

# The Security Sector and Poverty Reduction Strategies

Donata Garrasi, Stephanie Kuttner and Per Egil Wam

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Social Development Department  
Sustainable Development Network  
The World Bank Group  
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## Foreword

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The program has prepared the following reports and issue notes:

- Toward a Conflict-Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy: A Retrospective Analysis (World Bank 2005, 2007)
- Poverty Assessments in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: Strengthening the Conflict Perspective (World Bank, June 2009)
- Effective Poverty Reduction Strategies in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: Lessons and Suggestions (World Bank, June 2009)
- "The Security Sector and Poverty Reduction Strategies" (Dissemination Note, World Bank, July 2008)

## 1. Aim of This Issue Note

Provision of security is both a core function of the state and a necessary condition for the delivery of other essential services and investments for poverty reduction. Improving the effectiveness and accountability of security provision is therefore becoming an increasingly important element of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) in countries emerging from conflict.

This note aims to clarify the challenges for integrating security sector priorities into PRSs by drawing on existing and emerging knowledge and practice in conflict-affected countries. Introduced in the late 1990s, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are standard tools for developing countries to articulate medium-term macroeconomic and social policies for growth and poverty reduction. Countries take the lead in setting a development plan, while the World Bank and other donors align their assistance programs with those national strategies.<sup>1</sup>

This note focuses specifically on the World Bank's role in supporting governments during the preparation of PRSs and discusses entry points for engagement in the security sector drawing from experience in a mix of conflict-affected countries. It is intended to serve as a resource for World Bank country teams and their national counterparts when designing PRS processes in countries where improved security has emerged as a national priority.<sup>2</sup>

The following section explains concepts and provides definitions for key terms such as 'the security sector' and 'security sector reform'. Section 3 presents a rationale for the integration of security sector strategies into PRSs based on the linkages between poverty, insecurity, and the World Bank's core mandate. Section 4 reviews some strategic and operational challenges and identifies entry points for addressing security sector issues in the PRS process. Section 5 presents some lessons from country cases where security sector issues are being addressed in PRS processes. Finally, the concluding section situates this note in the broader context of international efforts by the World Bank and its partners to ensure alignment of their security and development interventions in conflict-affected countries and fragile states.

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<sup>1</sup> Guidance on the process, resources available, and country examples of PRSPs are available at <http://go.worldbank.org/FXXJK3VEWo>.

<sup>2</sup> This note draws upon the legal and policy framework for the World Bank's involvement in post-conflict situations and emergencies as outlined in *Development Cooperation and Conflict* (OP/BP 2.30, January 2001) and *Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies* (OP/BP 8.00, March 2007).

## 2. Concepts and Definitions

### 2.1 Defining the Security Sector

There are different national and international understandings of what actors and institutions constitute a country's security sector and the Bank's use of the term may vary depending on the applicable operational and analytical context. Broadly, the security sector can be defined to include all the actors and institutions with a role in ensuring the security of the state and its people. Institutions providing internal and external security vary between countries and may include a large number of non-state actors (local militia, private security, rebel forces, etc.), particularly in conflict-affected countries. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) provides a definition for the security sector which includes: core security actors (armed forces, police, paramilitaries, intelligence and security services, etc.), executive and legislative authorities with security management and oversight responsibilities, justice and law enforcement institutions, and non-statutory security forces.<sup>3</sup>

A more formal conception of the security sector focuses on those actors with a constitutional and legitimate responsibility for the provision of security for the state and its citizens. According to the UN, these are generally agreed to include: defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force, are in many instances also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups.<sup>4</sup>

While there is no single model for the sector, the UN has identified a number of common features of an effective and accountable security sector including:

- A legal and/or constitutional framework for the legitimate and accountable use of force and defining roles and responsibilities of different security actors;
- An institutionalized system of governance and management;
- The structures, personnel, equipment and resources to provide effective security;
- Mechanisms for the coordination of security actors; and
- A culture of service among security actors shaping the manner in which they carry out their responsibilities.<sup>5</sup>

### 2.2 Objectives of Security Sector Reform

*"Security Sector Reform is a governance issue...It is also a development issue and, for many countries emerging from conflict, a pre-condition and a foundation for development. In this context SSR, can be mainstreamed into country development assistance programmes and its poverty reduction strategy."*

(OECD-DAC, "Security Sector Reform and Governance", 2005)

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<sup>3</sup> OECD-DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance, Guidelines and Reference Series*, 2005.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Secretary General, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform*, (hereinafter, *UN SG's Report*) UN doc. A/62/659 – S/2008/39, Jan. 2008, para. 14.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, para.15.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been described by the United Nations as a process of assessment, review and implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation, led by national authorities, that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.<sup>6</sup>

According to the OECD-DAC, the overall objective of SSR is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and good governance. States face four inter-related challenges when engaging in SSR<sup>7</sup>:

1. Developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors;
2. Strengthening the governance of the security institutions;
3. Building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities; and
4. Ensuring the sustainability of justice and security service delivery.

The transformation of the security sector often constitutes a core element of peace-agreements and peace-building strategies. The PRS can reinforce these peace-building frameworks by integrating key priorities of security sector reform into the broader national development framework.

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid, para. 17.

<sup>7</sup> OECD-DAC, o.c., 2005.

### 3. Rationale: Integrating Security Sector Strategies in PRSs

"People need a secure environment to go about their daily lives and improve their lot. Security services must serve the interests of the communities within which they work without consuming disproportionate shares of national resources, and fair and non-violent means must be available for the resolution of disputes. IDA supports countries in their efforts to establish a safe environment for all members of society, especially the poorest."

(International Development Association, IDA 14, Final Report, March 2005)

The experiences of conflict-affected countries show that security is critically important for building peace, and achieving poverty-reduction and sustainable growth. A successful PRS depends on a reasonable level of security, and on sound management of security-related expenditures.

A World Bank review of PRS processes in nine conflict-affected countries found that while most PRSPs included some security-related activities, such as demobilization or de-mining, such initiatives would be more effective if they were integrated into a cohesive strategy for improved governance of the security sector and part of a prioritized PRS.<sup>8</sup> The following section outlines a rationale for the integration of security sector strategies into PRSs.

#### 3.1 Security is a Priority for Conflict-Affected Countries

Both governments and people in conflict-affected countries overwhelmingly identify security as a priority, and as a central element of both peacebuilding and development agendas. The PRS is a nationally-owned strategy developed through a participatory process to build consensus and increase accountability for poverty-reduction. Thus, international partners, including the World Bank, have a responsibility to support the integration of national priorities into the PRS, including those related to the security sector.

