Human Resource and Institutional Development in The Road Sector

An Overview: Moving from Crisis to Reform

Second Edition

Prepared by
Philip W. Moeller

In collaboration with
Bernard Chatelin

July 1991

Human Resources and Institutional Development Project
United Nations Development Program
Infrastructure Division, Technical Department
Africa Region, The World Bank
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFTIN</td>
<td>Africa Technical Department, Infrastructure Division (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRD</td>
<td>Human Resource Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRID</td>
<td>Human Resource and institutional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Institutional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Communications Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOW</td>
<td>Ministry of Works (Malawi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI</td>
<td>Road Maintenance Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSATP</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTACDA</td>
<td>United Nations Transport and Communications Decade for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The constraining role of inefficiencies in the transport sector in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) on economic development has long been recognized; it has also been recently underscored in the long Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa prepared by the World Bank. Despite the long experience of the World Bank and other donors in financing transport projects, the effectiveness and sustainability of past programs keyed to increasing the performance of institutions in the transport sector has been disappointing.

This report, prepared under the Human Resource and Institutional Development (HRID) Project of the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Program (SSATP), provides an overview and introduction to the HRID issues faced by organizations responsible for the management of national road systems in SSA. It is addressed to the donor community and asks: why has it been so difficult to improve the performance of road organizations, and what needs to be done differently?

The findings of the HRID project indicate the need to undertake major reform in order to address the crisis road organizations currently face in performing their functions. An expanded discussion of the constraints on road organizations in SSA and the approach recommended for the promotion of HRID for these organizations in their institutional setting is provided in the more comprehensive SSATP Modal Summary Report prepared for the road sector.

The following report draws from the lessons of the case studies prepared under the HRID Project, the analysis and recommendations provided in the Modal Summary Report, and the experience of the World Bank. A bibliography of selected references follows the main report.

Jean H. Donohue
Chief, Infrastructure Division
Technical Department
Africa Region

1/ The report limits its focus to the management of the physical infrastructure in the road sub-sector. Management of the road transport industry is the subject of another SSATP report.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Sub-Saharan African Transport Program (SSATP) is a transport sector policy and institutional reform program being implemented by the World Bank in association with the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The HRID component of the SSATP is financed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and by the Governments of Norway and Italy. HRID in other transport modes is also being studied under the overall HRID Project for the SSA Transport Sector financed by the UNDP. The following reports are under preparation by other agencies:

- Ports
- Civil Aviation
- Road Transport Organizations
- Shipping
- Telecommunications

Philip Moeller, HRID specialist and consultant to the World Bank's Africa Technical Infrastructure Division (AFTIN), prepared this report as well as the Modal Summary Report. The report was prepared under the overall direction and review of Jean H. Doyen (AFTIN Division Chief) and Bernard Chatelin (SSATP Program Manager). Other members of the staff of the World Bank also participated in the internal review process. Among these were: S. Berkman, A. Cisse, A. Faiz, and A. Labeau.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING: AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

III. WHERE TO BEGIN? A HIERARCHY OF INTERVENTIONS

IV. HOW TO BEGIN? A METHODOLOGY FOR CHANGE

V. A CHALLENGE FOR THE DONOR COMMUNITY

VI. CONCLUSIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY
OVERVIEW:
MOVING FROM CRISIS TO REFORM

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 It is well recognized within the donor community today that the organizations responsible for the management of the national road systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) face a common crisis. Beginning in the mid 1960's, most of the region saw two decades of concentrated road construction. The focus on construction diverted attention from the need to correspondingly increase the maintenance capabilities of the road organizations. Road organizations deferred both routine and periodic maintenance. As a result, the road organizations in the region generally lack the capacity to adequately maintain their national road networks, and the majority of roads in SSA are in need of rehabilitation or repair, at a cost in excess of perhaps US$ 13 billion (See Exhibit 1).

Exhibit 1

WHAT IS THE COST OF THE SSA ROAD MAINTENANCE BACKLOG?

The most current data available in late 1991 indicated that as a result of neglected maintenance 55% of SSA's paved roads and 75% of the unpaved network are in only poor or fair condition. The road sector strategy prepared under the Second United Nations Transport and Communications Decade for Africa projected that US$22.4 billion would be required to bring 85% of the paved roads, 40% of the unpaved roads and 25% of the rural roads to good condition. This estimate included rehabilitation, periodic maintenance and routine maintenance throughout the Decade.

