Bank Performance ............................................................................................................................. 29 5.2 Borrower Performance ...................................................................................................................... 30 6. Lessons Learned...................................................................................................................................... 30 List of Tables Table 1: GPR series prior actions ............................................................................................................... 15 Table 2: Registered tax payers .................................................................................................................... 21 Table 3: Condition of Road Network .......................................................................................................... 23 Table 4: Extension services, 2009-2012 ..................................................................................................... 25 Table 5: Pro-poor and priority sector expenditures (% of GDP), 2007-2012 ............................................. 26 List of Annexes Annex 1: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ........................................... 32 Annex 2: Beneficiary Survey Results ......................................................................................................... 35 Annex 3. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................................................. 36 N/AAnnex 4: Summary of Borrower's ICRR and/or Comments on Draft ICRR ....................................... 36 Annex 5: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ..................................................... 38 N/AAnnex 6: List of Supporting Documents ............................................................................................. 38 Annex 7: Map ............................................................................................................................................. 40 iii A. Basic Information Program 1 Niger Growth Policy Reform Country Niger Program Name Grant (Growth DPL-1) Program ID P107741 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-H4680 ICRR Date 01/21/2013 ICRR Type Core ICRR Lending Instrument DPL Borrower REPUBLIC OF NIGER Original Total XDR 26.50M Disbursed Amount XDR 26.50M Commitment Implementing Agencies Ministry of Economy and Finance Cofinanciers and Other External Partners Program 2 Growth Policy Reform Country Niger Program Name Operation II Program ID P117286 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-49620 ICRR Date 01/21/2013 ICRR Type Core ICRR Lending Instrument DPL Borrower REPUBLIC OF NIGER Original Total XDR 32.10M Disbursed Amount XDR 32.10M Commitment Implementing Agencies Cofinanciers and Other External Partners Program 3 GPRC-2 Supplemental Country: Niger Program Name: Financing Program ID: P129793 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-50600 ICRR Date: 11/12/2012 ICRR Type: Core ICRR Lending Instrument: DPL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF NIGER Original Total XDR 9.80M Disbursed Amount: XDR 9.80M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 9.80M Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Planning, Local Government, and Community Development Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) - P107741 Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 07/14/2008 Effectiveness: 05/03/2010 05/03/2010 Appraisal: 12/09/2008 Restructuring(s): Approval: 03/24/2009 Mid-term Review: Closing: 12/31/2009 06/30/2010 1 Growth Policy Reform Operation II - P117286 Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 12/15/2010 Effectiveness: Appraisal: 04/26/2011 Restructuring(s): Approval: 06/23/2011 Mid-term Review: 02/15/2012 Closing: 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing – P129793 Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 12/01/2011 Effectiveness: Appraisal: 01/09/2012 Restructuring(s): Approval: 02/23/2012 Mid-term Review: Closing: 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICRR Overall Program Rating Outcomes Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome Substantial Bank Performance Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICRR) Overall Program Rating Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance Performance C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) - P107741 Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating: Performance any) Potential Problem Program Yes Quality at Entry (QEA) None at any time (Yes/No): Problem Program at any Quality of Supervision Yes None time (Yes/No): (QSA) DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status Satisfactory 2 Growth Policy Reform Operation II - P117286 Implementation Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating: Performance Potential Problem Program No Quality at Entry (QEA) None at any time (Yes/No): Problem Program at any Quality of Supervision No None time (Yes/No): (QSA) DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing – P129793 Implementation Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating: Performance Potential Problem Program No Quality at Entry (QEA): None at any time (Yes/No): Problem Program at any Quality of Supervision No None time (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) - P107741 Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Banking 14 14 Central government administration 44 44 General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 14 14 General industry and trade sector 14 14 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 14 14 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Debt management and fiscal sustainability 20 20 Other Financial Sector Development 20 20 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 20 20 Rural markets 20 20 Tax policy and administration 20 20 Growth Policy Reform Operation II - P117286 Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Agricultural extension and research 22 22 Banking 11 17 Central government administration 44 44 General industry and trade sector 17 17 Other social services 6 0 3 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other Financial Sector Development 34 25 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 22 25 Rural services and infrastructure 22 25 Social safety nets 11 0 Tax policy and administration 11 25 GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing – P129793 Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Agricultural extension and research 22 22 Banking 11 17 Central government administration 44 44 General industry and trade sector 17 17 Other social services 6 0 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other Financial Sector Development 34 25 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 22 25 Rural services and infrastructure 22 25 Social safety nets 11 0 Tax policy and administration 11 25 E. Bank Staff Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) - P107741 Positions At ICRR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Madani M. Tall Sector Manager: Miria A. Pigato Iradj A. Alikhani Task Team Leader: Robert Johann Utz Ivan Rossignol ICRR Team Leader: Abdoulahi Garba Robert Utz ICRR Primary Authors: Abdoulahi Garba Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) - P107741 Positions At ICRR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Ousmane Diagana Sector Manager: Miria A. Pigato Jan Walliser Task Team Leader: Robert Johann Utz Robert Johann Utz ICRR Team Leader: Abdoulahi Garba Robert Utz ICRR Primary Authors: Abdoulahi Garba 4 GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing – P129793 Positions At ICRR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Ousmane Diagana Sector Manager: Miria A. Pigato Miria A. Pigato Program Team Leader: Abdoulahi Garba Robert Utz ICRR Team Leader: Abdoulahi Garba Robert Utz ICRR Primary Authors: Abdoulahi Garba F. Results Framework Analysis Program Development Objectives (from Program Document) The main objective of this operation is to help overcome policy constraints and institutional bottlenecks to growth by: (i) addressing the main business environment obstacles, including taxes; (ii) relieving infrastructure constraints for the private sector; (iii) promoting rural sector growth; (iv) pursuing public finance management reform; and (v) addressing demographic issues. Revised Program Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s) Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) - P107741 Original Target Values Formally Actual Value Achieved Indicator Baseline Value (from approval Revised Target at Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Improved business environment in Niger - Cost and time to set up a firm Value 17 days and (Quantitative or 19 days and US$475 11 days and US$300 17 days and US$406 US$400 Qualitative) Date achieved 06/02/2008 06/02/2010 06/30/2012 06/02/2012 Comments (incl. % Fully achieved. achievement) Indicator 2 : Improved business environment in Niger - Evidence of broadening the tax base 16,000 registered 18,000 registered tax Value Registered tax payers tax payers and No specific target payers and FCFA (quantitative or (13,000) and income tax business income provided. 