#### 3.2 Security is Important for Poverty Reduction

There is a growing body of research on the relationship between poverty and insecurity. Insecurity resulting from armed conflict increases the vulnerability of poor people and is a key factor in the perpetuation of poverty traps.<sup>9</sup> In its study *Voices of the Poor*, the World Bank found that poor people themselves identify insecurity and access to justice as primary concerns.<sup>10</sup>

The direct and indirect costs of insecurity are significant. Armed conflicts destroy physical infrastructure and productive assets, undermining investment and exacerbating unemployment. These effects are compounded by the distortion of human and social capital that results from violent conflict. Poverty and low rates of economic growth, in turn increase the likelihood that armed conflicts are perpetuated or regenerated. By some estimates, the typical civil war lasting 7 years cut 2.2 percent off the projected annual rate of growth, resulting in a GDP 15 percent lower than it would have been. A severe civil war can, in the short run, shrink per capita income in neighbouring states by as much as a third.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> World Bank, 'Towards a Conflict Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy', 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Paul Collier, et. al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, World Bank Policy Research Report, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> World Bank, *Voices of the Poor*, available at World Bank's PovertyNet at <http://go.worldbank.org/NKOX512JJ0>

<sup>11</sup> Paul Collier, et al., *On the Economic Consequences of War*, Oxford Economic Papers, No. 51. 1999.

Criminal violence has also been found to affect poor people disproportionately and function as a real obstacle to economic growth.<sup>12</sup> The 2005 World Development Report on investment climates found that crime and violence against people and property blocked investment and increased the cost of doing business. The direct costs of crime and violence can be estimated by factoring in public and private health expenditures, lost productivity due to injury and mortality and increased public expenditures on security. But there are also indirect socio-economic costs, such as lower human and social capital, reduced labor force participation, lower wages and incomes. These in turn, have negative multiplier effects on growth and poverty-reduction.

### **3.3 Security is a Core Governance Issue<sup>13</sup>**

There is a close relationship between poor governance and insecurity in many conflict-affected countries. Poor governance of the security sector itself is often at the core of state fragility in conflict-affected countries. It creates opportunities for corruption and political capture, can lead to inefficient and ineffective responses to external security threats, and often contributes to internal insecurity for citizens.

Inappropriate security structures and mechanisms can contribute to state fragility and violent conflict, which in turn prevent sustainable development and poverty reduction. When governments fail to provide basic security to their citizens, people develop a high level of distrust toward the state, and in different spheres of their lives cobble together alternate strategies for meeting their needs.

The interaction of security and governance in such contexts is often complex and can only be addressed through a broad range of governance reforms which integrate the security sector and apply the same basic principles of public sector governance, including civil oversight, public finance management and the basic tenets of public administration and civil service reform.<sup>14</sup>

### **3.4 Security is a Public Good and a Service Delivery Issue**

*"[W]ell run security and justice sectors are essential 'services' that responsible states should provide to their citizens...and security is a basic entitlement of the people like health and education."*

(DFID, *Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development*, 2005)

The 1997 *World Development Report* brought renewed attention to the central role of the state in the provision of core public goods, including security and rule of law, without which poverty reduction is difficult to achieve.<sup>15</sup> The provision of security rests upon two essential pillars: i) The ability of the State, through its development policy and programs, to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which people are exposed; ii) The ability of the State to use a range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect society's well-being.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> UNODC, *Crime and Development in Africa*, June 2005; World Bank and UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007. *Crime, Violence and Development: trends, costs, and policy options in the Caribbean*, Report No. 37820.

<sup>13</sup> The World Bank's Governance and Anticorruption Strategy defines governance as the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services. World Bank, 'Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption', 2007.

<sup>14</sup> World Bank, "Post-Conflict Security Sector and Public Finance Management: Lessons from Afghanistan", Social Development Notes, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, No. 24, July 2006.

<sup>15</sup> World Bank (1997), "The State in a Changing World", World Development Report, Washington DC.

<sup>16</sup> OECD-DAC, o.c.,2005

The 2004 *World Development Report* focused on making health and education service delivery work for the poor.<sup>17</sup> In particular, it brought attention to the institutional arrangements for service delivery, the incentive structures, and the accountability mechanisms that make these systems more or less effective. One of the main messages emerging from this report is that it is often possible to improve service delivery by focusing particularly on governance and accountability mechanisms. Although there are differences between sectors, security - like education or health - can be considered as an essential public good necessary for poverty-reduction. Applying a service delivery framework to the security sector allows for the systematic analysis of accountability relationships between policy-makers (governments and national security bodies), service providers (security forces) and beneficiaries (individuals and communities).

In addition to being a core public good, security is also a necessary condition for the delivery of other essential public services such as health and education which are normally central components of PRSs. In conflict-affected countries, improving the provision of security is, therefore, closely linked to achieving other objectives of the PRS.

### 3.5 Security and the World Bank's Policy on Crises and Emergencies

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was established with a broad mandate to support reconstruction and restoration following war. The IBRD Articles include a provision prohibiting interference in the political affairs of a member country which was interpreted, for many years, as precluding any Bank engagement in security issues. However, there has been increasing recognition within the Bank and its partners, that while respecting the mandate and comparative advantage of different institutions, there is a need to support integrated security, relief and development strategies, particularly in conflict-affected countries.

This approach is clarified in the World Bank's new policy on *Rapid Response to Crises and Emergency*<sup>18</sup> which has replaced the previous policy on *Emergency Recovery Assistance*<sup>19</sup>. It builds upon the OPCS note on "Fragile States: Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies"<sup>20</sup> which argues that countries could unintentionally undermine long-term development outcomes by separating out security issues from development strategies or by leaving them out altogether.

The Good Practice Note therefore calls for stronger integration of security and peace-building goals and activities in cross-cutting development processes which the Bank supports, including in the PRS. The Note clarifies that when the Bank engages with political and security sector institutions it should focus on its core economic and development competences (such as generic development planning or public finance capacity-building), and on developing partnerships with other donors or institutions that have expertise in specialized technical reform or capacity building in the peace and security areas.

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<sup>17</sup> World Bank (2003), "Making Services World for the Poor", 2004 World Development Report, Washington DC.

<sup>18</sup> OP/BP 8.00, March 2007.

<sup>19</sup> OP/BP 8.50, 1988, reissued 1995.

<sup>20</sup> World Bank, "Fragile States: Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies", Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS), December 2005, discussed with the Board in January 2006.

This same approach is adopted in the Bank's 2007 policy on Crises and Emergencies in which the Bank continues to focus its interventions on its core development and economic competencies. However, the new policy clarifies that in response to a member country's request, the Bank may support, in partnership with others, an integrated emergency recovery program that includes activities in areas outside its traditional core competencies, such as peace-building, security, and relief.<sup>21</sup> The new policy also envisages that the Bank may extend its assistance within the areas of its core competencies to borrower agencies and institutions involved in the emergency recovery effort, including, if necessary, relief, security, and law enforcement agencies. Finally, the new policy enables the Bank to develop partnerships with other donors for the preparation, appraisal, and supervision of relief, security, and peace-building activities in line with the comparative advantage and core competencies of each donor.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> OP/BP. 8.00, para. 5.

<sup>22</sup> The Legal Opinion which accompanied OP 8.00 clarifies that any activities financed or carried out by the Bank under the revised policy, including those involving peace-building objectives or those with linkages to integrated recovery programmes that include security, peace-building, and relief activities, must be consistent with the legal parameters set out in the IBRD Articles, and as interpreted by the Board, and must be consistent with the "guiding principles" for Bank engagement in conflict-affected areas. These are outlined in the OP 8.00 Annex, *Legal Opinion on Peace-building, Security, and Relief Issues under the Bank's Policy Framework for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies*, 22 March 2007.

