1. Project Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P149724</td>
<td>LB-Municipal Services Emergency Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Practice Area(Lead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/C/TF Number(s)</td>
<td>Closing Date (Original)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF-17510</td>
<td>30-Dec-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Project Cost (USD)</td>
<td>9,994,074.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing Date (Actual)</td>
<td>30-Jun-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD/IDA (USD)</td>
<td>Grants (USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original Commitment</td>
<td>10,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Commitment</td>
<td>10,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>9,994,074.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared by
Maria Elena Pinglo

Reviewed by
Vibecke Dixon

ICR Review Coordinator
Christopher David Nelson

Group
IEGSD (Unit 4)

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The specific project development objectives stated in both the Grant Agreement (Schedule 1) and the Project Appraisal Document statement of objectives is (p. 5):
"The project development objective is to address urgent community priorities in selected municipal services, targeting areas most affected by the influx of Syrian refugees."

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
   No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
   No

d. Components

**Component 1: Emergency Response** (estimated cost: US$3.5 million; completion: US$3.6 million). This component financed the provision of high priority municipal services (Subcomponent 1A) and initiatives that promote social interaction and collaboration (Subcomponent 1B) in the eleven participating unions of municipalities. Allocation of resources among unions would be based on the share of Syrian population (as a proxy of the additional stress on local communities). Initiatives would be selected in consultation with municipalities and communities, with a decentralized approach to decision-making. These initiatives aimed to provide non-exclusionary benefits, addressing some of the most immediate service needs in the unions most affected by the crisis: (i) improving safety and mobility; (ii) mitigating the increasing health and environmental risks associated with the deterioration of water, waste, and sanitation services; and (iii) increasing collaboration and interaction amongst the communities.

*Subcomponent 1A Service Delivery* focused on improving municipal service delivery in areas such as water supply and wastewater, solid waste management, roads improvement, and recreational facilities and community centers. Sub-projects were small in scale and required only simple preparation.

*Subcomponent 1B Community Activities* financed activities that the communities found conducive to reducing social tensions that stemmed from cohabitation of hosts and refugees. Activities were designed to be inclusive and socially cohesive, with a particular focus on women, children and the youth, covering skills exchange, learning, youth employment training, environmental campaigns, etc., as prioritized by communities.

**Component 2: Rehabilitation of Critical Infrastructure** (estimated cost: US$5.5 million; completion: US$5.9 million). This component financed mid-size works to rehabilitate and/or develop critical infrastructure in sectors such as solid waste management, roads improvement, water and sanitation, and community facilities. Due to the larger scale and costs of these works, and given the financing envelope, the number of unions benefitting from this component was limited and priority was given to demand-driven projects contributing to the highest number of beneficiaries. The investments would be identified through
consultations among elected officials and community representatives, consolidated at the union level and coordinated with relevant ministries to ensure coherence with sectoral policies.

**Component 3: Project Implementation Support** (estimated cost: US$1.0 million; completion: US$0.5 million). This component financed project management and covered the costs of the Project Management Unit (PMU) housed in the Lebanon Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), which was responsible for implementing the Project. This component also funded support needed for implementation of the decentralized, consultative approach. The consultation process was carried out by unions and municipalities, with facilitation support provided by teams of social and technical experts within the PMU, who helped communities translate the identified challenges into concrete proposals for infrastructure and social activities.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

**Project Cost:** The project was appraised at US$ 10 million. Actual project cost reached US$ 9.99 million or about 99.9% of total costs.

**Financing:** The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development acted as an administrator of the Lebanon Syrian Crisis Trust Fund grant.

**Dates:** The project was approved on September 2014 and became effective in February 2015. It was due for completion by December 2017 (FA, p.3). Considering the volatility of the security situation and the region, a request for a six-month extension came during a Bank supervision mission and through a communication from The Council for Development and Reconstruction of the Republic of Lebanon, the responsible agency, dated October 26, 2017. The project was first extended to be completed by June 2018.

