business 5 Doing200 in Obstaclesto ving Growth Remo Business Doing 2005 in Obstacles to oving Growth Rem A copublication of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and Oxford University Press © 2005 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone 202-473-1000 Internet www.worldbank.org E-mail feedback@worldbank.org All rights reserved. 1 2 3 4 08 07 06 05 A copublication of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and Oxford University Press. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the gov- ernments they represent. The World Bank cannot guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to: The Office of the Publisher, World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433 fax 202-522-2422, e-mail pubrights@worldbank.org. Additional copies of Doing Business in 2005: Removing Obstacles to Growth may be purchased at http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness ISBN 0-8213-5748-4 ISSN 1729­2638 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data has been applied for. Contents Doing Business in 2005 is the second in a series of Removing obstacles to growth: an overview 1 annual reports investigating the scope and manner of regulations that enhance business activity and Measuring with impact 9 those that constrain it. New quantitative indicators Starting a business 17 on business regulations and their enforcement can Hiring and firing workers 25 be compared across 145 countries--from Albania to Zimbabwe--and over time. Doing Business in 2004: Registering property 33 Understanding Regulation presented indicators in 5 Getting credit 41 topics: starting a business, hiring and firing workers, Protecting investors 49 enforcing contracts, getting credit and closing a busi- ness. Doing Business in 2005 updates these measures Enforcing contracts 59 and adds another two sets: registering property and Closing a business 67 protecting investors. The indicators are used to analyze References 75 economic and social outcomes, such as productivity, investment, informality, corruption, unemployment, Data notes 79 and poverty, and identify what reforms have worked, where and why. Doing Business indicators 89 Country tables 98 Acknowledgments 133 1 Removing obstacles to growth: an overview What are the findings? What to reform? Which myths to dispel? What to expect next? The past year has been good for doing business in 58 of Yet progress was uneven. Fewer than a third of poor the 145 Doing Business sample countries. They simplified countries reformed1. And those reformers concentrated some aspect of business regulations, strengthened prop- on simplifying business entry and establishing or im- erty rights or made it easier for businesses to raise fi- proving credit information systems (figure 1.1). Almost nancing. Slovakia was the leading reformer: introducing no reforms took place in making it easier to hire and fire flexible working hours, easing the hiring of first-time workers or in closing down unviable businesses. Across workers, opening a private credit registry, cutting the regions, African countries reformed the least. time to start a business in half and, thanks to a Many of the reforms in poor countries were spurred new collateral law, reducing the time to recover debt by by the desire of governments and donors to quantify three-quarters. Colombia was the runner-up. Among the the impact of aid programs (figure 1.2). The main suc- top 10 reformers, 2 other European Union entrants-- cess story is that business start-up is now easier in Lithuania and Poland--significantly lightened the bur- borrowers from the International Development Associ- den on businesses. India made progress in improving ation (IDA)--encouraged by performance targets set in credit markets. Five other European countries--Belgium, the 13th IDA funding round and by the Millennium Finland, Norway, Portugal, and Spain--reduced the cost of doing business and entered the top 10 list (table 1.1). TABLE 1.1 The major impetus for reform in 2003 was compe- Top 10 reformers in 2003 Reforms affecting Doing Business indicators on: tition in the enlarged European Union. Seven of the top Hiring 10 reformers were incumbent or new European Union Starting a and Enforcing Getting Closing a members. Thirty-six of 89 reforms--in starting a bus- Country business firing contracts credit business iness, hiring and firing workers, enforcing a contract, Slovakia Colombia getting credit and closing a business (topics in Doing Belgium Business in 2004 and 2005)--happened in EU countries. Finland Reforms in registering property and protecting investors India (new topics in Doing Business in 2005) are also taking Lithuania place fast in the EU. Accession countries reformed ahead Norway of the competitive pressures on their businesses in the Poland Portugal larger European market. Incumbent members reformed Spain to maintain their advantage in the presence of many Note: The table identifies all reforms that took place in 2003 and had a measurable effect low-wage producers from accession countries, produc- on the indicators constructed in this report. Countries are listed alphabetically, with the exception of Slovakia, the leading reformer, and Colombia, the runner-up. ers that would now compete with them on equal terms. Source: Doing Business database. 2 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 1.1 More reforms in rich countries Number of reforms by region What was reformed 26 26 Shares of reforms by topic Closing Hiring Starting a business and firing a business 4% Enforcing Starting 18% contracts 24% a business 19% Closing 11 a business 18% 52% 8 25% 7 25% 6 15% Credit 5 information Enforcing Credit contracts information OECD Europe & Latin Sub- Middle East Asia & South Reforms Reforms high income Central America & Saharan East & the Pacific Asia Asia the Caribbean Africa North Africa in rich countries in poor countries Note: Reforms affecting Doing Business indicators. Source: Doing Business database. Challenge Account, an initiative of the United States Being in the top 20 on the ease of doing business government.2 Measuring the initial burdens and the does not mean zero regulation. Few would argue it's progress with reforms also spurred reforms in the Euro- every business for itself in New Zealand, that workers are pean Union, labor reform in Colombia and bankruptcy abused in Norway or that creditors seize a debtor's assets reform in India. without a fair process in the Netherlands. Indeed, for Lithuania and Slovakia broke into the list of the 20 protecting property rights, more regulation is needed to economies with the best business conditions as measured make the top 20 list. in this year's report.3 New Zealand tops the list, followed All the top countries regulate, but they do so in less by the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong (China) and costly and burdensome ways. And they focus their efforts Australia (table 1.2). Among developing countries, Bots- more on protecting property rights than governments in wana and Thailand scored best. Latvia, Chile, Malaysia, other countries. If Australia needs only 2 procedures to the Czech Republic, Estonia, South Africa, Tunisia and start a business, why have 15 in Bolivia and 19 in Chad? Jamaica follow. At the other end of the spectrum, 20 poor If it takes 15 procedures to enforce a contract in Den- countries--four-fifths of them in sub-Saharan Africa-- mark, why have 53 in Lao PDR? If it takes 1 procedure to make up the list of economies with the most difficult register property in Norway, why have 16 procedures in business conditions. The list may change somewhat next Algeria? And if laws require all 7 main types of disclosure year because of reforms and because new topics will be to protect equity investors in Canada, why do those in added to the rankings. Cambodia and Honduras provide none? FIGURE 1.2 What gets measured gets done Reduction in time and cost for business start-up, 2003­04 TABLE 1.2 Top 20 economies on the ease of doing business All other Level in EU members IDA borrowers countries 2003 1 New Zealand 11 Switzerland 2 United States 12 Denmark COST TIME 3 Singapore 13 Netherlands ­5% 4 Hong Kong, China 14 Finland 5 Australia 15 Ireland 6 Norway 16 Belgium ­10% COST 7 United Kingdom 17 Lithuania COST TIME Top EU Top IDA 8 Canada 18 Slovakia reformers reformers 9 Sweden 19 Botswana France Ethiopia ­15% 10 Japan 20 Thailand Spain Benin TIME Slovakia Nicaragua Note: The ease of doing business measure is a simple average of the country's rank- 2004 START-UP MEASURED Belgium Mongolia ing in each of the 7 areas of business regulation and property rights protection mea- Finland Moldova sured in Doing Business in 2005. Source: Doing Business database. Source: Doing Business database. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW 3 What are the findings? boost growth--poor countries--put the most obstacles in their way (figure 1.3). The average difference between The analysis leads to 3 main findings: poor and rich countries on Doing Business cost indicators · Businesses in poor countries face much larger regu- is threefold. Rich countries score twice poor ones on in- latory burdens than those in rich countries. They face 3 dicators relating to property rights--enforcing contracts, times the administrative costs, and nearly twice as many protecting investors and legal rights of borrowers and bureaucratic procedures and delays associated with lenders. Latin American countries have very high regula- them. And they have fewer than half the protections of tory obstacles to doing business. But African countries property rights of rich countries. are even worse--and African countries reformed the · Heavy regulation and weak property rights exclude least in 2003. the poor from doing business. In poor countries 40% of the economy is informal. Women, young and low-skilled Heavy regulation and weak property rights workers are hurt the most. exclude the poor from doing business · The payoffs from reform appear large. A hypotheti- In The Mystery of Capital, Hernando de Soto exposed the cal improvement to the top quartile of countries on the damaging effects of heavy business regulation and weak ease of doing business is associated with up to 2 per- property rights. With burdensome entry regulations, few centage points more annual economic growth. businesses bother to register. Instead, they choose to oper- Businesses in poor countries face much larger ate in the informal economy. Facing high transaction costs regulatory burdens than those in rich countries to get formal property title, many would-be entrepreneurs own informal assets that cannot be used as collateral to It takes 153 days to start a business in Maputo, but 3 days obtain loans. De Soto calls this "dead capital." The solu- in Toronto. It costs $2,042 or 126% of the debt value to tion: simplify business entry and get titles to property. enforce a contract in Jakarta, but $1,300 or 5.4% of the But many titling programs aimed at bringing assets debt value to do so in Seoul. It takes 21 procedures to into the formal sector have not had the lasting impact register commercial property in Abuja, but 3 procedures that reformers hoped for. Doing Business in 2005 helps in Helsinki. If a debtor becomes insolvent and enters explain why. While it is critical to encourage registration bankruptcy, creditors would get 13 cents on the dollar in of assets, it is as important--and harder--to stop them Mumbai, but more than 90 cents in Tokyo. Borrowers from slipping back into the informal sector and to use and lenders are entitled to 10 main types of legal rights their formal status to gain access to credit. in Singapore, but only 2 in Yemen. Registering property--a new topic in this year's re- These differences persist across the world: the coun- port--explains that when formalizing property rights tries that most need entrepreneurs to create jobs and is accompanied by improvements in the land registry, collateral registry, the courts, and employment regula- FIGURE 1.3 More regulatory obstacles in poor countries tion, the benefits are much greater. If the formal cost of selling the property is high, titles will lapse by being Ratio of poor to rich countries traded informally. In Nigeria and Senegal that cost Cost to fire a worker 1.6 amounts to about 30% of the property value. And even Higher Cost to enforce contracts 3.0 costs when a formal title is well-established, it will not help to Minimum capital for start-up 4.2 increase access to credit if courts are inefficient, collat- Years to go through insolvency eral laws are poor and there are no credit information 1.9 More Days to register property systems, because no one would be willing to lend. Add to 1.8 delays Days to start a business 2.2 this rigid employment regulation, and few people will be hired. Women, young and low-skilled workers are hurt Less ­1.6 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders protection the most: their only choice is to seek jobs in the informal of property ­1.4 Contract enforcement procedures rights sector (figure 1.4). ­2.0 Investor protections: disclosure index Two examples. Nerma operates a small laboratory in Istanbul. She feels strongly about providing job opportu- Source: Doing Business database. nities for women but says employment legislation dis- 4 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 1.4 Complex regulations exclude the disadvantaged from doing business Women's share of private sector employment Informal sector share of GDP Greater Greater share share Lesser Lesser share share Least rigid Most rigid Fewest Most procedures procedures Countries ranked by rigidity of employment index, quintiles Countries ranked by procedures to register property, quintiles Note: Relationships are significant at the 5% level, controlling for income per capita. Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a), WEF (2004). courages it. When women marry they are given a year to Payoffs from reform appear large decide whether to leave their job and if they choose to go, the employer is required to pay a severance payment A hypothetical improvement on all aspects of the Doing based on years of service. And, if the business experiences Business indicators to reach the level of the top quartile of a drop in demand, it costs the employer the equivalent of countries is associated with an estimated 1.4 to 2.2 per- 112 weeks salary to dismiss a redundant worker. With centage points in annual economic growth (figure 1.5).4 such rigid regulation, employers choose conservatively. This is after controlling for other factors, such as income, Only 16% of Turkish women are formally employed. government expenditure, investment, education, infla- Rafael runs a trading business in Guatemala. A large tion, conflict and geographic regions. In contrast, im- customer refuses to pay for equipment delivered 2 months proving to the level of the top quartile of countries on earlier. It would take more than 4 years to resolve the com- macroeconomic and education indicators is associated mercial dispute in the courts and even then the outcome with 0.4 to 1.0 additional percentage points in growth. is uncertain. Rafael has no choice but to negotiate with the How significant is the impact of regulatory reform? customer and ends up getting only a third of the amount Very. Only 24 of the 85 poor countries averaged at least due.With no money to pay his taxes,Rafael closes the busi- 2% growth in the last 10 years. China, the most promi- ness and goes informal. He is not alone. More than half of nent among the 24, scores higher on the ease of doing economic activity in Guatemala is in the informal sector. business than Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia or Turkey. FIGURE 1.5 FIGURE 1.6 Ease of doing business is associated with more growth Simpler business regulation, more human development Additional annual growth from a hypothetical improvement Human development index to the top quartile on the ease of doing business 1.0 Implied +2.2% additional growth +1.4% +1.4% 2.6% 0.8 0.6 1.3% 1.4% Actual 1.0% growth 0.4 Most difficult Least difficult Countries ranked by ease of doing business, quartiles 0.2 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Note: Analysis controls for income, government expenditure, primary and secondary enrollment, Ease of doing business inflation, investment, regions and civil conflict. Relationships are significant at the 5% level. Source: Doing Business database, Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho (2004). Source: Doing Business database, UNDP (2004). REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW 5 FIGURE 1.7 Economic growth is only one benefit of better busi- High costs of dealing with business regulation ness regulation and property protection. Human devel- Percentage of firms reporting that government regulations opment indicators are higher as well (figure 1.6). Gov- occupy 10% or more of senior management time ernments can use revenues to improve their health and 61 education systems, rather than support an overblown 56 55 51 bureaucracy. 49 44 43 The gains come from two sources. First, businesses 37 spend less time and money on dealing with regulations and chasing after scarce sources of finance (figure 1.7). Instead, they spend their energies on producing and mar- keting their goods. Second, the government spends fewer resources regulating and more providing basic social ser- vices. Sweden, a top 10 country on the ease of doing busi- India Ecuador Albania Tanzania Kenya Ukraine Brazil Cambodia ness, spends $7 billion a year or 8% of the government Source: World Bank investment climate assessments. budget, and employs an estimated 100,000 government officials to deal with business regulations.5 The United Kingdom spends $56 billion a year, or nearly 10% of the budget. Some governments are more ambitious. In 2002 budget, to administer business regulation.6 The Nether- the Dutch government set a goal of cutting expenditures lands spends $22 billion or 11% of its budget. Belgium, on administrative burdens by 25% by 2006. Actal, an in- $10 billion. Norway, $6 billion.7 In both countries, this dependent agency for cutting red tape, estimates that $2 amounts to about 9% of government spending. billion has already been saved by doing impact assess- What would happen if these countries were to re- ments before new regulations reach the parliament. The duce red tape by a moderate 15%? The savings would Belgian government has set the same 25% reduction as a amount to between 1.2% and 1.8% of total government goal. Denmark, France, Italy and Norway have also set expenditures, or approximately half of the public health quantitative goals for reducing red tape. What to reform? point. Or one could visit countries nearby--Botswana, South Africa and Uganda all have well-functioning busi- The benefits of regulatory reform are likely to be even ness entry. The same approach could be followed for re- greater in developing countries, which regulate more.Yet forms of regulations of labor, credit, property, corporate few governments are eager to reform, arguing that they governance, courts and bankruptcy. have limited capacity, that it takes a long time and that it To prioritize reform, governments can start by mea- costs a lot. In 2003 countries that scored the lowest on suring regulatory costs and identifying the biggest oppor- the ease of doing business measure reformed at one tunities for improvement. Belgium did so by introducing third the rate of countries in the top quartile. an annual survey of enterprises on the main regulatory Reform involves simplification. Governments would obstacles they face. A total of 2,600 businesses participate have more capacity and more money if they reformed. in the survey, and the results are reported to the parlia- With so many examples of good practice to learn from, ment. The process identified problems in company regis- there is no reason to wait (table 1.3). tration--a main reason for the 2003 reform--and in Imagine Namibia wants to be among the best in reg- business licensing, where reform is ongoing. Actal, the in- ulating business entry. A delegation from the company dependent agency in the Dutch government, performs registrar's office could visit Australia, Canada or New cost-benefit analysis of regulatory proposals. Along with Zealand and see how the process works there. To learn similar agencies in Denmark and Korea, it is among the how reforms take place, it could travel to Serbia and best in measuring and reducing red tape. There are suc- Montenegro, which just passed legislation to move regis- cess stories in developing countries too. In Mozambique tration out of the courts--and to Italy, which made the and Vietnam, the government regularly seeks advice from entry process much easier by establishing a single access the business community on priorities for reform. 6 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 TABLE 1.3 Simple solutions and where they have worked Which myths to dispel? Principles of good regulation Starting · Registration as an administrative process This year's analysis has also dispelled some commonly a business CANADA, CHILE, ITALY, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO held beliefs about the environment for doing business. · Use of single identification number BELGIUM, ESTONIA, MOROCCO, TURKEY Myth #1 Regulatory reform is costly · No minimum capital requirement BOTSWANA, IRELAND, TANZANIA, THAILAND The costs are modest for many of the reforms just out- · Electronic application made possible lined. Setting up a private credit bureau cost less than LATVIA, MOLDOVA, SWEDEN, VIETNAM $2 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Setting up an ad- Hiring and · Long duration of fixed-term contracts ministrative agency for business registration cost less firing AUSTRIA, COSTA RICA, DENMARK, MALAYSIA than $2 million in Serbia and Montenegro. Integrating workers · Apprentice wages for young workers CHILE, ECUADOR, FINLAND, TUNISIA the business start-up process into a single access point · Redundancy as grounds for dismissal cost $10 million in Turkey. Simple calculations from ARMENIA, BOTSWANA, LEBANON, RUSSIA growth analysis suggest that the benefit-to-cost ratios of · Moderate severance pay for redundancy such reforms are on the order of 25:1.8 Easing start-up FINLAND, MADAGASCAR, NAMIBIA, URUGUAY was recently listed by a panel packed with Nobel laure- Registering · Consolidate procedures at the registry ates as one of the most cost-effective ways to spur devel- property LITHUANIA, NORWAY, THAILAND · Unify or link the cadastre and registry opment--ahead of investing in infrastructure, develop- AUSTRALIA, NETHERLANDS, SLOVAKIA ing the financial sector and scaling up health services.9 · Make the registry electronic ITALY, NEW ZEALAND, SINGAPORE Myth #2 Social protection requires more business · Complete the cadastre regulation AUSTRIA, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, IRELAND Just look at the Nordic countries. All four Nordic econo- Enforcing · Summary proceedings for debt collection mies in Doing Business are on the list of countries with contracts BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, FINLAND, LITHUANIA, PHILIPPINES the simplest business regulation: Norway (#6), Sweden · Case management in courts INDIA, MALAYSIA, SLOVAKIA, UNITED STATES (#9), Denmark (#12) and Finland (#14). Few would argue · Appeals are limited that they scrimp on social benefits relative to other BOTSWANA, CHILE, ESTONIA, GREECE countries, or regulate too little. Instead, they have simple · Enforcement moved out of court regulations that allow businesses to be productive. And HUNGARY, IRELAND, NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN they focus regulation on where it counts--protecting Getting · Legal protections in collateral law credit ALBANIA, NEW ZEALAND, SLOVAKIA, UNITED STATES property rights and providing social services. Estonia, · No restrictions on assets for collateral Latvia and Lithuania, having learned much from their AUSTRALIA, SINGAPORE, UNITED KINGDOM richer neighbors, are also among the countries with the · Sharing of positive credit information best business environment. Heavier business regulation GERMANY, HONG KONG (CHINA), MALAYSIA · Data protection laws to ensure quality is not associated with better social outcomes.10 ARGENTINA, BELGIUM, UNITED STATES Myth #3 Entrepreneurs in developing countries Protecting · Derivative suits allowed investors face frequent changes in laws and regulations CHILE, CZECH REPUBLIC, KOREA, NORWAY · Institutional investors active Entrepreneurs complain of unpredictability. And gov- CHILE, KOREA, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES ernments complain of reform fatigue, blaming the de- · Disclosure of family and indirect ownership velopment aid agencies. Yet reforms in developing coun- DENMARK, SWEDEN, THAILAND, TUNISIA tries are rare. Many have been stuck with the same laws · Public access to ownership and financial data GERMANY, POLAND, SOUTH AFRICA and regulations for decades: Mozambique's company Closing a · Foreclosure focus in poor countries law dates from 1888, Angola's from 1901. No legal business ARMENIA, KENYA, NEPAL, PARAGUAY change there. The difficulties businesses face come from · Specialized expertise in the courts a lack of information and from discretion in enforce- COLOMBIA, INDIA, LATVIA, TANZANIA · Appeals are limited ment. There are simple solutions. Online services in the AUSTRALIA, ESTONIA, MEXICO, ROMANIA company registrar can make it clear how to start a busi- · Administrators are paid for maximizing value ness. Disclosure laws can reveal company ownership and DENMARK, JAPAN, JORDAN, MALAYSIA finances. And collateral and property registries can de- Source: Doing Business database. termine who owns what. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW 7 FIGURE 1.8 Myth #4 Regulation is irrelevant in developing Heavier regulation--more informality countries because enforcement is poor Informal sector share of GDP If it were, it would not be associated with so much in- Greater share formality (figure 1.8). Few businesses comply with all regulations in poor countries, since it is so prohibitively costly that entrepreneurs choose to operate in the infor- mal economy. A large informal sector is bad for the economy: it creates distortions, reduces tax revenues and excludes many people from basic protections. If regula- tion were simplified, entrepreneurs would find benefits Lesser share in moving to the formal sector, such as greater access to Most difficult Least difficult credit and to courts. Countries ranked by ease of doing business, quintiles Source: Doing Business database. What to expect next? What does it take to import a good and bring it to the store shelf? How to deal with customs, pre-shipment in- Three other areas of the business environment are being spections and technical and quality certification? researched. First, dealing with business licenses. One ar- The other is corporate taxation--its level, structure gument that government officials give for why business and administration. Tax reform has been hotly debated, entry is difficult is that they don't need to spend many especially in Europe, where several transition econo- resources on regulation once the worthy entrants are se- mies--Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and Slovakia--are mov- lected. Studying business licensing tests this argument-- ing to or have already adopted flat corporate and personal and the argument fails. The same countries that heavily tax at rates lower than the ones in other European coun- regulate entry also have more complex and burdensome tries. Estonia has no tax on corporate earnings if they are licensing regimes (figure 1.9). The data and analysis will re-invested. Whether lowering taxation spurs enough be released in late 2004 on the Doing Business website. new business activity to make up for the loss of budget Two new topics will be featured in Doing Business in revenues is a question that will be addressed next year. 2006. One is trade logistics. What are the procedures, time The number of sample countries will continue to ex- and cost for an exporter to bring goods from the factory pand. This year, Bhutan and Estonia were included in this door to the ship, train or truck and across the border? report. Data for Fiji, Kiribati, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, FIGURE 1.9 Bureaucratic entry, bureaucratic operations Tonga and Vanuatu are available on the Doing Business website. The governments of another dozen countries, Cost to obtain operational licenses and permits such as Cape Verde and Tajikistan, have requested inclu- Higher sion in next year's sample. Beyond adding new topics and countries is the chal- lenge of understanding how reform takes place. Doing Business started by studying what entrepreneurs go through in starting a business, hiring and firing workers, enforcing contracts, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors and closing a business. With time, Lower the project is building more information on reforms-- what motivates them, how to manage them and what Least expensive Most expensive their impact is. Coming in Doing Business in 2006 are Countries ranked by cost to start a business, quintiles studies of what reformers go through to improve busi- Source: Doing Business database. ness conditions. 8 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Notes 1. Poor countries are defined as low and lower middle income economies conflict and regions. The relationship is robust using 5, 15 and 20 year under World Bank Group income classifications. growth rates, as well as when controlling for trade, ethnolinguistic frac- 2. As a part of the IDA13 round of funding, 39 IDA borrowers were tionalization, latitude, and in instrumental regressions. See Djankov, monitored on the days and cost to start a business between January McLiesh and Ramalho (2004). 2002 and January 2004. The population-weighted change during this 5. NNR (2003). period was ­12% on days to start a business and ­19% on cost to start 6. British Chamber of Commerce (2004). a business. 7. The data for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway come from Dan- 3. The ease of doing business measure is the simple average of country ish Commerce and Companies Agency (2003). rankings (from 1 to 135) in each of the 7 topics covered in Doing Busi- 8. Growth estimates implied from the analysis in Klapper, Laeven and ness in 2005. The ranking for each topic is the simple average of rank- Rajan (2004) suggest benefits of $48 million from the reforms imple- ings for each of the indicators--for example the starting a business mented in Serbia and Montenegro, and $413 million in Turkey, in the ranking averages the country rankings on the procedures, days, cost first year alone. and minimum capital requirement to register a business. 9. Copenhagen Consensus (2004). Available at http://www.copenhagen 4. Based on a hypothetical improvement to the average of the top quar- consensus.com/ tile of countries on the ease of doing business indicator. Standard 10. Djankov and others (2002). growth regression analysis estimates the relationship between 10 year average annual GDP growth rates and the ease of doing business indi- cator. The analysis controls for income, government expenditure, pri- mary and secondary school enrollment, inflation, investment, civil 9 Measuring with impact How are the indicators constructed? How is the methodology being improved? What is new? In 1908 the first Model T came off the Ford Motor Com- tory in the outskirts of Lima. It took 289 days and $1,231 pany's factory floor. The time to produce a single car: for the business to legally start operations. 12 ½ hours. The price: $825. Few people could afford Doing Business is a time-and-motion study which one. Realizing this, in 1911 Henry Ford asked Frederick measures, across 145 countries, the obstacles faced by Taylor, the creator of time-and-motion studies, for help. an entrepreneur performing standardized tasks: start- After studying the production process from beginning ing a business; hiring and firing workers; obtaining busi- to end, Taylor divided it into separate procedures and ness licenses; getting credit; registering property; pro- assigned workers to each. By 1914 it took 93 minutes to tecting investors; enforcing contracts; and closing down produce a Model T, and the price fell to $440. Ford pro- a business. It takes 7 procedures and 8 days and costs duced 261,000 that year, nearly as many produced by the 1% of income per capita to register a business in Sin- other 300 car manufacturers combined. gapore; 41 procedures, 455 days and 10% of the debt In 1986 Hernando de Soto published The Other to enforce a debt contract in Oman; 5 procedures, 49 Path, using a time-and-motion study to show the pro- days and 4% of the property value to register property hibitive obstacles to establishing a business in Peru. De in Pakistan; and 16 procedures,121 days and 13% of income Soto's research team followed all necessary bureaucratic per capita to recover collateral in Mexico (figure 2.1). procedures in setting up a one-employee garment fac- The Doing Business research is conducted in coop- FIGURE 2.1 Complex procedures to recover collateral in Mexico Days Percentage of income per capita 1. Filing of complaint before judge. 2. Writ of the court in which the complaint is admitted. 120 12 3. Judicial request for payment of the encumbered assets. 4. Answer to the claim. The debtor may oppose defenses. 5. Court admits or dismisses the answer. 90 9 6. Notice to the creditor of the opposed defenses. Cost 7. Hearing of admission of evidence. 8. Court renders judgement. 60 6 9. Decision to proceed to asset sale. 10. Determination of asset value. Time 11. Decision on method of sale. 12. Arrangement for public auction. 30 3 13. The debtor is notified of the date for the public auction. 14. Publication of legal notices for potential buyers. 15. Public sale. 0 0 1 4 8 12 16 16. Creditor reimburses the exceeding amount to the debtor. Procedures Source: Doing Business database. 10 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 eration with leading scholars. The methodology for each business in Bolivia, the Czech Republic, France, Hon- of the 8 topics is developed in an academic background duras, Madagascar and Tunisia; on enforcing a contract paper.1 More than 60 other researchers have used the in Iran and Tunisia; on closing a business in Serbia and data, uncovering systematic patterns in business regula- Montenegro; and on firing workers in South Africa. The tions and access to credit across countries, and testing corrections are immediately reflected on the website, the hypotheses for the determinants of these patterns.2 most up-to-date source. With 3,192 data points in last The Doing Business data come from readings of laws year's report, the corrections amount to 0.3% of the total and regulations, with input and verification from more sample. than 3,000 local government officials, lawyers, business Most important, the Doing Business analysis can be consultants and other professionals administering or used to support policy reforms, and is already starting to advising on legal and regulatory requirements. The do so--for 2 reasons. First, understanding the relation- methodology uses factual information and allows sev- ship between indicators and economic and social out- eral interactions with local respondents, ensuring accu- comes enables policymakers to see how particular laws racy by clarifying possible misinterpretations of ques- and regulations are associated with poverty, corruption, tions. A library of current laws, also specifying the employment, access to credit, the size of the informal regulatory reforms under way, supports each indicator set. economy and the entry of new firms. Putting higher ad- The use of local knowledge distinguishes Doing Business ministrative burdens on entrepreneurs diminishes busi- from several other existing indicators, such as the ones ness activity--but it also creates more corruption and a produced by the Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, larger informal economy, with fewer jobs for the poor. the International Country Risk Guide and Institutional In- Second, Doing Business provides guidance on the vestor, constructed by experts living in other countries. design of reforms. The indicators offer a wealth of detail Transparent and easily replicable, Doing Business on the specific regulations and institutions that enhance can be used for comparisons and benchmarks across or hinder business activity, the biggest bottlenecks caus- countries. All the surveys and details of the methodology ing bureaucratic delay and the cost of complying with are published on the website--http//rru.worldbank.org/ regulation. Governments can identify, after reviewing doingbusiness--as are the contacts for local partners their country's Doing Business indicators, where they lag who provide information.3 The indicators on starting a behind and what to reform (figure 2.2). They then can business have been audited externally.4 understand what constitutes best practices and which There is also a simple process for contesting the countries to learn from. For property registration, from data--a welcome way to improve the indicators.5 In the New Zealand, Norway and Thailand. For business regis- last year, about 60 inquiries have been received, primar- tration, from Australia and Canada. To improve contract ily from government officials and development experts, enforcement, from Dutch courts. To better protect small and in 10 cases the interaction led to revisions of an in- investors, from Canada, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom dicator. These include correcting the data on starting a or the United States and their regulators. FIGURE 2.2 Reform in Ethiopia focuses on the major obstacles Days Time reduced Percentage of income per capita 2003 from 44 days to 32 2003 45 450 2004 30 300 Procedures reduced Cost reduced from 8 to 7 from 484% to 78% (of income per capita) 15 150 2004 0 0 1 4 8 1 4 8 Procedures Procedures Source: Doing Business database. MEASURING WITH IMPACT 11 How are the indicators constructed? FIGURE 2.3 Enforcing a contract in Poland--1,000 days The methodology for each of the topics in Doing Busi- Days ness has 6 features: 1,000 Enforcement 180 days · The team, with academic advisers, collects and ana- lyzes the laws and regulations in force. 800 Trial and judgment 730 days · This analysis yields a survey designed for local pro- 600 fessionals experienced in their fields--such as incorpo- ration lawyers and consultants for business entry, litiga- 400 tion lawyers and judges for contract enforcement, officials in land registries and real estate lawyers for reg- 200 istering property. Filing of complaint 90 days · The survey utilizes a standardized business case to 0 1 41 ensure comparability across countries and over time-- Procedures Source: Doing Business database. with assumptions about the legal form of the business, its size, location and nature of operations. lous city. The data track the procedures to recover the · The local experts have several rounds of interaction debt through the courts or through an administrative with the Doing Business team, typically 4. process, if such a process is available and preferred by · The preliminary results are presented to both aca- creditors. The plaintiff has fully complied with the con- demics and practitioners for refinements in the survey tract (and is thus 100% in the right) and files a lawsuit to and further rounds of data collection. recover the debt. The debtor attempts to delay and op- · The data are subjected to numerous tests for robust- poses the complaint. But the judge or administrator de- ness, which lead to subsequent revisions or expansions cides every motion for the plaintiff. of the collected information. For example, the initial The data come from readings of the codes of civil contract enforcement study collected and analyzed data procedures and other court regulations, as well as from for the recovery of a debt in the amount of 50% of in- administering surveys to local litigation attorneys, with come per capita, as well as for 2 other cases--the evic- at least 2 lawyers participating in each country. In 30 tion of nonpaying tenants and the recovery of a smaller countries the surveys are also completed by judges to see debt claim (5% of income per capita). After the release whether their answers are similar to those of attorneys. of Doing Business in 2004, it became clear that court and They are. As with all of the Doing Business in 2005 top- attorney fees were often too high to expect small debt ics, the data are for January 2004. cases to reach the court. As a result, the debt amount was Based on the survey responses, 3 indicators of the increased fourfold in this year's report. efficiency of commercial contract enforcement are de- veloped: The result is a set of indicators that is easy to verify · The number of procedures, mandated by law or and replicate. And extending the dataset to obtain other court regulation, that demand interaction between the benchmarks is straightforward. For example, the Doing parties or between them and the judge (administrator) Business case studies assume a certain type of business-- or court officer. usually a domestic limited liability company. Analysts can follow the methodology, adjust the assumption and · The time of dispute resolution in calendar days, construct the same benchmarks for other standardized counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit cases, for example sole proprietorships and foreign com- in court until the moment of settlement or, when appro- panies. priate, payment. (This includes the days when actions The methodology for one project--enforcing a con- take place and the waiting periods between actions.) tract--illustrates the general approach. The indicators · The official cost of court procedures, including for contract enforcement are constructed by studying court costs and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys a standardized case of a payment dispute in the amount is mandatory or common, or an administrative debt re- of 200% of income per capita in a country's most popu- covery procedure, expressed as a percentage of the debt. 12 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Based on these data Doing Business constructs a time- dure--hearings--taking the longest. Cutting proce- and-motion figure for each country. The figure makes dures and reducing the time for hearings would sub- clear what the main bottlenecks are in the contract en- stantially improve efficiency. In Estonia it takes only forcement process. In Poland, for example, it takes 150 days and 25 procedures. 1,000 days and 41 procedures to enforce a simple debt Such analysis is conducted on each of the 8 topics, contract (figure 2.3). Three-quarters of that time is for every one of the 145 countries in the Doing Business spent on the trial and judgment, with the 22nd proce- in 2005 sample. How is the methodology being improved? her country in 2001­03. And the typical respondent to the survey on protecting investors has the largest advi- Two characteristics define good indicators. First, they sory practice on corporate governance issues in his capture the real constraints to doing business. Second, country and has worked on various bar association or they are understood by policymakers, business leaders, government committees in drafting new laws and regu- journalists and development experts and are easy to act lations on shareholder protections. It is difficult to sur- upon. Doing Business in 2005 introduces changes to de- pass their expertise and the accuracy of the data gener- velop more of each. ated from their answers to the Doing Business surveys. On capturing constraints, 2 concerns have been But these experts often work in the largest cities and raised: whether the data from surveys of professionals may not be familiar with the practice in other parts of are representative and whether the indicators are a good the country. So, this year Doing Business developed indi- reflection of business constraints across the country. The cators at the regional level in several large countries. answer: surveys of local professionals offer several ad- In Brazil 9 cities other than São Paulo have been studied. vantages over enterprise surveys or polling of interna- In India 8 cities other than Mumbai. In Pakistan 4 cities tional experts, but the indicators for a business in Rio de other than Karachi. Janeiro may be very different from the indicators for a From these limited exercises, and from the work of business in São Paulo. In large countries, particularly in others, it is apparent that large differences exist across re- such federations as Brazil, Indonesia and Russia, re- gions within a country (figure 2.4).6 In Brazil the mu- gional indicators need to be constructed. nicipal requirement for an alvará (operational license) The typical respondent to the survey on business accounts for a significant proportion of the overall time registration assisted over 100 businesses through the to start a business and is the main reason for differences entry process in 2003. The typical respondent to the sur- across cities. In São Paulo, the largest business city and vey of closing down a business comes from the law firm the benchmark for the Doing Business cross-country in- that dealt with the largest number of bankruptcy cases in dicators, the alvará requirement drives up the total days FIGURE 2.4 Regional variations in Brazil--tremendous Time and cost to start a business Time and cost to register property Days Percentage of income per capita (percentage of property value) 24 10 Salvador 12 5 Campo Grande 37 10 Belo Horizonte 22 27 20 Fortaleza 17 4 Porto Velho 30 18 Campo Grande 15 Salvador 37 13 Manaus 16 Fortaleza 3 Cuiabá 37 20 Cuiabá 16 Belo 48 25 Brasília 09 Rio de Janeiro Horizonte Brasília 47 30 Porto Velho 22 2 Manaus São Paulo 46 45 Rio de Janeiro 21 32 120 São Paulo 12 1 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Alvara Days Source: Doing Business database. MEASURING WITH IMPACT 13 to start a business to double that in most other cities. later court judgment and are not preferred by creditors. Some of the same patterns that hold across countries are But several countries--for example, Belgium, France visible at the subnational level--for example in Brazil and Greece--have administrative debt collection proce- the cities with higher official fees for registering property dures that are binding for both debtors and creditors. are also the cities with the longest time. This year, administrative procedures are used for coun- Such within-country work is necessary to identify tries where the respondents indicate they are the most constraints and design reforms. Here, the methodology common method. developed by Doing Business again offers advantages A different problem arises when the respondents de- over the alternative methods. It is significantly cheaper scribe how entrepreneurs would register a business, go than running enterprise surveys. And it is much more to court or enter bankruptcy--but in reality have dealt accurate than asking a New York-based expert about little with such transactions. To gauge their experience, business constraints in Porto Velho (the 60th largest city this year's surveys collected information on how many in Brazil). such transactions the respondent completed. The new Still, there is room for improvement. Changes have evidence shows that the average incorporation lawyer been made to every set of indicators. For example, last dealt with more than 100 cases of business entry in 2003. year the statutory requirement for minimum capital was And because Doing Business has about 500 respondents taken as part of the initial cost of starting a business. But on starting a business, the data reported here reflect ex- in a number of countries, only a part of the mandated perience with more than 50,000 transactions for the minimum capital needs to be paid up-front, with the whole sample--for only one of the topics in Doing Busi- rest paid over time. For example, only 25% is paid up- ness. Beyond the arithmetic, a professional dealing with front in Germany, 30% in Italy and 50% in Armenia. The these issues every day can differentiate between usual revised indicator reflects the up-front cost only. costs and delays and those under extraordinary circum- Indicators of credit markets were also improved. stances. Doing Business in 2004 reported a measure of the legal To inspire reform, indicators need to be simple. rights of creditors in insolvency. This year, the measure Changes to the methodology have been made where is expanded to cover collateral laws as well--which de- users of the indicators said they had trouble understand- fine legal rights that help both borrowers and lenders. ing them. For example, last year's indices on the rigidity And indicators on credit information were simplified of employment regulation were based on a reading of to an index of 6 variables, covering information sharing the laws and varied from 0 (less rigid regulation) to 100 from both public and privately owned registries. (more rigid regulation). Many business people asked As another example, last year's methodology for en- whether the indices could be presented in terms of costs. forcing a contract did not allow for a creditor to seek re- So this year, a new indicator on the cost of firing a re- covery outside the courts. This assumption was made in dundant worker has been constructed (figure 2.5), mea- the belief that such actions may always be reversed by a sured in terms of weeks of wages. For another example, last year's indicators on the FIGURE 2.5 High costs to fire in some countries difficulty of closing a business looked at the cost, time, priority of claims and extent of court involvement. Poli- Cost to fire (weeks) 0 50 100 150 cymakers have said that they are most concerned about New Zealand how much value is being lost in inefficient bankruptcy Algeria procedures. The result is a new indicator, which calcu- South Africa lates how many cents on the dollar can be recovered in Honduras bankruptcy (figure 2.6). Congo, Dem.Rep. Once the simple indicator triggers interest in re- India form, by comparing it with those for other countries and Romania by showing the economic and social benefits of im- Angola provement, more detailed information collected by the Greece Doing Business team can be used to assist the reformers. Guatemala One example is the indicators on registering property. Notice Severance Penalty for dismissal Once the government of Malawi acknowledges the need Source: Doing Business database. to make registration more efficient, the depth of the 14 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 2.6 vance of bankruptcy laws for the average business. The Low recovery rates in insolvency in most countries result: in 40 countries bankruptcy is hardly ever used. Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) The analysis of such data helps in setting priorities for 0 20 40 60 80 100 reform and in designing improvements to indicators. Brazil Doing Business in 2005 presents new indicators on col- Haiti lateral laws to address how creditors enforce their rights Philippines outside of bankruptcy. Kenya Doing Business in 2006 will report whether these im- Egypt, Arab Rep. provements help reformers. The use of various indi- Pakistan cators in allocating aid--for the United States' grants Poland under the Millennium Challenge Account, for the Inter- Belgium national Development Association and for World Bank Singapore lending operations in Brazil, Nigeria, Peru and a dozen other countries--is a hopeful start. So are the requests Source: Doing Business database. for inclusion in the Doing Business sample by the gov- ernments of Bhutan, Cape Verde, Estonia, Mauritius and analysis allows further investigation of where the reform Tajikistan. should focus (figure 2.7). In particular, the third proce- The early successes in supporting regulatory reform dure--the requirement to obtain consent from the min- owe much to the media. Since its publication last Octo- ister of lands for the property transfer--is the largest ber, Doing Business has been featured in more than 700 bottleneck to registering property. Cutting this proce- media stories around the world. And in Brazil, Colombia, dure would reduce the time by 75%. the Czech Republic, Poland and Serbia and Montenegro, Data have also been collected on the actual use of the media coverage helped policymakers to identify is- courts in filing for bankruptcy. This is a first attempt to sues and reform to gain momentum. measure use of public institutions and hence the rele- FIGURE 2.7 ANSWER ­ How can Malawi reform property registration? tnemeriuqer tnesnoc ronrevog eht tuC Days to register property Days 0 30 60 90 120 120 Thailand Malawi South Africa 90 Mozambique Paraguay Procedure 3 60 Cambodia Obtain consent from the minister Sri Lanka of lands for the property transfer Ukraine 30 Burkina Faso Malawi 0 1 6 Procedures Source: Doing Business database. MEASURING WITH IMPACT 15 What is new? listed or privately held companies. In countries where stock exchange regulations and securities laws are in Three new sets of indicators have been developed, show- force, the disclosure index assesses these regulations. In ing the regulations an entrepreneur faces when register- other countries, the disclosure requirements come from ing property, protecting investors and dealing with busi- the company law. So the indicators are relevant for pri- ness licenses. The data for the first 2 sets are presented in vate companies as well as publicly listed ones. this report. Information on business licenses has been so difficult to collect in some countries that the data will · Dealing with business licenses--procedures, time become available on the Doing Business website in No- and cost to obtain business licenses and permits for on- vember. The following indicators are constructed: going operations. Because licenses are industry-specific, the data are built for a case in the construction industry. · Registering property--procedures, time and cost to In future years the data will cover other major industries. register property. The indicators are constructed The same standardized case used in building the starting assuming a standardized case of a business that wants to a business data is applied to assess the procedures, time purchase land and buildings in the peri-urban area of and cost necessary for the business to operate legally in the most populous city. The property is already recorded the construction industry, after completing all required in the registry and cadastre, free of title dispute and val- general registration procedures. Next, a new standard- ued at 50 times income per capita. The indicators mea- ized case is developed to measure the formalities neces- sure the time and cost to comply with all necessary pro- sary for ongoing operations in the construction indus- cedures to register the transfer of title from the seller to try--assuming that the operations are to build a the buyer. warehouse in the peri-urban area of the most populous city. Technical characteristics of the warehouse are de- · Protecting investors--an index of ownership and fi- scribed to construction and real estate lawyers and con- nancial disclosure. Seven types of disclosure make up the struction associations who answered the survey. Indica- indicator--by reporting family, indirect and beneficial tors measure the procedures, time and cost to comply ownership, and on voting agreements between share- with all necessary regulations and formalities to com- holders, by requiring audit committees and the use of plete the warehouse construction--from obtaining a lo- external auditors and by making such information avail- cation permit or building permit to obtaining utility able to all current and potential investors. The data come connections and registering the new building. from a survey of corporate and securities lawyers. They Detailed explanations on the construction of indi- measure the highest available disclosure, reflecting the cators, including the new ones, are available in the Data choices of small investors to put their money in publicly Notes section. Notes 1. Several papers are already published, including Djankov and others 5. Questions about the methodology can be asked at http://rru.world- (2002), Djankov and others (2003a), Djankov and others (2003b), and bank. org/doingbusiness/askquestion and will be answered within 48 Botero and others (forthcoming). Two other papers--Djankov, hours. Readers who wish to contest the data are referred to the de- McLiesh and Shleifer (2004) and Djankov and others (forthcoming)-- tailed methodology in the Data Notes or at are the basis for the Getting Credit and Closing a Business chapters, re- http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness/ methodology and to the pro- spectively. cedure by procedure data on the Doing Business website. For exam- 2. These include, among others, Rajan and Zingales (2003), Klapper, ple, in contesting the Starting a Business data on Albania, the reader Laeven and Rajan (2004), Bolaky and Freund (2004), Lerner and should look at http://rru.doingbusiness.org/ Schoar (2004), Acemoglu (2003), Mulligan and Shleifer (2003), Hoek- doingbusiness/exploretopics/startingbusiness/economies/albania.pdf. man, Kee and Olarreaga (2003) and Smarzynska and Spatareanu 6. SEBRAE (2000), World Bank Investment Climate Assessments, avail- (2004). able at http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_country_re- 3. In the surveys, respondents are asked whether they wish to have their port.htm. names and contacts printed. A small percentage have requested anonymity. 4. Booz, Allen and Hamilton (2004). 17 Starting a business Who is reforming business start-up? What to reform? Why make starting a business easy? Ridwan always wanted to start his own business. So last almost halving the time to start a business--from 23 January the Indonesian quit his job as a nurse, sold his days to 13. Russia eliminated 3 procedures, cutting to 9 car and took his savings out of the bank. Five months the face-to-face interactions between the entrepreneur later, he is the owner of a health spa in Jakarta. Almost. and government officials. Similar administrative re- He still hasn't received an inspection from the municipal forms were implemented in Argentina, Colombia, Jor- authorities, mandatory for the business to operate legally. dan, Madagascar, Moldova, Morocco and Nicaragua. Nor has he gotten his operational permit. This is not The world's top reformer--France--adopted a law unusual. It takes 151 days to start a business in Jakarta. on encouraging entrepreneurs. It launched online busi- Starting a business is a leap of faith even in the best ness registration and scrapped the minimum capital re- of circumstances. Governments should encourage the quirement for private limited liability companies. The daring. And some do. In 2003 it became easier to start a number of procedures to start a business was cut from 9 new business in 35 countries. But progress was uneven. to 7. The time was reduced from 49 days to 8. And the Countries in the European Union and borrowers from cost of start-up became negligible. Some 14,000 new the International Development Association (IDA) im- businesses registered, up 18% on the year before. proved dramatically (figure 3.1). Few others changed. In Three other reformers passed new legislation. Spain the EU, following the 2000 Lisbon Summit, countries created a new corporate form and established a process signed a charter agreeing to benchmark and reform the FIGURE 3.1 regulation of business start-up.1 IDA received additional What gets measured gets done funding for borrowers conditional on cutting the time Reduction in time and cost for business start-up, 2003­04 and cost of business start-up.2 The lesson--what gets measured gets done. All other Level in EU members IDA borrowers countries Much was achieved with the stroke of a pen--by 2003 abolishing old decrees or passing new ones at the min- COST TIME istry of economy, ministry of finance or company regis- ­5% trar. Some countries combined several administrative functions into a single access point for would-be entre- ­10% COST preneurs. Others improved information systems. Turkey COST TIME launched one-stop registration, by combining 7 proce- dures into a single visit to the company registry. The ­15% TIME time to start a business was cut from 38 days to 9. The 2004 START-UP MEASURED cost fell by a third. And the number of registrations shot Source: Doing Business database. up by 18%. Italy opened online business registration, 18 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 to forward company applications electronically between days to register a business from 25 to 5. different government agencies. The number of proce- A few countries slipped. Azerbaijan extended the dures to start a business fell from 11 to 7. Changes in the statutory time limit for registration and increased the Slovak Company Law introduced a time limit on busi- time to start a business from 106 days to 123. India ness registration, cutting the days to start a business added a procedure by requiring separate steps for ob- from 98 to 52. Bosnia and Herzegovina modified the taining different tax numbers. Benin, Domican Repub- Law on Business Companies, reducing the minimum lic, Kuwait and Malawi increased fees. Zimbabwe hiked capital requirement from 10,000KM to 2,000KM and the capital duty from 1% to 20%, and increased the li- setting a statutory time limit for registration. In May cense application fee fourfold. Costs in Mauritania in- 2004 Poland adopted the Economic Freedom Act, which creased by a third, and in Rwanda by a quarter. will create a single registration procedure and reduce the FIGURE 3.2 Who is reforming business start-up? The top 10 reformers An entrepreneur trying to set up a business can face obsta- Average improvement, 2003­04 cles--costs, delays or procedural complexities. Doing Busi- Level Top reformers ness in 2005 measures 4 dimensions of this difficulty: the in 2003 France Minimum number of procedures, the time, the cost in official fees and Morocco capital Turkey the minimum capital that the entrepreneur must deposit ­8% Ethiopia in the bank before registration starts (Box 3.1).3 In each Slovakia Procedures case a higher number indicates that opening a business ­26% Mongolia Moldova is more difficult and that fewer entrepreneurs will do so. 2004 Belgium Time Doing Business in 2004 revealed that poor countries ­41% Spain regulate business start-up more than rich countries. Nicaragua These are the countries that most need to spur entrepre- Cost ­56% neurial activity, have the least enforcement capacity and the fewest checks to ensure regulatory discretion is not Source: Doing Business database. abused. The gap is still large. On average it takes 6 pro- cedures, 27 days and 8% of the income per capita to start But the biggest reforms are happening in Europe, a business in OECD countries--and 11 procedures, 59 where country performance on start-up regulations is days and 122% of the income per capita to do so in poor monitored under the European Charter for Small Enter- countries. Some are catching up. Armenia, Mongolia prises.5 Fully half the EU countries introduced improve- and Moldova introduced significant reforms. Others ments in 2003. France led the way, followed by Belgium, made incremental improvements, including Georgia, In- Finland and Spain. Among the new EU countries, Hun- donesia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia made the Of all areas of regulation measured in Doing Busi- fastest progress. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slo- ness, entry regulations were reformed the most. A quar- vakia further reforms are under way. ter of countries made it easier to start a business in 2003. Other regions reformed less, with some exceptions. Some reformed dramatically. The top 10 reformers cut In South Asia, Nepal and Sri Lanka reduced the time to procedures by 26%, time by 41%, cost by 56% and min- start a business, following Pakistan the previous year. imum capital by 8% on average (figure 3.2). In the Middle East and North Africa, Jordan and Mo- Why the change? Performance targets were impor- rocco implemented sweeping reforms and made the top tant. IDA received additional funding allocations condi- 20 reformers list. In Latin America, Argentina, Bolivia, tional on improvements in the time and cost of business Colombia and Nicaragua made significant improve- start-up. And the United States government (through ments. Moldova and Mongolia made the top 20 reform- the Millennium Challenge Account) began allocating ers list, as did Russia, which continued its rise up the funds based on performance in business start-up indica- rankings for a second year, by reducing the number of tors. More than two-thirds of IDA borrowers improved, procedures from 19 to 12 in 2002 and to 9 in 2003. by more than 10% on average (see figure 3.1). STARTING A BUSINESS 19 BOX 3.1 Who has the most regulation of business start-up--and who the least? Number of procedures Time (days) Fewest Most Least Most Australia 2 Argentina 15 Australia 2 Venezuela 116 Canada 2 Bolivia 15 Canada 3 Azerbaijan 123 New Zealand 2 Greece 15 Denmark 4 Burkina Faso 135 Finland 3 Guatemala 15 United States 5 Angola 146 Sweden 3 Ukraine 15 Puerto Rico 7 Indonesia 151 Belgium 4 Belarus 16 France 8 Brazil 152 Denmark 4 Brazil 17 Singapore 8 Mozambique 153 Ireland 4 Paraguay 17 Turkey 9 Congo, Dem. Rep. 155 Norway 4 Uganda 17 Hong Kong, China 11 Lao PDR 198 United States 5 Chad 19 Netherlands 11 Haiti 203 Two procedures are enough to start a business: notifi- Business start-up takes only 2 days in Australia and 27 cation of existence, and registration for tax and social days on average in rich countries. France and Turkey security. But only Australia, Canada and New Zealand joined the list of countries with the shortest entry time. limit requirements to just those 2. Many countries-- In poor ones it is more than twice that--60 days. Latin especially poor ones--impose additional procedures. America tops the list as the region with most delays, 70 Chad, the world's ninth poorest country, has 19. OECD days on average, followed by sub-Saharan Africa, at 63 countries require only 6 on average. More procedures days. Haiti takes the longest time, at 203 days. mean more delays and more opportunities for bureau- crats to extract bribes. Cost (% of income per capita, and $US) Minimum capital requirement (% income per capita, and $US) Least % $ Most % $ None (0%) Most % $ Denmark 0.0 0 Yemen, Rep. 269.3 1,404 42, including: Morocco 719 11,429 New Zealand 0.2 39 Zimbabwe 304.7 140 Australia Niger 745 1,925 United States 0.6 210 Rwanda 316.9 601 Botswana Egypt, Arab Rep. 816 8,126 Sweden 0.7 257 Congo, Rep. 317.6 2,501 Canada Mauritania 858 3,765 United Kingdom 0.9 314 Chad 344.2 1,086 France China 1,104 12,082 Puerto Rico 1.0 110 Niger 396.4 1,025 Nepal Jordan 1,148 21,157 Canada 1.0 271 Cambodia 480.1 1,529 Thailand Saudi Arabia 1,550 133,511 France 1.1 368 Congo, Dem. Rep. 556.8 611 Uganda Yemen, Rep. 1,561 8,138 Singapore 1.2 262 Angola 884.6 6,621 United States Ethiopia 1,822 1,740 Finland 1.2 417 Sierra Leone 1,268.4 1,663 Vietnam Syrian Arab Republic 5,054 267,261 Official fees do not buy efficiency. The time and cost to In all but 42 countries entrepreneurs need to deposit set up a business go hand in hand. Six of the 10 coun- minimum capital into a (usually frozen) account to es- tries with the shortest time to start a business also have tablish a limited liability company. But not all countries the lowest official cost. Eight of the 10 most expensive require paying the money up front.4 High capital re- countries for start-ups are in Africa, where it costs on quirements are the norm in the Middle East and North average twice the income per capita to start a business. Africa--more than 8 times income per capita. More Fees are high even in dollar terms. In France the entre- than half of the Latin American and East Asian countries preneur pays only $368 in official fees--in Niger and all South Asian countries require no paid minimum $1,025. In many countries bribes move the process capital. along, making the difference in total entry costs even larger between rich and poor countries. Source: Doing Business database. 20 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Procedures 5. Sri Lanka computerized the registry office, cutting a week off of waiting time. Moldova also introduced a new Governments can reduce the number of procedures electronic system at the state registration chamber, re- while maintaining the same level of regulation. Turkey ducing delays by a third. did this. In June 2003, 7 procedures--obtaining a permit from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, making a pay- Cost ment to the consumers' fund, registering at the trade Reducing costs can be straightforward. Ethiopia did it by registry, registering for taxes, for social security, at the eliminating the requirement to publish notices in two chamber of commerce and at the ministry of labor-- newspapers. Costs plummeted from almost 500% of in- were combined into one, and delegated to the chambers come per capita to 77%, and time fell from 44 days to 32. of commerce (figure 3.3). Application forms were uni- Albania eliminated some registration fees, almost halv- fied and shortened, and registry officers were trained in ing cost to 32%. Georgia cut the start-up cost from 23% customer relations. None of the substantive require- to 14%. The Democratic Republic of Congo reduced ments for the procedures were changed.6 A new business cost by a third, albeit to a still staggering 557% of the in- can now be started in about a week. come per capita. A year ago Colombia was tied with Belarus and Chad for the most procedures. Since then it established Capital business help centers and concentrated several proce- Scrapping minimum capital requirements is a difficult dures, relocating representatives of each agency to the reform because it requires legislative change. France was new offices. The number of procedures dropped from 19 the only economy to abolish the requirement last year, to 14--the time, from 60 days to 43. and Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only one to re- Belgium launched online registration and com- duce it. And the new draft company law in Serbia and bined 4 procedures into 1 at a company center. In so Montenegro contemplates a significant reduction in doing it entered the list of countries with fewest proce- 2005: from 5,000 Euro to 10. dures. The office now handles responsibilities previously Some justify capital requirements as protecting performed at the trade registry, social security registry creditors and society against damage from failing or un- and the tax registry. Time was cut from 56 days to 34. trustworthy businesses. But in many countries mini- mum capital can be paid with in-kind contributions, Time such as management time--hardly of value in insol- Eliminating or combining procedures gave the largest vency. In others the capital may be withdrawn immedi- time savings. But some countries also cut time by re- ately after registration. In practice recovery rates in in- forming individual procedures. Argentina established a solvency are no different between countries with and fast-track process for registration, reducing the time to without minimum capital requirements.7 The countries obtain a company identification number from 14 days to that developed the requirement in the 18th century-- England and France--have both scrapped it. FIGURE 3.3 Big changes in Turkey in 2003 Others should follow. Cambodia shows why. It takes almost 5 times the income per capita in official fees to Time 2003 start a business in Phnom Penh. Also the entrepreneur needs to deposit CR20 million, or about $5,100, in a bank account during the registration process: more than Time reduced 17 times the income per capita. Add other official costs, from 38 days to 9 and the entrepreneur needs $6,650, or 22 times the in- 2003 come per capita (figure 3.4). In the United States this would amount to $833,000. In reality the official fees for starting a business in New York City are $210, and there Procedures reduced is no minimum capital requirement. 