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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

TF 14414

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$41.7 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF MALI

FOR THE

MALI EMERGENCY EDUCATION FOR ALL PROJECT (P123503)

June 29, 2018

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective {Jun 13, 2018})

Currency Unit = FCFA

FCFA 558.6 = US\$1

US\$ 0.0017 = FCFA 1

FISCAL YEAR

Republic of Mali: January 1 – December 31

World Bank: July 1 – June 30

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADARS	<i>Appui direct à l'amélioration des rendements scolaires</i> (Direct Support for the Improvement of Education Delivery School Grants)
AGETIER	<i>Agence d'Execution des Travaux d'Infrastructures et d'Equipement Ruraux</i> (Agency for the Implementation of Rural Infrastructure and Equipment)
AGETIPE	<i>Agence d'Execution des Travaux d'Intérêt Public pour l'Emploi</i> (Agency for the Implementation of Public Works for Employment)
AM	Aide Memoire
CADDE	<i>Cellule d'Appui à la Décentralisation et à la Déconcentration</i> (Support Unit for Education Deconcentration and Decentralisation)
CAP	<i>Centre d'Animation Pédagogique</i> (Education Support Center)
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCSP	<i>Cellule de Coordination et de Suivi des Projets/Programmes</i>
CGS	<i>Comité de Gestion Scolaire</i> (School Management Committees)
CNCS	<i>Centre National des Cantines Scolaires</i> (Directorate of school canteens)
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CPS	<i>Cellule de Planification Scolaire</i> (Planning and Statistical Unit)
CT	<i>Collectivités Territoriales</i> (Local Government)
DP	Development Partner
DFM	<i>Direction des Finances et du Materiel</i> (Directorate of Finance)
DGPM	<i>Direction Générale des Marches Publics</i> (Directorate of Public Procurement)
DNACPN	National Agency in Charge of Environment
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EFA	Education for All
EFAEP	Mali Education for All Emergency Project (<i>PUEPT - Projet d'Urgence Education Pour Tous</i>)
ESIA	Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plans
ESSAF	Environmental and Social Screening Assessment Framework
EU	European Union
FM	Financial Management
GER	Gross Enrollment Rate
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFR	Interim Financial Report
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal

MEAPLN	<i>Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Alphabétisation et de la Promotion des Langues Nationales</i> (Ministry of Education, Literacy and National Languages)
MEFB	<i>Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et du Budget</i> (Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Budget)
MEN	<i>Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale</i> (Ministry of Education)
MTR	Mid-term Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PASEC	<i>Programme d'analyse des systèmes éducatifs de la CONFAMEN</i> (Program for the Analysis of Education Systems)
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
PISE	<i>Programme d'Investissement du Secteur de l'Éducation</i> (Education Sector Investment Program)
PRODEC	Programme Décennal du Développement de l'Éducation (Ten-year Education Sector Development Program)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SEGAL	<i>Secrétaire Général</i> (General Secretary)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
TTL	Task Team Leader
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WFP	World Food Program

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID	Project Name
P123503	Mali Emergency Education For All Project
Country	Financing Instrument
Mali	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Government of Mali	Ministry of Education

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

The project development objective is to increase access and improve the learning environment for affected students in targeted areas.



FINANCING

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
World Bank Financing			
TF-14414	41,700,000	41,700,000	41,248,412
Total	41,700,000	41,700,000	41,248,412
Non-World Bank Financing			
Borrower	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0
Total Project Cost	41,700,000	41,700,000	41,248,412

KEY DATES

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
22-May-2013	10-Jul-2013	12-Jun-2015	30-Dec-2016	31-Dec-2017

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
14-Jul-2016	32.23	Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

KEY RATINGS

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Substantial

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRS

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	30-Dec-2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.55
02	22-Jun-2014	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	4.72



03	15-Dec-2014	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	11.44
04	03-Jun-2015	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	25.05
05	22-Dec-2015	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	29.14
06	21-May-2016	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	29.14
07	08-Dec-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	32.23
08	14-Apr-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	37.11
09	29-Dec-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	41.25

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Education 100

Public Administration - Education	6
Primary Education	60
Secondary Education	28
Tertiary Education	6

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)

Human Development and Gender 100

Education	86
Access to Education	43
Education Financing	43
Nutrition and Food Security	14
Food Security	14

ADM STAFF

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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

Country context

1. A landlocked country in West Africa spread over 1,241,328 sq.km., Mali is a geographically diverse nation with a population of about 14.9 million. Its demographic growth is high, but its population density is extremely low, especially in the north, which consists of the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Although these regions cover two-thirds of the country, they comprise only 10 percent of the population. On average, life expectancy is 53 years, while the fertility rate is one of the highest in the world (6.54 children per woman). The vast majority of the population (70 percent) lives in rural areas. Further, the population is very young, with nearly 65 percent under age 25 years; and 50.4 percent of inhabitants are women.
2. The Mali Education for All Emergency Project (EFAEP) was developed in the aftermath of the political and security crisis that erupted in early 2012 after an armed conflict broke out in the north. This conflict was exacerbated on March 22, 2012 when there was a mutiny with soldiers taking control of Bamako, the capital, in a coup d'état and suspending the Constitution of Mali. This led to rebel control of the three largest northern cities (Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu), and to increased instability. Although the army had been driven out of the north, battles then took place between the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which seeks autonomy for the region as the homeland of the Tuareg people, and the Islamist armed forces of Ansar Dine over the control of the north.¹
3. Before the crisis, and despite significant improvements over the previous decades, Mali nonetheless had a high poverty rate and ranked very low on the Human Development Index (ranking 182 out of 187 countries). In turn, this reflects very low levels of human capital, high gender inequality, and indicates people's limited access to quality education. While poverty declined from 60 percent to 51 percent between 2000 and 2012, 50.4 percent of people still lived below the poverty line of US\$1.25 per day. Per-capita GDP was only US\$480, and the Gini coefficient, while also declining, remained significant at 0.33, indicating substantial income inequality.
4. Heightened poverty also translated into increased vulnerability to the risk of sudden shocks and undermined resilience, including a high dependence on climate-dependent subsistence agriculture with low value added. Even in the absence of political or economic crises, this represented a chronic threat to extremely fragile livelihoods.

Sector Context

5. The Government's vision for the Education sector is set out in the ten-year plan *Programme Décennal de Développement de l'Éducation* (PRODEC) prepared in 2000. Its fundamental objective is to enable all Malian children to complete quality basic education and enable the education sector to provide the country with the human resources required for its development. PRODEC is operationalized through the Investment Program for the Education Sector (PISE) which is divided

¹The Government of Mali requested international military assistance to re-conquer the north of the country, and military operations began in January 2013. By early February 2013, the Malian military and the international coalition had regained control of the northern territory; a peace deal was signed between the Government and Tuareg rebels in June 2013.



in three phases: PISE I (2001-2004); PISE II (2006-2008, extended to 2009) and PISE III (2010- 2013, extended to present)².

6. At the time of project preparation, and even before the political crisis, the Mali education sector faced considerable challenges and was far from achieving its goal of universal primary education (UPE) by 2015. Based on the 2010 review of the education sector,³ the Government set 2020 as the completion date for achieving UPE. Interim targets to help drive education sector reforms included 100 percent primary admission rate and 75 percent primary completion rate by 2015. In addition to UPE, the PISE III specifically aimed at improving the quality and relevance of the curriculum and increase retention at all levels⁴.
7. Key issues affecting the education sector were: (i) inadequate and inequitable access to education, particularly for girls and poor populations; (ii) low education quality, as evidenced in the low time on task for pupils and reflected in low learning outcomes; (iii) inefficient allocation and use of resources; and (iv) weak sector management, including teacher management and school construction.
8. **Inadequate and inequitable access to education, particularly for girls and poor populations:** Although the primary gross enrollment rate (GER) increased by an average of 4.6 percentage points per year between 2005 and 2011, reaching 81.5 percent in 2011, this rate of increase nevertheless was considered unlikely to allow Mali to achieve UPE by 2015. Further, the national-level GER masked a high degree of inequity in the system. For example, the enrollment gap between boys and girls widened marginally between 2004-2010, from 15.2 percent in 2004/05 to 15.6 percent in 2009/2010 (87.4 percent for boys, 71.8 percent for girls in 2009/2010). Available data also revealed that education outcomes varied by income, location and gender. Reasons for low and inequitable enrollment rates were related to both demand and supply factors, such as unaffordable costs of education to households, long distances to school, and poor quality of physical facilities. In many places, communities contributed significantly in an effort to create their own schools, independent of Government participation. However, these schools were often of low quality and located in the poorest regions, where families did not have the resources to manage and operate quality schools. Acknowledging this challenge, during PISE II, the Government established a fund transfer mechanism to schools, ADARS (*Appui direct à l'amélioration des rendements scolaires*), to provide direct funding to communities for school materials and for pedagogic activities, as well as for small repairs.
9. **Low education quality:** In 2012, the primary education completion rate stood at only 55.3 percent, compared to a sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) average of about 70 percent. In 2011, PASEC (*Programme d'analyse des systèmes éducatifs de la CONFAMEN*) data showed that 1 in 5 Malian students in second grade could not understand a sequence of simple sentences in writing and speaking, while two-thirds could not perform several complex tasks in reading and writing; and only a third of students met grade requirements. In math, 44 percent of second graders showed mastery of all skills, but many students could not apply mathematical concepts beyond basic levels; more than a third of students had difficulties in solving problems and in abstract thinking. Further, outcomes were even worse with older students: one-half of students at the end of their fifth year did not have basic skills in low-level math; the comparable rate for oral and written comprehension and writing

² Due to the political and security crisis facing the country, the Government decided to extend the closing date of PISE III and the first PRODEC until a normal situation had resumed. The second PRODEC is under preparation and expected to be adopted in 2018.

³ *Le système éducatif Malien, Banque mondiale-Pôle de Dakar, Document de travail de la Banque mondiale, No 198, Juillet 2010.*

⁴ A key innovation of PISE III was the consolidation of primary and first cycle of secondary education into a unique block of a nine-year cycle called '*éducation fondamentale*' (Fundamental Education) and the use of a bilingual approach (national languages and French) in the curriculum generalization. Faced with the existence of three main types of schools (public, private and community), PISE III aimed at harmonizing school curriculum, teaching skills, evaluation methodology, and training across the system. The ultimate objective was to progressively convert community schools into public schools by providing them with quality learning inputs, improving infrastructure and raising teacher quality.



was only 16 percent. Only 1 in 10 mastered all grade-appropriate skills in both math and French. The qualifications and quality of teachers also represented a major concern as well as the loss of instruction time as a result of high teacher absenteeism and inadequate teaching and learning conditions. In 2009-2010, for example, Malian students benefited only from 122 days of learning, out of 172 official days planned, thus losing almost 30 percent of learning time. This is much lower than the median for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (173 days) or the recommended annual 850-1,000 hours. In addition, the quality of the limited learning time available was adversely affected by a shortage of textbooks and other instructional materials.

10. **Inefficient allocation and use of resources:** At the time of project preparation, constraints existed in three areas: budget formulation, budget execution, and oversight. *In terms of budget preparation and execution*, while the education sector adhered to the Budget Directorate Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) together with a number of budget programs, the latter were more aligned with administrative requirements than with policy objectives and the country's funding decisions did not always support the education goals. Due to the lack of adequate information and real metric of need, resources were not distributed equitably between regions, localities and schools, and there was no recognition of additional costs of serving dispersed populations in the north, no funding for girls' education, and no consistent planning for capital needs⁵. More broadly, there was virtually no planning for accommodating the fast-growing school-age population. While much of the funding appeared to be transferred to localities, in reality, localities had little control over these funds, especially in terms of conveying their needs and accessing the funds in a timely manner. *In terms of budget oversight*, the 2010 Mali Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review underscored the need to bring fiscal forecasts more in line with sector strategies. However, a persistent lack of sufficiently detailed data, along with delays in data availability, hampered the effectiveness of external controls and, in particular, controls involved in the vote on the Budget Execution Review Law. Internal and external audits also highlighted weaknesses in monitoring of allocations of resources to the most de-concentrated education units.
11. **Weak sector management, including teacher management and school construction:** The 2010 education sector review acknowledged the need for administrative, fiduciary and pedagogical management reforms to achieve the country's UPE objectives. Management of the education and training system was adversely affected by the limited capacity of decentralized entities. Weak accountability was also related to a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities as the system moved to greater decentralization. In particular, it was not always clear that local authorities were directly responsible for a number of relevant areas, including payment of teacher salaries, preparation of school construction plans, and management of funds for both school grants and the school feeding program. Although Mali transferred human resource management functions to localities in 2002, the country did not create a merit and personnel system for territorial civil servants until 2009. Hence, between 2002 and 2009 localities were solely in charge of hiring teachers, without any support or qualification requirements from the Ministry of Education, Literacy and National Languages (*Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Alphabétisation et de la Promotion des Langues Nationales* – MEAPLN). This accelerated the decline in teacher quality, compounded by the country's extremely limited teacher training capacity. In 2011, only 4 percent of teachers received training at the primary level and 6 percent at lower secondary level.⁶ Overall, only about half the teachers at primary level and 73 percent of teachers at lower secondary level had received some kind of training during their career.
12. **Activities supported by donors are coordinated by the education cluster** operating under the leadership of the Ministry of Education. Following the 2012 coup d'état and suspension of aid, donor support began to resume progressively in 2013. At the time of appraisal, the donors' main interventions included school-health and feeding program by the World Food Program, teacher training, school construction and early childhood development (ECD) by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), school canteens, support to school-management committees (*Comité de gestion scolaire* – CGS) and ECD activities by various international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

⁵Mali Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review. The World Bank, March 2010.

⁶ Republic of Mali Education Public Expenditure Review. The World Bank, 2010.



Impact of the Crisis on the Sector

13. The political crisis and its security and economic effects had a severe impact on access to quality education and on the financing and management of the education sector, which jeopardized the country's progress toward achieving the millennium development goals (MDGs). Following the crisis, many international aid and development organizations withheld funding and put their development activities on hold. As a result, Mali's economy significantly slowed, government revenue dried up, and public expenditures drastically shrank, especially given the restrictions imposed in occupied areas. At the time of project preparation, it was estimated that about 120,000 students in primary and lower secondary education were displaced, of which around 50,000 had moved to the south. The status of education services, heavily disrupted in the north and overloaded in the south because of the influx of displaced persons, further contributed to worsening access to education, student dropout, and the low quality of services offered, including lack of school feeding and a shortage of qualified teachers. This likely led to the strong declines in the national-level primary education GER (from 81.5 percent in 2010 to 69.3 percent in 2013) and the primary completion rate (from 58.3 percent in 2010 to 47.7 percent in 2013).
14. *In the North*, fighters from various factions destroyed, looted and occupied more than 130 schools in 2012. An estimated 5,000 teachers were displaced, reducing capacities to teach in the north by at least a quarter overall, and by two-thirds in Kidal. The situation also created a shortage of learning materials. Where schools were still open, the lack of safety, as well as growing food insecurity, drastically reduced attendance, and the newly required segregation of boys and girls in schools under Sharia law further strained the capacity to provide education. Overall, almost all school-age children in the north were out of school during the last half of the 2011-2012 academic year. This situation was particularly worrisome given that many out-of-school girls were reportedly married off to escape possible sexual violence, while some boys were forcibly recruited to join combatants. Many children were under pressure to find work to support their families. Data from academic 2012/2013 also indicated a GER of only about 30 percent in Timbuktu and 14 percent in Gao, down from a high two years earlier of 77 percent and 98 percent, respectively. Not surprisingly, the primary completion rate also decreased substantially, from an already-low 30 to 40 percent in 2010/2011 to 10 to 20 percent in 2012/2013.
15. *In the South*, both overcrowding and retention were issues that the education system was forced to confront within a short time span. The massive inflow of new students placed tremendous pressure on already-overcrowded facilities, with adverse effects on access and quality. By the end of October 2012, more than 35,000 new basic education students (ages 7-15) were registered in the seven regions in the south (including the academies of Bamako right and left bank, Segou, San, Douentza, Mopti, Kati). Host teachers with varying levels of qualifications had to support additional academic and socio-emotional demands from students in very difficult living situations. At the family level, with less money to spend, displaced persons tended to reduce the proportion of expenses on non-food spending, including education. However, analysis of available data by the education cluster found that retention was also a major challenge: of the 35,000 new basic education students registered, only about 10,000 (28 percent), were actually enrolled in a school, while the remaining 72 percent (25,000 school-age children), many of them girls, had dropped out.
16. Mali had been issued a Global Partnership for Education (GPE) grant in the amount of US\$41.7 million for two years (2012 and 2013) to support reforms through a development policy operation (DPO) related to improving quality and strengthening decentralized management of basic education. Although the proposed Education for All Emergency Project (EFAEP) was already ready to be negotiated, the March 22, 2012 *coup d'état* immediately triggered the Bank's OP/BP 7.30 on "dealing with de facto Governments" and the DPO had to be abandoned. Following a request in September 2012 from the transition government and the Local Education Group (LEG), the DPO was converted into an investment emergency operation to address the most pressing needs of displaced and at-risk students and protect the gains achieved during the previous decade towards meeting the MDGs. The proposed EFAEP was subsequently designed with a focus on three key challenges: i) addressing the educational risks and vulnerabilities existing before the crisis; ii) addressing the critical needs that the 2012 crisis itself brought; and iii) addressing the original mandate to improve education access and quality.