## 4. Strategic and Operational Issues

This section examines experiences in several conflict-affected countries and fragile states to identify emerging approaches for integrating security sector priorities in the PRS process.<sup>23</sup> The issues presented here deal with both the broader policy and political context within which countries are addressing security problems or dealing with them in the PRS process. The section touches on opportunities for successful integration of securities sector priorities, along with strategies for addressing potential obstacles.

### 4.1 Situating the PRS in Conflict-Affected Countries and Fragile States

The PRS is a nationally-owned, medium-term development planning framework which integrates a country's macroeconomic, adjustment and reform policies with sectoral strategies for growth and poverty reduction. The World Bank uses the PRS as a basis for Country Assistance Strategies in IDA countries, and its effective implementation is generally a condition for achieving the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) multi-lateral debt relief completion point.<sup>24</sup> A growing number of conflict-affected countries and fragile states have developed a PRS.

It is important to note that in a number of these countries, development partners, including the World Bank, may have suspended their operations during prolonged periods of conflict and instability. In such cases, it is important to situate the PRS process in a larger framework of the international community's re-engagement strategy and the country's transitional recovery process. It is also important that the approach to security issues in the PRS is consistent with other national and international agreements, particularly peace accords and peace-building strategies. In some cases, a peace accord establishes a time-line and framework for international re-engagement (as, for example, in Burundi), while in others there is no formal national political framework (as, for example, in Haiti).

Following their respective decisions to re-engage, international partners generally undertake some form of joint post-conflict needs assessments (PCNA) around which there is a growing body of "good practice."<sup>25</sup> The PCNA can lead to a Transitional Results Matrix (TRM) establishing a compact between government and international partners for a transitional recovery process.<sup>26</sup> This often becomes the basis for an interim PRSP (I-PRSP) in which the government outlines its interim strategy for poverty reduction and the participatory process for developing a full PRSP, which is required under the HIPC debt-relief process. The PRSP then becomes a framework around which development partners can harmonize and align their assistance programs with national priorities for growth and poverty reduction, including those for the security sector.

On the basis of a country's PRSP, the World Bank develops its Country Assistance Strategy which provides a framework for budget support, analytic and sector work, and project lending. The Bank's support to the improvement of security and justice services will, in most cases, be limited to its specific areas of technical competence such as support for justice reform or to the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. However the Bank can extend its assistance and traditional expertise in public finance and budgeting to any

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<sup>23</sup> Country examples have been drawn primarily from those which are part of the Program to Support Effective PRS in Conflict-Affected Countries, through a World Bank-DFID partnership. Country cases represent a range of regions and conflict situations, as well as different stages of the PRS process. These include: Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina (BIH), Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Central African Republic, Georgia, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.

<sup>24</sup> For more on HIPC objectives, criteria and track record, see <http://go.worldbank.org/85B9o8KVEo>

<sup>25</sup> UN Development Group and World Bank, *Post-Conflict Needs Assessment Review*, Jan. 2007, available at <http://www.undg.org/?P=147>

<sup>26</sup> UN Development Group and World Bank, *Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices*, Jan. 2005, available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/TRM.pdf>

borrower agencies and institutions, including those in the security sector.<sup>27</sup> The Bank can also deploy its expertise within an overall effort led by other development partners to improve professionalism and strengthen civilian oversight of these institutions.<sup>28</sup> It can also support local leadership and ownership of the security sector reform process through its policy dialogue with government, including through its Development Policy Operations (DPOs).<sup>29</sup>

#### 4.2 Linking PRS and Security Dialogue

*"The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process offers a potentially important mechanism for soliciting public views on security and mainstreaming SSR into development policy."*

(OECD-DAC, "Security Sector Reform and Governance", 2005)

The PRS can create a relatively neutral space in which policy-makers, security providers and civil society - groups that are often disconnected and lack mutual trust - can discuss security issues, including the relationship between poverty and security, and security sector reform. SSR is a highly political process, with significant implications for the key actors in post-conflict and transition governments. The political economy of reform varies from country to country according to the particular configuration of national and international interests in the security sector.

As in all reform processes, it is important to identify SSR champions to support the creation of multi-stakeholder coalitions and to foster national ownership. National actors need to make difficult choices and compromises in order to achieve agreement on core national security objectives and appropriate institutional arrangements. Often there may be antagonism between those perceived as winners and losers of the planned reforms. Thus, international partners must begin by building an understanding of the views and apprehensions of various stakeholders.

When a country plans a PRS, it is important to extend the planning process beyond a small ministerial group to the whole of government and civil society stakeholders. On security issues in particular, there is often a disconnect between economic and social ministries from those responsible for defense and law enforcement. Thus the PRS process provides an opportunity for constructive engagement between development and security specialists within government. The PRS process can also create space for public participation in discussion of security issues, including security sector reform. However, as the box below describes, dialogue on security issues remains politically sensitive and progress is often slow.

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<sup>27</sup> The Bank's decision to engage with borrower agencies and institutions is made on a case-by-case basis based on the concerned entity's capacity and its linkage to development objectives.

<sup>28</sup> World Bank, *Towards a New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and Emergencies*, (OPCS, January 2007, revised March 2007), p.26.

<sup>29</sup> See World Bank "Good Practice Note for Development Policy Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile States" (OPCS, 2005) recognizing that a successful transition will usually require progress on a broad front under a government program that integrates political and security issues with the governance, economic and social issues that feature in conventional development policy operations. The note clarifies that while matters outside of the Bank's legal mandate or expertise may not constitute triggers or conditions for the Bank's financing, they may inform the Bank's consideration of the feasibility of the part of the program it will support. See for example, World Bank DPO to CAR approved November 2006 for "Re-engagement and Institutional Support Program", Report No. 37864-CF.

### Box 1: Security Dialogue

In the **Burundi** and **Central African Republic** cases described further below, the PRS participatory process, particularly the establishment of focus groups on security sector issues, provided a forum in which security sector actors and PRS teams could engage in a constructive dialogue on national priorities. However, dialogue on security issues has remained politically sensitive and constitutes only a small step towards agreement for comprehensive SSR.

In **Cambodia**, the non-governmental community incorporated a number of security issues in its 2003 submission to the PRS process. Specific recommendations were made in the areas of disarmament, demobilization, small arms reduction and management, and the rule of law. However, these were not fully reflected in the PRS. (*NGO Sectoral and Issues Papers on Poverty Reduction and Development in Cambodia, 2003*, at [www.ngo.forum.org.kh](http://www.ngo.forum.org.kh))

### 4.3 Timing and Sequencing of PRS and SSR

In terms of the timing and sequencing of PRS and SSR processes, there are two baseline scenarios. In the first, the SSR process is already underway (or has at least been agreed) under the terms of a national peace accord or international peacekeeping mandate (or both) during the time the PRS is being developed. In this case, key aspects of agreed security reforms can be integrated into the PRS. This may be relatively more straightforward than under the second scenario, where the PRS process gets underway first, and elements of a security sector strategy must be developed for the PRS. In most cases, countries mostly fall somewhere in-between these two scenarios.