2004 from 13 to 8 High capital requirements are common in the Mid- dle East and North Africa. Syria imposes the world's Number of procedures highest, at 50 times the income per capita. But this is a Source: Doing Business database. 20th century invention.8 Before then, the Middle East STARTING A BUSINESS 21 1148%­ 5054% FIGURE 3.4 "More difficult" can mean a lot more difficult % of income per capita TABLE 3.1 1500 Ease of business start-up Most difficult 16­19 Easiest Most difficult 152­203 Range of the 5 highest Canada Mauritania 1000 Australia Guinea 396%­ New Zealand Togo 1268% United States Cambodia Hong Kong, China Haiti 500 Puerto Rico Yemen, Rep. Easiest France Angola Range of the United Kingdom Burkina Faso 2­3 5 lowest 2­7 0­1% 0 Singapore Congo, Dem. Rep. Procedures Time Cost Minimum Denmark Chad (days) capital Source: Doing Business database. Source: Doing Business database. had some of the most flexible laws governing business es- and the capital required at the start of business. Canada tablishment. This suggests that reform is feasible. Indeed, comes first. France just joined the list. All 4 Nordic coun- Lebanon revised its company legislation in 1998, cutting tries are among the 20 best practice countries, as are Ire- capital requirements to 82% of its income per capita. land, Israel, Romania, Switzerland, and Thailand. Among What are the results of all this reform? The ease of the countries with the most cumbersome new business business start-up is a simple average of the ranking of start-up are 7 African countries (table 3.1). the number of procedures, the associated time and cost, What to reform? TABLE 3.2 The 5 largest obstacles to start-up As ways to ease business start-up, Doing Business in 2004 Identified problem Percent of respondents recommended single registration forms, a single com- Too many procedures 24 pany identification number, a general-objects clause in Poor service 16 the articles of incorporation and eliminating court in- Long duration 12 volvement in the registration process. Insufficient information 6 This year's analysis shows that these reforms work. Corruption 6 The update also asked local Doing Business partners to Note: 27% of respondents reported no significant obstacles, 3% reported high costs, 2% high minimum capital and 4% reported other obstacles. name the 5 biggest regulatory and administrative obsta- Source: Doing Business database. cles in starting new businesses. "Too many separate pro- cedures and different offices to visit" came out on top, at Create single access points for business 24% (table 3.2). Poor service was next, at 16%. Long du- ration of start-up procedures was third, at 12%. Successful reforms in 2003--in Belgium, Colombia, The data suggest that reform to reduce the number Kenya, Nicaragua, Portugal, Russia and Turkey--in- of procedures and the time to start a business would volved creating single access points for entrepreneurs have the highest payoff. Here are 6 ways to do it: (sometimes also known as business help centers). Past re- · Create single access points for business. forms tried launching a one-stop shop for entrepreneurs, which would then deliver the application documents to · Get out of the courts. all the other regulatory agencies. Experience shows that · Make registration electronic. this often meant a one-more-stop shop that frequently · Introduce temporary business licenses. increased delays.9 A better model is to nominate an exist- · Impose a "silence is consent" rule in business ing agency--such as the company registry--to be the registration. single access point and bring together representatives of · Standardize paperwork. various other agencies. 22 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Witness the work of the Centro de Formalidades de The countries that have most improved the ease of Empresa in Portugal. Ten such centers have opened in business start-up have done so by eliminating the need Portugal since 1998, at the initiative of the Portuguese for judges. Company registration is an administrative Entrepreneurs'Association. All company registration pro- process. Judges can be freed to focus on commercial dis- cedures are performed here in only 3 visits--previously putes. A recent example is Italy, which until 1998 had the it took 11. Thirty-seven other countries have single ac- most cumbersome regulation of any European economy, cess points, including Algeria, Austria, Estonia, Finland, with the process taking 4 months. Registration was taken Israel, Jamaica, Morocco, Romania, Thailand and the out of the courts, saving 3 months. Further reforms last United Kingdom. These countries take less than half the year reduced the time to only 13 days. Several Latin time of those without single access points. American countries, including Chile, Honduras and Nicaragua, have taken registration out of the hands of Get out of the courts judges as well.10 Serbia and Montenegro adopted legisla- A second group of reformers, including Bosnia and tion to do so in May 2004. The benefits are large: entre- Herzegovina and Romania, eliminated the need for man- preneurs in countries where registration is a judicial datory use of both notaries and judges. Romania made process spend 14 more days to start a business. optional the use of notaries in business registration. Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the midst of implementing Make registration electronic reform that will make registration an administrative In public administration, technology can create a unified process, without resorting to the courts. There remain 16 database of business information for sharing across mu- countries--mostly transition countries--where the use nicipal offices and government agencies. And the Inter- of notaries is still mandatory even though the registra- net can provide information to would-be entrepreneurs, tion process involves judges. Slovakia reformed last year such as details on procedures, fee schedules and the to give incorporation cases to court clerks, not judges. working hours of the relevant agencies. Notaries perform a simple verification service-- With some simple legislation to allow electronic sig- such as certifying that minimum capital has been de- natures, the Internet can also be used to file business regis- posited in the Republic of Congo or verifying the trations, as in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Singapore and founder's signatures in Hungary--which could easily be the United States--but also Moldova andVietnam.Almost handled by the municipal official or court clerk already half the sample countries have such laws, and a dozen oth- involved in registration. And they typically cost a lot. No ers have draft laws in parliament. Doing so cuts time--by wonder that survey respondents in Albania, Bosnia and more than 50% on average (figure 3.5). Paper registration Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia remains available for those without Internet access. and Macedonia say that notaries add no value to the in- corporation process. FIGURE 3.5 Electronic registration and silent consent can shorten start-up time Average change in time for business start-up +19 days Time limits alone are With time limit associated with increased but no silent consent Time without electronic registration registration time. Time without limit With online services or silent consent With electronic database With electronic With time database and limit and online services silent consent A "Silence is Consent" rule ­21 days imposes a deadline after which ­23 days a business is automatically considered registered. ­28 days ­30 days Source: Doing Business database. STARTING A BUSINESS 23 Introduce temporary business licenses nia, Cameroon, Honduras, Lithuania, Mozambique, Another reform is using temporary business licenses, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. And they are difficult to en- which let entrepreneurs get on with operating businesses force. So in most cases having only a time limit only in standard commercial and manufacturing sectors be- means more delays (figure 3.5). fore the final license is approved. Algeria, France and There is a simple fix: impose a shorter time limit-- Honduras allow this. Introducing such licenses in Brazil, say, 5 days--and introduce a "silence is consent" rule. one of the 10 countries where setting up a business takes Once the deadline has passed the business is automati- the longest, would have a big impact.11 Here's how it cally considered registered. This approach, pioneered in could work. While registering for municipal taxes the Italy, is currently enforced in Armenia, Georgia and Mo- entrepreneur could also receive a temporary operations rocco. All 4 are among the world's fastest 20% of coun- license. This license would last 6 months and be replaced tries to register a business. by a regular one on inspection by the municipal author- ity. With this simple reform, starting a business in Brazil Standardize paperwork would take 4 weeks, not 5 months. Sixty-four of the sample countries have standard articles of company incorporation, including China, Costa Rica, Impose a "silence is consent" rule Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Tunisia and Vietnam. Statutory time limits on business registration are com- With standard forms available, the entrepreneur does mon, and 43 countries have such statutes. The rationale not usually need legal or notary services. And the reg- is that government officials would have an incentive istry finds it easier to process the documents. In Arme- to meet the deadline. In practice, such time limits don't nia, for example, the statutory reply time for such appli- work. They are usually too generous--30 days in Alba- cants is only two days. Why make starting a business easy? FIGURE 3.6 Simpler regulation encourages entry Cumbersome entry procedures push entrepreneurs into Increase in new registrations, 2003­04 48% the informal economy, where businesses pay no taxes and many of the benefits that regulation is supposed to 21% provide are missing. Workers lack health insurance and 18% 18% pension benefits. Products are not subject to quality standards. Businesses cannot obtain bank credit or use 2004 12% courts to resolve disputes. Women are hurt dispropor- tionately, since they constitute 75% of informal employ- OECD ees. Corruption is rampant, as bureaucrats have many average opportunities to extract bribes. These effects were re- Level in ported in depth in Doing Business in 2004. 2003 Slovakia France Turkey Morocco Ethiopia The experience with reform shows that new entry Top 5 reformers of formal businesses grows when regulation is relaxed Source: Doing Business database, National Statistical Agencies. and administrative process simplified. Consider Ethio- pia, France, Morocco, Slovakia and Turkey--the top 5 re- On average, in a sample of 10 developing countries, in- formers in 2003. Since their reforms, new registrations formal enterprises produce 40% less than enterprises in have grown 2­4 times faster than in other countries (fig- the same sectors of the formal economy.13 Second, for- ure 3.6). In France 14,000 new businesses were registered mally registered enterprises pay taxes, increasing the tax in 2003, up 18% on the year before. Registrations in base for government revenues and reducing the statu- Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia and Russia shot up by tory tax rate on companies. The effect is even bigger similar rates after start-up procedures were streamlined.12 if business registration reforms are accompanied by Enticing enterprises to the formal economy has two streamlining tax, labor and related regulations, which economic benefits. First, because formally registered en- encourages formally registered firms to fully report sales terprises have less need to hide from government in- and officially register workers. As more companies move spectors and the police, they grow to more efficient sizes. to the formal economy, governments can lower the tax 24 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 3.7 burden on all firms, as recently done in Poland, Russia Lower barriers, higher growth and Slovakia. This gives every business more incentive Additional annual income growth to produce. International evidence suggests that a 1% 0.48% due to entry reform reduction in taxes is associated with a 3.7% increase Poor country 0.37% in firms, a 0.9% increase in sales and a 1.1% increase in average 0.34% employment.14 (0.33%) 0.30% Reforming business start-up can add between a 0.24% 0.25% quarter and half a percentage point to growth rates in the average developing economy (figure 3.7). These esti- mates come from recent firm-level studies that com- pare the growth of industries with naturally low entry barriers, such as retail or food production, to such in- Mozambique Indonesia Egypt Belarus Bolivia Brazil dustries as chemicals or paper-pulp, with high fixed entry costs.15 Growth in naturally "high entry" industries Note: The hypothetical reform involves moving from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile on the ease of start-up--that is, from a Paraguay to a Sri Lanka. is especially held back by cumbersome regulations--evi- Source: Calculations based on Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004). dence that simple regulation spurs growth, not the other about 0.4 percentage points annual economic growth in way around. countries where labor markets are flexible and business The result? Adding a quarter percentage point of an- start-up is easy.17 Why? Because trade enhances growth nual income growth in developing countries alone by channeling resources to their most productive uses would amount to $14 billion a year, about a quarter of all international development aid.16 In Brazil the added in the economy. But if such resource movement is en- cumbered by high entry barriers, the effects of trade annual growth would cover 25% of spending on pri- diminish and can even be reversed. This explains the mary education. negative effects of trade liberalization in some Latin There are indirect benefits as well. A study by the American countries, where entry is difficult and labor World Bank shows that trade openness contributes markets inflexible. Notes 1. European Charter for Small Enterprises, available at 11. SEBRAE (2000). http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/charter/char- 12. New registrations grew by 26% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16% in ter_en.pdf. Colombia and 14% in Russia. 2. Thirty-nine countries were monitored between January 2002 and 13. World Bank (forthcoming). January 2004 as a part of the IDA13 round of funding. The popula- 14. Calculations based on Goolsbee's (2002) analysis of the effect of corpo- tion-weighted change during this period was ­12% on days to start a rate tax on the corporate share of firms, sales and employment. Figures business and ­19% on cost to start a business. refer to firms operating in the industry classification "general merchan- 3. See Data Notes for details on the methodology. dise." Elasticities for other industries are of similar magnitude. 4. The table shows only paid capital requirements. The minimum capital 15. Klapper and others (2004) on Eastern and Western European coun- requirement in Belgium is 18,550 euro, but of this amount only 20% tries, and Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) on rich and middle in- needs to be deposited at registration. In Germany only 25% of the come countries. Both studies use the entry regulation measures devel- minimum capital or 12,500 euro, whichever is smaller, needs to be oped in Djankov and others (2002) and define good regulation at the paid at registration. In El Salvador and Uruguay a quarter of the mini- level of the United States--the benchmark is having 4 procedures, 4 mum capital is needed at the start; in Mexico, a fifth. days and a cost of 0.5% of the income per capita to start a business. 5. European Commission (2002). 16. Total income of the 81 IDA countries was $1.1 trillion in 2003, total 6. Foreign investors now receive the same treatment as domestic ones. aid about $58 billion. 7. The correlation between countries and the Doing Business indicator of 17. Bolaky and Freund (2004). recovery rates in insolvency is ­.09. 8. Mokyr (2003). 9. Sader (2002). 10. In these countries the commercial registry remains affiliated with the courts, but the relationship is limited to administrative oversight. In May 2004 Honduras passed a law to separate the commercial registry from the courts and make it a public administrative agency. 25 Hiring and firing workers Who is reforming employment regulation? What to reform? Why make hiring and firing easier? Employers in Burkina Faso cannot write fixed-term con- benefit--mostly men with several years of experience on tracts unless the job is seasonal. The mandated minimum the job. But young, female and low-skilled workers are wage is $54 a month--the third highest in the world rel- often denied job opportunities (figure 4.1). This is true ative to value added per worker, at 82%. Night and week- even in rich countries--52% of small business owners end work are prohibited, and women are not permitted in Greece, 46% in Belgium, 41% in Spain and 34% in to work more than 8 hours a day. If the business needs to Germany indicate that they have hired fewer employees downsize, the employer must notify the ministry of labor as a result of burdensome employment regulation.1 If to fire a single worker, and the law mandates that the re- Spain were to increase the flexibility of its employment dundant worker is trained and placed in other jobs prior regulation to the level in the United States, analysis to dismissal. If a resolute employer goes through these suggests employment would increase by 6.2 percentage procedures, a redundancy would cost 18 months' wages points. And additional job opportunities for women in severance pay and penalties. Small surprise that much would increase 3 times as much as those for men.2 of business operates in the informal sector, which ac- Employment regulations are designed to protect counts for 40% of economic output in the country. workers from arbitrary, unfair or discriminatory actions Rigid regulation is common in developing coun- by their employers. These regulations--from mandatory tries, so employers choose conservatively. Some workers minimum wage, to premia for overtime work, to FIGURE 4.1 Women and youth lose out from rigid employment laws Women's share of private sector employment Youth unemployment Greater Greater share share Lesser Lesser share share Least rigid Most rigid Least rigid Most rigid Countries ranked by rigidity of employment index, quintiles Countries ranked by difficulty of hiring index, quintiles Note: The relationships shown are significant at the 1% level and remain significant at the 5% level when controlling for income per capita. Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a), WEF (2004). 26 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 4.2 grounds for dismissal, to severance pay--have been in- Poor countries regulate employment the most troduced to remedy apparent market failures. The fail- Rigidity of employment index ures range from the exploitation of workers in one-com- pany towns to discrimination on the basis of gender, Poor race or age to the suffering of the unemployed in the 48 Poor Middle income Rich Poor Great Depression and in the transition of formerly so- Poor 38 Middle income cialist economies. More Middle Rigidity 32 Rich income In response, the International Labour Organization Middle income has established a set of fundamental principles and Rich Rich rights at work, including the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced labor, the abolition of child labor and the elimination of discrimination in hiring and work practices.3 Rigidity of = Difficulty + Rigidity + Difficulty employment of hiring of hours of firing Beyond these regulations, governments struggle to reach the right balance between labor market flexibility Source: Doing Business database. and job stability. Most developing countries err on the side of excessive rigidity, to the detriment of businesses sick leave and no pensions. If abused by their employer, and workers alike. Burkina Faso vies with Angola, Niger, they have no recourse to the courts since the employ- Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo for the country that reg- ment relationship is not documented. Far from protect- ulates employment the most. And across the world, poor ing the vulnerable, rigid employment regulations ex- countries regulate labor much more than rich countries clude them from the market. do (figure 4.2). This is done in the name of offering bet- In 2003, eight rich economies--Australia, Belgium, ter jobs. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and But as economies stagnate--due to inflexible labor Taiwan (China)--introduced more flexible employment markets, among other reasons--governments are pressed regulation. Five middle income countries--Croatia, to provide stability and they do so by imposing even Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia--did the same. stricter regulations on businesses in an attempt to pre- Only one poor country--Namibia--improved. Another serve current jobs. New job creation is stifled, and the in- 3--Albania, Egypt and Romania--passed more restric- formal sector expands. In the informal sector, women tive regulations. Two types of reforms were common: in- constitute three-quarters of workers. They have no health creasing the flexibility of working hours and introducing benefits and receive no support for their children, no new types of term contracts. Who is reforming employment regulation? job-search agency. Germany made it easier for small companies to hire temporary workers. And Australia in- Reforms of labor regulation are often triggered by a cri- troduced individual savings accounts in place of sever- sis--with varying results. The Great Depression, World ance payments.6 War II and the oil crises in the early 1970s brought in- The reforms had a common goal: creating jobs. creased regulation. The economic downturns in Europe Consider two examples. Italy abolished the government in the 1980s and the financial crises in Latin America and monopoly on job placement services and introduced job later in East Asia brought reforms to cut employment sharing, for 2 workers to share the same position. The regulation. The trend in the last two decades is toward number of hours and types of part-time contracts were more flexibility, except in Africa and Latin America.4 expanded. The government says these changes would Last year continued the trend. Slovakia introduced create 250,000 new jobs.7 Belgium expanded the system the most far-reaching changes (table 4.1). Latvia and of "service vouchers," to simplify hiring for such jobs as Norway increased the limit for overtime hours and ended cleaning, house repair and gardening. This is claimed to restrictions on weekend work.5 Hungary, Namibia and result in 25,000 new jobs.8 Whether or not these exact Taiwan (China) also increased the flexibility of working figures are reached, evidence shows that the increased hours. Poland and Portugal made it easier for employers flexibility will boost employment. to hire on term contracts. The Netherlands privatized its HIRING AND FIRING WORKERS 27 TABLE 4.1 Another obstacle to hiring new workers, especially Sweeping reforms in Slovakia in 2003 young ones, is a high minimum wage relative to the Before Now average wage in the economy. Almost all countries have · No part-time contracts · Part-time contracts for students, a minimum wage as a way of trying to provide a women and retirees decent living standard.10 In most rich countries, mini- · Term contracts could not be · Extensions of term contracts possible extended mum wages are typically a quarter to a third of value · Limit of 150 hours of overtime · Limit of 400 hours of overtime, with added per worker--21% in Finland, 24% in Japan, 25% a year worker consent in France and 29% in the Netherlands.11 But in Cambo- · Approval by union for firing a · No requirement worker dia, Niger and Vietnam minimum wages are two-thirds · Retraining before dismissal · No requirement or more of value added per worker. The result is a higher · Union approval for flexible · No approval for shifting hours in a number of unemployed youths and low-skilled work- work time 4-month period ers.12 And because these countries do not have a social · Approval by union for group · Notification for group dismissals dismissals safety net for the unemployed, the impact is even more serious. Source: Doing Business database, Jurajda and Mathernova (2004). Rigid work hours Three countries made regulation more rigid. Egypt Many industries have seasonal highs and lows. Much reduced the flexibility of working hours, made night of agro-processing business is in the summer and fall. work more difficult for women and doubled Hajj leave. Much of retail business is during holidays. Businesses In Albania the flexibility of working hours was reduced, can meet these fluctuations in demand by expanding payment for work during weekends doubled and fixed- and contracting the number of work hours--if the law term contracts were allowed only for temporary jobs. In permits. In El Salvador, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and Romania the premium for overtime work was increased Uganda the working day can extend to more than 12 from 50% to 75% and term contracts are now possible hours a day in peak periods. But in the Philippines and only for exceptional needs, making their use unlikely. But Ukraine the maximum is 8 hours. In both countries these changes don't always last--similar restrictive re- there are restrictions on night and weekend work, so the forms, introduced in Slovakia in 2001, were revised 2 employer cannot use 2 shifts. These rigidities allegedly years later.9 increase worker welfare. Yet workers prefer adjustments to changing demand through flexible working hours Difficulty of hiring rather than through the alternatives: hiring and firing or The best way to spur job creation is by making it easy to informal work.13 contract regular workers. If that is politically difficult, an intermediate step is to allow for flexible term contracts. Difficulty of firing These permit businesses to hire more workers when the A barrier to firing is a barrier to hiring. Yet South Asian demand for their products rises, without imposing high countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka and most African costs for dismissals if demand declines. Flexibility is countries impose formidable restrictions on firing. The greater if such contracts do not require special approvals, average African business faces twice the administrative can be used for any task and have longer duration. hassle in firing a worker than does an OECD business OECD, Middle Eastern and East Asian economies make (figure 4.3). The same countries that make hiring easy, in it easy to hire fixed-term workers. But many Latin Amer- the OECD and East Asia, make firing easy too. Transition ican and African countries impose excessive limitations. economies are mixed. Eastern European countries like Colombia, Mexico and Panama allow employers to write Slovakia and Bulgaria are among the least restrictive. term contracts only for specific tasks and for 1 year. After Former Soviet countries like Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine the year is over, the employer has to either fire the worker and Uzbekistan are among the most restrictive. or offer a permanent position. Chad, Mauritania, Niger Firing is almost impossible in Uzbekistan. Redun- and Togo also allow such contracts only for specific dancy--because of deteriorating economic conditions tasks, lasting for 2 years or less. The result: constant or falling demand--is not considered a fair ground for turnover of workers, who get fired just before the statu- dismissal. To fire a single worker, the employer must tory time limit is met. Employers have no interest in pro- document several incidents of drunkenness at the work- viding training. Productivity stays low. place or show a consistent pattern of insubordination. 28 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 BOX 4.1 Who has the most rigid labor regulation--and who the least? Difficulty of hiring Difficulty of firing Least Most Least Most 25, including: Romania Canada Cameroon Israel Mauritania Costa Rica Egypt, Arab Rep. Slovakia Central African Republic Hong Kong, China Ukraine Australia Rwanda Jamaica Congo, Rep. Denmark Togo Japan India Saudi Arabia Congo, Rep. Kuwait Mexico Botswana Morocco Saudi Arabia Nepal Russia Chad Singapore Angola United States Burkina Faso Uganda Tunisia Namibia Niger Uruguay Uzbekistan The Difficulty of Hiring index measures whether term The Difficulty of Firing index has 8 parts: whether redun- contracts can be used only for temporary tasks; the maxi- dancy is a fair ground for dismissal; whether the employer mum duration of term contracts; and the ratio of the needs to notify the labor union or the labor ministry for fir- mandated minimum wage (or apprentice wage, if avail- ing one redundant worker; and the same for group dis- able) to the average value added per working population.14 missals; whether the employer needs approval from the In Namibia, the 10th least regulated country, term con- labor union or the labor ministry for firing one redundant tracts can be used for any task and have unlimited dura- worker; and the same for group dismissals; whether the law tion; the minimum wage to value added ratio is 21%. In mandates training or replacement prior to dismissal; if pri- Mauritania, the 10th most regulated country, term con- ority rules apply for dismissals; and if priority rules apply tracts are allowed for specific tasks and are limited to 2 for re-employment. Uruguay doesn't regulate any of these years; the minimum wage to value added ratio is 68%. areas. Angola regulates all of them. Rigidity of hours Rigidity of employment Least Most Least Index Most Index Canada Brazil Hong Kong, China 0 Angola 75 Hong Kong, China Greece Singapore 0 Sierra Leone 76 Lebanon Spain Malaysia 3 Central African Republic 76 Malaysia Ukraine United States 3 Rwanda 76 New Zealand Venezuela Canada 4 Togo 76 Serbia and Montenegro Portugal Uganda 7 Congo, Dem. Rep. 77 Singapore Burkina Faso New Zealand 7 Chad 80 Tunisia Congo, Dem. Rep. Slovakia 10 Congo, Rep. 86 United States Côte d'Ivoire Jamaica 10 Burkina Faso 90 Chile Niger Saudi Arabia 13 Niger 90 The Rigidity of Hours index is a simple average of 5 indica- The Rigidity of Employment index is a simple average of tors: whether night work is allowed; whether weekend work the Difficulty of Hiring, Rigidity of Hours and Difficulty of is allowed; whether the workweek consists of 51/2 days or Firing indices, varying between 0 and 100, with higher val- more; whether the workday can extend to 12 hours or more ues for more rigid regulation. Differences across countries (including overtime); and whether the annual paid vaca- are enormous. Saudi Arabia, with the 10th most flexible em- tion days are 21 or less. In Chile, the 10th least regulated ployment regulations, has no restrictive regulations on hir- country, the workday can extend to 12 hours, the workweek ing and firing but regulates weekend work. Angola, with the can extend to 6 days, there are no regulations on night and 10th most rigid regulations, regulates heavily every aspect weekend work, and the minimum paid leave is 19 days a of work hours and firing, but allows term contracts with year. In Brazil, the 10th most regulated country, the work- 5-year duration. day is limited to 10 hours. Weekend work is not allowed, and the minimum paid leave is 30 days. Source: Doing Business database. HIRING AND FIRING WORKERS 29 FIGURE 4.3 FIGURE 4.4 Difficult to fire workers in some countries Who pays what to fire? Difficulty of firing index Severance cost in weeks of salary equivalence Highest 65 5 most expensive 50 Sub-Saharan Africa 100 Tunisia countries: 48 South Asia Uzbekistan Sierra Leone 188 Lao PDR 185 49 Guatemala 170 Brazil 165 43 Europe & Central Asia 42 Egypt, Arab Rep. 162 MORE RIGIDITY 39 Middle East & North Africa 34 Latin America & the Caribbean 33 East Asia & the Pacific 5 least expensive Lowest countries: 0 12 including: United States 8 27 OECD high income Poor Middle- Rich Canada countries income countries Belgium 8 Japan countries Singapore 4 Uruguay Puerto Rico 0 Source: Doing Business database. Source: Doing Business database. New Zealand 0 With this documentation in hand the employer seeks to work in poor countries frequently get neither a job approval from the ministry of labor. Within a month he nor unemployment insurance. receives a visit from a labor inspector and is asked Flexible labor markets, by contrast, provide job whether the employee was offered placement at another opportunities for more people, ensuring that the best position. The alternative placement must last 3 months, worker is found for each job. Productivity rises, as do with progress evaluated. After that, another application wages and output. Higher taxes are collected, and the is sent to the ministry. Chances of success are slim. The government can afford a social protection system. process for firing a group of workers is even more diffi- Consider Colombia. In 2002 the government broad- cult. The difficulty of firing is one of the reasons why ened the definition of just causes for dismissal. It cut the more than a third of economic activity in Uzbekistan severance payment of a worker with 20 years of experi- takes place in the informal sector. ence from 26 months to 11--and the mandated notice period from 8 weeks to 2. The reforms created 300,000 Cost of firing new jobs.15 And with the added tax revenues, the gov- An employer in Egypt faces administrative barriers to ernment established an incentive subsidy for hiring un- firing a redundant worker similar to those in Uzbekistan. employed youths in small enterprises. So far, however, But at the end of the process, an even bigger obstacle the incentive scheme has not worked as effectively as arises. More than 3 years of salary must be paid to see hoped. (A proposal for revisions is awaiting congres- the worker leave, comprising 3 months salary during the sional approval.) compulsory notice period, a severance package equiva- What triggered these reforms in Colombia? They lent to 27.5 months of salary (for a worker with 20 years started with a study by the Inter-American Development of experience) and a dismissal penalty equivalent to 8 Bank, which identified employment regulation rigidities months of salary. Small wonder that the employer keeps as the main cause of high unemployment.16 Comparing the worker around. the impact of regulations in Colombia with those of its Poor countries impose firing costs 50% higher than neighbors and select OECD economies, the study con- those in rich countries (figure 4.4). Some argue that this cluded that the current regime benefited the few at the is justified because governments in poor countries do expense of the many. Other analyses confirmed the find- not have enough resources to provide unemployment ings and proposed specific reforms. Faced with a 20% insurance, so the cost should be borne by businesses. unemployment rate, the government had little choice This is backward logic. Heavy regulation of dismissal is but to experiment. Good measurement and some des- associated with more unemployment, so those who want peration got the job done. 30 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 What to reform? Allow flexible working hours Bold reforms, as in Colombia or Slovakia, have the largest To accommodate fluctuations in demand, a business payoffs in increasing productivity, reducing unemploy- may at times need longer workweeks--hopefully not too ment, and providing women with better economic and often. Businesses in the Czech Republic, Hungary and social opportunities. In the absence of such sweeping Poland found this the hard way. With employment reg- change, four types of reform work best: ulations that permitted only 150 hours of overtime a · Increase the length and scope of term contracts. year in the mid-1990s, and with limits to term contracts, · Introduce apprentice wages. much demand remained unmet. All 3 countries reached an innovative solution: to allow swaps of working hours · Allow flexible working hours. between peak periods and slow periods, as long as the · Remove administrative approvals for dismissals. number of hours remained constant over the course of 6 months (Poland) or a year (Czech Republic, Hungary). Increase the length and scope of term contracts Poland soon found that a 6-month period was inade- In 1991 Peru revised its labor law to allow for a 3-year quate, because seasonal demands usually require an an- term contract for any task. The previous law allowed nual cycle. 1-year contracts for temporary tasks. Within a year, the More recently, many Central European economies number of workers on term contracts shot up by 50% have found a complementary solution: longer overtime and by 1997 more than doubled, to make up 40% of all hours, with the consent of employees. Latvia increased employment contracts. Young and informal workers the overtime hours to a maximum of 432 a year, Hun- benefited the most, with youth unemployment falling by gary and Slovakia to 400, Poland to 260. The combina- 7 percentage points and the informal sector shrinking tion of time swaps within the normal work hours and by 12 percentage points.17 expanded overtime makes it possible for businesses to Five of last year's reformers--Croatia, Italy, Poland, adjust to swings in demand. Portugal and Slovakia--increased the duration of term About 50 countries allow flexible working hours. In contracts and expanded their applicability. Germany the others, temporary increases in demand mean lost rev- and Russia did the same the previous year. In those 2 enues or higher production costs. For example, the nor- countries and in Poland, there is no limit to the length mal workweek in Indonesia is 40 hours, and 3 additional of term contracts. Portugal increased the duration to 6 hours of overtime per day are allowed. The premium for years, Slovakia to 5, Italy to 3. overtime work is 50% for the first hour, and 100% there- But term contracts are a good reform only when it is after. So to meet an increase in temporary demand of 50% difficult to reduce the cost of regular contracts--and the owner of a 200-employee company would have to hire even then as a temporary measure. If they are not ac- 19 new workers.20 The labor costs on that 50% output in- companied by reforms of regular contracts, term con- crease would rise by 96%. In Venezuela, where only two tracts could contribute to the development of a dual hours of overtime work per week are allowed, at a 50% labor market--as evidenced in Spain.18 premium, the business would have to hire 66 new work- ers and the labor cost would increase by 90%. Countries Introduce apprentice wages that move to more flexible work hours can bring those Thirty countries have apprentice wages, ranging from labor costs down considerably--Slovakia from 111% to Chile to Madagascar, Thailand to Tunisia, Serbia and 27%, Namibia from 54% to 39% (figure 4.5). Montenegro to Australia.Apprentice wages are a 1990s re- form, except for Denmark, France and some Latin Amer- Remove administrative approvals to dismissals ican countries, which have had them since the 1960s. Such Many countries have both high administrative barriers reform is cheap: the beneficiaries are easy to target, and and large direct costs of firing. If a business owner in Sri the apprenticeship lasts a short time, after which the em- Lanka decides to fire a redundant worker, she needs to ployee enters a regular contract.19 It is also easier to intro- obtain approval from the labor union. This takes time. duce apprentice wages than to lower the minimum wage, Often, the case ends up in the labor tribunal, involving because labor unions oppose them much less. further costs and delays. Fines are frequently levied for failing to comply with this or that procedure. And once HIRING AND FIRING WORKERS 31 FIGURE 4.5 Boosting production can be costly... ...but reform works. Cost to temporarily expand production by 50% (percentage increase in labor cost) Latvia Slovakia 111 Latvia, Slovakia Hungary 111 111 99 Hungary 99 90 Venezuela 90 90 80 Portugal Norway 72 Norway Reforms in 2003 72 yielded big Namibia 54 Namibia improvements Before 54 48 Tunisia After 39 39 30 Malaysia, United States 27 15 Morocco 6 Kenya 0 Ireland Source: Doing Business database. the approval is granted, the worker gets 25 months in in 1996. The timing was fortuitous, mitigating the effects severance pay.21 Hardly anyone gets fired, but few people on workers during the 1997­98 financial crisis. The get hired. Both employers and employees in countries Chilean reform of 2002 introduced savings accounts: the like Sri Lanka would be better off if the administrative employee pays 0.6% of gross wages and the employer approval were scrapped and severance payments are pays 2.4%, with two-thirds going to an individual ac- lowered. Colombia introduced such a system last year. count and a third to a common fund. Severance pay is Instead of (or together with) severance payments, cut from 30 days to 24 for each year worked. Unem- which hit a troubled business during the worst possible ployed Chilean workers receive benefits for 5 months, no time--economic downturns--middle income countries matter how long they have been insured. The payments can introduce unemployment insurance. This shifts the are progressively reduced each month, to encourage focus of regulation from protecting jobs to protect- searching for another job. Australia followed suit, intro- ing workers, by helping them deal with moving to new ducing individual savings accounts last year. jobs.22 The Korean government instituted a similar scheme Why make hiring and firing easier? taxes and corruption.25 One study shows that an in- crease in flexibility at the rate of the Slovak reforms is as- Businesses seek other means of staying competitive if sociated with 14­18% more foreign investment.26 employment regulation is rigid. They hire informal Rigid employment regulation also imposes indirect workers, pay them under the table and avoid providing costs, by restricting the ability of firms to adjust to social benefits.23 Women are 3 times more likely to be shocks, such as new technologies, macroeconomic hired informally. And as parents fail to find decent em- shocks and privatization.27 For example, very rigid em- ployment, children often turn up in the workplace. ployment regulation reduces the benefits of trade lib- The people employment regulation is supposed to eralization.28 As an economy opens, competition from protect are hurt the most (figure 4.6). When there are now-cheaper imports drives jobs away from less produc- fewer job opportunities in the formal sector, inequality tive sectors and into more productive ones, expanding often rises as people turn to the informal sector, which of- the economy. This happens only if workers can move. fers lower pay and no health insurance or social benefits.24 With high barriers to hiring and firing, labor remains in Foreign investment falls as well. Restrictive labor unproductive sectors. The result is less job creation and markets are cited as the third most important reason for a loss of competitiveness, as in much of Latin America in foreign companies not to invest, behind high corporate the last decade. 32 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 4.6 Who loses from rigid employment regulation? Informal sector Child participation in employment Income share of the poorest 20% Greater Greater share share Greater share Lesser Lesser Lesser share share share Least Most Least Most Least Most rigid rigid difficult difficult costly costly Countries ranked by Countries ranked by Countries ranked by rigidity of employment, quintiles difficulty of hiring, quintiles firing cost, quintiles Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 5% level. Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a). Notes 1. European Commission (2002). 15. Echeverry and Santa Maria (2004). 2. Di Tella and McCullom (1999). 16. Heckman and Pages (2003). 3. ILO (1998). 17. Saavedra and Torero (2003). 4. OECD (2004). 18. OECD (2004). 5. In the case of Latvia, for transport businesses only. 19. A number of countries have conducted studies on the effectiveness of 6. OECD (2004). such reform in attracting young employees and providing them on- the-job training. All have found positive results. See, for example, Neu- 7. But note that previous reforms in Italy have not always achieved the mark and Wascher (2003). desired effects. 20. Normal production is 200 workers @ 40 hours = 8,000 hours. A 50% 8. Eironline (2004). increase in demand requires 12,000 hours. The 200 workers can work 9. Jurajda and Mathernova (2004). 3 hours per day overtime, or 55 hours per week. Production with cur- 10. Eleven countries do not have a mandated minimum wage either by rent workers therefore expands to 200 workers @ 55 hours = 11000 law or by economy or industrywide collective agreements. These are hours. The remaining shortfall of 1,000 hours requires 19 additional Ethiopia, Guinea, Hong Kong (China), Kuwait, Malaysia, Namibia, workers (=1,000/55). Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates and 21. Vodopivec (2004). Yemen. They use other means for trying to provide good living stan- 22. For a detailed discussion, see World Bank (2004). dards for their working population. 23. Botero and others (forthcoming). 11. Most studies express the minimum wage as a percentage of the average wage. However, data on average wages are only available for about 30 24. There are exceptions. Income inequality in Chile is among the highest countries outside the OECD. In the absence of such data, the use of in Latin America--with the poorest 20% receiving only 3.3% of value added per worker is necessary. income--yet informality is the lowest, at less than a fifth of business activity. 12. See, for example, Neumark, Cunningham and Siga (2003). 25. ATKearney (2004). 13. Rutkowski (2004). 26. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2004). 14. The methodology in last year's report was different. This year's changes bring the methodology closer to the one developed in Botero and oth- 27. Betcherman (2002). ers (forthcoming). 28. Bolaky and Freund (2004). 33 Registering property Who makes registering property easy--and how? What else secures property rights? What to reform? Why reform? Every cloud has a silver lining. The Napoleonic wars Yet bringing assets into the formal sector is of little brought some of the most fierce battles Europe had seen. value unless they stay there. Many titling programs in But to fund his conquests, Napoleon had all French Africa were futile because people bought and sold prop- properties accurately mapped and registered for taxa- erty informally--neglecting to update the title records tion, saying "a good cadastre [property map] of the in the property registry.7 Why? In the average African parcels will be the complement of my civil code."1 Once country a simple formal property transfer in the largest annexed, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland re- business city costs 14% of the value of the property and ceived the same system. takes more than 100 days. Worse, the property registries There are better reasons for registering property are so poorly organized that they provide little security than financing wars. Defining and publicizing property of ownership. For both reasons, formalized titles quickly rights have proven good for entrepreneurs as well. Land go informal again. and buildings account for between half and three- Even if titles remain formal, they don't amount to quarters of country wealth in most economies.2 And much if governments control property prices and re- with formal property titles, entrepreneurs can obtain strict the ability to trade. Property markets will not mortgages on their homes or land and start businesses. function effectively if regulations restrict investment Banks prefer land and buildings as collateral since they from being channeled to its most productive use. And ti- are difficult to move or hide.3 In Zambia 95% of com- FIGURE 5.1 mercial bank loans to businesses are secured by land, in Defining and protecting property rights--large benefits Indonesia 80%, and in Uganda 75%.4 The benefits go Percentage increase beyond credit. Property titling can also significantly in- 0 30 60 90 120 crease land values and investment (figure 5.1).5 LAND VALUES Indonesia But a large proportion of property in developing Brazil countries is not formally registered. Peruvian economist Thailand INVESTMENT Hernando de Soto estimates the value at $9.3 trillion, Brazil calling it "dead capital." Unregistered property limits the Thailand financing opportunities for new businesses and expan- Honduras sion opportunities for existing ones. In Ethiopia 57% of 0 100 200 300 400 firms report that access to land is their main obstacle, as ACCESS TO CREDIT do 35% in Bangladesh and 25% in Kenya and Tanzania.6 Brazil Thailand Recognizing these bottlenecks, governments have em- barked on extensive property titling programs in devel- Note: Based on analysis of household survey data comparing titled and untitled property. Source: Feder (2002). oping countries. 34 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 tles won't lead to more credit if collateral laws make it have few problems protecting their property rights. They expensive to mortgage property and inefficient courts can afford the costs of investing in security systems and prevent banks from seizing collateral when a debtor other measures to defend their property. But small entre- defaults. Not surprisingly some studies document cases preneurs cannot. Reform can change this. Improving the where titling failed to bring the expected increases in in- security of property rights in Peru was shown to increase vestment or income.8 productive activities.9 Across countries, firms of all sizes Efficient property registration reduces transaction report that their property rights are better protected in costs and improves the security of property rights. This countries with more efficient property registration. But benefits all entrepreneurs, especially small ones. The rich the relationship is much stronger for small firms.10 Who makes registering property easy-- days are all that are required--the entrepreneur need and how? only submit registration forms and pay 3% in taxes and fees at a bank. The same is true in Thailand, which has a An entrepreneur wants to buy property in the peri-urban world-class system where all contracts are prepared in area of Lagos. It is a simple case--the seller has agreed the land office as a part of registration.12 In Singapore and the property is officially recorded and free of dispute. the buyer conducts all due diligence and pays taxes on Title registration begins. The entrepreneur starts by hir- the Internet. Registration is over in 9 days. ing a lawyer, mandatory in Nigeria. She obtains applica- A number of transition countries speed up registra- tion forms, tax clearances, a plan of the property, assess- tion by offering an expedited procedure: a buyer can pay ments and stamps of the deeds. Next she pays stamp a higher fee for faster processing. In Lithuania using the duties and deposits fees, conducts a search of the land fast track costs 25% extra but cuts time from 29 days to registry and submits the application for consent to the 3. In the Kyrgyz Republic and Slovakia the expedited governor of the state. And then waits for 6 months. After procedure saves 15 days, in Russia 20 days and in Kaza- obtaining consent, she pays another 3 separate fees and khstan 12 days.13 Outside the region Argentina also has taxes and submits the receipts to 2 more agencies. The a fast track service saving 21 days. And Spain has an in- property is inspected by state valuers and the transfer novative system to improve speed: the registry's fees are recorded in the land registry. Twenty one procedures, cut by 30% if the process exceeds 15 days. 27% of the property value in official fees and 274 days No such luck in most other countries. Much of the later, she owns the property. If she wants a mortgage, the difficulty is caused by overly complex procedures. Ghana bank must go through a similar procedure to obtain con- is switching from a system that records deeds of transfer sent for registering it. to one that provides guaranteed title. The transfer must The process is so cumbersome that the standard be registered in both systems, a process that involves 6 practice is to go through all the procedures to register a agencies and 382 days. Only 8% of properties are regis- business--no mean feat in Nigeria--and then put the tered. Austria, Honduras and Yemen require the buyer to property in the name of the business. That way the prop- go to both notaries and the courts. In Ukraine and erty can be traded by buying and selling the company Uzbekistan the land is registered separately from the rather than facing all the costs of registering property building, effectively doubling the complexity of the again.11 process. In 2004 Russia reformed, combining land and Compare this with what a Norwegian entrepreneur building information into a unified cadastre. The au- experiences when buying property in Oslo. He goes to thorities in Shanghai, China did the same. the land registry, submits an application form (which In a third of countries, delays in recording at the can also be obtained on the Internet or in bookstores) property registry are the main obstacle, including in the and pays the registration fee and 2.5% of the property Dominican Republic and Portugal. An entrepreneur in value in stamp duty. Registration is complete in a day. Guinea can complete the due diligence requirements in Some other countries also make it simple (box 5.1). 3 weeks. Unless he has connections, however, he'll then In New Zealand the buyer checks the legal status of the wait 3 months for the registry to finish processing. property with local authorities, then pays a conveyancer Threatened with delays, the entrepreneur may be 0.17% of the property value to register the transfer on- tempted to offer a bribe to move the process along. And line. Registration is complete in 2 days. In Sweden, too, 2 on top of that, he must pay 16% in taxes. REGISTERING PROPERTY 35 BOX 5.1 Who has the most efficient property registration--and who the least? Procedures (Number) Cost (% of property value) Fewest Most Least Most Norway 1 Latvia 10 Saudi Arabia 0.0 Sierra Leone 16.5 Sweden 1 France 10 New Zealand 0.2 Central African Republic 17.4 Belgium 2 Ecuador 11 Belarus 0.2 Zimbabwe 18.1 New Zealand 2 Uzbekistan 12 Mongolia 0.4 Burundi 18.1 Thailand 2 Tanzania 12 Azerbaijan 0.5 Cameroon 18.8 United Kingdom 2 Greece 12 Estonia 0.5 Mali 20.6 Finland 3 Brazil 14 United States 0.5 Congo, Rep. 22.5 Lithuania 3 Ethiopia 15 Denmark 0.6 Nigeria 27.2 Singapore 3 Algeria 16 Russian 0.8 Syrian Arab Republic 30.4 Taiwan, China 3 Nigeria 21 Lithuania 0.9 Senegal 34.0 Countries with the simplest registration require the en- Costs come largely from taxes, registration fees and no- trepreneur only to pay fees or taxes and to register the tary charges. A Saudi entrepreneur pays nothing--al- transfer. In Norway and Sweden the 2 steps are com- though he would also get less security because the regis- bined. Another 15 countries have 3 or fewer steps. Oth- tration is only with a notary and not linked to a cadastre. ers, especially poor countries, require a bewildering set Recent reforms will change this. Transfer taxes in Syria of procedures--getting approvals, notarizations, docu- are an astonishing 30% of the value. It doesn't lead to mentation, inspections, clearances and making pay- higher revenue collection: a common practice is to have ments. More procedures mean more delays and more 2 contracts, with one for the parties with the real price, chances for officials to demand bribes, as every en- and one for the tax agency with an underreported value. counter between the entrepreneur and official is an op- Reducing fees removes the disincentive to register trans- portunity for corruption. actions formally. Time (Days) Ease of registering property (Average ranking) Least Most Most Least Norway 1 Togo 212 New Zealand 127 Congo, Rep. 28 New Zealand 2 Belarus 231 Lithuania 120 Sierra Leone 27 Sweden 2 Nigeria 274 Norway 118 Tanzania 26 Thailand 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 331 Saudi Arabia 117 Senegal 26 Lithuania 3 Angola 335 Sweden 116 Congo, Dem. Rep. 24 Saudi Arabia 4 Côte d'Ivoire 340 Singapore 115 Côte d'Ivoire 22 Netherlands 5 Rwanda 354 United Arab Emirates 112 Uzbekistan 19 Australia 7 Ghana 382 United States 112 Burkina Faso 17 Taiwan, China 7 Slovenia 391 Armenia 109 Angola 16 Singapore 9 Croatia 956 Switzerland 106 Nigeria 4 Twenty-one countries allow the entrepreneur to regis- The ease of registering property is a simple average of ter property in 20 days. But in Angola, Bosnia and country rankings by the number of procedures, time Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia court backlogs can and cost, where higher values indicate more efficient cause delays of over a year. It is possible to get a provi- property registration. Entrepreneurs in Nordic countries sional title on application, but full certainty under have the easiest time transferring property. Armenia and property law comes only with the final title. Inefficient Lithuania also make the top 10 list following their re- registries delay the process in many African countries, forms. Nine of the 10 least efficient countries are in Sub- especially when bribes are not paid. Saharan Africa, largely because of combined high costs and time. Nigeria is the least efficient. Source: Doing Business database. 36 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 5.2 FIGURE 5.3 Registering property is complex in Uzbekistan Harder to register in poor countries Time and cost to register property Days Percentage of property value Days Percentage of property value 100 13 OECD 34 4.8 Cost High income East Asia & 75 12 51 the Pacific 4.2 Middle East & 54 North Africa 6.8 Time 50 11 South 56 Asia 6.1 Latin America & 62 the Caribbean 5.6 25 10 Europe & 133 3.2 Central Asia Sub-Saharan 116 14.4 0 9 Africa 1 Procedures 12 Source: Doing Business database. Source: Doing Business database. Inspections of the property slow the transfer of title of 1978. It was adopted to reduce conflict, but added a in 30 countries, none rich, including Bangladesh, Bolivia, 6-month delay and a 10% fee. the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan and The effect of such obstacles is evident across coun- Malaysia. Uzbekistan has 2, compounding an already tries. Registering property is almost twice as efficient in complex procedure (figure 5.2). Both inspections are to rich countries as in poor ones (figure 5.3). Across re- verify the property's borders. The first double-checks the gions, OECD and East Asian countries have the most ef- official cadastre records. The second triple-checks it. ficient registration, averaging about 40 days and costing Both times, every neighbor must sign and seal the in- less than 5% of the property value. It is most difficult in spection. Such complexity increases the likelihood that Sub-Saharan Africa, where it takes more than 100 days bribes may change hands. and with costs of over 14%. Latin American countries Another large bottleneck, especially in Africa, is the typically require many procedures, including more due requirement for government consent before property is diligence, and take longer than average. Most countries transferred. It causes delays, usually requires an exorbi- in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have low costs-- tant fee and can be a major source of corruption. 3.2% on average, with 6 countries at less than 1%. But in Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Zambia almost all, the seller will also need to pay value added all have consent requirements. This is not always a relic tax. And low costs in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, of colonial days. Nigeria's came with the Land Use Act Poland and Slovenia are offset by long delays. What else secures property rights? Doing Business in 2005 presents measures of the effi- registry and cadastre, with the two unified to avoid con- ciency of registering property. But many other factors flicting records. Registry information can be accessed on- help secure property rights. Among these are the organi- line without restriction. In Costa Rica about 1.2 million zation of the registry, the legal rights that come with properties are registered, but almost 1.7 million plots are ownership and the controls on property markets. Prop- supposedly recorded in the cadastre. The total area of all erty lawyers and property registries provided detailed in- registered properties exceeds the area of the country by formation on each of these areas. Several examples high- 6% (figure 5.4). Evidently, some records are duplicates or light how they matter. contradictory. Although it takes only 21 days and 3.6% to register transfers, the value of title is questionable as a re- Organization of the registry and cadastre sult. Burundi has the opposite problem--how to verify Property registries record legal ownership, and the cadas- who owns what, with less than 1% of properties recorded tre records physical characteristics and identifies bound- in a cadastre that is only paper-based. aries. In the Netherlands all properties are recorded in the REGISTERING PROPERTY 37 FIGURE 5.4 What proportion of property is recorded? Kenya, custom and personal law overrides the principle of anti-discrimination. Formal legal disputes over land title Estimated percentage of property recorded in the cadastre uphold custom law that women do not inherit land, with 0 20 40 60 80 100 Burundi the result that despite comprising 70% of the agricultural Senegal labor force and 48% of all small entrepreneurs, women Pakistan Togo hold less than 5% of registered Kenyan land titles.15 Nicaragua Some Asian and Latin American countries have in- Colombia troduced joint titling and explicit guarantees for women's Philippines Albania rights, including Nicaragua and Vietnam. Uganda just Thailand reformed to require women's participation in sales of Poland family land. These reforms support social development. Turkey Denmark When women can control property, children's educa- Slovakia tional attainment and other social indicators are higher.16 Costa Rica Source: Doing Business database. Property market controls Following extensive land reform in 1999­01, registering Types of property tenure transfers of property is quick in the Kyrgyz Republic. It takes only 15 days using the expedited option, with 7 More than 100 countries permit private ownership in procedures and at 5% of the property value. But tight re- perpetuity. By contrast in Mozambique, private owner- strictions remain. For example, agricultural land cannot ship of land is not permitted. A business can only obtain be sold to individuals residing in towns and cities a use right for 50 years. Similar restrictions apply in or to legal entities, making it difficult to establish agro- China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lao PDR, processing businesses. Lesotho and Uzbekistan. The shorter the length of the Similar restrictions limit the value of property rights lease, the less security for the business. And systems that in more than half of the sample countries (figure 5.5). In register limited tenure rights are generally more difficult Kenya parties to a transaction of agricultural land need to to maintain, especially ensuring that the use rights are be approved by the land control board. In Korea trans- followed and that extensions of terms are properly re- ferring titles in certain designated areas require govern- corded. The more complexity of rules, the more oppor- ment approval, with the idea of preventing speculation. tunities for corruption. Reforms in Macedonia in 2001 In reality it prevents owners from using their property converted use rights to private ownership, enabling a and drives transactions into the informal economy. more active property market to develop. Quantitative indicators of these, and other regula- But even with private ownership in perpetuity, in tory measures of the security of property rights will be around a fifth of countries there are restrictions on the developed in Doing Business in 2006. ability to sell, lease, bequeath, transfer by gift or mort- FIGURE 5.5 gage the most common form of ownership. Four-fifths Controls of property markets of countries limit foreign ownership of land, including Percentage of countries that control prices, outright bans in Bhutan, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Mongolia 37 ownership, and transfers and Oman. 31 In most countries women are far less likely to own property than men--although the number of female- 23 headed households has increased to almost a third in de- veloping countries, women have formal title to less than 14 5% of land.14 This is not because countries apply direct 8 legal bans, though some come close. As late as 1996 mar- ried women in Botswana could not register deeds in their own names. Today married women in Zimbabwe may not Controls Ceiling Price controls Restrictions Policies register land without their husband's permission. But im- of property on land of real estate on transfer to deter prices ownership services of property speculation proving women's property rights now requires attention to Source: Doing Business database. related laws, such as inheritance, family and custom law. In 38 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 What to reform? property registry is in the courts and accounts for over half of the case backlog, may consider as a priority re- Land reforms can be highly political and take years. But form merging the registry with the cadastre. Much like the ease of registering property can be improved with new business registration, land registration is inherently some simple steps. Here are 4 ways to start: an administrative, not adjudicative process, and does not require a judge's attention. · Simplify and combine procedures for registering Expanding access to information in the property reg- property. istry helps owners to be clearly identified, reducing the · First link, then unify the agencies involved. transaction costs to determine who owns what and cut- · Provide easier access to the registry. ting the need for time-consuming due diligence. But 28 · And a warning: don't regard technology as a panacea. countries restrict access to the property registry, including Bolivia, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kuwait and Nepal. In Sri Lanka Countries with the fastest time to register property a notary or lawyer must be used to access the information. also have the fewest procedures, without sacrificing due China, the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia are all imple- diligence. Most simply combine steps at the registry, menting reforms to improve access to what was previ- rather than require the entrepreneur to go to 7 different ously restricted information. Countries with the greatest agencies, as in Ethiopia and Tanzania, or 3 separate ease of registering property also provide more informa- agencies to pay taxes, as in the Philippines. In Chile the tion and make it more accessible to entrepreneurs. registry checks for payment of taxes, rather than require Many countries are embracing new technologies in the entrepreneur to go to the tax agency to get a tax property registration. One in 3 have made registration clearance certificate--as in Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay. electronic in the last 5 years, with rich countries leading In Cambodia the registry automatically forwards the no- the way. This helps in many ways (figure 5.6). Take the tification of registration to the municipality, rather than United Kingdom. Its Land Registration Act, the first add an extra step in the process--as in El Salvador and major overhaul of land registration since 1925, came Kyrgyz Republic. And in two-fifths of countries the en- into force in October 2003. The act sets up a new system trepreneur can pay the stamp duty at the registry when of electronic dealing with land, so that the register accu- applying, rather than make a separate trip to the tax rately reflects land ownership at any given time. The re- agency, bank or municipality. form allows users to investigate title to land online, with A related reform is to link or unify the property reg- the absolute minimum of additional searches, inspec- istry and cadastre. By doing so it is easier to detect over- tions and inquiries, and to get instantaneous computer- lapping and duplicate titles, saving time in due diligence ized updates of title. Implementation is not complete and improving the security of property rights. Control- yet, but time to register is already reported to have de- ling for income per capita, countries with unified agen- clined by 30%. cies score significantly higher on the ease of registering FIGURE 5.6 property. Lithuania unified its cadastre and property Use of technology is associated with more efficiency registry in 1997, as well as the separate land and building Average reduction in time to register property registries. It is now unifying all this with other important public registries--such as addresses and legal entities. Honduras is merging its registry and cadastre. Computerized Electronic Electronic Electronic business systems imaging of titles registry of cadastre A first step towards unification is linking the registry property rights and cadastre. Spain's 2002 Cadastral Act aims to do just ­15 days that, to increase consistency between the two. The same is happening in Costa Rica--where the registry also has access to the civil registry's national database, allowing it ­38 days to determine whether the person transferring property is alive. This has stemmed a flow of transactions in recent ­51 days years, when properties of deceased owners were known ­57 days to have exchanged hands, apparently with the owner's Source: Doing Business database. consent. Countries like Croatia and Slovenia, where the REGISTERING PROPERTY 39 Others are doing the same. Ireland recently digitized But technology is not a panacea. Many of the re- its registry records, allowed for electronic processing by formers already had fairly efficient property registration the registry and provided online information to cus- systems, which helped them to be among the first to go tomers. Electronic conveyancing has been introduced in electronic. In many other countries, particularly poor the Netherlands and New Zealand--2 of the most effi- ones, electronic registration is probably not sustainable cient countries for registering property. In Italy time to yet. If paper records are inaccurate, putting them in a register has been cut in half after electronic filing and re- computer won't help. There, the focus needs to be on lease of data were introduced. But it is not only rich improving the efficiency of current services and cover- countries. Middle income countries like Colombia, age and accuracy of the registry. Thailand, one of the Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia, and even Madagascar and most efficient registration systems in the world, is a good some states in India are making at least some aspects of example. The registry there is still manual. But there is a the registry and cadastre electronic. The benefits are ap- direct link between the registry and cadastral maps, land parent. Countries with more use of technology often records storage is continually improving, decentralized have more efficient property registration, even after con- registration is possible and there is a nationwide system trolling for income per capita. for personal identification. Why reform? No surprise then, countries that make registration easy also have fewer property title disputes.19 In Thai- Few would disagree that property rights are needed to en- land, where it takes 2 procedures, 2 days and costs 6% of courage investment, productivity and growth. Many stud- the value, an estimated 0.1% of registered parcels are in ies show this.17 The question is how to protect those rights. dispute. In the Philippines the estimated dispute rate is Some would argue that more regulation and a for- 15% and in Honduras 10%. malized property registration process ensure more due Faced with bureaucratic property registration, many diligence, enhancing property rights. But complexity entrepreneurs choose to keep their assets informal. In- breeds uncertainty, increases transactions costs and of- vestment in expensive titling programs is ill-advised in fers opportunities for fraud. And more bureaucracy pro- such countries, without reforms of property registries duces more mistakes about who owns what. Longer and and laws. Registry officials and property lawyers report a more expensive property registration is associated with significantly lower proportion of formally registered ti- weaker perceived security of property rights, even con- tles in countries with complex, lengthy and expensive trolling for income per capita (figure 5.7). Firms report registration. They also report more bribes (figure 5.7). In more problems in accessing land in countries with costly many countries firms also rate property registries as the and cumbersome registration procedures.18 most corrupt public organizations.20 FIGURE 5.7 Easy property registration--more secure property rights, less informality, less corruption Perceived security of property rights Informal sector share of GDP Perceived corruption More Greater secure share More corrupt Less Lesser Less secure share corrupt Least Most Least Most Least Most Countries ranked by Countries ranked by Countries ranked by steps to register property, quintiles steps to register property, quintiles steps to register property, quintiles Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 5% level. Source: Doing Business database, Heritage Foundation (2004), Kaufmann and others (2003). 