Higher-Level Objectives




17. The primary, country-specific development goal that the EFAEP was to support in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) (FY08-11) was to increase the educational level of the rural population while incorporating crosscutting issues of capacity building, gender equality and decentralization. The project also was to support goals for the Interim Strategy Note (ISN) 2013-2015 under preparation during project appraisal, with a focus on: i) protecting human capital and building resilience, and ii) preparing the conditions for economic recovery. The project fully fit within the human capital pillar, which aimed at supporting a comprehensive, synergetic approach to human capital development with an emphasis on: i) acting early through combined actions to improve the education, health and nutrition of infants and children, while also tackling issues of high fertility; ii) providing core skills to improve the productivity and employability of youth; and iii) combining measures to improve health and education services with demand-side interventions to protect human capital, with an aim of putting in place systems that mitigate risks and build resilience.
18. Lastly, the EFAEP was aligned with the World Bank Education and Africa Strategies, which aimed to maximize the impact of education on economic growth and poverty reduction by supporting the attainment of Education for All (EFA) goals and the MDGs, and by strengthening education for a knowledge economy

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

19. The project's two overarching objectives were to increase access to education and improve the learning environment for affected students in the targeted areas. To achieve this, the project's design was structured logically around three complementary components, with investment on infrastructures and goods combined with capacity-building activities (see figure 1).
20. The first component aimed at increasing access to basic education services. By supporting school construction, rehabilitation and equipment, the project aimed at creating additional places to restore access to school in the north and mitigate the negative effects of overcrowding in the south. The delivery of school health and nutrition programs as well as the provision of teaching-learning materials were expected to increased school attendance in the targeted areas. While this component mainly focused on increasing access, it was expected that some of the interventions would also contribute to improving the learning environment.
21. The second component aimed at strengthening technical and pedagogical capacity of the education system by delivering training to teachers, pedagogical advisers and school directors, and by providing remedial classes and school kits to students. The provision of adequate pedagogical support to displaced and affected students was likely to improve their learning environment.
22. The third component aimed at strengthening administrative and monitoring capacity of the education system by training and involving the CGS in the management of school activities, notably construction and school-canteens, and by supporting the Ministry's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system and project management. Enhancing the quality and regularity of education services was likely to contribute to improving the learning environment.
23. Together with other partners' interventions supporting the PRODEC, achievement of the PDO was expected to contribute to the Government's long-term objectives of UPE and improved retention and completion at the primary education level. This would also contribute to the GPE's strategy and objectives in Mali, namely increased support to fragile states, improving learning outcomes and the quality of education, and increased support to girls' education.



Figure 1. The Results Chain illustrated



Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

- 24. The overall project development objective (PDO), according to the project appraisal document (PAD), was to increase access to education, and improve the learning environment, for affected students in the targeted areas.
- 25. The original PDO according to the Legal Agreement was not materially different to the PDO in the PAD stating that the PDO was to increase access to basic education and to improve the learning environment for affected students in targeted areas of the Recipient's territory.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

- 26. It was expected that project-supported activities would result in the key outcomes of increased access and improved learning environment for affected students in targeted areas. Due to the emergency nature of the operation, the indicators were more output-based than outcome-based since the project was addressing the most pressing issues for restoring and maintaining education services in affected areas.



27. The four PDO indicators were strongly linked to the two overarching objectives and were supplemented by nine intermediate results indicators (IRI), three per component, which, together, provided the ability to track progress against achievement of the objectives.
- PDO indicator #1 measured the number of additional classrooms resulting from project intervention. The target was the construction of 960 classrooms at the primary level, 81 classrooms at the lower secondary level and 9 classrooms at the secondary level. This indicator was adequate to track the creation of additional places and inform on the evolution of access to school and mitigation of overcrowding in targeted areas.
 - PDO indicator #2 directly measured the evolution of access to school by tracking the number of additional students enrolled in targeted areas, with a target of 50,000 new students in school by the end of the project. The main beneficiaries include displaced students from the north and out-of-school children in the south.
 - PDO indicator #3 measured the number of classrooms rehabilitated as result of project intervention. The target was the rehabilitation of 200 classrooms that were either destroyed or damaged. This indicator was also adequate to track the creation of additional places in school but also inform on the improvement of the learning environment.
 - PDO indicator #4 measured the number of children benefiting school canteens as a result of project intervention. The target was 50,000 students per year over three years of implementation, totaling 150,000 students at the end of the project. This indicator intended to inform on the provision of services that contribute to improving the learning environment and are known to positively impact school attendance and retention.

Components

28. Project intervention areas were defined on the basis of the following criteria: (i) the number of displaced people in the area, (ii) the number of community schools located in underserved zones, and (iii) the GER of the area. Based on these criteria, the following seven academies (out of seventeen) were prioritized: Bamako right Bank, Bamako left Bank, Douentza, Kati, Mopti, San, Segou. The Bank and the Government agreed to wait until 2014 to determine whether or not some activities would take place in the north. Finally, the academies of Gao, Kidal and Tombouctou were also targeted by the project interventions.
29. **Component 1: Increasing access to quality basic education services (estimated: US\$29.85 million, actual: US\$35.20 million – 118 percent)**. The aim of this component was to increase access to and improve the learning environment of schools through the construction and rehabilitation of physical structures, provision of school health and nutrition programs, and relevant teaching-learning materials to students in targeted areas, with a focus on displaced students and those in the south.
30. Sub-Component 1.1: School construction, rehabilitation, and equipment. This sub-component was designed to accommodate displaced and affected students, and to expand the number of student places in basic education (primary and lower secondary), as well as in secondary education. The infrastructure program represented an increase of less than 5 percent of the capacity in primary while rehabilitation targeted 1 percent of existing classrooms. The program included construction and equipment of 1,050 classrooms, rehabilitation of 200 classrooms, construction of 100 blocks of latrines, 200 wells and distribution of 3,000 student desk in existing schools. The Ministry of Education decided to contract two construction managers to undertake overall implementation of classroom construction, with the Support Unit for Education Deconcentration and Decentralisation (*Cellule d'Appui à la Décentralisation et à la Décontraction – CADDE*) in charge of overall monitoring. It was decided that the construction program would be implemented in two phases, to wait for improved



security conditions before launching construction in the northern regions. Thus, the second phase mainly targeted the Academies of Gao and Tombouctou.

31. Sub-Component 1.2: School health, feeding program, and teaching materials. This sub-component aimed to increase access and retention of children in school and improve the learning environment, especially for girls living in areas of food insecurity and for vulnerable school-age children living in targeted areas. This was intended to be achieved through the provision of food and health services, and the provision of teaching-learning materials in schools. The project was to provide grants for beneficiary schools through direct support to improve school productivity schemes, support 300 school canteens, train 1,500 students-mothers, and purchase school materials for girls with at least 80 percent monthly attendance. In particular, the design of this sub-component was informed by best practices in the organization and management of school canteens. Implementation arrangements such as management of school canteens by the CGS, purchase of food within the community, and training of community leaders and canteen staff on nutrition, hygiene and sanitation all aimed at increasing levels of educational attainment as well as communities' health and well-being, as a foundation for further social and economic development.
32. **Component 2: Strengthening the technical and pedagogical capacity of the education system (estimated: US\$7.75 million, actual: US\$3.34 million – 43 percent).** This component aimed at improving the learning environment of schools through teachers' training activities and pedagogical support for displaced students. These interventions were expected to improve students' learning based on the Government's ongoing program of education reform.
33. Sub-Component 2.1: Teacher training. The objective of this sub-component was to improve the learning environment by supporting training activities that would enhance teachers' teaching skills in reading and math, along with pedagogical advisors' capacity to provide pedagogical support and school directors' management skills. It also provided pedagogical materials to students and teachers, particularly supporting teachers in multi-grade classes, especially those in community schools. Initial objectives were to train 75 teacher trainers, 2,000 primary school teachers, 250 secondary teachers, 100 teachers in multi-grade teaching and 300 school directors and pedagogical advisors. Given the size of the country and the accessibility challenges imposed by the 2012 crisis, a cascade approach was used for teacher training. In addition, the project provided logistical support, as well as reinforced communications and supervision, to address challenges associated with the use of cascade approach in teachers training. The teacher training program, meanwhile, aimed to accomplish two main goals: First, it would facilitate the transfer of eligible community teachers to the Government system, and second, it would ensure that teachers possess the basic skills needed to teach students reading and writing, both of which are essential for further learning. The transfer of community teachers to the Government payroll was designed to help build their confidence and effectiveness in the classroom, and to promote student learning. In turn, this was expected to build confidence in the community about the utility of schools, and to promote greater interest in education, including increased participation of girls and students from disadvantaged communities.
34. Sub-Component 2.2: Pedagogical support to affected students. This sub-component supported the readmission of 20,000 displaced students from the north through the provision of remedial courses and school kits to give them the necessary materials for studying. In addition, teaching-learning materials would be sent to students of 120 schools remaining in the north, with support from local NGOs. Remedial courses were designed to ensure that both displaced students and those affected by the conflict in the north received appropriate psycho-social support to cope with the trauma following the violence and displacement, that they made up for lost time on task, and that they were effectively prepared for responsible civic participation in the future through programs on peace and social integration. School supplies lost or damaged as a result of the crisis were replaced to allow students to benefit fully from the courses.



35. **Component 3: Strengthening the administrative and monitoring capacity of the education system, and project management (estimated: US\$4.10 million, actual: US\$2.71 million – 66 percent).** This component encompassed a variety of administrative, monitoring and project management activities, including strengthening of the CGS, monitoring and evaluation, and direct project management-related support.
36. Sub-Component 3.1: Involvement of the CGS in school management. The objective of this sub-component, aligned with priorities of the national education reform program, was to help address the issue of weak management and supervision of education services during the crisis. It aimed at establishing 1,000 CGS in new and existing primary schools. Operation of the CGS under Ministerial Decree (No. 04-0469 du 09 mars 2004-MEN) provided legal authority for their interventions, and the use of democratic principles for the composition and election of members. Transparency in their operations provided legitimacy for the groups and increased their effectiveness. Their primary responsibilities under the project were to manage school canteens, and ensure a friendlier and safer school environment; for the latter, they were to participate in a broad range of school management training activities, including use of resources, monitoring of student achievement, monitoring of teacher and student attendance, supervision of learning time, and promotion of girls' education. Strengthening of the CGS to participate in school management as part of the overall decentralized education management approach was considered an asset for promoting access, retention and quality education, as demonstrated in international research. Lastly, the sub-component included a structured M&E approach that permitted continuous assessment of operational effectiveness and provided the necessary guidance and basis for further improvements.
37. Sub-Component 3.2: Support to the MEAPLN M&E system in targeted areas. This sub-component supported a stronger M&E system in targeted areas to allow for more effective management and monitoring of the basic education sub-sector. The establishment of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) for the collection, analysis and use of data was considered a state-of-the-art approach with a number of benefits. Critically, it could promote efficiency by reducing the time for the collection and processing of data, which allows for more time to be spent on ensuring accuracy and relevance of data collected. The ability of Education Support Centers (*Centre d'Animation Pédagogique – CAP*) to use the system to analyze and transmit data in real time was considered a great asset in managing the crisis, especially in identifying key areas of need for targeted interventions and for monitoring impact. In the longer term, the objective was to improve policy and program development and implementation, as well as to foster better pedagogical practices. Overall costs of managing an education management information system (EMIS) also were to be substantially reduced as a result of reduced usage of paper and travel costs. This sub-component also aimed at establishing the basis for expanding the data ecosystem to lower administrative levels, and for the use of new technology (e.g., mobile telephones) to transmit school data. Specifically, the project was to support equipment, materials and operating costs to keep the system functioning during the crisis.
38. Sub-Component 3.3: Project management. Activities under this sub-component included provision of goods, consultant services, audits, training, and operating costs to the recipient for the purposes of project management, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Technical assistance for M&E activities were provided in specific areas, and included data collection, management of school infrastructure, and management of school feeding activities.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

N/A



Revised PDO Indicators

39. No revisions were made to the PDO indicators during the life of the project. A new indicator was identified during the Mid-Term Review (MTR) in 2015 and used by the Ministry to better track progress and regularity of meal delivery at school canteens supported by the project. However, this was not formally introduced into the Results Framework when the project was restructured in 2016.

Revised Components

N/A

Other Changes

40. **Change in Implementation Schedule:** Following the Government's request in May 2016, a Level 2 restructuring extended the project closing date from December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2017. This extension aimed to provide additional time for the completion of key activities.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

41. The Level 2 restructuring, approved in July 2016, was necessary to provide additional time for the results to be more fully achieved and outcomes to be consolidated, especially in relation to the completion of construction activities, school-feeding activities and scaling-up of the M&E system.

42. The changes introduced during the life of the project did not impact the PDO, outcome targets, indicators and implementation arrangements and, therefore, had no implication on the project's Theory of Change.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

43. **The project's objectives were highly relevant as they responded to key challenges facing the education sector in Mali at the time when a severe crisis was further jeopardizing the delivery of education services throughout the country.** Not only was the school-age population growing rapidly at 3.5 to 4 percent annually with a large proportion of out-of-school children and poor resource availability, but this was compounded when donor assistance, which made up almost the entire capital expenditure budget to the sector, was frozen during the 2012 crisis. Given this context, the project was timely in injecting much-needed resources into the sector. The Bank's decision to quickly intervene in the field and maintain a policy dialogue despite the crisis had a catalytic effect on other donors' decision to resume their support to the education sector in Mali and serves as a key lesson for engagement in conflict settings.

44. **In addition, the project reflected country strategies during appraisal.** The project's objectives were well-aligned with the PRSP and the 2008-2011 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) priorities which aimed to increase the education level among rural populations and support capacity-building and decentralization efforts in the sector as well as initiatives which promoted girls' access to quality education. The project objectives were consistent with the 2013-2015 ISN which was also



under preparation at the time the project was being designed and appraised. The PDO's emphasis on increasing access to education and improving the learning environment for affected students in targeted areas was very timely given the extremely challenging context in which the project would be implemented. Furthermore, the project's focus was consistent with the GPE's objectives to provide support to fragile states, promote girls' education, and to improve learning outcomes and the overall quality of education particularly among vulnerable groups. Finally, the Project's emphasis on improving the quality of education as a mean to promote economic growth, while alleviating extreme poverty, was well-aligned with the Bank's corporate strategies for the education sector in Africa. The PDO continued to be highly relevant throughout the project life, and this was reaffirmed with the re-endorsement of the PDO under the project restructuring in 2016.

45. **The PDO continues to remain relevant in terms of its alignment with various country documents and strategies.** The PDO remained aligned with the new Country Partnership Framework (CPF) 2016-2019 which includes as one of its key strategic objectives to improve social service delivery and develop human capital. The PDO is also still relevant with the Government's current priorities as evidenced by the interim national education sector development program 2015-2016 whose ultimate objective is to improve access, quality, service delivery and enhance the governance of the education system. Looking ahead, the new Ten-Year Education Program (PRODEC II) under preparation, will work towards the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 to "ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all". In addition, the forthcoming GPE financing is considering the possibility of supporting and expanding some of the project's activities.

46. **For these reasons, the relevance of the PDOs is rate as *High*.**

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

47. **The first sub-objective of increasing access for affected students in targeted areas was achieved**, through the construction and rehabilitation of physical structures as well as the delivery of school health and nutrition programs and teaching-learning materials to affected students.
48. During the life of the project, the objective of 1,050 additional classrooms was achieved through the construction by AGETIER and AGETIPE of 960 primary school classrooms, 81 lower secondary classrooms and 9 upper secondary classrooms. However, only 786 of these 1,050 classrooms (or 75 percent) were equipped due to the Ministry of Finances' decision in 2016 to start imposing taxes on all donor financed projects (following a change in government), therefore increasing the cost of the interventions, particularly the equipping of classrooms built during the second construction phase. Despite this increased cost, construction of all 1,050 classrooms was completed by diverting funds from other components of the project toward Component 1; but 264 classrooms remained unequipped which the Ministry of Education plans to fund from the national budget, for which a line item has been designated. The new GPE project will also consider financing the equipping of these remaining classrooms. 706 latrine blocs and 243 administrative offices were also constructed in some of the 1,050 schools, as part of the "infrastructure kit". In addition, the Ministry directly managed the rehabilitation of 202 existing classrooms, exceeding the original target of 200, and the construction of 200 wells and 100 latrine blocs, as initially planned. It also provided 3,000 school desks in existing schools as planned. All of these activities were conducted in the areas initially targeted by the project, namely the academies of Dioila, Douentza, Kati, Mopti, San, Segou, Bamako Right Bank and Bamako Left Bank.
49. Creating additional places contributed to restoring and increasing access to school in these academies, which were hosting the highest number of displaced students from the conflict-affected Northern areas. The northern academies of Gao and Tombouctou were also included during the second construction phase later in the project's life, as expected. The project was one of the first emergency education operation in the region. It raised awareness on the critical needs facing the education sector in Mali, including school construction, and encouraged further funding by other development partners (DPs) in targeted areas. Construction of classrooms was the driver in improved pupil-classroom ratios in the academies covered under the project which decreased from 48 in 2011/12 to 40 in 2016/17: while the percentage change in the student population



was approximately the same in both beneficiary and non-beneficiary academies in the south (at a little over 15 percent), the number of classrooms was substantially higher in project academies (nearly 40 percent) compared to non-beneficiary academies (24 percent). The combination of the Project outcomes and other partners' interventions contributed to a 38 percent increase of the total number of classrooms at the primary level between 2012 and 2016.

