63228 Bringing together the best of science and the best of development Independent Review of the CGIAR System Synthesis Report Bringing together the best of science and the best of development Independent Review of the CGIAR System Synthesis Report Elizabeth McAllister, Chair November 2008 Copyright © 2008 by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research All rights reserved For information on this and other CGIAR publications, contact: CGIAR Secretariat The World Bank MSN G6-601 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 USA Tel: (202) 473-8951 Fax: (202) 473-8110 Email: cgiar@cgiar.org Web: http://www.cgiar.org This publication should be cited as: CGIAR Independent Review Panel. 2008. Bringing Together the Best of Science and the Best of Development. Independent Review of the CGIAR System. Report to the Executive Council. Washington, DC. Editing, design, and production by Communications Development Incorporated, Washington, DC. The CGIAR Independent Review Panel was commissioned by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. This review is an independent publication that reflects the views of the panel members, who contributed in their personal capacities. This publication does not necessarily reflect the views of organizations that the panel members represent, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, or its Members. INDEPENDENT PANEL FOR THE REVIEW OF THE CGIAR SYSTEM November 3, 2008 Ms. Katherine Sierra Chair, CGIAR The World Bank Washington DC Independent Review of the CGIAR System Dear Kathy: On behalf of the Independent Panel for the Review of the CGIAR System, I am pleased to transmit to you the Synthesis Report of the Independent Review. The Panel and I wish to thank you and your colleagues for the trust and confidence that you have placed in us. We are very pleased to complete this Review and to deliver recommendations, which we believe may enable important reforms and position the CGIAR and its affiliated Centers as a leader in meeting the challenges of agriculture and natural resource management for the poor of the world. In conducting the Review and preparing our Report, we consulted widely and benefited greatly from the expertise, insights, and support of many people and institutions both within and outside the CGIAR. Members, staff, and stakeholders were generous with their time and candid in their contributions. We have benefited from the exchange of ideas with participants in the Change Management Process. We are grateful to all who contributed to our work. Today, there has been a unique confluence of a global food price crisis, an energy crisis, climate change challenges and environmental degradation, and a collapse of the international financial system. This is creating unprecedented demands on the international development community. Institutions will need to reform rapidly to cope with these developments. While the CGIAR can capitalize on its 37 years of global partnership, it must shed some systems and behaviors that no longer contribute to its effectiveness. It must produce a compelling results oriented strategy and work plan and create the trust that will lead to substantial and predictable funding for research in the future. Although in recent years other organizations have gained strength in agricultural research, there is no question that the world needs the CGIAR global network of research Centers and its committed funders. It is unique in its history and long standing in its credibility. It can make a vital contribution to the multiple tasks of scientific and social science research and technology innovation, resource mobilization, and constituency building. The Panel members and I are pleased that many of our recommendations have already been assimilated into the reform proposals that will be presented at the CGIAR 2008 Annual General Meeting. The Panel is optimistic that the final Synthesis Report and the Technical Report will continue to guide the CGIAR System in its efforts. In our view it is a key part of the international institutional architecture and its contribution to development results at the global, regional, national, and local levels is essential. Our recommendations call for swift decisions and urgent action focused on governance, results oriented management, funding, partnerships, and gender integration. In closing, thank you for your support to the Panel’s work, and for your unstinting support of the independence of the Panel and for our recommendations. Yours sincerely, Elizabeth McAllister Chair Independent Panel for the Review of the CGIAR System Table of contents Acknowledgments vii Abbreviations viii Overview: summary of findings and recommendations 1 1 Introduction 17 Objectives of the Independent Review Panel 17 Review standards and methodology 18 Participation and inclusion 18 Scope and limitations of the Review 18 2 The CGIAR in a changing context 20 Global food security: turning full circle 20 Dramatic recent changes in global agriculture present a major opportunity—and obligation—for CGIAR leadership 22 Findings on continued relevance: need to function more as a system 25 3 Effectiveness, quality, and results management 27 CGIAR research has had high overall returns, but impact assessment needs improvement 27 Performance measurement has received much more attention since the last CGIAR System Review 32 System Priorities fall short of objectives 39 Managing for results is key to revitalizing the CGIAR-Centers partnership 41 4 Gender at the CGIAR 46 Gender is not yet integrated into CGIAR research 46 The CGIAR’s Gender and Diversity Program 49 5 Resource mobilization, allocation, and management 53 Research funding has stagnated 54 Funding is more restricted 54 Research work programs have become more fragmented 56 Business practices must keep pace with shifts in funding 57 Cash flow is strong—but reserve targets should be increased 57 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T iii Capital investment declined sharply to 2003 and has only partly recovered 58 Challenge Programs greatly increase the complexity of financial management of the CGIAR System 58 The Multi-Donor Trust Fund is too limited a model 59 There must be a link between resource allocation and System priorities 60 The World Bank’s allocation of its contribution to the CGIAR 60 6 Reaching out—partners in development 63 Why invest in partnerships? 64 The cosponsors: opportunities for improved alignment and division of labor among the main multilateral agriculture organizations 65 The Global Forum for Agricultural Research: facilitating CGIAR engagement with stakeholders 65 The donors: broad agreement on what is working and what is not 66 Inter-Center partnerships: important, but lacking in effectiveness 67 Advanced research institutes: need for more joint programs 68 National agricultural research systems: key partnerships but in need of improvement 68 Partnerships for capacity and institution building: much more needs to be done by all participants 69 Partnerships with nongovernmental organizations: mutuality of values a driving force 70 Partnerships with the private sector: multiple obstacles 71 Intellectual property management is essential for partnerships 72 Some general lessons on global public partnerships 75 7 Governance: the imperative for structural reform 77 Previous reform efforts: findings and lessons 77 Assessing recent reform efforts: the Change Design and Management Team 81 Lessons learned 87 8 Doers and donors—a rebalanced partnership 92 The proposed structure of the partnership 92 The CGIAR Fund 93 The Consortium 96 Joint institutions of the partnership 97 Inaugural conference and a new reform compact 98 The Members’ perspective 98 The Centers’ perspective 98 A results orientation for managing implementation and monitoring performance 99 Transition arrangements 100 Appendixes 1 The CGIAR System 103 iv BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 2 Impact of CGIAR research 116 3 Terms of reference and Review Panel members 130 4 Methodology and sources of information 141 5 Expert commentaries on the Technical Report 154 References 169 Boxes 1 Criteria for getting on with rebalancing the Center-donor partnership 6 1.1 Sources of information for the Independent Review 18 2.1 The changed context for agriculture: key factors and challenges 22 2.2 The CGIAR System in brief 23 3.1 Meta-analysis of systemwide impact suggests substantial benefits from investment in CGIAR research 28 3.2 IFPRI and Mexico’s Progresa conditional cash transfer program 29 3.3 Stakeholder views on effectiveness of CGIAR research 30 3.4 Best intermediate outcomes resulting from CGIAR Center outputs, 2007 35 3.5 What is managing for results? 42 4.1 Inattention to gender in the CGIAR’s External Program and Management Reviews 47 5.1 CIAT’s financial crisis—a case study of financial challenges currently facing the Centers 54 6.1 Some key findings of the CGIAR’s 2006 Stakeholder Perceptions Survey 65 7.1 Five stages of CGIAR governance 80 7.2 The Science Council—perceptions of its importance and effectiveness 86 8.1 Science and evaluation in the balanced partnership 97 A1.1 Is the CGIAR a “System”? 105 Figures 1 Restricted and unrestricted funding for CGIAR 4 2 A rebalanced model of system governance 7 2.1 Official development assistance (ODA) to agriculture, 1995–2006 21 3.1 CGIAR publications and publications per scientist rose from 2006 to 2007 34 3.2 CGIAR Centers 2007 budget per publication 34 3.3 Average intermediate outcome ratings of CGIAR Centers, by Center categories, 2005–07 36 3.4 Average intermediate outcome ratings of CGIAR Centers, by Center, 2005–07 36 3.5 Accountability and responsibility for achieving results 44 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T v 5.1 Restricted and unrestricted funding for CGIAR 55 5.2 Rising numbers of restricted grants to selected CGIAR Centers, 1999–2007 56 5.3 Rising numbers of small grants (less than $100,000) to selected CGIAR Centers, 1999–2007 56 5.4 Restricted grants by size for selected CGIAR Centers, 2007 57 5.5 Unrestricted funding compared with total indirect costs, by CGIAR Center, 2006 58 5.6 Capital investments of CGIAR Centers, 1994–2007 59 5.7 Allocation of the World Bank Grant to the CGIAR 2007 61 6.1 CGIAR donors self-report of restrictions on financing 67 7.1 The CGIAR System in 1971 78 7.2 The CGIAR System in 2008 79 8.1 Balanced partnership model 94 8.2 A strategic Performance Measurement System for the CGIAR 100 A1.1 Restricted and unrestricted funding 107 A2.1 Aggregate benefit–cost ratios of CGIAR research under different scenarios of study selection 116 A2.2 Comparison of calculated costs and estimated benefits of joint CGIAR– national agricultural research systems investments in Sub-Saharan Africa 117 Tables 2.1 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centers 24 3.1 Center expenditure by research area, 1992–2007 28 3.2 Performance criteria for the Performance Measurement System 33 3.3 CGIAR System priorities, 2005 40 3.4 Differences between the CGIAR and managing for results 42 5.1 Nominal funding of CGIAR and affiliated Centers, 1995 and 2007 55 5.2 Constant dollar funding of CGIAR and affiliated Centers, 1995 and 2007 55 5.3 Restricted and unrestricted funding for the CGIAR System 55 7.1 CGIAR System Office structure (through the end of 2007) 84 7.2 Panel assessment of the World Bank’s role in the CGIAR 90 A1.1 CGIAR Members 104 A1.2 CGIAR System active standing committees, 1997–2007 105 A1.3 Nonmember funding by Center, 2007 107 A1.4 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centers 108 A1.5 Numbers of CGIAR Centers, regional offices, and countries by region 109 A1.6 Numbers of CGIAR regional and country offices, combined, by region 109 A1.7 Gender and diversity in CGIAR Centers’ staffing, 2003 and 2008 110 A1.8 Funding by Center in 1992, 2001, and 2007 as a percentage of CGIAR’s total funding 111 A1.9 Centers’ expenditure by priority area, 2007 112 A1.10 CGIAR investments by region 112 A1.11 Systemwide and Ecoregional Programs 113 A1.12 Challenge Program project summaries 114 A1.13 Revenue reported by the CGIAR, for all Challenge Programs 114 A1.14 Funding available to Challenge Programs, 2003–07 114 A2.1 Summary of poverty impact studies 126 vi BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Acknowledgments The Independent Review of the CGIAR Sys- also recognizes the generosity of the Food and tem was chaired by Elizabeth McAllister. The Agriculture Organization and the London In- Independent Review Panel comprised Keith ternational Development Centre in providing Bezanson, G.K. Chadha, John Mugabe, and meeting space and support. Ren Wang and his Jeff Waage, supported by Karin Perkins and staff at the CGIAR Secretariat (especially Lori Ken Watson, secretaries, and Joan Barclay and Dagdag, Namita Datta, Vino David, Fionna Francisco Sagasti, special advisors. Several con- Douglas, Iman Hassan, Xiao Hou, Maria Ik- sultants made valuable contributions to the sandarani, Manuel Lantin, Maria Lara, Dan- Panel’s work, including Meyer Burstein, Derek ielle Lucca, Selçuk Ozgediz, Harry Palmier, Byerlee, Christopher Gibbs, P.K. Joshi, Inge Shey Tata, Feroza Vatcha, and Jason Yauney) Kaul, John Lynam, Suresh Pal, Anne Perkins, deserve mention for their assistance, as do Rudy Gerald Neville, Mitch Renkow, Jan Rieländer, Rabbinge and his team in the Science Council, Vanessa Timmer, Godber Tumushabe, and and Emile Frison, chair of the Alliance. Mon- Yoshine Uchimura. The Panel thanks its ad hoc ika Szamko and Howard Ting of TriumGroup Advisory Committee (Robert Bertram, Anne- facilitated interaction between the Panel and Marie Izac, Franklin Moore, Jim Ryan, and Jon- the Change Management process. athan Wadsworth) for guidance throughout the Wendy Lawrence, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Review. Milica Zimonjic, Joan Bell, and Rita Agnes Quisumbing, and Vicki Wilde helpfully Dambita provided administrative assistance. provided information on gender and diversity. Sonja Vanek, Richard Labonte, and Commu- The Panel also benefited from the insights of nications Development Incorporated provided several long-time “friends of the CGIAR,” such editorial and document management support. as Gelia Castillo and Alex McCalla. The Panel is The Panel is grateful for the input and per- indebted to Adel El-Beltagy and his colleagues spectives from all those consulted during the at the Global Forum on Agricultural Research Review. The Panel is especially grateful to those for keeping the importance of partners at the who generously gave their time to be inter- forefront of the Panel’s work. Likewise, Monica viewed or to complete the survey of informed Kapiriri, Pat Mooney, Wilhelmina Pelegrina, stakeholders. The unusually high response rate and Tom Remington provided useful perspec- is a testament to people’s commitment to and tives from nongovernmental organizations, as investment in the CGIAR System and the Bill Neibur and Iranloye Oluyemisi did for the strong desire to see the System successfully re- private sector. invent itself for the 21st century. The Panel especially thanks Margaret Many individuals and Centers provided Catley-Carlson and Uma Lele for comment- helpful comments on drafts of the Panel Re- ing on the draft Technical Report. Finally, the view. Those who expended the time and effort Panel extends its gratitude to Kathy Sierra for to travel to the Philippines for the Stakeholder making herself available for consultations, for Workshop deserve particular thanks. her open-mindedness, and for her respect and The Panel is grateful to the staff of the support for the independence of the Review. Centers that received visits from Panel mem- As with previous evaluation teams, the bers, for their hospitality, support, and candid Panel was moved by the dedication of so many conversations. IRRI deserves special thanks for to making the CGIAR System work for the hosting the Stakeholder Workshop. The Panel betterment of humanity. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T vii Abbreviations CAS-IP Central Advisory Service for Intellectual Property CBC/CDC Committees of Board Chairs and Center Directors CBD Convention on Biological Diversity CDMT Change Design and Management Team CGI crop genetic improvement CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (International Center for Tropical Agriculture) CIFOR Center for International Forestry Research CIMMYT Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center CIP Centro Internacional de la Papa (International Potato Center) CPs Challenge Programs CPERs Challenge Program External Reviews ExCo Executive Council EPMRs External Program and Management Reviews FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FARA Forum on Agricultural Research in Africa GFAR Global Forum on International Agricultural Research GRPC Genetic Resources Policy Committee IAEG Impact Assessment and Evaluation Group ICARDA International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas ICRAF World Agroforestry Centre ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics IEG Independent Evaluation Group IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute IITA International Institute of Tropical Agriculture ILRI International Livestock Research Institute IPGRI International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (now called Bioversity) IRRI International Rice Research Institute ISI Institute for Statistical Information ITPGRFA International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture IWMI International Water Management Institute MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund NARS national agricultural research systems NERICA New Rice for Africa NGO nongovernmental organization NGOC NGO Committee NRM natural resource management viii BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T ODA official development assistance OED Operations Evaluation Department (now Independent Evaluation Group) OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PARC Public Awareness and Resource Mobilization Committee PMS Performance Measurement System PRGA Participatory Research and Gender Assessment Program PSC Private Sector Committee SC Science Council SGRP Systemwide Genetic Resources Programme SO System Office SPIA Standing Panel on Impact Assessment SPME Standing Panel on Monitoring and Evaluation SPMS Standing Panel on Mobilizing Science SPPS Standing Panel on Priorities and Strategies SWEPs Systemwide and Ecoregional Programs TAC Technical Advisory Committee TOR terms of reference TRIPS Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights UNCTAD The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UPOV International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants USDA United States Department of Agriculture WARDA Africa Rice Centre WFP World Food Programme BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T ix Overview: summary of findings and recommendations Centers contribute value, The importance of reviewing the Consulta- The Panel’s key conclusion is that the but the CGIAR System tive Group on International Agricultural Centers contribute value, but the CGIAR Research (CGIAR) became starkly apparent System is not achieving its full potential. Gov- is not achieving its full to the Independent Reviw Panel in 2008 as ernance transformation is needed for leader- potential. Governance food prices soared. World leaders called for ship in a rebalanced partnership to articulate transformation is needed rapid action to stem the effects of food price a shared, convincing strategy with a results inflation as 100 million people were pushed orientation, clear authorities, and effective for leadership in a into poverty and the ranks of the 800 mil- decisionmaking. rebalanced partnership lion already suffering hunger began to swell. The independent CGIAR network of re- to articulate a shared, As trade barriers on rice and other food com- search Centers matters—for achieving food modities were resurrected and food price pro- security, for dealing with climate change, and convincing strategy with tests hit many developing countries, the world for supporting achievement of the Millen- a results orientation, community was reminded of the importance nium Development Goals. The new global ar- clear authorities, and of food security to economic and political sta- chitecture for agriculture will need to respond bility. The questions posed to the Panel by the rapidly to emergencies, such as crop, animal, effective decisionmaking CGIAR membership became compelling. and zoonotic diseases of global significance. It In our visits to the Centers and atten- will also need to make sustained investments dance at various forums over the year, the over the coming decades to address such com- Panel was struck by the energy and dedication plex challenges as mitigation and adaptation that Center leadership and scientists have for to climate change and biotechnology for the their work. We participated in several retreats poor. with CGIAR members and stakeholders who Despite working in a complex environ- worked hard for almost a year in an intensive ment with significant management challenges, change exercise to renew the CGIAR as a CGIAR-supported research has seen high re- forum for bringing together the best of sci- turns. Global and regional meta-evaluations ence and the best of development. suggest that CGIAR investments have paid The CGIAR, however, suffers signs of age for themselves by a wide margin, even consid- as it turns 37. It is in urgent need of structural ering just a few well documented successes. Its change if it is to respond with its full potential multidisciplinary research activities and its to new challenges of food and environmental range of collaborations position the CGIAR security. A renewed and rebalanced partner- network of Centers as one for the world’s most ship is essential for the CGIAR System to im- innovative development partnerships—and as prove its game. a 21st century organization. In support of this renewal, the Panel of- But this is a serious moment in the CGIAR fers its answers to the questions posed by the System’s history. Notwithstanding its contri- CGIAR Members in the form of key findings butions and potential, the CGIAR system and recommendations, supported by a sum- has major shortcomings and is hitting below mary of its findings and a model for moving its weight. It has been largely absent from the forward, detailed in this Synthesis Report. The key global debates on the food crisis and cli- Panel’s full analysis is in its Technical Report. mate change, it lacks a coherent strategy, it has BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 1 A new compact—one experienced financial and administrative up- Findings based on separate heavals in recent years, and the trust between its constituent Centers and the donors that Finding 1: The CGIAR-supported governance and support them has deteriorated. Centers contribute substantially management and Center performance is uneven, financing to agricultural productivity and predictable funding—is arrangements have not kept pace with needs, natural resource management system governance has become cumbersome Overall, recent impact assessments of CGIAR needed to rebuild the and ineffective, and management practices re- research reveal very high returns on invest- cooperative spirit between quire improvement. Financing in real terms ment. A recent meta-analysis of all ex post Members and Centers has stagnated since the 1990s. The share of impact assessments over the System’s lifetime unrestricted funds has declined steadily since found benefits suggesting that total invest- and bring the best of 1998 and with it capital investment. The Cen- ments in the CGIAR have paid for themselves science together with the ters are experiencing difficulty attracting and by a wide margin—benefits ranged from best of development retaining top scientists. As a consequence, the $12 billion to $120 billion. Regional impact CGIAR Centers’ influence and impact are studies in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa less than they could be. point to substantial benefits of crop genetic The CGIAR System has been attempt- improvement research in Asia and of crop ing reform since 1994. Incremental, these at- genetic improvement and biological control tempts have largely failed to meet their ambi- research in Africa. But they also illustrate that tious aims. Needed now is extensive reform, research impacts in Africa have been limited particularly to address a dysfunctional gover- geographically, with lower positive returns on nance structure that is at the root of the Sys- investment than in other regions—despite tem’s inability to change. Sub-Saharan Africa’s receiving the largest A new compact—one based on separate regional share of CGIAR investment (41 per- governance and management and predictable cent over the CGIAR’s lifetime). funding—is needed to rebuild the coopera- Crop genetic improvement research has tive spirit between Members and Centers and received the most assessment and has gener- bring the best of science together with the ated evidence of profound positive impacts best of development.1 Effective structural re- from the broad diffusion of improved variet- form as the vital first step should allow new ies and subsequent spillover effects. Yield-en- leadership to emerge. The rebalanced CGIAR hancing and yield-stabilizing modern variet- partnership, with the mutual accountability ies produced by the Centers and their national recommended in this report, should facilitate partners have produced benefits of more than the formulation of a bold collective strategy. $10 billion annually, due largely to improved These challenges offer an opportunity for wheat, rice, and maize. Recent research on a renewing and strengthening the international range of crops and traits (drought resistance agricultural architecture as well as the CGIAR and nutritional content) are generating out- System. With a 3,300-person scientific staff puts and outcomes assessed as very promising dedicated to poverty reduction and one of the for potential impact. world’s largest and most important germplasm Recent studies on the impact of natural collections, the System can reaffirm its value resource management research, including to humanity. It generates and delivers inter- pest management, show substantial benefits national public goods—scientific and techno- and positive internal rates of return on in- logical knowledge, agricultural research prod- vestment. Some benefits have occurred at a ucts and services, and research capacities to considerable scale and are of international respond to and anticipate demand—that are significance. Notable examples are the work essential to improve agricultural productivity of the rice-wheat consortium in South Asia, and environmental sustainability in the poor biological control programs in Africa, and the regions of the world. Alternatives to Slash and Burn Program. But 2 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T much of the research impact for natural re- nutritional inadequacy, and climate change— source management is still on a much smaller especially in Africa. To be successful, these geographic scale than that for crop genetic im- partnerships will need to apply the lessons provement, often because adoption depends of the first green revolution in Asia, with its on local collective action, extension services, clear long-term strategy for delivery system or assignment of property rights. That means requirements, including financing for capac- that the spillovers can be very limited, and the ity and institution building. Without this, the overall impacts constrained. current attention of world leaders on issues of The number of studies on the impact of food production and food security for the policy-oriented research has risen considerably poor and vulnerable will come to very little. in recent years. Policy-oriented research offers Key characteristics of successful partner- strong potential for generating broad impacts ships include: affecting many people in many countries. Esti- Written and mutually endorsed un- mating benefit-cost ratios is more difficult for derstanding of the “coincidence of policy-oriented research than for most other objectives.” types of research. Even where the evidence is Stipulation and agreement on mutual clear that policy advice was applied, the advice expectations and the mechanisms for is usually only one of many influences. dispute resolution. Specification of “end points,” mile- Finding 2: The CGIAR and Centers stones, and a framework for ongoing need to take a more strategic evaluation. approach to partnership Inclusion of exit strategies and the The word partnership is greatly overused in conditions for their enactment. the discourse of international development. Where finances are part of the part- Yet the CGIAR System cannot function nership, advance understanding on effectively as a component of an international resource allocations, accountability, public goods delivery system without robust and management standards. partnerships that ensure the distribution and use of CGIAR outputs. Although Centers Finding 3: The Centers have have forged many high-value partnerships, made progress in addressing most are short term and ad hoc. The resources, intellectual property protection, incentives, and strategic arrangements needed but more needs to be done for an effective international public goods The CGIAR and its Centers’ capacity to han- delivery system are not in place. The challenge dle issues of intellectual property and gover- for the CGIAR donors and Centers is to be nance of genetic resources affects the status of part of such a system and to exercise vision the collections in genebanks, the exchange of and leadership in bringing it about. The green germplasm, the ability of the Centers to col- revolution of the 1970s in Asia was driven by laborate with NARS and farmer organiza- a strategic vision that included the scientific tions, and the kinds of partnerships they can discoveries of the CGIAR contributing to establish with the private sector and advanced a delivery system that catalyzed large-scale research institutes. The CGIAR cannot agriculture and infrastructure investment. ignore or casually handle issues of intellec- This resulted in an international public goods tual property protection. While some Centers delivery system through strong partnerships have relatively developed regimes, high levels between the CGIAR and the national agricul- of awareness, and staff dedicated to dealing tural research systems (NARS) and advanced with intellectual property issues, the major- research institutes. ity of the Centers do not have in-house staff New partnerships are needed to meet responsible for intellectual property issues today’s challenges—of food insecurity, and tend to deal with these issues on an ad hoc BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 3 basis, often reacting to crisis. The general view to develop a systemwide policy, strategy, and among people consulted by the Independent results framework. Review Panel is that Centers need to do more to effectively deal with issues of intellectual Finding 5: The Centers are in property protection. a quiet financial crisis Funding for the Centers has not grown in Finding 4: Gender is not adequately real terms for more than a decade (figure 1). integrated into Centers’ research In contrast, several international development mandates and outreach institutions have received record replenish- The Panel’s analysis indicates that the CGIAR ments of their concessionary and grant funds, System appreciates gender integration as being suggesting that the problem has not been the important or very important to its research unavailability of resources but a failure of the mandate and understands that the CGIAR CGIAR and Centers to set up institutions and the Centers have not been fully effec- that mobilize funds well. tive in integrating gender into their research Funding has been increasingly piecemeal and outreach. But there is scant evidence to rather than strategic. Every review of the indicate that the contributions of women to CGIAR in the past decade has recommended agriculture and their special knowledge and stronger central coordination of funding and needs are addressed at a level commensurate a tighter link between priorities, performance, with their importance to agriculture, as recog- and fund allocation. Yet funding has become nized by the CGIAR and Center leadership. increasingly “restricted,” with a proliferation Institutionally, the CGIAR System has not of smaller, targeted grants. While this has ben- built on best practice institutional account- efits for some donors, it means larger admin- ability approaches to mainstream gender and istrative costs for Centers, greater financial to devise special measures, where necessary, risk, and less flexibility to follow promising to address the specific needs of women and lines of research. It has also resulted in falling girls. There is misplaced reliance by CGIAR capital investments by the Centers at the risk leadership on staff advocacy functions below of falling behind scientifically. All growth in the executive level in convening Centers and funding from nonmembers is restricted. And in individual Centers, diverting responsibility while so far supporting CGIAR objectives, from operations. Even so, there is a readiness nonmember funding can also lead to further Figure 1 Restricted and unrestricted funding for CGIAR 2007 US$ millions 600 Total funding 500 400 Restricted funding 300 200 Unrestricted funding 100 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: CGIAR Financial Reports 1995–2007 adjusted for inflation index, 2007 base. 4 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T fragmentation of CGIAR and Center core effective locus for systemwide decisions on Centers need more objectives. important governance matters. Because resources, larger reserves, The CGIAR Centers have been placed in there is no empowered “entry point” into an invidious position by the lack of clear, ade- the CGIAR and no accepted leader who can and especially more quate, and consistent incentives. The discourse act with authority for the Centers, decision- unrestricted funds, but of the donor agencies has been rooted in the making is shifted down to individual Center donors are unlikely to Paris Declaration principles of alignment, boards or up to the Consultative Group. The harmonization, devolved ownership, and mu- expression of collective will of the members provide them without tual accountability. The incentives provided to is at the Annual General Meeting (particu- greater assurance of the CGIAR by donors, however, have pushed larly its Business Meeting), a large body that strategic effectiveness and competition and individual donor ownership, can take decisions only by consensus. Spe- resulting in fragmentation. Many Centers cur- cific decisions on vision, partnerships, orga- performance. Needed: rently manage 200–300 separate, relatively nizational structure, research activities, and a new institutional and small projects, many with different terms, resource allocation are made by the individ- financial structure with conditions, requirements, fiscal year reporting ual boards and managements of the Centers. schedules, and overhead rates. Between the Centers and the Annual General new tools for resource There are deficiencies in financial manage- Meeting of the Consultative Group are bodies mobilization as part of a ment at some Centers and limited tools for fulfilling only advisory or nonbinding over- general reform package managing financial risk across the partner- sight and monitoring functions. ship. The cross-cutting multipartner Chal- The lack of a focal point for Centerwide lenge Programs have increased the complex- decisionmaking has several pernicious out- ity of the research network and partnership comes. First are high transaction costs, iden- and the difficulty of financial management tified by new and existing donors and the and control. The ad hoc arrangements for dif- sister institutions in the international system ferent Challenge Programs do not provide a as a serious disincentive to working with the strong foundation of financial systems to cope CGIAR. Second is the inability of the net- with the rising numbers of such programs. work of Centers to mobilize quickly to re- In good times, these would be significant spond to opportunities or to position their problems. During the current food price cri- collective competence to create opportunities sis, new ideas and approaches are needed even in the rapidly changing context of research for more urgently. Because the problems are in- development. terrelated, the Panel believes that the finan- There is no use of modern results-based cial challenges can probably be resolved only strategy and management approaches that as part of an overall change in the institu- would help CGIAR entities decide where ac- tional structure of the partnership. Centers countability and responsibility for final results need more resources, larger reserves, and es- fall between production of the core components pecially more unrestricted funds, but donors and complementary delivery components of the are unlikely to provide them without greater international public goods delivery system. assurance of strategic effectiveness and per- The CGIAR has attempted reform several formance. Needed: a new institutional and times since the mid-1990s, with the twin aims financial structure with new tools for re- of ensuring strategic relevance and securing source mobilization as part of a general re- adequate, stable, and predictable financing. form package. All efforts proved largely unsuccessful. The CGIAR is once again attempting change Finding 6: Dysfunctional through a highly ambitious change manage- governance and management ment initiative. The Panel considers that a constrain the System’s potential successful outcome will require taking careful The CGIAR Charter enshrines what may account of the lessons of prior efforts: a struc- be called “dispersed governance,” with no tural transformation in CGIAR governance BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 5 Box 1 Criteria for getting on with rebalancing the Center-donor partnership The Panel recommends a new systemwide governance model take full account of the need for donors to demonstrate based on nine criteria: results and value for money. 1. A single entry point is required to position the CGIAR in inter- 6. Paris Declaration principles—alignment of developing national forums and to reduce the transaction costs identified country strategic priorities and CGIAR strategy and pro- by potential funders and international institutional partners. grams, harmonization of programmatic funding levels and 2. The functions of governance and management need to be reporting requirements, devolved ownership, and mutual differentiated and clearly separated to avoid conflicts of in- accountability—should be applied to the CGIAR. terest. Donors should not be involved in managing the Cen- 7. A fully independent evaluation and assessment function ters. Management and responsibility for operations should needs to be set up. The Science Council’s role as evaluator be separated from oversight. is incompatible with its role as advisor and honest broker on 3. Decisionmaking bodies should be empowered to take bind- scientific excellence. The two roles need to be separated. ing decisions and have commensurate authority to ensure 8. The CGIAR must maintain high standards of excellence in implementation, at least in clearly circumscribed areas es- research, while ensuring that key partners use the CGIAR sential for CGIAR System functioning. outputs to achieve development impact. The apparent 4. Governance arrangements require formal foundations— contradiction between focusing on scientific excellence legal in the case of the Consortium—to increase legitimacy and research achievements and giving priority to achiev- and improve effectiveness. This requires establishing rules- ing development outcomes and results needs to be recon- based membership conditions that include enforcement ceptualized using advanced models of international public mechanisms. goods and results management. 5. Adequate and predictable financing, particularly for inter- 9. The political viability of implementing the new governance national public goods, is required to allow the Centers to arrangements for the CGIAR should be acceptable to the retain a cadre of high-caliber scientists to tackle mid- and key players in the CGIAR community. A time-targeted plan long-term scientific challenges. Predictable and adequate to implement the proposed governance reforms should be financing must be earned. Financing arrangements must agreed to and supported financially. is the key precondition for the success of all Consortium (a legal entity owned other reforms. jointly by the Centers) and a CGIAR Fund (formed and managed by do- Recommendations nors), with some bridging institutions (figure 2). Recommendation 1. Rebalance the Some common institutions of the Center-donor partnership to sustain partnership need to be maintained. the CGIAR’s unique contributions Donors need to strike a new balance be- A central finding of the Panel is that the 37-year tween providing unrestricted resources to the partnership between Members/donors and Centers, achieving greater programmatic co- the research Centers is a robust comparative herence in funding, and strategically target- advantage of the CGIAR. No other interna- ing grants. In addition, resource allocation tional arrangement rivals this common-cause needs to be influenced more by Center perfor- partnership of development agencies and agri- mance. In return, the Centers need to work cultural science with its nearly four decades closely together to bring greater coherence of accumulated knowledge and social capital. to the network, to be more programmatic in This partnership should be preserved. But it their outlook, to make firm strategic and orga- needs rebalancing (box 1). nizational decisions and to demonstrate cost- The separate responsibilities and au- efficiency. Finally, the Centers cannot be held thorities of Members/donors and of accountable for the final delivery of their prod- the Centers need to be clarified and ucts to the poor, but they do need to be part of rationalized in a dual structure of a a larger strategy and set of arrangements with 6 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Figure 2 A rebalanced model of system governance Triennial General Meeting Consortium of Centers CGIAR Fund for Agricultural Research Chair Chair Board Joint Council Chief strategy and Executive Executive Officer Director results framework Independent evaluation unit Common Systemwide services programs Resource allocation Results management (including performance management Science and measurement system) Advisory Board Development strategy Other partners BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 7 donors and other partners to achieve specific Recommendation 2. Establish a legally development-based outcomes. structured Consortium of Centers After careful consideration, the Panel has Building on the conclusions of prior stud- concluded that four actions are vital: ies and the lessons of past reform efforts, 1. The CGIAR System should separate the Panel recommends establishing a new governance and management func- legally structured Consortium of Centers. tions. The roles of donors and man- It would be owned by the Centers, governed agement should be separated to avoid by a board chosen by them, and have a Chair conflicts of interest. The management and a Chief Executive Officer chosen through responsibility for operations should international competition. Its board would be separated from oversight. be assigned clear decisionmaking authorities, 2. The donors should establish a CGIAR fiduciary, and due diligence accountabilities by Fund for Agricultural Research as a the Centers and its decisions on all delegated new channel for predictable, unre- matters would be binding on members. The stricted funding to Centers and re- Consortium would be rules-bound. As new, stricted funding to programs. Money high-impact organizations appear over time, should be allocated from the Fund to the rules should allow for new and expanded Centers and to programs in a rules- membership. It should not be a closed shop. based manner, partly according to The Consortium would provide a single performance. In deciding how much point of entry and, in partnership with the grant funding to channel through the Fund, project a single coherent voice in in- pooled Fund, the donors should keep ternational policy forums, a much stronger in mind their Paris Declaration com- position than single Centers can occupy. The mitment to provide two-thirds of their Consortium will enable the Centers to man- development aid on a program rather age their common interests more coherently than a project grant basis by 2010. and strategically. In particular, it would pro- 3. The Centers should strengthen their vide an instrument for common services, pro- institutions for common action by gram coordination and administration, and consolidating common services, com- results-based management. mon policy and strategy, and program CGIAR Fund-supported programs administration in a jointly owned should have an administrative home in the Consortium. Consortium. 4. Both donors and Centers should set Many of the CGIAR’s main donors will up decisionmaking procedures based continue to expect consolidations and dem- on clear authorities and shared stra- onstrations of major cost-effectiveness gains tegic objectives. Nonbinding ap- over the next few years, and this will affect proaches to decisionmaking are no decisions on levels of financing. The Panel longer adequate for a collective enter- believes, therefore, that the new Consortium prise that spends half a billion dollars must address as a very high priority the reality of public money annually, resources of total governance size and costs. set to increase substantially if the To improve on past performance in spe- foregoing actions are taken. cific areas, a new Consortium of Centers The Panel has considered whether the rec- should: ommended approach to governance would be Improve financial management and more economical as well as more effective financial reporting. Specifically, the than the existing system. It seems clear that Consortium should evaluate transac- the true costs of governance will be less when tion costs of small grants and establish the dysfunctions of the current system are minimum grant requirements, move remedied. to full cost recovery on all projects, 8 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T increase reserve requirements to 180 As the new human resources function The Fund would work to days (and should not be penalized for becomes established, the Gender and ensure follow-through higher reserves), immediately assess Diversity Program should gradually the need for capital improvements hand over its mainstream activities on financial pledges, to across Centers, provide more detail (such as the staff survey) to human receive and hold funds in financial reports on nonmember resources. provided to the Fund, and contributions, and develop annual fi- Centers should develop a common nancial statements for Challenge Pro- strategy to protect their internally to make funds available to grams, which should be subject to an generated intellectual property and the Consortium of Centers annual independent audit. know-how, including filing their Simplify the Challenge Programs to own patent applications. The CGIAR focus on Center-led consortia. This must resolve issues related to its pol- change should not reduce the valu- icy of making research results publicly able involvement of external institu- available. The interests of the CGIAR tions in program development and and developing countries must be re- implementation if it is made a condi- spected, along with the interests of tion of program award and if propos- public sector companies. These issues als are adequately peer reviewed. It have been pending for more than a will help make Challenge or “mega” decade, and the Panel recommends Programs an effective tool of Sys- urgent and decisive attention. tem strategy. Further, the Challenge Programs and Systemwide and Eco- Recommendation 3. Establish a CGIAR regional Programs (SWEPs) should Fund for Agricultural Research be integrated into a more strategic The new CGIAR Fund for Agricultural (derived from System strategy and Research would be established under a gov- strategic objectives) new mechanism erning Council that would receive, hold, com- for inter-Center programmatic re- mit, and allocate financial resources assigned search with partners. Design and to it in trust. This would be principally a management of these programmatic shareholder governing body made up of con- initiatives should be based more on tributing members, including foundations. what is required to achieve results An option would be to assign voting shares and less on a portfolio of specific in- on the basis of groupings (constituencies) to struments. The Consortium of Cen- accommodate both large and smaller share- ters could provide a mechanism for holders and other stakeholders. managing programs that would avoid The Fund would work to ensure follow- conflicts of interest and improve fi- through on financial pledges, to receive and nancial oversight. hold funds provided to the Fund, and to Establish common services such as make funds available to the Consortium of strategic communications, financial Centers. In making funds available, it would reporting, and results management apply the conditions and schedules agreed in systems, internal audit, information multiyear financing discussions, including technology, and properly equipped performance- and results-based reporting, human resources function. The milestones, and benchmarks. Together with human resources function must en- the Board of the Consortium, it would be re- sure equity in internal Consortium sponsible for ensuring that transparency and and Center hiring, training, and com- full cost recovery are applied to all financing pensation and other rewards. Once agreements falling outside of the Fund. established, the new function could Once allocated from the CGIAR Fund prepare gender and diversity policies. to the Centers, funds should be unrestricted. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 9 The World Bank should Financial management should be strength- Rural Development Department. The World chair the new Fund ened, partly by giving programs a common Bank needs to disengage from operational administrative home in the Consortium, as- management of the CGIAR network of Cen- and cochair strategy suming that the Consortium would have a ters. The leadership of the World Bank in con- and replenishment- formal Finance Committee and would be ac- sultative group arrangements argues strongly like triennial meetings countable to the Fund for financial manage- that the Bank should assume the leadership ment of contributions. of this revitalized and modernized body. The with the Consortium The key responsibilities of the Fund would Bank’s convening power would be an essential be to lead funding negotiations, to maintain ingredient of success. The World Bank should strong links with the development and re- chair the new Fund and cochair strategy and search community on poverty reduction, and replenishment-like triennial meetings with to create opportunities for complementary the Consortium. programs to support the science and research of the Centres. The Fund would use its devel- Recommendation 4. Support the opment knowledge to allocate its resources Consortium and CGIAR Fund with to programs and Centers according to agreed a science advisory board and an criteria and rules. independent evaluation unit The main functions to be carried by the The Panel considered what common institu- Fund would include: tions should be maintained as part of a strong Establishing a multiyear financ- partnership between the Centers (and their ing mechanism on the lines recom- joint Consortium) and the proposed Fund, mended in this report and based on concluding that there should be at least three: the Monterrey principles of good do- A joint strategy and results frame- norship (adequacy and predictability work developed for the inaugural of financing and mutual accountabil- conference and renewed preferably ity for results). The aim should also as part of replenishment-like negotia- be that such financing equal approxi- tions on a triennial basis. mately two-thirds of total CGIAR fi- An independent evaluation unit, re- nancing by 2010. The CGIAR Chair porting to the council of the Fund, would exercise collective leadership in but working closely with the board of this regard and would provide over- the Consortium as well. sight for establishing the Fund. A committee of eminent advisors Approving transfers from the Fund that form a science advisory board. It to the Consortium based on agreed might be called the Science Council, schedules, performance-based indica- as at present, or perhaps something tors, targeted milestones and reviews broader if the inaugural conference of the specific program proposals that decides to include anti-poverty exper- would follow from the agreed strate- tise as well as science expertise. gic framework. Ensuring accountability and standards Joint Strategy and Results Framework: The of due diligence over all funds held Panel recommends establishment of a system- and assigned to the Consortium. wide strategic management for results frame- The World Bank should maintain its spe- work. Strategic results frameworks are the key cial relationship with the CGIAR and its affil- link between donors and Centers, the glue iated Centers. It should focus its engagement that holds the CGIAR System together. They on strategy, resource mobilization and allo- should be prepared in consultation with all cation, and building of the substantive links relevant partners, including those in charge between the Bank and the development com- of scientific advice and those responsible for munity, including its own Agriculture and independent evaluations. 10 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Although Centers have put in place strate- strategy and program proposals. It would As managing for results is gic planning, management, and performance not, however, carry out performance evalua- essentially a responsibility measurement systems, these are as yet absent tions, as is the current practice of the Science at the System level. In addition to guiding pri- Council. This is at fundamental variance of management, the ority setting and resource allocation, jointly with accepted best practice, as it has placed Consortium should take developed systemwide strategic management the Science Council in a conflicted position, the lead on performance for results frameworks provide the means for whereby it provides scientific and program- grounding the mutual accountability between matic advice, mandates programmatic norms management and donors and Centers on indicators, facts, and and standards, and evaluates performance measurement once new evidence. These, in turn, increase transpar- arising from its advice but without account- systems are established ency and allow performance assessment of ability for the performance. both parties in achieving commonly defined The Panel recommends that the strate- objectives and results. Together with an in- gic role of the current Science Council, em- ternational public goods delivery system ap- bodied in the former activities of the Science proach, these frameworks inform the design Council’s Standing Panel on Priorities and and implementation of partnerships and lead Strategies and the Standing Panel on Mobi- to an effective division of labor between Cen- lizing Science, be made the principle role of ters and their partners. They establish clear the future Science Advisory Board. This body lines of accountability for activities that are should remain an independent advisory body directly under Center control, and of respon- that provides advice to the Consortium of sibility for influencing partners in those they Centers. Its advice will also be useful to the do not control. donor Fund, but the Science Advisory Board The results framework would be the basis should not in any way be an instrument of the for Performance Contracts between the Con- Fund to organize or conduct monitoring and sortium and the Fund, against which imple- evaluation of the Centers or Consortium. mentation would be managed and perfor- A future role for the Science Advisory mance monitored. As managing for results is Board should include strategic studies on is- essentially a responsibility of management, the sues of potential importance to the CGIAR Consortium should take the lead on perfor- and to global agricultural research for devel- mance management and measurement once opment. Relative to current Science Council new systems are established. The Fund should activity, these studies need to be increased and develop its own results framework against made more timely in their delivery. Most im- which to judge its performance and report to portantly, they need to be developed in con- the Consortium on its effectiveness. sultation with the Centers, with a clear ini- tial understanding of how their results will Science Advisory Board: This would take up be used. those functions of the current Science Council The Panel also recommends that the cur- that are solidly service based and that aim to rent focus of the Science Council’s Stand- furnish the Consortium of Centers with the ing Panel on Impact Assessment remain as highest caliber of scientific counsel, including an activity of the science advisory body as the results of foresight exercises to keep the self-assessment assistance. Further, the Panel work of the rebalanced partnership “ahead of stresses the need to better assess the impact the curve” on the needs of science for develop- of all research areas, improving methods and ment. This body would provide the CGIAR levels of assessment for natural resource man- System with scientific and technical advice agement and policy-oriented research and and would be a broker to mobilize science and for capacity building, and understanding the technology for agricultural development. contribution of all these research activities to As required by the Consortium, it would the delivery of specific strategic objectives. also provide advice in the formulation of In this context, the Panel also recommends BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 11 The Panel stresses the continued effort to understand the impact study recommendation. The program would need to better assess of CGIAR research on poverty reduction. also cover “process evaluations” to cover There is a particular need to focus on under- process effectiveness as well as investment the impact of all research standing the impacts of CGIAR research in effectiveness. areas, improving methods Africa, given the comparatively low historical and levels of assessment impact and recent investment and promising Recommendation 5. The Consortium outputs. Finally, the Panel recommends that and the Fund adopt a gender strategy for natural resource future impact assessment make efforts to ac- based on accountability for integrating management and policy- curately assess environmental, gender, and gender in the work of partnerships. oriented research and other indirect effects of agricultural research The Panel recommends that IFPRI, on behalf for development. There are some impact as- of the Consortium, develop by 2009 a gender for capacity building, sessment activities that are most appropriately strategy and results framework for inclusion and understanding the undertaken by the Centers themselves, and in the new, overarching CGIAR strategy and contribution of all these the links between the science advisory body results management process. IFPRI, along and the Consortium regarding impact assess- with the Participatory Research and Gender research activities to ment would need to be worked out in more Analysis program, would establish an inter- the delivery of specific detail. Center and stakeholder task force to develop strategic objectives Systemwide strategic objectives for gender Independent Evaluation Unit: The Panel also integration in Center research nested under recommends that an Independent Evaluation each of the CGIAR strategic objectives. The Unit be established to conduct systems reviews task force would review guidelines for all and to evaluate progress on the Joint Strategy management and accountability instruments and nested Center and program strategies. to include indicators of achievement of the That is, as well as conducting overall systems proposed gender strategy. evaluations, it would also take on the Science The Panel recommends that one of the first Council’s current role in managing external mega programs to be developed address the evaluations of CGIAR activity, including productivity, production, and sustainability Centers and Challenge Programs. The Con- issues facing women in agriculture and the sortium of Centers will need to develop their special health and nutrition needs of women own capacity for results-based performance and girls. management and measurement.2 The Panel also recommends expansion of The Independent Evaluation Unit would the Gender and Diversity African Women report to the Council of the Fund. The Evalu- in Agricultural Research and Development ation Director would develop an evaluation (AWARD) Program into a global scientific strategy and work plans with the input of capacity-building program for women and the Consortium, the Fund, and partners for Group 2 nationals. Through a joint ven- tracking performance of the Consortium and ture with universities in Organisation for the Fund toward the agreed strategic objec- Economic Co-operation and Development tives and desired programmatic outcomes and countries and with centers of excellence in impacts defined in the strategy and the results developing countries, this would increase framework. the number of female and Group 2 nation- It would follow donor agreed guidelines als who earn PhDs in agricultural science, for evaluating global programs. It would work economics, and other agriculture-related to reduce transaction costs for the Centers by disciplines (including health). The Centers working toward joint evaluations with do- could assist Gender and Diversity Program nors. It would report triennially on its own work with donors to match universities and results and yearly on the evaluation results of CGIAR Centers where postgraduate re- the products set out in its multiyear strategy search for development can be undertaken and on the implementation of the previous and supported. 12 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Recommendation 6. The Consortium experts on intellectual property Members would be able and the CGIAR Fund together take a rights. A multistakeholder dialogue to focus their energies more strategic approach to partnerships can be used to achieve greater clar- ity on the nexus between intellectual on development strategy, with other actors in the production and delivery of international public goods property rights and public agricul- resource allocation and The CGIAR cannot function effectively as a tural research. oversight—matters that are component of an international public goods The Panel recommends the CGIAR delivery system in the absence of robust part- continue to apply its new policy for more important and much nerships that ensure production and scaled up building partnerships with nongov- more appropriate to them application of public goods. Current ad hoc, ernmental organizations. The sys- than micromanagement of short-term approaches to partnerships are tematic nature and concrete steps unsustainable. The results, relationships, and proposed in the policy should be Center network operations requirements for strategic partnerships need applied and tested over time. The to be made explicit and operationalized within Panel accords particular importance a results-based performance framework. in this regard to conducting regular Within the balanced partnership three-year evaluations of CGIAR– model, the Panel recommends as the nongovernmental organization part- highest priority for partnership devel- nerships. At least the first such eval- opment in the CGIAR, that partner- uation should be conducted on an ships be approached as integral com- independent basis. ponents of a medium-term strategy and results framework. Moving forward with a The Panel recommends that the balanced partnership CGIAR donor community and the governments of developing countries From the Members’ perspective, in accepting approach the needs of Africa systemi- a rebalanced partnership, Members would cally by assuring adequate provision achieve four benefits: for institution and capacity building First, Members would have an in- in the partnership among CGIAR, strument, the Fund, to achieve the NARS, and advanced research quantum advance in the funding of institutes. research in agriculture and natural The Panel also recommends the estab- resource management that climate lishment of a separate financing facil- change and the current crisis in food ity as a contingency fund for partner- prices demand. ship opportunities, not envisaged in Second, strategic allocation of pooled the strategic framework. This would funds would enable a programmatic be available, for example, to meet approach to investment in agricul- the short-term financing needs of a tural and natural resource manage- NARS partnership to test a promis- ment research for development. ing new technology or to gain rapid Third, authorities would be clarified and timely access to scientific equip- and accountability enhanced. ment available only in an advanced Fourth, members would be freed research institute. from management responsibilities, The Panel recommends a facilitated which would be assumed by the joint high-level dialogue with Chatham Consortium of the Centers. This House rules among representatives of would be a significant gain in time civil society organizations, the private and energy. Members would be able sector, representatives of Centers and to focus their energies on develop- the Consortium, and independent ment strategy, resource allocation and BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 13 The Centers would “up oversight—matters that are more im- increasing the total funding of the their game” by focusing portant and much more appropriate Centers and Programs within the first to them than micromanagement of commitment and pledging period. on large regional and Center network operations. They would enhance their compara- global challenges. In Members would accept the loss of some tive strategic advantage, not only doing so, their stature powers in return for gains that are more im- by the capabilities made possible by portant to them. They would: substantial incremental funding, but and relevance would Give up their quasi management of also by having a single entry point increase in the eyes of the Center affairs. and single voice in international fo- international community Face a stronger, more confident and rums. The brand and coherence of probably more assertive network or the network or partnership would be partnership of Centers. enhanced. Relinquish some sovereignty because They would be served by common financial contributions that were services owned by them. previously direct from individual They would have a stronger role in the Members to Centers would now be joint management of programs. partly shared in the pooled Fund. But But accepting the rebalanced partnership members would still exercise strategic model of governance for the common good sovereignty through their agreed re- and mission would involve tradeoffs for the source allocation framework. Centers: In summary, the Members would be re- They would cede some important lieved of management responsibilities and decisionmaking powers to the joint the conflicts of interest that attend them. In- Consortium. stead, they would have an appropriate instru- They would accept that much of the ment for results-based resource allocation flow of unrestricted and restricted (the Fund). The pooled Fund would enable (programmatic) funds would come Members to institute a results-based frame- through the CGIAR Fund, rather work, within which they could exercise due than directly from individual mem- diligence on development “value for money” bers, and that it would be allocated from the Centers. They would be working by members strategically, partly ac- within a governance structure more in ac- cording to Center performance and cord with the spirit of the Paris and Monterey program performance. Declarations, which encourage harmoniza- They would take more responsibil- tion and encourage Members to focus on ity, individually and collectively, for strategy, resource allocation, and oversight financial risk management, and there rather than on the ownership of projects and would be a lower probability of a bail- operations. out if a Center had serious financial From the Centers’ perspective, in accept- difficulties. ing the balanced partnership model, the Cen- They would pay significant fees and ters would gain certain benefits: levies to the joint Consortium, to The Centers would “up their game” by cover its operations, including joint focusing on large regional and global services to the Centers and adminis- challenges. In doing so, their stature tering programs. These expenditures and relevance would increase in the might be partly (or mostly) compen- eyes of the international community. sated by transfers to the Centers of They would have access to a major new funds that previously have gone di- source of unrestricted and restricted rectly to pay for system management. money through a new pooled Fund But there might be significant incre- with the objective of substantially mental costs to the Centers. 14 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T In summary, authorities and responsibili- and natural resource sustainability and major The Panel believes that ties in the new model of governance would be international research networks. all aspects of the new clarified and rebalanced to the long-term ben- efit of all parties. governance system Getting on with it cannot be decided in Transition arrangements Real progress cannot come one institution at the absence of serious a time. The CGIAR Centers need to lift their discussions between the There is now a window of opportunity for partnership game at all levels and with the the reformation of the CGIAR. The current private sector and nongovernmental organi- Member/donors and the world food price crisis demands immediate zations. But they cannot reform on their own. Centers. In this spirit the action. Therefore the Panel recommends that Nor can they address global challenges with- funding be made available to exploit exist- out institutional supports from their global Panel recommends an ing programming and to accelerate program partners. The next step is for the govern- inaugural conference to design to fully engage past investments and ments responsible for the five organizations reach agreement on a new to engage cutting edge science. comprising the core entities of the interna- If the CGIAR and the Centers decided tional agriculture architecture to review the reform compact for the to move to a partnership structure similar to recent evaluations of the International Fund rebalanced partnership the one outlined here, the Panel recommends for Agriculture Development, the Food and and the requirements an eight-month transition to bring the new Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, structures into existence. The process would the World Food Programme, and the CGIAR for its implementation entail two six-person task forces, one led by to determine how these important institutions the World Bank to propose the details of the can be better supported to work more effec- Fund and the other led by a chairperson desig- tively within more nimble, mission-directed, nated by the Centers to formulate the details and integrated international structures. for legal incorporation in a jurisdiction that Within this broad reform agenda, the it would determine in consultation with the CGIAR must enhance its global leadership. Centers. The task forces would present their Science (including that for policy and insti- proposals to the inaugural conference for the tutional innovations) will be at the heart of launch of the compact. faster productivity growth, adaptation to cli- The Panel believes that all aspects of mate change and the use of scarce water. The the new governance system cannot be de- priority challenges are becoming more trans- cided in the absence of serious discussions national in scope, putting a premium on re- between the Member/donors and the Cen- gional and global collective action and on the ters. In this spirit the Panel recommends an development of international public goods. inaugural conference to reach agreement on The Panel’s main message is that change a new reform compact for the rebalanced at the CGIAR is essential—and possible. Get partnership and the requirements for its on with it. implementation. In the future a triennial assembly of all Notes stakeholders would be organized and co- chaired by the chairs of the Fund and the 1. Nested frameworks from overarching strategy to Center and program strategy would guide the achievement of Consortium. Its purpose would be to present agreed strategic objectives. The results systems should and seek feedback on strategies and programs first and foremost serve the management of the Centers and to review all matters of interest to the to guide staff and secondly to demonstrate development impact achieved with partners. Efforts should be made to well-being of the CGIAR partnership. This reduce reporting at each level of the system to just what is could also seek to bring together the leaders of needed at the next to make decisions. the leading organizations concerned with ag- 2. Governance is making sure an organization is doing the right things; management is making sure the organization ricultural research and development, food se- is doing them right. curity, and the interface between agriculture BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 15 1 CHAPTER Introduction The Consultative Group on International Objectives of the Independent Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was created Review Panel in 1971 as an informal partnership among governments, private foundations, and inter- The Independent Review Panel was asked national organizations interested in sup- to “assess whether the CGIAR is well posi- porting agricultural research for developing tioned to address emerging food security countries through a small network of inter- and agriculture-related problems of develop- national agricultural research centers. The ing countries.” The objectives of this Review CGIAR System (the Consultative Group and were to take stock and assess the efficacy of the Centers) was guided by an independent the partnership, to assess the effectiveness Technical Advisory Committee. Since then, of the CGIAR research, and to recommend the CGIAR System has grown to include 64 changes in the CGIAR System to improve its Members, 15 research Centers, and an inde- efficacy and effectiveness for dealing with the pendent Science Council. It is supported by emerging challenges for food security, agricul- an Executive Council, a System Office, and ture, and natural resource management of the various standing and ad hoc committees. poor. The CGIAR periodically commissions The terms of reference for this evaluation independent reviews. The most recent sys- cover three linked topics: temwide review (the Third System Review) 1. Governance, partnership, man- was completed in 1998. In 2003, the World agement, and alignment of the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department CGIAR. conducted a meta-evaluation of the CGIAR 2. The scientific work of the CGIAR. System as part of a larger study of the World 3. Partnerships (national agricultural Bank’s involvement in global programs. Thus, research systems, advanced research this is the first full-fledged systemwide review institutes, the private sector, and non- of the CGIAR in 10 years. governmental organizations). Today, the CGIAR operates in a very dif- The Panel’s terms of reference included ferent context from that in 1971. New issues questions on the positioning of the CGIAR have come to the fore, putting at risk gains in along the research to development con- agricultural productivity and related poverty tinuum. The Panel assessed whether the reduction. These include greatly increased CGIAR System remains relevant and well populations in some countries, loss of arable positioned to make its best possible contri- land to urbanization, increased pollution and bution to the agricultural research needs of degradation of water and soils, climate change, developing countries, including natural re- and rising demand for biofuels. Yet, official de- source management, and, ultimately, to sup- velopment assistance to agriculture and agri- port the food security of poor people around cultural research has stagnated in real terms. the world. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 17 Review standards and and developing countries. The Panel visited methodology eight Centers, surveyed some 240 stakehold- ers directly involved in the CGIAR System The standards for an independent review through a written survey, 2 interviewed more have evolved since the Third System Review than 300 people, and conducted a stakeholder 10 years ago. In this Review, the Panel was workshop to solicit feedback on its draft Tech- guided by the World Bank Independent nical Report. People consulted during the Evaluation Group’s guidelines for the review Review are listed in appendix 4. of global partnership programs and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Scope and limitations and Development–Development Assistance of the Review Committee criteria for evaluations.1 As with previous independent reviews, the The Independent Review of the CGIAR Sys- Panel did not conduct or commission direct tem had an appropriately broad scope, similar measures of the impact of the CGIAR Centers to that of the three previous comprehensive and programs but relied largely on existing evi- reviews. But the time allocated for the Review dence. Box 1.1 lists the main sources of infor- was short relative to the breadth of the terms mation used by the Panel during the Review. of reference, previous reviews, and reviews of similar scope of other global programs Participation and inclusion and institutions. The members of the Panel were unable to work full-time on the Review The Panel sought input from a broad range because of other senior-level responsibilities of stakeholders, both internal and external they had to manage at the same time. Finally, to the CGIAR, from both industrialized it was a challenge to conduct the Review Box 1.1 Sources of information for the Independent Review CGIAR Performance Measurement System and other in- A written survey seeking the views of all those involved di- formation on the accountability and transparency of the rectly in the CGIAR System since 2001. CGIAR System. Structured Interviews with stakeholders and shareholders. Review of the extensive literature of reports previously Visits to and interviews with the cosponsors, the CGIAR’s commissioned by the CGIAR or by the CGIAR’s stakehold- administrative and coordinating units, CGIAR scientists and ers and shareholders,1 and other documents relevant to the management at CGIAR-supported Centers and national development impact of the CGIAR.2 agricultural research systems, and others involved with the Examination of previous independent reviews and major Centers. evaluations conducted by CGIAR Members, including the Inputs by consultants to the Panel. independent World Bank Operations Evaluation Depart- Participation of the Panel Chair in the Steering Committee ment Meta-evaluation of the CGIAR. of the Facilitated Change Management Process. Evaluations of other global programs, including the recent independent evaluations of IFAD (2005) and FAO (2007). The World Development Report 2008 analysis of the ef- 1. Core CGIAR documents (for example, Charter), CGIAR/Executive fectiveness of the World Bank in the agriculture and rural Council decision records, reports of previous reviews and studies development sector, and the 2007 Independent Evaluation (for example, System Office, Stripe Review of Corporate Gover- Group Report “World Bank Assistance To Agriculture In nance of CGIAR Centers), and the general literature of agricultural Sub-Saharan Africa.” research and development impact. Examination of financial information from the CGIAR Sys- 2. Reviews of Centers External Program and Management Reviews, tem Office and the Centers. external reviews of the Challenge Programs and Systemwide and Information on and recent reviews of governance and man- Ecoregional Programs, and evaluations of impact and other CGIAR agement of the CGIAR System. evaluations, including evaluations done by Centers to assess the Documents on financial risk management. impact of the CGIAR on poverty reduction. 18 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T staff. The overall response rate was 85 percent (201 simultaneously with the Facilitated Change responses). The intent was to examine how well those Management Process. The Facilitated Change knowledgeable about or directly involved in managing the CGIAR network think it is being managed and what Management Process has rightly captured the corrective steps might be taken to improve this. Others attention, enthusiasm, and resources of the involved in the network—such as the large number of CGIAR. However, the time and energy that scientists doing Center work, their partners (such as those working in the national agricultural research systems and went into that process diminished the sup- advanced research institutes), or the direct beneficiaries port that would otherwise have been avail- of their efforts (such as farmers and fishers)—were not able to the Review. On the positive side, the asked to respond. However, Panel members did interview Center scientists, partner representatives, and others in concurrent nature of the exercises created an person during visits as part of the Independent Review openness in the CGIAR System that had not process. Their opinions did not differ substantially from existed during past reviews. those of survey respondents. Survey questions focused on the development and implementation of Center research priorities; the roles of the World Bank (financial and other); Notes gender and diversity; the role and effectiveness of Science Council, of CGIAR partnerships, and of CGIAR Members 1. See comments in World Bank (2003); OECD/DAC (1999, and cosponsors; the Challenge Programs; funding and 2002, 2004, 2006); http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/grpp. financial management; and governance reform. Several questions compared the importance of an issue with the 2. The survey was sent to 237 individuals in five target groups: effectiveness or adequacy with which it is being addressed. the Executive Council and other member representatives, Over one-third asked respondents to select possible actions board chairs and Center executives, Challenge Program that might deal with the issues identified and invited them representatives, the Science Council, and professional to comment on these and related concerns. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 19 CHAPTER 2 The CGIAR in a changing context All institutions, including the Agriculture returned to the international increasingly transnational in scope, emphasiz- CGIAR, are lagging behind spotlight in 2008, when food riots erupted in ing regional and global collective action and many poor countries in response to a dramatic the development of international public goods, in the ability to respond spike in food prices. The underlying causes areas of the CGIAR’s comparative advantage. to today’s challenges. are structural, and the problem will not be There has never been a quickly corrected. All this heightens the need Global food security: for coordinated efforts across sectors and insti- turning full circle better time for the CGIAR tutions. But the institutions and mechanisms to re-assert its role and to implement and finance the global agenda In the early 1970s, when the CGIAR was relevance and redefine were developed for a very different world. created, there was deep concern about global All institutions, including the CGIAR, are food security and the prospect of famine in its vision and strategy lagging behind in the ability to respond to developing countries. Agriculture stood at the today’s challenges. There has never been a bet- center of the international political economy. ter time for the CGIAR to re-assert its role By 1982, agriculture was receiving the largest and relevance and redefine its vision and strat- sectoral share of official development assis- egy. Three broad principles should orient the tance, at 17 percent. CGIAR’s response to these challenges. Much of the concern vanished with the 1. Reforms of the global organizations green revolution of the 1980s. From 1980 to responsible for agriculture need to be 2005, agricultural production expanded glob- conducted holistically, to clearly es- ally by an average of 2.2 percent a year, faster tablish comparative advantages and than the population growth of 1.7 percent a areas of expertise. year. This rapid agricultural growth pushed 2. Specialized global organizations for down the real price of grains in world mar- agriculture will have to work together kets some 1.8 percent a year, even as crop land more effectively and with specialized per capita declined 40 percent over the same agencies in other sectors. period. 3. The emerging global architecture will These impressive successes, however, soon need to be able to respond rapidly to turned to neglect. The share of official devel- emergencies of global scope and to opment assistance for agriculture stalled and make sustained investments over de- then declined steadily to less than 2.9 percent cades to address some of the difficult in 2006 (figure 2.1). As the priorities of the challenges, such as adaptation to cli- development community shifted to other mate change and biotechnology for emerging goals, especially poverty, health, and the poor. environmental sustainability, total official de- Within this broad reform agenda, the velopment assistance (expressed in 2002 US CGIAR needs to enhance its global leader- dollars) to agriculture declined from $6.2 bil- ship role. Science will be central to the solution lion in 1980 to $2.3 billion in 2003. Over the to many challenges, such as faster productiv- same period, multilaterals cut their assistance ity growth, adaptation to climate change, and to agriculture from $3.4 billion to $0.5 billion use of scarce water. And priority challenges are (an 85 percent drop). 20 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Figure 2.1 Official development assistance (ODA) to agriculture, 1995–2006 ODA for agriculture Total ODA ODA for agriculture US$ billions Percent 100 10 80 8 60 6 40 4 20 2 0 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Source: www.oecd.org/dac/stats. These overall trends have been reflected India.2 The World Bank estimates that food in the trajectory of the CGIAR. Following production will need to grow by another 50 20 years of continuous program growth and percent by 2030 to keep pace.3 budgetary expansion, CGIAR financing ex- But rising demand alone is not the major perienced a rapid deterioration, which led to challenge, since demand is projected to grow a severe financial crisis in 1994. The CGIAR’s more slowly than it has over the past 20 years, share of publicly funded agricultural research although much depends on when second- in developing countries fell from about 10 per- generation biofuels using crop wastes and cent in 1980 to 1.5 percent in 2000.1 other feedstocks become profitable.4 The real Today, history is repeating itself. Agricul- challenge to the future of food production ture returned to the international spotlight in and global food security comes from rising 2008, when food riots erupted in many poor demand combined with severe constraints on countries in response to a dramatic spike in the supply-side. Among the key supply side food prices. The causes and effects of what has factors are acute resource constraints, slow- been called the “food price crisis” are global, ing technical change, uncertain effects of cli- however. The negative effects are being felt mate change, high energy prices, and lagging throughout the world. Its underlying causes regions. are structural, and the problem will not be These factors have moved issues of agri- quickly corrected. These causes include high culture and food security back to the center oil prices and a shift toward biofuels, but there stage of the international political economy. are also much deeper structural factors. At the recent Group of Eight Summit, world Aggregate demand for food is now higher leaders announced their commitment to ad- than at any time during the past half century, dress this “multifaceted and structural crisis.” and since 1984 population growth has ex- World Bank President Robert Zoellick has ceeded food production growth. Growth in called for “a new deal of global food policy,” demand for food over the past half century warning that a failure to act could result in has been about 1.5 percent a year, rising re- the loss of the poverty reduction gains of the cently to 2 percent and is forecast to rise as last decade. In the same statement, he called high as 2.6 percent within a decade, driven for a doubling of financing for the CGIAR.5 mainly by rapidly expanding affluence in These factors have also dramatically altered developing countries, especially China and the context in which the CGIAR operates. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 21 The agricultural development agenda includes development architecture (see box 2.2 for a more than restoring global food security. It brief profile of the CGIAR system and table includes other critical global challenges, some 2.1 for an overview of the 15 Centers). No lon- well known and others just emerging, relat- ger. The relative importance of the CGIAR, ing to poverty, environmental sustainability, measured by its financial share of agricul- human health, and gender (box 2.1). tural research and development (R&D), has Both short-term and long-term factors diminished over the past 15 years. At the same are driving the current food crisis. The crisis time, the international development architec- requires emergency responses, such as emer- ture has become populated by a multitude of gency aid, safety nets, and crash production new actors. The international development programs. But over the long term, sharply in- directory6 now lists more than 50,000 enti- creased and better coordinated global invest- ties involved in international development. ments are urgently needed to address critical Most are nongovernmental organizations, challenges to global food supply. A revitalized and many are directly engaged in rural devel- CGIAR would be uniquely well positioned to opment and agricultural work. Some large lead the attack on many of these challenges. nongovernmental organizations are now bet- ter financed and more influential than many Dramatic recent changes in long established agencies, including bilateral global agriculture present donors. a major opportunity—and In agricultural research for development, obligation—for CGIAR leadership the research systems in Brazil, China, India and some other developing countries have be- When the CGIAR was established in 1971, it come world leaders and could become leading occupied a unique position in the international sources of new technologies and knowledge Box 2.1 The changed context for agriculture: key factors and challenges Uncertain effects of climate change: Global climate change has ways to provide ready access by developing countries to genes introduced major uncertainties for agriculture. The combined ef- and techniques protected by intellectual property rights. fects of higher average temperatures, greater variability of temper- ature and rainfall, more frequent and intense droughts and floods, Gender: The design of technologies rarely takes account of the and reduced availability of water for irrigation could be devastating special needs of female farmers and laborers. The increasing for agriculture in many tropical regions. Unless current trends are commercialization of agriculture and the growing importance of reversed and new agricultural technologies developed, the recent rural labor markets and migration as pathways out of poverty Fourth Report of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change will accentuate these disadvantages. points to the risk of famine for hundreds of millions. New market structures: The institutional setting for technologi- Slowing of technical change: The yield growth for the major cal innovation is changing rapidly. With the development of mar- cereals has slowed sharply since the 1980s in most develop- kets and integrated supply chains, innovation becomes driven ing countries, suggesting that the easy gains from the green less by science (supply side) and more by markets (demand revolution inputs have already been realized, except in Africa. side). The challenge is to link science to users both within and Resistance to new products of biotechnology is also a factor in outside agriculture—including farmers, consumers, and market slowing the pace of technical change. agents—in an innovations systems framework. Access to new science in an era of privatization: Much of the Health risks from agricultural practices: Many agricultural prac- molecular biology revolution is driven by multinational, private tices pose threats to the health of the rural poor. Irrigation can sector firms, and the patenting of new tools and technologies increase the incidence of malaria, and pesticide poisoning is is now the norm in developed countries. A major challenge in estimated to cause 355,000 deaths annually. Zoonotic diseases harnessing these technologies to benefit the poor is to develop such as avian influenza that arise from the proximity of humans a new “global commons” of tools and technologies and to find and animals pose growing threats to human health. 22 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Box 2.2 The CGIAR System in brief Created in 1971 as an informal association of 17 donors sup- percent), and policy Centers (18 percent). On a regional basis, porting four international agricultural research centers, the 48 percent of CGIAR investment is directed to Sub-Saharan Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Africa. (CGIAR) was to serve “both as a mechanism for coordinating Besides research undertaken by individual Centers, donor policies and actions and as an informal forum for discus- CGIAR research includes 17 Systemwide and Ecoregional sion.”1 Since then, it has expanded to 64 Members (25 develop- Programs, such as Alternatives to Slash and Burn and the ing countries, 22 industrialized countries, 4 private foundations, Rice-Wheat Consortium for the Indo-Gangetic Plains, and and 13 regional and international organizations) supporting 15 such inter-Center initiatives as the Systemwide Information Centers (see table 2.1). Network for Genetic Resources and the Consortium for Spa- Today, the mission of the CGIAR is “to achieve sustain- tial Information. The CGIAR also supports four Challenge able food security and to reduce poverty in developing coun- Programs, time-bound, independently governed programs tries through scientific research and research-related activities of high-impact research that target CGIAR goals on complex in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy, and en- issues of overwhelming global or regional significance that vironment.” The CGIAR’s six founding governing principles— require partnerships among a wide range of institutions to de- Member sovereignty, Center autonomy, independent scientific liver their products. These four are Water and Food (improv- advice, consensus decisionmaking, informal status (the 15 ing the productivity of water in river basins in ways that are Centers are the only legal entities), and nonpolitical nature— pro-poor, gender equitable, and environmentally sustainable), remain in force, although some are under review in the current Generation (using plant genetic diversity, genomic science, change management process. and comparative biology to develop technologies to help plant The CGIAR System includes the CGIAR Members, the 15 breeders in developing countries produce better crop varieties Centers, and the Science Council, which provides independent for resource-poor farmers), HarvestPlus (using biofortification scientific advice. An Executive Council, standing committees, to increase levels of micronutrients to improve human nutri- and a System Office provide administrative support. The CGIAR tion by breeding new varieties of staple food crops consumed System is chaired by the World Bank and cosponsored by the by the poor), and Sub-Saharan Africa (addressing key con- Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Fund for straints to reviving agriculture in Africa—failures of agricultural Agricultural Development, the United Nations Development markets and policies, natural resource degradation—through Programme, and the World Bank. integrated agricultural research for development). The Execu- The CGIAR’s research agenda received $495 million in tive Council recently approved development of a Challenge funding in 2007, $437 million (88 percent) from Members and Program on Climate Change. $57 million (12 percent) from nonmembers. The European Com- Eleven Centers together maintain more than 650,000 sam- munity, United States, World Bank, United Kingdom, and Can- ples of crop, forage, and agroforestry genetic resources, held ada were the top five donors in 2007, accounting for half of all in trust in the public domain on behalf of humanity. The 15 Cen- funding. Developing country Members contributed 3 percent of ters have more than 200 regional or country offices in some 68 funding. While overall funding has increased in nominal terms, countries worldwide, 75 percent of them in Sub-Saharan Africa the Centers’ inflation-adjusted buying power has remained flat. and Asia and Pacific. They employ 7,716 staff, 3,300 of them Project-based or restricted funding has risen as a share of total scientific staff. Eighteen percent of managers are women, and funding in recent years, reaching 64 percent in 2007, leaving 36 35 percent are developing country nationals. The Centers col- percent of funding unrestricted. laborate with a wide range of partners. In 2007, the ecoregional Centers accounted for the largest share (33 percent) of total funding, followed by the commodity Centers (31 percent), natural resource management Centers (19 1. The Charter of the CGIAR System, March 2007, p. 2. for other countries and regions. The Bra- have national agricultural research institutes zilian Agricultural Research Corporation with solid capabilities. The private sector, as (EMBRAPA) has launched programs in Af- noted in box 2.1, is at the forefront in molecu- rica and has a budget more than three times lar biology research, which holds the greatest larger than the CGIAR’s. Regional research promise for future food security. And new organizations and networks are also playing philanthropic actors, such as the Bill & Me- a much greater role, while many developing linda Gates Foundation, are becoming major countries, including several in Africa, now players in financing international agricultural BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 23 Table 2.1 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centers 2007 funding Year Year outcome Center Headquarters’ location established joined CGIAR (US$ millions) Mandate Commodity Centers Africa Rice Centre (WARDA) Cotonou, Benin 1970 1975 10.2 Rice production in West Africa International Maize and Wheat Mexico City, Mexico 1966 1971 43.3 Wheat, maize, triticale Improvement Center (CIMMYT) International Potato Center (CIP) Lima, Peru 1970 1973 26.0 Potato, sweet potato International Livestock Nairobi, Kenya 1995a 1995 35.2 Livestock diseases, cattle, sheep, Research Institute (ILRI) goats, feed and production systems International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) Los Banos, Philippines 1960 1971 32.5 Rice and rice-based ecosystems Ecoregional Centers International Center for Tropical Cali, Colombia 1967 1971 45.1 Beans, cassava, tropical forages, rice, Agriculture (CIAT) hillsides, forest margins, savannas International Center for Agricultural Aleppo, Syria 1975 1975 27.7 Barley, lentils, fava beans, durum and Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) bread wheats, chickpeas, pasture and forage legumes; small ruminants; on- farm water management; rangelands International Crops Research Institute Patancheru, India 1972 1972 37.4 Sorghum, pearl millet, finger millet, for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) chickpea, pigeon pea, groundnut; sustainable production systems for the semi-arid tropics International Institute of Ibadan, Nigeria 1967 1971 45.1 Soybean, maize, cassava, cowpea, banana, Tropical Agriculture (IITA) plantain, yams; sustainable production systems for the humid lowland tropics Natural resource management Centers Center for International Forestry Bogor, Indonesia 1993 1993 18.2 Sustainable forestry management Research (CIFOR) International Water Management Colombo, Sri Lanka 1984 1991 23.5 Irrigation and water resource management Institute (IWMI)b World Agroforestryc Nairobi, Kenya 1977 1991 31.5 Agroforestry; multipurpose trees WorldFishd Penang, Malaysia 1977 1992 15.1 Sustainable aquatic resource management Policy Centers Bioversitye Rome, Italy 1974 1974 39.0 Plant genetic resources of crops and forages; collection and gene pool conservation International Food Policy Washington, DC, United States 1974 1980 46.4 Socioeconomic research related Research Institute (IFPRI) to agricultural development a. Created in 1995 through the merger of the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (established in 1973) and the International Livestock Center for Africa (established in 1974). b. Formerly the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) c. Formerly the International Centre for Research on Agroforestry (ICRAF) d. Formerly the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM) e. Formerly the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), and previous to that, the International Board on Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR). Source: OED 2003; www.cgiar.org; CGIAR Secretariat. research. The Gates Foundation has decided— were the four original founding Centers, so far at least—not to become a Member of and CGIAR’s reputation to this day contin- the CGIAR. ues to derive mainly from the achievements Thus the CGIAR today is in a very of that period. With expansion in the 1970s crowded field with numerous alternative sup- and again in the 1990s to reach the current 15 ply sources for the goods and services it pro- Centers, the system became more administra- vides. In its early years, the CGIAR’s main tively complex and more expensive. Financing focus was on increasing the productivity of became accordingly more complex and prob- cereal crops. In the vanguard for this work lematic. Restrictions to available financing 24 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T created increasing competition among Cen- activities of a transnational scope that draw There has never been ters, and restricted or project funding grew on its unique germplasm collection. Many of a better time for the steadily as a percentage of the total. At the its new research areas—not yet evaluated— same time, emphasis shifted from crop pro- involve the CGIAR in providing small-scale CGIAR to re-assert its ductivity to reflect changes in donor priorities activities at the national or sub-national level, role and relevance and in sustainability, natural resource manage- areas where national agricultural research sys- redefine its vision and ment, participatory- and community-based tems normally have a comparative advantage research, micronutrient nutrition, income and core competencies.”9 strategy. But this cannot distribution, and poverty reduction. Since the World Bank’s 2003 evaluation, be “business as usual” The dramatic recent changes in the global many of the CGIAR’s newer areas of endeavor agricultural situation represent not only a have been evaluated and some of the results major opportunity but also an obligation for are very encouraging (see chapter 3). Nev- the CGIAR to provide leadership. As the ertheless, a recent review prepared as back- CGIAR itself recognizes, there has never ground for World Development Report 2008 been a better time for the CGIAR to re-assert still concluded that the CGIAR has been los- its role and relevance and redefine its vision ing comparative advantage and that it is in ur- and strategy.7 But this cannot be “business as gent need of a course correction. That report usual.” As World Development Report 2008 stated “the comparative advantage of the CG notes, “the emerging global agenda for ag- system does not appear to have been a major riculture has new challenges, driven by new criterion in more recent decision-making. An actors, cutting across sectors.”8 Many of the apparent abundance of research resources may challenges are interrelated, with environ- have led to a perception that there was no op- mental, poverty, and gender dimensions, and portunity cost to accommodating the newer many intersect with human health. political agendas in the system. This percep- All this heightens the need for coordinated tion was clearly wrong.”10 efforts across sectors and institutions. But the A second recent review by IFPRI went institutions and mechanisms to implement further in examining the place of the CGIAR and finance the global agenda were developed in the international architecture. It concluded for a very different world. All institutions, in- that the CGIAR has lost strategic direction cluding the CGIAR, are lagging behind in and that “it is no longer in a strategic position the ability to respond to today’s challenges. to exercise the leadership envisaged for it by How can they be reformed to respond to the its original architects.” The review implies a new political and economic realities? negative response to its question of whether it is too late to re-assert comparative advan- Findings on continued relevance: tage and leadership. It positions the answer need to function more as a system within the larger context of an international approach to agricultural R&D in general With both the context and the CGIAR’s and states that “it is time to rethink interna- position in the international architecture tional approaches to agricultural R&D, both for agricultural research having changed because of the changes that have taken place dramatically, the principal challenge for the within the CG system and the changing con- CGIAR is to continue to occupy a strong text in which it will have to operate.”11 position of comparative advantage. Attention The Panel agrees. It finds that the CGIAR to the risk of changing circumstances to the System continues to provide a broad range of system’s comparative advantage was raised goods and services that add value. And it con- in the World Bank’s 2003 meta-evaluation, cludes that a major source of CGIAR compar- which noted that “the CGIAR has a strong ative advantage is the 37-year-old partnership comparative advantage and core compe- between the Centers and the international tency in germplasm research and in research donor community: no other arrangement BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 25 rivals the accumulated social capital of this to food security and food adequacy, means collaboration between agricultural research that the need for new agricultural technolo- and public financing for international public gies has never been greater. This presents the goods. CGIAR with a once in a lifetime opportunity The Panel also finds, however, that the to play a major role in responding to new chal- CGIAR is a system adrift. The donor-doer lenges. To do so, it will need much more ro- partnership has become fragile, and the sys- bust strategies and a much sharper delineation tem as a whole is seriously underperforming. of its comparative advantage. The system will Individual Center strategies exist, but the need to function far more as a system. whole has become considerably less than the sum of the component parts. There is no sys- Notes temwide strategy, and the CGIAR has been largely absent from the main debates and in- 1. Pardy et al. (2008). ternational forums on agriculture for develop- 2. Currie (2007). ment. The current situation is well described 3. World Bank (2008). 4. World Bank (2007b). by the warning of former CGIAR Chairman 5. World Bank (2007b). Ismail Serageldin, in his 2000 farewell speech 6. http://www.devdir.org/ to Members, that the CGIAR faces “the pros- 7. CGIAR Secretariat (2008b). pect of . . . gradually fading into obsolescence 8. World Bank (2007b). and, ultimately, oblivion, while other actors, 9. World Bank (2003). more swift, better endowed, and more respon- 10. Pardy, et. al. (2008), p. 71 sive to the needs of our clients, pass us by.12 11. Alston, Dehmer, and Pardey (2006), p. 23. The changed international context for ag- 12. Cited in World Bank (2003), p. 3. riculture, including the risks of climate change 26 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 3 CHAPTER Effectiveness, quality, and results management To achieve poverty The Panel was asked to consider the CGIAR stagnated in constant dollars (see chapter 5), reduction and other and Centers’ effectiveness across a broad while the CGIAR’s share of global research and range of topics to assess whether the CGIAR development for agriculture declined to about long-term societal gains, is making the best possible contribution to 1.5 percent. Meanwhile, rapidly growing devel- CGIAR research depends the agricultural research needs of developing oping countries such as China, Brazil, and India on partner institutions countries. Specifically, the Panel considered have made great strides in agricultural research, four issues to better understand the effective- altering their needs for CGIAR research, that transform CGIAR ness of the CGIAR and Centers. while in parts of Africa, national agricultural research outputs into What evidence is there of the impact research has remained underdeveloped. With outcomes and impact. of the Centers’ research? this changing context for international agricul- What is known about Centers’ per- tural research comes the question of whether This takes time, making it formance, including the volume and CGIAR research is having the greatest impact difficult to measure impact quality of research? where it is needed most. from recent research How well has the CGIAR System de- To achieve poverty reduction and other fined priorities against which to mea- long-term societal gains, CGIAR research de- sure effectiveness? pends on partner institutions that transform What kind of results framework CGIAR research outputs into outcomes and should the new CGIAR System use impact. This takes time, making it difficult to to guide the partnership and network measure impact from recent research, such as of Centers, and would it differ from over the Panel Review period since 2001. Im- its impact assessments and perfor- pact and associated outputs and outcomes can mance measures? be assessed over a longer period, however, and The Panel’s detailed assessment of impact then compared with more recent outputs and studies is in appendix 2. outcomes to get a sense of what future impact might be. CGIAR research has had high Since 2001, the CGIAR has invested heav- overall returns, but impact ily in assessing its impact through the Stand- assessment needs improvement ing Panel on Impact Assessment, within the Science Council. A comprehensive assessment Previous reviews identified the CGIAR’s of the global impacts of crop genetic improve- important contribution to agricultural devel- ment was published in 2003. Assessment of opment through crop genetic improvement the relatively neglected areas of natural re- research, its principle activity during its first 20 source management and policy-oriented re- years. Since the early 1990s, as the international search followed. Impact studies have been ini- agricultural context has changed, the CGIAR’s tiated in capacity building and participatory research agenda has diversified. It moved into research. Impact assessment in these newer natural resource management and policy-ori- areas of CGIAR research is challenging, re- ented research directed to achieving the benefits quiring new, often more qualitative method- of crop improvement and into animal resources. ologies than for assessment of the impact of As research diversified, research funding crop genetic improvement. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 27 High overall returns on crop genetic improvement and biological con- research investment trol research in Africa. They also illustrate Overall, recent global, regional, and local that research impacts in Africa have been lim- assessments of CGIAR research reveal very ited, with lower returns on investment than high returns on investment. Meta-analysis in other regions—this despite Sub-Saharan of impact assessments of global and regional Africa receiving the largest regional share of impact suggest that total investments in the CGIAR investment (41 percent) since 1971. CGIAR have paid for themselves by a wide margin, even when just a few well documented Trends in impact assessments in successes are considered (box 3.1). Regional main areas of research vary impact studies in South Asia and Sub-Saha- Expenditure trends since the early 1990s in ran Africa point to substantial benefits of crop the three main research area of crop genetic genetic improvement research in Asia and of improvement, natural resource management, and policy-oriented research have differed Box 3.1 Meta-analysis of systemwide impact suggests substantial (table 3.1). Crop genetic improvement (much benefits from investment in CGIAR research of which falls under “increasing productivity” in table 3.1) has remained the principal area A 2003 meta-analysis of all ex post impact assessments in peer-reviewed jour- of investment, falling from 49 percent of the nal articles, book chapters, and Center publications that estimated systemwide total in 1992 to 37 percent in 2007. Expendi- benefits is the only comprehensive benefit-cost assessment of CGIAR research ture on natural resource management (“sav- investments over the System’s lifetime.1 It found benefits ranging from nearly ing biodiversity” and “protecting the environ- $14 billion to more $120 billion. The benefit-cost ratios suggest that investments ment” in table 3.1) has fluctuated, rising from in the CGIAR have paid for themselves by a wide margin: even by the most con- 19 percent in 1992 to 29 percent in 2001 and servative criterion, overall benefits attributable to CGIAR research were roughly double the costs of the research. falling to 11 percent in 2007. Policy research The very small number of impact assessments of natural resource man- has grown rapidly since 2001, rising from 14 agement and policy-oriented research, together with the inclusion of all sys- percent to 17 percent. temwide expenditures in the analysis, means that the overall benefits of CGIAR Crop genetic improvement research has research were understated. received the most assessment and has gener- A very high proportion of benefits were associated with just a few of the ated evidence of profound positive impacts CGIAR’s many programs. Roughly half (47 percent) of total benefits were attrib- arising from the broad diffusion of improved uted to rice breeding, and almost a third (31 percent) to spring wheat breeding. varieties and subsequent spillover effects. Biocontrol research that led to reduced crop damage from the cassava mealy- bug accounted for most of the remaining total benefits (15 percent). Yield-enhancing and yield-stabilizing modern varieties produced by the Centers and their national partners have produced benefits of 1. Raitzer (2003). more than $10 billion annually, due largely to improved wheat, rice, and maize. Recent re- Table 3.1 Center expenditure by research area, 1992–2007 search on a range of crops and traits (drought resistance and nutritional content) is gener- Percent of total ating outputs and outcomes assessed as very Undertaking 1992 2001 2007a promising for potential impact. Increasing productivity 49.3 34.8 37.1 Recent studies on the impact of natural Saving biodiversity 7.7 9.6 9.7 resource management research, including Protecting the environment 11.5 18.9 15.0 pest management, show substantial benefits Improving policies 9.9 13.8 16.7 and positive internal rates of return on in- Strengthening national vestment. Some benefits have occurred at a agricultural research systems 21.7 22.9 21.4 considerable scale and are of international a. Estimated. significance; notable examples are the work Source: Centers’ medium-term plans, 2008–10; ILRI medium-term plan 2007–09; World Bank (2003); CGIAR Secretariat (2001a). of the rice-wheat consortium in South Asia, biological control programs in Africa, and the 28 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Alternatives to Slash and Burn Program. But advice is usually only one of many influences. much of the research impact for natural re- For example, there is convincing evidence that source management is on a smaller geographic IFPRI’s evaluations of Mexico’s cash-transfer scale than that for crop genetic improvement, program, Progresa, and Bangladesh’s Food for often because adoption depends on local col- Education furnished important added value lective action, extension services, or assign- to these programs, but the evaluations were ment of property rights. That means that the just one of several contributors to the overall spillovers can be very limited, and the overall impacts (box 3.2). impacts constrained. Demonstration of substantial positive The number of studies on the impact of impacts for natural resource management policy-oriented research have risen consider- and policy-oriented research is important. ably in recent years. Seven impact assessments A dearth of assessment studies in these areas of policy-oriented research were commis- in the 2003 meta-evaluation fed concern sioned in 2007 (publication forthcoming). that growing investment in these areas (see All found substantial returns to investment table 3.1) might not be optimizing CGIAR in high internal rates of return and large research impact. Crop genetic improvement benefit-cost ratios. Moreover, the total mea- research remains the major area of research ac- sured benefits of the projects were large—in tivity, and this is appropriate to its significant the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in potential for spillover effects. net present value terms.1 Policy research offers Complementary evidence from the In- strong potential for generating broad impacts dependent Review Panel survey of informed affecting many people in many countries. But stakeholders and External Program and Man- it is more difficult to estimate benefit-cost ra- agement Reviews (EPMRs) supports the find- tios for policy research than for most other ings on impacts. The great majority (82 per- types of research. Even where the evidence cent) of those stakeholders surveyed believe is clear that policy advice was applied, the that the CGIAR has been effective or highly Box 3.2 IFPRI and Mexico’s Progresa conditional cash transfer program The poor were particularly hard hit during the severe economic large part because of how it integrated evaluation into the downturn in Mexico during the mid-1990s. To help them survive program. the economic turmoil, a team of Mexican social scientists in the Quantitative assessment of IFPRI’s contribution to the pro- incoming Zedillo government designed a program of conditional gram’s success relied on a combination of interviews with key cash transfers for mothers of young children and adolescents to informants, written reviews of the program, and articles in the replace the traditional food distribution program. Conditions for popular press. These revealed four categories of impacts: re- receiving the cash assistance included ensuring that children duced delays in implementation, improvements in evaluation attended school, that infants received nutritional supplements, techniques and accompanying improvements in Mexican pro- and that all family members received regular health and nutri- gram managers, enhanced likelihood of program continuation tion checkups. beyond current political regime, and spillovers to programs in Progresa contracted IFPRI to evaluate the program dur- other countries seeking to emulate Progresa. ing 1998–2000; subsequent evaluations were taken over by Using conservative assumptions of the benefits attributable the Mexican Institute of Nutrition and Public Health. From in- to Progresa’s primary outputs (improved schooling and child ception, the program had incorporated state-of-the art analy- nutritional outcomes) and of the contribution of IFPRI’s involve- sis of data collected from tens of thousands of participating ment, quantitative estimates suggest that benefits greatly ex- households. These evaluations guided continuing refinements ceed costs for all four categories of impact. Thus, even under and improvements to the program and revealed very large the very conservative assumptions made about IFPRI’s role in benefits from improved nutritional and schooling outcomes the program, the benefits attributable to IFPRI were still quite for program participants compared with nonparticipants. They large relative to the costs of its participation. also raised the international profile of Progresa. Progresa (now called Oportunidades) has achieved international renown in Source: Behrman (2007). BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 29 The most striking effective in conserving and improving plant confronted methodological challenges. Sev- observations emerging and animal genetic resources (box 3.3). Only eral qualitative analyses tell convincing stories about half of respondents thought that natu- of human capital formation and institutional from a review of EPMRs ral resource management research was effec- effectiveness, but fall well short of providing is the clear conflict in tive or highly effective, and only about a third rigorous empirical evaluation. some Centers between thought that policy-oriented research was. A review of Centers’ EPMRs supports evidence of substantial impacts by individual generating international centers. It also reveals a clear conflict in some Impacts from poverty reduction, public goods outputs and capacity building, and Centers between generating international working with partners international public goods have pubic goods and working on the applied re- been more difficult to assess search and capacity building of partners in to turn outputs into turning outputs into outcomes and impacts. Poverty alleviation is a core mission of the outcomes and impacts CGIAR, and a large share of research from its Impacts reported in EPMRs are more inception has been oriented toward improv- apparent for crop genetic improvement re- ing the welfare of the poor. Attributing pov- search than for natural resource management erty reduction to specific CGIAR research research, likely because of the more complex activities is difficult, however, because of the impact pathways for such research and less large number of social, economic, and politi- developed methods for measuring impact. In cal influences not under the CGIAR’s con- general, impact assessment is regarded as de- trol. Still, some estimates show profound but ficient across Centers, in quantity and qual- declining pro-poor impacts, such as those of ity, with some exceptions. Ex ante impact improved rice varieties in China and India, assessment is receiving more attention from mainly through lower food prices. Centers. Still, only 3 of the 15 recent EPMRs The CGIAR invests about 20 percent of recognized evidence of the Science Council’s its resources in capacity building to support recent efforts to foster an “impact assessment technology delivery, particularly through culture” in the Centers. strengthening national agricultural research It was clear from EPMRs that many Cen- systems (NARS). Yet, there are very few im- ters are under pressure from donors and NARS pact evaluations of this activity, and they have to undertake more applied research and capac- ity building aimed at more local and immedi- Box 3.3 Stakeholder views on effectiveness of CGIAR research ate outcomes and impact. Some Centers are committed to maintaining a balance between The Independent Review Panel survey of informed stakeholders, including strategic research and activities that support Members and Centers, reveals that the great majority (82 percent) believe that the delivery of outcomes and impact. This is the CGIAR has been effective or highly effective in conserving and improving evident in responses to EPMRs, particularly in plant and animal genetic resources, about half believe that for natural resource concern expressed about international peer-re- management research, and about a third for policy-oriented research. viewed publications as a measure of Center re- More than 80 percent of respondents rated the CGIAR and Centers as work- search performance. One Center commented ing effectively or very effectively in “sustaining biodiversity” (81.6 percent) and in responding to its most recent EPMR: “the “genetic improvements” (81.9 percent). “Sustainable management of resources” was lower (51 percent), followed by “improving policies/facilitating institutional requirements of journal publications are often innovation” (32 percent) and “agricultural diversification” (23 percent). inimical to practical adoption analysis as part The respondents most likely to be directly concerned with meeting these of an on-going programme of research.” research priorities are those responsible for managing the Centers (board The most striking observations emerging chairs, Directors, and Deputy Directors General), Science Council members, from a review of EPMRs is the clear conflict and those involved in the Challenge Programs. in some Centers between generating inter- Respondents identified several factors constraining effectiveness, includ- national public goods outputs and working ing lack of funding, particularly for crop improvement research; lack of time; and with partners to turn outputs into outcomes the complexity of impact pathways, particularly for natural resource manage- ment and policy-related research. and impacts. With a few exceptions, the re- cent trend in EPMRs has been to emphasize 30 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T international public goods outputs, buttressed limited, to ensure that valuable re- by the strong emphasis by the Science Coun- search is being generated and that im- cil and System Priorities since 2004 on more pact pathways and partners are being strategic research and international public supported through capacity building. goods. Since Centers generally accept all or (For instance, there is concern that most recommendations of EPMRs, Centers the adoption of New Rice for Africa are likely to adjust their programs accord- [NERICA] rice and other new variet- ingly. Thus if Center activities to support the ies is slower than expected.) delivery of outcomes and impacts are as effec- Impact assessment of natural resource tive as evaluations have found them to be, and management research that includes if partners are not able to substitute for these environmental benefits, to demon- Center inputs, a decline in the future impact strate CGIAR’s progress in meeting of Center research is to be expected. its goal of promoting environmental sustainability. Assessments have fo- Conclusion cused on productivity benefits and Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that the have largely ignored environmental CGIAR continues to undertake research with benefits—presumably because of the a high potential for impact. It is also reason- methodological difficulties in quan- able to conclude from the diversity of CGIAR tifying them. research activities and its range of collabora- Impact assessment that considers tions that the CGIAR has some of the core higher level impacts related to system- attributes of a 21st century organization. It level goals. There has been a tendency is multidisciplinary, functioning along an to compartmentalize and contrast extended spectrum from the physical sciences impact assessment of research in dif- through the social sciences to the policy sci- ferent areas, rather than consider how ences. And its networks of actors stretches these areas collectively contribute to from other global entities to the small rural strategic goals. Natural resource man- farm. agement and policy research are es- The Panel finds considerable evidence sential to crop genetic improvement that CGIAR research has generated positive research, a point made eloquently in impacts and considerable benefits relative to the 2003 meta-evaluation. 2 Inter- costs. Recent research appears capable of pro- Center cooperation is an important ducing similar future impacts, although the means of achieving integration across dearth of outcomes reported in recent EPMRs research areas. recommends that this be carefully monitored. Assessment of whether the contribu- Research impact has been achieved across the tions of women to agriculture and range of CGIAR research, including crop ge- their special knowledge and needs netic improvement, natural resource manage- are addressed at a level commensurate ment, and policy-oriented research, with crop with their importance. The Panel’s genetic improvement having the greatest inter- analysis indicates that the CGIAR national impact because of spillover effects. System appreciates the importance The Panel suggests that assessment focus of gender to its research mandate, but in four areas, where better understanding and the cross-cutting gender dimension is monitoring of CGIAR research and its con- missing in the CGIAR Center focus, tributions are needed: in EPMRs, and in impact assessment. Impact assessment in Sub-Saharan The evidence is clear that unless gen- Africa, where the share of CGIAR der equality and the barriers women expenditure is high and rising and face are squarely addressed, it will not where impact has been comparatively be possible to achieve the efficiency BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 31 The Performance and productivity gains that are criti- The PMS collects some information annu- Measurement System is cal for poverty reduction and food ally and stakeholder perception information security. triennially (table 3.2). Intermediate outcomes not comprehensive. It is The collective effort of the CGIAR, as are also reported. mainly a self-assessment a System, has not been evaluated. This will system, but with elements need to be done as the CGIAR develops a Uses of Performance Measurement compelling results strategy involving clear System information of independent verification and achievable development impacts focused In 2008, the World Bank allocated about a and performance scoring more on strategic objectives and program out- quarter of its Development Grant Facility comes than on individual Centers and their funds to Centers based on their performance projects. scores. Since 2005, Germany has also used some PMS information to allocate 25 percent Performance measurement of its funds for the Centers. Germany intends has received much more to increase the weight for performance from attention since the last 30 percent to 50 percent. CGIAR System Review The main use of the CGIAR’s PMS, other than to guide donors’ resource allocations, is Impact assessments are episodic, but manag- to guide decisions by the Centers’ boards and ers need regular reporting to ensure alignment management. Some influence is easy to see. with and progress toward desired outcomes. When the “governance checklist” lists a par- In 2003, the CGIAR established a Working ticular type of policy, boards have been quick Group on Performance Measurement Sys- to adopt an appropriate policy when one has tems. It examined performance measurement been lacking. For example, one indicator of systems (PMS) in other organizations and institutional health is whether the Center has compiled a Sourcebook. The recommended conducted a survey of staff satisfaction within approach was the basis for the PMS that the previous two years. Between the introduc- was piloted in 2005 and has since been used tion of this indicator in 2005 and reporting annually.3 in 2006, the number of Centers complying The PMS is not comprehensive. It covers jumped from 6 to 12. It is plausible that Cen- the Centers, but not the joint administrative ters that receive low performance scores on a and program units, the Science Council, or particular criterion have an incentive to im- the Members. It is mainly a self-assessment prove. Tracing those influences was beyond system, but with elements of independent the Panel’s mandate, however. verification and performance scoring (by the Science Council, Standing Panel on Impact The Performance Measurement Assessment and Standing Panel on Monitor- System is strongest on monitoring ing and Evaluation, and external panels).4 the number and quantity of The CGIAR also conducted a stakeholder research outputs (publications) perceptions survey in 2006, which it intends CGIAR produced more publications in 2007 to commission every three years.5 It was a pur- than in 2006 and improved its publication pro- posive sample (partners’ names were supplied ductivity per scientist. Peer-reviewed publica- by the Centers), and the response rate was low tions rose from 2,249 in 2006 to 2,493 in 2007; (36 percent on average). The Centers’ research and publication productivity per scientist rose received high marks from the stakeholders. from 2.01 to 2.31 (figure 3.1). The range of pub- Most rated performance about the same or lication productivity across Centers narrowed improved over the previous five years, but they from 0.82–3.37 in 2005 to 1.35–3.5 in 2007. felt that CGIAR research should be directed Publication productivity in 2007 was more to the development needs of national roughly comparable to that of the World institutions. Bank’s Development Economics research 32 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Table 3.2 Performance criteria for the Performance Measurement System Area Criterion Results Outputs, outcomes, and impacts 1 Percent of medium-term plan output targets achieved 2 Science Council score on each Center’s five most significant outcomes during that year (scale 1–10) 3A Science Council/Standing Panel on Impact Assessment rating of each Center’s commitment to documenting impacts and creating an impact assessment culture 3B Science Council/Standing Panel on Impact Assessment rating of the rigor of two Center impact studies carried out in those three years (collected once every three years) Quality and relevance of research 4A Number of externally peer-reviewed publications per scientist in that year (excluding Thompson/ISI journals) 4B Number of peer-reviewed publications per scientist in that year in Thompson/ISI journals 4C Percentage of scientific papers that are published with developing country partners in refereed journals, conference and workshop proceeding 4D Relative rating of each Center’s 10 best publications as judged by the Thompson/ISI journal impact factor (indicator is being piloted) Institutional health Governance 5A Score on governance checklist 5B Peer review panel rating of the relevance/merit and anticipated impact of two Board actions in that year that were, in the opinion of the Board, the most important in improving oversight Culture of learning and change 5C Score on culture of learning and change checklist Diversity 5D Does the Center have Board-approved gender and diversity goals? (yes/no) 5E Percent of women in management (research and nonresearch) at December 31 5F Percent of internationally recruited staff from the top two IRS list countries 5G Percent of scientists/researchers with PhDs conferred in past five years Financial health 6A Short-term solvency (liquidity) 6B Long-term financial stability (adequacy of reserves) 6C Efficiency of operations (indirect costs ratio) 6D Cash management on restricted operations 6E External audit opinion qualified/unqualified Stakeholder perceptions (every three years) department, which achieved an average of 2.4 A new indicator piloted in 2006 weights a peer-reviewed publications per research staff Center’s publications by the expected impact annually in recent years. of a sample of journals in which it publishes, Ecoregional Centers had the highest pub- with journals assessed relative to the top three lication rate per scientist, commodity Centers journals in their subject category. CIAT and the lowest. However, commodity Centers have CIP achieved the highest journal impact the highest Institute for Statistical Informa- scores; ICARDA and Africa Rice Centre had tion (ISI) publication rate per scientist. Cen- the lowest. ters in other categories produce more non-ISI In 2007, IWMI produced most publica- than ISI publications (for Center classifica- tions per dollar funding, with one publication tion by category, see table 2.1 in chapter 2). per $120,000 budget. Bioversity is the least BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 33 Figure 3.1 CGIAR publications and assesses each intermediate outcome on a 10- publications per scientist rose point scale. (Outcomes are defined as “the from 2006 to 2007 external use, adoption, or influence of a Cen- Non-ISI publications ISI publications Publications per scientist ter output(s) [e.g., by partners, stakeholders, Number of publications Publications per scientist clients]).” 2,500 2.5 The quality of the submissions varies. The most common form is a narrative of “accom- 2,000 2.4 plishments” within a project or area. Some outcome statements describe the output and 1,500 2.3 beneficiaries. Most outcomes are the result of many years of work, which limits the useful- 1,000 2.2 ness of annual comparisons. The best evidence tends to be provided when there has been a recent evaluation (box 3.4). 500 2.1 Measures of influences on performance 0 2.0 2006 2007 for 2005–07 yield uneven results Source: Independent Review Panel analysis of Performance Measurement System The Panel examined three performance vari- data. ables: the Science Council’s score on each Center’s five most important intermediate efficient by this measure, with one publica- outcomes, publications per scientist, and bud- tion per $360,000 (figure 3.2). get per publication. It also looked at whether The CGIAR issues guidelines each year large Centers have a better performance on reporting performance indicators, speci- record than small Centers.7 fying the information to be provided.6 Each Center is asked to report “the five most signif- Science Council scores on five most important icant intermediate outcomes documented” in intermediate outcomes. The recorded average the previous year resulting from outputs that score for intermediate outcomes has declined it produced, with an explicit link to the Cen- in the past three years, from 8.08 (with a range ter’s medium-term plan. The Science Council of 4.7–10.0) in 2005 to 7.6 (2.0–10.0) in 2006 Figure 3.2 CGIAR Centers 2007 budget per publication US$ thousands 400 300 200 100 0 IWMI ICRISAT CIAT CIFOR World ICARDA IRRI CIMMYT IFPRI IITA Africa WorldFish ILRI CIP Bioversity Agroforestry Rice Source: Independent Review Panel analysis of Performance Measurement System data. 34 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Box 3.4 Best intermediate outcomes resulting from CGIAR Center outputs, 2007 Of the 75 intermediate outcomes submitted in 2007, 10 (13 per- than another. As a result of the study, the more effective cent) received a score of 9 or better out of a maximum of 10 approach was adopted in US Agency for International De- points: velopment– and World Vision–supported programs. IFPRI, Spatial Data and Knowledge Gateways project provides 9.4 water-related maps, models, and statistic for analyzing IFPRI’s research on pro-poor public investment has been water use (as a global public good). The data are widely widely cited and was used in World Development Report used around the world, and the project has won recogni- 2008 to argue for a reversal of the trend of declining govern- tion. IWMI, score = 10 ment budget allocations for agriculture. IFPRI, 9.4 Laboratory information management systems software for NARS in Bangladesh released a locally adapted salt- use in applied genomics was made available on the web in tolerant variety (BRRI dhan 47), the first available for farm- 2006 and has been used by partners. ICRISAT, 9.8 ers in southern Bangladesh. Farmer intermediaries have Research organizations and universities in Africa and Asia started to disseminate BBRI dhan 47, but dissemination is are applying new knowledge and skills from the ILRI– constrained because of seed supply shortages. IRRI, 9.4 Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences training pro- Advanced research institutes in Australia and the United gram through the animal genetics training resource to rede- States started to use pre-screened rice mutants (an IRRI sign their training courses, influence their national livestock output) as a core resource to address the high susceptibility policies, and develop breeding programs for livestock im- of wheat to mutating rust pathogens. IRRI, 9.4 provement. ILRI, 9.8 New ILRI research methodologies for identifying genes for Small but specifically diverse subsets of the world germ- disease tolerance in cattle are being used to identify ge- plasm collection of ICRISAT-mandate crops, of a size to be netic traits affecting human health. ILRI, 9.2 functionally manageable by breeders, particularly NARS, A series of publications gave World Agroforestry a voice enhanced the efficiency of breeding programs globally. in the international deliberations on the potential and con- ICRISAT, 9.4 straints of agroforestry for mitigating and adapting to cli- A 2006 study comparing the impact of two World Vision mate change and raised awareness of the crucial impor- Programs in Haiti found that one approach (preventing chil- tance of trees in farming landscapes for adaptation and dren from becoming undernourished) was more effective mitigation. World Agroforestry, 9.2 and 6.22 (3.1–8.4) in 2007. That the interme- Commodity Centers achieved the highest in- diate outcomes achieved by the Centers have termediate outcome ratings for both 2005– actually declined is not plausible. More likely, 07 and 2007 alone. Their average intermedi- there are at least two other factors at play. ate outcome rating for the three years was 7.9, First, the Centers’ intermediate outcomes followed by the ecoregional Centers at 7.2 and are achieved as the result of many years of the natural resource management Centers at work. To consider them as though they were 7.1, and then the policy Centers at 6.8. The achieved separately each year is to misconceive relatively low score for the policy Centers is the issue. In the first year of the PMS, the Cen- due mainly to Bioversity’s low intermediate ters had a backlog of intermediate outcomes outcome ratings in 2005 and 2007. But there to draw on, and they likely selected the best, is considerable unexplained variation. For so that some decline in scores in subsequent example, the natural resource management years would be unavoidable. Second, the scor- Centers seem to have had an outlier year in ing method changed from year to year—from 2005, with an average intermediate outcome two questions per intermediate outcome, to rating of 9.0, compared with 6.3 in 2006 and three questions, to a single-scale rating. 6.1 in 2007 (figure 3.3). Policy Centers had In 2007, 73 percent (55 out of 75) of in- an outlier year in 2006, with an average rat- termediate outcomes were rated higher than ing of 9.0, compared with 6.0 in 2005 and 5.2 5 out of 10 by the Science Council.8 But a sig- in 2007. nificant number of the remaining were rated The best performer in 2007 was IRRI (in- quite low, which should be cause for reflection. termediate outcome rating of 8.4), followed BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 35 Figure 3.3 Average intermediate outcome ratings of CGIAR Centers, by Center categories, 2005–07 2005 2006 2007 Science Council rating scale 10 8 6 4 2 0 Commodity Ecoregional Natural resource Policy management Type of research center Source: Independent Review Panel analysis of Performance Measurement System data. Figure 3.4 Average intermediate outcome ratings of CGIAR Centers, by Center, 2005–07 Science Council rating scale 10 8 6 4 2 0 ILRI CIMMYT CIFOR IRRI IFPRI CIP ICARDA IWMI ICRISAT CIAT IITA WorldFish World Africa Bioversity Agroforestry Rice Source: Independent Review Panel analysis of Performance Measurement System data. by IWMI (8.0), and CIP and ICRISAT (7.8). intermediate outcomes and publications. The Some Centers received much lower scores (figure data are worth further careful analysis. 