40 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 5.8 Easy property registration, more credit, more investment Private credit as a percentage of GDP Private investment as a percentage of GDP 20 8 6 15 4 2 10 0 Most difficult Least difficult Most difficult Least difficult Countries ranked by ease of property registration, quintiles Countries ranked by ease of property registration, quintiles Note: Relationships with private credit remain significant at the 1% level when controlling for income, contract enforcement, and GDP growth, at the 10% level for investment when controlling for income. Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004). With fewer assets in the formal sector, more entre- if their property rights are less secure. Inefficient regis- preneurs are excluded from using property as collateral, tration is associated with lower rates of private invest- and less credit is allocated (figure 5.8). The possibility of ment (figure 5.8). And it leads to lower productivity, getting loans is the only reason to take on the daunting since it is harder for property to be transferred from less task of registering in some countries. Banks in Rwanda to more productive uses. The result is slower growth. will even assign staff to assist in the registration process One study estimates that restrictive land market regula- so that they can take property as collateral. But when it tions cost 1.3% of annual economic growth in India.21 is too difficult, few bother. Entrepreneurs will invest less Notes 1. UNRCC (2004). 11. World Bank (2002). 2. Ibbotson, Siegal and Love (1985). This chapter focuses on register- 12. Land Equity International (2003). ing real property. See chapter 5 on registering movable property as 13. In Moldova and Ukraine the expedited procedure does not cut total collateral. time because they are performed simultaneously with procedures 3. More effective collateral laws would encourage greater use of that take a longer time. movable assets as collateral, as discussed in the next chapter. 14. Anderson-Saito and Dhar (2004). 4. World Bank Group Investment Climate Assessments (various). 15. Ellis (2004). Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_ 16. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002), Katz and Chamorro (2002). country_report.htm 17. Knack and Keefer (1995), Besley (1995), Claessens and Laeven 5. See Deininger (2003) for a summary. (2003), see Deininger (2003) for a summary and analysis of relevant 6. World Bank Group Investment Climate Assessments (various). studies. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_ 18. Based on analysis of 15,561 firms in 41 countries as reported in country_report.htm World Bank Investment Climate Assessments. 7. Deininger (2003). 19. Based on estimated dispute rates provided by property registries 8. Durand-Lasserve and Royston (2002). and lawyers as a part of the Doing Business survey. 9. Fields (2002). 20. World Bank Group Investment Climate Assessments (various). 10. Based on analysis of the Doing Business indicators with firm level Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_ data on the perceived security of property rights, as reported in country_report.htm Batra and others (2003). 21. McKinsey and Company (2001). 41 Getting credit Who is increasing access to credit? What to reform? Why reform? Zohra wants to expand her profitable catering business are large. In Bangladesh nearly half the poor people who in Algiers. She has new customers lined up, but needs received credit lifted themselves out of poverty, but only additional finance. She applies for a bank loan. The loan 4% of those without credit did.3 Some of the effect is no officer checks Zohra's credit history with the bank--and doubt due to differences in education and land owner- finds nothing. She has not borrowed before. And be- ship, but a large role remains for improving access for cause there is no credit registry in the country, he can- creditworthy borrowers.4 not confirm that she has always paid her bills on time. Others have tried alternative solutions. Laws in He asks about collateral. Zohra has only her accounts re- Benin, Chile and Syria cap the interest rates that lenders ceivable to offer because the family house belongs to her can charge. Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Italy, Mexico, Peru husband's family. But laws restrict the bank from taking and Vietnam permit a bankrupt debtor to seek safe har- receivables as collateral. The application is rejected. The bor from debt collection for the entire insolvency pro- business stays small. ceeding--by which time the bankruptcy estate is whit- Zohra's tale is common. Getting finance is rated as the tled to nothing. Real estate and essential business biggest obstacle for businesses in Algeria. It is the same in equipment in Bolivia, Mali and United Arab Emirates most other countries.1 Smaller businesses are constrained are exempt from collection on default. the most. Women, who are more likely to run small busi- nesses, face the biggest hurdles (figure 6.1).2 FIGURE 6.1 Some governments have made access to credit eas- Getting credit is hard, especially for some ier. In 2003­04, credit information systems were estab- Access to bank finance lished in Armenia, Bulgaria, India, Latvia and Slovakia (percentage of firms with bank finance) Large 47 and improved in another 20 countries. Collateral law re- firms form has also proceeded, at a more modest pace. Slova- kia was the top reformer last year. But a half dozen other More countries--from Macedonia to Spain--have reformed Access Male-owned Small 28 as well. And Poland increased the protection of secured 27 businesses firms creditors in bankruptcy. in Tanzania Improving credit information and the laws to create and enforce collateral--both in and out of bankruptcy-- is not just about creditor rights. It benefits deserving Female-owned 8 businesses debtors just as much, by increasing their chances to ac- in Tanzania cess credit. And it boosts productivity and growth, by Source: Doing Business database. shifting capital to the best business ventures. The gains 42 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 The rationale for such arrangements is that borrow- the law was amended to address some of its weaknesses). ers need protection. The irony is that they hurt the very Bankruptcy receives a lot of attention in reform people they are meant to protect. Insiders can always get proposals for improving access to credit. Yet bankers loans. But high-risk borrowers--most start-ups, small and corporate lawyers estimate that more than three- firms, poor people--will not get a loan at a capped in- quarters of collateral enforcement takes place outside of terest rate. Nor if they cannot offer their main business bankruptcy. In poor countries, more than 90%. This assets as collateral. They will be refused credit. may decrease if bankruptcy were more efficient. But Borrower protections often backfire. Introduce even in countries with the most efficient insolvency, the strong ones and there will be no borrowers to protect. majority of creditors enforce outside of bankruptcy. Take the Maldives. After a few years of successful devel- Credit markets work best with an effective assessment of opment of mortgage lending, politicians thought it the borrower's credit history, an ability to use a wide would be a popular reform to prohibit creditors from range of assets as collateral cheaply, and enforcement of seizing the primary residence in case of default. Within collateral out of court. This is where Albania, India and months the mortgage market dried up. (In April 2004 Latvia have focused their reform efforts. Who is increasing access to credit? FIGURE 6.2 Scant private information sharing in poor countries Sharing credit information Presence and coverage of credit information registries Presence Coverage Twenty-five years ago, only a third of countries had either (percentage of countries) (borrowers per 1,000 adults) a private bureau, a public registry or both. Today 80% do. Private bureau The growth in poor and middle income countries has 21 Poor 47 Middle been dramatic, with 37 new public registries and 23 pri- 60 223 income vate bureaus, mainly in Latin America, East Asia and 90 Rich 499 Central and Eastern Europe. But poorer countries still lag well behind rich ones, especially in information sharing Public registry Poor through private bureaus (figure 6.2, table 6.1). 60 14 Middle Credit registries are useful to lenders only if they 57 income 65 distribute a broad range of high quality and easily acces- 33 Rich 68 sible data. Fourteen countries have credit information Source: Doing Business database. systems with: · Both positive information, meaning loans outstand- information sharing including Albania, Ethiopia, Ja- ing, assets, payment behavior on accounts in good standing--as well as negative information, meaning maica, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Papua New Guinea, defaults and arrears. Russia and Syria. · Data on both firms and individuals. Reforms of registries focused on 5 areas: · Data from retailers, or utilities as well as financial institutions. · Providing data online. The bureaus in Bosnia and · Five or more years of historical data preserved. Herzegovina and Spain--as well as the Brazilian, Bel- gian, Mozambican, Pakistani and Portuguese public reg- · Data on all loans above 1% of income per capita. istries--launched online systems. Creditors can now ob- · Legal guarantees for the consumer's right to inspect tain information instantly. In most countries it used to their data. take more than a week. Bangladesh and Bulgaria plan to These are Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Germany, launch online access in late 2004. Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. · Sharing positive information. The public registries in But in many other countries, credit information is Belgium, Brazil and Turkey began sharing more positive limited--21 have at most 2 of these features including information. Backed by new laws, the Greek and Hong Ghana, Morocco, the Philippines, Serbia and Montene- Kong (China) private bureaus did the same. In Greece gro, Sri Lanka and Yemen. And 25 countries have no the number of consultations to the bureau grew by more GETTING CREDIT 43 TABLE 6.1 Coverage of credit registries: Borrowers covered per 1,000 adult population Private bureaus Public registries Top 10 Bottom 10 Top 10 Bottom 10 Canada 1,000 Portugal 79 Portugal 637 Mali 1 Ireland 1,000 Costa Rica 78 Belgium 533 Rwanda 1 Korea, Rep. 1,000 Denmark 71 Spain 394 Central African Republic 1 Norway 1,000 Spain 65 Malaysia 339 Saudi Arabia 1 United Kingdom 1,000 Philippines 34 Taiwan, China 334 Congo, Rep. 1 United States 1,000 Hungary 33 Chile 290 Serbia and Montenegro 1 Sweden 980 Israel 15 Venezuela 286 Cameroon 1 New Zealand 978 Pakistan 3 Argentina 201 Chad 0.4 Australia 954 Ghana 1 El Salvador 198 Nigeria 0.2 Germany 856 Kenya 1 Peru 143 Guinea 0.2 Source: Doing Business database. than 50%, and several new products for lenders were Overall, public registries reformed more than pri- launched. In Hong Kong (China) the number of bor- vate bureaus in 2003. But private bureaus remain better rowers covered by the bureau more than doubled, while structured to serve lenders. Public registries usually per- in Belgium it increased fivefold. form a dual role of serving creditors and supporting the banking supervisor in monitoring risk in the financial · Including more loans. Saudi Arabia's public registry system. For example only 14% of public registries report cut the minimum loan size for collecting data from 5 offering such services as credit scoring, borrower moni- million riyals to 500,000, almost doubling the number of toring or debt collection to clients--compared with 90% borrowers recorded. The Tunisian registry scrapped its of private bureaus. minimum loan cutoff altogether, increasing the coverage of borrowers by more than 15 times. Legal rights for borrowers and lenders Having access to past credit history is not enough. In · Introducing new products for lenders. These range most countries, only the largest and best connected from credit scoring in Austria, Peru, Singapore and businesses can get unsecured loans. The rest have to Turkey to fraud detection in Ireland and Spain. Singa- pledge assets as collateral. In many countries, collateral pore added data on borrower credit limits, the number laws make this no easy task. of days loans are overdue and commercial information Lending is easier when debtors are entitled to pledge from public registries. Brazil expanded the scope of in- any type of asset. But only 40 countries enable the debtor formation from 10 types to 30, including data on the to offer a changing pool of assets (such as inventory or type of loan and how borrowers use credit. receivables), future assets (such as crops) and the entire business as collateral. A borrower in the United States · Improving data quality. The Bangladesh public reg- can charge all assets of the business, tangible and intan- istry raised the penalty for banks that withhold data gible, present and future, to obtain a loan that may fluc- from 2,000 takas to 500,000 and the penalty for disclos- tuate in value. Doing so is impossible for a business in ing credit information to unauthorized parties from Paraguay. By law the agreement must identify and de- 2,000 takas to 100,000. As a result, the share of banks scribe each asset and the debt specifically--and how to submitting data on time jumped from 25% to 95%. In know the future? Panama the bureau created a customer service office for In Angola, Brazil, China and Mali inventory can be disputes on data accuracy. In Mozambique quality shot used as collateral, but the list has to be updated with up after new regulations allowed the registry to fine every change. How would a grocery store get credit if it banks for providing incomplete information. More than has to make adjustments to the collateral list every time a dozen countries are improving data protection laws, a new stock arrives? And imagine a bank taking security which include incentives and safeguards for quality. from an accounting firm in Algeria or Peru. Pledging its 44 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 6.3 main asset, accounts receivable, requires the notification High costs to create collateral in Africa and consent of all the debtors. Cost to create and register a collateral agreement After the type of security and debt is agreed, a lender Percentage of income per capita wants to check for existing rights to the collateral and 39 Sub-Saharan Africa alert others of its priority. The best way is with a collat- eral registry. Most countries have some type of reg- istry--for security over land, vessels, aircraft and intel- lectual property. And in most an agreement is binding 22 Middle East & North Africa 22 Poor 20 Latin America & the Caribbean over third parties only if it is registered. But only 30 have registries that allow registration of charges of all types of movable property, as well as link the registry across re- 7 Europe & Central Asia 10 Middle income 6 South Asia gions, to make it easy to retrieve information. 5 OECD high income 5 Rich Creating and registering movable collateral is easy 3 East Asia & the Pacific in many countries. In Botswana, Canada, Kuwait, the Source: Doing Business database. Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, fees, taxes and stamp duties are negligible, and registration is complete in 1 or 2 days. But in others, tributed through settlement procedures. Debtors have costs in a standardized case of creating security add up to unlimited opportunities to drag the process by appeal. 50% of income per capita or more (figure 6.3, table 6.2).5 Enforcement takes more than 7 years. Most countries register charges within 2 weeks. But In another 40 countries enforcing collateral requires it takes more than a month in Azerbaijan, Ghana, Hon- the same long court trial as for unsecured debt. Prospects duras, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and South for recovery are dim. Lenders respond with huge collat- Africa. In Poland registration takes place in the court, eral requirements and high interest rates. In Zambia av- where a judge must certify the legality of the agreement. erage collateral requirements are more than 3 times the The process can take 6 months. In the meantime, a value of the loan and interest rates top 28%.7 Few can af- fraudulent borrower could pledge the asset to another ford such terms. Compare this with Australia. The credi- creditor. And the main business of courts--resolving tor would appoint a receiver and serve notice on the bor- disputes--is held up. rower. The receiver would seize and sell the asset. No Costs to create collateral are highest in poor coun- courts are involved, as long as the debtor cooperates. En- tries and lowest in Asian and OECD countries. Coun- forcement is over in 10 days. In Latvia, even if the debtor tries with no registries are cheaper. But the creditors lose does not cooperate with out-of-court measures, enforce- out elsewhere because they have no way of notifying others of their right to the collateral. Collateral registration is only part of the story. Laws TABLE 6.2 The least expensive to create collateral--and the on who has priority to the collateral introduce another most set of risks. In India the creditor can lose out to unpaid Cost to create and register security, % income per capita taxes, to someone who bought the collateral in good faith or to judgment creditors.6 India is not alone. Sixty Top 10 Bottom 10 countries give priority to a claimant other than the se- New Zealand 0.02 Egypt, Arab Rep. 52.7 Netherlands 0.03 Jordan 56.3 cured creditor. The uncertainty means higher interest Canada 0.05 Mali 58.5 rates and less credit for borrowers. Kuwait 0.06 Morocco 62.2 In Brazil credit can be secured by movable collateral, United Kingdom 0.07 Niger 74.6 but only at high cost and with a painstakingly specific Puerto Rico 0.09 Benin 80.7 description in the loan agreement. If the debtor defaults, United States 0.14 Togo 83.4 Hong Kong, China 0.18 Cameroon 87.6 an even bigger obstacle arises. Creditors must file a claim Taiwan, China 0.20 Congo, Dem. Rep. 130.0 with the court. Long proceedings ensue before the judge Albania 0.25 Côte d'Ivoire 155.9 decides to enforce and orders bailiffs to seize the assets. Note: Austria, Cambodia, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland have no cost but After appraisal, a public auction is scheduled and adver- also no collateral registry. tised. The court determines a minimum price. If met, Source: Doing Business database. sale proceeds are deposited in a public agency and dis- GETTING CREDIT 45 ment only takes two months through a simple summary TABLE 6.3 The most legal rights for borrowers and lenders-- procedure with limits on frivolous appeals. and the least Collateral laws are of less use when debtors with Top 10 Bottom 10 multiple creditors default--or when the best way to re- United Kingdom 10 Brazil 2 cover debt is to reorganize an insolvent business. Bank- Hong Kong, China 10 China 2 ruptcy laws come in. They define who controls the Singapore 10 Morocco 2 process, who has rights to the debtor's assets, and the ef- Albania 9 Peru 2 ficiency of realizing these rights. It is natural to antici- Australia 9 Haiti 2 pate more lending if creditors expect to be treated fairly Botswana 9 Lao PDR 2 in a bankruptcy case, and the rights of secured lenders in Netherlands 9 Yemen, Rep. 2 bankruptcy law have been shown to expand credit.8 New Zealand 9 Turkey 1 Three of these rights are most important: Slovakia 9 Greece 1 Latvia 8 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 · A secured creditor may enforce on its collateral when a debtor enters reorganization--so the assets Source: Doing Business database. are not "stayed." · The secured creditor is the first to be paid out of the enforcement procedures by contract; and creditors may proceeds from liquidation. both seize and sell collateral out of court. Nine countries · The creditors or an administrator manage the busi- have more than 9 of these features. A dozen have 2 or ness during reorganization, rather than the bank- fewer (table 6.3). rupt debtor himself. OECD countries score the highest (figure 6.4). Transition countries follow, reflecting the sweeping col- Increasing these rights means changing bankruptcy lateral law reforms in almost every country in the last laws--a difficult reform. In 2003 only two countries im- decade, supported among others by the European Bank proved on these indicators.9 In Poland employees and for Reconstruction and Development.10 Poor and mid- taxes previously were paid before the secured creditors dle income countries score much lower than rich coun- upon liquidation. Now, secured creditors have priority tries. Some, such as the Dominican Republic, have laws to the proceeds from the sale of their collateral (if there on collateral from the 19th century--hardly relevant to is a shortfall, employee claims rank ahead). In Armenia, today's financing needs. Others score poorly even after since March 2004, the debtor automatically loses control reforms--such as the OHADA countries in West Africa. of its property to an administrator on bankruptcy, in- Their 1998 improvements did not go far enough. The creasing creditor rights. Some others, such as Spain, in- Middle East and North Africa and Latin America vie for troduced reforms that affected creditor rights but did the region with the weakest legal rights. not change the net score. To measure the ease of getting credit, a new index on FIGURE 6.4 how well collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending OECD countries--most rights for borrowers and lenders includes the 3 measures of legal rights in bankruptcy and Legal rights index 7 measures of collateral law: general rather than specific 6.3 OECD high income 6.3 Rich descriptions of assets are permitted (expanding the scope of assets covered); general rather than specific descrip- tions of debt are permitted (expanding the scope of debt GREATER 5.4 Europe & Central Asia covered); any legal or natural person may grant or take SECURITY 5.2 East Asia & the Pacific security over business credits; a unified registry including 5.0 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.9 Middle income charges over movable property operates; security pro- 4.5 Poor vides priority outside bankruptcy; parties may agree on 4.0 South Asia 3.8 Middle East & North Africa 3.9 Latin America & the Caribbean Source: Doing Business database. 46 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 What to reform? privacy. But consumer protection laws can allow sharing of both while safeguarding privacy. In 2003 Greece per- In an attempt to improve credit markets in the 1990s, mitted sharing positive data but with stricter require- many developing countries introduced procedures for ments for consumer consent before it can be accessed, reorganizing bankrupt companies, along the lines of enabling the borrower to opt out of the system if desired. Chapter 11 in the United States. The procedures are al- Brazil, Hong Kong (China) and Turkey did the same. most never used. A better approach is to improve credit Borrowers have the right to access their own credit re- information systems and legal rights. Doing Business in ports and a clear mechanism to challenge errors. 2004 recommended regulations or codes of conduct to encourage lenders to participate in private bureaus. It Expand providers also discussed how public registries can complement or, Expanding the sources of data also works. Trade credi- in some cases, help compensate for a lack of private in- tors, retailers and utilities have a wealth of information formation sharing. And it explored ways to improve debt on payment histories. Sharing it increases the power to recovery in bankruptcy, including giving clear and pre- predict default and expands credit (figure 6.5).13 Some dictable priority to secured creditors. 85% of private bureaus use data from retailers and utili- Six other reforms expand access to credit: ties, but only 35% of bank-owned bureaus do. And with · Distributing both positive and negative information. the exception of Belgium, all public registries gather data only from supervised financial institutions. Banking · Expanding providers of data to the credit registry. laws are sometimes a restriction to sharing data with · Making credit registries electronic. non-bank creditors, as in Poland. The Czech bureau is · Introducing universal security for debtors and creditors. awaiting a revision to the Personal Data Protection Act · Establishing registries for all security interests in to include information from nonbanking sources. The movables. Turkish bureau will do so by the end of 2004. · Permitting out of court collateral enforcement. Make the registry electronic Distribute positive and negative credit information An easy way to improve credit registries, without chang- The more information a registry provides to help predict ing laws or negotiating with lenders to submit more defaults, the more useful it is to lenders, and the more data: provide online access. The new online system in credit available (figure 6.5).11 Seventeen countries dis- Pakistan cost $500,000 to set up. It delivers reports to tribute only a limited range of positive data, all through lenders instantly. Compare that with a bank in Cam- public registries. Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Ghana, eroon, which must wait up to 3 months before getting a New Zealand and the Philippines distribute only nega- written report in the mail. Creditors in 24 other coun- tive data.12 Why not permit both? The excuse is usually tries cannot access data electronically. With technology so cheap, there is no reason to wait. Providing online ac- FIGURE 6.5 Broader information and electronic access--more credit cess is associated with more credit (figure 6.5). And it may help spur commercial banks to adopt credit scoring Increase in private credit to GDP associated with: Percentage points technology, which both speeds the lending process and 12.6 reduces opportunity for gender bias.14 12.0 10.8 Introduce universal security for debtors and creditors As a part of its collateral law reform in 2002, Slovakia permitted debtors to use all movable assets as collat- eral--present and future, tangible and intangible-- abol- ishing the requirement for specific descriptions of assets Both positive Retailers, Access and debt. Since then more than 70% of all new business and negative trade creditors is electronic information are shared and/or utilities credit is secured by movables and receivables. Credit to also submit data the private sector increased by 10%. Note: Analysis controls for income, GDP growth, enforcement, and legal rights. Relationships are significant at the 10% level. Borrowers in all countries can pledge land or land Source: Doing Business database. use rights. All can pledge tangible movable assets without GETTING CREDIT 47 losing possession.15 And then the restrictions come. Spe- Permit out of court collateral enforcement cific descriptions of assets and debt preclude debtors In 2000 Spain introduced out of court enforcement from using changing pools of assets and future assets as through notarial execution, allowing debtors and credi- collateral, preventing inventory and receivables financ- tors to agree on enforcement methods. Time to enforce ing. Some countries have tried to correct the problem. In was cut from more than 1 year to 3 months. The gains 1997 Panama introduced a floating charge over an entire from reforms in Slovakia were even larger. It took 560 business. But only for assets located outside the country. days to enforce a mortgage through the old system. Now Paraguay allows borrowers to pledge inventory. But only it is possible to enforce in 45 days (figure 6.6). if it consists of mining or industrial products. And each Ten years ago it was almost impossible to enforce item must be listed individually. Angola, Egypt, Morocco collateral in India. The process could easily take 25 years. and Vietnam permit nonpossessory pledges. But only to In 1998 the government established Debt Recovery Tri- licensed banks. bunals, with expedited enforcement proceedings. Ex- Such solutions always fall short. Potential borrowers pected time to enforce was cut to around 10 years. More with the wrong collateral miss out on loans. The answer reforms were introduced in May 2004. State-owned is to create a universal security instrument, covering all banks, which account for 90% of lending, were permit- assets and all debt, and letting all debtors and all credi- ted to enforce out of court. On default the bank must tors benefit. notify the debtor. After a 60 day grace period the bank can seize the assets directly and sell by public auction. Establish registries for all collateral Introducing the reform was difficult--it had to survive a Collateral registries work best when they are unified by Supreme Court challenge. But the new procedure is widely region and cover all types of assets. Even rich countries used. Creditors can expect to enforce within 9 months. need reform. Austria, Germany and Switzerland have no Designing out of court enforcement that doesn't collateral registries.16 France operates local registries. And collapse at the first objection of the debtor cuts en- there are separate registries for pledges over shares, bank forcement time by three-quarters on average. The less accounts, receivables and equipment. Separate registration courts are involved, the shorter the time, and the more with tax authorities is also required. Another 32 countries willing creditors are to lend. The point of collateral require multiple registration, including Cameroon, agreements is to avoid a regular trial. And if the case goes Colombia, Ecuador, Japan and Morocco. In Syria charges to court, efficiency can be improved by introducing over movable property are possible only where there is a summary proceedings--as in Estonia--without judicial pre-existing registry--namely vehicles, vessels and intel- analysis of the cause of the dispute, and with limitations lectual property. Turkey has a similar system. The solution: on debtor's ability to appeal. create universal charges and a unified registry of movable property charges indexed by the name of the debtor. Indonesia established a registry in 2001. And Spain unified its registries in 1998. But Eastern European FIGURE 6.6 countries have led the way in establishing unified reg- Reform works--Slovakia before and after istries of charges over movable collateral. Bulgaria, Hun- Days to enforce a mortgage gary, Romania and Moldova all successfully introduced 2003 such registries recently. Bosnia and Herzegovina is about Time reduced to launch its unified registry. Since it was established in from 560 days to 45 1998 the Macedonian registry has been used by banks as a standard part of lending. The most effective registries permit a simple administrative filing of a notice of the charge--and do not stall the registration process with legal review or authentication. The Romanian registry permits notice filing and is online, allowing creditors to check for existing liens in- Procedures reduced from 14 to 6 stantly. Another 23 countries make the registry accessible 2004 electronically. Those that do often have significantly faster Number of procedures Source: Doing Business database. registration and more credit, controlling for other factors. 48 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Why reform? There are more benefits. Countries with stronger legal rights have fewer nonperforming loans, even con- Broader sharing of credit information, stronger legal trolling for income per capita. Businesses report fewer rights in and out of bankruptcy and more efficient credit constraints. They also get cheaper loans--lending enforcement mean more credit (figure 6.7). Analysis of rates and spreads between lending and deposit rates are credit markets over the last 25 years shows that intro- significantly lower. And ratings of financial system sta- ducing information sharing and strengthening rights in bility are higher.21 bankruptcy expand credit, even controlling for other de- The result: higher productivity and more growth. terminants of lending.17 In poor countries, information Adding one of the features in the information-sharing sharing works better than legal rights. index is associated with 6 percentage points more credit The most credit constrained--small firms, women to the private sector (as a share of GDP). This implies and poor people--gain the most.18 All firms are more that moving from a score of 0 to 5 on the credit infor- likely to have loans from financial institutions in coun- mation index is associated with 0.9 percentage points tries with stronger legal rights. But the relationship is more GDP growth and 0.7 percentage points more pro- larger and more significant for small firms.19 One study ductivity growth. Reforming legal rights in Egypt or shows that small firms are 40% more likely to have a Turkey to the level of Botswana or Jordan suggests 1.1 bank loan in countries with credit registries.20 Why? Be- percentage points in more economic growth and 0.9 per- cause registries help sort good borrowers from bad. centage points higher productivity growth (figure 6.7).22 FIGURE 6.7 Better legal protections and more credit information lead to higher growth Stronger legal rights, more credit More information sharing, more credit More credit, higher growth (Credit as a percentage of GDP) (Credit as a percentage of GDP) (percentage points) 1.1 Egypt, More More Arab Rep. credit credit 0.9 Brazil 0.9 Turkey 0.7 Yemen, Rep. 0.7 China 0.6 Côte d'Ivoire 0.5 Cambodia 0.4 Pakistan Less Less credit credit Least rights Most rights Least sharing Most sharing Added Added Countries ranked by legal rights index Countries ranked by information sharing index GDP productivity growth quintiles quintiles Note: The relationships are significant at the 1% level and remain so at the 5% level when controlling for income per capita. Note: Based on implied growth from increasing the legal rights Sources: Doing Business database and King and Levine (1993). score to the 75th percentile. Notes 13. See also Barron and Staten (2003) for micro evidence of this effect. 1. Batra and others (2003). 14. Royal Bank of Canada (2004). 2. Even for larger firms, gender differences remain. See Center for 15. Either through title finance or a traditional security instrument. Women's Business Research (2004) and Weeks and Seiler (2001). 16. These countries require lenders to take title to the collateral. 3. Grameen Bank (2004). 17. Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2004). 4. See also Littlefield and others (2003), World Bank (2001). 18. See Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (forthcoming) and Gropp 5. The standardized case assumes a value of debt and security of 10 times and others (1997) for evidence on small firms. income per capita. 19. Based on analysis of the Doing Business legal rights of borrowers and 6. Judgment creditors are given the right to an asset by court verdict. lenders indicator with firm level data on access to bank finance, as re- 7. World Bank (2004b). ported in Batra and others (2003). 8. This 4-point measure of creditor rights was developed by La Porta, 20. Love and Mylenko (2003). Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and covered 49 countries. 21. Based on analysis of the Doing Business legal rights of borrowers and 9. The lack of reform in 2003 is not an aberration. Only 30 countries lenders indicator with: The IMF Global Stability Report measure of changed their creditor rights in bankruptcy score in the last 25 years. nonperforming loans; International Financial Statistics lending and de- 10. Dahan and Simpson (2004). posit rates; Global Competitiveness Report 2003­04 ratings of the ease 11. See also Barron and Staten (2003) for micro evidence of this effect. of getting loans and financial system soundness, and Moody's strength of financial system rating. Relationships are significant at the 5% level. 12. In another 7--Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay, Spain All analysis controls for income per capita. and Uruguay--the private bureau distributes only negative data but positive data is available from the public registry. 22. Calculations based on King and Levine (1993). 49 Protecting investors Who uses equity finance? What encourages equity investment? What to reform? Why reform? In July 1991 the Bank of Credit and Commerce Inter- In countries like Ghana, good corporate governance national, otherwise known as BCCI, collapsed. Its 400 is about creating incentives for investors to provide fi- branches in 70 countries closed. Investors faced losses to- nance without the need to exercise daily control of busi- taling more than $10 billion. In November the same year ness operations. The typical case looks more like the body of Robert Maxwell, one of Britain's wealthiest Kwadwo's search for a business partner than it resembles men, was found in the sea off the coast of Tenerife. A few BCCI or initial public offerings in rich countries. And days later the auditors of the Mirror Group found that potential investors worry about expropriation by the en- $900 million had been diverted as unauthorized loans trepreneur or managing partner.3 But the same princi- from the pension fund to Maxwell's private companies. ples of good corporate governance apply in both rich Interest in corporate governance took off. Sir Adrian and poor countries. Cadbury, chair of the first committee on corporate gov- Preventing expropriation from taking place, and ernance in the United Kingdom, writes:"When our Com- exposing it when it does, requires legal protections of mittee was formed [in 1991], neither our title nor our small shareholders and enforcement capabilities. And-- work program seemed framed to catch the headlines. It the focus of Doing Business in 2005--it requires that the is, however, the continuing concern about standards of business disclose information on ownership and finan- financial reporting and accountability, heightened by cial performance and on the precise nature of business BCCI, Maxwell, and the controversy over directors' pay, transactions. Whether small investors decide to go to the which has kept corporate governance in the public eye."1 court, file a complaint with the regulator or feed the in- Since the Cadbury report, more than 160 corporate gov- formation to the media and embarrass the insider, bet- ernance guidelines and codes of best practice have been ter information disclosure helps. produced in 90 countries.2 Four types of ownership disclosure reduce expropri- Meanwhile, Kwadwo, a Ghanaian who recently re- ation: information on family, indirect, and beneficial turned from working abroad, is looking for additional ownership, and on voting agreements between share- private financing. Having saved $40,000, he wants to holders. Two types of financial disclosure help investors: start a bus company to service the link between Accra the business can have an audit committee that reviews and Kumasi. He is looking to buy 6 buses and needs an- and certifies financial data and the law may require that other $30,000. So he goes to the bank but is told that he an external auditor be appointed. Finally, disclosure is needs to put up $90,000 as collateral for the $30,000 he most effective when both ownership and financial infor- would borrow. This won't do. Kwadwo approaches sev- mation is available to all current and potential investors. eral people who have that kind of money and offers Summing these seven features into a Disclosure Index, them a partnership. But everyone declines, afraid that ranging from 0 to 7, reveals that British investors enjoy Kwadwo would abscond with their money. among the strongest protections in the world, with a score 50 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 of 7. Ghanaian investors are among the least protected, or publicly listed companies. Banks would be the only with a score of 2 (the law requires disclosure of indirect source of finance. But poor collateral laws or weak prop- ownership and the appointment of external auditors). erty registration systems would be an insurmountable Investors benefit greatly from such legal protection. obstacle to many businesses in obtaining credit. The re- So do entrepreneurs. If expropriation remains unpun- sult: businesses do not reach efficient size for lack of fi- ished, few would dare investing in business partnerships nancing, and economic growth is held back.4 Who uses equity finance? TABLE 7.1 Top 40 stock markets, 2003 In rich countries new business start-ups and the state Total market raise money on financial markets. In developing coun- Listed capitalization Rank Market companies (US$m) tries, the established large companies and the state do. Stock exchanges in the United Kingdom and the United 1 United States 5,295 14,266,266 States have larger market capitalization and higher trad- 2 Japan 3,116 3,040,665 ing volume than all other stock markets combined (table 3 United Kingdom 2,311 2,412,434 4 France 723 1,355,643 7.1). The Toronto Stock Exchange has larger market cap- 5 Germany 684 1,079,026 italization than the stock exchanges in Brazil, India, and 6 Canada 3,578 893,950 Russia put together. 7 Spain 3,191 726,243 While stock markets exist in more than 100 coun- 8 Switzerland 289 725,659 tries, in only 40 do they contribute in any meaningful 9 Hong Kong, China 1,029 714,597 way to raising capital.5 Some countries have attracted 10 China 1,296 681,204 public equity investors. Chile has developed an active 11 Italy 271 614,842 12 Australia 1,405 585,475 stock market, bolstered by the privatization of pension 13 Netherlands 183 488,647 funds, the largest investors. Poland has followed a simi- 14 Taiwan, China 669 379,023 lar path. Markets in Mexico, Russia and Turkey attract 15 Korea 1,563 329,616 foreign institutional investors. China, Korea and Ma- 16 Sweden 264 287,500 laysia have seen the largest foreign inflows, thanks to the 17 India 5,644 279,093 growth of the corporate sector (figure 7.1). 18 South Africa 426 267,745 19 Brazil 367 234,560 Others have failed. In the 1990s many Latin Ameri- 20 Russia 214 230,786 can and transition economies established stock ex- 21 Belgium 152 173,612 changes to list privatized companies. But because own- 22 Finland 142 170,283 ership of these companies is concentrated in the hands 23 Malaysia 897 168,376 of a limited group of shareholders, and there are few 24 Saudi Arabia 70 157,302 shareholder protections to encourage minority invest- 25 Singapore 475 145,117 ment, voluntary de-listings are common--more than 26 Denmark 187 127,997 27 Mexico 159 122,532 150 companies moved into private hands in Brazil over 28 Thailand 405 118,705 the last 5 years, nearly 500 in Bulgaria, and more than 29 Greece 339 106,845 1,000 in the Czech Republic and Romania. Stock mar- 30 Norway 156 94,679 kets in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Repub- 31 Chile 240 86,291 lic, and Moldova are moribund. 32 Ireland 55 85,070 In all but a handful of countries, such as Japan and 33 Israel 576 75,719 the United States, publicly listed companies are controlled 34 Turkey 284 68,379 35 Portugal 59 58,285 by a few wealthy families (figure 7.2). The state frequently 36 Indonesia 333 54,659 has large holdings too. In 1999 the state controlled 30% of 37 Austria 86 54,528 large listed companies in Malaysia, 25% in Germany and 38 Argentina 107 38,927 Portugal and 20% in Indonesia and Thailand.6 In many 39 Luxembourg 44 37,333 Asian and Latin American countries business and politics 40 Poland 203 37,165 mix. In 1998, here is how Imelda Marcos described the ex- Source: Standard & Poor's (2004). tent of her family's holdings: "We practically own every- PROTECTING INVESTORS 51 FIGURE 7.1 FIGURE 7.2 Few initial public offerings outside OECD and East Asia Ownership is concentrated in developing countries Number of initial public offerings, 2003 Percentage ownership of the 3 largest investors 144 United States in the 10 largest publicly listed companies 68 64 125 Japan 62 Top 5 58 57 105 Canada 97 China 88 Australia 81 Korea Indonesia 6 19 18 56 Malaysia India 6 Philippines 4 South Africa 3 Poland 2 Mexico 1 Russia Mexico Egypt Indonesia Brazil United Japan Turkey 1 Arab Rep. States Source: Bloomberg and National Stock Exchange websites. Source: World Bank (2004d). thing in the Philippines from electricity, telecommunica- scarce. In Indonesia, for example, equity accounts for tions, banking, beer and tobacco, newspaper publishing, only 2% of financing in small businesses. In Romania, television stations, shipping, oil and mining, hotels and 5%. In Venezuela, 7%. In contrast, it is nearly a quarter beach resorts, down to coconut milling, small farms, real of financing in Malaysia.8 This is not because equity is estate and insurance."7 With such powerful controlling unnecessary. Firms in poor countries are twice as likely shareholders and few protections, small investors do not to report that a lack of equity finance is an obstacle to risk their money buying public equity. growth--42%, compared with 20% in rich countries.9 Firms in poor countries need private equity finance, But no investor will put money where it is not safe. as seen in Kwadwo's search for partners. But investors are What encourages equity investment? Disclosure What investors fear the most is having their money ex- Consider 5 examples of popular expropriation methods: propriated. Whether the company is private or public, · In 1996 controlling shareholders of Aeroflot, Rus- expropriation of minority shareholders may be achieved sia's largest airline, set up a company to handle Aeroflot's by selling products or assets at below-market prices, overseas revenues--but with a 6-month payment delay. buying products or assets at above-market prices, taking Aeroflot covered the gap by borrowing from another business opportunities away from the company and is- company--owned by the same controlling sharehold- suing loans at preferential rates. In many countries with ers--at above-market interest rates. More than $600 poor legal protections, clever entrepreneurs can devise million was siphoned.11 ways to deny fair returns to investors while remaining within the law.10 · In 1998 Peronnet, a French company, rented a ware- Doing Business distinguishes 3 dimensions of inves- house from SCI at above-market rates. Unbeknownst to tor protection: disclosure of ownership and financial small investors, Peronnet's controlling shareholder had information; legal protections of small investors; and en- established SCI, which bought land and built the ware- forcement capabilities in the courts or securities regu- house to lease back to Peronnet.12 lator. This year the focus is primarily on disclosure of · In 2001 LeisureNet, a fitness company in South ownership and financial information and on shareholder Africa, collapsed. The failure was triggered by a $7 mil- protections, with some discussion on enforcement. lion investment in a chain of gyms in Germany. Subse- Analysis of enforcement will be developed further in next quent investigation revealed that the intermediary com- year's report. pany, Dalmore, was jointly owned by the managers of LeisureNet. Each pocketed over $1 million.13 52 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 · In 2003 Unefon, the cellphone unit of the Mexican FIGURE 7.3 broadcaster TV Azteca, was at risk of defaulting Rich countries disclose the most on a $325 million loan from its biggest creditor, Nortel. Disclosure index Nortel sold the debt to a private company, Codisco In- 5.5 OECD high income 5.3 Rich vestments, at a steep discount, for $107 million. Four months later, Unefon paid back the full $325 million debt. Codisco netted $218 million. But TV Azteca ne- GREATER DISCLOSURE glected to tell investors that half of Codisco was owned by its controlling shareholder.14 3.9 East Asia & the Pacific 3.7 Middle income 3.6 Europe & Central Asia · In 2003 Italian dairy-foods giant Parmalat defaulted 3.2 South Asia on a $185 million loan, prompting auditors to inspect fi- 2.6 Middle East & North Africa nancial statements. It turned out accounts were falsified 2.6 Poor 2.4 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.3 Latin America & the Caribbean to hide $10 billion in losses and $620 million misappro- priated to other family owned companies. More than $9 billion of Parmlat's reported assets could not be traced.15 Source: Doing Business database. The common element in these cases: a lack of dis- These indicators come from a new survey of corpo- closure. None of the controlling shareholders informed rate and securities lawyers.16 The data measure the most minority investors of their ownership in related compa- stringent level of required disclosure, reflecting the nies. This is legal in many countries. In Mexico, Russia choices of small investors to put their money in publicly and 70 other countries neither the corporate law nor the listed or privately held companies. In countries where securities law required such disclosure. An external audit stock exchange regulations and securities laws are in finally caught the Parmalat scandal, but managers were force, the disclosure index assesses these regulations. In able to simply invent assets for 15 years without close other countries, the disclosure requirements come from scrutiny from audit committees. In Turkey and 67 other the company law. So the indicators are relevant for pri- countries, the combination of both internal audit com- vate companies as well as publicly listed ones. mittees and external audits to catch and disclose such Disclosure of ownership shows who has enough behavior is not required. power to appoint managers and determine business Canada, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom and the strategy. If an investor illicitly gains control of the busi- United States have the most disclosure requirements of ness, he may expropriate the investments of small share- any country (table 7.2). Rich countries mandate much holders and do so legally by voting for transactions that higher disclosure than do developing countries. East benefit him at the expense of others. Four types of own- Asia has the most disclosure of any developing region. ership disclosure reduce this possibility: information on Latin America has the least (figure 7.3). family, indirect or beneficial ownership, and on voting agreements between shareholders. TABLE 7.2 Rich countries disclose the most Family ownership. First, investors would like to know whether a large shareholder expands his control of the Most Disclosure Index Index business when another member of his family buys shares. Canada 7 Japan 6 Some countries--such as Canada, Japan, and Norway-- Israel 7 Korea, Rep. 6 mandate disclosure of ownership by immediate family Spain 7 Lithuania 6 United Kingdom 7 Nigeria 6 members. Others go further. The Czech Republic re- United States 7 Philippines 6 quires disclosure for "any related person." Still others im- Australia 6 Slovakia 6 pose no requirements whatsoever, including such rich Austria 6 South Africa 6 countries as Germany and Italy, as well as middle income Chile 6 Sweden 6 ones as Egypt. Czech Republic 6 Taiwan, China 6 France 6 Thailand 6 Indirect ownership. A second disclosure that benefits Hong Kong, China 6 Tunisia 6 small investors is that of indirect ownership. Yoshisuke Ireland 6 Zimbabwe 6 Aikawa, the founder of Nissan, describes a classic exam- Source: Doing Business database. ple. Consider a wealthy Japanese family that establishes a business, Choten Corp, with ¥1 billion.17 The family PROTECTING INVESTORS 53 FIGURE 7.4 Pyramid structures can mask related-party transactions ter yet, the committee may include some outside mem- bers. Korea has made the most progress, by mandating Controlling Total public family 51% audit committees and also requiring that two-thirds of investment 1b Public 4b the committee members in large companies be outsiders. investors Choten External audits. Laws can also require that an exter- 2b 51% 51% nal auditor be appointed. Countries like Argentina and Spain have both an internal audit committee and an ex- ternal auditor, while Hungary, like many other countries, Ichi Ni has a requirement only for an external auditor. One 1b 1b 51% 51% 51% 51% caveat: in many countries external auditors are not so in- dependent. In Peru, for example, an estimated 6,000 au- ditors vie for the business of 200 listed companies, which Futatsu-Ichi Futatsu-Ni Futatsu-San Futatsu-Yon pay the highest fees for auditing services. Sometimes, the 1b 1b 1b 1b most malleable auditors get the job. Source: Aikawa (1934). Public access to information. Finally, disclosure is most effective when both ownership and financial infor- takes Choten public and raises almost an additional ¥1 mation are available to all current and potential in- billion. It then organizes 2 other businesses, Ichi and Ni, vestors, either in stock exchange bulletins if the company each financed with ¥500 million from Choten and al- is public, or in annual reports, newspapers, or company most ¥500 million in public equity. Another 4 firms are registries for privately held companies. One example. In organized under Ichi and Ni with the same strategy (fig- 2000 the Australian Stock Exchange introduced a real- ure 7.4). Now the family fully controls 7 firms, with ¥5 time disclosure system that utilizes the Internet for re- billion in consolidated assets, by leveraging ¥4 billion porting information that may affect investors' choices. It from small investors. To raise the same equity through also monitors the media for company announcements Choten alone, their ownership would have been diluted that may have not been reported but fall under the dis- to a minority 20%. Good for the family. But minority in- closure regulation. About 300 such announcements were vestors are more vulnerable to expropriation if they are detected last year. Yet in countries like Saudi Arabia or unaware of how business between Choten and its sub- Venezuela, only the regulators have access to ownership sidiaries could benefit the controlling family. information. Beneficial ownership. A third way to gain control is The 7 ways of enhancing disclosure--by reporting through nominee accounts, trust funds, or brokerage family, indirect, and beneficial ownership, and on voting firms, where the identity of the buyer is not disclosed.18 agreements between shareholders, by requiring audit This practice is so popular in Indonesia, that by 1996 committees of the board of directors and the use of the Suharto family managed to amass control of 417 external auditors, and by making such information companies, 21 of them publicly-listed, using nominee available to all current and potential investors--make up accounts and trusts. The practice is still permitted. In the Doing Business indicator of disclosure (table 7.3). contrast, Malaysia revised its regulation in 2001 to limit Twenty four countries have 6 or more of these features. nominee ownership. Thirty others--almost all poor countries--have fewer Voting agreements. Fourth, shareholders may have than two. agreements that stipulate collective voting on strategic issues or managerial appointments. If these agreements Legal protections are not disclosed, as in Jordan, the Philippines or Turkey, Disclosure of ownership and financial information is small investors may lose out. just the beginning. Legal protections of the rights of In addition to ownership disclosure, 2 types of fi- small investors are needed. In the Peronnet case, for ex- nancial disclosure help investors. ample, failure to disclose was not sufficient to void the Audit committees. The quality of financial informa- lease agreement with SCI. The court ruled that the deci- tion is increased if the company law or securities law sion to lease was not taken with the sole intention of requires internal audits before financial statements are benefiting the majority shareholder and served a legiti- released to investors. The business can have an audit mate business purpose. It took no interest in the ques- committee that reviews and certifies financial data. Bet- tion of whether the creation of SCI and the price it 54 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 TABLE 7.3 Building the disclosure index Macedonia, Disclosure Measure Canada Korea, Rep. Mexico FYR Bangladesh Ghana Lebanon 1. Family ownership is disclosed Yes Yes No No No No No 2. Indirect ownership is disclosed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3. Beneficial ownership is disclosed Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 4. Voting agreements between shareholders must be disclosed Yes Yes No No No No No 5. Audit committees must be established Yes No Yes No No No No 6. External auditors must be used Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7. Both ownership and financial information is available publicly Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Disclosure Index (number of yes responses) 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Source: Doing Business database. charged for the building were fair to minority share- · Low threshold of capital, say 5%, to call shareholders' holders. The law did not provide for such interpretation. meetings. Lower capital thresholds make it easier A large literature documents the benefits of share- for shareholders to organize a meeting to challenge holder protection.19 It concludes that four legal protec- management and to put additional items on the meet- tions of small investors are both effective and relatively ing's agenda. easy to enforce:20 · Pre-emptive rights to buy new shares, where current · Cumulative voting for directors, which permits share- shareholders have the first opportunity to buy newly is- holders to multiply their number of votes by the number sued shares in order to avoid diluting their ownership. of directorships being voted on and to cast the total votes Pre-emptive rights limit the risk of expropriation, where for one director. Cumulative voting allows small in- shares are issued to the controlling shareholder or related vestors to gain representation at the board of directors, parties at below-market prices. improving their access to information and giving them Together, these protections help explain a large pro- voice in decisions on large transactions. portion of the variation in access to external financing · Allowing derivative suits, where shareholders can (figure 7.5) and the number of public listings across the sue on behalf of the company for damages caused world. Among middle income countries, Chile, with to the company. Derivative suits lower the cost of chal- strong protections for small investors, has a market cap- lenging management decisions in the courts, because a italization of 74% of GDP in 2003. Egypt, where equity shareholder only has to prove damages to the company investors have fewer protections, has one of 29%. Among instead of damages to herself. developed countries, Spain protects small investors and has a market capitalization nearly twice Italy's, 71% of FIGURE 7.5 FIGURE 7.6 More legal protections, more equity Efficient courts help protect minority shareholders Market capitalization to GDP Perceived protection of minority shareholders Higher High Lower Low Least protections Most protections Least time Most time Countries ranked by minority shareholder protection index, quintiles Countries ranked by days to enforce a contract, quintiles Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 5% level. Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 1% level. Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a). Source: Doing Business database, WEF (2004). PROTECTING INVESTORS 55 national income, compared with 40%. South Africa has Enforcement among the strongest protections for equity investors and a market capitalization rivaling Switzerland's. Good investor protections are the ones a country can en- Small investors in Yukos, the second largest Russian force. Even the best rules are useless if enforcement is oil company, have been hurt by a lack of pre-emptive weak. Some economies--such as the Kyrgyz Republic, rights. Here is what happened. In 1999 Yukos, the major- Moldova and Nigeria--adopted strong company or se- ity shareholder of Tomskneft, voted to increase the num- curities laws, but no cases of small investors' abuse have ber of Tomskneft shares by 300%. The new shares were ever been resolved in the courts. sold to off-shore companies, allegedly owned by the con- As in any other commercial dispute, the speed, cost, trolling shareholder of Yukos, without informing existing and fairness of the judgment determine whether small Tomskneft shareholders. The ownership of existing small investors would use the courts and succeed in getting shareholders dropped from 49% to 9%, reducing the compensation. Potential expropriators know this as well payoff to investors by four-fifths. This would have been and calculate the risk of being caught and punished. impossible in the presence of pre-emptive rights in Russ- New Zealand and Norway, where courts perform well, ian company law. At least the investors were allowed to see less abuse of investors (figure 7.6). Colombia im- file a derivative suit, and actually did--in another 20% of proved enforcement in 2002 by giving arbitration tri- countries even that would have been impossible, includ- bunals the power to issue binding judgments. A decision ing in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Kuwait and Vietnam. of the tribunal typically takes 6 months. What to reform? disclosure requirements. This would allow the introduc- tion of stricter disclosure for companies listed on the Start with what's simple. Increase disclosure. Then, make main market. it easier for small investors to challenge attempts at ex- Specialized commercial courts have been shown to propriation in the courts. Enforce harsher penalties for improve the enforcement of debt contracts and speed up managers or large investors who misbehave. And encour- bankruptcy proceedings. They are equally beneficial for age investors to be active in identifying bad practices. small investors who want to challenge decisions by man- It used to be that disclosing ownership and financial agers or boards of directors. Some countries, such as information cost a lot of money. Publishing a newspa- India, channel shareholder suits into special tribunals, per announcement every time shares change hands, and avoiding the delays in regular courts. Much like bank- printing quarterly financial statements cost money. ruptcy, corporate governance issues require more exper- Printing annual reports and reaching every small in- tise so it pays for judges to be specialized in commercial vestor cost even more. The internet has changed that. cases. And even without specialization, cutting the pro- Now it is almost costless to disseminate information, cedures, time and cost to go through the regular courts once it has been assembled.21 will help. Many companies and stock exchanges are taking ad- Disclosure requirements work only if they are vantage of this. In Thailand the stock exchange publishes backed by sufficient penalties and enforcement. Often, all ownership changes and quarterly statements on its penalties are negligible. Two examples. In Indonesia the website. Egypt increased the disclosure requirements last penalty for missing the deadline for submitting an an- year and penalized about 100 companies that did not nual report to the securities market regulator is $120. meet the higher standard. Chile required listed companies This is nothing for most companies. Not surprisingly, to publish quarterly financial reports and make them more than a third usually miss the deadline.23 In Bul- available electronically. Hungary passed a new Capital garia penalties were increased in a 2003 reform, but their Markets Act, which introduces US-style disclosure of enforcement is woeful. An estimated 6% of the value of ownership and financial information. Brazil took a dif- fines is paid. The remainder is challenged in the courts, ferent path by establishing the Novo Mercado, with more taking years to resolve.24 stringent disclosure requirements. About 40 companies Reforms in other countries show that disclosure have already listed.22 And in July 2004 the Indian govern- improves with stronger penalties. Mexico has increased ment announced intentions to create a separate market compliance. In 1999, 30 of its 180 companies did not for trading equity in smaller companies, with simpler meet disclosure requirements. A dozen were penalized. 56 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 In 2003 only 3 companies delayed their disclosure. South in emerging markets. This year its analysis shows that Africa recently implemented similar regulation that en- India, Israel, Korea and Poland have the strongest in- ables the stock exchange to suspend trading in compa- vestor protections. Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Venezuela nies that neglect disclosure. Again, the number of delin- have the weakest. Using such rankings, CalPERS only in- quents has dropped. vests in countries with good protection.25 No matter how good the disclosure, the legal pro- TIAA-CREF, the second largest pension fund in the tections, and the enforcement channels that government United States, and Franklin Templeton, a large mutual provides, they will amount to nothing unless someone fund, are also active in promoting disclosure and better uses them. Enter the institutional investors. The Califor- corporate governance. Others should follow. These large nia's Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), players, because of their financial clout, influence not with $162 billion in assets, is the most active. Every year only individual companies but also regulators, putting CalPERS publishes its assessment of investor protections them in the best position to lobby for change. Why reform? investor protections. Two deals take place for every 3 deals in countries that protect investors. And in the risky The more corporate governance scandals are reported, countries investors acquire majority stakes, limiting their the better. It means expropriators are getting caught. opportunity for diversification.26 And that small investors can take comfort in being pro- This pattern also holds down the size of stock mar- tected by disclosure laws and shareholder rights. kets. When small investors see high expropriation risk, If the rights of investors are not protected, having they do not invest. The market stays underdeveloped, majority ownership in a business is the only way to elim- with low trading volume (figure 7.7).27 Instead, they may inate expropriation. A majority investor has access to all put their money in the banking sector, invest in real es- the company documents and prevails in business deci- tate, or transfer it abroad. Either way, it does not reach sions. But few entrepreneurs would agree to have their profitable businesses in need of long-term financing. business controlled by someone else. Those who do have Better disclosure can change this. The United States se- less incentive to work hard, as the payoffs from success curities legislation of 1933­34 increased financial disclo- accumulate to someone else. The result: entrepreneur- sure and made auditors liable for mistakes--resulting in ship is suppressed and fewer profitable investment proj- a significantly larger number of listings.28 Today, if Rus- ects are undertaken. sia were to adopt the more stringent disclosure regula- A recent study of private equity transactions finds tions of Thailand, analysis suggests that its stock market this exact pattern: Both the entrepreneur and investors capitalization would increase by up to 60%, and the vol- lose out. In countries with higher risk of expropriation, ume of trades by 40%.29 the size of investments is half that in countries with good FIGURE 7.7 More disclosure, more access to equity markets and more turnover Perceived access to equity Turnover of stocks traded High High Low Low Least disclosure Most disclosure Least disclosure Most disclosure Countries ranked by disclosure index, quintiles Countries ranked by disclosure index, quintiles Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 1% level. Source: Doing Business database, WEF (2004), World Bank (2004a). PROTECTING INVESTORS 57 FIGURE 7.8 With languid equity markets, economic growth is Large potential growth from more active equity markets held back. If Jordan's equities traded as much as those Percentage point increase in annual GDP growth from in the average OECD market--implying a quadrupling equity turnover of their turnover--analysis suggests annual growth 1.3 would have been higher by up to 1.1 percentage points 1.1 a year.30 If equities in Mexico traded as much as those in the OECD on average, the analysis implies annual growth would be higher by up to 0.6 percentage points 0.7 0.7 0.6 (figure 7.8). Better disclosure and investor protections also result 0.3 in higher valuations. A recent study estimates that three- quarters of differences in corporate values across coun- tries are due to differences in investor protection.31 In Iran Jordan Greece Czech Mexico Hungary Republic a study of companies in the United States, an investment Source: Calculations based on Beck and Levine (2004). strategy that sells the decile of companies with weakest disclosure and legal protections and buys into the decile of companies with the most disclosure and protections business partners. The reason is that they don't have generated a 50% premium during 1995­99.32 Evidence long­standing relations with banks, as established busi- from Korea and Russia suggests even higher returns: a nesses do. If Kwadwo were to find a partner and start the 160% premium for Korean companies and nearly 800% bus service to Accra, other entrepreneurs benefit as well, premium for Russian ones.33 by having cheaper access to the capital city. But the effects The benefits accrue mainly to small businesses and reach farther. Travel to school and hospitals is easier. The entrepreneurs like Kwadwo, the Ghanaian looking for distance between equity markets and the poor shrinks. Notes 1. Cadbury report (1992). 