50. To improve school attendance, the project supported the delivery of school health and nutrition programs to affected students in the Academies of Dioila, Douentza, Gao, Kati, Mopti, San, Segou, and Tombouctou. Initial objectives of reaching 300 canteens and 150,000 beneficiaries were exceeded, as 168,434 children (of which approximately 47 percent were girls and 20,000 were displaced students) and 577 canteens benefitted from the school canteens program supported under the project, which provided a total of around 27.3 million meals. In addition, 1,500 mothers of students were trained in school health activities to support the functioning of school canteens by local communities. Communities received money from the project to collect local cereals for school feeding, a cost-effective approach that reduced leakages and ensured timely execution. In some cases, communities also supplemented what was provided through family contributions for condiments, water and compensation for the cooks, which ensures a degree of sustainability beyond project closure. An application was developed and piloted in 30 of the 577 canteens by the end of the project to ensure that each child received a meal, in turn confirming the attendance of the child. To foster girls' enrollment and attendance, the project supported the provision of incentives (e.g., school materials such as textbooks, notebooks, calculators, etc.) to 19,581 girls in the academies of Bamako, Dioïla, Douentza, Kati, Mopti, Segou, San, Gao and Tombouctou, exceeding the initial target off 15,000 girls. In total, 52,500 additional students were enrolled in the targeted areas following the project's interventions.
51. **The second sub-objective of improving the learning environment for affected students in targeted areas was achieved**, by creating or renovating physical infrastructures and by strengthening the technical, pedagogical, administrative and monitoring capacities of the education system. First, the creation of additional places through the construction and rehabilitation of classrooms in the seven academies where students had been displaced contributed to mitigating the negative effects of overcrowding on the learning environment, therefore preserving retention and learning for both displaced and resident students. As mentioned above, as a result of the project and other partners' interventions, pupil-classroom ratios improved from 48 in 2011/12 to 40 in 2016/17 in project academies; while pupil-classroom ratios also improved in non-project academies in the south, this change was much smaller, decreasing from 45 to 42 over the same period.
52. Second, the delivery of teacher training and pedagogical activities contributed to enhancing the system's capacities to provide adequate pedagogical support to affected students in targeted areas. The objective of training 2,000 additional teachers was exceeded as the project ultimately trained a total of 4,833 teachers. Concerning the core activities envisioned at appraisal, training was provided to 2,150 basic education teachers in psychosocial support and remediation, to 250 secondary school teachers in competency-based learning, and to 30 teachers in multi-grade teaching. In addition, the project also supported the training of 2,000 teachers on the new primary school curriculum and 403 teachers on the new secondary school curriculum. While the impact of these trainings has not been assessed, several missions were organized by the Training Directorates to follow-up and provide in-class support to trained teachers. Initial objectives also included training of 75 regional trainers and 300 educational advisors and school directors. This target was also exceeded, as 100 directors and educational advisors were trained in monitoring techniques, 212 trainers and educational advisors were trained on the new curriculum, 237 trainers and advisors were trained in learning assessment techniques, 100 educational advisors and regional staff were trained in subject didactical models for mobile schools, and 75 educational advisors were trained in the management of single-classroom schools. Thus, a total of 724 staff were trained in addition to teachers.
53. Regarding school remediation, the objectives of providing 20,000 students with remedial classes and 30,000 students with school kits (binder, notebook, pen, pencil and eraser) was exceeded, as a total of 39,981 students (of which approximately 48 percent were girls) benefitted from remedial classes and 30,925 students received school kits in the academies of Segou, Mopti, Douentza, Gao and Tombouctou. In those areas where many schools were closed due to security issues, the provision of pedagogical support to displaced students contributed to mitigating the impact of the crisis on their learning environment. In 2016, the admission rate at the final basic education exam in the academy of Mopti was higher for displaced students who benefitted from remedial classes supported by the project (67.24 percent) than the overall rate in the same academy (35.74



percent)⁷. In addition, the project supported training for 100 regional trainers in psychosocial support and remediation and provided motivation bonuses to 278 teachers in charge of remedial classes in the academies of Gao and Tombouctou.

54. Third, strengthening administrative and monitoring capacities contributed to the system's capacity to deliver quality and regular education services. To improve local management capacities in the targeted areas, 1,332 CGS were set up and trained, exceeding the initial target of 1,000. Specifically, 18,648 CGS members and 805 trainers from the regional and local education authorities were trained in managing school activities contributing to an improved learning environment such as remedial classes and school canteens. During the last year of the project's implementation, an EMIS under the form of a VPN was established at the central level and in 10 academies targeted by the project. The VPN is intended to facilitate and increase the efficiency of data collection, analysis and use by local, regional and national staff of the Education Ministry. However, the CAPs could not be equipped and supported due to the project's budget and timeframe. Since the system was not completed by the end of the project, it was not possible to witness its impact on decision-making and policies, but continuity is ensured by the European Union (EU) project which is funding equipment and wiring of the remaining 8 academies and all the CAPs. In addition, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is supporting the Ministry to migrate business applications to the new centralized computer platform.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

55. **The project either achieved or exceeded all targets in the Results Framework by project closing.** In addition, the Ministry of Education tracked an additional indicator on the number of meals distributed, which reached 27.3 million meals, exceeding its target of 27 million. Other indicators that were not tracked but demonstrated project success, in combination with other partners' interventions, included the greater reduction in pupil-classroom ratios⁸ in project academies than in non-project academies in the south. Further, the construction of classrooms in project academies significantly outpaced that of non-project academies in the south despite similar increases in the population. In addition, student performance for those in remedial classes was substantially higher than those who did not take these classes, also pointing to the project's impact. Some implementation delays, requiring the extension of the project closing date by 12 months, did not prevent the project to succeed in to completing key activities and achieving objectives. In addition, while the imposition of taxes increased construction costs, this did not hinder the completion of construction: all 1,050 classrooms were built, but the project was not able to equip 264 classrooms and was not able to fully set up the M&E system owing to time and budget constraints. The Ministry has nonetheless allocated a line item in the national budget for equipping these classrooms and the new GPE project will also consider supporting this activity. In addition, a comprehensive blueprint for the M&E system was developed that is already being taken up by other donors.
56. Based on the available evidence presented during the implementation completion and results report (ICR) mission and the achievements of all four PDOs and nine intermediate outcomes by the end of the project- in many cases exceeding the original targets, efficacy under the project is rated **Substantial**.

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

57. **Despite government's commitment to maintain funding to the education sector even in the face of the conflict, capital**

⁷ Data is only available for the Academy of Mopti. The impact of remedial classes was not measured in other areas. Note that this is an additional indicator collected by the Ministry over and above the indicators in the Results Framework.

⁸ According to official data extracted from the Ministry of Education's statistical booklet.



expenditure to education was significantly affected due to freezing of donor funds in 2012. During the 2012 crisis, the government continued to allocate 4.5 percent of their GDP to education. However, the majority of this spending was allocated toward current expenditure; when donor funding was frozen in 2012, capital expenditure as a share of total education expenditure dropped to 0 percent and has since steadily increased, reaching 8 percent in 2015; this still falls far below the level in 2009 which was 28 percent. In addition, while real per capita education expenditure has grown at an average of five percent annually between 2004 and 2011, this fell in 2012 by 19 percent and is slowly recovering at slower rate of three percent annually. Pre-conflict levels of education expenditure were already inadequate to account for the rapid increase in the school-age population, the proportion of excluded children, and poor resource availability and the conflict exacerbated these challenges. Hence, this project was not only pertinent in injecting much-needed resources into the education sector, but it was also timely in that it contributed to increasing capital expenditure at a time when donor funding had been frozen.

58. **By the end of the project, all targets in the Results Framework were met or exceeded and 99 percent of the project budget was expended; however, implementation realities meant that disbursement trends, costs and implementation efficiency varied substantially during implementation and 264 classrooms remained unequipped.** The first six months of 2015 and the last year of the project demonstrated high implementation efficiency, with high disbursement and strong implementation progress. However, due to implementation realities, the project stagnated at other times and, if it had closed out when originally scheduled in December 2016, only 8 of the 17 indicators in the Results Framework would have been met. This demonstrates the proactivity of the implementation team in extending the project to ensure that all indicators were met and to accommodate challenges with implementation. In addition, when looking at the budget by component, the project exceeded the budget in the PAD for Component 1 with a budget execution rate of 118 percent, while these rates for Components 2 and 3 were 43 percent and 66 percent, respectively. The cost overruns for Component 1 can be explained by the Ministry of Finances' decision to impose taxes on construction inputs of the project; while the project was able to complete construction, it was unable to equip 264 classrooms. Nonetheless, as noted above, the Ministry of Education has included a line-item in the national budget to fund this activity. In addition, the new GPE project may allocated funds for this purpose. Sub-component 3.2 recorded a 7 percent budget execution rate as extensive diagnostic studies took longer than expected which delayed implementation to the last year. However, when compared against approved annual workplans, savings in almost all areas were made, demonstrating the difficulty with forecasting costs in an emergency environment.
59. **Unit costs for all elements of the project were equal to or lower than cost comparators where these were available, often substantially so, demonstrating high cost effectiveness.** Unit costs for new classrooms, latrine blocs, and offices under the project were lower than other construction projects both in Mali and in other SSA countries, with 99 percent of quality standards met.⁹ School feeding unit costs were lower than in previous projects in Mali and hovered around the average in low-income countries. Unit costs for incentive kits for girls and displaced students were lower than incentive kits provided in Ghana, while the unit cost of remedial education was approximately equivalent to that in Ghana.
60. **Benefits were recorded in terms of increased access, reduced overcrowding and improved learning outcomes– all three areas that were highlighted during appraisal – while the literature has demonstrated long-term benefits in terms of future earnings, health outcomes and intergenerational benefits for some project components.** The project recorded increased access with 52,500 additional seats created. In combination with other DP-funded interventions in the same areas, the project also reduced overcrowding with pupil-classroom ratios decreasing from 48 in 2011/12 to 40 in 2016/17. This was driven primarily by an improvement in infrastructure: while the population of beneficiary and non-beneficiary academies in the south of the country both increased by a little over 15 percent, the percentage change in the number of classrooms was nearly 40 percent higher in project academies compared to 24 percent in non-project academies. The project contributed to improved learning outcomes which were measured for Mopti with students who had undergone remedial sessions in this region outperforming those who did not attend these sessions. Note that while data on learning outcomes was only collected for Mopti¹⁰, given that this region borders the conflict areas in the north, it is likely that learning outcomes also improved in

⁹ Note that unit costs did not include the cost of equipping classrooms.

¹⁰ This indicator was not required to be collected under the project, but was something that the Ministry collected



other areas covered by the project. The project may also have long-term impacts in terms of future earnings, health outcomes, and intergenerational benefits. According to 2010 estimates, returns to education in Mali at the primary and lower secondary level are 38 percent and 88 percent respectively, outperforming the SSA average, while an additional year of schooling increases earnings by 12 percent. In addition, education may also reduce fertility rates and improve health outcomes: the 2012 Mali Demographic and Health Survey indicates that women with education have fewer children and lower neo-natal and infant mortality rates than women who have no education. There are also intergenerational benefits to education with years of education for children positively correlated with the mother's level of education.

61. **While the sustainability of some results will depend on continued investment, the project supported many capacity-building activities which are likely to continue to have a positive impact in the medium to long term.** In addition to a large number of teachers being trained under the project, many CGS were provided with training and capacity-building. Though these activities will be supported by donor partners moving forward, investment in these under the project will continue to benefit the education system and students. There are some elements, however, which will require continued funding to be maintained including the school feeding activity and the provision of incentives. There are, however, encouraging signs: in addition to the project funds, communities directly contributed to school feeding by providing condiments, water and compensation for the cooks, which ensures some degree of sustainability. Further, given continued close cooperation in the context of the LEG, harmonization and coordination of efforts moving forward is likely. Although the project was not able to set up a full M&E system, the diagnostic analysis that was completed provides a strong blueprint for finalizing the setup, and has already been taken on by a EU -financed project which is extending the system to other academies and CAPs while UNESCO is supporting the Ministry to migrate business applications to the new centralized computer platform.

62. **Efficiency of implementation should be seen in the context of the circumstances under which the project was developed and implemented.** With a one-year extension, the project achieved or exceeded all indicator targets within budget, and with a lower or equal unit cost than comparators, and achieved all three benefits mentioned in the economic and financial analysis during project appraisal. In addition, the implementation team demonstrated proactivity in bringing up the discussion to extend the project early. The project also provides a blueprint of costs for future projects, and some elements of the project are already being adopted. However, the project was developed in an emergency context, making it difficult to forecast project costs especially for procurement-related activities that depended on bids and as a result expenditure diverged from the budget in the PAD. The political situation was also unpredictable, making implementation on the ground subject to constant volatility as the conflict moved geographically. As a result, implementation efficiency was affected, with many endline targets met only in the last year of the project and disbursement varying widely throughout the project. In addition, the Ministry of Finances' decision to impose taxes on construction elements of the project affected the pace of construction and required the reallocation of funds from other components into Component 1 to ensure that construction could be completed; this prevented 264 classrooms from being fully equipped. As a result, on balance, despite the efficiency gains achieved under the project – as summarized above and detailed in Annex 4 – overall efficiency under the project is rated **Modest**.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

63. **The project was highly relevant at appraisal and continues to remain so.** In a context of negligent levels of capital expenditure and high school-age population growth that was further compounded by the crisis, the project provided a much-needed investment into the education sector. Furthermore, the project was and continues to remain well-aligned with country documents and strategies: to increase the education level among rural populations and support capacity-building and decentralization efforts and to focus primarily on the poor. The project's focus on displaced students and girls was also highly relevant in the context in which the project was prepared and implemented. These project's objectives continue to remain highly relevant as evidenced by the re-endorsement of the PDO under the project restructuring in 2016. At project

to supplement project data.



closure, the PDO remained aligned with Government's priorities to improve access, quality, service delivery and governance of the education sector and with the SDG 4 focus on ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. The forthcoming GPE financing is also considering sustaining and expanding the project's outcomes.

64. **The project is also rated substantial in terms of its efficacy, having met all of its targets, although 264 classrooms remained unequipped.** The number of meals provided exceeded the Ministry's own target, and pupil-classroom ratios and the rate of increase in construction of new classrooms in project academies compared to non-project academies was significantly higher. Learning outcomes also improved substantially more for students in Mopti who participated in remedial education compared to those that did not. Despite the fact that 264 classrooms remained unequipped at the end of the project owing to the imposition of taxes on construction elements of the project, the Ministry of Education has committed to providing funds for this purpose while the new GPE project is also considering financing the equipping of these classrooms. Finally, although the project was not able to fully set up an M&E system, this is being taken up by other donors.
65. **Efficiency is rated Modest in light of the fact that, despite being relatively cost-effective, the project experienced implementation challenges.** Disbursements varied widely throughout the project and actual expenditure diverged from the budget in the PAD. The Ministry of Finances' decision to impose taxes on construction elements of the project affected the pace of implementation and required the reallocation of funds. Despite achieving or exceeding all the targets in a relatively cost-effective manner, a one-year extension of the closing date was needed to substantially achieve the two overarching objectives of project. Despite the efficiency gains observed under the project, overall efficiency under the project is rated Modest.
66. **In light of the ratings for Relevance of Objectives (High), Efficacy (Substantial) and Efficiency (Modest), the overall outcome rating for the Project is *Moderately Satisfactory*.**

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender

67. Although this was not part of the Result Framework at appraisal, the Ministry produced gender-disaggregated data for several IRIs, such as the number of children benefiting from school canteen, the number of students benefiting from remedial classes, and the number of students receiving school kits (see Annex A for more details). This allowed for the monitoring of gender parity among the project's beneficiaries across interventions. Eventually, 48 percent of beneficiaries of these interventions were girls. A specific intervention of providing incentive kits to girls with monthly attendance of at least 80 percent was supported by the project to promote girls' school attendance in the areas targeted by the project. In total, 19,581 girls in the academies of Bamako, Kati, Dioïla, Segou, San, Douentza, Mopti, Gao and Tombouctou benefited from incentives (school materials such as textbooks, notebooks, pen and calculator). The construction of separate latrines in schools supported by the project was also intended to promote girls' safety and attendance.

Institutional Strengthening

68. The project's emphasis on capacity-building within the education system is reflected in activities supported under Components 2 and 3. The focus on strengthening technical, pedagogical and administrative capacities as well as M&E and project management has supported institutional change. The project has been fully implemented by the Ministry of Education itself with the support of only one consultant for procurement. Despite challenges during implementation, the capacity of the financial management and procurement unit was strengthened in the process and will benefit future projects as the core team remained in place. The Ministry effectively assumed both the strategic and technical coordination of the project. The project was able to leverage the full commitment of the Secretary General at the Ministry of Education who



played the key role of project coordinator, leading and coordinating the necessary dialogue with all of the implementing units – a commendable achievement which has built the Ministry’s capacity. The project also promoted stronger communication and coordination among the various directorates at the Ministry as many interventions required the contribution of different units, under the oversight of one designated unit. It is expected that this collaborative approach will continue beyond the project’s closure as the benefits of increased collaboration across the Ministry’s directorates were clear to all stakeholder given the results achieved.

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

N/A

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

69. The project seems to have had a positive impact on poverty reduction and shared prosperity by targeting the most vulnerable students and communities in Mali. First, project intervention areas were defined to reach the most affected populations, based on the number of IDPs, number of community schools in underserved zones, and GER of the area. The project also had a specific focus on rural areas of the northern regions affected by the conflict. Second, the nature of the interventions, such as providing education, remedial classes and school materials to students, or training in hygiene and sanitation to mothers and canteen staff, likely contributed to improving the well-being of the communities in a difficult environment. While specific data are not available to assess the exact impact on poverty reduction, it can be deduced that interventions to increase/restore access to school had a positive impact on displaced and affected populations, as increase in education attainment is associated with higher private returns.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

70. The project had a positive impact on social development through the empowerment of local communities and school committees. 1,332 CGS were established using the JICA-supported model based on the principle of democratic elections and 18,648 CGS members were trained. CGS received funds through the ADARS mechanism, and were given the responsibility to manage school canteens and ensure a school friendly environment, as well as monitoring students and teacher attendance. Monitoring was conducted through the development of an application to monitor the provision of meals distributed to students, which was successfully piloted in 30 school canteens. In addition, some communities contributed by providing water, condiments, and supported the compensation of cooks, thereby ensuring a degree of sustainability. By ensuring legitimacy and strengthening capacity of CGS, the project contributed to empowering local communities in the management and supervision of education services across the country.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

71. **The clarity and realism of the PDO and supported interventions were relevant in light of the development challenges facing the sector as well as the immediate and pressing needs which had materialized following the outbreak of the crisis.** In a context of conflict and political instability, the project aimed at addressing the urgent needs of displaced students in the South and to attempt to curb service disruptions and preserve/restore education infrastructure to prevent significant



reductions in access to quality education. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and equity concerns informed the selection of the targeted areas, including seven academies in the south and three northern regions.

72. **The project's design was technically sound and structured logically among three complementary components, with investment on infrastructures and goods combined with capacity-building activities, to reach realistic outcomes.** Selectivity in project components and activities was justified given the volatile environment and low institutional capacities. The results chain linking project inputs, outputs and outcomes was coherent, as reflected in the selection of indicators in the result framework. The targets were also realistic given that all the baselines were zero at the time of appraisal and that the operation was processed in an emergency context. Successful implementation of key project-supported activities was likely to lead to the intended outcomes. Construction, equipment and rehabilitation of classrooms, provision of school material and kits were likely to increase access to primary education, given the significant number of damaged or precarious school facilities, the high pupil-classroom ratio and IDPs in targeted areas. Other outputs including school-feeding, school health programs, teacher training and remedial classes were also likely to improve the learning environment and enable increased access and retention. Finally, the design took into account other DP's interventions in the sector to ensure complementarity and support areas of critical need in which other donors were not active or with a limited scope. At the time of appraisal, UNICEF was supporting interventions related to teacher training, ECD and school construction in the regions of Bamako, Segou, Mopti, San, Kati and Kayes. WFP was running a school health and feeding program in Bamako, Segou, Mopti, san, Kati and Koulikoro. JICA was also supporting CGS, school construction and school canteens, along with many international NGOs such as Save The Children, Plan and Handicap International. Despite these country-wide interventions, support was inadequate to meet all the needs and room existed for the Bank to offer complementarity inputs by expanding geographic coverage of these interventions.
73. **The project used existing structures and systems familiar to policymakers, stakeholders and implementing agencies to promote ownership of the project and ensure efficient implementation.** The operation included mitigation measures to address potential risks identified at appraisal including those related to fiduciary management, institutional capacities, multiple stakeholders, M&E and overall implementation capacity. However, the proposed measures could not mitigate the low capacity of the two delegated contract management agencies (AGETIPE and AGETIER) which were exacerbated by a difficult and volatile environment. Despite deficiencies in procurement planning, monitoring and management the Ministry of Education was able to make course correction through a closer follow-up of contract execution and construction sites, which allowed to better mitigate the risks during the second construction phase.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Factor subject to government and/or implementing entities control

74. **Despite frequent staff turnover at leadership level within the Ministry of Education, the project still achieved all its targets.** The Ministry of Education experienced some staff and leadership turnover during the project's life with the succession of five different Ministers and four General Secretaries between July 2013 and December 2017. Although this contributed to slowing down project implementation at times, the Government of Mali remained strongly committed to achieving the project's objective, and, by the end of the project, all indicators in the Results Framework were met or exceeded, and 99 percent of the budget had been spent. Key members of the technical team at the Ministry of Education held their positions throughout the project life and ensured continuity of technical work and discussions.
75. **Working through government systems contributed to strong ownership of the project at the Ministry of Education.** The General Secretary played the role of project coordinator and managed the technical team responsible for implementation of the project activities. The technical team included representatives directly involved in project implementation from the Directorate of Basic Education, CPS, CADDE, the Directorate of school health and nutrition (CNCS), the Directorate of Finance (*Direction des Finances et du Materiel* - DFM), and other relevant units of the Ministry. Key responsibilities in the project management and implementation were successfully assumed by the Ministry's units, such as data collection and reporting



by the CPS and fiduciary management by the DFM. DFM used adequate reporting standards and protocols and submitted Interim unaudited financial reports (IFRs) in a timely manner and in accordance with established guidelines and procedures. In instances where issues were identified, the Ministry's technical team and the Government worked closely with the Bank's team to address them, in some cases having meetings on a weekly basis. The Ministry decided to delegate fiduciary responsibilities of school infrastructure and equipment to construction managers, AGETIER and AGETIPE. It retained, however, the responsibility for school rehabilitation and construction of wells and latrines.

76. **While there were procurement challenges with regards to the two agencies contracted to manage construction, the quality of construction remained high.** The procurement process was affected due to poor performance of the two delegated contract management agencies (AGETIPE and AGETIER) which were in charge of the main project activities (construction and goods) but had limited capacity in procurement planning, management and monitoring. The construction firms were awarded many contracts on multiple sites spread across large distances which made them difficult to manage. The security context also made the access and securing of several sites difficult. AGETIER and AGETIPE did not have the capacity to properly monitor and follow up the construction of the first 786 classrooms, which in addition to the limited capacities of construction firms, resulted in significant delays. Although many areas of improvement remained, the implementation team was proactive in addressing the challenges: weekly meetings were set up under the leadership of the General Secretary with representatives from the Ministry, the agencies and the World Bank TTL, to monitor progress of contract and sites execution. The Ministry of Education also relied on CGS and local communities to better monitor classroom constructions. Adequate measures were introduced during the second phase to mitigate the risks pertaining to a large conflict-affected territory, notably by (i) adapting the selection criteria to allow for the participation of local firms in the bid and benefit from their strong understanding of the local context in affected regions, and (ii) limiting the number of contracts awarded to each firm to match their actual capacities. As a result, the second construction phase was implemented in a more efficient way. Overall, the quality of construction remained at a high standard: an audit report for the first phase of the project found that 99 percent of sites met quality standards and all three FM audits were unqualified.
77. **The imposition of taxes on construction elements of the project during implementation prevented the equipping of 264 classrooms; however, there are plans to ensure that these classrooms will be equipped with funding from the national budget.** When the project became effective, taxes were waived by the Government in place on all development projects to maximize their impact. However, in 2016 the new Government decided to impose taxes again and retroactively on all development projects. As a result, the costs of project interventions increased, especially in the infrastructure component. Recognizing that this change could impact results, the Ministry of Education and the Bank team agreed to redirect project funds from other components toward completing this activity without affecting the implementation of the other components of the project. While construction was completed, 264 classrooms could not be equipped from project funds; instead, the Ministry of Education, has committed to equipping these classrooms from the national budget, designating a line item toward this and the new GPE project will also consider equipping these classrooms.
78. During implementation, the area of Dioila, a former CAP located in the region of Kati, was upgraded to the status of academy, which brought the number of academies supported by the project from 10 to 11, without any corresponding change in the geographical area covered by the project.

Factor subject to World Bank control

79. **Project implementation benefited from the TTL presence in Bamako as well as regular supervision missions throughout the project's life.** The TTL participated in the weekly meetings organized by the Secretary General from 2015 onwards to oversee progress in the construction component. These meetings contributed to improve the monitoring of contract execution and the procurement process, which greatly impacted the amount that was disbursed and project progress. ISRs were produced on a regular basis but could have been more detailed and comprehensive outlining the achievements and challenges observed during the project's implementation. There was a smooth handover of TTLs during the last year of implementation, which did not impact achievement of results. As the project's objectives were not fully achieved while entering the last year of implementation, it was decided to proceed with the restructuring of the project in a timely manner



to extend the closing date by one year. The proactivity of the Bank team allowed the Ministry to benefit from additional time to reach most of its desired outcomes and IRIs by the new closing date, and in some instances, even exceed the targets.

Factor outside the control of government and/or implementing entities

80. **Despite the signing of Peace agreements in 2015 between the Government and rebel coalitions, the political and security situation in Mali has remained particularly fragile and instable.** Attacks by armed groups on the UN force and the Malian army continue, mostly in the north, but the volatile security environment has also reached central regions of Mali, disrupting education services in those areas as well. This impacted the project implementation pace in several ways, especially in terms of access and securing of construction sites, the Ministry's limited capacity to monitor implementation progress and the World Bank's difficulty in conducting supervision missions in central and northern regions. To overcome these challenges, the project team resorted to NGOs from the emergency education cluster to collect information on the field. It was also decided to open up the bidding for construction elements of the project to local firms who were able to get construction contracts in the second phase.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

81. **The M&E system included a Results Framework with four PDO and nine IRIs.** Due to the emergency nature of the operation but also because this was not a requirement at the time of appraisal, the four PDO indicators were not mapped to a specific sub-objective. It was assumed that they would all contribute to the achievement of the two sub-objectives of the PDO: (i) increased access and (ii) improved learning environment for affected students in targeted areas. For instance, the construction of additional classrooms (PDO indicator #1) is expected to contribute to increased access for affected students in targeted areas by creating additional places, and to improved learning environment by reducing overcrowding in existing classrooms. A minor shortcoming was revealed during project implementation in the design of PDO indicator # 4 which measured the number of children benefiting from school canteens as a result of project interventions but did not capture the regularity of meal provision. In response, the Ministry decided to track an additional indicator and exceeded their own target of 27 million meals distributed, instead distributing nearly 27.3 million meals.
82. **The nine IRIs were logically linked to the three components of the project, except for IRI#1.3.** This indicator measured the number of CGS set-up and trained, which rather relates to the activity planned under component 3 and the strengthening of CGS. This can be nuanced however by the fact that having a CGS is a fundamental requirement for schools to receive funds for implementing school canteens, which is part of Component 1.
83. **For the same reasons explained above, the three components were not mapped to a specific sub-objective either as they included activities that would contribute to the achievement of the two sub-objectives of the PDO.** For instance, the construction of additional wells and latrines in schools (IRI#1.1) is expected to have improved both access and the learning environment.
84. **Overall, the set of indicators was adequate to track progress towards achievement of the two overarching objectives.** Many indicators were met beyond their initial targets because these targets had been set realistically, given the country's emergency context and low implementation capacities. As the security environment evolved and northern regions could be



reached by the project interventions, the Ministry was able to implement most of the activities initially planned and expand its capacity for action, therefore exceeding the project indicators' targets.

M&E Implementation

85. **Under Component 3, the project supported the Ministry of Education's M&E system in targeted areas through the establishment of a VPN for the collection, analysis, and use of statistical data.** This is considered as a state-of-the-art approach which was expected to not only allow effective monitoring of the basic education sector in targeted areas, including changes in student movements as a result of the crisis, but also to strengthen project monitoring and the process of transferring data from the CAPs to the academies and the central level. Project support for the VPN system was well-aligned with government priorities as the VPN was one part of a larger strategy to improve M&E that was conceived before the project. Given challenges with monitoring on the ground in a conflict environment and a large territory such as Mali with many hard-to-access areas, it was deemed as an appropriate tool to monitor interventions. Due to important delays in diagnostic studies, the VPN system was only partially established by the end of the project in 2017 (at the level of the Academies but not the CAPs). It was therefore not utilized during the project's life to inform decision-making, but the diagnostic studies served as a blueprint which other donors are now financing. The funds for this aspect of the project were redirected toward Component 1, which was also necessary given the increased cost of construction due to the imposition of taxes.
86. **However, the Ministry of Education did not solely rely on the VPN for data collection and resorted to other methods, including transferring data on USB keys or papers and third-party monitoring in the north, to monitor the project's interventions and progress in the entire education sector.** Although less efficient, data collection was effective, under the coordination of the Planning and Statistical Unit (*Cellule de Planification Scolaire – CPS*), and allowed the Ministry to be reactive when facing some bottlenecks. Specific arrangements were set up along the service delivery chain of the decentralized education system to monitor key interventions such as construction and school-feeding activities. For instance, the Ministry's CADDE, in charge of school infrastructure, established a monitoring mechanism of construction sites which involved staff at the central and decentralized level, including civil engineers posted in Education Academies and technicians posted in CAPs, as well as involving the members of the local CGS to monitor progress. Using third party monitoring in the north through NGOs and communities also ensured timely collection of data. In addition to the VPN, the project supported the development of an application to monitor the provision of meals to students in school canteens, with the objective of adding instruments to also monitor students and teacher presence. This system was successfully piloted in 30 school canteens and its scaling up will depend on further funding. The diagnostic studies ensured the compatibility between the application and the VPN.

M&E Utilization

87. **The Ministry and the World Bank team regularly used the M&E system to manage the project and track implementation progress, which led to the timely restructuring of the project and contributed to the achievement of all its targets by the new closing date.** The M&E system allowed for the timely identification of bottlenecks in project interventions, such as classroom construction and school-feeding, and the design of appropriate solutions, preventing further delays and solving implementation issues in a timely manner. In regions affected by security issues and hardly accessible, the project used a third part monitoring system through local NGOs and communities to supervise classroom constructions and canteen operations. In addition, the Ministry of Education has been producing timely statistical yearbooks since 2011.
88. **Utilization of the M&E system revealed a shortcoming in PDO#4 measuring the number of children benefiting from school canteens, but the Ministry was proactive in supplementing this indicator by tracking the number of meals distributed.** The initial target was to provide a meal per day to 50,000 children annually over three years of project implementation, with an



end target of 150,000 beneficiaries. During the MTR, it was noted that, despite a total number of beneficiaries up to 75,000 children, the beneficiaries had received the equivalent of a daily ration over 40 days a year instead of 180 days. The total number of meals provided since the beginning of the project was therefore 3 million instead of 18 million, as of June 2015. To improve the monitoring of school canteens, an indicator on the number of meals distributed to children was added to better reflect the regularity of meal provision. Although the project's Results Framework was not modified during the project restructuring, the indicator was closely monitored by the Ministry until the project closing in December 2017 and the objective of providing 27 million of meals was exceeded. The Ministry also disaggregated several indicators (number of children benefiting from school canteens, number of students benefiting from remedial classes, and number of students receiving kits) by gender, although this was not part of the Results Framework, again demonstrating proactivity in tracking gender results. A full list of indicators that were tracked under the project is available in Annex A.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

89. The quality of the M&E system is rated **Substantial**. The M&E system established under the project was sound, albeit some minor shortcomings related to ISI#3, which the Ministry was proactive about tracking by including a second indicator on the number of meals distributed. No change to PDO or intermediate results indicators was required. While the establishment of the VPN experienced delays, the CPS at the Ministry of Education did not rely on this system for reporting on indicators and was capable of collecting timely information on the project's achievements to produce periodic progress reports and update the Results Framework accordingly through a variety of approaches. The VPN was eventually established at the Academy level but could not be extended to the CAP level; however, this is being taken on by other donors. The system allowed for the timely identification of bottlenecks in project implementation and the design of appropriate solutions. In sum, the M&E system established and maintained under the project was generally robust and provided the necessary data to systematically track and evaluate the project's overall performance.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

90. **Financial Management** rating was **Satisfactory** throughout the project implementation. Three audits were undertaken and delivered an unqualified opinion as they revealed no significant irregularities. Reporting standards and protocols were adequate and IFRs were submitted in a timely manner and in accordance with established guidelines and procedures. During project implementation, some delays in the procurement process had an impact on the disbursement of funds. In instances where issues were identified, the Bank worked closely with the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and the Government to address them. The FM staff had adequate experience to carry out their required tasks effectively.
91. **Procurement** was rated **Moderately Satisfactory** throughout project implementation. While procurement started poorly it improved measurably through capacity-building. The procurement process was mainly affected by the poor performance of the two delegated contract management agencies (AGETIPE and AGETIER) who were in charge of the main project activities (construction and goods). This was evidenced by deficiencies in procurement planning & monitoring and procurement cycle management. To address the weak capacity issues identified, Bank staff provided hands-on support to the DFM and the delegated contract management agencies. The procurement review and approval process by the directorate in charge (*Direction Générale des Marchés Publics - DGMP*) was brought to the Government's attention and highlighted in monthly portfolio review meetings. The setting up of a specific coordination and monitoring unit (*Cellule de Coordination et de Suivi des Projets/Programmes – CCSP*) by the Ministry of Education contributed to the improvement of national procurement processes. The General Secretary also played an important role by convening weekly meetings for troubleshooting. The pace of procurement under the project gained significant momentum as a result. The PPR carried out on May and June 2018 still noticed some areas for improvement, including: (i) the lack of quality review of procurement documents within the executing agencies; (ii) the non-compliance with the deadlines for the contracts execution, even though these contracts were eventually executed; and (iii) the poor filing of procurement documents, characterize the three project executing agencies. The PPR



observations were communicated to the Government to ensure that they will be taken into consideration in future projects. Procurement capacity by Project end was nevertheless robust enough to contribute to the realization of all the (impressive) project outcomes.

92. **Safeguards** Compliance is **Moderately Satisfactory** throughout project implementation. Due to the delay noted to complete the preparation of relevant safeguards instruments and the absence of environmental and social audit scheduled in the ESMF. The project was classified as environmental category B. The project triggered three safeguards policies: OP/BP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment, OP/BP 4.11 on Physical Cultural Resources, and OP/BP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. As the project was processed through a Bank emergency policy (OP 8.00), an Environmental and Social Screening Assessment Framework (ESSAF) was developed prior to appraisal to help manage the environmental and social issues at the early stage of the project implementation. Two safeguards instruments; the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) acceptable to the Bank were expected to be prepared, consulted upon and disclosed within four months of effectiveness and before commencement of the civil works. The preparation of these instruments was delayed due mainly to the security situation in the country.
93. During implementation, the safeguards instruments have been prepared through consultations, approved and disseminated within the Bank and the country in March 2015. During implementation, the subprojects were subject to environmental and social screening and relevant specific environmental and social measures were considered and incorporated in the contractors' contracts. The National Directorate in charge of Sanitation, Pollution and Nuisance Control (DNACPN) collaborated with the PCU and reviewed the environmental and social instruments in a timely manner. It is worthy to note that the environmental and social audit that was part of the ESMF was not conducted before the project closure but the Government committed to hire a consultant with its own funds to complete the audit and assess the project performance.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

94. **The World Bank supported the preparation of a project that was relevant to national development strategies, relevant in a crisis context, and aligned with Government's priorities reflected in the 2010-2013 Education Sector Investment Program and the PRODEC.** The project design was tailored to the emergency context facing the country at the time of appraisal, where education services were heavily disrupted in the north and overloaded in the south because of the influx of displaced persons. The identification of project interventions took into consideration the sector's initial challenges and the political and security crisis which was worsening access to education, student dropout, school feeding services and shortage of qualified teachers. The Bank team consulted with local DPs during the project preparation in accordance with the GPE guidelines to ensure technical relevance and geographical complementarity of interventions, including on school construction, teacher training, school canteens and support to CGS which were areas invested by other DPS at time of appraisal (details on DPs interventions are provided in Annex 6). Based on this evidence, the World Bank's performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated **Satisfactory**.

