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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT  
(IDA-30460)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$65 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR

FOR AN

EDUCATION SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

October 24, 2005

**Human Development Group III  
Africa Region**

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective July 2005)

Currency Unit = Malagasy Ariary (MGA)

MGA 1.00 = US\$ 0.0005

US\$ 1.00 = MGA 1985.82

## FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 1

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFD	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i> French Development Agency	ICB	International Competitive Bidding
BACC	<i>Baccalauréat</i> (Baccalaureat)	IMF	International Monetary Fund
BEPC	<i>Brevet d'Etudes du Premier Cycle</i> Certificate of Lower Secondary Education	MENRS	<i>Ministère de l'Education Nationale et de la Recherche Scientifique</i>
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy	MGF	Malagasy Francs
CEG	<i>Collège d'Enseignement Général</i> (General Education College)	MTR	Mid-Term Review
CEPE	<i>Certificat d'Etudes Primaires Elementaires</i> (Primary and Elementary School Certificate)	NER	Net Enrollment Rate
CISCO	<i>Circonscriptions scolaires</i> (Educational Districts)	PAD	Project Appraisal Document
CONFEMEN	<i>Conférence des Ministres de l'Education des pays ayant le français en partage</i> Conference of French-Speaking Country National Education Ministers	PASEC	<i>Programme d'Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs</i> (Education Systems Analysis Programme)
CRESED	<i>Crédit de Renforcement du Secteur Education</i> (Education Sector Reinforcement Credit)	PDO	Project Development Objective
DCA	Development Credit Agreement	PIU	Project Implementation Unit
DRESEB	<i>Direction Régionale de l'Enseignement Secondaire et de l'Education de Base</i> (Regional Direction of Secondary and Basic Education)	PMU	Project Management Unit
EFA-FTI	Education for All – Fast Track Initiative	PREFTEC	<i>Projet de Renforcement de la Formation Technique</i> (Vocational Training Reinforcement Project)
EPSM	<i>Etude sur la Progression Scolaire et la Performance Académique à Madagascar</i> (Study on Education Progress and Performance in Madagascar)	PRSC	Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit
ESW	Economic and Sector Work	PSR	Project Status Report
FADES	<i>Fonds d'Appui au Développement de l'Enseignement Supérieur</i> Fund for the Development of Higher Education	QAG	Quality Assurance Group
FID	<i>Fonds d'Intervention pour le Développement</i>	SDR	Special Drawing Rights
FRAM	<i>Fikambanan'ny Ray Aman-drenin'ny Mpianatra</i> Association of Parents of	TTL	Task Team Leader

	Students		
GER	Gross Enrollment Rate	UERP	<i>Unité d'Etudes et de Recherches Pédagogiques</i> (Curriculum and Research Development Unit)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
HIPC	Heavily-Indebted Poor Country	ZAP	<i>Zones d'Administration Pédagogique</i> (Sub-district Office for Primary Education)

Vice President:	Gobind Nankani
Country Director:	James Bond
Sector Manager:	Laura Frigenti
Task Team Leader/Task Manager:	Sajitha Bashir

**MADAGASCAR**  
**Education Sector Development Project**

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<i>Project ID:</i> P001559	<i>Project Name:</i> Education Sector Development Project
<i>Team Leader:</i> Sajitha Bashir	<i>TL Unit:</i> AFTH3
<i>ICR Type:</i> Core ICR	<i>Report Date:</i> October 24, 2005

## 1. Project Data

*Name:* Education Sector Development Project *L/C/TF Number:* IDA-30460  
*Country/Department:* MADAGASCAR *Region:* Africa Regional Office

*Sector/subsector:* Primary education (65%); Central government administration (15%); Tertiary education (10%); Sub-national government administration (6%); Secondary education (4%)

*Theme:* Education for all (P); Rural services and infrastructure (P); Improving labor markets (P); Participation and civic engagement (P); Decentralization (S)

### KEY DATES

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Revised/Actual</i>
<i>PCD:</i> 07/15/1995	<i>Effective:</i> 07/08/1998	01/07/1999
<i>Appraisal:</i> 11/26/1997	<i>MTR:</i> 01/31/2001	01/31/2001
<i>Approval:</i> 03/10/1998	<i>Closing:</i> 10/31/2003	03/31/2005

*Borrower/Implementing Agency:* GOVERNMENT OF MADAGASCAR/MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

*Other Partners:*

STAFF	Current	At Appraisal
<i>Vice President:</i>	Gobind T. Nankani	Callisto Madavo
<i>Country Director:</i>	James P. Bond	Michael N. Sarris
<i>Sector Manager:</i>	Laura Frigenti	Nicholas Burnett
<i>Team Leader at ICR:</i>	Sajitha Bashir	Daniel Viens
<i>ICR Primary Author:</i>	Sajitha Bashir	

## 2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

*Outcome:* S  
*Sustainability:* L  
*Institutional Development Impact:* M  
*Bank Performance:* S  
*Borrower Performance:* S

*Quality at Entry:* QAG (if available) ICR  
U  
*Project at Risk at Any Time:* Yes

### 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

#### 3.1 Original Objective:

**Context:** The project, CRESED 2 (*Credit de Renforcement du Secteur de l' Enseignement – Education Sector Development Credit*) was prepared in 1997-98 to support the then government's National Education Improvement Program – 2 (PNAE 2 – *Programme Nationale pour l'Amelioration de l'Education 2*) covering all sub-sectors of the education. The project built on an earlier Bank project for primary education, CRESED 1, in particular drawing on the lessons of new initiatives introduced at mid-term, in community participation and devolving responsibilities to local levels, including schools. The PNAE-2 was prepared by the government with Bank assistance under CRESED 1 and based itself on a decentralized, school-based approach for primary and secondary education. As recorded in the PAD, the PNAE-2 was supported by all donors, who were expected to finance various sub-sectors to varying degrees. Although CRESED 2 covered all sub-sectors, except technical education (which was expected to be financed by a follow-up project to the existing Bank technical education project, PREFTEC), its main focus was on improving access and quality of primary education. At the time of preparation, Madagascar was under a Structural Adjustment program that put a freeze on additional recruitment of civil servants, including teachers.

The project was restructured after the mid-term review in 2001 due to slow disbursement and implementation problems associated with the original design; coverage of primary schools was substantially reduced, but most of the activities under the various components did not alter significantly.

A major change in the project's strategic approach occurred after the second restructuring in November 2002. This took place as part of the general portfolio restructuring in Madagascar, to respond to the conditions emerging from the political crisis of January-July 2002 following the December 2001 elections. During this period, the country operated with virtually two governments, GDP declined by about 15 percent in one year and there was much destruction of infrastructure. Increasing poverty and the lack of security forced parents to withdraw children from school; teachers were also not able to attend schools due to the disruption in transportation. After gaining international recognition, the new government presented its economic and social program to the donor community. Education was one of the main priorities, with the government seeking to establish its legitimacy vis-à-vis the population through immediate improvements in the conditions of primary schools and reducing the financial burden on parents. The Bank broadly endorsed this program and an Interim CAS, prepared in October 2002, outlined the Bank's intention to restructure projects, including the CRESED 2, to accelerate implementation of activities and increase disbursement to counteract the economic and social impacts of the crisis. The strategic focus of CRESED 2 changed to enable the government to carry out its immediate objectives vis-à-vis primary education in particular, to ensure the provision of key inputs to schools, to eliminate fees and prevent a fall in enrolment.

**Original Objective:** The overall objective of the project, as recorded in the Project Appraisal Document, was to support the Education Sector Program in producing more and better trained students at all levels of education at sustainable cost. The Development Credit Agreement stated the objective somewhat differently: “the objective of the project is to assist the borrower in its efforts to achieve universal access to primary education, support a gradual expansion and improvement of secondary education, and promote the modernization and diversification of higher education.”

The project objective of the PAD, which was used in the initial PSRs, was stated in general terms and did not differentiate between the relative importance to be given to the three sub sectors corresponding to the design. The objective in the DCA was more precisely formulated; however, it did not refer to improving

quality at the primary level, whereas as stated in the PAD and reflected in the project components, this was clearly intended to be a result. The DCA formulation with respect to the higher education objective was very broad as well.

The Project Development Objective (as stated in the DCA and used hereafter in this report) was consistent with (a) the Government's National Education Improvement Program – PNAE 2 (b) and the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Madagascar which was to promote human capital development in support of high growth and meaningful poverty reduction within a generation. However, the DO was not realistic especially in relation to secondary and higher education (given the design, as discussed later); moreover, the alternative formulations in the DCA and the PAD/PSRs reflected lack of clarity about expected outcomes.

### *3.2 Revised Objective:*

After the second Mid-Term Review (MTR) mission in May 2001, it was agreed that the DCA would be amended in two phases, though without a formal change in DO. The first amendment, approved by the Country Director, reduced the number of primary schools covered by almost 40 percent, which would have substantially affected the extent to which the project contributed to the objective of universalizing access at the primary level. Coverage was reduced due largely to the difficulties associated with the original strategy for building classrooms and the higher costs of construction proposed under the revised approach. The second amendment was to have taken place later in the year to include, after appraisal, a vocational/technical education and training component, which had been requested by the Borrower as the Bank had decided not to support vocational education with a follow-up project. Due to the political turmoil that engulfed the country subsequently, this amendment did not take place.

After the November 2002 restructuring, which was approved by the Board, the objective of the amended DCA read as follows: “The objective of the Project is to assist the Borrower in its efforts to achieve universal access to primary education, support a gradual expansion and improvement of general and technical secondary education, and contribute to the development of a strategy to modernize and diversify the higher education sub-sector.” The objective regarding primary education and more limited objective regarding secondary education remained relevant in the existing crisis conditions. The inclusion of vocational education was less justifiable given the implementation problems to date and the difficulties of implementing new strategies in a new sub-sector in the conditions after the crisis. The re-formulation of the objective regarding higher education was related to the fact that no additional donor financing had been secured and was therefore appropriate.

For ease of reference, the following terms are used to distinguish between the various phases of the project: Phase 1 (between January 1999 and April 2001 – implementation of original project design); Phase 2 (between May 2001 and November 2002 – post MTR) and Phase 3 (between December 2002 and March 2005 – generalization to whole country).

### *3.3 Original Components:*

**Component 1: universalize quality primary education by supporting community- and school-based projects aimed at improving access and learning outcomes in about 4,100 public schools (US \$37.0 million).** This was the most critical component in terms of achieving the development objective of the project, in decentralizing management and accountability to lower levels and encouraging responsiveness to local conditions. The two sub-components were; (a) technical/advisory services for recruitment, redeployment and professional development of teachers and (b) school sub-projects. The latter was expected to support (i) the preparation of *contrats programs* (school

contracts) in 41 out of 112 CISCOS (*Circonscriptions Scolaires* or educational districts); (ii) school-specific training of teachers based on local needs and (iii) construction/rehabilitation of rooms, using a variety of materials and methods, and furniture. The contracts were signed by communities, who agreed to contribute materials for construction and send children to schools, the government which would provide adequate teachers and school heads, who agreed to improve teaching; the project supplied inputs to schools with contracts. About 4,100 schools (out of 12,500) were expected to have *contrats programs*; 9,400 rooms were to be constructed/rehabilitated and furnished and 9,400 teachers and 4,100 heads trained.

**Component 2: improve access to quality secondary education in rural areas (US \$3.5 million).** The objective of this component was to support reform efforts by Government and to introduce innovations on a small scale. The three sub-components were: (a) development of a school map; (b) sensitization program for parents and policy measures to suppress double shift, increase the size of classes and partial redeployment of educational personnel and (c) school-based sub-projects. The last sub-component, in turn, comprised two activities: (i) provision of quality inputs to improve school management, teaching processes and staff development and (ii) construction and rehabilitation of classrooms, furniture and equipment. These were to be provided in 40 lower-secondary schools and 10 upper-secondary schools (out of 695 and 94, respectively), along the lines of the program planned for the primary schools. About 375 rooms were to be constructed/rehabilitated and furnished and 600 teachers and 50 heads trained.