20. These measure were developed by La Porta and others (1998) and 2. Gregory (1999, 2001, 2002) and OECD (2003). updated to January 2004 for 115 countries in Doing Business in 2005. Class actions suits are another protection for small investors but are 3. La Porta and others (2000). typically more difficult to enforce. 4. See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (forthcoming). 21. But note that implementing good internal controls and hiring external 5. Some examples are available in the corporate governance assessments car- auditors costs as much as it did before the Internet. ried out under the World Bank's Reports on the Observance of Standards 22. See Capaul (2004) for details. Thirty-one companies are listed on Nivel and Codes program. Thirty-eight assessments have been completed. I, 5 companies on Nivel II, and 3 companies on the highest level. Reports are available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg. html. 23. On October 1st 2004 the penalty for missing the deadline in submitting 6. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, the annual report will be raised to 500 million Rupiah (about and Shleifer (1999). US$55,000). 7. New York Times, Dec. 8, 1998, p. A16. 24. Naneva (2003). 8. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2002). 25. CalPERS (2004). 9. Batra and others (2003). 26. Lerner and Schoar (2004). 10. Johnson and others (2000). 27. Liquidity is the preferred measure for stock market development as it 11. Business Week, July 24, 2000, p. 17. reflects the opportunity for risk diversification and entry of small in- 12. Schmidt (1999). vestors. Market capitalization is frequently driven by prices and may 13. Sunday Times, Jan. 20, 2002, p. 4. reflect expectations about future growth rather than an active market. 14. New York Times, Dec. 24, 2003, C1. 28. Landis (1938). 15. Business Week, Jan. 12, 2004, p. 32. 29. Calculation based on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 16. Djankov and others (forthcoming). (forthcoming). 17. Cited in Morck and Nakamura (2003). 30. Beck and Levine (2004). Also see Levine and Zervos (1998). 18. Examples of how nominee ownership can be misused to expropriate 31. Nenova (2003). small investors are provided in OECD (2001). 32. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 19. The work by Andrei Shleifer and his colleagues has led to a large litera- 33. Black (2001) and Black, Jang and Kim (2003). ture on the benefits of investor protections. See La Porta and others (1998), Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2003). 59 Enforcing contracts Who is reforming courts? What to reform? Why reform? "I have had a company for 10 years. I've brought 15 cases debt of $2,000 can be higher than the amount claimed. against customers for nonpayment, but I've never been Businesses have little incentive to use the courts. able to win a judgment. The courts are full of cases. The In the absence of efficient courts, fewer investments rats eat the paper. The courts lose volumes of cases. Our and business transactions take place (figure 8.2). Those cases are not big enough to pay the bribes judges would that do involve a small group of people linked through accept. So we don't bother, we just can't collect our kinship, ethnic origin or previous dealings. This substan- debts."1 These are the words of Facundo, a businessman tially reduces the economic benefits that come from trade. in Buenos Aires. They may as well be the words of an en- Some would argue that more formality in dispute trepreneur in Bolivia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Poland or resolution ensures that due process is followed and jus- Serbia and Montenegro, countries where debt collection tice is done. The evidence suggests otherwise. The more through the courts takes years. complex the procedures for resolving disputes, the less Why do courts in so many developing countries per- likely firms are to report that judges are impartial and form so poorly? The problem is not the quality of judges court decisions fair.3 In the words of the former Assis- or the lack of resources. More training and more re- tant Attorney General of Mexico: "It is often stated that sources would help. But the main reasons lie elsewhere. A delay in the administration of justice is equivalent to a striking difference between courts in most developing denial of justice. If this is so, Mexico is plagued by de- countries and those in OECD countries is the overly bu- FIGURE 8.1 reaucratic judicial procedures that judges and litigants Courts in poor countries are inefficient face when resolving a dispute (figure 8.1). It takes 58 pro- Cost and time to enforce a contract cedures for a creditor to collect her debt in Sierra Leone 35 Poor but only 11 in Australia, and 55 procedures in Egypt but countries only 14 in Norway. Each additional procedure costs more time and money. Frequently, bribes change hands to move the process along. In Cambodia, for example, 18 Middle income 421 Poor countries judges top the list as the most corrupt public servants.2 countries 417 Middle income countries In many countries only the rich can afford resolving 12 Rich 280 Rich countries countries disputes through the courts. For the rest, justice is out of reach. In Venezuela recovering an overdue debt of $8,000 (twice the annual income per capita) would often Cost Time (days from filing cost $2,500 in court and attorney fees. In the Philippines (court and legal fees as a percentage of debt value) to enforcement) the creditor might pay as much as $1,000 to recover a Source: Doing Business database. debt worth $2,000. In Indonesia the fees for collecting a 60 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 8.2 Inefficient courts--less investment, less trade Investment as a percent of GDP Trade as a percent of GDP 23 90 22 80 21 70 20 60 Shortest Longest Least Most Countries ranked by days to enforce a contract, quintiles Countries ranked by cost to enforce a contract, quintiles Note: Relationships are significant at the 5% level. Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a). nials of justice. An excessive formalism of the proceed- then begrudgingly accepting the change. In some in- ings is the main cause of this situation."4 stances, particularly in Latin America, enforcement func- Courts serve businesses best when they are efficient tions were taken out of the courts altogether, rather than and fair. This requires simplifying debt collection--say, dealing with the politics of court reform. by establishing summary proceedings--and reducing FIGURE 8.3 cost and delays. Successful reforms have introduced case Colombia: the top reformer in 2003 management in the courts, as in Armenia and Slovakia, Days to resolve a commercial dispute put enforcement into the hands of specialized public 527 agencies or private bailiffs, as in Latvia, and reformed procedures to discourage frivolous appeals, as in Estonia. 146 Colombia implemented the most far-reaching re- 363 form of any country in 2003. The time to resolve a dispute 79 Enforcement was cut by 30% (figure 8.3). Eighteen other countries re- 216 formed one or more aspects of contract enforcement: 216 Judgment Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Honduras, Israel, Lao PDR, 165 Lithuania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, the Phil- 68 Notification ippines, Serbia and Montenegro and Slovakia. Many re- Before After reforms reforms forms were initiated by governments at the pressure of Source: Doing Business database. business groups, with judges initially opposing them and Who is reforming courts? fees account for 40% of the overdue debt, if collected. Re- covering debt in South Asian courts also comes at a high European countries made up more than half the reform- price--42% of the claimed amount will go toward such ers in 2003­04. Nordic and Baltic courts--in Estonia, fees. By comparison, legal fees account for only 6% of the Finland, Lithuania and Norway--saw the most changes. debt in OECD countries (table 8.1). No reform took place in the Middle East, Africa or South The 3 most ambitious reformers--Bosnia and Her- Asia. Yet debt recovery is slow in the Middle East, at 438 zegovina, Colombia and Lithuania--improved in differ- days. Lebanon and Syria take about 2 years each (box ent ways. Bosnia and Herzegovina allowed summary 8.1). The United Arab Emirates is only slightly faster. judgments for smaller commercial disputes and moved Middle Eastern countries also have the highest number such cases to lower courts. The time to resolve a dispute of procedures to enforce a contract. And enforcing con- was cut from 665 days to 330--a huge improvement, al- tracts is expensive in Africa, where court and attorney though still high. But lower courts need not always oper- ENFORCING CONTRACTS 61 BOX 8.1 Who has the most efficient contract enforcement--and who the least? Number of procedures to enforce a contract Australia heads the list as the country with the fewest pro- Fewest Most cedures to enforce a contract. Another 23 countries make Australia 11 Algeria 49 it simple, requiring 20 procedures or less. Most are rich Greece 14 Burundi 51 countries, although the list also includes Norway 14 Congo, Dem. Rep. 51 Georgia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Tunisia 14 Chad 52 Uganda and Zambia. Five African and 4 Middle Eastern United Kingdom 14 Kuwait 52 countries are on the list of countries with most proce- Denmark 15 Lao PDR 53 dures. Some Latin American economies--Bolivia, Uganda 15 United Arab Emirates 53 Panama and Paraguay--come close. Poor countries have Hong Kong, China 16 Egypt, Arab Rep. 55 more complex contract enforcement. On average it takes Ireland 16 Cameroon 58 Japan 16 Sierra Leone 58 50% more procedures in poor countries than in rich. Days to enforce a contract Simple debt collection in the 10 countries with the fastest Fastest Slowest contract enforcement lasts 3 months or less. In the slow- Tunisia 27 Syrian Arab Republic 672 est 10 countries, 2 years or more. Tunisia has the shortest Netherlands 48 Lebanon 721 time to enforce contracts. A simple summary proceeding New Zealand 50 Nigeria 730 is complete in a month. France is also among the fastest, Japan 60 Congo, Dem. Rep. 909 having an out-of-court procedure to collect debt. Estonia Singapore 69 Poland 1,000 nearly breaks into the top 10 list, improving its ranking to France 75 Slovenia 1,003 11th. Botswana and Lithuania follow, with less than 5 Korea, Rep. 75 Angola 1,011 months to enforce contracts. Three European Union Denmark 83 Serbia and Montenegro 1,028 countries feature in the bottom 10. Italy's courts are Norway 87 Italy 1,390 Belgium 112 Guatemala 1,459 among the world's slowest. So are Poland's and Slovenia's. Cost to enforce a contract (% of debt amount) Access to justice is cheapest in the European Union. Four Least Most member countries are among the 10 countries with the Norway 4.2 Philippines 50.7 lowest fees relative to the claim amount. New EU mem- New Zealand 4.8 Chad 54.9 bers such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are Switzerland 5.2 Central African Republic 72.2 only just outside the list. Five African and 5 Asian coun- Korea, Rep. 5.4 Burkina Faso 92.5 tries make up the list of countries with the most expensive Sweden 5.9 Papua New Guinea 110.3 contract enforcement, with court and attorney fees ac- Belgium 6.2 Bhutan 113.8 counting for more than half the amount of the debt. In Denmark 6.6 Cambodia 121.3 another 28 countries contract enforcement through the Finland 7.2 Indonesia 126.5 courts is a luxury few can afford, with costs amounting to United States 7.5 Malawi 136.5 Taiwan, China 7.7 Congo, Dem. Rep. 256.8 more than a third of the debt amount. Source: Doing Business database. ate more efficiently. A similar reform in Romania in TABLE 8.1 Cumbersome, costly enforcement in some regions 2001 increased delays, illustrating that reformers would Cost Cost benefit from information on where the largest bottle- Region Procedures Days (US$) (% debt) necks are before designing the change. East Asia & Pacific 29 325 1,604 43 In Colombia a courier company now notifies the Europe & Central Asia 30 413 930 16 debtor of the court filing. Previously, a court clerk was Latin America & Caribbean 35 469 1,343 24 responsible for delivering the notice. If the courier fails Middle East & North Africa 39 438 2,118 16 to reach the debtor, the notice is published in a newspa- OECD: High income 20 230 5,319 6 per. If the debtor does not show up in court, the case South Asia 30 375 497 42 continues without him. In a second reform, notaries Sub-Saharan Africa 36 433 340 40 All countries 31 389 1,734 26 and the chamber of commerce--not just the judge-- Source: Doing Business database. can organize auctions for the sale of assets. 62 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 8.4 In Lithuania the parties are encouraged to go into a Lengthy delays in enforcement summary proceeding, which takes a third of the regular Days between judgment and enforcement procedure's time. The full evidence is presented at the 162 Enforcement as a percentage beginning of the trial. The old practice was to keep some of the entire debt recovery process evidence to the end, and use it if things went wrong. Fees for appealing the court's judgment were increased sub- 55% Enforcement Jordan stantially, to discourage abuse. Filing and 75 judgement Summary proceedings 57% Mexico The most popular reform in 2003 was introducing sum- mary proceedings, especially for the collection of small debt.5 For example, in Israel the new civil procedure Poor Rich 72% India code incorporates a swift proceeding. Debt cases under countries countries NIS50,000 (about $12,000) are filed at the magistrate's Source: Doing Business database. court. Within 45 days the debtor has to enter his defense. The court then schedules a hearing within the next 135 days. The hearing cannot be postponed by anyone but nia and Portugal introduced stricter time limits on en- the presiding judge of the court. This is rare. After the forcement procedures, or allowed professionals other hearing the court has 14 days to issue judgment. In total than court officials to do it. the process takes less than 200 days. In Norway a similar summary procedure, previously Setting deadlines available only for returned checks and promissory notes, The third main type of reform--seen in Finland, Lithua- is now available for debt under NOK100,000 ($15,000). nia, Norway and Slovakia--puts emphasis on imposing In Portugal the new code allows summary proceedings: and adhering to deadlines for filing documents and pre- the creditor need only present the judge with evidence of senting arguments through case management. The the transaction and nonpayment. In the Philippines the Finnish experience illustrates the benefits.6 An electronic rules for summary proceedings cover cases like a bounced case management system keeps track of deadlines for con- check or nonpayment of a promissory note. So, debt testing claims or appealing judgments. If the deadline has cases no longer go through preliminary investigation be- passed, the system automatically notifies the court clerk fore the city prosecutor, as was the case before. This cuts and the plaintiff, and the case moves to the next stage. It nearly 4 months off the debt recovery time. also sets dates for court hearings. Case management in Two other countries sped up debt enforcement by Finland has yielded other benefits as well. For cases that moving it to a lower jurisdiction or out of court. In Lao have remained dormant over a prescribed limit--typi- PDR debt collection cases below $2,500 are now handled cally 9 months--the case management system sends a re- in the district courts. In Bangladesh the new law encour- minder to the presiding judge. Frequently the case has ages settlement before a case enters the regular proceed- been settled out of court or the plaintiff has decided not ings. The judge helps mediate such settlements. to pursue it further. Either way, the judge can close it. In Slovakia the main reduction in delays due to case Enforcing judgments management has come from the random assignment of The second most popular reform in 2003 focused on en- cases as they enter the courts. Cases are sent to whichever forcing judgments. In rich countries the average dura- judge has the lightest load, ensuring faster service. Case tion from the time the judge hands down a decision management has reduced corruption: it makes it more to the time the creditor gets her money back is 75 days. difficult to know which judge to bribe for a favorable rul- In middle income countries it takes 134 days. In poor ing. In 2002 a poll indicated that 79% of Slovaks saw ju- countries, 162 days. In India, Jordan and Mexico en- dicial corruption as a major problem. In early 2004 only forcement accounts for more than half the debt recovery 42% did--huge progress, even if there is a lot of room process (figure 8.4). Reforms in Austria, Colombia, Esto- for further improvement.7 ENFORCING CONTRACTS 63 What to reform? TABLE 8.2 Popular reforms in 2003 Doing Business in 2004 identified 4 types of reform that Establish judicial statistics Argentina, Bulgaria, Finland, have improved dispute resolution: systems Germany, Mexico, Slovakia · Establishing information systems in the courts. Remove nondisputes from Germany, Honduras, Nicaragua, judges' hands Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia · Taking transactions that are not disputes, such as business registration, out of the judges' hands. Introduce summary proceedings Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Lithuania, Portugal, Philippines · Reducing procedural complexity. Establish small claims courts Israel, Lao PDR, Norway · Establishing small-claims courts and specialized Source: Doing Business database. commercial courts. Some of these reforms have a long history. In Eng- of users of commercial dispute resolution, the typical land the first comprehensive report on caseloads and duration and cost of debt recovery cases and the likely judicial statistics came out in 1851. Sixty reports have outcome.12 The results surprised everyone: 60% of cases followed since.8 More countries have taken up reforms never moved beyond the initial filing: of those that did recently (table 8.2). Germany developed a case tracking half were abandoned before reaching judgment. So while system for staff planning in the judiciary.9 Bulgaria also Mexican judges claimed overload, in reality they dealt introduced such a system in all of its district courts. Ser- with only 1 in 5 cases.13 Once this adjustment is made, bia and Montenegro recently took business registration the data show that the average Mexican judge handles out of the courts. In Germany and Slovakia registration fewer cases than judges in Colombia and Ecuador. In- is still in the courts, but court clerks rather than judges stead of hiring more judges, the government can spare are now responsible for it. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fin- money for other uses. land and Lithuania simplified proceedings by making Three other reforms have proven successful in the the rules on presenting evidence more flexible. Stream- past year: lined procedures for small claims were established in Is- · Introducing case management. rael, Lao PDR and Norway. · Reducing abuse of appeals. Russia illustrates the benefits of reform. Within a year · Providing better incentives for enforcement. after the introduction of the summary procedure in late 2002, 60% of debt collection cases in Moscow used the Introducing case management new procedure, and about a third of cases in Novosibirsk and Saratov. A summary procedure typically takes 2 Case management--when the judge follows the case months from start to finish, 9 months less than the gen- from start to end--received international attention after eral procedure.10 The head of the commercial court in Lord Woolf's Access to Justice in England and Wales report Moscow notes that "the procedure is shorter and simpler, came out in 1995, though reforms to introduce it in Aus- and can take place without holding a judicial hearing, tralia, Canada and Hong Kong (China) were already on- only on the basis of written documents. This procedure is going.14 The report was concerned with the rapidly rising permitted when the parties have no objections to it. For expenditures on legal aid. At the same time, surveys of example, an energy supplier isn't paid. The business says it users consistently indicated a high level of dissatisfaction has no money. Where is the dispute? Everything is clear. with the courts. After reviewing several thousand cases, But before [the reform] we handled such cases according Lord Woolf recommended judicial case management as to the general procedure which is complicated. Now the the main way to increase access to justice. British courts time of judge is freed up to resolve more difficult cases."11 reformed accordingly. The idea has also sparked reforms The federal district court of Mexico City analyzed in India, Malaysia, New Zealand and Uganda.15 judicial statistics before introducing reform. The judi- By now there is ample evidence to show that case ciary had complained of a shortage of judges to handle management in the courts reduces delays and increases the ever-increasing number of cases and asked for ad- user satisfaction in rich, middle income and poor coun- ditional resources. In 2002 the Secretaria de Hacienda tries alike. The average duration of debt collection is 5 Credito y Publico commissioned a study on the profile months in rich countries where judges actively manage 64 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 8.5 Reducing abuse of appeals Active case management cuts time When the Portuguese set up courts in Brazil in the Days between filing and enforcement 1700s, they brought their civil procedure code, with one 529 change--appeals were allowed at any point during the Judges do not 521 actively 469 proceedings and an additional level of appeal was intro- manage duced. The ultimate decision lay with the King. The rea- Judges 330 son was simple: should a Portuguese be accused of rob- actively 278 bing, killing, defrauding or otherwise damaging the manage property of a local, the possibility for "home-bias" of the 151 judge was greatly reduced if his judgment could be eas- ily overturned. Three centuries later, much has changed in Brazil. Poor Middle income Rich countries countries countries But the rules on appeals remain the same. Debtors fre- quently abuse their rights of appeal, using it for stalling Source: Doing Business database. enforcement: 88% of judgments in commercial cases are appealed.20 And where the judge awards the full request the case--and nearly 18 months in rich countries where of compensation to the creditor, appeal is universal judges don't. The same pattern is seen elsewhere (figure (100%). If this number doesn't look high, consider this: 8.5). The reduction in time does not come at higher cost. in Argentina 13% of judgments are appealed, in Peru Quite the opposite: fees in countries with case manage- 17%, in Mexico 30%. ment tend to be lower because attorney costs are lower.16 Appeals on legal issues, a necessary feature of a fair Case management involves 2 changes. First, judges justice system, are allowed in every country. But they take the responsibility to follow cases from start to finish. needn't suspend the judicial process. It is better to allow In most countries a debt collection case typically comes an appeal on all alleged errors but to allow the trial and to the judge a dozen times. Without case management enforcement to continue while the appeal is resolved. the judge is not aware of how the case is progressing, This is what Botswana, Chile, France, Greece and 30 depending on other court officials to move the case other countries do. In countries where appeals suspend along. The second is introducing an electronic system of the enforcement of judgment, it takes twice the time to recording and following cases from the time they are collect on overdue debt--160 days instead of 80. Yet filed to the time judgment is issued or the case is with- users do not consider the procedure fairer, as reported in drawn, as in Finland. With greater incentives to reach Doing Business in 2004. resolution and better technology, the judge can follow Several countries have reformed their appeals each case at any moment. process. Benin barred appeals during small-claims cases. It doesn't take much time or money to develop a case Estonia and Finland do not allow appeal during the management system. Slovakia's reform started in 1999 as summary proceedings. If the debtor wants to dispute a pilot in the Banska Bystrica court.17 Within 6 months the judgment in these three countries, he would have to the average time between filing and the first hearing was open a new case. Lithuania tripled the fee for appeals, cut from 73 days to 27 and the average number of proce- obliging the debtor to pay all legal costs of the creditor dures from 23 to 5, as judges were randomly assigned and when the appeal fails. This has reduced appeals consid- could schedule the hearings without the need for consul- erably. Other countries, such as Japan, Mexico, Slovakia tation with court clerks and other judges. The pilot was and Thailand, allow appeal of the final judgment but do scaled up to all district courts in 2002­03.18 The cost was not allow interlocutory appeal (appeals during the pro- minimal: $2 million. Similar case management systems ceedings). This is associated with a 20% reduction in the are now being introduced in Albania and Armenia, with average court delay. World Bank support. Progress is benchmarked in the Ju- dicial Reform Index developed by the American Bar As- Improving enforcement sociation for its work in Central and Eastern Europe.19 In many countries, courts not only deliver judgments, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Ro- they try to enforce them. This generally doesn't work. mania and Ukraine are assessed as the least advanced in Specialized public collection agencies or private enforcers developing case management. are usually in a better position to collect debt (figure 8.6). ENFORCING CONTRACTS 65 FIGURE 8.6 FIGURE 8.7 Courts take longer to enforce a judgment Payment incentives for enforcers cut time Days between judgment and enforcement Days between judgment and enforcement Poor Middle income Rich Enforcer 178 Court countries countries countries paid fixed fee enforcement 151 time Enforcer paid pro-rated fee 104 Private or 82 89 specialized public ­15% enforcement time 29 ­25% Poor Middle income Rich countries countries countries Source: Doing Business database. ­39% Source: Doing Business database. Two types of reform have worked. First, in Finland, fect on collecting larger debts. The reason is that the Ireland and Sweden, a state enforcement authority col- bonus was capped at 800 rubles ($27), so the bailiff gets lects all debt, including what is due in taxes. Armenia, Es- the same reward for all cases of 40,000 rubles or more. As tonia and Latvia recently adopted a similar system. The larger amounts are more difficult to collect, enforcement second option is to privatize the enforcement process. focused on the easier cases.23 In France, a private enforcement specialist, huissier de Finally, a reform that usually fails: increasing the justice, collects on all private claims.21 Belgium and the number of judges to reduce court congestion. Such re- Netherlands also have private enforcement, as do many form has obtained strong support in the development former French colonies, such as Algeria and Benin. In- aid community.24 This is understandable: by simple spired by the French example, Hungary, Poland, Scotland arithmetic, the more the judges, the fewer cases per and Slovakia have all introduced private enforcement. judge. And it works for a brief period, after which delays And in many common law countries--Australia, Canada, increase again as more people bring cases to court, while New Zealand, Uganda--the creditor's attorney is respon- the efficiency of dealing with each case remains the same. sible for enforcement, with the help of the police. Sri Lanka is an example. To take the burden off the Better incentives for remuneration--as when the en- regular civil courts, specialized tribunals have been cre- forcer is paid a percentage of the recovered claim, or ated to hear tax disputes, consumer complaints, and a nominal fee plus a pro-rated bonus--speed up collec- labor cases. But the civil courts remain as backlogged as tion.22 These schemes are superior to a flat fee or wages ever. This is because the solution--more judges--treats (figure 8.7). Russia is a recent example of reform. In 2002, the manifestation of the problem, not the problem itself. the remuneration rules for bailiffs were changed so that a A simple rule for reformers: when the judiciary bailiff would receive a bonus of 2% of the debt claim if he argues for more judges, it is time to also simplify proce- successfully collected the money. This change improved dures. It costs less and has longer term effects. small debt recovery and had a lesser, but still positive, ef- Why reform? contracts beyond their narrow circle of known business partners. Trade increases and business expands, bring- ing more prosperity. A survey of Russian entrepreneurs The fewer procedures, the lower the cost, the shorter the shows that twice as many entrepreneurs start business in time to resolve disputes--the better that businesses rate cities like Taganrog, where the courts are perceived as ef- the efficiency and integrity of the courts (figure 8.8) and ficient, as in cities like Rostov-on-Don, where courts are the more likely that businesses are to go to the judge the perceived as corrupt and slow.25 next time a dispute arises. As confidence in dispute reso- A study comparing the corporate sectors in Mexico lution rises, entrepreneurs become more willing to enter and the United States finds that weaknesses in contract 66 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 enforcement are associated with a smaller size of busi- workers in the average business.26 nesses in Mexico. There, 96% of businesses employ less Reforms of debt collection reduce costs to the govern- than 10 workers. In the United States, only about 63% ment as well. This was the original motivation behind the of businesses do. And the efficiency of debt collection Woolf Report in the United Kingdom. The simpler the varies across Mexican states, with the top one, Aguas- procedures, the less the need for more court clerks and calientes, being nearly three times as efficient as the bot- judges.The more summary judgments,the less the taxpayer tom one, Guerrero. Improvements in debt recovery from money used to fund drawn out trials. The government can the bottom to the top quartile of states imply a large instead direct more resources to legal aid for the poor. jump in employment--a 17% increase in the number of FIGURE 8.8 More procedures--more corruption... ...less efficiency Perception of judicial integrity Perception of judicial efficiency Positive Positive Negative Negative Least Most Least Most Countries ranked by procedures to enforce a contract, quintiles Countries ranked by procedures to enforce a contract, quintiles Note: The relationships shown are significant at the 1% level and remain significant at the 5% level when controlling for income per capita. Source: Doing Business database, WEF (2004). Notes 1. An interview reported in Kahn (2003), p. 27. 14. Lord Woolf (1995). 2. World Bank (2004c). 15. See Australian Law Reform Commission (2003) for a summary of 3. Based on analysis of the Doing Business indicators with indicators of reforms. impartiality of the judiciary from Economic Freedom of the World and 16. On average, the cost of dispute resolution is 15% with case manage- Batra and others (2003). Results are significant at the 5% level, control- ment, and 25% without. This difference exists at all income levels. ling for income per capita. 17. Korb (2002). 4. Samano (2002), p. 9. 18. World Bank (2003c). 5. A recent report on case management in the Canadian judiciary suggests 19. CEELI (2004). as a main indicator of success the ratio of cases judged in summary pro- 20. World Bank (2003d). ceedings to cases judged in regular proceedings. The rationale is that summary proceedings reflect the willingness of judges to provide quick 21. Kennett (2002). resolution. See Quebec Ministere de la Justice (2001). 22. Data on remuneration of enforcement agents was collected for the first 6. Laukkanen (2004). time in this year's survey. The questionnaire is available at the Doing Business website. 7. Surveys published in Pravda newspaper, various issues. 23. Hendley (forthcoming). 8. Zuckerman (1999). 24. See, for example, Buscaglia and Dakolias (1999). 9. Deloitte Consulting (2003). 25. Djankov and others (2004). 10. Hendley (2004). 26. Laeven and Woodruff (2004). 11. Proskuryakova (2002). 12. World Bank (2003b). 13. Creditors complained of a pro-debtor bias in judgments. The evidence suggests otherwise. Nearly 90% of judgments in Mexico and 80% of judgments in Argentina were in favor of the creditor. These percentages rose after appeal. 67 Closing a business Where is exit easy? Who is reforming exit? What to reform? Why reform? Each year, more businesses--about 13,200--go through plex process of sorting through assets or revising the bankruptcy in Canada than in all non-OECD countries. business plan. More go through bankruptcy in Belgium--one in every But developing countries have few industrial giants 55--than in Latin America. More go through bank- like Daewoo or Parmalat. Their businesses typically have ruptcy in Norway--one in every 40--than in South Asia few sources of financing and face simpler problems in and Africa.1 The difference is large even as a share of all coordinating among creditors when becoming insolvent. firms (figure 9.1). And simpler problems need simpler solutions. But new This is not because businesses don't fail in develop- bankruptcy laws--and over 60 developing countries ing countries. They just don't use bankruptcy. And even have adopted them in the last 10 years--seldom meet the in rich countries, use of bankruptcy is rare. Creditors needs of investors. The effort has often been misdirected and debtors in OECD countries would typically renego- into establishing complex procedures for reorganizing tiate the terms of the loan, extend the payment period or businesses in distress: in Albania, Benin, Burkina Faso, write-off some part of the debt. Bankruptcy is only used Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, when it lowers the cost of exit. Everyone recognizes the Niger, Togo, Vietnam and Yemen, to name a few. Turkey names Enron, Kmart and WorldCom, the three largest and Uzbekistan both introduced reorganization in 2003, among 57,324 US bankruptcies in 2003. But these con- preventing creditors from using the less complex liquida- stitute only a fraction of the 600,000 business closures FIGURE 9.1 that year.2 The remaining 90 percent took place outside No bankruptcy in developing economies of bankruptcy, by creditors foreclosing on their loans Annual bankruptcy filings and businesses shutting down voluntarily. (average number 1999­2003) Bankruptcy--through liquidation or reorganiza- 9,744 Bankruptcies as a percentage of all limited liability firms tion--is a backup for simple foreclosure procedures.3 It Finland 4.14 is needed when a company like Daewoo, with dozens of New Zealand 3.67 United States 3.65 creditors, thousands of employees and billions of dollars Norway 2.59 in assets, becomes insolvent. Or when the failure of a France 2.62 Russia 0.31 business, such as Swissair, affects the normal function- Colombia 0.16 ing of many other businesses. Or when corporate fraud Argentina 0.12 Thailand 0.12 needs to be investigated--as for Parmalat. Liquidation-- Peru 0.05 314 when a business is judged unviable and sold to new 53 owners--and especially reorganization--when an at- Rich Middle Poor countries income countries tempt is made to keep the business in operation with Source: Doing Business database, Claessens and Klapper (forthcoming). current owners and (often) managers--involve a com- 68 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 tion and the even simpler foreclosure procedure. They Tunisia, and the United Kingdom streamlined their don't use the fancy reorganization procedure either. bankruptcy procedures--and some achieved immediate In developing countries, business exit works best in results. In Bulgaria, the creditors now typically collect 34 direct negotiations between the creditor and debtor. In cents on a dollar. In Estonia, 40 cents. In Tunisia, 50 Ethiopia, Jamaica, Namibia and Thailand, secured cred- cents. In India, where the reform has just started, credi- itors can seize the assets of defaulted companies without tors now collect 13 cents on the dollar, a third more than the complex court procedures associated with bank- they did a year ago. The reforms share similar features. ruptcy. As a result, they can recover 50 cents for every They reduce appeals that suspend the bankruptcy dollar loaned.4 Contrast this with 15 cents on the dollar process. They introduce or tighten time limits of proce- for liquidation and reorganization bankruptcy proceed- dures. They establish specialization in dealing with bank- ings in other poor countries. ruptcy cases. And they set incentives for the administra- Several countries got reforms right. In 2003, Bul- tor to get the most from the estate. garia, Estonia, India, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Spain, FIGURE 9.2 Where is exit easy? Higher recovery rate leads to more usage Perceived usefulness of bankruptcy law When a business closes, creditors and other claimants in Finland, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan (China) typically recover 90 cents on the dollar. In Belgium, Canada, Ire- land, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom, MORE USAGE more than 85 cents on the dollar. These are the 10 econo- mies with most efficient foreclosure or bankruptcy pro- cedures. Surveys of business executives agree (figure 9.2). How do these economies do it? Through a combi- nation of speed, low cost, and continuity of business op- AVERAGE RECOVERY erations (box 9.1). It takes less than a year to resolve RATE 8 21 32 50 82 foreclosure or bankruptcy.5 The cost of closing a busi- Countries ranked by recovery rate, quintiles ness is just a small percentage of the value of the trou- Note: Relationships are significant at the 1% level. bled business: 1% in Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Source: Doing Business database, WEF (2004). and Singapore; and about 4% in Belgium, Canada, Ja- pan, and Latvia. And in all of the most efficient ten, the important trading partner. In 1992, unsecured creditors business is sold or reorganized as a going concern and were given priority over tax and labor claims. In 1993 management is replaced.6 No value is lost by stopping a reorganization procedure was introduced. In 1995, a operations.7 bankruptcy ombudsman was established to supervise the Getting that efficient takes time. Consider Finland, a administration of bankruptcy estates. Finally in 2004, leader. It adopted the first bankruptcy law in 1734, when an amendment was adopted to prevent frivolous bank- it was still part of Sweden. More than a century passed ruptcy filings. before the law was amended in 1868, now in indepen- Several other countries provide claimants with a dent Finland, to clarify the priority of claims in liquida- high return when a business closes. In Australia, Austria, tion. Another century passed without reforms. In 1970, Hong Kong (China), Korea, Latvia, New Zealand, Spain the law was reformed to give the bankruptcy administra- and Sweden, recovery rates are more than 70 cents. Rich tor the right to terminate labor contracts on a short countries can afford to have a spectrum of exit options-- notice. Then in 1978, a new regulation was adopted on from foreclosure, which is still the prevalent exit mecha- group dismissals in large companies undergoing bank- nism in Australia and the United Kingdom, to liquida- ruptcy. A 1986 amendment enhanced the priority of tion, most often used in Austria, Denmark, Germany, the floating charge holders. In 1991, the rules for recovery Netherlands and Sweden, to reorganization, much used were elaborated in a separate legislative act. Several other in Canada, France and the United States. Recent reform reforms followed, prompted by the economic stagnation has focused on providing different bankruptcy tracks for after the collapse of the Soviet Union--Finland's most different types of businesses. For example, Finland and CLOSING A BUSINESS 69 BOX 9.1 Where is closing a business the most efficient--and where the least? Recovery rate Claimants--creditors, tax authorities, and employees--re- (Cents on the dollar) cover 92 cents on the dollar from an insolvent firm in Japan, but only 7 cents in Romania. This is the result of three differ- Most Least ences: the time spent closing down, the cost, and whether the Japan 92 Haiti 2 firm survives as a going concern. In Japan the business is re- Singapore 91 Angola 1 organized as a going concern under new management, with- Finland 90 Brazil 0 out loss of value.9 Official costs of the proceeding are 4%--re- ducing the available money to 96 cents. The reorganization Taiwan, China 90 Central African Republic 0 takes 6 months, while the assets depreciate and claims are tied Canada 89 Lao PDR 0 up at lending rates of 1.8% a year. The recovery rate is the Ireland 89 Chad 0 present value of the proceeds--92 cents on the dollar.10 The Norway 88 Cambodia 0 secured creditor has first priority and receives the full amount. Netherlands 86 Bhutan 0 Belgium 86 Rwanda 0 In Romania the business starts rehabilitation proceedings but United Kingdom 86 Madagascar 0 is eventually liquidated in parts--cutting the estate value from 100 to 70.11 This is reduced to 62 cents after paying 8% of the initial value in official costs. Assets depreciate and the claims are tied up for 4.6 years while the procedure is completed, at Time to go through insolvency rates of 45% a year. The result--claimants collect 7 cents on (Years) the dollar.12 The secured creditor is paid after taxes and labor claims. Fastest Slowest Ireland 0.41 Philippines 5.64 What drags the inefficient countries down? Delays. They ac- Japan 0.54 Haiti 5.70 count for half of the difference in the average rich and poor country's recovery rates. Top performers resolve foreclosure Canada 0.75 Belarus 5.75 or bankruptcy within a year. In 2004 Spain joined this list Singapore 0.78 Indonesia 6.00 by introducing statutory time limits on procedures. Closing Taiwan, China 0.79 Oman 7.00 down takes the longest in South Asia, at 4.8 years. Latin Amer- Norway 0.89 Mauritania 8.00 ica is second, at 3.6 years. Delays are 4 years in poor countries, Belgium 0.90 Czech Republic 9.17 twice as long as in rich countries. But there are notable excep- Finland 0.94 Brazil 10.00 tions in developing economies. Insolvency takes just over a United Kingdom 1.00 Chad 10.00 year in Jamaica, Latvia and Tunisia. Spain 1.00 India 10.00 Whether the business keeps operating explains a third of the difference between rich and poor countries. Thirty-four coun- tries typically keep the insolvent firm running. This includes Cost to go through insolvency Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as Thailand (% of estate) and Uganda. Over three quarters of OECD countries do. None in South Asia manage to. And only 4% of poor countries do. Least Most Finland 1 Congo, Rep. 38 High administrative fees account for another 15% of the dif- ference between rich and poor country's recovery rates. Sub- Kuwait 1 Macedonia, FYR 38 Saharan African and East Asian countries have the highest Netherlands 1 Panama 38 costs, at over 20% of the bankruptcy estate. Except Israel, no Norway 1 Philippines 38 rich economy has such high costs. Belgium 4 Sierra Leone 38 Canada 4 United Arab Emirates 38 The recovery rate is calculated at the time of entry into bank- Georgia 4 Venezuela 38 ruptcy or foreclosure proceedings. In some countries--such Japan 4 Central African Republic 76 as the Nordics--management must announce insolvency. Creditors can trigger insolvency proceedings immediately be- Latvia 4 Chad 76 fore more value is lost. But in many others, the debtor can New Zealand 4 Lao PDR 76 hide insolvency, and creditors cannot initiate proceedings. In such cases the value of the firm will shrink even before the proceedings start. Source: Doing Business database. 70 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 FIGURE 9.3 Japan have instituted simplified reorganization proce- Poor countries have low recovery rates dures for small businesses. Italy has introduced a new res- Recovery rate in reorganization cue procedure for large businesses--with more than Cents on the dollar 1,000 employees and debts exceeding US$1 billion. Aus- 67 tralia, Estonia, Finland and Sweden have instituted 25 TIME streamlined procedures for the liquidation of companies Difference which lack sufficient assets to complete a regular proce- between rich 34 and poor 7 COST dure. 14 BUSINESS A few other countries do well. Recovery rates in Ja- 21 KEEPS RUNNING maica, Mexico and Poland are over 60 cents on the dol- More time, higher costs lar. In contrast, secured creditors in Brazil, Costa Rica, and keeping the business running account for the the Philippines, and Romania get close to nothing if difference. their debtor enters bankruptcy. In all of these countries Rich Middle Poor countries income countries debtors can enter complex reorganization procedures, Source: Doing Business database. where they are protected from creditors. Reorganization lasts nearly 6 years in the Philippines and about 4 years in Costa Rica and Romania. Brazil takes the longest: are so rare outside the OECD, notwithstanding the re- creditors can start foreclosure but there are many op- forms of bankruptcy law. portunities for appeal, each time suspending the process. Not all claimants get the full recovery rate. Fifty- It typically takes 10 years.8 eight countries give the secured creditor priority to the Building an efficient reorganization procedure in proceeds. But in Belarus, Burkina Faso, Ecuador and bankruptcy is a luxury. Rich countries can afford it. Few Oman, taxes and workers all have higher priority than se- others can. The differences in recovery rates in a reorga- cured creditors. Recovery rates for these claimants are 15 nization procedure between rich and poor countries are cents on average. For the secured creditor, only 7 cents. large (figure 9.3). This explains why bankruptcy filings Who is reforming exit? appeal before a general court and then before a superior court. Now only one appeal is possible. Time to go In 2003­04 exit became easier in 9 countries: Bulgaria, through bankruptcy fell by 5 months, with further re- Estonia, India, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Spain, duction expected. Cost was cut in half. Estonia, Lithua- Tunisia and the United Kingdom. Two countries-- nia and the United Kingdom implemented similar re- Turkey and Uzbekistan--implemented reform that re- forms with success. duced efficiency. Poland reformed differently. A court-appointed ad- Those that succeeded in increasing recovery rates did ministrator takes over the management of the business so by simplifying existing law. Take Spain. The 2003 re- once bankruptcy is filed. At a preliminary meeting, the forms featured three improvements. First, the court can creditors' committee decides whether the business should now order debtors to pay, without entry into bankruptcy. be reorganized or liquidated. This allows for bankruptcy This reform is estimated to have reduced the number of to be avoided altogether in cases where the creditors can frivolous bankruptcy filings by 40%. Second, statutory agree on foreclosure. It is now also easier to switch be- deadlines on the duration of procedures are cut in half. tween the two proceedings if the prospects for recovery Third, appeals do not suspend the recovery of debt. These change. Time to go through bankruptcy was cut by a improvements raise the efficiency of Spanish bankruptcy quarter. The recovery rate of bankruptcy in Poland is to that of Hong Kong (China), at 83 cents on the dollar. now on a par with Portugal's, at 68 cents on the dollar. Bulgaria also amended its bankruptcy law by reduc- India started ambitious reforms. It repealed the Sick ing statutory deadlines and cutting opportunities for ap- Industrial Companies Act, which prevented bankrupt peal. Before, claimants were given 6 months to file claims companies from being liquidated. At the same time, it once a business declared bankruptcy. Now the limit is 3 established specialized bankruptcy tribunals. Twelve are months. Before the reform, if the reorganization plan already in operation, with several dozen to commence was rejected by the creditors' committee, the debtor could CLOSING A BUSINESS 71 operations in the next year. Time to go through bank- uidation. This was done to alleviate the burden on busi- ruptcy was cut by 15%. nesses during the latest financial crisis. Time for Some reforms made matters worse, increasing de- insolvency jumped by a year, and recovery rates fell by lays and reducing recovery rates. Exit became harder 15 cents. Uzbekistan created a reorganization proce- in Turkey and Uzbekistan in 2003. Turkey adopted a dure with a 3 month stay on creditors and an additional postponement procedure, which gives the creditor two level of appeals, increasing delays by 9 months and cutting years to implement a plan before creditors can start liq- recovery rates from 17 to 12 cents on the dollar. What to reform? Its reorganization procedure has not been used once since it was introduced in 1998. Nor is bankruptcy used Doing Business in 2004 recommended three ways to im- in many other OHADA countries--for example Central prove the closure of businesses. First, use simple exit African Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger--which adopted proceedings in poor countries and resist copying the a reorganization procedure at the same time. complex bankruptcy systems of OECD countries. Sec- Reorganization is a complex procedure, and it will ond, involve creditors in decisions throughout the bank- work well only with an effective judiciary, competent ruptcy process. Third, provide continuous training for bankruptcy administrators and a liquid market for the judges and bankruptcy administrators. This year five assets of bankrupt firms.14 Only rich countries have all more reforms have been identified: these features. In developing countries, complex solu- · Improve foreclosure in poor countries. tions make simple problems worse. · Speed up liquidation in middle income countries. Speed up liquidation in middle income countries · Provide specialized expertise. Middle income countries, where businesses often have · Limit appeals. more than one creditor, will find a high payoff from · Pay administrators for maximizing the estate value. making their liquidation procedures faster. If Botswana Improve foreclosure in poor countries can close down a business in 2 years, so can Brazil, Egypt, Jordan, Slovakia, Slovenia, Syria and Venezuela. Countries like Armenia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Estonia allows no appeals for entry into liquidation and and Paraguay have focused on improving the efficiency has introduced a fast-track for liquidation proceedings. of their foreclosure procedures. Anything more compli- In 2000 Slovakia made liquidation more efficient by al- cated would increase delays, reduce recovery rates, and lowing the firm to operate as a going concern through- create opportunities for corruption. out the process. Foreclosure can be improved by reforming secured transactions law to allow summary proceedings, out of court enforcement, and limited appeals. Poor countries FIGURE 9.4 should also ensure that liquidation or reorganization Rich countries waited to introduce reorganization does not stop foreclosure. This can be achieved by hav- Income per capita in year of reform ing creditor consent before the business enters bank- ruptcy, as in China, Hungary and Kuwait. In the past, 20,000 Canada 1992 many countries' laws stopped businesses from entering Norway 1984 reorganization by mandating a large payment, say 30% 15,000 of the outstanding debt, as a condition for entry into re- organization. This achieves the same outcome as credi- Ireland 1990 Costa Rica 1989 tors' consent but is more cumbersome to enforce. 10,000 France 1985 Bulgaria 2000 Some poor countries have introduced reorganiza- Albania 1996 tion in bankruptcy before there is the demand or capac- Georgia 2001 5,000 Cameroon 1998 ity to enforce it. If Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland Senegal 1998 didn't need modern reorganization until the late 1990s India 1986 0 Uzbekistan 2003 (figure 9.4), why would Albania, Bosnia and Herzego- Vietnam 1990 Source: Doing Business database. vina, and Uzbekistan need it now?13 Benin surely doesn't. 72 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Provide specialized expertise Beyond training and requirements for business ex- Whether in Burundi, Bulgaria or Belgium, the judiciary perience, scarce expertise can be pooled by allowing legal can be organized to provide specialization for the judges entities and not only physical persons to administer the who deal with foreclosure or bankruptcy cases. This has bankruptcy estate. The Czech Republic did this in 2000 large benefits in increasing recovery rates (figure 9.5). In with great success. But many countries don't permit it. poor countries, specialization can be achieved by estab- lishing a specialized commercial section in the general Limit appeals court. Its clerks and judges deal only with bankruptcy Appeals are needed to resolve legitimate disputes. But and debt recovery issues and not with divorce or crimi- too often they are abused--invoked for frivolous reasons nal cases. Ghana has done this, as has Bosnia and Herze- and delaying an efficient outcome. Limiting appeals, govina more recently. both at the outset and during the procedure, increases Where the flow of contract enforcement and bank- recovery rates (figure 9.6). In foreclosure proceedings, ruptcy cases is larger, specialized commercial courts the creditor in Australia, New Zealand or the United or bankruptcy authorities can be considered. Colombia, Kingdom need only prove that a payment is overdue. Ecuador, India, Latvia, Moldova, Peru and Tanzania have Appeal is not possible. In contrast, in El Salvador the implemented such reforms in the last few years. Coun- debtor can appeal foreclosure and delay its start by up to tries with a high volume of cases can establish specialized 16 months. In Angola, Haiti, and Honduras the appeals bankruptcy courts, as in Japan and the United States. The last so long--often years--that employees or the tax au- volume of cases and the complexity of the legal matters thority can initiate bankruptcy and stop the foreclosure ensures that only experienced judges, at advanced stages process altogether. Secured creditors get next to nothing. in their careers, are selected for these courts. As a result, banks are only willing to lend to businesses Countries can also build specialized expertise by whose owners put up personal assets as collateral. Few mandating that judges have business experience. Bank- can afford such terms. ruptcy judges in most rich countries have such experi- Appeals delay liquidation or reorganization proceed- ence, acquired by running their own firms as in France, ings even more. In Bolivia, appeals take a year. In Chile by being legal counsel in corporations or private law and Bosnia and Herzegovina, appeals last several years. firms, as in the United States, or by going through a busi- What to do? Cut the period of appeals. Romania just ness training program, as in Germany. With few excep- did so, reducing each appeal from 30 to 10 days. Or limit tions, like Peru, judges in developing countries have no appeals only to those on legal grounds, not on the case business experience and typically no training in business facts, which are already established and accepted by the and accounting matters either. This needs change be- judge at the start of the case. Or allow the case to con- cause countries that value business experience of judges tinue during appeal, as in Estonia. This avoids disruption have 10% higher recovery rates. while providing for disputes to be resolved. Allowing the FIGURE 9.5 FIGURE 9.6 Specialization pays off on all dimensions Limiting appeals increases recovery rates Time, cost, recovery 50 Percentage increase in recovery rate 32% and survival rate in insolvency 25% Case 48 continues 17% General Court 3.4 16 29 20 Specialized 2.6 court 10 Case is delayed Time Cost Recovery Probability Order initiating Liquidation Claim amount (years) (percentage rate of survival insolvency appealed disputed of estate) (cents per dollar) (percent) appealed Source: Doing Business database. Source: Doing Business database. CLOSING A BUSINESS 73 tries pay on market proceeds. The list includes Denmark, foreclosure or bankruptcy case to continue on appeal is Japan and the United States, as well as many developing associated with 20% less time in closing a business. And countries--including Jordan, Malaysia and Slovakia. But it almost doubles the chance of keeping it operating. many countries set perverse incentives, paying adminis- Pay administrators for maximizing the estate value trators a monthly salary. In this case, more delays mean higher income--hardly an incentive for the administra- Administrators can be paid on the outcome of bank- tor to speed the process. ruptcy, setting incentives to maximize proceeds. Doing so increases recovery rates--by 20% on average. Fifty coun- Why reform? able businesses contributed 19% to productivity growth in Taiwan (China), 23% in Korea and 39% in Indonesia Efficient insolvency helps new entrepreneurs start and in the 1990s.15 grow their businesses. With higher recovery rates, banks The link between entrepreneurship and the closing are more willing to lend (figure 9.7). And more money of unviable businesses is not as novel as it may sound. It goes to new business ventures. The freedom to fail in is nothing more than Schumpeter's notion of creative business, and do so through an efficient process, ensures destruction, where new people--or sometimes the same that a country's people and capital are put to their most people--try to develop new ideas into profitable busi- productive uses. Entrepreneurs benefit the most, as seen nesses. Schumpeter surely would have frowned at the ex- by the strong association between the closing of failed pansion of sophisticated rescue techniques for failed businesses and new start-ups (figure 9.8). Closing ineffi- businesses in developing countries. cient firms increases overall productivity. Exit of unvi- FIGURE 9.7 FIGURE 9.8 Higher recovery, more credit... ...more exit, more entry Private credit as a percentage of GDP Exiting and entering firms as a percentage of total firms (manufacturing firms, 1995­2002, weighted by employment) Entering firms Greater share 7 FINLAND 6 INDONESIA 5 4 ROMANIA NETHERLANDS TAIWAN ESTONIA U.K. CHINA KOREA Lesser CHILE HUNGARY share 3 ITALY MEXICO U.S. PORTUGAL BRAZIL Lowest rate Highest rate 2 COLOMBIA Countries ranked by recovery rate in insolvency, quintiles ARGENTINA 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Note: Analysis controls for income, GDP growth, contract enforcement, legal rights Exiting firms and credit information. Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a). Source: Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004). Notes 8. A new bankruptcy law was amended and approved by the Senate on July 6th 2004. 1. This is the result of having less efficient procedures, but also of the 9. The insolvent firm is viable by assumption of the case study. larger proportion of businesses that operate in the informal economy. 10. The calculation is (100 ­ (4% x 100) ­ (25 x .2 x .5))/(1+.018) ^0.5 = 92 2. US Census Bureau (2003), table 748, p. 506. 11. Research shows that the average loss in efficiency from exit of viable 3. Easterbrook (1990). firms is 30%. See Data Notes Section for details. 4. Dollars and cents are used as generic terms for local currency units 12. The calculation is (100 ­ (8% x 100) ­ (25 x .2 x 4.6))/(1+.45)^4.6 = 7 throughout the chapter. 13. Witness the draft Insolvency Bill in Nepal. It envisages a court- 5. But in the Netherlands where the process lasts 19 months. appointed reorganization manager. See details in Pradhan (2004). 6. In all ten, secured creditors have priority in the distribution of bank- 14. Baird (1986). ruptcy proceeds, before taxes, employees and suppliers. 15. Annual average labor productivity growth in Taiwan (China) from 7. 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Working Paper 3275, World Bank, Washington, DC. 79 Data notes Economy characteristics Starting a business Hiring and firing workers Registering property Getting credit Protecting investors Enforcing contracts Closing a business Ease of doing business The indicators presented and analyzed in Doing Business comparisons and benchmarks are valid across countries. And measure government regulation and the protection of prop- the data highlight not only the extent of obstacles, but also erty rights--and their effect on businesses, especially on help identify their source, supporting policymakers in de- small and medium-size domestic firms. First, they document signing reform. the degree of regulation, such as the number of procedures to The Doing Business methodology has 3 limitations that start a business or register commercial property. Second, they should be considered when interpreting the data. First, in gauge regulatory outcomes, such as the time and cost to en- many cases, the collected data refer to businesses in the coun- force a contract or go through bankruptcy. Third, the indica- try's most populous city and may not be representative of tors measure the extent of legal protections of property, for regulatory practices in other parts of the country. Second, the example in the disclosure of company information to in- data often focus on a specific business form--limited liabil- vestors or the scope of assets that can be used as collateral ac- ity company of specified size--and may not be representative cording to secured transactions laws. The data for all sets of of the regulation on other businesses, for example, sole pro- indicators in Doing Business in 2005 are for January 2004. prietorships. Finally, some indicators--such as time--in- Based on research of laws and regulations, with input and volve an element of judgment by the expert respondents. verification from more than 3,000 local government officials, Therefore, if sources indicate different estimates, the time in- lawyers, business consultants and other professionals rou- dicators reported in Doing Business represent the median val- tinely administering or advising on legal and regulatory re- ues of several responses given under the assumptions of the quirements, this methodology offers several advantages. It case study. uses factual information and allows for multiple interactions Questions on the methodology may be asked through the with local respondents, clarifying potential misinterpreta- "Ask a Question" function available on the Doing Business tions of questions. It is inexpensive, so data can be collected website at http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness and will in a large sample of economies--135 published in Doing be answered within 48 hours. For urgent queries, please call Business in 2005, with another 10 available on the website. Marie Delion at 1 202 473 0183. Updated indicators, as well Because the same standard assumptions are applied in the as any revisions of or corrections to the printed data, are data collection, which is transparent and easily replicable, available on the website. 80 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Economy characteristics Gross National Income (GNI) per capita Doing Business reports 2003 income per capita, calculated using the Atlas method (current US$), as published in the Region and income group World Development Indicators. For cost indicators expressed Doing Business uses the World Bank regional and income as a percentage of income per capita, 2003 local currency unit groupings available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/ GNI, as reported in the World Development Indicators, is countryclass/countryclass.html. Throughout the report, the used as the denominator. term rich economies refers to the high income group, middle income refers to the upper middle income group and poor Population economies refers to the lower middle and low income groups. Doing Business reports mid-year 2003 population statistics as published in the World Development Indicators. Starting a business does not handle products subject to a special tax regime, for example, liquor or tobacco. The business is not using Doing Business records all generic procedures that are offi- heavily polluting production processes. cially required for an entrepreneur to start up an industrial or · Leases the commercial plant and offices and is not a pro- commercial business. These include obtaining all necessary prietor of real estate. licenses and permits and completing any required notifica- · Does not qualify for investment incentives or any special tions, verifications or inscriptions with relevant authorities. benefits. After a study of laws, regulations, and publicly available in- · Has up to 50 employees 1 month after the commencement formation on business entry, a detailed list of procedures, of operations, all of them nationals. time, cost and minimum paid-in capital requirements is de- · Has a turnover at least 100 times income per capita. veloped. Subsequently, local incorporation lawyers and gov- · Has a company deed 10 pages long. ernment officials complete and verify the data on applicable procedures, the time and cost of fulfilling each procedure Assumptions about procedures under normal circumstances and the minimum paid in capi- To make the procedures comparable across countries, 6 as- tal. On average at least four different law firms participate per sumptions are employed: country. Information is also collected on the sequence in which procedures are to be completed and whether proce- · A procedure is defined as any interaction of the company dures may be carried out simultaneously. It is assumed that founder with external parties (government agencies, any required information is readily available and that all gov- lawyers, auditors, notaries). Interactions between com- pany founders or company officers and employees are not ernment and nongovernment agencies involved in the start- considered separate procedures. up process function efficiently and without corruption. If an- swers by local experts differ, enquiries continue until the data · The founders complete all procedures themselves, without middlemen, facilitators, accountants or lawyers, unless the are reconciled. use of such third party is mandated by law. Assumptions about the business · Procedures that are not required by law for start- ing a business are ignored. For example, obtain- To make the business comparable across countries, 10 as- ing exclusive rights over the company name is not counted sumptions are employed. The business: in a country where businesses may use a number as iden- · Is a limited liability company. If there is more than one tification. type of limited liability company in the country, the most · Shortcuts are counted only if they fulfill 3 criteria: they are popular limited liability form among domestic firms is legal; they are available to the general public; and avoiding chosen. Information on the most popular form is ob- them causes substantial delays. tained from incorporation lawyers or the statistical office. · Only procedures required of all businesses are covered. In- · Operates in the country's most populous city. dustry-specific procedures are excluded. For example, · Is 100% domestically owned and has 5 owners, none of procedures to comply with environmental regulations are whom is a legal entity. included only when they apply to all businesses. · Has start-up capital of 10 times income per capita at the · Procedures that the company undergoes to connect to end of 2003, paid in cash. electricity, water, gas and waste-disposal services are not · Performs general industrial or commercial activities, such included, unless they entail inspections required prior to as the production or sale of products or services to the starting operations. public. It does not perform activities of foreign trade and DATA NOTES 81 Cost measure and commits to completing each remaining procedure with- The text of the Company Law, the Commercial Code and out delay. The time that the entrepreneur spends on gather- specific regulations and fee schedules are used as sources for ing information is ignored. It is assumed that the entrepre- calculating the costs. If there are conflicting sources and the neur is aware of all entry regulations and their sequence from laws are not clear, the most authoritative source is used. The the beginning. constitution supersedes the company law, and the law pre- Paid-in minimum capital requirement vails over regulations and decrees. If conflicting sources are of the same rank, the source indicating the most costly proce- The paid-in minimum capital requirement reflects the dure is used, since an entrepreneur never second-guesses a amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank be- government official. In the absence of fee schedules, a gov- fore registration starts. This amount is typically specified in ernmental officer's estimate is taken as an official source. In the Commercial Code or the Company Law. Many countries the absence of government officer's estimates, estimates of in- mandate a capital requirement but allow businesses to pay corporation lawyers are used. If several incorporation lawyers only a portion of it during registration, with the remainder provide different estimates, the median reported value is ap- paid after the first year of operation. For example in January plied. In all cases, the cost excludes bribes. 