Quality of Supervision

95. **The project benefited from dedicated and appropriate supervision which facilitated the effective implementation of the project albeit with delays in some interventions.** The World Bank team profile had an appropriate skills mix, including specialists in education, fiduciary, environmental and safeguards, procurement and architecture, that enabled adequate support and supervision. The country core team members and a TTL who prepared and implemented the project also allowed for sustained and close supervision, which was necessary in a conflict setting with constantly changing implementation realities. The Ministry of Education and Bank teams closely supervised the project, and regular and open dialogue on implementation helped resolve bottlenecks.



the MTR, the World Bank team determined that there were delays in school-feeding activities and irregularity of meal provision led to the adoption of a supplementary indicator to better track progress of this intervention. Adequate supervision and pro also allowed the World Bank team to proceed with the restructuring of the project in a timely manner to enable the project t its objectives. The local DPs were consulted regularly during the monthly meetings of the education Partnership Framework *partenarial*) and this contributed to sustain some of the project interventions, such as the equipment and wiring of Academ CAP as part of the establishment of a VPN to monitor the education sector. Greater harmonization and exchange of informati other DPs could have been beneficial to further mainstream and scale up the successes observed under the project.

96. **While the quality of supervision was generally strong, additional details in monitoring documents such as ISRs and AMs wou been useful to more systematically track the Project's performance.** Some information was available and could have beer reported, for instance on the issue of taxes and subsequent trade-offs between components, while some other information was not available to the TTLs and the Ministry of Education due to the volatile environment and restriction of field missions. S mission could be carried out in the north, the Bank team and the Ministry resorted to third-party monitoring through CGS an from the emergency education cluster. There was a smooth handover of TTLs during the last year of implementation while th team and the Ministry of Education agreed on a detailed timeline and road-map to complete all remaining key activities by the the project, which indeed closed successfully.

97. Based on this evidence, the World Bank's performance in ensuring quality of supervision is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

98. Based on the ratings for Quality at Entry (Satisfactory) and Supervision (Moderately Satisfactory) and the Overall Outcome (Moderately Satisfactory), overall Bank performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

99. **Some project interventions can be expected to benefit future cohorts of students with minimal funding, while others will require continual funding.** Although Mali's school-age population is growing rapidly – at 3.5 to 4 percent a year – funding of construction elements contributed to reduced overcrowding with pupil-classroom ratios declining from 48 in 2011/12 to 40 in 2016/17 in project academies. This reduction will benefit future cohorts of students, but can only be sustained if there is a commitment to continue providing additional construction. Teacher training may require refresher trainings, but will continue to benefit students in future years. Interventions such as training for student-mothers in health, incentive kits, and school feeding will require continual funding. It should be noted that providing school feeding through the community has allowed for a degree of sustainability as communities have supplemented the cereals being provided to schools with family contributions for condiments, water and cooks' compensations. The Ministry of Education has informed the CGS of the project closing and encouraged them to take over school canteens. In reality this has proved to be difficult due to the already precarious situation in which these communities live.

100. **The project has also set the groundwork for future education projects in an emergency setting, providing accurate cost estimates.** Budget execution rates against approved annual work plans were substantially higher and more accurate when broken down by sub-component than when compared against the PAD, demonstrating the difficulty in budgeting within an emergency environment. However, this project lays the groundwork for costing of future projects in similar settings. In addition, although the VPN system was not fully set-up under the project owing to time and budget constraints, the extensive diagnostic analysis has enabled an EU-financed project to extend the system to other academies and CAPs, while UNESCO is supporting the Ministry to migrate business applications to the new centralized computer platform.

101. **The Government remains committed to increasing access to quality basic education services across the country.** In the



short term, efforts will be sustained through the continued implementation of the interim national education sector development program (*Programme Interimaire de Relance du Secteur de l'Education et de la Formation Professionnelle*) which aims at revamping the education sector to improve access and quality, and enhance the governance of the education system. The Government also remains engaged in the long run as evidenced by the recommendation of the 2018 sector review and the objectives proposed in the new Ten-Year Education Program under preparation in Mali.

102. **Technical and financial support by DPs in Mali will contribute to the sustainability of the project outcomes.** Education DPs are active and meet regularly with the Education Ministry under the education Partnership Framework's bi-monthly meetings (*cadre parternarial*). In addition, given that this was a GPE project with extensive coordination and harmonization across the Local Education Group, knowledge sharing and feedback from DPs was embedded into the project which greatly improves sustainability. Some of the project outcomes are being sustained by ongoing operations such as USAID's US\$14.5 million Education Emergency Support Activity or US\$15.2 million Education Recovery Support Activity which have been designed to increase equitable access to basic education for children affected by the conflict in central and northern Mali. Recent efforts have focused on the issue of remediation for out-of-school children which is also consistent with the project development outcomes. The new €40 million EU program on inclusive education will channel funds to UNICEF, WFP and NGOs to implement activities at the level of schools and communities with the objective of getting 250,000 children back to school by 2021 (details on DPs interventions are provided in Annex 6).
103. **One potential risk may come from the volatile security environment which has now extended to central regions of Mali.** This could materialize into more IDPs and the closing or destruction of schools, which are targeted by extremist armed groups. As of January 2018, 673 schools that were enrolling 49,786 students were closed due to security threats in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Menaka, Mopti, Segou and Tombouctou, which represents 15 percent of all schools in this area. The situation is closely monitored by the education emergency cluster, including UNICEF and NGOs working in the field. A potential risk may arise from the upcoming 2018 presidential elections which could lead to political instability and further staff turnover at the Ministry of Education.
104. **Based on the Government's commitment and the level of financing and support provided by DPs in Mali, it is likely that the project development outcomes will be sustained through subsequent operations and interventions, including the next GPE financing.**

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

105. **The personal involvement of the Secretary General in daily project management ensured adequate ownership of the project by the Ministry's team and close monitoring of project implementation.** During 2014 and 2015, weekly meetings were organized under the leadership of the Secretary General with the participation of the Bank TTL, the technical team consisting of representatives from all the directorates involved in the project, and contracting agencies. When regular, those meetings constituted a successful troubleshooting mechanism and contributed in removing bottlenecks and speeding up project implementation.
106. **Timely completion of construction programs and school-feeding activities in a large territory with limited institutional capacity requires specific measures, including on administrative proceedings, communication and monitoring.** Significant delays were experienced during the first construction phase due to the limited capacities of construction manager agencies and a poor monitoring of activities on site. Three key measures were introduced prior to the second phase to mitigate risks. First, it was decided to soften selection criteria in the tender documents to allow for the participation of local firms in the bid. This was especially valuable in affected regions such as Gao and Tombouctou where a strong understanding of the local context was essential to complete constructions on time. Another measure was the limitation of the number of contracts awarded to each firm (maximum two allotments per firm) to take into account the weak capacities of construction firms. Finally, the organization of weekly meetings to monitor contracts execution and construction progress, in the presence of the General Secretary and the Bank TTL, successfully contributed to reducing implementation delays at the end of the first



construction phase and during the second phase. Regarding school-feeding, services have been irregular and sometimes interrupted due to the late transfer of funds to the CGS and delay in the submission of expenditures documents by CGS. To resolve the situation, the Ministry of Education introduced several mitigating measures. First, the expenditure justification process was reviewed and simplified to match the local human and organizational capacities of CGS. Second, the monitoring mechanism was strengthened by the organization of bi-monthly joint missions by the Ministry, academies and territorial collectivities to verify effectiveness of funds transfer to CGS in randomly selected schools, to supervise implementation and provide additional training to local stakeholders, as well as to recover expenditure justification documents collected by CAPs and submitted at the level of academies.

107. **Successful implementation of an emergency operation in a volatile security environment requires adequate planning measures to mitigate risks, maintain communication and ensure monitoring of project interventions on the field.** The Bank and the Government had agreed to wait for improved security conditions in the north before implementing project interventions in this area. Despite this, occasional resurgence of insecurity in the north but also in central Mali impacted the pace of implementation, requiring the momentary interruption of some of the activities until security was restored. This partly explains why some of the activities were completed at a later stage and an extension of the project closing date required. Additionally, while field visits were restricted or suspended, the Bank and the Ministry resorted to third-party monitoring to ensure appropriate monitoring of construction and school canteens by local communities and NGOs from the education emergency cluster, which ensured continued project supervision.
108. **While setting-up a VPN is important to monitor and evaluate the education sector, the choice of instruments, timeframe and budget required should be carefully considered to ensure relevance with the context.** The objective of establishing a VPN was bold but this activity was part of a larger strategy that the Ministry of Education had planned to develop for years. This is deemed particularly relevant in large territories such as Mali and becomes even more pertinent during a crisis when many areas are difficult to access. This project intervention was based on thorough diagnostic studies that served as a building block for the VPN. However, the diagnostic studies revealed a budget that was larger than initially planned and the timeframe for implementing such an initiative within a conflict setting was ambitious. Thus, the VPN system could not be completed during the course of the project but is now being expanded by other donors. Although the Ministry resorted to other means of data collection during the project implementation, considering the timeframe and budget of implementing such an initiative is necessary to its success.
109. **Long-term engagement in the education sector and continuous support, especially in times of crisis, contribute to building trust with the Government and positively impacts the policy dialogue.** Prior to this emergency operation, Mali had already implemented several projects with GPE and Bank support. The accumulated experience allowed the Ministry of Education to progressively build its capacities, which in turn contributed to achieving the project outcomes, despite a difficult context. This underlines the importance for the Bank and other donors to develop a long-term engagement in education in order to positively impact the sector. In addition, maintaining the policy dialogue in a crisis – especially when other donors had pulled out of the sector – and implementing emergency operations in conflict-affected countries contribute to building trust with the governments and may also serve as a catalyst to encourage other donors to resume or expand their support in the country. In Mali, this is manifested by the Bank's growing education portfolio which now consists of one active project in higher education and two new projects in basic education under IDA and GPE financing.



ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: Increase access for affected students in targeted areas

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions.	Number	0.00	960.00	960.00	960.00
		26-Aug-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017
Number of additional classrooms resulting from project intervention at lower secondary (F2)	Number	0.00	81.00	81.00	81.00
		26-Aug-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017
Number of additional classrooms resulting from project intervention at secondary education	Number	0.00	9.00	9.00	9.00
		26-Aug-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of additional students enrolled in targeted areas	Number	0.00	50000.00	50000.00	52500.00
		26-Aug-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of classrooms rehabilitated as a result of project interventions	Number	0.00	200.00	200.00	202.00
		26-Aug-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of children benefiting from school canteen as a result of project intervention (by gender)	Number	0.00	150000.00	150000.00	168434.00
		26-Aug-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):

Objective/Outcome: Improve learning environment for affected students in targeted areas



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions.	Number	0.00 26-Aug-2013	960.00 31-Dec-2016	960.00 29-Dec-2017	960.00 27-Dec-2017
Number of additional classrooms resulting from project intervention at lower secondary (F2)	Number	0.00 26-Aug-2013	81.00 31-Dec-2016	81.00 29-Dec-2017	81.00 27-Dec-2017
Number of additional classrooms resulting from project intervention at secondary education	Number	0.00 26-Aug-2013	9.00 31-Dec-2016	9.00 29-Dec-2017	9.00 27-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets):					
Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of classrooms rehabilitated as a result of project interventions	Number	0.00 26-Aug-2013	200.00 31-Dec-2016	200.00 29-Dec-2017	202.00 27-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets):					



A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Component 1: Increase access to basic education services

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of additional wells resulting from project intervention	Number	0.00	200.00	200.00	200.00
		01-Jul-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of additional blocs of latrines resulting from project intervention	Number	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
		01-Jul-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of girls receiving incentives	Number	0.00	15000.00	15000.00	19581.00
		01-Jul-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017



Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of COGES set up and trained	Number	0.00	1000.00	1000.00	1332.00
		01-Jul-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):

Component: Component 2: Strengthen the technical and pedagogical capacity of the education system

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of students benefiting from remedial classes as a result of project intervention (by gender)	Number	0.00	20000.00	20000.00	39981.00
		01-Jul-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Teachers recruited or trained	Number	0.00	2000.00	2000.00	4833.00
		01-Jul-2014	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017



Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of students receiving kits as a result of project intervention (by gender)	Number	0.00	30000.00	30000.00	30925.00
		01-Jul-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):

Component: Component 3: Strengthen the administrative and monitoring capacity of the education system

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
EMIS system in place and functioning in targeted areas	Yes/No	N	Y	Y	Y
		01-Jul-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Availability of project audit report	Yes/No	N	Y	Y	Y
		01-Jul-2013	31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2017	27-Dec-2017



Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Availability of audit report on school infrastructures	Yes/No	N 01-Jul-2013	Y 31-Dec-2016	Y 29-Dec-2017	Y 27-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):



B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective 1: increasing access for affected students in targeted areas	Objective 2: improving the learning environment for affected students in targeted areas
<p>Outcome Indicators</p> <p><i>PDO indicator #1: Number of additional classrooms. Target: 1,050. Achieved: 1,050 (100%)</i> <i>PDO indicator #2: Number of additional students enrolled in targeted areas. Target: 50,000. Achieved: 52,500 (105%)</i> <i>PDO indicator #3: Number of classrooms rehabilitated. Target: 200. Achieved: 202 (101%)</i> <i>PDO indicator #4: Number of children benefiting school canteens. Target 150,000. Achieved: 168,434 (112%)</i> <i>PDO indicator #5: Number of girls benefiting from school canteens (indicator added). Achieved: 79,371 (or 47%)</i> <i>PDO indicator #6: Number of meals distributed (indicator added). Target 27,000,000. Achieved: 27,235,420 (101%)</i> <i>PDO indicator #7: Reduced pupil-classroom ratios (indicator added)</i> <i>PDO indicator #8: Improved learning outcomes in Mopti (indicator added)</i></p> <p>Key outcomes:</p> <p>Data in the ICR was deemed to be the most comprehensive and robust at the time of writing. The project achieved all its PDO indicators. Additional indicators that were not formally part of the results framework are also mentioned here given their relevance to the project and the availability of data to report on these indicators. Three of the four original PDO indicators were exceeded, while indicator 6, which the MOE also set targets for and tracked, was also exceeded. The Ministry recognized that tracking the provision of meals distributed would more accurately represent meal regularity, and took it upon themselves to set targets for and track this indicator demonstrating proactiveness. In addition, the Ministry chose to track the proportion of girls benefiting from school canteens, which reached 50% of total students benefiting from the canteens.</p> <p>The project-in combination with other DPs interventions, benefitted from reduced pupil-classroom ratios from 48 to 40 between 2011/12 and 2016/17, which far outpaced that in non-project academies (where they declined from 45 to 42 across the same time period). This was driven by the construction of new classrooms as increases in school populations across both project and non-project academies in the south were relatively the same (around 15 percent) but classroom construction in project academies far outpaced that of non-project academies (39 percent compared to 24 percent). In addition, improved learning outcomes were noted for students who took remedial courses in Mopti: the admission rate for displaced students during the 2016 Diploma of Basic Studies exam was 67 percent compared to the Mopti average of 36 percent.</p>	



Component 1: Increasing access to quality basic education services	Intermediate Results Indicator <i>1. Number of additional wells and blocs of latrine</i> <i>2. Number of girls receiving incentives</i> <i>3. Number of COGES set up and trained</i>
Key outputs: <p><u>Under sub-component 1.1</u>, a total of 1,050 additional classrooms were constructed by AGETIPE and AGETIER, including 960 primary school classrooms, 81 lower secondary classrooms and 9 upper secondary classrooms. Although not initially planned, 786 of these 1050 classrooms were equipped. 706 latrine blocs and 243 administrative offices were also constructed in some of the schools, as part of an “infrastructure kit”.</p> <p>In addition, the Ministry directly managed the rehabilitation of 202 existing classrooms, the construction of 200 wells and 100 latrine blocs, and the provision of 3,000 school desks in existing schools. These activities were conducted in the areas initially targeted by the project, namely the academies of Dioila, Douentza, Kati, Mopti, San, Segou, Bamako Right Bank and Bamako Left Bank. The northern academies of Gao and Tombouctou were also included during the second construction phase later in the project’s life, as expected.</p> <p><u>Under sub-component 1.2</u>, a total of 577 school canteens have been supported to provide around 27.2 million meals to 168,434 children (of which approximately 47 percent were girls and 20,000 were displaced students). In addition, 649 kitchen utensil kits were provided to schools. 1,500 mothers of students and 75 teacher trainers were trained in the development of school health activities to support the functioning of school canteens by local communities. An application was developed and piloted in 30 of the 577 canteens by the end of the project to ensure that each child received a meal, in turn confirming the attendance of the child. To foster girls' school enrollment and attendance, the project supported the provision of incentives (e.g., school materials such as textbooks, notebooks, etc.) to 19,581 girls in the academies of Bamako, Dioila, Douentza, Kati, Mopti, Segou, San, Gao and Tombouctou.</p>	



Component 2: Strengthening the technical and pedagogical capacity of the education system

Intermediate Results Indicator

- 4. Total number of Teachers trained
- 5. Number of students benefiting from remedial classes
- 6. Number of students receiving kits
- 7. Proportion of girls benefiting from remedial classes (indicator added)
- 8. Proportion of girls receiving kits (indicator added)

Key outputs:

Under sub-component 2.1, The delivery of teacher training and pedagogical activities contributed to enhance the system’s capacities to provide adequate pedagogical support to affected students in targeted areas. To this end, the project provided training to 2,150 basic education teachers in psychosocial support and remediation, to 250 secondary school teachers in competency-based learning, to 30 teachers in multi-grade teaching. In addition, the project also supported the training of 2,000 teachers on the new primary school curriculum under generalization in the country, to 403 teachers on the new secondary school curriculum. Thus, a total of 4833 teachers were trained through various interventions. The project also intended to train regional trainers, educational advisors and school directors. Under this component, 100 directors and educational advisors were trained in monitoring technics, 212 trainers and educational advisors were trained on the new curriculum, 237 trainers and advisors were trained in learning assessment technics, 100 educational advisors and regional staff were trained in subject didactical models for mobile schools, and 75 educational advisors were trained in the management of single-classroom schools. Thus, a total of 724 staff were trained in addition to teachers. The project also supported various activities implemented to follow-up trainings and provide support to teachers.