In terms of the timing and sequencing of security stabilization and SSR, a joint World Bank-UN Review of Post-Conflict Needs Assessments distinguished three stages:<sup>30</sup>

1. Early security stabilization measures: deployment of UN and/or other forces, integration of formerly opposing forces, command and control restructuring, and vetting, train and equip programs of the police.
2. Dealing with the legacies of conflict: DDR, mines, child soldiers, reconciliation, arms management, etc.
3. Longer-term security transformation and reform including "rightsizing", professionalism, oversight and accountability.

While a PRS would likely be developed during the later stages of this process, the implementation of earlier stages (such as reintegration of ex-combatants and police training) may still be underway, in which case it is important that these elements be integrated into the PRS. Even during the early stabilization phase, it is important to encourage both national and international partners to begin developing a strategic approach to the security sector.

It is also important to recognize that some countries may not be ready to engage in SSR when a PRS process is initiated. In these situations, it may be counterproductive for the international community to push security reforms prematurely, particularly if the reforms risk undermining fragile peace accords, contributing to political instability or even re-igniting conflict amongst armed groups.

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<sup>30</sup> World Bank-UN Review of Post-Conflict Needs Assessment, 2007, available at [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/Review\\_Report\\_\\_In\\_Support\\_of\\_Peacebuilding\\_\\_Strengthening\\_the\\_PCNA.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/Review_Report__In_Support_of_Peacebuilding__Strengthening_the_PCNA.pdf)

But even where SSR processes are not underway, the PRS creates an opportunity for preparatory activities around which there is already agreement and which may be less contentious (e.g. DDR, security assessments, census of security forces, etc.). The Burundi and CAR cases described further below provide examples of how the PRS can be used as opportunities to prepare the ground for SSR.

#### **4.4 Linking Poverty Diagnostics with Conflict Analysis and Security Assessments**

The PRS provides an important opportunity to link poverty assessments with conflict analysis and security assessments.<sup>31</sup> Research has shown that violent conflict is more likely in countries with high levels of poverty and inequality, while insecurity in turn increases the vulnerability of the poor. For any process of analysis and priority-setting, it would be critical to understand the ways that insecurity (e.g. widespread criminal violence, regions of ongoing armed conflict, flows of IDPs and refugees) is intertwined with poverty and inequality.

In conflict-affected countries, it is therefore important for the PRS to include analysis of the conflict and security situation throughout the country as well as an assessment of the capacity of security forces, justice, and law enforcement agencies to respond to conflict and insecurity. Understanding the dynamics of conflict and insecurity in such countries is an important consideration for the design of effective PRS implementation strategies.

UN or bilateral security assessments, where they exist, can be a useful source. The OECD-DAC's Institutional Framework for SSR (IF-SSR) outlines elements of a security sector assessment for donors, including: political analysis; the security context; capacity development and governance, and people's security and justice needs. The IF-SSR highlights the need to assess both the capacity constraints (technical competence) and integrity gaps (quality of governance) within security institutions.<sup>32</sup> In countries where such assessments have been completed, the PRS can draw from these to identify key security challenges and priorities.

#### **4.5 Integrating the Security Sector with PRS Pillars and Results Matrices**

Integrating security sector priorities into PRS pillars and results matrices helps both donors and government move from short-term and ad hoc technical assistance projects in the security and justice sector to a more strategic engagement. The adoption of a strategic approach to security requires the articulation of objectives for the sector, consideration of the governance of security institutions, and an assessment of any shortcomings with respect to their capacity and accountability.

Security issues have been integrated into PRS pillars and sectoral strategies in a number of ways. In Burundi, the PRS includes a pillar on governance and security issues; in DRC, security is linked with peace consolidation; while in Haiti, security is linked with justice and the rule of law. The precise configuration of PRS pillars and sectoral strategies, and the manner in which these integrate security issues, will reflect the particular dynamics linking security, peacebuilding, governance, and poverty-reduction in each country context.

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<sup>31</sup> See World Bank Note on Poverty Assessments for PRS in Conflict-Affected Countries, forthcoming.

<sup>32</sup> OECD-DAC, o.c. 2007. Other security assessment frameworks for more nationally-led processes include Centre for Democracy and Development, the *Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook*, Lagos, 2004, at [http://www.gfn-ssr.org/ssg\\_a/index.cfm?id=2&p=2](http://www.gfn-ssr.org/ssg_a/index.cfm?id=2&p=2) and *Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework*, The Hague: Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, at [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030800\\_cru\\_paper\\_ball.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030800_cru_paper_ball.pdf)

While many PRSs identify achieving security as a priority, they have generally been weak in developing clear implementation strategies and mechanisms to monitor outcomes. To the extent possible, the security sector elements of the PRS should include measurable indicators (for both outputs and outcomes) that are integrated into PRS monitoring, evaluation and reporting mechanisms.

#### **Box 2: Towards more a strategic approach**

In the case of **DRC**, described further below, security is broadly recognized as critical to enabling peace-building as well as poverty reduction. However, while the PRS for DRC includes certain activities in the security sector (notably DDR), it does not include a coherent strategy for the security sector. In contrast, the approach adopted in **Sierra Leone** provides an example of a more strategic approach, including the integration of core elements of a security sector strategy into the PRS.

### **4.6 Linking Justice and Security Sector Reform**

Well-functioning security and justice sectors share many goals, operate according to the same fundamental principles and deliver services through many of the same institutions. Yet justice and law enforcement institutions are often the responsibility of separate national authorities (justice ministry, attorney general, police commission etc.) from those responsible for national security (ministries of defense, national security agencies, intelligence agencies). There may also be different international actors providing support for rule of law and justice reform from those engaged in security sector reform.

Given that justice reform is often explicitly linked to security sector reform within peace agreements and international cooperation frameworks, these linkages should be reflected in the PRS. Although the precise intersection of justice and security sector reform programs will vary in every national context, some key linkages may include those described in Box 3 below.

#### **Box 3: Linking Justice and Security Sector Reform Programs**

- *Rule of Law Reform*: broad governance reform programs in which different institutions, including those in the security sector, become subject to the rule of law. Rule of law reform links to SSR on issues of civil oversight of security institutions and establishing transparent lines of authority and accountability for state security actors operating under established standards and procedures.
- *Justice Reform*: targeted institutional reform of one or several bodies of law. Reform of the criminal justice system includes law enforcement (police), criminal justice (courts) and corrections (prisons). May be linked to SSR where there is overlap between criminal justice and security actors.
- *Security, Law and Order*: programs to strengthen national security and law enforcement agencies in fulfilling their mandate for ensuring public safety, law and order; these tend to focus on operations and service delivery and may include some of the same actors engaged in security sector reform.
- *Human Rights Commissions/Ombudsman*: establishment and strengthening of national accountability mechanisms for the protection of citizens' rights. This may be linked to SSR in providing avenues for redress for abuse by state and non-state security actors.
- *Transitional justice*: may be linked to SSR through special post-conflict tribunals and truth commissions with jurisdiction to investigate prior abuses by security actors. These processes may be connected to vetting programs for security personnel.

Source: adapted from World Bank, *Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt*, Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, No. 37, 2006.