**Component 3: improve access to quality textbooks and teaching-learning materials to all primary schools (US \$14 million).** The coverage of this component was nationwide and it was the single most important element contributing to the improvement of learning and primary education quality. The textbook: pupil ratio was expected to improve to 1:1 in all primary schools, from a baseline of approximately 1:2. This was to be done by: (i) preparation and distribution of new titles and teaching guides (ii) re-printing, purchasing and distribution of existing titles (iii) distribution of basic learning materials and (iv) in-service training to teachers. Two approaches were envisaged: the development of new titles through private authors and field trials, with the aim of building national capacity in editing; and the purchase and reprinting of existing textbooks. The PAD did not specify the language in which the books would be printed.

**Component 4: Institutional development for key functions in the Ministry of Secondary and Primary Education (US \$3 million).** Improvements in teacher recruitment and deployment, building capacity for conducting learning assessments, school mapping, annual reports, and workshops were to be a part of this program, to strengthen institutional capacity at the central and decentralized levels.

**Component 5: Support reform of higher education in assisting institutions to modernize and to diversify through financing sub-projects under a Fund for the Development of Higher Education (US \$5 million).** This component supported the creation of a Fund for Development of Higher Education (*Fonds d'Appui pour le Developpement de l'Enseignement Superieure* - FADES) to provide funding to projects submitted by institutions on a matching basis, with about 20 pre-projects (maximum: \$20,000) and 50 sub-projects (maximum: \$100,000). The Fund was expected to be financed by other donors as well.

**Component 6: Support to Project management at central, provincial/regional and local levels (US \$2.5 million).** This component comprised establishment of a project management unit to coordinate implementation of project-financed activities with ministry staff, with regular reports and evaluation of implementation progress. The PMU comprised a General Coordinator, assisted by heads of components for primary, secondary and higher education (represented by the FADES Executive Secretary).

The project components exemplified a "sector development" approach and were appropriate in terms of the sub-sectors covered in the DO, but the design was complex and the secondary and higher education components were not aligned with the stated objectives. The project involved two Ministries at the outset and all sub-sectors of education (except vocational); six components; new, participatory and demand-led approaches in all sub-sectors; moving the locus of decision-making to individual schools resulting in thousands of sub-projects; decentralized management by district authorities with no prior experience for construction and training combined; building national capacity in developing textbooks; introduction of difficult concomitant reforms in relation to the recruitment and deployment of teachers; and the need to reconcile the participatory approaches with Bank procedures for procurement. The secondary education component was clearly a pilot and could not have contributed significantly to expanding access. The design of the higher education component, focusing on a large number of sub-projects prepared by individual academics, was not linked to the realization of the stated objective of reforming the system. The concept of the respective roles of the PMU and the Ministry were poorly defined with a lot of overlap between PMU and the Ministry Line Staff. Taken together, these constituted significant risk factors added to which was the weak implementation capacity of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, noted in the ICR for CRESED 1, and the untested implementation capacity of the Ministry of Higher Education. Finally, the expectation that the project would contribute to an overall program was unrealistic without firm donor commitments.

#### *3.4 Revised Components:*

##### After Mid-Term Review (May 2001):

The project components did not change but targets were revised downwards in the DCA from the targets listed above, as follows: in primary education – 2,500 schools with *contrats programs*, construction/rehabilitation of 5000 rooms and training of 5,000 teachers and 2,500 heads; in secondary education – construction/rehabilitation of 350 rooms and training for 350 teachers and 50 heads; in textbooks – to printing, purchasing and distribution of 6.2 million textbooks for primary and secondary schools. Construction of primary classrooms affected by the 2000 cyclone (in schools without *contrats programs*) was included and the community contribution eliminated. The reasons for reduced physical targets were the implementation problems and higher unit costs of construction resulting from the decision to eliminate beneficiary contributions and build all schools to anti-cyclonic standards. As part of the textbook component, it was agreed to finance purchase of 9th grade secondary mathematics books (which could not be completed under CRESED 1).

##### November 2002 restructuring:

**Component 1:** The original sub-components were retained but due to the nation wide coverage, references to numbers were dropped. Two new activities were added with nationwide coverage under school sub-projects: (a) provision of nutritional supplements to students in the three lowest grades of primary school to improve learning by combating attention deficiency and (b) providing grants to channel funds to primary schools against "*contrats pedagogiques*" signed by school administrators; these grants offset the abolition of pupil fees and were to be used for school supplies. The decentralized approach of school contracts was abandoned, and no further construction/rehabilitation or supply of furniture was envisaged. The justifications for this new approach were to ensure nationwide coverage, improve access by eliminating economic barriers for the poor, which comprised 75 percent of the population (Interim CAS) and allow construction to be taken up by a specialized technical agency (Social Fund of the Bank – FID), given the limited capacity of the Ministry of Education.

**Component 2:** A third sub-component on school pedagogic grants was introduced which were confined to

the original target schools; vocational education was not included as a separate activity but was meant to be covered under the sub-projects. Vocational/technical schools were expected to provide proposals for construction, rehabilitation, equipment and grants for new/modified courses based on “local employment demand”. The amendment also deleted the specific reference to redeployment of higher secondary teachers to lower secondary schools etc, to a general “partial redeployment of educational personnel”.

**Component 3:** References to specific figures were removed to enable the Ministry to provide the number of books and guides as required by current enrolment. The project also financed the printing of and some reference books to all secondary schools in Phase 3.

**Component 4:** Coverage was extended to all CISCOS in the country and to the Ministry of Higher Education.; both the CISCOS and the lower level education offices (*Zone d'Appui Pédagogique – ZAPs*) were to be strengthened.

**Component 5:** In addition to the sub-projects, which continued to be the main approach for higher education, the amendment provided for technical advisory services, materials and equipment to support the Master Plan for higher education.

The restructuring of components 1, 3 and 4 was consistent with the strategic focus on increasing access to primary education, creating the basic conditions for learning in primary schools and strengthening the capacity of the lower level administrative offices. While the name of component 1 (Universalizing Quality Primary Education) was retained, the emphasis was clearly on universalizing access rather than improving quality, which was appropriate given the conditions at the time. Although the inclusion of vocational education was justified from an overall sector perspective, the design did not specifically take into account the conclusions of the Bank’s education sector study which had been completed in 2002 (Education and Training in Madagascar). In higher education, although the objective had been correctly revised, the approach of the component remained essentially the same as before and, as discussed later, could not have led to the development of a strategy.

### *3.5 Quality at Entry:*

The project was not assessed by QAG. The quality at entry is rated as unsatisfactory using current criteria and for the following reasons: (i) the Bank’s ESW of 1995, focused on primary and secondary education but there was no analytical work covering higher education; (ii) procedures for approving and financing school sub-projects were not designed and tested in advance with the participation of implementing agencies and beneficiaries (iii) the costing of construction/rehabilitation was based on untested assumptions about expected community contributions (iv) capacity building needs at the CISCO level or at the Ministry level of managing a large decentralized program were not identified, as is reflected in the lack of clarity in the component relating to institutional development and (v) the economic analysis did not inform the design of project components (vi) performance indicators used in the PSRs were different from those in the PAD; both sets of indicators were designed for the national program and were not specifically attributable to the project; in addition, there were no specific indicators for learning outcomes at the primary level and (vii) a system of monitoring and evaluation was not set up; while learning assessments were mentioned, the PAD did not indicate when and by whom they would be done.

Lessons from earlier projects were not appropriately adapted to the project design. As stated in the PAD, the *contrat program* reflected lessons learned from CRESED 1 in community participation and devolving responsibilities to local levels through the PRAGAP (*Programme de Renforcement et de l'Amélioration de la Gestion Administrative et Pédagogique*), which was tried out in 20 CISCOS. However, this approach,

based on a traditional Malagasy concept of an agreement between various parties to contribute directly in kind to a school, differed in essence from the approach adopted in CRESED 2: under PRAGAP, the project supplied materials and the communities built rooms, whereas under CRESED 2, enterprises were hired by the project and communities were expected to make contributions in kind or labor. Similarly, lessons learnt from the IDA-financed vocational education project (PREFTEC) in administering a training fund provided the basis for the design of the higher education component, but experience from other higher education projects with competitive fund components was not taken account.

In particular, two aspects of the project design related to critical policy issues that were not adequately addressed: (i) reform of teacher management - there was no commitment from the Ministry of Finance for the recruitment of additional teachers, although it was included in the PNAE II and discussed with the IMF and Bank macro-economic teams (according to the TTL responsible for appraisal). No plan for the redeployment of teachers had been agreed with the Ministry of Education and given political realities, this would have proved difficult; (ii) there was no effective dialogue on the issue of language of instruction at the primary level, despite the fact that Malagasy was, and continues to be, the effective language of instruction used in most classrooms and the wealth of evidence regarding the benefits of using instruction in the maternal language. At the time of project preparation, the intention was to re-print existing Malagasy textbooks for grades 1-2 and develop new books in Malagasy for grades 3-5. This was changed to include new textbooks in French due to a last minute request by the government during negotiations (despite its significance, the change was not noted in the minutes of negotiations). As explained to the ICR team by the TTL at the time of appraisal, this was a politically sensitive issue; the official language of instruction was French after grade 2, various donors had different perspectives, and the Bank took a neutral position, focusing on the national technical capacity to develop books.

#### **4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs**

##### *4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:*

Overall, the achievement of the development outcome is considered moderately satisfactory. This rating is based largely on the satisfactory outcomes of improving access to and ameliorating the teaching-learning conditions in primary schools (which accounted for about 60% of the utilized credit) after the November 2002 restructuring (when 70 percent of the credit was disbursed). Since the project objective and key associated outcome targets as well as the project approach were formally revised, the project outcome has been assessed against both original and revised project targets to arrive at the overall rating.

##### Performance from January 1999 to November 2002:

With no indicators that were attributable to project performance in this period, only the level of project activities provide a gauge of performance during this period. Only 12 percent of the credit had disbursed up to MTR and 30% by end of 2002. In Phase 1, the number of *contrat programs* signed at both primary and secondary level and rooms constructed were too small to contribute to access or build school level management capacity. Policy goals regarding primary and secondary education were also not met, since there was no redeployment of teachers at either level. Very few higher education sub-projects had been approved. Performance is rated unsatisfactory in Phase 1. In Phase 2, there was an increase in the pace of activities related to improving access and learning conditions in primary education: almost 1,200 schools contracts were signed in about 10 months, though there were still delays in construction, and 1.8 million Malagasy textbooks were re-printed and distributed. In addition, 33 higher education projects were approved and under implementation against an MTR target of 35. Performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory in Phase 2.

Overall, the assessment of performance against the PDO during this period is rated moderately unsatisfactory.

#### Performance during the period December 2002 - March 2005

Performance in this period is judged on the basis of new agreed indicators (upper half of Annex 1).

The most significant change was in the vastly increased numbers of children who enrolled in primary schools – from 2.4 million in 2001-02 to over 3.2 million in 2004-05. Children from poor families contributed in large part to these increases. According to the official education statistics, the primary NER rose to 97% in 2004-05, against a target of 75%. However, there are some doubts whether the NER is as high as this and other survey data indicate lower figures (between 75-90 percent). The ICR mission noted that about 25 percent of children were over-age in the schools visited. Government and project officials have explained that many children aged 8-10 years had returned to school (or joined for the first time) since 2002 and this can contribute to instability in the NER estimates. These caveats notwithstanding, the target NER of 75% seems to have been reached or surpassed.