From the available figures on highway expenditures in thirty SSA countries for the period 1986-1988 the annual expenditures for road rehabilitation and maintenance was about US$700 million. The objectives set in the Decade strategy would require expenditures of about three times this level. Alternately expressed, such objectives would require 1.5% of GNP to cover their costs. Meeting these expanded costs will clearly stress both the financial and managerial resources of road organizations in the region.


1.2 The recognition that the majority of roads in SSA are in need of rehabilitation or repair and the realization of the high costs involved have come at a time when the region is facing

an economic downturn. The availability of resources has declined, and additional economies are likely to be necessary. Unless the institutional performance of road organizations can be increased, one can only expect additional deterioration of the road network. This deterioration will only further raise the ultimate costs for rehabilitation and repair, increase the already inflated costs of road transport in SSA, and further constrain economic development in the region.

1.3 Most donors have sought to improve the performance of road organizations in the region through the incorporation of technical assistance components in their road sector projects. These components have supported — with varying results — the transfer of road technology to the staff of road organizations. The analysis of the development specialists under the Human Resource and Institutional Development Project has shown, however, that the major current constraints on institutional performance in the road sub-sector relate more to the need for better governance and management than to deficiencies in technology. Efforts by the donor community at promoting better management of road organizations in SSA, however, have been disappointing.3/ Such disappointment was a major factor leading the World Bank and other donors to establish the HRID Project under the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Program (SSATP).4/

1.4 The findings of the HRID Project suggest that solving the current crisis faced by road organizations in SSA will require broad policy reform at both the macro and sectoral level. They also indicate that without improved approaches to HRID, efficiency in the sub-sector will not advance. Thus, ensuring the sustainability of HRID efforts will require that donors adopt different approaches — including the introduction of new methodologies — than have been taken in the past. This report provides a brief overview of the strategy the HRID Project advances to development professionals for the promotion of reform in support of HRID in the road sector. A more detailed discussion of this strategy is provided in the HRID Modal Summary Report for roads, published as a separate SSATP document.5/

3/ An appraisal of World Bank transport projects in 1987, for example, indicated that about 82 percent of the projects included institutional development components. Only about 34 percent of these projects, however, were judged to have substantially achieved the institutional development objectives which had been initially targeted; about 65 percent of the projects had achieved ID objectives only partially or negligibly. See Paul, Samuel. Institutional Development at the Sectoral Level: A Cross Sectoral Review of World Bank Projects. An Internal Paper for the World Bank, 1989.

4/ The primary objectives of the HRID Project include: reviewing what has been done in the past, determining the constraints on HRID, and identifying solutions for the resolution of these constraints. The basic elements of the project include: the conduct of research and analysis, the dissemination of findings, and the initiation of discussion with governments and institutions.

II. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING: AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

2.1 One of the central lessons highlighted in the findings of the HRID Project is the need to examine road organizations in SSA — and the constraints upon their performance — within the context of their institutional setting. The analytical framework used to develop the four HRID case studies gave equal weight to the constraints originating outside the road organizations being examined and the constraints that were internal to the road organizations themselves. When the findings were reviewed and the inter-relationships between the constraints were examined, however, additional weight was given to the importance of the institutional setting as a prerequisite for effective performance by road organizations in the region. Common problems — including a lack of autonomy, weak external and internal accountability, the limited role of road users, the nature of road networks themselves, and various external constraints — indicate the need to shift from past efforts to reform.

2.2 A Lack of Autonomy — Road organizations in SSA suffer from the institutional problems common to the public sector in the region. Most road organizations in the region have been used to create employment and have been subject to varying degrees of patronage and corruption. More attention has been paid to the initiation of new, large-scale projects and the purchase of equipment and vehicles than to the improvement of institutional performance. The construction of roads has taken on a symbolic importance in the region. New roads have become visible indexes of power and prestige, as has also become the holding of the portfolio for the ministry responsible for road construction. Similarly, appointments to senior technical posts in road organizations have often been politically determined and motivated.

