ID Enrollment Strategies: Practical Lessons from Around the Globe

WORLD BANK GROUP
Social Development
Some Rights Reserved

This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, or of any participating organization to which such privileges and immunities may apply, all of which are specifically reserved.

Rights and Permission

This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license, you are free to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, including for commercial purposes, under the following conditions:

Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: World Bank. 2019. ID Enrollment Strategies: Practical Lessons From Around The Globe, Washington, DC: World Bank License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO (CC BY 3.0 IGO)

Translations—If you create a translation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World Bank translation. The World Bank shall not be liable for any content or error in this translation.

Adaptations—If you create an adaptation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This is an adaptation of an original work by The World Bank. Views and opinions expressed in the adaptation are the sole responsibility of the author or authors of the adaptation and are not endorsed by The World Bank.

Third Party Content—The World Bank does not necessarily own each component of the content contained within the work. The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party-owned individual component or part contained in the work will not infringe on the rights of those third parties. The risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you. If you wish to re-use a component of the work, it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that re-use and to obtain permission from the copyright owner. Examples of components can include, but are not limited to, tables, figures, or images.

All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC, 20433; USA; email: pubrights@worldbank.org.

Cover photo by Anat Lewin/World Bank.
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About ID4D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Need for More Inclusive Registration Approaches</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration for Large-Scale Digital Identification Systems</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementary Measures</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Challenges</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Experiences and Good Practices</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coordination</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Preparation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication and Information Campaigns</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements for Registration</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration Points</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration Officers</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment for Registration</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Measures to Register Vulnerable and Poor People</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives to Register</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lessons Learned and Recommendations</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix. Case Studies</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia: Voter Registration 2009</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi: National Identification System 2017</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan: National Identification System 2008-2014</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda: New National Population Register 2007</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About ID4D

The World Bank Group’s Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative leverages global knowledge and expertise across sectors to help countries realize the transformational potential of digital identification and civil registration systems to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It operates across the World Bank Group with global practices and units working on digital development, social protection, health, financial inclusion, governance, gender, and legal aspects, among others.

The mission of ID4D is for all people to be able to access services and exercise their rights, enabled by inclusive and trusted digital identification systems. ID4D makes this happen through its three pillars of work: thought leadership and analytics to generate evidence and fill knowledge gaps; global platforms and convening to amplify good practices, collaborate, and raise awareness; and country and regional engagement to provide financial and technical assistance for the implementation of inclusive and trusted digital identification systems that are linked with civil registration.

The work of ID4D is made possible through support from the World Bank Group, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the UK Government, the Australian Government and the Omidyar Network.

To find out more about ID4D, visit id4d.worldbank.org. To participate in the conversation on social media, use the hashtag #ID4D.
Acknowledgments

This note was prepared by Nils Junge and co-produced by the World Bank’s Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative, Rapid Social Response Program, and Social Development practice group. The author is grateful for the inputs of practitioners who were willing to share their experience and insights for this note, including Antonio Costas (Bolivia), Jacques Kayisire (Rwanda National ID Management), and Tariq Malik (Pakistan). This note benefited greatly from the inputs and reviews of World Bank Group staff including Vyjayanti Desai, Gernot Brodnig, Victoria Esquivel-Korsia, Julia Clark, Anna Metz, Jonathan Marskell, Julian Najles, and Satyajit Suri, and research assistance from Hannah Rosenthal.
Introduction

Providing universal coverage and barrier-free access to ID systems is one of the three pillars of the Principles on Identification for Sustainable Development and is vital to achieving Target 16.9 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to “provide legal identity for all” by 2030. Large-scale registration campaigns can help achieve this objective by making identification accessible to large segments of the population within a short timeframe and by often being able to reach individuals and population groups who, for various reasons, face difficulties in obtaining IDs in the absence of concerted outreach efforts.

Without sufficient planning, coordination, and the adoption of appropriate policies and measures for inclusion and building trust in the system, however, registration drives may be unable to boost the coverage of the system to achieve a critical mass and can thus become a waste of (public) resources, while exacerbating exclusion. This note aims to help practitioners learn from past efforts, promote the adoption of good practices, and reduce the risk of failure.

Capturing lessons learned from large-scale registration campaigns for ID systems is important, as they are:

- critical for improving the coverage and accessibility of ID systems within a short timeframe;
- a core component of launching a new ID system and, at times, of modernizing an existing one;
- a significant investment, with costs as high as US$20 per registrant depending on the implementation timeline and approach;
- a complex process with many potential pitfalls that requires considerable planning and coordination across a wide range of stakeholders.

The lessons and case studies – from Bolivia, Malawi, Pakistan, and Rwanda – featured in this note are based on a desk review and interviews with officials and coordinators involved in large-scale registration campaigns as well as World Bank staff familiar with the countries and topic. The primary audience for the note is practitioners working in government and development agencies with an interest in how registration campaigns have been conducted around the world.

It is also important to note that registration drives are only one element of creating and maintaining an ID system; for information and guidance on other important design choices and best practices for building inclusive and trusted ID systems, see the ID4D Practitioners Guide.  

The Need for More Inclusive Registration Approaches

Nearly one billion people worldwide, including large segments of populations in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, are estimated to lack a widely accepted proof of identity, such as a birth certificate or national ID\(^3\). In low-income countries, about 36 percent of adults, and 44 percent of women, do not possess their country’s national ID or equivalent foundational identity document\(^4\). Many other groups are also at risk of being excluded from ID systems (see table 1). Often, individuals belong to more than one of these subgroups, potentially experiencing layer upon layer of disadvantage. People who are members of these groups tend to represent the most difficult and costly to reach in any enrollment initiative.

### Table 1. Population Subgroups at High Risk of Lacking ID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic status</th>
<th>Citizenship/immigration status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Women and girls</td>
<td>• Stateless persons people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Minors, including orphans and other vulnerable children</td>
<td>• Nationals lacking proof of nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Older persons</td>
<td>• Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Infirm and ill</td>
<td>• Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Persons with disabilities</td>
<td>• Asylum seekers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobility constraints**
- Older persons
- Infirm and ill
- Persons with disabilities

**Economic status**
- The poor
- Rural dwellers and other geographically isolated communities

**Education**
- Illiterate persons

**Citizenship/immigration status**
- Stateless persons people
- Nationals lacking proof of nationality
- Migrants
- Refugees
- Asylum seekers

**Lacking fixed address**
- Migratory groups, e.g., pastoralists and nomadic peoples
- Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

**Minority status**
- Gender and sexual identity minorities
- Persons with albinism
- Ethnic groups
- Linguistic groups
- Religious affiliation
- Members of opposition political parties

---


Lacking a government-recognized identity credential can severely limit access to public and private services as well as economic opportunities and the ability to travel freely. Ensuring that identification is accessible for all is thus critical to enhancing opportunities and reducing marginalization.

Long distances to the nearest registration point, high direct and indirect costs of obtaining an ID, and cumbersome enrollment processes and requirements are some of the key reasons why many people, particularly members of vulnerable and marginalized populations, lack proof of identity. Large-scale registration campaigns, when done right, can lessen some of these barriers by bringing registration points closer to people, simplifying enrollment requirements, and reducing the complexity, cost, and time required for enrollment. However, these campaigns may also reinforce already-prevalent patterns of marginalization if they fail to facilitate the registration of members of vulnerable or marginalized groups. To ensure universal ID coverage, it is critical to apply specific measures to address the barriers faced by those most likely to be left behind.

**Registration for Large-Scale Digital Identification Systems**

Depending on the government’s priorities, the rollout of an ID system across the country may be time-limited for achieving near-universal enrollment (for example, within a matter of days, months, or years) or rollout can take place gradually, over a longer time period. The decision on which target enrollment period to set is often driven by the government’s vision or goals for the system.