3. Relevance of Objectives

**Rationale**

The project objective remains relevant to the national development priorities. This plan outlines objectives and policies that will improve the quality of urban infrastructure, improve municipal services, and promote sustainable cities as contained in a section entitled "Livable Places, Sustainable Environment" (Tenth Development Plan, p. 117 -140). In addition, the project development objective is relevant to the Government's Integrated Urban Development Strategy and Action Plan (2010-2023), built on
the structural reform introduced during project implementation and informed by the results of the project such as reducing non-revenue water losses.

The PDO is also relevant to the WBG engagement strategy for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the country partnership framework (2017-2022). The overarching project objective of the regional strategy is to contribute to building peace and stability by tackling the social, economic and institutional drivers of conflict. More specifically the strategy is aligned through two main pillars. The first pillar, “renewing social contract” is addressed through the quality service provision and citizen engagement, and the third pillar of “resilience to shocks of refugees” is addressed through supporting host governments. The PDO objectives are also relevant to the two focus areas of the World Bank Country Partnership Framework (2017-2022) of (i) expanding access to and quality of service delivery through its support to water, urban transport and waste management; and (ii) expanding economic opportunities and increase human capital through its efforts to support the communities with inclusive and socially cohesive activities aimed at reducing social tensions that stemmed from cohabitation of hosts and refugees. Through these two focus areas, the WBG will help Lebanon mitigate the economic and social impact of the Syria crisis, safeguard the country’s development gains, and enhance the prospects for stability and development in the coming years.

However, while there is clear alignment between the project’s development objectives and the country- and World Bank strategies, the relevance of the objectives is pitched at a level that does not adequately reflect a potential solution to a development problem. While acknowledging the difficulty of the emergency environment, a shortcoming here is the lack of clarity in the PDO formulation around what outcomes would be achieved through addressing community priorities in community services. Focusing on “addressing urgent community priorities in selected community services” alone is not outcome focused and doesn’t sufficiently illustrate what development results were expected as a consequence of the project interventions. The objective was not defined such that its achievements would be plausibly traceable to improvements envisioned to arise from addressing community priorities in selected community services, whether they would be expected to lead to beneficiaries’ improved health, improved income and improved social stability in the communities. These may be longer term objectives but tracking them and identifying them is an important aspect of a successful development operation even in emergency type projects. Furthermore, the PDO does not cover the full range of expected outcomes from the project activities. Component 1B financing “activities conducive to reduce social tension” is not captured in the PDO statement and the clear representation of this in the theory of change limits the project’s ability to engage in this important aspect of the design.

Thus, the project relevance is rated **Substantial**.

**Rating**

Substantial

**4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)**
OBJECTIVE 1

Objective
The project aimed at addressing urgent community priorities in selected municipal services, targeting areas most affected by the influx of Syrian refugees

Rationale
Theory of Change. Activities associated with addressing urgent community priorities through selected municipal services, aimed at physical (improving water and waste water services, solid waste management, roads and community infrastructure) and social (raising environmental awareness, skills development and employment training and enhancing health care facilities) interventions in targeted areas with a high influx of refugees in urban areas of Lebanon. These outputs in turn were expected to contribute to the following outcomes: improve access of Lebanese host communities and refugees in providing water connections, solid waste collection and enhance mobility and thereby generate cost savings to beneficiaries and improve water continuity.

Outputs

- **Small-scale Water Supply and Waste Water**: installed 8 generators (1,700 kva for water pumping); 3 pumps for wells; 1 concrete water tank (total capacity of 500m3); 3 plastic water tanks; 2 water tank trucks (total capacity of 12.5 m3); 4,000 m of water supply pipes; 46 water filters; and 2,500 m sewer mains.
- **Solid Waste**: Installed 970 garbage containers (total capacity of 262,200 Liters); provided 5 compactor garbage trucks (total capacity of 38m3); 5 skid steer loaders with brooms; and 1 street sweeper.
- **Recreational and Community Facilities**: 2 public gardens of 1,750m2 in total; Installation of fences in 2 public gardens; and Renovation of 1 public hall.
- **Trainings and Community Outreach**: Environmental training (four participating unions): 64 training sessions on sorting, recycling and reusing of solid waste, as well as reforestation and 442 environmental awareness campaigns for school children, youth, women, and men. Employment training (two participating unions): 123 vocational training sessions on professional sewing, business operations, IT, accounting, management, and communication. Skills development (two participating unions): 531 training sessions and workshops on crafts, art, tailoring, knitting, foreign languages, culture, IT, academic subjects, and sports and 120 classes on science, math, environment, health, conflict resolution. Art program of Lebanese and Syrian children (all the 11 participating unions): Organized a 3-month highly collaborative art program among 500 children from 22 schools in 11 unions, including both Lebanese and Syrians, in partnership with UNESCO. Health training (three participating unions): 314 training and community outreach sessions on health.
- **Health Equipment (three participating unions)**: Provided 1 mobile clinic and its initial O&M, serving remote municipalities; Supplied equipment for 1 clinic focusing on poor women; Provided 1 ambulance.