#### 4.7 Linking the PRS and Security Sector with National Budgets

*"PRSPs allow for a wide-ranging discussion of government spending priorities. This offers an opportunity to bring security into the debate and to assess how competing demands on public resources should be resolved."* (OECD-DAC, "Security Sector Reform and Governance", 2005)

Since PRS are linked to budgets it is important to determine the sustainability of spending in the security sector in relation to other government priorities, including poverty reduction. However, this is not a simple matter of reducing security expenditures to increase social service delivery or other investments in poverty reduction. It may in fact be important to re-allocate or even increase security investments to improve the sector's capacity to create conditions conducive to poverty reduction. As in other sectors, the key issue is thus not the *level* of spending but rather the *process* by which spending decisions are made, the *quality* (efficiency and effectiveness) of the spending, and its link to the achievement of key national security and poverty reduction objectives.<sup>33</sup>

Weaknesses in security sector governance can be especially pronounced in conflict-affected countries and fragile states, where the sector is often disconnected from central government processes. However, there is growing consensus within the World Bank and other international organizations that basic principles of public financial management (PFM) and accountability are equally applicable to all areas of the national budget, including the security sector. Cordoning off the security sector in terms of PFM often results in a national budget that is neither comprehensive nor sustainable. Furthermore, increasing the transparency of spending in the security sector can support the government's efforts at resource mobilization for the PRS as donors may otherwise be wary of providing budget support where there is a perception of inappropriate or unaccountable spending in the security sector.

Using its standard diagnostic tools of Public Expenditure Reviews, Country Financial Accountability Assessments and Country Procurement Assessment Reviews, the Bank regularly analyzes the economic governance of a range of sectors and line ministries. These tools can usefully be applied to the security sector as in the case of Afghanistan described below. The Bank can also assist governments in post-conflict and fragile states to establish transparent and efficient procedures covering all parts of the budget. In country experience, it has been helpful to include the full range of executive branch agencies and ministries in budget and planning training programs, so that the budget and finance officers from the ministries of defense, justice and interior (and related civilian-military oversight and liaison units) participate alongside their counterparts from social service or infrastructure ministries.

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<sup>33</sup> Under existing World Bank's policy adopted in 1991, the Bank may analyze the impact of military and other non-productive expenditures on a country's development agenda, as part of its risk management analysis, research work, policy-based operations, and public expenditure reviews. However, in doing so, the Bank may not purport to determine an appropriate level for a country's military expenditures, or to assess military expenditure as such, but rather on the country's efforts in funding development expenditures. *Bank Work on Military Expenditure* (SecM91-1563), 9 December 1991; and *General Counsel's Statement on Whether Public Expenditure and Military Expenditure in Particular Fall within the Bank's Mandate* (SecM91-1563/1), 13 December 1991.

#### Box 4: Security Sector and Public Finance Management

In many fragile and conflict-affected countries, national authorities and donors are struggling to regain control of unaffordable levels of security sector spending, much of it financed directly by donors. In many cases, long-term external assistance may be required for the security sector, generating severe trade-offs with other priority sectors which also require long-term external support. Overcoming the legacy of a fiscally unsustainable and poorly managed security sector calls for full application of PFM principles to support the establishment of checks and balances required to establish a wholly accountable security sector. (World Bank, "Post-Conflict Security Sector and Public Finance Management: Lessons from Afghanistan", 2006)

### 4.8 Fostering National Ownership and International Coordination through PRS

By integrating security sector strategies into the PRS, governments have an opportunity to articulate national priorities for the security sector through a participatory process. The PRS can thus provide a national framework for generating support for the security sector from the international community. It is therefore important that the PRS integrate security sector priorities in a manner that is consistent with other peacebuilding and recovery frameworks.

In practice, the improvement of security and justice has often been undermined by a lack of coordination between international actors with different agendas for the security sector. Also, there has often been a significant disconnect between diplomatic, defense and development agencies' support to the security sector.<sup>34</sup> Thus, to the extent that the PRS process can involve these different actors in establishing a consensus around national security sector priorities, it can be an important tool for fostering both national ownership and international coordination.

#### Box 5: The PRS creates opportunities for improving coordination

In **Central African Republic**, the Bank and UNDP worked jointly to assist the PRS Secretariat with the integration of conflict factors, including security sector issues, in the PRS. The Security and Governance components of the PRS were finalized through a joint workshop, which brought together all relevant stakeholders, including donors.

While the UK provided major technical support to SSR in **Sierra Leone**, the SSR's integration as a key pillar in the PRS helped secure greater buy-in of national actors, allowed for more effective coordination and alignment of donors, and ultimately more effective and longer term international support to the government.

Independent evaluations of SSR in the **Democratic Republic of Congo** highlight the problems caused by the persistent lack of coordination between donors driven by different approaches to SSR, which is also reflected on the lack of strategic framework for SSR in the PRS.

### 4.9 Partnerships for SSR

The World Bank plays a key role in supporting PRSs and other national policy frameworks that integrate justice and security sector priorities. But other international partners usually take the lead on the provision of technical

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<sup>34</sup> See discussion in Sarah Cliffe et Gilles Alfandari, « Acteurs de la diplomatie, de la sécurité et du développement : un programme de collaboration », in Jean-Marc Châtaigner et Hervé Magro (eds.), *États et Sociétés Fragiles : Entre conflits, reconstruction et développement*, Agence française de développement, 2007.

support for security sector reform process. Since coordination is critical, it is important to understand the strengths of various international partners. Some key partners include:

### **United Nations System**

*“The objective of a UN approach to security system reform (SSR) is effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions operating under civilian control within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.”* (UN Secretary General, 16 February 2007)

The United Nations has been increasingly engaged in SSR through its Peacekeeping and Peace Support operations. However, it has only recently initiated an inter-agency effort to develop common policy and operational approaches. In a 2008 Report of the Secretary General, the UN System outlined its broad strategy for supporting national security sector reform processes.<sup>35</sup> The UN plays a normative role in the development of international principles and standards for support to SSR as well as guidelines for its implementation. UN departments and agencies are also engaged in a number of operational support roles for SSR including:<sup>36</sup>

- Establishment of an enabling environment for SSR through provision of security, support to DDR, human rights monitoring, etc.;
- Needs assessment and strategic planning;
- Facilitation of national security dialogue;
- Provision of technical advice and support to different actors and institutions within the security sector, including assistance for vetting, recruiting and training personnel, civilian management of security and justice institutions, etc.;
- Coordination and resource mobilization;
- Capacity-building for security sector oversight mechanisms;
- Monitoring, evaluation and review of SSR.

In order to coordinate these activities, an inter-agency SSR support unit has been established in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at UN Headquarters. This unit is responsible for the development of SSR policies and guidance, the provision of strategic advisory and specialist capacities for SSR, and the coordination of support to field operations.

### **OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC)**

The OECD has taken the lead in coordinating the development of common policy and guidance for its member states (mostly donor countries) who engage in SSR. The OECD-DAC has been working through its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) to produce a series of policies and operational guidance on Security System Reform.<sup>37</sup> These include a *Handbook on SSR*,<sup>38</sup> which covers the steps of engagement with SSR from building dialogue to program design, implementation, donor harmonization and joint planning.

The Handbook, which provides an Institutional Framework for SSR (IF-SSR) suggests three major overarching objectives for donor engagement: 1) the improvement and sustainability of basic security and justice service

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<sup>35</sup> UN SG's Report, *o.c.*

<sup>36</sup> UN SG's Report, *o.c.* para. 47-50.