61.3 billion business Qualitative) collected (CFAF140bn) tax receipts of income tax receipts FCFA 70 billion Date achieved 01/01/2009 06/02/2010 12/31/2011 12/31/2011 Comments Target for the increase in registered tax payers has been exceeded, but amount of (incl. % business income tax receipts below target achievement) 5 Rebuild working capital for formal enterprises through a payment of arrears as Indicator 3 : percentage point of GDP Overall arrears were further reduced by 0.6 percent of GDP in 2009, 0.5 percent of GDP in 2010, and 0.1 percent of GDP Value in 2011. However, (quantitative or -0.8 percent 0 percent while clearance of Qualitative) arrears dating from before 2000 proceeded, there was also an increase in the stock of new arrears Date achieved 01/01/2009 07/01/2009 12/31/2011 Comments Mixed progress, while overall arrears were reduced, the stock of new arrears (incl. % increased from FCFA 6.4 billion in 2009 to FCFA 23.1 billion in 2011 achievement) Finaposte is operating and meets prudential norms as regulated by the regional central Indicator 4 : bank A nationwide banking Agreements with network is providers of mobile established banking services Reporting from through a Value have been concluded Finaposte is not yet Finaposte is partnership (quantitative or and some financial operating satisfactory to the between Niger Qualitative) institutions are using Central Bank Poste and a the CNE network to commercial transfer money to bank or a their clients. mobile banking operator Date achieved 01/01/2009 06/02/2010 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 Comments The revised target value represents a significantly improved outcome compared to the (incl. % initially envisaged reform, which was a second best. achievement) Indicator 5 : Pension reforms are initiated The action plan for Value Pension reforms are not the restructuring of (quantitative or yet initiated the pension system Qualitative) is adopted Date achieved 01/01/2009 06/02/2010 Comments (incl. % Reform measure has been dropped reflecting change in political environment. achievement) 6 Indicator 6 : The road network is better maintained Value (quantitative or 6000km 7400 kms Qualitative) Date achieved 01/01/2009 06/02/2010 Comments As defined it was considered that the indicator is not meaningfully measurable. It has (incl. % thus been replaced with two indicators on the quality of the road network (Indicators achievement) 14 and 15). Indicator 7 : New law facilitates transparent participation of private sector in infrastructure Value All PPPs are in No PPP law exists in (quantitative or conformity with the Niger Qualitative) new law Date achieved 01/01/2009 06/02/2010 Comments (incl. % Indicator has been dropped as reforms have been postponed achievement) Indicator 8 : Access to , and use of, fertilizers improved Demonstrated by Value ex-post client survey (quantitative or No quantitative baseline (financed in context Qualitative) of the Prodex) Date achieved 01/01/2009 06/02/2010 Comments Client survey has not been yet carried out as political crisis caused delays. However, (incl. % other indicators such as the number of shops selling agricultural inputs and estimates achievement) on fertilizer use show increased availability and use of agricultural inputs. Indicator 9 : Access to technology improved demonstrated by ex- Value post client survey (quantitative or no quantitative baseline (financed in the Qualitative) context of the PRODEX) Date achieved 01/01/2009 06/02/2010 Comments Client survey has not been yet carried out as political crisis caused delays. However, (incl. % other indicators such as the number of demonstration plots and practical achievement) demonstrations increased significantly. and imply improved access to technology. Electronic processing of payables to private suppliers: reduce delays to process Indicator 10 : payments Value (quantitative or 33 days 15 days 10 days Qualitative) Date achieved 01/01/2009 06/02/2010 12/31/2010 Comments While the time to process payments has been reduced, problems in liquidity (incl. % management still cause the occurrence of arrears. achievement) 7 Parliament is provided with adequate documentation to make a decision on the Indicator 11 : proposed Finance Law The 2012 budget submitted to Parliament includes the summary of the The finance law budget, the includes a- macro macroeconomic hypothesis, b- framework, the state budgetary deficit, c- of implementation of financing of deficit, Value the current budget, d- debt stock, e- (quantitative or No quantitative baseline debt policy and the financial assets, f- Qualitative) analysis of debt budget review law, sustainability, the g- status of current annual liquidity plan, budget execution, h- tax expenditures, the synthetic budget revenue to be table recovered by the tax authorities and outstanding payments by the Treasury. Date achieved 01/01/2009 12/02/2009 01/01/2012 Of the eight budget documents, six are provided. In addition, the authorities have also made progress by including a Medium Term Expenditure Framework. The Comments budget review laws for 2008 and 2009 have been submitted to the National Assembly (incl. % and the authorities are making progress in closing the remaining gap. At present, the achievement) budget presentation is undergoing revision in line with the newly adopted organic public finance law. (75% completion.) Indicator 12 : Procurement processes more transparent and effective More than 75% (in 90.91 percent of Less than 75% (in Value number and public contracts were number and amount) of (quantitative or amounts) of public awarded through public markets are bid Qualitative) markets are bid competitive bidding competitively competitively in 2011 Date achieved 06/02/2008 06/02/2010 12/31/2011 Comments Data covers on procurement information available to the Procurement Regulatory (incl. % Authority, covering about 50 percent of public procurement. achievement) 8 Indicator 13 : The Ministry of Population implements the annual action plans of the DGPP Progress includes an increase in exclusive breastfeeding from 4.4 percent in 2008 to Value 10 percent in 2009 Ex-post qualitative (quantitative or No quantitative baseline and an increase in the review. Qualitative) use of modern contraceptives from 4.4 percent in 2006 to 12 and possibly 16 percent in 2010. Date achieved 01/01/2009 12/02/2009 06/30/2012 Comments An HDS has been carried out in 2012 which will provide more detailed data for the (incl. % assessment of progress. achievement) Indicator 14 : Share of asphalt roads in good condition Value (quantitative or 51% 71% Qualitative) Date achieved 01/31/2009 12/31/2011 Comments The value for 2011 is based on administrative data and most likely significantly (incl. % overestimates the share of roads in good condition. A more comprehensive achievement) assessment of road conditions is currently underway. Indicator 15 : Share of non-asphalt roads in good condition Value (quantitative or 27.5% 35% 76% Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2009 12/31/2012 12/31/2011 Comments The value for 2011 is based on administrative data and most likely significantly (incl. % overestimates the share of roads in good condition. A more comprehensive achievement) assessment of road conditions is currently underway. Growth Policy Reform Operation II - P117286 Original Target Values Actual Value Achieved Formally Revised Indicator Baseline Value (from approval at Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years GPRO II indicators are the same as GPRG-1 indicators. In cases where the GPRO II Indicator 1 : has adjusted indicators laid out in the GPR policy matrix, this is noted as adjustments to the GPRG-1 indicators. An indicator on pro-poor expenditures has been added. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved Comments GPRO II indicators are the same as GPRG-1 indicators. In cases where the GPRO II (incl. % has adjusted indicators laid out in the GPR policy matrix, this is noted as adjustments achievement) to the GPRG-1 indicators. An indicator on pro-poor expenditures has been added. 9 Indicator 2 : Pro-poor budget allocation (percent of GDP) Value (quantitative or 8.5 15 10.5 Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2008 01/01/2012 01/01/2012 Comments Target was unrealistic. Progress has been achieved in budget allocations and actual (incl. % expenditures for pro-poor expenditure items and for PRSP priority sectors. These achievement) expenditures have grown faster than other expenditures. GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing – P129793 Original Target Values Actual Value Achieved Formally Revised Indicator Baseline Value (from approval at Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing has no separate results indicators from the GPR Indicator 1 : series. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved Comments GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing has no separate results indicators from the GPR (incl. % series. achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) - P107741 Original Target Values Formally Actual Value Achieved Indicator Baseline Value (from approval Revised Target at Completion or Target documents) Values Years Indicator 1 : The prior actions have been met Value (quantitative or Ex post review of No quantitative baseline Qualitative) the prior actions Date achieved 01/01/2009 09/01/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Growth Policy Reform Operation II - P117286 Actual Value Original Target Values Formally Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value (from approval Target Values Completion or documents) Target Years G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) - P107741 Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 06/28/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/28/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.00 3 06/30/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 38.75 10 Growth Policy Reform Operation II - P117286 Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 12/17/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 50.50 2 07/11/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 50.57 GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing – P129793 Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 03/20/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 07/11/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.83 H. Restructuring (if any) 11 1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal Political context: At appraisal of the GPR series the internal political and social situation had been relatively stable since 1999 under the leadership of President Mamadou Tandja. Local elections were scheduled for March 2009 to be followed by legislative and presidential elections by end 2009. The program document indicates that these two events would test the strength of Niger’s democratic institutions. Increased spending that would undermine hard earned macroeconomic stability of recent years was considered to be the main risk arising from the forthcoming elections. The program document also notes that while the situation had significantly improved in that decade, the country still faced recurrent rebellions in the Northwestern mineral rich region. Economic context: According to United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report, Niger ranked 174 out of 177 countries on its Human Development Index with a Gross Domestic Product per capita in purchasing power parity terms equal to US$780, one of the lowest in the world. Nevertheless, since 2000 there had been improvements in both economic and social indicators. Despite periodic setbacks due to droughts, locust invasions, and avian flu, growth had slowly been gathering momentum. Average per capita GDP growth had been positive since 2000, marking an encouraging shift from falling per capita GDP during the 1990s. Donor support under debt relief initiatives had contributed to this improved performance. However, Niger’s financial sector and Niger’s private sector base remained among the smallest and least developed ones in the region. Most of Niger’s growth potential was associated with the oil and mining sector, and with regional trade in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and with Nigeria. While most countries in Africa were experiencing a slowdown in mining and oil and gas related investments, this was not the case in Niger, where these investments had been initiated and largely implemented before mid- 2008. The downturn in food and oil prices benefited Niger’s economy as it was a net importer of both. Its non-mining exports (live animals, onions and cowpeas) were sold in the regional markets and were therefore not directly affected by the global decline in demand. Overall, it was expected that the ripple effects of the on-going global financial crisis and recession would be moderate in Niger. The Government’s fiscal position had been fairly stable with the deficit easily covered by external financing. Niger had not resorted to domestic bank financing in the four years preceding appraisal and had been able to build up its net international reserves to exceed five months. There was some decline in external donor financing between 2006 and 2008 that was offset by greater domestic fiscal revenues, mostly from agreements with the French mining company AREVA on investment in uranium mining and from the US$300 million signature bonus for the oil extraction and refinery building contract with a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corporation. The external current account deficit, excluding grants, had been stable as a proportion of GDP at around 11 percent through 2007. In 2008 it widened to 12.3 percent of GDP, due to higher capital imports by extractive industries and increased prices of food and oil imports. 12 1.2 Original Program Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators The Growth Policy Reform series was initially envisaged to consist of two programmatic development policy operations (GPRG-1 and GPRC-2) that would be disbursed over two years and focus on growth of the productive sectors. The GPRG-1 was a grant and GPRC-2 a credit. The main objectives of the GPR series were to help overcome policy constraints and institutional bottlenecks to growth by (i) addressing the main business environment obstacles, including taxes; (ii) relieving infrastructure constraints for the private sector; (iii) promoting rural sector growth; (iv) pursuing public finance management reform; and (v) addressing demographic issues. The main expected outcome of the series was higher private investment and job creation through improving the business climate. More specifically, the two DPOs were expected to bring about: (i) an improved business environment, freeing up financing for short term capital needs, and increased access to finance; (ii) improved road infrastructure; increased private sector participation in public infrastructure projects; (iii) a better performing agricultural sector, through food imports rationalization and technology investment; (iv) improved public financial management by: (a) enhancing the linkages between budget and treasury functions which will directly translate in the reduction of payment delays to private suppliers, (b) strengthening the financial relationship between the State and the private sector, (c) encouraging an increase in registered tax-paying firms by lowering the profit tax, (d) and bolstering financing for infrastructure maintenance; and (v) the implementation of the government’s policy on demographics. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators The objectives of the operation were not revised. 1.4 Original Policy Areas Supported by the Program Policy area 1: Promote Private Sector Growth The GPR series sought to support the Government’s efforts in promoting private sector-led growth and entry into the formal sector by: (i) reducing the corporate income tax from 35 percent to 30 percent, as a first step towards comprehensive tax reforms, broadening of the tax base, and overhaul of incentives to ensure a level playing field for private firms; (ii) accelerating and completing the repayment process of all internal debt arrears due to the private sector, completing a process launched in the early 2000s; (iii) completing the setup of FINAPOSTE through its capitalization. Policy area 2: Address Infrastructure Constraints for Private Sector Growth GPRG-1 focused on two policy areas in infrastructure that have direct and indirect impact on private sector and rural growth: the quality of roads and service delivery by the infrastructure sectors including the energy and water/irrigation sub-sectors. Policy area 3: Support Agricultural Sector and Rural Development as the Main Generator of Employment 13 The GPR series supported the reform of agriculture sector institutions with the objective of improving access, cost effectiveness, and quality of agricultural inputs and extension services. The program entailed reforms that would (i) improve the efficiency of the input marketing system by allowing farmers to have access to inputs at better prices and (ii) support the modernization of agricultural services. Policy area 4: Address Public Finance Constraints The GPR series supported reform program in this area included (i) the introduction of electronic processing of payables to private suppliers,(ii) the improvement of transparency and procurement controls by the revision of the decrees 113/10/06 and 114/10/06 on conflict of interest and control of contracts awards and (iii) the preparation /disclosure of the 2010 Budget Law in accordance with the provisions of the organic law no. 2003-011 dated April 1, 2003 and it contains a functional and economic presentation. In the next step, the support focused (i) on increasing pro-poor expenditures by at least one percentage point of the Gross Domestic Product in the 2011 budget compared to the second revised budget of 2010 and (ii) submission to the National Assembly of a bill for the adoption of a new procurement code that is consistent with the WAEMU directives. Policy areas 5: Demographics The focus of reforms in this area was to ensure that the institutional set-up for the implementation of the Government Declaration of Population Policy (DGPP) was made effective at the national, regional, departmental, and communal levels. 1.5 Revised Policy Areas While the policy areas supported by the GPR series were maintained, the fact that Niger was ruled by a military transition government between February 2011 and April 2012 required some adjustments to the specific reforms implemented under GPRC-2: In particular, the transition government (i) adopted a revised strategy for financial sector reform which was consistent with Bank advice; (ii) considered that reforms of the pension system and public-private partnership required a broader political consensus, whose attainment was outside the priorities and possibilities of the transition government, and (iii) insisted on evaluating the full impact of fiscal reforms before proceeding with further reforms. Consistent with the transition government’s focus on strengthening public financial management, the adoption of a new General Tax Code and an increase in pro-poor spending were introduced as new reform measures monitored under GPRC-2. 1.6 Other significant changes While it was initially envisaged that the GPR series would be implemented over a period of two years, the political crisis erupting after Board approval of GPRG-1 in March 2009 resulted in significant delays in the effectiveness of GPRG-1(May 2010) and in the Board approval of GPRC-2 (June 2011). Severe external shocks in the form of spillovers from conflict in Libya and another food crisis in 2012 generated an unanticipated financing gap and required the preparation of a supplemental financing operation to GPRC-2. 14 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Program Performance The GPR series consisted of two operations: GPRG-1 of SDR 26.5 approved on March 24, 2009 and GRPRC-2 of SDR 32 million approved on June 23, 2011. In order to help Niger sustain the implementation of the reforms supported by GPRC-2 in the context of unanticipated additional financing needs due to the adverse impact of the Libyan crisis and a poor harvest in 2011/2012, the Bank approved a supplemental financing GPRC-2of SDR 9.8 million on February 23, 2012. GPRG-1 closed on June 30,210 and GPRC-2 and the supplemental financial financing operation on June 30, 2011. All prior actions listed in Table 2 were met by the time of Board approval and the three operations were fully disbursed before the closing dates. Despite the political crisis and changes in government, the program was effective in supporting the reforms favorable to the private sector promotion and PFM improvement in Niger. Table 1: GPR series prior actions Policy Areas GPRG-1 ( 2009) GPRC-2 (2011) I. Promote 1. The Recipient has reduced the corporate Private Sector income tax rate applicable to the 2010 Growth private enterprise financial results from 1. Clear internal debt arrears (for 35% to 30%. private enterprises only) in the 2. The Recipient has submitted to the amount of FCFA 2.5billion, National Assembly a bill for the adoption of consistent with the relevant budget the draft new general tax code, which inscriptions in the 2009 Law of updates the current tax code and Finance. consolidates tax reforms to the tax system that have been introduced over the past years in the context of the annual budgets. 3. The Recipient has reduced the stamp duties for registering new businesses with the Commercial Registry (capped at FCFA 2. Build confidence in FINAPOSTE: 11,500) and the tax authorities (FCFA the amount corresponding to CNE’s 1,500). frozen deposits (FCFA5.7 billion) is 4. The Recipient has (i) adopted the deposited in a Treasury account at the decision to abandon the creation and BCEAO. operationalization of FINAPOSTE1; (ii) initiated the second phase of the return to depositors of their deposits in the CNE (which has not been operating since 1998) and has returned more than 68% of the 1 The initial program had foreseen the capitalization of FINAPOSTE to ensure the country wide provision of financial. This was indeed the second best option presented in the 2008 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP report) and chosen by the government at the time of preparation of the GPR series. The transition government reviewed the financial implications of recapitalizing FINAPOSTE and decided to adopt the first best option proposed in the FSAP report, namely to forego the establishment of FINAPOSTE and to seek to ensure the provision of countrywide financial services through partnerships between the Nigerien Post Office and private sector operators. 15 Policy Areas GPRG-1 ( 2009) GPRC-2 (2011) amount outstanding; and (iii) adopted a detailed action plan prepared by Niger Poste to seek a partnership with a commercial bank and/or a company offering mobile banking services. II. Address 3. Maintain adequate funding for road Infrastructure maintenance, as evidenced in the Constraints for 2009 Finance Law. Private Sector Growth 4. The Ministry of Agricultural 5. The Recipient has adopted an ordinance Development adopts and publishes a for the restructuring of the Agricultural bill (Arrêté) to validate the Inputs Procurement Unit (AIPU) in a restructuring option of the AIPU. manner consistent with the objective of the Farmers will have access to inputs at Strategy for the Procurement of Agricultural better prices. Inputs for a Sustainable Agriculture adopted III. Support by the Recipient in 2006. Furthermore, the Agricultural recipient has issued by Presidential Decree Sector and Rural the statutes of the restructured AIPU, which Development as broadens the membership in governance the Main organs of the AIPU to users of agricultural Generator of inputs. Employment 6. The inter-ministerial steering committee for the Rural Development Strategy has issued a decision to adopt the integrated framework for extension services for rural development. This decision has been approved by the Recipient’s Minister of Finance. 5. Electronic processing of payables 7. The Recipient has prepared and disclosed to private sector suppliers is effective. the 2010 Budget Law in accordance with 6. Improve transparency and the provisions of the organic law no. 2003- procurement controls by the revision 011 dated April 1, 2003 and it contains a of the decrees 113/10/06 and functional and economic presentation. 114/10/06 on conflict of interest and 8. The Recipient has increased the pro-poor IV. Address control of contracts awards. expenditures by at least one percentage Public Finance point of the Gross Domestic Product in the Constraints. 2011 budget compared to the second revised budget of 2010. 9. The Recipient has submitted to the National Assembly a bill for the adoption of a new procurement code that is consistent with the WAEMU directives. 7. The Government has issued a decree to confirm the DGPP’s V. Demographics institutional set up at the national, regional, departmental, and communal levels. 16 2.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation Political context: In an effort to circumvent term limits and broaden his power, President Tandja suspended the constitution and implemented emergency rule during May-June 2009. He dismissed a Constitutional Court ruling that concluded that he could not use a referendum to change the constitution and remove constitutional term limits, and also dissolved the Parliament. Voters endorsed Mr. Tandja's new constitution in a referendum in August 2009, which would have allowed him to remain in office for three more years with additional powers. The opposition boycotted the referendum, as well as the parliamentary elections in October, which the candidates supported by Mr. Tandja won handily. The President’s actions to subvert constitutional rule were widely criticized by the international community. The political crisis resulted in the withholding of donor support and severe macroeconomic uncertainty, which also prevented IDA from declaring GPRG-1 effective. The military assumed power on February 18, 2010, with the stated objective of returning the country to constitutional rule. The coup d’état occurred with no major disruptions in the daily life of the people of Niger. Following the coup and until April 7, 2011, Niger was governed by the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy led by Army General Djibo Salou. The transitional authorities put in place a credible and technocratic Government. The coup d’état triggered the Bank’s O.P 7.30 on dealings with de facto governments. Based on the findings of a mission that reviewed the situation in Niger in the context of O.P. 7.30 in April 2010, the Regional Vice President authorized that the necessary steps for declaring GPRG-1 effective be taken. GPRG-1 was declared effective on May 3, 2010. A joint Bank/IMF/EU mission took place in June 2010 during which the transition government reconfirmed its commitment to continue with the implementation of the GPR supported reform program with some adjustments to GPRC-2, as described above. Local elections were held on January 8, 2011, legislative elections and the first round of Presidential elections took place on January 31, 2011. The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) emerged as the strongest party in the legislative elections. The second round of Presidential elections was held on March 12, 2011 and Mahamadou Issoufou of the PNDS was elected President, obtaining more than 57 percent of the votes. The new National Assembly was installed on March 31, 2011 and the President sworn in on April 7, 2011. A GPRC-2 appraisal mission visited Niamey starting April 27, 2011 to confirm the new government’s commitment to the GPR supported reform program, assess the completion of the outstanding prior actions, and negotiate the credit. External shocks: The implementation period was also characterized by severe external shocks that have affected the economic, social and security situation of the country. First, poor harvests in 2009 and 2011 led to severe food crises and high levels of food insecurity. GDP growth dropped to minus 0.9 percent in 2009 and to 2.3 percent in 2011. Armed conflicts in neighboring countries– Libya, Mali, and Nigeria-have led to a proliferation of arms in the sub-region and increased insecurity and terrorist activities. These conflicts have resulted in the return of between 100,000 and 200,000 Nigerien migrant workers from Libya. Managing these shocks in a situation of political transition claimed much of government’s attention and put additional stress on Niger’s weak basic service delivery systems. The conflict in Libya also resulted in a disruption of trade, aid, investment and remittances between Libya and Niger. Dealing with the 17 large number of returning migrant workers, the food crises, and increased security threats required increased government spending in these areas, crowding out spending in other areas. The international community also provided significant support in 2010 and in 2012 to help Niger deal with these crises. Capacity: Weak human and institutional capacities represent a significant constraint to the implementation of reforms in Niger. The problem has been identified by the GPR series as a significant risk. The political crisis and transition, which resulted in significant turnover of senior level staff and the management of the external shocks, which claimed significant attention by government’s senior staff, further accentuated capacity constraints during the implementation of the GPR supported reform program. Adequacy of Government’s Commitment Successive governments remained committed to the implementation of the GPR supported reform program and to maintaining macro-economic stability. However, the military transition government focused on (i) improving the political and economic system, (ii) achieving reconciliation among Nigeriens, and (iii) returning the country to democracy. While this entailed an acceleration of public financial management reforms, reforms of the pension system and promotion of public-private partnerships were considered to be outside the main priorities of the transition government and preferably implemented by a government with full democratic legitimacy. The need to maintain social stability in an environment of high political and security tensions required an approach that seeks consensus, which sometimes resulted in slower than expected implementation of reforms. In particular, the elimination of large fuel subsidies that arose from the delinking of domestic pump and international oil prices in the run-up to the 2009 elections proved difficult. A gradual approach of increasing domestic fuel prices was adopted by the transition government and sustained by the new, democratically elected government, resulting in the elimination of fuel subsidies by the end of 2012. Soundness of Background Analysis The preparation of the credit was grounded in a relatively rich set of analytical work covering most aspects of the operation, firsthand knowledge from sectoral investment engagement, and the experienced gained in previous operations. Key analytical work included a Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire survey (CWIQ) 2005, a Household Budget Survey (2007/08), an Investment Climate Assessment (2006), a Country Economic Memorandum (2007), a Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (Modernizing Trade during a Mining Boom) (2007), annual Doing Business surveys, and a Financial Sector Assessment (2008). Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Reviews (PEMFARs) prepared in 2004 and 2008, and a Public Expenditure Financial Assessment – PEFA issued in December 2008 gave a comprehensive assessment of the public expenditure management systems. The Country Procurement Assessment and the 2006 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) provided the underpinnings for procurement and demographic reforms. In retrospect, the available knowledge was adequate to identify and prioritize reforms. However, in some areas, such as tax reform and the reduction of the business income tax, the underlying analysis may not have been comprehensive enough to allow a full appreciation of the economic and social impacts of the measure. Additional Poverty and Social Impact Assessment could have helped to provide more comprehensive assessments of 18 the expected impacts. In the case of the reform of the business income tax, such work is currently underway. The social and environmental aspects of the GPR series were adequately analyzed. The poverty assessment based on the 2007/2008 household survey provided an update of the poverty profile that highlighted the need to increase access of the poor to public services notably in the rural areas where depth and severity of poverty are all high. The GPR series supported increased pro- poor expenditures and emphasized improved transparency, accountability, and strengthened budget execution as well as the links between public spending and the priorities of the Government’s poverty reduction strategy. Relevance of Risk Analysis The GPR series outlined adequately the substantial political, macroeconomic and fiscal risks, as well as the issues of institutional capacity and fiduciary risk facing the country, and ways to mitigate them. The political risk had been associated with the organization of elections that could lead to increased spending that would undermine hard earned macroeconomic stability of recent years. Macroeconomic and fiscal risks were also related to fuel subsidies, vulnerability to external shocks (drought, price and exchange rate fluctuations), and Dutch disease effects from a growing mining sector and aid inflows. Slowing reform program and weak human and institutional capacities were identified as posing further risks to the achievement of the GPR objectives. However: (i) the security risk associated with the instability of neighboring countries had not been identified as at that time it was difficult to foresee the emergence, scale, and scope of conflict in Libya, Nigeria and Mali; and (ii) the political risk as interruption of the democratic system was not considered (maybe because it was identified in the CAS). Mitigation of the political risks consisted in involving the parties who feel aggrieved into the political process, including having them participate in the design and implementation of the policies that affect them. Regarding capacity issues, the main action proposed by the country team consisted in engaging proactively with the authorities to support them in the design and implementation of their emerging reform program and provide necessary facts and policy analysis. The link between the GPR series and the Bank investment projects in the areas of supported reforms was identified as an opportunity to provide technical assistance to the client. In retrospect, technical assistance provided by the Bank and by other development partners to the implementation of GPR supported reforms was essential and broadly adequate to overcome capacity weaknesses. The propositions to mitigate macroeconomic and fiscal risks were focused on the policy dialogue of the World Bank and the IMF with the authorities to assist Government in taking appropriate measures to ensure an appropriate macro-economic environment for the GPR supported reform program. The dialogue contributed, inter alia, to the adoption of measures to eliminate fuel subsidies and the preparation of a realistic budget for 2012. Budget support by IDA and other development partners provided also important incentives to the authorities to carry out reforms and implement the development program laid out in PRSP-II 19 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization M&E design. An inter-ministerial steering committee was charged with monitoring outputs and outcomes and ensuring that remedial actions were implemented in time to avoid slippage. Monitoring and evaluation of the GPR supported reform program relied primarily on existing Government processes. The Government had designed an M&E framework to monitor and evaluate the implementation of its PRSP. Annual PRSP progress reports, prepared by the permanent PRSP secretariat in the Prime Minister’s Office, are the Government’s main tool for monitoring overall progress in the implementation of the PRSP-II. A first annual progress report was prepared in 2010 and a mid-term review report in 2012. M&E implementation and utilization: In the context of the dramatic political changes that took place during the implementation of the GPR series, the Ministry of Economy and Finance ensured continuity in the overall coordination of program implementation and in overseeing progress in achieving program objectives. In this context, the inter-ministerial steering committee played a lesser role, but at key stages of the program the Prime Minister and the Council of Minister’s played important roles in ensuring progress in program implementation and the completion of prior actions. Monitoring the implementation of reforms drew mainly on existing processes: (i) the dialogue and monitoring of public financial management took place in the context of the established government-development partner dialogue, including through the PEMFAR steering and technical committees, (ii) monitoring of agriculture sector reforms took place in the context of the framework for the implementation and monitoring of the rural development strategy as well as the implementation support to the Bank’s rural development portfolio in Niger, (iii) monitoring of reforms aimed at strengthening road maintenance took place through regular reports prepared by the Autonomous Road Maintenance Fund (CAFER), (iv) reforms related to the business environment were monitored by the annual Doing Business reports, (v) fiscal reforms were monitored in close collaboration with the IMF program review, (vi) reforms related to demographic issues were monitored through the implementation of the action plan of Government’s Declaration on Population Policy (DGPP). 2.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation A new programmatic “Shared Growth� DPO series consisting of three operations has been prepared and broadly maintains the focus of the GPR series. The first operation in the new series was approved by the Board on June 23, 2012 and the second operation is currently under preparation. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The focus of the GPR series on removing obstacles to private sector growth and on enhancing public financial management was highly relevant and addressed Niger’s key development challenges. The GPR objectives were fully aligned with and supportive of the government PRSP and the CAS. The relevance of the GPR supported reform program and objectives is confirmed by Niger’s new PRSP (Plan for Economic and Social Development 2012 to 2015) which has as its overarching objective to achieve sustained and inclusive economic growth. 20 The design of the GPR operations followed established good practice principles in policy-based lending. Prior Actions (as conditions of disbursement) were few and were relevant to the achievement of agreed results. The adoption of a programmatic approach proved helpful in sustaining policy dialogue and reforms in an environment of dramatic political change. 3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives The achievement of GPR development objectives is moderately satisfactory. Despite the difficult political, economic, and social context, the authorities made substantial efforts to undertake reforms in order to remove constraints to private sector growth, to promote rural sector growth and to strengthen public financial management. The macroeconomic framework was stable. Promote Private Sector Growth Three outcomes were expected from the reforms to support private sector growth: an improved business environment, the rebuilding of working capital of formal enterprises and the repayment of CNE deposits and the establishment of a country wide financial network with a commercial bank or mobile banking company. a. Improved business environment in Niger As part of the GPR supported reform program, government reduced the business income tax from 35 to 30 percent, adopted a new General Tax Code, and lowered the stamp duties for the registration of new businesses. The indicators defined to assess the impact of these reform measures are (i) the cost and time to set up a firm, (ii) the number of registered tax payers and the evolution of business income tax collected. The explanation below shows that this outcome was achieved. The base lines of the cost and time to set up a firm were respectively US$475 and 19 days in 2008. The target was to reduce the cost and time to US$400 and 17 days by 2012. The Doing Business 2013 data for Niger (using data of 2011) indicates cost and time to set up a firm US$406 and 17 days. In March 2012, the Government issued a decree to reduce the time to 3 days. The number of companies registered with a tax identification number increased on average by 16 percent between 2008-2012. The target of increasing the number of registered tax payers to 16,000 by 2012 was thus exceeded significantly. The number of enterprises subject to the business income tax (ISB) increased annually at an average rate of 13 percent over the same period. However, ongoing work on the impact of tax reforms suggests a significant disparity between the number of registered tax payers and the number of tax payers who actually file their tax returns. Table 2: Registered tax payers Indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Registered taxpayers 11713 13515 15477 18309 21668 ISB taxpayers 8133 9500 11168 13462 13555 ISB tax receipts (FCFA billion) 44.3 71.6 57.2 61.3 Source: Ministry of Finance/General Directorate of Taxes 21 Revenue from the business income tax dropped by about 20 percent in 2010, the first year that the reduced business income tax rate of 30 percent was applicable. However, in 2011 business income tax receipts started to recover. It is important to note that in 2009 business income tax receipts were exceptionally high. Considering the period 2008 to 2011, business income tax receipts increased on average by more than 10 percent per year. A Poverty and Social Impact Assessment of the change in the tax rate is presently underway which will provide a more detailed analysis of the impact of this reform measure. b. Rebuilding of the working capital of formal enterprises GPRG-1 supported the repayment of arrears to private enterprises in the amount of FCFA 2.5 billion (which represents 0.7 percent of credit to the private sector) to help these enterprises rebuild their working capital. The indicator defined to assess the achievement of the outcome is the payment of arrears as a percentage of GDP, with the baseline defined as -0.8 percent of -0.8 percent in 2008 and a target of 0 percent in 2010. The target appears to be poorly specified and inconsistent with the discussion in the program document for GPRG-1 which indicates that the government’s domestic arrears reduction plan calls for the paying down of domestic arrears to around 6-7 percent of GDP by 2013 with the hope of eliminating all arrears by 2017. IMF data indeed suggest that government has made continuous progress in reducing arrears - by 0.6 percent of GDP in 2009, by 0.5 percent of GDP in 2010, and by 0.1 percent of GDP in 2011. The targeted progress as stated in the program document has thus been significantly exceeded. However, it is also important to note that Niger’s arrears consist of two main components. The first is the stock of arrears that were accumulated prior to 2000 and whose reduction was the primary objective of reforms supported by GPRG-1. This stock is being gradually reduced and declined from FCFA 112.9 billion in 2009 to FCFA 92.8 billion in 2011. At the same time, Government accumulated new arrears in 2010 and 2011, which increased from FCFA 6.4 billion in 2009 to FCFA 23.1 billion in 2011. c. Repayment of CNE deposits and establishment of a country wide financial network by a commercial bank or a company offering mobile banking services in partnership with Niger Poste. Government repaid frozen deposits of the Caisse Nationale d’Epargne (CNE), which previously provided post office financial services. The objective of repaying 68.8 percent of outstanding claims was met. Initially, it was also envisaged that the government would recapitalize and operationalize the newly created FINAPOSTE, a