2004 the minimum capital requirement for limited liability companies in Armenia was 50,000 dram, of which half was Time measure payable before registration. In Honduras in January 2004 the Time is recorded in calendar days. It is assumed that the min- minimum capital requirement was 25,000 lempiras, but only imum time required per procedure is 1 day. Time captures a quarter of this amount needed to be paid in before regis- the median duration that incorporation lawyers indicate is tration. necessary to complete a procedure. If a procedure can be ac- celerated for an additional cost, the fastest procedure is cho- This methodology is originally developed in Djankov and others sen. It is assumed that the entrepreneur does not waste time (2002) and adopted with minor changes here. Hiring and firing workers · Earns a salary plus benefits equal to the country's average wage during the entire period of his employment. Every economy has established a complex system of laws and · Has a nonworking wife and two children. The family re- institutions intended to protect the interests of workers and sides in the country's most populous city. to guarantee a minimum standard of living for its popula- · Is a lawful citizen who belongs to the same race and reli- tion. The OECD Job Study and the International Encyclope- gion as the majority of the country's population. dia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations identify 4 areas · Is not a member of the labor union, unless membership is subject to statutory regulation in all countries: employment, mandatory. industrial relations, occupational health and safety, and social The business: security. Doing Business focuses on the regulation of employ- ment, specifically the hiring and firing of workers and the · Is a limited liability company. rigidity of working hours. · Operates in the country's most populous city. The data on hiring and firing workers are based on a detailed · Is 100% domestically owned. study of employment laws and regulations. The employment · Operates in the manufacturing sector. laws of most countries are available online in the NATLEX database, published by the International Labour Organiza- · Has 201 employees. tion. In all cases, both actual laws and secondary sources are · Abides by every law and regulation, but does not grant used to ensure accuracy. Conflicting answers are further workers more benefits than what is legally mandated. checked in 2 additional sources, including a local legal trea- tise on employment regulation. Secondary sources include Indicators the International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Indus- Two indicators are constructed: a Rigidity of Employment trial Relations. Finally, all data are verified and completed by Index and a Cost of Firing measure. local law firms through a detailed survey on employment reg- The Rigidity of Employment Index is the average of three ulations. sub-indices: a Difficulty of Hiring index, a Rigidity of Hours To make the data comparable across countries, several as- index and a Difficulty of Firing index. All sub-indices have sumptions about the worker and the company are employed. several components. And all take values between 0 and 100, The worker: with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. · Is a nonexecutive full-time male employee who has The Difficulty of Hiring index measures (i) whether term worked in the same company for 20 years. contracts can only be used for temporary tasks; (ii) the max- 82 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 imum duration of term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the the labor ministry for firing 1 redundant worker; (iii) mandated minimum wage (or apprentice wage, if available) whether the employer needs to notify the labor union or the to the average value-added per working population. A coun- labor ministry for group dismissals; (iv) whether the em- try is assigned a score of 1 if term contracts can only be used ployer needs approval from the labor union or the labor min- for temporary tasks, and a score of 0 if term contracts can be istry for firing 1 redundant worker; (v) whether the employer used for any task. A score of 1 is assigned if the duration of needs approval from the labor union or the labor ministry for term contracts is 3 years or less; 0.5 if the duration is between group dismissals; (vi) whether the law mandates training or 3 and 5 years; and 0 if term contracts can last more than 5 replacement prior to dismissal; (vii) whether priority rules years. Finally, a score of 1 is assigned if the ratio of minimum apply for dismissals; and (viii) whether priority rules apply wage to average value added per worker ratio is higher than for reemployment. If the answer to any question is yes, a score 0.75; 0.67 for ratios between 0.50 and 0.75; 0.33 for ratios be- of 1 is assigned, otherwise a score of 0 is given. Questions (i) tween 0.25 and 0.50; and a score of 0 if the ratio is below 0.25. and (iv), as the most restrictive regulations, have double- For example, term contracts are only allowed for temporary weight in the construction of the index. For example, an em- tasks in Uruguay (a score of 1), but they can be longer than 5 ployer in Brazil has to both notify (a score of 1) and seek ap- years (a score of 0), and the ratio of the mandated minimum proval (a score of 2) from third parties when dismissing a wage to the value-added per worker in 0.10 (also a score of 0). redundant worker, she has to both notify (a score of 1) and Averaging the three subindices and scaling the index to 100 seek approval (a score of 1) when dismissing a group of gives Uruguay a score of 33. workers, and redundancy is not considered a fair grounds for The Rigidity of Hours index has 5 components: (i) whether dismissal (a score of 2). The law does not mandate priority night work is restricted; (ii) whether weekend work is al- rules for dismissal (a score of 0) or reemployment (a score of lowed; (iii) whether the workweek consists of 51/2 days or 0), and there is no requirement for retraining or alternative more; (iv) whether the workday can extend to 12 hours or placement prior to dismissal (a score of 0). Adding up and more (including overtime); and (v) whether the annual paid scaling to 100 gives the final index of 70 for Brazil. vacation days are 21 days or less. If the answer to any of these The Cost of Firing indicator measures the cost of advance no- questions is no, the country is assigned a score of 1, otherwise tice requirements, severance payments and penalties due a score of 0 is assigned. For example, night work is not al- when firing a worker, expressed in terms of weekly wages. For lowed in Vietnam (a score of 1), weekend work is restricted (a example, in Cameroon an employer is required to give 16 score of 1), the workday--with overtime--can extend to 12 weeks advance notice prior to a redundancy dismissal, the hours (a score of 0), 6-day work weeks are allowed (a score of severance pay for workers with 20 years of experience equals 0), and paid vacation is 16 days (a score of 0). The scores are 7 months of wages, and redundancy is grounds for dismissal then summed and scaled to 100 to get to the final index of 40 so no penalty is levied. Altogether, the employer pays the for Vietnam. equivalent of 46 weeks of salary to dismiss the worker. The Difficulty of Firing index has 8 components: (i) whether redundancy is not grounds for dismissal; This methodology is originally developed in Botero and others (ii) whether the employer needs to notify the labor union or (forthcoming) and adopted with minor changes here. Registering property Assumptions about the business To make the business comparable across countries, five as- A business purchases land and a building in a peri-urban area sumptions are employed. The business: of the most populous city. Doing Business covers the full se- · Is a limited liability company. quence of procedures necessary to transfer the property title from the seller to the buyer. Every required procedure is in- · Is located in a peri-urban area of the country's most pop- ulous city. cluded, whether it is the responsibility of the seller, the buyer, or where it is required to be completed by a third party on · Is 100% domestically and privately owned (no foreign or their behalf. state ownership). Local property lawyers and property registries provide infor- · Employs 50 employees, all of whom are nationals. mation on required procedures, as well as the time and the · Operates in general commercial activities. cost to fulfill each of them. In most countries, the data are based on responses by both lawyers and officials in the prop- erty registries. DATA NOTES 83 Assumptions about the property All procedures that are legally required for registering prop- To make the property comparable across countries, ten as- erty are recorded, even if they may be avoided in exceptional sumptions are employed. The property: cases. It is assumed that the purchasing company follows the fastest legal option available. Although the business may use · Has a value of 50 times income per capita. lawyers or other professionals where necessary in the regis- · Is currently fully-owned by another domestic limited lia- tration process, it is assumed that it does not employ an out- bility company. side facilitator in the registration unless required to by law. · Has no mortgages attached and has been under the same ownership for the past 10 years. Cost measure · Is adequately measured and filed in the cadastre, regis- Only official costs are recorded. These include fees, transfer tered in the land register and free of title disputes. taxes, stamp duties, and any other payment to the property · Is located in a peri-urban commercial zone and no rezon- registry, notaries, public agencies or lawyers, if required by ing is required. law. Other taxes, such as capital gains tax or value added tax · Consists of land and a building. The land area is 6,000 (VAT) are excluded from the cost measure. If cost estimates square feet (557.4 square meters). A warehouse of 10,000 differ among sources, the median reported value is used. square feet (929 square meters) is located on the land. The Total costs are expressed as a percentage of the property warehouse is 10 years old, in good condition and was con- value, calculated assuming a property value of 50 times in- structed following all safety standards, building codes and come per capita. other legal requirements. · Will not be subject to renovations or additional building Time measure following the purchase; Time is recorded in calendar days. It is assumed that the min- · Has no trees, natural water sources, natural reserves or imum time required for each procedure is one day. Time cap- historical monuments of any kind; tures the median duration that property lawyers or registry · Will not be used for special purposes and no special per- officials indicate as necessary to complete a procedure. It is mits for residential use, industrial plants, waste storage, assumed that the entrepreneur does not waste time and com- certain types of agricultural activities, etc. are required; mits to completing each remaining procedure without delay. · Has no occupants (legal or illegal) and no other party If a procedure can be accelerated for an additional cost, the holds a legal interest in it. The purchasing company will fastest procedure is chosen. If procedures may be undertaken take vacant possession of the property. simultaneously, it is assumed that they are. It is assumed that the parties involved are aware of all regulations and their se- Procedures measure quence from the beginning. Time spent on gathering infor- A procedure is defined as any interaction of the buying or mation is not considered. selling company, their agents (if the agent is required by law) or the property itself with external parties, including govern- The methodology is developed in "Property," an ongoing re- ment agencies, inspectors, notaries, lawyers, etc. Interactions search project by Simeon Djankov, Facundo Martin and between company officers and employees are not considered. Caralee McLiesh. Getting credit · Coverage of the market · Scope of information collected and distributed Doing Business constructs measures on credit information · Access to the data sharing and the legal rights of borrowers and lenders. One set · Quality of data of indicators measures the coverage, scope, quality and acces- · Legal framework for information sharing and quality of sibility of credit information available through public or pri- data. vate credit registries. A second set describes how well collat- eral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. The surveys were adapted from previous versions designed in Data on credit information sharing are built in two stages: cooperation with the "Credit Reporting Systems Project" in first, the respective banking supervision authorities as well as the World Bank Group and with input from Professor Marco public information sources are surveyed to confirm the pres- Pagano of the University of Naples. Survey responses are ver- ence or absence of public credit registries and private credit ified through several rounds of follow-up communication information bureaus. Second, when applicable, a detailed with respondents as well as by contacting third parties and survey on the public or private credit registry's structure, law, consulting public sources. In more than a third of cases, the and associated rules collects data in 5 areas: survey data are complemented by teleconference calls. 84 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Public credit registry coverage supervised financial institutions, lenders can access informa- A public credit registry is defined as a database managed by tion from retailers and utilities from the private bureau (a the public sector, usually by the Central Bank or Superinten- score of 1). The public registry preserves more than 5 years of dent of Banks, that collects information on the standing of historical data (score of 1). It collects data on loans only if borrowers (persons or businesses) in the financial system and they are more than $11,000--3.6 times income per capita-- makes it available to financial institutions. The coverage indi- but the private bureau collects information on loans above cator reports the number of individuals and firms listed in 100 pesos, less than 1% of income per capita (a score of 1). the public credit registry with current information on repay- Consumers do not have the right to access their data (score of ment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. The num- 0). Summing across the variables gives the total score of 5 for ber is scaled to country's adult population (per 1,000 adult Uruguay. population). If a public registry does not operate, the cover- Cost to create and register collateral age value is 0. The indicator assesses the ease of creating and registering col- Private credit bureau coverage lateral. The data are based on research of collateral and insol- A private credit bureau is defined as a private firm or a non- vency laws and responses to a survey on secured transactions profit organization that maintains a database on the standing laws, developed with input and comments from a range of of borrowers (persons or businesses) in the financial system experts including those from the Center for Economic Analy- and facilitates exchange of credit information among banks sis of Law, the International Bar Association Committee E8 and financial institutions. Credit investigative bureaus and on Financial Law, and the European Bank for Reconstruction credit reporting firms that do not directly facilitate informa- and Development. tion exchange between financial institutions are not consid- Participating lawyers estimate the costs, based on the follow- ered. The coverage indicator reports the number of individu- ing standardized case: An entrepreneur with a medium size als or firms listed in the private credit bureau with current (100 employees) textile business located in the most popu- information on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit lous city seeks a loan from a local bank. The loan would fi- outstanding. The number is scaled to the country's adult nance the purchase of industrial sewing machines worth 10 population (per 1,000 adult population). If a private bureau times income per capita. The entrepreneur secures the loan does not operate, the coverage value is 0. by pledging the industrial sewing machines as collateral while keeping both possession and ownership title (nonpossessory Credit information availability security right). If a non possessory security right is unavail- This index measures rules affecting the scope, access and able in the country, the closest functional substitute is used. quality of credit information available through either public Costs include taxes, notary fees and duties associated with or private bureaus. A score of 1 is assigned for each of the fol- creating the security right and registering it in the collateral lowing 6 features of the credit information system: registry, where such a registry operates. Countries without a · Both positive and negative credit information (for exam- registry usually have lower costs, although the secured credi- ple on payment history, number and kind of accounts, tor is disadvantaged elsewhere because they are unable to no- number and frequency of late payments and any collec- tify other creditors of their right to the collateral through a tions or bankruptcies) is distributed; registry. The cost measure is presented as a percentage of in- come per capita. · Data on both firms and individuals is distributed; · Data from retailers, trade creditors and/or utilities as well Legal rights of borrowers and lenders as financial institutions is distributed; The index measures the degree to which collateral and bank- · More than 5 years of historical data is preserved; ruptcy laws facilitate lending. It is based on data collected · Data on loans of above 1% income per capita is through research of collateral and insolvency laws supported distributed; by the responses to the survey on secured transactions laws. · By law, the consumer has the right to access their data. It includes 3 aspects related to legal rights in bankruptcy, and The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating 7 aspects found in collateral law. The indicators related to that more credit information is available from either a public creditor rights in bankruptcy are based on the methodology registry or a private bureau to facilitate lending decisions. For of La Porta and others (1998). A score of 1 is assigned for example, in Uruguay, both a public and private registry oper- each of the following features of the laws: ate. The private bureau distributes only negative information, · Secured creditors are able to seize their collateral when a but the public registry distributes both negative and positive debtor enters reorganization--that is there is no "auto- information (a score of 1). Both the public and private reg- matic stay" or "asset freeze" imposed by the court. istries distribute data on firms as well as individuals (a score · Secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds from of 1). Although the public registry shares data only among liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other parties DATA NOTES 85 such as government or workers. · Parties may agree on enforcement procedures by contract. · Management does not stay in reorganization. An admin- · Creditors may both seize and sell collateral out of court. istrator is responsible for managing the business during The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating reorganization, rather than the management of the bank- that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to ex- rupt debtor. pand access to credit. · General--rather than specific--description of assets is permitted in collateral agreements. This methodology is developed in Simeon Djankov, Caralee · General--rather than specific--description of debt is per- McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, "Private Credit Around the mitted in collateral agreements. World," working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard · Any legal or natural person may grant or take security. University, July 2004; and adapted from La Porta and others · A unified registry including charges over movable prop- (1998). erty operates. · Security provides priority outside of bankruptcy. Protecting investors · Has only national shareholders. · Has only invested in the country and has no subsidiaries Doing Business distinguishes 3 dimensions of investor protec- or operations abroad. tion: disclosure of ownership and financial information; legal · Is not involved in the banking, power, telecommunica- protections of small investors; and enforcement capabilities tions or insurance industries or any other industry where in the courts or securities regulator. Doing Business in 2005 there are special regulations applicable to the particular focuses on disclosure of ownership and financial informa- industry. tion. The data come from a survey of corporate and securities lawyers and are based on relevant corporate governance laws Disclosure measure and regulations applicable to a standard company. Only gen- The index captures seven ways of enhancing disclosure: eral rules--as opposed to those applicable to companies whether laws and regulations require reporting (i) family, (ii) within a particular industry--are considered. In building the indirect and (iii) beneficial ownership; (iv) disclosing infor- data, the highest available level of disclosure is taken into ac- mation on voting agreements between shareholders; (v) audit count, reflecting the notion that small investors can put their committees to the board of directors; (vi) use of external au- money in public or private equity. In countries where stock ditors; and (vii) ownership and financial information is pub- exchange regulations and securities laws are in force, the dis- licly available to all current and potential investors. The index closure index assesses these regulations. In other countries, varies between 0 and 7, with higher values indicating more the disclosure requirements come from the company law. So disclosure. For example, in Bangladesh the company is not the indicators are relevant for private companies as well as required to disclose family ownership (a score of 0), but is re- publicly listed ones. quired to disclose indirect ownership (a score of 1) and ben- eficial ownership (a score of 1). Voting agreements are not re- Assumptions about the business quired to be disclosed (a score of 0). There are no To make the data comparable across countries, the following requirements for audit committees (a score of 0), but exter- assumptions are made about the business. The business: nal auditors must be used (a score of 1). Ownership and fi- · Is a publicly-traded corporation, listed on the country's nancial information are not required to be disclosed publicly most important stock exchange. If there are no publicly- (a score of 0). Summing across all variables yields the total traded companies in the country, it is assumed that the index of 3 for Bangladesh. company is a big private company with a large number of shareholders and employees. The methodology is developed in "Corporate Theft," an · Has a Board of Directors and a Chief Executive Officer ongoing research project by Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, (CEO), who has the legal capacity to act on behalf of the Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. Company where permitted, even if this is not specifically required by law. 86 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Enforcing contracts · The debtor opposes the complaint (default judgment is not an option). Indicators on enforcing contracts measure the efficiency of · The judge decides every motion for the plaintiff. the judicial (or administrative) system in the collection of · The plaintiff attempts to introduce documentary evidence overdue debt. The data are built following the step-by-step and to call one witness. The debtor attempts to call one evolution of a payment dispute either before local courts or witness. Neither party presents objections. through an administrative process, if such a process is avail- · The judgment is in favor of the plaintiff. able and preferred by creditors. The data are collected through research of the codes of civil procedures and other Procedures measure court regulations, as well as surveys to local litigation lawyers. The indicator measures the number of procedures mandated At least 2 lawyers participate in each country and in a quarter by law or court regulation that demand interaction between of the countries, judges complete the survey as well. To ensure the parties or between them and the judge (or administrator) comparability, survey respondents are provided with signifi- or court officer. cant detail, including the amount of the claim, the location and main characteristics of the litigants, the presence of city Cost measure regulations, the nature of the remedy requested by the plain- The indicator measures the official cost of going through tiff, the merit of the plaintiff's and the defendant's claims and court procedures, including court costs and attorney fees the social implications of the judicial outcomes. where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, or the Assumptions about the case costs of an administrative debt recovery procedure, expressed as a percentage of the debt value. To make the case comparable across countries, 10 assump- tions are employed: Time measure · The debt value equals 200% of the country's income per The indicator measures the time of dispute resolution--in capita. calendar days--counted from the moment the plaintiff files · The plaintiff has fully complied with the contract (the the lawsuit in court until settlement or payment. This in- plaintiff is 100% right). cludes both the days where actions take place and waiting pe- · The case presents a lawful transaction between businesses riods between actions. The respondents make separate esti- residing in the country's most populous city. mates of the average duration of different stages of the · The bank refuses payment for lack of funds in the bor- dispute resolution: for the completion of service of process rower's account. (time to notify the defendant), the issuance of judgment · The plaintiff attempts to recover the debt by filing (time for the trial or administrative process) and the moment a law suit or going through an administrative process, if of payment or repossession (time for enforcement). such a process is available and preferred by creditors. · The debtor attempts to delay service of process but it is fi- The methodology is originally developed in Djankov and others nally accomplished. (2003) and adopted with minor changes here. Closing a business board (aside from the founder, there is no other share- holder who has above 1% of shares). Doing Business studies the time and cost of insolvency pro- · Has downtown real estate as its major asset, on which it ceedings involving domestic entities. The data are derived runs a hotel. from survey responses by local law firms, all members of the · Has a professional general manager. International Bar Association. Answers were provided by a · Has average annual revenue of 1,000 times income per senior partner at each firm, in cooperation with one or two capita over the last 3 years. junior associates. · Has 201 employees and 50 suppliers, each of whom is owed money for the last delivery. Assumptions about the business · Borrowed from a domestic bank 5 years ago (the loan has To make the business comparable across countries, 10 as- 10 years to full repayment) and bought real estate (the sumptions are employed. The business: hotel building), using it as a security for the bank loan. · Is a limited liability company. · Has observed the payment schedule and all other condi- · Operates in the country's most populous city. tions of the loan up to now. · Is 100% domestically owned, of which 51% is owned by · Has a mortgage with the value of the mortgage principal its founder, who is also the chairman of the supervisory being exactly equal to the market value of the hotel. DATA NOTES 87 Assumptions about the case Time measure To make the case comparable across countries, 3 assumptions Time is recorded in calendar years. It captures the average du- are employed: ration to complete a procedure as estimated by insolvency · In January 2004 the business is experiencing liquidity lawyers. Information is collected on the sequence of the problems. The company's loss in 2003 brought its net bankruptcy procedures and on whether any procedures can worth to a negative figure. There is no cash to pay the bank be carried out simultaneously. Delays due to legal derailment either interest or principal in full, due on January 2, 2004. tactics that parties to the insolvency may use, in particular ex- Therefore, the business defaults on its loan. Management tension of response periods or appeals, are considered. believes that losses will be incurred in 2004 and 2005 as well. Recovery rate · The bank holds a floating charge against the hotel in The recovery rate measures the efficiency of foreclosure or countries where floating charges are possible. If the law bankruptcy procedures. It estimates how many cents on the does not permit a floating charge, but contracts com- dollar claimants--creditors, tax authorities, and employees-- monly use some other provision to that effect, this provi- recover from an insolvent firm. The calculation takes into ac- sion is specified in the lending contract. count whether the business is kept as a going concern during · The business has too many creditors to renegotiate out of the proceedings, as well as court, attorney and other related court. Its options are: a procedure aimed at rehabilitation costs and the discounted value due to the time spent closing or any procedure that will reorganize the business to per- down. If the business keeps operating, no value is lost on the mit further operation; a procedure aimed at liquidation; initial claim, set at 100 cents on the dollar. If not, the initial or a procedure aimed at selling the hotel, either as a going concern or piecemeal, either enforced through court (or a 100 cents on the dollar are reduced to 70 cents on the dollar. government authority like a debt collection agency) or out Then, the official costs of the insolvency procedure are de- of court (receivership). ducted (1 cent for each percentage cost of the initial value). Finally, the value lost due to the time that the money remains Cost measure tied up in insolvency procedures is taken into account, in- cluding the loss of value due to depreciation of the hotel fur- The cost of the bankruptcy proceedings are calculated based niture. Consistent with the international accounting practice, on answers by practicing insolvency lawyers. If several re- the depreciation rate of office furniture is taken to be 20%. In spondents report different estimates, the median reported turn, the value of the furniture is assumed to be a quarter of value is used. Costs include court costs, as well as fees of in- the total value of assets. The recovery rate is the present value solvency practitioners, independent assessors, lawyers, ac- of the remaining proceeds, using end-2003 lending rates countants, etc. Bribes are excluded. The cost figures are aver- from IMF's International Financial Statistics and supple- ages of the estimates in a multiple-choice question, where the mented with data from central banks. respondents choose among the following options: 0­2%, 3­5%, 6­10%, 11­15%, 16­20%, 21­25%, 26­50%, and This methodology is developed in "Efficiency in Bankruptcy," an more than 50% of the estate value of the bankrupt business. ongoing research project by Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Ta- tiana Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer. Ease of doing business formation availability and legal rights scores. The protecting investors and closing a business rankings is based on the dis- The ease of doing business index is the simple average of closure index and recovery rates, respectively. And the en- country rankings (from 1 to 135) in each of the 7 topics cov- forcing contracts ranking averages the country rankings on ered in Doing Business in 2005. The ranking for each topic is the procedures, time and cost to enforce contracts. The ease the simple average of rankings for each of the indicators. The of doing business measure ranges from 1 to 135, with higher starting a business ranking averages the country rankings on values indicating more efficient regulation and stronger pro- the procedures, days, cost and minimum capital requirement tections of property rights. to register a business. The hiring and firing ranking averages the country rankings on the rigidity of employment index This methodology is developed by Simeon Djankov, Caralee and firing costs. The property ranking averages the country McLiesh, and Rita Ramalho in "Growth and the Ease of Doing rankings on the procedures, time and cost to register prop- Business," working paper, World Bank, Aug. 2004. erty. The credit ranking is based on the sum of the credit in- 89 Starting a Business Hiring and Firing Workers January 2004 January 2004 Minimum Difficulty Rigidity Difficulty Rigidity of Cost capital of hiring of hours of firing employment Firing Number of Time (% of income (% of income index index index index costs Economy procedures (days) per capita) per capita) (0­100) (0­100) (0­100) (0­100) (weeks) Albania 11 47 32.2 41.3 11 60 20 30 55 Algeria 14 26 27.3 65.5 56 60 50 55 17 Angola 14 146 884.6 64.4 44 80 100 75 116 Argentina 15 32 15.7 8.1 44 80 30 51 94 Armenia 10 25 7.0 4.5 17 40 50 36 17 Australia 2 2 2.1 0.0 0 40 10 17 17 Austria 9 29 6.0 64.1 0 80 40 40 55 Azerbaijan 14 123 14.7 0.0 33 40 40 38 42 Bangladesh 8 35 91.0 0.0 11 40 20 24 47 Belarus 16 79 25.3 44.3 33 60 70 54 21 Belgium 4 34 11.3 14.1 11 40 10 20 8 Benin 8 32 196.9 333.4 72 60 50 61 54 Bhutan 11 62 11.0 0.0 78 60 10 49 94 Bolivia 15 59 173.9 4.6 61 60 0 40 98 Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 54 46.2 65.0 78 40 30 49 33 Botswana 11 108 11.3 0.0 0 20 40 20 19 Brazil 17 152 11.7 0.0 67 80 70 72 165 Bulgaria 11 32 10.3 116.6 33 40 10 28 30 Burkina Faso 13 135 152.8 498.6 100 100 70 90 80 Burundi 11 43 191.5 0.0 50 40 60 50 41 Cambodia 11 94 480.1 394.0 33 80 30 48 39 Cameroon 12 37 182.5 232.0 61 80 80 74 46 Canada 2 3 1.0 0.0 11 0 0 4 28 Central African Republic 10 14 204.5 559.2 89 80 60 76 37 Chad 19 75 344.2 610.4 100 80 60 80 47 Chile 9 27 10.0 0.0 17 20 20 19 51 China 12 41 14.5 1104.2 11 40 40 30 90 Colombia 14 43 27.4 0.0 72 60 20 51 49 Congo, Dem. Rep. 13 155 556.8 246.8 72 100 60 77 62 Congo, Rep. 8 67 317.6 244.6 89 80 90 86 42 Costa Rica 11 77 25.7 0.0 44 60 0 35 38 Côte d'Ivoire 11 58 133.6 222.3 78 100 30 69 92 Croatia 12 49 14.4 24.4 61 60 50 57 55 Czech Republic 10 40 10.8 44.5 44 20 20 28 22 Denmark 4 4 0.0 48.8 0 40 10 17 39 Dominican Republic 10 78 25.4 1.9 11 80 30 40 70 Ecuador 14 92 47.4 10.4 44 40 70 51 131 Egypt, Arab Rep. 13 43 63.0 815.6 0 80 80 53 162 El Salvador 12 115 128.0 132.5 67 40 50 52 110 Estonia 6 72 7.5 49.7 11 80 40 44 33 Ethiopia 7 32 77.4 1821.9 50 60 20 43 48 Finland 3 14 1.2 29.3 33 60 40 44 24 France 7 8 1.1 0.0 78 80 40 66 32 Georgia 9 25 13.7 54.5 17 60 70 49 21 Germany 9 45 5.9 48.8 44 80 40 55 80 Ghana 12 85 87.5 31.4 11 40 50 34 25 90 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Starting a Business Hiring and Firing Workers January 2004 January 2004 Minimum Difficulty Rigidity Difficulty Rigidity of Cost capital of hiring of hours of firing employment Firing Number of Time (% of income (% of income index index index index costs Economy procedures (days) per capita) per capita) (0­100) (0­100) (0­100) (0­100) (weeks) Greece 15 38 35.2 125.7 78 80 40 66 133 Guatemala 15 39 62.8 31.8 61 40 20 40 170 Guinea 13 49 208.2 475.4 67 80 30 59 133 Haiti 12 203 176.1 182.4 11 40 20 24 26 Honduras 13 62 72.9 37.0 22 40 30 31 46 Hong Kong, China 5 11 3.4 0.0 0 0 0 0 13 Hungary 6 52 22.9 86.4 11 80 30 40 34 India 11 89 49.5 0.0 33 20 90 48 79 Indonesia 12 151 130.7 125.6 61 40 70 57 157 Iran, Islamic Rep. 9 48 7.3 2.1 0 60 60 40 122 Ireland 4 24 10.3 0.0 28 40 20 29 52 Israel 5 34 5.5 0.0 0 80 20 33 90 Italy 9 13 16.2 11.2 61 60 30 50 47 Jamaica 7 31 15.4 0.0 11 20 0 10 12 Japan 11 31 10.6 74.9 33 40 0 24 21 Jordan 11 36 52.0 1147.7 11 40 50 34 90 Kazakhstan 9 25 10.5 32.7 0 60 20 27 17 Kenya 12 47 53.4 0.0 22 20 30 24 47 Korea, Rep. 12 22 17.7 332.0 11 60 30 34 90 Kuwait 13 35 2.4 148.5 0 60 0 20 42 Kyrgyz Republic 8 21 11.6 0.6 33 40 40 38 21 Lao PDR 9 198 18.5 28.5 11 60 80 50 185 Latvia 7 18 17.6 41.4 78 20 50 49 42 Lebanon 6 46 131.5 82.3 44 0 40 28 103 Lesotho 9 92 58.4 17.7 0 60 20 27 47 Lithuania 8 26 3.7 62.8 33 60 30 41 34 Macedonia, FYR 13 48 11.6 89.5 33 40 40 38 38 Madagascar 13 44 65.3 50.7 28 60 60 49 41 Malawi 10 35 140.8 0.0 22 20 20 21 90 Malaysia 9 30 25.1 0.0 0 0 10 3 74 Mali 13 42 187.4 482.3 78 60 60 66 81 Mauritania 11 82 140.8 858.1 89 60 60 70 31 Mexico 8 58 16.7 15.5 67 60 90 72 83 Moldova 10 30 18.6 24.6 33 60 70 54 21 Mongolia 8 20 8.1 182.1 11 80 20 37 17 Morocco 5 11 12.3 718.6 100 40 70 70 101 Mozambique 14 153 95.8 14.5 72 80 40 64 141 Namibia 10 85 19.3 0.0 0 60 40 33 26 Nepal 7 21 74.1 0.0 22 20 90 44 90 Netherlands 7 11 13.2 66.2 28 60 40 43 16 New Zealand 2 12 0.2 0.0 11 0 10 7 0 Nicaragua 9 45 170.1 0.0 22 80 50 51 24 Niger 11 27 396.4 744.7 100 100 70 90 76 Nigeria 10 44 95.2 59.4 22 80 30 44 13 Norway 4 23 2.9 28.9 11 40 40 30 12 Oman 9 34 4.9 100.1 44 60 0 35 13 DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 91 Starting a Business Hiring and Firing Workers January 2004 January 2004 Minimum Difficulty Rigidity Difficulty Rigidity of Cost capital of hiring of hours of firing employment Firing Number of Time (% of income (% of income index index index index costs Economy procedures (days) per capita) per capita) (0­100) (0­100) (0­100) (0­100) (weeks) Pakistan 11 24 36.0 0.0 78 40 30 49 90 Panama 7 19 25.1 0.0 78 40 70 63 47 Papua New Guinea 8 56 30.7 0.0 11 20 20 17 38 Paraguay 17 74 157.6 0.0 56 60 60 59 99 Peru 10 98 36.4 0.0 44 60 60 55 56 Philippines 11 50 19.5 2.2 22 60 40 41 90 Poland 10 31 20.6 237.9 11 60 30 34 25 Portugal 11 78 13.5 39.5 33 80 60 58 98 Puerto Rico 7 7 1.0 0.0 22 20 20 21 0 Romania 5 28 7.4 0.0 78 60 50 63 98 Russia 9 36 6.7 5.6 0 60 20 27 17 Rwanda 9 21 316.9 0.0 89 80 60 76 54 Saudi Arabia 12 64 69.7 1549.5 0 40 0 13 79 Senegal 9 57 112.9 270.4 61 60 70 64 38 Serbia and Montenegro 11 51 9.5 120.3 28 0 40 23 21 Sierra Leone 9 26 1268.4 0.0 78 80 70 76 188 Singapore 7 8 1.2 0.0 0 0 0 0 4 Slovak Republic 9 52 5.7 46.1 0 20 10 10 17 Slovenia 10 61 12.3 19.0 28 80 50 53 47 South Africa 9 38 9.1 0.0 56 40 60 52 38 Spain 7 108 16.5 16.9 67 80 60 69 68 Sri Lanka 8 50 10.7 0.0 0 40 80 40 108 Sweden 3 16 0.7 36.9 28 60 40 43 24 Switzerland 6 20 8.6 33.2 0 40 10 17 12 Syrian Arab Republic 12 47 34.2 5053.9 0 60 50 37 79 Taiwan, China 8 48 6.3 224.7 61 60 30 50 90 Tanzania 13 35 186.9 6.8 56 80 60 65 38 Thailand 8 33 6.7 0.0 67 40 20 42 47 Togo 13 53 229.4 485.7 89 80 60 76 84 Tunisia 9 14 11.0 327.3 61 0 100 54 29 Turkey 8 9 26.4 0.0 44 80 40 55 112 Uganda 17 36 131.3 0.0 0 20 0 7 12 Ukraine 15 34 17.6 113.9 33 80 80 64 94 United Arab Emirates 12 54 26.5 416.9 0 80 20 33 96 United Kingdom 6 18 0.9 0.0 11 40 10 20 25 United States 5 5 0.6 0.0 0 0 10 3 8 Uruguay 11 45 48.2 181.6 33 60 0 31 34 Uzbekistan 9 35 17.0 21.9 33 40 100 58 28 Venezuela, RB 13 116 15.0 0.0 78 80 10 56 83 Vietnam 11 56 28.6 0.0 56 40 70 55 98 Yemen, Rep. 12 63 269.3 1561.1 0 80 30 37 17 Zambia 6 35 22.8 2.7 0 40 40 27 47 Zimbabwe 10 96 304.7 53.0 11 40 20 24 29 92 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Registering Property Getting Credit January 2004 January 2004 Cost to Legal Credit Private Cost create collateral rights information Public registry bureau Number of Time (% of property (% of income index index coverage coverage Economy procedures (days) value) per capita) (0­10) (0­6) (per 1,000 adults) (per 1,000 adults) Albania 7 47 3.8 0.3 9 0 0 0 Algeria 16 52 9.0 0.4 3 0 0 0 Angola 8 335 11.0 6.9 3 4 7 0 Argentina 5 44 8.8 21.3 3 6 201 733 Armenia 4 18 0.9 0.9 4 . . . . 0 Australia 5 7 4.5 5.5 9 5 0 954 Austria 3 32 4.5 0.0 5 5 11 393 Azerbaijan 7 61 0.5 9.2 6 0 0 0 Bangladesh . . . . . . 21.3 . . 3 7 0 Belarus 7 231 0.2 3.6 5 3 . . 0 Belgium 2 132 12.8 6.4 7 6 533 0 Benin 3 50 15.1 80.7 4 2 2 0 Bhutan 4 44 1.0 0.6 . . 0 0 0 Bolivia 7 92 5.1 51.0 3 4 96 0 Bosnia and Herzegovina 7 331 6.1 15.2 5 4 0 156 Botswana 4 69 5.0 2.0 9 5 0 309 Brazil 14 42 2.0 21.4 2 6 78 425 Bulgaria 9 19 2.4 1.0 6 4 13 0 Burkina Faso 8 107 16.2 22.2 4 2 2 0 Burundi 5 94 18.1 38.3 . . 2 2 0 Cambodia 7 56 4.1 0.0 4 0 0 0 Cameroon 5 93 18.8 87.6 4 2 1 0 Canada 6 20 2.0 0.0 7 5 0 1000 Central African Republic 3 69 17.4 15.0 3 3 1 0 Chad 6 44 13.3 48.9 3 3 0 0 Chile 6 31 1.4 5.3 4 6 290 220 China 3 32 3.1 0.0 2 3 4 0 Colombia 7 23 3.6 38.9 4 4 0 300 Congo, Dem. Rep. 8 106 10.1 130.0 3 0 0 0 Congo, Rep. 6 103 22.5 151.1 3 3 1 0 Costa Rica 6 21 3.6 16.2 4 5 10 1000 Côte d'Ivoire 7 340 10.2 155.9 2 2 2 0 Croatia 5 956 2.5 6.1 4 0 0 0 Czech Republic 4 122 3.0 0.6 6 5 21 249 Denmark 6 42 0.6 16.4 7 3 0 71 Dominican Republic 7 107 6.3 38.4 4 5 . . 294 Ecuador 12 21 16.0 10.8 3 5 124 0 Egypt, Arab Rep. 7 193 7.0 52.7 0 3 102 0 El Salvador 5 52 3.5 5.0 5 5 198 823 Estonia 4 65 0.5 43.0 . . 5 0 95 Ethiopia 15 56 11.0 10.6 5 0 0 0 Finland 3 14 4.0 0.8 6 4 0 148 France 10 193 5.8 0.5 3 3 17 0 Georgia 8 39 2.5 30.0 7 0 0 0 Germany 4 41 4.2 0.0 8 6 6 856 Ghana 7 382 4.1 37.9 5 2 0 1 DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 93 Registering Property Getting Credit January 2004 January 2004 Cost to Legal Credit Private Cost create collateral rights information Public registry bureau Number of Time (% of property (% of income index index coverage coverage Economy procedures (days) value) per capita) (0­10) (0­6) (per 1,000 adults) (per 1,000 adults) Greece 12 23 13.7 29.5 1 4 0 111 Guatemala 5 55 2.4 15.0 4 4 0 124 Guinea 6 104 15.7 31.7 2 2 0 0 Haiti 5 195 8.1 30.2 2 3 3 0 Honduras 7 36 8.8 36.6 5 3 61 0 Hong Kong, China 3 56 2.0 0.2 10 4 0 615 Hungary 4 79 6.8 13.5 5 3 0 33 India 6 67 13.9 11.3 4 0 0 0 Indonesia 6 33 11.0 2.5 5 3 4 0 Iran, Islamic Rep. 9 36 5.0 . . 5 2 . . 0 Ireland 5 38 10.3 3.2 8 5 0 1000 Israel 7 144 7.5 4.0 8 4 0 11 Italy 8 27 1.3 3.7 3 6 79 571 Jamaica 5 54 13.5 . . 6 0 0 0 Japan 6 14 4.1 2.7 6 6 0 615 Jordan 8 22 10.0 56.3 6 3 5 0 Kazakhstan 8 52 1.8 4.1 5 0 0 0 Kenya 7 39 4.0 3.3 8 4 0 1 Korea, Rep. 7 11 6.3 8.1 6 5 0 1000 Kuwait 8 75 1.0 0.1 5 4 0 166 Kyrgyz Republic 7 15 5.3 12.4 8 0 0 0 Lao PDR 9 135 1.1 3.8 2 0 . . 0 Latvia 10 62 2.1 1.5 8 4 6 0 Lebanon 8 25 5.9 2.2 4 4 31 0 Lesotho 6 101 9.1 44.5 . . 0 0 0 Lithuania 3 3 0.9 4.1 4 3 44 0 Macedonia, FYR 6 74 3.7 15.9 6 2 6 0 Madagascar . . . . . . 39.0 4 3 3 0 Malawi 6 118 3.5 . . . . 0 0 0 Malaysia 4 143 2.2 3.2 8 6 339 . . Mali 5 44 20.6 58.5 3 2 1 0 Mauritania 4 49 8.5 5.6 7 1 2 0 Mexico 5 74 5.3 25.7 2 6 0 382 Moldova 5 81 1.3 1.5 6 0 0 0 Mongolia 4 10 0.4 2.0 5 3 23 0 Morocco 3 82 6.1 62.2 2 2 6 0 Mozambique 7 33 11.9 5.0 4 4 5 0 Namibia 9 28 9.7 28.3 . . 5 0 353 Nepal . . . . . . 2.4 4 3 1 0 Netherlands 4 5 6.4 0.0 9 5 0 645 New Zealand 2 2 0.2 0.0 9 5 0 978 Nicaragua 7 65 6.5 2.0 4 5 62 0 Niger 5 49 12.5 74.6 4 3 1 0 Nigeria 21 274 27.2 20.7 8 3 0 0 Norway 1 1 2.5 0.5 6 5 0 1000 Oman 4 16 3.0 20.9 3 0 0 0 94 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Registering Property Getting Credit January 2004 January 2004 Cost to Legal Credit Private Cost create collateral rights information Public registry bureau Number of Time (% of property (% of income index index coverage coverage Economy procedures (days) value) per capita) (0­10) (0­6) (per 1,000 adults) (per 1,000 adults) Pakistan 5 49 4.2 11.5 4 4 2 3 Panama 7 44 2.4 1.9 6 5 0 530 Papua New Guinea 4 72 5.2 2.9 . . 0 0 0 Paraguay 7 48 2.1 26.0 3 6 90 . . Peru 5 31 3.2 16.0 2 6 143 271 Philippines 8 33 5.7 8.3 5 2 0 34 Poland 7 204 1.6 1.2 2 5 0 380 Portugal 5 83 7.3 10.2 5 5 637 79 Puerto Rico . . . . . . 0.1 6 5 0 643 Romania 8 170 1.9 1.1 4 3 4 0 Russia 6 37 0.8 11.6 3 0 0 0 Rwanda 5 354 9.5 . . 5 3 1 0 Saudi Arabia 4 4 0.0 0.0 . . 2 1 0 Senegal 6 114 34.0 16.5 3 2 3 0 Serbia and Montenegro 6 186 5.5 87.4 5 1 1 0 Sierra Leone 8 58 16.5 175.3 5 0 0 0 Singapore 3 9 1.5 0.3 10 4 0 335 Slovak Republic 5 22 3.1 20.1 9 3 6 0 Slovenia 6 391 2.0 3.2 6 3 25 0 South Africa 6 20 11.3 2.3 6 5 0 636 Spain 4 20 7.1 11.4 5 6 394 65 Sri Lanka 8 63 5.1 0.7 3 2 0 19 Sweden 1 2 3.0 15.0 6 4 0 980 Switzerland 4 16 1.4 0.0 6 5 0 233 Syrian Arab Republic 4 23 30.4 6.4 5 0 0 0 Taiwan, China 3 7 7.0 0.2 4 5 334 . . Tanzania 12 61 12.6 21.3 5 0 0 0 Thailand 2 2 6.3 1.1 5 5 0 150 Togo 6 212 7.8 83.4 2 2 3 0 Tunisia 5 57 6.1 22.4 4 2 93 0 Turkey 8 9 3.3 19.9 1 4 32 300 Uganda 8 48 5.5 11.9 5 0 0 0 Ukraine 9 93 4.3 3.5 6 0 0 0 United Arab Emirates 3 9 2.1 9.4 4 2 18 0 United Kingdom 2 21 4.1 0.1 10 6 0 1000 United States 4 12 0.5 0.1 7 6 0 1000 Uruguay 8 66 7.1 28.6 4 5 72 756 Uzbekistan 12 97 11.8 1.0 5 0 0 0 Venezuela, RB 8 34 1.8 7.7 4 4 286 0 Vietnam 5 78 5.5 2.0 4 3 8 0 Yemen, Rep. 6 21 3.9 4.7 2 1 12 0 Zambia 6 70 9.2 19.2 6 0 0 0 Zimbabwe 4 30 18.1 2.4 7 0 0 0 DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 95 Protecting Investors Enforcing Contracts Closing a Business January 2004 January 2004 January 2004 Recovery rate Disclosure index Number of Time Cost Time Cost (cents on Economy (0­7) procedures (days) (% of debt) (years) (% of estate) the dollar) Albania 3 39 390 28.6 4.0 38 24.6 Algeria 2 49 407 28.7 3.5 4 37.0 Angola 2 47 1011 9.2 4.7 18 1.2 Argentina 5 33 520 15.0 2.8 18 23.5 Armenia 3 24 195 17.8 1.9 4 39.6 Australia 6 11 157 14.4 1.0 8 80.0 Austria 6 20 374 9.8 1.0 18 72.5 Azerbaijan 2 25 267 19.8 2.7 8 33.2 Bangladesh 3 29 365 21.3 4.0 8 23.2 Belarus 1 28 250 20.7 5.8 4 11.9 Belgium 4 27 112 6.2 0.9 4 86.2 Benin 1 49 570 29.6 3.1 18 8.8 NO NO Bhutan 1 20 275 113.8 PRACTICE PRACTICE 0.0 Bolivia 2 47 591 10.6 1.8 18 32.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 36 330 19.6 3.3 8 32.1 Botswana 5 26 154 24.8 2.2 18 50.9 Brazil 5 25 566 15.5 10.0 8 0.2 Bulgaria 2 34 440 14.0 3.3 8 34.2 Burkina Faso 1 41 458 92.5 4.0 8 6.4 Burundi 1 51 512 35.0 4.0 18 16.4 NO NO Cambodia 0 31 401 121.3 PRACTICE PRACTICE 0.0 Cameroon 1 58 585 36.4 3.2 18 21.4 Canada 7 17 346 12.0 0.8 4 89.1 Central African Republic 1 45 660 72.2 4.8 76 0.0 Chad 1 52 526 54.9 10.0 76 0.0 Chile 6 28 305 10.4 5.6 18 19.3 China 4 25 241 25.5 2.4 18 35.2 Colombia 2 37 363 18.6 3.0 1 54.6 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 51 909 256.8 5.2 18 1.9 Congo, Rep. 3 47 560 43.0 3.0 38 10.3 Costa Rica 1 34 550 41.2 3.5 18 15.5 Côte d'Ivoire 2 25 525 47.6 2.2 18 14.8 Croatia 4 22 415 10.0 3.1 18 26.1 Czech Republic 6 22 300 9.6 9.2 18 16.8 Denmark 5 15 83 6.6 3.4 8 59.8 Dominican Republic 1 29 580 35.0 3.5 8 17.1 Ecuador 1 41 388 15.3 4.3 18 18.1 Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 55 410 18.4 4.2 18 18.4 El Salvador 1 41 275 12.5 4.0 8 24.9 Estonia 4 25 150 10.6 3.0 8 40.0 Ethiopia 2 30 420 14.8 2.4 8 40.0 Finland 5 27 240 7.2 0.9 1 90.2 France 6 21 75 11.7 1.9 8 46.6 Georgia 5 18 375 31.7 3.2 4 20.3 Germany 5 26 184 10.5 1.2 8 50.3 96 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Protecting Investors Enforcing Contracts Closing a Business January 2004 January 2004 January 2004 Recovery rate Disclosure index Number of Time Cost Time Cost (cents on Economy (0­7) procedures (days) (% of debt) (years) (% of estate) the dollar) Ghana 2 23 200 14.4 1.9 18 28.2 Greece 5 14 151 12.7 2.0 8 45.6 Guatemala 1 37 1459 14.5 4.0 18 18.3 Guinea 4 44 306 27.6 3.8 8 22.2 Haiti 1 35 368 25.0 5.7 38 1.5 Honduras 0 36 545 33.1 3.7 8 21.5 Hong Kong, China 6 16 211 12.9 1.1 8 82.3 Hungary 5 21 365 8.1 2.0 23 30.8 India 4 40 425 43.1 10.0 8 12.5 Indonesia 4 34 570 126.5 6.0 18 10.6 Iran, Islamic Rep. 2 23 545 12.0 4.5 8 19.1 Ireland 6 16 217 21.1 0.4 8 88.9 Israel 7 27 585 22.1 4.0 23 38.0 Italy 5 18 1390 17.6 1.2 18 43.5 Jamaica 2 18 202 27.8 1.1 18 63.5 Japan 6 16 60 8.6 0.5 4 92.4 Jordan 3 43 342 8.8 4.3 8 26.7 Kazakhstan 5 41 400 8.5 3.3 18 13.4 Kenya 2 25 360 41.3 4.5 18 14.7 Korea, Rep. 6 29 75 5.4 1.5 4 81.1 Kuwait 1 52 390 13.3 4.2 1 38.7 Kyrgyz Republic 3 46 492 47.9 3.5 4 24.4 Lao PDR 1 53 443 30.3 5.0 76 0.0 Latvia 5 23 189 11.0 1.1 4 85.0 Lebanon 1 39 721 26.7 4.0 18 19.3 Lesotho 4 49 285 23.9 2.6 8 33.0 Lithuania 6 17 154 14.1 1.2 8 52.4 Macedonia, FYR 4 27 509 32.8 3.7 38 7.9 no no Madagascar 1 29 280 22.8 practice practice 0.0 Malawi 2 16 277 136.5 2.6 8 17.6 Malaysia 5 31 300 20.2 2.3 18 35.4 Mali 1 28 340 34.6 3.6 18 6.3 Mauritania 1 28 410 29.3 8.0 8 6.1 Mexico 5 37 421 20.0 1.8 18 64.5 Moldova 3 37 280 16.2 2.8 8 29.3 Mongolia 3 26 314 22.6 4.0 8 16.5 Morocco 4 17 240 17.7 1.8 18 34.8 Mozambique 2 38 580 16.0 5.0 8 12.3 Namibia 1 31 270 28.3 1.0 4 53.7 Nepal 3 28 350 25.8 5.0 8 25.8 Netherlands 5 22 48 17.0 1.7 1 86.2 New Zealand 5 19 50 4.8 2.0 4 71.4 Nicaragua 1 18 155 16.3 2.2 8 38.1 Niger 1 33 330 42.0 5.0 18 2.6 Nigeria 6 23 730 37.2 1.5 18 33.2 Norway 5 14 87 4.2 0.9 1 87.9 DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 97 Protecting Investors Enforcing Contracts Closing a Business January 2004 January 2004 January 2004 Recovery rate Disclosure index Number of Time Cost Time Cost (cents on Economy (0­7) procedures (days) (% of debt) (years) (% of estate) the dollar) Oman 1 41 455 10.0 7.0 4 23.6 Pakistan 4 46 395 35.2 2.8 4 38.1 Panama 1 45 355 37.0 2.0 38 18.2 Papua New Guinea 4 22 295 110.3 2.8 38 34.2 Paraguay 4 46 285 30.4 3.9 8 8.7 Peru 4 35 441 34.7 3.1 8 31.1 Philippines 6 25 380 50.7 5.6 38 3.8 Poland 4 41 1000 8.7 1.4 18 68.2 Portugal 5 24 320 17.5 2.5 8 69.9 Puerto Rico . . 43 270 21.0 3.8 8 61.4 Romania 2 43 335 12.4 4.6 8 6.9 Russia 3 29 330 20.3 1.5 4 48.4 NO NO Rwanda 1 29 395 49.5 PRACTICE PRACTICE 0.0 Saudi Arabia 2 44 360 20.0 2.8 18 31.7 Senegal 1 36 485 23.8 3.0 8 18.8 Serbia and Montenegro 3 36 1028 23.0 2.6 23 20.8 Sierra Leone 1 58 305 31.0 2.5 38 12.1 Singapore 5 23 69 9.0 0.8 1 91.3 Slovak Republic 6 27 565 15.0 4.7 18 39.6 Slovenia 4 25 1003 16.3 3.6 18 23.6 South Africa 6 26 277 11.5 2.0 18 31.8 Spain 7 23 169 14.1 1.0 8 83.4 Sri Lanka 4 17 440 21.3 2.2 18 33.1 Sweden 6 23 208 5.9 2.0 8 73.2 Switzerland 5 22 170 5.2 4.6 4 37.0 Syrian Arab Republic 1 48 672 34.3 4.1 8 29.2 Taiwan, China 6 22 210 7.7 0.8 4 89.6 Tanzania 1 21 242 35.3 3.0 23 21.3 Thailand 6 26 390 13.4 2.6 38 42.0 Togo 2 37 535 24.3 3.0 18 14.5 Tunisia 6 14 27 12.0 1.3 8 50.1 Turkey 2 22 330 12.5 2.9 8 25.7 Uganda 2 15 209 22.3 2.1 38 35.5 Ukraine 3 28 269 11.0 2.6 18 25.5 United Arab Emirates 2 53 614 16.0 5.1 38 4.7 United Kingdom 7 14 288 15.7 1.0 6 85.8 United States 7 17 250 7.5 3.0 8 68.2 Uruguay 1 39 620 25.8 2.1 8 21.9 Uzbekistan 4 35 368 18.1 4.0 4 12.5 Venezuela, RB 1 41 445 28.7 4.0 38 4.9 Vietnam 1 37 404 30.1 5.5 18 16.4 Yemen, Rep. . . 37 360 10.5 3.0 8 28.6 Zambia 1 16 274 28.7 2.7 8 19.4 Zimbabwe 6 33 350 19.1 2.2 18 9.2 98 ALBANIA GNI per capita (US$) 1,740 Population (m) 3.2 Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 47 Time (days) 47 Cost (% of income per capita) 32.2 Cost (% of property value) 3.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 41.3 Number of procedures 39 Getting Credit Time (days) 390 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.3 Cost (% of debt) 28.6 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 30 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 55 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 24.6 ALGERIA GNI per capita (US$) 1,890 Population (m) 31.8 Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 16 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 26 Time (days) 52 Cost (% of income per capita) 27.3 Cost (% of property value) 9.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 65.5 Number of procedures 49 Getting Credit Time (days) 407 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.4 Cost (% of debt) 28.7 Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.5 Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 37.0 ANGOLA GNI per capita (US$) 740 Population (m) 13.5 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 146 Time (days) 335 Cost (% of income per capita) 884.6 Cost (% of property value) 11.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 64.4 Number of procedures 47 Getting Credit Time (days) 1011 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 6.9 Cost (% of debt) 9.2 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 100 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 7 Time of insolvency (years) 4.7 Rigidity of employment index 75 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 116 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 1.2 ARGENTINA GNI per capita (US$) 3,650 Population (m) 38.4 Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 32 Time (days) 44 Cost (% of income per capita) 15.7 Cost (% of property value) 8.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 8.1 Number of procedures 33 Getting Credit Time (days) 44 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 21.3 Cost (% of debt) 15.0 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 201 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8 Rigidity of employment index 51 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 733 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 94 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 23.5 COUNTRY TABLES 99 ARMENIA GNI per capita (US$) 950 Population (m) 3.1 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 25 Time (days) 18 Cost (% of income per capita) 7.0 Cost (% of property value) 0.9 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 4.5 Number of procedures 24 Getting Credit Time (days) 195 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.9 Cost (% of debt) 17.8 Difficulty of hiring index 17 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index . . Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Time of insolvency (years) 1.9 Rigidity of employment index 36 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 39.6 AUSTRALIA GNI per capita (US$) 21,650 Population (m) 19.9 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 2 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 2 Time (days) 7 Cost (% of income per capita) 2.1 Cost (% of property value) 4.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 11 Getting Credit Time (days) 157 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.5 Cost (% of debt) 14.4 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0 Rigidity of employment index 17 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 954 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 80.0 AUSTRIA GNI per capita (US$) 26,720 Population (m) 8.1 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 29 Time (days) 32 Cost (% of income per capita) 6.0 Cost (% of property value) 4.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 64.1 Number of procedures 20 Getting Credit Time (days) 374 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 9.8 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 11 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0 Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 393 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 55 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 72.5 AZERBAIJAN GNI per capita (US$) 810 Population (m) 8.2 Europe & Central Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 123 Time (days) 61 Cost (% of income per capita) 14.7 Cost (% of property value) 0.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 25 Getting Credit Time (days) 267 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 9.2 Cost (% of debt) 19.8 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.7 Rigidity of employment index 38 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 42 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 33.2 100 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 BANGLADESH GNI per capita (US$) 400 Population (m) 138.1 South Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures . . Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 35 Time (days) . . Cost (% of income per capita) 91.0 Cost (% of property value) . . Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 29 Getting Credit Time (days) 365 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 21.3 Cost (% of debt) 21.3 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 7 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 23.2 BELARUS GNI per capita (US$) 1,590 Population (m) 9.9 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 16 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 79 Time (days) 231 Cost (% of income per capita) 25.3 Cost (% of property value) 0.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 44.3 Number of procedures 28 Getting Credit Time (days) 250 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.6 Cost (% of debt) 20.7 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) .. Time of insolvency (years) 5.8 Rigidity of employment index 54 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 11.9 BELGIUM GNI per capita (US$) 25,820 Population (m) 10.3 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 4 Number of procedures 2 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 34 Time (days) 132 Cost (% of income per capita) 11.3 Cost (% of property value) 12.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 14.1 Number of procedures 27 Getting Credit Time (days) 112 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 6.4 Cost (% of debt) 6.2 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 533 Time of insolvency (years) 0.9 Rigidity of employment index 20 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 8 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 86.2 BENIN GNI per capita (US$) 440 Population (m) 6.7 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 32 Time (days) 50 Cost (% of income per capita) 196.9 Cost (% of property value) 15.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 333.4 Number of procedures 49 Getting Credit Time (days) 570 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 80.7 Cost (% of debt) 29.6 Difficulty of hiring index 72 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 3.1 Rigidity of employment index 61 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 54 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 8.8 COUNTRY TABLES 101 BHUTAN GNI per capita (US$) 660 Population (m) 0.9 South Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 62 Time (days) 44 Cost (% of income per capita) 11.0 Cost (% of property value) 1.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 20 Getting Credit Time (days) 275 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.6 Cost (% of debt) 113.8 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) no practice Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) no practice Firing costs (weeks) 94 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0 BOLIVIA GNI per capita (US$) 890 Population (m) 9.0 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 59 Time (days) 92 Cost (% of income per capita) 173.9 Cost (% of property value) 5.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 4.6 Number of procedures 47 Getting Credit Time (days) 591 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 51.0 Cost (% of debt) 10.6 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 96 Time of insolvency (years) 1.8 Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 98 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 32.5 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA GNI per capita (US$) 1,540 Population (m) 4.1 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 54 Time (days) 331 Cost (% of income per capita) 46.2 Cost (% of property value) 6.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 65.0 Number of procedures 36 Getting Credit Time (days) 330 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.2 Cost (% of debt) 19.6 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.3 Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 156 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 33 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 32.1 BOTSWANA GNI per capita (US$) 3,430 Population (m) 1.7 Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 108 Time (days) 69 Cost (% of income per capita) 11.3 Cost (% of property value) 5.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 26 Getting Credit Time (days) 154 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.0 Cost (% of debt) 24.8 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2 Rigidity of employment index 20 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 309 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 19 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 50.9 102 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 BRAZIL GNI per capita (US$) 2,710 Population (m) 176.6 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 17 Number of procedures 14 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 152 Time (days) 42 Cost (% of income per capita) 11.7 Cost (% of property value) 2.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 25 Getting Credit Time (days) 566 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 21.4 Cost (% of debt) 15.5 Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 78 Time of insolvency (years) 10.0 Rigidity of employment index 72 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 425 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 165 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.2 BULGARIA GNI per capita (US$) 2,130 Population (m) 7.8 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 32 Time (days) 19 Cost (% of income per capita) 10.3 Cost (% of property value) 2.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 116.6 Number of procedures 34 Getting Credit Time (days) 440 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.0 Cost (% of debt) 14.0 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 13 Time of insolvency (years) 3.3 Rigidity of employment index 28 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 30 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 34.2 BURKINA FASO GNI per capita (US$) 300 Population (m) 12.1 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 135 Time (days) 107 Cost (% of income per capita) 152.8 Cost (% of property value) 16.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 498.6 Number of procedures 41 Getting Credit Time (days) 458 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 22.2 Cost (% of debt) 92.5 Difficulty of hiring index 100 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 100 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 90 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 80 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6.4 BURUNDI GNI per capita (US$) 100 Population (m) 7.2 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 43 Time (days) 94 Cost (% of income per capita) 191.5 Cost (% of property value) 18.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 51 Getting Credit Time (days) 512 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 38.3 Cost (% of debt) 35.0 Difficulty of hiring index 50 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 50 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 41 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 16.4 COUNTRY TABLES 103 CAMBODIA GNI per capita (US$) 310 Population (m) 13.4 East Asia & Pacific Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 0 Time (days) 94 Time (days) 56 Cost (% of income per capita) 480.1 Cost (% of property value) 4.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 394.0 Number of procedures 31 Getting Credit Time (days) 401 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 121.3 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) no practice Rigidity of employment index 48 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) no practice Firing costs (weeks) 39 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0 CAMEROON GNI per capita (US$) 640 Population (m) 16.1 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 37 Time (days) 93 Cost (% of income per capita) 182.5 Cost (% of property value) 18.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 232.0 Number of procedures 58 Getting Credit Time (days) 585 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 87.6 Cost (% of debt) 36.4 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 3.2 Rigidity of employment index 74 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 46 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 21.4 CANADA GNI per capita (US$) 23,930 Population (m) 31.6 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 2 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 7 Time (days) 3 Time (days) 20 Cost (% of income per capita) 1.0 Cost (% of property value) 2.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 17 Getting Credit Time (days) 346 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 12.0 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.8 Rigidity of employment index 4 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 28 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 89.1 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 260 Population (m) 3.9 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 14 Time (days) 69 Cost (% of income per capita) 204.5 Cost (% of property value) 17.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 559.2 Number of procedures 45 Getting Credit Time (days) 660 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.0 Cost (% of debt) 72.2 Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 4.8 Rigidity of employment index 76 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 76.0 Firing costs (weeks) 37 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0 104 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 CHAD GNI per capita (US$) 250 Population (m) 8.6 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 19 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 75 Time (days) 44 Cost (% of income per capita) 344.2 Cost (% of property value) 13.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 610.4 Number of procedures 52 Getting Credit Time (days) 526 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 48.9 Cost (% of debt) 54.9 Difficulty of hiring index 100 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 10.0 Rigidity of employment index 80 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 76.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0 CHILE GNI per capita (US$) 4,390 Population (m) 15.8 Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 27 Time (days) 31 Cost (% of income per capita) 10.0 Cost (% of property value) 1.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 28 Getting Credit Time (days) 305 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.3 Cost (% of debt) 10.4 Difficulty of hiring index 17 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 290 Time of insolvency (years) 5.6 Rigidity of employment index 19 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 220 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 51 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 19.3 CHINA GNI per capita (US$) 1,100 Population (m) 1288.4 East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 41 Time (days) 32 Cost (% of income per capita) 14.5 Cost (% of property value) 3.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1104.2 Number of procedures 25 Getting Credit Time (days) 241 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 25.5 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 4 Time of insolvency (years) 2.4 Rigidity of employment index 30 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 35.2 COLOMBIA GNI per capita (US$) 1,810 Population (m) 44.6 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 43 Time (days) 23 Cost (% of income per capita) 27.4 Cost (% of property value) 3.6 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 37 Getting Credit Time (days) 363 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 38.9 Cost (% of debt) 18.6 Difficulty of hiring index 72 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0 Rigidity of employment index 51 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 300 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0 Firing costs (weeks) 49 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 54.6 COUNTRY TABLES 105 CONGO, DEM. REP GNI per capita (US$) 100 Population (m) 53.2 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 155 Time (days) 106 Cost (% of income per capita) 556.8 Cost (% of property value) 10.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 246.8 Number of procedures 51 Getting Credit Time (days) 909 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 130.0 Cost (% of debt) 256.8 Difficulty of hiring index 72 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 100 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 5.2 Rigidity of employment index 77 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 62 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 1.9 CONGO, REP. GNI per capita (US$) 640 Population (m) 3.8 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 67 Time (days) 103 Cost (% of income per capita) 317.6 Cost (% of property value) 22.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 244.6 Number of procedures 47 Getting Credit Time (days) 560 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 151.1 Cost (% of debt) 43.0 Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 90 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0 Rigidity of employment index 86 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 42 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 10.3 COSTA RICA GNI per capita (US$) 4,280 Population (m) 4.0 Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 77 Time (days) 21 Cost (% of income per capita) 25.7 Cost (% of property value) 3.6 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 34 Getting Credit Time (days) 550 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 16.2 Cost (% of debt) 41.2 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 10 Time of insolvency (years) 3.5 Rigidity of employment index 35 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 15.5 CÔTE D'IVOIRE GNI per capita (US$) 660 Population (m) 16.8 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index . . Time (days) 58 Time (days) 340 Cost (% of income per capita) 133.6 Cost (% of property value) 10.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 222.3 Number of procedures 34 Getting Credit Time (days) 525 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 155.9 Cost (% of debt) 47.6 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 100 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2 Rigidity of employment index 69 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 92 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 14.8 106 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 CROATIA GNI per capita (US$) 5,350 Population (m) 4.5 Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 49 Time (days) 956 Cost (% of income per capita) 14.4 Cost (% of property value) 2.