2.3 The result has been a politicization of road administrations. Road programs have come to be judged on the basis of new investment rather than on the appropriate mix of expenditures for construction and maintenance. Political considerations have come to outweigh technically valid decision-making. The narrow economic interests of national elites have often resulted in distorted investment priorities. New construction and the upgrading of existing roads benefiting a few have been undertaken at the expense of the less visible maintenance requirements. The end result has not been the promotion of a professional core of engineers dedicated to effective maintenance and management of the national road network. Instead, what has most often evolved has been a cadre of administrators guided by a survival ethic based on serving the prestige and economic interests of the most powerful politicians.

2.4 Weak Accountability — The case studies indicated that within the context of the institutional setting commonly faced by road organizations in the region, accountability for the road maintenance function — both within the organization and externally to the public — has been significantly eliminated. In fact, the need to promote accountability internally and externally may be the central requirement for effective performance by road organizations in SSA. Internally, road organizations in the region lack a performance-based orientation. Without such an orientation there is no guide for action, and staff at all levels are not held accountable for specific achievements within specific time-frames. Without the demand for accountability, the staff of road organizations have few incentives and little motivation to provide effective road maintenance services. Faced by inadequate allocations of resources and weak management systems, moreover, many of the more promising young professionals have chosen to leave government service for employment in the private sector.

2.5 Externally, the lack of accountability by road organizations in SSA to road users is an equally serious disincentive to institutional performance. In part this is because road maintenance is a diffuse service; road organizations do not "sell" a well-defined product, such as the haulage of
goods by railways and airlines. Consequently, the relationship between road organizations and their users is indirect. Most simply put, road organizations do not collect a fee for the provision of services. Whatever road user charges are in place — ranging from permit and license fees to taxes placed on the sale of fuel — are not collected by road organizations but by agencies often located even under another ministry. Most often this is the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Transport. The revenue collected, moreover, is usually placed in the general revenue fund and is not specifically earmarked for roads.

2.6 Limited Role of Road Users — Road users often well know the inconvenience of poorly maintained roads. Since there is a time lag between poor road maintenance and the visible deterioration of roads, however, road users commonly do not understand the importance of sustained programming for road maintenance. They also often underestimate the economic costs to them of deferred maintenance. Even if they do understand the consequences of poor road maintenance, road users in SSA are not especially well organized. They have little access to the policy process, and whatever linkages they have with road organizations are informally structured. As a result there is little opportunity for the promotion of user-oriented interests — especially in terms of maintenance — and public accountability.

2.7 There is also a reverse side to this issue. If road organizations are not responsible to their users, they also have little control over the use of the roads for which they are responsible. Responsibility for enforcement, again, often lies outside the jurisdiction of roads organizations. Thus, the government organizations that are responsible for controlling road use may not understand the economic implications of road use in excess of design specifications, may have other priorities, or simply may not have the resources to support a meaningful enforcement program.

2.8 Other External Constraints — The case studies noted that the lack of autonomy and weak accountability of road organizations in SSA was compounded by other external constraints. Primary among these were salary limitations imposed by civil service regulations, budget allocations at levels inadequate to meet recurrent maintenance requirements, and foreign exchange allocation policies which did not support the levels of imported materials, fuel, equipment, and spare parts needed for road maintenance.

2.9 The Nature of Road Networks — In addition to these external constraints, again common to many public sector organizations, road organizations face the multiple stresses of administering roads widely dispersed throughout the national networks of their respective countries. Such dispersal complicates, for example, the need to balance centralized control of policy-making with decentralized decision-making at the operational level. On a national basis, the contact between headquarters, regional offices, and field crews is often constrained by limits in the national communication systems and is inadequate for effective administration. Field engineers often complain that they lack the authority to effectively use even the limited resources at their disposal; headquarters replies that field reporting is too delayed to facilitate the administrative controls needed to increase local authority.