Why and when do governments conduct large-scale registration campaigns, given their cost and complexity? Some countries are looking to provide large segments of their population with a foundational ID credential for the first time, with the goal of fostering better access to services while also leveraging the ID system for more efficient public service delivery (Malawi, Philippines). Others need to update a database ahead of an election, either because it is mandated by law (for example, Bolivia) or to strengthen participation and the legitimacy of the vote. In other cases, the ID registry may have been (partially) destroyed during a conflict (for example, Peru, Rwanda), and the rapid re-establishment of a functioning ID system is seen as critical for the country’s effort to rebuild and to provide its citizens with high-quality services. Legacy ID databases may be of poor quality, with many duplicates or suspected fake identities (for example, Pakistan). In almost every case, reliance on the standard, on-demand registration process—individuals voluntarily travelling to and registering at permanent registration offices—would have been inadequate to achieve the development outcomes expected to be supported by the ID system. Without large-scale registration, creating a new ID registry or fully updating an existing one would likely take decades, while the limited coverage of the ID system would limit its capabilities with regard to supporting robust identity verification and authentication across a range of services and transactions.

Countries can choose to insource and/or outsource mass and continuous registration and data updating for the ID system, depending on their capacity, budget, timeline, and the availability of outsourcing partners—for example, other government agencies at different levels and the private sector (see table 2). Given the complexity of planning and managing a registration drive and the human resources and hardware required over a sustained period, implementing entities may choose to outsource the initial registration campaign, while transitioning to insourcing for continuous registration and data updating as they move to a steady state. Alternatively, they may insource registration for populations where there might be insufficient commercial incentive for outsourced registration agents to operate—for example, smaller, rural, or remote communities—while urban and densely populated areas are covered by outsourced partners.

---

**Table 2. Insourcing Versus Outsourcing Large-Scale Registration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insourced</strong></td>
<td>The ID authority retains full control and accountability for the implementation of registration and it is easier to change plans (compared to renegotiating an outsourcing contract).</td>
<td>The ID authority must have the capacity to carry out procurements, manage human resources and equipment, and coordinate logistics. Without proper planning, government procurement requirements may make operations less flexible. After a registration drive, the ID authority will have to find a way to repurpose surplus registration equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ID authority procures its own registration equipment, hires and trains its own registration staff (temporary or permanent), develops its own registration plans, manages its own logistics (travel, security, installation), and/or provides its own technical support. Some of these functions could also be outsourced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outsourced</strong></td>
<td>Particularly during an initial registration drive, an ID authority can outsource complicated operations to other actors, freeing up resources to focus on other core functions. Competition among registration agents can also create incentives for them to innovate and register the population quickly. Furthermore, by creating an ecosystem of registration agents, it may be possible to drive down the cost of equipment through competition among hardware providers. Outsourcing to other Government agencies, e.g., social security and health insurance agencies, can also leverage their offices and use the opportunity of people using their services to simultaneously register.</td>
<td>Unless the ID agency has visibility on operations and management, there are risks of poor data quality and performance because of the financial incentive to register as many people as quickly as possible, as well as data protection and privacy risks, e.g., that personal data is retained by the registration agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ID authority hires the services of one or more public and/or private sector organizations as registration agents to carry out the same operations described above, and they are compensated based on each successful, i.e., unique, registration. The ID authority will likely still have to provide registration software, carry out supervision and monitoring, certify that equipment meets relevant standards, and lead outreach and awareness raising.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complementary Measures

In certain settings, authorities may be able to leverage existing databases to add new records to the ID registry and to use this as the basis for providing people with new identifiers. This approach involves the back-end integration and/or deduplication of current databases in order to populate a new database and to issue new credentials for people utilizing existing records collected at another point in time. However, for this approach to work, the data should be of a satisfactory quality, have gone through a similar level of identity proofing, and either be in an interoperable format or easily cleaned and converted to be re-used as part of a different registry. In addition, the migration or reuse of the data from existing databases may raise further concerns around data protection and privacy. For example, the data might not be able to be migrated from other registries and databases unless people provide explicit consent.

A large-scale registration campaign, on its own, is not sufficient to create a sustainable system. In order for the database to remain accurate over time and useful for service delivery and the administration of public programs, registration campaigns need to be complemented and followed by continuous enrollment (of new people) and updating of records (of people who have already enrolled). This is the “stock and flow” concept, the stock being the existing database of identified individuals, and the flow being the continuously added new individuals. Without a plan for continuous updating, ID systems and records will gradually become out of date, necessitating repeated—and costly—ad hoc data collection exercises.

For continuous enrollment, registration is usually conducted through a limited number of permanent registration points, often supported by a small number of mobile registration units to conduct periodic enrollment in remote areas. Registration points for continuous enrollment help capture the “flow” of additional enrollees (that is, for new births, migrants, and people who were not initially registered), and enable already-enrolled individuals to update existing records. Continuous – or steady-state – registration, unlike registration drives, is not time-limited.

If an ID system already has high coverage and, for example, the government wants to slowly upgrade to a new version of a credential as old IDs expire, a concerted, rapid registration drive is not likely to be needed. Conversely, if a new ID system is being built from scratch, an initial large-scale enrollment campaign is often a logical choice, and using only an on-demand approach would result in slow uptake.

Common Challenges

Although barriers to registration will vary with country context and the specific objectives of the enrollment campaign, there are certain common challenges that most countries will need to address to successfully enroll the majority of the population:

- **Overcoming distance.** In many countries, parts of the population live in remote, difficult to access areas. Some combination of poor quality (or even nonexistent) roads, rough terrain, and higher poverty rates can make it difficult for people to reach the locations where registration centers are set up. Ensuring that these populations have an opportunity to register during an initial enrollment campaign for a new system is all the important given their isolation. However, reaching remote and vulnerable populations will often require complex logistics and additional resources. Gelb and Diofasi-Metz (2018) note, for example, that registering vulnerable populations can cost up to eight times more than those in urban areas6. Travel by boat, pack animal (Bolivia), using skis (Pakistan),

---

and even helicopter (Côte d’Ivoire) may be required. It may also be more challenging to recruit registration agents who are from remote or sparsely populated areas and are familiar with the local language and culture.

• **Overcoming cultural barriers.** Cultural, religious, and social norms can pose challenges for registration. For example, in some countries or regions, it is not considered acceptable for women to have one-on-one interactions with men, especially if this involves any physical contact, as can often occur when fingerprints are captured as part of a registration campaign. A woman who wears a veil may not be comfortable in revealing her face to unfamiliar men, which can pose a problem when a photograph is needed. As observed in the case of Malawi, religious beliefs in conservative Christian areas around the capture of fingerprints resulted in a few incidents in which villagers attacked and chased away registration agents, requiring police intervention.

• **Overcoming language barriers.** A seemingly obvious but sometimes overlooked issue is the language used for informing and sensitizing the population and during the actual registration process. It is common for only the official language of the country to be used, which can lead to exclusion. Even if registration agents are able to speak the language of enrollees, some registration materials (for example, registration forms, information leaflets on registration processes, times, and locations, and so on) may not be available in indigenous and local languages, reducing the ability and likelihood of registration for certain groups. People who do not speak the primary or official language of the country may also struggle to seek redress for their grievances. To overcome this barrier, in Peru and Bolivia, for example, printed information was made available in many local languages.

• **Overcoming institutional fragmentation or competition.** Mass registration campaigns are rarely, if ever, conducted by just one government entity. Campaigns often need to work closely with local government to reach large segments of the population and they often leverage expertise, infrastructure, and resources from multiple agencies and sectors. Different agencies have different perspectives and goals and managing these to promote the necessary cooperation can be difficult. Coordination across multiple government agencies and departments, and with development partners, if they are involved, can be challenging, but is critical for a successful, wide-reaching campaign. Strong leadership, backed by powerful, high-level political actors is essential to ensure buy-in from a wide range of actors and promote collaboration.