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 24.4 Number of procedures 22 Getting Credit Time (days) 415 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 6.1 Cost (% of debt) 10.0 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.1 Rigidity of employment index 57 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 55 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 26.1 CZECH REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 6,740 Population (m) 10.2 Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 40 Time (days) 122 Cost (% of income per capita) 10.8 Cost (% of property value) 3.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 44.5 Number of procedures 22 Getting Credit Time (days) 300 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.6 Cost (% of debt) 9.6 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 21 Time of insolvency (years) 9.2 Rigidity of employment index 28 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 249 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 22 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 16.8 DENMARK GNI per capita (US$) 33,750 Population (m) 5.4 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 4 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 4 Time (days) 42 Cost (% of income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of property value) 0.6 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 48.8 Number of procedures 15 Getting Credit Time (days) 83 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 16.4 Cost (% of debt) 6.6 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.4 Rigidity of employment index 17 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 71 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 39 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 59.8 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 2,070 Population (m) 8.7 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 78 Time (days) 107 Cost (% of income per capita) 25.4 Cost (% of property value) 6.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1.9 Number of procedures 29 Getting Credit Time (days) 580 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 38.4 Cost (% of debt) 35.0 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Time of insolvency (years) 3.5 Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 294 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 70 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 17.1 COUNTRY TABLES 107 ECUADOR GNI per capita (US$) 1,790 Population (m) 13.0 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 12 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 92 Time (days) 21 Cost (% of income per capita) 47.4 Cost (% of property value) 16.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 10.4 Number of procedures 41 Getting Credit Time (days) 388 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 10.8 Cost (% of debt) 15.3 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 124 Time of insolvency (years) 4.3 Rigidity of employment index 51 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 131 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.1 EGYPT, ARAB REP GNI per capita (US$) 1,390 Population (m) 67.6 Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 43 Time (days) 193 Cost (% of income per capita) 63.0 Cost (% of property value) 7.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 815.6 Number of procedures 55 Getting Credit Time (days) 410 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 52.7 Cost (% of debt) 18.4 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 0 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 102 Time of insolvency (years) 4.2 Rigidity of employment index 53 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 162 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.4 EL SALVADOR GNI per capita (US$) 2,200 Population (m) 6.5 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 115 Time (days) 52 Cost (% of income per capita) 128.0 Cost (% of property value) 3.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 132.5 Number of procedures 41 Getting Credit Time (days) 275 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.0 Cost (% of debt) 12 Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 198 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 52 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 823 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 110 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 24.9 ESTONIA GNI per capita (US$) 4,960 Population (m) 1.4 Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 72 Time (days) 65 Cost (% of income per capita) 7.5 Cost (% of property value) 0.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 49.7 Number of procedures 25 Getting Credit Time (days) 150 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 43.0 Cost (% of debt) 10.6 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0 Rigidity of employment index 44 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 95 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 33 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 40.0 108 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 ETHIOPIA GNI per capita (US$) 90 Population (m) 68.6 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 15 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 32 Time (days) 56 Cost (% of income per capita) 77.4 Cost (% of property value) 11.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1821.9 Number of procedures 30 Getting Credit Time (days) 420 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 10.6 Cost (% of debt) 14.8 Difficulty of hiring index 50 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.4 Rigidity of employment index 43 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 48 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 40.0 FINLAND GNI per capita (US$) 27,020 Population (m) 5.2 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 3 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 14 Time (days) 14 Cost (% of income per capita) 1.2 Cost (% of property value) 4.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 29.3 Number of procedures 27 Getting Credit Time (days) 240 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.8 Cost (% of debt) 7.2 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.9 Rigidity of employment index 44 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 148 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0 Firing costs (weeks) 24 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 90.2 FRANCE GNI per capita (US$) 24,770 Population (m) 59.7 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 10 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 8 Time (days) 193 Cost (% of income per capita) 1.1 Cost (% of property value) 5.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 21 Getting Credit Time (days) 75 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.5 Cost (% of debt) 11.7 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 17 Time of insolvency (years) 1.9 Rigidity of employment index 66 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 32 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 46.6 GEORGIA GNI per capita (US$) 830 Population (m) 4.6 Europe & Central Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 25 Time (days) 39 Cost (% of income per capita) 13.7 Cost (% of property value) 2.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 54.5 Number of procedures 18 Getting Credit Time (days) 375 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 30.0 Cost (% of debt) 31.7 Difficulty of hiring index 17 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.2 Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 20.3 COUNTRY TABLES 109 GERMANY GNI per capita (US$) 25,250 Population (m) 82.6 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 45 Time (days) 41 Cost (% of income per capita) 5.9 Cost (% of property value) 4.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 48.8 Number of procedures 26 Getting Credit Time (days) 184 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 10.5 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 1.2 Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 856 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 80 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 50.3 GHANA GNI per capita (US$) 320 Population (m) 20.4 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 85 Time (days) 382 Cost (% of income per capita) 87.5 Cost (% of property value) 4.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 31.4 Number of procedures 23 Getting Credit Time (days) 200 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 37.9 Cost (% of debt) 14.4 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.9 Rigidity of employment index 34 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 25 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 28.2 GREECE GNI per capita (US$) 13,720 Population (m) 10.7 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 12 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 38 Time (days) 23 Cost (% of income per capita) 35.2 Cost (% of property value) 13.7 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 125.7 Number of procedures 14 Getting Credit Time (days) 151 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 29.5 Cost (% of debt) 12.7 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 1 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0 Rigidity of employment index 66 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 111 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 133 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 45.6 GUATEMALA GNI per capita (US$) 1,910 Population (m) 12.3 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 39 Time (days) 55 Cost (% of income per capita) 62.8 Cost (% of property value) 2.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 31.8 Number of procedures 37 Getting Credit Time (days) 1459 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.0 Cost (% of debt) 14.5 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 124 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 170 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.3 110 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 GUINEA GNI per capita (US$) 430 Population (m) 7.9 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 49 Time (days) 104 Cost (% of income per capita) 208.2 Cost (% of property value) 15.7 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 475.4 Number of procedures 44 Getting Credit Time (days) 306 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 31.7 Cost (% of debt) 27.6 Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.8 Rigidity of employment index 59 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 133 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 22.2 HAITI GNI per capita (US$) 380 Population (m) 8.4 Latin America & Caribbean Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 203 Time (days) 195 Cost (% of income per capita) 176.1 Cost (% of property value) 8.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 182.4 Number of procedures 35 Getting Credit Time (days) 368 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 30.2 Cost (% of debt) 25.0 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Time of insolvency (years) 5.7 Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 26 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 1.5 HONDURAS GNI per capita (US$) 970 Population (m) 7.0 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 0 Time (days) 62 Time (days) 36 Cost (% of income per capita) 72.9 Cost (% of property value) 8.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 37.0 Number of procedures 36 Getting Credit Time (days) 545 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 36.6 Cost (% of debt) 33.1 Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 61 Time of insolvency (years) 3.7 Rigidity of employment index 31 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 46 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 21.5 HONG KONG, CHINA GNI per capita (US$) 25,430 Population (m) 6.8 East Asia & Pacific High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 11 Time (days) 56 Cost (% of income per capita) 3.4 Cost (% of property value) 2.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 16 Getting Credit Time (days) 211 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.2 Cost (% of debt) 12.9 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 10 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0 Rigidity of employment index 0 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 615 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 13 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 82.3 COUNTRY TABLES 111 HUNGARY GNI per capita (US$) 6,330 Population (m) 10.1 Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 52 Time (days) 79 Cost (% of income per capita) 22.9 Cost (% of property value) 6.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 86.4 Number of procedures 21 Getting Credit Time (days) 365 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 13.5 Cost (% of debt) 8.1 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0 Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 33 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 23.0 Firing costs (weeks) 34 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 30.8 INDIA GNI per capita (US$) 530 Population (m) 1063.7 South Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 89 Time (days) 67 Cost (% of income per capita) 49.5 Cost (% of property value) 13.9 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 40 Getting Credit Time (days) 425 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.3 Cost (% of debt) 43.1 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 90 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 10.0 Rigidity of employment index 48 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 79 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 12.5 INDONESIA GNI per capita (US$) 810 Population (m) 214.5 East Asia & Pacific Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 151 Time (days) 33 Cost (% of income per capita) 130.7 Cost (% of property value) 11.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 125.6 Number of procedures 34 Getting Credit Time (days) 570 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.5 Cost (% of debt) 126.5 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 4 Time of insolvency (years) 6.0 Rigidity of employment index 57 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 157 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 10.6 IRAN, ISLAMIC REP. GNI per capita (US$) 2,000 Population (m) 66.5 Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 48 Time (days) 36 Cost (% of income per capita) 7.3 Cost (% of property value) 5.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 2.1 Number of procedures 23 Getting Credit Time (days) 545 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) . . Cost (% of debt) 12.0 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Time of insolvency (years) 4.5 Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 122 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 19.1 112 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 IRELAND GNI per capita (US$) 26,960 Population (m) 3.9 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 4 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 24 Time (days) 38 Cost (% of income per capita) 10.3 Cost (% of property value) 10.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 16 Getting Credit Time (days) 217 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.2 Cost (% of debt) 21.1 Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.4 Rigidity of employment index 29 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 0.1 Firing costs (weeks) 52 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 88.9 ISRAEL GNI per capita (US$) 16,020 Population (m) 6.7 Middle East & North Africa High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 7 Time (days) 34 Time (days) 144 Cost (% of income per capita) 5.5 Cost (% of property value) 7.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 27 Getting Credit Time (days) 585 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 4.0 Cost (% of debt) 22.1 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 33 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 11 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 23.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 38.0 ITALY GNI per capita (US$) 21,560 Population (m) 57.6 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 13 Time (days) 27 Cost (% of income per capita) 16.2 Cost (% of property value) 1.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 11.2 Number of procedures 18 Getting Credit Time (days) 1390 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.7 Cost (% of debt) 17.6 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 79 Time of insolvency (years) 1.2 Rigidity of employment index 50 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 571 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 43.5 JAMAICA GNI per capita (US$) 2,760 Population (m) 2.6 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 31 Time (days) 54 Cost (% of income per capita) 15.4 Cost (% of property value) 13.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 18 Getting Credit Time (days) 202 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) . . Cost (% of debt) 27.8 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.1 Rigidity of employment index 10 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 12 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 63.5 COUNTRY TABLES 113 JAPAN GNI per capita (US$) 34,510 Population (m) 127.2 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 31 Time (days) 14 Cost (% of income per capita) 10.6 Cost (% of property value) 4.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 74.9 Number of procedures 16 Getting Credit Time (days) 60 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.7 Cost (% of debt) 8.6 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.5 Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 615 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 92.4 JORDAN GNI per capita (US$) 1,850 Population (m) 5.3 Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 36 Time (days) 22 Cost (% of income per capita) 52.0 Cost (% of property value) 10.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1147.7 Number of procedures 43 Getting Credit Time (days) 342 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 56.3 Cost (% of debt) 8.8 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 5 Time of insolvency (years) 4.3 Rigidity of employment index 34 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 26.7 KAZAKHSTAN GNI per capita (US$) 1,780 Population (m) 14.9 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 25 Time (days) 52 Cost (% of income per capita) 10.5 Cost (% of property value) 1.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 32.7 Number of procedures 41 Getting Credit Time (days) 400 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 4.1 Cost (% of debt) 8.5 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.3 Rigidity of employment index 27 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 13.4 KENYA GNI per capita (US$) 390 Population (m) 31.9 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 47 Time (days) 39 Cost (% of income per capita) 53.4 Cost (% of property value) 4.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 25 Getting Credit Time (days) 360 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.3 Cost (% of debt) 41.3 Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.5 Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 14.7 114 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 KOREA, REP. GNI per capita (US$) 12,020 Population (m) 48.0 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 22 Time (days) 11 Cost (% of income per capita) 17.7 Cost (% of property value) 6.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 332.0 Number of procedures 29 Getting Credit Time (days) 75 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 8.1 Cost (% of debt) 5.4 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.5 Rigidity of employment index 34 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 81.1 KUWAIT GNI per capita (US$) 16,340 Population (m) 2.4 Middle East & North Africa High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 35 Time (days) 75 Cost (% of income per capita) 2.4 Cost (% of property value) 1.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 148.5 Number of procedures 52 Getting Credit Time (days) 390 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.1 Cost (% of debt) 13.3 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.2 Rigidity of employment index 20 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 166 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0 Firing costs (weeks) 42 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 38.7 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 330 Population (m) 5.1 Europe & Central Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 21 Time (days) 15 Cost (% of income per capita) 11.6 Cost (% of property value) 5.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.6 Number of procedures 46 Getting Credit Time (days) 492 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 12.4 Cost (% of debt) 47.9 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.5 Rigidity of employment index 38 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 24.4 LAO PDR GNI per capita (US$) 320 Population (m) 5.7 East Asia & Pacific Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 198 Time (days) 13.5 Cost (% of income per capita) 18.5 Cost (% of property value) 1.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 28.5 Number of procedures 53 Getting Credit Time (days) 443 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.8 Cost (% of debt) 30.3 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Time of insolvency (years) 5.0 Rigidity of employment index 50 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 76.0 Firing costs (weeks) 185 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0 COUNTRY TABLES 115 LATVIA GNI per capita (US$) 4,070 Population (m) 2.3 Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 10 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 18 Time (days) 62 Cost (% of income per capita) 17.6 Cost (% of property value) 2.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 41.4 Number of procedures 23 Getting Credit Time (days) 189 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.5 Cost (% of debt) 11.0 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 1.1 Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 42 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 85.0 LEBANON GNI per capita (US$) 4,040 Population (m) 4.5 Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 46 Time (days) 25 Cost (% of income per capita) 131.5 Cost (% of property value) 5.9 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 82.3 Number of procedures 39 Getting Credit Time (days) 721 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.2 Cost (% of debt) 26.7 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 31 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 28 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 103 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 19.3 LESOTHO GNI per capita (US$) 590 Population (m) 1.8 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 92 Time (days) 101 Cost (% of income per capita) 58.4 Cost (% of property value) 9.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 17.7 Number of procedures 49 Getting Credit Time (days) 285 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) . . Cost (% of debt) 23.9 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6 Rigidity of employment index 27 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 33.0 LITHUANIA GNI per capita (US$) 4,490 Population (m) 3.5 Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 26 Time (days) 3 Cost (% of income per capita) 3.7 Cost (% of property value) 0.9 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 62.8 Number of procedures 17 Getting Credit Time (days) 154 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 4.1 Cost (% of debt) 14.1 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 44 Time of insolvency (years) 1.2 Rigidity of employment index 41 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 34 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 52.4 116 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 MACEDONIA, FYR GNI per capita (US$) 1,980 Population (m) 2.0 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 48 Time (days) 74 Cost (% of income per capita) 11.6 Cost (% of property value) 3.7 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 89.5 Number of procedures 27 Getting Credit Time (days) 509 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.9 Cost (% of debt) 32.8 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 3.7 Rigidity of employment index 38 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 7.9 MADAGASCAR GNI per capita (US$) 290 Population (m) 16.9 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures . . Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 44 Time (days) . . Cost (% of income per capita) 65.3 Cost (% of property value) . . Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 50.7 Number of procedures 29 Getting Credit Time (days) 280 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 39.0 Cost (% of debt) 22.8 Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Time of insolvency (years) no practice Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) no practice Firing costs (weeks) 41 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0 MALAWI GNI per capita (US$) 170 Population (m) 11.0 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 35 Time (days) 118 Cost (% of income per capita) 140.8 Cost (% of property value) 3.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 16 Getting Credit Time (days) 277 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 44.5 Cost (% of debt) 136.5 Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6 Rigidity of employment index 21 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 17.6 MALAYSIA GNI per capita (US$) 3,780 Population (m) 24.8 East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 30 Time (days) 143 Cost (% of income per capita) 25.1 Cost (% of property value) 2.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 31 Getting Credit Time (days) 300 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.2 Cost (% of debt) 20.2 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 339 Time of insolvency (years) 2.3 Rigidity of employment index 3 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 74 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 35.4 COUNTRY TABLES 117 MALI GNI per capita (US$) 290 Population (m) 11.7 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 42 Time (days) 44 Cost (% of income per capita) 187.4 Cost (% of property value) 20.6 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 482.3 Number of procedures 28 Getting Credit Time (days) 340 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 58.5 Cost (% of debt) 34.6 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 3.6 Rigidity of employment index 66 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 81 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6.3 MAURITANIA GNI per capita (US$) 430 Population (m) 2.7 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 82 Time (days) 49 Cost (% of income per capita) 140.8 Cost (% of property value) 8.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 858.1 Number of procedures 28 Getting Credit Time (days) 410 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.6 Cost (% of debt) 29.3 Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 1 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 8.0 Rigidity of employment index 70 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 31 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6.1 MEXICO GNI per capita (US$) 1,380 6,230 Population (m) 102.3 Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 58 Time (days) 74 Cost (% of income per capita) 16.7 Cost (% of property value) 5.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 15.5 Number of procedures 37 Getting Credit Time (days) 421 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 25.7 Cost (% of debt) 20.0 Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 90 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.8 Rigidity of employment index 72 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 382 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 83 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 64.5 MOLDOVA GNI per capita (US$) 590 Population (m) 3.6 Europe & Central Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 30 Time (days) 81 Cost (% of income per capita) 18.6 Cost (% of property value) 1.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 24.6 Number of procedures 37 Getting Credit Time (days) 280 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.5 Cost (% of debt) 16.2 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8 Rigidity of employment index 54 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 29.3 118 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 MONGOLIA GNI per capita (US$) 480 Population (m) 2.5 East Asia & Pacific Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 20 Time (days) 10 Cost (% of income per capita) 8.1 Cost (% of property value) 0.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 182.1 Number of procedures 26 Getting Credit Time (days) 314 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.0 Cost (% of debt) 22.6 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 23 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 37 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 16.5 MOROCCO GNI per capita (US$) 1,320 Population (m) 30.1 Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 11 Time (days) 82 Cost (% of income per capita) 12.3 Cost (% of property value) 6.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 718.6 Number of procedures 17 Getting Credit Time (days) 240 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 62.2 Cost (% of debt) 17.7 Difficulty of hiring index 100 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 1.8 Rigidity of employment index 70 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 101 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 34.8 MOZAMBIQUE GNI per capita (US$) 210 Population (m) 18.8 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 153 Time (days) 33 Cost (% of income per capita) 95.8 Cost (% of property value) 11.9 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 14.5 Number of procedures 38 Getting Credit Time (days) 580 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.0 Cost (% of debt) 16.0 Difficulty of hiring index 72 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 5 Time of insolvency (years) 5.0 Rigidity of employment index 64 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 141 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 12.3 NAMIBIA GNI per capita (US$) 1,870 Population (m) 2.0 Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 85 Time (days) 28 Cost (% of income per capita) 19.3 Cost (% of property value) 9.7 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 31 Getting Credit Time (days) 270 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 28.3 Cost (% of debt) 28.3 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0 Rigidity of employment index 33 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 353 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 26 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 53.7 COUNTRY TABLES 119 NEPAL GNI per capita (US$) 240 Population (m) 24.7 South Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures . . Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 21 Time (days) . . Cost (% of income per capita) 74.1 Cost (% of property value) . . Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 28 Getting Credit Time (days) 350 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.4 Cost (% of debt) 25.8 Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 90 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 5.0 Rigidity of employment index 44 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 25.8 NETHERLANDS GNI per capita (US$) 26,310 Population (m) 16.2 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 11 Time (days) 5 Cost (% of income per capita) 13.2 Cost (% of property value) 6.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 66.2 Number of procedures 22 Getting Credit Time (days) 48 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 17.0 Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.7 Rigidity of employment index 43 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 645 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0 Firing costs (weeks) 16 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 86.2 NEW ZEALAND GNI per capita (US$) 15,870 Population (m) 4.0 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 2 Number of procedures 2 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 12 Time (days) 2 Cost (% of income per capita) 0.2 Cost (% of property value) 0.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 19 Getting Credit Time (days) 50 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 4.8 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0 Rigidity of employment index 7 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 978 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 0 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 71.4 NICARAGUA GNI per capita (US$) 730 Population (m) 5.5 Latin America & Caribbean Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 45 Time (days) 65 Cost (% of income per capita) 170.1 Cost (% of property value) 6.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 18 Getting Credit Time (days) 155 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.0 Cost (% of debt) 16.3 Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 62 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2 Rigidity of employment index 51 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 24 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 38.1 120 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 NIGER GNI per capita (US$) 200 Population (m) 11.8 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 27 Time (days) 49 Cost (% of income per capita) 396.4 Cost (% of property value) 12.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 744.7 Number of procedures 33 Getting Credit Time (days) 330 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 74.6 Cost (% of debt) 42.0 Difficulty of hiring index 100 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 100 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 5.0 Rigidity of employment index 90 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 76 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 2.6 NIGERIA GNI per capita (US$) 320 Population (m) 135.7 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 21 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 44 Time (days) 274 Cost (% of income per capita) 95.2 Cost (% of property value) 27.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 59.4 Number of procedures 23 Getting Credit Time (days) 730 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 20.7 Cost (% of debt) 37.2 Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.5 Rigidity of employment index 44 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 13 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 33.2 NORWAY GNI per capita (US$) 43,350 Population (m) 4.6 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 4 Number of procedures 1 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 23 Time (days) 1 Cost (% of income per capita) 2.9 Cost (% of property value) 2.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 28.9 Number of procedures 14 Getting Credit Time (days) 87 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.5 Cost (% of debt) 4.2 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.9 Rigidity of employment index 30.3 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0 Firing costs (weeks) 12 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 87.9 OMAN GNI per capita (US$) 7,830 Population (m) 2.6 Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 34 Time (days) 16 Cost (% of income per capita) 4.9 Cost (% of property value) 3.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 100.1 Number of procedures 41 Getting Credit Time (days) 455 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 20.9 Cost (% of debt) 10.0 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 7.0 Rigidity of employment index 34.8 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 13 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 23.6 COUNTRY TABLES 121 PAKISTAN GNI per capita (US$) 470 Population (m) 148.4 South Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 24 Time (days) 49 Cost (% of income per capita) 36.0 Cost (% of property value) 4.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 46 Getting Credit Time (days) 395 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.5 Cost (% of debt) 35.2 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8 Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 38.1 PANAMA GNI per capita (US$) 4,250 Population (m) 3.0 Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 19 Time (days) 44 Cost (% of income per capita) 25.1 Cost (% of property value) 2.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 45 Getting Credit Time (days) 355 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.9 Cost (% of debt) 37.0 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0 Rigidity of employment index 63 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 530 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.2 PAPUA NEW GUINEA GNI per capita (US$) 510 Population (m) 5.5 East Asia & Pacific Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 56 Time (days) 72 Cost (% of income per capita) 30.7 Cost (% of property value) 5.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 22 Getting Credit Time (days) 295 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.9 Cost (% of debt) 110.3 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8 Rigidity of employment index 17 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 34.2 PARAGUAY GNI per capita (US$) 1,100 Population (m) 5.6 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 17 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 74 Time (days) 48 Cost (% of income per capita) 157.6 Cost (% of property value) 2.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 46 Getting Credit Time (days) 285 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 26.0 Cost (% of debt) 30.4 Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 90 Time of insolvency (years) 3.9 Rigidity of employment index 59 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 99 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 8.7 122 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 PERU GNI per capita (US$) 2,150 Population (m) 27.1 Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 98 Time (days) 31 Cost (% of income per capita) 36.4 Cost (% of property value) 3.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 35 Getting Credit Time (days) 441 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 16.0 Cost (% of debt) 34.7 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 143 Time of insolvency (years) 3.1 Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 271 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 56 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 31.1 PHILIPPINES GNI per capita (US$) 1,080 Population (m) 81.5 East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 50 Time (days) 33 Cost (% of income per capita) 19.5 Cost (% of property value) 5.7 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 2.2 Number of procedures 25 Getting Credit Time (days) 380 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 8.3 Cost (% of debt) 50.7 Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 5.6 Rigidity of employment index 41 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 34 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 3.8 POLAND GNI per capita (US$) 5,270 Population (m) 38.2 Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 31 Time (days) 204 Cost (% of income per capita) 20.6 Cost (% of property value) 1.6 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 237.9 Number of procedures 41 Getting Credit Time (days) 1000 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.2 Cost (% of debt) 8.7 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.4 Rigidity of employment index 34 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 380 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 25 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 68.2 PORTUGAL GNI per capita (US$) 12,130 Population (m) 10.2 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 78 Time (days) 83 Cost (% of income per capita) 13.5 Cost (% of property value) 7.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 39.5 Number of procedures 24 Getting Credit Time (days) 320 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 10.2 Cost (% of debt) 17.5 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 637 Time of insolvency (years) 2.5 Rigidity of employment index 58 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 79 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 98 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 69.9 COUNTRY TABLES 123 PUERTO RICO GNI per capita (US$) 10,950 Population (m) 3.9 Latin America & Caribbean High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures . . Disclosure Index . . Time (days) 7 Time (days) . . Cost (% of income per capita) 1.0 Cost (% of property value) . . Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 43 Getting Credit Time (days) 270 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.1 Cost (% of debt) 21.0 Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.8 Rigidity of employment index 21 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 643 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 0 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 61.4 ROMANIA GNI per capita (US$) 2,310 Population (m) 22.2 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 28 Time (days) 170 Cost (% of income per capita) 7.4 Cost (% of property value) 1.9 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 43 Getting Credit Time (days) 335 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.1 Cost (% of debt) 12.4 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 4 Time of insolvency (years) 4.6 Rigidity of employment index 63 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 98 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6.9 RUSSIA GNI per capita (US$) 2,610 Population (m) 143.4 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 36 Time (days) 37 Cost (% of income per capita) 6.7 Cost (% of property value) 0.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 5.6 Number of procedures 29 Getting Credit Time (days) 330 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.6 Cost (% of debt) 20.3 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.5 Rigidity of employment index 27 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 48.4 RWANDA GNI per capita (US$) 220 Population (m) 8.3 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 21 Time (days) 354 Cost (% of income per capita) 316.9 Cost (% of property value) 9.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 29 Getting Credit Time (days) 395 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) . . Cost (% of debt) 49.5 Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) no practice Rigidity of employment index 76 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) no practice Firing costs (weeks) 54 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0 124 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 SAUDI ARABIA GNI per capita (US$) 8,530 Population (m) 22.5 Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 64 Time (days) 4 Cost (% of income per capita) 69.7 Cost (% of property value) 0.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1549.5 Number of procedures 44 Getting Credit Time (days) 360 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 20.0 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . . Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8 Rigidity of employment index 13 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 79 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 31.7 SENEGAL GNI per capita (US$) 550 Population (m) 10.0 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 57 Time (days) 114 Cost (% of income per capita) 112.9 Cost (% of property value) 34.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 270.4 Number of procedures 36 Getting Credit Time (days) 485 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 16.5 Cost (% of debt) 23.8 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0 Rigidity of employment index 64 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.8 SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO GNI per capita (US$) 1,910 Population (m) 8.1 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 51 Time (days) 186 Cost (% of income per capita) 9.5 Cost (% of property value) 5.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 120.3 Number of procedures 36 Getting Credit Time (days) 1028 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 87.4 Cost (% of debt) 23.0 Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 1 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6 Rigidity of employment index 23 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 23.0 Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 20.8 SIERRA LEONE GNI per capita (US$) 150 Population (m) 5.3 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 26 Time (days) 58 Cost (% of income per capita) 1268.4 Cost (% of property value) 16.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 58 Getting Credit Time (days) 305 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 175.3 Cost (% of debt) 31.0 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.5 Rigidity of employment index 76 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 188 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 12.1 COUNTRY TABLES 125 SINGAPORE GNI per capita (US$) 21,230 Population (m) 4.3 East Asia & Pacific High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 8 Time (days) 9 Cost (% of income per capita) 1.2 Cost (% of property value) 1.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 23 Getting Credit Time (days) 69 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.3 Cost (% of debt) 9.0 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 10 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.8 Rigidity of employment index 0 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 335 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0 Firing costs (weeks) 4 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 91.3 SLOVAKIA GNI per capita (US$) 4,920 Population (m) 5.4 Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 52 Time (days) 22 Cost (% of income per capita) 5.7 Cost (% of property value) 3.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 46.1 Number of procedures 27 Getting Credit Time (days) 565 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 20.1 Cost (% of debt) 15.0 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 4.7 Rigidity of employment index 10 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 39.6 SLOVENIA GNI per capita (US$) 11,830 Population (m) 2.0 Europe & Central Asia High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 61 Time (days) 391 Cost (% of income per capita) 12.3 Cost (% of property value) 2.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 19.0 Number of procedures 25 Getting Credit Time (days) 1003 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.2 Cost (% of debt) 16.3 Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 25 Time of insolvency (years) 3.6 Rigidity of employment index 53 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 23.6 SOUTH AFRICA GNI per capita (US$) 2,780 Population (m) 45.3 Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 38 Time (days) 20 Cost (% of income per capita) 9.1 Cost (% of property value) 11.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 26 Getting Credit Time (days) 277 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.3 Cost (% of debt) 11.5 Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0 Rigidity of employment index 52 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 636 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 31.8 126 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 SPAIN GNI per capita (US$) 16,990 Population (m) 41.1 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 7 Time (days) 108 Time (days) 20 Cost (% of income per capita) 16.5 Cost (% of property value) 7.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 16.9 Number of procedures 23 Getting Credit Time (days) 169 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.4 Cost (% of debt) 14.1 Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 394 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0 Rigidity of employment index 69 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 65 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 68 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 83.4 SRI LANKA GNI per capita (US$) 930 Population (m) 19.2 South Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 50 Time (days) 63 Cost (% of income per capita) 10.7 Cost (% of property value) 5.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 17 Getting Credit Time (days) 440 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.7 Cost (% of debt) 21.3 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2 Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 19 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 108 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 33.1 SWEDEN GNI per capita (US$) 28,840 Population (m) 9.0 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 3 Number of procedures 1 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 16 Time (days) 2 Cost (% of income per capita) 0.7 Cost (% of property value) 3.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 36.9 Number of procedures 23 Getting Credit Time (days) 208 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.0 Cost (% of debt) 5.9 Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0 Rigidity of employment index 43 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 980 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 24 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 73.2 SWITZERLAND GNI per capita (US$) 39,880 Population (m) 7.3 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 20 Time (days) 16 Cost (% of income per capita) 8.6 Cost (% of property value) 1.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 33.2 Number of procedures 22 Getting Credit Time (days) 170 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 5.2 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.6 Rigidity of employment index 17 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 233 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 12 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 37.0 COUNTRY TABLES 127 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 1,160 Population (m) 17.4 Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 47 Time (days) 23 Cost (% of income per capita) 34.2 Cost (% of property value) 30.4 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 5053.9 Number of procedures 48 Getting Credit Time (days) 672 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 6.4 Cost (% of debt) 34.3 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.1 Rigidity of employment index 37 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 79 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 29.2 TAIWAN, CHINA GNI per capita (US$) 13,320 Population (m) 22.6 East Asia & Pacific High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 48 Time (days) 7 Cost (% of income per capita) 6.3 Cost (% of property value) 7.0 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 224.7 Number of procedures 22 Getting Credit Time (days) 210 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.2 Cost (% of debt) 7.7 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 334 Time of insolvency (years) 0.8 Rigidity of employment index 50 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 89.6 TANZANIA GNI per capita (US$) 290 Population (m) 34.9 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 12 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 35 Time (days) 61 Cost (% of income per capita) 186.9 Cost (% of property value) 12.6 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 6.8 Number of procedures 21 Getting Credit Time (days) 242 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 21.3 Cost (% of debt) 35.3 Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0 Rigidity of employment index 65 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 23.0 Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 21.3 THAILAND GNI per capita (US$) 2,190 Population (m) 62.0 East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 2 Disclosure Index 5 Time (days) 33 Time (days) 2 Cost (% of income per capita) 6.7 Cost (% of property value) 6.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 26 Getting Credit Time (days) 390 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.1 Cost (% of debt) 13.4 Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6 Rigidity of employment index 42 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 150 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 42.0 128 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 TOGO GNI per capita (US$) 310 Population (m) 4.9 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 53 Time (days) 212 Cost (% of income per capita) 229.4 Cost (% of property value) 7.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 485.7 Number of procedures 37 Getting Credit Time (days) 535 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 83.4 Cost (% of debt) 24.3 Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0 Rigidity of employment index 76 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 84 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 14.5 TUNISIA GNI per capita (US$) 2,240 Population (m) 9.9 Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 14 Time (days) 57 Cost (% of income per capita) 11.0 Cost (% of property value) 6.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 327.3 Number of procedures 14 Getting Credit Time (days) 27 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 22.4 Cost (% of debt) 12.0 Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 100 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 93 Time of insolvency (years) 1.3 Rigidity of employment index 54 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 29 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 50.1 TURKEY GNI per capita (US$) 2,790 Population (m) 70.7 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle incom Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 9 Time (days) 9 Cost (% of income per capita) 26.4 Cost (% of property value) 3.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 22 Getting Credit Time (days) 330 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 19.9 Cost (% of debt) 12.5 Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 1 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 32 Time of insolvency (years) 2.9 Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 300 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 112 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 25.7 UGANDA GNI per capita (US$) 240 Population (m) 25.3 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 17 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 36 Time (days) 48 Cost (% of income per capita) 131.3 Cost (% of property value) 5.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 15 Getting Credit Time (days) 209 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.9 Cost (% of debt) 22.3 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.1 Rigidity of employment index 7 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 12 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 35.5 COUNTRY TABLES 129 UKRAINE GNI per capita (US$) 970 Population (m) 48.4 Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 3 Time (days) 34 Time (days) 93 Cost (% of income per capita) 17.6 Cost (% of property value) 4.3 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 113.9 Number of procedures 28 Getting Credit Time (days) 269 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.5 Cost (% of debt) 11.0 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6 Rigidity of employment index 64 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 94 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 25.5 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES GNI per capita (US$) 20,217 Population (m) 4.0 Middle East & North Africa High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 2 Time (days) 54 Time (days) 9 Cost (% of income per capita) 26.5 Cost (% of property value) 2.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 416.9 Number of procedures 53 Getting Credit Time (days) 614 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 9.4 Cost (% of debt) 16.0 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 2 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 18 Time of insolvency (years) 5.1 Rigidity of employment index 33 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 96 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 4.7 UNITED KINGDOM GNI per capita (US$) 28,350 Population (m) 59.3 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 2 Disclosure Index 7 Time (days) 18 Time (days) 21 Cost (% of income per capita) 0.9 Cost (% of property value) 4.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 14 Getting Credit Time (days) 288 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.1 Cost (% of debt) 15.7 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 10 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0 Rigidity of employment index 20 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 6.0 Firing costs (weeks) 25 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 85.8 UNITED STATES GNI per capita (US$) 37,610 Population (m) 291.0 OECD: High income High income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 7 Time (days) 5 Time (days) 12 Cost (% of income per capita) 0.6 Cost (% of property value) 0.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 17 Getting Credit Time (days) 250 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.1 Cost (% of debt) 7.5 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7 Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 6 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0 Rigidity of employment index 3 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 8 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 68.2 130 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 URUGUAY GNI per capita (US$) 3,790 Population (m) 3.4 Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 45 Time (days) 66 Cost (% of income per capita) 48.2 Cost (% of property value) 7.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 181.6 Number of procedures 39 Getting Credit Time (days) 620 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 28.6 Cost (% of debt) 25.8 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 72 Time of insolvency (years) 2.1 Rigidity of employment index 31 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 756 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 34 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 21.9 UZBEKISTAN GNI per capita (US$) 420 Population (m) 25.6 Europe & Central Asia Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 12 Disclosure Index 4 Time (days) 35 Time (days) 97 Cost (% of income per capita) 17.0 Cost (% of property value) 11.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 21.9 Number of procedures 35 Getting Credit Time (days) 368 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.0 Cost (% of debt) 18.1 Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 100 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 58 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0 Firing costs (weeks) 28 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 12.5 VENEZUELA GNI per capita (US$) 3,490 Population (m) 25.5 Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 116 Time (days) 34 Cost (% of income per capita) 15.0 Cost (% of property value) 1.8 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 41 Getting Credit Time (days) 445 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 7.7 Cost (% of debt) 28.7 Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 286 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0 Rigidity of employment index 56 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0 Firing costs (weeks) 83 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 4.9 VIETNAM GNI per capita (US$) 480 Population (m) 81.3 East Asia & Pacific Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 56 Time (days) 78 Cost (% of income per capita) 28.6 Cost (% of property value) 5.5 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 37 Getting Credit Time (days) 404 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.0 Cost (% of debt) 30.1 Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 8 Time of insolvency (years) 5.5 Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 98 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 16.4 COUNTRY TABLES 131 YEMEN, REP GNI per capita (US$) 520 Population (m) 19.2 Middle East & North Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index . . Time (days) 63 Time (days) 21 Cost (% of income per capita) 269.3 Cost (% of property value) 3.9 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1561.1 Number of procedures 37 Getting Credit Time (days) 360 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 4.7 Cost (% of debt) 10.5 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2 Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 1 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 12 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0 Rigidity of employment index 37 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 28.6 ZAMBIA GNI per capita (US$) 380 Population (m) 10.4 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 1 Time (days) 35 Time (days) 70 Cost (% of income per capita) 22.8 Cost (% of property value) 9.2 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 2.7 Number of procedures 16 Getting Credit Time (days) 274 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 19.2 Cost (% of debt) 28.7 Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.7 Rigidity of employment index 27 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0 Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 19.4 ZIMBABWE GNI per capita (US$) 480 Population (m) 13.1 Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 6 Time (days) 96 Time (days) 30 Cost (% of income per capita) 304.7 Cost (% of property value) 18.1 Enforcing contracts Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 53.0 Number of procedures 33 Getting Credit Time (days) 350 Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.4 Cost (% of debt) 19.1 Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7 Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2 Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0 Firing costs (weeks) 29 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 9.2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 133 Acknowledgments Contact details of local partners are available on the Doing Business website at http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness Doing Business in 2005 was prepared by a team led by Paccieri, Katarina Mathernova, Richard Messick, Simeon Djankov and Caralee McLiesh under the gener- Margaret Miller, Nataliya Mylenko, Vincent Palmade, al direction of Michael Klein. The team also comprised Friedrich Peloschek, Ismail Radwan, Jan Rutkowski, Ziad Azar, Ghanem-Redouane Benamadi, Marie Delion, Jaime Saavedra, Jolyne Sanjak, Stefano Scarpetta, Stefka Osborne Jackson, Joanna Kata-Blackman, Marcelo Lu, Slavova, Peer Stein, Richard Symonds, Stoyan Tenev, Facundo Martin, Tatiana Nenova, Rita Ramalho, Lisa Milan Vodopivec, David Wofford, and Wael Zakout. The Smith, Sylvia Solf and Lihong Wang. full draft report was reviewed by Shanta Devarajan, Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez- Cheryl Gray, Daniel Kaufmann, Natalie Lichtenstein, de-Silanes and Oliver Hart co-authored several of the Joseph O'Keefe, Zia Qureshi, Neil Roger, and Alan background studies and provided academic advice Winters. throughout the project. Several organizations and indi- The online service of the Doing Business database vidual experts provided comments on survey design, as is sponsored by the Rapid Response Unit of the World detailed in the Data Notes section. Amanda Ellis advised Bank Group under the management of Suzanne Smith. on gender issues. Bruce Ross-Larson edited the manu- The team is comprised of Vadim Gorbach, Graeme script. Timothy Harford and Suzanne Smith provided Littler, Vandana Mathur, Victor Robinson, Leila Search- editorial advice throughout the development of the re- Zalmai and Fatima Shah. port. Gerry Quinn designed the interior of the report The report was made possible by the generous con- and Peter Grundy designed the cover. tribution of more than 3,000 lawyers, judges, business- Individual chapters were refereed by a panel of people and public officials in 145 countries. Many of the experts comprising Nagavalli Anamalai, Lubomira contributors are members of the Lex Mundi association Beardsley, Thorsten Beck, David Bernstein, Gordon of law firms or the International Bar Association. The Betcherman, John Bruce, Tony Burns, Mierta Capaul, names of those wishing to be acknowledged individual- Jacqueline Coolidge, Frederique Dahan, Klaus Deinin- ly are listed below and contact details are posted on the ger, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Marie-Laurence Guy, Luke Doing Business website, http://rru.worldbank.org/doing Haggarty, Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Eric Haythorne, business. Scott Jacobs, Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven, Isabel Lavadenz 134 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 GLOBAL Samir Hamouda Santiago M J A Nicholson Greg Channell Walter Bornett CONTRIBUTORS SAMIR HAMOUDA NICHOLSON Y CANO DEPARTMENT OF LANDS AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME RESEARCH BAKER & MCKENZIE Yamina Kebir Alfredo Miguel O'Farrell Brett Cook YAMINA KEBIR MARVAL, O'FARRELL & MAIRAL ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON Doris Buxbaum INTERNATIONAL BAR BINDER GRÖSSWANG ASSOCIATION Said Maherzi Jorge Raul Postiglione David Cross RECHTSANWÄLTE BANK OF ALGERIA BRONS & SALAS ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON LEX MUNDI ASSOCIATION OF Martin Eckel LAW FIRMS Mohamed Sator Juan Manuel Alvarez Prado Christopher Davie EISELSBERG NATLACEN CABINET SATOR ALVAREZ PRADO & ASOCIADOS CLAYTON UTZ TRANSUNION INTERNATIONAL WALDERDORFF CANCOLA Nassima Talbi Liliana Segade Petrea Draper Tibor Fabian ALBANIA GHELLAL & MEKERBA QUATTRINI, LAPRIDA & COWLEY HEARNE BINDER GRÖSSWANG ASOCIADOS RECHTSANWÄLTE Artur Asllani Spyridon Tsallas Peter Gemell STUDIO LEGALE TONUCCI IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS Matias Sicardi EVANS & PECK Julian Feichtinger FORNIELES & DEL CARRIL CERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD Yair Baranes Lucinda Girdlestone ANGOLA HLAWATI USAID Angelica Sola COWLEY HEARNE Fatima Freitas MARVAL, O'FARRELL & MAIRAL Ferdinand Graf Genc Boga Penny Grau FATIMA FREITAS ADVOGADOS GRAF, MAXL & PITKOWITZ BOGA & ASSOCIATES Ignacio L. Triolo CLAYTON UTZ Teresinha Lopes MARVAL, O'FARRELL & MAIRAL Bernhard Gumpoldsberger Evis Bozo Boris Hristovski F. FARIA DE BASTOS, P. LOPES, SAXINGER, CHALUPSKY, EVIS BOZO Alfredo Vicens GADENS LAWYERS T. LOPES E L. SEBASTIÃO & ORGANIZACION VERAZ WEBER & PARTNERS Alban Caushi ASSOCIADOS Paul James Andreas Hable KALO & ASSOCIATES Octavio Miguel Zenarruza CLAYTON UTZ Katila Machado ALVAREZ PRADO & ASOCIADOS BINDER GRÖSSWANG Victor Chimienti FÁTIMA FREITAS ADVOGADOS Eric Janssens RECHTSANWÄLTE BOGA & ASSOCIATES BAYCORP ADVANTAGE Jorge Leao Peres ARMENIA Harald Heschl Vilsa Dado NATIONAL BANK OF ANGOLA Doug Jones AM KREDITSCHUTAVERBAND VON Tigran Atanesyan KALO & ASSOCIATES CLAYTON UTZ 1870 Alexandre Do Rêgo Pinto LAWYER Sokol ElMajaz Pegado Sonya Karo Sylvia Hofinger Karen Hambardzoumyan BOGA & ASSOCIATES ALEXANDRE PEGADO ASIC CITY GOVERNMENT CENTRAL BANK OF ARMENIA Vilma Gjyshi Judy Lau Wilhelm Holler ARGENTINA Hayk Hovhannisyan KALO & ASSOCIATES AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL GRISS & PARTNER INVESTMENT LAW GROUP Lisandro A. Allende REGULATION AUTHORITY Majlinda Hakani Alexander Klauser BRONS & SALAS Adnan Hrenovica KPMG Timothy L'Estrange BRAUNEIS, KLAUSER & PRANDL LCR Juan Arocena ANZ Shpati Hoxha Robert Kovacs ALLENDE & BREA Artashes F. Kakoyan BOGA & ASSOCIATES Joanne Little COFACE INTERCREDIT INVESTMENT LAW GROUP Federico Augusto Brandt ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON Sonila Ibrahimi Edgar Langeder ALFARO Alan Kuchukyan BOGA & ASSOCIATES John Lobban FRIEDERS TASSUL & PARTNER KPMG ARMENIA Vanesa Balda BLAKE DAWSON WALDRON Perparim Kalo Christian Lettmayr VITALE, MANOFF & FEILBOGEN Ara Markosyan KALO & ASSOCIATES Helen Mac Kay AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME KPMG ARMENIA Oscar del Rio ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON RESEARCH Genci Krasniqi CENTRAL BANK OF ARGENTINA Suren Melikyan Gregor Maderbacher KALO & ASSOCIATES Des Mooney KPMG ARMENIA Bernardo Horacio Fernandez DEPARTMENT OF LANDS BRAUNEIS, KLAUSER & PRANDL Renata Leka CENTRAL BANK OF ARGENTINA Eduard Mesropyan Peter Madl BOGA & ASSOCIATES Luke Nicholls JINJ CO. Celia Fernández Ramallo CLAYTON UTZ SCHONHERR RECHTSANWALTE Krenar Loloci FORNIELES & DEL CARRIL Ashot Petrosyan Irene Mandl LOLOCI & ASSOCIATES Tim O'Doherty MINISTRY OF TRADE AND Alejandro D. Fiuza BAKER & MCKENZIE AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME Andi Memi ECONOMICAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH MARVAL, O'FARRELL & MAIRAL HOXHA, MEMI & HOXHA OF RA Michael O'Donnell Leopold Mayer Francisco Jose Fornieles THOMSON PLAYFORD Merilda Petri Ashot Poghosyan DUN AND BRADSTREET FORNIELES & DEL CARRIL KALO & ASSOCIATES ARAX CONSULTING GROUP Mark Pistilli INFORMATION SERVICES María Fraguas ATANASKOVIC HARTNELL Miranda Ramaj Hayk Sahakyan Wolfgang Messeritsch NICHOLSON Y CANO BANK OF ALBANIA INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Michael Popkin NATIONAL BANK OF AUSTRIA Nicolas Garcia Pinto AND CADASTRAL PROJECTS' ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON Spyridon Tsakalis Gerhard Muggenhuber BAKER & MCKENZIE IMPLEMENTATION, STATE IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS COMMITTEE OF REAL PROPERTY Michael Quinlan BEV ­ FEDERAL OFFICE OF Santiago Laclau CADASTRE ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON METROLOGY AND SURVEYING ALGERIA MARVAL, O'FARRELL & MAIRAL Tom Samuelian Robert Riddell Ninel Jasmine Sadjadi GADENS LAWYERS Branka Achari-Djokic Martin Lanfranco DR. TOM SAMUELIAN CENTER OF LEGAL COMPETENCE BANK OF ALGERIA MARVAL, O'FARRELL & MAIRAL Tigran Serobyan Ron Schaffer Christine schögler CLAYTON UTZ Mamoun Aidoud Roberto Laterza KPMG ARMENIA GRISS & PARTNER AIDOUD LAW FIRM ORGANIZACION VERAZ Armen Ter-Tachatyan Andrew Smith Benedikt Spiegelfeld MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES Adnane Bouchaib Patricia Lopez Aufranc TER-TACHATYAN LEGAL & CERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD BOUCHAIB LAW FIRM MARVAL, O'FARRELL & MAIRAL BUSINESS CONSULTING Lyn Thomson Christine Stark DEPARTMENT OF LANDS Samir Boukider Maria Lujan Bianchi Mikayel Tovmassian BINDER GRÖSSWANG RECHTSANWÄLTE GHELLAL & MEKERBA BRONS & SALAS TER-TACHATYAN LEGAL & Jane Wilson BUSINESS CONSULTING BAYCORP ADVANTAGE Dagmar Straka Mourad Dubert Eugenio J. Maurette Artur Tunyan NATIONAL BANK OF AUSTRIA DUBERT ABELEDO GOTTHEIL David Zwi TUNYAN & ASSOCIATES COWLEY HEARNE Reinhard Toegl Amine Ghellal, Esq. Sean McCormick Andranik Vahanyan REINHARD TOEGL LAW OFFICE GHELLAL & MEKERBA LLERENA & ASOCIADOS TER-TACHATYAN LEGAL & AUSTRIA Georg Tuppa Mohamed El Amine Haddad Olga Muino BUSINESS CONSULTING CJSC GRAF, MAXL & PITKOWITZ GHELLAL & MEKERBA CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS Helmut Auer BONAERENSES AUSTRALIA LAND ADMINISTRATION Lothar Wachter Mustapha Hamdane WOLF THEISS MUSTAPHA HAMDANE Miguel P. Murray Johannes Barbist David Buda MURRAY, D´ANDRÉ, ISASMENDI BINDER GRÖSSWANG & SIRITO DE ZAVALÍA COWLEY HEARNE LAWYERS RECHTSANWÄLTE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 135 Angela Zaffalon Halim Bepari Sergey Alexeevich Shavrov Louis-H. Verbeke Rodrigo Garrón CERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD SUPREME COURT OF NATIONAL CADASTRAL AGENCY ALLEN & OVERY MORENO-BALDIVIESO HLAWATI BANGLADESH Yulia Sitnikova Primitivo Gutiérrez BENIN Shirin Chaudhury AZERBAIJAN LAW COMPANY TRUST GUEVARA & GUTIÉRREZ THE LAW ASSOCIATES Galina Syromiatnikova Ganiou Adechy Enrique Hurtado Ofelia Abdulaeva Nasirud Doulah DICSA INTERNATIONAL GROUP ETUDE DE MAITRE GANIOU SUPERINTENDENCY OF BANKS SALANS HERTZFELD & DOULAH & DOULAH ADVOCATES OF LAWYERS ADECHY AND FINANCIAL ENTITIES HEILBRONN Shamsud Doulah Alexander Vasilevsky Jean Sourou Agossou Ricardo Indacochea Nazli Ahmadova DOULAH & DOULAH ADVOCATES VALEX CONSULT ORDRE NATIONAL DES SAN MARTIN INDACOCHEA & BAKU LAW CENTRE ARCHITECTES ET URBANISTES ASOCIADOS Aneek R. Haque Igor Verkhovodko Elgar Alekperov HUQ AND COMPANY BUSINESSCONSULT Rafikou Alabi Manfredo Kempff BAKU LAW CENTRE CABINET MAITRE ALABI C.R. & F. ROJAS Raquibul Haque Miah Vasily Volozinets Aykhan Asadov ADVOCATES & ATTORNEYS LAW BUSINESSCONSULT Agnes A. Campbell Ana Maria Luna Yañez BAKER & MCKENZIE FIRM CABINET D'AVOCATS CAMPELL & LUNA YAÑEZ ARCHITECT ASSOCIES Ismail Askerov BELGIUM Shamsul Hasan Alejandra Bernal Mercado LEDINGHAM CHALMERS THE LAW ASSOCIATES Veronique Akankoussi Hubert Andre-Dumont C.R. & F. ROJAS Deguenon Rufat Aslanov Kamal Hossain MCGUIREWOODS CABINET AKANKOUSSI Milenka Saavedra Muñoz NATIONAL BANK OF AZERBAIJAN DR. KAMAL HOSSAIN & Judith Buddingh BUFETE AGUIRRE Vilevo Biova Devo Alum Bati ASSOCIATES LOYENS CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE Mariana Pereira Nava SALANS HERTZFELD & Amir-Ul Islam L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST INDACOCHEA & ASOCIADOS HEILBRONN Hugo Callens THE LAW ASSOCIATES ELEGIS AFRICAINE Fernando Rojas Christine Ferguson Karishma Jahan Jacques Migan C.R. & F. ROJAS BAKER BOTTS Simon Cookson DR. KAMAL HOSSAIN & ASHURST JACQUES MIGAN LAW FIRM Pablo Rojas Farrukh Gassimov ASSOCIATES Edgar-Yves Monnou C.R. & F. ROJAS BAKER BOTTS Ludo Cornelis Ahsanul Kabir EUBELIUS ATTORNEYS CABINET EDGAR-YVES MONNOU Milenka Saavedra Muñoz Elchin Hagverdiyev KABIR & ASSOCIATES Edgar-Yves Mpoy BUFETE AGUIRRE LEDINGHAM CHALMERS Dirk de Backer Khondker Shamsuddin ALLEN & OVERY CABINET EDGAR-YVES MONNOU Sergio Salazar-Machicado Farhad Hajizade Mahmood Francois Nare SALAZAR & ASOCIADOS SALANS HERTZFELD & ADVISERS' LEGAL ALLIANCE Pieter de Koster CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE HEILBRONN Kazi Abdul Mannan ALLEN & OVERY L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST A. Mauricio Torrico Galindo QUINTANILLA & SORIA Nadir Huseynbayov KAZI & RAHMAN ASSOCIATES Steven de Schrijver AFRICAINE LAND REGISTRATION AND Mirza Quamrul Hasan VAN BAEL & BELLIS Afolabi Raphael Javier Urcullo CADASTRE AGENCY FOR SUPPORT ADVISERS' LEGAL ALLIANCE Marc Dechevre AFOLABI RAPHAEL CHAMBERS CRIALES, URCULLO & ANTEZANA TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNION PROFESSIONNELLE DU AGRICULTURAL PRIVATE SECTOR Mohammed Abdur Razzak Paula Bauer Velasco CREDIT BHUTAN THE LAW ASSOCIATES C.R. & F. ROJAS Yusif H. Jabbarov Luc Demeyere NATIONAL BANK OF AZERBAIJAN Abdur Razzaq Tshering Dorji ALLEN & OVERY BOSNIA AND REPUBLIC THE LAW COUNSEL EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CHAMBER HERZEGOVINA Joan Dubaere EEIG FOR THE KINGDOM OF Gunduz Karimov Jasim Uddin Ahmad PEETERS ADVOCATEN-AVOCATS BHUTAN Emina Adembegovic BAKER & MCKENZIE BANK OF BANGLADESH Alain Francois Prakash Rasaily IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS Natik Mamedov BELARUS EUBELIUS ATTORNEYS CITY LEGAL UNIT Aida Alibalic BAKER & MCKENZIE Pamela Cordova Ugyen Rinzin LANSKY, GANZGER & PARTNER Bakhtiyar Mammadov Ivan Alievich LOYENS YANGPHEL Yair Baranes BAKER BOTTS VIPCONSULT Sandrine Hirsch Karma Tshering USAID Daniel Matthews Galina Belarus SIMONT BRAUN REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES, Jovana D. Batalo BAKER & MCKENZIE DICSA INTERNATIONAL GROUP MINISTRY OF TRADE & OF LAWYERS Dieter Honore INDUSTRY LANSKY, GANZGER & PARTNER Farhad Mirzayev ALLEN & OVERY Senada Havic BM LAW FIRM Vladimir G. Biruk Sonam P Wangdi STOLITSA GROUP Jean Philippe Lebeau MINISTRY OF TRADE & LRC CREDIT BUREAU Benjamin Paine COMMERCIAL COURT OF INDUSTRY Adnan Hrenovica LEDINGHAM CHALMERS Alexander Botian BOROVTSOV & SALEI BELGIUM LRC CREDIT BUREAU Mark Rowley BOLIVIA Ignace Maes Nikola Jankovic BAKER BOTTS Svetlana Dashuk VLASOVA & PARTNERS BAKER & MCKENZIE Maria Cecilia Agreda Gómez LANSKY, GANZGER & PARTNER Abdullayev Sabit Carl Meyntjens MORENO-BALDIVIESO Kemal Jogic BAKER & MCKENZIE Alexandr Dovgenko INCORPORATION LAWYER ASHURST Fernando Aguirre FEDERAL MINISTRY OF LABOUR Kanan Safarov Andre Moreau BUFETE AGUIRRE AND SOCIAL POLICY LEDINGHAM CHALMERS Ivan Gerasimovich VIPCONSULT LEGAL SERVICES NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM Carolina Aguirre Urioste Kerim Karabdic Safkhan Shahmammadli Didier Muraille BUFETE AGUIRRE ADVOKATI SALIH & KERIM BAKER BOTTS Gennadiy Glinskiy KARABDIC DICSA NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM Miguel Angel Jemio Vadim Shneyer Tom Kyriakopoulos Leo Peeters MORENO-BALDIVIESO BM LAW FIRM Yuri Krasnov IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS NATIONAL BANK OF THE PEETERS ADVOCATEN Johnny Arteaga Chavez Valery Sidnev REPUBLIC OF BELARUS Castimir Mandaric Carine Van Regenmortel DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE TIERRAS BAKER BOTTS LAWYER Eugene Lazarenkov ALTIUS DE SANTA CRUZ Michael Walsh LAW COMPANY TRUST Branko Maric Sophie Rutten Francisco Bollini Roca LEDINGHAM CHALMERS GUEVARA & GUTIÉRREZ. BRANKO & VLADIMIR MARIC Kanstantsin Mikhel ALLEN & OVERY María Eugenia Antezana V. Sead Milkovic BANGLADESH VIPCONSULT Hans Seeldrayers CRIALES, URCULLO & ANTEZANA LAWYERS' OFFICE TKALCIC- Vassili I. Salei EUBELIUS ATTORNEYS Nahid Afreen DULIC & PREBANIC BOROVTSOV & SALEI José A.Criales THE LAW ASSOCIATES Rudy Trogh CRIALES, URCULLO & ANTEZANA Vesna Mrkovic Vitaliy Sevrukevich NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM A.B.M. Badrud Doulah LANSKY, GANZGER & PARTNER DICSA INTERNATIONAL GROUP Carlos Ferreira DOULAH & DOULAH Jan Van Celst OF LAWYERS C.R & F. ROJAS ADVOCATES, ATTORNEYS & ALLEN & OVERY NOTARIES Tom Vantroyen ALTIUS 136 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Ibrahim Polimac S. A. Ziga Daniela Lessa Beatriz Ryoko Yamashita Vilevo Biova Devo AGENCY FOR BANKING OF ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS DEMAREST E ALMEIDA FISCHER & FORSTER CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST HERZEGOVINA Maria Fernanda Lopes Ferraz BRAZIL BULGARIA AFRICAINE Tella Nedzida Salihovic-Whalen Plinio Cesar Romanini FELSBERG E ASSOCIADOS Svetlin Adrianov Dieudonne Bonkoungou DLA WEISS-TESSBACH BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL OHADA LEGIS Ricardo Loureiro LEGAL INTERCONSULT ­ PENKOV, Peter Solt MARKOV AND PARTNERS Andrea Acerbi SERASA Thierry Compaore DLA WEISS-TESSBACH FELSBERG E ASSOCIADOS ORDRE DES ARCHITECTES DU Felipe Loureiro Salgueiro Lilia Banakieva BURKINA Bojana Tkalcic-Dulic LEGAL INTERCONSULT ­ PENKOV, Maximiano Aguiar Camara FELSBERG E ASSOCIADOS LAWYERS' OFFICE TKALCIC- MARKOV AND PARTNERS Bernardin Dabire AGUIAR CAMARA ADVOGADOS DULIC & PREBANIC Joao Luiz Coelho da Rocha ASSOCIADOS DABIRE SORGHO & TOE BASTOS ­ TIGRE, COELHO DA Borislav T. Boyanov Spyridon Tsallas BORISLAV BOYANOV & CO. Flavia Bailone Marcilio ROCHA E LOPES Barthélémy Kere IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS VEIRANO ADVOGADOS CABINET D'AVOCATS Jose Augusto Martins Dimitar Danailov ASSOCIADOS GEORGIEV, TODOROV & CO. BARTHÉLÉMY KERE BOTSWANA BAKER & MCKENZIE Nadine Baleeiro Teixeira Evelyne Mandessi Bell Henrique de Faria Martins George Dimitrov Neill Armstrong DEMAREST E ALMEIDA OHADA LEGIS GOULART PENTEADO, IERVOLINO O.R.A.C. DIMITROV, PETROV & ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS CO. Adriana Baroni Santi E LEFOSSE Oumarou Ouedraogo T.M Bakwena ULHÔA CANTO, REZENDE E OHADA LEGIS Maria Lucia Silva Mauricio Alexander Georgiev SAFETY AND HEALTH OFFICE, GUERRA Costa DOBREV, KINKIN, LYUTSKANOV Titinga Frédéric Pacere MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND DEMAREST E ALMEIDA & PARTNERS CABINET D'AVOCATS TITINGA HOME AFFAIRS Altamiro Boscoli DEMAREST E ALMEIDA FREDERIC PACERE André Megale Veselin Iliev Outule Bale GOULART PENTEADO, IERVOLINO I CONSULT Mahamadi Sawadogo KNIGHT FRANK Ulhôa Canto ULHÔA CANTO, REZENDE E E LEFOSSE ­ ADVOGADOS Georgi Kitanov CABINET SAWADOGO MAHAMADI John Carr-Hartley GUERRA Aloysio Meirelles de Miranda TOTEV PARTNERS Ignace Sawadogo ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS Samuel Carvalho ULHÔA CANTO, REZENDE E Stephan Kyutchukov CICAD Val Cooke ESPINOLA E GUSMAO GUERRA DJINGOV GOUGINSKI Barterlé Mathieu Some TRANSUNION ITC ADVOGADOS E ASSOCIADOS Fabiano Milani KYUTCHUKOV & VELICHKOV LAWYER Edward W. Fashole-Luke II Gustavo Castro GOULART PENTEADO, IERVOLINO Dessislava Lukarova Marie-Antoinette Sorgho-Sery LUKE & ASSOCIATES VISEU, CASTRO, CUNHA E E LEFOSSE ARSIV NATCHEV GANEVA DABIRE SORGHO & TOE ORICCHIO Vincent Galeromeloe Joao Montandon Borges Jordan Rumenov Manahilov Frank Didier Toe INFORMATION TRUST Paulo Sergio Cavalheiro MONTANDON BORGES BULGARIAN NATIONAL BANK DABIRE SORGHO & TOE CORPORATION CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL Laecio Nascimento Stoyan Manolov Akheel Jinabhai Tania Mara Coelho de NASCIMENTO IMOVEIS BULGARIAN NATIONAL BANK BURUNDI MAGANG & COMPANY Almeida Costa João Otávio Pinheiro Olivério SECRETARIA DE INSPECAO DO Marina Marinova Sylvestre Banzubaze Elizabeth Macharia GOULART PENTEADO, IERVOLINO GEORGIEV, TODOROV & CO. S&P BANZUBAZE ­ CABINET TRABALHO CHIBANDA, MAKGALEMELE & E LEFOSSE ­ ADVOGADOS D'AVOCATS COMPANY Guilherme G. Cronemberger Ioannis Mittikas Andrea Oricchio Kirsh Parente IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS Severin Kagabo Magang VISEU CASTRO CUNHA E BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL BANQUE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU MAGANG & COMPANY ORICCHIO Totyu Mladenov BURUNDI Helson de Castro GENERAL LABOUR INSPECTORATE Mercia Makgalemele Maria Fernanda Pecora IPPOLITO, RIVITTI, DUARTE, EXECUTIVE AGENCY, MINISTRY Anatole Miburo CHIBANDA, MAKGALEMELE & VEIRANO ADVOGADOS CASTRO, PARADEDA & MARTINS OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL POLICY CABINET ANATOLE MIBURO COMPANY ASSOCIADOS Silvio de Salvo Venosa Vladimir Natchev Tharcisse Ntakiyica Colin McVey Cacilda Pedrosa Vieira DEMAREST E ALMEIDA ARSIV NATCHEV GANEVA CABINET THARCISSE NTAKIYICA LANDFLOW SOLUTIONS NASCIMENTO IMOVEIS Heloisa Bonciani Nader di Yordan Naydenov Yves Ntivumbura Abel Walter Modimo Silvia Poggi de Carvalho Cunto BORISLAV BOYANOV & CO. BANQUE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU MODIMO & ASSOCIATE DUARTE GARCIA, CASELLI DUARTE GARCIA, CASELLI BURUNDI GUIMARÃES E TERRA Stefaniya Nikolova Claude Mojafi GUIMARÃES E TERRA François Nyamoya Eliane Ribeiro Gago DJINGOV, GOUGINSKI, MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND Julia Dinamarco KYUTCHUKOV & VELICHKOV AVOCAT HOME AFFAIRS DUARTE GARCIA, CASELLI DEMAREST E ALMEIDA GUIMARÃES E TERRA Alexander Pachamanov Deogratias Nzemba Otsweletse Moupo Thomas Benes Felsberg Valeria Salomao GEORGIEV, TODOROV & CO CABINET DE MAÎTRE DÉEGRATIAS MOUPO, MOTSWAGOLE & FELSBERG E ASSOCIADOS NZEMBA DINGAKE CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL Vladimir Penkov Leandro Figueiredo LEGAL INTERCONSULT ­ PENKOV, Laurent Nzeyimana Alfred Ngowi Domingos Sávio Ramos FIGUEIREDO, RAUSCH MAINENTI de Lima MARKOV AND PARTNERS BARREAU DU BURUNDI UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA E TARCIA DOMINGOS SAVIO RAMOS DE Kamelia Popova Fabien Segatwa Kwadwo Osei-Ofei Renato Giovanni Filho LIMA E ASSOCIADOS COFACEINTERCREDIT BULGARIA ETUDE MAITRE SEGATWA ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS ULHÔA CANTO, REZENDE E Alexandre Schutze Svilen Todorov Rubeya Willy Moses Pelaelo GUERRA ADVOGACIA E ACESSORIA LEGACOM ANTOV & PARTNERS BARREAU DU BURUNDI BANK OF BOTSWANA Isabel Franco JURIDICA Spyridon Tsallas CAMBODIA Randolph Samuel DEMAREST E ALMEIDA Leonardo Soares de Oliveira IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS TRANSUNION ITC Duarte Garcia SECRETARIA DE INSPECAO DO Irina Tsvetkova Naryth H. Hem TRABALHO Doreen Seromola DUARTE GARCIA, CASELLI LANDWELL BULGARIA BNG ­ ADVOCATES & ATTORNEY GENERALS CHAMBERS GUIMARÃES E TERRA Marcos Tiraboschi SOLICITORS VEIRANO ADVOGADOS Stefan Tzakov Virgil Vergeer Esther Jerussalmy Phyroath Heng ASSOCIADOS KAMBOUROV & PARTNERS COLLINS NEWMAN & CO. ARAÚJO E POLICASTRO INDOCHINA RESEARCH LIMITED David Troy Giles Marius A. Velichkov Angelica Waibale-Muganga Caio Julius Tayseng Ly IPPOLITO, RIVITTI, DUARTE, DJINGOV, GOUGINSKI, ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS BOLINA LAZZARESCHI CASTRO, PARADEDA & MARTINS KYUTCHUKOV & VELICHKOV DFDL/MEKONG LAW GROUP Greg Ward Luciana Laquimi Andre Villoria Céline Mollard BURKINA FASO TRANSUNION ITC MINISTRY OF JUSTICE BONELLI E VILLÓRIA ADVOGADOS INDOCHINA RESEARCH LIMITED Dave Williams Vinicius Lemos ASSOCIADOS Jean-Pierre Bassole Edward Nicholas MINCHIN & KELLY LEMOS ADVOCACIA EMPRESARIAL Pedro Vitor Araujo da Costa CABINET D'AVOCATS TITINGA DFDL/ MEKONG LAW GROUP E TRIBUTÁRIA ESCRITORIO DE ADVOCACIA FREDERIC PACERE Timothy Jason Smyth GOUVÊA VIEIRA IMC CONSULTING ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 137 Nolan Stringfield Thomas S. Cumming Thomas Dingamgoto Felipe Ossa Tianpeng Wang STRINGFIELD & CHENG GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON CABINET DINGAMGOTO ET CLARO & CIA. KING AND WOOD ASSOCIÉS Samon Uy Michael Davies Juan Eduardo Palma Jr. James Wong DFDL MEKONG LAW GROUP OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT Allaïssem K. Djaibe VIAL Y PALMA ABOGADOS DEACONS CABINET D'AVOCATS David Epstein Carmen Paz Cruz Lozano Haibo Yang CAMEROON MADANI/DJAÏBE GARDINER ROBERTS CAMARA CHILENA DE LA DEHENG Roland Abeng Tahir Souleyman Haggar CONSTRUCCION James Farley Hong Ye ABENG LAW FIRM LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE LAWYER L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE Daniela Peña Fergadiott COUDERT BROTHERS ­ BEIJING D. Etah Akoh BARROS COURT CORREA Y CIA. Gian Fortuna Gerard Leclaire Xiaojuan Zhao ETAH-NAN & C SOCIÉTÉ ABOGADOS KENAIDAN CONTRACTING DEHENG LAW OFFICES D'AVOCATS, BARRISTERS & INGÉNIERIE & ARCHITECTURE Alfonso Reymond Larrain SOLICITORS Yoine Goldstein Pierre Talom ALDUNATE Y CIA. Jin Zhong GOLDSTEIN FLANZ & FISHMAN JUN HE Feh H. Baaboh BEAC ­ HEADQUARTERS ABOGADOS HENRY SAMUELSON & CO Leonid Gorelik Ricardo Riesco Zhang Zihong BAKER & MCKENZIE CHILE PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA David Boyo CLARO & CÍA. JING & PARTNERS Karen Grant Cristian Araya Edmundo Rojas García Xiaochun Zou TRANSUNION ALCAINO RODRIGUEZ & SAHLI SINOSOURCE LAW FIRM Tognia Djanko CORPORACIÓN CHILENA DE ORDRE NATIONAL DES Adrian Hartog Jorge Benitez ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO COLOMBIA ARCHITECTES DU CAMEROUN OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT URRUTIA & CIA REGISTRAL Emmanuel Ekobo Pamela S. Hughes Enrique Benitez Urrutia Gerardo Varela Patricia Arrázola Bustillo CABINET EKOBO BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON URRUTIA & CIA CARIOLA DIEZ PEREZ-COTAPOS GOMEZ-PINZON LINARES & CIA. SAMPER SUAREZ VILLAMIL Isabelle Fomukong Charles Johnston Manuel Blanco Sebastián Yunge CABINET FOMUKONG SUPERINTENDENCY OF FINANCIAL BLANCO & CIA ABOGADOS Pablo Barraquer-Uprimny INSTITUTIONS GUERRERO, OLIVOS NOVOA Y BRIGARD & URRUTIA Tahir Souleyman Haggar Jimena Bronfman ERRAZURIZ LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE Jason Koskela GUERRERO, OLIVOS NOVOA Y Leonardo Calderón L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON ERRAZURIZ CHINA COLEGIO DE REGISTRADORES DE INSTRUMENTOS PÚBLICOS DE Paul Jing Susan Leslie Miguel Capo Valdez Brian Barron COLOMBIA JING & PARTNERS FIRST CANADIAN TITLE BESALCO BAKER & MCKENZIE Dario Cardenas Navas Henri Pierre Job Desmond Mackey Jeronimo Carcelen Rico Chan CARDENAS & CARDENAS HENRI JOB LAW FIRM FIRST CANADIAN TITLE CARIOLA DIEZ PEREZ-COTAPOS BAKER & MCKENZIE & CIA. Camilo Cortés Guarín Gaston Kenfack Douajni Charles Magerman Yanjua Rebecca Chao LEWIN & WILLS ABOGADOS MINISTRY OF JUSTICE BAKER & MCKENZIE Hector Carrasco Reyes JUN HE SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS E Felipe Cuberos Jean-Jacques Kotto Patrick McCarthy INSTITUCIONES FINANCIERAS Barry Cheng PRIETO & CARRIZOSA GROUPEMENT D'ARCHITECTES BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS BAKER & MCKENZIE AFRICAINS Jaime Cordova Ignacio Durán Shelley Munro SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y Harry Duprey COMPUTEC ­ DATACRÉDITO Jean Aimet Kounga OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT INSTITUTCIONES FINANCIERAS KING AND WOOD PRC LAWYERS ABENG LAW FIRM Carlos Fradique-Méndez Jeff Rosekat CHILE Kejun Guo BRIGARD & URRUTIA Kumfa Jude Kwenyui BAKER & MCKENZIE Rodrigo Cuchacovich DEHENG JURIS CONSUL LAW FIRM Juanita Olaya Garcia Harris M. Rosen BAKER & MCKENZIE Zhang Hongsheng NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF Mwambo Litombe Ndeley, esq SHIBLEY RIGHTON Martín del Río PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA PLANNING JURIS CONSUL LAW FIRM Paul Schabas VIAL Y PALMA ABOGADOS Dong Jing Alvaro Jose Rodriguez Gomez Daniel Mwambo Ndeley BLAKE CASSELS & GRAYDON Cristian Delpiano CHEN & CO POSSE HERRERA & RUIZ JURIS CONSUL LAW FIRM Leneo Sdao BLANCO & CIA ABOGADOS Bob Kwauk Mónica Espinosa Gutiérrez Ernestine Mbong Samba BAKER & MCKENZIE Fernando Echeverria BLAKE CASSELS & GRAYDON MUNOZ TAMAYO & ASOCIADOS ETA BESONG LAW CHAMBERS Norman Siebrasse CAMARA CHILENA DE LA Joseph Lam Santiago Gutiérrez Pierre Talom FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CONSTRUCCION DEACONS JOSÉ LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO BEAC ­ HEADQUARTERS NEW BRUNSWICK Ricardo Escobar Edward E. Lehman Jorge Lara Rafael Tung Nsue John Solursh CAREY Y CIA LEHMAN, LEE & XU BAKER & MCKENZIE (RAISBECK, LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON Cristian Eyzaguirre LARA, RODRIGUEZ & RUEDA) L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE Wei Lei Jonathan Wigley CLARO & CIA. CHEN & CO José Antonio Lloreda CANADA BAKER & MCKENZIE María Ester Feres Nazarala JOSE LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO Yang Ling Erica Young DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, Margarita Llorente Arthur Adams HUAXIA INTERNATIONAL BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON MINISTERIO DEL TRABAJO Y DE BRIGARD & URRUTIA SOUTHERN ONTARIO CREDIT PREVISIÓN SOCIAL BUSINESS CREDIT CONSULTING BUREAU Gabriela Mancero CENTRAL AFRICAN Silvio Figari Napoli Jerry Liu CAVELIER ABOGADOS Paul Avis REPUBLIC DATABUSINESS HUAXIA INTERNATIONAL MCMILLAN BINCH BUSINESS CREDIT CONSULTING Juan Pablo Moreno-Piñeros Emile Bizon Luis S. Gutierrez BRIGARD & URRUTIA David Bannon Linfei Liu NICOLAS TIANGAYE LAW FIRM PUGA & ORTIZ OGILVY RENAULT JUN HE Luis E. Nieto Maurice Dibert- Dollet Cesar Jimenez Ortiz NIETO & CHALELA ABOGADOS Eldon Bennett Hongli Ma MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y AIRD & BERLIS INSTITUCIONES FINANCIERAS JUN HE Ricardo Leon Otero Tahir Souleyman Haggar CHILE SUPERINTENDENCIA BANCARIA Christopher William Besant Chen Min LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE DE COLOMBIA CASSELS BROCK & BLACKWELL BLAKE CASSELS & GRAYDON L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE Leon Larrain BAKER & MCKENZIE Carlos Felipe Pinilla Acevedo David Bish Rocky Qian Pierre Talom PINILLA, GONZÁLEZ & PRIETO GOODMANS LEHMAN LEE & XU BEAC ­ HEADQUARTERS Andrés Jana Linetzky ALVAREZ, HINZPETER, JANA & Daniel Posse John Campbell Jie Tang Nicolas Tiangaye VALLE POSSE HERRERA & RUIZ WEIRFOULDS COUDERT BROTHERS ­ BEIJING NICOLAS TIANGAYE LAW FIRM Sebastian Obach Rodrigo Prieto Martinez Jay A. Carfagnini Li Wang CHAD CARIOLA DIEZ PEREZ-COPATOS PINILLA, GONZÁLEZ & PRIETO GOODMANS DEHENG & CIA Jaime Robledo-Vasquez Susan Clifford Nathé Amady Yingdong Wang Claudio Oritz Tello ZULETA SUAREZ ARAQUE & OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT AVOCAT JUN HE BOLETIN COMERCIAL JARAMILLO ABOGADOS 138 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Juan Carlos Rocha Pierre Talom CÔTE D'IVOIRE Marija Haramija Jiri Cerny PRIETO & CARRIZOSA BEAC ­ HEADQUARTERS KORPER & HARAMIJA PETERKA & PARTNERS Vilevo Biova Devo Mónica Rolong Dunja Hitrec Tomas Denmark COSTA RICA CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE JOSÉ LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO. L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST ERNST & YOUNG CZECH BANKING CREDIT BUREAU Paula Samper Salazar Gabriela Araya AFRICAINE Irina Jelcic GOMEZ-PINZON OLLER ABOGADOS Alice Anthony-Diomande HANZEKOVIC & RADAKOVIC Martin Divis PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Bernardo Salazar Kathya Araya FADIKA-DELAFOSSE, K. FADIKA Sanja Juric BRIGARD & URRUTIA FACIO & CAÑAS ET C. KACOUTIÉ JURIC LAW OFFICES Libor Drabek Geneviève Brou SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY Felipe Sandoval Villamil Bernardo Alfaro Araya Davor Juros CABINET N'GOAN, ASMAN & GOMEZ-PINZON LINARES SUPERINTENDENCIA GENERAL DE COFACE INTERCREDIT CROATIA Gabriela Hájková ASSOCIÉS SAMPER SUAREZ VILLAMIL ENTIDADES BANCARIAS DE COSTA PETERKA & PARTNERS RICA Margita Kis Jean-François Chawuveau Ignacio Santamaria Escobar POROBIJA & POROBIJA Vít Horácek CABINET JEAN-FRANÇOIS JOSÉ LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO Carlos Ayon Lacayo GLATZOVÁ & CO ALFREDO FOURNIER Y CHAUVEAU Tarja Krehic-Duranovic Eduardo Mantilla Serrano ASOCIADOS Sarka Jandova Jean-Charles Daguin WOLF THEISS MUNOZ TAMAYO & ASOCIADOS PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR Alejandro Bettoni Traube FIDAFRICA, MEMBER OF Snjezana Levar Gustavo Suárez Camacho DONINELLI & QUINTANA PRICEWATERHOUSE CROATIAN NATIONAL BANK Michal Koranda ZULETA SUAREZ ARAQUE & Simon Silue Dognima VEJMELKA & WÜNSCH JARAMILLO ABOGADOS Michael Bruce Jerina Malesevic ACZALAW FADIKA-DELAFOSSE, K. FADIKA KOPRER & HARAMIJA Andrea Korpasova Diego Munoz Tamayo ET C. KACOUTIÉ BAKER & MCKENZIE MUNOZ TAMAYO & ASOCIADOS Eduardo Calderón Fran Marovic BUFETE FACIO & CAÑAS Karim Fadika MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, LABOUR Miroslava Kybalova Andrés Téllez Núñez FADIKA-DELAFOSSE, K. FADIKA AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP AMBRUZ & DARK ADVOKATI JOSÉ LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO Luis Manuel Castro ET C. KACOUTIÉ BLP ABOGADOS Ana Mataga Karol Marsovszky Carlos Umaña Seyanne Groga CROATIAN NATIONAL BANK WOLF THEISS BRIGARD & URRUTIA Silvia Chacon Bolanos CABINET JEAN-FRANÇOIS ALFREDO FOURNIER Y CHAUVEAU Tin Matic Jan Molik Carlos Urrutia Holguin ASOCIADOS MATIC LAW OFFICES JUDR JAN MOLIK ADVOKAT BRIGARD & URRUTIA Colette Kacoutie Daniel de LaGarza FADIKA-DELAFOSSE, K. FADIKA Iain McGuire Jarmila Musilova Juan Manuel Villaveces GONZALEZ · URIBE ILP ET C. KACOUTIÉ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS CZECH NATIONAL BANK Hollmann COMPUTEC Roberto Esquivel Noel Koffi Zvonko Nogolica Ivo Nesrovnal OLLER ABOGADOS CABINET NOËL Y. KOFFI LAW OFFICES NOGOLICA GLEISS LUTZ ADVOKATI Felipe Trias Visbal MUNOZ TAMAYO & ASOCIADOS Freddy Fachler Gerard Kone Dogbenin Zeljko Pazur Dagmar Novakova PACHECO COTO SCPA NAMBEYA-DOGBEMIN ET SME UNIT, MINISTRY OF PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR Eduardo Zuleta ASSOCIES FINANCE ZULETA SUAREZ ARAQUE & Alfredo Fournier Beeche Pavla Prikrylova JARAMILLO ABOGADOS BEECHE FOURNIER ASOCIADOS Jacques Raphaël Kouassi Sanja Porobija PETERKA & PARTNERS CABINET N'GOAN, ASMAN & POROBIJA & POROBIJA LAW FIRM Octavio Fournier M. Radek Hladky CONGO, DEM. REP. ASSOCIÉS ALFREDO FOURNIER Y Vlado Sevsek Varazdin GLEISS LUTZ ASOCIADOS Serge Messou VLADO SEVSEK & ZELJKA Bernard Claude Natasa Randlová FIDAFRICA, MEMBER OF BRLECIC CABINET DE MAITRE MBU NE Tomás F. Guardia PRICEWATERHOUSE PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR LETANG BUFETE FACIO & CAÑAS Ana Sihtar Ghislaine Moise-Bazie SIHTAR ATTORNEYS AT LAW Petr Riha Lambert S. Djunga David Gutierrez SCPA KONATE, MOISE-BAZIE & PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR DJUNGA & RISASI AVOCATS BLP ABOGADOS Stefan Stockinger KOYO WOLF THEISS Zdenek Rosicky Ambroise Kamukuny Ronald Lachner Vanie Nadia SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY CABINET TSHIBANGU ET BLP ABOGADOS M. Lidija Stopfer CABINET N'GOAN, ASMAN & ASSOCIES VUKMIR Daniel Rosicky Ivannia Mendez ASSOCIÉS PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR Jean Claude Mbaki Siluzaku OLLER ABOGADOS Francois Nare Jane Tait CABINET MBAKI ET ASSOCIES PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Erik Steger Juan Muñoz-Giró CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE WOLF THEISS Bernard Claude Mbu-Letang SUPERINTENDENCIA GENERAL DE L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST Iva Torik CABINET MBU NE LETANG ENTIDADES FINANCIERAS AFRICAINE POROBIJA & POROBIJA LAW FIRM Roman Studnicny COFACE INTERCREDIT CZECHIA Polycarpe Kabasele Mfumu Pedro Oller Georges N'Goan Hrvoje Vidan Tshishimbi OLLER ABOGADOS CABINET N'GOAN, ASMAN & WOLF THEISS Ruena Trojánková CABINET KABASELE MFUMU & ASSOCIÉS LINKLATERS & ALLIANCE ASSOCIES Rodrigo Oreamuno Jasminka Vrbanovic Dominique Taty FACIO & CAÑAS JASMINKA VRBANOVIC Katerina Trojanova Louman Mpoy FIDAFRICA, MEMBER OF CZECH BANKING CREDIT CABINET ML & A Humberto Pacheco PRICEWATERHOUSE Ivan Vukas BUREAU PACHECO COTO URIC I PARTNERI Marius Muzembe Mpungu Léon Désiré Zalo Ludek Vrána CABINET KABASELE MFUMU Frederico Peralta MINISTÈRE D'ETAT, MINISTÈRE Hrvoje Vukic LINKLATERS & ALLIANCE FACIO & CAÑAS DE L'AGRICULTURE VUKIC, JELUsIC, SULINA, Vladimir Wagner CONGO, REP. STANKOVIC, JURCAN & JABUKA Roger Petersen CROATIA CZECH NATIONAL BANK, ALLIANCE LAW GROUP, SRL Eugen Zadravec BANKING ANALYSES SECTION Claude Coelho Tatjana Arapinac EUGEN ZADRAVEC LAW FIRM CABINET D'ADVOCATS CLAUDE Mario Quintana Katerina Wlodarczykova COELHO DONINELLI & QUINTANA PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS CZECH REPUBLIC GLATZOVÁ & CO Tahir Souleyman Haggar Luis Monge Sancho Mladen Duliba DENMARK LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE TELETEC CROATIAN NATIONAL BANK Vladimir Ambruz L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE AMBRUZ & DARK ADVOKATI Manuel Gonzalez Sanz Bojan Fras V.O.S. Elsebeth Aaes-Jørgensen Jerome Loutete FACIO & CAÑAS URIC I PARTNERI NORRBOM & VINDING TRIBUNAL D'INSTANCE DE Libor Basl Beata Glinska Kovac Christian Andersen MAKELEKELE ET DE BACONGO Dagoberto Sibaja Morales BAKER & MCKENZIE REGISTRO NACIONAL DE COSTA URIC I PARTNERI JONAS BRUUN Rafael Tung Nsue RICA Jarmila Bilkova Marijan Hanzekovic Jorgen Als Andersen LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR HANZEKOVIC & RADAKOVIC MARITIME & COMMERCIAL L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE Carlos Manuel Valverde Retana Juri Bobek COURT OF COPENHAGEN Zdenko Haramija Jean Petro FACIO & CAÑAS SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY KORPER & HARAMIJA Jens Arnesen CABINET D'AVOCATS JEAN PETRO EVERSHEDS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 139 Thomas Bang Joanna M. Bonnelly Ginebra ECUADOR Nabila Mohamed Habashy Ali Mohamad Talaat LVP LAWYERS LETT, VILSTRUP & STEEL HECTOR DAVIS PEÑA CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT BAKER & MCKENZIE PARTNERE PRIETO & GAMUNDI Fabián Andrade Narváez PAZ & HOROWITZ Mohamed Ajsa Mona Zulficar Claus Bennetsen Ana Isabel Caceres CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT SHALAKANY ACCURA TRONCOSO Y CACERES Ines Baldeon CONSULTORES ESTRATEGICOS Attef Mohmed Alfeky EL SALVADOR Ole Borch Praxedes J. Castillo Baez ASOCIADOS ALFEKY SOLIMAN & PARTNERS BECH-BRUUN DRAGSTED LAW CASTILLO Y CASTILLO ADVOCATES Francisco Armando Arias FIRM Lucía Cordero-Ledergerber Robinson Cuello Shanlate Rivera FALCONI PUIG ABOGADOS Sami Barakat Lars Buhl SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA ELGHATIT LAW FIRM F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ KORT & MATRIKELSTYRELSEN Fernando del Poso Sarah de León Ruth Jeannette Cuestas GALLEGOS & VALAREZO Rania Bata Jeppe Buskov HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ & SARWAT A. SHAHID LAW FIRM Ramirez KROMANN REUMERT FERNANDEZ Antonio Donoso Naranjo DIRECCIÓN DE LOS REGISTROS DE SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS E Amal Afifi Dawood EL SALVADOR Mogens Ebeling Wendy Diaz SEGUROS DENTON WILDE SAPTE JONAS BRUUN WENDY DIAZ & ASSOCIATES Luis Miguel Espino José Duran Ashraf Elibrachy ESPINO, NIETO, UMAÑA & Eivind Einersen Mary Fernández Rodríguez MOELLER, GÓMEZ-LINCE & CÍA IBRACHY & DERMARKAR ASSOCIADOS PHILIP & PARTNERE HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ & FERNANDEZ Luis C. Fernandez Tarek El-Marsafawy Roberta Gallardo N.V. Falling Olsen PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE ADEL KAMEL F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ POUL SCHMITH Wilson Gomez Ramirez KAMMERADVOKATEN SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA Juan Carlos Gallegos Sarwat Abd El-Shahid Juan Carlos Herrera GALLEGOS & VALAREZO SARWAT A. SHAHID LAW FIRM, IN F.A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ Ulrik Frirs Franklin M F Guilamo AFFILIATION WITH WEIL, COMMERCE AND COMPANIES FIGUEROA GUILAMO Luis Eduardo Garcia GOTSHAL & MANGES Thelma Dinora Lizama de AGENCY LEGALSA & HEINERT Osorio Fabio Guzman Samir El Tagy SUPERINTENDENCIA DEL SISTEMA Henrik Groos GUZMAN ARIZA Ana Maria Gomez CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR FINANCIERO ACCURA LEGALSA & HEINERT PROTECTING MANPOWER AND Armando P. Henriquez WORKING ENVIRONMENT, Marcela Mancia Christian Guldmann STEEL HECTOR DAVIS PEÑA Silvia Hidalgo-Pallares MINISTRY OF MANPOWER AND F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ KROMANN REUMERT PRIETO & GAMUNDI PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE MIGRATION Diego Martin-Menjivar Steen Halmind Luis Heredia Bonetti Jacob R. Hidrowoh Ahmed Farid Mohamed ACZALAW BECH-BRUUN DRAGSTED LAW RUSSIN, VECCHI & HEREDIA PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE El-Sherbiny FIRM BONETTI Astrud María Meléndez Rodrigo Jijon AHMED EL-SHERBINY LAW FIRM TRANSUNION Mette Hedelund Thomasen Hipolito Herrera V. PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE Samiha Fawzy KROMANN REUMERT PELLERANO & HERRERA Mauricio Melhado Miguel Macias Carmigniani THE EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR GOLD SERVICE S.A. DE C.V Mikkel Hesselgren José Antonio Logroño MACIAS HURTADO & MACIAS ECONOMIC STUDIES GORRISSEN FEDERSPIEL Morales Antonio R Mendez Llort Heinz Moeller Freile Taher Helmy KIERKEGAARD, LAW FIRM ADAMS GUZMAN & ASOCIADOS ROMERO PINEDA & ASOCIADOS MOELLER, GÓMEZ-LINCE & CÍA HELMY, HAMZA & PARTNERS, Jens Steen Jensen Porfirio Lopez MEMBERS OF BAKER & Miriam Eleana Mixco Reyna Paulina Montesdeoca De KROMANN REUMERT DATA-CREDITO MCKENZIE GOLD SERVICE S.A. DE C.V Bustamante Jørgen B. Jepsen Paola Mañón Taveras Sara Hinton MACIAS HURTADO & MACIAS Hilda Morena Segovia KROMANN REUMERT HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ & TROWERS & HAMLINS SUPERINTENDENCIA DEL SISTEMA Jorge Paz Durini FERNANDEZ FINANCIERO, EL SALVADOR Jørgen Kjærgaard Madsen Sadeyaa Ibrahim PAZ & HOROWITZ KROMANN REUMERT Xavier Marra CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR Maria Eugenia Olmedo de José M. Pérez DHIMES & MARRA PROTECTING MANPOWER AND Castaneda Jakob Hüttel Larsen PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE WORKING ENVIRONMENT, ACZALAW PHILIP & PARTNERE Roberto Payano MINISTRY OF MANPOWER AND Sebastian Pérez-Arteta SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS MIGRATION Celina Padilla Pia Moller DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA PEREZ BUSTAMANTE & PONCE F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ DANISH FINANCIAL AUTHORITY Karim Adel Kamel Luis Pellerano Bruno Pineda-Cordero ADEL KAMEL & ASSOCIATES Monica Guadalupe Pineda Soren Lehmann Nielsen PELLERANO & HERRERA PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE Machuca HJEJLE, GERSTED & MOGENSEN Mohamed Kamel ACZALAW Maria Portes Xavier Amador Pino AL KAMEL LAW BUILDING, Claus Kaare Pedersen CASTILLO Y CASTILLO ESTIDIO JURIDICO AMADOR Ana Patricia Portillo Reyes PHILIP & PARTNERE Reinhard Klarmann GUANDIQUE SEGOVIA Claudia Roca Falconi Puig MENA ASSOCIATES QUINTANILLA Christina Prince HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ & FALCONI PUIG ABOGADOS MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST Daniel MacSweeney FERNANDEZ Danilo Rodríguez Villamil Sandra Reed STANBROOK TROWERS & HAMLINS ESPINO, NIETO, UMAÑA & Celeste Rodríguez González PEREZ BUSTAMENTE & PONCE ASSOCIADOS Louise Krarup Simonsen Katerina Miltiadou RUSSIN, VECCHI & HEREDIA ABOGADOS KROMANN REUMERT BONETTI MECOS Jose Romero Maria de los Angeles Roman ROMERO PINEDA & ASOCIADOS Kurt Skovlund Jesus R. Almanzar Rojas FABARA & COMPAÑIA Ashraf Nadoury KROMANN REUMERT DE MARCHENA KALUCHE & ABOGADOS NADOURY & NAHAS Roxana Romero ROMERO PINEDA & ASOCIADOS Jorn Skovslund Hansen ASOCIADOS Jose Rumazo Arcos Diaa El-Din Abd Rabou RKI KREDIT INFORMATION Marcelino San Miguel PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT Manuel Telles Suvillaga LEXINCORP Henrik Stenbjerre CICLA Hernan Santacruz Ingy Rasekh KROMANN REUMERT Wilfredo Senior PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE MENA ASSOCIATES ESTONIA Knud Villemoes Hansen HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ & Santiago Terán Muñoz Ahmed Abdel Reheem NATIONAL SURVEY AND FERNANDEZ MOELLER, GÓMEZ-LINCE & CÍA NADOURY & NAHAS S Aet Bergmann CADASTRE ­ DENMARK / Juan Suero TARK & CO. Guillermo Torres Hala F. Riad KORT-OG MATRIKELSTYRELSEN AARON SUERO & PEDERSINI INFAES KOSHERI, RASHED & RIAD Heili Haabu RAIDLA & PARTNERS DOMINICAN Manuel Tapia Mohamed Serry REPUBLIC DR. RAMON TAPIA ESPINAL & EGYPT, ARAB REP SHALAKANY Silja Holsmer ASOC. LAW FIRM MODY & HÄÄL Alaa Amer Adelaida Adames Mahmoud Shedid Eduardo Trueba GLIMSTEDT CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ & SHALAKANY PELLERANO & HERRERA PROTECTING MANPOWER AND Imanta Hütt FERNANDEZ WORKING ENVIRONMENT, Ragy Soliman HOUGH, HÜBNER, HÜTT & Flavia Baez de George MINISTRY OF MANPOWER AND IBRACHY & DERMARKAR PARTNERS PELLERANO & HERRERA MIGRATION 140 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Andres Juss John Ridgway Bekka Rasane Joanna Gumpelson Archil Melikadze ESTONIAN LAND BOARD PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC DE PARDIEU BROCAS MAFFEI & CENTER FOR ENTERPRISES LAWYERS DEVELOPMENT CENTER LEYGONIE RESTRUCTURING AND Igr Kostjuk MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS HOUGH, HÜBNER, HÜTT & Mikko Reinikainen Olivier Jaudoin FINLAND PARTNERS PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS SECRETARIAT GÉNÉRALE DE LA Roin Migriauli COMMISSION BANCAIRE, BANQUE MIGRIAULI & PARTNERS Kristi Kullerkup Markku Aaltonen Sakari E. Sorri DE FRANCE TARK & CO CONFERERATION OF FINNISH BUTZOW NORDIA Avto Namicheishvili CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES Marc Jobert BEGIASHVILI & CO Peeter Lepik Kenneth Svartström JOBERT & ASSOCIÉS LEPIK & LUHAÄÄR Ahti Auikolinen HANNES SNELLMAN Joseph Salukvadze MINISTRY OF LABOR Odile Lautard KFW FINANCED CADASTRE AND Lea Liigus Sarah Tahkala MICAPCOR-DAGEMO, MINISTÈRE LAND REGISTER PROJECT SORAINEN Claudio Busi HANNES SNELLMAN CASTREN & SNELLMAN DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES, DU Kakha O. Sharabidze Jaan Lindmäe Micaela Thorström TRAVAIL ET DE LA SOLIDARIÉ BUSINESS LEGAL BUREAU TARK & CO Mikko Eerola ROSCHIER HOLMBERG, Patrick Le Moal WASELIUS & WIST (IN ASSOCIATION WITH TULLOCH ATTORNEYS Indrek Link MICAPCOR-DAGEMO, MINISTÈRE & CO) HOUGH, HÜBNER, HÜTT & Timo Esko Irmeli Timonen DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES, DU Vakhtang Shepardnadze PARTNERS ESKO, TIMO & UOTI, SAMI HANNES SNELLMAN TRAVAIL ET DE LA SOLIDARIÉ MGALOBLISHVILI KIPIANI Marko Mehilane Pekka Halme Sami Tuominen Philippe Lefevre DZIDZIGURI LEPIK & LUHAÄÄR NATIONAL LAND SURVEY OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LEFEVRE PELLETIER & ASSOCIES FINLAND GERMANY Sven Papp Eeva Vahtera Delphine Legras RAIDLA & PARTNERS Berndt Heikel MINISTRY OF LABOR DUBARRY LE DOUARIN VEIL Wulf Bach HANNES SNELLMAN SCHUFA Raino Paron Helena Viita Antoine Maffei RAIDLA & PARTNERS Jenni Hupli ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG & DE PARDIEU BROCAS MAFFEI & Klaus Berner CASTREN & SNELLMAN WASELIUS LEYGONIE NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW Anton Sigal Geraldine Malinge FIRM LEPIK & LUHAÄÄR Raimo Husu Carita Wallgren FINANCIAL SUPERVISION ROSCHIER HOLMBERG, KLEIN-GODDARD ASSOCIÉS Jennifer Bierly-Seipp Tarmo Sild AUTHORITY ATTORNEYS Olivia Michaud GASSNER STOCKMANN & LEXTAL LAW FIRM Pekka Jaatinen KOLLEGEN Gunnar Westerlund LEFÈVRE PELLETIER & ASSOCIÉS, Tambet Tonisson CASTREN & SNELLMAN ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG & AVOCATS Simon Cookson MINISTRY OF JUSTICE Juuso Jokela WASELIUS Andre Pedron ASHURST Marit Toom SUOMEN ASIAKASTIETO OY ­ DELOITTE & TOUCHE JURIDIQUE Hans-Joachim Dohr RAIDLA & PARTNERS FINSKA FRANCE ET FISCAL FEDERAL FINANCIAL Karolina Ullman Bernt Juthstrom Vincent Asselineau Bernard Piot SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG & ASSELINEAU & ASSOCIÉS COMPETITION TRIBUNAL & Marc Eumann STANBROOK ADVOKATBYRÅ EESTI WASELIUS COMMERCIAL COURT OF PARIS JUSTIZMINISTERIUM DES LANDES FILIAAL Antoine Azam-Darley Kaija Kilappa AZAM-DARLEY & ASSOCIES Philippe Prevost NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN Urmas Ustav FINANCIAL SUPERVISION BANQUE DE FRANCE Ute Foshag LEXTAL AUTHORITY Laurent Barbara BAKER & MCKENZIE Alexia Simon HOGAN & HARTSON RAUE Toomas Vaher Gisela Knuts AZAM-DARLEY & ASSOCIES Klaus Günther RAIDLA & PARTNERS ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG & Nicolas Barberis Laurent Valadoux OPPENHOFF & RÄDLER- WASELIUS ASHURST MORRIS CRISP Vesse Võhma BANQUE DE FRANCE LINKLATERS & ALLIANCE LEPIK & LUHAÄÄR Pauline Koskelo Bertrand Barrier Jean Luc Vallens Roland Hagemeister THE SUPREME COURT OF GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL JUDGE HÖLTERS & ELSING ETHIOPIA FINLAND Safouen Ben Abdallah Manfred Heinrich CABINET D'AVOCATS SERRES AND Philippe Xavier-Bender Tameru Wondm Agegnehu Patrik Lindfors ASSOCIATES GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK TAMERU WONDM AGEGNEHU HANNES SNELLMAN ATTORNEYS AT LAW Dorothée Bontoux Stefan Heyder Bekure Assefa GEORGIA NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW Tomas Lindholm ASHURST BEKURE ASSEFA AND ASSOCIATES FIRM ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG & Louis Bernard Buchman Irakli Adeishuvili Teshome Gabre-Mariam WASELIUS Peter Hoegen CAUBET CHOUCHANA MEYER GEORGIAN LEGAL PARTNERSHIP Bokan ALLEN & OVERY Jyri Makela Eka Aleksidze TESHOME GABRE-MARIAM LAW Paul Henri de Cabissole Hök FIRM CONFEDERATION OF FINNISH DE PARDIEU BROCAS MAFFEI & EY LAW CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES LEYGONIE LAW FIRM DR. HÖK, Berhane Ghebray Marekh Amirashvili STIEGLMEIER & KOLLEGEN Mikko Mali BERHANE GHEBRAY AND Stéphanie Chatelon AMIRASHVILI, GOGISHVILI & Andrea Hosenfeld ASSOCIATES KROGERUS & CO. DELOITTE & TOUCHE JURIDIQUE SHENGELIA ASHURST Aberra Ketsela Johan Nybergh ET FISCAL Giorgi Begiashvili Markus Jakoby TAMERU WONDM AGEGNEHU HANNES SNELLMAN Simon Cookson BEGIASHVILI & CO. ASHURST VELTEN FRANZ JAKOBY Debebe Legesse Samu Palkonen Zaza Bibilashvili Christof Kautzsch DEBEBE LEGESSE LAW FIRM ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG & John D. Crothers EY LAW WASELIUS GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL HAARMANN HEMMELRATH Lakew Lemma Lado Chanturia Mikko Parjanne Bernard Khun NATIONAL BANK OF ETHIOPIA Bertrand Debosque SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA SUOMEN ASIAKASTIETO OY BIGNON, LEBRAY, DELSOL & LOVELLS Mekuria Tafassa FINSKA Irina Gordeladze ASSOCIES Rainer Magold FITANRARI TAFASSA LEGAL FIRM GEORGIAN LEGAL PARTNERSHIP Kari Parkkinen Bertrand Delaunay BAKER MCKENZIE HEDMAN OSBORNE CLARKE Khatuna Khutsurauli FIJI ASHURST MORRIS CRISP ALLIANCE BUSINESS LEGAL BUREAU Michael Molitoris NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW Nehla Basawaiya Anne Delerable Sami Pauni Murtaz Kikoria FIRM MUNRO LEYS GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL ROSCHIER HOLMBERG, NATIONAL BANK OF GEORGIA Bernd Oberbossel Delores Elliott ATTORNEYS Stanislas Dwernicki Victor Kipiani BUNDESAMT FÜR FINANZEN DATA BUREAU Johanna Pulli GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA MGALOBLISHVILI, KIPIANI, DZIDZIGURI Heike Pospiech Richard Krishnan Naidu CASTREN & SNELLMAN Xavier-Philippe Gruwez NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW MUNRO LEYS Marja Ramm-Schmidt XP LEGAL INTERNATIONAL LAW Dimitri Kitoshvili FIRM FIRM GEORGIAN LEGAL PARTNERSHIP Mohini Prasad KROGERUS & CO. Joerg Rossen CROMPTONS CREDITREFORM ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 141 Günter Schneiders D.A.K. Mensah Anna Th. Kazantzidou Lissa Polanco Evangelina Lardizábal BUNDESAMT FÜR FINANZEN CENTRAL DATABANK PANAGOPOULOS, VAINANIDIS, AGUILAR & ZARCEÑO F.A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ SCHINA, ECONOMOU Thomas Schulz Sam Okudzeto Alfredo Rodriguez-Mahuad Ulises Mejía León-Gómez NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW SAM OKUDZETO & ASSOCIATES Emmanuela Truli RODRÍGUEZ, ARCHILA, B&B ABOGADOS FIRM ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS CASTELLANOS, SOLARES & Lawrence Otto AGUILAR F. Dario Lobo Ingrid Seitz FUGAR AND COMPANY Spyridon Tsallas BUFETE GUTIERREZ FALLA DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS Jorge Rolando Barrios Fred Quarshie BONILLA, MONTANO & Rene Lopez Rodezno Raphael Söhlke MINISTRY OF FINANCE & Tsoumelea Vasiliki TORIELLO LOPEZ RODEZNO & ASOCIADOS P + P PÖLLATH + PARTNERS ECONOMIC PLANNING KARATZAS & PARTNERS LAW FIRM Sylvia Ruiz Armida Maria Lopez de Markus Stadler Issac Quarshie RUIZ SKINNER-KLEE & RUIZ Arguello NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW UNATRAC C/O TRACTOR & Victoria Zachopoulou ACZALAW FIRM EQUIPMENT GHANA TIRESIAS Isabel Samayoa CARRILLO & ASOCIADOS Dennis Matamoros Batson Virginia Strelen Jacob Saah GUATEMALA F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ OPPENHOFF & RÄDLER- PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Luis Turk Mejia LINKLATERS & ALLIANCE Maria Elena Matute Cruz Juan Luis Aguilar Salguero SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS GREECE GUATEMALA SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA Holger Thomas AGUILAR & ZARCEÑO SJ BERWIN KNOPF TULLOCH Juan Carlos Mejia Cotto Themis Antoniou Silvia Alejos Ana Lucía Umaña STEININGER OFICINA DE MODERNIZACIÓN DE BANK OF GREECE ARENALES & SKINNER-KLÉE MAYORA & MAYORA REGISTROS DE LA PROPIEDAD Michael Unkelbach Georgios B. Bazinas Ruby Asturias Ernesto Viteri Echeverria KANZLEI UNKELBACH Enrique Ortez Sequeira ANAGNOSTOPOULOS BAZINAS ACZALAW VITERI & VITERI ORTEZ SEQUEIRA & ASSOCIATES Frank Vogel FIFIS COUNSELLOR & ATTORNEYS Ana Lucia Barrera GUINEA SJ BERWIN KNOPF ULLOCH AT LAW Jose Ramon Paz ARENALES & SKINNER-KLÉE STEININGER J. R. PAZ & ASOCIADOS Ioanna Bokorou Boubacar Barry Mario Adolfo Búcaro F. Oliver Waldburg KYRIAKIDES ­ GEORGOPOULOS BOUBACAR BARRY LAW FIRM José Rafael Rivera Ferrari DÍAZ-DURAN & ASOCIADOS ALLEN & OVERY LAW FIRM J.R. PAZ & ASOCIADOS Ibrahima Diakite Juan Pablo Cárdenas Villamar Wilhelm Zeddies Alkistis Christofilou LANDNET Enrique Rodriguez Burchard DHV CONSULTANTS WORKING COMMITTEE OF THE IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS ABOGADOS Y ASESORES Cheick Mohamed Tidjane SURVEYING AUTHORITIES OF THE Poulakou Chryssiis Juan Pablo Carrasco de Sylla Roberto Zacarias Jr. STATES OF THE FEDERAL KYRIAKIDES ­ GEOGROPOULOS Groote BANQUE CENTRALE ZACARIAS AGUILAR & REPUBLIC OF GERMANY LAW FIRM DÍAZ-DURÁN & ASOCIADOS ASOCIADOS HAITI GHANA Angeliki Delicostopoulou Alfonso Carrillo Violeta Zuniga de Godoy A & A DELICOSTOPOULOU CARRILLO & ASOCIADOS Steve Christian Brown COMISION NACIONAL DE BANCOS Stella Ackwerth Rodimiro Castaneda BROWN LAW FIRM Y SEGUROS LAWYER Stefanoyannis Economou ECONOMOU AND ASSOCIATES SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Jean Baptiste Brown HONG KONG, Larry Adjetey GUATEMALA BROWN LAW FIRM CHINA LAW TRUST COMPANY Maira Galani IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS Carlos González Castellanos Yves Joseph Stephen Allen Brobbey RODRÍGUEZ, ARCHILA, Fk Au BANQUE DE LA REPUBLIQUE SUPREME COURT OF GHANA Athanassios Kanellopoulos CASTELLANOS, SOLARES & JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER KALLIMOPOULOS LOUKOPOULOS AGUILAR D'HAITI Nene Amegatcher CHIOTELLIS Andrew Baggio Robert Laforest SAM OKUDZETO & ASSOCIATES Anabella Chaclan BAKER & MCKENZIE Petros Kapasouris ARENALES & SKINNER-KLÉE CABINET LAFOREST Wilfred Anim-Odame LAWYER David Bateson Louis Gary Lissade LAND VALUATION BOARD Guillermo Contreras MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES Catherine M. Karatzas BANCARED ORBE CABINET LISSADE Seth Asiama KARATZAS & PARTNERS Charles D. Booth Salim Succar INSTITUTE OF LAND Eduardo Dawe UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG CABINET LISSADE MANAGEMENT AND Constantinos Klissouras MAYORA & MAYORA Stephen Briscoe DEVELOPMENT ANAGNOSTOPOULOS BAZINAS FIFIS COUNSELLOR & ATTORNEYS Juan Manuel Díaz-Durán HONDURAS RSM NELSON WHEELER T. Dela Avle AT LAW DIAZ-DURAN ASOCIADOS CORPORATE ADVISORY SERVICES LARYEA, LARYEA & CO. Gustavo Martin Arguello Ilias Koimtzoglou Julio Eduardo Camey Silva ACZALAW Nicholas Chan Reginald Bannerman ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS REGISTRO GENERAL DE LA SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY, IN BRUCE-LYLE BANNERMAN & PROPRIEDAD DE GUATEMALA Jorge Omar Casco ASSOCIATION WITH BOUGHTON THOMPSON Nicholas Kontizas BUFETE CASCO & ASOCIADOS PETERSON YANG ANDERSON ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS Juan Pedro Falla Kojo Bentsi-Enchill RUIZ SKINNER-KLEE & RUIZ Tania Casco Albert PC Chan BENTSI-ENCHILL & LETSA Irene C. Kyriakides BUFETE CASCO & ASOCIADOS THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC KYRIAKIDES ­ GEORGOPOULOS Gabriela Maria Franco UNIVERSITY Stella Bentsi-Enchill LAW FIRM TRANSUNION Estela Chavez LEXCONSULT AND COMPANY TRANSUNION Wendy Chiu John C. Kyriakides Rodolfo Fuentes UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG V.J. Dela Selormey KYRIAKIDES ­ GEOGROPOULOS PROTECTORA DE CREDITO Carment Chavez BANK OF GHANA LAW FIRM COMERCIAL COMISION NACIONAL DE BANCOS Paul Fox Y SEGUROS THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC Lawrence Fubara Anga Vassiliki Lazarakou Juan Diaz Lopez UNIVERSITY ANGA & EMUWA ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Ana Cristina de Pereira GUATEMALA COMISION NACIONAL DE BANCOS Glenda Fung William E. Fugar Konstantinos Mellios Y SEGUROS JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER FUGAR & COMPANY SARANTITIS & PARTNERS Eduardo Mayora Dawe LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND MAYORA & MAYORA José Dolores Tijerino Tammy Goh NOTARIES PUBLIC Effie G. Mitsopoulou BUFETE TIJERINO Y ASOCIADOS JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER KYRIAKIDES ­ GEOGROPOULOS Victor Orantes David A. Hesse LAW FIRM PRESA, POLANCO, QUEVEDO, Francisco Guillermo Durón Ramona Ho HESSE & LARSEY LAW FIRM ORANTES & SISNIEGA Lopez SIT, FUNG, KWONG & SHUM Dimitris E. Paraskevas BUFETE DURÓN Rosa Kudoadzi ELIAS SP. PARASKEVAS Luis Pellecer Cindy Lam BENTSI-ENCHILL & LETSA CARRILLO & ASOCIADOS León Gómez THE LAND REGISTRY Katia J. Protopapa B & B ABOGADOS Kenneth D. Laryea TRYFON J. KOUTALIDIS Claudia Pereira David Lawrence LARYEA, LARYEA & CO. MAYORA & MAYORA Laureano Gutierrez Falla DEACONS Kleanthis Roussos BUFETE GUTIERREZ FALLA Samuel L'Quartey ROUSSOS LAW FIRM Diego Polanco Teresa Ma SAMLON CONSTRUCTION PRESA, POLANCO, QUEVEDO, Lynet Kawas LINKLATERS Athina Skolarikou ORANTES & SISNIEGA BUFETE GUTIERREZ FALLA ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS 142 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Richard Mazzochi Zoltan Krausz Trupti Garach P.R. Viswanathan Eman Achmad Sulaeman MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES BUILD & ECON HUNGARY BRAND FARRAR BUXBAUM CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU LUBIS, SANTOSA & MAULANA INDIA Rupert Nicholl Olga Latkoczy Nirmala Gill Helen Sunarjo JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER DEPT. OF LANDS AND MAPPING, LITTLE & CO INDONESIA MAKARIM & TAIRA S. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND Steven M. W. Shum RURAL DEVELOPMENT Vijay Goel Mahdi Syahbuddin SIT, FUNG, KWONG & SHUM SINGHANIA & CO. John Andre Panggabean BANK PERMATA Zoltan Marosi ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO, Philip Smart OPPENHEIM & PARTNERS Akil Hirani REKSODIPUTRO Ernst G. Tehuteru UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS MAJMUDAR & CO. ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO, Theodoor Bakker REKSODIPUTRO Thomas So DERINGER Toral Jhaveri ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO, JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER Ferenc Mátrai FOX MANDAL REKSODIPUTRO Irene Vloerberg EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF Nina Sze HAYHURST ROBINSON Ravi Kulkarni Hamud M. Balfas TECHNOLOGY JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER Túri Melinda LITTLE & CO ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO, REKSODIPUTRO Pudji Wahjuni Purbo Richard Tollan NAGY ÉS TRÓCSÁNYI Prachi Puri Malhotra MAKARIM & TAIRA S. JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER Istvan Nagy KACHWAHA & PARTNERS Fabian Buddy Pascoal HANAFIAH PONGGAWA BANGUN Brian J. Wesol Sara Tong CREDITREFORM INTERINFO Som Mandal ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO, TEMPLE CHAMBERS Péter Nógrádi FOX MANDAL Jenny Budiman REKSODIPUTRO MAKARIM & TAIRA S. Thomas P.J. Vaizey NÓGRÁDÍ Vipender Mann JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER IRAN, ISLAMIC REP. Klara Oppenheim CHAWLA & CO. Ayik Candrawulan Gunadi ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO, Stephen Vine OPPENHEIM & PARTNERS Stephen Mathias REKSODIPUTRO Mohammad Adib ANGELA WANG & CO FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS KOCHHAR & CO BANGALORE ADIB LAW FIRM DERINGER Emilia L.C. van Egmond-de Raymond Wong Ganpat Raj Mehta Alexander Aghayan Adam Petho Wilde de Ligny JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER THE BANK OF RAJASTHAN ALEXANDER AGHAYAN & BISZ EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF ASSOCIATES Patrick Wong Dara Mehta TECHNOLOGY Csaba Pigler JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER LITTLE & CO Behrooz Akhlaghi NAGY ÉS TRÓCSÁNYI H.M.U. Fachri Asaari, S.H. DR. BEHROOZ AKHLAGHI & Sandy H.Y. Wong S.K. Mitra WARENS & ACHYAR Tamas Saad ASSOCIATES DIBB LUPTON ALSOP INDIAN INVESTMENT CENTER BUILD & ECON HUNGARY Aprilda Fiona Reza Askari James Wong Ajit Mittal FIONA, RAHMAN & PARTNERS Konrad Siegler FOREIGN LEGAL AFFAIRS GROUP THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC RESERVE BANK OF INDIA Yulian Hadromi UNIVERSITY MARTONYI ÉS KAJTÁR BAKER & Albert Bernardi MCKENZIE Vijay Nair HADROMI & PARTNERS ALBERT BERNARDI & ASSOCIATES Shirley Yuen Benedek Sipöcz CHAWLA & CO. Riza Haryadi TRANSUNION Ali Hatami DEWEY BALLANTINE Ravi Nath BANK INDONESIA DR. BEHROOZ AKHLAGHI & Alex Yuen Gábor Spitz RAJINDER NARAIN & CO. Erwandi Hendarta ASSOCIATES TRANSUNION HAARMANN HEMMELRATH Shreyas Patel HADIPUTRANTO, HADINOTO & PARTNERS, AN INDONESIAN Katerina Miltiadou HUNGARY Csaba Szabó FOX MANDAL CORRESPONDENT FIRM OF BAKER MECOS DESSEWFFY, BELLÁK & PARTNERS M Prabhakaran & MCKENZIE Csendes Agnes Shahla Pournazeri CONSULTA JURIS DESSEWFFY, BELLÁK & PARTNERS Ágnes Szent-Ivány Rahayu N. Hoed SHAHLA POURNAZERI & SÁNDOR, SZEGEDI, SZENT-IVÁNY Madhu Radhakrishnan MAKARIM & TAIRA S ASSOCIATES Geza Apagyi RADHAKRISHNAN & CO Yahya Rayegani DIVISION OF LAND Csaba Szoke Darrell R. Johnson REGISTRATION, DEPT. OF LANDS BOGSCH & PARTNERS K.K. Ramani SSEK INDONESIAN LEGAL LAWYER AND MAPPING, MINISTRY OF CONSULTANTS Judit Torok LAWS4INDIA Seyed Mehdi Salyani AGRICULTURE AND RURAL Stephanus Jonathan BANKING INFORMATION DEVELOPMENT SUPREME COURT OF HUNGARY K. V. Ramesh KOCHHAR & CO. HADROMI & PARTNERS DEPARTMENT András Békés Melinda Turi Galinar Kartakusuma Parviz Savrai HUNGARIAN LABOUR NAGY ÉS TRÓCSÁNYI Dipak Rao DR. PARVIZ SAVRAI AND INSPECTORATE MAKARIM & TAIRA S. Zoltan Varszegi SINGHANIA & PARTNERS ASSOCIATES Péter Berethalmi DEZSORETI & ANTALL Sameer Rastogi Vyati Kartika Sari, SH M. Shahabi NAGY ÉS TRÓCSÁNYI LANDWELL SINGHANIA & CO. LUBIS GANIE SUROWIDJOJO TAVAKOLI & SHAHABI, Barbara Bognar Erica Voros Abhishek Saket Keat Lee ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS HUNGARIAN FINANCIAL HUNGARIAN FINANCIAL SINGHANIA & CO. LAWYER AT LAW SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY Radhika Sankaran Timbul Thomas Lubis B.F. Zarin-Ghalam Zsuzsanna Cseri Hermann Zsofia FOX MANDAL LUBIS GANIE SUROWIDJOJO CENTRAL BANK OF THE ISLAMIC BARD CSERI AND PARTNERS HAYHURST ROBINSON REPUBLIC OF IRAN Shekar Saraf Bill MacDonald Tunde Ezsias INDIA MR SHEKAR SARAF, ADVOCATE PRICEWATERHOUSECOPPERS IRELAND COFACE INTERCREDIT HUNGARY Shardul S. Shroff Ferry Madian Raj Pal Arora Andrew Bates Gabor Fejes AMARCHAND MANGALDAS NUGROHO REKSODIPUTRO BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION OF DILLON EUSTACE OPPENHEIM & PARTNERS INDIA Vikram Shroff Yoga Mulya FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS Declan Black NISHITH DESAI ASSOCIATES HADIPUTRANTO, HADINOTO & DERINGER V C Augustine PARTNERS MASON HAYES & CURRAN DEPARTMENT OF BANKING D.C. Singhania Gábor Felsen SUPERVISION Daniel Boland SINGHANIA & CO. Ali Imron Murim KÖVES CLIFFORD CHANCE CENTRAL BANK OF INDONESIA ARTHUR COX PÜNDER Harminder Chawla Ravi Singhania CHAWLA & CO. Luhut Pangaribuan Alan Browning Gyula Gábriel SINGHANIA & PARTNERS LUHUT M.P. PANGARIBUAN & L. K. SHIELDS BOGSCH & PARTNERS Sumeeta Choudhari A. Sivananthiram PARTNERS FOX MANDAL Tanya Colbert Anna Gaspar SUBREGIONAL ILO OFFICE Arwin Rasyid MASON HAYES & CURRAN BUILD & ECON HUNGARY Freyan Desai Suhas Srinivasiah BANK NEGARA INDONESIA KACHWAHA & PARTNERS Gerard Coll Gábor Horvàth KOCHHAR & CO BANGALORE Inge Resdiano EUGENE F. COLLINS OPPENHEIM ÈS TÀRSAI Rajkumar Dubey K. Suresh MAKARIM & TAIRA S. SINGHANIA & CO. Anthony E. Collins FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS STARTUPBAZAAR Julinorita Simatupang EUGENE F. COLLINS DERINGER R.J. Gagrat S.N. Variava LUBIS GANIE SUROWIDJOJO, Kathryn Copeland Andrea Jádi Németh GAGRAT & CO-ADVOCATES & SUPREME COURT OF INDIA LAW FIRM SOLICITORS CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND HAARMANN HEMMELRATH ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 143 Gavin Doherty Jackob Melcer Giuseppe Lombardi Elise Douet Tetsuro Sato EUGENE F. COLLINS E.S. SHIMRON, I. MOLHO, PEDERSOLI LOMBARDI E BANK OF JAMAICA ASAHI KOMA PERSKY & CO. ASSOCIATI John Doyle Dave L. Garcia Tomoe Sato DILLON EUSTACE Zvi Howard Nixon Stefano Macchi di Cellere MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON CREDIT INFORMATION CENTER ELCHANAN LANDAU JONES DAY CORP Patricia Heffernan Peter Goldson O'DONNELL SWEENEY Galit Rozovsky Fabrizio Mariotti MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON Setsuko Sato YUVAL LEVY & CO STUDIO LEGALE BELTRAMO CCB Steven Hegarty Tamara Green ARTHUR COX Eliot Sacks Ida Marotta MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON Hiromasa Shiozaki HERZOG, FOX & NEEMAN ALLEN & OVERY ASAHI KOMA Melissa Jennings Gayon Hosin ARTHUR COX Yaacov Salomon Daniela Marrani BANK OF JAMAICA Gaku Suzuki LIPSCHUTZ & CO PORTOLANO COLELLA CAVALLO ASAHI KOMA William Johnston PROSPERETTI STUDIO LEGALE Anthony Jenkinson ARTHUR COX Asaf Samuel NUNES, SCHOLEFIELD DELEON & Yuko Takagi LIPSCHUTZ & CO Eva Maschietto CO. FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY Andrew Mawdsley ASHURST LAWYER Ron Storch Derek Jones Shinjiro Takagi GLOBAL CREDIT SERVICES Pier Andrea Fré Torelli MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON INDUSTRIAL REVITALIZATION Robin McDonnell Massini CORPORATION OF JAPAN EUGENE F. COLLINS Dror Vigdor CARNELUTTI Derek N. Jones YIGAL ARNON & CO MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON Takanobu Takehara Patricia McGovern Maria Grazia Medici NISHIMURA & PARTNERS L. K. SHIELDS Tomer Wisblech VERUSIO E COSMELLI STUDIO Norman Minott YIGAL ARNON & CO MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON Kenji Utsumi Michael Meghen LEGALE NAGASHIMA OHNO & ARTHUR COX Janet Morgan ITALY Francesco Misuraca TSUNEMATSU DUNNCOX David O'Donohoe SPASARO MISURACA & Tadeshi Yokoyama ARTHUR COX Giuseppe Alemani ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM Suzette Moss CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON Barry O'Neill Luciano Panzani & MOSLE Setsuko Yufu EUGENE F. COLLINS SUPREME COURT OF ITALY Rosie Plant Gilioli Alemani ATSUMI & PARTNERS INCORPORATED MASTERBUILDERS Maurice Phelan Francesco Pensato BOCCHIOLA TAMBURINI E ASSOCIATION OF JAMAICA MASON HAYES & CURRAN PARTNERS FRANZOSI DAL NEGRO JORDAN Alfred A. O.J. Rattray Sinead Power Maria Pia Ascenzo Catherine Perrigaud RATTRAY, PATTERSON, RATTRAY Ala'a Abdel-Hadi IRISH CREDIT BUREAU BANK OF ITALY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RAHHAL AND ASSOCIATES LAW ORGANIZATION Alfred A. Rattray Jonathan Sheehan Gilles Blanchi Salah el Dine Al Bashir Barbara Picchi MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON ARTHUR COX INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEGAL LAW ORGANIZATION BANCA D'ITALIA Stuart Stimpson ASSOCIATES Gavin Simons Andrea Rescigno MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON EUGENE F. COLLINS Gian Bruno Bruni Ola Al Kadi BRUNI GRAMELLINI E ASSOCIATI WHITE & CASE, VARRENTI E Humprey Taylor ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI Seamus Tighearnaigh ASSOCIATI ­ MILAN TAYLOR CONSTRUCTION ZU'BI IRISH CREDIT BUREAU Enrico Bugielli Beatrice Rubini VERUSIO E COSMELLI STUDIO Karen Wilson Eman M. Al-Dabbas Michael Treacy LEGALE CRIF RATTRAY, PATTERSON, RATTRAY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEGAL LAND REGISTRY ASSOCIATES Sergio Calderara Nerio Saguatti Ted Williams JAPAN NUNZIANTE MAGRONE CONSORZIO PER LA TUTELA DEL Sami E. Al-Louzi ARTHUR COX CREDITO ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI Filippo Cecchetti Shinichiro Abe Gillian Woods Marco Sella ZU'BI CHIOMENTI STUDIO LEGALE BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN ARTHUR COX STUDIO LEGALE MACCHI DI Ali Al-Masri Domenico Colella CELLERE E GANGEMI Naoki Eguchi KHALAF MASA'DEH & PARTNERS ISRAEL PORTOLANO COLELLA CAVALLO TOKYO AOYAMA AOKI/BAKER & Pensato Setti PROSPERETTI STUDIO LEGALE MCKENZIE Sahar Anani Eli Arbel STUDIO LEGALE MACCHI DI ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI Simon Cookson CELLERE E GANGEMI Tamotsu Hatasawa BANK OF ISRAEL ZU'BI ASHURST HATASAWA & WAKAI LAW FIRM Daniela Sgro Avie Arenson Arar Batarseh Barbara Corsetti SPASARO MISURACA & Kaoru Hattori A. ARENSON KHALAF MASA'DEH & PARTNERS PORTOLANO COLELLA CAVALLO ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM ASAHI KOMA Paul Baris PROSPERETTI STUDIO LEGALE Nelly Batchoun Piervincenzo Spasaro Shigetoshi Hirano YIGAL ARNON & CO CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN Luisa Cucchi SPASARO MISURACA & OH-EBASHI LPC & PARTNERS Ofer Bar-On JONES DAY ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM Yosuke Kanegae Francis Bawab SAVIT BAR-ON INBAR PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Lisa Curran Vittorio Tadei OH-EBASHI LPC & PARTNERS Sabina Blank ALLEN & OVERY CHIOMENTI STUDIO LEGALE Osamu Kawakami Micheal T. Dabit SMALL BUSINESS AUTHORITY OF MICHEAL DABIT & ASSOCIATES Antonio de Martinis Antonella Tanico JAPAN INFORMATION CENTER ISRAEL ATTORNEYS AT LAW SPASARO MISURACA & LAWYER CORP Dina Brown ASSOCIATES Saleh Abd El-Ati Fabio Tortora Takaya Konishi ELCHANAN LANDAU ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI Federico Dettori EXPERIAN CREDIT BUREAU ASAHI KOMA ZU'BI Clifford Davis GIANNI, ORIGONI, GRIPPO & Luca Tufarelli Nobuaki Matsuoka S. HOROWITZ & CO. PARTNERS Masoud Sakfal Hait RISTUCCIA & TUFARELLI YAMAGUCHI INTERNATIONAL ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI Amihud Doron Roberto Donnini Vito Vittore Toshio Miyatake ZU'BI AMIHUD DORON & CO. ALLEN & OVERY NUNZIANTE MAGRONE LAW FIRM ADACHI HENDERSON Nissreen Haram David Drutman Alberto Maria Fornari MIYATAKE & FUJITA Giulio Cesare Zanetti INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEGAL AMIHUD DORON & CO. BAKER & MCKENZIE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Satoshi Ogishi ASSOCIATES Alex Hertman Giuseppe Godano LAW ORGANIZATION NISHIMURA & PARTNERS Sa'ed Karajah S. HOROWITZ & CO. BANK OF ITALY Yuji Onuki KARAJAH & ASSOCIATES JAMAICA Pinchas Katz Giovanni Izzo ASAHI KOMA Fadi Kawar BANK OF ISRAEL ABBATESCIANNI E ASSOCIATI Christopher D. R. Bovell Satoshi Otana ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI Gideon Koren Enrico Lodi DUNNCOX JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ZU'BI BEN ZVI KOREN CRIF Russlyn Combie Sykes ORGANIZATION Alá Khalifeh Michelle Liberman NUNES, SCHOLEFIELD DELEON & Jeremy Pitts KHALIFEH & PARTNERS CO. S. HOROWITZ & CO. BAKER & MCKENZIE 144 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Youssef Khalilieh Maxim Telemtayev Wanjiru Nduati Dong Chin Lim David Greer RAJAI DAJANI & ASSOCIATES MCLEOD DIXON KAPLAN & STRATTON CHUNG & SUH ATTORNEYS AT ARD/CHECCHI LAW Firas Malhas Assel Tokusheva Conrad Nyakuri Gulnara Kalikova INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEGAL MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Joshua Margolis DIGNITAS ASSOCIATES HWANG MOK PARK Marla Valdez Virginia Nzioka Temir Kazy Ahmad Masa'deh DENTON WILDE SAPTE B M MUSAU & CO. ADVOCATES Sung-Ho Moon IN AFFILIATION WITH DIGNITAS KHALAF MASA'DEH & PARTNERS HORIZON LAW GROUP Aidar Yegeubayev Fred Ochieng Alexander Korchagin Khaldoun Nazer BRACEWELL & PATTERSON KAPLAN & STRATTON Sang Il Park BAKER & MCKENZIE, CENTRAL KHALIFEH & PARTNERS HWANG MOK PARK ASIA Natalie Yelizarova Richard Omwela Shireen Okkeh ZHAKENOV AND PARTNERS, IN HAMILTON HARRISON & Paul Stephan Penczner Curtis Masters ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI AFFILIATION WITH WHITE MATHEWS LAW FIRM KIM AND CHO BAKER & MCKENZIE, CENTRAL ZU'BI SAVELIEVA ASIA Tom Onyango Ae-Ryun Rho Naif Salem Aiman Yerenova OCHIENG, ONYANGO, KIBET & KIM & CHANG Emil Oskonbale JORDANIAN CONSTRUCTION AEQUITAS LAW FIRM OHAGA, ADVOCATES SPHYNX CONSULT CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION James Rim Carter Younger Sonal Sejpal JUNGMIN Bakytbek Saparaliev Faris Sharaf MCGUIREWOODS KAPILA ANJARWALLA & KHANNA DIGNITAS CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN ADVOCATES Kyung-Han Sohn Valerie Zhakenov ARAM INTERNATIONAL Mirgul Smanalieva Iyad Zawaideh ZHAKENOV AND PARTNERS, IN Rina Thakar LAW FIRM "PARTNER" ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI AFFILIATION WITH WHITE WALKER KONTOS ADVOCATES Sung-il Yang ZU'BI SAVELIEVA MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND Aisuluu Subanbekova Fred Waithaka WELFARE IN AFFILIATION WITH DIGNITAS Shadi Zghoul Rima Zhakupova KAPLAN & STRATTON DAJANI & ASSOCIATES SALANS Nurlanbek Tynaev KUWAIT Cilla White NATIONAL BANK OF THE KYRGYZ Ali Sharif Zu'bi Ivan A. Zaitsev KAPLAN & STRATTON Walid Abd Elrahim Ahmed REPUBLIC ALI SHARIF ZU'BI & SHARIF ALI MCGUIREWOODS ABDULLAH KH. AL-AYOUB & ZU'BI Larisa Tashtemirovna KIRIBATI ISLANDS ASSOCIATES Zhanibekova KENYA KAZAKHSTAN John Ridgway Abdullah Al-Ayoub LAWYER Amoyo Andibo PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK ABDULLAH KH. AL-AYOUB & Ahmetzhan Abdulaev METROPOL EAST AFRICA LAWYERS ASSOCIATES LAO PDR GRATA K.S. Anjarwalla Mishare M. Al-Ghazali Lasonexay Chanthavong KOREA, REP Madiar Balken KAPILA ANJARWALLA & KHANNA MISHARE M. AL-GHAZALI & MEKONG LAW GROUP GRADUATE LAW ADADEMY ADVOCATES Won-Mo Ahn PARTNERS ADILET Louis-Martin Desautels Philip Coulson AHN & CHANG Reema Ali MEKONG LAW GROUP John W. Barnum KAPLAN & STRATTON Jae Won Bae ALI & PARTNERS MCGUIREWOODS Edward Nicholas W.S. Deverell HWANG MOK PARK Ruba El- Habel MEKONG LAW GROUP Alexander Baruskov KAPLAN & STRATTON Yong S. Bae ABDULLAH KH. AL-AYOUB & MCGUIREWOODS ASSOCIATES Isabelle Robineau Oliver Fowler SOJONG PARTNERS MEKONG LAW GROUP Yuri Bassin KAPLAN & STRATTON Duck-Soon Chang Sam Habbas AEQUITAS AL SARRAF & AL RUWAYEH, IN Audray Souche Fiona Fox FIRST LAW OFFICES OF KOREA ASSOCIATION WITH STEPHENSON MEKONG LAW GROUP Yuri A. Bolotov PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Dean Fealk HARWOOD MICHAEL WILSON & PARTNERS LATVIA Peter Gachuhi KIM & CHANG Nazih Abdul Hameed Olga Chentsova KAPLAN & STRATTON Shin Hi-Taek AL-SALEH & PARTNERS Ilze Abika AEQUITAS James Kamau KIM & CHANG Rafiq Jaffer SKUDRA & UDRIS Mariya Gekko ISEME, KAMAU & MAEMA Ju Myung Hwang ABDULLAH KH. AL-AYOUB & Ilze Baltmane BAKER & MCKENZIE ADVOCATES HWANG MOK PARK, P.C. ASSOCIATES BALTMANE & BITANS Kulyash Muratovna Ilyasova Sheetal Kapila C W Hyun Jasmin P. Kohina Sandis Bertaitis SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE KAPILA ANJARWALLA & KHANNA KIM & CHANG ABDULLAH KH. AL-AYOUB & MARKVARTE & PARTNERI FOR PRIVATE LAW, HUMANITIES ADVOCATES ASSOCIATES AND LAW UNIVERSITY Park Jaewan Mikus Buls Kamau Karori Mohammad H. Omar Eric Imashev SEOUL DISTRICT COURT KLAVINS & SLAIDINS ISEME, KAMAU & MAEMA ABDULLAH KH. AL-AYOUB & MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN ADVOCATES James (Ik-Soo) Jeon ASSOCIATES Andis Conka Dina Khakimzhanova Hamish Keith SOJONG PARTNERS BANK OF LATVIA Adel Sami SALANS DALY & FIGGIS ADVOCATES Young-Cheol Jeong MISHARI AL-GHAZALI & Ivars Grunte Yelena Manayenko Anthony Kiruma WOO YUN KANG JEONG & HAN PARTNERS LAW FIRM GRUNTE&CERS AEQUITAS MUTHOGA, GATURU & Eui Jong Chung Liga Hartmane COMPANY ADVOCATES KYRGYZ REPUBLIC Marat Kh. Muzdubaev BAE, KIM & LEE KLAVINS & SLAIDINS LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & Henry M Kissinger Gee Hong Kim Elmurat Abdraimov Irina Ivanova MACRAE METROPOL EAST AFRICA HORIZON LAW GROUP IN AFFILIATION WITH DIGNITAS FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL Kamilya T. Nurpeissova Alexandra Kontos MARKETS COMMISSION Daniel Y. Kim Rosa Abirova LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & WALKER KONTOS ADVOCATES SOJONG PARTNERS MCLEOD DIXON Dace Jenava MACRAE William Maema JENAVA BIROJS Sung Jin Kim Julia Bulatova Snezhana V. Popova ISEME, KAMAU & MAEMA WOO YUN KANG JEONG & HAN LAW FIRM "PARTNER" Edvins Kapostins MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN ADVOCATES STATE LAND SERVICE OF THE K.C. Lee Tania Chogai Jazykbaeva Raushan Andrew Muchigi REPUBLIC OF LATVIA KISC, KOREA TRADE- DIGNITAS AEQUITAS LAW FIRM ISEME, KAMAU & MAEMA INVESTMENT PROMOTION Filip Klavins ADVOCATES John Corrigan Richard Remias AGENCY KLAVINS & SLAIDINS LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE & MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN John Murugu Dong Myung Lee MACRAE Ludmila Kornijenko CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA Sanzhar Shaimardanov ICHON DISTRICT COURT Anna Fomina BLUEGER & PLAUDE MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN Benjamin Musau Gahng Hee Lee IN AFFILIATION WITH DIGNITAS Valters Kronbergs B M MUSAU & CO. ADVOCATES Tatyana Suleyeva MINISTRY OF LABOR Natalia Sidorovna Galiamova KRONBERGS AEQUITAS LAW FIRM Lee Muthoga Sung Whan Lee THIRD ARBITRAGE COURT Monika Kuprijanova MUTHOGA, GATURU & AHNSE COUNCIL OF SWORN NOTARIES COMPANY ADVOCATES OF LATVIA ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 145 Indrikis Liepa Yara Maroun Bronislovas Mikuta Dragana Vukobrat MALAYSIA LIEPA, SKOPINA/BORENIUS, TYAN & ZGHEIB STATE ENTERPRISE CENTRE OF NATIONAL BANK OF THE ATTORNEYS AT LAW REGISTERS REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Hendun Abd Rahman Katerina Miltiadou AZMI & ASSOCIATES Baiba Plaude MECOS Marius Navickas MADAGASCAR BLUEGER & PLAUDE FORESTA BUSINESS LAW GROUP Wilfred Abraham Fadi Moghaizel MESSRS ZUL RAFIQUE & Ivars Pommers MOGHAIZEL Ramunas Petravicius Raphaël Jakoba PARTNERS ADVOKATFIRMAN GLIMSTEDT LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS, VALIUNAS MADAGASCAR CONSEIL Mario Mohanna INTERNATIONAL Kunal Chahl Juris Puce IR PARTNERIAI GEORGE JABRE & ASSOCIATES ZAIN & CO CREDIT REFORM LATVIA Kazimieras Ramonas Manantosoa Choucair Najib BANK OF LITHUANIA MADAGASCAR CONSEIL Yun Chang Inese Rendeniece BANQUE DU LIBAN INTERNATIONAL TAY & PARTNERS LAW FIRM GRUNTE&CERS Laimonas Skibarka Walid Nasser LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS, VALIUNAS Michel Pain Jean Chitty Zane Stalberga ­ Markvarte WALID NASSER & ASSOCIATES IR PARTNERIAI AVOCAT AZMI & ASSOCIATES MARKVARTE & PARTNERI Toufic Nehme Dainius Stasiulis Justin Radilofe H.Y. Chong Kristine Stege ALBERT LAHAM LAW FIRM "BERNOTAS & CABINET RADILOFE AZMAN, DAVIDSON & CO BALTMANE & BITANS Nady Tyan DOMINAS GLIMSTEDT Hanta Radilofe Wong Chong Wah Anita Tamberga-Salmane TYAN & ZGHEIB Marius Urbelis CABINET RADILOFE SKRINE KLAVINS, SLAIDINS & LOZE SORAINEN Danielle Rakotomanana LESOTHO J. Wilfred Durai Ugis Treilons Mindaugas Vaiciunas RAKOTOMANANA ADVOCAT AU ZAIN & CO KLAVINS & SLAIDINS Stefan Carl Buys D. FOIGT AND PARTNERS / BARREAU DE MADAGASCAR Mohammad Haszri Ziedonis Udris DU PREEZ LIEBETRAU & CO. REGIJA Gerard Ramangaharivony