postal bank with a country wide network. However, the transition Government concluded that the creation of a competitive postal bank would be too costly and adopted a strategy of seeking partnerships with existing financing institutions to offer banking services in post offices. This decision was consistent with the advice provided in the 2008 FSAP. Agreements with providers of mobile banking services have been concluded and some financial institutions are using the CNE network to transfer money to their clients. (The revised target was to have a national financial network of a commercial bank or of a company offering mobile banking services in partnership with Niger Poste.) The spread of mobile phone based banking services has far reaching impacts. For example, a recent study 22 shows that these services allow the more efficient delivery of cash transfer programs, especially in areas with limited road and financial infrastructure.2 Address Infrastructure Constraints for Private Sector Growth In the context of the GPR supported reform program, the authorities were to undertake reforms to increase the sustainability of the Autonomous Road Maintenance Fund (CAFER) through increased budgetary funding and to adopt a legal framework for public private partnerships. Road maintenance expenditure increased from FCFA2.7 billion in 2008 to FCFA4.8 billion in 2009, FCFA5.1 billion in 2010, and FCFA6 billion in 2011. However, the Government decision of not fully passing through international oil price increases to domestic fuel prices, which was in place from 2009 to 2011, resulted in reduced transfers of fuel levy receipts to the road maintenance agency. Increased spending on road maintenance was accompanied by more effective control of vehicle overloading. While current levels of road maintenance are still significantly below the estimated requirements for minimally adequate maintenance of the existing network, further increases in spending will need to be accompanied by measures to strengthen capacities and institutional arrangements for managing and monitoring the quality of road maintenance work. The result expected in this area was: “Road network is better maintained annually�. Initially, the results indicator was defined as “the total road length maintained annually� with a baseline of 6000 km in 2008 and a target of 7,400 km in 2010. However, in the course of the preparation of GPRC-2, it was determined that this indicator was not particularly meaningful as it does not reflect the quality of maintenance and difficult to measure, as basic maintenance extends over the whole road network. The initial indicator was thus replaced by two indicators to evaluate the results: share of asphalt roads in good condition and share of non-asphalt roads in good condition. The table below shows the evolution of these indicators: Table 3: Condition of Road Network Outcomes Indicators Reference 2001 2009 2011  share of asphalt roads in good Road network is 41 51 71 condition (percent) better maintained annually  share of non-asphalt roads in 16.2 27.5 76 good condition (percent) Source: Ministry of Works Administrative data provided by the authorities suggest improvements in the road condition. The proportion of asphalt roads in good condition increased from 51 in 2009 to 71 percent in 2011. Similarly, the share of non-asphalt roads in good condition increased from 27.5 percent in 2009 to 76 in 2011 while the target for 2012 was 35 percent. However, given the uneven allocation of funds for road maintenance and the suppression of direct allocation of funds to CAFER, these data may significantly overestimate road conditions. More detailed data on the road condition in 2012 are currently being collected and will provide a more reliable assessment of the condition of roads. 2 Aker J., R. Boumnijel, A. McClelland, and N. Tierney. 2011. Zap it to me: The short-term impacts of a mobile cash transfer program. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 268. September 2011. 23 Reforms with regard of the establishment of a legal framework for public private partnerships were not considered a priority by the military transition government. It was thus agreed to postpone these reforms. Subsequently, the legal framework was prepared and adopted under the successor budget support operation (SGC-1). Support Agricultural Sector and Rural Development as the Main Generator of Employment Reforms undertaken in the area of rural development included the restructuring of the agricultural inputs unit and the adoption of the integrated framework for extension services for rural development. Two main results were expected: (i) enhanced access to, and use of fertilizers and (ii) enhanced access to technology. Unfortunately, the political crisis led to a delay in the surveys that were expected to provide the data for the assessment of these results. Nonetheless, available data do suggest an increase in access to fertilizers:  Regional, departmental and communal committees have been put in place to manage the distribution of fertilizer. These committees are composed of members of administrations, representatives of farmers' organizations and the private sector, while prior to the reforms, fertilizer management was performed by staff of the parastatal agency. The involvement of farmers' organizations at both the decision-making structures and at the level of input management is expected to improve the inclusion of their concerns, particularly in terms of accessibility and quality of inputs in accordance with soil characteristics of their land;  The number of shops selling agricultural inputs rose from twenty in 2009 to 50 in 2011 and 180 in November 2012. This multiplication of shops will help to improve the physical accessibility of inputs. It will also improve affordability due to lower transportation costs for farmers, as input prices are the same across the country;  With the new legal status of the Agricultural Inputs Unit (CAIMA), it is now subject to annual audits by the Court of Accounts. Regarding access to technology, efforts are being made by the government to ensure better dissemination of agricultural technologies among producers. Pending the results of a customer survey planned for 2013 which will provide feedback on government’s effort to enhance extension services, the following actions reflect efforts to improve access to extension services:  The number of demonstration plots increased from 129 in 2009 to 419 in 2011. Based on a ratio of one demonstration plot for 20 people, we deduce that more than 8,000 farmers were involved in 2011 against less than 3000 in 2009. According to forecasts, more than 10,000 producers will benefit from 548 demonstration plots proposed in 2012, which corresponds to a growth of over 300 percent compared to the baseline of 2009.  The practical demonstrations of new techniques increased from 240 points of demonstration in 2009 to 720 in 2011, with an increase in the number of beneficiaries from 3600 producers in 2009 to 10800 in 2011, representing an increase by 200 percent. For 2012, the Ministry of Agriculture estimates that the number of beneficiaries would be 14,400. 24 Table 4: Extension services, 2009-2012 2009 2010 2011 2012* Demonstration plots 129 270 419 548 Demonstration plot beneficiaries 2580 5400 8380 10960 Beneficiaries progression (%) - 109.30 55.19 30,79 Points of demonstration 240 480 720 960 Beneficiaries of demonstration 3600 7200 10800 14400 Progression of demonstration beneficiaries (%) - 100 50 33.33 Source: Based on data from the General Directorate of Agriculture; the data do not include statistics of non-state structures;*= estimates Address Public Finance Constraints Reforms in this area aimed at strengthening the budget process and the promotion of sound public finance management. They included measures to reduce delays in the processing of payments, more comprehensive budget documentation submitted to Parliament, better alignment of public expenditures with the PRSP, and a strengthening of the procurement system through the adoption of a new Procurement Code in line with WAEMU directives and the revision of procurement decrees relating to conflict of interest and control of contracts awards. (i) Reduce delays in processing payments The introduction of electronic processing of payables to private suppliers has reduced the time it takes for private enterprises to receive payment from Government for goods and services provided from about one month to an average of less than 10 days in 2010.3 The target was to reduce the time to seven days by 2012, however, data for 2012 are not yet available. However, the lack of integration between the budget and the Treasury systems results in liquidity constraints which prevents government from paying its bills, which has led to an accumulation of new arrears as discussed above. (ii) Provide Parliament with adequate documentation to make decisions on the budget The objective was to provide the National Assembly with more comprehensive budget documentation for improved decision making. In 2008, budgetary documents submitted to the National Assembly did not meet the information requirements set out in the organic public finance law. In 2008, eight elements were missing in the presentation of the draft Finance Law to Parliament, including: (a) the macroeconomic framework; (b) the fiscal deficit; (c) the financing of the deficit; (d) the debt stock, (e) financial assets, (f) the status of budget execution in the preceding year through a budget review law; (g) the status of current budget execution, and (h) a summary budget table. In 2012, the documents submitted to parliament included the summary of the budget, the macroeconomic framework, the state of implementation of the current budget, debt policy and the analysis of debt sustainability, the annual liquidity plan, tax expenditures, the situation of revenue to be recovered by the tax authorities and the situation of what remains to be paid by the Treasury. Instead of the status of financial assets, a forecast of the dividends of these assets was included. Thus significant improvements have been achieved compared to 2008, but it 3 Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances. Analyse de la rapidité dans l’établissement des ordres de paiement. Janvier 2011. 