• **Overcoming distrust.** One of the key challenges for any enrollment exercise – and the system or registry it is intended to support – is fostering registrants’ trust in the process and in the continued management of their data. People’s questions and concerns about the motives for the campaign itself, how their data will be used, how their privacy will be protected, should be addressed early on and in sufficient detail. Building trust needs to be at the core of the registration process, including careful attention being paid to the messages that are communicated and who communicates them.
Country Experiences and Good Practices

This section describes different approaches and considerations for key elements of large-scale registration campaigns, highlighting country experiences from across the globe.

Institutional Coordination

Strong leadership and good cross-sector, cross-institutional coordination is critical for successful registration campaigns. Mass registration for ID systems often cuts across multiple ministries and levels of government, as well as involving private companies and nongovernmental organizations. For concerted registration drives to succeed, implementation requires high level political commitment and coordination, often relying on multiple committees tasked with oversight, coordination, and technical expertise. Campaigns also tend to work closely with local governments, highlighting the importance of both horizontal coordination (between institutions) as well as vertical coordination (between different levels of government).

Coordination across agencies and sectors has several advantages, for instance:

- generating buy-in for the registration and broader ID system across a wide range of stakeholders;
- making it possible to identify and leverage existing resources and infrastructure;
- helping to identify areas of comparative advantage and distribute tasks accordingly; and
- ensuring that the registration exercise will generate broad-based benefits, thus reducing the risk of future fragmentation through the need for separate registration efforts by sector or agency.

Coordination begins well in advance of the actual registration campaign, sometimes years in advance. Use of a coordinating committee is good practice, given the complexity of running nationwide campaigns. Committees meet regularly to review and discuss planning and issues. Multiple coordinating committees may be established. For example, there may be a central level committee and regional/provincial level committees with representatives from regional governments (province, district, and so on) and local governments. Coordination is also important for leveraging resources from different state institutions. In some countries, such as Malawi, representatives of the international organizations providing financial support to the rollout of the ID system were also on the committee.

In India, a Cabinet Committee was created in October 2009, chaired by the Prime Minister and including 12 ministers, to oversee the operationalization of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). The committee oversaw UIDAI’s organization as well as its plans, policies, and the implementation progress for the rollout of the Aadhaar program, including two technical committees responsible for the establishment of demographic and biometric standards.

The Government of Rwanda formed a National Technical Team composed of IT staff from across state institutions, including the Rwanda Information Technology Authority (RITA), Immigration, National Policy, Rwanda Social Security Fund, Rwanda Medical Insurance, National Statistics, and the Electoral Commission. The Technical Team reported twice weekly to the National ID Steering Committee.
In Malawi, the Technical Committee included ministers, development partners, ambassadors, heads of missions, heads of high commissions, and international NGOs. Technical committee meetings were held on a monthly basis and steering committee meetings on a quarterly basis.

**Planning and Preparation**

Extensive and careful planning precedes successful registration. In Rwanda, while the first round of the registration campaign itself only took three days—followed by eight months of biometric registration —, a total of three years was spent on preparation, with the coordinating committee meeting twice a week during that period. The preparatory phase included the development of a National ID Rollout Plan, a 250-page document prepared by the National Technical Team, which went to cabinet for approval. In Bolivia, the goal was to create a robust functional ID system for a limited, specific purpose – a voter registry – to support the electoral process. To realize this goal, the government spent two years (2006-08) preparing for a 75-day voter registration campaign that ran from August to October 2009.

Many components must to be in place in advance of a registration drive (beyond the planning and decision making required for the ID management strategy, ID technology, etc.). Some of the core elements of large-scale registration include:

- Development of a strategy or roadmap
- Agency coordination meetings
- Site mapping of service centers (including fixed, temporary, and mobile)
- Procurement of vendor services, if outsourced
- Rollout schedule, including sequencing, and taking into account physical and network accessibility
- Procurement of registration equipment
- Recruitment plan and recruitment of registration agents, maintenance staff, hotline staff
- Preparation of terms of reference and tenders for private-sector service providers, if they are used
- Training of trainers
- Training of registration agents
- Training of maintenance staff
- Rehearsal of all steps to enroll people in remote areas
- Development of public awareness campaign
- Transportation means
- Setting up a data entry site and hiring data entry personnel
• Set-up and configuration of the registration kit
• Piloting of registration equipment and procedures
• Setting up hotline / grievance redress mechanism and training personnel to respond
• Liaising with local governments and community/neighborhood associations and groups
• Liaising with consulates/embassies abroad to set up registration points if the registration campaign is targeting nationals residing abroad

A key element of planning is sequencing and geographic coverage. Some countries roll out nationwide simultaneously (India), while others move the campaign from region to region (Malawi). In Bolivia, the registration was first launched in rural areas, which were less densely populated, and thus had fewer people registering at each registration point. This allowed registration teams to acquire on the job training in a lower-pressure environment.

Communication and Information Campaigns

Prior to the launch of a registration campaign, people need to be informed about where, how, and why to register through public information campaigns. To participate in the ID system, the public needs to know: who is eligible to enroll; when and where to enroll; and how to enroll, including which supporting documents or other evidence will be required. Without clear, consistent messaging regarding process and requirements, misinformation is likely to spread, creating barriers to participation.

Typically, communication campaigns combine both broad, national-level efforts, and localized, community-level outreach, conducted in local languages. In addition to providing information about registration procedures, communication campaigns also play a vital role in motivating people to register by articulating the benefits of enrollment and alleviating fears or concerns, for example, about the misuse of data or discrimination.

Some common challenges or concerns that need to be addressed relate to social or religious norms (for example, acceptability of a male registration agent coming into physical contact with a woman in the process of capturing fingerprints; capturing facial images of women wearing a face veil, and so on), and to eligibility (can anyone register regardless of citizenship or other immigrations status, or is enrollment limited to only citizens and certain categories of residents?).

Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) campaigns and ongoing communication strategies should take a multipronged approach using multiple media channels, formats, and styles to reach a broad audience that spans ages, social, economic, and linguistic groups. These typically include: television, radio (in local languages), local governments and village heads, community meetings, storytellers, traveling theater, and word of mouth. Some of these methods are costly while others are essentially free.

A common theme emphasized by practitioners is that the communication campaign should not be politicized, or be seen as politicized, as it will alienate large segments of the population (for example, supporters of opposition parties). The entire registration campaign needs to be managed as an administrative process.

In Malawi, which did not have a widespread national ID system before 2017, a major civic engagement campaign was implemented over six months. Three levels of communication were used – national,
community-based, and direct, individual outreach via text messages to mobile phones. The national level communication via television and radio provided general information while community-based communication was tailored to local conditions. A wide range of tools were used: posters (27,630 of which 90 percent were in Chichewa, a local language spoken by over half the population), banners, jingles, leaflets, radio, TV call-in programs, press releases, and district-focused SMS campaigns. Despite these extensive efforts, there were still some areas of the country where registration agents faced problems among people who believed registration agents were marking them with the sign of the apocalypse.

The Bolivian voter registration campaign notified residents in urban areas of the upcoming registration by pasting announcements on houses and buildings notifying them in advance of the dates of the registration. In rural areas, the campaign worked with local associations and NGOs to deliver the message. Slogans such as, “Your fingerprints, your vote,” were devised to encourage people to register and link the procedure with a sense of civic empowerment.

In India, a nationwide logo competition was launched, calling for the submission of logo designs by the general public to raise awareness about registration and to generate enthusiasm and interest for its Aadhaar system. The competition received over 2,000 entries; the winner was awarded a Rs 100,000 prize (about US$1,400)⁸.