<sup>37</sup> available at [www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr](http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr)

<sup>38</sup> OECD, *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice*, 2007, available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>

delivery;<sup>39</sup> 2) the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability mechanisms; 3) the development of local leadership and ownership of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs of the security system.

### ***Other International Actors***

International actors – bilateral development agencies, multi-lateral and regional organizations, peace support operations, non-governmental organizations and private sector companies – are playing increasingly significant roles in security and justice delivery in conflict affected countries and fragile states. These roles vary depending on the actor and the context.

Among the more active bilateral donors, both at the policy and technical levels are the UK and the US. Both countries have had significant engagement with security sector reform programs (with varying degrees of success) in a number of post-conflict settings. The UK has established a number of cross-departmental and interdisciplinary mechanisms to support these efforts, while the US approach remains largely segmented between different government agencies. Although neither has developed a comprehensive national policy on SSR, elements of their approaches can be found in military doctrine and government policy statements.<sup>40</sup> France and the Netherlands have also provided bilateral assistance to the security sector in a number of conflict-affected countries.

Regional organizations – including the European Union, the African Union, and ECOWAS - are also playing an increasingly important role in dealing with security sector issues, although in general their policy framework and operational capacities are less developed than the examples mentioned above. They have tended to have focus more on immediate, post-conflict and peace-keeping interventions than on longer term development approaches. However, some organizations like the EU are taking steps towards developing long-term approaches to SSR.<sup>41</sup>

Civil society is also an important partner in SSR (particularly on questions of dialogue, transparency and accountability) and is becoming increasingly organized into international and regional networks which can provide assistance to national reform process. See for example resources and support available through the Africa Security Sector Network<sup>42</sup> and the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Specific guidance on the delivery of security and justice in Fragile States is treated in details in a further OECD paper "*Enhancing Security and Justice Service Delivery*", May 2007.

<sup>40</sup> For more on different bilateral and multilateral approaches to SSR, see Sean McFate, *Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries*, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, Sept. 2008, available on [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org).

<sup>41</sup> Recognising that Security Sector Reform (SSR) is becoming an essential component in the delivery of the EU's defence, security, development, crisis management and conflict prevention policies, the EU is developing a comprehensive SSR strategy that would enable it to address current security challenges as a prerequisite for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. See Commission of the European Communities Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, "A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform", Brussels, 24 May 2006.

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/>

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.dcaf.ch/>

## 5. Emerging Practice: Some Country Cases

While the previous section identified operational and strategic issues and entry-points for the integration of security issues in PRSs, this section presents some recent and on-going country cases. As these experiences show, security sector issues are being linked to PRS processes in several conflict-affected countries and fragile states in various ways and at various stages of the PRS process. The role of the World Bank has also varied across different cases. Some of the key emerging lessons highlight the importance of:

- Supporting country analytical work which identifies local dynamics of, and linkages between, security, conflict and poverty;
- Recognizing that national and international actors will have different interests and objectives for the security sector and that reform is often a contested process;
- Facilitating dialogue and collaboration among national stakeholders and international partners;
- Identifying key entry-points and appropriate timing for linking ssr and prs processes;
- Taking advantage of opportunities to link dialogue on security sector and poverty reduction issues with participatory processes for the prs;
- Linking security sector issues to standard service delivery and governance frameworks; and
- Building upon and re-enforcing security sector priorities in existing frameworks such as peace agreements, post-conflict needs assessments and transitional results frameworks.

### 5.1 Afghanistan: Integrating a Strategic Vision for the Security Sector

*"Security in all parts of the country is essential for effective governance, private sector development, economic growth, poverty reduction and the safeguarding of individual liberty." (ANDS, 2008)*

In Afghanistan, where the World Bank is a key partner for post-conflict reconstruction and development, security has been identified as a national priority and even designated as the country's 'ninth' MDG. 'Security' constitutes the first pillar of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS, 2008)<sup>44</sup> which articulates the strategic objective to 'ensure the security of state, persons and property through the implementation of an integrated and sustainable defense, security and law and order policy'.

The ANDS chapter on security presents a vision for the sector based on a five-year National Security Policy which contains two interrelated strategies: a National Security Strategy and a Security Sector Reform Strategy. The ANDS incorporates key elements of these strategies. In particular, it articulates reform benchmarks and outcomes including integration of different security sector institutions under the direction of a National Security Council, ensuring effective oversight by legislative, judicial and human rights bodies, as well as strengthening the synergies between civil and military operations. It also articulates a three-phase plan for the gradual transfer of responsibility for security from NATO/ISAF forces to the Afghan National Army and National Police Force.

The ANDS also recognizes the need for fiscal sustainability of the security sector. It outlines a 'Right-financing' approach to the security sector as a means to strike an appropriate balance between meeting current security challenges (requiring external support in the short to medium-term) and the longer term objective of fiscal sustainability.

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<sup>44</sup> Afghanistan National Development Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (ANDS), February 2008.

The ANDS provides an example of the incorporation of a strategic vision for the security sector within a national development framework. Rather than considering security as a condition or context for poverty reduction, the ANDS presents security as an integral part of its poverty reduction strategy and provides a strategic vision for the sector and the role of the international community in achieving its objectives. The World Bank has been able to support this effort by working closely with other international partners and bringing its own technical expertise on budget and finance management to bear.

## 5.2 Burundi: Bringing the Stakeholders Together

Security sector issues were a central feature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2000). These included key elements of SSR including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and integration of former rebel groups into the national security forces. International actors including the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi (ONUB) and the World Bank,<sup>45</sup> have been supporting the implementation of the Agreement, including the DDR and SSR processes.

However, when the PRS was being prepared, a strategic vision for a comprehensive reform of the security sector had not been developed. Early drafts of the PRS identified security and peacebuilding as government priorities and included some specific security interventions in support of the ceasefire and DDR process. But it did not go on to establish a strategic vision based on national priorities. This became a matter of concern for many international partners, including the World Bank.

It was in this context, during the final stages of PRS preparation, that the World Bank actively supported the PRS Secretariat with the integration of conflict factors and security issues into the Burundi PRS. In close collaboration with the UN system, the World Bank brought together focal points from the PRS team and government ministries as well as civil society actors working on issues of governance, security, human rights and justice, land reform and equity in access to public services. Working groups were established following a two day workshop on these issues. This process created a relatively neutral space for actors engaged in the security sector to discuss these issues in the context of a national development strategy and, with the support of UN experts, to identify key steps which would lay the groundwork for a more detailed strategic reform of the security sector. Thus, while there was not yet a formal SSR process underway when the PRS was being finalized in Burundi, there was still an opportunity to link security sector issues to a broader development framework and lay some of the groundwork for undertaking SSR.

As a result, "Improving Governance and Security" became one of the four pillars of Burundi's PRSP adopted in September 2006.<sup>46</sup> This pillar contains objectives and actions related to the professionalization of the defense and security forces and establishing police and armed forces at levels commensurate with the security needs and financial resources of the country – core aspects of any SSR process. Moreover, a section on "Strengthening Rule of Law, Justice and Human Rights" includes elements of institutional and legal reform in support of the rule of law. While many of the proposed actions will require the development of detailed implementation plans, they are now explicitly integrated into the PRS and its monitoring and implementation frameworks.