2.10 Past Efforts — The case studies reviewed a variety of efforts by donors to address constraints on the performance of road maintenance. In most cases HRID components had been attached to technically oriented projects, rather than being established as stand-alone projects. This often complicated both the design and implementation of these components. For example,

6/ This, in turn, reinforces the vulnerability of road organizations to top-level political interference.
comprehensive institutional assessments were often bi-passed, and the actions undertaken under the projects focused on problems internal to the road organization. Departments were frequently reorganized and functions reshuffled, but incentives for improved performance were often not addressed. In some cases such efforts brought improvements during the life of the project, but to the extent that the external constraints — especially political interference and the lack of accountability — were not addressed, these improvements seldom proved sustainable. Clearly a major explanation for the limited progress in HRID was the frequent focus on organizational development rather than on the broader context of institutional development.

2.11 The Need for Reform — The analysis of the findings of the HRID case studies indicates not the need for more of what has been done, but, rather the need to do things differently. This suggests that donor actions supporting the promotion of HRID for road organizations should place a priority on the resolution of the external constraints on autonomy and accountability. Addressing these constraints would require major reforms reducing political interference, modifying policies, and restructuring institutional arrangements. The issues for reform, moreover, would need to be approached within an integrated and comprehensive framework. Only such a reform approach can effectively deal with the crisis being faced by road organizations in SSA.

2.12 The need for reform does not discount the importance of addressing such internal needs of road organizations as organizational restructuring, redundancy programs, and training. These are seen as part of the overall requirements for reform, but the analysis indicates that investment in them before macro reform issues have been addressed would provide only marginal results in the long-term. The common theme in macro reform programs must be the promotion of policies supportive of institutional accountability.

2.13 The next question the HRID Project addressed was how donors could promote the needed reform, and how could this process be linked to the resolution of the internal constraints faced by road organizations? The breadth and depth of the issues to be addressed suggested the need to revise both the targets and the methodology being used to promote HRID.
III. WHERE TO BEGIN? A HIERARCHY OF INTERVENTIONS

3.1 Basic to the design of the original research model used by the HRID Project was the recognition that although certain generalizations could be made for SSA as a whole, each country in the region must be addressed as an individual entity. Thus, the starting point for successful reform of road network operations seemed to be a country-specific review of the mission defined for each road organization. This review would be keyed to both national development plans and specific transport sector requirements. It would include a review of performance by the road organization and identify external and internal constraints. The review would provide the basis for building openness and commitment to the need for reform; it would also suggest the range of issues and interventions needed to promote autonomy and accountability.

3.2 The specialists staffing the HRID Project did not feel that there could be any fixed plan or guaranteed formula for the administration of road operations. A review of the research findings, however, suggested a framework for interventions which might be followed in the promotion of the reform process. This framework is based on the ranking of institutional issues and the order in which they should be addressed (See Exhibit 2).

Exhibit 2

INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

- Review Mission and Performance of Road Operations.
- Develop Commitment to the Need for Reform.
- Develop and Refine Reform Policy Framework.
- Implement Strategic Reform and Restructuring.
- Strengthen Top Management Environment, Motivation and Incentives.
- Improve Resource Availability.
- Implement Reorganization and Management Control.
- Strengthen Managerial Systems, Processes, and Procedures.

3.3 The framework builds upon the examples of success and failure. It uses the findings of the case studies and the lessons learned by development and HRID specialists within and outside such donor institutions as the World Bank. The framework seeks to facilitate reform in that successful change at one level is generally dependent upon prior conditions having been met at a higher level. The framework also provides a useful bridge between actions addressing the constraints in the external and internal management environments.

3.4 For example, strengthening systems and procedures alone will have a negligible impact unless an effective organizational structure with adequate management control exists. Such structure and controls can only operate if the resources required for work performance are available. Improving the availability of resources may have only marginal effect if top management is not improved. The improvement of management of road operations requires sector and institutional policy reform. Sector and institutional policy reform can only be achieved if there is a strong commitment on the part of the government to the need for change. Government commitment to
change will develop only if there is the perception that performance of road organizations is not supporting the role defined for the road sector.

3.5 HRID is an interactive process, and the framework is a conceptual guide to action. Because many of the issues are interrelated, their solution may require simultaneous interventions at several levels. In such cases, the synchronization and coordination of interventions is crucial to effective implementation. As an interim strategy, moreover, interventions may be introduced at a lower level before a higher level is fully addressed. The sustainability of HRID project results, however, can be assured only when certain factors and their improvements are addressed first.