3.4). The range is so wide (from 5.4 to 8.9) that There is no relation between the size of a further study is needed to determine whether it Center measured by its budget and its inter- reflects true differences in effectiveness or is the mediate outcome ratings. A simple linear re- result of as yet unanalyzed factors. gression with 2005–07 average intermediate The Panel found the PMS to be a rich source outcome ratings and budget size yields a triv- of data, though still evolving, about the inter- ial coefficient of 0.02 with no significance. mediate outcomes of the Centers’ work. The Panel was able, in the time available for the Re- Publications per scientist and budget per publi- view, to examine only a small part of the data on cation and intermediate outcome ratings. The 36 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T relationship between intermediate outcome It should be transferred to the new Centers that publish a ratings and publications per scientist over Consortium proposed by the Panel lot also produce highly the period 2005–07 is interesting. A simple (see chapter 8), enabling it to be a tool linear regression delivers a high positive coef- for self-management by the Centers. rated intermediate ficient of 0.55, but it is not statistically signifi- 2. To facilitate transparent report- outcomes. To simplify cant. Commodity Centers achieve the high- ing and accountability to CGIAR somewhat, good science est intermediate outcome ratings and have the stakeholders. highest number of Thompson/ISI publica- The PMS is primarily a reporting does produce good tions per scientists, but have the lowest num- and accountability tool and, within development outcomes ber of total publications per scientist. its limited scope, it does this task In 2007, publications per scientist is signifi- well. Its “results orientation” can be cantly positively related to intermediate out- improved, but it is a good start. come ratings. Centers that publish a lot also pro- 3. To complement other evaluation instru- duce highly rated intermediate outcomes. The ments (mainly EPMRs and Center- regression analysis also indicates that the qual- commissioned external reviews). ity of productivity matters, since publications in The timing of the PMS (annual) more prestigious journals have a larger positive complements the EPMRs (every five relationship with intermediate outcome ratings years). The PMS data, particularly than publications in less prestigious journals. To outcome ratings and governance rat- simplify somewhat, good science does produce ings, should gradually become an good development outcomes. increasingly important source of in- In 2007, there is a significant negative re- formation for the teams conducting lationship between a Center’s intermediate EPMRs. Progress and prospects seem outcome ratings and its “efficiency,” measured good. in overall budget per publication. The more 4. To provide standard performance data a Center spends per publication the higher that can be aggregated up to the System its top five intermediate outcomes tend to be level. ranked. This relationship is not particularly The PMS data can be aggregated strong, however, and overall budget per pub- to the System level. However, simple lication is a crude measure of efficiency. aggregations are not very instructive because the 15 Centers are so hetero- Performance Measurement System geneous. More finely grained analysis objectives and achievements of the performance data and the fac- The PMS has several objectives.9 They are tors that appear to influence perfor- listed below, each followed by a summary mance is needed. Also, the Centers assessment by the Panel of the degree of are not the whole System. The PMS achievement of the objective. should be expanded to cover the other 1. To be a learning tool for each Center System components. to manage its own performance and to 5. To be an input to funding and other be able to compare its performance with decisions by CGIAR Members. other Centers using benchmarks. The PMS data are used by the The PMS is not well positioned World Bank and by Germany to al- as a learning tool for the Centers be- locate some of their funds among the cause it is difficult for the one instru- Centers. This provides an incentive ment to play three divergent roles— for the Centers to take the PMS seri- accountability, resource allocation, ously. The World Bank has assigned and learning. It is managed by the weights to each of the PMS criteria. CGIAR Secretariat and the Science These are not consensus weights. The Council to monitor the Centers. Centers and other donors should be BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 37 Performance is highly consulted to see whether it is pos- Development Economics research depart- variable across Centers sible to develop consensus weights. ment10). The average intermediate outcome These will be necessary if a major ratings of the Centers declined substantially and over time for each new pooled Fund is established and between 2005 and 2007, but the decline seems Center: ecoregional its funds are allocated partly by per- to be an artifact of changes in the measure- Centers have had the formance (see chapter 8). ment system and the nature of the variable 6. To be an early warning system for prob- rather than a real change in performance. highest publication rate per lems and weaknesses. The greatest weakness in the data relates scientist, and commodity The PMS needs to be linked sys- to the measurement and reporting of results: Centers achieved the tematically with a “red flag” system At the output level, publications are to make Centers at risk more visible. extremely important to global public highest intermediate Financial data need to be collected goods because the sharing of knowl- outcome ratings and analyzed more frequently than edge is basic to the production of the annually—probably quarterly. public good. However, more work is needed to conceptualize other signif- Summary findings on performance icant outputs. The PMS should give It is too soon to analyze trends in the perfor- Centers strong incentives to make mance data from the PMS in part because their research available and useful for three years is not long enough and in part development, in line with the global because the definitions of variables changed public good mission of the CGIAR. significantly from year to year as lessons were At the intermediate outcome level, drawn and the system was improved. not only numbers of publications but Performance is highly variable across Cen- also use of those publications should ters and over time for each Center. How im- be monitored (citations, website hits, portant these variations are needs to be ana- downloads, and the like). lyzed once more data are accumulated. So far At the outcome level, listing the five it seems that ecoregional Centers have had the best outcomes per year is a flawed highest publication rate per scientist and com- measure of Center performance in modity Centers the lowest. However, com- a particular year. It is too selective. modity Centers have the highest Thomson/ There must be a better resting point ISI publication rate per scientist. Commod- somewhere between listing five best ity Centers achieved the highest intermediate outcomes and listing all outcomes for outcome ratings, and policy Centers the low- the year, an unwieldy burden. Match- est. While the best science seems to be associ- ing the number of outcomes to Center ated with the best development outcomes, the size is too mechanical and superficial. limited data should not be overinterpreted. The Panel suggests that each Center Weighting publications per scientist by jour- present its outcomes within a results- nal impact (one year of data only) does not based framework each year. seem to change the ranking of Centers much, Actual impacts, not just “impact but this deserves further investigation. culture,” need to be assessed. More Within the limitations of the data, there work is needed on a systemwide re- are indications of strong performance by many sults framework and nested Center- Centers. CGIAR overall produced more pub- specific results frameworks within lications in 2007 than in 2006 and improved which to assess intermediate and its productivity per scientist. CGIAR’s aver- final outcomes. It has been proposed age 2.31 peer-reviewed publications per sci- that an actual measure of impact be entist per year have not been benchmarked developed for presentation at the against comparable institutions (but compare 2008 Annual General Meeting. The well to the 2.4 average of the World Bank’s Panel applauds the intention while 38 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T not underestimating the difficulty of The design of the CGIAR stakeholder Performance measuring impact. However, impact perceptions survey should be rethought be- accountability should is best addressed by an independent fore the 2009 survey. Target stakeholders evaluation unit, not annually but as should be defined better and sampled more be mutual—the PMS part of the three-year strategy and rigorously, and other procedures should be Annual Report should funding cycle (see chapter 8). put in place to obtain a high response rate. recount the performance Despite its limitations the PMS data are In the past five years, the CGIAR and being used to allocate part of World Bank the Centers have made considerable progress of all components of funding to the Centers. This use may become in annual performance measurement. The the CGIAR System, even more important if a similar system is used principles stated by the Science Council in individually and as a whole to allocate funds from the pooled CGIAR 2002 have been followed with some success. Fund advocated by the Panel (see chapter 8). The stakeholder perceptions survey was less The Panel believes that the World Bank should successful because of difficulties of a purpo- assign greater weight to the results indicators sive sample and a low response rate. The PMS than to the other indicators of performance in may be even more important in the future if the PMS in its allocation system. there is a substantial pooled Fund that allo- Performance measurement and manage- cates funds to Centers and programs partly ment should be the responsibility mainly according to performance. of managers, not donors. Therefore, a PMS based on a results framework aligned with the System Priorities fall strategic objectives should be the responsibil- short of objectives ity of the Consortium in the new governance structure suggested by the Panel (see chap- A Standing Panel on Priorities and Strategies ter 8). Centers should take more collective re- was set up in early 2003 under the interim Sci- sponsibility for monitoring performance and ence Council. Its mandate was to develop new using performance information for manage- System Priorities to: ment purposes. Focus CGIAR research more closely Some performance indicators need more on its poverty reduction mission. work to avoid creating perverse incentives. Reduce the dispersion of research For example, the Centers lose points if their projects in the CGIAR and the drift “long-term financial stability (adequacy of re- toward development projects by refo- serves)” is above a certain modest level. This cusing on strategic research and deliv- produces a disincentive for Centers to build ery of international public goods. an endowment that would help stabilize their Mobilize research across the Centers finances (see chapter 5). through inter-Center collaboration. Performance accountability should be Improve partnerships and attract new mutual—not one-way accountability from research partners. the Centers to the donors. Therefore, the Improve accountability and help do- PMS Annual Report should recount the per- nors allocate resources. formance of all components of the CGIAR The priority-setting exercise produced five System, individually and as a whole. System Priorities each with four subpriorities. The use of PMS data should be more ana- These were released with detailed descriptions lytical. What influences or hinders good out- of each priority, their development, relevance comes? The first step toward better use of the to Millennium Development Goals, and plans PMS data is to produce a single integrated data- for implementation. base with standard record layout for each Cen- The System Priorities broadly match cur- ter and for each year that includes descriptive rent CGIAR research activities with some data about the Centers (explainers or indepen- minor adjustments (table 3.3). One major ad- dent variables) as well as performance data. dition is new research on high-value products BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 39 and associated research on increasing market applied research to support impact pathways, access and income for poor farmers (mostly capacity building (although research on capac- priority 3). A few areas of earlier research such ity building may be included in the 80 percent as post-harvest research have been excluded. strategic research), and other Center activities The major change in research activity that help research outputs achieve impact. driven by the System Priorities was in the na- The Science Council assumed that develop- ture of the research rather than in research ment partners will pick up outputs and un- areas. The Science Council proposed that 80 dertake necessary subsequent research. It ac- percent of each Center’s research be strategic, knowledged that this will be easier for “strong on priority themes, and directed at delivering NARS” than “weak NARS,” implying that international public goods. Of the remain- research in support of weak NARS should be ing 20 percent, the Science Council recom- limited to activities where there are partners mended that at least half be strategic research to ensure uptake and impact. aimed at developing future research areas. The Science Council developed a three-part Squeezed into this 20 percent must also be three-year plan for implementing these Sys- all nonstrategic research activities, including tem Priorities over 2006–08.11 First, Centers Table 3.3 CGIAR System priorities, 2005 Priority area Description Area 1 Sustaining biodiversity for current and future generations 1A Conserving and characterizing staple crops 1B Promoting conservation and characterizing underutilized plant genetic resources to increase the income of the poor 1C Conserving indigenous livestock 1D Conserving aquatic animal genetic resources Area 2 Producing more and better food at lower cost through genetic improvements 2A Maintaining and enhancing yields and yield potential of food staples 2B Increasing tolerance to selected abiotic stresses 2C Enhancing nutritional quality and safety 2D Enhancing the genetic quality of selected species to increase income generation by the poor Area 3 Reducing rural poverty through agricultural diversification and emerging opportunities for high-value commodities and products 3A Increasing income from fruits and vegetables 3B Increasing income from livestock 3C Enhancing income through increased productivity of fisheries and aquaculture 3D Promoting sustainable income generation from forests and trees Area 4 Alleviating poverty and managing water, land, and forest resources sustainably 4A Promoting integrated land, water, and forest management at landscape level 4B Sustaining and managing aquatic ecosystems for food and livelihoods 4C Improving water productivity 4D Promoting sustainable agro-ecological intensification in low- and high-potential areas Area 5 Improving policies and facilitating institutional innovation to support sustainable reduction of poverty and hunger 5A Improving science and technology policies and institutions 5B Making international and domestic markets work for the poor 5C Strengthening rural institutions and their governance 5D Improving research and development options to reduce rural poverty and vulnerability. Source: Science Council, Standing Panel on Priorities and Strategies, 2005. 40 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T would specify in their 2007–09 medium-term involve all participating donors in deciding Even accepting that the plans how they would assign research activi- about allocation (based on priorities on which System Priorities have ties and budgets to particular System Priori- they have all agreed) and all Centers in agree- ties or to other categories of “development, ing to a common funding approach. not delivered a research new research, and stand-alone training” (the strategy for the CGIAR, other 20 percent of research). Second, Centers What can be done with the they have nonetheless would develop framework plans for each Sys- System Priorities? tems Priority—strategic documents defining been an instructive The System Priorities exercise suffered from a the long-term goal of CGIAR research in that lack of a common vision between the Science exercise. Using the System area, along with its scope and plans for system- Council and the Centers. Centers resisted Priorities framework as wide implementation. Third, a parallel process major restructuring of their research pro- would be established to design a mechanism grams around System Priorities, for a variety a resource allocation for funding the System Priorities. of reasons. An important lesson from this mechanism has identified The Centers and Science Council have exercise is that the Centers must have a major important and challenging struggled to find a common vision for imple- role in developing the strategy that they will menting the System Priorities. The recent de- implement, to ensure both ownership and preconditions for success cision to discontinue work on the framework feasibility. plans, and the mandate of the change design Even accepting that the System Priorities process to develop a small set of outcome- have not delivered a research strategy for the oriented strategic objectives for the System, CGIAR, they have nonetheless been an in- would suggest that the CGIAR has decided structive exercise. Using the System Priorities that the System Priorities have not been framework as a resource allocation mecha- effective. nism has identified important and challenging preconditions for success. The initial frame- The System Priorities failed as work planning exercise has demonstrated a spur to donor funding that moving to a more programmatic, cross- Some envisioned the System Priorities as a way Center research approach may incur substan- to elicit funds from donors. The Executive tial transaction costs and challenge Center Council established a task force and then an research strategies. The exercise has shown Ad Hoc Committee on Funding System Prior- how research in different Centers might fit ities to develop principles and models for fund- together in a systemwide research framework ing the CGIAR through System Priorities.12 It and how special inter-Center initiatives, such developed a model based on a matrix with Cen- as Challenge Programs and Systemwide and ters or Challenge Programs on one axis and Sys- Ecoregional Programs can strengthen that. It tem Priorities on the other. Across this matrix, stimulated consideration of how boundaries Centers would distribute their “demand” in might be put around CGIAR research. And terms of planned research investments under it highlighted important issues for any future different System Priorities, and donors would Consortium of Centers, such as how genetic distribute their “supply” in terms of planned improvement, natural resource management, funding to Centers and System Priorities. and policy research should be managed to- However, the changes in donor and Cen- gether across Centers. ter behavior needed to make this system work seem unlikely. The mechanism bears a super- Managing for results is key ficial likeness to the way unrestricted funds to revitalizing the CGIAR- had been allocated by the Technical Advisory Centers partnership Committee before System reform, based on System priorities established by the Techni- The CGIAR and the Centers are operating in cal Advisory Committee. What is different a fast-changing context of international devel- here, however, is that this mechanism would opment cooperation. Managing for results has BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 41 become an essential tool for demonstrating Box 3.5 What is managing for results? learning and value in this context (box 3.5). The CGIAR and Centers have not yet fully mastered this imperative. Managing for results is a coherent frame- The current international impetus for work for strategic planning, management, and communications based on continuous change began with adoption of the Millen- learning and accountability. It applies sev- nium Development Goals in 2000, continued eral principles: through the Monterrey Financing for Devel- Results-oriented strategy sets strategic opment Conference of 2002 and several inter- directions and outcomes. national roundtables on managing for results, Management decisions and resource al- and culminated in the Paris Declaration at locations align with strategic outcomes. the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness Program performance indicators target in March 2005.13 Through all this, the inter- clients and their beneficiaries and the differences to be made in beneficiaries’ national community has developed a shared lives. understanding of the power of focusing on re- Indicators are used as signals to motivate sults rather than on inputs and processes. staff and to provide a base for under- CGIAR Members and donors are com- standing how service can be improved. mitted by the Paris Declaration to mutual accountability, managing for results, harmo- nization, alignment, and coordination among current System Priorities are too numerous, themselves to provide support to the Centers. and they lack alignment with any overarching In turn, the Centers need to adopt good gov- strategy or core strategic objectives or metrics ernance practices and to deliver results-based of achievement. Table 3.4 notes some of the and transparent management. differences between CGIAR practice and a managing for results framework. What needs to change for the How the CGIAR System produces and CGIAR to be more effective? delivers international public goods needs to A recurring theme in the Panel’s and in the be considered within a results framework. EPMR analysis of the Centers and the Chal- There has long been tension in the CGIAR lenge Programs is the lack of an agreed strate- between producing international public goods gic framework. At the System level, Centers (through science) and delivering development and funders have no compass to guide diffi- impact. International public goods and meas- cult decisions and to align behavior with pri- uring for results approaches recognize that orities in a way that can be easily communi- no institution or sector can achieve develop- cated and internalized by staff. The CGIAR’s ment outcomes alone, especially at a global, Table 3.4 Differences between the CGIAR and managing for results What managing for results involves What CGIAR does Results-oriented strategy sets strategic directions and Competency-oriented strategy, not defines desired outcomes of Centers and programs prioritizing research for results relative to the mission and strategic objective indicators Management decisions and resources There is no management system: independent aligned with strategic objectives Centers are not working together or effectively with CGIAR and its coordinating bodies Program performance targets clients/partners and client/ Program performance targets outputs and is unclear about partner’s beneficiaries quality of life improvements international public goods “core” and “complementary” roles Indicators used to direct resources to most effective Mistrust between System and Centers relates to indicators results, motivate staff, and improve service and evaluation and leads to poor cooperation. Source: Independent Review Panel. 42 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T regional, or network level. The world is made diverse seeds and other plant materials are up of increasingly complex systems and inter- safeguarded within the public domain. Cen- dependent institutions. Agricultural pro- ter management would use measurement ductivity depends on trade regimes, environ- indicators to manage investment across the mental conventions and laws, transportation production line to demonstrate that project infrastructure, rural finance, and education schedules from discovery to product to prod- policies. Science depends on uptake by a wide uct adoption have been adhered to within variety of partners. Science is also becoming benchmarked variances on cost and time. more demand driven and answerable to a The Centers would also be responsible for broader range of constituencies. monitoring intermediate outcomes: the influ- To achieve development impact from the ence of their outputs on client behavior. The provision of international public goods re- Centers and would track CGIAR influence quires a delivery system with core and com- on international institutions to determine plementary components. Activities in the whether they benefit from CGIAR science core components (those that define the mis- advice. The Centers would track whether re- sion, goals, and objectives and that transform search results on the genetic enhancement of inputs into outputs, making them available to high-value species being are used by national other partners and users) are under the direct agricultural research systems and civil society control of the Centers, which can be held di- organizations to assist farmers and to raise in- rectly accountable for how they are performed come from forest and natural resource man- and made available to partners. The comple- agement. They would be responsible for show- mentary activities (those carried out by part- ing that their outputs are being used and that ner organizations such as NARS, government the clients using them are satisfied with the agencies, civil society organizations, private product. firms, farmer associations, international orga- The Centers would be responsible for nizations) transform CGIAR system outputs monitoring progress toward and evaluat- into intermediate and final outcomes, which ing final outcomes with clients, donors, and should ultimately have a development impact other partners to ensure that together they on the ground. The complementary activities have the best mix of outputs for maximum are not under the direct control of the Cen- citizen effect. ters, but they are under their influence; the The methodological challenge is to test Centers can play the roles of catalyst, facilita- causal effects of the CGIAR’s contribution tor, convener, and promoter, among others, to beyond the clear zone of control (figure 3.5). enable their uptake. CGIAR Centers can be Clear attribution of impact at a strategic level held responsible for understanding and help- is not possible because of the other contribu- ing to improve the way other entities in the in- tions and conditions necessary for sustainable ternational public goods delivery system value, development. Results information systems adopt, and use the outputs of Center work. are meant to be a lean, strategic management The Panel suggests that the CGIAR Sys- tool. The systems feed into impact assessment, tem and the Centers are accountable for pro- which is done periodically to measure results ducing outputs: high-quality science products on the ground and test the validity of the re- that are launched within an agreed timeframe sults framework. Impact assessment draws on and financial allocations and that are relevant data outside of results reports to make judg- to the agreed mission of the CGIAR. The ments about possible attributions and unin- Centers could continue to measure the qual- tended impact. ity of their research output through reports or The CGIAR Centers cannot reach pov- publications against agreed benchmarks. The erty reduction goals alone. Successful devel- Centers would use measures to ensure their opment requires partnership. And it requires funders that the collections of genetically partners to manage the links between them, BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 43 Figure 3.5 Accountability and responsibility for achieving results Responsible: (zone of influence) Goals/impact Managing toward outcomes, monitoring effectiveness of outputs, learning, taking corrective action Final outcomes Monitoring development changes with clients Intermediate outcomes Monitoring influence of outputs on clients Accountable: (zone of control) Outputs Monitoring resource use Producing or coproducing outputs promised within agreed allocation Source: Dutch Leonard, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Presentation to the World Bank, 2002. making explicit mutual obligations to demon- partners, and end users in a learning-based ap- strate and take responsibility for performance proach that tolerates risk. It rewards knowl- based on shared objectives and agreed expec- edge from failure as well as risk, as long as evi- tations. Thus an important part of the results dence is used to improve performance. approach is to learn continuously with clients, Management for results and international donors, and other partners about how their public goods approaches would help to im- and CGIAR-supported contributions, and the prove accountability in the CGIAR. These environment in which they occur, fit together approaches replace hierarchical accountabil- to create development results. And when ity models, which involve one-way reporting CGIAR scientists do achieve development between recipient and donor, with mutual goals through participatory research, they can- accountability, which takes responsibility for not scale up to global impact without building performance in light of agreed expectations, on partnerships. The challenge is to strategi- and joint responsibility. Mutual accountabil- cally partner with others at global, network, ity is one of the five principles to which donors and local levels to scale up the effects of the committed in the Paris Declaration in 2005. research through complementary services to In the proposed strategic management for re- strengthen institutions and reduce poverty. sults framework, donors would report on the quality, predictability, and timeliness of their Moving forward with a managing contributions to the CGIAR system, while for results–international public goods the Centers would collectively report on out- approach puts, outcomes, and impact. To take full advantage of a results approach, the leadership and managers of the CGIAR Notes and Centers will have to adapt the EPMRs, PMS, impact studies, and strategic plans to 1. Preliminary results from two of the other commission studies—analyses of ICARDA research on Syrian fertilizer a results-based system that collects common supply policies and barley production—which focused results indicators on what they jointly judge on direct productivity effects, did not find significant links to be key strategic objectives. between technology adoption and poverty reduction. The most fundamental shift required for 2. Raitzer (2003). 3. There were two reports by the Working Group: CGIAR the CGIAR system may be cultural. Manag- (2004a) and Cleaver et al. (2004). ing for results is meant to engage employees, 44 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 4. The CGIAR Internal Audit Unit (a unit of the System 8. These data are available only for 2007. In 2005 and 2006 Office) did the verification at first, but now a consultant the Science Council gave only a combined score for a undertakes verification in collaboration with the Internal Center’s five best intermediate outcomes, but did not rate Audit Unit. For example, to verify publications, the individual intermediate outcomes on a 10-point scale. consultant selects five Centers at random and verifies 9. Iskandarani and Reifschneider (2007), p. 3. indicator 4A (“the number of externally peer-reviewed publications per scientist, excluding articles published 10. Research staff is defined as GF-level staff and above in journals listed in the Thompson Scientific/ISI”). The that work on research in the Development Economics consultant then selects another five Centers at random Department. The department also tracks citations that from the remaining Centers and verifies indicator 4B. The could be a useful additional indicator to CGIAR’s PMS to remaining five Centers have their 4C data verified. track the impact of research. 5. Globescan Inc. (2006b). 11. Science Council (2006f). 6. CGIAR (2008). 12. Wadsworth et al. (2007). 7. Some caveats are in order. First, this is very preliminary 13. Other major conferences include the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization, the 2004 Marrakech analysis. Second, correlations do not necessarily imply Roundtable on Results, and the 2006 Vietnam causality. Third, the definitions of some PMS variables Roundtable in 2006 on core principles for applying good have changed significantly during the last three years, practice results. The OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid so comparisons over time are risky. This is especially Effectiveness oversees the process of ensuring progress the case for the rating of intermediate outcomes by on the Paris Declaration agreement. Annual reports and the Science Council. The rating method has changed recent evaluation are available on the OECD-DAC website substantially from year to year. Finally, the dataset for 15 (www.oecd.org). Centers over three or four years is small. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 45 CHAPTER 4 Gender at the CGIAR Addressing gender issues The Panel finds that despite good efforts by come from developing countries. That is not in development is an particular CGIAR Centers and progress what this chapter recommends—far from it. made by the CGIAR’s Gender and Diversity Addressing gender issues in development is institutional responsibility— Program, the CGIAR System and Centers an institutional responsibility—not the re- not the responsibility of have not integrated gender into their research sponsibility of a subset of staff drawn from a subset of staff drawn and outreach mandates, nor are they yet doing target groups. What is needed is accountabil- enough to ensure that gender equity and ity through more gender analysis and perfor- from target groups. What diversity analysis inform their staffing.1 mance measurement and reporting. is needed is accountability The Panel concludes that the CGIAR through more gender and its Centers need a more empirical ap- Gender is not yet integrated proach to ensuring that barriers to gender eq- into CGIAR research analysis and performance uity and diversity are eliminated. Data-based measurement and reporting performance measurement and reporting are The CGIAR System generally recognizes needed to identify unintended adverse im- gender integration as an important or very pacts in seemingly gender-neutral program important part of its research mandate. Yet designs, science agendas, and employment it also acknowledges that the CGIAR and its systems. Progress on gender equity and di- Centers have not effectively integrated gender versity at the CGIAR—both for develop- into their research and outreach mandates. ment impact and internally—will require Scant evidence can be produced to show that moving from an advocacy to an account- the CGIAR is addressing women’s agricul- ability model for anticipating and eliminat- tural contributions, their special agricul- ing adverse impacts. tural knowledge, or their agricultural needs To appreciate the need for a more quan- in ways that reflect their full importance titative, accountability-based approach, it is to agriculture (as recognized by the World important to understand the need to frame Bank’s World Development Report 2008 and gender equity and diversity appropriately. In- by CGIAR and Center leadership). tegration of equity issues has too often been The Panel specifically finds that there is: approached as a problem of individual behav- No systemwide policy on gender in ior and perception, leading to solutions based the CGIAR. on advocacy that are ad hoc and without sys- No leadership on gender at the tematic institutional support. Decades of ex- CGIAR System level (Chairs, Execu- perience have now shown that such solutions tive Council, Secretariat). A pattern do not succeed. Instead, the CGIAR and its of misplaced reliance by CGIAR Centers must frame gender equity and diver- leaders on submanagerial staff func- sity as issues of development and institutional tions has shunted responsibility for necessity. gender away from operations manage- The Panel further underlines that the ment and professional staff. CGIAR and its Centers cannot effectively No attention to gender research and address either gender or diversity simply by development issues in the Annual adding scientists who are women or who CGIAR Performance Indicators. 46 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Negligible attention to gender issues CGIAR members have accepted System Pri- in the CGIAR’s Science Priorities. orities that do not include gender as a priority Negligible attention to gender is- or as a cross-cutting theme to be managed and sues in the CGIAR’s Medium-Term consistently measured in priority areas. And Plans. neither the CGIAR nor the Centers address Negligible attention to gender issues gender in their institutional guidance and in External Program and Manage- management instruments. ment Reviews (EPMRs); unless spe- Gender goes almost unmentioned in cifically requested by a panelist. CGIAR’s key instruments for aligning the Negligible attention to gender issues work of Centers with System Priorities. For in Center strategies and work plans example, the EPMRs have rarely covered (with a few exceptions). gender—and where they have, such coverage No gender-disaggregated reporting re- has not been consistent (box 4.1). Similarly, quirement for project management. CGIAR’s Impact Assessments reveal little ev- No gender-disaggregated reporting idence of analysis, action, or impacts related requirement for monitoring and eval- to gender. The CGIAR does not systemati- uation systems. cally collect successes and lessons learned on No mandate for any CGIAR body gender, nor is work done by the Centers ana- —not even the Gender and Di- lyzed systematically for possible unintended versity Program or the Participa- results. tory Research and Gender Analysis Having no evidence of positive or negative Program—to track progress toward gender impact does not demonstrate a lack of institutional objectives in gender re- impact. Neutral interventions can have posi- search and technology development. tive or negative impacts. Whether they help or In short, gender has not been integrated harm women and girls can only be known if into the CGIAR’s research and outreach gender analysis is integrated into assessments work. at all stages of a program. Certainly, some individual scientists and Centers have already addressed gender in re- Box 4.1 Inattention to gender in the CGIAR’s External search and outreach—at times with gender Program and Management Reviews coordinators or advisors supporting their work. Donors can require attention to gender According to a review of the External Program and Management Reviews in the projects they fund. And although the (EPMRs) commissioned by the Panel for this report, “Substantive consideration Panel was not called on to assess the work of of gender in [the reviews] is still the exception rather than the rule.” individual Centers on gender, it noted that The review found that gender in programs is: IFPRI, ILRI, and IRRI are often cited for Mentioned somewhat in the EPMRs of CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP, and ICRISAT. having done good work. The Participatory Mentioned very slightly in the EPMRs of the Africa Rice Centre, ICARDA, ILRI, IPGRI, and IWMI. Research and Gender Analysis Program has, Not mentioned in the EPMRs of CIFOR, ICLARM, IFPRI, IITA, IRRI, and in many cases, supported such efforts. Gen- World Agroforestry. erally, though, attention to gender analysis in The review stated: “Some EPMR Panels claim that good science is blind to the CGIAR is ad hoc and depends on indi- gender. But if the ultimate objective of the CGIAR is an impact on food security, vidual initiative. poverty reduction and sustainable natural resource management, attention to So far, the Centers have not adopted gender is unavoidable.” proven institutional practices to measure A cursory review of the External Program and Management Review Guide- gender-related impacts or to devise measures lines (issued by the Science Council) shows that they are silent on the need for attention to gender in the reviews’ assessments of the Centers’ science. Thus, for meeting women’s and girls’ specific needs. any gender coverage is purely at the discretion of each review panel. Though there have been clear examples of ef- forts by particular Centers on gender, such ef- Source: Gibbs (2008). forts are not managed as a systemwide priority. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 47 This principle means The Panel is optimistic that the CGIAR the fact that recent World Bank findings on shifting from an advocacy- will embrace a more serious approach to gen- gender in agriculture and development mir- der. Some champions exist; good work has ror those of the 1970s and 1980s3 points to based approach, which been done; and a critical mass of CGIAR re- the international community’s ongoing fail- addresses personal spondents show a readiness to adopt empirical ure to address the different needs of women persuasion and is and institutional approaches. (For example, and men in agriculture. Although women are 43 percent of respondents to the 2008 In- now often the majority in an expanding com- supply-driven, to an dependent Review Panel survey of informed mercial workforce for developing country ag- accountability-based stakeholders called the inclusion of gender riculture, familiar patterns continue to favor approach, which addresses measures in the Performance Measurement men over women. For instance, in the grow- System “important.”) ing horticultural sector, men tend to predom- institutional standards inate in “permanent” positions; in contrast, and is demand-driven Why the CGIAR and its Centers women work less rewarding and empowering need an integrated gender “flexible” jobs (casual or seasonal). However, accountability framework some opportunities for women are also being Evidence from the recent past has taught created with these shifts—through access to us that we must test our assumptions about higher-value crop production and through in- the impact of an evolving agricultural world creased demand for labor. on women living in a subsistence environ- Because gender inequalities are so inter- ment. Research done since the early 1980s twined with slow progress in agricultural has shown that no development intervention development—and especially considering the can claim to be gender-neutral without a sys- current food crisis and the loss of potential tematic analysis of its impact on women’s and productivity by women farmers—the Panel men’s social and economic roles. took a close look at the CGIAR’s record on For institutions this principle means shift- gender. In the CGIAR System’s research ing from an advocacy-based approach, which agenda, the only program for responding to addresses personal persuasion and is supply- gender is the Participatory Research and Gen- driven, to an accountability-based approach, der Analysis Program (PRGA). The PRGA which addresses institutional standards and was launched in 1997 “to treat participatory is demand-driven. An accountability-based research and gender analysis as strategic re- approach requires action to prevent uninten- search methodologies for generating agricul- tional harm, and it requires action to improve tural technologies for poor farmers,”4 with the status of women and girls. Since integrat- CIAT as its convening Center. ing women is a development effectiveness In 2007 the First External Review of the issue, it is a professional responsibility and PRGA called the PRGA’s performance on not a matter of personal persuasion. Equality- gender unsatisfactory, arguing that this pro- based organizations are organizations that gram is unlikely to succeed at systemwide measure such impacts—not those that claim gender mainstreaming—in part because it to be gender-neutral. (Unfortunately the ag- remains focused on advancing participatory ricultural reforms of the 1990s, based on eco- research, rather than gender. In addition, nomic liberalization and “structural adjust- several gender specialists argued that “using ment,” have tended to revive long-discredited the PRGA program . . . to mainstream gen- assumptions about gender neutrality.) der . . . reinforces the assumption that gen- Agriculture in developing countries today der research is qualitative, participatory, has been called “vast, varied, and changing.”2 and soft.” The Science Council, in a note at- The Panel recognizes that this places strong tached to the First External Review, made limits on the availability of sex-disaggregated recommendations—to broaden the PRGA’s data. Local variation in gendered patterns mandate to include institutional incentives makes generalizations awkward. Nevertheless, for systemwide adoption and to phase out the 48 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T PRGA’s participatory research component in guidance on best practices. But to ensure that The Independent Review favor of its gender mandate (or else find other such materials are practically used to adjust sci- Panel survey of informed instruments to scale up gender). Those recom- ence to the needs of poor women and children mendations have gone unheeded. (as well as men), accountability—with col- stakeholders found that The 2008 Independent Review Panel sur- lection and analysis of gender-disaggregated fewer than half of Center vey of informed stakeholders sought to assess data—is essential. That has been clear to re- management judged the CGIAR’s consideration of gender in Cen- searchers of development for decades. ter leadership. Most CGIAR respondents in- Unfortunately, acceptance of data- their collective efforts dicated strong support for integrating gender intensive approaches is low where it counts the on gender “effective” into research. Seventy-nine percent of respon- most. On the Independent Review Panel sur- dents, and 80 percent of Center governance vey of informed stakeholders, just 20 percent and management, judged gender integration of the CGIAR’s Board Chairs and Center Ex- “important” or “very important.” Despite ecutives responded favorably to the proposal this wide recognition of gender’s importance, “Collect more gender disaggregated data and the Independent Review Panel survey found performance indicators for [the Performance that fewer than half of Center management Measurement] System.” This lack of support judged their collective efforts on gender “ef- for performance reporting and measurement fective.” And among all respondents, only stands in the way of further progress on gen- one-third judged the CGIAR’s record on gen- der at the CGIAR and its Centers. der “effective.” Asked to comment on varied The Panel recognizes that managing gen- approaches to improving the track record of der well is a complex undertaking. To make the CGIAR and the Centers, only a minority gender a matter of professional responsibil- of each group of respondents believed that “no ity in reaching CGIAR Strategic Objectives, change is needed.” consistent leadership will be needed (as im- plied in the gender frameworks used by IFPRI Training and best-practices materials and ILRI). Support on gender must include are not enough—they must be investing in technical capacity and provid- supported with data-intensive ing financial support, using existing manage- approaches to ensure accountability ment and accountability systems, and shaping The Independent Review Panel survey of a strong organizational culture that addresses informed stakeholders asked respondents to the needs and preferences of women and girls. indicate whether they favored various sug- Finally, the experiences of successful gender gestions for improving the CGIAR’s and programs show that—to create incentives Centers’ approach to gender in research and for integrating gender issues through institu- related activities. The suggestion that received tional planning, programming, and reporting a favorable response from the largest share of instruments—staff positions on gender need all respondents (59 percent) was “Provide redefining to ensure that they support man- training and guidance materials or best prac- agement to integrate gender into institutional tices on gender and diversity in agriculture.” accountability. The Panel found that disappointing. The CGIAR and Centers already have many train- The CGIAR’s Gender and ing and best-practices materials on integrat- Diversity Program ing gender into development for agriculture and agriculture-related areas (such as health The CGIAR’s Gender and Diversity Pro- and nutrition). To make progress on gender, gram is focused on improving career oppor- other, data-intensive methods are needed and tunities and institutional environments urgently require attention. for Group 2 nationals and women. Hosted There is no question that the CGIAR and by the World Agroforestry Centre in Nai- Centers must continue to provide training and robi, the program reports to the Director BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 49 Rather than seeking General there and to the CGIAR System were optional. Such an approach, though, to remedy intentional Office Steering Committee. A 1999–2003 does not create networkwide incentives to external review of the program found that identify and remove common barriers to discrimination by it had made rapid, excellent progress in the equity. individuals through mere four years of its existence.5 The review The 2003 Review Panel also called for the advocacy, best practice attributed this progress to the program’s system’s Human Resources Advisory Service leader, who, with a staff of just one to three to develop Human Resources Guidelines— seeks to remedy systemic people, provided CGIAR Centers with comparable to Financial Guidelines—includ- discrimination by a variety of tools. In addition, the Bill & ing for gender and diversity. But the Advisory quantitatively measuring the Melinda Gates Foundation has recognized Service has never found its feet and has not the program’s leadership with the African provided the CGIAR with adequate support impact of seemingly neutral Women In Agriculture Research and Devel- for tackling larger human resources manage- systems in employment opment (AWARD) Fellowships. The fellow- ment issues. ships include a $13 million grant to pilot a In a networked system, even more than gender program in agriculture, which, if in a traditional institutional setting, manage- successful, will likely be extended. Clear, ment for a barrier-free environment is key. In measurable outcome results have been set recent decades, legal action and social science for the AWARD program and there is much research have changed our understanding evidence of its future promise. of workplace discrimination. As our under- The Gender and Diversity Program has standings of different types of discrimina- been less successful at promoting account- tion have evolved, so too have our remedies ability around systemic employment barriers for each. to women and Group 2 nationals at CGIAR Rather than seeking to remedy in- Centers. To regularly identify and eliminate tentional discrimination by individuals such barriers in all aspects of CGIAR-spon- through advocacy, best practice seeks to sored Center employment—from entry to remedy systemic discrimination by quanti- compensation, promotion, development, and tatively measuring the impact of seemingly exit—the Centers need to adopt a more so- neutral systems in employment. This data- phisticated approach. This work needs to be intensive approach uses information on the harmonized to aid mutual learning among representation of target group members the Centers, and to allow progress on inter- in the recruitment pool—setting goals for nal gender and diversity to be reported in the proportional representation in recruitment CGIAR Annual Report. based on the numbers of available qualified individuals. The CGIAR should shift management Recognizing that gender and diversity for internal gender and diversity to tracking has been the cornerstone of employ- a new human resources function, ment equity programs, the Panel explored with performance-based data whether the CGIAR System measured the reporting and accountability effects of its own employment systems. The The Gender and Diversity Program has a Panel asked for data on the representation strategy of allowing autonomy to the Cen- of women and developing country (Group 2) ters, which determine their own objectives; nationals by job category and by compensa- the program then responds to their requests. tion levels. It was told that although such data The 2003 external review leaned toward safe- are collected, the way they are collected makes guarding this autonomy. Rather than urging comparisons and trend analysis difficult. So, more commitment to program objectives the Panel included questions on its Indepen- through increased accountability for Cen- dent Review Panel survey of informed stake- ter management and boards, the review sug- holders to solicit respondents’ views on the gested that greater accountability measures present approach and to test their readiness 50 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T to move to a more institutional workplace- were Group 2 nationals rose from 58 percent Any new Center-based equity model. in 2003 to 66 percent in 2008. The picture for information management Asked “What should be done to improve Center management, however, is more mixed. the CGIAR and Centers’ approaches to Between 2003 and 2008, the share of women will have to be achieving gender and diversity objectives?”, in management doubled from 9 percent to accompanied by strong many respondents to the Independent Re- 18 percent—still a very low figure. Over the guidance on using view Panel survey called for a more empirical same period the share of Group 2 nationals in approach to—and more accountability for— Center management decreased from 46 per- performance-based data gender and diversity in the Centers’ human cent to 35 percent. to manage and to report resources management. A stronger empirical These figures will have more meaning on gender and diversity base is needed to reveal how different groups when the full report is available, with more fare in hiring, promotion, training, evalua- contextual data, in February 2009. Yet they tions, and layoffs. Centers are not using stock generally suggest that the Gender and Diver- and flow data regularly to manage barrier-free sity Program’s strategy has had an impact. movement of staff through hire, promotions, Similarly, the results of the 2008 Indepen- and staff development opportunities. dent Review Panel survey of informed stake- After the 2003 external review the Gen- holders show that the Gender and Diversity der and Diversity Program launched a new Program has done an excellent job with few strategy with a strong focus on decentralized resources in advocating and supporting di- accountability mechanisms. But without an- versity in the workplace. But to convince the nual commitments to report on gender and Centers to take accountability for managing diversity performance, the approach has no equity systematically and professionally—to teeth. And visits to the Centers indicate that identify hidden barriers and to sustain prog- the approach has been unevenly adopted. ress—more sophisticated approaches will be Overall, there has not been a sufficient needed. systemwide effort to use statistical methods One reason to embrace such systematic, proven in identifying unintended institutional professional methods for managing gender eq- barriers. The CGIAR and the Centers have no uity and diversity is to ensure science quality. common practice—or even understanding— Some comments by respondents to the Inde- of gender and diversity performance manage- pendent Review Panel survey report an unset- ment. Most Centers do not conscientiously tling perception: that efforts to make progress or consistently collect data to reduce adverse on gender and diversity have threatened the impact in employment practices. An update quality of science. The experience of many or- to a 2003 baseline staff profile, for example, is ganizations has shown that when recruitment now behind schedule because of difficulties in targets are set without analyzing availability retrieving datasets. profiles, and without analyzing the movement of targeted groups once employed, two prob- The Gender and Diversity Program’s lems result: staffing survey shows good progress When targets are disconnected from since 2003—but more systematic availability, some of those hired may accountability is needed lack needed qualifications—and will Early reports from the staffing survey led be destined to fail. by the Gender and Diversity Program indi- When barriers in employment sys- cate that both groups made good progress tems are not identified or remedied, between 2003 and 2008. The number of exclusion will continue. female scientists doubled between 2003 and To avoid these problems at the CGIAR, 2008, increasing their share in this staff only a more evidence-based approach to iden- group from less than 20 percent to 26 per- tifying employment targets—aligned with ac- cent. And among Center scientists, those who countability, and revealing unintentional and BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 51 hidden barriers—will do. Any new Center- because policy and evaluations on diversity were not based information management will have to available. Gender issues do cut across all groups, and the approach recommended for gender could equally be accompanied by strong guidance on using be applied to diverse social, ethnic, and economic performance-based data to manage and to re- groups. port on gender and diversity. 2. World Bank (2007b), p. 1. 3. World Bank (2007b). Notes 4. CIAT Participatory Research and Gender Analysis website: http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/asia/prga.htm, accessed September 18, 2008. 1. The Panel reviewed performance on gender in the research mandate. Diversity issues were not covered 5. Castillo and Fogelberg (2004). 52 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 5 CHAPTER Resource mobilization, allocation, and management The research Centers The research Centers are experiencing a quiet research network and partnership are experiencing a quiet financial crisis. This has been masked by more complex, that complexity has growing nominal (before inflation) revenues made financial management and financial crisis. This has and increasing numbers of grants. It is none- control more difficult. The ad hoc ar- been masked by growing theless real. rangements for different Challenge nominal (before inflation) The Centers face five financial challenges: Programs are not a strong founda- Funding for the Centers has not tion for helping financial systems to revenues and increasing grown after inflation for more than cope with increasing numbers of such numbers of grants. It a decade. In contrast, several inter- programs. is nonetheless real national development institutions In good times these would be significant have received record replenishments problems. Now, during the food price crisis, of their concessionary and grant new ideas and approaches are needed even more funds—suggesting that the problem urgently. There is no easy solution. Because the has not been a lack of available re- problems are interrelated, the Panel believes sources, but the failure of the CGIAR that the financial challenges can probably be and Centers to set up institutions that resolved only as part of an overall change in the mobilize funds well. partnership’s institutional structure. Centers Funding has become increasingly need more resources and, in particular, more restricted, with a proliferation of unrestricted funds—and donors are unlikely smaller, targeted grants. While this to provide them without greater assurance of has benefits for donors, it means strategic effectiveness and performance. A new higher administrative costs for Cen- institutional and financial structure, with new ters, some increased financial risk, tools for resource mobilization, needs to be and less flexibility to follow promis- part of a general reform package. ing lines of research. Most multilateral organizations would Funding has been increasingly piece- prefer to mobilize funds on a pooled basis. meal rather than strategic. Every This allows for a performance-based system review of the CGIAR in the past that allocates money more strategically, by decade has recommended stronger priority—and gives recipients strong incen- central coordination of funding and tives for good performance. a tighter link between priorities, per- Pooled funds also have a number of major formance, and fund allocation. advantages for stakeholders: There are deficiencies in financial They enable donors and doers to agree management at some Centers— on a strategic results agenda. notably at CIAT in recent years They provide a channel for mobiliz- (box 5.1)—and tools for managing ing major increments of funding. financial risk across the partnership They provide a means of eliciting are limited. commitments (including financial As cross-cutting, multipartner management commitments) by all Challenge Programs have made the involved. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 53 Box 5.1 CIAT’s financial crisis—a case study of financial challenges currently facing the Centers A recent financial crisis at the International Center for Tropical did not help—it failed to stem CIAT’s losses over the long term. Agriculture (CIAT) nearly led to that Center’s closure. One of Though the CGIAR Secretariat flagged CIAT’s poor financial the CGIAR’s oldest and largest Centers, CIAT suffered great state year after year, the Secretariat took no further action to financial harm from injudicious management decisions and correct the CIAT business model’s grave underlying problems. the failure to recognize flaws in its business model. Although For example, if the Secretariat had reviewed variances against the Center experienced a 30 percent increase in revenue since project budgets it could have learned that the cost recovery 2000, the Center’s financial health—measured by several indi- issue was a chronic one—and an intervention with donors to cators—sharply declined. By the end of 2006 CIAT’s reserves rectify some underpricing might have been possible. had fallen to an amount equivalent to just 18 days of spending The Panel notes that, during the CIAT crisis, the CGIAR (the CGIAR standard is 75–90 days). disbanded its Finance Committee and eliminated an important CIAT is a case study in the many financial challenges fac- instrument of financial oversight and transparency. The Panel ing the Centers. A significant decline in unrestricted funding notes, further, that neither the CGIAR financial report for 2006 coupled with the Center’s inability to recover full costs on its nor the CGIAR financial report for 2007 discussed the CIAT cri- restricted contracts were underlying causes of the crisis. The sis at significant length. CIAT crisis unfolded over a period of years, yet the Center’s CIAT exemplifies an extreme case of the difficulties that financial management and oversight failed to recognize that Centers face when financial management systems do not re- full direct and indirect costs for projects were not being recov- spond properly. Presently, most Centers are recovering less ered. In the words of CIAT management, “Overheads to cover than 100 percent of full indirect costs on restricted projects institutional costs (indirect project costs) . . . were often not in- while continuing to deal with declining levels of unrestricted cluded at realistic levels (largely a result of limitations imposed funding. There is evidence that even the Challenge Programs— by donors) and full direct costs, prior to June 2007, were rarely a program design by the CGIAR and its affiliated Centers—do included at all.”1 not allow full recovery of indirect costs. The fiduciary responsibility for CIAT’s financial woes lies with CIAT’s Board of Trustees and executive management. But financial oversight and leadership at the CGIAR System level 1. CGIAR, Ad Hoc Finance Committee of the Executive Council (2008). If the CGIAR is to substantially increase requiring donor-Center relationships that re- its funding of Centers and programs and sult in increased transaction costs and an inef- strengthen the financial management of the ficient way of doing business. The Panel also partnership, it must consider a pooled fund- finds that the lack of a single entry point for ing approach. donors establishes a bias toward nonstrategic, project by project, targeted funding, depriv- Research funding has stagnated ing the CGIAR and its affiliated Centers of opportunities to engage in more robust, sys- From 1995 to 2007, total revenues for the temwide, strategic programs. CGIAR and its affiliated Centers increased from $344 million to $520 million in nominal Funding is more restricted US dollars, a 51 percent increase, or an average annual growth rate of 4 percent. A compound Not only has real funding failed to grow, but annual growth rate of 4 percent, in nominal there has also been a trend toward restricted revenues, has not been sufficient to fund real funding (figure 5.1). In 1995, 37 percent of growth after inflation. In constant dollars rev- funding received by the Centers was restricted. enues have been flat, rising only $21 million By 2007, 64 percent was restricted—a major in 12 years (tables 5.1 and 5.2).1 shift with significant implications for finan- The Panel believes that the failure to mo- cial management (table 5.3). bilize funds is attributable, in part, to the in- Although there are some advantages some efficiencies inherent in the current matrix of donors to restricted funding, there are major 64 members and 15 independent Centers, all burdens for the Centers. First, restricted 54 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Table 5.1 Nominal funding of CGIAR and affiliated Centers, 1995 and 2007 US$ millions Change 12-year compound annual growth Funding source 1995 2007 Amount Percent rate (percent) Grant funding 329 495 166 50 4 Other income 15 25 10 67 4 Total revenue 344 520 176 51 4 Source: CGIAR Financial Reports (CGIAR 1995, 2007). Table 5.2 Constant dollar funding of CGIAR and affiliated Centers, 1995 and 2007 2007 US$ millions Change 12-year compound annual growth Funding source 1995 2007 Amount Percent rate (percent) Grant funding 477 495 18 4 0 Other income 22 25 3 1 0 Total revenue 499 520 21 4 0 Source: CGIAR Financial Reports (CGIAR 1995, 2007b), adjusted for inflation index (2007 base). Figure 5.1 Restricted and unrestricted funding for CGIAR 2007 US$ millions 600 Total funding 500 400 Restricted funding 300 200 Unrestricted funding 100 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: CGIAR Financial Reports 1995–2007 adjusted for inflation index, 2007 base. Table 5.3 Restricted and unrestricted funding for the CGIAR System 2007 US$ millions Change Percent of Percent of Type of funding 1995 total funding 2007 total funding Amount Percent Restricted 175 37 316 64 141 81 Unrestricted 302 63 179 36 –123 –41 Total 477 100 495 100 18 4 Source: CGIAR Financial Reports (CGIAR 1995, 2007b), adjusted for inflation index (2007 base). BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 55 grants have a higher level of administrative Figure 5.2 Rising numbers of restricted costs. Second, restricted funds cannot be rec- grants to selected CGIAR ognized as revenue until costs are incurred, Centers, 1999–2007 a situation noted in annual financial reports 1999 2007 as causing unfavorable budget variances (al- Number of restricted grants though the funding is available, it cannot be 300 recognized). Third, and most important, re- stricted funding is directly correlated with fi- nancial instability at the Center level. Regres- sion analysis shows a positive correlation of 38 200 percent between restricted funding levels and surpluses/deficits. 100 Research work programs have become more fragmented The Panel finds that several unfavorable trends 0 IITA CIAT Bioversity ICRISAT in grants, most notably the increasing number Note: CIAT data are for 2000, as details for 1999 were unavailable. and decreasing size of research grants, place Source: Grant schedules provided by individual Centers. additional administrative burdens on the Centers. For example, CIAT, ICRISAT, and Figure 5.3 Rising numbers of small grants IITA were each managing more than 200 (less than $100,000) to selected restricted grants in 2007. From 1999 to 2007 CGIAR Centers, 1999–2007 the total number of ICRISAT’s restricted 1999 2007 grants rose by 130 percent (an increase of 127 Grants under $100,000 restricted grants). IITA now has about twice 150 as many restricted grants to manage as it did in 1999 (figure 5.2). The shift toward smaller restricted grants (figures 5.3 and 5.4) exacerbates the trans- 100 action cost problem (fixed transaction costs translate into higher costs for smaller grants). The smaller grants also tend to be of a non- 50 strategic, project by project nature. The Panel’s grant findings are not new. In March 2006, the Report of the Third External Program and Management Review of World 0 IITA CIAT Bioversity ICRISAT Agroforestry reached similar conclusions and Source: Grant schedules provided by individual Centers. noted concerns that “smaller projects carry a heavy administrative burden which is out of proportion to the science and income they While small grants are not all bad, the generate.”2 The External Program and Man- overall balance in funding for some Centers agement Review Panel noted that in 2005, 67 has shifted too far toward small grants. In of 162 of World Agroforestry’s active projects such cases, small grants generate a dispropor- were funded at less than $50,000. While ac- tionate amount of administrative activity, po- counting for 41 percent of total grants, this tentially distracting resources from important group of projects represented only 6 percent research objectives. Although difficult, the of World Agroforestry’s restricted income and CGIAR System and affiliated Centers need less of its total income.3 to consider what is a reasonable minimum for 56 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Figure 5.4 Restricted grants by size for The question is often asked about what selected CGIAR Centers, 2007 level of unrestricted funding is adequate or appropriate. As a benchmark indicator, a con- Over $5 million $2–$5 million $1–$2 million $501,000–$1 million $251,000–$500,000 $101,000–$250,000 sultant to the Panel calculated total indirect Under $100,000 costs for each Center (as reported in Exhibit II Percent of the 2006 financial reports) and compared 100 24 4 9 5 9 2 12 the indirect cost with the unrestricted fund- 15 6 20 36 12 14 ing available to each Center. Each Center had 14 21 30 39 more than adequate unrestricted funding to 75 26 33 32 cover all indirect expenses. At the low end, 59 38 31 unrestricted funding covered 1.57 times indi- 47 50 rect costs (World Agroforestry). At the high 120 end, unrestricted funding covered 3.59 times 99 102 64 indirect cost (CIP; see figure 5.5). Although 25 the benchmark is useful in comparing indi- rect cost coverage, it does not take into con- sideration other expenses that are typically 0 IITA CIAT Bioversity World Agroforestry covered by unrestricted funding, including Note: Numbers in each column are the number of grants at each level. capital expenditures. Source: Grant schedules provided by individual Centers. Cash flow is strong—but reserve restricted grants to ensure that costs of such targets should be increased grants do not outweigh the benefits. Under the proposed model, a new initia- From a financial perspective, cash is the life- tive to pool donor funds, the CGIAR Fund blood of an organization. In 2007, the CGIAR (see chapter 8), should work to redress the bal- and its affiliated Centers had a strong (cash ance in grant size. flow) liquidity position, with enough cash or near-cash assets to meet short-term liabilities. Business practices must keep In addition to a liquidity indicator, each pace with shifts in funding Center also calculates a reserve benchmark to determine whether it is prepared to meet As more and more funding is restricted, Cen- longer-term financial disruptions. The Panel ters must strengthen their cost controls, espe- reviewed current reserve indicators for the cially their ability to fully recover indirect Centers and recommends two changes. First, costs on restricted projects. To date, full cost the CGIAR’s current cash reserve “bench- recovery varies significantly across Centers. A mark” of 75–90 days should be extended to few Centers have reported 100 percent recov- 180 days or six months to reflect the intended ery of indirect costs—but others struggle with “longer-term” nature of the benchmark. Sec- the need to renegotiate contracts where donor ond, Centers should not be penalized if they practices and constraints restrict such recov- build even larger reserves (for some Centers ery. In some cases, there may also be a failure these might eventually approach the size of of Center management to fully understand, endowments). It would also be useful to iden- manage, and negotiate full cost recovery con- tify where and to what extent reserve balances tracts. Until all restricted projects assume have been earmarked or designated (what are their full share of indirect costs, donors of the reserve restrictions). In reviewing bench- unrestricted funds are subsidizing restricted marks, the Panel noted a shortcoming in the projects. The recommended Consortium of calculation of the reserve and liquidity bench- Centers, with a formal policy on full costing marks. In cases where a Center does not have of research (see chapter 8), will help. long- or medium-term assets, the reserve BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 57 Figure 5.5 Unrestricted funding compared with total indirect costs, by CGIAR Center, 2006 Unrestricted funding Total indirect costs US$ millions 20 15 10 5 0 CIP IFPRI ICARDA Bioversity Worldfish CIFOR Africa Rice ILRI IRRI CIMMYT IWMI CIAT ICRISAT IITA World Agroforestry Source: CGIAR Financial Report (CGIAR 2006d). calculation is not meaningful as it is the same investment needs, taking into consideration calculation as the liquidity indicator. long-term strategic goals and what will be re- quired to maintain comparative advantage. Capital investment declined sharply to 2003 and has Challenge Programs greatly only partly recovered increase the complexity of financial management Capital investment is essential for keeping at of the CGIAR System the forward edge of science. But capital invest- ment (in constant US dollars) declined across The Challenge Programs, collaborative the Centers, from $30.3 million in 1994, to research efforts on issues of global or regional below $10 million in 2002 and 2003. It rose significance, were introduced in 2003. They to $18.7 million in 2007—still 38 percent were expected to mobilize incremental funds below its 1994 level (figure 5.6). for the Centers. In some cases, however, they Center reserves are used to fund capital ex- have instead absorbed funding that otherwise penditures, but Center reserves can be replen- would have gone directly to the Centers. ished only with adequate levels of unrestricted Although what would have happened funding. It is no surprise that levels of capital without the Challenge Programs cannot be expenditures have decreased as unrestricted known with certainty, it is clear that they have funding levels have decreased. With declining not driven revenue growth for the System as a levels of unrestricted funding already stretched whole. To achieve major gains in funding for to cover indirect costs, the Panel finds that some the CGIAR System, other tools for mobiliz- Centers have not had the resources to make nec- ing resources probably will be needed. essary capital investments. Discussions with se- Challenge Programs have created prob- lected Center financial Directors confirmed lems in other areas of financial management that capital expenditure levels do not adequately within the CGIAR System. First, since fund- cover either cyclical investment requirements or ing for Challenge Programs is by definition investments in new systems and technologies. “restricted,” it has contributed to the rise in The Centers and the new Consortium the share of restricted funds. Second, the gov- of Centers (see chapter 8) should identify ernance and financial management of each 58 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Figure 5.6 Capital investments of CGIAR Centers, 1994–2007 US$ millions 50 40 Capital investments, constant dollars 30 20 Capital investments, nominal 10 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Note: Constant dollar calculations based on inflation data included in CGIAR financial reports. The base year is 2007. Source: CGIAR Financial Reports 1994–2007. Challenge Program is unique. A program may partly reflects the desirability of simplifica- be an incorporated or unincorporated joint tion and standardization. But it also reflects venture, a program of a host Center, or some the Panel’s view that having one or two “host other form of partnership. It may or may not Centers” manage the finances of the Chal- have audited financial statements. The Panel lenge Programs—while those Centers pay advises that all Challenge Programs should for a substantial amount of research funded have independently audited annual financial by the Challenge Programs—presents a con- statements, with governance arrangements to flict of interest. Five years of experience with enable such audits. Third, the complexity of pilot programs and Challenge Programs in- the Challenge Programs creates obstacles to dicate that the Challenge Programs have not overall financial reporting by the CGIAR Sec- led to major increases in funding. They have retariat. There are inconsistencies in report- not led to more unrestricted funding, longer- ing across the System (CGIAR Secretariat), term funding, or strategic performance-based program (Challenge Program management), allocation of pooled resources. and Center (host) levels. Some sources report funding on a cash basis, some on an accrual The Multi-Donor Trust Fund basis, and some on a “hybrid” of both. It is is too limited a model difficult to relate or reconcile what the Secre- tariat reports to what the Challenge Programs The World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund and Centers report individually. (MDTF) for the CGIAR was established in The Panel believes that the materiality, 2005 to enable donors to channel funds to importance, and multipartner complexity of the CGIAR and the Centers.4 In 2007, about the Challenge Programs require more finan- $100 million—nearly a quarter of all contri- cial control—not less. It recommends that a butions to the CGIAR that year—were chan- single administrative home be created, with neled through the MDTF. standardized policies and procedures for Trust Fund Administration Agreements establishing and managing the Challenge are prepared annually by the CGIAR Secre- Programs. tariat with each Center and each donor wish- The Panel’s recommendation of a single ing to use the MDTF. For its services the administrative home for Challenge Programs World Bank charges an administrative fee in the Consortium of Centers (see chapter 8) (0.175 percent of the total sum).5 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 59 To achieve a quantum Each agreement names a Center or Cen- these System Priorities have not effectively improvement in funding, ters to receive funds and notes the condi- guided resource allocation. tions—if any—on their use.6 A donor may In June 2008, Working Group 1 of the more is needed than a require the World Bank, through the CGIAR CGIAR Facilitated Change Process began to slightly modified MDTF Secretariat, to make specific agreements with outline a foundation for a strategy and results Centers before disbursing the funds. But the framework which—with more articulation— Bank does not audit compliance with the could guide performance-based allocations. conditions.7 The Working Group produced a new vision, That the Bank does not audit Centers’ two mission statements, and three main stra- compliance with conditions in MDTF agree- tegic objectives, as follows: ments has caused concern. In 2006, the Euro- Food for people. Sustainably increase pean Commission asked the Bank to provide productivity and the production of assurance that the funds channeled through healthy food and for the poor. the MDTF were used as agreed—but the Environments for people. Conserve, question of who should provide such assur- enhance, and sustainably use natu- ance remained unresolved.8 This problem of ral resources and biodiversity to im- assurance is related to a larger problem with prove the livelihoods of the poor in the Centers’ accountability for how funds are response to climate change and other used. factors. The MDTF is an important convenience Policies for people. Promote policy to donors. It reduces transactions costs and and institutional change to stimulate simplifies accounting, avoiding the need for agricultural growth and equity that multiple agreements and separate transactions will benefit the poor, especially rural between the donor and Centers. And, because women and other disadvantaged of policy or program constraints internal to groups. each donor, it might be easier for some donors Each of the three objectives is accompa- to make contributions through a multilateral nied by notional indicators (to be further de- institution than directly to a research center. veloped) and by an appreciation of key oppor- Nevertheless, to provide the structure for tunities, major players on the scene, CGIAR a rejuvenated resource mobilization system, advantages, and CGIAR functions that sup- and meet the needs of a revitalized CGIAR, port the key opportunities.10 the MDTF would need to be a much more There is no process yet for determining how substantial operation. to allocate resources among priority areas. The Panel suggests that to achieve a quan- The existing model that most closely re- tum improvement in funding, more is needed sembles the Panel’s recommended approach to than a slightly modified MDTF. The Panel CGIAR resource mobilization and allocation proposes a balanced partnership model as the is the management of the World Bank’s $50 governance structure for the partnership be- million annual grant from the Development tween the CGIAR and the network of Cen- Grants Facility to the CGIAR, Centers, and ters (see chapter 8). programs. The Panel examined the evolution of this approach alongside other options. 11 There must be a link between resource allocation The World Bank’s allocation of and System priorities its contribution to the CGIAR The 2005 CGIAR Annual General Meeting The World Bank plays several funding roles endorsed a set of 5 research areas and 20 over- in resource mobilization and allocation. It has all priorities for 2005–15, proposed by the been the largest single donor, has coordinated Science Council.9 Chapter 3 discusses how management of the MDTF, and has managed 60 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T its own allocation of funds in the interest of (figure 5.7). About half the funds pay for the the CGIAR System as a whole. Over time the CGIAR, special projects, and programs. The Bank has taken three different approaches to other half are allocated to the Centers by for- allocating its grant to the CGIAR and the mula, and are divided into two tranches: Centers: Base support—unrestricted grants re- Filling funding gaps (1972–93), lated to the size of each Center sometimes called “balancing” and General support—funds allocated to sometimes “donor of last resort.” each Center based on its score on 16 Matching funds (1993–2004). performance criteria.14 Strategic allocation, applying a formula In 2007 about equal amounts were allo- that includes Center need, potential, cated as base support and general support. So, and performance (2004–present). about one-quarter of the funds were linked di- Filling funding gaps and matching funds rectly to scores on the 16 performance criteria. are discussed in the Panel’s full Technical Re- Among the performance criteria, four are port. Strategic allocation is described below. explicitly related to results—achievement of In 2003, the first full year of Challenge outputs targets, most significant outcomes, Program funding and the major funding year and the quality of impacts monitoring, as as- for a project to rehabilitate germplasm collec- sessed by the Science Council and were given tions,12 the World Bank Operations Evalu- a 35 percent weight. The other criteria cover- ation Department recommended that the ing quality and relevance of current research, Bank abandon the matching grant model.13 institutional health, and financial health In 2004, the Bank introduced its strategic were given a 65 percent weight.15 In addition, allocation system, which is partly similar— a small weight was first given in 2007 to the being formula-based and, to some degree, “focus areas” identified in the stakeholder per- performance-based—to the allocation system ception survey. The criterion with the largest for its own major concessionary fund (Inter- weight is “solvency.”16 national Development Association). There are no restrictions on how the Cen- Since 2004, the World Bank has divided ters may use the World Bank funds allocated its annual $50 million contribution to the by formula, either as base support or as gen- CGIAR into differently allocated segments eral support. Figure 5.7 Allocation of the World Bank Grant to the CGIAR 2007 CGIAR Secretariat $4.4M Targeted to Challenge Programs/Systemwide and specific purposes Ecoregional Programs $9.0M $23.6M Specific programs and committees Global public goods project $7.8M $19.2M Restructure/emergency $1.4M Total grant $50M Science Council and committees $1.0M Base support (based on size) $13.2M Formula-based $26.4M General support (based on performance and potential) $13.2M Source: CGIAR Secretariat 2007c. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 61 Notes will examine the period from inception (October 2005) to December 2007. 1. CGIAR Annual Reports, 1995 to 2007, The inflation rates 8. Consequently, the traditional 2006 EC contribution to the are dollar-based annual rates for each Center. They are CGIAR of about €23–24 million was not forthcoming. In derived from three elements: the currency basket of a 2007 the EC concluded an intermediate arrangement Center’s expenditures (source: Centers); annual inflation with IFAD, and its CGIAR contribution that year was rates (as measured by the consumer price index) on approximately twice the traditional annual amount, the currencies in the basket (source: IMF International presumably to compensate for the lack of funding the Financial Statistics); and annual changes in exchange previous year. rates of each currency in the basket against the US dollar 9. CGIAR Science Council (2005d). (source: IMF International Financial Statistics). 10. CGIAR Secretariat (2008b). 2. World Agroforestry Centre (2006). 11. Wadsworth (2007). 3. World Agroforestry Centre (2006). 12. In 2003, the World Bank allocated $24 million to general 4. Prior to 2005 the World Bank managed a number of support, $7 million to the Challenge Programs, $17 million different funds targeted to the Centers. It instituted the to rehabilitation of global public goods assets, $1.7 million MDTF partly to standardize the Trust Fund Administration to Systemwide Programs, and $1.4 million to special Agreements by which it manages funds contributed by allocations (CGIAR 2003, p.15). other donors to the Bank for disbursement to the CGIAR and the Centers. The CGIAR Secretariat obtained approval 13. World Bank (2003), p. 37. for an Initiating Brief for the Trust Fund that effectively 14. Two groups of indicators were used. One was indicators established a global multidonor trust fund. Approval of a of results, including “achievement of acceptable output new standardized administrative agreement (MDTFAA) targets,” “Science Council ratings of Center reports on was obtained on September 1, 2005 (World Bank 2005, research outcomes,” “SC/SPIA rating of overall institutional p. 2). On September 8, 2006, the Vice President of impact assessment,” and “SC/SPIA rating of two Center Sustainable Development and the Chair of CGIAR reported impact studies.” The other was indicators of potential that the new arrangement was fully implemented. (“Update to perform, including “quality and relevance of current on the Implementation of the Management Action Plan.”) research,” “institutional health,” and “financial health.” 5. The World Bank plays a “limited trustee” role. Services 15. Quality and relevance of current research (peer-reviewed include receiving donor funds, managing those funds, publications per scientist other than ISI; peer-reviewed disbursing funds, providing periodic reports, and publications per scientist in journals listed in the ISI; and producing an externally audited financial statement for the the percentage of publications coauthored with developing MDTF every three years. country partners); institutional health (governance score, board statement, culture of learning and change, and 6. Each donor may attach any terms and conditions to its diversity); and financial health (solvency/reserves in days funds that it wishes, and the World Bank attaches those of expenditures, efficiency of operations [indirect cost same terms and conditions to its agreement with the ratio], and cash management on restricted operations). Center(s) that are to receive funds. A donor may specify that its funds are to be disbursed as unrestricted “core 16. The reduction in weight of the weight of “liquidity in days contributions” or that their use is to be restricted to a of expenditure” from 10 percent in 2006 to 0 percent in specific region, Center, program, or project. The donor 2007, and the similar reduction of “solvency/reserves in may instruct the MDTF on different uses and conditions days of expenditures” from 15 percent to 12 percent was for different tranches of funds. decided in light of the 2006 reprogramming of $6 million of the World Bank contribution from performance-based 7. In addition to there being no compliance audit, there has support to base support in response to the nondelivery of not yet been a financial audit of the MDTF. The World the EC contribution to the CGIAR in 2006. Bank will conduct the first audit of the Fund in 2008. It 62 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 6 CHAPTER Reaching out— partners in development While there is evidence at Partnerships are essential to the effectiveness of NARS more explicitly when they partner the Centers of an important and relevance of the CGIAR, to its mandate with Centers. of poverty reduction, and to providing inter- At the System level, partnership com- range of partnerships with national public goods. Robust partnership mittees with membership in the Executive measurable added value, strategies are needed at both the CGIAR Council were intended to serve as the basic on the whole, the Panel System and Center levels that integrate the architecture for building and strengthening actions of different actors around major objec- partnerships. The approach failed for nongov- finds that the CGIAR and its tives with specified, measurable outcomes. ernmental organizations, and the initiative Centers are falling far short While there is evidence at the Centers of an was suspended. It is doubtful that a commit- of developing the strategic important range of partnerships with measur- tee approach could successfully represent the able added value, on the whole, the Panel finds diversity of nongovernmental organizations. potential of partnerships that the CGIAR and its Centers are falling The Private Sector Committee has proved far short of developing the strategic potential more durable, but evidence of progress toward of partnerships. measurable benefits remains elusive. From the The Panel found that the Centers have private sector perspective, the absence of an formed many sound partnerships but that empowered entry point into the CGIAR is a most are one-off and short-term. The recent constraint to interaction. External Program and Management Reviews The objective for the CGIAR System is (EPMRs) of all 15 CGIAR Centers refer con- to act on the basis of comparative advantage sistently to the Centers’ lack of appropriate and to add value to outcomes. The problem tools to engage in and manage partnerships. for the CGIAR is that its comparative advan- The reviews also point frequently to partner- tage has become opaque. At all levels—global, ships that provide limited value to the Centers regional, national, and local—there are many or involve work more appropriately done by alternative sources of supply for the goods and others. The result is a host of ad hoc partner- services that the CGIAR alone once provided. ship arrangements that lack strategic purpose. Recently, there have been a growing number Part of the problem is financial. But another of calls to bring alignment to the interna- at least equal part is the absence of ambitious tional agricultural architecture. This presents strategies with embedded partnerships that an opportunity for the CGIAR to define its promise major development breakthroughs comparative advantage, formulate in time- and that attract financing enthusiasm. bound targets what it could contribute to a The 2008 Independent Review Panel sur- global effort, and indicate the partnership di- vey of informed stakeholders confirms these vision of labor requirements for the produc- conclusions, as does the CGIAR Stakeholder tion, distribution, adaptation, and application Perceptions Survey of 2006. Consultations of international public goods. with representatives of national agricultural At the regional level, the new efforts under research systems (NARS) point to the need way to strengthen regional research and devel- for new approaches that differentiate more opment capacities in agriculture particularly in sharply between advanced and less advanced Africa where these are most urgently required, NARS and that recognize the achievements offer new potential for partnership. They also BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 63 The CGIAR cannot require new strategic understandings on spe- of that system, the CGIAR needs effective link- produce and deliver cialization, subsidiarity, and division of labor. ages to other international science centers and As regional bodies such as the Association for private research laboratories to remain at the alone the international Strengthening Agricultural Research in East leading edge of science and technology. At the public goods that are and Central Africa, the West and Central Af- other end, it needs solid linkages with national the core of its mandate rican Council for Agricultural Research and adaptive and delivery agents, principally NARS Development, and the Forum for Agricultural and nongovernmental organizations. Research in Africa in Africa, and the Asia-Pa- Second, agricultural research has become cific Association of Agricultural Research In- more complex as a result of scientific and tech- stitutes in Asia expand and strengthen, the role nological advances, social and economic devel- of the CGIAR will doubtless need to change. opments, and environmental changes. Tradi- This should be envisaged, planned, and inte- tional disciplinary approaches to agricultural grated into specific partnership agreements research are giving way to multidisciplinary with measurable milestones. Here again, the and transdisciplinary approaches to deal with need is for a strategic framework with partner- this complexity. No single Center possesses the ships as an integral component. expertise and infrastructure to single-handedly At the national level, the neglect of capac- address such change. Centers must collaborate ity and institution building of the past two with each other and with other international decades will need to be reversed if a global ef- entities to establish multidisciplinary teams. fort is to succeed and be sustained. To what Third, considerably higher costs are asso- extent should this be a continuing role for the ciated with new lines of research. The CGIAR CGIAR and to what extent for other regional and its Centers need to forge partnerships in bodies or other international organizations or order to share resources such as laboratory the many strong professional organizations of equipment, information and communication civil society? To reignite the kind of vision for technology infrastructure, administrative the CGIAR-NARS partnership that made and finance capacities, and technical exper- the green revolution of the 1970s possible will tise. Centers can exploit economies of scale require new and determined attention to and if they share resources through structured financing for capacity and institution build- partnerships. In areas such as bioinformatics, ing, especially for Africa. some Centers are unlikely to possess adequate resources to invest in state-of-the art equip- Why invest in partnerships? ment and laboratories. Fourth, the CGIAR needs partnerships The CGIAR invests in both internal and with the private sector and advanced research external consultative group partnerships for institutes in order to access proprietary scien- many reasons. tific information and technologies. First, the CGIAR cannot produce and de- Recent System-level evaluations (the Third liver alone the international public goods that System Review and the World Bank Operation are the core of its mandate. While the Centers Evaluation Department’s meta-evaluation) can provide the core components of interna- and reform efforts (the 2001 Change Design tional public goods delivery systems, they need and Management Team and the 2005 Sub- to collaborate with partners in the private, Saharan Africa Task Force) found weaknesses public, civil society, and international sectors in CGIAR partnerships (such as poorly devel- to provide the complementary components re- oped linkages with nongovernmental organi- quired for development impact (see chapter 3). zations and the private sector, insufficient at- The CGIAR can achieve development impacts tention to capacity-building with NARS, and where they matter—for farmers, families, and weak or absent strategy). The CGIAR’s own societies—only by being part of an interna- 2006 Stakeholder Perceptions Survey reported tional public goods delivery system. At one end serious difficulties in partnerships (box 6.1). 64 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T The cosponsors: opportunities for There are obvious complementarities be- improved alignment and division of tween the FAO as an organization with con- labor among the main multilateral vening power to frame international and agriculture organizations regional issues and create policy and the CGIAR as the most successful international Along with the CGIAR, the main institu- producer of applied agriculture technology in tions that make up the international public history. There are similar complementarities architecture for agricultural development are between the IFAD mandate to support poor the Food and Agriculture Organization of landholders and the UNDP’s coordination the United Nations (FAO), the World Food and policy mandate role. Creating institu- Programme (WFP), the International Fund tional platforms and a legal identity for the for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the CGIAR will require systemwide reform— World Bank, and the regional banks. FAO, reliance on individual institutional reforms IFAD, and the World Bank are cosponsors of now under way at the CGIAR, FAO, IFAD, the CGIAR, along with the United Nations and WFP cannot bridge the gaps. Development Programme (UNDP). Today there are major opportunities for The Global Forum for Agricultural improved alignment and division of labor Research: facilitating CGIAR among the main multilateral organizations engagement with stakeholders with mandates in agriculture and rural devel- opment. The Independent Review Panel survey In October 1996, stakeholders of agricultural of informed stakeholders found that 73 per- research for development, together with a cent of respondents considered these partner- group of donors and four facilitating agencies, ships with cosponsors to be important or very including the CGIAR, established the Global important but that only 28 percent thought Forum for Agricultural Research (GFAR) as that they were “playing their role effectively.” Among respondent groups, however, there are differing assessments of the importance and Box 6.1 Some key findings of the CGIAR’s 2006 Stakeholder Perceptions Survey value of the existing partnerships with the FAO, IFAD, and UNDP as cosponsors. At the Civil society organizations are among the most critical of CGIAR’s stake- same time, all groups agree (79 percent) that holders and had the greatest influence on CGIAR’s overall reputation, in- the CGIAR should make better use of cospon- cluding with CGIAR Members. sors to influence broad international policies Coordination of activities across Centers and the quality of partnerships in agriculture and development. were two perceived weakness of the CGIAR. Other concerns included ex- The CGIAR System has undervalued its cessive bureaucracy, lack of funding, and relevance. role in policy dialogue. The policy-oriented Survey respondents indicated the two areas of the CGIAR most in need of Centers such as CIFOR, Bioversity, and improvement were collaboration with external organizations and research collaboration with partners. IFPRI (and other institutions in their area of Specific to Centers, good partnership ratings ranged from 43.2 percent to expertise) have actively participated in inter- 66.6 percent. national policy arenas. But the 15 Centers do On average across all Centers: not have a single entry point that facilitates Only 51 percent of respondents agreed that Centers share credit for the dialogue or joint action on larger policy is- success of projects with the partners involved. sues to reduce transactions cost for partner Only 42 percent agreed that Centers do not duplicate the efforts of other institutions. The lack of an integrative voice research institutions. was seen in the absence of systemwide prepa- Only 40 percent agreed that Centers fully and meaningfully involve partners in important decisionmaking. rations in advance of the Bali conference on Only 45 percent of respondents agreed that Centers serve local needs well. climate change and the Rome conference on food security. There is no collective policy and Source: GlobeScan 2006a,b. strategy to guide international interactions. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 65 This Panel concurs that a multistakeholder forum to promote part- 5). The main factors for concern in donor fund- the Global Forum for nership, dialogue, and action on agricul- ing for the CGIAR are these: tural research for development. Stakeholders A steady rise in uncoordinated re- Agricultural Research include NARS from industrial and develop- stricted financing linked to short- has a central role to play ing countries, the CGIAR and its Centers, term deliverables. in facilitating CGIAR other international agricultural research cen- Unevenness in how overhead costs are ters, farmer organizations, nongovernmental calculated and provided for, resulting engagement with the organizations, the private sector, and donor in inconsistent and inadequate cost breadth of stakeholders and development agencies.1 recovery and a free-rider problem. in agricultural research for The Third System Review of the CGIAR A rise in the number of small projects in 1998 recognized the potential of GFAR in Center portfolios, which boosts development and that the for enhancing the CGIAR’s work and part- administrative costs and, when not CGIAR should support the nerships.2 Eight years later, a GFAR-initiated linked to higher order objectives, dis- strengthening of GFAR review found that GFAR’s visibility in the tracts from Center priorities. global community remained low3 and that A rise in the number of individual ties between GFAR and the CGIAR had donor evaluations. weakened since the CGIAR’s financial sup- More rapid growth in nonmember port for GFAR ended in 2003.4 than Member financing, reducing the More recently, GFAR has worked to in- collective merits of the partnership. crease its visibility and enhance its attractiveness Neglect of the complementary invest- as a forum for stakeholder consultation. Despite ments required for the CGIAR Cen- GFAR’s weaknesses, it continues to be the ob- ters to function effectively in a high- vious choice for facilitating cooperation in ag- impact international public goods ricultural research for development. Working delivery system. Group 2 of the CGIAR’s Change Management Donors are aware of these negative con- process indicated that it “considers GFAR to be sequences. A background paper for a Mem- the most appropriate institutional mechanism ber Coordination Forum at the 2006 Annual to organize this process” even though GFAR General Meeting focusing on harmonization has not been effective so far and noted that the of financing and evaluation reported on re- active support of the CGIAR and other part- sponses from 17 donors on restrictions in ners is vital for achieving a strong GFAR.5 their financing policies and practices. Twelve This Panel concurs that GFAR has a cen- donors reported that their financing was re- tral role to play in facilitating CGIAR engage- stricted to projects; only two indicated that ment with the breadth of stakeholders in ag- their financing restrictions were linked to ricultural research for development and that CGIAR priorities (figure 6.1). About a quar- the CGIAR should support the strengthen- ter of donors that responded indicated that ing of GFAR. they did not provide Centers with full cost re- covery on their financing.6 The donors: broad agreement on Interviews with some donors indicated what is working and what is not agreement on the need for good donorship principles: financing intentions should be Organisation for Economic Co-operation and stated early and clearly; funding should be Development (OECD) donors provide 75 per- broadly stable and predictable; multiyear fi- cent of CGIAR’s financing. Current trends in nancing is preferable; donors should hold OECD donor financing are toward fragmenta- organizations principally accountable for tion of effort and increasing cost-inefficiencies development impacts; and the Paris Declara- and reduction of impact potential (these fac- tion principles should apply. Several donors tors are examined in detail in the full technical also volunteered that their national political report of the Panel’s evaluation; see also chapter systems impeded them from applying those 66 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Figure 6.1 CGIAR donors self-report of CGIAR lacks a strategy and clear ob- Interviews with some restrictions on financing jective indicators. In interviews some donors indicated donors placed a stronger emphasis on Number of donors agreement on the need for 15 conducting good science and others on demonstrating poverty reduction good donorship principles: benefits. All agreed, however, on the funding should be broadly importance of the link between the 10 two and that their authorizing en- stable; donors should hold vironments require more persuasive organizations accountable demonstration of links to observable for development impacts; 5 development results or—“part of a col- lective effort to secure” such results. and the Paris Declaration Fundamental changes in governance principles should apply are needed. Change attempts have as- 0 sumed that change can be made in- Regional CGIAR Project Program Other priorities crementally and at the margin; the Source: CGIAR (2006e). general view among donors is that these efforts have been mainly un- principles in the CGIAR. Most, but not all, successful and that major structural were critical (some even self-critical) of donors reform is called for. To paraphrase seeking ownership or attribution of project one donor: “This review and change benefits and of using the CGIAR Centers to management process can’t be like past promote national foreign policy objectives. efforts. The CGIAR is at risk now as The Panel discovered substantial agree- never before. Change is needed and it ment in assessments of what is right and what must be deep and serious.” is wrong with the CGIAR and on the need Governance and decisionmaking ca- for change. The main areas of agreement were pacities are the keys. There is agree- as follows: ment among donors interviewed that The CGIAR is punching below its CGIAR governance is weaker than weight. CGIAR System performance that of other multilateral organiza- has been declining in relevance and tions and that, while decisionmaking impact in a field that has become might have improved somewhat with crowded with new actors, from strong the establishment of the Executive NARS and research universities in Council, the CGIAR’s consensus developing countries to multinational model of decisionmaking is not ade- corporations. Yet, the CGIAR has an quate for a network enterprise of this important role as an independent in- importance, scale, and complexity ternational agriculture research sys- tem in tackling global challenges. Inter-Center partnerships: The CGIAR is an organizational important, but lacking paradox. Donors tend to portray the in effectiveness CGIAR as a paradox—an ultramod- ern, 21st century organization estab- More than half of respondents to the lished on the basis of networks and 2008 Independent Review Panel survey of alliances, with a vista from the global informed stakeholders considered Center to to the local, and committed to partner- Center partnerships as “very important” for ships, yet rigid, slow, and indecisive. the delivery of the CGIAR mandate and pro- Strategy and results are unclear. grams, but fewer than a quarter rated them as Most donors voiced concern that the “effective.” EPMRs indicate that relationships BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 67 More than half of between the Centers are generally good and about what should be done to improve part- respondents to the that Directors General viewed the other nerships between Centers and advanced re- Centers positively, although areas of tension search institutes: 75 percent of respondents Independent Review between certain Centers are also reported. indicated that they should be strengthened Panel survey of informed Center to Center partnerships tend to be by funding joint projects and programs.10 stakeholders considered under-resourced, with the exception of the Systemwide and Ecoregional Programs. National agricultural research Center to Center Center to Center relationships are gener- systems: key partnerships partnerships as “very ally organized around projects, most of short but in need of improvement important” for the delivery duration, limiting collaborations to one-off efforts. There are, however, numerous exam- The relationship between the CGIAR and of the CGIAR mandate, ples of Centers trying to work around such NARS has changed considerably over 35 but fewer than a quarter constraints to forge longer, more systematic years. In some regions (for example, Asia) and rated them as “effective” collaboration (World Agroforestry and ILRI some countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (for share information and communication tech- example, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa), nology procurement; CIFOR, IWMI, and the Centers have changed from mentors to WorldFish share some cooperative services; collaborators or partners with NARS. A sig- the Africa Rice Centre and IITA have inte- nificant portion of Centers’ scientific publi- grated many of their administration func- cations are produced in collaboration with tions) and to work out mutually agreeable their developing country partners (45 percent divisions of labor (IITA and CIMMYT col- on average across all Centers, ranging from 29 laborate on maize research; IITA focuses on percent for Africa Rice Centre to 66 percent lowlands and CIMMYT works in mid- to for ICARDA), according to data collected by high altitude).7 the CGIAR’s Performance Measurement Sys- tem (see chapter 3). Where NARS are still rel- Advanced research institutes: atively weak, the CGIAR continues to work need for more joint programs on institutional capacity building, although with severely constrained resources. On the EPMRs suggest wide variability in individual whole, the CGIAR has co-evolved well with Centers’ collaboration and relationships with most NARS around the world. advanced research institutes. The eight reviews The number of developing country Mem- that discuss Center partnerships with advanced bers of the CGIAR increased greatly in the research institutes indicate that collaboration is 1990s, and today, 25 of 64 Members are de- concentrated in such upstream work as molec- veloping countries. Many are represented ular biology, genetic engineering, genomics, in CGIAR governance by their NARS. But and bioinformatics. CIMMYT’s EPMR views participation has been uneven, and the voices partnering with ARIs as providing it with “the of developing country partners in CGIAR ability to participate in cutting edge research in governance have been muted. As Working a wide range of subject areas . . . eliminating or Group 2 of the Change Management process reducing CIMMYT’s need to make the invest- summarized the situation: “Developing coun- ments in expertise or infrastructure required try participation in [annual general meetings] to be competitive.”8 The Africa Rice Centre’s and other governance bodies has been weak, review commended the Center for its long- and their voices are not strongly heard, in part standing relationships with advanced research because they have not been able to follow the institutes, but notes the need for a specific bud- complex decisionmaking processes in the get to enhance such collaborations.9 CGIAR and prepare adequately to participate That finding of the Africa Rice Centre re- and influence the decisions. Those that par- view is echoed in responses to the Independent ticipate tend to represent the larger and more Review Panel survey of informed stakeholders powerful developing countries.”11 68 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Forums for CGIAR engagement with “by nature country-specific with low research Nearly all respondents NARS include regional and subregional or- content. The inputs of Centers into such areas in the Independent ganizations, such as the Asia-Pacific Associa- should be strategic and brief. . . .”15 tion of Agricultural Research Institutions, The relations between Centers and NARS Review Panel’s survey of the Forum for the Americas on Agricultural are not all positive, however. Nearly all re- informed stakeholders Research and Technology Development, the spondents (90 percent) in the Independent consider partnerships Forum on Agricultural Research in Africa, Review Panel survey of informed stakeholders and GFAR. Engagement has been consulta- consider partnerships with NARS as impor- with NARS as important. tive, for the most part. tant or very important. But only 45 percent But only 45 percent NARS remain key partners with the Cen- of respondents believe that such partnerships believe that such ters. IRRI’s 2004 EPMR shows that the Cen- are effective or very effective. Some 32 percent ter had bilateral arrangements with 16 rice- find them neither effective nor ineffective, and partnerships are effective growing countries in Asia. Each country had 23 percent believe that CGIAR and Centers’ a staff member at IRRI as liaison. The review partnerships with NARS are marginally or concluded that this arrangement has been very completely ineffective. successful in providing a single point of scien- In more than one Center, relationships tific contact with IRRI headquarters. NARS, with NARS are tense, at best. EPMRs and particularly in Asia, collaborate with IRRI in Panel interviews with NARS indicate that upstream areas of research such as genom- interactions are too often characterized by ics and bioinformatics.12 WorldFish’s 2007 competition rather than collaboration. More EPMR also found that NARS work with the than one NARS representative complained Center mostly in upstream areas of research of patronizing treatment of the NARS by the and that NARS represent 74 percent of the CGIAR. Competition for funding is an under- Center’s memoranda of understanding and current in tensions between Centers and their letters of agreement.13 More than half of Bio- NARS partners. In the Independent Review versity’s and ICARDA’s partners at the time Panel survey, developing country respondents of their most recent EPMRs (2004 and 2007) articulated a desire for Centers to devolve rel- were NARS. Most Centers report NARS in- evant activities to strong NARS and for NARS volvement in the development of medium- to play a greater role in priority setting. term plans. A Center-commissioned review The Panel believes that the Centers need of Africa Rice Centre partnerships in 2005 to address the tension with the NARS. Two concluded that they were growing in number major funders told the Panel that they had and intensity. In 2006, the Africa Rice Cen- significantly curtailed new funding to the tre was awarded the United Nations South- CGIAR Centers because of this tension. One South Triangular Partnership award, the first said that the tension signals that the CGIAR of such awards in the CGIAR. That same is not the best channel for building sustain- year, however, the CGIAR Stakeholder Per- able capacity in agriculture research in devel- ceptions Survey reported that only 43 percent oping countries. of Africa Rice Centre partners agreed that it performed well on partnerships attributes— Partnerships for capacity the lowest rating of all 15 Centers.14 and institution building: The Association for Strengthening Agri- much more needs to be cultural Research in Eastern and Central Af- done by all participants rica and the West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development as- Preliminary results of a United Nations Edu- sign priority to CGIAR involvement in NARS cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization capacity building in post-conflict states. At global study of scientific and research capaci- least one EPMR, however, has questioned Cen- ties, including in agriculture, depict a severe ters’ involvement in post-conflict situations as and accelerating brain drain from developing BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 69 The Centers’ expenditures to developed countries that is especially pro- The Centers’ expenditures on strengthen- on strengthening NARS nounced in the life sciences, including agricul- ing NARS have not changed appreciably as ture. Sub-Saharan Africa overall (not just in a percentage of total expenditures since the have not changed agriculture) has 83 scientists per 1 million peo- early 1990s (21.7 percent in 1992, 22.9 per- appreciably as a ple. By comparison, Asia has 785 scientists per cent in 2001, and 21.4 percent in 2007), even percentage of total 1 million people and OECD countries have in light of reformulated system priorities and 1,100 per 1 million. Even in relatively strong IFPRI’s absorption of a downsized Interna- expenditures since regions, distribution is highly skewed. Brazil, tional Service for National Agricultural Re- the early 1990s for example, accounts for half the agricultural search. Many recent EPMRs also point to a research expenditure in Latin America. About continuing commitment by Centers to train- half the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa spent ing and capacity building activities, despite less in 2000 on agricultural research and devel- funding limitations. opment than in 1991.16 The interim Science Council commis- These findings are disturbing for the sioned an independent evaluation of train- work and mission of the CGIAR and, more ing in the CGIAR, which was completed in broadly, for Africa, where major productivity 2006. Among its findings and conclusions: gains are urgently needed. The success of the NARS have become more differenti- green revolution in Asia in the 1970s was due ated, with some becoming equal part- to a strong CGIAR and the massive comple- ner to the CGIAR Centers. mentary investments in support of national The CGIAR’s investment in training agriculture research and development institu- and learning continues to be high, tions that could produce agricultural develop- with about a quarter of researchers’ ment strategies; receive, adapt, and apply new time dedicated to training. technologies; and establish effective field de- The panel found “strong and consis- livery systems. tent evidence” of the effectiveness of Some initiatives are under way to address CGIAR investments in training and this problem, but they seem worryingly mod- learning.17 est given the magnitude of the challenge. With the rising predominance of The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and project funding, Centers are decen- the Rockefeller Foundation are supporting a tralizing training to researchers and partnership of 12 African universities to offer reducing the role of centralized train- joint doctorates in agricultural subjects. They ing units, to the detriment of institu- have also worked with IFPRI to establish a tional strengthening of NARS and program of educational support for female the Centers’ abilities to fully exploit agricultural scientists in Africa. Within the past investments. CGIAR, there have been discussions on pro- The CGIAR needs to collaborate moting a world agricultural university, but with institutions with development- there is some disagreement about whether this oriented mandates to address broader is an area of comparative advantage. ICRISAT NARS’ capacity needs. Centers and IFPRI, with support from the Gates should not cover resource shortages Foundation, have also developed the Global in NARS out of project funds that Open Food and Agriculture University, now cannot be sustained. called the Agricultural Open Curriculum and Learning Initiative. The Panel did not Partnerships with evaluate to what extent this furnishes a foun- nongovernmental organizations: dation for a cross-CGIAR strategic initiative, mutuality of values a driving force including perhaps a major donor partnership linking in universities in industrial countries, Nongovernmental organizations have become but it deserves serious examination. a vital actor for the delivery of international 70 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T public goods, especially in weak states with engagement with NGOs indicating that part- There have been no poorly developed public institutions. In many nerships can be established only where there is specific evaluations countries, NGOs exert a strong influence in a strong mutuality of values and interests.19 the agriculture sector. A Center collaboration survey by the Sci- of the effectiveness of As developing country governments and ence Council in 2006 found evidence of nu- Center-NGO partnerships official aid agencies moved away from agri- merous active partnerships between Centers culture and rural development in the 1980s, and NGOs. In total, the Centers reported international NGOs assumed an increasingly 3,395 partnerships, although this number may prominent position. Relief-oriented NGOs count the same organization more than once as such as Oxfam, CARE International, Catho- Centers often collaborate with the same orga- lic Relief Services, and World Vision extended nizations multiple times. The largest number of their activities beyond relief operations to ad- reported partnerships was with NARS (30 per- dress agricultural productivity and food secu- cent), followed by developing country NGOs rity. As the global environmental movement of (12 percent). Only 4 percent of reported part- the 1980s and 1990s took root, environmen- nerships were with developed country NGOs. tal NGOs shifted from pure conservation to Almost no multiple partnerships were re- sustainable agriculture and “sustainable rural ported; 87 percent were partnerships between livelihoods.” In the last two decades, several one Center and one organization. of these NGOs have created a worldwide net- In the Independent Review Panel survey work of country offices and field operations. of informed stakeholders, 58.7 percent of They also demonstrate an increasing capacity respondents said that CGIAR and Centers’ to attract the highest levels of professional and partnerships with NGOs were important or technical expertise. very important, although only 20 percent Formal engagement between the CGIAR considered them effective. System and NGOs dates from the Lucerne There have been no specific evaluations Ministerial Meeting of 1995, when the CGIAR of the effectiveness of Center-NGO partner- decided to establish an NGO Committee to ships, however, and EPMRs generally give serve as a mechanism for interactions between them cursory treatment. An exception was the CGIAR and NGOs and as a springboard the 2007 EPMR of WorldFish, which exam- to new partnerships. The NGO Committee ined the performance and value of the Center’s adopted as its main objectives strengthening a partnerships with NGOs. It found that NGOs people-centered approach to sustainable agri- and NARS constitute the largest partnership culture research and development and contrib- categories of WorldFish and that more than uting to the mutual understanding between 60 percent of its partners in Asia are NGOs. the NGOs, the CGIAR, and farmer, fisheries, It added specifically that most of WorldFish’s and forestry organizations.18 work in transforming outputs to outcomes Almost from the outset, the relationship and impacts has been achieved with NGOs. ran into difficulties. The NGO Committee felt that its recommendations and contribu- Partnerships with the private tions were not being treated seriously, while sector: multiple obstacles others viewed its positions on matters such as biotechnology and CGIAR collaboration The 1995 Special Ministerial Meeting in with the private sector as extreme and unwel- Lucerne, Switzerland, launched a formal sys- come. Matters came to a head in 2002 when temwide partnership arrangement with the pri- the NGO Committee suspended its member- vate sector. The Private Sector Committee was ship in the CGIAR. Over the past four years, established and accorded membership on the steps have been taken to recast a systemwide CGIAR’s Executive Council.20 There has been CGIAR-NGO relationship. The 2006 Annual little progress at the System level in establishing General Meeting approved a policy paper on partnerships through the Lucerne mechanism. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 71 At the Center level, The chair of the Private Sector Committee the private sector can be discouraged by the partnerships with the reports continuing frustration and concern slow pace of decisionmaking and action in the that the CGIAR System still lacks clarity on public sector. private sector constitute what it wants from the private sector. A princi- Intellectual property rights, however, seem a small share of CGIAR pal barrier continues to be the absence of a Sys- to pose the greatest obstacle. Not enough collaborations or tem entry point: the private sector claims that progress has been made in the decade since it cannot form scientific research and develop- the Third System Review recommended high- structured relationships ment partnerships with 15 Centers. est priority attention to a clear policy on intel- At the Center level, partnerships with lectual property and investment in systemwide the private sector constitute a small share of capacity to manage all aspects of intellectual CGIAR collaborations or structured rela- property rights pertaining to agriculture. tionships. The main ones are concentrated in Some interviewees, including serving Direc- four of the larger or older commodity centers: tors General, pointed to the complexity and CIAT, CIMMYT, ICRISAT, and IRRI. Ac- divisiveness of intellectual property rights as cording a survey of CGIAR collaborations a reason for the continuing lag in partnering published by the Science Council in March with the private sector. Yet many organizations 2006, only these four Centers considered the whose mandates are poverty reduction and the private sector a highly relevant collaborator. production and delivery of international pub- Center directors and senior management lic goods have resolved these issues, including suggest that the main reasons for limited part- the World Health Organization, the Global nerships with the private sector include: Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, and Difficulty securing funding for part- the African Agricultural Technology Founda- nerships with the private sector, with tion. The CGIAR can do the same. donors hesitant to fund Center link- ages with private companies. Intellectual property management Concern in some quarters (including is essential for partnerships Center board members) that partner- ships with the private sector could di- There are more than a dozen international vert the CGIAR from its core business treaties and protocols that govern the protec- of producing global public goods. tion of intellectual property in such forms as Fear that NGO opposition could pro- inventions, knowledge, and genetic material. duce bad publicity in the international Of these regimes, the Convention on Biologi- press, resulting in loss of reputation. cal Diversity (CBD), Trade-Related Aspects (Some NGOs are convinced that large of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), private sector corporations are inter- and the International Treaty on Plant ested in public-private partnerships Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture in developing countries merely as a (ITPGRFA) are the most recent and compre- means to opening regulatory doors to hensive. Along with the International Con- their transgenic products.) vention for the Protection of New Varieties Weak CGIAR and Center capacities of Plants (UPOV), they directly impinge on to manage the intellectual property public agricultural research and the produc- rights of private companies and related tion of international public goods in general. technology licensing agreements. Political correctness fears, driven by a International agreements on lack of resolve. intellectual property have created A recent IFPRI study suggests that yet an- new rules that the Centers have other obstacle is the absence of examples of to consider in their operations successful public-private partnerships in agri- How they affect the work of CGIAR Centers cultural research.21 The study also notes that depends largely on national interpretation 72 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T of provisions of the regimes and on how the partnerships with civil society and The CGIAR cannot agreements are implemented through domes- community-based organizations. ignore or casually handle tic legislation. On the whole, agreements gov- The germplasm collections held by ern the production, use, and control of intel- the Centers are now regulated by the issues of intellectual lectual property and genetic resources. They ITPGRFA and the CBD. Centers property protection have created new rules that the Centers have cannot privatize them or make them to consider in their operations. Centers’ host freely available to private sector or countries have also laid out national legisla- other institutions that will privatize tion and regulations for intellectual prop- them. This consideration will influ- erty protection, access to genetic resources, ence how Centers and the CGIAR respect for and protection of traditional and interact with the private sector. Cen- indigenous knowledge, and a wide range of ters’ partnerships with the private sec- other aspects of the governance of research tor will need to be managed so that and technological innovation. Centers have a provisions of the treaties are not ig- legal obligation to follow national procedures, nored or violated. regulations, and laws. The three treaties or regimes are com- The CGIAR and its Centers’ capacity plex and under continuous negotia- to handle issues of intellectual property and tions, giving rise to uncertainty in governance of genetic resources affects the sta- implementation and enforcement at tus of collections in genebanks, exchange of national and institutional levels. germplasm, and the ability of the Centers to The CGIAR and the Centers’ work collaborate with NARS and farmers. And it also relates to other forms of intel- influences the kinds of partnerships they can lectual property rights such as copy- establish with the private sector and advanced right, trademarks, and trade secrets. research institutes. The CGIAR cannot ig- The Centers’ work depends on access nore or casually handle issues of intellectual to and use of software and publica- property protection. They need informed tions, and the Centers also generate strategies to adhere to the CBD, TRIPS, IT- intellectual property that needs to PGRFA, and related national laws. Some of be appropriately protected. For ex- the key issues that the CGIAR and Centers ample, ILRI has a patent filed in the need to consider are: United States on an animal vaccine Transaction costs of accessing genetic against theileria infection. CIAT material from farmers and communi- has plant variety protection certifi- ties are likely to rise as developing cates filed in its name by Papalotla countries enact legislation and regula- in Australia, Nicaragua, South Af- tions to implement Articles 8j and 15 rica, and the United States. All of of the CBD. Centers will require legal the countries in which the Centers expertise and guidelines to negotiate publish are members of the Berne with communities and farmers for ac- Convention, so copyright is an im- cess to locally improved or enhanced portant part of the Centers’ intellec- germplasm. Some Centers work with tual property. communities and appropriate and use The CGIAR and Centers address issues local people’s knowledge and informa- of intellectual property protection and gov- tion. They are required now to abide ernance of genetic resources at both the Sys- by Article 8j of the CBD. The extent tem and the Center levels. At the System level, to which the CGIAR and Centers the Genetic Resources Policy Committee in particular follow and implement (GRPC) and the Central Advisory Service for provisions of the CBD will deter- Intellectual Property (CAS-IP) are the main mine whether and how they forge institutional arrangements for addressing BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 73 There is a general view intellectual property and genetic resources intellectual property issues. There is a general among most interviewees policy and legal issues. view among most interviewees that Centers The main role of the GRPC, established in need to do more to effectively deal with issues that Centers need to do 1994, is to advise the CGIAR on policy and of intellectual property protection at the more to effectively deal legal issues pertaining to genetic resources. Center level. The majority of the Centers do with issues of intellectual It is expected to assist the CGIAR Chair in not have in-house staff responsible for intel- providing overall policy guidance and leader- lectual property issues and tend to deal with property protection at the ship on how the CGIAR handles issues of ge- intellectual property issues on an ad hoc basis, Center level. The majority netic resources. A 2002 external review of the often reacting to crisis. A study conducted by of the Centers do not have GPRC concluded that it had fulfilled its man- CAS-IP in June 2004 concluded that intellec- date in “a very satisfactory manner” and that tual property management practice is uneven in-house staff responsible “there is need to retain such an independent among Centers. “A few Centers have been for intellectual property mechanism within the CGIAR.” Most Cen- able to establish stable [intellectual property] issues and tend to deal ters view the GRPC as an authoritative source Management Units; a few more are in the pro- of policy documents on genetic resources is- cess of establishing units, while many Centers with intellectual property sues. It is credited with enhancing the Cen- do their [intellectual property] management issues on an ad hoc basis ters’ awareness of policy issues. GRPC was in an ad hoc manner backed by [intellectual instrumental in guiding the CGIAR’s par- property] committees that meet once a year ticipation in the negotiation of the ITPGFA. or less.”22 According to one interviewee, “if such a com- Center scientists are gaining an under- mittee had not been established in the 1990s, standing of why intellectual property man- the CGIAR would now be in disorder insofar agement is crucial to their operations. Few, as handling of complex legal and policy issues however, understand international and na- on genetic material.” tional laws on intellectual property. A 2006 The CAS-IP, established in 1999, focuses Science Council report noted that: “Much largely on supporting the CGIAR to effec- effort has been made by the System-wide Ge- tively manage intellectual property protec- netic Resources Program (SGRP), CAS-IP tion. It provides Centers with advice on such and others to make sure that Center staff have issues as material transfer agreements, stew- a high level of understanding regarding the ardship of intellectual property and technol- ITPGRFA. . . . So, while it is not surprising ogy transfer, and proprietary technologies. that Center staff feel that their level of aware- ness of TRIPs or IP/IPR-related law is low, it Centers need to do more to is frustrating that the CBD and the Interna- effectively deal with intellectual tional Treaty are not well-known. In addition, property protection when this lack of awareness of these treaties The Centers are experimenting with a wide is coupled with the fact that much of the 3rd range of institutional arrangements and pro- party materials that the Centers use is infor- cedures to handle issues of intellectual prop- mation and knowledge associated with ge- erty protection and genetic resources policy. netic resources or the use of genetic resources, All Centers have Intellectual Property Policy we can see that more effort needs to be put Statements. Six Centers have established in- into increasing awareness and understanding house units or offices on intellectual property of these international agreements.”23 management (Bioversity, CIAT, CIMMYT, Most of the Centers do not have annual ICRISAT, ILRI, and IRRI). All Centers budgets dedicated to intellectual property have focal points and intellectual property management, though some have units and committees. However, Centers have different committees. According the Science Coun- capacities. Some Centers are more advanced, cil study, intellectual property “focal points with relatively developed regimes, high lev- have had to use funding from other projects’ els of awareness, and staff dealing with to support attendance at intellectual property 74 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T strategy meetings. 24 Most of the Centers more in Conference of Parties to the Most of the Centers do spend only $10,000–$15,000 a year, most of CBD, particularly in the ongoing ne- not have annual budgets it on the work of CAS-IP. gotiations to develop guidelines on access to genetic resources and shar- dedicated to intellectual Emerging issues ing of benefits from the use of these property management, The CGIAR is working to improve its man- resources. though some have units agement of intellectual property protection The CGIAR and Centers, though and related issues of genetic resources, but it having no status in the World Trade and committees is insufficient. Centers and the CGIAR Sys- Organization, should establish a tem are becoming more aware of the impor- mechanism for monitoring develop- tance of intellectual property management, ments in the organization, particu- and CAS-IP is supporting the Centers in larly future negotiations on Article their efforts. The GRPC has been instrumen- 27 of TRIPS. CGIAR needs capacity tal in helping the Centers and the CGIAR to procure or generate evidence-based to better understand genetic resources policy options on how best to address issues and legal issues. It played a major role in guid- emerging with the implementation of ing the CGIAR to participate in the forma- the TRIPS. tion of the ITPGRFA and some of the CBD Center scientists, leaders, and man- negotiations. agers must increase their awareness The GRPC and the CAS-IP and the of the obligations raised by the re- Centers will need to do more to comply with gimes, through workshops and guid- provisions of the treaties. Some actions to be ance from GRPC and CAS-IP. Cen- considered: ter leadership should be aware of the The CGIAR needs to commission or obligations and ensure that Centers undertake a comprehensive study of are responsive and not reactionary transaction costs arising from the ob- to developments in intellectual prop- ligations created by the three regimes erty protection pertaining to genetic (Article 27 of TRIPS and Articles 8j resources and agricultural research. and 15 of the CBD). The CGIAR and Centers need to re- Some general lessons on view and learn more about national global public partnerships laws and regulations to implement the treaties and agreements. They On global public partnerships, the most need to monitor national processes extensive study to date has been the World for access to genetic resources, shar- Bank’s independent evaluation of its global ing of benefits arising from access and partnerships.25 It involved close examination use of the resources, creation of spe- of 26 global partnership programs, including cialized systems, and other develop- its partnership with the CGIAR. While the ments in national intellectual prop- recommendations are directed to the World erty management. Centers need to Bank, the broader lessons and their implica- build capacity to manage third-party tions apply as well to the CGIAR: intellectual property and should have A global strategy is an essential precon- a better understanding of liabili- dition to partnerships. This must begin ties associated with infringement or with an understanding of alternative noncompliance. sources of supply and a clear deter- The CGIAR and the Centers, through mination of comparative advantage. CAS-IP and the GPRC, and through It would need to take full account of participation of individual Centers’ changes in the international architec- representatives should participate ture for the production and delivery BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 75 Partnerships work well of public goods and the comparative which the CGIAR may address deficiencies when they are purposive advantage of different institutions. in its current partnership arrangements. The Financing requirements for partner- starting point is the formulation of a strate- and situated within explicit ships need to be tightly linked to pro- gic framework, with partnership as one of results-based frameworks grams and program priorities, and its key components. Partnership strategies the means-end requirements must be do not function well on their own because clearly presented. This requires identi- they establish partnerships as ends in them- fying underfunded long-term global selves. Partnerships work well when they public goods programs that benefit are purposive and situated within explicit the poor and indicating the financ- results-based frameworks. Thus, partnership ing required for their production, strategies need to be carefully constructed delivery, adaptation, and effective as a means to ends that are worked out col- use. There is little point in proposing lectively and that establish a “coincidence of programs to bring about a production objectives.” revolution in drought-resistant grains or in the sustainable management of a Notes natural resource, for example, unless realistic financial means are linked to 1. IFPRI Forum, June 2005, p. 9 those ends. 2. CGIAR (1998). Effective management is imperative. 3. Gonsalves and Hounkonou (2006), p. 4. 4. Gonsalves and Hounkonou (2006), p. 4. This depends on attention to the 5. CGIAR (2008b), pp. 34–35. details of approval, oversight, evalu- 6. http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/agm06/agm06_mcf_member_ ation, exit/reauthorization criteria, funding.pdf, page 2. the subsidiarity principle, separation 7. Compiled through Panel review of the 15 most recent of oversight from implementation EPMRs. management, and clarity of roles, re- 8. Science Council Secretariat (2006a), p. 96. sponsibilities, and accountabilities. 9. Science Council Secretariat (2008b). The application of universally accepted 10. The questionnaire provided three options, of which respondents could choose more than one. standards of good governance. These 11. CGIAR (2008b), p. 34. standards should accord priority to 12. Science Council Secretariat (2005). transparency, results-based manage- 13. Science Council Secretariat (2007b). ment, independent evaluation, writ- 14. GlobeScan (2006a,b). ten agreements and conflict of interest 15. Science Council Secretariat (2007a), p. 93. guidelines, assignment of evaluation 16. FAO (2007). and auditing functions to governing 17. Science Council Secretariat (2006b), pp. 1–3. bodies, and the inclusion of clients in 18. NGO Committee of the CGIAR (1995). shaping and deciding strategies and 19. CGIAR (2006c). programs. 20. http://www.cgiar.org/who/structure/committees/ Measurement and evaluation need to partnership/ps-tor.html. be explicitly negotiated and stipulated 21. Spielman, Hartwich, and von Grebmer (2007); see also in advance, as a foundation for part- http://www.hlspinstitute.org/aideffectiveness/global. nerships and to establish a schedule of 22. CGIAR (2004b). 23. Science Council (2006c), p 19. independent evaluations. 24. Science Council (2006c), p 22. These five broad lessons are echoed in 25. World Bank (2004a). other studies on partnership. 26 They fur- 26. See, for example, Wilson and Charlton (1997). nish a best practices framework against 76 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 7 CHAPTER Governance: the imperative for structural reform Governance reform When the CGIAR was founded in 1971 it forces that do not allow for decisive decision- for the CGIAR is not was small and structurally simple, with only making, strategy formulation, or presentation four Centers and a few donors (figure 7.1). of a corporate identity. The whole is less than optional. Without The CGIAR’s informal decisionmaking gov- its parts. In the Centers and among CGIAR governance reform, it will ernance arrangements met its needs. members there is widespread disquiet about be impossible to restore Since then, however, the CGIAR’s mem- the future. bership and operations have become so di- Governance reform for the CGIAR is confidence in the system verse and complex that they are difficult to not optional. Without governance reform, understand—let alone explain (figure 7.2). it will be impossible to restore confidence in The CGIAR System today presents the system. Without governance reform, the deep paradoxes. Its funding has stagnated CGIAR’s comparative advantage will con- even as total official development assistance tinue to be eroded—and the CGIAR will funds have doubled since 2002. Much of the become increasingly marginal to the interna- CGIAR’s financing also continues to become tional response to new global challenges. less and less stable and predictable, while other For illustrative purposes, five distinct development entities (such as the African De- stages in the evolution of the nature, context velopment Fund and International Develop- and challenges of CGIAR governance may be ment Association) get multiyear funding described (box 7.1). increases of up to 50 percent. In the face of climate change, new agricultural technolo- Previous reform efforts: gies have never been more needed, but there is findings and lessons little assurance that the CGIAR System will play a major role in meeting the challenge. The main preoccupation of the CGIAR Sys- The CGIAR System has been largely ab- tem since the mid-1990s has been to bring sent from recent debates and forums to de- about successful reforms, with the twin aims fine international agendas on climate change of ensuring strategic relevance and securing and food security. Many donors and mem- adequate, stable, and predictable financing. bers openly express a loss of confidence in the There have been many initiatives, including CGIAR System. Trust is fragile between the a crisis summit (Lucerne, 1995), the Third Centers and CGIAR donors and Members. System Review (1998), the Sub-Saharan And the Centers are having more and more Africa Task Forces (2003–05), the Techni- difficulty attracting and retaining top scien- cal Advisory Committee Visioning Exercise tists. Attempts at reform have stalled or fallen (2000), the Synthesis Group attempt (2000), far short of their objectives. the Change Design and Management Team It has long been clear that the CGIAR’s (2000–01), an attempted merger of two Cen- current governance structures are ill suited ters (2004), the transformation of the Tech- to solving such problems. Successive reviews nical Advisory Committee into the Science over the past 15 years have concluded that sys- Council (2003–04), the establishment of the temwide governance arrangements are cum- Executive Council (2001), and the launching bersome, ineffective, and driven by inertial of the Alliance of Centers (2006). BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 77 78 Figure 7.1 The CGIAR System in 1971 Observers CGIAR Members Developed Developed International countries (7) Foundations (4) countries (9) organizations (2) International organizations (3) Cosponsors United Nations Food and World Bank Development Agriculture Programme Organization BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Technical Advisory Consultative group Committee CGIAR Chairman Chairman Centers CGIAR Secretariat CIAT CIMMYT IRRI IITA TAC Secretariat Figure 7.2 The CGIAR System in 2008 CGIAR Members Countries: Developing (25) Cosponsors Consultative Group and Developed (22) International Fund for World Agricultural Bank Devleopment International Annual General Meetings organizations (13) United Nations Food and Advisory Committee Development Agriculture Programme Organization Foundations (5) Executive Council (ExCo) Science Council Standing panels Global Forum on SPIA: Impact Agricultural Research Assessment CGIAR Secretariat Regional federations SPPS: Priorities Governance and Chief Information Investor Relations and fora and Strategies Partnership Office ICT–KM and Finance (APAARI, AARINENA, Latin America and Caribbean Forum Gender and Central Advisory Service System Strategic Advisory Service SPME: Monitoring on AR) Diversity Program for Intellectual Property on Human Resources and Evaluation Office Other non-CGIAR Media Internal Information and SPMS: Mobilizing institutions Unit Audit Corporate Communications SC Secretariat Science Alliance Board Alliance Office GRPC: Generic Resources Policy Committee Alliance Executive Alliance of future Harvest Centers of the CGIAR Alliance Challenge Programs Subcommittee and Centers AE Task Forces CIAT CIMMYT IITA ICRISAT IFPRI Partnership committee Communities of practices Africa Rice IRRI CIFOR ILRI Bioversity Int. PSC: CSOs: Marketing Group Private Civil Society Executive Sector Organizations CIP World Agroforestry IWMI ICFRAF WorldFish Committee Committee BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 79 All of these efforts and reviews have shared as [global-public-good-producing] research, three perspectives: and inter-Center disputes on mandates.” The That the CGIAR is a unique, valu- Report concluded that “the problem faced is able partnership of donors and doers, less programmatic; the core of the problem is with social capital accumulated over structural. Even if one looks at programmatic decades. alignment, the key concern is how to achieve That the CGIAR, as a system, is not alignment within the CGIAR itself.”1 working as it should. The Independent Review Panel has come That the CGIAR’s root problems are to three similar conclusions: structural. The 37-year partnership between agri- For example, the Report of the Sub-Saha- cultural scientists and CGIAR mem- ran Africa Task Force found “no System vision bers still has a unique comparative ad- for CGIAR in [Sub-Saharan Africa], a large vantage for producing and delivering portfolio of un-coordinated CGIAR efforts, international public goods. over-burdening of NARS, overlap of some The CGIAR System is cumbersome Center activities, lack of integration mecha- and underperforming. It is in a very nisms for Centers, a large number of proj- crowded field with many new actors, ects that would have difficulty in qualifying including strong research universities Box 7.1 Five stages of CGIAR governance The governance of the CGIAR has evolved in five stages, from decline. By 1997 donors were increasingly pressing for cen- the period before its foundation in 1971 to the present day. tralized governance and controls—yet again, in 1998, the Before 1971. Before the CGIAR there were four Centers Centers rejected the Third System Review’s proposal for (CIAT, CIMMYT, IITA, and IRRI), financed by the Ford and governance by an Executive Board of donors. Rockefeller Foundations and with boards appointed by the 1998–2007. The CGIAR slid from crisis to crisis, as a grave foundations. The boards were small, each with 9–12 mem- decline in the quantity and quality of funding left several bers—mainly leading international scientists, and all serv- Centers near insolvency. Studies and reform efforts prolif- ing in personal capacities. Their sole governance task was erated—in 2000, the Visioning Exercise and the Synthesis to support scientists to do good science. The foundations Group; in 2000–01, the Change Design and Management directly handled finances and fiduciary matters. Team; in 2003–05, the Sub-Saharan Africa Task Force; and, 1971–90. In the CGIAR’s golden age, its financial resources in 2004, a proposed merger of two Centers—but few results grew rapidly—mainly as unrestricted core funds. Board were seen. Reform efforts, including pressure from donors membership was decided by CGIAR nomination, board for mergers and a single governance structure (especially self-renewal, or both. The average number of board mem- over 2004–07), aroused opposition and generated distrust bers grew to 16. Those members were still mainly scien- between the Centers and the Secretariat. The Centers tists, and ensuring freedom in scientific research contin- formed an Alliance as a defense mechanism. CGIAR donors ued to be the main focus of board governance. There was sent contradictory messages—on the one hand pushing for little direct accountability to donors, with no systematic integrated strategies and collective accountability, but on results measurement or reporting. The number of Centers the other hand providing effective incentives that encour- increased from 4 to 18. Centers’ boards varied widely in aged fragmentation. The CGIAR approved a written, but their governance. entirely nonbinding charter. 1990–98. A sharp decline in funding led to a financial crisis in 2008. An uncertain future presented major threats—but 1994, with some Centers verging on insolvency. As donors with them, new possibilities. A Change Management initia- became more concerned with results accountability, the tive was launched to renew the CGIAR. Agriculture returned share of all funding that was restricted rose to 40 percent. to the center of international political economy, creating a In 1993 an Oversight Committee was established—a signifi- new opportunity. There was widespread agreement on the cant step toward centralized governance. The committee need for fundamental governance reform. Yet opinions on reported “uneven performance” across Centers’ boards. what that reform should look like differed greatly. Yet in 1995 the Lucerne Summit rejected a proposal for uni- fied governance and failed to reverse the CGIAR’s financial Source: Independent Review Panel. 80 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T and NARS, international nongovern- entail. The CDMT’s report had proposed Previous diagnoses of mental organizations (now perform- “transformation with renewal” around five the CGIAR have identified ing many of the tasks that were once main objectives: the exclusive domain of the CGIAR), Establish a CGIAR strategy on a pro- the same problems and national and multinational cor- grammatic basis focused on major and the same barriers porations forging breakthroughs in problems. to moving forward that agricultural science. Individual Cen- Achieve more and better financing. ters have developed research strate- Improve decisionmaking and increase this Review does gies, yet the CGIAR System has no efficiencies across the system. strategic direction and is no longer in Improve partnerships, with empha- a position to exercise the leadership sis on national agricultural research envisaged for it by its original archi- institutes. tects. No integrated strategy exists Strengthen science in the CGIAR, as to guide the CGIAR’s funding and the main foundation of its compara- work toward common objectives. tive advantage. The main problems of the CGIAR are structural. They cannot be resolved Objective 1. Establish CGIAR without major structural changes. strategy on a programmatic basis In other words, previous diagnoses of the focused on major problems CGIAR have identified the same problems The CDMT’s report found that CGIAR activ- and the same barriers to moving forward that ities had become fragmented, with no strategic this Review does. All those previous diag- focus and many small undertakings that did noses shared the broad goals of rejuvenating not add up to the scientific and developmental the partnership; “upping the game” through impacts expected of the CGIAR. To sharpen increasing the CGIAR’s strategic relevance the focus of the CGIAR, and to fix it more to global challenges; achieving adequate, squarely on programmatic approaches and predictable, high-quality funding; building “global problems,” the report proposed a shift confidence and trust throughout the system; to Global Challenge Programs—intended as establishing a shared corporate identity; and the catalyst to move Centers away from myr- making institutional arrangements for ef- iad, small, and underfinanced projects toward fective decisionmaking. Yet they all proved a collective focus on major global challenges. largely unsuccessful—as is apparent in the The Challenge Programs were also intended state of CGIAR finances today, and in the to build new partnerships (especially with need to launch the present effort for compre- NARS), to generate significant new financ- hensive and systemwide reform. ing, and to become about 50 percent of the CGIAR research program by 2006. Time- Assessing recent reform bound, independently governed, high-impact efforts: the Change Design research programs were to give the CGIAR a and Management Team strategic focus. Despite some undoubted gains through The most ambitious and comprehensive pre- the Challenge Programs, the CGIAR’s over- vious reform effort was a package of changes all performance against the CDMT’s objec- launched in 2001, based on the work of the tives has been very disappointing. The Chal- Change Design and Management Team lenge Programs have not attracted worthy (CDMT). 2 The starting point for the project concepts or proposals from external CDMT’s recommendations had been that, organizations. The process has been started, while there was strong consensus on the need stopped, and started again, while more than for a structural realignment of the Centers, 80 submissions have led to only one new pro- there was no consensus on what that should gram since 2003. Six of the seven concepts BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 81 Despite the low success that have reached the full proposal stage to demonstrate “proof of concept,” they can rate in the process for have come from Center-led consortia—and, potentially make outstanding contributions. it might be argued, could have been gener- These existing Challenge Programs demon- developing new Challenge ated through a less complex internal process, strate the clear potential for inter-Center col- Programs, some of the with incentives to involve external organiza- laboration and for strategic partners’ engage- programs now in place tions. Three “lessons learned” reviews have ment in a new, programmatic approach to been carried out, two by the Science Council CGIAR research. are promising and point and one by the Alliance.3 They found that Recent assessments of the Systemwide to a future strategy for the Challenge Programs have created ad- and Ecoregional Programs suggest that many programmatic research ditional research infrastructures with new of them are strongly “downstream,” and are transaction costs. Such processes under- better managed by partner institutions.5 mine the quality of proposals. By compel- But the assessments also suggest that some ling many centers to participate in propos- of these programs have—like the Challenge als, they generate “overcrowded” proposals Programs—a strong complementary poten- that lack focus and that fail to build strong tial to contribute to research and to capacity external partnerships. building. The Systemwide and Ecoregional Although the Challenge Programs have Programs deserve further development. brought in some new funding, much of that The Panel concludes that despite the low funding has not been incremental. Indeed, the success rate in the process for developing new World Bank has diverted funding that would Challenge Programs, some of the programs otherwise have been mainly unrestricted now in place are promising and point to a fu- funding to Centers—eroding the Centers’ ture strategy for programmatic research. Such confidence in the Challenge Programs. And a strategy would involve Center-led research the Challenge Programs have been slow to consortia that are directed at key research develop. The complex, multistage procedures challenges, committed to innovative external for awarding new programs have created only partnerships, and aligned with overall system limited incentives for new partnerships and strategy. have inhibited responses. Far from becoming 50 percent of the CGIAR’s research program Objective 2. Achieve more by 2006, the Challenge Programs were only and better financing about 9 percent of that year’s program, with The CDMT underscored a principle that only about half going to Centers. is apparent in the history of development: The Panel is concerned that the develop- new money, and more money, flows to excit- ment of new Challenge Programs has not ing concepts targeted at current and relevant been well integrated with internal CGIAR challenges. Arguing that the CGIAR would strategic research planning (planning that is need to make this happen, the CDMT also now associated with System Priorities). The indicated that the potential for significant Panel is also concerned about the consistency increases in funding from the CGIAR’s tra- of financial arrangements, management, and ditional donors was limited—and that this associated risks. The Panel recommends an would challenge the CGIAR leadership to independent financial audit of the Challenge bring in new sources of financing, includ- Programs. ing donations in kind. Finally, the CDMT On the positive side, several pilots “fast urged more attention to expanding multi- tracked” through the Challenge Programs are year financing. The CDMT proposed the excellent examples of innovative, high-impact Challenge Programs as the main vehicle to research (see appendix 1 for a description of bring about these changes and to bring more, ongoing programs). These programs have higher-quality financing to the CGIAR. added value to CGIAR research through ex- The CDMT’s report was also clear that the ternal partnerships.4 Although they have yet Challenge Programs should be financed from 82 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T “incremental resources” and should not divert delivery support services provided by The Independent Review funds from existing activities. the System Office, the Centers would Panel survey of informed Against all these goals, results have been become more efficient. disappointing. The Bill & Melinda Gates The Executive Council was established stakeholders and interview Foundation has provided some new financ- in 2001. It received no decisionmaking au- results indicate that the ing, yet most Challenge Program financing thority, but only a mandate strictly limited Executive Council is does not involve newly added funds. Nor has to “co-ordinating, monitoring, overseeing, the quality of financing increased. If any- and recommending.” Since then the council widely considered a “lost thing, it has decreased, with a steady trend has evolved somewhat. For example, the 2007 opportunity” because toward year-by-year unpredictability, short- Annual General Meeting gave it decision- it has not assumed term restricted finances, and numerous small making authority on matters related to Ex- projects. Finally, the goal of more diverse fi- ternal Program and Management Reviews. enough qualities of a nancing has not been met. However, the Independent Review Panel sur- decisionmaking body vey of informed stakeholders and interview Objective 3. Improve results indicate that the Executive Council decisionmaking and increase is widely considered a “lost opportunity” be- efficiencies across the system cause it has not assumed enough qualities of The CDMT recommended establishing two a decisionmaking body. Less than 1 percent new CGIAR bodies, to improve decision- of respondents to the survey called the coun- making and to make the system more cil “very effective”; over 70 percent assigned it efficient. ratings ranging from “not clearly effective” to To improve decisionmaking, the “completely ineffective.” Meeting records con- CDMT proposed creating the Ex- firm that the Executive Council has focused ecutive Council, a body delegated to on processes, taking almost no decisions. True perform functions and carry out ac- to its original framework, it has mainly ad- tions following from Annual Gen- vised and promoted continuity between An- eral Meetings. Comprising mainly nual General Meetings. Issues or proposals to shareholders, the council would also delegate decisionmaking authorities to the include the cosponsors and two ex of- council have not been a regular part of An- ficio representatives of the Centers. nual General Meeting agendas. To make the system more efficient, The System Office was created in 2001. the CDMT proposed integrating the Ten units, until then operating separately, existing CGIAR Secretariat and sev- were brought under its umbrella (table 7.1). eral isolated support functions into a The units vary considerably in size and single new entity, the System Office. character—from the CGIAR Secretariat, It would make overall services more with its $4.15 million budget, to small units efficient, reduce costly and conflict- with few staff and budgets under $300,000. creating duplication, promote align- The objectives of streamlining and re- ment across the System, assign clear moving “nondecisionmaking committees” roles and responsibilities, remove through the System Office seem to have been “nondecisionmaking committees,” nullified by the CGIAR Charter approved in and consolidate support for the entire 2004. According to the charter, the System CGIAR System. The System Office Office “is a virtual office and is not a physical would also provide a single, integrated consolidation,” while “each unit will continue communications function “to drive a to be accountable in a fiduciary and perfor- new System communication vision mance sense to its own governing authority” and strategy in cooperation with the and also “in a broad sense to the [Executive Centers’ public awareness units.”6 Council] (with) accountability being coor- Through common management and dinated through the CGIAR Director.” 7 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 83 Table 7.1 CGIAR System Office structure (through the end of 2007) System Office unit Established Intended purpose CGIAR Secretariat 1975 The hub of the CGIAR System. It is intended to have a significant integration and facilitation role—ensuring that collective action by many independent, but interdependent components is directed to the CGIAR mission. The secretariat implements communication with the CGIAR System and with its partners. Science Council Secretariat 1975 Intended to provide technical and administrative (formerly the Technical support by preparing strategic studies and Advisory Committee) documents, preparing external reviews, organizing Science Council meetings, backstopping the activities of four Science Council panels, and implementing Science Council decisions. Alliance Office 2006 Established by Center Board Chairs and Center Directors General; conceived as an integral part of the CGIAR System Office. Intended to provide high-level strategic and operational support to CGIAR Centers, to ensure the alignment of the Centers’ work with the wider CGIAR activities and objectives, and to inform the collective work of the System Office with the Centers’ views and expertise. Gender and Diversity 1999 Intended to provide and facilitate expert advice and enhance the exchange of knowledge and experiences. Internal Audit 2000 Intended to provide a cost-effective internal audit service to improve operations and strengthen internal controls in participating Centers. Central Advisory Service for 2002 Intended to provide and facilitate expert advice and intellectual intellectual Property (CAS-IP) property management and technology transfer. Chief Information Officer 2002 Intended to help plan and coordinate information technology and information and knowledge management within the CGIAR System. SAS-Human Resources 2003 Intended to help participating Centers define needs, develop and implement sound people policies through strategic approaches, and monitor the impact and success of human resources policy and practice. Media Unit 2006 Intended to develop and implement a media strategy that secures positive coverage, in mainstream print and broadcast media outlets, of joint Center research achievements and of the impacts of collective work. Association of International Agricultural Withdrawn Research Centers (AIARC) Future Harvest Withdrawn In 2007, the System Office Steering Com- structures and committees. Within the Cen- mittee determined that the Science Council ters, the Panel found a high level of frustration Secretariat should be removed from the Sys- with the System Office over what the Centers tem Office, to assure the independence of the view as unnecessary demands for information secretariat’s science advisory role, and that the and unrealistic time deadlines. Representative remaining units should be amalgamated into views of the System Office from the Centers five (the Alliance Office, the CGIAR Secre- include that the office is “distant and aloof,” tariat, the Internal Audit Unit, the Intellec- that it is “concerned more with making work tual Property Advisory Unit, and the Infor- for us than with helping us to work,” and that mation Office). The System Office Steering it is “supply-side” (“they don’t take time to un- Committee also determined that the Alliance derstand what we really need”). Office and all other units except the CGIAR These negative assessments are highly cor- Secretariat should have a program advisory related with failures of trust. All reports show committee. that confidence between Centers and the Sys- These measures in the Charter and by tem Office has declined in recent years. How- the System Office Steering Committee sug- ever, there is encouraging evidence that trust gest a tendency toward creating complicated 84 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T has begun to improve over the past year or Objective 5. Strengthen science in Through its Standing so. the CGIAR as the main foundation Panel on Impact of its comparative advantage Assessment the Science Objective 4. Improve partnerships, Concerned that CGIAR’s comparative with emphasis on national advantage in strong science was weakening, Council has undertaken agricultural research institutes the CDMT recommended transforming the work of high value on The CDMT reported that the CGIAR would Technical Advisory Committee into a Sci- need to develop very different partnership ence Council. This council was established in retrospective, systemwide arrangements—especially with the NARS, 2004 with the objectives of: assessments of CGIAR where the new arrangements were needed to Enhancing and promoting the qual- research, along with reflect the institutes’ increased capacities. The ity, relevance, and impact of science in new partnerships were to place greater emphasis the CGIAR. more focused research on full partnerships in research, and on networks Advising the CGIAR on strategic sci- on project assessment of partnerships as opposed to brick-and-mortar entific issues important to its goals. institutions (given advances in information and Mobilizing and harnessing the best communications technology). international science to address goals The Panel found many effective partner- of the international agricultural re- ships at individual Centers. But it also found search community. that most such partnerships are almost com- The Science Council pursued these objec- pletely ad hoc. And it found that the Centers tives through four specific activities of four lack tools, including financial tools, to en- Standing Panels—on Impact Assessment, on gage in and manage partnerships. Ambitious Monitoring and Evaluation, on Priorities and strategies, with embedded partnerships that Strategies, and on Mobilizing Science. attract financing for promising major devel- Through its Standing Panel on Impact opment breakthroughs, are lacking. Assessment the Science Council has under- The relationship between the CGIAR taken work of high value on retrospective, and the NARS has changed considerably over systemwide assessments of CGIAR research, the past 35 years. On the whole, the CGIAR along with more focused research on project has co-evolved well with most of the NARS assessment. It has sought to help Centers with around the world. However, more than one retrospective assessments and to build an “im- Center has tense relations with the NARS. pact culture” in the system. Much of its work Many interactions are more competitive than has focused on crop genetic improvement collaborative. Several NARS representatives impacts, but efforts are also being made to complained to the Panel that the CGIAR pa- evaluate the impact of research in other areas, tronizes the NARS. including natural resource management and Competition for funding is an undercur- policy-oriented research (which now consti- rent in tensions both among CGIAR Centers tute a substantial proportion of CGIAR re- and between Centers and their NARS part- search spending; see chapter 3). The Science ners. In the Independent Review Panel survey Council is also aware of a growing need to of informed stakeholders, developing country expand beyond retrospective performance respondents expressed a desire for Centers to evaluations to prospective evaluations of po- devolve relevant activities to strong NARS tential performance as a basis for strategic pri- and for the NARS to play a greater role in ority setting. Some Centers (such as IFPRI, priority setting. Two key donors noted that with its Harvest Choice project) are making the tensions between the NARS and the Cen- important advances in this area. The Science ters have made it difficult for them to increase Council should play a major role in supporting funding to the Centers, given that their man- prospective evaluations across the system. dates assign priority to country-level capacity Through its Standing Panel on Monitor- building, ing and Evaluation the Science Council has BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 85 managed an impressive volume of Center completing and starting to put in place the evaluation and assessment on behalf of the System Priorities—a process that the Sci- CGIAR System—including, since its incep- ence Council inherited at its establishment tion, the External Program and Management in 2004. The Science Council has also pro- Reviews of 13 Centers (bringing this pro- gressed with several studies in areas of stra- cess back on track) and external reviews of tegic significance to the CGIAR System, in- four new Challenge Programs. In addition, it cluding biosafety and ethics. This effort has has put in place a plan to simplify and stan- been valuable. It calls for more investment, dardize monitoring and evaluation, making and for close integration with Centers in de- performance measurement more and more sign and execution to ensure that its outputs integrated, common, and consistent across are relevant and used. Centers.8 Such streamlining was intended to The most challenging task for the Science reduce the burden of assessment on Centers. Council was that of its Standing Panel on Yet other changes, such as the CGIAR Secre- Mobilizing Science. A new undertaking for tariat’s introduction of the Performance Mea- the System, this Standing Panel required the surement System, have contributed to a view Science Council to make a System-level con- in many Centers that the burden of reporting tribution that would add significant value to has, if anything, grown—with little evidence the existing work of Centers in engaging part- of associated benefits, such as increased fund- ners from their research areas and regions. Ef- ing or fewer independent donor evaluations of forts included developing a database of Cen- Centers (box 7.2). ter research partners, publishing a book in The Science Council’s Standing Panel international agricultural research,9 and con- on Priorities and Strategies has focused on tributing to World Development Report 2008 Box 7.2 The Science Council—perceptions of its importance and effectiveness The Panel surveys and consultations—with other recent stud- ies—suggest how donors and Centers view the Science Coun- Survey respondents who rate the Science cil. All view the council and its roles as important to the CGIAR Council “important” and “effective” System. The Executive Council and CGIAR members value the Science Council Executive Council and members Science Council’s reporting on evaluations of Centers and re- Board Chairs, Directors General, and Deputy Directors General search initiatives as a major contribution to the business of the Percent of respondents in three CGIAR stakeholder groups Executive Council. 100 Nevertheless, more than 80 percent of Center Board Chairs, Directors General, and Deputy Directors General believe that the Science Council has not been effective (see figure). The main reasons given are that the Science Council: 75 Focuses too much on its evaluation role, overburdening Centers with reporting requirements without obvious ben- efits to the Centers. 50 Does not do enough to help the Centers to explore future opportunities and challenges and to mobilize the interna- tional scientific community. 25 Does not engage or communicate effectively with the Centers. Imposes too narrow a view of science on the Centers. Other studies also point to these concerns. And several 0 Important Effective donors share them—agreeing, in particular, that the Science Council should help the Centers with its work on strategy and Source: Independent Review Panel survey of informed stakeholders. on mobilizing science. 86 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T on agriculture for development. A plan for a to start with lessons learned from past efforts. Both donors and Centers regular international conference was not fully Five such lessons stand out: must relinquish old, realized, but has recently been revived. Evolutionary approaches to restruc- In the view of CGIAR management, turing have not worked and are un- dysfunctional patterns of donors, and Centers, the Standing Panel on likely to work if attempted again. governance to make the Mobilizing Science has not been very success- This observation is not unique to the CGIAR more relevant and ful. CGIAR, as a collective entity, was absent CGIAR. A main conclusion from from important dialogues on climate change the many restructuring attempts of effective in responding and the food crisis. It is very important for the UN development agencies is that to challenges because CGIAR to develop this area in future. their complicated multilateral gover- the stakes are so high— nance structures are subject to change only through directive, top-down ap- reducing hunger and Lessons learned proaches with specified milestones.11 poverty in the world The CDMT reform effort was the most com- Most CGIAR reform efforts have prehensive and ambitious of recent reform started by reaffirming three founding efforts. But in its diagnostic it was broadly principles of the CGIAR—donor sov- similar to the others. Why have they all come ereignty, Center independence, and to so little? The Sub-Saharan Africa Task consensus decisionmaking—which Force suggested that the principal cause is the have been outdated since the Paris territoriality of the Centers. The Panel agrees Declaration and which are root causes that the suggestion has some validity, but also of dysfunctional CGIAR governance. considers it a vast oversimplification. Donor sovereignty must give way to CGIAR reform efforts have disappointed, more harmonization and coordina- not because of any one factor, but because of tion. Center independence must give a collective failure. The Panel agrees with the way to more network collaboration. Advisory Group to the World Bank 2003 Both donors and Centers must re- meta-evaluation of the CGIAR, which con- linquish old, dysfunctional patterns cluded that the cause of failure in efforts to of governance to make the CGIAR reform the CGIAR has been a tragedy of the more relevant and effective in re- commons. Each donor furthers its aims by sponding to challenges because the providing funds restricted to those aims. Each stakes are so high—reducing hunger Center goes its own way, partly to get such and poverty in the world. Decision- funds, partly because doing so frees it from making must be founded on clear au- pressures to work with the System as a whole. thority, with binding decisions. The results are lack of systemwide strategy, Sound governance requires clearly as- little sense of overall ownership, and loss of signed responsibilities, accountabilities, System efficiency.10 and effective authority. Past reform ef- All the main parties to the CGIAR part- forts have explicitly recognized these nership are equally responsible for the failure factors, but have failed to resolve them. of efforts to achieve effective governance. The In the words of the CDMT: “At pres- parties participate in good faith and genuinely ent, most decisions default to mecha- want to strengthen the CGIAR. Yet deep iner- nisms (committees, TAC [Technical tias at the Centers have combined with a frac- Advisory Committee], and Secre- tured system of donor goals and incentives to tariat) which either lack authority or create a continuing impasse. The parties de- comparative expertise. Multiple com- fault to their own immediate interests, and the mittees examine the same issues. De- result is indeed a tragedy of the commons. cisions are not strongly binding on Any renewed attempts to reform the gov- either shareholders or the Centers . . . ernance of the CGIAR System would do well there is no mechanism for following BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 87 The Centers were up decisions . . . and hence no clear denied. Although management the- encouraged to believe accountability for success or failure.”12 ory generally affirms that form should Past efforts have tended mainly to es- flow from function, it also shows that that their resources would tablish an ever-increasing array of to decide about function, form must increase if they supported structures, based on ad hoc relation- be in place. For the CGIAR, function the Challenge Programs, ships that have further blurred lines will need to be preceded by form. of responsibility and accountability. but the added resources The incentives for change need to The World Bank’s role in failed to materialize be aligned with strategic objectives. CGIAR governance Clearly established and adequate in- The World Bank has helped drive the develop- centives have not been provided to ment of the CGIAR from its inception. The support efforts to bring about signifi- Bank is a linchpin of the CGIAR’s finances, cant structural and governance re- operations and governance. It houses the forms, including consolidations and CGIAR Secretariat, provides it with a Chair mergers of individual Centers. The and Director, and gives it major financial sup- Centers were encouraged to believe port. The Bank now pays all the costs of the that their resources would increase CGIAR Secretariat, $4.2 million in 2007. if they joined in and supported the The Panel has estimated the total costs of the Challenge Programs, but the added CGIAR System Office (including the costs of resources failed to materialize. There the Annual General Meeting and the costs is no incentive for Centers to partici- borne by the Food and Agriculture Organiza- pate in Challenge Programs when tion for the Science Council) at about $14 mil- they suffer loss of unrestricted funds lion in 2006, of which the Bank paid about as a result. Centers view some possible $10.2 million, or 73 percent. That does not changes as fraught with risk—to rep- meet the Bank’s own guidelines for its Devel- utations, to brand recognition, and to opment Grant Facility, which state that the jobs. Moreover, as the Sub-Saharan Bank should not fund more than 50 percent Africa Task Force correctly observed, of the costs of an in-Bank secretariat “to avoid several donors have directed incen- a program’s over-reliance on the Bank.”13 tives toward individual projects, many The multiple roles of the Bank in the of them short term and modest in CGIAR have strengthened the CGIAR Sys- their ambitions. Such incentives per- tem, but have also created problems and dis- versely reinforce the CGIAR’s basic tortions. According to the Independent Eval- problems: a lack of strategic focus and uation Group of the World Bank (then the a lack of system coherence. Operations Evaluation Department), writing Since the core problem of CGIAR in 2003, the multiplicity of roles the Bank has governance is structural (as the Sub- assumed has led to: Saharan Africa Task Force rightly Excessive Bank involvement in the concluded), solving the problem will day-to-day management of the Sys- require changes to the CGIAR’s gov- tem and dependence of the System ernance structure. Past reform efforts on the Bank. have presumed that the CGIAR’s Little use by the CGIAR of the Bank’s form—its structure—will follow its country assistance capability and only function. In the CGIAR’s case, how- minor intellectual engagement be- ever, structures for decisionmaking tween programs of the World Bank are not in place. Without such struc- Agriculture and Rural Development tures the decisions needed on strat- Department and the Centers. egy, strategic objectives, aligned allo- A disproportionate share/burden of cations, and a results framework are CGIAR management responsibility 88 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T allocated to a Bank senior manager essential to the CGIAR’s global role and the The Bank’s convening already burdened by other heavy impact it can have. power has been, and managerial responsibilities. The Panel, however, sees a need to distin- Reporting relationships for both the guish between two views of this relationship. continues to be, essential CGIAR Secretariat and the Bank that [in- On the first view, a World Bank Vice Presi- to the CGIAR’s global role volve] real or potential conflicts of interest. dent chairs a consultative body to mobilize and the impact it can have These features limit the capacity of the Bank resources, to encourage strategic allocation of to provide the objectivity and leadership those resources, and to coordinate agriculture needed. . . .”14 investments to support the best use of agri- Responding to the evaluation, Bank cultural research—a highly appropriate and management agreed on the importance of important role. On the second view, a World separating the Bank’s management and over- Bank Vice President chairs a joint organiza- sight functions and indicated that the Bank’s tion of Centers, taking substantial respon- “Chief Economist would be responsible for sibility for Center operations—a somewhat the oversight function.”15 Bank management inappropriate role, and one without compara- also announced that there would be indepen- tive advantage. Given the limits on how much dent triennial evaluations of the CGIAR, time a World Bank Vice President can spend with Bank Board approval, as a requirement working as the Chair of the CGIAR, chair- for continuing Bank support. This Review— ing a consultative body seems a better fit than five years following the announcement—is chairing a joint organization of Centers. the first such exercise. The Office of the Chief The CGIAR Director, too, is a World Economist had some input into the terms of Bank staff member. That gives the CGIAR reference for this Review. But that office was system still more access to the Bank’s orga- not represented on the ad hoc committee of nizational and convening powers. But it also the CGIAR that drafted those terms, nor on makes it difficult to distinguish where the the advisory and steering committee for the CGIAR Secretariat ends and the Bank be- Panel. It is not clear to the Panel what other gins. The Panel understands, for example, that CGIAR oversight actions the Bank expected the performance appraisal of the CGIAR Di- its Chief Economist to take. rector is a sole prerogative of the Bank. The Panel concludes that although an ini- Respondents to the Independent Review tial step was taken to separate and strengthen Panel survey were polarized on the value of oversight after the Bank’s evaluation of the the CGIAR Director being a World Bank CGIAR, nothing has changed the essential staff member. A majority thought it was im- problem: that the Bank is both a major donor portant, yet a substantial minority dissented. to the CGIAR and its dominant manager. Ambivalence over the position of the CGIAR The weaknesses identified in the evaluation Director arises (like ambivalence over the remain basically unchanged after five years. Chair’s position) partly from a lack of clear The World Bank provides the Chair of responsibilities and authorities. The Panel the CGIAR, and all but the first CGIAR sees a major distinction between the role of Chair have been World Bank Vice Presidents the Director of a consolidated donor fund for responsible for agriculture. Respondents to the CGIAR, and that of the chief administra- the Independent Review Panel survey of in- tor and manager of a collectivity of Centers. formed stakeholders agree that these appoint- The Director of a consolidated donor fund ments have served the CGIAR well. Almost requires deep knowledge of international two-thirds of respondents consider it impor- development, but only modest management tant or very important to the CGIAR that ability (the Secretariat of the Fund would not it have a World Bank Vice President as its need to be large or complex). In contrast, the Chair. The Panel concurs. The Bank’s con- chief administrator and manager of the joint vening power has been, and continues to be, Centers would need to be a credible leader of BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 89 Table 7.2 Panel assessment of the World Bank’s role in the CGIAR Panel Criteria rating Comment Oversight Medium The World Bank stated in 2003, after its Operations Evaluation Department did an independent evaluation of the CGIAR, that the Bank’s “Chief Economist would be responsible for the [CGIAR] oversight function.”a It is not clear to the Panel what the Bank expected its Chief Economist to do in that capacity. (The Office of the Chief Economist had some input into this Review’s terms of reference, but was not represented on the committee drafting the terms or on the Panel’s advisory and steering committee.) The roles in the CGIAR of the Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development Department, and of its Sector Board, have also remained unchanged. The Panel finds that although an effort was made to separate and strengthen oversight after the 2003 evaluation, the Bank remains both a major donor to the CGIAR and its dominant manager. That is a problem. Subsidiarity High The CGIAR and the network of Centers form a highly decentralized partnership. Most operational decisions are decentralized. Subsidiarity is not a significant problem. Comparative advantage Medium The World Bank has relevant strengths, only partly replicated among CGIAR cosponsors. The CGIAR furthers the Bank’s development and resource mobilization objectives in fields basic to the CGIAR’s operations, but does not compete with regular Bank operations. However, some of the support the Bank could give to the CGIAR, and some of the benefits it could draw from its involvement, are not realized. At the country level, the Bank does not seriously engage the Centers for multisectoral views, development analysis, or country-level presence and knowledge. There are very few linkages between Bank country operations and the Centers. The Bank has a global mandate, reach, and convening power—but it has not fully exploited its capabilities to produce a global vision for the CGIAR. Multicountry benefits High The CGIAR and its affiliated Centers produce global public goods and regional public goods (research findings, germplasm conservation) that would be more difficult to produce country by country. Leverage (narrow) High Narrowly defined as the relationship of World Bank funding to total CGIAR funding, the amount of leverage is appropriate. The Bank’s contribution does not exceed the guideline 15 percent of total funding of the CGIAR and Centers. (Indeed, the Bank’s contribution is under 10 percent, and is falling as a share of total CGIAR funding.) Leverage (broad) Medium In the CGIAR’s founding phase the Bank’s contribution was probably an essential lever to other donors. It is probably still important to ensure adequate funding to the Centers—but not as essential as it was, since agriculture and agricultural research have now reestablished their importance during the food price crisis. The Bank has not increased net funding since 2001, but it has worked successfully to limit the effects of Japan’s reduced contributions. It encouraged two more donors and foundations to join the CGIAR. For most of the past two decades, the Bank has taken the lead in making agriculture an international development priority. The Bank could do more to support human resources for development, in the opinion of the Panel, by engaging the 3,200 scientific staff at Centers. Managerial competence Medium The Panel generally finds the managerial competence of the System Office acceptable compared with the norm for global funds. Structural weaknesses exist, however. Unclear responsibilities and inadequate authorities make management difficult. For example, the System Office may monitor the financial situation of Centers, but has no authority to intervene—only to advise. Arm’s length relationship Low The management of the CGIAR is not independent of the Bank Group. Over a long period the requirement for an arm’s length relationship has been waived. Risks and risk Low Several risk areas are not adequately controlled—and probably cannot be within the present governance structure of the management CGIAR and the Centers. Financial risk exposure tends to persist for a long time. When a crisis occurs, the Bank tends to be the funder of last resort. There is also some risk to the Bank’s reputation. The Centers’ compliance with Bank safeguard policies is not actively monitored, and ethical reviewing of research projects varies by Center. Disengagement strategy Low The Bank has not yet faced the need to disengage from managing network aspects of the Centers. The key need is to disengage from operational involvement with the System Office, and to reorient the Bank’s involvement toward resource mobilization, strategic resource allocation, and investment coordination. Promoting partnerships Medium The CGIAR’s main initiative for partnerships in the past five years has been the Challenge Programs. They have had mixed success. The CGIAR’s relationships with nongovernmental organizations are poor. Relationships with the private sector are minimal and are slighted. Institutional capacity High The World Bank did much to establish and maintain the CGIAR as a major research and conservation institution with a focus on development. The Bank’s continued involvement in funding CGIAR Centers is very important. Also very important is the Bank’s leadership in promoting CGIAR governance reform. Overall appropriateness High, The Panel thinks the World Bank’s involvement in the CGIAR is strong in some areas, relatively weak in others. The Panel rated of Bank involvement but more the Bank in the CGIAR as high in four areas, medium in four, and low in four. Overall, the practical benefits of continuing a long selectivity tradition of Bank involvement are high. The Panel therefore thinks that the Bank should continue to play a leading role in the needed. financial and funding side of the CGIAR, but that the Bank should disengage from a direct management role. a. World Bank (2003), p. 177. 90 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T such Centers (with scientific credentials), a and the Executive Council takes on respon- thoughtful and persuasive strategist, and an sibilities for “doing things right” rather than effective manager of fairly large joint opera- focusing on whether the System was “doing tions. The Panel concludes that the two roles the right things.” Governance responsibilities should be separated. ensure that structures, functions, processes, The World Bank Independent Evalua- and culture are aligned with the system’s stra- tion Group has formulated 12 criteria against tegic objectives and ensure that objectives are which the Bank’s participation and perfor- achieved effectively and transparently. mance in global funds can be judged. The In- In the next and final chapter, the Panel dependent Review Panel has rated the Bank’s lays out a model for a balanced partnership be- involvement in the CGIAR against those and tween the CGIAR and the affiliated Centers. similar criteria (table 7.2). The Bank’s involve- The Panel recommends a new compact based ment in the CGIAR is assessed as strong in on the separation of governance and manage- some areas, but relatively weak in others. The ment. It aims to assist the CGIAR System to practical overall benefits of continuing a long capture the implications of the Panel’s diag- tradition of involvement are high. The Panel noses by addressing the structural impedi- concludes that the Bank should continue to ments to bringing together the best of science play a leading role on the financial and fund- and the best of agricultural development in a ing side of the CGIAR, but should disengage common cause. from a direct management role. In summary, previous reform attempts Notes have not been successful in addressing the dysfunction that is recognized by most share- 1. CGIAR Secretariat (2005b), p. 10. holders, stakeholders, and the Centers alike. 2. CGIAR (2001c). Taken together, the lessons of the CDMT 3. Science Council and CGIAR Secretariat (2004, 2007). 4. Uauy, Palenberg, and Zakri (2008); Biswas, Palenberg, reform and the Panel’s analysis suggest that and Bennet (2008); Science Council (2008b). there is confusion between the roles of gov- 5. Bevege, Egger, and Debela (2006); Science Council ernance and the roles of management. The (2008f). primary purpose of creating System-level 6. CGIAR (2001c), p. 8. governing bodies such as the Science Coun- 7. CGIAR (2003b), p. 18. cil, Consultative Group Secretariat, Execu- 8. Science Council (2005a, 2006e). tive Council, and various System Office units 9. Science Council (2005b). was (or should have been) to provide strate- 10. World Bank (2003), p. 4. gic direction for the CGIAR and the affili- 11. See, for example, Schlesinger (1997) and Nordic UN Project (2000a,b). ated Centers. The individual Centers could 12. CGIAR (2001c), p. 21. not accomplish this individually without an 13. World Bank (2000), p. 5. The guidelines continue, “After overarching structure. no more than three years, a decision should be made The System-level governing units, how- either to move the secretariat out of the Bank, or to keep ever, have not provided strategic direction it in the Bank with strong donor support, or to discontinue the effort due to lack of donor interest or other reasons. but, have focused instead on matters typically In exceptional cases, where there is strong donor interest handled at the operational and management in maintaining an in-Bank secretariat after three years, level of organizations. For example, the Sci- then this secretariat should be financed 100 percent by partners.” ence Council takes responsibility for perfor- 14. World Bank (2003), p. 27. mance monitoring, the CGIAR Secretariat 15. World Bank (2003), p. 177. takes on financial reporting and budgeting, BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 91 CHAPTER 8 Doers and donors— a rebalanced partnership The partnership between A central finding of this review is that the unrestricted funding to Centers and CGIAR Members and 37-year partnership between CGIAR Mem- for restricted funding to programs, bers and donors and CGIAR Centers is a and as a foundation for fundraising. donors has become strong comparative advantage of the CGIAR. Money should be allocated from the frayed. The CGIAR No other international arrangement comes CGIAR Fund to Centers and to pro- System needs to find its even close to bringing together development grams according to rules and partly agencies and agricultural science in a common according to performance. In decid- strategic direction. Its main cause. ing how much grant funding to chan- funders have been losing However, the partnership has become nel through the pooled CGIAR Fund, confidence. Without a new frayed. The CGIAR System needs to find its donors should keep in mind their Paris strategic direction. Its main funders have been Declaration commitment to provide compact to rebalance the losing confidence. Without a new compact to two-thirds of their development aid partnership, the CGIAR’s rebalance the partnership, the CGIAR’s de- on a program basis by 2010. decline will continue cline will continue. The Centers should strengthen their CGIAR Members and donors must strike institutions for common action by a new balance among providing unrestricted consolidating common services, resources to the Centers, achieving greater common policy and strategy, and programmatic coherence in funding, and stra- program administration in a joint tegically targeting grants. And resource allo- Consortium. cation must be more heavily influenced by the Both donors and Centers should es- Centers’ performance. In return, the Centers tablish decisionmaking with clear must take collective responsibility for their authorities. Nonbinding decision- well-being, collaborate to make the network making no longer works for a col- more coherent, act programmatically, make lective enterprise that expends half firm strategic and organizational decisions, a billion public dollars annually—an and be cost-efficient. amount that should be expected to The Panel has identified four actions that increase substantially if the above ac- are most likely to equip the CGIAR to be a tions are taken. major institutional force in meeting the new The Panel considers that, in addition to agricultural challenges of the 21st century: making the CGIAR generally more effective, The CGIAR’s governance and man- the recommended governance approach will agement functions should be sepa- economize. The true costs of governance will rated to avoid conflicts of interest and drop when the dysfunctions of the present confusion over mandates and author- system are remedied. ities. Management responsibility for operations should be separated from The proposed structure oversight. of the partnership The donors should set up a new CGIAR Fund for Agricultural Research—as The Panel envisages a continuing close partner- a new channel for predictable, ship between CGIAR Members and donors 92 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T and CGIAR Centers, with a dual structure community and with research on poverty re- The CGIAR Fund’s key that clarifies responsibilities and authorities. duction, and to allocate money to programs responsibilities would be to This balanced partnership structure will com- or Centers according to agreed criteria and prise the CGIAR Fund, a Consortium, and rules. It would work to ensure follow-through lead funding negotiations, other bridging institutions (figure 8.1). on financial pledges, to receive and hold funds to maintain strong links provided to it, and to make funds available with the development The CGIAR Fund to the Consortium of Centers. In making funds available, it would apply the conditions community and with A new instrument, the CGIAR Fund, will and schedules agreed in multiyear financing research on poverty enable CGIAR donors to raise new funds— discussions, including agreeing to mutual reduction, and to allocate preferably through multiyear replenishment, expectations with the Consortium on per- but allowing some donors to be accommo- formance- and results-based reporting, mile- money to programs or dated with a yearly appropriation supple- stones, and benchmarks. It would decide on Centers according to mented by indicative figures for future years. the evaluation work program proposed by an agreed criteria and rules The Fund would allocate the money strategi- independent evaluation unit. It would likely cally through a performance-based resource need to meet quarterly, with additional fre- allocation system, somewhat similar to those quent meetings, as required, for multiyear fi- of the World Bank’s International Develop- nancing discussions. ment Association or the Global Fund to Fight The Panel thinks that consensus decision- AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. These making is not appropriate to a body as large practices enable agencies to allocate funds and complex as the CGIAR Fund. The Coun- strategically, while leaving their specific uses cil of the CGIAR Fund must have proper au- unrestricted. Performance-based allocations thorities and clear, formal decisionmaking would be made according to explicit criteria practices. It would look to the best practices and with explicit weights. of similar funds that provide concessionary financing for poverty reduction. The CGIAR Fund must There are various options for secretar- break new ground iat support of the CGIAR Fund. The cur- The Fund would be governed by a Council rent CGIAR Director, and the parts of the and would have a Chair, Director, and Secre- CGIAR Secretariat and System that are not tariat. The inaugural convention would draft logically part of the operational management the Council’s constitution. of the Consortium of Centers, would con- The CGIAR Fund’s decisionmaking tinue in support of the CGIAR Fund. The body—a new Council of the CGIAR Fund— Secretariat would need new staff, especially would be principally a shareholder governing for managing financial consultations, strate- body made up of contributing members, in- gic planning, and performance management. cluding foundations. The details of member- The Secretariat would also need strong capa- ship would need to be worked out during the bilities to review funding proposals for consis- transition period proposed below. One share- tency with approved three-year strategy and holder membership option would be to assign results frameworks and to prepare analytical voting shares on the basis of groupings (con- assessments of program funding proposals for stituencies) to accommodate both larger and review by the Council of the CGIAR Fund. smaller shareholders and other stakeholders. The CGIAR Director and Secretariat The Chair of the CGIAR, traditionally ap- should provide leadership in securing fi- pointed by the World Bank, would serve as nancing (including new sources of funding) the Chair of the Council. to meet the complementary needs of inter- The CGIAR Fund’s key responsibilities national public goods—the complementary would be to lead funding negotiations, to work by national agricultural research systems maintain strong links with the development (NARS), government agencies, associations, BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 93 94 Figure 8.1 Balanced partnership model Triennial General Meeting Consortium of Centers CGIAR Fund for Agricultural Research Chair Chair Board Joint Council Chief strategy and Executive Executive Officer Director results framework Independent evaluation unit BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Common Systemwide services programs Resource allocation Results management (including performance management Science and measurement system) Advisory Board Development strategy Other partners private firms, and farmers needed to deliver and Ecoregional Programs through Acting as a catalyst those goods to the field. Acting as a catalyst Center-led consortia. Providing Con- to finance and to to finance and to institutional and capacity sortium-level financial management strengthening for strong and effective part- for Challenge Programs would also institutional and capacity nerships among the CGIAR, NARS, and ad- address the Panel’s concerns about fi- strengthening for strong vanced research institutes, the CGIAR can nancial oversight and accountability and effective partnerships again achieve the synergies that enabled the in those programs. green revolution of the 1970s. The CGIAR Fund would also among the CGIAR, give performance-based, unrestricted NARS, and advanced New ways of allocating funds grants to Centers. Over time, such research institutes, Donors would keep appropriate control of grants could become the main flow of funds and of their strategic allocation through unrestricted funds to the Centers; un- the CGIAR can again a performance-based allocation system, using like today’s grants, they would be allo- achieve the synergies best practices developed in most major inter- cated according to the CGIAR’s agreed that enabled the green national financial institutions over the past results-based strategic framework, and decade. The Panel envisages four distinct win- would be affected by a Center’s perfor- revolution of the 1970s dows for funds. mance in the preceding period. Window 1—stable, long-term fund- Window 3—grants from bilateral and ing to guarantee the permanent pro- multilateral donors directly to Centers, vision of certain very high-priority in- now subject to greater transparency ternational public goods. For example, and policy guidance by the joint Con- window 1 funding would ensure full sortium. A long-established practice financing of the Global Crop Diver- would thus, in part, continue. Full sity Trust through an endowment. project-by-project cost recovery would This would support the genebanks as be mandatory for all Centers wish- a permanent service to humanity (a ing to remain members of the Con- role assigned to the CGIAR and its sortium, and would be monitored by Centers in the International Treaty the Consortium. Centers would also on Plant Genetic Resources for Food agree to costing rules for services to and Agriculture).1 third parties as a condition of Con- Window 2—multiyear, program-based, sortium membership. pooled funding to programs and Cen- Window 4—contributions from non- ters, administered by the Consortium to CGIAR members. Accepting such con- encourage partnerships (as in the Global tributions would be subject to the same Challenge Programs). Grants from the rules set by the Consortium for accept- CGIAR Fund to programs would be ing grants from CGIAR members. aligned with the CGIAR strategic The foundation of this proposal with its objectives and would meet program- four windows rests on the requirement that management and fiduciary require- the Centers produce a collective strategy ments. Funding partnerships would and results framework with inputs from the be integral to program approval. Pro- Fund, the Science Advisory Body, and global grams not aligned with the CGIAR’s partners. The strategy must addresses global strategic objectives would not attract challenges; situate and clearly establish the funding from the Resource Alloca- CGIAR comparative advantage; stipulate per- tion Committee. Window 2 fund- formance and measurement criteria standards ing would give continuing support to and milestones, including those of cost-effec- successful programmatic initiatives tiveness; address means-ends linkages; and associated with existing and future demonstrate the fiduciary and due diligence Challenge Programs and Systemwide requirements for accountability. It would set BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 95 The Consortium would out Member and donor commitments to fund firms, and farmers that put the results of Cen- enable the Centers to the Consortium and to provide compemen- ters’ work in practice, and that have an impact tary programs in the field and on people’s lives. manage their common Assuming that the CGIAR Fund would interests more coherently be receiving financial resources each year that The Consortium and strategically and donors had committed in the previous replen- ishment-type negotiations, the Fund would The Centers would have a new, legally incor- provide an instrument need to match its cash flows to its grant com- porated instrument, the Consortium. Cen- for common services, mitments. It might do that by making unre- ters have expertise in different areas and program coordination stricted grants to Centers on a rolling three- would continue to speak individually to year basis, one year firm and two indicative. those areas. But the Consortium would allow and administration, and The grant amounts would depend on the size them to project a single voice in international results-based management of replenishments. policy forums, on broad agricultural research The aim should be to secure approximately and development issues, and on global chal- 66 percent of CGIAR financing on a program lenges. Centers would support the Consor- basis to the second window. This would be tium and pay for common services with fees consistent with the Paris Declaration donor and levies. objective of assigning that percentage of total The Consortium would enable the Cen- financing on a program basis (in other words, ters to manage their common interests more not as project assistance) by 2010.2 As donor coherently and strategically. It would provide practice is to report all contributions to multi- an instrument for common services, program lateral organizations as program financing, a coordination and administration, and results- 66 percent target for the CGIAR would be based management. It would be governed by consistent with current practice. Programs a board and would have a Chair and a Chief would be defined by the Fund every three Executive Officer. It would eventually acquire years during replenishment-type consulta- enough staff for the Consortium to take over tions. The common “strategy and results common management functions from the framework,” developed jointly with the Con- System Office. sortium of Centers, would provide the con- The Consortium’s board would be elected text for program development. by its owners in normal fashion. The Con- All strategic programs should have a com- sortium’s founding charter would decide mon administrative home in the Consortium questions of equal ownership or ownership of Centers in order to simplify and improve shares in proportion to the size of Centers. their financial management. A good approach The Consortium’s membership could change might be to have a certain percentage of each over time, with Centers joining or departing program grant set aside for administrative, fi- or with other entities becoming members. nancial, and audit support by the Consortium A possible set of Consortium Directors (to be paid directly from the fund to the Con- would include five eminent researchers not sortium at the start of each program). presently attached to a CGIAR Center, five CGIAR donors and partners should take eminent development professionals not pres- into consideration the financial resources re- ently attached to a CGIAR Member, and five quired to ultimately make use of the results of other specialists from different partnership CGIAR Centers’ work, the core component entities (such as the Global Forum on Agricul- of the international public goods delivery sys- tural Research, farmer organizations, nongov- tem. This implies responsibility for ensuring ernmental organizations, or the private sec- that there is financing for the complementary tor). The Chief Executive Officer, supported component of the international public goods by staff, would manage the Consortium. delivery system, which links the Centers with The Panel considers it essential that the the national and local institutions, agencies, Consortium be empowered to act on behalf 96 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T of the Centers under agreed delegations of multiyear financing replenishment- authority incorporated into the Consor- type negotiations. tium’s charter and bylaws. Such delegations An independent evaluation unit, re- would include differentiated requirements, porting to the Council of the CGIAR with different voting majorities, for executive Fund, but working closely with the resolutions and for ordinary resolutions. And Consortium’s board as well. it would clarify what authorities remain with A committee of eminent advisors the individual Center boards. A task force (box 8.1) that might be called the Sci- would produce the legal incorporation docu- ence Council—as now—or, perhaps, ment establishing the framework for the Con- the Science Advisory Board, to em- sortium’s board and the Centers’ boards. phasize its role as advisor to the entire system. (The title might be even more Joint institutions of broad if a decision were made to in- the partnership clude anti-poverty expertise with sci- ence expertise.) The Panel has considered what common A set of occasions for exchanging institutions should be maintained as part of a views, ideas, findings, and informa- strong partnership between the Centers (and tion among the CGIAR Fund, the their joint Consortium) and the proposed Consortium, and other partners and CGIAR Fund. It has concluded that there stakeholders on key issues related to should be at least four: the CGIAR. These occasions would A joint strategy and results frame- include a Triennial General Meet- work (see below), developed for the ing, specialized seminars, and pe- partnership’s inaugural conference, riodic meetings of CGIAR system and revisited thereafter as part of partners. Box 8.1 Science and evaluation in the balanced partnership The joint strategy and results framework for the Consortium and would organize the scientific advice and partnerships needed the CGIAR Fund will require careful monitoring by both parties, for their specific research activities. with regular evaluations focused on the quality and relevance The Science Council now monitors, evaluates, assesses, of scientific outputs and on progress with partners toward de- and gives its advice on strategy and partnerships for the CGIAR sired outcomes and impacts. For the CGIAR Fund, an indepen- System. The Panel believes that both the CGIAR Fund and the dent evaluation unit will monitor and evaluate the Consortium’s Consortium will need such a body (referred to as a Science Ad- practice of the strategy and progress of Fund commitments. visory Board in figure 8.1), and notes that it would be economi- The Consortium will work with Center leadership to develop a cal and efficient for that body to support both the CGIAR Fund performance management and measurement system to guide and the Consortium. Clearly the present Science Council could and monitor its performance against the strategy. become that body. However, the Panel recommends that it do In addition, both the CGIAR Fund and the Consortium will so only if three changes are made: need advice on key strategic issues in international agricultural Separate advisory from monitoring and evaluation roles (as research and on emerging threats and opportunities that the proposed above). The Science Council will focus on strategic CGIAR should address with other international agricultural re- studies, mobilizing science, and impact assessment studies— search partners. Such advice will inform the evolution of the but not on monitoring and assessment for accountability. agreed strategy and the development of programmatic re- Improve the Science Council’s advisory role for strategic search. For example, the Consortium would need advice on studies and mobilizing science, which has been compara- strategic issues (such as biosafety and nanotechnology) and tively neglected. on partnerships with organizations (such as the Food and Ag- Establish a positive working relationship with both the Con- riculture Organization and the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli- sortium and the Fund, based on a shared vision, a commit- mate Change) that are relevant to all Centers. Individual Centers ment to engagement and dialogue, and mutual trust. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 97 CGIAR Members would Inaugural conference and In exchange for these more valuable gains, be working within a a new reform compact members would give up certain powers. They would: governance structure more Stop being the Centers’ quasi- The Panel believes that no aspect of the new in accord with the spirit governance system can be decided with- managers. of the Paris and Monterey out serious discussions between CGIAR Face a stronger, more confident, members and donors and CGIAR-affili- probably more assertive network of Declarations, which ated Centers. Thus, the Panel recommends Centers. encourage harmonization an inaugural conference to agree on a new Lose some sovereignty, as the finan- and encourage Members to reform compact for the rebalanced partner- cial contributions that members had ship and on the requirements for putting it been making directly to Centers focus on strategy, resource into practice. The compact would require would now be partly shared in the allocation, and oversight stipulated changes, both to the Centers’ past pooled CGIAR Fund. Nevertheless, rather than on ownership decisionmaking approaches, and also to the members would still exercise strategic Members’ and donors’ past decisionmaking sovereignty through their agreed re- of projects and operations approaches. source allocation framework. To sum up, the members would be re- The Members’ perspective lieved of management responsibilities and the conflicts of interest that attend them and Agreeing to the proposed rebalanced partner- would instead gain an appropriate instru- ship would bring members five benefits: ment for results-based resource allocation, the The CGIAR Fund would help mem- CGIAR Fund. The pooled fund would enable bers secure the quantum funding ad- members to institute, with the Consortium, a vances for research in agriculture and results-based framework within which to do natural resource management that are due diligence on development value for money demanded by the food price crisis and from the Centers—while Centers could track by the challenges of climate change. progress toward, and lessons learned from, The strategic allocation of pooled joint actions and partnerships for high-level funds would enable a programmatic outcomes. All would be working within a approach to investments in research governance structure more in accord with the on agriculture and natural resource spirit of the Paris and Monterey declarations, management for development. which encourage harmonization and encour- The balanced partnership structure age Members to focus on strategy, resource al- would clarify authorities and increase location, and oversight rather than on owner- accountability. ship of projects and operations. The Centers’ joint Consortium would relieve Members of management re- The Centers’ perspective sponsibilities. Members would thus regain time and energy to focus on Agreeing to the proposed rebalanced partner- joint development strategy, resource ship would bring Centers five benefits: allocation, and oversight—matters The new focus on large regional and that are more important and much global challenges would allow the more appropriate to them than man- Centers to “up their game,” increasing aging Center network operations. their stature and relevance in the eyes The partnership could return to its of the international community. earlier form as a forum to discuss ag- The new CGIAR Fund would give ricultural policy and coordination. Centers access to a major new source The World Bank would cease to have a of unrestricted and restricted funds. real or perceived conflict of interest. One objective would be a substantial 98 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T increase in total funding for the Cen- governance model would bring long-term The results-based strategy ters and Programs within the first re- benefits to all parties. should take into account plenishment period. The balanced partnership would im- an analysis of developing A results orientation for prove the Centers’ comparative stra- managing implementation and countries’ needs, as well tegic advantage, not just by bringing monitoring performance as the advantages of the them substantially increased funds, but also by giving them a single entry Centers, Consortium, To apply the principles of management for point and a single voice in interna- results and international public goods in the and fund over other tional forums. It would “brand” the CGIAR System, the CGIAR Fund and the agriculture research network of Centers and make its pres- Consortium will need to agree on a results- ence more coherent. based strategy—stating a vision, articulating a organizations providing The joint Consortium’s common ser- clear mission statement, and specifying a lim- international public goods vices would increase efficiency, reduc- ited number of strategic goals for the system ing costs for the Centers. over 5–10 years. The results-based strategy The balanced partnership would give should take into account an analysis of devel- Centers a strengthened role in the oping countries’ needs, as well as the advan- joint management of programs. tages of the Centers, Consortium, and fund These benefits of the balanced partner- over other agriculture research organizations ship model for the common good and mission providing international public goods. would come to the Centers only with certain From the new results-based strategy, a new tradeoffs. The Centers would: results framework should articulate and quan- Cede important decisionmaking tify key outcomes for funders, global partners, powers to the joint Consortium. and Centers (at the global, regional, and na- Accept that much of the flow of un- tional levels) to achieve jointly. The key out- restricted and restricted (program- comes would be articulated at a high level of matic) funding would come through aggregation with measurable goals and stated the CGIAR Fund, rather than di- targets. They would inform the new perfor- rectly from individual Members— mance contracts—between the Fund and the and that the Members would allocate Consortium and between the Consortium such funds strategically, partly ac- and the Centers—for managing implementa- cording to Center performance and tion and monitoring performance. program performance. A good results system uses as few indica- Take more responsibility, individu- tors as possible—just enough for managing ally and collectively, for financial risk performance at a given level, to achieve objec- management—if a Center met with tives one level up. A one-entry, multiple-use serious financial difficulties, a bailout information system would support senior- would be less likely. scientist performance management needs Pay significant fees and levies to the and underpin aggregation to high-level results joint Consortium to cover its opera- reports for use by Center management and tions, including joint services to the Board members. A few vital indicators would Centers and program administration. roll up from there, to report performance on The Centers might make up part or progress toward CGIAR strategic objectives most of this money by recovering funds and crosscutting program objectives. that they had been paying directly for Considerable work will be needed to es- System management; still, their costs tablish a systemwide CGIAR strategic frame- might significantly increase. work linked to international public goods Again: by clarifying and rebalancing delivery systems. But that work has good pros- authorities and responsibilities, the new pects for yielding highly significant benefits. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 99 The proposed strategic Performance Measure- crisis demands immediate action. The Panel ment System (figure 8.2) would help donors recommends making funds available to take align their funding and programs toward advantage of existing programming and to shared desired outcomes, and it would help advance program design—to make the most them harmonize their processes. It would sup- of past investments while engaging cutting- port strategic decisions, the replenishment of edge science. the CGIAR Fund, and allocations to specific Should the CGIAR and the Centers programs—supporting the funding of larger choose to move to a partnership structure program “buckets” through performance con- such as that outlined in this Review, the Panel tracts between the Consortium and Centers. recommends an eight-month transition with An integrated system for collecting higher- two six-person task forces. One task force, led level results would build trust through evi- by the World Bank, would propose the details dence, enabling donors to do their own re- of the CGIAR Fund. The other task force, led porting without returning repeatedly to the by a chairperson designated by the Centers, Centers for information. would formulate the details for legal incor- The proposed system would guide the di- poration in a jurisdiction that the task force verse work of various Centers toward com- would select in consultation with the Cen- mon objectives. Having a results information ters. The two task forces would present their system that cuts across Centers does not mean proposals at the inaugural conference for the that the Centers will be doing the same work. launch of the compact. Instead, different Centers—through their The World Bank would be expected to different outputs—will aim at shared strate- take a major leadership role, in and beyond gic objectives: for example, food productivity the transition, by mobilizing support and in- increases, better policies increase poor farm- creased funding for the changed relationships ers to trade internationally, or better evidence and the renewed partnership. Agriculture of health from higher nutrient foods. has returned to the center of international political economy, and a revitalized CGIAR Transition arrangements can play a major part in producing the new technologies that will be essential to food ad- There is now a window of opportunity for equacy and food security in the years ahead. reforming the CGIAR. The world food price But the CGIAR and others must do more Figure 8.2 A strategic Performance Measurement System for the CGIAR Triennial Joint General Meeting Consortium Board and Policymaking Strategic strategic guidance performance partner organization governance information bodies/CGIAR Fund for Agricultural Development Operational information Center boards/management Senior scientists/ Challenge Programs Source: Independent Review Panel. 100 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for than produce needed new technologies. There Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). Intended to ensure the must also be the capacity for adapting and ap- use of plant genetic resources based on the principle of easy access and exchange, the treaty is consigned plying such technologies to local conditions. by international agreement to the Food and Agriculture The international donor community should Organization. The treaty assigns responsibility for reflect on all the factors that were required the world’s most important gene bank collections, around 600,000 samples, to the CGIAR. However, the for the green revolution of the 1970s. Those financing arrangements to safeguard the treaty and factors included strong Centers in a support- its components remain incomplete. The treaty has ive CGIAR. They also included massive, com- mechanism for funding genetic resource collections: the Global Crop Diversity Trust set up jointly by the plementary investments in Asian countries to Food and Agriculture Organization and the CGIAR. To support agricultural development strategies, date the trust has raised funding pledges of more than technology, and delivery systems, includ- $140 million. Of this, more than $100 million is in an endowment, generating an annual income of about ing solid support to the NARS to adapt and $4.5 million. The target for the endowment, however, spread the new technologies. was $260 million, leaving a large gap in the financing Absent a return to that 1970s vision that required to ensure the safeguarding and continuous development of this international public good. The result linked the CGIAR, NARS, and advanced is that implementation of the treaty depends on annual research institutes in a functioning, mutu- donor contributions. This situation is at fundamental ally supportive partnership, a restructured variance with the nature of international public goods. Financing for these international public goods should CGIAR will turn out to be just one more be guaranteed, based on a careful study of recurrent missed opportunity and a source of further cost requirements, and considered independently of arrangements for other international public goods and frustration. It will also be a tragedy for the activities the CGIAR performs. A possible approach to world’s poor and vulnerable, especially in strengthen the Global Crop Diversity Trust and close Africa. the financing gap could be through an annual assessed contribution of all signatory countries to the Treaty. The CGIAR’s Systemwide Genetic Resources Program Notes highlights the genebank’s financing gap in its July 2008 paper “Mapping Our Future: Sustaining CGIAR’s 1. The role of the CGIAR in genebanks is an explicit Genebanks for greater Impact” (SGRP 2008). component of the executive safeguarding of the 2. OECD/DAC (n.d.) Indicators of Progress. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 101 APPENDIX 1 The CGIAR System History Member sovereignty. Center autonomy. The Consultative Group on International Independent scientific advice. Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was created Consensus decisionmaking. in 1971 as an informal association of donors. Informal status (the only legal entities Supporting four international agricultural are the 15 independent Centers). research Centers that the Ford and Rocke- Nonpolitical nature. feller Foundations had established previously, the CGIAR was to serve “both as a mecha- Membership nism for coordinating donor policies and actions and as an informal forum for discus- The CGIAR currently includes 64 Mem- sion.”1 Because the founding donors wanted bers: 25 developing countries, 22 industri- the CGIAR to have an informal character, alized countries, 4 private foundations, and they created it without a charter, rules of 13 regional and international organizations procedure, or bylaws governing membership. (table A1.1). Decisionmaking was to be by consensus. 