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<sup>45</sup> Through Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). For more information on the program and partners, see <http://mdrp.org/>

<sup>46</sup> Republic of Burundi, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, September 2006.

### 5.3 Central African Republic: Building a Security Sector Reform Agenda

Security has long been a major challenge in the Central African Republic (CAR), a landlocked country in the midst of a conflict zone which is often affected by the spillover of violence in neighboring DRC, Chad and Sudan. In July 2005, capitalizing on a successful transition period, the Government of CAR developed a draft Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) for 2005-08 which included pillars on 'the reinforcement of security, the consolidation of peace', and 'the improvement of governance and public sector institutional capacity'<sup>47</sup>

World Bank support for the integration of conflict factors and security sector issues into the PRS began through a conflict analysis undertaken jointly with national stakeholders prior to the World Bank's full re-engagement in CAR. In the context of a regional study for the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP),<sup>48</sup> the Bank later analyzed opportunities and constraints for security sector reform in CAR. That exercise included a focus on public finance management - a core component of the World Bank's re-engagement strategy in CAR<sup>49</sup> - as well as a review of the PRS process to assess how conflict factors were being addressed. Initial findings showed that although governance and security were widely recognized as major development problems in CAR, they were not being adequately addressed during PRS preparation. The integration of conflict factors and a focus on governance, including on issues around the reform of the security sector, thus became an important aspect of the World Bank's assistance to the PRS Secretariat in close cooperation with the UNDP and other partners.

The first pillar of the PRSP ('Restore security, consolidate peace and prevent conflict') now recognizes the link between poverty and insecurity, the lack of trust and credibility of security institutions linked persistent problem of impunity, as well as regional insecurity.<sup>50</sup> The PRSP calls for the development of an integrated and coherent approach through security sector reform to include: (i) restructuring and strengthening of the defense and security forces, (ii) good governance, particularly regarding public finances, justice and the participation of civil society, and (iv) improving regional cooperation. While the PRSP lays out key objectives and some priority actions, the challenge remains developing and implementing a coherent national strategy for SSR.

The Bank has therefore worked closely with other international partners (including the UN, France, and EU) in support of the efforts of the President of CAR (who is also the Minister of Defense) who has been keen to launch an overarching reform of the security sector. As part of this effort, and in recognition of its comparative advantage and technical expertise on budget and financial management, the Bank was invited to broaden the scope of its initial support to PFM work in CAR to include the security sector.

The World Bank is leading a holistic Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) exercise in CAR which is an integrated monitoring framework that allows measurement of the country PFM performance over time. The Government has requested technical assistance from the World Bank to undertake analytic work related to past and current PFM practices in the security sector, based on the principles of PEFA's PFM Performance Report. The Government recognizes the need to improve FM practices related to its largest budgetary outlay, the security sector. Based on the findings of the PFM review, the Bank will finance training activities for civilian and military personnel geared toward improving financial management of the security sector. (Areas of intervention could include *inter alia*:

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<sup>47</sup> Central African Republic, PRSP Preparation Status Report, November 2006

<sup>48</sup> MDRP is active in seven countries: Angola, Burundi, CAR, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. see <http://mdrp.org/>

<sup>49</sup> As outlined in the Joint World Bank – African Development Bank Interim Strategy Note FY07-08, Report No. 37974-CF.

<sup>50</sup> Central African Republic, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2008-2010, April 2008.

budget preparation, budget tracking, fiscal sustainability, public oversight, as well as on transparency and accountability).<sup>51</sup>

#### **5.4 Democratic Republic of Congo: A Missed Opportunity?**

*"No issue is more important than security sector reform in determining the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) prospects for peace and development. Establishing a security environment is not possible without a thorough security assessment that takes into account the country's risks, needs, capabilities and financial means."<sup>52</sup>*

The PRS in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was elaborated during a fragile post-conflict transition period which included the organization of a constitutional referendum, the holding of elections, and the transition from an interim to an elected government. When a PRS is prepared in such a context of volatile post-conflict transition, security sector issues tend to be looked at through a short-term, immediate post-conflict lens - focusing on programs such as demobilization, rather than on longer term comprehensive governance reform and development strategy.

The DRC PRS includes the security sector under the pillar "Good governance and peace consolidation through the strengthening of institutions". The focus here is on DDR, and on the integration of the army, police and security services, rather than on an overall framework for the restructuring of the sector, as may have been advisable. Linkages with other aspects of rule of law are missing as well as the analysis of the linkages between security, conflict and poverty. The DRC experience calls attention to key challenges related to national ownership of SSR, the timing and phasing of the process in relation to the PRS, the difficulty of ensuring a coherent and coordinated support by the international community, and of the PRS's alignment or non-alignment with the key processes that post-conflict transition countries are undergoing.

#### **5.6 Haiti: Building on an Interim Cooperation Framework**

The Haitian army was disbanded in 1995 following President Aristide's return from exile and after a particularly violent period of military dictatorship. A national police force was created in its place and has since struggled to fulfill its mandate of ensuring the security of the state and its citizens. The establishment of a national police force has been a central element of international stabilization efforts in Haiti through a series of UN peacekeeping missions during the 1990s and now again under the mandate of MINUSTAH.<sup>53</sup> Thus, 'security sector issues' in Haiti have been focused mainly on the reform of law enforcement and criminal justice institutions.

While there is no formal peace agreement in Haiti, the integration of security and justice issues into the PRS process builds on existing international cooperation frameworks. In particular, Security and Justice together constituted a core

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<sup>51</sup> "In keeping within the scope of its mandate, the Bank, through this exercise, will not seek to obtain information about specific defense purchases or systems; nor will it seek to impose conditionality related to military expenditures or render opinions on the nature or scope of these expenditures. Rather, the PFM review constitutes an analytical exercise to provide a basis for high-level policy dialogue with Government of CAR to ensure better financial management and budgetary planning across various sectors in order to contribute to poverty reduction in CAR." See *Supporting Stabilization Through Improved Accountability*, LICUS Trust Fund FY2008 Grant Proposal, 14 April 2008.

<sup>52</sup> International Crisis Group, *Security Sector Reform in the Congo*, February 2006.

<sup>53</sup> For more on the mandate and operations of peacekeeping missions in Haiti, see <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/>

pillar of the Interim Cooperation Framework (and its transitional results matrix) established jointly between the Government of Haiti and donors (with significant UN and World Bank support) for the transition period leading up to 2006 elections. Justice and security sector reform was subsequently identified as a government priority in the I-PRSP (2006) and constitutes the priority for the Governance pillar of the full PRS (2007).<sup>54</sup>

While the UN and other international partners are taking the lead on providing technical assistance for the reform of justice and security sector in Haiti, the World Bank has focused on linking these efforts to areas of its own comparative advantage. A Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (PEMFAR) exercise undertaken jointly by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank created an opportunity to look into PFM aspects of the justice and security sector. The PEMFAR was used to inform the development of a macro-framework for the PRS and the discussion of related budget priorities. The impact of justice and security issues on development and poverty reduction was also integrated in the World Bank's analytical work on Haiti, including the Country Economic Memorandum and Country Social Assessment.<sup>55</sup> As a result, the Bank's overall engagement strategy links security and development issues, as outlined in the Interim Strategy Note (FY07-08). This coordinated and multi-pronged approach to the integration of justice and security issues in the Bank's and other international partners' key analytical and programmatic initiatives has helped to ensure that justice and security remain a priority in and beyond the scope of the PRS.