ABU HASSAN AZMI & SKUDRA & UDRIS Arshad Farouk Victor Vaitkevicius ETUDE RAMANGAHARIVONY & ASSOCIATES RAFANOMEZANA Asnata Venckava DU PREEZ LIEBETRAU & CO. KREDOLINE Lim Koon Huan IGK SYSTEM Graig Grant Rolandas Valiunas Theodore Ramangalahy SKRINE COMMISSION DE SUPERVISION Laura Viksna WEBBER NEWDIGATE LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS, VALIUNAS BANCAIRE ET FINANCIERE Khoo Guan Huat BANK OF LATVIA IR PARTNERIAI Margarete Higgs SKRINE Edilbert P. Razafindralambo Romualds Vonsovics DU PREEZ LIEBETRAU & CO. Darius Zabiela EDILBERT P. RAZAFINDRALAMBO Ng Swee Kee LEJINS, TORGANS & VONSOVICS LAW FIRM ZABIELA, ZABIELAITE Vuyelwa Kotelo & PARTNERS SHEARN DELAMORE & CO. Henri Bernard Razakariasa Daiga Zivtina VVM KOTELO AND CO Audrius Vybas BANQUE CENTRALE DE Chew Siew Kheam KLAVINS & SLAIDINS Tseliso Daniel Makhaphela LAW FIRM BERNOTAS & MADAGASCAR CENTRAL BANK OF MALAYSIA MINISTRY OF LOCAL DOMINAS GLIMSTEDT LEBANON Njiva Razanatsoa Christopher Lee GOVERNMENT BANQUE CENTRALE DE BAKER & MCKENZIE Antoine Abbound Deborah Mofolo MACEDONIA, FYR MADAGASCAR Caesar Loong ABBOUD & ASSOCIATES MOFOLO, TAU ­ THABANE AND Zlatko Antevski RASLAN LOONG COMPANY MALAWI Reem Abou Fadel LAWYERS ANTEVSKI Azmi Mohd Ali MOGHAIZEL Lebohang Molete Benita Beleskova Robert Atherstone AZMI & ASSOCIATES WEBBER NEWDIGATE Nada Abu Samra IKRP ROKAS AND PARTNERS STUMBLES SACRANIE, GOW & Rajendra Navaratnam BADRI AND SALIM EL MEOUCHI Qhobela Cyprian Selebalo CO Biljana Cakmakova AZMAN DAVIDSON & CO LAW FIRM LAND MANAGEMENT AND Marshal Chilenga ADMINISTRATION MENS LEGIS Shameer Bin Othman Walid Alamuddin TF& PARTNERS Zoran Cvetanoski NIK SAGHIR & ISMAIL BANKING CONTROL COMMISSION LITHUANIA Alan Chinula OF LEBANON STATE AUTHORITY FOR GEODETIC Sbdul Rahim Ali WORKS WILLIAM FAULKNER, ATTORNEYS Ramy Aoun Kestutis Adamonis AT LAW REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES Violeta Angelova Gerovska BADRI AND SALIM EL MEOUCHI SORAINEN Roseline Gramani Loganath B Sabapathy LAW FIRM IKRP ROKAS AND PARTNERS Egidijus Bernotas SKOPJE SAVJANI & ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM LOGAN SABAPATHY & CO Raymond Azar LAW FIRM "BERNOTAS & Theodoros Giannitsakis S.E. Jussab Veerasimir Saraswathi Chitty RAYMOND AZAR LAW OFFICES DOMINAS GLIMSTEDT IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS SACRANIE, GOW & CO. AZMI & ASSOCIATES Jean Baroudi Renata Beranskiene Ilija Graorkovski Bansri Lakhani Chua See Hua BAROUDI & ASSOCIATES SORAINEN NATIONAL BANK OF THE SCRANIE, GOW & CO. RASLAN LOONG Samir Baroudi Dovile Burgiene REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Shabir Latif Tharminder Singh BAROUDI & ASSOCIATES LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS, VALIÛNAS LOGAN SABAPATHY & CO IR PARTNERIAI Biljana Joanidis SCRANIE, GOW & CO. Katia Bou Assi LAW & PATENT OFFICE JOANIDIS W.R. Milonde Chin Sok Ee MOGHAIZEL Tomas Davidonis BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA SORAINEN Dejan Knezovic RESERVE BANK OF MALAWI Raymonde Eid KNEZOVIC & ASSOCIATES Shepher Mumba Francis Tan BADRI AND SALIM EL MEOUCHI Dalia Foigt AZMAN DAVIDSON & CO LAW FIRM D. FOIGT AND Irena Petkovska SAVJANI & CO Salim El Meouchi PARTNERS / REGIJA LAWYERS ANTEVSKI Ben Ndau Tuan Zubaidah Tuan Muda BADRI AND SALIM EL MEOUCHI Kornelija Francuzeviciute Marija Petroska SAVJANI & ASSOCIATES NIK SAGHIR & ISMAIL Ramzi George BANK OF LITHUANIA ECONOMIC CHAMBER OF Temwa Nyirenda Jong Yon Tzan PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS MACEDONIA Rolandas Galvenas NYIRENDA & MSISHA SHEARN DELAMORE & CO. George Jabre LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS, VALIUNAS Kristijan Poolenak D. A. Ravel Chung Tze Keog GEORGE JABRE & ASSOCIATES IR PARTNERIAI POLENAK WILSON & MORGAN CTOS SDN BHD Fady Jamaleddine Marius Jakulis Jason Boris Popovski Krishna Savjani Leonard Yeoh JAMALEDDINE LAW FIRM AAA LAW FIRM IKRP ROKAS AND PARTNERS SAVJANI & ASSOCIATES TAY & PARTNERS SKOPJE Georges Kadige Mindaugas Kikis Singano Melina Yong KADIGE & KADIGE LAW FIRM LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS, VALIUNAS Tatjana Popovski SAVJANI & ASSOCIATES RASLAN LOONG POLENAK Albert Lahan IR PARTNERIAI Samuel Tembenu Datuk Heliliah Yusof LAW OFFICES OF ALBERT LAHAM Jurate Kugyte Ljubica Ruben TEMBENU MASUMBU & CO HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS, VALIUNAS MENS LEGIS Georges Mallat IR PARTNERIAI Don Whayo Azlan Zain HYAM MALLAT Spyridon Tsallas KNIGHT FRANK ZAIN & CO Linas Margevicius IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS Nabil Mallat AAA LAW FIRM HYAM MALLAT 146 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 MALDIVES Eduardo Heftye David A. Brodsky M. Odonhuu Carlos de Sousa e Brito LOPEZ VELARDE, HEFTYE Y SORIA BRODSKY USKOV LOOPER REED TSETS CARLOS DE SOUSA E BRITO & Shuaib M. Shah & PARTNERS ASSOCIADOS SHAH, HUSSAIN & CO. Roberto Hernandez Garcia Ulziideleg Taivan COMAD Mihail Buruiana CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU Aquiles Dimene MALI BURUIANA & PARTNERS VASCONCELOS PORTO & Bill Kryzda MOROCCO ASSOCIADOS GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y Procop Buruiana Mamadou Dante ASOCIADOS BURUIANA & PARTNERS Maria João Dionísio CABINET DANTE Mohamed Mehdi Ibn MIRANDA, CORREIA, Jorge León Stela Cibotari Abdeljalil Djibril Guindo AMENDOEIRA & ASSOCIADOS GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y NATIONAL BANK OF MOLDOVA MOHAMED MEHDI IBN P/LA SCPA JURIFIS CONSULT ASOCIADOS ABDELJALIL Rodrigo Ferreira Rocha Victoria Ciofu Seydou Ibrahim Maiga MIRANDA, CORREIA, Jorge Leon-Orantes NATIONAL BANK OF MOLDOVA Richard Cantin CABINET D'AVOCATS SEYDOU AMENDOEIRA & ASSOCIADOS GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y CABINET NACIRI & ASSOCIÉS IBRAHIM MAIGA ASOCIADOS Alexi Ghertescu Adrian Frey BRODSKY USKOV LOOPER REED Hassan Echawnic Francois Nare JOSE CALDEIRA & ASSOCIATES Rafael Licea Alvarez & PARTNERS AVOCAT CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE CAMARA MEXICANA DE LA Rita Furtado L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST Frédéric Elbar INDUSTRIA DE LA Nicolae Gorea H. GAMITO, CUITO, GONCALVES AFRICAINE CMS BUREAU FRANCIS LEFEBVRE CONSTRUCCION GOREA & ASSOCIATES PEREIRA, CASTELO BRANCO & Malick Badara Sow Myriam Bennani ASSOCIADO Eduardo Llamosa Victor A. Levintsa ATELIER D'ARCHITECTURE ET AMIN HAJJI & ASSOCIÉS PROFANCRESA LEVINTSA & ASSOCIATES Jane Grob D'URBANISME ADVOCATE ASSOCIATION D'AVOCATS BANCO AUSTRAL María Casas Lopez Ahmadou Toure Amin Hajji BAKER MCKENZIE Lurie Lungu Manuel Eduardo Guta ETUDE DE MAÎTRE AHMADOU ADVOCATE AMIN HAJJI & ASSOCIÉS MANI ARTE CONSTRUCOES LDA TOURE Enrique Nort ASSOCIATION D'AVOCATS COMISION NACIONAL BANCARIA Irina Moghiliova Mohamed Ibn Abdeljalil Cristina Hunguana MARSHALL Y DE VALORES BRODSKY USKOV LOOPER REED MOHAMED IBN ABDELJALIL H. GAMITO, COUTO, GONÇALVES ISLANDS & PARTNERS PEREIRA E CASTELO BRANCO & Tatiana Ortega Carolina Muravetchi Azeddine Kabbaj ASSOCIADOS Kenneth E. Barden GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y KAPPAJ ASOCIADOS TURCAN & TURCAN Rufino Lucas MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PALAU Azzedine Kettani CONSRUFIL Humberto Padilla Elema Sdimu MAURITANIA KETTANI RITCH, HEATHER Y MUELLER BURUIANA & PARTNERS Gabriel Machado Maximenco Serghei Nadia Kettani CONFEDERACAO DAS A.S. Bouhoubeyni Pablo Perezalonso BSMB LEGAL COUNSELLORS KETTANI ASSOCIACOES ECONOMICAS DE CABINET BOUHOUBEYNI RITCH, HEATHER Y MUELLER MOCAMBIQUE Carina Turcan Abdelmajid Khachai Brahim Ould Chadli José Luis Quiroz Joao Martins TURCAN & TURCAN Ahmed Lahrache BANQUE CENTRALE DE MATEOS WINSTEAD Y RIVERA BANK AL-MAGHRIB PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS MAURITANIE Rafael Ramirez Arroyo Alexander Turcan Patrick Larrivé Orquídea Palmíra Massarongo Adama Demba Diop MARTÍNEZ, ALGABA, ESTRELLA, TURCAN & TURCAN SCP D'AVOCATS UGGC & JOSE CALDEIRA & ASSOCIATES AVOCAT DE HARO Y GALVAN-DUQUE Irina Verhovetchi ASSOCIÉS Jennifer McDonald Oumar Mohamed Moctar Juan Manuel Rincon BSMB LEGAL COUNSELLORS Anis Mahfoud NOVOBANCO CABINET MAITRE OUMAR FRANCK, GALICIA Y ROBLES Sirghi Viorel CMS BUREAU FRANCIS LEFEBVRE MOHAMED MOCTAR Lara Narcy Irela Robles Victory BSMB LEGAL COUSELLORS Hicham Naciri H. GAMITO, COUTO, GONÇALVES Yarba Ould Ahmed Saleh SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO CABINET NACIRI & ASSOCIÉS PEREIRA E CASTELO BRANCO & CABINET ME SIDIYA ECONOMICO MONGOLIA ASSOCIADOS Réda Oulamine Aliou Sall Martinez Arrieta Rodríguez Batbold Amarsanaa NACIRI & ASSOCIES/ GIDE António de Vasconcelos Porto ASSURIM VEGA RUBIO Y ASOCIADOS ANDERSON & ANDERSON LOYRETTE NOUEL VASCONCELOS PORTO & Arturo Saavedra Rodríguez Bayarmaa Badarch ASSOCIADOS MEXICO Mehdi Salmouni-Zerhouni MARTINEZ ARRIETA, RODRÍGUEZ, LYNCH & MAHONEY Rodrigo Ferreira Rocha VEGA, RUBIO Y ASOCIADOS SALMOUNI-ZERHOUNI Miguel Alessio Robles N. Bahdal MIRANDA, CORREIA, Myriam Slaoui NOTARIO PUBLICO Adrián Salgado Morante AMENDOEIRA & ASSOCIADOS TSETS COMAD SCP D'AVOCATS UGGC & David H. Brill Bonifácia Mario Suege Batzaya Bodikhuu ASSOCIÉS GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y Carlos Sanchez-Mejorada BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE MONGOL ­ ADOVATE ASOCIADOS SANCHEZ-MEJORADA Y PASQUEL MOZAMBIQUE Christopher Tanner David Buxbaum Gerardo Carreto-Chávez Cristina Sanchez-Urtiz FAO REPRESENTATION IN ANDERSON & ANDERSON Louise Alston BARRERA, SIQUEIROS Y TORRES MIRANDA, ESTAVILLO, STAINES Y MOZAMBIQUE JOSE CALDEIRA & ASSOCIATES LANDA PIZARRO-SUAREZ Batbayar Byambaa Agostinho Zacarias Vuma LYNCH & MAHONEY Samuel Alberto Banze María Casas Juan Francisco Torres-Landa VUMA CONSTRUCOES BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE BAKER & MCKENZIE BARRERA, SIQUEIROS Y TORRES L. Chimgee LANDA BANK OF MONGOLIA Ali Eduardo Barrote NAMIBIA Oscar de la Vega BARROTE CONSTRUCOES P. BASHAM RINGE Y CORREA Ivonne Uriarte Acosta Battsereg Erdenebadrakh Hanno D. Bossau BAKER & MCKENZIE. ANDERSON & ANDERSON Jose Caldeira LORENTZ & BONE Luis Duarte Coppel JOSE CALDEIRA & ASSOCIATES CERVANTES, AGUILAR ALVAREZ, Jorge Videgaray Verdad Mary Frances Edwards Natasha Cochrane SAINZ Y VERDUZCO CAMARA MEXICANA DE LA NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE Alexandra Carvalho P.F. KOEP & CO INDUSTRIA DE LA COURTS SOLE PRACTITIONER David Enríquez CONSTRUCCION Val Cooke GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y Ts. Gerelchuluun André Couto TRANSUNION ITC ASOCIADOS ANDERSON & ANDERSON MICRONESIA H. GAMITO, COUTO, GONCALVES PEREIRA, CASTELO Herman Charl Kinghorn Eugenia Gonzalez Batmunkh Javkhlant BRANCO & ASSOCIADO KINGHORN ASSOCIATES GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y Kenneth E. Barden ANDERSON & ANDERSON ASOCIADOS MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PALAU Pedro Couto Peter Koep Maurice M. Lynch H. GAMITO, COUTO, GONÇALVES P.F. KOEP & CO Carlos Grimm Michael Sipos LYNCH & MAHONEY PEREIRA E CASTELO BRANCO & BAKER & MCKENZIE SIPOS & BERMAN Lorinda Koorts Daniel Mahoney ASSOCIADOS P.F. KOEP & CO Ali B. Haddou-Ruiz MOLDOVA LYNCH & MAHONEY Victor Osório de Castro FEDERAL REGULATORY Willem Carel Kotze Davaadorj Nomingerel MIRANDA, CORREIA, IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION Veronica Bradautanu P.F. KOEP & CO ANDERSON & ANDERSON AMENDOEIRA & ASSOCIADOS TURCAN & TURCAN Richard Mueller P.F. KOEP & CO ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 147 Phillip Mwangala Paul Huijzendveld Michael Cole Carlos Bonilla Daniel Agbor BANK OF NAMIBIA LABOUR INSPECTORATE OF THE SIMPSON GRIERSON SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y UDO UDOMA & BELO-OSAGIE NETHERLANDS Deon Obbes Chris Gordon DE OTRAS INSTITUCIONES FINANCIERAS F. Akrinrele LORENTZ & BONE Rolf S.Jelsma BELL GULLY F.O. AKINRELE & CO BRADDA KUTNER Humberto Carrión Renate Rossler ATTORNEYS AT LAW Margaret Griffin CARRIÓN, SOMARRIBA & Lawrence Fubara Anga P.F. KOEP & CO RESERVE BANK OF NEW ASOCIADOS ANGA & EMUWA Jaap Koster ZEALAND Randolph Samuel HOUTHOFF BURUMA Gloria Maria de Alvarado Ndubisi Chuks Nwasike TRANSUNION ITC Paul Heath ALVARADO Y ASOCIADOS FIRSTCOUNSEL FIRM R. Koster HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND Attie Slabber CHAMBER OF COMMERCE María José Guerrero O J Ebohon WEDER KRUGER & HARTMAN AMSTERDAM Alastair Charles Hercus F. A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE, BUDDLE FINDLAY DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY Marius van Breda Joop Lobstein Luis Byron Mejia Rueda INFORMATION TRUST STICHTING BUREAU KREDIET Hershla Ifwersen MEJIA & ASSOCIATES Samuel Etuk CORPORATION REGISTRATIE SIMPSON GRIERSON ETUK & URUA Jacinto Obregon Sanchez Greg Ward Natalia Lorenzo van Rooij Hana Kafedzic OBREGON Y ASOCIADOS Lawrence Ezetah TRANSUNION ITC HOUTHOFF BURUMA CHAPMAN TRIPP CHIEF LAW AGU EZETAH & CO. José Olivas Hershla Lfwersen O.I. Imala NEPAL Dunja Madunic ALVARADO Y ASOCIADOS BRADA KUTTNER SIMPSON GRIERSON CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA Janak Bhandari Roy Rivera Pastora Frits Meijer Kirri Lynn Chike Obianwu GLOBAL LAW ASSOCIATES MEJIA & ASSOCIATES OTB RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR COMPANIES OFFICE UDO UDOMA & BELO-OSAGIE Shrawan Khanal HOUSING, URBAN AND MOBILITY Ana Rizo Laurie Mayne Uzoma Ogbonna M.K. NIRMAN SEWA STUDIES F. A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ RUSSELL MCVEAGH CHIEF LAW AGU EZETAH & CO. Indra Lohani Hugo Reumkens César Carlos Porras Rosses Lee-Ann McArthur Joy O. Okeaya-Inneh DHRUBA BAR SINGH THAPA & VAN DOORNE ALVARADO Y ASOCIADOS COMPANIES OFFICE CHIEF ROTIMI WILLIAMS' ASSOCIATES Stefan Sagel Oscar A. Silva Peter CHAMBERS Rachel Menhennet Surendra Man Pradhan DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE DELANEY & ASSOCIATES SIMPSON GRIERSON Nonyelum Okeke NEPAL RASTRA BANK WESTBROEK José Evenor Taboada AJUMOGOBIA & OKEKE Robbie Muir Kailash Prasad Neupane Karin Schreuder TABOADA & ASOCIADOS LAND INFORMATION NEW Patrick Okonjo NEPAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS STICHTING BUREAU KREDIET ZEALAND Rodrigo Taboada OKONJO, ODIAWA & EBIE AUTHORITY REGISTRATIE TABOADA Y ASOCIADOS Richard Peach Jobalo Oshikanlu Megh Raj Pokhrel Piet L. A. M. Schroeder BAYCORP ADVANTAGE Gustavo-Adolfo Vargas ALUKO & OYEBODE DHRUBA BAR SINGH THAPA & BAKER & MCKENZIE F.A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ ASSOCIATES Nicola Penman-Chambers Gbenga Oyebode Jamila Tib SIMPSON GRIERSON ALUKO & OYEBODE Devendra Pradhan, Esq. HOUTHOFF BURUMA LAWYERS, NIGER PRADHAN & ASSOCIATES CIVIL NOTARIES, TAX ADVISERS Charlotte Rose Olufemi Sunmonu SIMPSON GRIERSON Mounkaila Adama FEMI SUNMONU & ASSOCIATES Bharat Raj Upreti Jaap-Jan Trommel CABINET D'AVOCATS PIONEER LAW ASSOCIATE NAUTA DUTILH ATTORNEYS Lester Roy Dempster Ladi Taiwo CONVEYANCERS Vilevo Biova Devo ABDULAI, TAIWO & CO. Saroj Shrestha Paul van der Molen CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE LOTUS LAW ASSOCIATES CADASTRE AND LAND REGISTRY Scott Russell L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST Adamu M. Usman AGENCY SIMPSON GRIERSON AFRICAINE F.O. AKINRELE & CO Kusum Shrestha KUSUM LAW FIRM Els van der Riet Peter Sheerin Aïssatou Djibo NORWAY HOUTHOFF BURUMA BAYCORP ADVANTAGE ETUDE DE MAÎTRE DJIBO Sudheer Shrestha AÏSSATOU KUSUM LAW FIRM Jackline van Haersolte van Murray Tingey Frederik Astrup Borch Hof BELL GULLY Bernar-Oliver Kouaovi ADVOKATFIRMAET SELMER DA Anil Kumar Sinha DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE CABINET KOUAOVI SINHA VERMA LAW CONCERN Jan L. Backer WESTBROEK Michael McLean Toepfer HESKETH HENRY Marc Lebihan WIKBORG, REIN & CO. Sajjan Thapa Peter van Schilfgaarde CABINET LEBIHAN DHRUBA BAR SINGH THAPA & Morten Beck DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE Gregory Towers ASSOCIATES WESTBROEK SIMPSON GRIERSON Marie-Virginie Mamoudou ADVOKATFIRMAET AVOCAT PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Sarah Walsh NETHERLANDS Enno Wiersma Stig Berge DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE SIMPSON GRIERSON Evelyne Mandessi Bell THOMMESSEN KREFTING GREVE Rob Abendroth WESTBROEK OHADA LEGIS Jane Wilson LUND ALLEN & OVERY Marcel Willems BAYCORP ADVANTAGE Francois Nare Frode Bernstsen Henri Bentfort van KENNEDY VAN DER LAAN CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE Richard Wilson ADVOKATFIRMAET Valkenburg L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST Eugene Witjes JACKSON RUSSELL PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS HOUTHOFF BURUMA AFRICAINE MINISTRY OF HOUSING, SPATIAL Arthur William Young Petter Bjerke W.R. Bremer PLANNING AND THE Daouda Samna CHAPMAN TRIPP THOMMESSEN KREFTING GREVE MINISTRY OF HOUSING, SPATIAL ENVIRONMENT OHADA LEGIS LUND PLANNING AND THE NICARAGUA ENVIRONMENT NEW ZEALAND NIGERIA Lillann Bugge SCHJODT LAW FIRM Joost Cuijpers Douglas Seymour Alderslade Roberto Arguello Oluseyi Abiodun Akinwunmi LABOUR INSPECTORATE OF THE Villavicencio CHAPMAN TRIPP AKINWUNMI & BUSARI Lars Carlsson NETHERLANDS F. A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ CREDITINFORM Geoff Bevan Olaleye Adebiyi Margriet H. de Boer Bertha Argüello CHAPMAN TRIPP ALUKO & OYEBODE Carl Christiansen DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE F.A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ RAEDER ADVOKATFIRMA WESTBROEK Tony Bevin Funke Adekoya San Minerva Bellorin LAND INFORMATION NEW AELEX PARTNERS Finn Erik Engzelius M. de Kogel ZEALAND ACZALAW THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND DE NETHERLANDESCHE BANK Lara Ademola Tim Buckley Luis Alberto Bendaña LARA ADEMOLA & CO. Stein Fagerhaug Taco de Lange CHAPMAN TRIPP REGISTRO PÚBLICO DE LA THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND LEXENCE PROPIEDAD INMUEBLE Y John Adetiba Niels Campbell MERCANTIL DEL DEPARTAMENTO PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Stein Fagerhaug Michiel Gorsira BELL GULLY DE MANAGUA THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND SIMMONS & SIMMONS Francisca Agbasi Shelley Cave Maria Jose Bendaña CHIEF LAW AGU EZETAH & CO. Thomas S. Farhang Glenn C. Haulussy SIMPSON GRIERSON BENDAÑA & BENDAÑA KVALE & CO. HAULUSSY ADVOKATEN 148 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Linda Fjellheim Ala'a Eldin Mohammed Syed Ahmad Hassan Shah Alfredo Ramirez Jr Francisco Berninzon Ponce WIKBORG, REIN & CO. ABU-GHAZALEH INTELLECTUAL RIZVI, ISA, AFRIDI & ANGELL ALFARO, FERRER AND RAMIREZ BERNINZON, LORET DE MOLA & PROPERTY BENAVIDEZ ABOGADOS Claus R. Flinder Aziz Shaikh Lizbeth Ramsey SIMONSEN FØYEN José A. Delmar PAKISTAN AZIZ A SHAIKH & CO ASOCIACION PANAMEÑA DE ADVOKATFIRMA CRÉDITO BENITES, DE LAS CASAS, FORNO Haider Shamsi & UGAZ Hans Haugstad Masood Khan Afridi HAIDER SHAMSI AND CO Luz María Salamina THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND RIZVI, ISA, AFRIDI & ANGELL ASOCIACIÓN PANAMEÑA DE Guillermo Ferrero Salman Talibuddin CRÉDITO ESTUDIO FERRERO Bjørn H. Kise Bilal Aftab KABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN ABOGADOS VOGT & WIIG NEWS-VIS CREDIT ADVOCATES & LEGAL Juan A. Tejada Mora INFORMATION SERVICES COUNSELLORS ICAZA, GONZALEZ-RUIZ & Luís Fuentes Villarán Jorgen Lund ALEMAN BARRIOS FUENTES URQUIAGA THOMMESSEN KREFTING GREVE Nadeem Ahmad Saleem uz Zaman LUND ORR DIGNAM & CO KABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN Ramon Varela Carlos Gamarra ADVOCATES & LEGAL MORGAN & MORGAN SUNARP ­ SUPERINTENDENCIA Aase Aa. Lundgaard Omar Aziz Khan COUNSELLORS NACIONAL DE LOS RESGISTROS DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU IRFAN & IRFAN PAPUA NEW PUBLICOS DE PERÚ Glenn McKenzie Salman Aslam Butt PALAU GUINEA Juan Luis Hernández BRØNNØYSUND REGISTER CORNELIUS LANE & MUFTI HERNÁNDEZ & ROSSELLÓ CENTRE, SPØR Kenneth E. Barden Vincent Bull Mohammad Azam Chaudhry ABOGADOS OPPLYSNINGSTELEFONEN MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PALAU ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON AZAM CHAUDHRY LAW Jesús Matos Ernst Arvid Moe ASSOCIATES PANAMA Rio Fiocco ESTUDIO OLAECHEA BANKRUPTCY COURT Khalid Daudpota POSMAN KUA AISI LAWYERS Leonor Alvarado José Antonio Olaechea Nina Moss KHALID DAUDPOTA & CO. Richard Flynn ALVARADO, LEDEZMA & DE ESTUDIO OLAECHEA THE BANKING, INSURANCE AND Faisal K. Daudpota BLAKE DAWSON WALDRON SANCTIS SECURITIES COMMISSION OF Manuel P. Olaechea Du Bois KHALID DAUDPOTA & CO. Winifred T Kamit NORWAY Ernesto B. Arias ESTUDIO OLAECHEA Ikram Fayaz GADENS LAWYERS Christian Mueller SUCRE, ARIAS & REYES Alonso Rey Bustamante QAMAR ABBAS & COMPANY Kirsten Kobus THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND Francisco Arias G. PAYET, REY, CAUVI ABOGADOS Faisal Fazli ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON Thomas Nordgård ARIAS FABREGA & FABREGA Ricardo P. Silva RIZVI, ISA, AFRIDI & ANGELL Mayambo Ipu Peipul VOGT & WIIG Ebrahim Asvat ESTUDIO MUÑIZ, FORSYTH, Syed Ahmad Hassan Shah ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON RAMIREZ, PEREZ-TAIMAN & Helge Onsrud PATTON MORENO & ASVAT SHAH, AFRIDI & ANGELL & John Ridgway LUNA VICTORIA STATENS KARTVERK (NORWEGIAN KHAN Raúl Zuñiga Brid PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK MAPPING AND CADASTRE ALEMAN, CORDERO, GALINDO & Manuel Ugarte AUTHORITY) Ishrat Husain LAWYERS LEE BENITES, DE LAS CASAS, FORNO & UGAZ Johan Ratvik STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN Eric Britton PARAGUAY RIME & CO. ADVOKATFIRMA Ali Adnan Ibrahim INFANTE GARRIDO & GARRIDO Sergio Valencoso Hugo Berkemeyer CERTICOM Finn Rime RIZVI, ISA, AFRIDI & ANGELL ABOGADOS BERKEMEYER ATTORNEYS AND RIME & CO. ADVOKATFIRMA Mahomed Jaffer Delia Cardenas COUNSELORS Carlos Vegas CAMARA PERUANA DE LA Robert Romansky ORR DIGNAM & CO SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Luis Breuer CONSTRUCCION KVALE & CO. ANS Kairas Kabraji DE PANAMA BERKEMEYER ATTORNEYS AND Pedro Chaluja Manuel Villa-García Vegard Sivertsen KABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN COUNSELORS ADVOCATES & LEGAL SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS ESTUDIO OLAECHEA DELOITTE & TOUCHE COUNSELLORS Esteban Burt TOHMATSU DE PANAMA PERONI, SOSA, TELLECHEA, BURT Monica Yoland Arteaga Muhammad Khalid Javed Shanina Jean Contreras J. Chaparro Bernt Olav Steinland & NARVAJA BOARD OF INVESTMENT AROSEMENA, NORIEGA & REGISTRO PREDIAL URBANO ADVOKATFIRMAET SELMER CONTRERAS Olga Dios Sikandar Hassan Khan Gino Zolezzi Sverre Tyrhaug VOUGA & OLMEDO-ABOGADOS CORNELIUS LANE & MUFTI Julio Cesar Contreras, III, Esq. CERTRICOM THOMMESSEN GREVE LAND AROSEMENA, NORIEGA & Juan Bautista Fiorio Gimenez Mamoon Khan Eirik Vikanes CONTRERAS FIORIO, CARDOZO & ALVARADO PHILIPPINES ORR DIGNAM & CO THOMMESSEN KREFTING GREVE Alma de Latorraca Pablo Livieres Guggiari LUND Anwar Mansoor Khan Ofelia Abueg-Sta.Maria ARIAS, ALEMAN & MORA ESTUDIO JURIDICO LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY Nils-Petter Wedege MANSOOR AHMAD KHAN & CO. CANIZA-LIVIERES Carlos Alberto de Obaldia Marissa Acain DIRECTORATE OF LABOUR Aftab Ahmed Khan DE OBALDIA Y GARCIA DE Roberto Moreno Rodriguez PHILBIZINFO INSPECTION SURRIDGE & BEECHENO PAREDES Alcala Preben Willoch Babar Mufti MORENO RUFFINELLI & Theresa Ballelos Alexandra Duque ADVOKATFIRMAET ASOCIADOS INTERNATIONAL CREDIT BAKER & MCKENZIE SUCRE & ASOCIADOS PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INFORMATION Armindo Riquelme Manuel Batallones Maria Alejandra Eisenmann FIORIO, CARDOZO & ALVARADO BAP CREDIT BUREAU OMAN Rafiq.A. Nazir EISENMANN ABOGADOS Y AZAM CHAUDHRY LAW CONSULTORES Maria Gloria Triguis Cecile M.E. Caro Said Al Shahry ASSOCIATES BERKEMEYER ATTORNEYS AND SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ & SAID AL SHAHRY Ricardo Eskildsen Morales Amna Piracha COUNSELORS GATMAITAN ESKILDSEN & ESKILDSEN Majid Al Toky INTERNATIONAL CREDIT PERU Angelica Cayas TROWERS & HAMLINS INFORMATION Jorge Garrido BOARD OF INVESTMENT INFANTE GARRIDO & GARRIDO Adrian Jones Javed Iqbal Qureshi Marco Antonio Alarcón Piana ABOGADOS Connie Chu TROWERS & HAMLINS RIZVI, ISA, AFRIDI & ANGELL ESTUDIO ECHECOPAR ROMULO, MABANTA, José Juan Márquez C. BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE P.E. Lalachen Abdul Rahman Guilhermo Alceu Auler SUCRE, ARIAS & REYES LOS ANGELES HASSAN AL ANSARI LEGAL QAMAR ABBAS & COMPANY MUNIZ FORSYTH RAMIREZ CONSULTANCY Juan Tejada Mora PEREZ-TAIMAN & LUNA Khurran Rashid Kenneth L. Chua ICAZA, GONZALEZ-RUIZ & VICTORIA CASTILLO LAMAN TAN Mansoor Jamal Malik SURRIDGE & BEECHENO ALEMAN Luis Felipe Arizmendi PANTALEON & SAN JOSE AL ALAWI MANSOOR JAMAL & Muhammad Saleem Echecopar CO. José Miguel Navarrete Emerico de Guzman CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU AROSEMENA, NORIEGA & SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION Malik Mansoor Jamal Jawad A. Sarwana CONTRERAS SEGUROS DEL PEUR REGALA & CRUZ AL ALAWI, MANSOOR JAMAL & ABRAHAM & SARWANA Juan Luis Avendaño C. CO. Francisco Pérez Benjamin de la Cruz Huma Shah PATTON MORENO & ASVAT MIRANDA & AMADO ABOGADOS BOARD OF INVESTMENT SURRIDGE & BEECHENO ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 149 Nestor Espenilla Renata Cichocka Peter Urbanek Marta Leitão Myrna Lozada CENTRAL BANK OF THE HAARMANN HEMMELRATH NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW ABREU & MARQUES, VINHAS E GOLDMAN ANTONETTI & PHILIPPINES FIRM ASSOCIADOS CORDOVA Sergiusz Ciolkowski Melva M. Evangelista-Valdez GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL Tomasz Wardynski Jorge Lopes Rubén M. Medina-Lugo JIMENEZ GONZALES LIWANAG WARDYNSKI & PARTNERS POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE OF CANCIO, NADAL, RIVERA & DÍAZ BELLO VALDEZ CALUYA & Bozena Ciosek BRAGANÇA FERNANDEZ WIERZBOWSKI I WSPÓLNICY Krzysztof Wierzbowski Luis Mongil-Casasnovas WIERZBOWSKI I WSPÓLNICY Francisco Jose Maia Coelho MARTINEZ ODELL & CALABRIA Gilberto Gallos Slawomir Domzal AICCOPN ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA & BIURO INFORMACJI KREDYTOWEJ Robert Windmill Pedro A. Morell CRUZ LAW FIRM HAARMANN HEMMELRATH & Paulo Lowndes Marques GOLDMAN ANTONETTI & Maciej Duszczyk PARTNER ABREU & MARQUES, VINHAS E CÓRDOVA Andres Gatmaitan BIURO INFORMACJI KREDYTOWEJ ASSOCIADOS SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ & Magdalena Wolowska Jorge Ruiz Montilla Stanislas Dwernicki GATMAITAN GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL Fernando Marta MCCONNELL VALDES GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL CREDINFORMACOES Tadeo F. Hilado Steven Wood Jorge Souss Tomasz Dys ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA & TGC POLSKA LAW FIRM Jorge Neves GOLDMAN ANTONETTI & DYST LEGAL CRUZ LAW FIRM BARROCAS & ALVES PEREIRA CORDOVA Jaroslaw Wysocki Anna Dzieciatkowska Natividad Kwan GEODESY AND CARTOGRAPHY Filipa Nevoa Jorge Souss TGC POLSKA LAW FIRM BAKER & MCKENZIE ABREU, CARDIGOS & GOLDMAN ANTONETTI & Janusz Zaleski Rafal Dziedzic ASSOCIADOS CORDOVA Francisco Ed. Lim NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA & BUILDING EMPLOYERS Filipa Pedroso ROMANIA CRUZ LAW FIRM Patryk Figiel MORAIS LEITAO, J. GALVAO Lukasz Zelechowski TELES & ASSOCIADOS Philip Ankel Romeo M. Mendoza NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW ALLEN & OVERY FIRM MOORE, VARTIRES & ASSOCIATES ROMULO MABANTA Pedro Porto Dordio Maciej Zielinski BUENAVENTURA SAYOC & DE Banasiuk Grzegorz ANTÓNIO FRUTUOSO DE MELO E HAARMANN HEMMELRATH & Laura Ardeleanu LOS ANGELES GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA ASSOCIADOS PARTNER NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON Yolanda Mendoza-Eleazar PETERSEN Pawel Ignatjew Margarida Ramalho CASTILLO LAMAN TAN BAKER & MCKENZIE PORTUGAL ASSOCIAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS DE Daniel Bruma PANTALEON & SAN JOSE CONSTRUÇÃO E OBRAS PÚBLICAS BOSTINA & ASSOCIATES Iwona Janeczek Rui Amendoeira Jesuito Morallos Margarida Lima Rego COMMERCIAL DEBTOR PEREIRA DE MIRANDA, CORREIA Anamaria Corbescu FOLLOSCO MORALLOS & HERCE REGISTER/KSV INFORMATION & AMENDOEIRA MORAIS LEITAO, J. GALVAO SALANS ­ MOORE, VARTIRES & TELES & ASSOCIADOS Olivia T. Olalia SERVICES ASSOCIATES Catarina Araújo ROMULO, MABANTA, Edyta Jusiel Fernando Resina da Silva AICCOPN Tiberiu Csaki BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LINKLATERS VIEIRA DE ALMEIDA & SALANS ­ MOORE, VARTIRES & LOS ANGELES Manuel P. Barrocas ASSOCIADOS ASSOCIATES Tamasz Kanski BARROCAS & ALVES PEREIRA Nicanor N. Padilla Cristina Cabral Ribeiro SOLTYSIÑSKI KAWECKI & Teodor Gigea SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO & SZLEZAK Segismundo Pinto Basto BARROCAS & ALVES PEREIRA COFACE INTERCREDIT ROMANIA ONGSIAKO MORAIS LEITAO, J. GALVAO Tadeusz Komosa Vicky Rodriguez TELES & ASSOCIADOS Ciprian Glodeanu Polo S. Pantaleon LINKLATERS NEVILLE DE ROUGEMONT & BOSTINA & ASSOCIATES CASTILLO LAMAN TAN Ines Batalha Mendes ASSOCIADOS PANTALEON & SAN JOSE Katarzyna Kompowska ABREU, CARDIGOS & Veronica Grunzsnicki Francisco Salgueiro COFACE INTERCREDIT POLAND ASSOCIADOS BABIUC SULICA & ASSOCIATES Emmanuel C. Paras NEVILLE DE ROUGEMONT & SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ & Pawoak Krzysztof Susana Braz ASSOCIADOS Corina Gabriela Ionescu GATMAITAN SOLTYSIÑSKI KAWECKI & BARROS, SOBRAL, G. GOMES & José J. Tomaz Gomes NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON SZLEZAK ASSOCIADOS PETERSEN Teodore Regala ASSOCIAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS DE ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION Wojciech Kwasniak João Cadete de Matos CONSTRUÇÃO E OBRAS PÚBLICAS Andrea Ionescu REGALA & CRUZ NATIONAL BANK OF POLAND BANCO DE PORTUGAL AnaIsavel Vieira ALTHEIMER & GRAY MOORE Ricardo J. Romulo Kamil Paduch Miguel de Avillez Pereira BANCO DE PORTUGAL Nicoleta Kalman ROMULO, MABANTA, HAARMANN HEMMELRATH ABREU, CARDIGOS & Patrícia Vinagre e Silva NICOLETA KALMAN BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE ASSOCIADOS Przemyslaw Pietrzak VIEIRA DE ALMEIDA & Edita Lovin LOS ANGELES NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW João Cadete de Matos ASSOCIADOS ROMANIAN SUPREME COURT Tess Sianghio-Baac FIRM BANCO DE PORTUGAL Daniel Lungu ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA & PUERTO RICO Bartlomiej Raczkowski Rosemary de Rougemont CRUZ LAW FIRM RACOTI, PREDOIU & PARTNERS, SOLTYSIÑSKI KAWECKI & NEVILLE DE ROUGEMONT & Tomás Acevedo ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS Cirilo T Tolosa SZLEZAK ASSOCIADOS MCCONNELL VALDES Mihaela Marin SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ & Anna Ratajczyk Carlos de Sousa e Brito GATMAITAN Vicente Antonetti SALANS ­ MOORE, VARTIRES & GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA CARLOS DE SOUSA E BRITO & GOLDMAN ANTONETTI & ASSOCIATES Rolando Mario G. Villonco ASSOCIADOS Jean Rossi CORDOVA Elena Mirea SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO & MOZAMBIQUE ONGSIAKO GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA James A. Arroyo DELOS CREDITINFO Cristina Dein TRANSUNION DE PUERTO RICO Romarie Villonco Andrzej Siemiatkowski JALLES ADVOGADOS Obie L. Moore SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO & ALLEN & OVERY Mildred Caban SALANS ­ MOORE, VARTIRES & Francisco Lino Dias ONGSIAKO ASSOCIATES Robert Siuchmo GOLDMAN ANTONETTI & BARROS, SOBRAL, G. GOMES & BIURO INFORMACJI KREDYTOWEJ CORDOVA ASSOCIADOS Ion I. Nestor POLAND NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON Marta Soltysik Delia Castillo de Colorado João de Morais e Almeida PETERSEN John Bakowski NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW REGISTRO DE LA PROPIEDAD DE António Luís Figueiredo PUERTO RICO GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA FIRM Manuela M. Nestor DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF Samuel Céspedes, Jr NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON Patrick Bell Tomasz Stawecki REGISTRY AND NOTARY CIVIL MCCONNELL VALDES PETERSEN LINKLATERS BAKER & MCKENZIE SERVICE Harry Cook Theodor Nicolescu Malgorzata Bielinska Anna Talar-Jeschke Mafalda Rodrigues Fonseca MCCONNELL VALDES THEODOR NICOLESCU BIURO INFORMACJI KREDYTOWEJ HAARMANN HEMMELRATH CARLOS DE SOUSA E BRITO & ASSOCIADOS Marcelo Lopez Anca Sandru Tomasz Brudkowski Dariusz Tokarczuk Rita Granado Antunes GOLDMAN ANTONETTI & RACOTI, PREDOIU & PARTNERS, KOCHANSKI BRUDKOWSKI & GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL CORDOVA ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS PARTNERS VIEIRA DE ALMEIDA & Tomasz Turek ASSOCIADOS Christina Spyridon Malgorzata Burzynska NIKIEL I ZACHARZEWSKI IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS NATIONAL BANK OF POLAND 150 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 David Stabb Janna Mansourova Mohammad S. Aba Al-Khail Sidy Abdallah Kanoute Katarina Nedeljkovic STEPHENSON HARWOOD ­ GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY Mamadou Mbaye LAW OFFICE KATARINA POPESCU & ASSOCIATES AGENCY NEDELJKOVIC Alexey Overchuk SCP MAME ADAMA GUEYE & Arin Octav Stanescu FEDERAL AGENCY FOR CADASTRE Fahd Al-Mufarrij ASSOCIES Srdja M. Popovic NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY Ibrahima Mbodj POPOVIC, POPOVIC, SAMARDZIJA PRACTITIONERS IN AGENCY & POPOVIC REORGANIZATION AND WINDING Olga Revzina ETUDE MAITRE IBRAHIMA UP GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL Basel B. Barakat MBODJ Todd Robinson LAW OFFICES OF HASSAN HAYHURST ROBINSON Cristiana Stoica Jason Sande Ndjaye Mbodj MAHASSNI STOICA & ASOCIATII ATTORNESY MACLEOD DIXON ETUDE MAITRE IBRAHIMA Petar Stojanovic AT LAW Majed Mohammed Garoub MBODJ JOKSOVIC, STOJANOVIC & Alexey Simanovskiy THE LAW FIRM OF MAJED M. PARTNERS Paraschiva Suica-Neagu BANK OF RUSSIA Moustapha N'Doye GAROUB NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON Francois Nare Lidija Tomasovic Vladislav A. Talantsev PETERSEN Taj Eldin M. Hassan CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE POPOVIC, POPOVIC, SAMARDZIJA RUSSIN & VECCHI AL-GHAZZAWI PROFESSIONAL L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST & POPOVIC Valeria Tomesou Victor Topadze ASSOCIATION AFRICAINE CREDIT REFORM ROMANIA Spyridon Tsallas GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL Jochen Hundt Amadou C. Sall IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS Catalin Tripon Luc Trillaud AL-SOAIB LAW FIRM AGENCE CHARGÉE DE LA BABIUC SULICA & ASSOCIATES Milos Zivkovic GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL PROMOTION DE Mohammed Jaber ZIVKOVIC & SAMARDZIC LAW Spyridon Tsallas L'INVESTISSEMENT ET DES Dimitry Yeremin NADERLAW & TRANSLATION GRANDS TRAVAUX OFFICE IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS LAW FIRM ALRUD OFFICE Francois Sarr SIERRA LEONE Florentin Tuca Larissa Zabotina Abdul Kareem FRANCOIS SARR & ASSOCIÉS MUSAT & ASOCIATII GOWLINGS INTERNATIONAL INC. THE ALLIANCE OF ABBAS F. Sonkita Conteh GHAZZAWI & CO. AND HAMMAD Mamadou Seck Petre Tulin A. TEJAN-COLE AND ASSOCIATES Andrey Zhdanov & AL-MEHDAR SCP SOW, SECK & DIAGNE NATIONAL BANK OF ROMANIA BAKER & MCKENZIE Berthan Macaulay Jr Hassan Mahassni Cristina Virtopeanu SERBIA AND BASMA & MACAULAY LAW OFFICES OF HASSAN NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON RWANDA MONTENEGRO MAHASSNI Emmanuel Roberts PETERSEN Claudine Gasarabwe Francois Majdy Miroslav Basic ROBERTS AND PARTNER Perry V. Zizzi GASARABWE CLAUDINE & KASSEEM AL-FALLAJ LAW FIRM STUDIO LEGALE SUTTI Abdul Tejan-Cole SALANS ­ MOORE, VARTIRES & ASSOCIES A. TEJAN-COLE AND ASSOCIATES ASSOCIATES Stephen Matthews Bojana Bregovic Jean Haguma LAW OFFICE OF MOHAMMED S. WOLF THEISS Mustapha S. Turay RUSSIA HAGUMA & ASSOCIÉS AL-RASHEED Yorgos Chairetis ROBERTS AND PARTNER Annie Kairaba Anatoly E. Andriash Katerina Miltiadou IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS Ibrahim S Yillah RISD/LANDNET MACLEOD DIXON MECOS Natasa Cveticanin ROBERTS & PARTNER CHAMBERS Angelique Kantangwa Darya Angelo Akram Mohamed Nader JANKOVIC, POPOVIC & MITIC NATIONAL BANK OF RWANDA SINGAPORE LAW FIRM ALRUD BAHRA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY Zivka Djuric Leopold Munderere Kala Anandarajah Peter Barenboim Mohammed M.J. Nader MINISTRY OF LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL RAJAH & TANN MOSCOW INTERBANK CURRENCY MEMBRE DU CONSEIL DE NADER LAW & TRANSLATION AFFAIRS EXCHANGE L'ORDRE OFFICE Deborah Evaline Barker Eugene Rurangwa Ilija Drazic Christian Becker Ceyda Okur KHATTAR WONG & PARTNERS MINISTÈRE DES TERRES, DRAZIC, LAZAREVIC / BEATOVIC, HAARMANN HEMMELRATH THE ALLIANCE OF ABBAS F. ENVIRONNEMENT, FORÊTS, EAU Sam Bonifant GHAZZAWI & CO. AND HAMMAD BEOGRAD Alexander Belov ET RESSOURCES NATURELLES & AL-MEHDAR CLIFFORD CHANCE Horst Ebhardt LAW FIRM ALRUD André Verbruggen Sameh M Toban WOLF THEISS Ai-Chuin Serene Chee Dmitry Besedin AVA TOBAN LAW FIRM DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW Patricia Gannon BESEDIN VODOLAGIN SOKOLOVA Jean Marie Vianney Ebaish Zebar KARANOVIC & NIKOLIC Leslie Chew Alexey Binetsky Mugemana LAW FIRM OF SALAH AL- ADVOKATI KHATTAR WONG & PARTNERS BINETSKY & PARTNERS CABINET D'AVOCATS MUGEMANA HEJAILANY Daniel Chia & ASSOCIES Nikola Jankovic Maria Blagowolina JANKOVIC, POPOVIC & MITIC YEO-LEONG & PEH SENEGAL HAARMANN HEMMELRATH SAMOA Julijana Jevtic Gooi Chi Duan Vladimir Dragunov Ameth Ba JANKOVIC, POPOVIC & MITIC DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW Fiona Ey BAKER & MCKENZIE ETUDE DE MAÎTRES BA & PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK Ong Hway Cheng TANDIAN Dragan Karanovic Igor Gorchakov KARANOVIC & NIKOLIC RAJAH & TANN Semi Leung-Wai Ramatoulaye Diagne BAKER & MCKENZIE ADVOKATI LEUNG WAI LAW FIRM Latiff Ibrahim ORDRE DES ARCHITECTES David Griston Nikola Kosic HARRY ELIAS PARTNERSHIP John Ridgway Andrée Diop-Depret CMS CAMERON MCKENNA AGENCY SPORTNET DIN PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK ThamYew Kong GA 2D John Hammond LAWYERS Dubravka Kosic MONETARY AUTHORITY OF Vilevo Biova Devo SINGAPORE CMS CAMERON MCKENNA STUDIO LEGALE SUTTI SAUDI ARABIA CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE Lee Kuan Wei Dimitry Ilyin L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST Vidak Kovacevic VENTURE LAW (IN ASSOCIATION LAW FIRM ALRUD Ali Abedi AFRICAINE WOLF THEISS WITH WHITE & CASE) Julia Koroleva THE ALLIANCE OF ABBAS F. Rita Fall Manolis Ktistakis GHAZZAWI & CO. AND HAMMAD Lee Lay See GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL AGENCE CHARGÉE DE LA IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS & AL-MEHDAR PROMOTION DE RAJAH & TANN David Lasfargue Emmanouel Ktistakis Belal Talal Al Ghazzawi L'INVESTISSEMENT ET DES Eugene Lim GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS AL-GHAZZAWI PROFESSIONAL GRANDS TRAVAUX DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW Sergei Lazarev ASSOCIATION Aboubacar Fall Natasa Lalovic Angela Lim RUSSIN & VECCHI WOLF THEISS Talal Amin Al Ghazzawi FALL ASSOCIATES BAKER & MCKENZIE.WONG & Stepan Lubavsky AL-GHAZZAWI PROFESSIONAL Mame Adama Gueye Mirko Lovric LEOW BAKER & MCKENZIE ASSOCIATION SCP MAME ADAMA GUEYE & NATIONAL BANK OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO Alvin Lingam Michael J. Malloy Mohammed Al-Jaddan ASSOCIES HARRY ELIAS PARTNERSHIP GOWLINGS INTERNATIONAL THE LAW FIRM OF YOUSEF AND Khaled Houda Miodrag Markovic MOHAMMED AL-JADDAN HAYHURST ROBINSON Chit Fai Kelry Loi Lyudmila Malykhina CABINET KANJO KOITA DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW CMS CAMERON MCKENNA Neli Markovic CREDIT INFORMATION SYSTEM ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 151 Beng Hong Ong Tomás Kamenec Andrej Jarkovic Miranda Feinstein Ralph Zulman WONG TAN & MOLLY LIM DEDÁK & PARTNERS SELIH, SELIH, JANEZIC & EDWARD, NATHAN & FRIEDLAND SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF JARKOVIC SOUTH AFRICA Tan Peng Chin Renatus Kollar Lauren Flemming TAN PENG CHIN ALLEN&OVERY Aleksandra Jemc TRANSUNION ITC SPAIN JADEK & PENSA Nandakumar Ponniya Petr Kucera Mike Forsyth CLIFFORD CHANCE Agustin Bou Maqueda ASPEKT KILCULLEN Florian Kirchhof AUSTEN SMITH ATTORNEYS SCHÖHNERR RECHTSANWÄLTE JAUSA, NADAL & VIDAL Mark Rowley Michal Luknar David Garegae CREDIT BUREAU SINGAPORE Cristina Calvo SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY Denis Kostrevc GREATER PRETORIA DELOITTE & TOUCHE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL ASHURST Teng Siu Ing Vladimir Malik SINGAPORE LAND AUTHORITY Ariadna Cambronero COFACE INTERCREDIT SLOVAKIA Katja Kumar Bavec Hennie Geldenhuys COLJA, ROJS & PARTNERJI DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS URÍA & MENÉNDEZ Cheah SweeGim Jozef Maly´ KELVIN CHIA PARTNERSHIP DETVAI LUDIK MALY´ UDVAROS Gerald Lambert Tim Gordon-Grant Simon Cookson DELOITTE & TOUCHE BOWMAN GILFILLAN INC. ASHURST Bok Hoay Tan Tomás Maretta DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKY´ Mitja Novak Kim Goss Fermin Córdoba Gavín MITJA JELENIC NOVAK BOWMAN GILFILLAN ECHECOPAR ABOGADOS Sharon Tay Jana Moravcikova DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKY´ Pavle Pensa Sam Gumede Charles Coward JADEK & PENSA WERKSMANNS URÍA & MENÉNDEZ David Teo Peter Netepn DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW DETVAI LUDIK MALY´ UDVAROS Tomaz Perse Osafo Gyimah Soledad Crucesde Abia TRADE AND INVESTMENT CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY BANK OF SPAIN Lincoln Teo Zuzana Petrasova PROMOTION OFFICE DEVELOPMENT BOARD CREDIT BUREAU SINGAPORE Sergio del Bosque CECHOVÁ RAKOVSK ADVOCATES Natasa Pipan Nahtigal Desere Jordaan URÍA & MENÉNDEZ Daphne Teo Tomás Rybár SELIH, SELIH, JANEZIC & WEBBER WENTZEL BOWENS MONETARY AUTHORITY OF Iván Delgado CECHOVÁ RAKOVSK ADVOCATES JARKOVIC SINGAPORE Jude Kearney PÉREZ-LLORCA Radoslav Saly Boris Ruzic LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE & Tjong Yai Tjan Anselmo Diaz Fernández CECHOVÁ RAKOVSK ADVOCATES LABOUR INSPECTORAT OF MACRAE TAN PENG CHIN BANK OF SPAIN Milan Semelak SLOVENIA, MINISTRY OF LABOUR, Fritz Keller Ng Wai King FAMILY AND SOCIAL AFFAIR Alejandro Ferreres NATIONAL LABOUR INSPECTORATE LINDSAY, KELLER & PARTNERS VENTURE LAW Rudi Selih URÍA & MENÉNDEZ Erik Steger Alison Koen Lim Wee Teck SELIH, SELIH, JANEZIC & Guillermo Frühbeck WOLF THEISS LINDSAY, KELLER & PARTNERS RAJAH & TANN JARKOVIC DR FRÜHBECK ABOGADOS Y Jana Stelbacká Renee Kruger ECONOMISTAS Lee Kuan Wei Klemen Sesok CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKY´ WEBBER WENTZEL BOWENS VENTURE LAW DELOITTE & TOUCHE Pablo González-Espejo Lenka Subenikova Fatima Laher URÍA & MENÉNDEZ Benjamin Yap Damjana Sitar WOLF THEISS BOWMAN GILFILLAN KELVIN CHIA PARTNERSHIP BANK OF SLOVENIA Calvin A. Hamilton Roman Turok-Hetes Sam Lefafa MONEREO, MEYER & Jennifer Yeo Irina Skocir NATIONAL BANK OF SLOVAKIA DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS MARINEL-LO ABOGADOS YEO-LEONG & PEH COFACE INTERCREDIT SLOVENIJA Zuzana Valerova Francis Manickum Ana Just Samuel Yuen Barbara Smolnikar PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND LURIS VALLS ABOGADOS DAVID LIM & PARTNERS SKB BANKA DD SLOVAK OFFICE INDUSTRY André Monereo Velasco SLOVAKIA Tomás Zareck´Y SOLOMON ISLANDS Andrew Muir MONEREO, MEYER & CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKY´ AUSTEN SMITH ATTORNEYS MARINEL-LO ABOGADOS Milos Kachanák John Ridgway Fernando Mendez DETVAI LUDIK MALY´ UDVAROS SLOVENIA PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK Johan Neser LAWYERS CLIFFE DEKKER COLEGIO DE RESGITRADORES DE Martin Bednár Stane Berlec LA PROPIEDAD Y MERCANTILES Laurence F Pereira HMG & PARTNERS SLOVENIAN TRADE & SOUTH AFRICA DE ESPAÑA VORSTER PEREIRA INVESTMENT PROMOTION Monika Berecova Nicolas Nogueroles AGENCY Michael Adcock Randolph Samuel MINISTRY OF LABOUR, SOCIAL COLEGIO DE RESGITRADORES DE BOWMAN GILFILLAN AFFAIRS AND FAMILY Crtomir Borec TRANSUNION ITC LA PROPIEDAD Y MERCANTILES DELOITTE&TOUCHE Heidi Bell DE ESPAÑA Roman Bircak Hugo Stark BOWMAN GILFILLAN CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKY´ Candido Paz-Ares Simon Bracun SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK URÍA & MENÉNDEZ LAW FIRM COLJA, ROJS & Andrea Bezuidenhout Jana Brezinova Claire Tucker PARTNERJI FINMARK TRUST Alfonso Pedrajas DEDÁK & PARTNERS BOWMAN GILFILLAN Borut Brezovar Fatima Bhyat MULLERAT Katarina Cechova Llevellyn Van Wyk CONSULTANT CECHOVA RAKOVSKY´ LABOUR INSPECTORATE OF CSIR Pedro Pérez-Llorca Zamora SLOVENIA, MINISTRA OF LABOUR, Ann Boulton PÉREZ-LLORCA Ondrej Dusek FAMILY AND SOCIAL AFFAIR Jacques VanWyk TRANSUNION ITC Roser Ràfols PETERKA & PARTNERS CLIFFE DEKKER Markus Bruckmueller Marianne Brown ROCA JUNYENT ADVOCATS Juraj Elias WOLF THEISS Michael Vorster INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC FINANCE CMS CARNOGURSKY´ BOWMAN GILFILLAN Arturo Rainer Pan Miodrag Dordevic AND AUDITING ECHECOPAR ABOGADOS LAW Pavol Erben SUPREME COURT OF SLOVENIA Greg Ward Vicky Bunyan FIRM BLAHA, ERBEN & PARTNERI TRANSUNION ITC Petra Drobne WERKSMANNS Enrique Rajoy Lubos Frolkovic SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT David Watkins Mary Chege-Mwangi COLEGIO DE RESGITRADORES DE WOLF THEISS CENTER BOWMAN GILFILLAN INC. LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE & LA PROPIEDAD Y MERCANTILES DE ESPAÑA Milan Horvath Marina Ferfolja MACRAE Phillip Webster NATIONAL BANK OF SLOVAKIA GORSE & PARTNER LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE & Paul Coetser Ricardo Rebate Labrandero MACRAE SÁNCHEZ PINTADO, NÚÑEZ & Martin Javorcek Joze Golobic BRINK COHEN LE ROUX INC. ASOCIADOS CMS CARNOGURSKY´ SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT Allen West Val Cooke CENTER DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS Eduardo Rodríguez-Rovira Michaela Jurková TRANSUNION ITC (JUSTICE COLLEGE) URÍA & MENÉNDEZ CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKY´ Vilma Hanzel Gretchen De Smit BANK OF SLOVANIA Peter Eugene Whelan María Rubio de Casas Milos Kachanak EDWARD, NATHAN & FRIEDLAND BOWMAN GILFILLAN FINDLAY & BAKER & MCKENZIE, MADRID DETVAI LUDIK MALY´ UDVAROS Sreco Jadek O J Ebohon TAIT JADEK & PENSA SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE, DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY 152 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Pilar Salinas John Wilson, Jr. Åke Rådberg SYRIAN ARAB Yuling Hsu SÁNCHEZ PINTADO, NÚÑEZ & JOHN WILSON PARTNERS SWEDISH CONSTRUCTION REPUBLIC FORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL ASOCIADOS FEDERATION ATTORNEYS AT LAW SWEDEN Alissar Al-Ahmar Rafael Sebastián Cecilia Rembert Jack J.T. Huang AL-AHMAR & PARTNERS, URÍA & MENÉNDEZ Hans Andersson INVEST IN SWEDEN AGENCY ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL JONES DAY Arancha Seva García MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, Jonna Svefors ADVISORS Roxy Huang URÍA & MENÉNDEZ EMPLOYMENT AND GÄRDE WESSLAU Kanaan Al-Ahmar YANGMING PARTNERS COMMUNICATIONS Miguel Torres Martin Wallin AL-AHMAR & PARTNERS, Margaret Huang MULLERAT Mats Berter LINKLATERS LAGERLÖF ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL LCS & PARTNERS MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST ADVISORS Carlos Vall STANBROOK ADVOKATBYRA Robert Wikholm C.Y. Huang Hani Bitar LURIS VALLS ABOGADOS ADVOKATFIRMAN VINGE TSAR & TSAI LAW FIRM Henrik Bielenstein SYRIAN ARAB CONSULTANTS LAW Javier Valle Zayas LINKLATERS ADVOKATBYRA Zue Min Hwang SWITZERLAND OFFICE URÍA & MENÉNDEZ CHINESE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION Tommy Bisander Riad Daoudi Eva M. Vazquez OF GENERAL CONTRACTORS. UC AB Peter R. Altenburger SYRIAN ARAB CONSULTANTS LAW MONEREO, MEYER & ALTENBURGER & PARTNERS OFFICE Charles Hwang MARINEL-LO ABOGADOS Vibekke Eliasson YANGMING PARTNERS FINANSINSPEKTIONEN Karl Arnold Antoun Joubran Carlos Viladás PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY SYRIAN ARAB CONSULTANTS LAW James J.M. Hwang URÍA & MENÉNDEZ Jörgen Estving OFFICE TSAR & TSAI LAW FIRM MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST Beat M. Barthold Marco Zambrini STANBROOK ADVOKATBYRA FRORIEP RENGGLI Muhammad Jumma Victor I-Hsiu Chang URÍA & MENÉNDEZ BANK OF SYRIA LCS & PARTNERS, COUNSEL Magnus Graner Frederic Betrisey BAKER & MCKENZIE Ousama Karawani Jen Kong Loh SRI LANKA ADVOKATFIRMAN LINDAHL KARAWANI LAW OFFICE ALLIANCE INTERNATIONAL LAW Leif Gustasson Philippe de Salis Asanka Abeysekera OFFICES BAKER & MCKENZIE BOREL & BARBEY Fady Kardous TICHURELVAM ASSOCIATES KARDOUS LAW OFFICE Fang-Ting Kuo Olof Hallberg Suzanne Eckert Subashini Abraham JOINT CREDIT INFORMATION ADVOKATFIRMAN LINDAHL WENGER PLATTNER Katerina Miltiadou SUDATH PERERA ASSOCIATES CENTER MECOS Eric Halvarsson Robert Furter Ayomi Aluwihare- Fang-Ting Kuo HAMMARSKIÖLD & CO. PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY Moussa Mitry Gunawardene JOINT CREDIT INFORMATION FACULTY OF LAW ­ DAMASCUS F.J.& G. DE SARAM Peder Hammarskiöld Rotf Gertsch CENTER UNIVERSITY / LOUKA & MITRY HAMMARSKIÖLD & CO SWISS FEDERAL BANKING N.P.H. Amarasena LAW OFFICE Edward Lai COMMISSION CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU Paula Hammarstrom CENTRAL BANK OF CHINA Moussa Mittry OF SRI LANKA Andersson Erwin Griesshammer LOUKA & MITRY LAW OFFICE Bee Leay Teo ANDERSSON MAGNUSSON VISCHER Bertie Buddhisena BAKER & MCKENZIE WAHLIN QVIST STANBROOK Samer Nofal MINISTRY OF LANDS Hans R. Hintermeister ADVOKATBYRA SAMER NOFAL LAW FIRM Justin Liang ZEK SWITZERLAND Sharmela de Silva BAKER & MCKENZIE John Henwood Gabriel Oussi TIRUCHELVAM ASSOCIATES Yvonne Hintermeister ROBINSON HERTRAM SYRIAN ARAB CONSULTANTS LAW Jeffrey Lin HANDELSREGISTERAMT DES Savantha DeSaram OFFICE JOINT CREDIT INFORMATION Stefan Holmberg KANTONS ZURICH D. L. & F. DE SARAM CENTER GÄRDE WESSLAU Housam Safadi Urs Klöti Amila Fernando SAFADI BUREAU Rich Lin Margret Inger PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY JULIUS & CREASY LCS & PARTNERS FINANSINSPEKTAIONEN Abdulhay Sayed Michael Kramer Desmond Fernando DR. MOUSTAFA AL-SAYED Jennifer C. Lin Bengt Kjellson PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY FERNANDO & CO. TSAR & TSAI LAW FIRM LANTMÄTERIET Eva Leuthold TAIWAN, CHINA T.G. Gooneratne Jocelyn Liu Mattias Larsson PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY JULIUS & CREASY Hui-ling Chen LCS & PARTNERS ADVOKATFIRMAN CEDERQUIST Andrea Molino WINKLER PARTNERS Mahinda Haradasa Thomas H. McGowan Camilla levinsson SPIESS BRUNONI PEDRAZZINI VARNERS LANKA OFFICE Edgar Y. Chen RUSSIN & VECCHI MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST MOLINO TSAR & TSAI LAW FIRM U.L. Kadurugamuwa STANBROOK ADVOKAT Guy-Philippe Rubeli Mark Ohlson F.J.&G. DE SARAM YANGMING PARTNERS Tomas Lööv PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY John Chen FORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL Roshani Kobbekaduwa BOARD OF SWEDISH INDUSTRY Bertrand Schott Patrick Pai-ChiangChu ATTORNEYS AT LAW F.J.&G. DE SARAM AND COMMERCE FOR BETTER PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY LEE AND LI REGULATION Chun-Yih Cheng Ramani Muttetuwegama Kurt Spinnler Angela Wu Lars Mikael Mellguist FORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL TICHURELVAM ASSOCIATES SWISS FEDERAL BANKING YANGMING PARTNERS SVEA COURT OF APPEAL ATTORNEYS AT LAW COMMISSION Kandiah Neelakandan Shiau-Pan Yang Lars Nylund Helen Chou MURUGESU & NEELAKANDAN Daniel Steudler LEE AND LI ADVOKATFIRMAN FYLGIA RUSSIN & VECCHI SWISS FEDERAL DIRECTORATE OF Sudath Perera TANZANIA Susanne Öhbom CADASTRAL SURVEYING Cindy Chou SUDATH PERERA ASSOCIATES HÖKERBERG & SÖDERQVIST CHEN, SHYUU& PUN ATTORNEYS Jacques Tissot Charles Acworth R. Senathi Rajah ADVOKATBYRÅ AT LAW OFFICE CHARGÉ DU DROIT DU KNIGHT FRANK TANZANIA JULIUS & CREASY Malin Ohlin-Akermark REGISTRE FONCIER ET DU DROIT Julie Chu S.J. Bwana Rujaratnam Senathi Rajah ADVOKATFIRMAN VINGE FONCIER JONES DAY HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA JULIUS & CREASY Mattias Örnulf Marc-André Tudisco Serina Chung Augustino Chatulika Paul Ratnayeke HÖKERBERG & SÖDERQVIST INTERNATIONALER VERBAND FUER JONES DAY BANK OF TANZANIA PAUL RATNAYEKE ASSOCIATES ADVOKATBYRÅ ARBEITSNEHMERSCHUTZ Joyce Fan Naimi Dyer Avindra Rodrigo Carl Östring Marc Tütsch LEE AND LI KALUNGA & CO. ADVOCATES F.J. & G DE SARAM ADVOKATFIRMAN FYLGIA WENGER PLATTNER Stephen Franck Ademba Gomba P. Samarasiri Martin Pagrotsky Thomas Zogg YANGMING PARTNERS GOMBA & CO. ADVOCATES CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA ADVOKATFIRMAN VINGE PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY James Hong Johnson Jasson Niranjan Sinnethamby Lennart Palm CHEN, SHYUU& PUN ATTORNEYS AT LAW JOHNSON JASSON & CO TIRUCHELVAM ASSOCIATES BOARD OF SWEDISH INDUSTRY ASSOCIATES AND COMMERCE FOR BETTER Neelan Tiruchelvam REGULATION TIRUCHELVAM ASSOCIATES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 153 Leopold Thomas Kalunga Dej-Udom Krairit Jean-Marie Adenka Ilhem Ouanes Sebnem Onder KALUNGA & COMPANY, DEJ-UDOM & ASSOCIATES CABINET ADENKA FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES CAKMAK ORTAK AVUKAT ADVOCATES MEZIOU KNANI BUROSU Kobnang Kunjura Richard Akpoto ­ A.K. Kameja THAI CREDIT BUREAU Kougbleneou Lina bou Richa Nihat Ozdemir KAMEJA & NGULUMA L'ECOLE AFRICAINE DES MÉTIERS FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES TURKISH CONTRACTORS ADVOCATES Narong Leungbootnak DE L'ARCHITECTURE ET DE MEZIOU KNANI ASSOCIATION ASIAN INSTITUTE OF Wilbert Kapinga L'URBANISME, STUDIO ALPHA TECHNOLOGY A.I.C. Imed Tanazefti Eser Ozer MKONO & CO. LAW FIRM GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL ANORBIS ULUSLARARASI BILGI Tongurai Limpiti Koffi Alinon MERKZI Sam Mapande BANK OF THAILAND CRCD/LANDNET TURKEY LAW ASSOCIATES Emin özkurt Sakchai Limsiripothong Philippe Ametsiagbe MEHMET GÜN & CO. Ishengoma Masha WHITE & CASE Burcu Acarturk MINISTRY OF URBANISM AND MUJULIZI & MAGAI ADVOCATES PEKIN & PEKIN Serdar Paksoy David Lyman HOUSING PAKSOY & CO. Henry Sato Massaba TILLEKE & GIBBINS Ugur Aktekin Alexis Aquereburu KAMEJA & NGULUMA INTERNATIONAL MEHMET GÜN & CO CABINET ME A.C. AQUEREBURU Ahmed Pekin ADVOCATES PEKIN & PEKIN Steven Miller I. Hakki Arslan Vilevo Biova Devo L.H. Mkila JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER CENTRAL BANK OF THE CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE Sefika Pekin BANK OF TANZANIA REPUBLIC OF TURKEY M.FETHI PEKIN & SEFIKA PEKIN Piched Niamnud L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST Nimrod Mkono CHANDLER AND THONG-EK AFRICAINE Mehmet Artemel M. Selçuk Polat MKONO & CO. LAW FIRM SERAP ZUVIN TURKISH CONTRACTORS Stephen Ogunlana Kofi Kumodzi ASSOCIATION Fidelis Mutakyamilwa ASIAN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE DRH ­ GLOBAL EXCEL Elvan Aziz MINISTRY OF LANDS AND INTERNATIONAL PAKSOY & CO. Nihat Sahin HUMAN SETTLEMENTS Peradach Patanachan Francois Nare Kadriye Baysal GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF LAND DEVELOPMENT CLIFFORD CHANCE CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE TURKISH CONTRACTORS REGISTRY AND CADASTRE Aisha Naiga Cynthia Pornavalai L'UNION MONETAIRE OUEST ASSOCIATION Y. Selim Sariibrahimoglu MKONO & CO. LAW FIRM TILLEKE & GIBBINS AFRICAINE SARIBRAHMOLU LAW OFFICE INTERNATIONAL Erol Bircanoglu Jr. Alex Nguluma Adjémida Douato Soededjede BIRCANOGLU LAW FIRM Yesim Sezgingil MAAJAR, RWECHUNGURA, Noppramart Prasitmonthon SAFECO Melis Biskin DTB DIS TICARET BILGI NGULUMA & MAKANI TILLEKE & GIBBINS MERKEZI INTERNATIONAL TONGA OFFICES OF M. FADLULLAH Charles RB Rwechungura CERRAHOGLU Paul Sheridan MAAJAR, RWECHUNGURA, Pascale Prud'homme John Ridgway Mesut Cakmak DENTON WILDE SAPTE & GUNER NGULUMA & MAKANI TILLEKE & GIBBINS PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK INTERNATIONAL CAKMAK ORTAK AVUKAT LAWYERS Pinar Tanilkan Constantine Rweyemamu BUROSU PEKIN & PEKIN MUTALEMWA , ISHENGOMA, Jane Puranananda TUNISIA Zeynep Cakmak MASHA, MUJULIZI & MAGAI DEJ-UDOM & ASSOCIATES Nese Tasdemir CAKMAK ORTAK AVUKAT MEHMET GÜN & CO. Grace Shao Wanna Rakyao Badreddine Barkia BUROSU MAAJAR, RWECHUNGURA, DEPARTMENT OF LANDS CENTRAL BANK OF TUNISIA Selcuk TayfunOk Ibrahim Canakci NGULUMA & MAKANI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Piyanuj Ratprasatporn Bouaziz Belaiba BANKING REGULATION AND ISTANBUL Ringo Tenga TILLEKE & GIBBINS SORENCO SUPERVISION AGENCY LAW ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL Elif Tezcan Lamine Bellagha Fadlullah Cerrahoglu M.FETHI PEKIN & SEFIKA PEKIN Leopold Thomas Kalunga Nuttida Samalapa ADLY BELLAGHA AND ASSOCIATES M. FADLULLAH CERRAHOGLU KALUNGA & CO. ADVOCATES BAKER & MCKENZIE Selma Toplü Ünlü Adly Bellagha Devrim Çukur MEHMET GÜN & CO Jessada Sawatdipong ADLY BELLAGHA AND ASSOCIATES ÇUKUR & YILMAZ THAILAND CHANDLER & THONG-EK Fuat Tuac Héla Ben Miled Dilara Duman PEKIN & PEKIN Tratit Anudhira Alexander James Seeley FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES SARIBRAHMOLU LAW OFFICE CHANDLER AND THONG-EK INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MEZIOU KNANI Feyza Tukel COUNSELLORS Lale Giray BIRCANOGLU LAW FORM Natsuda Bhukkanasut Kamel Ben Salah PEKIN & PEKIN BANK OF THAILAND Hunt Talmage GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL Aysegül Yalçinmani CHANDLER AND THONG-EK Semiha Gorgulu M. FADLULLAH CERRAHOGLU Rujira Bunnag Abdelfatah Benahji YAMANER & YAMANER MARUT BUNNAG INTERNATIONAL Anongporn Thanachaiary FERCHIOU & ASSOCIES MEZIOU Selim Yavuz LAW OFFICE TILLEKE & GIBBINS KNANI Ali Gozutok PEKIN & PEKIN INTERNATIONAL PEKIN & PEKIN Albert T. Chandler Elyès Ben Mansour Mehtap Yildirim-Ozturk CHANDLER AND THONG-EK Boonchai Thaveekittikul GAIJI & BEN MANSOUR Mehmet Gün CAKMAK ORTAK AVUKAT BOONCHAI ARTHUR ANDERSEN MEHMET GÜN & CO. BUROSU Chinnavat Chinsangaram Celine Dupont WHITE & CASE Rawee Wan Thongsrimadum FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES Sezin Guner Serap Zuvin CLIFFORD CHANCE MEZIOU KNANI PEKIN & PEKIN SERAP ZUVIN Thawat Damsa-ard TILLEKE & GIBBINS Harold K. Vickery Jr. Salaheddine Caid Essebsi Selen Gures UGANDA INTERNATIONAL VICKERY & WORACHAI SALAHEDDINE CAID ESSEBSI & M. FADLULLAH CERRAHOGLU ASSOCIATES John Fotiadis Pimvimol Vipamaneerut Senem Gursoy Russell Eastaugh TILLEKE & GIBBINS TILLEKE & GIBBINS Amina Larbi Ezzine BIRCANOGLU LAW FIRM PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INTERNATIONAL INTERNATIONAL GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL Hande Hamevi Moses Jurua Adriko Paul Gregory Prapakorn Wannakano Faiza Feki PEKIN & PEKIN ADRIKO & KARUGABA CLIFFORD CHANCE BANK OF THAILAND CENTRAL BANK OF TUNISIA ADVOCATES Baris Kalayci Vira Kammee Nipa Wongyeekul Noureddine Ferchiou MEHMET GÜN & CO Oscar Kambona INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEJ-UDOM & ASSOCIATES FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES KAMPALA ASSOCIATED Kazim Kerman COUNSELLORS MEZIOU KNANI ADVOCATES KKB KREDIT KAYIT BUREAU TOGO Suwat Kerdphon Sami Kallel Masembe Kanyerezi Burcu Mutulu BANGKOK METROPOLITAN LAND MUGERWA & MASEMBE Ayessou Adade KALLEL & ASSOCIATES M. FADLULLAH CERRAHOGLU OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF LANDS ADVOCATES CADASTRAL INSPECTION Radhi Meddeb Sezin Okkan Komkrit Kietduriyakul Philip Karugaba Folly Adama COMETE ENGINEERING PEKIN & PEKIN BAKER & MCKENZIE ADRIKO & KARUGABA CABINET AQUEREBURU AND Faouzi Mili Fahri Okumus ADVOCATES Samma Kitsin PARTNERS MILI AND ASSOCIATES CENTRAL BANK OF THE THAI CREDIT BUREAU REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 154 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 Sim K. Katende Ruslan Israpilov Hassen A. Ferris Michael Prior Howard Oken KATENDE, SEMPEBWA AND GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS AFRIDI & ANGELL SHAWN COULSON FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY ADVOCATES INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW Valeria Kazadorova Ayman Hamdy YORK Bart Katureebe BAKER & MCKENZIE SHALAKANY LAW OFFICE Milton Psyllides KAMPALA ASSOCIATED EVERSHEDS LAW FIRM John Ralls ADVOCATES Anastasiya Khutko Hussan M.K. Hourani THELEN REID & PRIEST SHEVCHENKO DIDKOVSKIY & AL TAMIMI & COMPANY Dave Sharp Lilian Keene-Mugerwa PARTNERS REGISTERS OF SCOTLAND Stephen Raslavich LAND TENURE REFORM Nabil A. Issa UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY PROJECTS, MINISTRY OF WATER, Alexandr Kireyev AFRIDI & ANGELL Paul Sillis COURT LANDS, AND ENVIRONMENT NATIONAL BANK OF UKRAINE COLLYER-BRISTOW Walid Karam Lillian E. Rice Assumpta Kemigisha Sergei Konnov HABIB AL MULLA& CO Kathy Smith CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & NANGWALA, REZIDA & CO KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY SLAUGHTER AND MAY Suneer Kumar HAMILTON ADVOCATES, Svetlana Kustova AL-SUWAIDI & COMPANY Michael Steiner Phillip Salomon Robert Kiggundu KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY DENTON WILDE SAPPE Katerina Miltiadou FIRST AMERICAN TITLE ARCH FORUM Olexander Martinenko MECOS Katherine Stones INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK Mohmed Mbabazi BAKER & MCKENZIE WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES Stephen Rodd NYANZI, KIBONEKA AND Ilona Melnichuk David Snyder BRYAN CAVE Sally Willcock MBABAZI ADVOCATES KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES SNYDER & SNYDER Vandana Rupani David F.K. Mpanga Sergiy Onishchenko Richard Spillenkothen AFRIDI & ANGELL Philip Wood A.F. MPANGA, ADVOCATES CHABOURNE AND PARKE ALLEN & OVERY FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD Jonathan Silver Gabriel Mpubani Andrii Palianytsia Frederick Turner CLYDE & CO Julia Yates GABRIEL MPUBANI ICPS FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS SNYDER & SNYDER Mahamed Suwaidi Charles Muganwa Ssemakula DERINGER Olexiy Pokotylo Jason Vonderhaar AL-SUWAIDI & COMPANY LAWYER KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY John Young TRANSUNION Neil Taylor Peters K. Musoke EVERSHEDS LAW FIRM Vira Potyekhina DAVIS LANGDON URUGUAY SHONUBI, MUSOKE & CO. GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS UNITED STATES Rachel Mwanje Musoke UNITED KINGDOM Maria Elena Abo Olyana Rudyakova MUGERWA & MASEMBE MUXI & ASOCIADOS BAKER & MCKENZIE David Adkins ADVOCATES Kenneth Baird FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD Laura Arocena Igor A. Shevchenko FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS Rose Namarome HUGHES & HUGHES SHEVCHENKO DIDKOVSKIY & DERINGER Carl Anduri LEX UGANDA ADVOCATES & PARTNERS LEX MUNDI César I. Aroztegui SOLICITORS Richard Boulton AROZTEGUI & ASOCIADOS/ Oleg Shevchuk FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY Richard F. Broude Charles Odere BRONS & SALAS PROXEN RICHARD F. BROUDE LEX UGANDA ADVOCATES & Greg Boyd Luis Baccino SOLICITORS Markian Silecky BAKER & MCKENZIE Mike Calder FIRST AMERICAN TITLE AROZTEGUI & ASOCIADOS/ Alex Rezida THE SILECKY FIRM Michael Brown INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW BRONS & SALAS NANGWALA, REZIDA & CO Mykola Stetsenko EVERSHEDS LAW FIRM YORK Maria Isabel Bonaffon ADVOCATES, BAKER & MCKENZIE Richard Clark Peter R Chaffetz DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE Justin Semuyaba Sergei Voitovich SLAUGHTER AND MAY CLIFFORD CHANCE REGISTROS SEMUYABA, IGA, & CO. GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS Simon Cookson Corina Bove ADVOCATES Tammy Fudem Alexander N Yefimov ASHURST THELEN REID & PRIEST (NEW GUYER & REGULES Alan Shonubi ALEXANDER YEFOMIV Laura Cram YORK) Carlos Brandes SHONUBI, MUSOKE & CO Oleg Zagnitko ASHURST Veronica Glanville GUYER & REGULES Ssekatawa MAGISTER & PARTNERS David Crosthwaite UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY Mercedes Jimenez de MUGERWA & MASEMBE, COURT Arrechaga ADVOCATES Galina P. Zagorodnyuk DAVIS LANGDON CONSULTANCY KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY Lawrence Haas GUYER & REGULES Ezekiel Tuma Paul Samuel Gilbert BAKER & MCKENZIE, CHICAGO Conrado Hughes Delgado SHONUBI, MUSOKE & CO. Svitlana Zakhtey FINERS STEPHENS INNOCENT BAKER & MCKENZIE HUGHES & HUGHES Andrew Glaze Melissa M Johns UKRAINE CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & Oleg Zinkevych WRAGGE & CO María Durán HAMILTON HUGHES & HUGHES Oleg Alyoshin KRAVETS & LEVENETS Simon Graham Jonel Jordan VASIL KISIL & PARTNERS WRAGGE & CO Noelia Eiras UNITED ARAB TRANSUNION HUGHES & HUGHES Viktor Andriyaka EMIRATES John Hadlow Charles L. Kerr GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS EXPERIAN Gabriel Ejgenberg Saeed Abdulla Al Hamiz MORRISON AND FOERSTER ESTUDIO BERGSTEIN Natalia Artemova Andrew D. Haywood CENTRAL BANK OF THE UAE Pierre le Roux GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS DARLINGTONS SOLICITORS Agustín Etcheverry Reyes Murad Abida INTERGRAPH MAPPING AND ESTUDIO DR. MEZZERA Daniel A. Bilak Gillian Key-Vice GEOSPATIAL SOLUTIONS HADEF AL DHAHIRI & JURVNESHSERVICE ATTORNEYS & Marcelo Femenías ASSOCIATES EXPERIAN Erik Lindauer COUNSELS BADO, KUSTER, ZERBINO & Bashir Ahmed Gillian Key-Vice SULLIVAN AND CROMWELL RACHETTI Yuriy Brykaylo AFRIDI & ANGELL EXPERIAN David Malamed KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY Daniel Ferrere Salah El Dien Al Nahas Sarah Lawson GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL FERRERE LAMAISON Serhiy Chorny HADEL AL DHAHIRI & DENTON WILDE SAPPE Raymond McGuire BAKER & MCKENZIE Diego Galante ASSOCIATES Steve Mallen CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATION OF GALANTE & MARTINS Olexandr Fedoriv Habib M. AlMulla KNIGHT FRANK GREATER NEW YORK CREDIT RATING AGENCY Rosario Garat HABIB AL MULLA& CO Christopher Mallon Matthew Meade SLAVRATING SUPERINTENDENCIA DE Ammar Al-Saleh WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES MORRISON AND FOERSTER INSTITUCIONES DE Anna V. Globina AL TAMIMI & COMPANY Willie Manners David Newberg INTERMEDIACIÓN CHABOURNE AND BARKE Lisa Dale MACFARLANES COLLIER, HALPERN, NEWBERG, Flavia Gatti Yaroslav Gregirchak NOLLETTI, & BOCK AL TAMIMI & COMPANY John Meadows FERRERE LAMAISON MAGISTER & PARTNERS Samuel Nolen Abdul latif Eissa HM LAND REGISTRY Manuel Gonzalez Rocco James Hitch RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER HILAL ASSOCIATES Jim Meikle BANCO CENRAL DEL URUGUAY BAKER & MCKENZIE DAVIS LANGDON CONSULTANCY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 155 Marcela Hughes VANUATU Victor Sanchez Leal Nguyen Viet Ha Morris Mulomba HUGHES & HUGHES LEAL BENTATA ABOGADOS RUSSIN & VECHI BANK OF ZAMBIA Christopher Dawson Ariel Imken DAWSON BUILDERS Oscar Ignacio Torres Pham Nghiem XuanBac Henry Musonda BANCO CENTRAL DEL URUGUAY TRAVIESO EVANS ARRIA RENGEL VISION & ASSOCIATES KIRAN & MUSONDA ASSOCIATES Juris Ozols & PAZ INVESTMENT & MANAGEMENT Alfredo Inciarte Blanco JURIS OZOLS AND ASSOCIATES CONSULTANTS Marjorie Grace Mwenda PEREZ DEL CASTILLO ­ NAVARRO Carlos Velandia Sanchez MG JOHNSON-MWENDA & CO ­ INCIARTE ­ GARI John Ridgway ASOCIACIÓN VENEZOLANA DE YEMEN, REP. PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK DERECHO REGISTRAL Kanti Patel Estudio Jurídico LAWYERS CHRISTOPHER, RUSSELL COOK & MUXI & ASOCIADOS Patricia Wallis Sheikh Tariq Abdullah CO ITP CONSULTING Anwar Adham Nelly Kleckin VENEZUELA ADHAM & ASSOCIATES Solly Patel ESTUDIO BERGSTEIN CHRISTOPHER, RUSSELL COOK & Jorge Acedo-Prato VIETNAM Jamal Adimi CO Elbio L. Kuster HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO & JAMAL ADIMI LAW OFFICE BADO, KUSTER, ZERBINO & DUQUE Pierre Anglès d'Auriac Noah Siasimuna RACHETTI FLÉCHEUX, NGO & ASSOCIÉS Khaled Al Buraihi MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND Carolina Armada KHALED AL BURAIHI FOR SOCIAL SECURITY Jose Lorieto ITP CONSULTING Brett Ashton ADVOCACY & LEGAL SERVICES CLEARING DE INFORMES CHESTERTON PETTY John Sichinsambwe Alfredo Basalo-Rodríguez Abdalla Al Meqbeli MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL Matilde Milicevic HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO & Nicholas Audier ABDALLA AL MEQBELI & SECURITY CLEARING DE INFORMES DUQUE GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL ASSOCIATES Albert M. Wood Alejandro Miller Artola Gertrudiz Bonilla Frederick Burke Hassan Al-Dailami ALBERT M WOOD & CO ARTOLA GUYER & REGULES ROMERO-MUCI & ASOCIADOS BAKER & MCKENZIE HASSAN AL-DAILAMI & CO. A.R. Zikonda Ricardo Olivera-García Mercedes Briceño Frederick Burke Mohamed Taha Hamood Al- HIGH COURT OF ZAMBIA OLIVERA & DELPIAZZO CONAPRI BAKER & MCKENZIE Hashimi Veronica Raffo Alvaro Briceño Doan Chien MOHAMED TAHA HAMOOD & ZIMBABWE CO. FERRERE LAMAISON ITP CONSULTING GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL Nageeb Alkadi Richard H. S. Beattie Bruno Santin Camilo Daza Uan Pham Cong NAGEEB ALKADI & ASSOCIATE THE STONE BEATTIE STUDIO ESTUDIO JURÍDICO MUXÍ & CONAPRI STATE BANK OF VIETNAM OFFICES ASOCIADOS Roger H. Chadwick Arturo de Sola Lander Giles Thomas Cooper Abdalla Al-Meqbeli SCANLEN & HOLDERNESS Alvaro Tarabal DE SOLA PATE & BROWN BAKER & MCKENZIE ABDALLA AL-MEQBELI & GUYER & REGULES Innocent Chagonda Trino Alcides Díaz Florent Fassier ASSOCIATES ATHERSTONE & COOK GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL UZBEKISTAN SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Abdulla Al-Olofi Lindsay Cook Carlos Dominguez John Hickin CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN ATHERSTONE &COOK Sanjar Abdukhalilov HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO & JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER DENTON WILDE SAPPE Mohamed Jaffer Kassim DUQUE C.L. Dhliwayo Phong-anh Hoang MINISTRY OF JUSTICE RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE Jamol Askarov Carlos G. Domínguez GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL CHADBOURNE AND PARKE Zuhair Abdul Rasheed HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO & Obert Chaurura Gutu Nguyen Hoang Kim Oanh SHEIKH TARIQ ABDULLAH GUTU & CHIKOWERO Ilkhom Azizov DUQUE BAKER & MCKENZIE AZIZOV & PARTNERS Khaled Saeed Rossanna D'Onza Stephen Gwasira Ian K. Lewis AL BURAIHI KHALED RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE Irina Gosteva BAKER & MCKENZIE JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER DENTON WILDE SAPTE Saeed Sohbi Iris Guijarro Kantor Han Mahn Tien SAEED HASSAN SOHBI KANTOR & IMMERMAN Thomas Johnson ITP CONSULTORES CONCETTI CONSULTING DENTON WILDE SAPTE Victor Sanchez Leal ZAMBIA Brenda Wood Khahari Tran Manh Hung B.W. KAHARI Moubarak Kambarova BENTATA ABOGADOS BAKER & MCKENZIE Adam Aziz DENTON WILDE SAPTE Antonio López Castillo Peter Lloyd Nguyen Tuan Minh AD ADAMS & CO GILL GODLONTON & GERRANS Natalia V. Lopaeva DE SOLA PATE & BROWN TILLEKE & GIBBINS Moses Chatulika SUPREME ECONOMIC COURT OF Luiz Ignacio Mendoza CONSULTANTS T S Manjengwah BANK OF ZAMBIA THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN RODRIGUEZ & MENDOZA WINTERTONS LAW FIRM Lai Minh Thuy Mwelwa Chibesakunda Ibrahim Mukhamedjanov Gustavo Muci FREEHILL HOLLINGDALE & PAGE Tendayi Manyumwa CORPUS GLOBE ADVOCATES AZIZOV & PARTNERS ROMERO-MUCI & ASOCIADOS DEPARTMENT OF Dao Nguyen Elias Chipimo GEOINFORMATICS AND Ravshan Rakhmanov Irving Ochoa JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER CORPUS GLOBE SURVEYING AT THE UNIVERSITY BAKER & MCKENZIE SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y Anna On OF ZIMBABWE Abdulla Dudhia Taminech Roshanian OTRAS INSTITUCIONES BAKER & MCKENZIE MUSA DUDHIA & CO Thembiwe Mazingi ROSHIANIAN, PAYMAN, IRWIN Fernando Peláez-Pier Viet D. Phan COGHLAN, WELSH & GUEST Robin Durairajah Alexander Samborsky HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO & TRAN H. N. & ASSOCIATES DUQUE CORPUS GLOBE ADVOCATES John Meyburgh MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF STUMBLES AND ROWE GEODESY, CARTOGRAPHY AND Tran YenTrang Phan Miguel Angel Pérez Lavaud Harriet Kapekele STATE CADASTRE BAKER & MCKENZIE AVELEDO KLEMPRER RIVÀS CORPUS GLOBE ADVOCATES Honour P. Mkushi SAWYER AND MKUSHI Vakhid Saparov PEREZ TRUJILLO SANZ & Timothy Reinold Pixie Linda Mwila Kasonde- ASOCIADOS BAKER & MCKENZIE FREEHILL HOLLINGDALE & PAGE Yangailo Piniel Mkushi Gustavo Enrique Planchart SAWYER & MKUSHI Sofiya Shaikhrazieva Yee Chung Seck P.H. YANGAILO & COMPANY Pocaterra DENTON WILDE SAPTE BAKER & MCKENZIE Frank M. Lwambano Stenford Moyo TINOCO, TRAVIESO, PLANCHART SCANLEN & HOLDERNESS Sergey Shirov & NUÑEZ ThanhHa Tran ELLIS & CO DENTON WILDE SAPTE BAKER & MCKENZIE Alwyn Pichanick Carlos Plaza Anselmi N.K. Mubonda WINTERTONS LAW FIRM Umarov Abdurakhim BAKER & MCKENZIE Thomas J. Treutler D.H. KEMP & CO. 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