25 remains to complete the documentation by the status of budget execution through a budget review law and the status of current budget execution. It is important to note that further progress requires inclusion in the budget of information such as data of the budget estimates from the previous year and information on actual spending from the preceding year, information on revenue collected by certain ministries and own resources of parastatal institutions. (iii) Accelerate implementation of PRSP-II through an increase in resources allocated to pro- poor expenditures The GPR series monitored the alignment of budgetary expenditures with Niger’s PRSP. The monitoring took place at two levels – expenditures on pro-poor expenditure items defined by the authorities and expenditures in PRSP priority sectors. Budget allocations to pro-poor expenditure items increased continuously from 7.4 percent of GDP in 2007 to 10.5 percent in 2012, only interrupted by a decline in 2010, the year of the coup d’état. The target was that budget allocations to pro-poor expenditures would reach 15 percent in 2012. However, in hindsight this target clearly was not realistic. Actual expenditures increased at a similar pace as budget allocations, though the budget execution rate remained at about 80 percent during the period and efforts should be undertaken to increase the budget execution rate. Expenditure on priority sectors funded from government’s own resources increased from 5.1 percent in 2007 to 7.7 percent in 2011, with a budget execution rate of about 90 percent. Table 5: Pro-poor and priority sector expenditures (% of GDP), 2007-2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Pro-poor expenditures (Budget) 7.4% 8.5% 9.2% 8.4% 9.7% 10.5% Pro-poor expenditures (Actual) 5.7% 6.8% 7.5% 6.2% Priority-sector expenditures (Budget - funded from own resources) 5.1% 6.6% 7.3% 6.1% 7.7% Priority-sector expenditures (Actual - funded from own resources) 4.0% 6.1% 6.0% 5.3% 7.0% (iv) Procurement The GPR series aimed at enhancing the efficiency and transparency of public procurement. Government adopted a new Procurement code and revised decrees on conflict of interest and control of contract awards in line with WAEMU directives. The indicator used is that of the evolution of the percentage of public contracts awarded through competitive bidding, which was less than 75 percent in 2008. A comprehensive measure of these indicators in 2009, 2010 and 2011 are not available. Currently, only the database of the Procurement Regulatory Agency is available which represents about 50 percent of all procurements. The percentage of public contracts awarded through competitive bidding was 90.91 percent in 2011 -significantly above the target of at least 75 percent. Demographics GPRG-1 supported the creation of an appropriate institutional setup for the implementation of Government’s Declaration on Population Policy (DGPP) at the central, regional, departmental, 26 and communal level. This has established the basis for meeting the GPR target in this area, namely the implementation of annual action plans with funding from the general budget as well as support from an IDA grant and other donors (e.g., UNFPA). Available data suggest already some positive impact of the implementation of the policy, including the increase in exclusive breast feeding from 4.4 percent in 2008 to 10 percent in 2009 and an increase in the use of modern contraceptives from 4.4 percent in 2006 to 12 and possibly 16 percent in 2010. The transition government consolidated responsibility for population issues, promotion of women, and the protection of children in a single ministry, which is expected to facilitate the effective implementation of the DGPP. The budget allocation for this ministry almost doubled from FCFA 3 billion in 2010 to FCFA 5.8 billion in 2011. 3.3 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory In terms of relevance, the focus of the GPR series on economic growth and public financial management has remained highly relevant. The relevance of this focus has been reemphasized in the Government’s new PRSP which was adopted in 2012 and which has as its primary objective the achievement of sustainable shared growth. Specific policy areas supported by the GPR series were consistent with the Government’s PRSP and the Banks CAS and also figure prominently in the Government’s new PRSP and the Banks draft CPS for the period 2012 to 2014. The relevance rating is thus Satisfactory. Achievements under the GPR series need to be considered in the context of the political turmoil and exogenous shocks that characterized the period 2009-2012. The series permitted notably to engage with difficult reforms despite the political turmoil and weak capacities of the country. The different governments maintained the willingness to implement the reforms supported by the program. The transition military government appropriated the reforms under GPRC-1 adopted in March 2009, before the coup d’état of February 18, 2010; and the elected authorities endorsed the reforms of GPRC-2 handed down by the transition government. The financial support provided in 2010 and 2011 through GPRG-1 and GPRC-2 has been critical in allowing Government to maintain macroeconomic and fiscal stability in the face of multiple pressures emanating from the political and food crises. Achievements of the PDOs are mixed with some not having achieved the envisaged targets. However, in all areas improvements did occur despite the adverse external environment. On balance, the achievement of PDOs and other outcome indicators is rated as Moderately Satisfactorily. 3.4 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development GPR supported reforms were expected to contribute to poverty reduction by fostering economic growth and greater efficiency and alignment with the PRSP of public expenditures. Preliminary analysis of the data from the 2011 Living Standards Measurement Survey indicates that headcount poverty dropped from 59 percent in 2007/08 to 56 percent in 2011, with a parallel decline in the depth of poverty. 27 (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Public financial management has been considerably strengthened in 2010 with the creation of an independent Court of Auditors and the General Directorate of Treasury and Public Accounting by improving the audit, accounting and reporting aspects. In October 2011, the government adopted a comprehensive program of modernization (2011-2014) and reform of public finance management which provides a road map for further reforms in this area, including the implementation of the WAEMU directives on public financial management. In the agriculture sector, the Agricultural Inputs Procurement Unit (AIPU) has been transformed into a public enterprise with commercial/industrial objectives (EPIC) called “Central Procurement Unit for Agricultural Inputs and Equipment� (Centrale d’Approvisionnement en Intrants et Equipement Agricoles CAIMA). The new organizational structure and participation of producers in its governance is expected to result in improved procurement and stock management and enhanced responsiveness to producer needs. The GPR series was also instrumental in the establishment of the institutional structures for the implementation of the Government’s population policy. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts The GPR series provided financial support at critical stages of the political transition and thus contributed significantly to preventing macroeconomic instability and helped to address external shocks encountered by the country. In particular, the coup d’état in February 2010 resulted in the withholding of budget support by most donors, even though government had to deal with a severe food crisis. IDA acted quickly to assess that all conditions for continued Bank support under O.P. 7.30 were met. In close consultation with other development partners and regional and international organizations and based on a credible plan and timetable for the country’s return to a democratically elected regime, IDA declared GPRG-1 effective in May 2010 which allowed it to provide important resources to the authorities to help fund government programs for dealing with the severe 2010 food crisis. IDA’s proactive engagement with the transition government and the incoming democratically elected government made it possible to appraise and negotiate GPRC-2 shortly after the democratically elected government had taken office in April 2011 and to provide resources to the new government early in its tenure, helping to get the government program off the ground and also paving the way for budget support by other donors. Finally, as Niger was severely affected by the return of a large number of migrant workers in the wake of the Libyan crisis during the second half of 2011 and another severe food crisis in 2012, IDA was quick to prepare a supplemental financing operation which helped to close an unanticipated financing gap which had been created by the need to respond to severe economic shocks. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant The sustainability of development outcomes is affected by risks at the macro level that affect the overall development outcome of the GPR series as well as specific risks to the sustainability of specific reform impacts. 28 At the macro level, development outcomes could be affected by the significant security, political, and economic vulnerabilities of Niger. As in many of the reform areas achievement of the desired results requires continued sustained reforms, capacity constraints also pose a significant risk to the sustainability of results. With respect to the sustainability of individual reform efforts, reforms that involved budget allocations (for road maintenance and arrears clearance) or that provide only the first step of a larger reform effort (such as the approval of a strategy for the reform of the extension system) face high risks. However, most of the reforms supported by the GPR series are built on strong consensus building efforts and commitment by the government and thus likely to be sustained. Niger has also developed a fairly strong track record of sustaining reforms and for refraining from reform reversals. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory At entry, the GPR series focused on key issues for removing constraints to private sector led growth and strengthening public financial management. It built upon the achievements of two broader two-tranche DPOs (Rural and Social Policy Reform Credits – RSCR-1 and RSCR-2). The GRP series had been designed within the same conceptual approach as the RSCR series, including continued PFM reform, further strengthened by a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA2008) assessment, but with a shift in focus towards the growth agenda instead of human development. The shift in focus helped to establish a clearer division of labor with the European Union’s budget support, which focusses primarily on public financial management and human development. This division of labor was formalized subsequently in the context of the preparation of the successor programmatic budget support operation, which has a joint policy matrix including IDA, the European Union, and, more recently, also the African Development Bank. The design of GPR series addressed key issues in removing obstacles to investment and private sector led growth. However, there are a few instances where prior actions may not address the key obstacles in a particular policy area. In particular, instead of focusing on the budget allocation for road maintenance, in hindsight it would have been better to focus on a more sustainable financing mechanism for road maintenance. Similarly, conditionality on arrears settlement also faced the problem of sustainability of reforms and it may have been better to focus on financial management reforms that would have contributed to preventing the accumulation of arrears. GPR support to the reduction of the business income tax does not seem to have fully considered the structure of the Nigerien economy and in particular, the role of foreign participation in the mining sector. However the results framework was not adequately developed to undertake a full assessment of the program achievements: (i) some of the results indicators were poorly defined and difficult to measures and, (ii) in some cases, the link between results targeted and reforms undertaken is not obvious. 29 The GPR operations were disbursed on agreed conditions. The programmatic approach helped to maintain the focus on critical reforms and ensured that the Bank remained engaged in policy dialogue with the authorities during and after the political crisis. The triggers and prior actions were extensively discussed with the authorities, well focused, underpinned by good analytical work, and took into account the government’s limited capacity. The risk analysis was satisfactory, pointing out the substantial risks that Niger faced. The operations are designed to contribute to country macroeconomic and social stability. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory Supervision of the credit was highly responsive to the two changes in government and successful in engaging, ensuring commitment, and supporting successive governments in the implementation of the GPR supported reform program. The team also exercised appropriate flexibility in adjusting the program content and pace of reforms to the more limited mandate and reform priorities of the military transition government, while the overall thrust of the program was maintained. Supervision benefitted from strong management support, including participation in missions. In the course of supervision, cooperation with the IMF and the EU was scaled up in order to ensure a coordinated approach in dealing with the transition government, given the complex and uncertain country environment. Six ISRs were prepared: two during 2009, one in 2010, one in 2011 and two during 2012. Aide-memoires on performance were prepared in close consultation with the authorities and the potential impact of the economic and social context on the overall performance of the operations was raised. Sector specialists and consultants participated in the supervision missions, contributing valuable expertise and TA in each of the operation’s policy areas. Bank management was highly supportive of the team. 5.2 Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Despite the difficult context, the successive governments remained committed to implement the reforms supported by the program. The military transition government appropriated the reforms under GPRC-1 adopted in March 2009, before the coup d’état of February 18, 2010; and the elected authorities endorsed the reforms of GPRC-2 handed down by the transition government. However, political turmoil, electoral period, food insecurity and public security management have slowed down the implementation of reforms under the GPR series. The operations’ closing dates were not extended. 6. Lessons Learned The programmatic development policy operation approach proved extremely helpful in maintaining dialogue and reforms in a rapidly changing political environment. In particular, having an agreed reform program in place allowed the Bank to engage with the military transition government at a technical level and to continue to support the implementation of these reforms. It would have been unlikely that a new reform program could have been developed and agreed with the transition government. Close collaboration with other partners in a complex 30 political environment is essential to come to a shared assessment of the situation and to adopt a coordinated and coherent approach in dealing with a de facto government. As highlighted in the 2012 CAS completion report, for a country like Niger budget support plays an important role in buttressing the functioning of government: predictable and sustained budget support plays a bigger role in Niger than in countries with a higher revenue base and less external stress. A programmatic DPO approach plays an important role in keeping the reform agenda on track and mobilizing the Government on cross-cutting issues in an environment of frequent external shocks and instability. Most reforms would have never realized or accelerated without Bank support through the GPR series. Comments on issues raised by borrower/implementing agencies/partners 31 Annex 1: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members P107741 - Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Lending Supervision E. Philip English Lead Economist AFTP4 John F. May Consultant AFTHE Korotoumou Ouattara Sr. Financial Economist AFTFW Ibrah Rahamane Sanoussi Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Fily Sissoko Lead Financial Management Spec. AFTMW El Hadj Adama Toure Senior Agriculture Economist AFTA1 P117286 - Growth Policy Reform Operation II Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Lending Amadou Alassane Sr Agricultural Spec. AFTA1 Taoufiq Bennouna Sr Natural Resources Mgmt. Spec. MNSEN Helene Bertaud Senior Counsel LEGAM Robert Cauneau Consultant AFTMW Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Abdoulahi Garba Economist AFTP4 Soukeyna Kane Manager ECSO3 Salifou Noma Temporary AFMNE Korotoumou Ouattara Sr Financial Economist AFTFW Janet M. Owens Senior Economist AFTP4 Andre Ryba Consultant AFTFE Ibrah Rahamane Sanoussi Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW El Hadj Adama Toure Senior Agriculture Economist AFTA1 Robert Johann Utz Senior Economist AFTP4 Paula Joachim White Temporary CFPIR Supervision Amadou Alassane Sr Agricultural Spec. AFTA1 Taoufiq Bennouna Sr Natural Resources Mgmt. Spe MNSEN Helene Bertaud Senior Counsel LEGAM Robert Cauneau Consultant AFTMW Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Abdoulahi Garba Economist AFTP4 Soukeyna Kane Manager ECSO3 Salifou Noma Temporary AFMNE Korotoumou Ouattara Sr Financial Economist AFTFW Janet M. Owens Senior Economist AFTP4 Andre Ryba Consultant AFTFE Ibrah Rahamane Sanoussi Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW El Hadj Adama Toure Senior Agriculture Economist AFTA1 Robert Johann Utz Senior Economist AFTP4 Paula Joachim White Temporary CFPIR 32 P129793 -GPRC-2 Supplemental Financing P107741 - Niger Growth Policy Reform Grant (Growth DPL-1) Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Lending Amadou Alassane Sr Agricultural Spec. AFTA1 Helene Bertaud Senior Counsel LEGAM Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Carlo Del Ninno Senior Economist AFTSW Abdoulahi Garba Economist AFTP4 Karima Laouali Ladjo Program Assistant AFMNE Janet M. Owens Senior Economist AFTP4 El Hadj Adama Toure Senior Agriculture Economist AFTA1 Robert Johann Utz Senior Economist AFTP4 Supervision Amadou Alassane Sr. Agricultural Spec. AFTA1 Helene Bertaud Senior Counsel LEGAM Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Carlo Del Ninno Senior Economist AFTSW Abdoulahi Garba Economist AFTP4 Karima Laouali Ladjo Program Assistant AFMNE Janet M. Owens Senior Economist AFTP4 El Hadj Adama Toure Senior Agriculture Economist AFTA1 Robert Johann Utz Senior Economist AFTP4 (b) Staff Time and Cost P107741 - Growth Policy Reform Grant 1 Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY08 11.55 64.89 FY09 24.68 107.40 Total: 36.23 172.29 Supervision FY09 0.25 1.20 FY10 9.07 46.18 FY11 2.33 11.60 Total: 11.65 59.01 33 P117286 - Growth Policy Reform Operation II Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY10 3.27 3.96 FY11 20.66 158.41 Total: 23.93 162.38 Supervision FY12 0.83 13.91 Total: 13.91 P129793 - Growth Policy Reform Operation II – Supplemental Financing Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY12 11.04 65.58 Total: 11.04 65.58 Supervision FY13 4.88 4.34 Total: 4.34 Note: Lending cost of GPRO II and GPRO II – Supplemental Financing include also additional supervision cost for GPRG 1. 34 Annex 2: Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) N/A 35 Annex 3. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) N/A 36 Annex 4: Summary of Borrower's ICRR and/or Comments on Draft ICRR The Borrower broadly concurs with the assessment contained in the ICR and highlights the adverse impact of the political crisis on the implementation of the program. The political crisis also resulted in delays in the implementation of the planned agriculture survey to monitor results and the Borrower expresses its commitment to carry out these surveys in order to be able to assess the impact of these reforms. The Borrower also underlines the need to carefully define outcomes and results indicators in order to be able to assess the impact of the program. The Borrower expresses the importance of carefully defining intermediate and global results indicators for institutional and legal reforms in future budget support operations. 37 Annex 5: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A 38 Annex 6: List of Supporting Documents N/A 39 10°E 15°E L I B YA NIG ER To Djanet To Tajarhi SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS ALGERIA DEPARTMENT CAPITALS NATIONAL CAPITAL NIGER RIVERS Madama MAIN ROADS DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES T é To Tamanrasset This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. 20°N The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information n é Mont Greboun shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any (1,944 m ) A G A D E Z endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. r é 0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers Air Mts. D e Arlit Bilma 0 50 100 150 Miles s e r MALI t Agadez Ingal TAHOUA D I F F A To Tchin- Gao Tabaradene °N 15∞ N ZINDER CHAD Tahoua Tanout 15°N Keïta TILLABÉRI To Tillabéri Illéla Dakoro Bouza Ouahigouya Téra Filingué MARADI S a h Gouré e l Nguigmi Mt s. Nig Birnin a Konni ng er NIAMEY Zinder a NIAMEY Aguié M Kollo Maïné- Diffa Maradi Soroa Dosso 1963 Level To Magaria 1973 Level Lake BURKINA DOSSO Kontagora 2001 Level Chad SEPTEMBER 2004 FASO IBRD 33457 To Ouagadougou NIGERIA To Kaduna 0° BENIN 5°E 10∞ 10 °E E 15∞ 15 °E E