2 After a significant expansion of Mem- Since the CGIAR’s inception its member- bers in the 1990s, notably from developing ship has grown (from 17 to 64), and there are countries, membership has stabilized in re- now 15 CGIAR-supported Centers (down cent years. Since 2001, there have been only from a high of 18). The research agenda has six new Members (Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, become more complex, and attention to Turkey, the Syngenta Foundation for Sustain- stakeholder input has increased. As a result, able Agriculture, and the Gulf Cooperation the CGIAR System has become more com- Council). Over the years, two Members (Le- plex than it was earlier, with multiple layers of verhulme Foundation and Saudi Arabia) have committees and service units supporting it. officially left the CGIAR. To be a Member, a Member must agree to: Mission Support the mission and objectives of the CGIAR. The current mission of the CGIAR is “to Participate in the deliberations of the achieve sustainable food security and to reduce CGIAR. poverty in developing countries through sci- Serve on its committees. entific research and research-related activities Make a minimum yearly cash contri- in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, bution of $500,000 toward support- policy, and environment.”3 ing CGIAR-approved research pro- Each Center has its own mission state- grams or CGIAR System governance ment that reflects its work. mechanisms. In 2006, 15 Members had the status of Governing Principles “Member-observers” because they had not paid their minimum contributions for the previ- Six governing principles have formed the basis ous two calendar years. In 2007 there were 11 of the CGIAR since its founding: Member-observers.4 Member-observers may BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 103 Table A1.1 CGIAR Members Countries Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, The Philippines, Portugal, Republic of South Africa, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States Foundations Ford Foundation, Kellogg Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture Organizations African Development Bank, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Asian Development Bank, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Gulf Cooperation Council, Inter-American Development Bank, International Development Research Centre, International Fund for Agricultural Development, OPEC Fund for International Development, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Environment Programme, World Bank Source: CGIAR Secretariat. attend the Annual General Meeting and par- independent institutions (Members and Cen- ticipate in face-to-face and virtual discussions, ters) that have agreed to work together around but may not participate in decisionmaking nor a mutually accepted mission. sit on the Executive Council. As a result, in The network refers to itself as the “CGIAR 2006–07, 40 percent of developing country System” (box A1.1). Its chief parts are: Members effectively could not participate in The Consultative Group on Inter- CGIAR governance. To recognize the impor- national Agricultural Research (the tance of the voices of developing countries in Members). CGIAR governance, the CGIAR’s Third Sys- The Science Council, which provides tem Review in 1998 recommended that the independent scientific advice to the CGIAR officially recognize in-kind contri- Consultative Group. butions.5 So far, in-kind contributions are not The 15 independent international counted toward membership contributions. agricultural research centers (the The President of the World Bank nomi- Centers). nates the CGIAR’s Chair. Since 1974, the These independent parts of the system are Chair has been a World Bank Vice President or supported by the Executive Council (ExCo), Senior Vice President in charge of agriculture. various standing committees, and the System Among the CGIAR’s Members, the Food Office (a group of service units). and Agriculture Organization of the United The ExCo of the CGIAR is chiefly a com- Nations (FAO), the International Fund mittee of shareholders (Members), expanded for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the to include stakeholders. Industrial and de- United Nations Development Programme veloping country Members are represented (UNDP), and the World Bank are CGIAR equally. The ExCo also includes a seat for the cosponsors.6 Science Council Chair, an Alliance represen- The CGIAR’s Charter states that tative, the Global Forum on Agricultural Re- cosponsors provide the Chair with continu- search, and one representative each from civil ity, strengthen the international character of society and from the private sector (who serve the CGIAR System, and serve as an informal as full members). policy advisory group to the Chair. Cospon- In 2005, the CGIAR Centers formed an sors also are intended to “assist the CGIAR in Alliance to strengthen and guide their collec- crisis management, should the need arise.” 7 tive work.8 The Board Chairs of all 15 Centers sit on the Alliance Board, and the Centers’ Di- The System rectors General form an Alliance Executive. The CGIAR’s two advisory committees The CGIAR does not exist as a formal are the Science Council and the Genetic Re- organization. It is an informal network of sources Policy Committee. Its two partnership 104 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Box A1.1 Is the CGIAR a “System”? Calling the CGIAR a “System” is somewhat misleading. It assumes that the different entities interact in organized or coherent ways—and that they are organized to heighten interactions, positive feedback, and production. It also implies that there is one identifiable central authority with some semblance of a legal personality. That is not the case with the CGIAR, which has no one cognitive structure or legal personality. Other defining features of systems include shared objectives and concrete performance measures—none of which the CGIAR has. The CGIAR is a group, not a system. Table A1.2 CGIAR System active standing committees, 1997–2007 Committee 1997 2003 2007 CGIAR Executive Executive Council (ExCo) ExCo Finance Committee ExCo Finance Committee Oversight Oversight Committee ExCo Program Committee Technical Advisory Committee Science Council Science Council Advisory Genetic Resources Policy Committee (GRPC) GRPC GRPC NGO Committee (NGOC) NGOC Partnership Private Sector Committee (PSC) PSC PSC Center Directors’ Committee (CDC) CDC Alliance Executive Centers Committee of Board Chairs (CBC) CBC Alliance Board Impact Assessment Evaluation Group (IAEG) Other Public Awareness and Resource PARC Mobilization Committee (PARC) Source: Strong er al. 1998; World Bank 2003; www.cgiar.org. committees have been the Private Sector Com- Evaluation Group (IAEG) is now part of mittee and the NGO Committee (though the the Science Council, as is the Standing Panel latter was dissolved in 2006).9 The Group or on Impact Assessment (SPIA). The Public the ExCo also create ad hoc committees on Awareness and Resource Mobilization Com- particular issues when needed. mittee (PARC) no longer exists. In 1998 the Third System Review called With the elimination of some CGIAR for streamlining the CGIAR’s committee standing committees, important functions of structure. Indeed, there are fewer standing the CGIAR cannot be carried out. Dissolv- committees today than there were in 1997 ing the ExCo Finance and Program Commit- (table A1.2). Since 1998 the only addition to tees left the System without enough financial the standing committee structure has been oversight. That is why, at the 2007 Annual the ExCo.10 There are no longer standing com- General Meeting, the CGIAR decided to mittees on oversight, programs, or finance. A create an ad hoc Finance Committee of the Science Council replaced the Technical Ad- ExCo.11 visory Committee. The NGO Committee, Communications used to be a responsibil- inactive since 2002, was dissolved in 2006. ity of the now defunct PARC. There has been The Alliance Executive replaced the Center a consolidation of communication functions Directors’ Committee (CDC), and the Alli- within the CGIAR Secretariat over the past ance Board replaced the Committee of Board year. Outreach to media has been successful, Chairs (CBC). The Impact Assessment and but more strategic uses of communications BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 105 and social marketing throughout the CGIAR December, and through the ExCo. The ExCo System are possible. meets semi-annually and—when decision- Following recommendations from the making authority has been delegated to 2001 Change Design and Management pro- the ExCo on specific matters—acts for the cess, the CGIAR established the CGIAR CGIAR between meetings on matters del- System Office in that year. The virtual office egated to it. includes nine units: Decisions taken at the Annual General The CGIAR Secretariat (hosted by Meeting and at ExCo meetings are nonbind- the World Bank). ing. According to the Charter, “[d]ecisions The Science Council Secretariat reached by the CGIAR have the force of (hosted by the FAO). commitment to the mission and objectives of The Alliance Office (currently hosted the Group, though the CGIAR has no legal by the IFAD). status. The Group’s decisions do not preempt The Central Advisory Service on Intel- policymaking on the same issue by sovereign lectual Property (hosted by Bioversity). governments or other institutions whose rep- The Chief Information Office/ resentatives form the CGIAR.”12 Information and Communication Technology–Knowledge Manage- Overall CGIAR funding ment (hosted by Bioversity). The Gender and Diversity (hosted by In 2007, the overall research agenda of the the World Agroforestry Centre). CGIAR (Centers and Challenge Programs) The Strategic Advisory Service for received $495 million in funding. Other sources Human Resources (no host Center of revenue, such as interest, produced an addi- identified at the time of this writing; tional $25 million, for a total of $520 million previously hosted by WorldFish). (figure A1.1). Of the $495 million in contribu- The Internal Audit (hosted by tions, CGIAR Members contributed $437 mil- IRRI). lion (88.4 percent). Nonmembers contributed The Media Unit (hosted by ILRI). the remaining $57 million (11.6 percent). Some of these units predate 2001. To en- While overall funding has continued to hance the efficiency, responsiveness, and over- increase nominally over the years, the buying all performance of each unit, the CGIAR’s power of Centers has remained fairly flat when System Office brought them together. adjustments are made for inflation. Mean- At its 2007 Annual General Meeting, the while the research agenda has expanded—for CGIAR decided on the following changes to example, to Challenge Programs. Thus, the the System Office: Centers (and their partners) are being asked Transform the Gender and Diversity to do more with less. Program into a systemwide program. The quality and quantity of funds are Transfer the Human Resource unit’s in question. The share of all funding that is function to the CGIAR Secretariat. project-based (restricted) has risen in recent Remove the Science Council Secre- years. In 2007, 36 percent of total funds were tariat from the System Office. considered unrestricted and the remaining Transfer the Media Unit into the 64 percent were restricted. That is almost an Communications Team (CGIAR exact inversion of the situation in 1995, when Secretariat). 63 percent of funds were unrestricted and 37 percent were restricted. Conducting business The European Community, the United States, the World Bank, and the United King- The CGIAR conducts its business at an dom were the four largest contributors to the Annual General Meeting, usually in early CGIAR in 2007, with Canada a somewhat 106 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Figure A1.1 Restricted and unrestricted funding for CGIAR 2007 US$ millions 600 Total funding 500 400 Restricted funding 300 200 Unrestricted funding 100 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: CGIAR Financial Reports 1995–2007 adjusted for inflation index, 2007 base. Table A1.3 Nonmember funding 1992. For 2008 CGIAR Centers received by Center, 2007 $106 million in grants from the Bill & Me- Percent of total linda Gates Foundation, to be disbursed over Center funding outcome three years. The foundation will rank among Africa Rice Centre 4.9 the top 10 contributors to the CGIAR despite Bioversity 4.4 not being a Member. This ranking will likely CIAT 11.5 persist until the end of the grant period.14 CIFOR 7.1 Nonmember funding varies widely across CIMMYT 21.5 Centers. At the extremes, 22 percent of 2007 CIP 13.1 funds for CIMMYT came from nonmembers, ICARDA 2.5 while nonmembers provided only 2.5 percent ICRISAT 11.2 of funds for ICARDA (table A1.3). IFPRI 15.9 IITA 12.6 The work of the CGIAR Centers ILRI 8.2 IRRI 5.2 The CGIAR currently supports 15 interna- IWMI 3.0 tional agricultural research Centers. Except World Agroforestry 19.0 for two, all are in developing countries. For WorldFish 5.3 analysis, they can be distinguished according to their mandates and so clustered into four Source: 2007 CGIAR Financial Report. groups: commodity Centers, ecoregional Centers, natural resource management Cen- distant fifth.13 Together, these five donors ac- ters, and policy Centers (table A1.4).15 counted for exactly half of all contributions to the CGIAR’s research agenda in 2007. Con- Locations of CGIAR regional tributions from developing country Members and country offices made up 3 percent of overall funding. Contributions from nonmembers have Collectively, the 15 Centers have some 203 risen steadily over the past few years. The $57 regional or country offices in 68 countries million contributed by nonmembers in 2007 worldwide (table A1.5). Seventy-five percent is a marked increase over the $4.6 million in of all regional or country offices are in Sub- BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 107 Table 2.1 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centers 2007 funding Year Year outcome Center Headquarters’ location established joined CGIAR (US$ millions) Mandate Commodity Centers Africa Rice Centre (WARDA) Cotonou, Benin 1970 1975 10.2 Rice production in West Africa International Maize and Wheat Mexico City, Mexico 1966 1971 43.3 Wheat, maize, triticale Improvement Center (CIMMYT) International Potato Center (CIP) Lima, Peru 1970 1973 26.0 Potato, sweet potato International Livestock Nairobi, Kenya 1995a 1995 35.2 Livestock diseases, cattle, sheep, Research Institute (ILRI) goats, feed and production systems International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) Los Banos, Philippines 1960 1971 32.5 Rice and rice-based ecosystems Ecoregional Centers International Center for Tropical Cali, Colombia 1967 1971 45.1 Beans, cassava, tropical forages, rice, Agriculture (CIAT) hillsides, forest margins, savannas International Center for Agricultural Aleppo, Syria 1975 1975 27.7 Barley, lentils, fava beans, durum and Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) bread wheats, chickpeas, pasture and forage legumes; small ruminants; on- farm water management; rangelands International Crops Research Institute Patancheru, India 1972 1972 37.4 Sorghum, pearl millet, finger millet, for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) chickpea, pigeon pea, groundnut; sustainable production systems for the semi-arid tropics International Institute of Ibadan, Nigeria 1967 1971 45.1 Soybean, maize, cassava, cowpea, banana, Tropical Agriculture (IITA) plantain, yams; sustainable production systems for the humid lowland tropics Natural resource management Centers Center for International Forestry Bogor, Indonesia 1993 1993 18.2 Sustainable forestry management Research (CIFOR) International Water Management Colombo, Sri Lanka 1984 1991 23.5 Irrigation and water resource management Institute (IWMI)b World Agroforestryc Nairobi, Kenya 1977 1991 31.5 Agroforestry; multipurpose trees WorldFishd Penang, Malaysia 1977 1992 15.1 Sustainable aquatic resource management Policy Centers Bioversitye Rome, Italy 1974 1974 39.0 Plant genetic resources of crops and forages; collection and gene pool conservation International Food Policy Washington, DC, United States 1974 1980 46.4 Socioeconomic research related Research Institute (IFPRI) to agricultural development a. Created in 1995 through the merger of the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (established in 1973) and the International Livestock Center for Africa (established in 1974). b. Formerly the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) c. Formerly the International Centre for Research on Agroforestry (ICRAF) d. Formerly the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM) e. Formerly the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), and previous to that, the International Board on Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR). Source: OED 2003; www.cgiar.org; CGIAR Secretariat. Saharan Africa (41 percent) and East Asia with, or are hosted by, other CGIAR Centers and the Pacific (34 percent). All Centers have or national research partners. offices in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 13 have offices in East Asia and the Pacific. Only six CGIAR Center staff Centers are in either Latin America or Cen- tral and West Asia and North Africa. In 2008, the Centers collectively employ 7,716 Of the 203 regional or country offices staff, of whom 2 percent are managers and 13 throughout the world, Centers indicate just percent are scientists (table A1.7). Total scien- over half share facilities, services, or resources tific and technical staff represent 43 percent 108 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Table A1.5 Numbers of CGIAR Centers, regional offices, and countries by region Centers with Regional Regional Region Offices Offices Countries Locations Sub-Saharan Africa 15 84 21 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe East Asia and the Pacific 13 69 19 Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, People’s Democratic Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Caledonia, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam Central and West Asia and North Africa 6 27 16 Afghanistan, Egypt, Georgia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen Latin America 6 16 8 Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru Europe and North America 3 7 4 Belgium, France, Italy, United States Total 93 203 68 Source: Personal communication with Center staff. Table A1.6 Numbers of CGIAR regional and country offices, combined, by region Central and Europe East Asia and West Asia and and North Center Africa the Pacific North Africa Latin America America Total Africa Rice 5 0 0 0 0 5 Bioversity 4 4 2 2 3 15 CIAT 6 3 0 4 3 16 CIFOR 6 3 0 2 0 11 CIMMYT 3 4 5 2 0 14 CIP 5 9 1 3 0 18 ICARDA 1 1 16 0 0 18 ICRISAT 5 2 0 0 0 7 IFPRI 5 2 0 0 1 8 IITA 11 0 0 0 0 11 ILRI 6 5 0 0 0 11 IRRI 3 12 0 0 0 15 IWMI 4 9 2 0 0 15 World Agroforestry 16 7 0 3 0 26 WorldFish 4 8 1 0 0 13 Source: Personal communication with Center staff. of all employees. Most staff are from Group 2 diversity (staff from Group 2 countries) has countries (Eastern Europe and Central Asia, fallen among managers, though it has risen East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America among scientists. and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa). CGIAR Center public goods assets The share of women in management posi- tions has fallen since 2003; but the share of Eleven CGIAR Centers collectively hold women in science positions has risen, and the over 650,000 samples of crop, forage, and total share of women in management and sci- agroforestry genetic resources in the pub- ence positions combined has risen. Similarly, lic domain. These germplasm collections are BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 109 Table A1.7 Gender and diversity in CGIAR Centers’ staffing, 2003 and 2008 Total Managers Scientists Grouping 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 Total 7,651 7,716 146 136 925 1,020 Women 2,057 (27%) 2,225 (29%) 13 (9%) 25 (18%) 182 (20%) 267 (26%) Group 2 countries 6,843 (89%) 7,095 (92%) 67 (46%) 48 (35%) 533 (58%) 675 (66%) Note: The human resources survey conducted by the Gender and Diversity Program used the following definitions: management is the level of manage- ment immediately below Director General. It includes Deputy Directors General, Challenge Program Leaders, Directors of major programs, research program heads, and heads of administration; scientists are those who initiate, develop, lead and carry out science projects, and who initiate, develop and sustain partnerships with their Center’s partners. It includes scientists ranging in rank from Post-Doctoral Fellow to Principal Scientist; Region 2 refers to Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. We have paraphrased this definition to call it developing countries. Source: Gender and Diversity Program, 2008, Report on the CGIAR human resources survey 2008. held in trust for humanity through the Inter- The Board and Executive meet both sepa- national Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources rately and together. Decisions of the Alli- for Food and Agriculture. The Treaty recog- ance are made by consensus where possible, nizes the CGIAR Centers’ collections as a by vote when necessary. Alliance decisions central pillar of global conservation efforts. are binding.17 The collections, among the world’s largest, are arguably the most important anywhere CGIAR Center funding for addressing global food security and pov- erty alleviation. A global public good, they are In 2007, IFPRI had the largest budget of any available to all researchers. of the CGIAR’s 15 Centers ($46.4 million); The Centers’ germplasm collections are Africa Rice had the smallest ($10.2 million). complemented by several networks and data- Table A1.8 shows how overall funds were bases operated by the Centers. They include, distributed among the Centers. In 2007 the among others, the Systemwide Information ecoregional Centers accounted for the largest Network for Genetic Resources (SINGER), share (32.7 percent) of total funds. the International Crop Information System Collectively, however, the commod- (ICIS), and the Agricultural Science and ity Centers have seen their share of overall Technology Indicators (ASTI) initiative. funds fall since 2001, while the other three Two other CGIAR-supported databases, re- groups of Centers have seen their shares rise. lated to fisheries and coral reefs, are FishBase Eight Centers saw their individual shares and ReefBase. (percentages) of overall funds rise between 2001 and 2007: Bioversity, CIAT, CIFOR, CGIAR Center governance ICRISAT, IFPRI, ILRI, IWMI, and World Agroforestry. Each Center is an independent legal entity with its own governing board. In 2006, there Center research and the were 188 board members across the 15 Cen- CGIAR research agenda ters. Of those, 59 percent came from develop- ing countries, and 34 percent were women.16 In 2005, after an in-depth consultative pro- The Boards of Trustees of the individual Cen- cess, the Science Council presented 20 sys- ters meet independently on a schedule set in tem priorities for the CGIAR System for each Center’s bylaws. 2005–15. The 20 priorities are clustered in The Alliance of CGIAR Centers conducts five major areas: business through biannual meetings of the Priority Area 1, sustaining biodiversity Alliance Board and the Alliance Executive. for current and future generations. 110 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Table A1.8 Funding by Center in 1992, 2001, and 2007 as a percentage of CGIAR’s total funding Center 1992 2001 2007 Commodity Centers 41.1 36.7 30.9 Africa Rice 3.0 2.7 2.1 CIMMYT 9.8 11.9 9.1 CIP 6.5 5.7 5.5 ILRI 8.9 7.3 7.4 IRRI 12.9 9.2 6.8 Ecoregional Centers 37.8 30.4 32.7 CIAT 10.1 8.3 9.5 ICARDA 5.7 6.4 5.8 ICRISAT 10.8 6.2 7.9 IITA 11.2 9.6 9.5 Natural resource management Centers 9.8 17.2 18.5 CIFOR 1.0 3.7 3.8 IWMI 2.8 3.3 4.9 World Agroforestry 3.9 6.5 6.6 WorldFish 2.1 3.7 3.2 Policy Centers 11.2 15.7 17.9 Bioversity 3.9 6.7 8.2 IFPRI 4.1 6.6 9.7 ISNAR 3.3 2.4 n/a n/a is not applicable. Source: World Bank 2003; CGIAR Financial Reports. Priority Area 2, producing more and The System Priorities are now being sup- better food at lower costs through ge- planted by a small set of broader, more re- netic improvement. sults-oriented strategic objectives as part of Priority Area 3, reducing rural pov- the CGIAR’s Change Management initia- erty through agricultural diversi- tive. Still, the older System Priorities use- fication and emerging opportuni- fully represent the Centers’ collective core ties for high-value commodities and competencies. products. In 2007, the Centers’ Medium Term Plans Priority Area 4, promoting poverty collectively showed 137 major project areas, alleviation and sustainable man- including individual Center projects, Chal- agement of water, land, and forest lenge Programs and systemwide programs.18 resources. In 2007 genetic improvement represented Priority Area 5, improving policies the largest percentage of overall Center ex- and facilitating institutional innova- penditures (24 percent), followed by policies tion to support sustainable reduction and institutional innovation (23 percent), in- of poverty and hunger. tegrated natural resource management (22 The Science Council also stated, how- percent), sustaining biodiversity (12 percent), ever, that up to 20 percent of Center research and diversification and high-value commodi- should be in frontier research, stand-alone ties (11 percent; table A1.9). Nonpriority areas training, and development activities (all of accounted for only about 7 percent of total ex- which are outside the five priority areas). penditures. The accuracy of this representation BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 111 Table A1.9 Centers’ expenditure by Center and systemwide programs. There are priority area, 2007 now 17 such programs (table A1.11). Besides these, the Centers also collaborate US$ Percent on a handful of other initiatives such as the System priority area millions of total Sustaining biodiversity 60 12.3 Systemwide Information Network for Ge- Genetic improvement 118 24.1 netic Resources and the Consortium for Spa- tial Information. Diversification and high-value commodities 54 11.0 Integrated natural CGIAR Challenge Programs resource management 109 22.3 Policies and institutional Following a recommendation from the innovation 112 22.9 Subtotal 453 92.6 2001 Change Design and Management Development activities 14 2.9 Team, the CGIAR created Challenge Pro- Standalone training 9 1.8 grams for collaborative research in 2003. New research areas 13 2.7 A CGIAR Challenge Program is a “time- bound, independently-governed program Subtotal 36 7.4 of high-impact research that targets the Total 489 100 CGIAR goals in relation to complex issues Source: 2008 Financing Plan. of overwhelming global and/or regional sig- nificance, and requires partnerships among a wide range of institutions in order to deliver of Centers’ work is unclear. Also unclear is its products.”19 Challenge Programs were whether Centers have been reluctant to char- added to the existing work and financing of acterize expenditures as nonpriority. the Centers. The Change Design and Man- In 2007, 77 percent of total CGIAR in- agement Team envisioned that within five vestments were directed at Sub-Saharan Af- years, CGIAR financing would expand sig- rica and Asia (table A1.10). Investments in nificantly and Challenge Programs would Sub-Saharan Africa have grown steadily, from account for 50 percent of overall CGIAR 39 percent of the total in 1992 to 48 percent financing. 20 in 2007. Initially, the CGIAR launched three Challenge Programs: Water and Food, Gen- Systemwide and eration, and HarvestPlus. At its 2004 An- ecoregional programs nual General Meeting, the CGIAR approved a fourth Challenge Program, Sub-Saharan Besides research undertaken by individual Africa. All four are now under way (table Centers, CGIAR research also includes inter- A1.12). In May 2008 ExCo approved a fifth Table A1.10 CGIAR investments by region Percent of total Region 1992 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Sub-Saharan Africa 39 43 43 45 45 47 46 48 Asia 33 31 33 32 32 32 30 29 Latin America and the Caribbean 16 17 15 14 14 12 14 13 Central and West Asia and North Africa 12 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 Note: Percentages restated in 2007 to exclude Challenge Program partner expenses. Source: 2007 CGIAR Annual Report; CGIAR Secretariat; World Bank 2003. 112 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Table A1.11 Systemwide and Ecoregional Programs Program Convening Center Alternatives to Slash and Burn World Agroforestry Centre Global Mountain Program CIP African Highlands Initiative World Agroforestry Centre Collaborative Research Program for Sustainable Agricultural ICARDA Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus Desert Margins Program ICRISAT Rice-Wheat Consortium for the Indo-Gangetic Plains CIMMYT Consortium for the Sustainable Development of the Andean Ecoregion (CONDESAN) CIP Systemwide Initiative on Urban and Periurban Agriculture CIP Consortium for the Sustainable Use of Inland Valley Agroecosystems in Sub-Saharan Africa Africa Rice Centre Participatory Research and Gender Analysis CIAT Systemwide Initiative on HIV/AIDS Africa Rice Centre Systemwide Initiative on Water Management IWMI Systemwide Genetic Resources Program Bioversity Systemwide Livestock Program ILRI Systemwide Program on IPM CIP Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights IFPRI Systemwide Program on Malaria and Agriculture IWMI Source: http://www.cgiar.org. Table A1.12 Challenge Program project summaries Convening Center/ Challenge Program organization Year established Focus Generation CIMMYT 2003 To use plant genetic diversity, advanced genomic science, and comparative biology to develop tools and technologies that help plant breeders in the developing world produce better crop varieties for resource-poor farmers. HarvestPlus CIAT, IFPRI 2003 To improve human nutrition by breeding, through a process called biofortification, new varieties of staple food crops consumed by the poor that have higher levels of micronutrients. Sub-Saharan Africa FARA 2003 To address the most significant constraints to reviving agriculture in Africa—failures of agricultural markets, inappropriate policies, and natural resource degradation—with a new paradigm, Integrated Agricultural Research for Development. Water and Food IWMI 2004 To improve the productivity of water in river basins in ways that are pro-poor, gender equitable and environmentally sustainable Source: http://www.cgiar.org. Challenge Program, on Climate Change, for Africa (FARA), a different CGIAR Center development. convenes each program. Each Challenge Pro- With the exception of the Sub-Saharan gram has an independent governing board. Africa Challenge Program, which is convened The CGIAR reports that revenues for the by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Challenge Programs totaled $48 million in BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 113 2007. (CGIAR practice is to count revenue Another characteristic of the CGIAR is only when the funds have been spent.) Such uncertainty—especially about funding and, revenues over the history of the Challenge hence, about the reform agenda of the past Programs are shown in table A1.13. Chal- decade. These uncertainties are further asso- lenge Program financing can also be viewed ciated with major changes in the CGIAR’s based on cash receipts recorded in total by external context. With the continuous search the convening Center each year. In this way, for change, an aura of uncertainty surrounds table A1.14 reflects actual funding available the future of the CGIAR. to the individual programs from 2004–07. On the whole, the CGIAR today is char- The Challenge Programs have certainly acterized by increasing complexity, both brought new funding to the CGIAR. But cognitive and structural; by diversity in its how much is unclear—indeed it is nearly im- membership, its funding, and its organiza- possible to see. For example, although fund- tion; and by an increasing uncertainty associ- ing to the Challenge Programs by the Gates ated with changes in its internal and external Foundation is clearly new funding, some do- environments. nors (for example, the World Bank) appear to have shifted at least part of their contri- Notes butions away from Centers to Challenge Programs. 1. CGIAR Secretariat (2007b), p. 2. 2. CGIAR Secretariat (2007b). 3. The current mission statement was adopted at the The character of the CGIAR CGIAR’s Mid-Term Meeting in Dresden in 2000. 4. In 2006, the following Members were not in good The CGIAR is characterized by complexity, standing: African Development Bank, Bangladesh, with many institutions in different countries Côte d’Ivoire, Gulf Cooperation Council, Indonesia, Inter-American Development Bank, Kellogg Foundation, of different ages and with different cultures, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, purposes, and focuses. This complex institu- Russian Federation, Thailand, and Uganda. In 2007, all tional arrangement has evolved over 37 years. but four (African Development Bank, Gulf Cooperation Table A1.13 Revenue reported by the CGIAR, for all Challenge Programs $ millions 2004 2005 2006 2007 CGIAR 14 25 29 31 Partners 5 10 11 17 Total 19 35 40 48 Note: Total revenue and expenditures are not reported in aggregate for 2003 (only-cash basis receipts are reported). Source: CGIAR Financial Reports, 2004–2007. Table A1.14 Funding available to Challenge Programs, 2003–07 Percentage of total 2004 2005 2006 2007 Generation 19.1 13.6 9.5 23.5 HarvestPlus 3.9 15.5 12.1 19.6 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 0 3.5 7.8 Water and Food 9.4 9.3 8.4 17.1 Total 37.1 38.4 33.6 68.0 Source: CGIAR Financial Reports, 2004–2007. 114 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Council, Portugal, and Uganda) were still in arrears and 11. The ad hoc Committee on Finance was created at the remained in Member-observer status. Source: CGIAR 2007 Annual General Meeting, with the agreement that it Secretariat. would exist until December 31, 2008. 5. Strong et al. (1998). 12. CGIAR (2007b), p. 20. 6. The World Bank, FAO, and UNDP were founding 13. Note that the EC contribution is somewhat distorted, in cosponsors. From 1994–2000, the United Nations that a large part of its 2006 contribution was disbursed Environment Programme was also a cosponsor. IFAD and recorded in 2007. became a cosponsor in 2001. 14. Note that the CGIAR reports funding during the year it 7. CGIAR Secretariat (2007b), p. 37. is expensed, so it appears that the Gates Foundation 8. In 1998, the Centers created the Future Harvest contributed $23 million in 2007. However, the Gates Foundation as a nonprofit corporation in an effort to Foundation actually made cash contributions to the reach out to new constituencies and increase the funding Centers in the amount of $43 million. base of the Centers and their strategic work. The Future 15. We have chosen here to use the same classification as Harvest Foundation was dissolved in 2004. the 2003 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department’s 9. Engagement with civil society now takes place through Meta-Evaluation. This will facilitate analysis of trends in dialogue processes and ad hoc representation at CGIAR programming and financing over time. meetings. 16. CGIAR (2007a). 10. There have been a small number of new committees 17. Future Harvest (2006). added at various times, that were then eliminated. 18. CGIAR Secretariat. (2007c). For example, the Consultative Council, following the Third System Review, and the Science Partnership 19. Interim Executive Council (2001a). Committee. 20. Change Design and Management Team. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 115 APPENDIX 2 Impact of CGIAR research Since 2001, the CGIAR has invested sub- themselves by a wide margin: even by the stantially in assessing its impact through the most conservative criteria, overall benefits Science Council’s Standing Panel on Impact from CGIAR research were roughly double Assessment (SPIA). SPIA has commissioned the costs of that research (figure A2.1). three studies over the past five years that have Of note is the fact that the meta-analysis quantified the impacts of the CGIAR at the included only existing impact assessments. global and regional levels. These studies find The small number of impact assessments of that the benefits from past investments in natural resource management and policy- CGIAR research have exceeded the costs of oriented research means that the benefits of that research—usually by a large margin. CGIAR research were understated, insofar as Raitzer (2003) provides the only com- later evidence suggests that this research also prehensive assessment of the relative benefits had a positive impact. Coupled with the fact and costs of CGIAR research investments that all systemwide expenditures were con- over the System’s lifetime. This meta-analysis sidered, the reported benefit-cost ratios were reviewed all available ex post impact assess- similarly understated. ments from peer-reviewed journal articles, Interesting is the high proportion of ben- books, and Center publications, to estimate efits associated with just a few of the CGIAR’s the total benefits attributable to the CGIAR. many programs. Roughly half (47 percent) of Only studies that were published after 1989, total benefits were attributed to rice breeding, covering middle- or low-income countries and generating total benefits exceeding $50 Figure A2.1 Aggregate benefit–cost ratios of million, were considered. A rating scale was CGIAR research under different developed—based on the transparency of scenarios of study selection analytical methods, the extent to which cau- Benefit-cost ratio sality was demonstrated, the plausibility of 20 counterfactuals, and the degree to which es- timated impacts were projected beyond the time frame analyzed—to establish a range of 15 estimated benefits. Benefit scenarios ranged from the most conservative (“substantially demonstrated and empirically attributed”) 10 to the least conservative (“plausible, extrap- olated to 2011”). For each of these five sce- 5 narios, benefits were compared with total sys- temwide expenditures ($7.1 billion in 1990 dollars) dating back to 1960.1 0 Estimated systemwide benefits ranged Significantly Significantly Plausible (no Plausible, Plausible, demonstrated demonstrated explanation) extrapolated extrapolated from nearly $14 billion to more than $120 and empirically to the present to 2011 attributed billion. The benefit-cost ratios suggest that Source: Raitzer (2003). investments in the CGIAR have paid for 116 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T and an additional 31 percent to breeding of from these investments have exceeded their spring bread wheat. Biocontrol research re- costs. sulting in reduced crop damage from the cas- Following similar methods to those de- sava mealybug accounted for most of the re- scribed for the systemwide evaluation, Mare- maining benefits (15 percent). dia and Raitzer (2006) undertook a meta- Two recent regional studies on Sub-Saha- analysis of 22 impact assessment studies ran Africa and South Asia reveal very differ- conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa. The final ent levels of impact of CGIAR research. No set of studies considered was culled from a such study has been made for Latin America, much larger group of 367 studies that were though many specific studies show substantial initially reviewed. Primary criteria for inclu- impact, for instance, in the uptake of rice2 and sion of a study in the meta-analysis included a maize3 varieties. sufficiently large geographic scale of adoption (eliminating many small-scale adoption stud- Sub-Saharan Africa ies), quantification of research benefits, and having undergone a peer review. Nearly every Since its founding in 1971, the CGIAR has study that emerged from this screening pro- invested approximately $4.3 billion in Sub- cess evaluated crop genetic improvement or Saharan Africa.4 This represents 41 percent biological control technologies. Roughly two- of total CGIAR expenditures, the largest thirds of these were conducted since 2001 (the share allocated to any geographical region. earliest since 1994). Estimates of benefits were With the continent’s relative lack of suc- calculated based on varying levels of conser- cess in achieving agricultural development vatism and whether ex ante projections were and poverty alleviation goals, the scale of considered. resources devoted to Sub-Saharan Africa has Figure A2.2 presents the key findings.5 inevitably raised questions about the returns Benefits exceeded costs for all scenarios that on those investments. For this reason, in included ex ante projections beyond the study 2005, the SPIA commissioned a regional period, with benefit-cost ratios ranging from study to assess whether documented benefits 1.12 to 1.64. When only ex post benefits were Figure A2.2 Comparison of calculated costs and estimated benefits of joint CGIAR–national agricultural research systems investments in Sub-Saharan Africa Costs Documented benefits 2004 US$ billions, discounted value 30 B:C = 1.64 B:C = 1.51 25 B:C = 1.12 20 B:C = 1.03 B:C = 1.00 B:C = 0.92 15 10 5 0 Potential Plausible Substantially Potential Plausible Substantially demonstrated demonstrated Ex post Ex post + ex ante Source: Maredia and Raitzer (2006). BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 117 considered, benefits and costs were more bal- in maintaining impressive rates of agricul- anced; for the most conservative scenario, tural productivity growth in the region costs slightly outweighed benefits. The au- since the green revolution. These productiv- thors point out that many studies considered ity improvements have also yielded substan- only one year of research benefits, even though tial indirect impacts on food security and such benefits would almost certainly extend poverty alleviation through price effects. for a number of years. Yet, even if benefit-cost Hazell finds that economic returns to these ratios rose to the level of the least conservative research investments have been consistently scenarios, they would still be well below those higher than national discount rates and found in the systemwide meta-analysis. Thus, that there is little evidence that these rates while benefits from CGIAR investments in of return have declined over time. CGIAR Sub-Saharan Africa have certainly exceeded Centers have made particularly impressive their costs, the returns to research investment contributions to overall well-being through have been considerably lower in Sub-Saharan crop genetic improvement. Based on existing Africa than in other parts of the world. impact assessments, Hazell finds average an- The geographic scale of measured im- nual benefits of more than $1 billion from pacts is also relatively small. At the end of crop genetic improvement work, far in ex- the 20th century, only about 11 million hect- cess of the estimated $65 million of annual ares (of about 100 million) were planted with expenditures of the CGIAR in South Asia. CGIAR-derived improved germplasm in Sub- A survey of specific commodity and coun- Saharan Africa.6 In addition, adoption of spe- try studies further supports substantial rates cific CGIAR technology products has been of return to CGIAR crop improvement re- fairly small scale (in the tens of thousands of search. Many such studies tend to be rather hectares). dated, however. But the distribution of benefits from Alternative approaches to agricultural de- CGIAR research is noteworthy. Biological velopment, such as organic farming and low control activities—particularly for the cas- external input technologies, though found to sava mealybug—account for approximately be unviable in the more favored agroecologi- 80 percent of documented benefits, with crop cal areas, are more promising in less favored genetic improvement accounting for nearly all areas where natural resource and crop man- of the remainder. This is roughly the opposite agement regimes are central to the success of of what has been found systemwide, a finding agricultural development strategies vis-à-vis that is squarely in line with conventional wis- seed varietal adoption. In addition, Hazell dom that crop genetic improvement has been does find evidence of significant net benefits less successful in Africa than elsewhere. arising from work on efficient water and fer- tilizer use, on integrated pest management, South Asia and on zero tillage. Hazell finds that there is a dearth of im- Hazell recently undertook a critical review of pact studies linking agricultural research in- agricultural investments by the CGIAR and vestments to environmental or poverty out- its partners in South Asia in the post-Green comes. While assertions that agricultural Revolution period (since the early 1980s).7 intensification strategies have had undesirable The study takes a markedly less structured environmental impacts are commonplace, approach to impact assessment than the two there are few empirical studies to quantify meta-analyses just described, reviewing exist- these impacts. Likewise, there is little in the ing peer-reviewed studies of productivity, way of impact studies that include environ- social, environmental, and policy impacts. mental costs and benefits or poverty reduc- Evidence indicates that agricultural re- tion in measures of rates of return to research search in South Asia has been instrumental investments. 118 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Crop genetic improvement research on yield growth, contributing from 0.7–1.0 percent annually. But impacts for “orphan” Crop genetic improvement (CGI) has histori- crops—crops other than rice, wheat, and cally been the bread and butter of the CGIAR maize—accelerated toward the end of the pe- System. Improved germplasm for use by riod. The use of CGIAR germplasm products national programs, for direct release or as par- has been even higher in released varieties of ent materials, is a classic international public those crops (although areas under cultivation good that demonstrated high spillovers across remain comparatively lower globally). Pota- regions and countries for wheat and rice in the toes are the only crop where CGIAR germ- early years of the CGIAR. Nonetheless, over plasm plays a minor role. time CGI has received a sharply declining Overall, 65 percent of the area’s 10 impor- share of CGIAR resources, estimated at only tant food crops (wheat, rice, maize, sorghum, 16 percent by 2005.8 millet, barley, lentils, beans, cassava, and po- Since the 1980s impacts of CGI have tatoes) are improved varieties. Sixty percent been fairly consistently tracked at the global of the area is sown to varieties with CGIAR level by IRRI for rice and by CIMMYT for ancestry, and half of these are derived from wheat. A number of studies have analyzed crosses made at a CGIAR Center (direct re- use of CGIAR germplasm in released va- leases by national systems). rieties, yield impacts, and global economic Among regions, impacts have been highest benefits. They consistently find high rates of in Asia (both in relative and absolute terms) return to the CGIAR investment in these and lowest in Africa. This partly reflects the crops—echoing the findings of the meta- distribution of crops between the regions— analysis of total (systemwide) benefits and orphan crops are more important in Africa. costs noted above.9 This is not surprising, But even for the same crop, impacts have gen- given the broad geographic scale of the dif- erally been lower in Africa. This reflects the fusion of improved varieties. That the ben- late start to breeding work in that region. For efits have been so well chronicled reflects the example, CIMMYT established its first se- relatively straightforward nature of quanti- rious maize breeding program for Africa (in fying benefits associated with productivity Harare) in the late 1980s. increases and attributing those benefits to The benefits of CGIAR’s contribution to specific CGIAR research investments. In CGI are extraordinarily large—in the billions addition, methods for evaluation of impacts of dollars. Most of these benefits are produced of CGI are well established in the literature, by the three main cereals. Raitzer summarizes notwithstanding some questions of parti- average annual benefits for CGIAR research: tioning benefits between the CGIAR and $2.5 billion for spring bread wheat, $10.8 bil- national systems.10 lion for rice (Asia only), and $0.6–0.8 bil- The first comprehensive global evalua- lion for maize (CIMMYT only).12 Evenson tion of the impacts of the CGIAR in CGI and Gollin estimate rates of return to the was undertaken by SPIA around 2000. This CGIAR’s investment in CGI research rang- study covered research carried out on 10 crops ing from 39 percent in Latin America to more during 1965–98 at 8 Centers (Africa Rice than 100 percent in Asia and Middle East and Centre, CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP, ICARDA, North Africa.13 ICRISAT, IITA, and IRRI).11 Using a global model of food supply and The impact of CGI generally, and the cen- demand, Evenson and Rosegrant also esti- tral role of the CGIAR specifically, is clear for mated the counterfactual of what would have almost all crops. As expected, impacts have happened to world food production without been greatest in rice, wheat, and maize in CGIAR contributions to CGI:14 both area influenced and adoption. For these World food production would have three crops, CGI has had the largest impacts been 4–5 percent less, and developing BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 119 countries would have produced 7–8 new varieties of the common bean (phaseolus percent less. vulgaris) developed by the CIAT have been World grain prices would have been adopted in about half of the total bean area 18–21 percent more—adversely af- in East, Central, and Southern Africa, encom- fecting poor consumers. passing some 5 million households and reach- Area planted with crops would have ing 35 million people over 17 years. been significantly higher for all food In marginal regions with low and uncer- crops, as cultivated area in develop- tain rainfall, participatory approaches that di- ing countries would have expanded rectly involve farmers in varietal breeding and by 11–13 million hectares (and 5–6 selection are also yielding positive impacts. million in industrialized countries), Between 1997 and 2004, ICARDA’s Barley at the expense of primary forests and Research Program in Syria transformed its fragile lands with high biodiversity. operation from 8,000 plots planted and eval- In developing countries, per capita uated on the research station to 8,000 plots food consumption would have been planted in farmers’ fields and evaluated by 5 percent less on average, and up to 7 farmers.19 Participatory plant breeding and percent less in the poorest regions varietal selection speeds varietal development Some 13–15 million more children and dissemination up 5–7 years, half the years would have been malnourished, pre- in a conventional plant-breeding program. dominantly in South Asia, where in- But impacts on farmer adoption have been cidence of hunger is highest. modest to date. An important question for this review Participatory variety selection has been is whether there is evidence that historical used for more than 10 years for selection of benefits from CGI have been maintained in so-called New Rice for Africa (NERICA) the 20th century. The answer is constrained upland rice varieties in Africa, especially with by the paucity of global evidence since the participation of female farmers. NERICA Evenson and Gollin study was completed.15 rice combines the high productivity of Asian At a global and regional level, CIMMYT rice and the stress tolerance of African rice continued conducting impact studies until varieties. NERICA lines have been tested 2005 for wheat (with data ending in 2002). in 31 countries, with 16 lines released in 15 These studies indicated similar if not higher countries, and adoption on about 200,000 benefits. hectares.20 Other studies at the local level point to Ex ante impact studies have favorably progress in other crops and environments. evaluated NERICA. But except in Guinea, ICRISAT has achieved successes with chick- adoption of NERICA has been slow. Partici- peas in India, including in poor and marginal patory variety selection has been important in environments.16 The net present value of the exposing farmers to the new varieties; of the investment in the genetically improved dual- farmers exposed to the new varieties, 38 per- purpose cowpea research and extension in cent have adopted NERICA rice. Initial as- West Africa over 20 years was estimated in sessments suggested high yield gains from the range of $299–$1,085 million.17 Depend- NERICA would facilitate farmer-to-farmer ing on different assumptions, internal rates of transfers of seed and knowledge—as has been return of 50–103 percent and a benefit-cost demonstrated in many areas, including many ratio of 32–127 were estimated. Deb et al. marginal areas of Asia. But more recent assess- chronicle substantial geographic spillovers ments have found much more modest yield throughout Africa of ICRISAT sorghum gains, suggesting that an intensive and pos- varieties developed with Indian national ag- sibly costly program of participatory variety ricultural research systems (NARS).18 And a selection would be needed over many years to series of recent adoption studies estimates that scale up adoption of NERICA rice. 120 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Yield stability varieties. 26 Likewise, IITA has successfully Yield stability is important for all farmers, tackled a severe outbreak of cassava mosaic but especially for poor farmers whose food disease in western Kenya through rapid iden- security and livelihood are vulnerable to pest tification and release of resistant varieties.27 and disease outbreaks, droughts, and other Research in developing varieties that per- stresses. While early studies suggested that form well under drought, heat, flood, and sa- yields of improved varieties might be more linity is particularly relevant to threats posed variable than those they replaced, 21 recent by climate change. Progress has been slower evidence suggests that later generations of than for disease and pest resistance. After improved varieties have stabilized yields. 22 more than 30 years of research to produce For example, Gollin concluded that the vari- drought-tolerant maize varieties and hybrids, ability of maize and wheat yields measured CIMMYT is now seeing results in East and by the coefficient of variation around trends Southern Africa. Compared with existing hy- over the past 40 years has fallen in developing brids, new hybrids yield 20 percent more on countries.23 This decline is statistically asso- average under drought conditions. 28 In ad- ciated with the spread of improved varieties, dition, recent evidence points to significant even after controlling for more irrigation and yield gains in breeding wheat in drought and other inputs. The annual value of benefits heat-stressed environments. 29 New varieties from improved yield stability in maize and of rice that survive flooding have also been wheat alone is estimated at $149 million and identified.30 $143 million, respectively—more than the total annual spending on maize- and wheat- Genetic improvement of fish breeding research in developing countries. WorldFish has developed genetically improved Yield stability of improved varieties largely strains of Nile tilapia for on-farm produc- reflects long-standing efforts in breeding for tion and extended these to farmers in six disease and pest resistance. A third to a half Asian countries, including Bangladesh. An of current research and development invest- assessment of on-farm trials by Deb and Dey ments in crop breeding in the CGIAR may shows yield gains of 78 percent in Bangladesh be for varietal maintenance. The only study achieved without any increase in production to have attempted to capture this “hidden costs.31 Using economic surplus methods, impact” of CGI, Marassas estimates that Deb and Dey quantified the benefits from CIMMYT’s work on maintaining leaf rust and costs of research and dissemination by resistance alone has generated $5.4 billion in WorldFish and its partners in all six coun- net present value from 1973–2007.24 tries and obtained an internal return rate of Since large areas are now being used each 70 percent.32 year for major food crops in relatively few im- proved varieties, genetic uniformity can make Biofortification crops vulnerable to major yield losses. Some Although not strictly impact assessment, evidence suggests that genetic uniformity in- recent evaluation of biofortified crops is inter- creases yield risk, even though it can also pro- esting because it is one of the first examples duce higher yields. 25 In recent decades, the within the CGIAR of using experimental world has largely avoided major disasters from approaches to evaluate interventions—spe- genetic uniformity, partly because more fre- cifically, comparing a biofortified treatment quent turnover of varieties has brought new with a conventional variety in randomly sources of resistance. selected households. But a new race of stem rust in wheat Quality protein maize, now grown on after more than 50 years has left CIMMYT, about 600,000 hectares, has been subject to ICARDA, and their partners scrambling to such evaluations—though all with method- find and release a new generation of resistant ological problems. In a meta-analysis of eight BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 121 such studies, Gunaratna finds a 7 percent av- improved chickpeas and cowpeas have, been erage effect of quality protein maize on chil- found to produce impressive gains in local dren’s rate of height gain and 9 percent on and regional analyses, they have not yet been weight.33 A recent study at two sites in Ethi- evaluated in the quantitatively rigorous way opia finds mixed results. Significant height that other crops were in the landmark Even- and weight gains (21 percent and 26 percent, son-Gollin volume. Thus, there is a continu- respectively) were found at one site; but at ing need for the CGIAR Centers and SPIA another site no significant anthropometric to regularly update global assessments of the effects were found.34 In Mozambique, 850 impacts for all crops (once every five years). households participated in an experiment with orange-fleshed sweet potatoes from Natural resource CIP. A significant increase of vitamin A in- management research take was measured among young children liv- ing in households receiving the orange-fleshed Natural resource management (NRM) treatment combined with extension advice on research within the CGIAR has evolved over nutrition.35 time. In the 1960s and 1970s, NRM research These studies are not strictly impact focused mainly on agronomic issues, such as studies, since they do not consider aggregate efficient use of nutrients and fertilizers, pesti- adoption and long-run use. Still, this type cide use, and water distribution and manage- of work is likely to accelerate with the scal- ment. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the NRM ing up of biofortification research under the research agenda took on more of a farming HarvestPlus program. Ex ante impact work is systems perspective and emphasized farmer also under way—for example, the evaluation participatory methods. Productivity-related of the potential impacts on disability adjusted work broadened to include whole farm sys- life years of Vitamin A rice in India.36 tems (as opposed to crop-specific impacts), CGI has long been the staple activity of and the focus of much water management the CGIAR, one whose net benefits have been research shifted from the farm-level to the large and well chronicled. Overall, the avail- watershed- or district-level.37 able evidence does not indicate a slowdown in The decision in 1990 to expand the the benefits of CGIAR efforts in CGI in re- CGIAR to include four new Centers—with cent years, even with ever-tighter funding. Re- mandates in forestry (CIFOR), agroforestry cent research in a range of crops, both cereals (World Agroforestry Centre), water manage- and noncereals, and traits (such as drought re- ment (IIMI), and fisheries (ICLARM)— sistance and nutritional content) are generat- marked a turning point in the position of ing very promising outputs and outcomes for NRM research within the System. Invest- future impact. But the long delays between ments in those four Centers grew steadily initial funding and the development of such throughout the 1990s and into the 21st cen- CGI products makes continued funding for tury—largely at the expense of commodity CGI research difficult. Between the 1990s and ecoregional Centers with a stronger pro- and the present, research to increase produc- ductivity-enhancement orientation.38 This tivity has declined in real terms and as a per- was also the case for allocating resources to centage of CGIAR research expenditure (see NRM research programs through other pro- chapter 5). grams in the other Centers. Another concern is the paucity of evalua- CGIAR research on pest management tive evidence on the adoption and impacts of has been a particular aspect of its NRM re- some promising CGI outputs for which dif- search involving conservation and use of fusion appears poised to take off (for example, natural enemies of crop pests and diseases. It NERICAs, biofortified products like quality complements CGI research on breeding resis- protein maize); while other successes, such as tance to pests and diseases and has played an 122 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T important role in yield stability in a range of Farmer field schools have brought signifi- crops. Pest management research at Centers cant benefits to farmers.42 A study that as- has focused on biological control, integrated sessed CIP’s pilot field school program in pest management, and resistant varieties. Peru found a 14 percentage point increase in Biological control of alien pests and weeds knowledge score for participants and an esti- has been a particular success story for the mated 32 percent gain in productivity.43 And CGIAR, particularly in Africa. The capac- a project in Vietnam, Three Reductions— ity of CGIAR Centers to work effectively at Three Gains, begun by IRRI in 2003 shows an intercontinental level, to identify biologi- promise in using mass media to disseminate cal control agents, and at a regional level with information on the benefits of reducing pes- national programs, to distribute agents effec- ticide use (as well as lowering seeding rates tively, has contributed to this success. One of and fertilizer use). This project uses radio and the best known cases is the control of the cas- television dramas, in addition to more tradi- sava mealybug in 20 countries in Sub-Saharan tional extension channels, and has enjoyed Africa.39 The biological control provided by some early successes, though these have yet to an introduced wasp was so effective that the be rigorously evaluated. cassava mealybug is now largely controlled. Longer-term and larger-scale impact of Even when using the most conservative as- integrated pest management training may sumptions, the return on this research invest- be less certain,44 in part because, unlike im- ment has been extremely high (net present proved crop varieties, the spread of knowledge value estimated at $9 billion). intensive integrated pest management meth- CGIAR Centers and partners have since ods requires considerable and maintained in- extended biological control in West Africa vestment in training.45 to cassava green mite, mango mealybug, and Policy-oriented research by Templeton water hyacinth. Evaluations consistently show and Jamora provides evidence of large impacts very high returns to the investments in these of IRRI research on reducing the health costs programs. Indeed, biological control makes up of pesticide use.46 The value of private health a large share of the demonstrated benefits of savings from that research—attributable the CGIAR’s research portfolio in Sub-Saha- to regulation of highly toxic insecticides in ran Africa.40 Coulibaly estimates investments rice production, labeling requirements, and in biological control of cassava green mite to training of rural health officers—has been have generated net present values of $1.7 bil- estimated to have a net present value of $117 lion for Nigeria, $383 million for Ghana, million. and $74 million for Benin.41 And even these Growing evidence suggests positive re- impressive benefits are likely understated be- turns on investments in a variety of NRM cause the analyses did not account for ecologi- research activities in the System. As methods cal benefits. for measuring impacts of NRM research be- Integrated pest management research come better developed—due in large part to arose from a need to find alternatives to reli- SPIA’s efforts to promote that line of impact ance on chemical pesticides to protect yield assessment—documentation of net benefits improvements in rice. Since this work in the to NRM research should accelerate. 1980s many Centers have contributed to a But much NRM research occurs at a rela- global effort by the Food and Agriculture tively limited geographic scale through other Organization, national agricultural research types of CGIAR research—often because systems, and nongovernmental organiza- local collective action and delineation of prop- tions to develop integrated pest management erty rights are central to adopting NRM tech- approaches, including development of bio- nologies (CIMMYT’s zero-tillage work in logical pesticides and farmer field schools to South Asia is a notable exception). This likely train farmers in integrated pest management. limits the potential for spatial spillovers of BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 123 management methods and biophysical pack- These provide substantial qualitative evidence ages, particularly in comparison with spill- on how and why policy-oriented research and overs associated with seed varieties. the research recommendations it generates In addition, NRM research impact as- find their way into the real-world policy for- sessments to date have focused largely on pro- mulation and implementation. But the stud- ductivity benefits. Environmental benefits are ies stop short of quantifying impacts on core largely ignored—presumably because of the CGIAR missions of food security, poverty methodological difficulties in quantifying alleviation, and environmental sustainability, them. Such quantification would require non- though they do represent an essential comple- market valuation techniques, which are still ment to quantitative research. rare in developing countries. An unfortunate The dearth of empirical impact assess- consequence of this is that there is little evi- ments is attributable to the difficult challenges dence on CGIAR’s success in meeting its goal facing analysts of policy-oriented research in of promoting environmental sustainability. the quantification of ideas and knowledge— the fundamental product of policy-oriented Policy-oriented research research—and their attribution to specific producers of that knowledge. Even so, the Policy analysis is the basic mandate of four authors of the scoping study conclude that Centers (Bioversity, CIFOR, IFPRI, and the “the level of measured and documented IWMI) and is a major focus of the others. impact and influence attributed to CGIAR CGIAR expenditures on policy-oriented policy-oriented research by rigorous analysis research have grown substantially, in absolute is probably insufficient at present to justify the terms and as a proportion of the systemwide associated total investment made to date.”51 research portfolio.47 Conservative estimates As a follow-up to the scoping study, seven place the total value of such investments at impact assessments of policy-oriented re- $800 million (in real 2004 terms), and more search were commissioned in 2007 through than triple that number using a broader defi- a competitive selection process among the nition of policy research.48 Centers. The project was overseen by the late As with NRM research, the World Bank’s Bruce Gardner until his death in early 2008, meta-evaluation of the CGIAR49 found a by which time the case studies had been pre- striking lack of credible studies analyzing sented at a final workshop. The seven studies impacts of the large historical investments in are currently in preparation for publication in policy-oriented research. In response, SPIA an edited volume. conducted a scoping study in 2006 that iden- All of these studies found substantial re- tified and reviewed 24 ex post assessments turns to policy-oriented research investments from CGIAR policy-oriented research proj- in the form of high internal rates of return ects.50 Only three studies yielded empirical and large benefit-cost ratios.52 In addition, the estimates of economic impacts. About half of overall measured benefits of the projects were the others (10 of 21) documented “influences” large—in the tens or hundreds of millions of (or outcomes, in the nomenclature adopted in dollars in net present value terms. However, a this Review), generally relying on interviews few qualifications to these positive results are of relevant stakeholders as “data.” The re- in order: maining 11 assessment studies went only so The studies employed different means far as to document outputs, primarily through of attributing behavioral changes bibliometric and webmetric citations analy- to policy changes and what was the sis. The 21 more qualitative studies spanned contribution of the relevant CGIAR a range of policy domains: property rights, Center to the policy change. All stud- plant genetic resources, and gender, in addi- ies indicated that “conservative” as- tion to the NRM policy studies in chapter 3. sumptions were made in this regard, 124 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T although defining what constitutes provide interesting insights into the effective- conservatism in this context is in- ness with which policy-oriented research evitably random. But taking as given translates into actual policy influence. A that the studies’ authors have erred on review of the Ethiopian Strategy Support Pro- the side of caution, then the true net gram’s activities and impacts over 2004–07 benefits of policy-oriented research indicates substantial success in the generation are larger—perhaps substantially of research-based policy recommendations, so—than what is reported. development of policy-analysis tools (out- Identifying the appropriate counter- puts), and capacity-building within the nexus factual—what would have occurred of Ethiopia’s government and research sec- in the absence of the research that was tors.54 Central to the program’s successes was conducted—is a challenge for assess- IFPRI’s strong on-the-ground presence (spear- ing policy-oriented research impacts. headed by the program director, an Ethiopian In most cases, the counterfactual re- national). In contrast, a review of IFPRI’s lated to earlier implementation of a Global Research Project on the Sustainable policy or set of activities than would Development of Less-Favored Lands over have occurred without the Center’s 1998–2004 found significantly less success in involvement. Again, the impact assess- translating a large body of outstanding pol- ment literature provides little guid- icy-oriented research generated by the project ance to assist in making these choices. investigators into sustained policy influence As with attribution issues, the analysts in the countries of emphasis—Ethiopia, Hon- tended to simply adopt “conservative” duras, and Uganda.55 This lack was attributed assumptions, in the hope that any to limited on-site representation, which inter- bias in the benefits estimation would rupted the process whereby research findings be downward. This does not intend to can be transformed into policy. call into question the accuracy of the studies’ findings but rather to point CGIAR’s impact on poverty out the inevitable lack of precision in the point estimates of impact (internal Poverty alleviation is a core mission of the rates of return, benefit-cost ratios). CGIAR, and throughout its 37-year his- All five impact assessments were coun- tory much research has been oriented toward try studies conducted in a particular policy enhancing the welfare of the poor. The litera- environment, but all produced knowledge ture on economics provides substantial evi- relevant to policy domains in other coun- dence of pro-poor impacts of international tries. Such spillovers, if and when they occur, agricultural research and development. represent potent international public goods. Thirtle, Lin, and Piesse conclude, for exam- Only the PROGRESA study quantified these ple, that “public sector national agricultural spillovers, finding that they were in fact nearly research systems, with the assistance of the five times greater than the entire cost of IF- CGIAR, can justly claim to have reduced PRI’s contribution to the research activity. poverty, probably more than any other single Ryan’s earlier analysis of IFPRI’s contribution policy initiative.”56 In a recent work, how- to policy change in Vietnam’s rice sector also ever, Alston, Dehmer, and Pardey contend finds that the benefits from spillovers greatly that the broadening of CGIAR objectives outweigh the project’s costs.53 over time—termed mission creep—has actu- ally eroded the System’s effectiveness in ful- Other recent policy-oriented filling its various missions (including poverty research assessments alleviation).57 Two other recent qualitative impact assess- Between 1998 and 2006, systematic as- ments conducted under the auspices of IFPRI sessment of the extent to which CGIAR BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 125 research has led to poverty reduction was im- relationship between area under modern va- plemented under IFPRI leadership. This ef- rieties and incomes of the poor disappeared fort culminated in seven poverty impact stud- between 1987 and 2002. ICRAF’s analysis ies.58 Table A2.1 provides a summary of five of agroforestry-related soil fertility replen- of these studies.59 Two studies assessing the ishment technologies in Kenya appears to poverty impacts of modern variety rice adop- suggest that poorer households with smaller tion in Bangladesh, China, and India were na- landholdings were less able to benefit from tional in their coverage, while the studies of those technologies. Similarly, the analysis of fishpond and vegetable technologies in Ban- fishpond and vegetable technologies in Ban- gladesh, soil fertility replacement due to agro- gladesh indicated that landholdings were a forestry in Kenya, and creolized and recycled limiting factor in adoption of fishponds for maize varieties in Mexico had a more limited the poorest households and that fishponds geographic focus. also may have raised the vulnerability of the In general, the studies described in poor to income shocks. The study of creolized table A2.1 were unable to establish firm em- and recycled maize in Mexico raised interest- pirical links between the technology prod- ing issues about informal breeding by poor ucts and packages and poverty reduction. The farmers and the links to CIMMYT germ- Bangladesh modern variety rice study found plasm but fell short of quantifying its impact that the statistical significance of the positive on the poverty status. Table A2.1 Summary of poverty impact studies Institution Location Program (timing) (scale)a assessed Impacts on poverty status IRRI Bangladesh IRRI rice Lower consumer prices. (1988, 2001) (National sample: improvement Modern variety rice adoption freed up labor resources 1,888 hectares, research for participation in nonagricultural labor markets. 64 villages) Positive, significant direct impact from area with modern variety on income of the poor in 1987 but not in 2002. IFPRI Bangladesh Polyculture Social empowerment (particularly women). (1996, 2001) (Three districts: fishponds Positive impact on vulnerability clearer for 321 hectares, and improved vegetables, ambiguous for polyculture. 27 villages) vegetablesb Some coercive transfer of gains. ICRAF Kenya Soil fertility Social networks crucial to the poor attaining (1999–2002) (Two districts: replenishment benefits of soil fertility replenishment. 120 hectares, Households with little land, labor less likely to benefit. 17 villages) Positive impact on asset accumulation, but not on expenditure or nutrition. CIMMYT Mexico Creolized Popularity with poor farmers because of the (Two states: varieties and cost savings from improved varieties and the 325 hectares, recycled hybrids superior production traits from landraces. 12 communities) IFPRI China, India IRRI rice China: 6.77 million people moved out of poverty (1981–1999) (National: district- improvement due to IRRI research (but steady decline from level data) research 1 million in 1981 to 30,000 in 1999) India: 14 million people moved out of poverty due to IRRI research during 1990s (but declining in latter half of decade) Decline over time in individuals who moved out of poverty per $1,000 of IRRI spending a. Excludes nonadopting control villages or households used for purposes of comparison. b. Technologies developed by ICLARM and Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center, respectively. Source: Hossain et al. for IRRI; Hallman, Lewis, and Begum for IFPRI 1996 and 2001; Place et al. for ICRAF; Bellon et al. for CIMMYT; and Fan et al. for IFPRI 1981–99. 126 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T In contrast, the studies of modern vari- impact; and those few have had to confront ety rice in China and India provide stark em- a number of methodological challenges in pirical evidence of impact. They find that be- terms of attribution of benefits to CGIAR tween 1981 and 1999 more than 6.75 million Centers, establishment of meaningful coun- Chinese moved out of poverty due to IRRI’s terfactuals, and assessment of spillovers.63 A research. In India the numbers are even more few of these studies have already been men- impressive: 14 million people moving out of tioned in the context of policy-oriented re- poverty between 1991 and 1999. According search. Institutional capacity building lies at to these studies, lower food prices from in- the heart of CIFOR’s establishment of crite- creased aggregate production were the main ria and indicators of sustainable forest man- pathway by which modern variety rice reduced agement in forest policymaking.64 Likewise, poverty in China and India.60 But even here, IFPRI’s Ethiopian Strategy Support Program there is one sour element to the story. The has generated significant qualitative evidence bulk of these impressive poverty reduction ac- of impact on capacity building within Ethi- complishments occurred in the early part of opia’s government and research sectors.65 In the time period analyzed, with the marginal addition, many of the activities surrounding contribution to poverty reduction declining the Alternatives to Slash and Burn SWEP re- rather precipitously over time. The study’s volved around institutional capacity building authors attribute this to the diminished mar- in countries with large tracts of tropical forest ginal yield improvements from investment in land.66 rice research over time and budgetary limits Another study conducted under the aus- for IRRI research, along with the inevitable pices of SPIA’s initiative on policy-oriented decrease in the marginal contribution of rice research deserves mention here. Gotor, Car- research to poverty reduction in the face of acciolo, and Watts document Bioversity’s rapidly falling poverty levels.61 pivotal role in the establishment of in-trust agreements governing CGIAR germplasm.67 Capacity building with partners These agreements formally maintained the in- ternational legal status of germplasm that the Capacity building is not, strictly speak- CGIAR held in ex situ genebanks. This was ing, CGIAR research that generates specific truly a landmark achievement: Without these outputs. But it is an essential element of the agreements , multilateral exchange of genetic CGIAR’s capacity to support the delivery of resources would have been subject to signifi- impact, through empowering national agri- cant disruption, as states would have had the cultural research system partners and others authority to restrict access to CGIAR’s very involved in the impact pathway. The CGIAR sizeable germplasm holdings. invests about 20 percent of its resources in Training is one of the major capacity- capacity building to strengthen national building activities of nearly all CGIAR Cen- agricultural research systems, a share that ters. A systemwide evaluation of training com- has remained relatively steady over time. 62 missioned by the Science Council found that Capacity building covers a range of activities Center training is broadly relevant to national classified into formal short-term and gradu- agricultural research systems’ capacity needs, ate training, networking activities, support training quality is generally of high quality, to specific countries that integrates training, and trainees’ perceptions confirm that sig- and technical assistance and institutional and nificant synergies exist between training and infrastructural development. In addition, positive research outcomes.68 That review also capacity building involves various informal found substantial regional differences in the activities, such as mentoring of scientists. effectiveness of training within the CGIAR, Despite the substantial resources de- with particular deficits associated with poorer voted to this activity, there are few studies on countries. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 127 Graduate training has been favorably as- adoption of expected and yet-to-be-realized sessed by ILRI in contribution to skills and outputs. by inference to institutional development. 69 Finally, several Centers have undertaken CIMMYT has conducted four evaluations of long-term support to build country-specific its in-service short courses since 1971. Most research capacity, especially for weak national recently, Cooksy and Arellano favorably agricultural research systems or countries evaluated these short courses for instigating emerging from civil conflict. IRRI has evalu- new knowledge and skills, accessing new re- ated the impacts of these programs in Cam- search methods, changing research priorities, bodia, Laos, and Myanmar for programs that and building social capital among wheat and ran over a decade.75 While all three studies maize scientists from around the world.70 show rapid increases in rice production and Neither studies provide rigorous quantitative incomes, they fail to show attribution or con- measures of impact, however. Alternatively, sider the counterfactual, although in all prob- Jackson finds that impacts on training and ca- ability, IRRI’s contribution was critical to the pacity building of IFPRI’s research on gender success. and intrahousehold allocation were “rather lower than hoped,” due to lack of demand on Notes the part of policymakers.71 Networking is also a major capacity-build- 1. The choice of 1960 was made to account for expenditures made by the founding Centers prior to formal inception of ing activity of all Centers. These networks in- the system in 1971. volve various forms of exchange of knowledge 2. Sanint (2004). and materials and research collaboration, and 3. Morris and Lopez Pereira (1999). many also provide equipment and training. 4. Maredia and Raitzer (2006). However, the role of the CGIAR Centers and 5. Maredia and Raitzer (2006). the organization of networks vary widely.72 6. Maredia and Raitzer (2006), p. 18. There are very few recent evaluations of 7. Hazell (forthcoming). impacts of these networks. One is a recent 8. Pingali and Kelley (2007). evaluation by Pray of the Asian Maize Bio- 9. Raitzer (2003). technology Network organized by CIMMYT 10. In addition, most studies tend not to explicitly address counterfactual scenarios of technology products that in six Asian countries.73 This network was would have been produced (by alternative sources) in successful in developing new skills in molec- a world without the CGIAR—Evenson and Rosegrant ular-assisted selection focused on specific dis- (2003) being a notable exception. ease problems. The study also measured in- 11. Evenson (2003a, 2003b). creased expenditure on maize research, more 12. Raitzer (2003). exchanges within the region, and a sharply 13. Evenson and Gollin (2003). increased rate of journal publication, espe- 14. Evenson and Rosegrant (2003). cially in international journals (from 4 inter- 15. Evenson and Gollin (2003). 16. Joshi, Asokan, and Bantilan (2005); Shiyani et al. (2002), national articles before the network was es- pp. 33–39. tablished to 24 after). This study goes beyond 17. Kristjanson et al. (2002). direct effects on network participants to look 18. Deb et al. (2004). at spillover effects and potential economic 19. Walker (2007). impacts from faster progress in achieving dis- 20. Somado, Guei, and Keya (2008). ease resistance (even though products of the 21. Anderson and Hazell (1989). network have yet to reach farmers’ fields). A 22. Gollin (2006); Pandey and Pal (2000). similar study by Longmore et al. reviewed a 23. Gollin (2006). capacity-building effort in biotechnology for 24. Marasas, Smale, and Singh (2004). insect resistant Bt sorghum in India.74 They 25. Smale and Drucker (forthcoming). also estimated a benefit-cost ratio of at least 26. Stokstad (2007), pp. 1786–1787. 24, again based on assumptions about future 27. Abele et al. (2005), pp. 233–237. 128 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 28. CIMMYT (2006). supply policies and barley production (Shideed, Alary, 29. Lantican, Dubin, and Morris (2005). et al. 2007) and ILRI research on dairy marketing policy in Kenya (Kaitibie et al. 2007)—also indicate benefits 30. Xu et al. (2006). exceeding cost by a substantial margin . 31. Deb and Dey (2005). 53. Ryan (1999). 32. Deb and Dey (2005). 54. Colman, and Mellor (2007). 33. Gunaratna (2007). 55. English and Renkow (2007). 34. Ethiopian Health & Nutrition Research Institute, 56. Thirtle, Lin, and Piesse (2003), p. 1973. Sasakawa-Global (2000); International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (2008). 57. Alston, Dehmer, and Pardey (2006). 35. Low et al. (2007). 58. Adato and Meinzen-Dick (2007). 36. Stein, Sachdev, and Qaim (2008). 59. Two other case studies—of hybrid maize in Zimbabwe and of agricultural research–urban poverty linkages 37. Gregersen and Kelley (2007). in India and China—are omitted from consideration 38. Kelley and Gregersen (2005). here because the poverty impacts they chronicle are 39. Zeddies et al. (2000). not explicitly connected to specific CGIAR research or technology products. 40. Maredia and Raitzer (2006). 60. In contrast, the other studies, which focused on direct 41. Coulibaly et al. (2004). productivity effects, did not find significant linkages 42. van den Berg (2004). between technology adoption and poverty reduction. 43. Godtland et al. (2004). 61. Fan et al. (2007). 44. Feder, Murgai, and Quizon (2004). 62. Pingali and Kelley (2007). 45. Tripp, Wijeratne, and Piyadasa (2005). 63. SPIA is currently initiating an effort to develop methods for 46. Templeton and Jamora (2007). accommodating these challenges. 47. Using data from CGIAR annual reports, Havenner 64. Spilsbury (2007). computes that overall funding for policy grew by roughly 65. Colman and Mellor (2007). 85 percent between early 1992 and 2005—from 10 66. SPIA (2006b). percent to 16.5 percent of the total systemwide budget. During the same period, production-related funding 67. Gotor, Caracciolo, and Watts (2007). fell by 15 percent, from nearly half to just over a third 68. CGIAR Science Council (2006). of the systemwide budget (Art Havenner, personal 69. Eley et al. (2003). communication). 70. Cooksy and Arellano (2006). 48. SPIA (2006a). 71. Jackson (2005). 49. World Bank (2003). 72. Plucknett, Ozgediz, and Smith (1990). 50. SPIA (2006a). 73. Pray (2006). 51. SPIA (2006a), p. 19. 74. Longmore, Gordon, and Bantilan (2007). 52. Preliminary results from two of the other commissioned studies—analyses of ICARDA research on Syrian fertilizer 75. Young et al. (2001); Shrestha and Bell (2002); Shrestha, Boupha, and Khamphoukeo (2006). BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 129 APPENDIX 3 Terms of reference and Review Panel members Terms of reference FAO, IFAD, and UNDP as cosponsors. The CGIAR provides 15 international agricul- In the last several years the CGIAR has wit- tural research centers with strategic guid- nessed considerable changes as part of its ance, financial assistance, and a forum for internal reforms, including establishing an interaction with donors. A loosely connected Executive Council, creation of the Science network of several components forms the Council, and the launching of the Challenge CGIAR System. The pillars of the CGIAR Programs. The 15 Centers have also created an System are: the Consultative Group, its Exec- alliance to more effectively facilitate and coor- utive Council (ExCo), and partners that pro- dinate their collective activities. Even though vide funding and strategic guidance; the Sci- all CGIAR Centers and programs undergo ence Council that helps to maintain a high external reviews regularly, there has been no quality of science in the CGIAR System; 15 review at the system level to assess the impact legally independent international agricultural and effectiveness of changes initiated during research Centers, and the Alliance they have the reform program except for one of the com- formed for their collective action, which are ponents of the reform (the System Office).1 the implementing agencies and research arm The last CGIAR System review was con- of the CGIAR system. ducted nine years ago, and it has been four These are supported by the CGIAR Sys- years since the last independent meta-evalu- tem Office (SO),4 which has a pivotal facilitat- ation commissioned by the World Bank was ing role in the integration and administration released. Therefore, this external evaluation of the System. will take stock of the efficacy of the CGIAR Each part of the System is expected to per- partnership and address issues of governance, form a distinct set of functions, based on its management, alignment, and other changes roles and responsibilities. These functions are required at the System level.2 The review will meant to be mutually supportive and comple- also assess the achievements and effectiveness mentary: the components are interdependent, of the CGIAR research through an analysis and the whole is far greater than the sum of and synthesis (of existing reviews and im- the parts, thereby providing the CGIAR with pact assessments of the Center programs and its systemic character. The CGIAR System Challenge Programs) and assess if the system collaborates in research and research-related is well positioned to address the emerging activities with many partners, to support, con- future food security and agriculture-related duct, and disseminate international agricul- problems of developing countries.3 tural research of the highest quality, in order to ensure that agricultural science and tech- Introduction nology contribute significantly to sustainable The Consultative Group on International development and the attainment of the Mil- Agricultural Research (CGIAR), created in lennium Development Goals. 1971, is an informal association of 64 inde- The mission of the CGIAR is to achieve pendent public and private sector members, sustainable food security and reduce poverty from South and North, with the World Bank, in developing countries through scientific 130 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T research and research-related activities in Member-commissioned reviews of centers/ the fields of agriculture, livestock, forestry, projects, and other external reviews of the fisheries, policy, and natural resource CGIAR programs. Findings from both parts management. will be consolidated in a final report that will These terms of reference (TOR) describe also highlight linkages between the two com- the following: objectives of the external re- ponents of the review. view, scope of the review, methodology, re- ports, budget, review panel, ExCo Ad Hoc Part I. Efficacy of partnership: Advisory Group, tentative timeline, and key governance, management, and next steps; an ExCo ad hoc advisory group has alignment in the System been established to guide finalization of the The Consultative Group, its Executive Council, TOR for the external review and panel com- and partners position. The group is composed of one alli- 1. What are the strengths and weaknesses ance representative, two CGIAR Members, of the partnership as a whole? Is the gov- and one Science Council (SC)/Standing Panel ernance structure effective and enhanc- on Impact Assessment (SPIA) member. ing the system? What have been the key changes in the governance and manage- Objectives of this Review. The Review will ment processes/procedures in recent years, have the following objectives, with a special and how did that impact the partnership? emphasis on (but not limited to) the impact Are there key constraints/limitations to of the recent reform program: the partnership, and if so, what are they? To take stock and assess the efficacy 2. How effective is the partnership approach of the CGIAR partnership. taken by the CGIAR in forming an in- To assess the effectiveness of CGIAR formal international association? Are research. there any lessons for/from other global To make recommendations for partnerships? changes in the CGIAR System that 3. How effective is the CGIAR in serving will improve its efficacy and effective- as a platform and catalyst in supporting ness in view of emerging challenges and delivering international agricultural for food security, agriculture, and research for development? natural resource management of the 4. In terms of the governance of the Sys- poor. tem, what has been the performance of the Executive Council since its inception Scope of the Review. The Review would have in 2001 as one of the important compo- two concurrent, closely linked, and equally nents of the reform program? Has the important parts. Part one: the review of the Executive Council made decisionmaking efficacy of the CGIAR System operating as more effective and efficient within the an international partnership building on CGIAR partnership? Are the role, size, three pillars—the Consultative Group, the and composition of ExCo appropriate Science Council, and the 15 research centers for its mandate? How effective are the and their Alliance. Part two: the review of CGIAR Annual General Meetings, in- the effectiveness of research supported by the cluding the Stakeholder Meeting and CGIAR based on analysis and synthesis of the Business Meeting? existing external evaluations such as center 5. Does the partnership operate in a trans- External Program and Management Reviews parent manner? How are the members (EPMRs), the ongoing external reviews of of the partnership accountable to the Challenge Programs, reviews of the System- partnership? wide and Ecoregional Programs (SWEPs), 6. How effective is the CGIAR in establish- impact assessment studies, the CGIAR ing and facilitating partnerships among BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 131 CGIAR Centers and between CGIAR 2. How has the process for setting system Centers and external partners (both pub- priorities, led by the SC, contributed to lic and private sector)? the CGIAR strategic alignment? 7. Is the current financing structure for the 3. Is the size, composition, and structure of system appropriate? Is it efficient and the Science Council suitable for the key suited to the development and dissemi- functions it performs within the CGIAR nation of international public goods? Is system? the CGIAR constricting or creating syn- 4. How is the SC perceived by CGIAR ergies for aligning the funding? What is Members and Centers? the role of unrestricted resources in sup- porting the system, including the reform The Centers program? How has the decline in unre- 1. How well does the Alliance of the stricted funding affected the system as CGIAR Centers perform collectively? a whole, particularly its governance and Is the Alliance a cost-effective mecha- its ability to deliver research products nism for collective action? How is it per- that contribute to the fulfillment of the ceived by Centers, Members and other CGIAR mission? How effectively does partners? the system deal with financial risks? 2. How does system governance (ExCo 8. What is the role of the World Bank, as and the CGIAR) relate to Center gover- the largest contributor of unrestricted nance? How does System governance re- resources, in facilitating the operation late to the governance of the Alliance of of the system? How is the World Bank the CGIAR Centers? contribution (which is not only mon- 3. How does the autonomy of the 15 re- etary) assisting to leverage other CGIAR search Centers and of the 64 Members Members’ funding into the CGIAR and balance with the need for accountability impacting reform of the system, its gov- and collective action at the System level? ernance, mode of operation, etc.? What What are the challenges of keeping the is the role of the other cosponsors? system aligned while also respecting this 9. How do CGIAR Members view their autonomy? involvement and change of involvement 4. How effective is the oversight and gov- over the past few years? And the role ernance of the individual Centers? How played by the cosponsors? well equipped are the Center Boards in playing this oversight role at the center The Science Council level? 1. How does the SC fulfill its role within 5. How effective is the partnering of the system? How is their performance CGIAR Centers outside the system? perceived by internal and external stake- holders? Has the SC effectively fulfilled The System Office the three main objectives for which it was 1. How effective is the System Office, as a set up: virtual structure, in helping to increase Enhancing and promoting the qual- coordination, capture synergies, and in- ity, relevance, and impact of science crease overall performance of central ser- in the CGIAR. vice units that support the Centers and Advising the group on strategic scien- the CGIAR System as a whole? tific issues of importance to its goals. 2. How well do three units of the System Mobilizing and harnessing the best Office, namely the CGIAR Secretariat, of international science for address- Science Council Secretariat, and the Al- ing the goals of the international ag- liance Office, perform their functions? ricultural research community? Are their structure, size, and composition 132 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T appropriate for the key functions they resource management, and food security? perform? Are accountability mechanisms What is the evidence of the relationship and processes for increasing efficiency ap- between achieving these and economic propriate given their respective roles? Is growth and poverty alleviation? there a potential conflict of interest in 2. What evidence is there that CGIAR- the CGIAR Secretariat’s involvement in generated technology and policy options administration of the allocation of the are international public goods that are funds from the World Bank and other utilized by partners, with the former ul- donors? timately adopted by poor smallholders 3. What are CGIAR Members and Centers and the latter implemented by develop- perceptions about the three units? ment agencies? 3. Does the CGIAR contribute to poverty Relations and synergies across the three pillars reduction objectives of international de- of the CGIAR System velopment agencies (including the World 1. Are the levels of responsibility and ac- Bank), and how are CGIAR outputs countability among the three pillars ap- being utilized by them? propriate? Are the voices of the three pil- 4. How effective are the Challenge Pro- lars appropriately represented in System grams, both in terms of partnership mod- governance? els they use and also in terms of the pro- 2. What are the costs, including transac- ductivity of the research? tion costs, and benefits of the governance 5. What pressing issues should be consid- structure? Is the distribution of these ered for new and expanded CGIAR ef- costs and benefits among the three pillars forts? Are there areas where CGIAR re- appropriate to enhance the implementa- search could be reduced? tion of the mission of the CGIAR? 6. How does investment in agricultural 3. What are CGIAR Members’ perceptions research and development relate to agri- about the issues of relative autonomy and cultural GDP (for example, Sub-Saharan accountability and about the current lay- Africa), and what is the share of the total ers of governance in the System CGIAR investment in total agricultural research and development (for the same Part II. Achievements and region)? What is the trend and would an effectiveness of CGIAR research increase in international agricultural re- To assess the achievements (outputs, out- search investments (such as the CGIAR) comes, and impact) and the effectiveness affect agricultural GDP significantly? of the CGIAR research, the evaluation will For example, given the small share of the rely mainly on analysis and synthesis of the total investment in agricultural research EPMRs, the Challenge Program External and development that is represented by Reviews (CPERs), external reviews of system- the CGIAR investment, and given the re- wide programs, the CGIAR Member–com- turns on this investment so far, would an missioned reviews of centers, projects, and increased investment in CGIAR research other external reviews of the CGIAR pro- bring about more than proportional re- grams, Center- or SC-commissioned impact turns in terms of impacts on the CGIAR assessment studies, general Center reports mission? as well as pertinent development literature. 7. Has the CGIAR system maintained its The evaluation should address the following focus on international public goods? issues: How well do the system priorities posi- 1. Given the level of investment, how do tion the CGIAR with respect to its mis- CGIAR funds contribute to enhanc- sion? What forces are affecting programs ing agricultural productivity, natural and decisionmaking in this regard? Is BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 133 this the most effective focus to alleviate b. Review of evaluations conducted by poverty? other CGIAR Members, including 8. How effective are current approaches to the independent World Bank Opera- collaborative research with partners? Do tions Evaluation Department Meta- the respective partnership roles properly evaluation of the CGIAR. exploit the comparative and comple- c. Evaluations of other Global mentary advantages of those involved? Programs. Are linkages with national agricultural d. Pertinent development literature research systems, civil society organiza- (including independent academic tions, advanced research institutes, and research on the CGIAR). the private sector effectively supporting e. Center reports. the achievements of CGIAR research ob- 4. Assessment of CGIAR financial and jectives as well as meeting partner needs funding information to better under- and expectations, e.g., how effective have stand the use of unrestricted funding. Centers been in capacity building of 5. The Review Panel could also commis- NARS? sion studies to address some of the spe- cific issues that would be outlined during Methodology the inception consultation (as described The methodology for the Review will include later). the following components: 6. The Review Panel would also use quan- 1. Interviews with Members, partners, Cen- titative indicators in their assessment, ter staff, Center Board members, SO Unit where possible. staff, and other stakeholders. 2. Review of core CGIAR documents, such Reports as the Charter, CGIAR/ExCo decisions, The evaluation panel is expected to prepare available reviews (e.g., System Office, three reports: Stripe Review of Corporate Governance 1. Inception consultation and work plan. The of CGIAR Centers), and so on. Specific panel will have two inception consulta- issues to look at are the programmatic and tions with the ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory structural alignment efforts (for example, Group: (i) at the outset of the work to the Centers in Africa), and the system- seek overall guidance and briefing from wide management of financial risks. the Advisory Group; (ii) two to three 3. Analyses and syntheses: weeks later the evaluation panel will pres- a. Reviews of Centers’ External ent a work plan to the ExCo Ad Hoc Ad- Program Management Reviews visory Group seeking their feedback and (EPMRs) together with the exter- suggestions. nal reviews of the Challenge Pro- The work plan will provide an oppor- grams (CPs) and Systemwide and tunity to Ecoregional Programs (SWEPs). In a. Further specify methodological and addition, the evaluations of impact organizational aspects of the evalu- studies, and other CGIAR evalu- ation, including any provisions for ations including evaluations done needed meetings, interviews, site by Centers can serve to assess the visit travel, new data collection, etc. impact of the CGIAR on poverty b. Further specify the deliverables avail- reduction at large. Also the annual able for the interim report (please see Performance Measurement System below) (PMS) can provide information on The panel will explore the feasibility the system including accountability of developing quantitative indicators that and transparency. could possibly be used in the evaluation. 134 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 3. Interim Report. An interim report is ex- Process for Panel pected by March 10, 2008. The CGIAR Membership will be invited to 4. Final Report. nominate firms/institutions or individuals The final full report should be sub- for Panel membership according to the above mitted by July 2008 and will highlight specified profiles. The TOR of the External clear and actionable recommendations. Review will be posted on the CGIAR website A draft final report should be sent by the inviting nominations and applications. The panel for comments. TOR will also be circulated on listserves of professional evaluation associations. A Budget long list of all nominations and applications While the World Bank has agreed to defray received will be prepared and presented to the a major part of the review cost, it would be ExCo Ad Hoc Group. The proposed final list important for other CGIAR Members to identified by the ExCo Ad Hoc Group will be share the costs. The CGIAR Secretariat would sent to ExCo/CGIAR for approval. be approaching other Members on this issue of sharing costs of the Review. Estimates are Executive Council (ExCo) being generated. ad hoc advisory group ExCo established an “ExCo ad hoc advisory Review panel group to guide finalization of the TOR for Composition the external review and panel composition. The Review Panel will be composed of a core The group should be composed of 1 Alli- team of five members: ance representative, 2 CGIAR Members, and A panel chair with extensive expertise 1 SC/SPIA member.” (Summary Record of in evaluation, preferably of interna- Proceeding of the 12th Meeting of the CGIAR tional research for development net- Executive Council May 2007). works or global partnerships. As such the ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory A member with extensive experience Group will guide the finalization of the TOR on institutional governance issues and and the selection of the Review Panel and will expertise in organizational structure advise the review panel during the review, in issues in the public/private sector. particular during the inception consultation. A member with an understanding of At the same time, the ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory networks or partnerships of multi- Group will maintain an adequate distance lateral organizations. from the panel to ensure the independence of Two members with extensive exper- the review. tise in international agricultural re- search for development leading the Tentative timeline and key next steps program review through part 2 of the 1. ExCo Ad Hoc Group formed—June 29, Review. 2007. It would be desirable to have one to two 2. ExCo Ad Hoc Group meeting to finalize members of the panel with significant CGIAR TOR and discuss panel composition and System knowledge. next steps—July 17, 2007. 3. Invite nominations for panel composition Support and backstopping from July 17 to August 2, 2007, including One or two consultants will support the panel nominations from CGIAR Membership, and report to the panel chair. The CGIAR the ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory Group, open Secretariat, the SC Secretariat, and the Alli- call for nominations and applications on ance Office will help with providing neces- the CGIAR website, wide dissemina- sary background documentation supporting tion of TOR to professional evaluation the Review. associations. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 135 4. Long list of nominations and applications Board in the Annual Report on Operations compiled and sent to ExCo Ad Hoc Ad- Evaluation. While at the Bank, Ms. McAllis- visory group—August 3, 2007. ter also held positions as Director of External 5. Virtual meeting of the ExCo Ad Hoc Ad- Affairs and United Nations Relations, Direc- visory Group on the selection of a short tor of Special Projects, Strategy and Resource list of the panelists for consideration by Management Vice Presidency; and Special ExCo/CGIAR—August 7, 2007. Advisor to the Vice President on managing for 6. TOR and panel composition approved results in the East Asia and Pacific Region. by ExCo/CGIAR before September 30, Prior to joining the World Bank, Ms. 2007. McAllister held executive positions in the 7. Inception consultation/work plan dis- Canadian International Development cussed with ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory Agency (CIDA) in operations and policy, Group by November 16, 2007. including Director General, Performance 8. Final Inception Report by December 14, Review (Evaluation, Internal Audit, and Re- 2007. sults Based Management); Director General, 9. Interim Report on part 1 and part 2 by Latin American and the Caribbean Region; March 10, 2008. Director of the China Country Program; 10. Final report submitted by July 30, 2008. Counselor, Development in Indonesia; and Director of Women in Development. During Panel Members, secretaries, her career, Ms. McAllister represented CIDA and advisors and the World Bank in leadership positions in a wide variety of high level international Elizabeth J. McAllister, Panel Chair forums, including OECD–DAC, the United Elizabeth McAllister has held leadership Nations, the Organization of American positions in international development for 25 States, and country coordination meetings. years. She served in a number of senior posi- Her education includes a Masters of Pub- tions at the World Bank including Director lic Administration from Harvard University of the Operations Evaluation Department and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science (OED; now the Independent Evaluation from the University of New Brunswick. She Group) where she directed a work program has taken courses in law and program evalua- of 400 products a year to provide an indepen- tion and benefited from the World Bank’s in- dent assessment of World Bank/International tensive Executive Development Program with Development Association operations, poli- Harvard University, INSEAD, and Stanford cies, and practices to satisfy the require- University. ments of accountability to member countries. Ms. McAllister is a recipient of a number While leading the department, she was deeply of awards for community service and leader- involved with her staff in a number of major ship, including a 1994 Governor General’s evaluations, including Forestry, Aid Coordi- Commemorative Medal in recognition of nation, Gender, the Special Partnership for significant contribution to Canada. African Development, and several Country Her recent clients include various pro- Assistance Evaluations. Ms. McAllister led grams within the World Bank, the European OED through a change process that funda- Commission, the Canadian Task Force on mentally altered how the department oper- Afghanistan, the International Federation of ated. During her tenure, OED linked its work the Red Cross Red Crescent, and the Carib- plan to the Bank’s policy agenda and scaled up bean Development Bank. In addition to her its products to country, thematic/sector, and professional contributions, Ms. McAllister global reviews from a previous focus on project works pro bono for a number of organizations evaluation, and developed a results framework focused on disability, international relations, to measure its own outcomes reported to the development, and international evaluation. 136 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Keith Bezanson, Panel Member Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Keith Bezanson holds degrees from Carle- Minister of India. Recently, he has taken over ton University (BA) and Stanford University as the Chief Executive Officer of the newly (PhD), as well as the degree of Doctor of Sci- created South Asian University located in ence (Honoris Causa) from the University of New Delhi. His teaching career includes Sussex. His career has involved over 35 con- international experience as a Visiting Fellow secutive years of scholarship and leadership in at the Institute of Development Studies, Uni- international development. versity of Sussex, England; a Visiting Research Dr. Bezanson has taught, researched, and Fellow at the Institute of Developing Econo- published on a wide range of development mies, Tokyo; and a Visiting Professor at the subjects, including African education, sus- University of Mauritius. Professor Chadha tainable development, science and technology, is currently an Honorary Professor at Shen- poverty reduction, development effectiveness, zhen University, China, and Nihon Fuku- the multilateral development system, the fi- shi University, Nagoya-Japan. Additionally, nancing of development, institutional trans- Professor Chadha serves as a member of the formation, the East Asian financial crisis, and International Advisory Board of the Centre the provision and financing of international for Development Research, Colombo. public goods. Professor Chadha is a recipient of numer- In addition, Dr. Bezanson has held a ous awards and distinctions for his contribu- number of senior leadership positions in in- tions in the field of economics. He has recently ternational organizations, including Direc- been elected as the President of the Indian tor of the Institute of Development Studies, Economic Association. In prior years, he had President and Chief Executive Officer of the been the President of the Indian Society of International Development Research Centre, Agricultural Economics as well the Indian Ambassador of Canada to Peru and Bolivia, Society of Labour Economics. He is an author Vice-President of the Canadian International of 16 books and a contributor to 85 research Development Agency, and Vice-President of papers in national and international research the Inter-American Development Bank. He journals on a wide range of development issues recently (2006–07) served as Team Leader relating to India and other developing coun- and Principal Author of the largest indepen- tries of Asia, notably Indonesia and China. dent evaluation of a United Nations agency In addition to teaching, Professor Chadha (the Food and Agriculture Organization) ever worked as a consultant to several international carried out. development organizations, including such He serves as Senior Advisor to the Presi- United Nations agencies as the Food and Ag- dent of the International Fund for Agricul- riculture Organization, the International La- tural Development and to the Executive Di- bour Organization, the United Nations Con- rector of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, ference on Trade and Development, and the Tuberculosis, and Malaria. He also serves as a Economic and Social Commission for Asia trustee to a number of international develop- and the Pacific, and served on numerous in- ment institutions. ternational and national expert committees. Gopal K. Chadha, Panel Member John Ouma Mugabe, Panel Member G.K. Chadha has a 38-year distinguished John Ouma Mugabe is the Regional Director career in teaching and research. He is a Pro- of the Eastern and Southern African Office fessor Emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru Uni- of the International Union for Conservation versity, New Delhi from where he recently of Nature (IUCN). Prior to joining IUCN, retired as Vice-Chancellor. He is also a Uni- he was the Science and Technology Advisor versity Grants Commission Emeritus Fellow to the New Partnership for Africa’s Develop- for Economics and serves as a Member of the ment and Secretary of the African Ministerial BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 137 Council on Science and Technology based in Biological Diversity. In 2001 he became Head Pretoria, South Africa. He is an Associate Pro- of the Department of Agricultural Sciences at fessor at the Institute of Technological Inno- Imperial College (formerly Wye College) and vation University of Pretoria. In 2002, he was subsequently restructured this and environ- elected Fellow of the World Academy of Art mental research at Imperial College. During and Science. He also serves on boards of sev- this period he was also Chair of the Sustain- eral research and development institutes. able Agricultural Panel of the Biological and Dr. Mugabe holds a doctorate degree in Biotechnological Science Research Council political economy of science and technol- in the United Kingdom and a member of the ogy from the University of Amsterdam, The Science Advisory Council for the UK De- Netherlands, and has published widely. He is partment of Environment, Food and Rural the author of more than 20 monographs, edi- Affairs. tor of several books, and author of numerous research and conference papers on science, Karin Perkins, Panel Secretary technology, and environmental policy issues. Karin Perkins has extensive knowledge of the CGIAR. She was an analyst in the Review Jeff Waage, Panel Member Secretariat of the Third System Review, and Jeff Waage, OBE, is the Director of the Lon- she coordinated the World Bank Opera- don International Development Centre, a col- tions Evaluation Department’s (OED) 2003 laboration between six Colleges of the Uni- Meta-evaluation of the CGIAR, in which versity of London. she also evaluated the system’s governance Professor Waage was trained as an ento- and financing mechanisms. While work- mologist and ecologist and has made a sub- ing with the Foreign Agricultural Service of stantial research contribution to the theory the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), and practice of biological control and inte- she coordinated CGIAR-related programs grated pest management. between the USDA and the US Agency for His international research management ca- International Development. reer began when he joined CAB International, Ms. Perkins’s other evaluation experience where he was sequentially Director of the In- includes participating in OED’s evaluation of ternational Institute of Biological Control and the World Bank’s Forest Policy, in which she Chief Executive Officer of CABI Bioscience. was coauthor of a country case study on Brazil, During this period he developed and managed and conducting an assessment of the results of a range of donor-funded collaborations with World Bank agriculture projects in the Africa CGIAR and national agricultural research sys- Region for the Bank’s Agriculture and Rural tems partners, including the successful biologi- Development Department. Among other pro- cal control of insect pests on tropical crops and fessional positions, she managed a multistake- development of a biopesticide for the desert lo- holder research program on protected-area cust (the LUBILOSA programme with IITA). management in the Dominican Republic for While at CABI, he cofounded, with the Food Cornell University’s International Institute and Agriculture Organization and World Bank for Food, Agriculture, and Development; colleagues, the Global Integrated Pest Manage- analyzed land-use changes in Ecuador at the ment Facility; advised the United Nations and Agricultural Policy Institute in Quito; and re- World Bank on integrated pest management; searched high-value food crop production in and was the President of the International Or- Latin America at World Resources Institute. ganization of Biological Control. Most recently, Ms. Perkins has worked as Professor Waage cofounded, and subse- a consultant in the World Bank’s Agriculture quently chaired, the Global Invasive Species and Rural Development and Environment Programme, a project of the Global Environ- Departments, outlining the Bank’s strategy ment Facility linked to the Convention on for forest law enforcement and governance. 138 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Ms. Perkins has lived and worked in Latin programs to facilitate Canada’s agriculture America and Indonesia and has a master’s exports. He has led several evaluation studies degree in Development Policy from Cornell on agriculture programs (including evalua- University, with a background in agricultural tion of seasonal storage facilities and related and resource economics. research). He has also undertaken evaluations of research facilities, including an assessment Kenneth Watson, Panel Secretary of salmon stock management research facili- Kenneth Watson is a professional evalua- ties (Fisheries and Oceans Canada). tor and evaluation methodologist. He has Previously, Dr. Watson held a position of supported several major evaluation research Full Professor (fixed term) at the Australian efforts and has led assignments in the agricul- National University, Managing Business in tural research sector. Asia Program. He is the author of the Cana- Dr. Watson was the principal econo- dian Treasury Board Secretariat Guide to Ben- mist for the evaluation of the Eco-Research efit Cost Analysis and the Canadian Treasury Program, a joint program of the three main Board Guide to Evaluation Methods. He is a Granting Councils of the Government of recipient of the 2002 Contribution to Evalu- Canada (The Canadian Institutes of Medical ation Award of the Canadian Evaluation So- Research, the Social Sciences and Humanities ciety, presented annually to a person who has Research Council, and the Natural Sciences made a significant contribution to the theory and Engineering Research Council), involv- and practice of evaluation in Canada. In ad- ing an assessment of research carried out at 27 dition to professional publications, he has universities and research institutions and an 12 peer-reviewed articles on evaluation. He assessment of the effectiveness of the network is a member of the Campbell Collaboration itself. In addition, Dr. Watson was a principal for meta-evaluations and the development in a multicomponent evaluation of the Asian of systematic reviews across countries and Development Fund V–VIII for which he de- disciplines. signed the evaluation, coordinated inputs from Dr. Watson holds a doctorate from a large team of consultants, and wrote substan- Harvard University in economics and public tial parts of the draft of the synthesis report. finance. In 2007 he played a similar role for the Ca- ribbean Development Bank, leading a team of Joan Barclay, Panel Senior Advisor five consultants to evaluate the Special Devel- Joan Barclay has over 20 years of executive level opment Fund, Cycle 6. Dr. Watson has suc- experience in the development, growth, and cessfully completed three assignments for the leadership of nonprofit and for-profit organi- International Fund for Agricultural Devel- zations. Her expertise focuses on developing opment, in the area of concessionary resource actionable strategies that align organizational allocation models. He has also monitored or vision and mission with daily operations. Ms. evaluated agricultural extension projects for Barclay has a successful track record working the Asian Development Bank and the Carib- with senior executives to identify core com- bean Development Bank. petencies and to capitalize on opportunities Dr. Watson is a member of the Institute for that grow and strengthen the organization’s Risk Research (Canada) and has undertaken key programs and services. As an independent assignments related to food inspection (Audi- consultant and President of Barclay Associ- tor General of Canada), randomized field tri- ates, she has provided financial analysis and als for veterinary biologics (Auditor General of strategic direction to the senior management Canada), the strategic plan of the Central Ex- and nonprofit Board of Directors of National perimental Farm (Agriculture and Agrifood Geographic, the US Naval Institute, Public Canada), regional research facilities (Agricul- Radio International, and the Community ture and Agrifood Canada), and international Services for Autistic Adults and Children. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 139 During her tenure with Booz Allen Ham- the ministers of foreign affairs, education, in- ilton’s Change Management Division, Ms. dustry and the prime minister; advisor to the Barclay lead a team of analysts in a $30 bil- Chief of the National Planning Institute and lion restructuring of a US federal healthcare the National Council for Science and Tech- organization, including the evaluation of key nology; Vice-Chairman of the Board of the operating functions and processes. She was Industrial Technology Institute in Perú, and also instrumental in developing the strate- consultant to numerous private, public and gic plan for Booz Allen’s Global Healthcare civil society organizations. He has also taught Business spearheading the industry analysis at the Universidad del Pacífico and the Pon- of growth markets, competitors, trends, and tificia Universidad Católica del Perú and has opportunities. been a visiting lecturer at several universities Prior to starting Barclay Associates, she in the United States, Europe, and developing was a Vice President and Chief Financial Of- regions. ficer with Time Life, Inc., where she managed Dr. Sagasti holds a Ph.D. in operations the financial operations of a $250 million di- research and social systems sciences from the vision and was instrumental in the successful University of Pennsylvania and engineering launch of new products and services. degrees from the National Engineering Uni- Ms. Barclay holds a BS in Economics and versity in Lima, Peru and Pennsylvania State an MBA from the Wharton School of the University. He is the author of more than 20 University of Pennsylvania. She has been a books and monographs of about 200 papers Chartered Financial Analyst since 1990. and is a frequent contributor to Peruvian newspapers and magazines. Francisco Sagasti, Panel Senior Advisor Francisco Sagasti is Senior Associate at FORO Notes Nacional/Internacional, Chair of the Board of the Science and Technology Program at the 1. This System Office External Review focused on assessing the synergies and added value of operating as a System Office of the Prime Minister in Peru, member Office, but it did not review the individual units composing of the Board of Governors of the Canadian the System Office, as those are reviewed individually. International Development Research Cen- 2. The term alignment has been used in the CGIAR to encompass (i) alignment among Centers in terms tre, and member of the international advi- of program, governance and corporate services, sory board of The Lemelson Foundation. He (ii) alignment at system level among Members, and advises and consults with international orga- (iii) alignment between the different components constituting the CGIAR System (i.e. Members, Science nizations, private foundations, and public sec- Council, Centers, and System Office). Alignment in this tor agencies in a variety of subjects, including context refers to the capacity to work more effectively development financing, social policies, devel- together toward the accomplishment of the mission of the CGIAR. opment strategies, science and technology 3. In addition, the review would also help CGIAR meet policies, international relations and develop- requirements of the World Bank Development Grant ment cooperation. Facility whereby grant recipients need to be evaluated Previously, Dr. Sagasti has been Direc- every three to five years. The World Bank has contributed $50 million a year in the several past years to the CGIAR, tor of the Agenda PERÚ program at FORO and is the largest provider of unrestricted funds to the Nacional/Internacional; Chief of Strategic system. It provides the system with its Chair and Director, Planning and senior advisor at the World and houses the CGIAR Secretariat. The strategy used by the World Bank in the past several years is to support the Bank; visiting professor at the Wharton Centers with unrestricted resources (general support) and School of Finance, University of Pennsyl- the reform program initiated in 2001. vania; and chairman of the United Nations 4. The SO includes a list of nine units—Central Advisory Service for Intellectual Property, CGIAR Secretariat, Advisory Committee on Science and Tech- Chief Information Office, Alliance Office, Gender and nology for Development. Dr. Sagasti was a Diversity Program, Strategic Advisory Service on Human founder and executive director of GRADE, a Resources, Internal Audit Unit, Media Unit, and Science Council Secretariat. policy-oriented think tank in Peru; advisor to 140 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T APPENDIX 4 Methodology and sources of information Shareholder and stakeholder The Center’s productivity (outputs). consultations The Center’s impact (outcomes). The strength of the Center’s part- This appendix covers shareholder and stake- nerships (specific links within the holder consultations, a list of people consulted, CGIAR and outside). and a summary of the Independent Review Perceptions at the Center of the value Panel survey of informed stakeholders. added by the CGIAR (incremental funding, scientific priorities advice, Center visits integration of gender perspectives, Because time and resource constraints made it Challenge Programs, and adminis- impossible for Panel members to visit all Cen- trative support). ters during the Review, Panel members vis- Willingness at the Center to em- ited selected Centers. These Centers included brace possible reforms to the CGIAR Bioversity, ICRISAT, IFPRI, IITA, ILRI, System. IWMI, and World Agroforestry. The visits were not intended to evaluate Surveys and interviews Centers individually. They were intended to The Independent Review Panel survey of enable the Panel members to develop an un- informed stakeholders was not sample-based. derstanding of the Centers collectively—with Instead, the Panel surveyed all the people— a reasonably large sample—and to go into about 240—who had held certain positions Review questions in depth with the Centers. in the CGIAR or the Centers during the five This was vital to a successful Review. years preceding the survey. These included: Each Center visit included interviews with Directors General of the Centers. the Director General, the Board Chair (where Deputy Directors General (Research). possible), senior scientists and young scientists, Chairs of Center Boards. CGIAR member representatives (where possi- Members of the Science Council. ble), the national agricultural research systems, System Office professional and execu- and stakeholder organizations. Key topics ad- tive staff. dressed during each visit included: Challenge Program staff. The Center’s focus (strategy, scenarios). Representatives of CGIAR members. The Center’s funding (restricted With an overall response rate of 85 per- and unrestricted, other resource cent, the Survey gave the Panel significant mobilization). input from knowledgeable System stakehold- The Center’s stability profile and fi- ers across a broad spectrum of issues relevant nancial performance. to the Review’s objectives. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 141 Persons consulted (continued) CGIAR members Peter Core Director, Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), Australia Jos Kalders Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DGDC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belguim Alexandre Cardoso Office of International Relations, EMPRAPA, Brazil Elisio Contini Agricultural Economist, EMBRAPA, Brazil Francisco Reifschneider Past CGIAR Director, Brazil Charles Haines Multilateral Programs Branch, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada John Jackson Director, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada Iain MacGillivray Senior Program Officer, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada Helene Corneau Director General, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada Wendy Lawrence Gender Advisor, Africa (Retired), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada Huajun Tang Vice President, International Relations, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), China Arturo Vega Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Colombia Jean-Luc Khalfaoui Director General, Research, European Commission Remy Noe Director General, EuropAid, European Commission Paolo Sarfatti Agricultural Research for Development, Policies for Sustainable Development, European Commission Ayman Abou Hadid President, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Egypt Marja-Liisa Tapio-Biström Senior Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, International, Finland Isabel Alvarez Director, Research and Extension Division, Food and Agriculture Organizaiton of the United Nations (FAO) Mafa Chipeta Sub-Regional Coordinator, Eastern Africa, Ethiopia, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Eric Kueneman Chief, Crop and Grassland Service, Agriculture and Consumer Protection Department, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Alexander Müller Sous-Director General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Terri Raney Senior Economist and Editor, The State of Food and Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Pierre Fabre Executive Secretary, International Agricultural Research Commission (CRAI), France Marlene Diekmann Research Advisor, Advisory Service on Agricultural Research for Development, Germany Wolfgang Kasten Project Manager, GTZ, Germany Mangala Rai Secretary, Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), India Garvan McCann Senior Development Specialist, Technical Section, Irish Aid, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland Jean Lebel Director, Environment and Natural Resource Management, International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Maureen O’Neil President, International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Pascal Sanginga Senior Program Specialist, Regional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa, International Development Research Centre (IDRC) (continued) 142 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Persons consulted (continued) Rodney Cooke Director, Latin America and the Caribbean, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Shantanu Mathur Coordinator, Grant Program, Technical Advisory Division, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Jafar Khalghani Deputy Minister and Head, Agricultural Research and Education Organization, Iran Marina Puccioni Technical Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy Takuji Sasaki National Institute of Agrobiological Sciences (NIAS), Japan Masahiro Nakata Global Issues Cooperation Division, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Keiichi Sugita Deputy Director, Global Issues Cooperation Division, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Romano Kiome Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Kenya Ephraim Mukisira Director, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), Kenya Jeroen Rijniers Senior Policy Officer, Cultural Cooperation, Education and Research Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands Wijnand van Ijssel Department of Environment and Water (DMF) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands Vicki Poole Deputy Director, Global Group, NZ Agency for International Development (NZAID), New Zealand Andrea Stewart Development Programme Manager, Greater Mekong Subregion, NZ Agency for International Development (NZAID), New Zealand B.Y. Abubakar Executive Secretary, Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (ARCN), Nigeria Ruth Haug Professor, Head of Department, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Noragric, Norway Joseph Sebola Director, Research and Technology Development, Department of Agriculture, South Africa Håkan Marstorp Senior Research Advisor, Sida-SAREC, Sweden Jürg Benz Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Switzerland Katharina Jenny Senior Advisor, Natural Resources and Environment, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Switzerland Marco Ferroni Director, Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture Denis Kyetere Director General, National Agricultural Research Organization, Uganda Charles Mukebi Former Director General, National Agricultural Research Organization, Uganda Tamar Bello Head of Regional Development Banks Team, Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom David Howlett Team Leader, Growth and Livelihoods, Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom Gordon Conway Chief Scientist, Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom Andrew Steer Director General, Policy and Research, Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom Jonathan Wadsworth Senior Rural Livelihoods Adviser, General Research Department, Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom Philip Dobie United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Charles Ian McNeill Environment Programme Team Manager and Senior Biodiversity Adviser, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Robert Bertram Team Leader, International Research and Biotechnology, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), United States (continued) BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 143 Persons consulted (continued) Dana Dalrymple Senior Research Advisor and Agricultural Economist, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Belay Demissie Senior Agricultural Advisor and Head, Rural Productivity Division, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Ethiopia John Graham Senior Policy Advisor, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Ethiopia Franklin Moore Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Kifle Negash Office Chief, Business, Environment, Agriculture and Trade, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Ethiopia Meredith Soule Agricultural Economist, U.S. Agency for International Agricultural Development (USAID), United States Alliance of CGIAR Centers Papa Seck Director General, Africa Rice Centre Gaston Grenier Board of Trustees, Africa Rice Centre Ibrahim Bamba Policy Economist, Africa Rice Centre Shellemiah Keya Assistant Director General, Research and Development, Africa Rice Centre Olupomi Ajayi Liaison Scientist, Africa Rice Centre Francis Nwilene Liaison Scientist, Africa Rice Centre Emile Frison Director General, Bioversity International Anthony Gregson Board Chair, Bioversity International Kwesi Atta-Krah Deputy Director General, Bioversity International Geoff Hawtin Director General, CIAT Yves Savidan Past Board Chair, CIAT Albin Hubscher Director of Finance, CIAT Frances Seymour Director General, CIFOR Andrew Bennett Board Chair, CIFOR Yemi Katerere Deputy Director General, CIFOR Bentval Ravindra (Ravi) Prabhu Regional Office for Southern and Eastern Africa, CIFOR Thomas Lumpkin Director General, CIMMYT Lene Lange Board Chair, CIMMYT Masaru Iwanaga Past Director General, CIMMYT Marianne Bänziger Director, Global Maize Program, Regional Office—Kenya, CIMMYT Dennis Friesen Agronomist, African Livelihoods, Global Maize Program, Ethiopia, CIMMYT Pamela Anderson Director General, CIP Jim Godfrey Board Chair, CIP Hubert Zandstra Past Director General, CIP Mahmoud Solh Director General, ICARDA Guido Gryseels Board Chair, ICARDA Willie Dar Director General, ICRISAT Stein Bie Board Chair, ICRISAT Simon Best Past Board Chair, ICRISAT Rajesh Agrawal Director, Financial Services, ICRISAT V. Balaji Global Leader, Knowledge Management and Sharing, ICRISAT M.C.S. Bantilan Global Theme Leader, Institutions, Markets, Policy, and Impacts, ICRISAT (continued) 144 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Persons consulted (continued) P.M. Gaur Principal Scientist, Chickpea Breeding, ICRISAT C.L.L. Gowda Global Theme Leader, Crop Improvement, ICRISAT C.T. Hash Principal Scientist, ICRISAT D.A. Hoisington Global Theme Leader, Biotechnology, ICRISAT Richard Jones Program Manager, SCOSA (Sustainable Commercialization of Seeds in Africa), ICRISAT J.D.H. Keating Deputy Director General, Research, ICRISAT I.R. Nagaraj Director, Human Resources and Operations, ICRISAT S.N. Nigam Principal Scientist, Groundnut Breeding, ICRISAT Suresh Pande Principal Scientist, Legumes Pathology, ICRISAT P. Pathak Principal Scientist, ICRISAT K.N. Rai Principal Scientist, Pearl Millet Breeding, ICRISAT G.V. Ranga Rao Special Project Scientist, IPM, ICRISAT K. Purnachandra Rao Principal Scientist, Economics, ICRISAT P. Parthasarathy Rao Senior Scientist, ICRISAT Belum V.S. Reddy Principal Scientist, Sorghum Breeding, ICRISAT M. Prabhakar Reddy Head, Farm and Engineering Services, ICRISAT K.L. Sahrawat Visiting Scientist, ICRISAT K.B. Saxena Principal Scientist, Pigeonpea Breeding, ICRISAT B.I. Shapiro Director, Project Development and Marketing, ICRISAT H.C. Sharma Principal Scientist, Entomology, ICRISAT Piara Singh Principal Scientist, ICRISAT T.K. Sreedevi Scientist, ICRISAT R.P. Thakur Principal Scientist, Cereals Pathology, ICRISAT H.D. Upadhyaya Principal Scientist, Genetic Resources, ICRISAT Rajeev Varshney Senior Scientist, Applied Genomics, ICRISAT S.P. Wani Regional Theme Coordinator, GT-Agroecosystems, ICRISAT Joachim von Braun Director General, IFPRI Ross Garnaut Board Chair, IFPRI Suresh Babu Senior Research Fellow; Program Leader, Learning and Capacity Strengthening Program, IFPRI Regina Birner Senior Research Fellow, Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI David Governey Director of Finance and Administration, IFPRI Rajul Pandya-Lorch Chief of Staff, Director General’s Office; Head, 2020 Vision Initiative, IFPRI Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI Lauren Pandolfelli Research Analyst, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI Mark Rosegrant Director, Environment and Production Technology Division, IFPRI David Spielman Research Fellow, International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) Division, IFPRI Agnes Quisumbing Senior Research Fellow, Food Consumption and Nutrition, IFPRI Peter Hartmann Director General, IITA Bryan Harvey Board Chair, IITA (continued) BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 145 Persons consulted (continued) Paula Bramel Director, Research for Development in East and Southern Africa, IITA Melba Davis-Mussagy Agro-Enterprise Development Specialist, IITA Alfred Dixon Cassava Breeder, Root and Tuber Research, IITA Dominique Dumet Germplasm Specialist, Head of Gene Bank, IITA Vroh Bi Irie Molecular Geneticist, Central Biotechnology Lab, IITA Christian Fatokun Coordinator, Legumes for Livelihoods Project, Ibadan, Nigeria, IITA Lava Kumar Virologist (West and Central Africa), Plant Health Management, IITA Abebe Menkir Maize Breeder, Maize Research, IITA Lakshmi Menon Deputy Director General, Research for Development Support, IITA Omoshalewa Sholola Chief Financial Officer, IITA Carlos Sere Director General, ILRI Uwe Werblow Board Chair, ILRI P. Anandajayasekeram Manager, Capacity Strengthening, ILRI Peter Bezkorowajnyj Project Manager, Fodder Innovation Project, India, ILRI Delia Grace Postdoctoral Scientist, Kenya, ILRI Segenet Kelemu Director, Biosciences Eastern and Central Africa (BecA)-ILRI Platform, Nairobi, Kenya, ILRI Steve Kemp Scientist, Molecular Biologist, ILRI Loza Mesfin Assistant to the Director, Partnerships and Communications, ILRI Okeyo Mwai Acting Operating Project Leader, ILRI Liz Ogutu ILRI Julie Ojango Research Officer, ILRI Iheanacho Okike Country Programme Manager, Ibadan, Nigeria, ILRI Amos Omore Scientist, ILRI Roger Pelle Scientist, Molecular Biologist, ILRI Gabrielle Persley Special Advisor, Nairobi, Kenya, ILRI Tom Fitz Randolph Senior Scientist, Operating Project Leader, ILRI Edward Rege Scientist, ILRI Bruce Scott Director, Partnerships and Communications, ILRI Steve Staal Theme Director, ILRI Hamady Tall Head of Operations, ILRI Phil Toye Operating Project Leader, Improving Disease Control and Product Safety, ILRI Robert Zeigler Director General, IRRI Keijiro Otsuka Board Chair, IRRI Achim Doberman Deputy Director General for Research, IRRI Michael Jackson Director for Program Planning, IRRI Norman McDonald Director for Management Services, IRRI William Padolina Deputy Director General for Operations and Support Services, IRRI Glenn Gregorio Senior Scientist, Rice Breeding and Liaison Scientist to Africa Rice Centre, IRRI Colin Chartres Director General, IWMI Nobumasa Hatcho Board Chair, IWMI Mobin-ud-Din Ahmad Senior Researcher, Hydrology and Remote Sensing, IWMI (continued) 146 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Persons consulted (continued) Akissa Bahri Regional Director, Africa, IWMI Alexandra Clemett Researcher, Livelihoods/Water Quality/Waste Water, IWMI Charlotte De Fraiture Theme Leader, Water Basin Management, IWMI Mark Giordano Head, Institutions and Policies, Global Research Division, IWMI Amol Kisty Director, Finance and Administration, IWMI Peter McGornick Regional Director, Asia, IWMI David Molden Deputy Director General, Research, IWMI Aditi Mukherjee Post Doctoral Fellow, Economics, IWMI Andrew Noble Head, Southeast Asia, IWMI Lisa Maria Rebelo Post Doctoral Fellow, Wetlands Remote Sensing, IWMI Sonali Senaratna Sellamuttu Researcher, Livelihood Systems, IWMI Prasad Thenkabail Principal Researcher, Head, Remote Sensing/GIS and Natural Resource Management, IWMI David van Eyck Training, Career Development and Capacity Building Officer, IWMI Dennis Garrity Director General, World Agroforestry Centre Lynn Haight Board Chair, World Agroforestry Centre Henning Baur EA Regional Coordinator, World Agroforestry Centre Ramni Jamnadass Global Research Project Leader, Tree Genetic Resources and Domestication, World Agroforestry Centre Roeland Kindt Scientist, Ecologist, World Agroforestry Centre Alan Rodgers Consultant, World Agroforestry Centre Tony Simons Deputy Director General, World Agroforestry Centre August Temu Director of Partnerships, World Agroforestry Centre Lou Verchot Scientist, World Agroforestry Centre Stephen Hall Director General, WorldFish Center Trondt Bjorndal Board Chair, WorldFish Center Challenge Program staff Jean-Marcel Ribout Director, Generation Challenge Program Graham McLaren Biometrician, Head of IRRI-CIMMYT Crop Research Informatics Laboratory, Generation Challenge Program Howarth Bouis Director, HarvestPlus Challenge Program Kim Geheb Basin Network Coordinator, Challenge Program on Water and Food, IWMI Pamela George Program Manager, Challenge Program on Water and Food Jonathan Woolley Program Coordinator, Challenge Program on Water and Food Science Council Roelof Rabbinge Chair, Science Council Jim Ryan Chair, Standing Panel on Impact Assessment Michael Gale Member, Science Council; Panel Chair, External Programme and Management Review of International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) 2003 Ruben Echeverría Executive Director, Science Council Secretariat Peter Gardiner Senior Agricultural Research Officer, Science Council Secretariat Sirkka Immonen Senior Agricultural Research Officer, Science Council Secretariat Timothy Kelley Senior Agricultural Research Officer, Science Council Secretariat (continued) BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 147 Persons consulted (continued) Genetic Resources Policy Committee Carl-Gustav Thörnstrom Researcher, Swedish Biodiversity Centre; Associate Professor in genetic and plant breeding policies; research adviser to Sida and the Swedish University of Agricultural Science CGIAR System Office Ren Wang CGIAR Director Namita Datta Senior Technical Specialist, IFC; Past Governance Advisor, CGIAR Secretariat Maria Iksanderani Technical Specialist, CGIAR Secretariat Lori Dagdag Financial Officer, CGIAR Secretariat Fionna Douglas Program Manager, ARD; Former Strategic Alignment Advisor and Communications Team Leader, CGIAR Secretariat Laura Ivers Communications Officer, CGIAR Secretariat Maria Eugenia Herrera Lara Governance and Partnerships Specialist, CGIAR Secretariat Manny Lantin Science Advisor, CGIAR Secretariat Selcuk Ozgediz Senior Consultant, CGIAR Secretariat Harry Palmier Senior Liaison Officer, CGIAR Secretariat Shey Tata Investor Relations and Finance Team Chief, CGIAR Secretariat Jason Yauney Operations Analyst, CGIAR Secretariat Fiona Chandler Scientific Liaison Officer, Alliance of the CGIAR Centers Anne-Marie Izac Chief Alliance Officer, Alliance of the CGIAR Centers Vicki Wilde Director, CGIAR Gender and Diversity Program Victoria Henson-Apollonio Senior Scientist and Manager, CGIAR Central Advisory Service on Intellectual Property (CAS-IP) Simone Staiger-Rivas Leader, Knowledge Sharing Project, CIAT (ICT-KM Program) John Fitzsimon Director, Internal Audit Unit World Bank Group Jock Anderson Consultant, Portfolio Advisor, Agriculture and Rural Development Shawki Barghouti Consultant, Development Economics Brian Bedard Senior Livestock Specialist, ECSSD Adolfo Brizzi Sector Manager, South Asia, Agriculture and Rural Development Mayra Buvinic Sector Director, Gender and Development, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Derek Byerlee Staff director, World Development Report 2008 Mark Cackler Sector Manager, Agriculture and Rural Development Oscar Chemerinski Director, Agribusiness Department, International Finance Corporation (IFC) Christopher Delgado Strategy and Policy Advisor, Agriculture and Rural Development Sophia Drewnowski Senior Partnership Specialist, Global Programs and Partnerships Alan Gelb Director, Development Policy, Development Economics Christopher Gerrard Lead Evaluation Officer, Sector, Thematic and Global Evaluation, Independent Evaluation Group Marcos Ghattas Program Manager, Technical Cooperation Program Richard Henry Lead Economist, Agribusiness Department, International Finance Corporation (IFC) Emmanuel Njomo Senior Financial Management Specialist, Latin America and Caribbean Eija Pehu Science and Technology Advisor, Agriculture and Rural Development (continued) 148 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Persons consulted (continued) Jeeva Perumalpillai-Essex Lead Operations Officer, Ethiopia and Sudan Sustainable Development, Ethiopia Country Office Kathy Sierra Chair, CGIAR; Vice President, Sustainable Development Network Margret Thalwitz Director, Global Programs and Partnerships Juergen Voegele Sector Director, Agriculture and Rural Development Partner organizations, nonmember countries, and others A.T. Agboola Librarian, University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria Mario Allegri Director, Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agropecuarias (INIA), Uruguay O.J. Ariyo Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Development), University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria Solomon Assefa Director General, Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR), Ethiopia Channa Bambaradeniya Coordinator, Regional Species Conservation Programme (RSCP), IUCN Asia Hans Binswanger Consultant, AFTP1, World Bank; Former: Director Rural Development, Africa Region, the World Bank and Chairman, SPAAR Mpoko Bokanga Executive Director, African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) Margaret Catley-Carlson Chair, CGIAR Change Design and Management Team, 2001 Gelia Castillo Professor Emeritus, University of the Philippines, Los Baños, Philippines Kalyan Chakrawarthy Managing Director, Aakruthi Agricultural Associates of India Fernando Chaparro Director, Centro de Gestión de Conocimiento y la Innovación, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, Colombia M.S. Chari Centre for Sustainable Agriculture, Bagh Amber Pet, India Norman Clark Professor, Innovation Systems and Development, Open University, United Kingdom David Coombs ECORYS, CESO, Scotland Rukazambuga Ntirushwa Daniel Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, National University of Rwanda K. Rama Devi Director, Society for Transformation, Agriculture and Alternatives in Development (STAAD) Josué Dioné Director, Sustainable Development Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Ethiopia Adel El-Beltagy Chair, Global Forum on Agricultural Research P.S. Dravid President, JK Agri Genetics Ltd., India Howard Elliott Consultant, Winnipeg, Canada I.C. Eromosele Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic), University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria Patricio Faylon Executive Director, Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry, and Natural Resources Research and Development (PCARRD), Philippines Maria Fernandez CIRA for Research and Action, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Neway Gebre-Ab Director, Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), Ethiopia Raghunath Ghodake Chair, APAARI A.D.S. Gunawardena Board Member and Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation and Water Management, Government of Sri Lanka S.K. Gupta Senior Vice President, Research, Advanta India Ltd., Secunderabad, India G. Harinarayana Director of Research, Ganga Kaveri Seeds Pvt Ltd, India Mark Holderness Executive Secretary, Global Forum on Agricultural Research Robert Horsch Senior Program Officer, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (continued) BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 149 Persons consulted (continued) Upali Imbulana Ministry of Agricultural Development, Mahaweli Development Project, Government of Sri Lanka Yemis Iranloye Director, EKHA Glucose Factory, Ibafo, Nigeria Martha N. Njama Accountant/Administrator/Traditional Medicine Consultant, PROMETRA INTERNATIONAL, Kenya Ananda Jayasinghe Additional Director, Agronomy, IMD, Ministry of Irrigation, Government of Sri Lanka Palitha Jayaweera Programme Director, Community of Self Improvement (COSI), Government of Sri Lanka Ian Johnson Chair, IDEAcarbon; Past Chair of CGIAR and Vice President for Sustainable Development Monty Jones Chair, Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) Ahmed Kamal Scientist-F, Indian Institute of Chemical Technology (IICT) Abdul Kareem Subject Matter Specialist, Agronomy, Accion Fraterna, Rural Development Trust (RDT), Pradesh, India Lawrence Kent Agricultural Development, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Jomo Kenyatta Professor, University of Agriculture and Technology, Kenya Paul Kibwika Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Extension/ Education, Makerere University, Uganda Miriam Kinyua Associate Professor, Moi University, Kenya Alex Kirui Kenya Country Director, Heifer International C. Ganesh Kumar Senior Scientist, Indian Institute of Chemical Technology (IICT), India Uma Lele Senior Advisor, Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank (Retired); Team Leader, OED Meta-Evaluation of the CGIAR, 2002 Nancy MacPherson Special Adviser, Performance Assessment, World Conservation Union (IUCN) Peter Matlon Retired, Rockefeller Foundation Alex McCalla Professor Emeritus, Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California at Davis Jeff McNeely Chief Scientist, IUCN Pat Roy Mooney Executive Director, ETC Group, Ottawa, Canada V.K. Nanayakkara Hector Kobnbakaduwe Agrarian Training Institute, Government of Sri Lanka N.C.M. Navaratne Project Director-Walawe, Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka, Government of Sri Lanka Victoria Ngumi Professor, University of Agriculture and Technology, Kenya S.B. Niyangoda Chair, Sri Lanka Water Partners, Global Water Partnership, Sri Lanka; Former Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Sri Lanka Balaji Nukal Managing Director, M/s Seed Works India Pvt Ltd., India Hameed Nuru Senior Policy, Livestock and Fisheries Officer, African Union, Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) B.A. Ogunbodede Plant Breeder/Agronomist, Obafemi Awolowo University, Institute of Agricultural Research and Training, Nigeria T.A. Okusami Head, Farming Systems Research and Extension, IAR&T, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria Iranloye Oluyemisi Manager, Ekha Agro Farms Ltd, Lagos, Nigeria A.R. Palaniswamy Managing Director, Rusni Distilleries Pvt Ltd., India Markus Palenberg Managing Director, GPPi Consulting, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin, Germany Victor Palma Past Executive Director, INCAGRO, Peru R.S. Paroda Executive Secretary, APAARI (continued) 150 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Persons consulted (continued) Wilhelmina Pelegrina Executive Director, SEARICE, Philippines Per Pinstrup Andersen Professor, Cornell University T. Harischandra Prasad Secretary, Society for Transformation, Agriculture and Alternatives in Development (STAAD), India Y.S. Ramakrishna Director, CRIDA, India Tom Remington Principal Agriculture Advisor, Africa, Catholic Relief Services G. Subba Rao Scientist, Aakruthi Agricultural Associates of India Jalapathi Rao Associate Director of Research, Regional Agricultural Research Station, Warangal, Andhra Pradesh, India Ranjith Ratnayake Sri Lanka Water Partnership, Global Water Partnership, Sri Lanka T. Brahmananda Reddy Former Member of the Board of Directors, Southern Online Biotechnologies Limited, India N. Pradeep Kumar Reddy Federation of Farmers’ Association, Andhra Pradesh, India T. Yellamanda Reddy Chief Scientist, Agricultural Research Station, Acharya N G Ranga Agricultural University (ANGRAU), India George H.L. Rothschild Emeritus Professor—International Development, Natural Resources Institute (NRI) University of Greenwich (UK); Chair, European Forum on Agricultural Research for Development (EFARD); Chair, UK Forum on Agricultural Research for Development (UKFARD) Shiva Rudrappa Joint Programme Coordinator, BAIF, India Lateef Sanni Director, University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria Ian Scoones Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex N. Seetharama Director, National Research Centre for Sorghum (NCRS), India Paco Sereme Executive Secretary, CORAF/WECARD S. Sivakumar Chief Executive, Agribusinesses, ITC Limited, India Maurice Strong Chair, Third System Review of CGIAR, 1998 Maurice Tankou Agro-Economist, Chief, Agricultural Marketing and Support Services Section, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Ethiopia Nick Wanjohi Vice-Chancellor, University of Agriculture and Technology, Kenya Bernard Wood Team Leader, Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration Summary of results of the questionnaire, for a response rate of 85 Independent Review Panel survey percent for the target groups together. of informed stakeholders The intent of the survey sample was to ex- amine how well those knowledgeable about The survey was conducted in early 2008 as or directly involved in managing the CGIAR part of the work of the Independent Review network think it is being managed and what Panel. The results were intended to comple- corrective steps might be taken to improve ment visits to the Centers and personal inter- this. Others involved in the network—such as views that were undertaken by members of the large number of scientists doing Centers’ the Review Panel during the same period. work, their partners (national agricultural re- It was sent to 237 individuals in five tar- search systems, advanced research institutes), get groups: the Executive Council and other or the direct beneficiaries of their efforts member representatives, Board Chairs and (farmers, fishers)—were not asked to respond. Center Executives, Challenge Program rep- But Panel members did interview the Centers’ resentatives, the Science Council, and profes- scientists, partner representatives, and others sional staff. Some 201 individuals answered during their overseas visits. It is interesting BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 151 that their opinions did not differ substantially 4. The need to manage partners and the part- from those of survey respondents. nering process well Survey questions focused on a number of Throughout the survey, and especially in those areas, including the development and imple- questions that focused specifically on partner- mentation of center research priorities; the roles ships, respondents stressed the importance of the World Bank (financial and other), gen- of healthy partnerships within the CGIAR der, and diversity; the roles and effectiveness of System and with sponsors and other outside the Science Council, of CGIAR partnerships, partners. They also offered several suggestions and of CGIAR members and cosponsors; the on how these partnerships might be managed Challenge Programs; funding and financial more effectively. management; and governance reform. Several questions compared the importance of an issue 5. Opinions—some shared, others polarized with the effectiveness or adequacy with which There was a surprising level of agreement about it is being addressed. Over a third asked respon- the importance or effectiveness of a particular dents to select possible actions that might deal CGIAR actor or activity. Differences of opin- with the issues identified and invited them to ion tended to be much more polarized in the comment on these and related concerns. respondents’ more open-ended comments, especially where there was already some dis- General findings agreement (for example, the importance and effectiveness of Challenge Programs). There 1. The effectiveness deficit—a most pressing was also a great deal of consistency between challenge groups on the relative priority of the options Although respondents judged most CGIAR offered for discussion in the questions on how system actors, functions, or activities as to improve a given situation (80–100 percent important or very important, they were agreement on relative priority of options for almost always rated significantly lower with 15 of the 18 “how to improve” questions). respect to effectiveness. One clear exception At the same time, there were some very was the World Bank in its cosponsorship role, significant disagreements—between respon- with 64 percent importance and 54 percent dent groups and individual respondents. effectiveness ratings. These were particularly evident, for example, in comments about the kind of organization 2. Roles, responsibilities, and authorities respondents want to see the CGIAR become The survey revealed clearly that responsibili- (more centralized or more decentralized with ties and authorities are not well balanced. respect to decisionmaking) or how resources Throughout, respondents pointed to the should be allocated (more or less performance need to clarify, strengthen, change, and re- based). distribute roles, responsibilities, and authori- ties with respect to CGIAR System actors, Findings by topic defined broadly to include state and organi- zational donors, cosponsors, and partners. It 1. Center research priorities was also apparent that many respondents did Respondents generally agreed that the CGIAR not know who had responsibility and author- and Centers are highly effective in the sustain- ity to make decisions or get things done. ing biodiversity and genetic improvements research areas. Effectiveness ratings were rela- 3. The need for better communication tively low for agricultural diversification and A significant number of respondents pointed polices and institutions, and in the midrange to problems with trust and communication for sustainable resources. Respondents identi- between the Centers, the CGIAR, the Sci- fied some reasons why these priorities are not ence Council, and external stakeholders. being met as effectively as they might be. 152 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 2. Roles of the World Bank It is interesting that partnerships with the pri- Nonfinancial roles. Between 44 and 69 percent vate sector were generally devalued in com- of respondents thought that having the World parison with the other partnerships. Bank provide the Chair of Executive Com- mittee, the Director of the Secretariat, and 6. Cosponsors in addition to the World Bank secretariat offices was important. The Bank’s In addition to the World Bank, there are three exercise of its convening power received an other cosponsors: the Food and Agriculture importance rating of 82 percent (very impor- Organization, the United Nations Develop- tant). However, a number of respondents ment Programme, and the International Fund were concerned that these functions should for Agricultural Development. Respondents be more independent from the Bank. questioned (a) whether the concept of “cospon- Financial roles. The World Bank is a donor sor” is useful and should be continued; (b) and cosponsor, a mobilizer of contributions what additional powers and responsibilities from other donors, and the manager of the they should have; and (c) whether they should Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Sixty-four percent become more involved in the CGIAR, the Cen- indicated that it is appropriate for the World ters, and Challenge Programs and, if so, how. Bank to perform all these. And 54 percent believe it is performing these roles effectively. 7. Challenge Programs There were some concerns about whether the The Challenge Programs were not highly rated, Bank is in a conflict of interest by fulfilling and there was general uncertainty whether they both financial and governance roles, about should stay or go. Many feel they are poorly the lack of openness and transparency, and managed, costly, and competing against the related issues. Centers for financial and other resources 3. Gender and diversity 8. Funding and financial management Respondents identified a need for more work The key issues with respect to unrestricted to make the gender and diversity perspective funding were the need to: (a) reverse declining an integral part of CGIAR and Center culture, levels of unrestricted funds; (b) improve man- despite some potentially difficult challenges. agement to build trust and thereby attract more unrestricted funds from donors; and (c) man- 4. Science Council age the relationship with donors better. Some The Science Council’s roles, responsibilities, key issues identified on financial management and relationships with other CGIAR System were: (a) a concern that there is a general lack actors were frequently questioned. Respon- of appreciation for the importance of risk man- dents focused on (a) the nature, quality, and agement; and (b) the need to have qualified quantity of Council personnel and other people in place across the system who under- resources; (b) the degree of creativity, inno- stand finances, audit, and risk management. vation, and appropriate risk-taking needed to support ground-breaking research; and (c) 9. Governance reform ways to improve performance. The general consensus was that reform efforts since 2002 have, at best, been moderately 5. Partnerships effective—though they have been costly, The vast majority of respondents believe both in terms of money and administrative that partnerships with national agricultural burden. Many respondents suggested changes research systems, advanced research institutes, that would improve governance in the future, the private sector, and between Centers are some of which were discussed with other important or very important, and most were issues. Respondents also identified some key judged to be effective. Suggestions were also barriers to reform and provided ideas on how made about how to make them more effective. they might be overcome. BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 153 APPENDIX 5 Expert commentaries on the Technical Report Commentary by Margaret focus on personnel and staffing as the Catley Carlson principal measure of good gender input) and partnership (should grow organi- The Independent Review Panel has considered cally and relate to the need to fulfill the the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability system mandate and promote implemen- of the CGIAR in order to make recommenda- tation and dissemination). These need tions on how the CGIAR can be better posi- to be adopted. The existing rhetoric on tioned to address emerging issues of food and private sector collaboration needs to be agriculture of developing countries.1 subject to serious exploration of actual possibilities—as suggested. Five overarching contributions 4. The report recommendation for declared of the Independent Review and specific transitional arrangements 1. The amount of information supplied is and the call for “directive, top down extraordinary—probably far beyond the approaches with specified milestones” capacity to absorb it. The chapter on gov- should be heeded—no matter which se- ernance is an exceptional document in the ries of structural changes is adopted, In- history and analysis which should be read dependent Review or Working Groups. by all in the System, and used rather than 5. The report notes that the combination of repeated or redone in future analyses. donor sovereignty, center independence, 2. The Independent Review has gone fur- and consensus decisionmaking has over ther than earlier reviews in pointing out time gotten the system where it is, and— some of the reasons for the dysfunction- unless modified—will nourish the cur- alities in the current system. It is very rent problems, not provide solutions. candid about causes and symptoms of the malaise—diversion of effort, too many Ten inconvenient deficiencies layers of inconclusive decisionmaking, and how the Independent lack of clarity in the decisions taken. This Review recommendations would gives Members a real opportunity to ask address some of these themselves whether suggested solutions 1. No consensus on change direction. All agree in either the Independent Review or the on the urgent need for change, but there Working Group reports would actually is no consensus on the direction such address the real problems in the system change must take. In particular, how can as set out in the Independent Review. we engineer the essential consensus bar- 3. There are sensible recommendations gain of an assured increase in the flow which draw a strong and necessary link of unrestricted resources in return for between program impact deficiencies guaranteed (but unspecified) output and and the absence of a more professional changes in behavior? gender approach (more emphasis on a. The Independent Review does not programmatic dimensions using proven suggest how to get to consensus. methodologies, rather than the current Once again, the recommendation 154 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T is for structural change in the (un- in the system. And yet neither review proven) hope that such change will really suggests how to get to a position provide new structures within which where someone has the authority and the it will be possible to engineer the accountability to make decisions that do needed consensus. not impose such duplication and heavy b. The suggestions of my coreviewer, costs on the system. Someone or some Uma Lele, should be read with great group must have the authority to pull care—it may now be essential to the major players into a small room and hammer out agreement on how to emerge with a compromise that cuts into get on with it now among a small core this cycle and creates reasonable, cost- group which is capable and willing to conscious decisions. support an accord with resources. a. There is an accelerating mountain of 2. Considerable work effort misplaced. The requests and demands on the Cen- current system exacts an extraordinary ters for reports, workplan analyses, price in focusing of the time and effort evaluations, appraisals, statements, of managers on system issues, rather than and restatements of their activities. those issues related to the agricultural There is also an accelerating mass of improvement and poverty-reduction material for the Executive Council mandate—and this has continued and to work through. This is noted in intensified over the past half-decade. At the Change Reform panels and in the same time those charged with gover- the Independent Review—but nei- nance, such as the Executive Council, are ther report states what will be put in overburdened with reports and analysis place to stop this. and spend much time on issues best left b. Nobody can say “no” in the system to management purview. and get the workload focused on the a. The Independent Review report has essentials. (Instead of concentrating documented and described this well. on defining the core, central, tough- The report suggests and offers con- est issues, the definitional meetings crete steps on the separation of gov- for this Independent Review ex- ernance management. panded the scope to the point where b. The report suggests removing the the excellent final product stands a Science Council from some manage- real chance of never being read). ment and system issues, which could i. The Independent Review rec- reduce part of the distortion caused ommendations would help out by too many entities giving manage- somewhat in that they reduce ment advice. the mandate of at least one c. The complex of issues surrounding player, the Science Council, to the Secretariat are set out but not intervene and demand work be resolved. done on a number of system and 3. Duplication and churn in the system (a re- management issues. lated but not identical issue). It is symp- c. The system needs to adopt a UN tomatic of severe problems in the system habit and impose strict limits on that this Independent Review has been page length of documents (e.g., 10 undertaken at the same time as a paral- pages with annexes, etc., put on the lel exercise of Working Groups has been web). The current documentation considering a number of the same issues. flow is absurd. It is not the first time that one mega-exer- 4. Lack of international “voice” on agricul- cise has begun while another is finishing tural issues. The Independent Review re- or mooted. The result is perpetual churn port notes that the CGIAR System lacks BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 155 the way to channel its best advice to in- What these entities are talking ternational conferences on key issues of about is a point of entry that can en- climate change and food security. This is sure that actions take place by desig- puzzling given that the products are often nated Centers. Before effecting this at hand: the massive and well packaged degree of central coordination, one Comprehensive Assessment on water, the would have to be awfully sure that IFPRI work on subjects from the impact the golden ring exists—is the Food of rural roads on agriculture to biofuels and Agriculture Organization really to alternative investment patterns, the going to create an improved, encom- very compelling ILRI work on threats to passing global food strategy that the biodiversity in livestock, etc. Much of this whole world will agree with, if Cen- work has been made clear and accessible. ters coordinate? Are the imaginable Some effort might be devoted to working private sector collaboration gains re- out what specific effort is needed to im- ally there if there were a coordinating prove the CGIAR voice in the clamor— point of entry? perhaps more important than, or at least 5. Financing is restricted, directed, and does an essential adjunct to, further structural not cover all costs for which project mon- reworking. ies may be made available. The useful a. There is also a difference between and candid review of donor comport- coordinating and facilitative mecha- ment does not suggest how these donors’ nisms, such as one that might exist domestically derived strictures are to be between the Food and Agriculture overcome in the proposed Fund for Agri- Organization and Alliance to avoid cultural Research. If adopted, this Fund the need to conclude seven agree- could go a good direction in solving the ments with seven Centers in order financing issues. As most of the current to have program cooperation. Coor- discussion is focused in this area, I con- dinating mechanisms, on the other centrate on the other issues. hand, lead to the syndrome of re- 6. Lack of ambitious strategies focused on peated annual coordinating meet- development breakthroughs and suscep- ings with X, Y, and Z—and more tible to attracting financial inflows.2 I will frustration at the lack of output. leave to my very distinguished coreviewer b. This underlines the source of one the discussion on the needed precedence of of the continuing pressures to cre- form vs. function. The Independent Re- ate more central, work-directing or- view locates the responsibility for stra- gans. There are complaints reported tegic development in the proposed Con- in this chapter about “no single sortia, close to the Centers, in dialogue point of entry”—for the Food and with the Fund. This is undoubtedly the Agriculture Organization, for the correct location for this function. A num- private sector, etc. One answer to ber of short specific dialogues based on that is “why should there be?”—or, short specific papers should be the main more precisely, “for what exact rea- vehicle for establishing system directions son should there be?”, if the Centers and address issues. are entities pursuing different re- 7. Unrealistic goal language. The language search agendas focused on improv- of the system goals is not appropriate ing the situation for poor farmers in for what the CGIAR Centers can actu- their area of competence? A point of ally deliver. The emerging issues of food entry that is good at providing a Di- and agriculture of developing countries rectory (who does what, where) will must be addressed by policy reform and not lessen much of the frustration. investment within those countries. The 156 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T CGIAR Centers can advise on both but in themselves. A well running research cannot deliver either. The CGIAR Mem- center would want to form relationships bers which could deliver more in these with those that could contribute to its areas have not to date used the CGIAR mandate. Elaborate systemwide struc- venue to articulate or negotiate their own tures and processes which are not based contributions to investment or policy on constructive opportunism (as most change. The unrealistic goal statements successful partnerships are) end up being lead to frustration. It is probably a pious expensive, time-consuming, and not suc- hope to suggest that goal statements cessful by anybody’s measurement of should be set in terms of yield improve- them. Frustration—and anger with the ments, rural stabilization and improve- Centers as the operators—results. ment, and environmental preservation, There is also a misleading tendency but it would lead to systemic goals more to see a progression where none exists, in line with deliverables. i.e., the suggestion that when national a. CGIAR cannot even have large-scale agricultural research systems get more impact on yields and rural devel- capable, part of the funding that goes to opment without either substantial Centers should be allocated instead to na- strengthening of national agricul- tional agricultural research systems. This tural research systems in the poor- is logical only if the activity is dissemina- est countries, or more acceptance of tion/extension or if national agricultural the dissemination and training and research systems are producing interna- information-dispersion role of the tional public goods and/or organizing Centers. Good, even great scientific their work, time, and resources in such a breakthroughs and technology do way as to share results and resources with not sell themselves or autodistribute. other countries. At that point this would Pilot projects rarely foment change indeed be logical. outside the project areas without in- a. The Independent Review offers tensive ongoing investment. The very helpful guidance material on part- slow uptake of New Rice for Africa nerships—if these criteria are not rice is only the latest example. The In- satisfied, there may not be a need for dependent Review speaks to the need partnerships for the case in hand. to find more consensuses on the up- b. The Independent Review has re- stream-downstream debate; perhaps peated the assertion in several Ex- there needs to be more differentiation ternal Program and Management among Centers or Center activities Reviews that Centers should be col- to set out where downsteam work is laborating with the private sector— needed and welcomed by the system? but once again it is not set out as 8. Partnerships not effective. The effort “why, and to do what”? The recom- to foster and maintain partnerships is mended enquiry is well needed. highly resource intensive, and these re- 9. Policy role not well developed. In fact, sources come from time and money policy may not be a principal strength of that has alternative uses. Forming part- the CGIAR System. It is interesting that nerships because of system pressures or no part of the Panel Review or the Work- political correctness, or trying to forge ing Groups picks up on the World Bank partnerships where the shared interest meta-evaluation which questions why the and opportunities are tenuous at best, Centers should be involved in policy (ex- or because these are essential to a perfor- cept of course where it is natural for them mance reporting system, can be highly to be so). Turning the CGIAR inside out distortive. Partnerships are not a virtue so that there is a “policy spokesperson” is BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 157 odd; IFPRI speaks to the issues on which and recommendations of the Independent they have studied policy; ILRI has strong Review of the CGIAR.1 The review origi- views on livestock policy, etc. It is not evi- nated as part of the requirement of the World dent that the Consultative Group has an Bank’s Development Grant Facility that such overall policy recommendation role—or an independent review be carried out every that the value added to the extraordinary three to five years. It was expanded into a effort to create this capacity would lead to full-fledged external review to consider effi- other than generalities. ciency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the a. Similarly, the insistence on an “inte- CGIAR, and to “assess whether the CGIAR grated CGIAR policy view on Af- is well positioned to address emerging issues rica” is problematical, and advocates of food and agriculture of developing coun- of such an approach have not to date tries and to make recommendations.”2 outlined what such an integrated pol- icy might contain given that there are General comments on the scope, 40+ countries with different climatic analytical approach, findings, zones, levels of development, rainfall, conclusions and recommendations etc. Rather, it is suggested that the ab- Its overall conclusion seems to be that the sence of this integrated view supports system is inefficient, has been effective in sev- the need for structural change. Deci- eral areas, but as currently managed it limps sions turn into mechanisms indeed. along—however, without being in a position 10. Inconsistencies with Paris Declaration and to address the emerging issues of food and evolving development assistance trends. agriculture of developing countries. Clearly there is a need for the CGIAR The report focuses on improving gover- system to work in harmony with the nance first, separating financing from manage- broad lines of the Paris Declaration to the ment of the centers through a firewall, letting CGIAR system. It is not totally clear how the Alliance take charge of developing and the ownership of developing countries managing programmatic approaches, and let- will devolve from a new arrangement be- ting the appointed new governors address all tween donors. the rest of the issues of the system identified in the report. It is a substantial report rich in Notes content. There is a great deal to absorb in the 1. These comments are made in my personal capacity and 15 chapters in a very short time, even for those reflect long involvement in the CG as a donor (President of CIDA 1983–89), as a Board member (ICARDA and deeply knowledgeable about the CGIAR, its IWMI) and Board Chair (ICARDA). Perhaps most germane, history and evolution. Whether those in key I chaired the 2001 Change Management Team. It is also positions to determine the CGIAR’s future of interest that I have sat or Chaired the Boards of two non-CG agricultural research organizations, CABI and the would have the time to absorb its full con- International Fertilizer Development Center. This offers an tent, and, even more important, to devote the interesting perspective indeed on pros and cons of CGIAR time needed to develop thoughtful proposals membership. 2. This was of course the main rationale behind the Challenge attuned to the future needs of the system is Programs which, it was hoped would create small, short a question. The question has acquired added lived parts of the system working very differently from importance since nearly 60 actors in the sys- Centers, rather than Center-like creatures tackling complex and long standing subjects with full system strictures tem are also concurrently involved in their competing for funding , influence, and longevity. own parallel Change Management exercise, with the input of time and financial resources of comparable magnitude to that of the exter- Comments by Uma Lele nal evaluation. Issues relate to the content of this report As per the terms of reference, these comments as well as to its ownership in the system. To focus on the analysis, findings, conclusions, make my comments useful to the External 158 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T Review in the context of the Change Man- well described in the report, there is no agement process, and given the time pressures consensus on how to reform the system under which both are operating during dis- in a manner that is well positioned for cussions in IRRI, I provide support below for the 21st century and yet has the broad the following propositions: ownership of the key actors in the sys- 1. The Independent Review’s methodology tem (namely, the CGIAR Chair and Sec- and approach has been similar to that of retariat, three or four key donors—the the Operations Evaluation Department’s World Bank, the United States, and the (OED) meta-review completed in 2003, European Union representing its Mem- with some major differences outlined im- bers with a coherent voice—the Centers, mediately below. and the Science Council). Developing 2. The Independent Review updates the countries have had a small voice in the meta-review picture in many areas. But system ever since it was established, and its scope is more limited than that of the even with increased membership, they OED meta-review. The meta-review fo- have either not exercised it effectively or cused on the implications of the chang- have not succeeded in getting their con- ing global science. It also explored im- cerns across, except to press for retention plications of the greatly differentiated of Centers in their countries. Regrettably, national agricultural research systems for as this report points out yet once again, the CGIAR’s comparative advantage and they have not played their part effec- core business. tively. I concur with the quote from the 3. The Independent Review’s focus on im- three Gurus of Agriculture and Rural proving governance first is problematic Development, Yujiro Hayami, Michael for three reasons. First, I show why form Lipton, and Harris Mule,who served on should follow function, and not the other the Meta Review’s External Advisory way round, as the Independent Review Panel—namely, that the CGIAR is fac- argues. Second, given the deep and long ing the challenge of managing a global standing divide among the CGIAR’s commons. key donor Members on the focus on up- 5. What I recommend at the end of this stream vs. downstream research, defini- note builds on, but is different from ei- tion of the CGIAR’s function has been ther the Independent Review’s conclu- a challenge for quite some time without sions and recommendations or those of any resolution. No amount of governance the Change Management, seen from my reform, nor periodic more vision and own lens on the CGIAR system and from mission statements—as the CGIAR has the perspectives of developing countries done over the last two decades—alone by now for nearly 40 years (oops—it has can address that challenge. Third, a form been that long!). Prospects for a new vi- already exists or can be created relatively brant CGIAR emerging remain unclear. easily for the purposes of reforming the And yet the synthetic view of the Change CGIAR, if there is political will among Management and Independent Review the key donors of the CGIAR to use the conclusions and recommendations in- existing knowledge and to act. Reforms terspersed with my own thoughts might based on a partial view of the system, well be worth considering in IRRI. whether from this external review or Notwithstanding the differences in em- from the latest Change Management Ex- phases noted above, the intended purpose of ercise, will continue to be detrimental to a periodic, independent, systemwide, external the system. evaluation which OED recommended to the 4. While there is general agreement on the World Bank remains valid. It was to achieve current state of affairs in the CGIAR, transparency and accountability of the system, BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 159 not just to its immediate stakeholders, but to findings of Science Council’s new evaluations the membership at large. of policy and natural resource management The CGIAR has had an impressive evalua- research, and on the treatment of issues of tion record at the Center level, but it has been gender and diversity—including particularly historically reticent to undertake System-level the decline in the representation of devel- evaluations (a distinction the Independent oping countries in management positions, Review does not make) and to learn from among others.4 them. The World Bank’s Independent Evalu- There are a few key distinctions between ation Group is increasingly encouraging such the Independent Review and the OED meta- System-level evaluations of global programs, review in the methodological approach and using common guidelines and standards, scope. given an ever larger flow of donor aid going The Independent Review has had the through global partnerships. Assessing aid ef- benefit of visits to CGIAR centers. fectiveness of these partnerships has become The OED meta-evaluation did not. more important, but more difficult, because The OED review commissioned pa- accountability for performance is diffused— pers from national agricultural re- as the CGIAR well demonstrates. Yet assess- search systems in Asia, Africa, and ing their impacts or achieving reforms in well Latin America to explore the impli- intentioned, but ill conceived programs too cations of the changing status of the has become a daunting task.3 An independent national agricultural research systems assessment can potentially provide a useful to the CGIAR reforms—an aspect input into reforms. which is currently lacking in this re- I hope therefore that the Independent view, as well as in the ongoing Change Review will be published and disseminated Management exercise. widely, after it has been fully vetted for its A broader view would have led the Inde- evidentiary base, factual accuracy, scope, pendent Review to explore the implications and content. I also hope it will contribute of its very interesting findings for the reforms to the discussion of the future directions of needed. Several examples follow. the CGIAR which the Change Management Process has currently underway. National agricultural research systems and CGIAR programs. The reviews of the Sys- Detailed comments temwide and Ecoregional Programs stress the difficulties of scalability and replicabil- Analytical approach, evidentiary base, scope, ity, and the importance of—but the absence and methodology. The review is based on the of—a measurement of environmental impacts. meta-evaluation of the CGIAR’s own volu- Without the active participation of national minous output completed since 2001, the agricultural research systems in research and CGIAR’s own financial data, the use of the application there is limited, if any, prospect of CGIAR’s other extensive measurement and Systemwide and Ecoregional Programs having reporting systems, and interviews and sur- large-scale impacts, except when they focus veys of stakeholders. The method is similar to tightly only on productivity mainly through the one deployed by OED’s meta-evaluation germ plasm improvement. Moreover, even in (which had reviewed nearly 700 reports and some of the successful Systemwide and Eco- consulted well over 265 stakeholders). This regional Programs, such as the Alternatives to review updates OED’s analysis in useful ways Slash and Burn and Rice and Wheat Systems, and expands it in several areas, e.g., in report- with which I happen to be familiar, the impli- ing on the poor functioning (according to the cations for action—in policy and operational findings of the Independent Review) of the terms—need the entire gamut of national fourfold reforms set in train in 2001, on the systems.5 There are interesting tidbits in the 160 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T report on the CGIAR study of its impacts in institutions. Both the Independent Review South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in drier and Change Management are inward looking. areas. It suggests that the impact has been Neither explores what would be required stra- greater in South Asia than in Africa. I suspect tegically and structurally for the CGIAR sys- that is because of the stronger national agri- tem, and of the donors who fund the CGIAR, cultural research systems in India, which has to mobilize cutting edge science on the one done more applied and adaptive research on hand, and to increase the scientific relevance the crops in drier areas (a matter of long stand- to the clients on the ground on the other. ing controversy between India and the Interna- The Independent Review’s finding that tional Crops Research Institute for the Semi- the national agricultural research systems Arid Tropics), and is due to a stronger, but by find the CGIAR centers competing for re- no means an ideal, service-delivery system. sources, rather than complementing their ac- However, neither perhaps the specific impact tivities, is a long standing tension, and it is studies of the CGIAR, nor this external eval- problematic. uation explore its full policy or institutional So is the Independent Review’s finding, in implications. The meta-review had noted that the context of the Challenge Programs, that the role of strong national research and deliv- few advanced-country research institutions ery systems is frequently underrecognized in have found the challenge programs so fair in the CGIAR’s impact evaluations, which tend competitiveness as to want to invest their own to take credit largely to its own activities. This resources to compete. The Independent Re- also means some national agricultural research view does not delve into how Challenge Pro- systems, too, can compete and lead Challenge grams have evolved. They have not been cred- Programs through South-South coopera- ible enough in terms of the openness of their tion. Phil Pardy has made this same point by competition, and some in the size of their re- meticulously documenting the importance of sources, for either the advanced research insti- investment in agricultural research in develop- tutes or the more advanced national agricul- ing countries together with the CGIAR. tural research systems to compete as leaders. Yet the genuine opening to both national CGIAR’s poverty impacts. There is no possible agricultural research systems and advanced way that—acting alone, or mimicking in small research institutes can be achieved success- ways the national agricultural research sys- fully where there is demonstrated political tems’ functions through adaptive research— will to reform the system and full prepared- the CGIAR can have large-scale, immediate ness in the design of competition to achieve poverty impacts in a manner that the CGIAR it. Brazil’s EMBRAPA showed this, an effort donors have been increasingly demanding which the World Bank supported through a of it (a call to which the CGIAR Centers loan of $50 million to the PRODETAB pro- have been responding). It calls not only for gram. That program was in turn derived from strengthening national agricultural research the GREAN Initiative which had gathered systems (and in the case of small national agri- considerable momentum in the mid 1990s cultural research systems, both regional and but was never implemented beyond Brazil for national research systems), but for seamless lack of funding.7 And the original intention partnerships with developing countries with of the Challenge Programs was similar. regard to their national policies, institutions McNamara’s Bank achieved this same ef- and delivery systems. This is also illustrated fect of larger impacts brilliantly, albeit in a by the disappointing spread of New Rice for different way, in Asia in the 1970s. The Bank Africa rice noted in the report.6 had not only designed a clever CGIAR, on which I say more later, but made massive com- CGIAR’s relationship to national agricul- plementary investments in Asian countries in tural research systems and advanced countries’ support of agricultural development strategies BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 161 technology, and delivery systems that would CGIAR, foundations, and the private sector. help national agricultural research systems to Also from such a broader perspective, how adapt and spread the new technologies on the should the CGIAR relate to Gates and other ground.8 foundations at the System level? The Inde- Absence of such a vision for the CGIAR– pendent Review documents well the substan- national agricultural research systems– tially increased role of the Gates Foundation advanced research institutes partnership may in the CGIAR funding through the two best turn out to be a particularly important missed Challenge Programs. But it does not explore opportunity in the context of the redesign of its implications for mobilizing science using the CGIAR, given that donors and the World foundations. Gates is doing this ably in the Bank are once again focusing on food and health sector by funding global vaccine pro- agriculture—although their current focus is grams. It is dealing with the issues of intellec- on short term price stabilization and increas- tual property and licensing. It is also investing ing access of the poor to food, a consequence in universities. Foundation Research, and its of the neglect of agriculture in developing application through the use of the private sec- countries over two decades. tor more generally for the CGIAR reforms, To summarize: are profound—including for a legal persona. To achieve larger impacts CGIAR The proposed funding of the Gates Founda- needs to add value by complementing, tion in agriculture is already far larger than in rather than competing investments— the CGIAR, and the issue of CGIAR reforms over and above what donors, national needs to be considered in that context. agricultural research systems, and The Strong Review, the OED meta-review, other new suppliers of technologies the CGIAR itself, and its donor supporters and services already do, can do, or have often flagged these two challenges—but should do at the country level. they acknowledge that they have failed to come The CGIAR not only needs to be a to grips with them. Even the report by the for- better global player in the arena of mer Director and Chair of the CGIAR of the agricultural policy, as the report sug- reform efforts in the 2001–07 period, which, gests, but as its sponsor and lender unlike the Independent Review, is generally to development countries. The Bank laudable of what has been achieved, acknowl- and other donors need to make com- edges failure to mobilize new science—one of plementary long-term investments. the major stated objectives of converting the The implications of these facts for the Technical Advisory Committee into the Sci- CGIAR’s own reform process or the ence Council at the time. By the same token, Bank’s and donors’ complementary the Independent Review gives insufficient rec- activity in developing countries are ognition to the evaluation work carried out not explored either in the Indepen- by the Science Council including of the many dent Review or in the Change Man- centers, thematic and inter-Center programs. agement process. The result is that I return to the organizational issues of the the CGIAR is expected to perform CGIAR later. an impossible task by its donors— namely, to deliver large-scale poverty Findings which resonate with the OED meta- impacts quickly. review. Some of the findings of the report I discuss below the performance-based cri- resonate fully with those of the meta-review, teria for resource allocation in the CGIAR, the Strong Review, and indeed even the find- rather than the one based on the dual criteria ings of the Change Management working of the potential for scientific breakthroughs groups. These include the CGIAR’s unique- (and/or application of known science) and for ness as an instrument, its high rates of returns poverty impacts. (particularly to the CGIAR’s germ plasm and 162 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T biological control research), its well estab- countries. In this regard I found the Indepen- lished contribution to poverty reduction dent Review perhaps too influenced by the (mainly in the areas of germplasm and bio- Center perspectives. I also found it difficult logical control), its greater successes in Asia to understand some of the criticism of the Sci- than Africa (even in the rained areas growing ence Council. To the extent that the donors similar crops)—and yet, the increased role of fund numerous small projects and demand in- restricted funds, stagnation of funds in real dependent evaluations of their programs, and terms, declining allocation of resources to the CGIAR secretariat does its own financial germplasm improvement research, a highly monitoring, this has resulted in triplication complex management structure, rigidities and of work. slowness of decision making. The fundamental problem is restricted The review also confirms the warning funding by donors to Centers for activities of the OED meta-review that the fourfold of their joint choice, without regard to their Change Design and Management Team re- international public-goods character. The forms—of the Executive Council and a Sys- World Bank underwriting the overhead costs tem Office, transforming the Technical Ad- of the Centers compounded the problem of visory Committee into a Science Council, Centers by giving them the attributes of con- and Challenge Programs as a programmatic sulting firms. It compounded the problems of approach—did not go far enough, and the re- overhead cost collection once the Bank’s role forms were unrealistic in assuming they could as a donor of last resort to produce interna- transform the system as a whole in a short pe- tional public goods broke down. riod using Challenge Programs as an instru- It is true that the Bank’s funding has be- ment.9 With Challenge Programs—such as come more restricted to Challenge Programs. on water, rushed through using massive donor Some Challenge Programs are producing fund commitments rather than by the science international public goods, and perhaps the quality—the outcome was predictable, and Bank has not supported the right Challenge the incentives to centers were clear. All Cen- Programs. The timebound nature of Chal- ters flocked to Challenge Programs, further lenge Programs has always puzzled me. The spreading the system thin rather than leading two best ones have depended on the work of to the wholesale elimination of some of the re- the CGIAR Centers for well over a decade in search programs—or indeed even of the Cen- those activities! It is also clear that the Chal- ters, as the reform process had hoped. lenge Programs have doubled the work of the The Independent Review’s findings, but Centers by engaging in and providing lead to not its recommendations, confirm the earlier Challenge Programs. This is in part because assessment of the meta-review, that there is they know the rules of the CGIAR better need for systemwide allocation of resources than outsiders, as the Independent Review by an able and qualified Science Council, state—but also because the Challenge Pro- based on system-level priorities. These need grams failed to open up the system for true to be determined by scientific possibilities, competition, in a way the GREAN Initiative science quality, and potential for impact on had proposed and EMBRAPA instituted for poverty reduction. The actual impact of the PRODETAB achieved. CGIAR technology must, however, come by In short governance, management and fi- strengthening systems in developing coun- nance are intrinsically related to how science tries through complementary investments is conducted in the CGIAR. Simply address- by governments and donors alike, and not by ing governance, and creating a fund, desirable downstream development activities of Cen- as it is, will not address the problem for rea- ters. The latter is a manifestation of the fail- sons discussed below. ure of both governments and donors to invest The report documents well the lack in research and service delivery in developing of clarity, overlap and gaps in the roles, BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 163 responsibilities and accountabilities of the Challenge Programs simply be turned back key units of the system—namely, the Secre- to the Centers to lead because they do a good tariat, the Science Council, the Systems Of- job under the current rules of the game for the fice, and the Centers (Chairs, Directors and Challenge Programs, as the report suggests? Managers). While these tensions are inevita- Should one declare defeat in the transforma- ble in a CGIAR as an entity, and indeed have tion of the system beyond what the centers existed for a long time, the report’s findings are willing to agree to, in terms of bringing suggest that they may have worsened in the new science and actors to the table, as distinct post-2001 reform period, in part due to exces- from the reality of what the changed external sive centralization of functions in the office environment calls for? of the CGIAR Director as the Chief Execu- One of the reason new actors are needed tive Officer. In that sense the 2001 reforms is that the cost of investing in the capital changed the character of the CGIAR funda- equipment to conduct modern science in mentally by shifting power from the Chair of the CGIAR compounds is too high, and the Technical Advisory Committee/Science the CGIAR does not have the resources— Council to the CGIAR Secretariat. From the nor, seemingly, the political will among its report these tensions seem to have led to the traditional official development assistance Science Council subsequently to (re?)assert- donors—to invest in a situation of declin- ing its independence from the System Office, ing resources and increasing costs of mod- the relationship of which the CGIAR Secre- ern research in a highly dynamic biological tariat was ambiguous from the outset. The re- and informational science. Yet there is also a forms of the 2002 also led the centers to (re?) considerable underutilization of the physical asserting their independence from the Secre- capital invested in biological and physical re- tariat and the Science Council.10 The CGIAR search, e.g., in US universities, and a hunger Director perhaps no longer acts as the Chief for collaborations in the context of globaliza- Executive Officer of the System as a whole, tion which is better achieved under an inter- although some post 2001 CGIAR publica- national umbrella. tions suggest that that is his role. As a result, the report indicates that there is diffusion of The way forward tensions in the last year. However, it does not Both the External Report and the Change indicate that they have occurred to a point Management process are attempting to come where there is mutual trust and a collaborative to grips with these general findings, but they ambiance which once existed in the CGAIR are doing so in very different ways. Whereas system. So how much of the dysfunction is the there may well be a great deal of consensus on result of structure as distinct from functions the findings, there remains little agreement and personalities? And should structure pre- on how to address them. This is best illus- cede functional clarity? trated by the report “Revolutionizing the Evo- lution of the CGIAR” by the former Direc- Looking ahead tor and Chair of the CGIAR. Their diagnosis While the Independent Evaluation report of the CGIAR performance and what needs suggests that the central Change Design and to change, their conclusions, and their rec- Management Team strategy for the conduct ommendations focus on improving Center of science, and to transform the CGIAR sys- governance, questioning the Center alliance, tem from a center based to a program-based reducing perhaps the number of Centers, dis- system, is not working well, the good news banding the Science Council and replacing it is that Centers are collaborating more with with ad hoc panels, and a strong (CGIAR or each other. What, then, does this mean for Science Council?) Secretariat. These are radi- proceeding with expanding the Challenge cally different recommendations from those Programs as the strategy—and should the of the Independent Evaluation. It is unclear 164 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T at this stage if they are more in sync with the and think tanks for delivery of health and Change Management proposals. education programs. What the independent evaluation does Role of the current and not point out is that there is dearth of work future Science Council currently on critical agricultural policy is- The Independent Review does not make a sues crying out for guidance: e.g., the fiscal, sharp distinction between the roles of the productivity, poverty and environmental im- Center-level and system-level evaluations and pacts of input pricing and subsidies and im- those of self- and independent evaluations. plications for productivity growth involving There is much room for improving the quality the poor and natural resource conservation, of both in the CGIAR, e.g, by including par- of price stabilization programs on food secu- ticularly the greater use of controlled experi- rity of the poor, the reality and the scope for ment methodology in evaluations, and by the public-private partnerships in the delivery of use of counterfactual and alternative sources agricultural services, to name only a few such of supply analysis in evaluating the work of the topics. And there are few alternative sources Centers (i.e., the costs and benefits when the of supply in these areas. In the absence of hard CGIAR center is engaged in an activity simi- analysis, donor policy recommendations have lar to the ones being conducted by national been driven by ideology and expediency. Gov- agricultural research systems and even some ernment intervention in developing countries, nongovernmental organizations). Yet improv- even in the face of massive public support of ing the quality of Center-level evaluations can OECD agriculture and little prospects for ag- be achieved with quite different reforms of ricultural policy reforms in developed coun- the system’s evaluation function than the ones tries, has remained controversial in the donor suggested in the panel report of separating the community, with little help to advance agri- evaluation function completely. culture in developing countries—dual stan- Separating the evaluation function is dards if there ever were any. more necessary for the system-level evalu- Promoting cash transfers, on the other ations than the Center-level evaluations of hand, has now become hip. When donor funds Center management and Centers’ scientific are tied to what research CGIAR centers can programs. There is no reason why some of this do, there is little scope for the CGIAR to play work can not be outsourced without violating up to its true comparative advantage in essen- the principle of independence of evaluators. tial areas of policy and institutional choices This is where linking evaluation to strategy is for all Member countries, areas in which few critical. others are likely to venture. That was the rea- To give an example, the report sites that son why IFPRI was brought into the CGIAR stakeholders interviewed consider Natural system when another such food crisis erupted Resource Management and policy research in the 1970s. to have had much less impact than germ- In reviewing and commenting on the ex- plasm research. The two examples of the ternal evaluation, therefore, one cannot help IFPRI policy research with considerable im- but note that two concurrent exercises are cur- pact cited in the report are the evaluation rently underway. The latter also involves 60 of the Progressa program in Mexico and of to 65 people, with concurrent consultations the school program in Bangladesh. Even with a similar number of CGIAR’s 200 to though IFPRI work in both these cases is of 300 stakeholders as held by this review (donor high quality and has had impact, there are and developing country Members, Center di- plenty of others who conduct such evalua- rectors and managers, Science Council and tions of school feeding programs (including Executive Council members, among others). MIT). Indeed, an impact evaluation indus- This experience is similar to when the OED’s try has recently emerged in US universities meta-review was being conducted in 2002 and BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 165 2003, when also a reform program based on poverty in a sustainable way complemented by the recommendations of the Change Design long term investments in agricultural research and Management Team was underway. It pro- and development in developing countries— posed a more gradualist approach to reforms. needs to precede form. Besides, there is history of lack of ownership This is particularly essential now in the of the recommendations of external reviews case of the CGIAR. Like the external panel, in the CGIAR, well represented in the com- I too place a high premium on getting an mentary on the Strong Report by the former agreement among key donors on unrestricted director and the chairman of the CGIAR, funding to the system as a whole and in larger one which the meta-review had also encoun- amounts as an integral part of the reform. And tered. This leads me to conclude that it would yet the Change Management reform proposals be impossible to reform the CGIAR without seemed to be built upon a (realistic) assessment the key actors—particularly the World Bank, that increased unrestricted funding as pro- EU, and US—buying into the reform pro- vided currently is unrealistic. This situation cess, particularly in mobilizing completely can change only if there is a complete make unrestricted funds for the CGIAR, much over of the CGIAR funding. CGIAR funding like in the case of the Global Fund to fight has evolved as trickles of restricted funding in AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria or the Inter- support of small projects contributed to by in- national Development Association. However, numerable actors in donor agencies in negotia- this needs to be done without the Indepen- tions with individual centers, in sharp contrast dent Review’s analogy of resource allocation to the GEF, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, procedures carried out by either the Global Tuberculosis and Malaria, or the Interna- Fund or the International Development As- tional Development Association (which itself sociation being applied to the CGIAR, for the is losing its unrestricted nature). The lack of reasons discussed below. unrestricted funding in larger amounts, as en- visaged by the Change Management process, Recommendations in my view will fundamentally constrain the The Independent Review recommends real reforms which the CGIAR system needs that governance be reformed first, a fire- urgently. The Change Management proposals wall between financing and management be are influenced by this reality, perhaps apart established, the Centers’ alliance should have from the reluctance of those scores of donor a legal status—and be given the role in the and center staff involved in the system to relin- development and management of program- quish their own control of the system. matic approaches with advice from a scien- This logjam on funding can only be bro- tific advisory body—and the new governance ken at the highest level by the World Bank team should address all other issues, including President. And it can only be achieved by the of all allocations with support from another CGIAR chair working closely with the World set of advisors/experts. Bank President to mobilize his key counter- OED/IEG’s reviews of global programs, parts in the US and EU, the two other key which are by now substantial in number and actors essential for this reform process to are on the IEG’s external website, together achieve real reforms. UN agencies and devel- with evidence above, shows that governance, oping countries can provide the much needed finance, and management of global programs legitimacy to this process in a way that the interact in a complex way, and they need to Bank’s Global Food Facility is being blessed be tackled simultaneously. I do not agree with and legitimized. But they cannot change the the Independent Review conclusion that the current state of affairs. The OED meta-review form needs to precede function. Function—in had made such a proposal. this case, an agreement among donors on the In my interviews of Robert McNamara conduct of best science to address problems of during the OED meta-evaluation, he had 166 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T indicated that when the CGIAR was formed, global institution. The International Develop- he faced the challenge of replicating the Rock- ment Association and the Global Fund are ex- efeller model: letting outstanding scientists clusively country-oriented grant programs. If with understanding, both of science and de- it wishes, the CGIAR can mobilize expertise velopment, be put in charge of resource allo- from China, Brazil, and India to help Africa cation for the CGIAR. Sir John Crawford, a in a way the CGIAR Mexican and Japanese savvy agricultural economist with confidence varieties of maize, wheat and rice helped Asia of donors and knowledge of Indian agricul- before. That is something the International ture, and a close advisor to McNamara on Development Association and the Global India, was the first Technical Advisory Com- Fund were not conceived to do. The Rock- mittee chair. McNamara said he was afraid, efeller/Ford-funded Centers that led to the that without such a Technical Advisory Com- birth of the CGIAR had that grand vision. mittee chair, the system will be run by bureau- The task of change management should crats in the World Bank and USAID. They be assigned to a small group of thoughtful would not know how best to allocate resources knowledgeable people who know and under- to achieve results in making science work for stand the CGIAR system, have the confidence development. I believe strongly he was right. of donors, and have an understanding of the He had the vision and the shrewd instinct developmental process to explore all options about how bureaucracies work. I do not know for an overhaul of the system. It can not be if this can happen again. The Change Man- incremental and succeed. agement Proposals reflect the reality that this large and long-term strategic vision may not Notes be realizable at this time. 1. These comments are made in my personal capacity. They benefit from my experience in being engaged in At the same time I do not think the allo- the issues of the emerging global aid architecture for cating principles of the Global Fund to fight food, agriculture, health and environment and from my AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria or the Inter- involvement in and evaluation of global programs and partnerships. More information on these evaluations can national Development Association, which are be found at www.umalele.org quite different, are applicable to the CGIAR 2. TOR sent to the reviewers. by any means. The Global Fund is based on 3. World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, Source Book competitive proposals with competition being for Evaluating Global and Regional Programs: Indicative Principles and Standards, 2007. open to all developing Member countries, in 4. Women were always marginal in management positions a way that has not happened in the CGIAR, in the CGIAR. That void has been made up to some and the Independent Review does not propose extent at the top with the Chair of the CGIAR and the this. Besides, with preponderant resources Science Advisor in the World Bank being women. As a development economist borne and raised in a going to Africa, where the need is great but developing country, I tend to be more concerned about the capacity to use resources effectively is the CGIAR being staffed by qualified individuals than small, the impacts are likely to be less—the with the gender balance given how unequal that balance remains throughout the world in all endeavors. The report Global Fund has yet to be held accountable shows that with growing uncertainty about unrestricted for results. International Development Asso- resources to recruit and retain top quality scientists, ciation allocations are based on demonstrated whether men or women, and whether from developed or developing countries, this remains a matter of policy and institutional reforms by countries. considerable concern in the CGIAR system. Most still sing the mantra of the free mar- 5. In the case of Alternatives to Slash and Burn, which I ket, not a helpful criterion for the allocation recently reviewed in the context of the second evaluation of the World Bank’s 2002 Forest Strategy and Forest of CGIAR funds to centers by any stretch of Related Global Programs, the implications relate to imagination. Besides, Centers have demon- land tenure, community management, global markets strated their own weaknesses—namely, to for tropical timber, agriculture and energy, forest concession policies to name only a few. In the case of pursue funding as a way of remaining in busi- the Rice-Wheat System Initiative in which I was involved ness, rather than always pursuing their noble at the beginning when it was being set up, an important mission. Finally, the CGIAR was created as a concern was the crop rotation of rice and wheat leading BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 167 to decline in productivity of both, related in part to the 9. “The Challenge Programs were being established without government’s pricing and subsidy policies towards both first addressing the issues of system level funding, priority crops and inputs, and a lack of other attractive options setting, science quality and governance treated in the for planting. Any payment for environmental services in previous evaluations of the CGIAR. OED recommended the face of a distorted price regime, which, in any case, that the CGIAR postpone the approval of new Challenge have not advanced much in India, would certainly call for Programs (beyond the first two already approved) pending measurement of environmental benefits. an assessment of System-level priorities, and a thorough 6. The World Bank for example has consistently questioned review of the design and approval process of the first the economics of rice production in Africa and frequently two programs to learn lessons for the selection, design, there is no research or extension system to speak of in the sequencing and phasing of future Challenge Programs in countries. There is no way that NERICA’s adoption can be the context of System-level priorities and strategies. expanded without such a link to national systems 10. The OED Meta review had noted that “the CGIAR is less 7. A joint effort by US Universities, CGIAR centers and focused on enhancing agricultural productivity than it developing country scientists, co-chaired by Cornell used to be. Its current mix of activities reflects neither University and University of Florida, The Global Research its comparative advantage nor its core competence. on the Environmental and Agricultural Nexus (GREAN), The six founding principles that were adopted when was endorsed by the then chairman of the CGIAR, Ismail the CGIAR consisted of fewer centers and less diverse Serageldin. constituents are no longer suited to today’s politically driven authorizing environment, wider research agenda 8. See Uma Lele, India’s Food Crisis and the World Bank’s and expanding membership”, Précis of the CGIAR Meta Role in Fifty Years is enough. Review, OED, 2004. 168 BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T References Abele, S., P. Ntawuruhanga, M. Odendo, H. Obiero, E. Twine, Barnett, M. 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BRINGING T OGE THER THE BES T OF SCIENC E AND THE BES T OF DE V ELOPMEN T 177 Contents of the Technical Report (on the attached CD-ROM) Included with this document is a CD-ROM to optimize CGIAR science and synergies containing the Independent Review Panel’s among Centers and between Centers and full Technical Report. partners. Chapter 9 evaluates System- and The Technical Report begins with an Center-level gender and diversity issues. Overview of Findings and Recommendations. Chapter 10 assesses the CGIAR’s and The body of the Technical Report is presented Centers’ management of intellectual prop- in 15 chapters that address the Review’s Terms erty. This leads into Chapter 11, in which of Reference and cover four overarching top- the Panel reviews the CGIAR’s and Centers’ ics as outlined in the Inception Report: the partnerships, both internally and with outside global context in which the CGIAR operates, organizations. In Chapter 12 the Panel ana- governance of the CGIAR and its Centers, fi- lyzes how the CGIAR conducts evaluation nancing, and partnerships. and performance measurement and describes Chapters 2 and 3 discuss challenges to how the CGIAR System can better incorpo- global agriculture and provide an assessment rate results-based management into its opera- of the CGIAR’s scientific achievements. tions to improve its relevance and efficacy, as Chapter 4 describes the multiple components well as its ability to articulate outcomes and of the CGIAR System and their operation. impacts of its work. It also discusses the character of the CGIAR Chapter 13 reviews the Executive Coun- “System” and the CGIAR’s capacity for stra- cil, the System Office, and the CGIAR’s re- tegic planning. Chapter 5 then provides an form efforts over the past five years. It then analysis of the international architecture for puts forth a governance model based on a re- agricultural research for poverty reduction. balanced partnership between the Consulta- Chapter 6 evaluates the work of the Sci- tive Group and the Centers it supports. This ence Council, and Chapter 7 assesses the roles is complemented by Chapter 14, which de- of the CGIAR’s Members and cosponsors. In scribes current and proposed resource mobi- Chapter 8 the Panel reviews the Challenge lization and allocation practices. Chapter 15 Programs and the extent to which they have gives an in-depth analysis of financing trends met the objectives set out in the 2001 Change and financial management. Design and Management process. The chap- Appendix 1 of the Technical Report is ter also discusses Ecoregional and Other Sys- a detailed summary of the results of the In- temwide Programs and whether they and the dependent Review Panel survey of informed Challenge Programs are effective mechanisms stakeholders.