Under sub-component 2.2, a total of 39,981 students (of which approximately 48 percent were girls) benefitted from remedial classes and 30,925 students received school kits in the academies of Segou, Mopti, Douentza, Gao and Tombouctou. In those areas where many schools have been closed due to security issues, the provision of pedagogical support to displaced students contributed to mitigate the impact of the crisis on their learning environment. In 2016, the admission rate at the final basic education exam in the academy of Mopti was higher for displaced students who benefitted from remedial classes supported by the project (67,24%) than the global rate in the same academy (35,74%). In addition, the project supported training for 100 regional trainers in psychosocial support and remediation and motivation bonus for 278 teachers in charge of remedial classes in the academies of Gao and Tombouctou. Under this component, several activities were also implemented to ensure a close monitoring of training and delivery of remedial classes. Note that although this was not formally part of the Results Framework, the project also tracked the proportion of girls benefiting from remedial classes and the number of girls receiving kits, which was 48 percent for both indicators.



Component 3: Strengthening the administrative and monitoring capacity of the education system and Project management

Intermediate Results Indicator

- 7. EMIS system in place and functioning in targeted areas*
- 8. Availability of project audit report*
- 9. Availability of audit report on school infrastructures*

Key outputs:

Under sub-component 3.1, 1,332 school-based management committees (CGS) were set up and trained to strengthen local management capacities, exceeding the initial target of 1000. Specifically, 18,648 CGS members and 805 trainers from the regional and local education authorities were trained in managing school activities contributing to improved learning environment such as remedial classes and school canteens.

Under sub-component 3.2, an Education Management Information System (EMIS) in the form of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) was established at the central level and in 10 academies targeted by the project. The VPN is intended to facilitate and increase the efficiency of data collection, analysis and use by local, regional and national staff of the Education Ministry. However, as this activity was implemented only during the last year of the project, the CAPs could not be equipped and supported due to the project's budget and time limit. Since the system was not complete by the end of the project, it was not possible to witness its impact on decision-making and policies, but continuity is ensured by the EU project which is funding equipment and wiring of the remaining 8 academies and all the CAPs.

Under sub-component 3.3; studies, report and audits were produced for the purpose of project management, implementation and monitoring. It included for instance the infrastructure audit report. Technical assistance was also provided to support the establishment of the M&E system and the VPN.



ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name	Role
Preparation	
Supervision/ICR	
Adama Ouedraogo	Task Team Leader(s)
Mahamadou Bambo Sissoko, Boubacar Diallo	Procurement Specialist(s)
Tahirou Kalam	Financial Management Specialist
Gernot Brodnig	Social Safeguards Specialist
Pierre Joseph Kamano	Team Member
Astou Diaw-Ba	Team Member
Ruxandra Costache	Counsel
Emeran Serge M. Menang Evouna	Environmental Safeguards Specialist
Lalaina Noelinirina Rasoloharison	Team Member
Alice Diarra Sangare	Team Member

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation		
FY11	9.607	49,525.61
FY12	39.453	331,719.50
FY13	31.499	258,760.57
FY14	.350	2,519.44
Total	80.91	642,525.12



Supervision/ICR		
FY11	0	56,537.57
FY12	0	- 828.60
FY14	15.460	176,065.30
FY15	20.125	157,272.30
FY16	19.232	164,727.23
FY17	12.158	124,169.11
FY18	7.750	78,066.47
Total	74.73	756,009.38



ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (US\$M)
Component 1 – Increase access to quality basic education services.	29.85	35.20	118%
Component 2 – Strengthen the technical and pedagogical capacity of the education system	7.75	3.34	43%
Component 3 – Strengthen the administrative and monitoring capacity of the education system	4.10	2.71	66%
Total	41.70	41.25	99%



ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Introduction

1. This annex provides an efficiency analysis at project closing. It is structured similarly to the economic and financial analysis conducted at appraisal but adds additional sections owing to more robust information provided at closeout. However, in order to complement what was done at appraisal, a summary of this analysis is warranted.
2. The assessment at appraisal was divided into two parts: first, it detailed education sector financing, and second it projected costs and benefits the project was expected to achieve. This analysis will follow in a similar vein, but will add more sections to strengthen the analysis. This annex is divided into four parts: first, an analysis of education financing in Mali will be detailed; next, a cost-benefit analysis of project components is conducted; third, an analysis on efficiency of spending and implementation is presented; and finally this assessment concludes with a sustainability analysis.

Education Financing

3. **Mali has remained committed to financing the education sector in spite of the conflict.** The share of Mali's GDP allocated toward education has hovered around 4.5 percent since 2010, with the exception of 2011 when it increased to over 5 percent (Table 1). The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) recommends that 20 percent of a country's expenditure should be allocated to education, a target that Mali has consistently met. In 2012, while overall government expenditure declined due to the crisis, the Malian government prioritized and chose to protect the education sector, thereby increasing the share of government expenditure allocated to education to 27 percent. Compared to other Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries, Mali's share of GDP and education expenditure allocated toward education falls within the middle group of countries, although it does marginally outperform the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) average on both measures.¹¹

¹¹ The SSA average of education expenditure as a share of GDP is 4.3 percent, while for education expenditure as a proportion of public expenditure it is 16 percent.



Table 1: Education expenditure indicators in Mali, 2010 to 2015


	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Share of public expenditure on education in GDP	4.4%	5.1%	4.3%	4.5%	4.5%	4.6%
Share of public expenditure on education in government expenditure *	20%	22%	27%	20%	18%	20%

Table Notes: GDP for 2015 is projected based on the projected growth rate by the African Development Bank. Fiscal years 2014 and 2015 data use projected commitments based on the execution rate from 2012 and 2013. * Excludes debt service.

Source: Mali Public Expenditure Review Education, 2017

4. **Although per capita education expenditure has grown faster than per capita income, it is still inadequate to account for the rapidly growing population.** Real per capita education expenditures grew at an average of five percent annually between 2004 and 2011, but fell in 2012 by 19 percent and has since been growing at a slower rate of 3 percent annually. Meanwhile, real GDP per capita grew at an average of 1 percent between 2004 and 2014. However, in order to address some of the biggest challenges to access and quality education, per capita education expenditure would have to increase even further. Mali has seen an increase in the proportion of excluded children between 2011 and 2013 (Figure 1), a rapid increase in school-age population which is growing at 3.5 to 4 percent per year (even faster than the overall population growth rate which, given that Mali has one of the highest fertility rates in the world, is high) and poor resource availability (lack of schools, teachers, textbooks, and teaching materials). The conflict has further exacerbated these challenges, providing a strong justification for investment in education.

Figure 1: Share of excluded children in Mali, 2001 to 2013



Source: Mali Public Expenditure Review Education, 2017

5. **The sector’s continued emphasis on primary education is evident from the proportion of education expenditure allocated toward this sub-sector.** In 2014, primary education



received 43 percent of overall education funding, a record high. However, when considering this in terms of enrolment, in 2014, tertiary education had only 3 percent of total enrolment but received one-fifth of total education expenditures.

6. **Allocation inefficiencies continue to exist with capital expenditure growing since 2012, but still makes up a low proportion of education expenditure.** During the crisis in 2012, donor funds, the main source of funding of capital expenditure at the basic level, were frozen and current expenditure made up 100 percent of total expenditure (Table 2). Since then, donor funding has been gradually increasing and is reflected in a growing proportion of capital expenditure as a proportion of total education expenditure: in 2015, capital expenditure reached 8 percent. Within current expenditure, the vast majority goes toward wages and salaries. The project was thus a timely intervention to ensure continued investment in capital expenditure.

Table 2: Expenditures by budget object class, 2009 through 2015, in billions of CFA

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014*	2015*
Operating expenditures	27.4	27.4	44.6	37.0	39.0	41.6	42.9
Wages and Salaries	67.8	76.0	97.8	113.0	112.9	123.8	123.5
Current Transfers	6.3	5.4	6.1	6.0	4.5	6.9	6.8
Total Current Exp.	101.5	108.8	148.5	156.0	156.4	172.4	173.1
Capital Expenditures	39.1	17.6	34.2	0.7	1.5	10.1	14.9
Total Spending	140.7	126.3	182.7	156.7	158.0	182.5	188.0
Share in spending	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Operating expenditures	19%	22%	24%	24%	25%	23%	23%
Wages and Salaries	48%	60%	54%	72%	72%	68%	66%
Current Transfers	4%	4%	3%	4%	3%	4%	4%
Total Current Exp.	72%	86%	81%	100%	99%	94%	92%
Capital Expenditures	28%	14%	19%	0%	1%	6%	8%
Total Spending	100%						

The figures for 2009 through 2013 are liquidations. 014 and 2015 figures are projected liquidations based on the budget execution rate in 2012 and 2013.

Source: Mali Public Expenditure Review Education, 2017

Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Project

7. **The average unit cost of an additional child enrolled was US\$ 668.15.**¹² A total of US\$ 35,078,093.12 was spent on Component 1, which aimed to increase access to quality basic education by investing in both construction and rehabilitation, and by investing in school health and feeding programs, and the project recorded 52,500 additional students enrolled at endline. It is difficult to compare this cost with other projects as each project has a different set of interventions; however, various elements of this Component are broken down further in this section and compared.

¹² Note that this is calculated based on the total budget for this component of the project divided by total number of additional pupils enrolled. These unit costs do not account for equipping of classrooms.



8. **The project was relatively more cost-effective for all construction** items for which data is available compared to both other national and international projects.
9. Table 3 provides a unit cost analysis for new classrooms, three-block latrines, and offices constructed under the project and compares them to unit costs for civil works for other projects both in Mali and in other SSA countries.¹³ The unit costs for all three construction items are lower than cost comparators, often substantially so demonstrating high cost-effectiveness. In addition, the audit report for the first phase of the project found that, of the sample of sites visited, 99 percent met quality standards. However, the same report found that only 32 percent of environmental and social safeguards standards were met.¹⁴ In addition, only 786 out of the 1,050 classrooms were equipped with furniture. This is because of the Ministry of Finances’ decision to impose taxes on construction elements of the project, which increased project costs and had repercussions on equipping the remaining 264 classrooms. As of May 2018, the Ministry of Education is still committed to equipping these remaining classrooms using funds from the national budget, for which a line item has already been designated; if this is not done in a timely manner, a new GPE project will consider equipping these classrooms.

Table 3: Unit Costs of Construction Project Components, USD

Item	Unit Cost	Unit Costs for Comparative Projects
New classrooms	13,750	14,802 (Mali); 16,651 (Ghana); 30,000 (Sudan)
Latrine blocs	4,146	5,530.22 (Mali); 7,240 (Ghana)
Offices	6,493	8,988 (Mali)

Source: Constructed by the author from analysis of project data

10. **The per child unit cost of school feeding was US\$ 48.27, which is slightly higher than the average in low-income countries of US\$ 41 (Kristjansson et al., 2016) but lower than previous school feeding estimates in Mali of US\$ 74 per child (Drake et al., 2016).** Figure 2 shows the standardized average costs of school feeding per beneficiary across a range of countries, demonstrating a wide range with Mali hovering around the average for middle-income countries but higher than the average for low-income countries.¹⁵ The cost per meal was US\$ 0.30.


¹³ Note that costed data for construction interventions was only available for the first phase of construction so these figures are used in calculating unit costs.

¹⁴ Note that the final audit report will only be finalized at the end of June 2018, and findings from this report can therefore not be included in this analysis.

¹⁵ Note that these comparisons should be viewed with the caveat that the per child cost under the project were not standardized so may not be entirely comparable.



Figure 2: Standardised school feeding costs in USD across low- and middle-income countries



Source: Global School Feeding Sourcebook, Drake et al., 2016

11. **The per participant training cost for the teacher training intervention was US\$ 824.26, covering 2,708 teachers.** Given how variable trainings are across projects in terms of scope, duration, mode of delivery, etc. it is difficult to identify a relevant cost-comparator. However, these costs also account for training teachers from the three northern regions who had to be transported and accommodated to the south of the country to receive training.
12. **The per student cost of incentive kits for girls was US\$ 6.73 covering 19,581 girls; the per student cost for kits received for affected students was US\$ 19.35 covering 30,925 displaced students.** Aside from the fact that the content of these kits varies from project to project, an approximation for an appropriate cost-comparator comes from Ghana where detailed project documents indicated that kits provided to girls in basic education for a scholarship program cost upward of US\$ 50 once school fees were removed.
13. **The unit cost of the remedial education sub-component was US\$ 19.85, covering 39,981 beneficiaries.** This program was approximately as cost effective as a remedial intervention in Ghana that employed community assistants to deliver remedial education during or after school at a unit cost of US\$ 20.24.

Benefit Incidence

14. **The project fulfilled its Project Development Objective to increase access and improve the learning environment for affected students in targeted areas and the three benefits¹⁶ outlined in the economic and financial analysis conducted at appraisal.** This is evidenced by the following:
 - **Increased access:** 52,500 additional students were enrolled in targeted areas through a combination of civil works, school feeding, and incentives provided to girls, which

¹⁶ These were: (i) restoring / increasing access to school; (ii) mitigating the impact of “over-crowding” on the learning environment; and (iii) improving learning (and completion). This analysis attempts to address all three.




exceeded the endline target of 50,000.¹⁷ Girls in Mali are 7 percent less likely to be in school compared to boys (Mali Public Expenditure Review Education, 2017) and the project helped increase access for girls by providing 19,581 girls with incentives, exceeding the target of 15,000. In addition, of the 168,434 students who benefited from school canteens, approximately 47 percent were girls, and 20,000 were displaced students.

- **Reduced overcrowding:** The project also improved the educational environment by building more schools, wells and latrines, and rehabilitating existing structures, thereby improving facilities and reducing crowding for current and future cohorts of students.
- Figure 3 shows pupil-classroom ratios at the primary level for academies covered under the project compared to academies in the south of the country that were not covered under the project. While it is difficult to attribute changes in pupil-classroom ratios solely to project interventions, it is clear that these ratios decreased more rapidly in beneficiary academies (from 48 in 2011/12 to 40 in 2016/17) than in non-beneficiary academies (from 45 to 42 across the same years). In addition, while the percentage change in population across beneficiary and non-beneficiary academies was roughly the same between 2011/12 and 2016/17 (15.75 percent and 15.35 percent respectively), the percentage change in the number of classrooms was substantially higher in project academies (38.71 percent compared to 24 percent) indicating that this reduced overcrowding was driven by infrastructure interventions.

¹⁷ Note that this number is an estimate based on the number of classrooms built and the pupil-classroom ratio of 50:1. However, 264 classrooms were not equipped by the end of the project, while some newly built classrooms accommodated more than 50 pupils so it is difficult to assess whether this indicator was fully met.



Figure 3: Pupil-classroom ratios at the primary level for project and non-project academies, 2011/12 to 2016/17



Note: Non-project AEs only include AEs in the south to make a relevant comparison. Also note that Dioila was a new academy created in the 2013/14 and split from an existing project academy, hence it is also included in the project academies from this year onwards.
 Source: Created by author from analysis of *Annuaire Statistiques*

- Improved learning outcomes:** While it is difficult to establish causation, teacher training on remedial education for displaced students may have been effective in improving learning outcomes: in Mopti, displaced candidates who received remedial education outperformed that of the CAP average when comparing the admission rates to the 2016 Diploma of Basic Studies (DEF) the basic education terminal exam. Admission rates for displaced students were 67.24 percent in Mopti compared to the Mopti average of 35.74 percent and the national average of 30.02 percent. Recent evidence from Ghana suggests that remedial education that target the weakest pupils significantly improve test scores and that these benefits persist over time (Innovations for Poverty Action, 2018) so this impact may benefit students in future years as well. In addition, teachers can apply the knowledge acquired through the teacher training to benefit future cohorts of students and improve learning outcomes for both displaced and non-displaced students.

15. **The project may also have long-term impacts on the following:**

- Future earnings:** The most recent returns to schooling estimates in Mali are from 2010 where an additional year of schooling is correlated with a 12 percent increase in wage, which falls at the SSA average for 37 countries. These returns are higher when some primary or some lower secondary education is completed at 38 percent and 88 percent respectively, which is much higher than the SSA average, as Table 4 indicates.




- Figure 4 also clearly shows that earnings increase as educational attainment increases in Mali. Thus, Component 1 of the project, which aimed to improve access, has significant benefits for the additional 52,500 students enrolled in terms of future earnings.