The project target of reducing the primary repetition rate to below 5 percent was not achieved. Given the high repetition rate in Madagascar of above 30 percent (one of the highest in sub-Saharan African which had persisted for decades), this target was unrealistic for a time frame of 1-2 years. It was included in the performance indicators in order to focus on one of the big sources of inefficiency in the system. Due to continued policy dialogue undertaken by the Bank and donors, the repetition rate fell to 20 percent in 2003-04, as a result of government directives to introduce automatic promotion within cycles of the primary stage; with continued adherence to this policy, the repetition rate is expected to gradually decline to about 8 percent over the next few years, which would be a significant achievement.

The restructured project did not include an indicator for learning outcomes; although the project supplied a significant amount of books and learning materials (accounting for 31 percent of the credit); almost all of this happened after the restructuring and could not be expected to contribute to detectable improvements in learning over the remaining project life. The project financed a survey in 2003 conducted by Cornell University (*Etude sur la Progression Scolaire et la Performance Academique en Madagascar – EPSM*) to enable a comparison with the results from the PASEC (*Programme d'Analyse des Systemes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN*) survey conducted in 1998 for grade 2 and grade 5 children. These results show that there was no improvement in average scores for French and mathematics in class 2, while there was deterioration in performance in class 5, especially substantial in French; the reasons for this have not been analyzed.

At the secondary level, there was no improvement in the GER (for *colleges* and *lycees* – lower and upper secondary level, respectively – taken together): in 2003-04, it remained at the baseline figure of 19, against a target of 25. The pass rate in the Baccalaureat examination was 33% in 2004 against a target of 35% and baseline of 30%. The main difficulty with these indicators is that they cannot be attributed mainly to the limited project activities.

No specific indicator was set for the revised higher education objective. In 2004, a Master Plan for higher education was written by a small committee of the FADES; this is a fairly general document that does not address the key structural and financing issues identified in the PAD, the Bank's 2002 ESW or other studies. Some workshops and studies had been conducted, but up to the time of the ICR mission, there was no evidence of systematic work, or effort to use the sub-projects, to develop a strategy for reform of higher education.

In this phase, the achievement of project outcomes is considered moderately satisfactory, largely due to the tremendous quantitative impact on primary enrolments and the improvement of teaching-learning conditions, achieved in the very difficult circumstances after the crisis and within a relatively short time frame.

#### *4.2 Outputs by components:*

##### *Universalize quality primary education*

#### Achievements in Phases 1 and 2

**Recruitment, redeployment and professional development of teachers.** Results were limited in Phases 1 and 2 due to the general ban on recruitment of civil servants that was in place as part of the structural adjustment program. Recruitment (to be paid out of the government budget) and redeployment of teachers was considered pivotal to the success of the *contrats programs*, but only 600 teachers had been hired until April 2000 in the project CISCOS against a cumulative target of 8,000 additional teachers for the project period. A more favorable environment was created with the HIPC process, initiated in 2001. Between 2001 and 2003, about 3,500 teachers were and another 8000 FRAM teachers (paid by parents' associations) were provided subsidies. No redeployment or professional development of teachers took place.

**School-based sub-projects.** The impact of the three interlinked activities of this sub-component on improving access, quality, decentralized management and adaptation to local needs was relatively limited. There is evidence, however, that the approach, where implemented by the CISCOS with considerable mobilization efforts, elicited a positive response and high expectations among communities, with a large number of proposals being submitted by schools in the first year. However, there were considerable delays in signing contracts (especially at the Ministry level). The contracts did not become a tool for improving school functioning but were used mainly as a method of accessing project funds for construction. There has been no assessment or systematic classroom observation about the relatively limited teacher training provided by local pedagogic teams during phase 1. Since training was expected to be school-specific, no over-arching training strategy was developed. Construction activities were very slow to start because there were few signed school contracts and therefore contributed little to improving access; in fact, about 40 percent of the rooms were completed only after 2002. The quality of the classrooms constructed is rated satisfactory, resistant to all types of weather and even generally to cyclones, according to a recent study completed for the ICR. Contrary to original project expectations, almost all classrooms built under the *contrats program* were of the same type with little use of local materials, with an average unit cost of \$ 7000, whereas the PAD had envisaged the majority of rooms to be built with semi-durable or traditional materials with an average cost of \$ 5000 and \$ 2500, respectively. The unit cost of rooms built after 2001 was significantly higher – closer to US \$ 10,000. Quantitative achievements were limited: only 419 *contrats programs* were signed by the end of 2000 and a total of 1,605 contracts by the end of 2001; only 1,164 teachers were trained (less than 10 % of the target for teachers/heads). Under the *contrats programs*, 556 new rooms were built and 666 rehabilitations undertaken, against a target of 1,415 and 8,016 respectively. Construction of new rooms continued after the MTR, when management was taken up by the Central Ministry, but no new rehabilitations were taken up, resulting in a total of 1406 new rooms were built (close to the original target). 1,118 schools were equipped with furniture, about one-quarter of the targets indicated in the PAD.

#### Achievements in Phase 3

**Recruitment, redeployment and professional development of teachers:** In 2004, about 1,900 new primary teachers were recruited and 12,000 FRAM teachers received subsidies thanks to additional budgetary support through the PRSC and from other donors. However, there has been very limited success in redeploying teachers. Thus, despite the increase in the teaching force, the overall imbalances in pupil-teacher ratio across regions and the average high pupil-teacher ratio noted at the beginning of the project persist. Efforts are now being made to recruit new teachers to specific schools on a contractual basis. The training of teachers in use of the new textbooks, originally included in Component 3, was financed under the first sub-component (discussed later). The only other significant training was that given to over 4,000 teachers of private schools. There is no evidence about the quality of this training.

**School-based sub-projects.** Of the two new sub-components added here, provision of school pedagogic grants (*caisses ecole*) proved the most successful and one of the best achievements of the project. In particular, it reduced the financial burden on the poor. The abolition of school fees was part of the policy dialogue between the Bank and the government and the project contributed to it through the means of these grants. These grants were provided to over 90 percent of primary schools (15,412 government and 4,738 private schools) in the academic year 2003-04. The grants were released against *contrats pedagogiques*, which contained an undertaking by schools to use them for teaching-learning materials. An expenditure tracking survey done by the Bank showed that over 90 percent of the funds had reached the schools. The sub-component related to the provision of nutritional supplements did not move beyond a pilot stage. Initial plans involved the supply of milk or, alternatively, nutritional biscuits to all primary schools, both of which proved logistically and financially unviable. Two pilot activities – the first, through the provision of cooked food in schools and second, through the provision of biscuits - were tried out in 2003 in 28 schools each for two weeks. Difficulties associated with manufacture and distribution, as well as the costs of generalization were identified. However, no decision was taken and there appears to have been no further discussion on the strategy for school nutrition, regarding targeting and technical aspects.

Overall, the achievements under this component are rated moderately satisfactory, due to the success of the school pedagogic grants in boosting enrolment and additional teacher recruitment.

*Improve access to quality secondary education in rural areas.*

**Development of a school map.** No tangible results are visible from any phase. A strategy for the expansion and development of secondary education has not been developed and there is no evidence that school mapping has determined investment priorities or the allocation of resources.

**Sensitization program for parents and policy measures to suppress double shift, increase the size of classes and partial redeployment of educational personnel** The activities under the second sub-component were not clear; project officials told the ICR mission that double shift had not existed at the secondary level. Systematic efforts to increase class sizes (in order to reduce costs and improve efficiency) have not been undertaken, nor has there been redeployment of underqualified teachers from upper secondary to lower secondary and from lower secondary to primary level.

**School-based sub-projects.** In Phases 1 and 2 of the project, the sub-component on school sub-projects produced some results in terms of eliciting parental contributions, activating school managements and participation and providing training to teachers in 58 schools with *contrats programs*. An innovative approach was followed with the formation of subject-specific pedagogical teams (comprising 200 trainers) which provided on-site training, using simple pedagogical materials and evaluation exercises, tailored to the needs of each school and teachers who were teaching subjects outside their specialization. The construction program was more successful than in primary education, perhaps because of the limited coverage and

because parents, being from richer sections, could make the required contributions: 163 new rooms were constructed (target: 188) and 299 rehabilitated (target 108). Some laboratories were also constructed in Phase 1. These turned out to be completely dysfunctional, both because of their lay out and because no provision had been made for the recurrent expenditures associated with their utilization.

In Phase 3, the additional activities included did not produce results that were related to the project objectives. School pedagogic grants were of limited coverage and provided only to the 58 schools with *contrats programs*; since fees were not abolished at the secondary level, they did not directly contribute to increasing access and were instead intended to improve school functioning. There has been no monitoring of the use of the grants. Close to 2,000 teachers in private schools were also trained.

The results of activities related to vocational education are even less promising. About 20 institutions (vocational schools and technical schools) received project financing, based on proposals developed after consultation with local enterprises. Most of the equipment arrived after project closing (around June 2005) and most of the new courses had not started at the time of the ICR mission. In many cases, the equipment supplied did not match the original requests, as the lists supplied by institutions were later standardized at the centre. For many of the new programs in continuing vocational training for the informal sector, there would be insufficient trainees with the capacity to pay. The proposals do not suggest how to improve institutional problems related to poor internal efficiency (many institutions graduate just 3-5 graduates each year in each stream, with high rates of repetition and drop out), the fragmentation of courses, high unit costs and outmoded courses.

Overall, the component is rated moderately unsatisfactory.

#### *Improve access to quality textbooks and teaching-learning materials*

In purely quantitative terms, the project achieved a tremendous increase in textbook availability, moving to a ratio of 0.86 books per pupil (in each subject) in 2004-05 and making books available in all schools, compared to a situation where many schools were without any books. The books were provided free and hence, poor children in rural areas had access to a variety of textual materials for the first time. About 9.47 million primary textbooks were distributed. Thirteen new titles in French (mathematics, language, geography and general knowledge) and fourteen accompanying teacher guides were produced; a total of 4.9 million pupil books and 240,000 guides were distributed in 2003-04. Twenty titles in Malagasy (mathematics, language, geography and general knowledge) and one in French language were re-printed and distributed at the end of 2001; a total of 2.17 million books were re-printed and distributed. The current book: pupil ratio for French textbooks (0.9) is higher than for Malagasy textbooks (0.7) because the latter were printed when enrolments were lower. The layout of most textbooks is clear, with attractive illustrations. The physical quality of the textbooks is good and since they are kept at school, they can be expected to last 5 years. An important achievement of the project is that the Ministry of Education has exclusive copyrights of 20 titles (new and existing titles) and films are held at the Ministry for re-printing. All teachers (57,000 in public and private schools) were provided two rounds of training.

The component did not realize the original objective of developing national capacity for editing and publishing. In fact, the institution that existed to develop books, *Unite d' Etudes et Recherches Pedagogiques, UERP*, and created under CRESED 1, did not play an active role in preparing new textbooks and was disbanded by the new government in 2003. The task of development of curricula and teaching-learning materials was entrusted to a newly created Direction de l'éducation fondamentale, but the Direction has not played an active role so far.

The quality of the new French titles and guides and whether they are appropriate for classroom needs has not been evaluated. The new books are considered by Malagasy educators to be much better than the earlier French language textbooks. Private schools, which teach in French, are especially appreciative. The content of the textbooks is in keeping with the curriculum, but given the limited proficiency of children in French in public schools, much of the content of the books is not age-appropriate. According to the Ministry's evaluation report, about 70 percent of teachers thought that students only partially understood or could not comprehend at all the expressions used in the books. About two-thirds of teachers felt that the books corresponded relatively little or not at all to the children's environment, especially in rural areas. The mathematics series contains several conceptual errors, including an explanation that numbers can only be subtracted from larger numbers. The methodological approaches in the teacher guides are frequently inconsistent with the active learning methods espoused by the government—calling explicitly for recitation and rote memory, for instance, rather than more active, child-friendly approaches to learning. Many of these issues arise from the implementation problems in Phases 1 and 2 and the accelerated procedures in Phase 3, which eliminated field trialing and compressed the time for development of books (discussed more in the section on factors affecting implementation).