3.6 The research model for the HRID Project gave separate focus to the promotion of human resource development (HRD) as one of the dimensions incorporated under institutional development (ID). The findings of the case studies suggested the importance of beginning with improved human resource policies and management including, again, the assessment of needs and the development of commitment. As in the case of ID there seemed to be a ranked framework for interventions (See Exhibit 3).

3.7 For example, Improving the effectiveness of technical assistance and the appropriateness of training, for example, would have little impact if accountability, incentives, and sanctions were not in place. Similarly the support of most HRD activities logically needed to follow redundancy program which sought to adjust employment to needs. There did seem, however, to be a high level of interaction between the elements in the HRD framework, and there seemed to be a greater potential for simultaneous interventions.

Exhibit 3

INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

- Improve Human Resource Policies and Management.
- Adjust Employment to Needs.
- Strengthen Accountability, Incentives, and Sanctions.
- Improve Manpower Utilization and Job Resources.
- Development Managerial and Supervisory Skills.
- Improve Personnel Systems.
- Increase the effectiveness of Technical Assistance.
- Improve the Appropriateness of Training.
IV. HOW TO BEGIN? A METHODOLOGY FOR CHANGE

4.1 Most donors have at least some experience in the promotion of reform in SSA. The experience of the World Bank in the promotion of structural adjustment, for example, has both indicated an increased openness of governments in the region to the introduction of change and demonstrated the complexity of the promotion of change. The terms of reference for the HRID Project called for an assessment of donor assistance in SSA. The findings of the case studies indicated several methodological lessons which donors might find useful in the design, implementation, and monitoring of interventions in support of HRID. The effective application of these lessons to some of the interventions suggested may require the assistance of HRID specialists.

4.2 Internal Nature of HRID — The most fundamental methodological lesson is the limited potential for inducing HRID from the outside. External development assistance agents can promote the recognition of the need for change and assist in setting the stage for the reform process, but they cannot successfully impose or force the process. Reform must take place within the road organizations and their institutional settings. Acceptance of the need for, commitment to, and the initiation of HRID interventions must come from within. To be effective, HRID interventions require a sense of ownership of and identification with the introduction of change. Change resulting from external pressure is often marginal and difficult to sustain. It is clearly the national Government’s responsibility.

4.3 Long Time-Frame — The majority of HRID activities in SSA have been undertaken within the context of project-related objectives and limited to the typically short time-frame of the project cycle. Experience shows that HRID requires a longer period of time — perhaps ten years or more — in order to monitor and, if necessary, adjust the institutional changes made and ensure their sustainability. This time-frame, extending over the lifetime of several projects, requires giving particular attention to continuity in the implementation process, including staff, objectives, and resources. Continuity can only be assured as a result of sustained commitment to HRID by governments, road organizations, and donors alike. Special mechanisms — ranging from task forces to review committees — may be needed to ensure such continuity.

4.4 HRID as a Discrete Activity — Activities addressing HRID in the road sector have usually been designed as components set within technically-oriented projects. HRID is perhaps best seen as a distinct process conceptually separate from technically oriented activities. It has different kinds of goals and different kinds of methods. It uses different techniques for measurement, verification, and monitoring. It has a time-frame, moreover which suggests it should be conceived in terms of program development instead project implementation.

4.5 Facilitation, Collaboration, and Participation — HRID should be structured on the basis of the involvement of the target policy-makers and the organizations and individuals to be involved in the proposed change. External agents can act as facilitators, but there must be a high degree of participation and facilitation in order to achieve commitment at all levels to the introduction of change.

4.6 Institutional Assessment — In order to formulate effective responses and specify developmental measures for a special road organization it is important to conduct an institutional assessment of both the external and internal constraints affecting the performance of the road organization. Such an assessment is a primary prerequisite for the design of HRID programs. Such
an assessment must be thorough, allowing sufficient time and resources to examine the institutional setting. Over time, specialized follow-up research may be required.

4.7 **Conditionality** — Conditionality should be linked to meeting specific, verifiable, and realistic conditions. Experience shows that the collaborative participation of donors, governments, and road organizations in the definition of conditionality enhances the commitment to meeting the terms which have been mutually established. Donors should, however, be willing to put a hold on lending until they feel commitment has been reached and the government and sector organizations can support their commitment with actions.