Outcomes: Achievement of the PDO was measured through the following outcome indicators (OIs):
The project benefitted nearly 475,700 people directly, including Lebanese and Syrians, men and women, compared to targets of 300,000.

In the first year, over 300,700 conflict affected people (including Lebanese and Syrians) received benefits from the project, surpassing the end target of 80,000 by 276%. These first-year beneficiaries included over 159,300 (53%) female, over 204,400 (68%) host population, and over 96,300 (32%) displaced population, far outperforming the end sub-targets of 40,000, 60,000, and 20,000 respectively.

100% of implemented sub-projects corresponded to the priorities identified by unions of municipalities under the project (all the sub-projects were identified through consultations), exceeding the end target of 80%.

72% of beneficiaries were satisfied with improved sanitary and/or mobility conditions, exceeding the target of 50%.

The project benefitted 1.4 million people indirectly including Lebanese and Syrians, men and women, compared to targets of 1.35 million.

While the indicators above show achievement over targets, these results are in themselves insufficient to show that the project was able to improve access to municipal services as they are mostly focused on the number of beneficiaries. While the ICR shows additional information in the positive results from perception surveys and some unintended outcomes (eg. the cost savings to beneficiaries of water supply), this does only in part provide evidence of outcome achievement. But the following results go some way towards identifying the project's outcomes.

**Improve access and generated cost savings to beneficiaries of water supply:** Provided and distributed 12,423m3/day of municipal water to 124,572 beneficiaries at US$175/HH/year for municipal water compared to US$1,200/HH/year on average from private suppliers resulting in total savings US$1,025/HH/year. Prior to the project water in schools was not potable. The project provided safe, potable water to 13,902 students in 45 schools, which enable them to save US$154/student/year from buying bottled water. While quality of water was improved as prior to the project water was not potable. There is no evidence data provided in the ICR. Overall, 77% beneficiaries were satisfied with improved water and sanitation (no targets).

**Increased Solid Waste Collection:** Collected 79 tons/day of SW for 42,584 beneficiaries, equivalent to approximately 23% of total solid waste generated in project municipalities; Compacted and transported 41 tons/day of garbage to solid waste treatment plants, equivalent to approximately 16% of total solid waste collected in the project unions, benefitting 68,966 people; and Swept the streets of city centers and villages in project municipalities. Prior to the project, participating municipalities faced enormous challenges in SW collection, especially after the Syrian crisis. Streets in cities and villages had ubiquitous garbage due to the lack of SW collection and sweeping facilities. Overall, 79% of beneficiaries were satisfied with improved solid waste collection (no targets).

**Enhanced access and mobility:** for 62,481 beneficiaries in 14 municipalities by connecting and rehabilitating existing roads to improve access to markets, schools, clinics, playgrounds, and community facilities; Street lighting for 9 km of roads for 43,360 beneficiaries to enhance safety and access to shops and public spaces at night. Overall, 74% of beneficiaries were satisfied with improved roads and street lighting (no targets)

**Enhanced Access to recreational activities:** Created public spaces for 4,000 beneficiaries; Prior to the project, participating municipalities lacked public spaces for recreational activities. Overall, 64% of beneficiaries were satisfied with improved parks and public facilities (no targets).
• **Employment Creation (two participating unions):** Provided certified vocational training for 240 young people, women and men, including Lebanese, Syrians, and disabled and 18 trainees found jobs shortly after the training. Skills development (Two participating unions): trained 1518 people and created two jobs. However, it is unclear how the vocational training activities led to employment creation in 18 cases.