The training provided to teachers on the new books was more in the nature of a preliminary orientation and did not focus sufficiently either on the content or the new pedagogical methods, due to the cascade model adopted to ensure coverage in a short time. Despite the favorable national availability indicators, the actual availability of textbooks in schools varies from 1:1 to 1:3, due to problems of estimating pupil numbers and organizing timely distribution to CISCOS and within CISCOS. A computerized distribution and inventory management system had been envisaged to ensure the stocking and tracking of books at CISCO/school levels, but this is only partially operational due to the changes in project management at the start of the project and the difficulty of obtaining accurate data from the schools and CISCOS.

The component is rated as moderately satisfactory despite these shortcomings, as it contributed to the strategic objective of increasing primary enrolments at a critical time and created more favorable conditions for pupil learning compared to a situation where most children were without any learning materials.

#### *Institutional development for key functions in the Ministries of Education*

In Phases 1 and 2, performance was unsatisfactory because there was lack of clarity about what was intended and possible under this component. Intermittent, disconnected and, overall, relatively few activities were undertaken between 1999-2002, covering studies, micro-planning, workshops and school mapping; of these, the most important were a number of sub-sectoral studies in 2002 after the completion of the Bank's ESW on education, but which do not seem to have been used subsequently.

A new orientation was given after the November 2002 restructuring with the decision to strengthen the capacity of all CISCOS and ZAPs to better manage primary education. The most significant outputs were (a) the equipping of 112 CISCOS with vehicles and computers and 1600 ZAPs with motorcycles and typewriters (b) a large number of studies relating to planning and management done by international and some local consultants and (c) recruitment of new CISCO chiefs in 2003 on the basis of contracts and their regular evaluation and (d) development of a new EFA plan and strategies, which was presented to donors in October 2003. The training of Ministry staff continued to be sporadic and not well planned. Ministry staff were trained to conduct learning assessments and participated in the survey conducted by Cornell mentioned earlier. CISCO staff were also trained in the use of computers, but many other training programs were disparate. The ICR mission saw basic 3-year institutional development plans in CISCOS, which indicated objectives and lists of activities without resources. Studies on human resource management, financial management and the functional re-organisation of the Ministry (after the merger of

the three Ministries in early 2004) were undertaken right at the end of the project and could be utilized in the future. Many of these activities occurred too late in the project for their impact to be visible by the closing date. Overall, the component is rated moderately satisfactory due to the contributions it made to strengthen the management of primary education and its new strategic orientation.

#### *Support reform of higher education*

**Support for policies, measures and activities to modernize and diversify higher education.** A few studies were done but specific policies or measures were not developed. This sub-component could conceivably have financed higher education regulatory or support institutions.

**Establishment of Fund for the Development of Higher Education to finance sub-projects.** The ICR mission noted that there were a number of excellent individual sub-projects (of which there were 131, in considerable excess of the target) and that many had made important contributions to capacity building at the level of each institution, to student and staff training, development of research skills, and links between institutions in Madagascar and with tertiary institutions abroad. An International Panel of experts was expected to be financed by various donors; this met at least once a year until 2003, with members from several different countries including Germany, Italy, France, Great Britain, and the US, and seems to have been useful in giving advice, helping resolve early problems of project requirements and encouraging modification of the project. It did not meet subsequently because of lack of commitment by other donors.

The sub-projects did not promote diversification of higher education in a meaningful way, for example, by promoting private or non-university institutions, by introducing new types of courses, or by generating alternatives for resources (private sector or reform of student finance). About 60% of the projects went to the University of Antananarivo (in Phase 1, almost exclusively so); only 2% to private institutions. 40% of the projects went for capacity building (equipment and materials for the institution), 34% for applied research and 16% for training, the remainder for social and economic topics – but there was no focused attention on modernizing curricula or introducing new courses. In Phase 3 of the project, the design of the sub-component was not changed to deliberately contribute to the new objective of development of a strategy for higher education. Only at the very end of the project were some efforts focused on more general themes related to overall planning and change in higher education – one of which, *Note sur les Orientations Strategiques de la Reforme du sous secteur Enseignement Superieur*, the ICR mission team saw only in draft form. A final version including a budget was only received on 21 July 2005 after the ICR mission, but has not been discussed with the Ministry. Another study on the labor market had not been completed at the time of the ICR mission.

The performance of the component is considered moderately satisfactory because of the quality of the sub-projects; however, due to the design and implementation mechanisms, it did not contribute to realizing either the original or the revised purported objective.

#### *4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:*

Two components/sub-components were highly cost-effective in primary education: (i) the *caisses ecoles* (school grants), which offset the fall in school receipts due to the abolition of pupil fees, involved an expenditure of \$ 1.46 per pupil, and contributed to the rise in enrolment of almost 0.8 million. (ii) textbooks and learning materials, provided at a per pupil cost of approximately \$ 6 resulting in a very low annualized cost over life-time of 5 years. This assumes that the books were of appropriate quality and will contribute to improving student outcomes (reducing repetition, improving learning). The sub-components relating to construction and furniture in primary education were relatively expensive, with an estimated per pupil investment of \$ 96; the annualized cost would depend on the quality of construction.

While the average per pupil expenditure by the project on primary and secondary education was reasonable compared to prevailing unit recurrent costs, that on vocational education was high – about \$ 70 per pupil in vocational, compared to \$ 20 in primary and \$ 22 in secondary education. This is questionable especially if the project did not improve the efficiency of the vocational sub-sector, which already has high recurrent costs (US \$ 270 compared to \$ 70 for general secondary education) and poor student outcomes.

The recurrent expenditures arising from rise in enrolments (mostly on salaries of additional teachers) are expected to be fiscally sustainable if the government allocates a higher share of its budget to education and there is continued donor commitment to primary education.

#### *4.4 Financial rate of return:*

Not applicable.

#### *4.5 Institutional development impact:*

The CRESED 2 had a significant institutional impact in primary education and less so in secondary, vocational and higher education. This is reflected mainly in the development of a coherent strategy for EFA with a medium-term plan and expenditure framework, which is being monitored and updated regularly. On the other hand, the project does not appear to have generated new strategic thinking or approaches for the other sub-sectors. The impact on primary education is understandable given the emphasis of the project on this sub-sector (components 1, 3 and 4). A small core of project managers and Ministry staff has been created, with the capacity to plan and implement new strategies and approaches in primary education on a country-wide basis. There is evidence of new thinking regarding the use of Malagasy as the language of instruction to improve educational quality, although no policy decisions have been taken as yet. An important contribution of the policy dialogue, conducted through the project with the new government, is the merging of the three Ministries which has created the conditions for developing a more holistic sector development perspective

## **5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome**

### *5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:*

The political crisis brought implementation to a virtual halt for nine months, and together with delays in completing construction activity initiated before the crisis, led to two extensions of the project closing date. Two major cyclones (in 2000 and 2003) affected the construction program. The delivery of re-printed Malagasy textbooks was delayed as the paper quality of the books supplied was inferior to that stipulated in the contract.

### *5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:*

The failure to deposit counterpart funds and to appoint teachers according to the national program were the main reasons for twice postponing the effectiveness date, leading to a delay of almost one year in the launch of the project. Although these conditions relate to the overall design and quality at entry, as discussed earlier, the supervision reports do not suggest that there was urgency on the part of the government to resolve these issues once they had been identified as stumbling blocks.

The project management unit was not fully staffed in the first year. At the end of the first year, the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education dismissed the Project Coordinator and the coordinator for Primary Education. The project remained without leadership for one year because of disagreements between the Ministry and the Bank. As described by the then TTL, the Bank did not give a non-objection for hiring civil servants in the project management unit since this was against the rules; on the other hand, the Ministry argued that it was unreasonable to expect civil servants to resign their jobs to take up their appointment. An

acceptable solution was found only at the MTR, after which new appointments were made.

Difficulties associated with decentralized management of construction in Phase 1 undermined the *contrat program* as well as decentralized management by the CISCOS and, hence, the core of the design of the original project. The envelope given by the CISCOS did not take into account differences in costs arising from remoteness and the difficulty of the terrain, leading to paucity of funds for the enterprises. The small size of the enterprises also led to delays due to lack of sufficient workers and working capital, according to the study done for the ICR. Community contributions were particularly problematic: they often did not match the technical specifications laid down by the contracted enterprise, were not delivered at the required time and were onerous, representing 25-30% of the cost of construction according to estimates of some CISCOS.

In Phases 1 and 2, government decisions regarding the process of textbook development underwent arbitrary changes. The efforts to purchase existing titles of textbooks in French (from other francophone African countries) did not succeed, mainly due to the difficulties of obtaining copyright for re-printing. An alternative approach, to develop and publish new titles with technical specifications through ICB, was agreed with the Bank after the MTR in 2001. Field trialing was also abandoned in order to reduce the time for the development of books. The process of selecting the publishers was not found acceptable to the Bank, since the Ministry appointed overruled the selection of a first committee, appointed a second committee and accepted the recommendations of the latter. With the intervening political crisis, a decision was delayed.

Under the new government, in 2002, an accelerated ICB process was agreed with the Bank in order to fulfill the new President's declared priority of ensuring that books reached schools within two months. The Ministry decided to take the average of the scores given by the two committees in 2001 and awarded the contract accordingly. As the approach was the same as in 2001, no field trialing was envisaged but publishers were required to use Malagasy authors and a few school teachers were also sent to Paris to review the content; however, the time was clearly insufficient to ensure that the materials were pedagogically appropriate. Despite the accelerated procedures, the books could not be delivered within two months; they were flown in at a cost of half a million dollars at the request of the President, to ensure that they arrived before the end of the academic year 2002-03.

Taken together, these factors (together with the delay in printing Malagasy textbooks) meant that the outputs of one of the main project components, with the most significant impact on quality, arrived very late and effective teacher training could not be conducted.

Although the new government speeded up procurement of textbooks, procurement delays continued in the supply of equipment for vocational/technical schools, much of which arrived after the project closing date. The ICR mission was told that the authorization from the Central Procurement Commission took up to one year.

### *5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:*

The project management unit, BCP, was responsible for developing procedures for the *contrats program* for primary and secondary education; in the case of higher education, the responsibility lay with the FADES council. In the initial phase, the procedures developed for the primary, secondary and higher education sub-projects were extremely cumbersome, contrary to the spirit of decentralization and the demand-led approach.

The process of procuring equipment for technical and vocational schools developed by the Ministry and the

project management unit proved counterproductive. The approach was meant to be responsive to local needs; however, requests from individual institutions were consolidated and, in many cases, standardized for the purpose of procurement. Equipment finally delivered to the institutions did not match the original requirements, as observed by the ICR mission and reported in the interviews. By contrast, the procurement process for higher education was much more successful, because the individual researchers were involved in both stipulating and receiving the equipment.

#### *5.4 Costs and financing:*

Total program costs were estimated to be US \$ 183 million, of which IDA financed US \$ 65 million through CRESED II, the government was to provide \$ 23 million, other donors \$ 85 million and communities \$ 10 million. Other donor financing was not channeled to the program. The PAD showed the procurement arrangements for the total program and the IDA credit, but not for the project cost (Annex 2: Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements- appraisal estimate).

The latest estimates indicate that a total of US \$ 70.63 million had been disbursed, with IDA disbursements amounting to US \$62.45 million (95 percent of the total Credit). This was achieved after two extensions of the closing date which was two years later than anticipated. Disbursements were very slow in the first two years and while they started picking up after the MTR, they became much more rapid after the December 2002 restructuring due to generalization of activities to the whole country and the inclusion of many new activities. Depreciation of the Malagasy franc in 2002 -2004 partly explains the relatively small undisbursed component.

The primary education component received only 51 % of the original IDA allocation at the time of closing and this was due mainly to the elimination of construction after the November 2002 restructuring. Other components related to primary education received proportionately more; the textbook component received 36 percent more mainly due to the provision of school kits to all primary pupils and the jump in primary enrolment; institutional development received 164 percent more mainly due to the supply of jeeps, vehicles and other equipment to all CISCOS and ZAPs. These changes were in line with the main focus of the restructured project on supplying critical inputs. On the other hand, the components that did not contribute significantly to the overall objectives also spent more than anticipated. Secondary education received 71 percent more than the original allocation due to the inclusion of vocational/technical education and the higher cost of construction and the expenditure for higher education was almost 50 percent higher due to the \$ 2 million additional allocation agreed at the MTR.

These changes are reflected in the composition by category of expenditure. The expenditure from the credit on civil works was only US \$ 15 million against a target of US \$ 24 million; on furniture, equipment and vehicles, it was US \$ 5 million against a target of US \$ 8.4 million (the original allocation was meant mostly for primary schools; the actual expenditure includes that for the CISCOS). Training also received less than originally allocated. Expenditure on textbooks and learning materials and on higher education was significantly higher than anticipated.

## **6. Sustainability**

### *6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:*

The gains in primary education are highly likely to be sustained as are those relating to the modest increase in enrolment that could be attributed to project activities in secondary education; however, the achievements with respect to quality improvement in secondary and vocational education, as well as in higher education are unlikely to be sustained. Given the preponderance of primary education in the credit, overall sustainability is considered likely.

Strong government commitment to primary education, continuing donor support through budgetary support programs that have increased allocations for the sub-sector as well as the institutional development factors mentioned earlier contribute to making the gains in primary enrolment largely irreversible. The continuity of the project management staff in the EFA implementation structures also ensures that the capacity built by the project will be utilized. The main threats to sustainability arises from (i) the still nascent technical and management capacity of the Ministry and (ii) fiscal vulnerability which could jeopardize the hiring of new teachers (civil servants and community teachers) or the continued provision of the school grants and thus raise the burden for poor parents. Based on the experience of 2004-05, when the operating/incremental non-personnel recurrent costs of the primary education component of the project were expected to be absorbed by the budget, the availability of timely funds for textbooks, *kits scolaires*, school grants and operating costs of vehicles is still an issue that can compromise the effectiveness of project investments. Only half the schools were provided the grants through the government budget due to difficulties in payments by the Treasury. These developments reflect the weaknesses in the general budget preparation and execution procedures of the government and continued shortfalls in domestic revenues. However, donor support for primary education has increased through the grant of US \$10 million from the Catalytic Fund of the EFA-Fast Track Initiative in 2005, and another US \$25 million in 2006; other donors have also indicated fresh commitments.

In secondary education, the gains in enrolment due to the construction and rehabilitation of schools are also likely to be sustainable, with parents participating in hiring additional community-financed teachers; the limited pedagogical innovations are less likely to be sustained. In vocational education, the intended achievements are unlikely to be realized due to the financial unviability of many programs, especially in the *colleges professionnels*. Some of the higher education projects continue to function after project closing, especially those involved in upgrading tertiary education programs: most of the research projects are unlikely to continue due to lack of continued financing from other sources.

#### *6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:*

The responsibilities for management of the primary education component have been taken up by the Ministry in the context of the normal budget. Immediately after project closing, as part of the efforts by the government to join the EFA-Fast Track Initiative and access funds from the Catalytic Fund of the FTI, the government prepared plans to put in place a technical support group for the Ministry which will provide technical and management assistance. This group will enable the Ministry to utilize additional funds made available from all donors and will be a mechanism for operationalising donor coordination and improving synergies with the budget. UNICEF and AFD agreed to provide financing for this technical support group for a 3 month interim period. All the goods acquired during the project life are being transferred to the MENRS with a detailed inventory, along with the technical files relating to the sub-projects (of all sub-sectors), studies, films of textbooks materials etc. Furniture, equipment and vehicles acquired for project management will be used by the technical support group for primary education. While goods acquired for other sub-sectors have also been transferred to the Ministry, the arrangements for managing the projects in these sub-sectors have not been defined.

## **7. Bank and Borrower Performance**

### ***Bank***

#### *7.1 Lending:*

The Bank's performance during the preparation phase is considered unsatisfactory and most of the design flaws have been discussed in the section on Quality at Entry.

Preparation assistance did not focus sufficiently on ensuring that the project was ready for implementation.

Discussion with implementation agencies, such as the CISCOs, at the time of preparation by the appraisal team seems to have been lacking. The work load and time associated with the processing of each *contrat program* was not assessed nor the logistical difficulties of combining community contributions with the enterprises. In higher education, the insistence on cumbersome procedures and a large number of prior conditions - a high level of individual contributions, securing of international and private sector partnerships, institutional networking - reflected lack of awareness of the operational difficulties of administering a new program of small grants to individual researchers/departments in a system that had deteriorated over several decades. More importantly, little effort seems to have been put into designing the fund in such a way as to promote the objectives: improvements in internal efficiency and spill-over effects of reforms across institutions were neither explicitly built into selection criteria for projects nor consciously managed. The Bank should have provided more focused technical assistance in these areas where there was limited capacity to manage innovations.

The lack of readiness for implementation is reflected in the 7 conditions for project effectiveness, which included among others, the preparation of procedures manuals, the establishment of FADES, and implementation of measures on recruitment and re-assignment of teachers in accordance with commitments made in the Letter of Development Policy.

#### *7.2 Supervision:*

In Phase 1, the poor quality of supervision is reflected in lack of focus on the objectives and on concretely addressing implementation problems. The first seven PSRs (until December 2000) continued to use the objectives of the PAD (and not of the DCA). The initial aide-memoires and PSRs discussed at length the problems with teacher management, but no specific solutions were found, largely due to the macro-economic constraints and difficulties in introducing reforms in civil service regulations and, eventually, the reforms got progressively less attention. Efforts to simplify the contracts (which ran into 50 pages initially) received attention only after one and a half years, when an implementation specialist was included in the supervision. The aide-memoires also did not accurately reflect the delays in textbook preparation, in secondary education and in FADES, which became evident during the mid-term review. The Bank team did not pro-actively address the problem of staffing the project management team.

The rating for PDO continued to be satisfactory even though implementation progress was considered unsatisfactory right until the MTR in 2001. This rating was based on the performance indicators, which were national level indicators not related to project activities. This rating sent wrong signals to Bank management about the performance of the project.

Task management changed at the time of the MTR and greater attention was paid to accelerating disbursement, specifically through the simplification of procedures and eliminating/reducing the contributions for primary school construction and higher education sub-projects; in the latter, the condition regarding external partnerships was eliminated. The Bank team also encouraged the government to improve communications to intended beneficiaries. Cancellation of part the credit was discussed with the government in case the disbursement target of \$12 million was not met by October 2001. Due to the pro-active efforts of the Bank, the project management structures were staffed with appropriate people. By October 2001, 20% of the credit had disbursed as a result of these measures. However, the larger reform issues seem to have been dropped and learning processes and quality of instruction were not addressed at this stage. The MTR could also have been the occasion of re-designing the components relating to secondary education and, especially, higher education to align them better with the objectives (or alternatively to change the objectives). Further, instead of trying to reduce the project complexity, there was discussion about including a new distance education sub-component (for primary and secondary education); it was also agreed to include a separate component for vocational training, since the original

idea of a new project was dropped.

The Bank was very responsive to the changed conditions after the political crisis, and the new government's focus on getting all children back to primary school and showing tangible improvements in teaching-learning conditions. 100% financing was provided in 2003 (as part of the portfolio restructuring). The Bank re-oriented CRESED 2 from being a project with pre-defined activities to a "sector development credit" with a nation wide coverage and a focus on ensuring universal access to primary education. Instead of trying to increase access through constructing classrooms, the credit supported the abolition of fees through the *caisses ecoles* and the supply of *kits scolaires*, which allowed Madagascar to avert the usual problems of lack of school supplies associated with sudden surges in enrolment. The decision to remove school construction from the project and have it implemented by the FID was a good response to the limited technical capacity of the Ministry and the difficulties associated with the centralized management of construction in Phase 2. While the components remained unchanged, various new activities, such as capacity building for CISCOs and ZAPs and others, were financed as the dialogue proceeded. In this way, "ownership" of the project was increasingly transferred to the government and this approach encouraged the government to think of the policies of for primary education as a whole.

The November 2002 restructuring could, however, have been used better to prepare conditions for quality improvement in primary education, to re-design the secondary and higher education components, and for a better design of the vocational component. For example, the nutritional sub-component, proposed by the government, could have benefited from prior technical and economic analysis, or even international experience, that would have shown the infeasibility of the proposed approach. In the case of textbooks, while the government's haste was understandable, adequate time to prepare appropriate books and train teachers was advisable, given the cost of the investment and its long term impact on future learning. With a highly responsive government, as recorded in the supervision missions, there was room for a more pro-active approach on this.

During this final phase of the project, the Bank task team worked closely with the Country Director and the President of Madagascar, which facilitated taking decisions. Towards the end of the project, as reflected in the supervision aide-memoires, the project and the education component of PRSC were addressed together and hence focused on issues of strategy, budget allocations and budget management apart from project specific activities. The major reform issues – such as teacher redeployment and human resource management – not addressed in the project began to be taken up in the PRSC dialogue. The Bank team also led donor coordination in primary education, leading to joint missions as part of the supervision for CRESED 2 and PRSC; this also led to UNICEF, in particular, closely aligning its technical assistance with the CRESED 2. A sector strategy and EFA plan, to which the Bank and other donors contributed technical assistance, was presented to an international donor forum in October 2003. The transition from a largely Bank-led project to a government-led strategy and implementation plan for primary education is an important result of the Bank's new approach. The Bank ensured continuity in task management during this critical phase until December 2004.

The composition of Bank supervision teams throughout the project did not reflect the complexity and scope of the project. Although the provision of textbooks and learning materials was a major part of the project, no textbook specialist participated in supervision after the MTR (and only one before that, together with one pedagogical consultant). Only two supervision missions benefited from a higher education specialist and none had an expert on institutional development. This reflects the inadequacy of supervision budgets and also the lack of Bank management attention to the implementation problems early in the project. In Phase 3, the supervision missions benefited from the technical expertise of other donors, including UNICEF, the French Cooperation and the Norwegian government.

### *7.3 Overall Bank performance:*

Overall performance is rated as moderately satisfactory due to the pro-active efforts by the Bank to staff the project management team and simplify procedures in Phase 2, as well as to the Bank's responsiveness to the crisis situation, re-orientation of the project to the new priorities of the government and implementation progress in the final phase of the project.

### **Borrower**

#### *7.4 Preparation:*

Preparatory work done by the government to operationalise the complex approaches envisaged by the project was inadequate. Delays in preparing the operational manuals and provision of counterpart funds, as well as implementation of other policy measures, reflected this as well.

#### *7.5 Government implementation performance:*

Until the 2002 restructuring, the government implementation performance was largely unsatisfactory. The *contrat program* approach, though being central to the PNAE 2, was not owned by the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education. As told to the ICR mission, hundreds of school contracts languished in the Ministry for months pending the signature of the Minister. The government failed to appoint senior project management staff (including the Project Coordinator) for almost a year. The award of school construction contracts in the Phase 2, when sites were selected and construction was managed centrally by the Ministry, was problematic. In some cases, the sites selected for construction did not have a school at all. This partly led to the eventual decision to remove construction from the project in Phase 3. The government's performance was especially poor with respect to the textbook component, where critical decisions were delayed.

After the 2002 restructuring, the new government was much more pro-active in supporting the project. The involvement of the President in key decisions, as stated in several aide-memoires, facilitated decisions but also put pressure on the implementing agency to implement activities without carefully evaluating the consequences. The decision to procure books without any field trials, in order to meet the President's request for getting books into schools in two months, is a case in point.

#### *7.6 Implementing Agency:*

The BCP (project management unit for primary and secondary education) suffered from lack of staffing during the second year of the project. After the MTR, management effectiveness improved tremendously with the recruitment of qualified staff and the appointment of a qualified Project Coordinator. A new person was recruited for handling the textbook component after it was decided to go for ICB. The project management demonstrated its integrity and capability to manage contracts when it contested the quality of the paper used by a supplier in the re-printing of textbooks; seeking recourse in the provisions of the contract, the paper was tested in Malagasy and international laboratories. The supplier subsequently agreed to a 40% reduction in price, resulting in considerable savings.

After November 2002, in the generalization phase of the project, the project management unit successfully managed the procurement and supply of inputs to all the schools of the country. It also effectively serviced the requests of the Ministry for studies and capacity building. Interaction between the project staff and the Ministry units was much more successful. Financial management was excellent and audit reports were submitted on time. One lacuna in its performance, however, was the lack of regular monitoring and supervision in the field; this was partly due to the fact that the staffing had not increased despite the changed orientation of the project and the stress on speeding up implementation.

The FADES Council and Executive Director, in the first two years, appear to have done little to stimulate proposals from universities outside the capital. As a result, almost all project proposals received before the MTR were from the University of Antananarivo. After the MTR, the FADES Council engaged in systematic communication efforts and appointed local coordinators in each university to help academic staff formulate proposals. Overall, the unit functioned efficiently. Unlike the project management unit for primary and secondary education, the interaction of the FADES Council with the Ministry even after the 2002 restructuring was limited. This partly contributed to the failure to achieve the overall objective of the project of developing a coherent strategy for reforming the higher education sub-sector.

#### *7.7 Overall Borrower performance:*

Overall borrower performance is rated as moderately satisfactory, based largely on improved performance after the MTR and the performance since 2002 when most of the activities were undertaken.

## **8. Lessons Learned**

### **Design and Implementation Phases 1 and 2**

(i) Agree on clear development goals from the beginning, which are acceptable to all stakeholders. Agree on a coherent results chain and choose appropriate performance indicators in line with objectives and use them for systematic monitoring and regularly discuss implementation performance with the government.

(ii) Complex project design with many components and sub-components involving several Ministries and innovations in each area requires a high degree of ownership and preparation by the government and focused technical assistance by Bank. “Ownership” should be actively demanded as the pre-condition for further advancement of the project at agreed milestones, especially for key reforms.

(iii) Innovations: If project components, sub-components are experimental / innovations, lessons should be drawn early in project life to draw full benefits. For sub-sectors with small credit allocation, clearly identify what is the objective (innovation/experimentation or improving access and quality).

(iv) Textbooks and learning materials: a variety of materials adapted to actual classroom needs should be prepared, especially when there is not sufficient agreement on key policy issues such as the language of instruction. Field trialing is important to ensure that full benefits are captured.

(v) Decentralisation: make clear what decisions will be taken at each level; involve implementing units at an early stage and trial innovations before large-scale investments begin. Decentralizing to school-level projects is unrealistic - the numbers are too large to manage effectively.

(vi) Beneficiary participation: level and mode must be realistically assessed in the specific country context and in relation to component objective.

(vii) Donor commitments should be formalized before they are included in the financing plan or else be included in risk assessment in the event they do not materialize.

(viii) Procurement: ensure capacity is assessed for each component separately in complex projects; separate community contributions from payment of work by enterprises; avoid linking up preparation of textbooks with contracts for printing/distribution; develop capacity to use copyright laws.

(ix) Project restructuring: simplification of procedures and better communications can improve implementation radically.

### **Restructured Project (Phase 3)**

(i) Strong government leadership and commitment creates a positive environment for implementation

(ii) Adaptation of Bank projects to changing circumstances mid-stream is possible and good – but don't lose sight of original objectives (or else modify them)

(iii) Monitoring and evaluation systems need to be set up early and should be supplemented by field

supervision by project management.

(iv) Policy and strategy development is difficult when the structures do not exist for reflection, analysis and collaborative decision-making; implementation progress and studies alone do not automatically lead to a development of a strategy.

(v) Complex projects require adequate supervision and appropriate skill mix.

## **9. Partner Comments**

*(a) Borrower/implementing agency:*

See Annex 8.

*(b) Cofinanciers:*

*(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):*

## **10. Additional Information**

## Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

### Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR <sup>1</sup>	Actual/Latest Estimate
PRIMARY EDUCATION: Increased National Net Enrollment Rate	76%	97% (2003-04)
Decreased Repetition Rate	< 5%	20% (2003-04)
SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATION -- Gross Enrollment Rate	25%	19 % (2003-04)
Better Baccalaureat Results (Secondary School Examination)	35%	33% (2004)

### Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR <sup>1</sup>	Actual/Latest Estimate
PRIMARY EDUCATION - Increased awareness of communities and improved partnership between teachers, administrators and local communities: Targetted Primary Schools with contract program	All Primary Schools	2003-04: 92 % of public (15,412) and 90 % of private schools (4,738)
PRIMARY EDUCATION: Increased amounts of textbooks distributed in schools	1.0 textbook per student per subject	2004-05: 0.86 textbook per student per subject
PRIMARY EDUCATION: Schools equipped with pedagogical kits	All Primary Schools	2003:04 - all public primary schools (students: 2,715,526) and in all private schools ( students: 650,936); all teachers (47,315);  2004-05: supplied to all newly admitted children (993, 736) and all newly recruited teachers recruited (1,996)
PRIMARY EDUCATION: Schools equipped with Pedagogic School Grant	All Primary Schools	2003-04: 92% of public and 90% of private schools); half of the schools did not receive any in 2004-05 (june 2005)
PRIMARY EDUCATION: Students benefit from nutritional supplements	Students in Primary Grades 1-3 in all schools	Two interventions piloted in 28 schools in 4 CISCOS for all primary grades (total of 10,800 student beneficiaries)
PRIMARY EDUCATION: Brochures on AIDS distributed to students of 7th grade	All students and teachers grades 5, 6 and 7 have received information	All students and teachers in grades 5, 6 and 7 (453,000 booklets)
SECONDARY EDUCATION: Increased targetted schools with contract program	40 CEG, 10 Lycées	40 CEG, 10 Lycées
SECONDARY EDUCATION: Increased number of built or rehabilitated classrooms	>450	163 new classrooms; 299 rehabilitated
SECONDARY EDUCATION (BEPC AND LYCEE): Graduates at junior and senior secondary cycles	NA	In 2003: 35,236 for the BEPC 19,087 for the BACCALAUREAT
HIGHER EDUCATION: Increased number of financed sub-projects, fulfilled and evaluated	85	131 financed; 123 evaluated
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT: Definition and elaboration of action plans	Action Plans available, and under implementation	Action Plans are available at central and decentralized levels

<sup>1</sup> End of project

## Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US\$ million equivalent)

Component	Appraisal Estimate US\$ million	Actual/Latest Estimate US\$ million	Percentage of Appraisal
Universalize Quality Primary Educaiton	37.00	18.90	51
Improve access to Quality Secondary Education in Rural Areas	3.50	5.98	171
Textbooks and Teaching Learning Materials	14.00	19.04	136
Institutional Development	3.00	7.91	264
Support Reforms of Higher Education	5.00	7.28	146
Support to Project Management	2.50	3.34	134
<b>Total Baseline Cost</b>	65.00	62.45	
<b>Total Project Costs</b>	65.00	62.45	
<b>Total Financing Required</b>	65.00	62.45	

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US\$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category	ICB	Procurement NCB	Method <sup>1</sup> Other <sup>2</sup>	N.B.F.	Total Cost
<b>1. Civil Works</b>	0.00 (0.00)	15.00 (12.00)	15.00 (12.00)	38.50 (0.00)	68.50 (24.00)
<b>2. Furniture, equipments and vehicles</b>	3.40 (3.40)	3.40 (3.00)	2.40 (2.00)	7.80 (0.00)	17.00 (8.40)
<b>3. Textbooks and learning materials</b>	10.10 (10.10)	1.30 (1.00)	1.30 (1.00)	7.30 (0.00)	20.00 (12.10)
<b>4. Training</b>	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	6.00 (5.50)	6.00 (0.00)	12.00 (5.50)
<b>5. Consultancies</b>	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	4.00 (4.00)	5.00 (0.00)	9.00 (4.00)
<b>6. Operating Costs</b>	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	7.50 (6.00)	8.00 (0.00)	15.50 (6.00)
<b>7. FADES</b>	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	5.00 (5.00)	3.00 (0.00)	8.00 (5.00)
<b>Total</b>	13.50 (13.50)	19.70 (16.00)	41.20 (35.50)	75.60 (0.00)	150.00 (65.00)

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US\$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category	ICB	Procurement NCB	Method <sup>1</sup> Other <sup>2</sup>	N.I.F. (Not IDA Financed)	Total Cost
<b>1. Civil Works</b>	0.00 (0.00)	2.52 (2.14)	15.79 (12.84)	0.38 (0.00)	18.68 (14.98)

<b>2. Furniture, equipments and vehicles</b>	2.08 (1.98)	0.33 (0.27)	2.76 (2.76)	0.00 (0.00)	5.18 (5.02)
<b>3. Textbooks and learning materials</b>	19.05 (18.83)	0.00 (0.00)	3.38 (3.38)	0.00 (0.00)	22.43 (22.21)
<b>4. Training</b>	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	3.43 (3.21)	0.00 (0.00)	3.43 (3.21)
<b>5. Consultancies</b>	1.11 (1.11)	0.00 (0.00)	2.26 (2.26)	0.00 (0.00)	3.37 (3.37)
<b>6. Operating Costs</b>	0.00 (0.00)	0.08 (0.06)	1.71 (1.67)	0.00 (0.00)	1.79 (1.73)
<b>7. FADES</b>	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	7.02 (7.02)
<b>Total</b>	22.24 (21.93)	2.93 (2.47)	29.33 (26.12)	0.38 (0.38)	61.90 (57.55)

Figures in brackets are the amounts for IDA

**Project Financing by Component (in US\$ million equivalent)**

Component	Appraisal Estimate			Actual/Latest Estimate			Percentage of Appraisal		
	Bank	Govt.	CoF.	Bank	Govt.	CoF.	Bank	Govt.	CoF.
Universalize Quality Primary Educaiton	37.00	7.40		18.90	3.89		51.1	52.6	
Improve access to Quality Secondary Education in Rural Areas	3.50	0.70		5.98	0.58		170.9	82.9	
Textbooks and Teaching Learning Materials	14.00	0.70		19.04	0.32		136.0	45.7	
Institutional Development	3.00	0.60		7.91	0.67		263.7	111.7	
Support Reforms of Higher Education	5.00	0.54		7.28	2.13		145.6	394.4	
Support to Project Management	2.50	0.50		3.34	0.59		133.6	118.0	
<b>Total cost</b>	<b>65.00</b>	<b>10.43</b>		<b>62.45</b>	<b>8.18</b>		<b>96.1</b>	<b>78.4</b>	

### **Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits**

The economic analysis in the PAD was very general; it included an assessment of fiscal sustainability but did not assess the cost-effectiveness of specific interventions.

A complete ex-post analysis is difficult because of the differing coverage and approach of the project over time. This examination looks at the unit cost of different interventions at primary and secondary level and compares them qualitatively with the benefits.

Two components/sub-components were highly cost-effective in primary education: (i) the *caisses écoles* (school grants) involved an expenditure of \$ 1.46 per pupil, and to the extent they compensated for school fees, the benefit was the rise in enrolment of almost 0.8 million. However, other measures paid by the government, such as subsidies to teachers hired by parents also contributed to enrolment increase and should be taken into account. (ii) textbooks and learning materials, provided at a per pupil cost of approximately \$ 6; with a life-time of 5 years, this translates into a very low annualized investment cost with high benefits. An important caveat to this is that the quality of books is appropriate for learning outcomes. The project achieved this through a relatively low cost per text book (\$ 1.02); the cost of school kits was higher (\$ 2.53).

On the other hand, the sub-components relating to construction and furniture in primary education were relatively expensive. Approximately US \$ 15.8 million was spent on about 1,100 primary schools; assuming an average enrolment of 150 students per schools, this yields a per pupil investment of \$ 96. The annualized per pupil cost would depend on the expected life of the building and furniture.

Overall, the average per pupil expenditure of the project on primary education was about US \$ 20, which compares with an annual recurrent cost borne by the budget of US \$ 30 in 2004. The average per pupil expenditure on secondary education was \$ 22, compared with an annual recurrent cost of about \$ 70.

In vocational education, the project spent \$ 70 per pupil compared to an annual per pupil recurrent expenditure of \$ 240. The latter reflects the existing inefficiency of provision and the project intervention was not cost-effective, given the fact that internal and external efficiency cannot be expected to improve significantly.

The recurrent expenditures arising from rise in enrolments (mostly on salaries of additional teachers) are expected to be fiscally sustainable if the government allocates a higher share of its budget to education. As a share of GDP, public expenditures on education have risen from 1.5 percent in 1997 to 2.4 percent in 2004 (at appraisal, the incremental costs associated with the program were considered sustainable if the share rose to 2 percent in 2000). According to its commitment to EFA-Fast Track Initiative, the government plans to increase this share to 2.9 percent of GDP, with roughly half being allocated to primary education. This will require continued donor commitment to bridge the gap in domestic resources; apart from budgetary support programs that allocate additional resources to primary education, Madagascar has received incremental grant financing from the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund for 2005 and 2006 to sustain and expand primary education.

## Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:

Stage of Project Cycle	No. of Persons and Specialty (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)		Performance Rating		
	Month/Year	Count	Specialty	Implementation Progress	Development Objective
<b>Identification/Preparation</b>					
	11/08/1996	6	MISSION LEADER (1); ECONOMIST (1); EDUCATION SPEC. (3); IMPL SPEC. (1)		
	12/06/1996				
<b>Appraisal/Negotiation</b>					
	07/16/1997	6	MISSION LEADER (1); ECONOMIST (1); TEXTBOOKS SPEC. (1); HIGHER ED. SPEC. (1); IMPL. & VOC. TRAIN. SPEC. (1); EDUCATION SPEC. (1)		
<b>Supervision</b>					
	06/29/1998	3	MISSION LEADER (1); IMPL. & VOC. TRAIN. SP (1); HIGHER ED. SPECIALIST (1)	HS	HS
	10/30/1998	3	EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); IMPLEMENTATION SPECIAL (1); TEXTBOOK SPECIALIST (1)	S	S
	05/27/1999	3	MISSION LEADER, EDUCAT (1); IMPLEMENTATION SPECIAL (1); HIGHER EDUCATION SPECI (1)	S	S
	05/31/2000	2	MISSION LEADER (1); IMPLEMENTATION SPECIA. (1)	U	S
	10/27/2001	5	TTL (1); EDU ECONOMIST CONSULTA (1); PEDAGOGICAL SPEC. CONS (1); FMS SPECIALIST (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1)	S	S
	11/03/2002	2	EDUCATION/TTL (1); EDUCATION (1)	S	S
	06/03/2003	4	LEAD ED SP/TTL (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); PROGRAM ASSISTANT (2)	S	S
	09/10/2003	4	EDUCATION/TTL (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); ECONOMIST (1); PROGRAM ASSISTANT (1)	S	S

<b>ICR</b>	05/31/2004	3	LEAD ED SP/TTL (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); PROGRAM ASSISTANT (1)	HS	S
	12/18/2004	4	LEAD EDUCATION SPECIAL (1); SR. EDUCATION ECONOMIST (1); SR EDUCATION SPECIALIS (1); ADMIN ASSISTANT (1)	HS	S
	06/13/2005	4	SR. EDUCATION ECONOMIST/TTL (1); LEAD EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); HIGHER EDUCATION CONSULTANT (1); CIVIL WORKS CONSULTANT (1)		

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle	Actual/Latest Estimate	
	No. Staff weeks	US\$ ('000)
Identification/Preparation		696,200
Appraisal/Negotiation		
Supervision		750,000
ICR		
Total		1,446,200

## Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

	<u>Rating</u>				
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Macro policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Sector Policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Physical</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input checked="" type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Financial</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input checked="" type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Institutional Development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Environmental</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<i>Social</i>					
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Poverty Reduction</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input checked="" type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Gender</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Private sector development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Public sector management</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA

## Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

### 6.1 Bank performance

#### Rating

- |                                      |                          |                                    |                                    |                          |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lending     | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input type="radio"/> S            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Supervision | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U            | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overall     | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U            | <input type="radio"/> HU |

### 6.2 Borrower performance

#### Rating

- |  |                          |                                    |                                    |                          |
|--|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Preparation                           | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input type="radio"/> S            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Government implementation performance | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U            | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Implementation agency performance     | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U            | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overall                               | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U            | <input type="radio"/> HU |

## **Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents**

### **Bank project documents**

Aide-Memoire of Appraisal mission, World Bank, 1997  
Agreed Minutes of Negotiation, World Bank, 18 December 1997  
Project Appraisal Document, World Bank, February 13, 1998  
Development Credit Agreement, World Bank, 9 April 1998  
Amendment to Development Credit Agreement, World Bank, September 18, 2001  
Interim Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Madagascar, October 23, 2002  
Amendment to Development Credit Agreement, World Bank, Letter dated December 12, 2002  
Project Status Reports (PSR), World Bank, 1998-2004  
Aide-Memoires of Supervision missions, World Bank, 1998-2005

### **Other Bank documents**

- Madagascar - Towards a School-Based Strategy for Improving Primary and Secondary Education, April 1995  
- Education and Training in Madagascar - Towards a Policy Agenda for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, 2002

### **Government documents**

- Final Evaluation Report of the Mid-Term Review, 2001  
- Etude Relative a l'Evaluation Finale du Project CRESED II, July 2005  
- Madagascar EFA Plan, May 2005

### **Other documents**

- Etude diagnostique des collèges et lycées publics, Galaxy Consulting, 2004-2005  
- Etude sur la progression scolaire et la performance académique à Madagascar, Cornell University, 2005  
- Amélioration de la gestion des effectifs et de la gestion des ressources humaines, Core Advice, 2005  
- Etude pour le diagnostic organisationnel et proposition de restructuration, Academy of Educational Development (AED), 2005  
-

## **Additional Annex 8. Borrower's Contribution**

### **ICR CRESED II Contribution by the Government**

The present document, which was developed by the Malagasy Government, provides the Report on the Completion of the Project that was the object of the Credit Agreement for Strengthening the Education Sector (Accord de Cr dit de Renforcement du Secteur Educatif—Phase II' (CRESED II). This Credit Agreement 3046-MAG was signed on April 08, 1998, ratified on September 07, 1998, and enforced on January 07, 1999. Contributions respectively by the World Bank and the Government under such agreement consisted of what follows:

- SDR 47.7 million (equivalent to US\$65 million or MGF 429.5 billion during the negotiation) from the World Bank, and
- MGF 54 billion (equivalent to US\$ 14.5 million during the negotiation) from the Malagasy Government.

The purpose of the credit agreement was to take part in implementing the defined Malagasy educational policy:

- First, in the National Program II for Improving Education (Programme National d'Am lioration de l'Education II - PNAE II),
- Then, in the Strategic Plan for Reforming and Developing the Educational Sector (Plan Strat gique de R forme et de D veloppement du Secteur Educatif - PSRDSE) including the Education for All Plan (Plan Education Pour Tous - EPT).

The credit was closed on March 31, 2005, that is about two years after the planned date (originally on June 30, 2003; then extended through October 31, 2004, and in the end, set to March 31, 2005).

#### **1. CONTEXT**

Following the Programme National d'Am lioration de l'Education I - PNAE I, the Ministries in charge of Education developed a second program, PNAE II, the orientations of which were:

- making primary education universal,
- training agents,
- success in learning and training and
- efficiency of the education system

and the objectives of which consisted in:

- ensuring access of all school age children to quality primary education,
- enhancing access to, and quality of secondary education, particularly in rural areas,
- supporting reform in higher education by assisting education institutions in modernizing and diversifying their training curricula, and
- pursuing reforms in vocational training.

The scope of the Program was defined in such a way as to include activities impacting the quality of learning among pupils. Furthermore, PNAE II strategic orientation was centered on delegating

responsibilities to decentralized structures of the Ministry, and on a method based on collaboration with communities. The impacts expected from the Program would be measured through improved school results, through internal and external effectiveness of education and access to primary and secondary education, namely in rural areas.

The total cost of the program for developing the education sector was estimated at US\$ 183 million, of which:

- US\$94.0 million for primary education,
- US\$25.6 million for secondary education,
- US\$23.2 million for higher education, and
- US\$30.0 million for technical training.

It has been planned that about 63% of such cost —not including the one related to technical training—would be borne by external donors, of which 67% by the World Bank (US\$65 million). Thus, it was planned to pursue CRESED Project through a second phase, which is CRESED II.

## **2. DESCRIPTION OF CRESED II PROJECT**

The objectives for the CRESED II Project consisted of:

- providing all children with access to quality primary education,
- supporting the gradual development and improvement of general secondary education, as well as of technical education and vocational training, and
- developing a quality training and research system for higher education so as to provide the professional sectors in the Malagasy society with available human resources capable of responding to their needs.

For achieving these objectives, the activities planned were as follows:

- completing new construction and rehabilitation works for classrooms, as well as providing school furniture so as to increase capacity,
- training trainers, as well as purchasing and distributing school textbooks/ education books and materials for improving the effectiveness of the education system,
- providing technical advisory services, materials and equipment, as well as capacity building to improve the management of the Ministry, both its central services and decentralized structures, and
- Conducting studies and research in the area of education and society, on the one hand, and implementing subprojects in training, applied research and institutional support, on the other hand.

The Project activities contributing to achieving these objectives have been classified into six (6) Components:

- Component 1 : Primary Education Component,
- Component 2 : Secondary (general, technical and vocational) Education Component,
- Component 3 : School Manuals and Pedagogical Aids Component,
- Component 4 : Institutional Development Component,
- Component 5 : Higher Education Component, and
- Component 6: Project Management Component.

## **3. ACHIEVEMENTS**

The objectives, which were readjusted according to evaluations and restructuring of the Project, were achieved overall with a very high disbursement rate (95%).

### **3.1. Activities completed**

CRESED II Project activities affected all sub sectors as well as the administration of the system.

The diverse interventions for the "Primary Education" Component relied on the principle of contracting. In that framework, 1,605 program contracts were arranged between schools, the local community and the Ministry. 12,730 pedagogical contracts were developed and drawn up. 1,074 schools have benefited from construction/ rehabilitation works, totaling 2,074 classrooms; 1,118 schools have been equipped with school furniture and 247 schools with school kitchens, including 132 schools with cooking equipment. Some 65,000 teachers took part in various training sessions. 17,486 school funds (small grants managed by the local education community, meant for running the school) have been allocated. Experimentations in nutritional support were also undertaken..

As regards Component 2, "General Secondary Education ", the achievements among 58 public schools were also based on the principle of program contracts. 460 classrooms and one boarding school have been built or rehabilitated; school or boarding school furniture and school funds (small grant managed by the local education community) were also provided. Concerning overall interventions, 110 public high schools were equipped with computer materials, 1,625 scientific equipment batches were received by public and private junior secondary schools about 2,000 teachers and heads of school were trained, and specific support experimentation (pedagogical and administrative management, pedagogical tools) was conducted in 18 small junior secondary schools (less than 80 pupils).

Interventions in Component 2, "Technical Education and Vocational Training", involved 20 public schools and were based on developing program contracts. Their purpose was implementing new training curricula; and 44 pathways have thus been identified. The Component also provided them with school funds, rehabilitated 17 schools, and delivered about 2,500 pedagogical books. In addition, 19 training actions have been conducted for the benefit of 180 teachers. Most training equipment/ materials (10 batches out of 12) expected have been received. The two batches which were not delivered were materials, equipment, accessories and tooling meant for the "Apparel & Clothing" and "General Mechanics" industries.

The object of Component 3, "Textbooks and Pedagogical Aids", was designed to equip public and private schools, essentially primary ones, with school manuals, master's guides and pedagogical aids. More than 10 million textbooks and pedagogical guides have thus been distributed. To these were added various aids such as dictionaries, maps, plates, collective pedagogical materials, scientific and computer equipment, and especially school kits. In absolute value, the achievements match the figures planned. However, the ratio of 1 book per pupil as regards manuals in primary schools has not been achieved as the number of pupils increased substantially. Such achievements, together with school funds, were considered to have significantly contributed to very considerable enrolment increase

The original objective for Component 4, "Institutional Development", was to improve the management of the Ministry so that it might effectively fulfill its mission. More specific objectives were to develop and define the reform strategy and sub sector action plans. In addition to actions designed to achieve such objectives, services and means required to implement the strategy were provided. As regards the second focus of activities, ZAPs and CISCOs capacities were strengthened. At the central level, the Ministry now has the elements needed to conduct its reorganization. The functions of planning and managing, as well as of computerization, through to CISCO level, have been strengthened, The Ministry, down to DIRESEBs, is

from now on networked. The equipment and training sessions, which were brought in, were intended to put in place the Ministry Information system (statistics, budget monitoring, etc.). As regards the quality of education, various strategic studies have been conducted. The Component provided the means, but their operationalization depends on the various structures involved.

In terms of achievement, Component 5 "Higher Education" funded 131 sub-projects. They were distributed into 4 implementation areas: training, research, institutional support, and education and social studies and research. The Component included 12 fields of activity of very diverse kinds. Education and information technology, which represent 38% of total, were the fields which benefited most from FADES funding, respectively with 27 and 16 sub projects.

With regard to Component 6, "Management of the Project", the Project experienced a difficult start up during its first two years, with a very low disbursement rate (less than 10%). Staff number, combined with inadequate resources, lack of manual of procedures for the overall operations involving the 6 components, and cumbersome and complex procedures were all factors contributing to such slowness. Thereafter, the Project made a considerable effort to build its institutional capacities: recruiting officials for the Component, developing a management and implementation manual of procedures, and streamlining procedures. The Disbursement rate thereafter increased from 2001 onward. Achievement rates for the Component activities - respectively at about 100% or more in most cases - show that there were adequate resources to implement their activities.

### **3.2. Financial achievements**

The US\$ 47.7 million funds allocated by IDA to CRESED II Project, originally evaluated at US\$ 65 million, underwent US dollar depreciation against SDR and finally rose to US\$ 71.9 million at the end of the project. The disbursement rate over IDA Credit is therefore 96.2%. Furthermore, the Malagasy counterpart, for its part, also increased to MGF 101 billion at project end, instead of MGF 54 billion that were originally planned. The disbursement rate for the Project as a whole (IDA and Malagasy counterpart) is thus evaluated at 94.9%.

After a fairly slow start (about 6% of disbursement for the first two years), resources began to be significantly used only in 2001. Activities intensified—with namely the school grants, the distribution of school kits and textbooks—reflected on the expenditures for the years 2002 and 2003. Nevertheless cumulative disbursements accounted for 79% at the end of 2003: thus, more than a quarter of the IDA credit would have been left unused if the original completion date (June 2003) had been observed. The impetus of that period was maintained during the last two years (2004 and 2005), having thus mobilized about 95% of the available resources by the final completion date.

Apart from the novelty of the participatory approach and from the fact that activities were focused on civil works, one of the reasons for the initial slow disbursement probably is the fact that the Project Management Team was still in the process of being constituted. Putting in place the human resources required translated into raising the number of executives from 21 in 2000 to 31 in 2001. Such an increase seems to have reflected immediately on the pace of disbursement. The Project life (as understood through annual disbursements) underwent four clearly distinct phases: Start up (1999 and 2000), slow advance (2001 and 2002), cruising phase (2003-2004) and, last, finalizing (2005).

Textbooks, education materials and the "civil works" represented the largest expense items of the Project: They accounted for more than half (54.2%) of the whole. They are followed by FADES and "furniture,

material and vehicles” (24.8%). The other 4 categories take up the remaining part (21.0%). Annual disbursements actually started only in 2001, with 35.56% disbursement for “civil works”. Regarding the other categories, the maximum rates were achieved in 2002 for “school grants” (80.93%), in 2003 for “textbooks and education materials” (52.85%), and in 2004 for FADES (55.12%). Expenses for “Training” were concentrated in 2003 (31.50%) and 2004 (36.63%), as was also the case with “furniture, materials and vehicles” respectively with 29.17% and 20.16% and “consultants” respectively with 14.75% and 21.94%.

Initial resource earmarking, both for the Project Components and by expense category, underwent modifications during the implementation of the Project. The most significant reorientations especially involved:

- reducing parts of the primary education component, (due to transfer to other operators for the building and rehabilitation of classrooms, but along with massive introduction of the « school grants » linked to pedagogical contracts) and of the secondary education component (largely due to charging some expenses to other Components) ;
- increasing parts of textbooks and teaching aids, institutional development, higher education, introducing a sub-component on technical education and vocational training, as well as generalizing the activities to public and private schools.

#### **4. BOTTOM LINE AND MAIN LESSONS TO BE LEARNT**

The most tangible impact of the Project has been its contribution to large increases in access to primary education thanks namely to relieving parent from charges, which was made possible through school grants, providing all students from public and private schools with textbooks and pedagogical kits, and extending school capacity. Such inputs which arrived to schools boosted enrolment, and restored parents’ confidence. Impacts at the secondary level are less visible given the restricted volume of the Project intervention in this sub sector. However, all sub sectors were actually boosted, including higher education through sub projects.

What also has to be underlined as a novelty for pupils, parents and teachers in primary schools was the availability of textbooks for all subject matters and all forms for the first time in 30 years. However, such textbooks were provided only several years after the curricula were developed (1997), and their adequacy for present realities may be questioned. Such a gap should not occur in the future.

Positive results were achieved because of particular capacities and methods used in the implementation of the project:

- A common vision, shared and accepted by all the stakeholders
- The Project willingness and ability to adjust its activities and working methods according to the lessons learnt from its own experience,
- Work discipline put in place with the various parties involved in the development of the education sector
- Capacity to generalize its interventions ( to all CISCOS and to public and private schools, etc.) after it began to work on pilot schools
- Faculty of adapting to the orientations of actions defined by the Ministry ; and
- Adopting the program approach and the integrated approach to implementing the project activities.

They may also be attributed to the kind, means and scope of such interventions:

- Unfrozen, unspecialized intervention areas
- Relevance of interventions to the objectives of the education policy
- Interventions having direct, concrete effects over beneficiaries
- Widening the fields of sub projects and eligible expense categories
- Availability of management tools, and
- Significant amount of the Project credit.

Factors relative to the project environment are not to be neglected:

- Willingness of the World Bank to amend the Credit Agreement in compliance with the orientations of the Ministry,
- Flexible and streamlined procedures in the organization.

Conversely, some aspects deserve more reflections and actions for improvement:

- Informing beneficiaries and local administrators for better accountability, enhanced active participation and better understanding of related activities and assignments as normal and natural ones, but not as chores,
- Enhancing actions aimed at quality improvement
- Putting in place the principle of establishing contracts under a format that was better tailored to individuals and that was not a standard one, which aimed at better performance of schools, taking account of regional and local specificities
- Planning in both assignment of teachers and capacity of schools facing the increase in enrollment rates.
- System for monitoring results of interventions
- Developing technical specifications for materials, equipment and supplies
- Planning all actions aiming at Education For All (EPT) with supporting measures to avoid all negative consequences entailed by success of EPT, and
- Encouraging partnership with the private sector

## 5. CONCLUSION

Designing the Project as a tool for supporting the implementation of the national education plan has remained constant throughout its existence. In its implementation, its content evolved and was adapted to changing conditions: working conditions, economic, social, political “environments”, etc. The project's relevance to the objectives has been saved thanks to successive adaptations.

The most important lesson to be learnt from the experience of the CRESED II Project relates to the actual involvement of the Ministry of Education. Indeed, all activities were developed according to the education policy adopted, as well as to the priorities of the Ministry. In addition, the mindset that the Manager (in a collective manner: the Government, Donors, *Project Implementation Unit*) has brought to the project—that is their philosophy / psychology / attitude towards the common enterprise—to a large extent explains the fact that the Project has good results. An attitude made up of vigilance and of permanent “watch” allowed it, on the one hand, to be able to seize opportunities and, on the other hand, to prevent probable threats.

The Project physical and financial achievements are very impressive. In addition, “capacities” and know

how have been created or strengthened: by CDAPs regarding distribution of manuals and other supplies to schools, or “making projects” in higher education. And despite the fact that results are still mixed or mitigated as regards the mindset or an approach oriented to “participation”, the Project managed to have the principle of working rigorously accepted, according to well defined standards and procedures.

However, the slow start up of the Project may be explained by several factors. Initially, the project was focused on civil works, and completion relied primarily on communities: considering their limited means, their obligations were beyond their capacities. In addition, the BCP team was fairly reduced regarding the various assignments required for such works, and the relay structure (at the CISCO level) has not performed well enough for various reasons, including the novelty of the approach proposed. In fact, the “participatory approach”, the objective of which was ownership, does not seem to have been fully “understood” or assimilated not only among beneficiaries but also at the level of the Ministry, at least in its deconcentrated entities.

Monitoring activities has not been always completed in a satisfactory way and/ or as it should have been. But the project team has been able to draw lessons from its own experience. Thus, in the last years, evaluating the project has been conducted on an ongoing basis, through a “gliding” Annual Work Plan (PTA) scheme, with in-year adjustments without waiting for the end of year or the end of PTA—namely on the occasion of supervision missions.

The selected elements, which were recalled above, provide many improvements that would be useful to be preserved. The education sector may take advantage of them and build upon the experience and/ or the gains from CRESED-II Project. In fact, the “success” of the Project is leaving behind it a trail of “issues” for the Ministry in charge of Education. It is still too early to be able to define with precision the impacts of the Project on the quality of education and teaching, although such impacts are probably positive. The impacts are clear in terms of training provided to teachers, and for making textbooks available to pupils and their teachers.

Conversely, it is certain that, through its actions, the Project will largely have contributed to increasing enrollment and the pupil numbers, requiring other future actions for developing capacity and for strengthening the teaching corps (both in numbers and in qualification)—the more so as communities will become increasingly demanding, having had a “taste” of what it is possible to do (in good), for obtaining a “quality education for all” their children. Such is the challenge that will be handed over by the “Crédit de Renforcement du Secteur Éducatif - Phase II” (CRESED-II) Project to the education system in Madagascar.