Table 4: Returns to education in Mali and SSA by level

	Additional Year	Some Primary	Some Lower Secondary
Mali	12%	38%	88%
SSA	12%	33%	73%

Figure 4: Earnings in thousands of 2010 CFA, by educational attainment



Source: Data on returns to education for 37 SSA countries and Mali Public Expenditure Review Education, 2017

- **Health outcomes:** Adolescent fertility rates in Mali are among the highest in the world with 169 children born to every 100 women under the age of 20 years old, and child mortality rates at 132 per thousand are well below global targets (Mali Public Expenditure Review Education, 2017). Several studies have found negative correlations between education and child mortality and fertility rates (Witter et al., 2017). Mali’s example corroborates these findings: the 2012 Mali Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) finds that women with no education are likely to have 6.5 children in their lifetime, compared to 5.9 for women with primary education and 4 for women with secondary education and beyond. The survey also finds that the neo-natal and infant mortality rates for mothers who have at least a secondary education is 23 percent and 38 percent respectively compared to 36 percent and 64 percent for mothers who have no education.¹⁸ In addition, UNESCO projects that while the number of underage births (before the mother is 17 years) in SSA and South and West Asia is estimated at 3.4 million, this would fall by 10 percent and 59 percent if all women had primary and secondary education respectively (Witter et al., 2017). Hence, the project may positively impact health outcomes for those who benefitted.
- **Intergenerational effects:** The benefits of education spillover to future generations. Of 16 SSA economies, 87.7 percent and 95.5 percent of children with mothers who had six years and 12 years of education respectively attended school, compared to 68 percent of

¹⁸ Note that these are correlations and do not account for selection bias i.e. it may be that those who are more highly educated are also less likely to have more children due to factors outside of being educated (income, etc.).



children with uneducated mothers. In addition, between 1990 and 2009, for a sample of 56 countries, UNESCO found that the marginal impact (an extra year) of mother's education resulted in an increase in the child's education by 0.32 years (Witter et al., 2017). Thus, the long-term impact of the project may positively affect future generations.


Efficiency of Implementation

- 16. The project disbursed 98.92 percent of the budgeted amount or USD 41.25 million of the USD 41.70 million allocated to the project; however, the disbursement trend has not always been smooth.**¹⁹ The change in the proportion disbursed from one period to the next has varied throughout the life cycle of the project with average disbursement during a six-month cycle of 11.90 percent. Figure 5 provides both the percent disbursed and the percentage point change in the percent disbursed from one period to the next. There was a significant increase of the total amount disbursed during the first six months of 2015 from 27.43 percent to 60.07 percent, an increase of 32 percentage points, while no disbursements were made in the first six months of 2016. This is reflective of implementation challenges in a volatile political context: in the first half of 2015, the Ministry and the World Bank monitored implementation and contracts on a weekly basis and were able to resolve bottlenecks through a new troubleshooting mechanism thereby allowing the project to stay on course. However, a cabinet reshuffling in the first six months of 2016 slowed the pace of implementation and monitoring was conducted more infrequently, on a monthly basis. It is during this time that the discussions for extending the timeframe of the project are first brought up to ensure that construction activities are able to be completed, demonstrating proactiveness from the supervisory team. It is also worth noting that all financial management audits were unqualified demonstrating judicious use of project funds.

¹⁹ Note it is not expected that disbursement should be even throughout the course of the project as some activities may require a large number of resources at a certain time. However, examining the disbursement trend still provides an indication of project progress.



Figure 5: Disbursement trends of the USD 41.70 total over project life cycle



Source: Constructed by author from ISRs

17. **When breaking down expenditure by component and sub-component, actual expenditure diverged from the budget documented in the PAD.** Table 5 shows the budget as documented in the PAD, expenditure, difference between these two, and the budget execution rate for each component and sub-component of the project. Both Components 2 and 3 of the project underspent compared to their budget with budget execution rates of 43 percent and 66 percent respectively. These funds were redirected to Component 1 with a budget execution rate of 118 percent, which is justified by the fact that the Ministry of Finances’ decided to impose taxes on the construction elements of the project, thereby increasing project costs. When looking at sub-components, school construction and rehabilitation had the highest budget execution rate of 123 percent, while the lowest was recorded for Component 3.2 which was 7 percent with Component 2.2 also recording a low execution rate of just 21 percent.

**Table 5: Budget in PAD vs. Expenditure by Project Component and Sub-Component, XOF**

Comp.	Description of Component	Budget (PAD)	Expenditure	Difference	Budget Execution Rate
		(1)	(2)	(3) = (1)-(2)	(4) = (2)/(1)
1	Increasing access to quality basic education services	14,925,000,000.00	17,539,046,558.00	-2,614,046,558.00	118%
1.1	School construction, rehabilitation and equipment	10,575,000,000.00	13,047,279,909.00	-2,472,279,909.00	123%
1.2	School health and feeding and teaching materials	4,350,000,000.00	4,491,766,649.00	- 141,766,649.00	103%
2	Strengthening the technical and pedagogical capacity of the education system	3,875,000,000.00	1,665,912,849.00	2,209,087,151.00	43%
2.1	Teacher training	2,025,000,000.00	1,269,015,346.00	755,984,654.00	63%
2.2	Pedagogical support to affected students	1,850,000,000.00	396,897,503.00	1,453,102,497.00	21%
3	Strengthening admin. and monitoring capacity of the education system and project management	2,050,000,000.00	1,348,879,373.00	701,120,627.00	66%
3.1	Involvement of the CGS in school management	750,000,000.00	666,754,309.00	83,245,691.00	89%
3.2	Support to the MEAPLN M&E system in targeted areas	400,000,000.00	29,475,756.00	370,524,244.00	7%
3.3	Project management	900,000,000.00	652,649,308.00	247,350,692.00	73%
TOTAL		20,850,000,000.00	20,553,838,780.00	296,161,220.00	99%

Source: Constructed by author from Rapport d'Execution, 2018

18. However, when considering the budget in terms of approved annual work plans which more accurately reflected project implementation, savings in almost all areas were made (Table 6). Notably, while construction costs overran the budget in the PAD, the budget execution rate as against the annual work plan for sub-component 1.1 was 87 percent. Component 2 activities fully aligned with the budget, with the execution rate for this component at 100 percent (compared to just 43 percent when documented against the PAD). Budget execution rates for sub-component 3.2 were still low. The overall budget execution rate as compared to the annual work plan was 88 percent.

**Table 6: Budget in Annual Work Plan vs. Expenditure by Project Component and Sub-Component, XOF**

Comp.	Description of Component	Budget (Annual Work Plan)	Expenditure	Difference	Budget Execution Rate
		(1)	(2)	(3) = (1)-(2)	(4) = (2)/(1)
1	Increasing access to quality basic education services	19,502,136,699.00	17,539,046,558.00	1,963,090,141.00	90%
1.1	School construction, rehabilitation and equipment	14,937,430,468.00	13,047,279,909.00	1,890,150,559.00	87%
1.2	School health and feeding and teaching materials	4,564,706,231.00	4,491,766,649.00	72,939,582.00	98%
2	Strengthening the technical and pedagogical capacity of the education system	1,665,912,849.00	1,665,912,849.00	-	100%
2.1	Teacher training	1,269,015,346.00	1,269,015,346.00	-	100%
2.2	Pedagogical support to affected students	396,897,503.00	396,897,503.00	-	100%
3	Strengthening admin. and monitoring capacity of the education system and project management	2,144,038,428.00	1,348,879,373.00	795,159,055.00	63%
3.1	Involvement of the CGS in school management	666,754,309.00	666,754,309.00	-	100%
3.2	Support to the MEAPLN M&E system in targeted areas	361,975,960.00	29,475,756.00	332,500,204.00	8%
3.3	Project management	1,115,308,159.00	652,649,308.00	462,658,851.00	59%
TOTAL		23,312,087,976.00	20,553,838,780.00	2,758,249,196.00	88%

Source: Constructed by author from Rapport d'Execution, 2018

19. **Diagnostic studies often exceeded the budget and were significantly delayed, affecting implementation.** For example, an application to monitor school canteens was first developed and piloted by a Canadian firm and then dropped; another application was then developed by a local firm in Mali and piloted in 30 schools. This was not scaled due to time constraints. The diagnostic study on the M&E system also took a substantial amount of time, resulting in a delay in setting up the system; by the end of the project, this system was not used for data collection for the project as set up was incomplete. However, as previously mentioned, the M&E system which was eventually established under the project was robust and capable of systematically tracking the project's overall performance.
20. **All indicators in the Results Framework were met by the close of the project despite implementation challenges within an emergency context; however, implementation efficiency varied during project implementation.** Implementation is especially strong during the first six months of 2015 when there are high disbursements, and in the last six months of the project when many of the construction projects are completed. However, in other periods, implementation slowed substantially as did disbursements. Despite the Ministry of Finances' decision to impose taxes on construction elements of the project, all endline indicators were met at project closeout demonstrating cost efficiencies; however, 264 classrooms remained unequipped which the government is committed to fund from the national budget. The decision to extend the project is also strongly justified and demonstrates proactivity: if it had closed in December 2016 as originally scheduled, only 8



out of the 17 endline indicators would have been met, partly because of the delay in declaring effectiveness by six months from what was documented in the PAD.

Sustainability Analysis

- 21. **Many of the project interventions can be expected to benefit future cohorts of students.** As already mentioned, civil works interventions in the form of construction and rehabilitation as well as training (teachers, mothers, school directors and pedagogical advisors, CGS) interventions will continue to benefit students beyond the scope of the project, but will require some degree of funding especially for upkeep of buildings and refresher trainings as necessary.
- 22. **However, other interventions will need to be funded, but encouraging examples of community involvement in supporting school feeding have been documented.** The cost of interventions that will require continued investment are detailed in Table 7. The school feeding aspect of the project, however, is already being partially supported by the community, ensuring some degree of sustainability. Funding for school feeding under the project was modelled on previous projects; however, even with an increased amount being provided, this was stretched and thereby relied on family contributions to supplement what was being provided, with some communities collecting cereals during the harvest season to supply to schools. This is important for future sustainability of school feeding. As the conflict in Mali continues, ensuring that systems are in place to absorb displaced students while simultaneously providing adequate resources to accommodate the increased student population will be essential. As previously mentioned, with a higher fertility rate that is outpacing the growth in per capita education expenditure, resources to the education sector will have to be intensified.

Table 7: Expenditure and Unit Costs that will require continued investment, USD

Item	Quantity	Expenditure	Unit Cost
School feeding (number of students)	168,434	8,130,745.80	48.27
Mothers trained in health	1,500	629,401.29	419.60
Girls receiving incentives	9,581	131,718.60	6.73
Students receiving kits	30,925	598,530.89	19.35

Source: Constructed by author from Rapport d'Execution, 2018

- 23. **The project enabled more accurate costing of education interventions in an emergency environment that can be used to budget for future education projects in Mali.** As presented above, costs for various project components varied substantially from the budget allocations in the PAD to accommodate for the changing implementation realities in an emergency situation; however, the project provides a good baseline for costs for a wide range of interventions within an emergency context that can be used for future projects during the ongoing conflict. Given that this was a GPE project that required



extensive feedback and harmonisation from across members of the Local Education Group, project interventions and implementation was well aligned with donor priorities. Other donors and partners are implementing some interventions in the areas of teacher training, school canteens, and CGS capacity building. In addition, the costed plan of developing a comprehensive M&E system has set the groundwork for adopting this in future interventions. While part of the project funds were intended to set up an M&E system, an initial analysis of the requirements of this set-up revealed that it would be too costly under the project and the lengthy timeline for conducting diagnostic studies resulted in a delayed setup. However, the project did support the equipment and wiring of the data centre at the central level and the academies targeted by the project during the last year of project implementation. The costed plan serves as a blueprint for future programs to take this on board to more effectively monitor education interventions especially in a conflict setting and the extension of this M&E system to other academies and CAPs is currently being financed through a European Union-financed project, while UNESCO is supporting the Ministry to migrate business applications to the new centralised computer platform. Ultimately, however, sustainability will heavily depend on the political landscape in Mali.

24. **This analysis should be seen in the context of the circumstances under which the project was developed and implemented.** With a one-year extension, the project achieved or exceeded all indicator targets within budget, and with a lower or equal unit cost than comparators, and achieved all three benefits mentioned in the economic and financial analysis during project appraisal. In addition, the implementation team demonstrated proactivity in bringing up the discussion to extend the project early. The project also provides a blueprint of costs for future projects, and some elements of the project are already being adopted. However, the project was developed in an emergency context, making it difficult to forecast project costs especially for procurement-related activities that depended on bids and as a result expenditure diverged from the budget in the PAD. The political situation was also unpredictable, making implementation on the ground subject to constant volatility as the conflict moved geographically. As a result, implementation efficiency was affected, with many endline targets met only in the last year of the project and disbursement varying widely throughout the project. In addition, the Ministry of Finances' decision to impose taxes on construction elements of the project affected the pace of construction and required the reallocation of funds from other components into Component 1 to ensure that construction could be completed; this prevented 264 classrooms from being fully equipped. As a result, on balance, despite the efficiency gains achieved under the project overall efficiency under the project is rated **Modest**.



ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

PROJET D'URGENCE EDUCATION POUR TOUS (PUEPT)

Rapport du Gouvernement sur l'achèvement du projet (PCR)

• **INTRODUCTION**

Suite à la crise sécuritaire et politique qui a commencée en fin 2011, le Gouvernement du Mali et les partenaires techniques et financiers (PTF) ont décidé en fin 2012 de convertir, le don de US\$41.7 million octroyé par le Partenariat Mondial pour l'Éducation (PME) au Mali en 2011 pour un projet de développement, en projet d'urgence afin d'aider le ministère de l'éducation nationale à faire face au flux massif de déplacés internes (IDP) et offrir une opportunité d'éducation aux enfants et élèves déplacés internes. La Banque mondiale en tant qu'entité de supervision a ainsi initié le Projet d'Urgence Education Pour Tous (PUEPT) qui a initialement ciblé 7 académies avec le taux le plus élevé de IDP, à savoir : Mopti, Kati, San, Ségou, Douentza (à l'exclusion de zones occupées comme le centre de Douentza), Bamako rive droite et rive gauche. Compte tenu de l'inaccessibilité sécuritaire des trois régions du Nord du Mali, il a été convenu que lorsque la situation le permettrait, les activités du projet seraient étendues aux trois régions du Nord. Au-delà des 7 académies initiales, le projet a aussi couvert les académies des régions de Kidal, Gao et Tombouctou, après la sécurisation des centres-villes des régions du Nord. Initialement prévu pour être exécuté sur 3 ans (Septembre 2013-Décembre 2016), le projet a connu une extension de la date de clôture au 31 décembre 2017 afin de compléter certaines activités, en particulier les infrastructures et les cantines scolaires.

• **DESCRIPTION DU PROJET**

L'objectif de développement du projet est d'accroître l'accès et améliorer le cadre d'apprentissage pour les élèves touchés dans les zones ciblées.

Le projet est structuré en trois composantes :

Composante 1 : Accroissement de l'accès aux services d'éducation de base de qualité

1.1 La construction, la réhabilitation et l'équipement d'écoles, y compris (i) la construction et l'équipement de nouvelles salles de classe du cycle primaire et secondaire équipées de latrines et de puits dans les zones retenues du territoire du Bénéficiaire ; (ii) la réhabilitation de salles de classe, la construction de blocs de latrines et de puits, et la distribution de tables-bancs.

1.2 la santé, l'alimentation scolaire et le matériel didactique à travers l'octroi de Dons aux écoles dans le cadre de l'Appui Direct à l'Amélioration des Rendements Scolaires, pour : (i) le soutien et la fourniture des vivres aux cantines scolaires pour l'alimentation des élèves y compris des élèves déplacés ; (ii) la formation des mères éducatrices et le développement d'activités de santé scolaire dans les écoles ; (iii) la fourniture de matériel scolaire aux filles ayant eu au moins 80% de fréquentation scolaire par mois.



Composante 2 : Renforcement de la capacité technique et pédagogique du système éducatif

2.2 Le financement de la formation des enseignants en lecture et en mathématiques, l'amélioration des compétences des conseillers pédagogiques pour leur permettre d'apporter un soutien pédagogique adéquat, ainsi que de la formation des directeurs d'école à la gestion des établissements.

2.3 Le soutien pédagogique aux élèves affectés à travers des cours de rattrapage y compris : (i) la formation des enseignants chargés des cours de rattrapage ; (ii) l'organisation des cours de rattrapage et (iii) l'acquisition et la distribution de kits de fournitures scolaires aux élèves affectés.

Composante 3 : Renforcement de la capacité administrative et de suivi du système éducatif et Gestion du Projet

3.1 : La mise en place des CGS dans les nouvelles écoles primaires et celles existantes et la dotation aux CAP de fonds devant être distribués intégralement aux écoles retenues sur la base du nombre de salles de classe et des effectifs scolarisés selon le mécanisme de l'appui direct au rendement scolaire (ADARS).

3.2 : L'appui au système de Suivi & Evaluation du Ministère de l'Education, via le renforcement du système *Virtual Private Network* récemment établi et notamment le processus de transfert des données statistiques de l'école au niveau central en passant par les CAP et les Académies.

3.3 : La fourniture de biens et de services de consultants pour la gestion du Projet, y compris des audits, les formations et les frais de gestion liés à la mise en œuvre du projet ainsi que le suivi-évaluation.

- **EVALUATION DE LA PERTINENCE DES OBJECTIFS DU PROJET ET DE LA QUALITE DE LA CONCEPTION DU PROJET**

Les objectifs de développement et la conception du Projet étaient pertinents par rapport aux défis éducatifs que connaissait le pays au moment de la préparation du projet, à savoir : (i) un accès faible et inéquitable à l'éducation, particulièrement pour les filles et les populations défavorisées, (ii) une qualité faible de l'éducation, illustrée par un temps effectif d'enseignement et des résultats d'apprentissage insuffisants, (iii) une allocation insuffisante et inefficace des ressources, et (iv) une gestion déficiente du secteur éducatif, notamment des enseignants et des constructions scolaires. En visant l'accroissement de l'accès à l'éducation et l'amélioration de l'environnement d'apprentissage, le Projet était susceptible de contribuer à résoudre ces défis. Par ailleurs, la conception du projet en tant que projet d'urgence était pertinente dans un contexte de crise politique et sécuritaire qui mettait en péril les services éducatifs à travers tout le pays. Ces objectifs restent pertinents de nos jours en raison du maintien d'un contexte sécuritaire volatile et sont cohérents avec les priorités esquissées dans le nouveau programme décennal pour le secteur de l'éducation.