4.8 **Process Nature of HRID** — HRID cannot be approached mechanistically. Institutional development is a process by which institutional capacity is built-up over time by a range of strategies and intervention. There are no fixed blueprints for interventions but rather there are only guidelines and general frameworks for HRID. HRID processes are often interactive and require progressive, mutual re-alignments and adjustments.

4.9 **The Management of Change** — At the very core of HRID is the process of change. Few organizations and individuals readily accept change. At the outset change is often avoided or resisted. In such instances special management techniques which facilitate change are required. For example, the management of change is facilitated by an active organizational leadership which challenges the status quo, is open to the modification of the institutional arrangements that exist, as well as the adoption of new management approaches and techniques. The donor community should expect to play a significant role in the promotion of such new attitudes. This may be set within the context of such joint efforts as Phase II of the Road Maintenance Initiative (RMI,II). The RMI, II has been structured so that the donor community can collaborate together and facilitate the participation of local policy-makers and managers in the reform process.
V. A CHALLENGE FOR THE DONOR COMMUNITY

5.1 The design and implementation of reform programs for the road organizations in SSA will be a complex task; it will require a long-term perspective, careful preparation, and effective monitoring. The findings of the HRID Project also suggest that the donors, themselves, may need to review their internal policies and operations in order to fully prepare themselves to support the demands of HRID programming.

5.2 Most donors active in SSA have pressed for the initiation of structural adjustment programs and have at least some experience with the implementation of the macro economic reforms required by such programs. The background of every donor, moreover, is sufficient to enable it to draw from the lessons learned from successful and unsuccessful HRID in the region and to build on the best practices learned through experience. The HRID achievements under the 5th Highway Sector Loan in Malawi, for example, is an excellent example of where progress was possible because an enabling environment was already in place (See Exhibit 4).

Exhibit 4

MALAWI: AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR MANAGEMENT

The HRID case study for Malawi examined efforts to improve the performance of road maintenance by the Ministry of Works (MOW) under the 5th IDA Highway Sector Loan. The initiatives undertaken under the loan were predicated on the existence of high level commitment to the importance of road maintenance, emanating from the office of the President. The underlying goal was the installation of mechanisms and processes supporting accountability. Workshops for senior and mid-level management were used to identify constraints, build commitment to change, and introduce strategic management concepts. A core management group was created and targets were identified for building a performance orientation and accountability at all levels of staff. Workshops for mid-level managers sought to build skills and attitudes for increased delegation of decision-making.

Staff at different levels participated in a structural/functional review and an assessment of manpower and training needs. Complementary technical assistance introduced maintenance management and accounting systems which were keyed to the specifications of levels of performance and the reinforcement of accountability. The initiatives undertaken were perceived as on-going activities to be subsequently funded under the 6th Highway Sector Loan. The MOW continues to use the services of a management consultant but has increased its internal capacity to assess its needs, develop appropriate policies, and manage objective-oriented action plans.

5.3 Most donors have conducted reviews and evaluations of the HRID projects they have supported and have internally disseminated summaries of the findings and recommendations. Some
donors, such as the World Bank, have sponsored seminars and symposia to promote HRID. Donors also have begun to liaise in order to build on common experiences in the promotion of HRID. 7/

5.4 The findings of the HRID Project, however, indicate that in spite of the increased interest and involvement in HRID some donors have yet to fully install and integrate the concepts and methodologies required for HRID into their programming and operational activities. The acceptance of a new HRID orientation by members of the staff varies widely through such organizations. Thus, the successful implementation of HRID often remains more a function of the particular individuals associated with a project than a reflection of an HRID oriented culture on the part of the donor organization itself.

5.5 To a degree this represents institutional inertia or the time-lag that is often encountered in an organization between the advocacy of a concept and the widespread application of that concept. HRID specialists have suggested that sometimes such a lag is the result of the way in which the concept has been articulated. It may be advantageous, therefore, for some donors to examine the tone of the reports and seminars on HRID they are producing and sponsoring; an excessively theoretical perspective which ignores the practical concerns of project officers may be contributing to a delay in the acceptance and application of the lessons learned. In other cases the lag may be the result of administrative barriers, for example, a lack of communication between operational and evaluation units. Innovative mechanisms to promote communication and the assimilation of the skills and attitudes required for HRID might include teaming and the creation of internal HRID steering committees. 8/

5.6 The process methodology suggested for in-country implementation of HRID is unfamiliar to most of the staff serving donor, government, and road sub-sector organizations. The application of this methodology will require not only process skills but also the adoption of new approaches and attitudes. It is unrealistic to expect the staff of such organizations to assimilate these requirements rapidly or easily. It is likely, therefore, that externally recruited HRID and process specialists will be needed to support the HRID process and promote policy reform. 2/

5.7 There are three primary considerations suggested for donors seeking to enhance their commitment to HRID. First, although at the policy level most donors have identified the importance of HRID, some donors may need to reinforce the linkage of HRID programs to their annual, long-term planning processes. The linkage of a donor policy which emphasizes HRID as a major objective to the operational outputs of the donor is not automatic and must be carefully managed. An essential

---

7/ The SSATP Program itself represents an attempt of donors to share their experiences and frustrations with HRID.

8/ The thematic teams being established within the World Bank, for example, are excellent examples of such mechanisms.

2/ A recent study, for example, examined the role of country officers and economists at the World Bank in support of ID. Country officers were found to be faced by the heavy demands of coordination and administration. Country economists were equally overloaded with macro-economic considerations. Neither group had training in ID nor the time to assimilate the new skills and attitudes required for HRID. The report suggested that ID specialists to be added to the permanent staff of the Country Operations Divisions or the Sector Operations Divisions (See Gray, Cheryl. et. al. Institutional Development Work at the Bank: A Review of 84 Bank Projects. Working Paper No. 437, Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development Division of the World Bank, June 1990).
component in this process is the development of HRID program strategies at the country, sectoral, and organizational levels.

5.8 Secondly, the linkage between the formulation of policy and the allocation of resources may be weak or based on inappropriate estimates of the resources required. Adequate time and budgets for the preparation of HRID interventions, for example, are essential. Increased time and funding will also be required for monitoring and supervision, especially in support of the management of change. Expectations should not be unrealistic, and the monitoring of outputs will often require the development of criteria which are not easily quantified.

5.12 Thirdly, the need to review HRID design issues and to facilitate and monitor the impact of HRID interventions will be an essential, long-term element of donor operations. If donors are committed to increasing their support for HRID, they must supplement their technical staff with HRID specialists. For example, specialists will be needed to conduct institutional assessments, assist in the design of HRID projects, and conduct such specific interventions as workshops; long-term, resident facilitators may be required to promote participation and ensure continuity. Donors may need to consider permanently adding a pool of such specialists to their technical staff. 10/

5.13 In view of the increasing emphasis on HRID in donor assistance programming, moreover, it is likely that the demand for HRID expertise will require more than the establishment of a single HRID departmental slot or the use of external consultants. Donors may even find it necessary, for example, to establish HRID units within regional or functional departments. This would expand the range of HRID expertise available to a department and reduce the dependence on the ad hoc availability of external consultants. The establishment of such a unit could promote program continuity over time. It would also signal the importance a donor accords to HRID in programming and implementation activities.

---

VI. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 The case studies have indicated the need for reform in order to move road organizations in SSA away from the current crisis they face. The case studies have also found a new openness on the part of government policy-makers and the senior managers of road organizations to the need for new approaches and solutions for the promotion of institutional performance. These findings suggest that the time is right for the promotion of reform.

6.2 The promotion of reform will be dependent upon the ability of the donor community to build upon this new openness and to facilitate the generation of commitment by governments and road organizations to carry out the requirements of reform. The effective introduction of change is a complex process; in order for reform to succeed, donors, governments, and road organizations must turn away from "business as usual" approaches.

6.3 In order for reform to succeed, governments must define and implement new policies, the commitment of top management must be spread throughout road organizations which have been restructured on the basis of autonomy and accountability, and the donor community must be prepared for a long-term commitment to the facilitation of HRID. Clearly, this is a challenge for all, and the donor community needs to address internal issues which might constrain its ability to support reform and the promotion of HRID in the region.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