**Requirements for Registration**

In order to register, individuals are typically requested to provide evidence of their identity or particular identity attributes (for example, name, age) as part of the “identity proofing” process to verify who they are. Keeping requirements for enrollment minimal and flexible is considered good practice in the case of foundational ID systems to ensure the accessibility of the registration process (and the ID system) for all, particularly in places where civil registries and other existing government databases only cover a limited share of the population. During registration campaigns, registrants typically have several different options for providing evidence about their identity – multiple documents, such as birth certificates, voter registration cards, beneficiary cards, or student IDs may be accepted. In the absence of any prior documentation, the testimony of a witness or “introducer,” either a trusted community member or organization, is often used for identity validation.

---

⁷ Previous efforts to roll out a national ID had been partial and fragmented, and only an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Malawians possessed an ID at the time of the 2017 campaign.

In the case of Botswana’s Universal Registration Campaign (launched in 2015), which aimed to increase registration of births among vulnerable populations (people living in remote areas, people with disabilities, orphans, street children, and other vulnerable children) documentation requirements were relaxed. Instead, identity evidence about the registrant was provided through community-level verification. If applicants lacked an official proof of birth, any available “social footprints” were used to assist in registration. A committee, whose secretary was a Department of Civil and National Registration representative, interviewed the applicant and family members, relying on assistance from the village chief and the Village Development Committee. The goal was to verify as much information as possible after which a recommendation was made to the registrar.\(^9\)

In Malawi, a scoring system was used, according to which different forms of identity evidence carried different weight\(^10\). A total of 100 points were required in order to obtain a national ID (see table 3):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Acceptable Forms of Proof of ID in the Malawi Registration Campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National ID card presented in person by biological parent, who is a Malawian (100) &amp; A certified copy of adoption court order (in the case of an adopted child when one or both of the adopting parents are Malawian citizens) (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt presented in person by biological parent, who is a Malawian and registered previously by same Biometric Registration Kit (BRK) (100) &amp; Malawian passport (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two community witnesses registered by same BRK (must be present when registering) (100) &amp; Letter from district social welfare officer (in case of abandoned child now 16 years old or above) (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certified and signed letter from village head with indication of your parent and list of children (80) &amp; Driver’s license (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal testimony of village head and advisor (80) &amp; Government pay slip (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name in village register (80) &amp; Old birth certificate pre-2015 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawian diplomatic/service passport (70) &amp; Employment discharge certificate (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New birth certificate post-2015 (60) &amp; Employment ID card (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship or naturalization certificate (60) &amp; Marriage certificate (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certified and signed letter from village head (40) &amp; Any other official document (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter card (40) &amp; Tax certificate (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Similar approaches have been used to improve inclusion in functional ID systems, like voter registries. In Liberia, for example, individuals were given the choice of presenting any of the following proofs of identity for voter registration:

- valid Liberian passport;
- certification of naturalization;
- Liberian birth certificate;
- certificate of renunciation of citizenship of another country;
- the sworn testimony of two other registered voters appearing in person before the registrar to confirm the applicant’s eligibility to register; or
- testimony by a Liberian traditional leader appearing in person before the registrar to confirm the applicant’s eligibility to register.

Well-designed campaigns will also need to ensure that enrollment is available in a fully inclusive and accessible manner to people with no or limited literacy and familiarity with various digital technologies, to people with disabilities, and members of other vulnerable and marginalized groups. In Namibia, for example, illiterate voters can put a fingerprint on their voting card, in lieu of providing a signature.

### Registration Points

Countries generally do not have enough permanent registration offices to be able to effectively conduct large-scale registration activities relying on existing infrastructure alone. Existing offices often have limited capacity to manage high-volume intake and the distance between registration offices and communities served is often large. Permanent registration offices are not generally designed to enroll millions of individuals in a matter of few days (Rwanda), weeks (Bolivia) or months (most other countries).

The ID4D Practitioner’s Guide summarizes key lessons related to registration points, many of which are relevant to large-scale registration. The lessons include, among other issues: establishing flexible operating times, space and facilities; providing crowd control and secure physical access; leveraging existing space; providing registration receipts; and creating express queues.

Common measures for expanding the registration point network during registration campaigns include:

- Using other government-owned social or administrative infrastructure as temporary registration points, such as schools (Rwanda) or small churches (Bolivia)
- Deploying mobile brigades who move from site to site on a schedule (Malawi, Bolivia)
- Deploying mobile temporary registration offices, such as a vans or trucks, which are stationed at a site for the duration of the registration drive (Bolivia)

---

In Pakistan, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) created 2,000 pop-up registration offices during its registration campaign for a population of 98 million. It registered 55 million people between 2008 and 2013. Malawi deployed 2,000 registration officer teams (a total of 4,200 registration officers) to register 9 million people in six months. The teams spent 25 days to a little over a month in a region before moving on to the next. In Rwanda, schools were used for the country’s intensive three-day registration campaign (paper-based) in 2007, where teachers served as registration agents to enroll the entire population. Over 15,000 temporary registration points were established for the purpose.

In India, UIDAI worked with an ecosystem of partners, including more than 150 registrars (government and semi-government agencies), over 710 enrollment agencies (private), and more than 500,000 individual operators (trained and certified) to register residents throughout the country (at a peak rate of 1.5 million individuals per day). These enrollment agencies covered capital and labor expenditures in the field (for example, by paying for devices and field enrollment operators/agents), and were paid a small fee for each successful registration. This decentralized approach to enrollment relieved UIDAI of having to hire its own temporary staff and equipment, leveraging the local brick and mortar structures of partner agencies and enabling the program to achieve scale at a faster pace.

In several cases, following the completion of the registration campaign, once the bulk of the population has been enrolled in the database (the stock), countries have expanded their permanent registration points to better serve continuous enrollment (the flow). For instance, Pakistan expanded the number of NADRA offices from 100 to 537.

Conditions at registration points are important. This includes places to sit for those for whom standing for long periods is difficult. Observations and reports from the Kenya and Tanzania registration drives mention long queues and poor conditions for those waiting in line as understaffed registration offices struggled to cope. In Malawi, members of the registration team invited older or infirm people to the front of the queue so that they would not have to wait. In hot climates, cool areas to wait should be provided, such as facilities with air conditioning or shaded areas. A security presence at registration points is often required to ensure safety of both registrants and registration personnel, maintain order and handle incidents.

**Registration Officers**

Registration officers (ROs) or agents are the people responsible for enrolling individuals: their tasks usually include verifying any existing identity documents, capturing registrants’ data, and issuing them with a proof of registration. Countries with an ID agency typically have their own cadre of full-time registration officers, although registration may be outsourced to third parties as well. Generally, the need for agents far exceeds the supply of existing agency staff when it comes to mounting a large-scale registration campaign. The recruitment and training of temporary agents becomes necessary. They are sometimes recruited directly by the government, but recruitment may also be outsourced to a private provider.

A multistep process is involved when using temporary agents. It involves planning, advertising, and recruiting; testing; training of trainers; training of agents; contracting and deployment.

---

• **Planning:** to determine, among other things: how many teams are needed; how many ROs per registration point; how many will be mobile or based at fixed sites; how they will be held accountable for the registration kits/equipment.

• **Recruiting:** advertising for the positions, with minimum requirements. In some countries, recruitment is done at the regional level, because of the importance of language and cultural familiarity and to control transportation costs. In other cases, ROs are recruited nationally and deployed throughout the country (more feasible in small, more homogenous countries). Qualifications generally include a certain level of computer and data entry skills.

• **Testing.** To select agents, they may be required to take a test. A certain number of those who do not pass the test are then held in reserve. In *Pakistan*, the recruitment drive in certain remote areas did not lead to enough qualified applicants, so the qualification threshold was lowered and additional training was provided.