- **EVALUATION GLOBALE DE LA PERFORMANCE DU PROJET ET DE SON IMPACT DE DEVELOPPEMENT**

Malgré des délais dans la mise en œuvre de certaines activités, notamment les constructions et les cantines scolaires, justifiant ainsi une extension de la date de clôture du projet d'un an, tous les



objectifs quantitatifs visés au début du PUEPT ont été atteints et même dépassés dans certains cas. A la date du 28 décembre 2017, l'ensemble des activités ont été achevées, les cibles des différents indicateurs atteintes et certaines dépassées, tout en restant dans l'enveloppe du projet.

Les indicateurs de développement

Les quatre indicateurs de développement du projet ont été atteints :

- Nombre de salles de classes construites et équipées avec l'appui du projet : il était prévu de construire 1050 salles de classes au total, dont 960 salles de classes pour le premier cycle du fondamental, 81 salles pour le second cycle du fondamental et 9 salles de classes pour le secondaire. A la date du 28 décembre 2017, toutes les salles de classes sont achevées et 100 pourcent des infrastructures ont été réceptionnées provisoirement. Cependant, compte tenu de la décision gouvernementale intervenue lors de la mise en œuvre de la seconde phase des constructions, à savoir la réalisation en TTC de tous les marchés du projet, le Ministère de l'Education Nationale (MEN) a pris la décision de ne pas inclure l'équipement des 264 salles de classes de cette phase de construction dans le financement du projet. Par conséquent, ce sont 786 salles de classes construites qui ont été équipées dans le cadre du projet. Le MEN a inscrit dans son plan d'action 2018 l'équipement des 264 salles de classes construites par le projet.
- Nombre d'élèves supplémentaires inscrits dans les zones ciblées par le projet : il était prévu d'accueillir 50.000 élèves supplémentaires dans les zones d'interventions du projet. A la date de clôture du projet, 52.500 nouveaux élèves ont été accueillis dans les zones d'intervention du projet.
- Nombre de salles de classe réhabilitées résultant de l'intervention du projet : le projet avait prévu de réhabiliter 200 salles de classes. Au total, ce sont 202 salles de classe qui ont été rénovées à la date du 28 décembre 2017.
- Nombre d'enfants bénéficiant de cantines scolaires résultant de l'intervention du projet: il avait été envisagé de donner un repas par jour de classes à 50.000 enfants pour une durée de 3 années scolaires, soit un total de 150.000 élèves à couvrir pour la durée du projet. Afin de raffiner cet indicateur, il a été convenu à la revue à mi-parcours que le projet allait en plus du nombre d'enfants suivre le nombre effectif de repas distribués. Au total le projet envisageait de distribuer 27 millions de repas sur les trois années. A la fin du projet, 168.434 élèves (dont 89.063 garçons et 79.371 filles) ont été couverts à travers la distribution de 27.235.420 repas.

Les réalisations par composantes

Composante 1 : Améliorer l'accès aux services d'Education de base de qualité

Sous-composante 1.1 : Construction, réhabilitation et équipement d'écoles : Le projet prévoyait de construire et équiper 1.050 salles de classes, dont 960 salles du Fondamental 1 (F1), 81 salles pour le Fondamental 2 (F2) et 9 salles pour le secondaire, en deux phases de construction. La



première phase a réalisé 786 salles de classes équipées et la seconde phase a couvert 264 salles non équipées. Au total, le projet a réalisé 1050 nouvelles salles de classes et équipé 786 salles. En plus, 202 salles de classes ont été rénovées, 200 points d'eau ont été construits et de 100 blocs de trois latrines ont été construits dans des écoles existantes. La mise en œuvre du programme de construction et d'équipement des écoles a été déléguée par le Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale (MEN) à deux agences de Maîtrise d'Ouvrage (AGETIPE et AGETIER) pour l'exécution du volet construction et équipements de nouvelles salles de classes. A la date du 28 décembre 2017, toutes les activités prévues ont été réalisées et réceptionnées provisoirement.

Sous-composante 1.2 : Programme de santé et alimentation en milieu scolaire et matériel didactique : le projet prévoyait initialement d'appuyer 300 cantines et 150 000 enfants bénéficiaires. Au final, le projet aura appuyé 648 cantines en fournissant plus de 27,2 millions de repas à 168 434 enfants bénéficiaires durant la mise en œuvre du projet. 648 kits ustensiles ont été acquis et remis en soutien aux cantines scolaires appuyées par le projet. 1.500 mères d'élèves ont également été formées en matière de santé afin d'accompagner la mise en œuvre des cantines scolaires par les communautés, et 75 formateurs de maîtres ont été formés au développement d'activité de santé scolaire. Enfin, le projet a donné des incitations à 19,581 filles qui avaient plus de 80 pourcent de fréquentation scolaire afin d'améliorer leur fréquentation scolaire et leur rétention. Une réalisation majeure de cette sous-composante est le développement et l'expérimentation d'une application informatisée appelée Suivi Automatisé des Cantines Scolaires (SACS) pour le suivi, en temps réel, de l'effectivité de la distribution des repas aux enfants, permettant aussi de vérifier la présence de l'élève à l'école. Cette application pourrait être étendue pour une couverture totale du pays, mais aussi pour suivre la fréquentation scolaire des élèves et potentiellement des maîtres.

Composante 2 : Renforcer les capacités techniques et pédagogiques du système éducatif

Sous-composante 2.1- Formation des maîtres : Les formations dispensées dans le cadre de cette sous-composante sont essentiellement des activités de formation en Approche Par compétence (APC), au soutien psychosocial et de remédiation, aux techniques de suivi de proximité, au suivi-appui des maîtres au nouveau curriculum en phase de généralisation, au nouveau programme des lycées, en évaluation sommative des apprentissages, à la didactiques des disciplines enseignées au premier cycle de l'enseignement fondamental, à l'animation et la gestion des Écoles à Classe Unique, à l'enseignement multigrade, à l'élaboration des instruments de suivi-appui des encadreurs de maîtres, et au suivi des différentes formations. Au total, le projet largement dépassé l'indicateur intermédiaire visant la formation de 2000 enseignants, avec la formation, entres autres, de 2150 enseignants du fondamental au soutien psychosocial et de remédiation, 250 enseignants du secondaire formés à l'APC, et 30 enseignants formés dans l'enseignement multigrade.

Sous-composante 2.2 : Soutien pédagogique aux élèves affectés : Cette sous-composante vise à apporter un soutien pédagogique aux élèves des zones affectés par la crise et qui, pour des raisons diverses n'ont pas pu continuer leur éducation. Au total, 39 981 élèves ont bénéficié de cours de soutien et 30 925 ont reçu des kits scolaires. 70 formateurs régionaux ont été formés aux techniques de remédiation et 30 formateurs régionaux ont été formés aux techniques de soutien psycho-social.



Composante 3 : Renforcer les capacités administratives et de suivi du système éducatif

Sous-composante 3.1 : Mise en place de 1 000 CGS : Le projet a appuyé la mise en place de 1332 CGS selon le modèle initialement développé par la JICA afin d'appuyer les écoles dans le suivi des élèves et des enseignants, ainsi que dans la mise en œuvre effective des cantines scolaires. Cette approche a permis de développer et renforcer la gestion de l'école avec la participation des communautés et de reconstruire la confiance entre l'école et les communautés. Au total, c'est également 19 453 agents qui ont été formés dans le cadre des CGS.

Sous-composante 3.2 – Appui au système de S&E du Ministère dans les zones ciblées : Le projet appuyé le renforcement du Virtual Private Network (VPN) afin de déconcentrer la collecte, la saisie et le traitement des données pour la gestion du système éducatif. Avec des retards substantiels dus aux études diagnostiques et la planification initiale, le système a quand même été mis en place au niveau des dix académies couvertes par le projet. Pour être complètement opérationnel, le système devra ensuite être étendu aux autres académies et au niveau des CAP et des écoles.

Sous-composante 3.3 Gestion du Projet : la mise en œuvre du PUEPT s'est appuyé sur les structures du MEN avec le Secrétaire Général comme coordonnateur du projet et les directions et institutions du ministère comme organes de planification et d'exécution. Ce qui a permis un renforcement institutionnel de toutes les structures engagées dans la mise en œuvre des activités du projet. Aussi, au regard de l'achèvement de la quasi-totalité des activités, indicateurs et objectifs du projet, quelques fois au-delà des cibles initiales avec la même enveloppe, il est possible d'affirmer que la gestion du projet a été exemplaire, avec un taux d'exécution de près de 100 pourcent et un taux de décaissement de 99 pourcent.

- **COÛT DU PROJET**

Le coût total du projet était estimé à 41.700.000 d'USD lors de la phase de préparation, réparti comme suit :

Composante 1 : 29.850.000 soit 71.58% du financement

Composante 2 : 7.750.000 soit 18.58% du financement

Composante 3 : 4.100.000 soit 9.84% du financement

Le Taux de décaissement du Projet d'Urgence Education Pour Tous (PUEPT-P123503) à la date du 28 décembre était de 99 pourcent.

- **SOUTENABILITE FINANCIERE ET INSTITUTIONNELLE DU PROJET**

Le gouvernement est actuellement dans le processus de finaliser le programme décennal pour le secteur de l'éducation, qui adressera les mêmes défis que ceux identifiés lors de la préparation du



projet, à savoir l'accès, la qualité et le développement institutionnel. Les domaines et interventions clé ayant connu un succès dans leur mise en œuvre et l'atteinte de résultats, seront étendus et amplifiés dans le cadre de ce nouveau programme, qui sera financé par les ressources du gouvernement ainsi que les contributions des partenaires techniques et financiers du secteur éducatif malien.

A noter que certains partenaires ont déjà entrepris de prolonger certaines interventions du PUEPT, à l'image du projet PROF de l'Union Européenne qui poursuit l'appui au système de suivi & évaluation dans les huit (08) académies et les trente six (36) CAP non couverts par le PUEPT et la formation de 3400 CGS. L'UNESCO apporte également un appui au système via un soutien technique à la migration des applications métiers vers la nouvelle plateforme de solutions intégrée (VPN) du Ministère de l'Education.

- **EVALUATION GLOBALE DE LA PERFORMANCE DU GOUVERNEMENT ET DE L'AGENCE DE MISE EN ŒUVRE DU PROJET**

La mise en œuvre du PUEPT s'est appuyée sur les structures du MEN avec le Secrétaire Général comme coordonnateur du projet et les directions et institutions du ministère comme organes de planification et d'exécution. Ceci a permis un renforcement institutionnel de toutes les structures engagées dans la mise en œuvre des activités du projet. Malgré les délais enregistrés dans la mise en œuvre et la nécessité d'une extension de la date de clôture du projet, le Ministère est parvenu à l'achèvement de la quasi-totalité des activités, indicateurs et objectifs du projet, quelques fois au-delà des cibles initiales, et ce avec la même enveloppe budgétaire prévue initialement. Ces réalisations ont été possibles malgré un contexte sécuritaire volatile et une instabilité politique illustrée par la succession de 5 ministres sur la durée de vie du projet. Au final, il est donc possible d'affirmer que la gestion du projet a été efficace, avec un taux d'exécution de près de 100 pourcent et un taux de décaissement de 99 pourcent.

- **LEÇONS APPRISES ET RECOMMANDATIONS**

Constructions : des délais conséquents ont été enregistrés lors de la 1ère phase en raison d'un manque de capacité des agences de construction et d'un faible suivi des activités. Des mesures ont été prises pour la 2e phase de construction afin d'atténuer les risques, telles que : l'assouplissement des critères de sélection des entreprises afin de pouvoir inclure les entreprises locales ; limitation du nombre de contrats par entreprise (2 lots) afin de prendre en compte les limites de capacité ; et la mise en place de rencontres hebdomadaires sur l'état et exécution des chantiers en présence du Secrétaire Général et d'un représentant de la Banque mondiale. Les perspectives en termes de solutions et leçons à tirer :

- La mise en place d'un mécanisme de suivi des chantiers par les agents de la CADDE et ceux des services déconcentrés à travers les ingénieurs en génie civil des AE et les techniciens en construction des CAP;



- L'utilisation des procédures simplifiées pour le recrutement des MOE (la Sélection basé sur les Qualifications des Consultants) et des entreprises (Consultation de Fournisseur);
- La mise en place d'un mécanisme de suivi rapproché des agences MOD dans la mise en œuvre de la deuxième phase des travaux;
- La possibilité de sélection des entreprises locales;
- L'implication des techniciens de l'hydraulique dans le suivi des points d'eau à travers une convention de partenariat entre le Ministère de l'Education Nationale et celui de l'Energie et de l'Eau;
- Le renforcement du suivi des activités par les agents des services déconcentrés (AE et CAP) et les collectivités à travers les CGS;

Cantines et alimentation scolaire : Lors de la mise en œuvre, le Ministère a constaté un retard dans la provision de repas aux élèves des cantines soutenues par le Projet et cela a questionné la pertinence de l'indicateur retenu qui était le nombre d'élèves bénéficiant de repas. En effet, lors de la revue à mi-parcours du Projet, si le nombre d'élèves bénéficiaires étaient atteints, les élèves n'avaient en fait reçu qu'un repas par jour pendant 40 jours par an (au lieu de 180 jours) équivalent à 3 millions de repas au total, alors que cela aurait dû être 18 millions. Il a donc été convenu d'ajouter un indicateur portant sur le nombre total de repas servis pour permettre de mieux refléter les résultats de cette activité. Les interventions relatives aux cantines scolaires ont accusé du retard et le service a même été interrompu en raison des délais enregistrés dans l'arrivée des fonds aux CGS ainsi qu'un retard dans la remontée des pièces justificatives. Le Ministère a pris les mesures suivantes pour débloquer la situation : révision et allègement des procédures de justification des fonds, partage des principes et procédures allégés avec les acteurs locaux renforcement du processus de suivi de l'activité, à travers des missions conjointes (MEN, Académie, collectivités territoriales) sur le terrain pour vérifier l'effectivité des fonds, assurer la supervision et la formation complémentaire des acteurs locaux, ainsi que récupérer les pièces justificatives au niveau des académies. Les leçons apprises sont que de telles activités nécessitent l'adaptation des procédures aux capacités locales, la communication et la formation des acteurs locaux, ainsi qu'un système de suivi rigoureux. Les meilleures pratiques identifiées au cours de l'exécution du projet :

- La réalisation des missions de collectes des pièces justificatives des cantines scolaires ;
- La mise en place d'un mécanisme de suivi rapproché des activités de l'alimentation scolaire par les agents du CNCS et des services déconcentrés à travers les chargés des cantines des CAP ;
- Le développement et l'expérimentation d'une application informatisée pour l'automatisation du suivi-évaluation de l'alimentation scolaire ;

Gestion du projet : la mise en place d'un cadre de suivi hebdomadaire des activités du projet, présidé par le SEGAL, a permis de lever de nombreux blocages et d'accélérer la mise en œuvre du projet. L'implication quotidienne des services techniques du Ministère a contribué à l'appropriation des résultats par le Ministère et a contribué à une bonne mise en œuvre du Projet.



ANNEX 6. DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Development Partners’ interventions in Mali

In 2013

Agency	Domain of intervention	Geographic area
The Netherlands, CIDA (through NGOs and Firms)	Quality improvement (reading and writing, textbooks)	Kati, Koulikoro, Segou, Mopti
UNICEF	Teacher training, ECD, school construction	Bamako, Segou, Mopti, San, Kati, Kayes
Save the Children, Plan Mali, Handicap International, Aga Khan Foundation, Right to Play, Islamic Relief, CRS, BIT, GARDL, JICA	School canteens, support to CGS, school construction, ECD	Country wide, but inadequate to meet all the needs.
World Food Program	School health and feeding program	Bamako, Segou, Mopti, San, Kati, Koulikoro

In 2018

Agency	Domain of intervention	Geographic area
European Union (PROF €20 million, PAIS €40 million)	Quality of education, strengthening capacities of Academies and CAPs, school remediation	Country wide
UNICEF Country Program 2015-2019 (\$328,410)	Quality of Education (learning materials), school remediation, school construction and equipment, teacher training, ECD	Mopti, Sikasso, Gao, Kidal, Tombouctou
USAID “Education Emergency Support Activity” 2016-2018 (\$14.5 million), Education Recovery Support Activity” 2015-2020 (\$15.2 million); Selective Integrated Reading Activity” (\$51 million)	Construction and rehabilitation of classrooms, Quality of education (early grade reading), school remediation, teacher training, capacity building for MoE and communities, vocational training and work readiness preparation	Segou, Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou, Menaka, Kidal, Taoudenni, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Gao, Menaka
WFP	School feeding	Country wide but inadequate to meet all needs
AFD Secondary education 2016-2018 (€10 million) Vocational training 2018-2022 (€10 million)	School construction, teacher training and learning materials, vocational training	Gao, Mopti



ANNEX 7. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Project documents

- Project Appraisal Document, May 6, 2013. Report No: 77364-ML
- GPE Grant Agreement, May 27, 2013. TF014414
- Restructuring Data sheet, July 14, 2016. Report RES23855

Implementation Status and Results Reports

- ISR Sequence 1-9

Aide Memoires

- AM October 2012
- AM October 2013
- AM June 2015
- AM December 2015
- AM April 2016
- AM April 2016
- AM February 2017
- AM December 2017

Additional Documents

- *Critical case insights from Mali: Strengths and Opportunities for Education Reform in the Midst of crisis.* The World Bank, June 2014
- Mali Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review. The World Bank, March 2010
- Mali Social Protection Policy Note. *Opportunities for Social Protection to address Poverty and Vulnerability in a Crisis Context.* The World bank, March 2015
- *Poverty malnutrition and vulnerability in Mali.* Patrick Eozenou, Dorsati Madani, Rob Swinkels The World Bank 2013
- *Crise sécuritaire et évolution de la situation des écoles au nord Mali,* Avril 2018, World Bank, Poverty and Equity Department
- *Annuaire Statistique,* year 2011-2017, Ministry of Education, Republic of Mali