## **5.7 Liberia: Linking PRS and Peacebuilding Frameworks**

In Liberia, the question of integrating SSR into the PRS was first addressed during the delicate period of transition from emergency post-conflict interventions to longer-term development frameworks. Failure to initiate a legitimate SSR process following the 1997 peace agreement was widely agreed to have resulted in human rights abuses that lead to the resurgence of civil war. The 2003 Accra Agreement reflected a renewed political consensus on the need to engage in SSR, which is now one of the four major objectives pursued by the Liberian government as it rebuilds after the fifteen-year civil war. Security sector issues have also been central to the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia.

The 2003 peace accord provided a framework for the integration of security sector issues into the Liberian PRS. Recognizing that security failures and the collapse of the public sector contributed to the breakdown of previous peace agreements, both the government PRS team and international partners (including the World Bank), put great efforts during the design of the I-PRS and later, full PRS, into developing a conflict sensitive strategy. As a result, the PRS acknowledges the dynamics linking insecurity, chronic poverty, and past injustices as having contributed to Liberia's poverty-conflict trap.

'Consolidating Peace and Security' constitutes the first pillar of the Liberian PRS which approaches the security sector in a comprehensive and coherent manner. Key priorities include the consolidation of the peace by advancing the reform of the security sector through the development of sound overall policy and institutional restructuring.<sup>56</sup> The PRS outlines concrete steps towards accomplishing these goals including the implementation of a National Security Sector Strategy and Implementation Matrix, the development of a legal framework for a new streamlined National Security Architecture, and the rebuilding of the Liberian security forces. In addition, the PRS identifies strengthening human and personal security (with a particular focus on gender-based violence), and

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<sup>54</sup> Republic of Haiti, I-PRSP, November 2006 and Republic of Haiti, Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, November 2007.

<sup>55</sup> Haiti CEM, CSA and ISN available on <http://go.worldbank.org/FIVCDQHZ30>

<sup>56</sup> Republic of Liberia, PRSP, April 2008.

building regional peace and security as key security objectives. Efforts to reform the security sector are also complemented by the third pillar of the strategy, "Strengthening Governance and the Rule of Law," which reflects an understanding of the need to integrate security issues within the country's broader governance framework.

However, there has been some difficulty in ensuring coherent and coordinated support from the international community in achieving these objectives. For example, several international actors are providing direct support to different national stakeholders (including the Ministry of Defense, Parliament and Governance Reform Commission and civil society) without the proper coordination.<sup>57</sup> Ultimately, successful implementation of SSR (and of the entire PRS) will depend to a great extent on the government's capacity to provide leadership and on the international community's ability to provide coherent and coordinated support.<sup>58</sup>

## 5.8 Sierra Leone: Adopting a Strategic Approach

Security sector reconstruction was a core element of the 1999 Lome Peace Agreements and became a central element of the PRS in Sierra Leone. Good governance, peace and national security constitute the first and core pillar of the PRS, as well as cross-cutting issues linked to a wider range of development strategies across all sectors of the poverty reduction strategy.<sup>59</sup>

In similarity to the Liberia case, the Sierra Leone peace accord provided a framework for the integration of security sector issues into the PRS, thus facilitating the government's commitment to address these issues and ensuring the international community's support of the process.<sup>60</sup> Stakeholders in the Sierra Leone PRS acknowledged the linkages between poverty, conflict and insecurity, and that the restructuring of the security sector would be necessary for the State and its citizens to achieve long-term peace and development. Furthermore they recognized that the PRS had to be developed in the broader context of a post-conflict transition.

The integration of the security sector as a key element of the PRS in Sierra Leone was possible because, a) governance and security had been identified as a key obstacle to peace and development during the peace process; b) there was a broad consensus that only a conflict sensitive PRS would be a useful PRS; c) international partners, in particular the UK, had committed to providing long term support for security sector reform.<sup>61</sup>

However, while there is broad international consensus on the importance of security for development in Sierra Leone, this has not always translated into coherent and coordinated donor engagement. For example, questions surrounding the fiscal sustainability of the international community's support to SSR were not addressed for some time. Furthermore, according to a DFID evaluation, the HIPC debt-relief conditionality has not been helpful in supporting the development of a sector-wide budget for justice and security sector reform in Sierra Leone.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> See reports available at [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

<sup>58</sup> See also, "Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Domestic Considerations and the Way Forward". United States Institute for Peace, Peace Brief, April 2007.

<sup>59</sup> Government of Sierra Leone PRSP, March 2005.

<sup>60</sup> T. von Gienanth, W. Hansen, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and National Ownership – Lessons from the Sierra Leone Peace Process, 2005

<sup>61</sup> J. Kayode Fayemi, in A. Bryden and H. Hanggi, *Governing insecurity in post-conflict states: the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia*, 2004. Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector; Geneva Centre for the democratic control of armed forces DCAF – Working Paper Series – No 51 - Security Sector Reform, a Research Note, Christopher Smith. 2002

<sup>62</sup> Nicole Ball, Piet Biesheuvel, Tom Hamilton-Baillie and 'Funmi Olonisakin, *Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa*, DFID, Evaluation Working Paper 23, 2007 available at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/sjr.pdf>

## 6. Conclusion

There is a growing recognition within the World Bank and among other development partners, on the close linkages between security, growth and poverty-reduction, particularly in conflict-affected countries and fragile states.

This paper suggests that while the World Bank may not have the capacity or mandate to deal with the many technical aspects of the security sector, the Bank can support the integration of security sector strategies in international cooperation frameworks, such as PCNAs and TRMs, and national development strategies, such as the PRS. As the cases outlined above highlight, there are also important entry-points for World Bank engagement in the sector in its core areas of expertise such as governance and public finance management. Emerging country practice highlights the cross-sectoral nature of work in this area, which will require new partnerships with key regional, multilateral and bilateral players, as well as learning and collaboration across networks within the World Bank.

It is equally clear that there are risks in either ignoring security challenges or addressing them only in an ad hoc, fragmented series of stand-alone projects. Costly and inefficient security structures may prove to be fiscally unsustainable. Inadequate or inequitable security systems will fail to deliver the first peace dividend many citizens will expect to follow a peace accord, undermining trust in a new government. Continuing threats to people and property—in a context of impunity or distorted judicial systems—increase the likelihood of relapse into violent conflict. Continuing insecurity undermines the ability of governments to deliver essential public services, results in the distortion of human and social capital, and reduces investments needed for poverty reduction.

As more and more fragile states and conflict-affected countries are engaging in the PRS process, it is becoming increasingly important for the Bank and partners to facilitate the integration of security sector strategies into PRSs. There is also growing need to gather knowledge and lessons that can contribute to the further development of operational guidance in this area. This paper represents a first step towards the achievement of these objectives.

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