• **Training:** Because of the large number of agents, training usually involves training of trainers and may need to occur in phases. In *Malawi*, as one cohort of agents was trained, they were deployed to the field, so it was not necessary to train everyone at once before the campaign could start.

• **Deployment:** Agents are sent to the field on a predetermined schedule. In most cases, they must be supplied with vehicles (cars or motorcycles). Some areas cannot be reached by vehicle and alternative modes of transportation, ranging from helicopter (*Côte d’Ivoire*) and boat to foot (hiking and mountaineering through difficult terrain in *Pakistan*) and even skiing have been used.

Some or all of this process can be outsourced. For example, in *Malawi*, the testing and training of agents was outsourced to a private company, while the agents were paid by the state budget. For *Cambodia’s* Universal Birth Registration program, 13,000 people were trained as registration agents and deployed throughout the country, registering 7 million people in ten months.\(^\text{13}\)

Enrollment agents (or private companies if registration is outsourced) may be compensated via a pay-for-performance model or may be provided bonuses or performance incentives to increase registration. In *India*, where registration was outsourced to public and private entities, contracted enrollment agents (registrars) were paid up to Rs 50 (about US$0.70) for each completed (verified and unique) registration per person. In *Cambodia*, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided a small financial reward to mobile registration volunteers for every 100 people registered.\(^\text{14}\) In pay-for-performance cases, controls need to be in place against multiple, incomplete, or insufficient-quality registrations – for example, by paying enrollment agents only after deduplication and validation checks, based on new, unique enrollments – to discourage agents from cutting corners or registering the same individual multiple times.

---

**Equipment for Registration**

The registration approach and registration equipment should be appropriate for local conditions, which may be different across different regions of the country.\(^\text{15}\) Common challenges encountered at registration points, especially those in remote areas, include limited, inconsistent, or no supply of electricity and Internet

---


\(^\text{14}\) Ibid.
connectivity. For capturing data, including biometrics, in an electronic format, power must be supplied. Connectivity is needed to send data back to the central servers to deduplicate biometrics.

Some important considerations for equipment in the case of registration campaigns include:

- **Portability**: the choice of field equipment needs to take into account weight and handling considerations for transport by vehicle, motorcycle, on foot, pack animals; it is easier to take a tablet-based system to the field than a suitcase system with separate, bulkier slap biometric scanners. and so on. Especially for travel in difficult terrain, equipment should be light enough to carry (for example, by hikers and skiers in Pakistan, or by pack animals in Bolivia).

- **Power and power sources**: battery power and extra battery packs, solar power generator for areas without electricity or where there may be power outages;

- **Durability**: equipment should be resistant to heat, water, and dust;

- **Internet connectivity**: in remote areas, Internet connectivity may be weak or nonexistent;

- **Security**: measures to ensure equipment is not stolen; and

- **Ease of use**: equipment should be sufficiently easy to use, and repair if necessary, by registration agents in the field and easy for registrants to interact with (for example, the process of biometric capture should be easy to explain, demonstrate, and for registrants to complete).

In Malawi, biometric registration kits were solar powered, and included a digital camera, laptop, fingerprint scanner, card reader, photo booth, solar panel, and other peripheral equipment. Because they were in use for approximately 12 hours per day, extra batteries were carried. Rapid response teams were deployed to repair them on the spot, if needed\(^\text{16}\). To prevent theft or misuse, registration officers were the first to be issued IDs, which were then linked to a specific kit.

Enrollment timelines are a key determinant – along with the size of the target population – for the number of registration kits/equipment needed. As a general rule, the shorter the registration timeline for a given population size, the more registration kits/equipment will be needed, and the higher the cost for registration will be.

### 2.1 Special Measures to Register Vulnerable and Poor Persons

The registration process often imposes a number of costs, including:

- the fee for registering or for the ID document;
- the distance to the registration point, which may require significant travel by public transportation;

---

15 See the World Bank ID4D Practitioner’s Guide for a broader discussion of equipment needs and considerations for registration in general, including servers, storage, and network.
16 Malik, 2018.
• time spent waiting in a queue, which represents an opportunity cost;
• the cost of obtaining proof of identity (breeder documents);
• if witness testimony (from relatives, neighbors, village head as “introducer”) is used for identity proofing, effort – and possibly gifts or at least an informal reciprocal obligation – will still be required.

Beyond these costs, there is also the uncertainty of being denied an ID for some reason after all the person has gone through all the effort to register. Registrants may also encounter cultural and language barriers during the registration process that make it prohibitively difficult for them to complete enrollment. Finally, becoming informed about what is needed to register itself is a cost.

The costs and barriers are magnified for members of vulnerable and marginalized groups, who may be limited in their physical mobility or live in remote or difficult-to-reach areas, who may be constrained in their ability to register because of social norms or may have concerns about registration owing to cultural sensitivities. Registration campaigns should recognize these issues and plan for them as part of the campaign design, logistics, equipment, and so on. Typical measures include:

• Home visits by registration agents to bedridden or immobile individuals;
• Gender-sensitive approaches when it is culturally unacceptable for men to register women;
• Use of agents from vulnerable groups to foster inclusion and empowerment;
• Outreach via representatives or community-based organizations working with specific groups, such as women, persons with albinism, or persons with disabilities;
• Relaxing documentation requirements to enable people without prior documentation (for example, birth certificate) to enroll;
• Relaxing registration criteria or providing alternatives when biometric capture is inadequate or impossible, such as for those whose fingerprints are not digitally legible;
• Special measures at registration points to make waiting less burdensome, such as providing seating, shade, air conditioning, inviting the infirm to the front of the line, and so on (see Registration Points);
• Eliminating registration fees (or subsidizing these fees for the poor)

In culturally conservative areas of Pakistan, NADRA opened 15 women-only registration centers. These centers were staffed entirely by women - managers, data entry operators, and drivers - thereby overcoming reluctance of women or their families to register17. NADRA also introduced a transgender category for its national ID, making it one of the first (and few) countries in the world to legally recognize transgender identities through its ID system. Aadhaar in India also includes three genders.

In Rwanda, vulnerable persons were reached in two ways: through groups which represented them, and through home visits if they were unable to go the registration point themselves. In addition, although the cost of the ID card was low (less than $1).

In Malawi, efforts were made to recruit registration agents from vulnerable groups – including women, persons with disabilities, and the albino community. Having a registration agent conducting enrollments while using a wheelchair, for example, was a potent signal that enrollment was open to, and possible for, everyone.

In Pakistan mountaineers, hikers, and skiers were hired as agents to travel into remote, mountain areas in order to reach isolated communities. In Bolivia, agents venturing into remote areas carried 30 kg backpacks with the registration equipment into areas unreachable by road. In many campaigns, it is common for mobile teams to conduct home visits for persons who are immobile and bedridden (for example, in Thailand and Peru).

**Incentives to Register**

In addition to removing barriers and reducing the cost of registration, providing additional incentives for enrollment to the entire population or to selected groups can boost the success of registration campaigns. These incentives to help nudge individuals to register may come in a variety of forms.

People often associate registration for a foundational ID system with national pride and see inherent value in enrollment and in being issued with an ID credential, even if they may not immediately have a use for it. At the same time, some people will be reluctant to register – and invest the necessary time (and money) – if they see limited direct value in it for their daily lives. Messaging such as clearly articulating the benefits of enrolling in the ID system can help overcome this reluctance. Such anticipated benefits from obtaining an ID may include:

- Access to social transfer programs, services, opportunities, transactions including registration of land, applying for formal jobs, cash or noncash transfers, ability to buy a SIM card or open a bank account, subsidies for agricultural inputs, and so on;
- Civic engagement: ability to exercise rights, ability to vote;
- Symbolic, nonmaterial benefits: sense of pride, recognition as a member of a community.

In some countries, registration is a legal requirement, in part to increase enrollment. In addition, registration for a specific ID is sometimes mandatory to access a particular service or benefit (for example, voter ID cards for voting). While such policies may seem like an incentive to enroll, they have the potential to increase exclusion, as – discussed above – marginalized and vulnerable groups are likely to face the most difficulty accessing IDs, and therefore also be excluded from associated services and transactions.

In addition, large-scale registration campaigns may provide immediate, one-time benefits at the time of registration to encourage people to enroll, that is, either to travel to registration points or allow registration agents into their homes if they have mobility issues. Examples of onsite benefits provided during registration drives include:

- Food and entertainment
- Village lotteries
- Material goods such as baby supplies and clothes, t-shirts
- Mobile phones or mobile phone credit
Onsite benefits for people to come to registration points are provided by governments, local authorities and sometimes the private-sector operator – in accordance with local laws and regulations, and typically with approval of locally elected leaders (for example, the prefect or the village head). Social pressure – not wanting to be left out if everyone else in the community is registering – may also play a role.

In Peru, special registration days are organized in the village square in rural areas, accompanied by festivities and food and parties for children. This signals that birth certification is something to be celebrated rather than just an administrative process18.

18 Gelb and Diofasi Metz 2018.
Lessons Learned and Recommendations

What do successful registration campaigns have in common and what operational lessons can be learned? The following are the most critical success factors, shared by most of the registration campaigns studied:

a) **Thorough preparation.** Each of the many components that are part of a registration campaign (see Planning and Preparation) must be designed and planned. Responsibilities must be assigned, resources mobilized, contingencies planned, and then the entire operation must be rolled out, supervised and supported. In almost all cases (Bolivia, Malawi, Rwanda), several years were spent on planning before the rollout.

b) **Strong leadership.** Political will was crucial to ensuring campaigns were successfully implemented and challenges addressed in a timely manner. Those responsible for designing and conducting campaigns need to have the confidence and support of high-level leadership (for example, by the cabinet, prime minister, or president’s office) to enable them to marshal resources and overcome challenges. This is especially important because of the multiple agencies or ministries involved. In some cases, the political will was galvanized by recent historical events related to divisive effects of previous conflicts or social tensions around identity or socioeconomic status. Rwanda and Bolivia are good examples (as is Peru, although it was not a time-limited campaign). In contrast, a large-scale registration campaign in Ghana planned for nine months ended up taking five years, with a two-year break and delays triggered by the change in government in 2009.

c) **Special measures for hard to reach populations.** The campaigns incorporated specific strategies and measures for the hardest to reach groups – the vulnerable, poor, remote. These measures included targeted communication campaigns, outreach and home visits, relaxation of identity proofing requirements, incentives to offset the cost to register, and so on.

d) **Good coordination between different government agencies.** A coordinated approach was often ensured through the establishment and continued contributions of oversight, coordinating, and technical committees that brought together all the agencies who had a stake in the outcome. Registration campaigns affect and rely on multiple entities across the public and private sectors, elevating the need for cross-agency coordination.

e) **Strategic use of resources.** The campaigns looked to leverage existing public infrastructure and staff to set up and operate temporary registration points and for additional registration-related logistics (for example, the armed services in Rwanda delivered registration forms using its trucks). This helped reduce campaign costs, while reinforcing, the crosscutting, whole-of-government nature of registration campaigns (and often, the ID system itself).

f) **Neutral, nonpolitical exercise.** The campaigns were portrayed and implemented as politically neutral, administrative efforts. Ensuring that registration does not – and is not perceived to – serve the needs or interests of a given political party or faction is critical for securing the public’s trust and broad-based participation in the process. If mass registration is perceived as furthering political goals, this may compromise the goal of achieving universal registration (or even registration for the majority of the population).
Appendix. Case Studies

Bolivia: Voter Registration 2009

Context

In 2009, Bolivia conducted a large-scale voter registration campaign to create a new biometric registry notable for its rapid implementation over the course of just 75 days. The voter registration drive was initiated in response to a long-simmering political crisis, with the credibility of electoral institutions at stake. By the end of the campaign, over 5.1 million voters representing over three quarters of eligible voters, had been registered. The Carter Center, in the role of independent observer, concluded that the overall process was in line with Bolivia’s international commitments (that is, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and noted “large and enthusiastic” participation by the population19.

Preparation

The transitional electoral law passed in April 200920 set the date of the elections for December of that year and also required the establishment of a biometric electoral registry. Biometric registration was intended to contribute to more transparent elections and provide an opportunity for those to participate who were believed to be disenfranchised by previous voter registration processes. Nevertheless, many were skeptical the process could be completed in time for the December 2009 elections, within less than five months of the passage of the law21.

The tight pre-election deadline posed significant challenges for the campaign. The parties responsible for the creation of the registry, the Plurinational Electoral Body (OEP) and the Departmental Electoral Courts (CDEs), were under immense pressure to deliver, and risks were perceived high that the CDE would not be able to complete the registry in time. Implementation itself was outsourced to a vendor, a private company. The compressed registration timeline also elevated costs because of the need for large quantities of biometric registration equipment and the large number of temporary registration staff needed to achieve enrollment targets. Additional challenges were posed by the need to reach Bolivia’s dispersed populations, some only accessible by foot, on top of a reported tendency among the citizenry to wait until the last minute to register.

Identification and Registration Processes

Prior to registration, each individual’s data was verified by electoral notaries based on a wide range of documents, including identity cards, military service books, and passports.

In addition to biographic data, registrants’ fingerprints, a photograph, and signature was also captured and records were deduplicated using an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). In a small minority of cases where fingerprints could not be registered – primarily affecting the elderly and manual laborers – alternative deduplication methods were used.

20 Regimen Electoral Transitorio (RET), Law no. 4021, April 14, 2009.
21 A. Costas (former President of the National Electoral Court of Bolivia), personal communication, May 14, 2019.
Implementation

The campaign mobilized over 10,000 workers who served as registration officers on the 3,000 registration teams. Each team was responsible for an enrollment terminal consisting of a desktop or notebook computer, digital camera, tripod, printer, signature, and fingerprint scanners.

Two types of registration centers were used: 1,700 stationary and 1,300 mobile centers, the latter including temporary mobile registration in vans or trucks. Special registration teams were dedicated to indigenous rural populations (and for army barracks, prisons, and hospitals.) Registration teams walked into remote areas unreachable by road, carrying the registration equipment weighing 30 kg on their backs or using pack animals. An additional 150 registration points were established overseas, in Spain, Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, for expatriates to register. Fifty-nine registration teams were available as reserves.

People in certain rural areas with lower population density were registered first, over 10 days, allowing registration teams to become familiar with the process and address issues in a lower-pressure environment. In these areas, the campaign worked with local associations and NGOs to deliver the message. In urban areas, residents were notified of the upcoming voter registration campaign through announcements posted on houses and buildings. Slogans such as, “Your fingerprints, your vote,” encouraged people to register and linked the procedure with a sense of civic empowerment.

Although registration proceeded at a breakneck pace, some activities were not completed within the expected timeline. For example, the voter registry was published only days before the election, which did not give voters sufficient time as stipulated by law to review or submit corrections or complaints.

Outcomes

Through high-level commitment, careful coordination, and the adoption of an inclusive enrollment approach, an effective campaign was conducted, exceeding its registration target of 3.8 million by about 50 percent. According to Antonio Costas, then President of the National Electoral Court of Bolivia, the biometric registry “resolved definitively the problems of voter duplication and voter fraud, restored political stability in the country, and [gave] a record number of Bolivian citizens the chance to participate in democratic elections”22.

Lessons

The 2009 Bolivia voter registration campaign is noteworthy for several reasons. Its ability to create a new registry for 5.1 million people in 75 days points to an inclusive, well-planned, and well-executed registration approach. The decision to begin registration in low population density rural areas allowed for teething problems to be addressed in less high-intensity settings before the system was deployed in busier, urban areas. Bolivia’s campaign was also adaptive with regard to different environments and populations, developing tailor-made approaches to facilitate rapid and inclusive enrollment for urban, rural, peri-urban and overseas regions, for remote areas inaccessible by road, and among indigenous populations.

---

Malawi: National Identification System 2017

This case study draws extensively on Malik (2018)\textsuperscript{23}, which provides a detailed description of Malawi’s mass registration exercise. For additional details, readers are encouraged to consult the full note.

Introduction

In 2017, the Government of Malawi reached near-universal registration over a 180-day large-scale registration campaign run from May to November. Over 9.1 million citizens were registered during this period for the country’s national ID. The total cost of the campaign was US$52 million.

Context

The National Registration Act of 2010 made it mandatory for all Malawians aged 16 and above to be registered in the National Registration and Identification System (NRIS). The law came into effect in August 2015. The act also created the National Registration Bureau (NRB), which is responsible for managing both civil registration and identification.

Preparation

The Government of Malawi led the design, management, and implementation of the national ID system in partnership with UNDP, with additional support from other donors who provided financing for the project. There was strong private-sector buy-in, particularly from banks and mobile money operators. Financial service providers saw the ID system as an opportunity to expand their customer base and their suite of financial products, while also making it easier to meet customer due diligence requirements.

Implementation was led by a multinational team of advisors, consultants, program analysts, and UN volunteers. This core team was responsible for developing the enrollment strategy, assigning tasks, and hiring temporary registration staff. A technical committee was set up comprising a wide range of stakeholders to guide the implementation of the project, with monthly meetings to ensure swift progress. The technical implementation team was divided into several smaller, specialized units (for example, logistics team, ICT team, and so on), each with a dedicated leader and each focused on the realization of specific tasks, which helped streamline operations.

The implementation team collaborated with local universities to create a testing and training program and employ students as temporary registration officers. In addition to the more technical aspects of registration, the training course also emphasized the value of having an ID as well as the “patriotic” aspects of creating an ID registration program.

Out of the larger group of ROs, 60 technicians passed an advanced technical training course that equipped them with the skills to maintain and repair every part of the biometric registration kits (BRKs). They became part of rapid response teams of technicians, available to fix BRKs on the spot.

Registration staff comprised a diverse group of individuals, including women, persons with albinism, persons with disabilities and members of additional marginalized and vulnerable groups. In doing so, it not

only provided new employment opportunities for ROs from vulnerable groups, but also sent a powerful message about a national ID system being created with the contribution of people representing the entire country. Special precautions were taken to protect the safety of registration officers with albinism, who faced a particularly high risk of discrimination and even violence.

Before registration began, a communications campaign was launched both at the national and community level to raise awareness about the national ID system and the upcoming large-scale registration effort. Information was disseminated via multiple channels, including newspapers, radio, and television as well as with the help of local faith-based and community-level organizations. An SMS service provided citizens with information about when a campaign would be launched in their district.

The goal was to make communications materials as easy to understand as possible, and information and consultation meetings were initiated with all possible stakeholders and community groups. In addition to raising awareness among regular citizens, it was equally important to educate, inform, and secure the buy-in of government officials at the national, regional, and local levels.

**Implementation**

The campaign was divided into five phases, each covering four to six districts out of Malawi’s twenty-eight. Each phase lasted about one month and was only closed after a “sign-off” was received from a taskforce of local leaders to confirm that all available adults had been enrolled.

4,200 ROs, mostly university students, were hired to support the mass registration effort at both temporary and permanent registration sites. Their responsibilities included supporting the organization of the registration process, as well as individually registering citizens. To ensure accountability and timeliness in returning the equipment, ROs were required to swipe their own ID cards to log into their BRK each morning.

The field campaign used 2,000 customized biometric registration kits. Once mass registration was completed in a region, some kits were left behind for continuous registration, to allow for the enrollment of those who were unable to participate in the initial registration drive.

Citizens’ biographic, and biometric data was collected as part of registration, including ten fingerprints, a photograph, and signature. Citizens could present a wide range of evidence to verify their identities at the time of registration, including testimonies from the village head or other local leaders or from two community witnesses who had previously registered at the same site. To ensure inclusive and responsive implementation, the campaign established a call center and a SMS service to help with customer service needs and register grievances from citizens.

Information stored in the BRKs was synchronized after each phase and downloaded to the central server. It was then deduplicated and underwent additional checks regarding its integrity and completeness. Finally, the data was sent in batches to be printed onto ID cards. ID cards were delivered to district offices, where local authorities worked closely with community organizations to inform people that their ID cards had arrived and to provide details on how to collect them. An SMS service was also set up to allow for registrants to verify the location of their card using the receipt number provided at the time of registration.
National ID cards were issued early in the campaign for members of parliament and civil servants engaged in the process. This was intended as a gesture providing tangible proof that the plan, and the ID cards, were working, and as a sign of goodwill.

Following the completion of the registration campaign, BRKs were provided for other public entities, such as the Malawi Electoral Commission, to reuse for their own biometric registration and authentication efforts.

**Outcomes**

Over 9.1 million citizens were registered during the six-month registration campaign. Of the 9 million citizens registered, 99.7 percent had received their IDs by August 2018. A further 3.96 million children were registered alongside their parents, creating a database which would allow the government to notify them of their eligibility to obtain an ID card when they turned 16. The National Registration Bureau (NRB) estimates that 500,000 new ID cards will be issued annually through District Commissions and post offices.

The introduction of unique ID numbers has created opportunities to broaden the scope of services such as social benefits. The District Commissioner’s Offices are responsible for undertaking continuous registration to account for anyone who might have missed the registration campaign, and for those turning 16 years of age after the conclusion of the campaign.

**Lessons**

First, organization and planning were key to meeting the campaign goal of universal registration. Second, regular meetings with key stakeholders, the creation of smaller “taskforces,” and careful delegation of assignments was key to effective coordination and timely rollout. Third, a diverse and well-trained team of ROs proved essential to the campaign’s success. Fourth, the decision to build up in-country knowledge of the BRKs, including how to conduct repairs, via the special training of a core technical staff helped troubleshooting technical issues as they arose. Employing persons from marginalized groups facilitated reaching members of those groups among the population, who might otherwise have been reluctant to come forward and register.
Pakistan: National Identification System 2008-2014

This case study draws extensively on Malik (2014)24, which provides a detailed description of Pakistan’s ID system and the approach to increase enrollment. For additional details, readers are encouraged to consult the full note.

Introduction

Between 2008 and 2014, a campaign led by Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) massively expanded the registered population from 54 million to 98 million, and collected registrants’ digital biometrics. The campaign helped address multiple problems, including duplicate IDs, the proliferation of false IDs, and the lack of trusted, government-recognized ID among millions of people. The campaign also deployed a range of strategies to register difficult to reach groups and regions. By 2014, NADRA had delivered a biometric computerized national identity card (CNIC) to over 80 percent of the eligible population of adults over the age of 18.

Although the campaign took place over years rather than months, it is nonetheless considered a notable example of massive organization and mobilization of resources to reach 44 million people. The country’s vast population (the fifth largest in the world at the time), diverse tribal regions and languages, and remote and partly inaccessible regions were serious challenges faced by the campaign.

Context

Prior to 2001, Pakistan had used a paper-based national identification system. The rollout of the new CNIC, which included biometric data collection and the issuance of a new, unique 13-digit number, began in 2001, but the system’s capabilities and robustness were relatively limited and enrollment remained low. Leading up to 2008, the technical infrastructure and business processes of the system were enhanced, including by enabling the effective capture and processing of a full set of 10 fingerprints and digital photograph for deduplication. Still, because of reliance on the older, less advanced legacy system, there was a high prevalence of fake IDs, duplicates, and many people remained without any government-recognized ID25.

Preparation

NADRA was established via the “NADRA ordinance” in 2000 and has since become a large, autonomous technical agency with approximately 18,000 employees. For the registration campaign, additional registration agents were recruited to staff the registration centers. NADRA prioritized the hiring of registration officers who were from the local community, and who knew the local language and customs. In addition, a certain share of agents was recruited from minority and marginalized groups to encourage members of those groups to come forward and feel more at ease when registering. They included women, members of different ethnic and linguistic groups, and transgender people. When qualified staff could not be found in certain areas, the criteria for hiring were relaxed, and NADRA hired nonlocals whom they provided with additional training.

Implementation

NADRA introduced multiple measures for increasing registration rates. It established permanent registration centers in all of Pakistan’s more than 150 districts, increasing the number from 100 to 537. The centers were organized into eight regions, each with its own data infrastructure office transmitting data back to a centralized database in Islamabad. The permanent registration centers were complemented by 236 mobile vans (which traveled between communities) and 74 semimobile units (temporary registration offices that stayed in one place for the duration of a local registration drive). During the registration campaign, NADRA also created 2,000 temporary “pop-up” registration offices. Since many registration locations lacked electricity connections, solar panels were brought along.

NADRA opened 15 registration centers staffed only by women in conservative areas. The managers, data entry operators, and drivers were all women. The purpose of these centers was to address reluctance among women to register (or by their families to let them register) by providing targeted encouragement and more accessible spaces. By the end of the campaign, the number of registered women had increased by 104 percent, while that of men had only increased by 60 percent.

Mountaineers, hikers, and skiers were hired as registration agents to travel into remote, mountain areas, carrying the kits on their backs, in order to reach isolated communities. For some people, registering for an ID was practically their first formal interaction with the state.

The elderly and disabled were given priority in the registration process; they were not required to stand in the queue to register. Furthermore, agents at the registration points were instructed to keep an eye out for vulnerable persons and lead them to the front of the line.

On the supply side, NADRA increased pay for registration agents and introduced a reward and recognition system to reduce the acceptance of bribes for jumping the line or for registrations involving inaccurate or fake identities. In addition, NADRA created an official fast-track service costing PRs 1,100 (about US$7), awarding staff bonuses related to payments collected for this service.

On the demand side, NADRA introduced a robust civic education campaign to communicate the potential benefits of registering and incentivized registration among vulnerable populations by linking certain benefits with having the card (for example, the Benazir Income Support Program or BISP, see below).

26 The number has steadily increased over the years.
Outcomes

The campaign stressed how registration empowers women which, along with female-staffed registration centers, helped overcome the prior gender imbalance in registration: by the end of the campaign women’s registration rates had increased significantly.

The ID program underpinned various social transfer programs, for example, the BISP, which is the largest single social safety net program in Pakistan; the Watan Card, as well as a new voter roll. The many use cases for the ID also helped incentivize registration further.

The ID system and the authentication mechanisms enabled through it were also instrumental for delivery of cash transfers for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in areas affected by conflict. The government was able to deliver cash assistance to almost 400,000 displaced households via debit cards in tandem with biometric verification to prevent double dipping.

Lessons

Among the many lessons, the Pakistan case represents a good example of using a wide range of targeted measures to increase registration, especially of groups who may be reluctant to enroll or difficult to reach. These measures include the reduction of cultural and physical barriers to enrollment by hiring staff with local knowledge and creating registration centers adapted to meet the needs of marginalized and vulnerable populations, including women. In addition, the establishment of permanent registration offices throughout Pakistan’s districts was vital for removing barriers to access for continuous registration and for ensuring high coverage of the ID system in the long term. Providing clear incentives for registration, such as by linking the ID to access to cash transfers, was also critical for boosting enrollment.

Introduction

Over the course of a three-day weekend in 2007, the Government of Rwanda mobilized virtually the entire country to implement a registration campaign that covered over 9 million people. This was followed by an eight-month process to capture biometric data from registered individuals, using the paper records collected during the initial weekend registration. The campaign, which resulted in a new National Population Register (NPR), served three purposes: as a general census (National Population Registry), a civil registration exercise, and a voter registration drive. The registration campaign was designed and implemented by the National Identity Agency (NIDA), which is also responsible for the management of the National Population Register (NPR), with support from the National Electoral Commission (NEC). Opting for the combined process reduced the costs that would have been incurred from conducting multiple campaigns. The shared database that was created could be used by multiple government departments and agencies.

Preparation

Rwanda's registration exercise was underpinned by extensive preparatory work, which lasted three years. The government formed a Steering Committee to coordinate multiple agencies, and a National Technical Team. The latter was composed of IT staff from across state institutions, including the Rwanda Information Technology Authority (RITA), Immigration, National Policy, Rwanda Social Security Fund, Rwanda Medical Insurance, National Statistics, and the Electoral Commission. The Technical Team reported twice weekly to the National ID Steering Committee and prepared a National ID Rollout Plan, a 250-page document that went to Cabinet for approval. Members of the National Technical Team were also responsible for ensuring that TV, radio, church, community and ministry announcements were made to explain the ID project and the technology that would be used.

Implementation

Phase 1

During the weekend campaign, people were asked to remain in their home districts, while field teams opened registration centers and collected personal details and residential information. Registration was paper based, with registration forms being filled in by hand. Over 15,000 temporary registration points were established across the country, often in schools and with teachers providing registration support. The armed services were also engaged, using their trucks to deliver registration forms across the country’s 416 sectors. Field teams also conducted door-to-door visits for individuals with mobility issues.

29 Jacques Kayisire, Personal communication, March 4, 2019.
Registration of vulnerable persons was facilitated by engaging groups and associations which represented them, and via home visits for those unable to go the registration point themselves. Notably, sensitive information, such as race, ethnicity, religion, social origin, group memberships and other characteristics are not part of the NPR. The three-day registration campaign managed to capture the registration data of over 9.2 million citizens, around 95 percent of the total population.

**Phase 2**

Following the three-day, country-wide registration campaign, data entry technicians transferred all data captured by hand on the registration forms into a digital format. This information was then used to return to Rwanda’s 30 districts and capture biometric data (face, two thumbprints and signature), a process which took an additional eight months. This was done on a rolling basis at village level registration centers, using 160 registration kits. The collected data was then entered into the NPR, with each individual issued a unique 16-digit ID number. Staff tasked with data entry did not require additional training, as the National Statistics Institute was able to draw on a large roster of experienced data entry workers.

**Outcome**

Rwanda has successfully registered over 9 million people and has continued to maintain high coverage of its population registry and ID cards ever since. The National Identity Card (NID) and unique identity number produced as a result of this registration supports the electoral register as well as the delivery of public and private sector services. In addition, the NID can also be used as a travel document in the East African Community. To promote the accessibility of the ID system, the government has kept the fee for its basic national identity card (NID) card low (RF 500, or about US$0.72), and the fee was waived for the very poor.

**Lessons**

Strong leadership and effective coordination between various government ministries were considered key to the campaign’s successful implementation. Given Rwanda’s recent history of conflict, in which ID credentials were used to target certain populations, it was important to build trust in the system and secure support for its implementation from the population. To safeguard personal data against potential misuse and allay concerns to this effect among the people, no sensitive information, such as ethnicity, was captured. In addition, commitment to the project at the national leadership level and buy-in from various government agencies helped to build trust and mobilize people to participate in the registration campaign.

Rwanda’s small geographic size, combined with a culture of *Umuganda*, a monthly day of public service during which communities come together to do local public works, likely facilitated both sensitization and mobilization of the population.

The campaign made strategic use of resources, leveraging existing social or agency infrastructure for temporary registration points, or logistics (such as the use of schools as registration sites) to reduce costs.

---

30 Evrensel. 2010.
31 Atick. 2016.