**Rating**

High

**Rationale**

The results framework indicators show achievement over targets. While these achievements are sufficient to justify a High rating for Efficacy and show that the project was actively and sustainably responding to urgent community priorities, they only go a small way towards illustrating the broader mandate outlined in the theory of change which seeks to mitigate conflict and improve the extent of service delivery. The ICR shows additional outcomes outside the results framework that provides some additional evidence of improvements in key areas of municipal services.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**

High

**5. Efficiency**

**At appraisal,** due to its emergency and consultative nature, the project did not carry out ex-ante economic analysis. However, methods for the economic analysis were set at appraisal. Given their diverse scope, analytical tools were tailored to each component. Additionally, the appraisal stated that an analysis of a sample of 20 percent of these small investments will be carried out at the mid-term and at Project closure. Medium-sized infrastructure investments financed under component two will be subject to prior feasibility and cost benefit analyses, including calculation of Net Present Value, Financial Internal Rate of Return and Economic Internal Rate of Return. Benefits justifying the investment in service delivery and social activities were captured during project preparation. Tangible benefits include better services, an improved enabling environment for business development and positive externalities for local economic development. Intangible benefits include enhanced social capital through the social activities and the consultative processes underlying service delivery at the local level.

The **ex-post** analysis included the results based on 79% of total investments through cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and cost comparisons. The results show high or substantial economic rates of return including under adverse scenarios, as well as value-for-money. According to the ICR, the Internal Rates of Return (IRR) estimates for interventions are economically viable, but its ICR Estimate point values vary significantly from a range of 108% for water filters in schools to 19% for road rehabilitation. A sensitivity analysis indicates that all interventions remain economically viable even under scenarios of a 20% increase in capital...
costs, a 20% reduction in benefits, and a combination of both. While the economic analysis is helpful in providing a rough overview of the likely returns from the different investments, there are limitations in the analysis with considerable optimism in the infrastructure longevity, limited explanation on O&M for purchased equipment and unrealized claims against environment benefits. While these evidently exist, the presumptions around behavior are particularly important to the efficiency rates being realized. This is certainly not a given in an environment with a large itinerant population.

According to the ICR (pg 18), tangible benefits are the creation of over 21,000 workdays of permanent employment per year for Lebanese workers and over 25,600 non-permanent workdays per year for Syrian workers in operation of the infrastructure and equipment. But the ICR does not provide evidence of how these forecasts were realized, nor detail on where and how they were applied. Focus group discussions under the beneficiary survey and interviews contributed to better operation of local businesses. In addition, investments contribute to climate change and environmental benefits such as 1. Investments in solar systems contributed to an estimated 1500 tons/year reduction in CO2 and 2. Investments to enhance composting and recycling to reduce in solid waste and waste water without treatment. Intangible benefits are the citizen engagement which included active consultation by CDR, unions and municipalities which laid the foundation for designing activities that met citizen needs and possibly led to sustainable results over time. Again, while potentially helpful, these forecasts are largely speculative.

There were minimal operational and administrative inefficiencies. The closing date was extended six months to allow completion of project activities as per the original design. Investments were prioritized through a highly participatory process that involved 55 consultations with stakeholders. According to the ICR (p. 17) only five percent of the Grant was used for project management to undertake systematic consultations and a beneficiary survey, as well as to maintain a fully functional PMU.

**Efficiency Rating**

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate Available?</th>
<th>Point value (%)</th>
<th>*Coverage/Scope (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR Estimate</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>0 79.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

This is a project with innovative features for community consultations with both the host community and the Syrian refugees, that was prepared and implemented under emergency procedures in difficult country
conditions. Based on the discussion outlined above and the ratings of substantial for Relevance of PDO, high for efficacy and substantial for efficiency, the overall outcome of the project is rated **Satisfactory**.

a. **Outcome Rating**
   Satisfactory

### 7. Risk to Development Outcome

**Political & Macroeconomic Risk**: While O&M arrangements are in place, risks remain in maintaining development outcomes. The political and macroeconomic instability in Lebanon, national fragility and regional security issues, and fiscal constraints pose risks to maintaining the development outcomes. Close follow up from the central government and from the Bank/donor community is needed to address the sustainability of project outcomes.

**Social Risk**: The impact of the refugee crises continues beyond project closure. Despite project, Lebanon’s residency policy makes it difficult for Syrians to maintain legal status, heightening risks of exploitation and abuse and restricting refugees’ access to work, education, and healthcare. This will continue to add pressure to the country and municipalities in terms of service delivery.

### 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

**a. Quality-at-Entry**

The design incorporated relevant global lessons of engaging municipalities and citizens, benefitting both refugees and host communities, and allowing flexibility. The design integrated physical and social interventions to address the multi-dimensional challenges of the fragile, stressed country context during the refugee crisis. Given the emergency and the need for consultations, the project adopted an effective framework approach that allowed flexibility during implementation.

Targeted areas were adequately identified through a pilot consultative approach at a level of unions and municipalities following a systematic four step criteria for selection.

The institutional responsibility for M&E was placed with the PMU which collected the information from unions and municipalities. Despite the emergency nature, the results framework shows targets set up at approval in 2014 (based on additional information provided by the team in an email dated June 25th). However, the majority of indicators as well as the PDO formulation were for the most part output-based and not designed to measure development outcomes of the project.

**Quality-at-Entry Rating**
Satisfactory
b. Quality of supervision

The supervision team provided support and proactive supervision in difficult country conditions in the following areas: (i) bringing stakeholders together and facilitating discussions to expedite implementation, (ii) providing technical support to change plans to replace proposed solid waste treatment to a solar lighting due to unavailability of land, (iii) bank playing a key role in facilitating O&M arrangements.

The Mid-Term review was not conducted. While not many changes happened during implementation, a midterm review is a useful tool to monitor project progress and make course corrections if needed.

The Bank’s team mobilized additional support to help the client with support needed to achieve the PDO. The Bank strengthened technical support to the implementing agency in engineering and social development by mobilizing local consultants and technical experts.

Frequent supervision (11 missions), and close coordination with the implementing agencies throughout the project cycle allowed the project to be implemented in a very volatile environment.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Highly Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The objectives were unclear. More specifically there is lack of clarity in the PDO formulation around what outcomes would be achieved through addressing community priorities in community services. In addition, most of the indicators (especially at the outcome level) did not cover anything other than the number of beneficiaries – which is inadequate to document and report on relevant achievements reflected by those objectives.

While the ICR reports (pg.21) that infrastructure targets were to be set and defined during implementation due to the demand driven nature of the project, there is limited use and articulation of what this meant in terms of longer term intended outcomes. Appropriate proxy measures for community cohesion and benchmarks for different infrastructure options were unfortunately not included in the design limiting the ability of with and without project scenarios.

The project management unit (PMU) had the prime responsibility for M&E. The PMU was given overall responsibility to collect information from the unions and municipalities were the activities were planned.
b. M&E Implementation

The PMU was responsible for the implementation of the M&E system. Data sources and responsible agencies for data collection were defined for all indicators. The data was collected, and indicators were updated as per the agreed frequency. Semi-annual progress reports on key activities, progress, and results were submitted to the Bank on time.

c. M&E Utilization

The M&E data was used to monitor project progress, subprojects databases and to prepare reports to donors. There were some implementation delays with component 2 that affected progress in indicators of component 2. These caused remedial measures to accelerate the progress of this component.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was categorized as a Category ‘B’ project, and OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment (OP 4.11) and OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement safeguard policies were triggered.

Environmental Safeguards. The Project triggered OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and was classified as Category B. An Environmental and Social Safeguards Documents (ESMF) was prepared which included an Environmental and social screening tool to exclude all Category A projects, identify the types of risks and incorporate mitigation measures. The ICR does not have a statement of compliance.

Social Safeguards. The PAD triggered OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared bases in the requirements of OP 4.12 and Lebanese laws and regulations. The RPF identified procedures and measures to be put in place in case of impacts on squatters or encroachers or the involuntary taking of land. The overall safeguards performance was consistently rated satisfactory throughout project implementation.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management (FM). The ICR reports that Financial Management was assessed as satisfactory (ICR p.23). An independent auditor carried out the Audits. All audit reports had unqualified clean auditor’s
opinions. Adequate FM arrangements were in place during project implementation to ensure proper use and accountability of project funds. A dedicated financial officer, financed by the grant, was assigned to the project, due to the large number of small contracts. The project experienced some delays in disbursement as funds were requested to flow through the MoF treasury account to the project Designated Account.

**Procurement.** The ICR reports that procurement was handled satisfactorily (ICR p 23). All contracts were procured based on the Bank’s Procurement and Consultant Guidelines. The project was prepared under OP8.00 (Rapid response to crises and emergencies), which enabled the CDR to award two contracts to contractors who had already been selected competitively under a previous project. A total of 46 contracts for works, goods and consultancy services were procured and successfully implemented. Procurement plans were prepared and adhered to diligently. Prior and post reviews carried out by the Bank found that procurement processing and contract management were overall satisfactory. Recommendations provided by the Bank were taken on board (for example, technical specifications of equipment were upgraded as per Bank recommendation to reduce O&M costs). The complaint mechanism was in place and the complaint received on the solar pumping contract was resolved within 90 days.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)
---

d. Other
---

| 11. Ratings |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Ratings**     | **ICR**         | **IEG**         | **Reason for Disagreements/Comment** |
| Outcome         | Highly Satisfactory | Satisfactory    | The ratings for relevance and efficiency were both Substantial with minor shortcomings |
| Bank Performance| Highly Satisfactory | Satisfactory    | There were moderate shortcomings in quality of design. |
| Quality of M&E  | Substantial      | Substantial     |                                              |
| Quality of ICR  | ---              | Substantial     |                                              |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. Lessons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The ICR provided a series of lessons. The most important are the following:

**For a successful intervention for effective emergency response, it is critical to intervene at the local/municipal levels.** Local authorities are on the frontlines of emergency responses. The local authorities play the main role in managing the increased demand for services, jobs and the rise of social tensions due to the rapid influx of refugees. The project worked closely with local
governments through CDR in identifying and responding to local needs. Through this process, the project also built the capacity of the local governments in establishing an inclusive decision-making mechanism, as well as in implementing community-level sub-projects.

A consultative decision making system and framework approach, rather than relying on a centralized plan of pre-defined solutions, may work well in implementing local solutions in emergency situations. The combination of a consultative decision-making system and a framework approach adopted by the project was critical in identifying the needs of communities and in responding to these needs in a rapidly changing context. The decentralized, participatory approach also resulted in high ownership and satisfaction from beneficiaries, though sufficient time needed to be allocated for an effective consultative process. Defining the scope of the project clearly and allowing for flexibility facilitated the successful achievement of results.

Both quick wins and mid-/long-term improvements are necessary to restore trust and the social contract. In an emergency context, where there is mounting pressure and perceived competition over resources and services, quick, visible improvements in municipal services were critical for building trust in local authorities. On the other hand, mid-size, developmental solutions, though taking longer time to prepare, provided larger, more lasting impacts. The two-pronged approach adopted by the project was a meaningful model, as evidenced by high beneficiary satisfaction. But it is important these intentions and approaches are suitably captured in the PDO for the project.

13. Assessment Recommended?
No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR
The ICR is clear and well written, provides good coverage of most important subjects and uses all available data instead of relying on indicators. The report is candid, engages effectively with the challenges of emergency project efficiency analysis, and makes a strong case for the additionality that was clearly evident in this type of project. However, there were minor shortcomings. In some instances, the ICR did not use adequate evidence to substantiate its claims. In addition, the report would benefit from a stronger adherence and reference to the excellent theory of change presented in the report. Closer linking to the theory of change would have helped clarify the substantial link between the projects outputs and intended outcomes.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial