Report Number : ICRR14588

IEG ICR Review
Independent Evaluation Group

1. Project Data:		Date Posted :	02/25/2015	
Country:	Uganda			
Project ID :	P078382		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name :	Kampala Institutional And Infrastructure Development Project	Project Costs (US$M):	37.10	35.64
L/C Number:	C4367	Loan/Credit (US$M):	33.60	33.58
Sector Board :	Urban Development	Cofinancing (US$M):		
Cofinanciers :		Board Approval Date :		11/06/2007
		Closing Date :	12/31/2010	12/31/2013
Sector(s):	Sub-national government administration (31%); Flood protection (23%); Roads and highways (23%); Solid waste management (23%)			
Theme(s):	Other urban development (50% - P); Municipal governance and institution building (25% - S); Municipal finance (25% - S)			

Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	ICR Review Coordinator :	Group:
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2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:

The project development objective for the Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP) in the Financing Agreement (4367-UG) was “to support the borrower's efforts to improve the institutional efficiency of Kampala City Council (KCC), through the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Reform of the KCC” (Schedule 1).
The project development objective in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was virtually the same as the one in the Financing Agreement.
This project was Phase 1 of a three phase Adjustable Program Loan with the overall objective defined in the PAD to “Develop a strong governance and management capacity in KCC to enhance service delivery and economic development” (page 6).
This review will assess the project’s achievements against the objective in the Financing Agreement.

b.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes
If yes, did the Board approve the revised objectives /key associated outcome targets?
Yes
Date of Board Approval: 12/03/2010

c. Components:

The project had three components:
Component 1 - Institutional Development (estimated cost US$ 5.8 million, actual cost US$ 6.93 million). The component focused on institutional development which included three sub -components:

- Support to organizational development and governance which included the development of a comprehensive approach to municipal development.
- Support to Financial Recovery which was to implement a detailed financial recovery plan designed to place KCC on a sound financial position by the end of the program.
- Strengthening Service Delivery which was to provide support to strengthen KCC's capacity in service delivery.

Component 2 – Kampala City Infrastructure and Services Improvement (estimated cost US$ 28.5 million, actual cost US$ 25.6 million). This component supported activities aimed at improving the provision of critical services to the city. The activities were:

- Drainage system improvement which included increasing the capacity of the Lubigi primary channel (total length 3.6 km); expanding the capacity and lining of secondary channels (total length 4 km); and undertaking remedial measures on four tertiary drainage "black spots" in various parts of the city;
- Traffic management which included improving area traffic management through provision of traffic management infrastructure such as guard rails, signs etc.; and providing localized widening and signalizing for five junctions;
- Road maintenance and upgrade which included maintenance of about 26 km of selected tarmac roads and upgrading of about 14.42 km of high priority gravel roads to bitumen standard;
- Solid waste management which included expansion of a landfill by 6 acres, testing and installation of a landfill gas collection and flaring system at the existing landfill, and design of a new landfill site to be identified and acquired by KCC;
- Urban markets infrastructure development which was to provide improved access roads, lighting, and sanitation to two markets (Kibuli and Kawempe).

Component 3 - Project Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation (estimated cost US$ 2.8 million, actual cost US$3.07 million). This component supported the management activities associated with the project implementation, the establishment and implementation of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system and the preparation of the next phase of the project.

The project was restructured twice, the first restructuring was completed on December 3, 2010 and the second restructuring was on December 27, 2012.

The first restructuring included: (i) extension of the closing date by 24 months from December 31, 2010 to December 31, 2012; (ii) reduction in total project funding from US$37.1 million to US$ 35.64 million to reflect a decrease in the government's contribution from US$3.5 million to US$2.06 million; (iii) reallocation of the funds between components; (iv) creation of additional category of eligible expenditure for involuntary resettlement as the government could no longer fully finance the project resettlement cost. (v) adjustment of the project activities as a result of the decreased funding available. The secondary and tertiary drainage channel works, area traffic management, landfill gas collection and flaring system were dropped. The maintenance of about 26 km of selected tarmac roads was dropped from the project but was financed by government funds. The provision of infrastructure for two markets was dropped from the project, however, other international development agencies planned to finance the development of seven markets in Kampala. (vi) The project development objectives were not revised, however, the targets for three outcome indicators were revised upwards and two new indicators were added (more detailed information is provided in the M&E section).
The second restructuring was for a further extension of the closing date from December 31, 2012 to December 31, 2013 to allow additional time for the completion of the project activities.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:

Project Cost: The actual final project cost (US$35.64 million) was about US$1.5 million less than the estimated cost at appraisal (US$37.1 million). The lower actual cost was due to the less counterpart funding from the government and a reduced scope of work.
Financing: The final disbursed IDA amount was US$33.58 million which was about US$0.02 million less than the approved amount of US$33.6 million. The share of the total project costs financed by the Loan increased from 90.5 percent at appraisal to 94 percent at project completion as a result of the reduced total project cost.
Borrower contribution: The borrower contribution was reduced from the estimated US$3.5 million to US$2.06 million at project closure because of pressures on the government budget.
Dates: The project closing dates were extended twice for a total of three years from December 31, 2010 to December 31, 2013.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:

Substantial

At appraisal, the project development objective of improving the institutional efficiency of Kampala City Council was consistent with the 2005 Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy developed by seven of Uganda 's major development partners including the World Bank. One of the areas that the strategy focused on was to strengthen the budget process and public sector management. The project development objective was also relevant to the Uganda Government's own Poverty Eradication Action Plan in which one of the development pillars was to enhance governance (Pillar Four).

At project closing, the project development objective remained relevant to the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy for Uganda (2011-2015), which included Strategy Objective Two (Enhance Public Infrastructure) with a specific outcome of "Improved management and delivery of urban services" (CAS, page 36) and the Strategy Objective Four (Good Governance and Value for Money) in the CAS (page 39). "Improving the institutional efficiency of Kampala City Council" aiming at enhancing the urban service provision and delivery (PAD page 6) was closely aligned with the strategy set out in the Bank's CAS and would contribute to the implementation of the Bank's CAS. The relevance of the project's development objective was therefore assessed as Substantial.

b. Relevance of Design:

Substantial

The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not present a clear results framework (PAD, Annex 3) which showed f how the chain of project activities would lead to intermediate outcomes and then to final outcomes. The results framework in Annex 3 prepared by the project team was mainly about the indicators to be used to track the project's progress and the achievement of the project development objective. Nevertheless, the project's activities were relevant and their implementation would contribute to the achievement of the project 's development objectives. Specifically, the designed activities focused on two areas: institutional development and urban infrastructure development. Improving the skills of City Council employees, enhancing the Council's administration as well as its revenue and expenditure management would directly contribute to the project development objective of improving the institutional efficiency of Kampala City Council. The development of urban infrastructure would help reduce the infrastructure deficit of the city and put KCC on a more solid foundation for sustained service delivery. At the same time, the implementation of the infrastructure component would enable the implementation agency to enhance its capacity through "learning-by-doing". The relevance of design is therefore assessed as Substantial.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):

The project development objective was "to improve the institutional efficiency of Kampala City Council (KCC), through the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Reform of the KCC". In 2010 the KCC was reformed and established by law as a central government institution and renamed the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). The project's achievements involve both institutions.

Outputs

At project closing, the following main project outputs were delivered (detailed project output information is in the ICR (Annex 2):

- 76 staff trained in contract management, revenue collection, etc.
- purchase of 25 vehicles
- ICT equipment purchased and the network extended to division offices
- Records management equipment purchased
- Strategic Framework of Reform Performance workshops carried out
- Strategic plan development process completed
- Five Public consultations and stakeholders engagements activities completed
- KCC financial recovery plan implemented
- Kampala Physical Development Plan updated
- Lubigi primary water channel expanded

- Upgrading of 11.81 km of roads
- 6 acres of land adjacent to existing landfill site developed

Outcomes: Substantial

The improved institutional efficiency of Kampala City Council, and later the Kampala City Council Authority, could be evidenced by the improvement in three areas: (a) financial efficiency, (b) governance efficiency; and (c) infrastructure service delivery efficiency. As the targets for these three outcome indicators were revised, project efficacy will be assessed against the original outcome target and the revised outcome targets.

(a) **Financial efficiency:** The reorganization of the KCC to the KCCA greatly reduced its stock of overdue liability, from UGX 8 billion to 0 billion; this achievement exceeds the original target of reducing KCC's overdue liability to UGX3 billion and the revised target of reducing KCC's overdue liability to UGX0.5 billion. KCC also increased its own source revenue from UGX 22 billion at project start in FY2005/2006 to UGX 55.71 billion by FY2012/13 at the end of the project. This revenue amount was much higher than both the originally set target of UGX30 billion and the revised target of UGX33.5 billion. Such an achievement was mainly a result of the successful implementation of project activities including the implementation of the Financial Recovery Action Plan and the improvements in the collection of current property rates, local service tax and hotel tax (ICR page 17).

(b) **Governance**: KCC/KCCA governance was improved. A new results-driven working culture included a dynamic and aggressive approach to addressing governance issues. The KCCA management started the enforcement of a zero tolerance policy for corruption and took appropriate disciplinary actions on errant staff and immediate sanctioning of staff involved in corrupt activities. At project closure, the building permit approval processing time was reduced to two months from one year in 2006. The percentage of property rate demand notes issued to property owners increased from 30 percent in 2006 to 100 percent in 2013 (ICR data sheet, section F). The above efficiency improvement was a result of actions initiated by the project including the staff performance-based compensation system, enforcing the code of conduct, improvements in records management system of the general administration, implementation of a communication strategy and staff training.

(c) **Infrastructure service delivery:** The project team used the "public satisfaction in service delivery in (i) Roads, (ii) Drainage and (iii) Solid waste" as an outcome indicator to measure the improved infrastructure service delivery. It is noted that this indicator did not pertain solely to the project specific activities but measured performance of infrastructure and services in the whole Kampala city (ICR, para 43). By project closure, the Citizens Report Card Surveys showed that there was a vast improvement in satisfaction levels in the areas of solid waste, roads and drainage, which coincided with the areas of infrastructure improvements undertaken by the project. It was noted by this review that the scale of the project direct investment on infrastructure improvement was relatively small, however, the project helped improve the KCC's financial situation and its governance, contributing substantially to improving the efficiency of the KCC/KCCA which enhanced infrastructure service delivery in Kampala city area.

Based on the above evidence, the achievement of the project development objectives was assessed as substantial both against the original target and the revised targets.

5. Efficiency:

Substantial

At project appraisal, quantitative economic analysis was conducted for the roads and drainage improvement activities. The Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4) was used as the analytical tool for the roads improvement activities. The cost was the estimated project investment cost plus the maintenance cost. The main benefits were the projected savings in vehicle operating costs (VOC) and savings in passenger travel time. The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was estimated at 32 percent. For the drainage improvement activities, the costs were the estimated project capital and the maintenance cost, the main benefits were savings from prevention of road damage and damage to property and structures, prevention of disruption to commercial and industrial activities and traffic, additional income from rentals. The ERR of drainage improvement activities was estimated at 16.8 percent.

In the ICR, qualitative analysis of efficiency was conducted for the institutional development component and quantitative economic analysis was carried out for the infrastructure and service delivery component.

Two sub-components directly supported the outcome of institutional achievement : Organizational Development & Governance (project cost of US$1.46 million) and Support to Financial Recovery (project cost of US$0.16 million). The project's investment on this component was about US$ 1.6 million, the main benefit was the increased Kampala City Authority Own Sources of Revenue which increased by about US$ 17 million at project completion. This amount was translated into an annual 12.2 percent increase for the project period as compared with the 6.4 percent annual growth rate prior to the project (FY00-06).The ICR (page 20) considered the project funds being utilized efficiently. However, this review concluded that the efficiency of the use of funds for this component was not assessable because of the lack of information on the additional investment by KCC (e.g. cost of additional salaries and time for the revenue collection staff) for increasing its revenue and the lack of a clear benchmark of an efficient investment for a revenue collection system .

The project's investment on the infrastructure and service delivery components was about 68 percent of the total project investment at the appraisal stage and about 65 percent of the total project investment at the ICR stage . For the roads improvement activities, the costs were the actual project investment and maintenance costs, the main benefits were savings in vehicle operating costs and savings in passenger travel time . The economic analysis of the project road improvements based on the updated traffic data at project closing found that three road activities yielded positive Net Present Values (NPVs) and ERRs greater than the discount rate of 12 percent and two roads generated negative NPVs and ERRs less than 12 percent. The two roads with ERRs of less than 12 percent were mainly due to the much higher actual construction cost . The overall ERR for the road activities was 29.8 percent. For the drainage system improvement activities, the costs were the actual project capital investment and maintenance costs . The main benefits were the savings from prevention of road damage and damage to property and structures, prevention of disruption to commercial and industrial activities and traffic, additional income from rentals. The actual ERR of the drainage improvement activity was 17.5 percent, a bit higher than the estimated ERR at the appraisal stage .

Given that the project's investment on roads and drainage works was more than 50 percent of the total project funds and these investments generated relatively high ERRs (even though the three years' extension of the project closing date caused some efficiency loss) the overall project efficiency is assessed as being Substantial .

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation :

	Rate Available?	Point Value	Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal		%	%
ICR estimate		%	%

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome:

The project development objective was relevant to the country development priorities both at appraisal and at the completion. The designed project activities were substantially relevant to the intended project objectives . Regarding the achievement of the project development objectives, the Kampala City Council did improve its institutional efficiency as a result of the project intervention . The achievement was assessed as substantial compared with the original and revised outcome targets . The project's resources were utilized efficiently and generated greater benefits than originally envisaged . Overall, there were minor shortcomings in the project's relevance, achievements and efficiency and its outcome is therefore rated as Satisfactory .

a. Outcome Rating : Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The possible risk to the outcome achieved is whether the infrastructure and the institutional capacity built under the project could be sustained. The ICR (page 24) reported that Kampala City Council Authority is responsible and has the budget for the maintenance of the infrastructure built under the project . In addition, there was additional road maintenance funding provided by the Road Fund to the Authority to ensure the sustainability of the project roads. The World Bank will also continue to support institutional and infrastructure investments in

Kampala through the second phase Kampala Institution and Infrastructure Development Project, that would help sustain the project's development outcome. Therefore, though the Kampala City Council Authority was only 30 percent staffed at the time when the ICR was prepared and the Authority also faces political influences, the overall risk to the development outcome is assessed as Moderate.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Moderate

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:

The project was a continuation of the Bank's engagement with Government of Uganda in support of the development of Kampala City. The Bank- funded Uganda First Urban Project (1991) focused on infrastructure investment with limited effort being made to strengthen Kampala City Council's organizational capacity (PAD, page 3). This project targeted at enhancing the institutional capacity of Kampala City Council in service delivery, which was identified by the Borrower as a key issue. The project activities were selected based on solid analytical work and in full consultation with the Borrower. The planned activities were also closely aligned with the Government's Strategic Framework of Reform to ensure the full participation and buy-in from the Government. During project implementation, the scope of infrastructure work was reduced due to various reasons listed above in the project component section, the reduction of the scope could also be an indication that the project design should have included fewer infrastructure activities. There was room to improve the project M&E framework, for example, the project used the "increase in public satisfaction in service delivery" to measure the improved institutional efficiency of KCC, however, the achievement of this specific indicator could not be solely attributed to the project intervention. The achievement of another PDO indicator "average traffic growth on the project upgraded roads" also did not pertain to the project only. The quality at entry is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating : Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:

The ICR (page 25) reported that full mission supervision was regular at twice every year together with the continuous support provided by the Bank's team based in the Kampala country office. The team provided technical support throughout the implementation process including support to the project procurement and contractual activities so as to prevent any major issues from arising. The team also initiated project restructuring to ensure the achievement of the project development objectives. However, the supervision did not refine the project outcome indicator that measured the "increase in public satisfaction in service delivery". The achievement of this indicator, as noted before, was not related solely to the project. Overall, the quality of supervision is assessed as Satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision Rating : Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:

The government refers to the national government of Uganda. The ICR (para 96) commented that the government remained committed to the project throughout the project period. The cooperation between the government and the Bank was close and the government was usually prompt in responding to the Bank's inquiries. The project's effectiveness was delayed because the required parliamentary approval was delayed. This delay in parliamentary approval was out of the government's control. The government did not fully pay the committed counterpart funding or on schedule due budget problems (ICR, para 96). The Bank's project team advised that the reduced government contribution to the project cost was due in large part to the constraints of the IMF program for Uganda and, therefore, out of the government's control. The ICR (para

96) took note that the counterpart funding was adequately provided after the Kampala City Council Authority took over the counterpart funding responsibility from GoU from 2012. The overall Government performance was rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

Government Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:

The implementing agency refers to Kampala City Council which was restructured to become Kampala Capital City Authority. The project implementation was negatively impacted by the transition from the Council to the Authority, which was not fully staffed and had limited capacity. During project implementation, deficiencies of safeguard implementation and contract management were observed (e.g. landfill operations) but no mis-procurement was reported. Although constrained by its capacity, the implementation agency was nevertheless committed to the project. It appointed a core team responsible for project implementation and also applied a number of innovative solutions (such as use of escrow accounts to address working capital constraints for contractors) to facilitate project implementation (ICR para 97). At project closing, most project activities were completed, including fixing the inadequate landfill management. The overall performance of the implementation agency was Moderately Satisfactory.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:

At project design staged, it was planned that the M&E data collection was to be mainstreamed into the data collection system performed by the Economic Planning Department in KCC. The project also provided support to KCC to develop a council-wide M&E system and to strengthen the Economic Planning Department to implement it (PAD, para 36).

The M&E framework had four PDO indicators, three of them were closely linked to the project activities and could accurately assess and track the achievement of the project development objective. For example, the reduction of KCC's overdue liabilities and increases of KCC's own source of revenue could be largely attributed to the implementation of KCC Financial Recovery Plan supported by the project, the achievement of the indicators' target was a good indication that the institutional efficiency of Kampala City Council was improved. The fourth outcome indicator (increase in public satisfaction in service delivery in (a) roads, (b) drainage and (c) solid waste was not a direct outcome of the project because the project's investment in urban infrastructure was limited. The two new PDO indicators added at the first project restructuring: average traffic growth on project upgraded roads and the reduced number of people directly affected by floods along Lubigi Channel, could not be used to accurately assess the achievement of the project development objectives.

The intermediate outcome indicators were designed to track the project implementation progress and were aligned with the monitoring and evaluation framework of Strategic Framework for Reform II.

b. M&E Implementation:

The ICR (para 44) reported that data collection was performed by KCC/KCCA, the reporting of the results was done regularly and consistently during implementation through quarterly/annual financial reports and the mid-term and annual review reports. The targets of three outcome indicators were revised:

- The target for the reduction of KCC's overdue liabilities to Uganda Shillings (UGX) 3 billion was revised to UGX0.5 billion;
- The target for increasing the percentage share of KCC's own source revenue spent on service delivery to 30% was revised to 34%;
- The target for increasing KCC's own source revenue to UGX 30 billion was revised to UGX33.5 billion.

The two PDO indicators added during the restructuring also had baseline established and the information on them was collected and reported when the information became available.

c. M&E Utilization:

The M&E information was used to monitor the project's progress and used as a basis for adjustment during implementation. The ICR (para 44) reported that the indicators on KCCA's financial performance were main streamed into the overall KCCA corporate M&E framework, and would be monitored beyond the project period .

M&E Quality Rating : Substantial

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards:

Environment : This was a Category B project Hence the Banks' policy OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and OP 4.04 Natural Habitats were triggered. At project preparation stage, an Environmental Analysis (EA) including an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) were prepared (PAD, para 67). However, because KCC/KCCA had limited capacity and lacked a specialist to handle the safeguard issues, there were deficiencies in safeguard implementation especially for the landfill operations. The issues included poor handling of the landfill acquisition with no proper due diligence undertaken prior to the purchase of the 6 acre extension land fill, incomplete fencing around land fill site, relying on temporary license for land fill operation for longer than expected period, inadequate leachate monitoring and treatment system, not commensurate with the national waste water treatment and discharge standard, posing health and safety risks to the public . The above noted issues, though, were all resolved within a month of project closure (ICR, para 43).

Social: Bank's policy OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement was triggered for the project. A detailed Resettlement Action Plan was prepared at project preparation stage. However, a lack of capacity in the Kampala City Council/Authority, compounded by insufficient government funding for the resettlement compensation, led to various issues For example, by the project's closing date on 31 December 2013, 494 Project Affected Persons were compensated while 239 persons had yet to receive compensation. The ICR (para 48) reported that most of the outstanding payments were due to unsubstantiated claims . At the time of concluding the ICR, all eligible claims were paid off.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:

Financial management : The financial management system for the project was assessed as complying with project financial management requirements and the Government of Uganda financial regulations (ICR, para 49). During the course of the project, the periodic financial reports were prepared on time and the annual financial audits were unqualified. The last available audit report (June 2013) concluded that "adequate records have been maintained concerning the project progress and financial statements were adequately supported and presented a true and fair view of the financial position of the project and of its operating expenditures " (ICR, para 49).

Procurement : The risk associated with a general lack of procurement management capacity in Kampala City Council/Kampala City Council Authority was identified early in the project preparation stage . Measures to assist and improve the procurement capacity were taken which included establishing a Procurement and Disposable Unit (PDU) in Kampala City Council, providing training to staff, etc . At the beginning of the project implementation, the procurement responsibility was held by the Ministry of Local Government which resulted in procurement activities delays because there was one more layer of approval . After the PDU was fully staffed and the Unit was responsible for all the project procurement activities the procurement turnaround time was shortened from two months to about two weeks. However, delays of procurement were still experienced as a result of insufficient capacity in the implementation agencies and the project procurement management was rated as moderately unsatisfactory in the last two project implementation support reports . However, no mis-procurement was reported.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

d. Other:

12. Ratings:	ICR	IEG Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome:	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	The project development objectives were relevant to the country development priorities. The designed project activities were substantially relevant to the intended project objectives. At the end of the project, the project development objectives were substantially achieved. The project's resources were utilized efficiently and generated greater benefits than originally envisaged.
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate	Moderate	
Bank Performance :	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Borrower Performance :	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of ICR :		Satisfactory	

NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:

The ICR concluded that there were several lessons which are summarized below :
1. Projects which are closely aligned with the country systems and country strategy can ensure strong ownership..
2. Continuous efforts devoted to institutional and governmental reform can ensure that institutional improvement is sustained.
3. The capacity of the implementation agency is key to successful project implementation .

One lesson suggested by this review is that it is possible to design appropriate indicators to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of projects aimed at strengthening institutions - as was the case with the evaluation of improvements in the capacity of the KCC/KCCA in this project.

14. Assessment Recommended? ○ Yes ● No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is very comprehensive with ample project information, yet the story line is clear . It is also useful that in the project implementation section, the ICR listed and differentiated the factors which were out of the borrower's control and under the borrower's control, so that the readers could understand better the performance of the borrower and the implementation agency. The ICR's analysis of the project's efficacy was also good as it clearly explained which project achievements could be attributed to the project intervention and which could not . The quality of the ICR is rated Satisfactory.

a.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory