MADIA DISCUSSION PAPER 2 8477 ~~~-~ U w MANAGING = X-<- /AGRICULTURAL_ DEVELOPMENT_ IN AFRICA __- /~~~~~~~~~~ _. E.)t.t" ... u.t t--rn ca r-i. t ..-a.... -ti- o C3t; an .....t.... e r- . E: F .;1. 5 . . f. _ FOREWORD The MADIA study and the papers comprising this MADIA Discussion Paper Series are important both for their content and the process of diagnosis and analysis that was used in the conduct of the study. The MADIA research project has been consultative, nonideological, and based on the collection and analysis of a substantial amount of concrete information on specific topics to draw policy lessons; it represents a unique blend of country-oriented analysis with a cross-country perspective. The conclusions of the studies emphasize the fundamental importance of a sound macroeconomic environment for ensuring the broad-based development of agriculture, and at the same time stress the need for achieving several difficult balances: among macroeconomic, sectoral, and location-specific factors that determine the growth of agricultural output; between the development of food and export crops; and between the immediate impact and long-run development of human and institutional capital. The papers also highlight the complementarity of and the need to maintain a balance between the private and public sectors; and further the need to recognize that both price and nonprice incentives are critical to achieving sustainable growth in output. The findings of the MADIA study presented in the papers were discussed at a symposium of senior African and donor policymakers and analysts funded by USAID in June 1989 at Annapolis, Maryland. The participants recommended that donors and African governments should move expeditiously to implement many of the study's valuable lessons. The symposium also concluded that the process used in carrying out the MADIA study must continue if a stronger, more effective consensus among donors and governments is to be achieved on the ways to proceed in resuming broad-based growth in African agriculture. The World Bank is committed to assisting African countries in developing long-term strategies of agricultural development and in translating the MADIA findings into the Bank's operational programs. Stanley Fischer Edward V K. laycox Vice President Development Economics Vice President and Chief Economist Africa Regional Office MADIA DISCUSSION PAPER 2 MANAGING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA THREE ARTICLES ON LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE UMA LELE, ED. THE WORLD BANK ______ WASHINGTON, D.C.- _ _!U Copyright © 1989 All rights reserved The International Bank for Reconstruction Manufactured in the United States of America and Development/THE WORLD BANK First printing November 1989 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington. D.C. 20433, U.S.A. MADIA Discussion Papers are circulated to encourage discussion and ment, at the address shown in the copyright notice above. The World Bank comment and to communicate the results of the Bank's work quickly to the encourages dissemination of its work and will normally give permission development community: citation and the use of these papers should take promptly and, when the reproduction is for noncommercial purposes. with- account of their provisional character Because of the informality and to out asking a fee. Permission to photocopy portions for classroom use is not present the results of research with the least possible delay, the manuscript required. though notification of such use having been made will be has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to appreciated. formal printed texts, and the World Bank accepts no responsibility for The complete backlist of publications from the World Bank is shown in errors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this the annual Index of Publications, which contains an alphabetical title list and paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any indexes of subjects, authors, and countries and regions. The latest edition is manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of available free of charge from the Publications Sales Unit, Department F The its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. World Bank, 1818 H Street. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.. or from The material in this publication is copyrighted. Requests for permission Publications. The World Bank, 66. avenue d'1ena. 75116 Paris, France. to reproduce portions of it should be sent to Director. Publications Depart- Uma Lele is the manager of Agricultural Policy in the Africa Technical Department at the World Bank. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lele, Uma J. Managing agricultural development in Africa: lessons of a quarter century. (MADIA discussion paper; 2) Includes bibliographical references. 1. Agriculture-Economic aspects-Africa, Eastern. 2. Agriculture and state-Africa, Eastern. 3. Managing Agricultural Development in Africa (Organization) I. Title. II. Series. HD2117LA45 1989 338.1'867 89-22723 ISBN 0-8213-1318-5 Contents Introduction Managing Agricultural Development in Africa: Lessons of Experience for Governments and Aid Donors ...... .......... 5 Uma Lele Sources of Growth in East African Agriculture .......................... 9 Uma Lele The Development of National Agricultural Research Capacity: India's Experience with the Rockefeller Foundation and Its Significance for Africa .......................................... 29 Uma Lele and Arthur A. Goldsmith Introduction All three of these articles were originally published in journals, but it was felt that their contribution to the completeness of the study warranted inclusion in this MADIA Discussion Paper Series. They are therefore being reprinted in one volume. Together the articles serve to illuminate the main issues identified and addressed by the MADIA project, to illustrate the benefits of cross-country analysis, which is a significant aspect of the MADIA research process, and to show the importance of the agricultural sector for broad- based growth in Africa. 5 Managing Agricultural Development in Africa Lessons of experience for governments and azd donors Uma J. Lele Throughout most of Sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture, formerly the preserve of one of These differences in countries'performance agriculture is in crisis. Frequent droughts, the largest European settlements in Sub- reflect their differing macroeconomic policy growing expenditures on food imports, and Saharan Africa, was much more advanced environments and agricultural policies. Both falling export earnings have been cutting into than Malawi's or Tanzania's. In both Kenya Kenya and Malawi have maintained a macroe- living standards and growth prospects. The and Malawi, population growth has put conomic policy environment that broadly effects have been pervasive, not only on intense pressure on agricultural land, and the favored agriculture and allowed them to adjust incomes of agricultural producers, who in- structure of land holding has been dualistic, better than Tanzania to the severe external clude most of Africa's poor, but also on with a few large and many very small farms. shocks all three East African countries have supplies of food and raw materials for In Tanzania, land has been abundant in most faced. These shocks included substantial industry, on employment, savings, govern- areas and the possibilities for agricultural terms-of-trade losses on agricultural exports. ment revenues, and on the demand for goods production more diverse. Unlike Tanzania, Kenya and Malawi have and services produced outside agriculture. Since independence, the three countries avoided prolonged overvaluation of their Yet policy changes and planning for the have followed different policy paths with very currencies, and thus implicit taxation of resumption of growth in agriculture are different outcomes for agriculture. Kenya, agriculture, and their budgetary deficits and hampered by a pervasive lack of country- which has achieved the fastest growth of inflation rates have been smaller and more specific information. Reform efforts all too agricultural output, has given smalUholders a stable than Tanzania's. Their shares of often try to apply general remedies to Africa's leading role in its development strategy. It government expenditures in GDP have been diverse problems. has thereby achieved the greatest success in smaller than Tanzania's, but they have Prompted by these concerns, the Bank in reconciling growth with equity, and in devel- devoted larger shares of their government 1985 launched a cross-country comparative oping both foodcrops (especially maize) and budgets to agriculture and infrastructure. study, Managing Agricultural Development export crops (tea, coffee, and horticultural As to agricultural policies, Kenya avoided in Africa (Madia). The study analyzed devel- crops). Malawi achieved substantial growth explidt taxation of its smallholders by passing opments in agriculture in Kenya, Malawi, and in high-value agricultural exports (especially on international price changes to tea and Tanzania, in East Africa, and Cameroon, tobacco, tea, and sugar) until 1983, but coffee producers. Malawi, by contrast, re- Nigeria, and Senegal, in West Africa, since largely from estates; smallholder production sponded to new opportunities for exporting independence and drew lessons for future grew little or not at all in per capita terms. tobacco in the mid-1960s and 1970s by polides and programs (see box). This article Tanzania, as is well known, has given promoting a rapid expansion of burley and draws on the findings of the study. precedence in its development strategy to flue-cured tobacco production on estates, East Afiica equity over growth. In the 1970s, heavy because it was thought that only large farms East A ic aiminvestments in industry and social welfare could achieve the rapid growth necessary. The three East African countries studied programs led to a severe overextension of Malawian smallholders retreated increasingly inherited broadly similar production possibil- government resources, and neglect of agri- into subsistence farming, and the distribution ities at independence. However, Kenya's culture. of agricultural income and assets became 6 increasingly skewed. The differences in the government has encouraged production of policies the two countries pursued in the relatively high-cost "new" crops such as rice The Madia study 1970s, combined with differences in initial and sugar, over traditional foodcrops such as institutional endowments, left Kenyan small cassava, yams, and sorghum. The Madia study was jointly undertaken by farmers better able than their Malawian Nigeria's agriculture declined rapidly in the the World Bank, seven other donors counterparts to adopt improved maize and wake of the oil boom, in part because of the (USAID, UKODA, DANIDA, SIDA, other technology in the 1980s, and created implicit taxation of export crops through France, Germany, and the EEC) and the stronger growth linkages with the rest of the overvaluation of the currency, but also due governments of six African countries economy. to ever-changing thrusts in polcy initiatives, (Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania; Cameroon, In Tanzania the government heavily taxed neglect of technology, and erosion of the Nigeria, and Senegal). The study covered the major export, coffee. Though other capacity of state and local governments to a period of 25 years. Its analyses of exports were taxed less heavily and later provide services. macroeconomic and sectoral policy took exports were ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~account of the influences of historical and even subsidized, producer prices have not Senegal's difficult natural conditions for political factors on economic policy, and compensated adequately for the imphcit agriculture have been exacerbated by poor looked at the ways in which interactions taxation caused by increasing overvaluation policies. The loss of French protection for between policy and resource endowments of the currency. Export crops have stagnated groundnuts, its main export, encouraged it help to determine agricultural performance. in both the large-scale and smallholder to diversify out of agriculture into industry In evaluating the role of aid donors, the sectors, and smallholders have moved out of and, within agriculture, into irrigated rice. Its study gave particular attention to the these crops into foodcrops. The difficulties economic diversification and import substi- influences of donors' policy advice on created for smallholders by price and tax tution of rice have turned out to be costly, recipient governments' policy and invest- poficies compounded the effects of insti- as is discussed below. ment choices. The findings are being tutional instablty through such po.icies as published in a senes of books and working involuntary resettlementhr inh suca vlages asP'roductivity papers; further information on the study is involuntar-y resettlement in Ujamaa viUages available from the author. and successive official experiments with Agricultural output in all the countries cooperative and public sector production and studied has grown more from expansion in distribution arrangements. area, and changes in cropping patterns, than West Africa from increases in yields per hectare. Yields on estates have risen impressively in Kenya The presence of oil in Nigeria and Came- and Malawi. But except for coffee in Kenya, roon and phosphates in Senegal has meant cotton in Cameroon and Senegal, and maize reduce the role of government in marketing. that agriculture plays a smaller role in these in areas of assured rainfall, together with Many of the price reforms have sought to economies than in the three East African occasional irrigated rice schemes, average remove subsidies and to reduce the taxation countries studied. Nigeria inherited better crop yields per hectare have not risen of agriculture by adjusting exchange rates and infrastructure and institutional endowments significantly on smallholdings. (Though bringing domestic producer prices into line than Cameroon or Senegal. Cameroon has productivity may have risen on original land with international prices. In East Africa, more abundant and diverse agricultural land holdings, in many areas population pressure programs have also concentrated on govern- than Nigeria, where population pressure is has brought increasingly marginal land into ments' intervention in markets, and better higher. Senegal's variable and declining rain- cultivation, perhaps affecting statistics on allocation of resources to agriculture. Ni- fall and poor natural resources for agriculture average yields per hectare.) Pressure on land geria's program indudes the removal of price make it the least well endowed for agriculture for agriculture is rising fast in several distortions in the export crop sector; its of the three. countries, and the need to increase land export marketing boards were abolished in Unlike their East African counterparts, all -and labor-productivity is becoming urgent. 1986. Senegal has abolished marketing boards, three economies benefited in the 1970s from All the countries studied have had major removed input subsidies, and revised pro- changes in their international terms of trade. institutional problems in generating new ducer prices. The boom in the extractive sector, however, agricultural technology, but Kenya has been The changes in relative prices have changed had adverse consequences for agriculture. It quite successful in promoting technological the mixture of crops being grown, but have inflated incomes and expenditures, swelled change in maize, as well as in tea and coffee, not changed the low levels of productivity. the movement of population into dties, pineapples, vegetables, potatoes, wheat, and This has brought home the need to address reducing labor availability in agriculture, and pyrethrum. Over 60 percent of Kenya's small issues other than prices-such as land tenure encouraged a shift in consumption away from farms cultivate hybrid maize, compared to arrangements, the generation and adoption traditional domestic foods toward imported less than 10,percent in Malawi or Tanzania. of new technologies, and the institutional rice and wheat. In the West African countries, the most development necessary to broaden access to Agricultural performance has been best in promising and cost-effective technical improve- credit, extension services, and markets. Cameroon. Like Kenya, Cameroon has fol- ment has been the expansion of maize The studies undertaken for Madia have. lowed relatively stable and predictable macro- production under diverse conditions and, in stressed the paucity of information on the economic and sectoral polcies. It has ex- the Francophone countries, of cotton; very diverse microeconomic and institutional panded its output of robusta coffee, cotton, productivity in traditional crops has not factors that determine producers' decisions. and oil palm, and achieved the highest cotton increased. These factors need to be better understood yields in Africa (1,300 kilograms per hectare). Ad. on a specific basis so that price reformns can Taxation encouraged a fall in the qualty and justment be complemented by the technological and profitability of arabica coffee, however, lead- Thus far, the main efforts of adjustment institutional changes that specific countries ing to a switch to food and horticultural crops. programs in agriculture in the six countries and regions need if they are to achieve In response to growing urban demand, the studied have been to rationalze prices and productivity growth (see Ajay Chhibber, 7 "Raising Agricultural Output: Price and Non- essential on welfare as well as economic related products. Though it is true that price Factors," Finance & Development, June grounds, but priority was in practice given to Senegal's groundnut exports are less compet- 1988). diversifying out of traditional foodcrops into itive than they once were, the Madia results new, high-cost production of rice and wheat suggest that a more cautious approach to Role of aid for the urban sector. moving out of groundnut exports, together Aid flows to Madia countries have been The first lesson of the 1970s is the need with a more purposive emphasis on cost- large, and have had a profound effect on the to interpret the food security mandate reducing technology, would have maintained scale, direction, and quality of recipients' broadly: it is often more efficient for a country Senegal's competitiveness in a growing edible- development efforts. Excluding Nigeria, which to import certain foods (especially those oil market. received little concessional assistance in the consumed by urban dwellers), using revenues In Kenya after 1973-74, donors shifted 1970s, concessional foreign assistance sup- earned from thriving agricultural exports, their emphasis away from development of plied 20 to 60 percent of government than to grow all its own. Unfortunately, traditional export crops, warning of poor expenditures in 1970-85 and was equivalent production of traditional foodcrops stagnated export prospects and the need for diversifica- to between 5 and 20 percent of GDP. Just as and agricultural export earnings fell; as a tion. Notwithstanding, Kenya pushed ahead important as financial assistance has been the result, food import bills grew while the on the basis of its comparative advantage donors' role in the formulation of policy and capacity to meet them shrank. through very supportive government policies of investment strategies. Success in develop- The second lesson is that whether at the toward tea and coffee. Kenya's exports of ment depends less on the size of aid flows household or at the national level, food these crops have grown rapidly, supplying than on the quality of assistance. security requires high and stable agricultural increasing shares of world trade in these The development of smallholder tea and incomes. These can best be achieved by a crops, and 50-60 percent of the country's coffee in Kenya, cotton in Cameroon, and balanced production strategy for food and export earnings. maize in Northern Nigeria and elsewhere export crops that draws on the productive In their support for adjustment in the provides outstanding examples of the cata- capacity developed over a long period. 1980s, donors have again turned toward lytic role that well-conceived assistance can Donors' advice and financial support for exports, and particularly toward correcting play in agriculture. Overall, however, aid has diversification out of traditional export crops, price distortions. Such price reforms have made a relatively small contribution to the in which recipient countries had a strong been easier than expected. But they now agricultural growth that has occurred. comparative advantage, into new activities, need to be followed by efforts to tackle In many instances, the swinging pendulum was unfortunate. Such advice confused com- long-term problems, such as the decline in of donors' concerns has tended to divert parative advantage, based on the costs of the research capacity in export crops and the attention from basic long-run problems. Devel- alternative production possibilities within a need to develop new export markets. Unfor- opment strategies in the 1970s tended to country, with the separate issue of the tunately, the long-term attrition that has concentrate on "quick" poverty alleviation, country's domestic costs relative to those of taken place in the export crop expertise of which gave priority to helping low-income other, competitor, countries. In so doing, it Britain and France has not been offset by regions and populations, and to raising food- failed to recognize the fundamental impor- growth of such expertise within Africa or from crop production, mainly to meet growing tance of cost-reducing technologies for main- other sources that assist Africa. urban demand. The results of these poverty- taining competitiveness in traditional food and Reconciling growth with equity. Donors' oriented strategies, and of efforts to replace export activities. There was also a good deal pervasive pessimism about export markets imported food with domestic production, of optimism about how quickly diversification in the 1970s, together with a heightened were mixed. In the 1980s, the emphasis could be achieved. concern for poverty alleviation, led them to switched to equally "quick" solutions, based In Senegal, for example, economic analysis reorient their approach to development away on the correction of price incentives and undertaken in the 1970s suggested that the from growth and toward equity concerns. liberalization of markets, designed to raise country had lost its comparative advantage This change coincided with African govern- production, particularly of exports. Most in its main export, groundnuts. This, com- ments' goals of expanding access to public recently, interest has revived in food secu- bined with high projected rice prices in the services. Much progress was made in broad- rity. mid-1970s, reinforced the government's ening participation in rural development and Too little attention has been paid to five desire to shift its own and donor support out laying some of the foundations of long-term prerequisites for achieving broadly based, of groundnuts into irrigated rice. Senegal lost growth-for example through improving sustainable agricultural growth: shares of world trade in groundnuts and health and extending access to education. Balancing food and export crops. In the However, a large number of donor-funded 1970s governments, often encouraged by projects inspired by concern for the poor donors, shifted investments away from tradi- depended on raising farm production in tional export and foodcrops into new, high- Uma J. Lele marginal areas, and areas where there were cost, production of rice, wheat, and sugar for Indian, has a PhD from no suitable technologies for raising agricul- the urban sector. Reasons included export Cornell University and has tural productivity; most such projects have pessimism; humanitarian concerns about food held management positions had low economic rates of return (see Julian security and poverty, especially in the light in the research and opera- Blackwood, "World Bank Experience with of the 1973-74 food crisis and severe African tional complxes of the Rural Development, " Finance & Develop- drought; the likelihood of Africa's increased Bank. She is currently ment, December 1988). A more balanced exports competing with those of some Chief of the Special Studies strategy would give priority to areas of known aid-giving countries; rising domestic demand Divisininthe Bank's Com-n potential in the medium run while methodi- for food from growing populations; and byEconmi Departmnst. caDlyseekinglong-termsolutionsforresource- expectations of rising world food prices. poor areas, including consideration of invest- Efforts to ensure food security are obviously ment in human resources and of appropriate 8 subsidies for certain groups in the short run Public sector. The Madia study empha- extension efforts in many cases need to be and promoting emigration, to areas of more sizes the strategic role the public sector has broadened, beyond plant breeding and toward, potential, or to pursue actvities other than played wherever growth has occurred, by for example, soil management techniques and agriculture, in the long run. promoting a macroeconomic environment the integration of cropping with livestock and Short-term macropolicy adjustments that is conducive to growth, an investment forestry. vs. long-term capacity building. There is pattern that expands the supply of human and 0 Mounting evidence that adjustment good reason for donors' emphasis, in the physical infrastructure, and an institutional based on macroeconomic reforms and "get- 1980s, on relatively short-run policy reform. strategy that supports agricultural research ting prices right" cannot alone put African Nevertheless, it has left many donors with a and extension and broadens factor and pro- agriculture back on to a growth path. The need to rebuild their own capacity to assist duct markets. study highlights the diversity of country with badly needed longer-term development In countries at early stages of develop- circumstances and the importance of under- investments. This is increasingly being recog- ment, the public sector plays a vital role in standing individual countries' specific endow- nized in the donor community. developing markets and broadening oppor- ments, long-term processes of development, Human capital and institutional devel- tunities by investing in public goods. Where and needs, to which reform and investment opment. By and large, relations between privatization is to be attempted, its speed, packages must be tailored if they are to have donors and governments still place much timing, and extent are all crucial to its sustainable positive effects. Unless the grow- more emphasis on transfers of finance and success, especially at early stages of develop- ing tendency of Africa's multilateral donors technical assistance than on the development ment. Unless the public sector has already to "call the shots" on recipients' policies is and use of African institutional and human helped to put in place transport and informa- accompanied by better and more consistent capacity. Donors have often fallen back on tion networks that allow markets to function, help with building indigenous capacity for technological and organizational solutions aris- and arrangements that ensure adequate development planning and implementation, ing from their own backgrounds and expecta- supplies of credit to crop traders; and unless the gains made under structural adjustment tions, which may have little to do with regulations exist that promote competition in will not be maintained. In this context it will recipients' needs or their organizational and the private sector, public monopolies may be be necessary to reinstate aid at the level of personnel endowments. replaced by private monopolies. The private projects and subsectors in its essential role The successful cases of smallholder devel- sector may choose only to operate where as a catalyst of development, within the opment cited earlier in tea, coffee, cotton, profits are quick and high-as has been shown context of appropriately funded and targeted and maize expansion have all involved com- by experience with the liberalization of sector and macroeconomic policies. plex packages of public policy measures, several African markets for grain and for * The desirability of reviving production designed on the basis of detailed local fertilizer. of traditional food and export crops in which knowledge, together with strong field-level , African countries still have a clear compar- services that have responded to the grass- Conclusions ative advantage. More research is needed roots needs of local producers, who have To sum up, the key issues identified by the on export crops, as a complement to, for themselves developed a stake in the success Madia study include the following: example, the currently exclusive focus on of such efforts. In future, much will depend * High and rising pressure on land, and the food crops of the Consultative Group for on how well African governments explain and urgent need to raise factor productivity. In International Agricultural Research. donors understand the constraints on growth much of Sub-Saharan Africa, technology * The danger of relying on privatization in individual projects and subsectors, and on development in agriculture is only now to solve fiscal imbalances, and the need for the emphasis placed on training and relying beginning to receive high priority. As yet, effective actions by the public sector, espe- on people with local knowledge. Govern- there are not strong enough links between cially in research, infrastructure, and informa- ments themselves need to place greater the nature of resource endowments, the tion networks, to provide the preconditions emphasis on using external assistance to substance of development strategy, and the for successful privatization and for smallhol- develop their own capacity. content of technology policy. Research and der agricultural growth. a This article first appeared in Finance and Development (March 1989) and has been reproduced here with the permission of the editors. Sources of Growth in East African Agriculture Uma Lele A dynamic agricultural sector is critical for alleviating Sub-Saharan Africa's current economic crisis, and for laying the foundations of sustained future growth. In recent years, however, agriculture has performed poorly in many African countries. Efforts to assist its recovery, often through structural adjustment lending, have suffered from inadequate information about country- and region-specific factors, and from an emphasis on macroeconomic policies without complementary interventions at the sector level. The article describes the patterns of agricultural growth in Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania, and examines price and nonprice aspects of three sets of factors: initial endowments and subsequent exogenous developments, general economic influences, and sectoral issues and policies. It suggests that government action at the sectoral and subsectoral levels in such critical areas as land policy, smallholders' access to inputs, and agricultural research needs to be combined with macroeconomic reforms to achieve sustained and broadbased agricultural growth. Countries at early stages of development in Africa depend overwhelmingly on agricultural growth for employment, foreign exchange, government revenue, and food. Although African agriculture is generally believed to have performed poorly, there are relatively few detailed studies that document the causes of its poor performance (or, in the exceptional cases, the sources of growth). Some growth theorists (Solow, Kuznets, and others) have tended to emphasize the importance of nonconventional inputs (technological progress and knowledge) relative to that of conventional factors of production (land, labor, and capital) in the process of modernization, and some among them (Schumpeter, Schultz, and Harry Johnson) have focused on particular forms of capital and the com- plementarity among them in determining the process of knowledge acquisition and technical progress. In a specifically African context, some analysis has focused on adverse price incentives and excessive government intervention as critical constraints (World Bank 1984, 1986), while others have criticized the recent emphasis on "getting prices right" as excessive (Lipton 1987). Some analysts have argued that among the nonprice factors, technological constraints are the most binding (Mellor 1984). Others have stressed the inadequate institutional, human capital, and physical infrastructural environment (Lele 1988b), and still others have decried the large-scale bias of the agricultural strategies pursued by many African governments (Johnston and Kilby 1975). The extent to which prices automati- cally induce the relaxation of the various nonprice constraints, and the ability of public policy to loosen technological, institutional, and organizational con- straints, are also matters of much debate in the literature (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Mundlak 1988; Lele and Mellor 1988). This article examines key price and nonprice factors in agricultural growth and distribution in three East African countries, Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania. Formal modeling of the range of issues and length of time covered here would require comprehensive and reliable data, which are not available. The approach used combines quantitative analysis of some factors with a broader political- economic analysis for other issues as appropriate. Uma Lele is a division chief in the Country Economics Department, the World Bank. This article is based on work done for a World Bank research project, Managing Agricultural Development in Africa (MADIA), which was conducted with the participation of the governments of Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Senegal and of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.K. Overseas Development Administration, the Danish International Development Agency, the Swedish International Development Authority, the governments of France and of the Federal Republic of Ger- many, and the Commission for the European Communities. The author wishes to thank Harris Mule, M. L. Muwila, J. S. Magombo, Stephen O'Brien, Paul Isenman, Gregory Ingram, Andrew Spurling, Michael Westlake, Kevin Cleaver, and James Adams for helpful comments. © 1989 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK. 10 The issues are introduced in section I, a brief overview of agricultural per- formance in the three countries. Sections II-IV highlight three sets of factors in agricultural performance: (i) the countries' "luck," that is, their natural endow- ments (including physical and human capital) at independence and subsequent external developments outside their control; (ii) the general economic environ- ment and strategies; and (iii) sectoral policies. All three sets of factors have price and nonprice aspects. Section V briefly discusses a critical issue-food security policies and prospects-that exemplifies the interplay between the three sets of factors. Section VI offers some conclusions. 1. OVERVIEW OF POSTINDEPENDENCE AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE IN KENYA, MALAWI, AND TANZANIA The macroeconomic context for agricultural production has varied substan- tially among the three countries (as suggested by table 1), creating differential employment and income-earning opportunities within and outside agriculture. In most cases Kenya has the strongest economic indicators and Tanzania the weakest. Per capita annual income in 1965 (when all had achieved independ- ence) was highest in Kenya ($103), followed by Tanzania ($76) and Malawi ($63). Malawi's social indicators were and are the lowest, with the exception of primary school enrollment and access to safe water (levels of which were higher than in Tanzania in 1965). Table 1. Macroeconomic Indicators for Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania, 1967-84 Indicator Kenya Malawi Tanzania Growth rates (percent) Gross domestic product (GDP) (real) 5.7 5.1 3.8 Population 3.9 3.0 3.3 Per capita GDP 1.8 1.3 0.5 Inflation (consumer price index) 10.9 9.3 14.6 Agriculture (real) 3.9 3.9 2.7 Manufacturing (real) 9.3 2.5 5.4 Mining (real) 3.2 - -5.6 Exports (real) 1.4 5.6 -1.8 Imports (real) 1.5 3.3 0.3 Shares of GDP Investment 23.2 24.4 20.8 Total saving 19.7 13.0 14.0 Net exports -3.5 -8.7 -8.8 Current account deficit 5.8 6.7 10.0 Fiscal deficit 4.1 7.1 7.5 Central bank claims on government 4.1 6.1 9.8 Export ratios Total debt/exports 116.1 207.0 279.3 Debt service/exports 13.7 17.8 8.9 - Negligible. Note: All growth and inflation rates were calculated using ordinary least squares; all are significant at the O.OS level. Source: International Monetary Fund (1985). This varying economic health is also found in the agricultural sector. Be- tween 1970 and 1985 only Kenya experienced an increase in total output and exports across all its main agricultural commodities (table 2). Equity objectives were also well served in Kenya, with the share of small farmers' production in exports and food output rising substantnally mainly due to expansion of the total cropped area and, to a lesser extent, increases in yields. In the case of maize (table 3), the tendency for yields to fall with the movement of population into marginal areas was offset by the increasing use of fertilizer and high-yield varieties. 11 Table 2. Average Annual Percentage Growth in Volume of Agricultural Exports and Production, Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania, 1970-85 Kenya Malawi Tanzania Commodity Exports Production Exports Production Exports Production Coffee 3.8 0.8 Smaliholder 6.0 2.3 Estate 1.0* -4.1 Tea 7.5 1.9 Smallholder 13.5 13.7 Estate 5.5 5.2 4.5 1.0 Sugar Smallholder 16.9 Estate 5.3 28.1 14.7 0.8* Dairy Smallholder 8.5 Estate 0.0* Rice Smallholder 2.8 -2.7* Cotton Smallholder 4.9 -12.5 1.1* -2.3 1.6 Tobacco' -4.7' Smallholder 0.3* -4.8* Estate -7.5 Burley 14.1 15.4 Flue-cured 9.2 10.4 Groundnuts Smallholder -13.2 -7.2 Cloves Smaliholder and estate -2.7* Sisal Estate (mainly) -5.9 Cashewnuts Smallholder -6.8 Horticultural 12.7 * Statistically insignificant (all other figures significant at the 0.05 level). a. In Malawi, burley and flue-cured figures refer to estate production; smaliholder production in- cludes dark-fired, sun-air cured, and oriental tobacco. Source: Lele and Meyers (1987). Table 3. Food Sources: Average Annual Percentage Growth in Maize Production, Cereal Imports, and Food Aid, 1970-85 Source Kenya Malawi Tanzania Maize Production 3.9 1.5* 2.1 Official purchases 2.4* 19.1 1.1* Official sales 9.2 23.7 1.9 Net cereal imports 5.1 -4.1 3.3 Food aid 43.1' 28.6 23.5 * Statistically insignificant (all other figures significant at 0.05 level). a. Started from a low base during 1970 to 1978 and increased dramatically in 1979. Source: Lele and Meyers (1987). l In Malawi, estate production increased impressively, while per capita small- holder maize output stagnated and output of other smallholder crops either declined or showed no trend. Estate sector tobacco yields increased considera- bly, with an average differential of four times the smallholder yields (Lele 1987). Malawi also had a larger differential between the land productivity of its tobacco estates and smallholders sectors (4:1) than did Kenya in its tea and coffee production (2:1) (Lele and Meyers 1987). Kenya's smallholder gains have been slow and steady since the late 1950s, whereas Malawi's export crop output expanded very rapidly in the 1970s and peaked at the end of the 1970s 12 and in the early 1980s. Because Malawi's strong agricultural growth arose primarily in the estate sector, agricultural employment and income have been more narrowly distributed than in Kenya. This has constrained internal de- mand for food and food imports relative to those in Kenya and allowed greater agricultural exports. While Kenya and Malawi increased the world market share of their major export crops, Tanzanian agricultural exports from both large and small farms have performed poorly. Coffee and tea exports increased slightly (with the share of smallholders in total output increasing, albeit from a very smal] base) but exports of all other major crops have declined. As in Malawi, smallholder production shifted away from agricultural exports and into food crops. All three governments have operated de jure or de facto monopolies on purchases and sales of maize and other major cereals. Officially purchased and sold output showed substantial year-to-year fluctuations, particularly since the late 1970s, reflecting changes in total output and large shifts in the proportion of that output handled by official and informal markets. Fluctuations in official maize purchases have risen substantially since inde- pendence, as the share of small producers in the total has grown. Small farmers (and especially the lowest-income households) tend to sell grain in the harvest season to meet cash requirements and then to buy it back in the postharvest season. This tendency has increased with growing land pressure, as households have less to sell and a greater need to purchase from the market. In a period of crop shortfall, therefore, marketing parastatals are faced with both declining inventories and increasing demand, whereas the reverse tends to be the case in good crop years (Lele and Candler 1981). Over the 1970-85 period as a whole, Malawi was generally a net maize exporter, while Kenya and Tanzania were net importers (although Kenya was a net exporter during most of the 1970s) (table 3). Food aid dependence has also been greater in Kenya and Tanzania than in Malawi, and has increased over time. Several factors in the economic environment may have a bearing on Malawi's ability to export cereals, in contrast to that of Kenya and Tanzania. Both Kenya and Tanzania have higher rates of urbanization and population growth than Malawi (table 4). Kenya and Malawi, however, have greater population con- centration on arable land. All these could reduce net per capita cereal availabil- ity. Malawi's skewed distribution of income and assets, discussed below, how- ever, also affected internal effective demand adversely (Lele 1987). Country experience with diversification out of agriculture has varied. Table 4 shows that the share of agriculture in GDP had declined by the early 1980s in Kenya and Malawi. In Tanzania, however, agriculture's share in GDP and exports had increased, despite the adoption of industrial promotion measures such as the channeling of public investment, with donor support, into heavy industry and agroprocessing (Lele 1984; Lele and Meyers 1987). II. THE "LUCK" FACTOR: ENDOWMENTS AT INDEPENDENCE, EXTERNAL SHOCKS, AND AID Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania are former British colonies or protectorates with relatively similar ecological conditions and many of the same crops. At independence, agriculture was the most important sector. The three inherited similar agricultural structures, consisting of many small African farms and a modern agricultural sector operated by European settlers. Kenya had the largest European settlement, the most advanced economy, and a relatively more devel- oped physical infrastructure and institutional base. Kenya also had the lowest share of agriculture in GDP, employment, and exports, reflecting its more 13 advanced state of structural transformation, while Malawi had the highest (table 4). Tanzania is well-endowed in terms of per capita arable land, although pock- ets of land pressure exist, whereas land pressure has been substantial in Kenya and Malawi since independence and has been exacerbated by population growth, which has been highest in Kenya (see table 4). Differences in land quality and rainfall make production possibilities more limited in Malawi than in Kenya or Tanzania. While only 26 percent of Kenyan land is arable (relative to 37 and 56 percent in Malawi and Tanzania, respectively), 16 percent of that land is of very high quality, whereas in Malawi and Tanzania medium-potential land dominates. Malawi has only a single rainy season, allowing cultivation once a year, compared to the bimodal rainfall pattern in Kenya and Tanzania. Table 4. Economic and Social Development Indicators, K,enya, Malawi, and Tanzania Indicator Year Kenya Malawi Tanzania Sectoral share (percent) Agriculture's share in: GDP 1967-73 34 44 41 1982-84 33 40 52 Employment 1965 84 91 88 1980 78 83 86 Exports 1967-73 75 97 78 1979-81 57 94 79 Industry's share in GDP 1967-73 12 11 12 1982-84 16 12 10 Land density Population (millions). 1965 9.5 3.9 11.7 1985 20.2 7.0 22.2 Land area Millions of hectares 1985 56.4 9.4 88.4 Arable as percentage of total' 1985 26 37 56 Arable land: hectares per capital 1965 1.54 0.89 4.23 1985 0.73 0.50 2.23 Social indicators Population (average annual 196S-73 3.8 2.8 3.2 percentage rate) 1980-85 4.1 3.1 3.5 GNP per capita (current 1965 103 63 76 U.S. dollars) 1986 300 160 250b Life expectancy (years) 1965 45 39 43 1985 54 45 52 Infant mortality rate (per 1965 112 199 138 thousand) 1985 91 156 1I0 Population per physician 1965 12,820 46,900 21,700 1981 10,140 53,000 19,810 School enrollment (percentage of age group) Primary 1965 54 44 32 1984 97 62 87 Secondary 1965 4 2 2 1984 19 4 3 Safe water access 1973 1S 33 13 (percentage of population) 1980 28 41 34 Urbanization (average annual 1965-80 9.0 7.8 8.7 growth rate) Road density (kilometers per 1965 7.4 10.8 1.8 100 square kilometers of 1985 11.3 12.1 9.2 land) a. Arable defined as cultivable rainfed land. b. Use of overvalued official exchange rate overstates GNP per capita. Sources: Sectoral share, land area: Lele and Meyers (1987); population, social indicators: World Bank (1986b, 1987, 1988); except GNP per capita for 1965: International Monetary Fund (1987); infant mortality and safe water access: World Bank (1985, 1986a); and road density: Lele (1988a). 14 Access to land-and especially differential access on the part of different groups-is a key determinant of patterns of agricultural growth. Land in Ma- lawi, for instance, is divided into three broad classifications. Customary land is held by the state for smallholder cultivation; it accounts for over two-thirds of all land in Malawi. Private land is held under both leasehold and freehold; all estate cultivation is on private land. Public land is mainly composed of forest reserves and game parks. Since 1964, the quantity of customary land available for cultivation by smallholders in Malawi has declined by more than 700,000 hectares, which is almost 10 percent of total customary area (Mkandawire and Phiri 1987), and the proportion of households with less than one hectare of land has increased sharply, now exceeding S0 percent of all households. Little is known about the recent evolution of smallholder land availability in Kenya, but the average size of smallholder farms fell from a mean of 2.3 hectares in 1974 to 1.7 hectares in 1979. Detailed data on land ownership or access are unavailable for Tanza- nia, but more than three-quarters of farmers in Tanzania cultivate smallhold- ings of less than 2 hectares, and government policy has discouraged private ownership and private farming. Kenya possesses the best transportation network of the three countries, some of which was constructed before independence by European settlers involved in the large-scale production of coffee, tea, maize, and dairying. Kenya has also invested significant resources in transportation. Malawi had higher road den- sity-10.8 kilometers per 100 square kilometers of land in 1965, compared with 7.4 in Kenya and only 1.8 in Tanzania-but it is landlocked, while both Kenya and Tanzania have good ports. Transportation problems have escalated for Malawi since the 1980s as the war in Mozambique has cut off Malawi's major transportation route for exports. Tanzania's transportation needs have been high due both to poor initial conditions and the large size of the country. The growth in road density for Tanzania (table 4) is somewhat deceptive, as most roads in Tanzania are in poor condition. Economic growth and stability in the three countries have been affected by terms of trade volatility, oil price hikes, worldwide recession, and escalating interest rates on foreign debt. Unfavorable movements in terms of trade have been the main external shocks, with Kenya suffering the greatest loss in barter terms, followed by Malawi and Tanzania (figure 1). Kenya and Malawi in particular have incurred higher interest payments on foreign loans as they Figure 1. Index of International Barter Terms of Trade for Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania, 1967-84 130 120- 110 / 60 90 9 80- 70 60 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 Key: . Kenya ----- Malawi ---Tanzania Source: Ansu (1986). 15 increased the proportions of their debt owed to private sources. Because Tan- zania relied more heavily on concessional assistance, it suffered less from inter- est rate changes. Tanzania's income terms of trade loss was the greatest, how- ever, owing to stagnation in the volume of its exports. Other external shocks include the effects of droughts, wars, and the move- ment of refugees, all of which have had substantial effects on one or more of the three countries, but from which Malawi has suffered most. For example, between 1967 and 1977, an estimated 330,000 Malawian migrant workers (or three-quarters of its total population living abroad) returned from Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa, mostly to settle on scarce agricultural land in the Southern Region (Christiansen and Kydd 1983). The subsequent closure of Malawi's port outlets in Mozambique in the early 1980s increased the insecu- rity of transport and its cost. By 1988 the hostilities also drove 700,000 refugees (equivalent to 10 percent of Malawi's population) across Mozam- bique's borders into Malawi. Other shocks include the breakup of the East African community, affecting Kenya and Tanzania, closure of their common border in February 1977, and Tanzania's involvement in the Ugandan war in 1979. Levels of external aid represent another factor over which recipient countries may exercise little direct control. Official development assistance (ODA) as a proportion of recipients' government expenditure is summarized in figure 2. The ODA share peaked in the late 1970s and began to decline in Malawi and Tanzania as donors took account of poor project portfolios and the need for macro policy reforms. As recipients began to undertake reforms, however, ODA levels again increased in 1982 and 1983. Although ODA to Tanzania dropped sharply (owing to its reluctance to undertake macroeconomic policy reforms), in 1984 aid was still higher in per capita terms in Tanzania (US$25) than in Kenya (US$21) or Malawi (US$23) (Cancian 1987). Figure 2. Official Development Assistance as a Percentage of Government Expenditure in Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania, 1970-84 5s 50 45 / 40 1972 \\ 35/ 3 0 2 5 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 Key: - KenYa ----- Malawi --- Tanzania Source: Cancian (1987). III. THE IMPACT OF GENERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL GROWTH Public Expenditure Patterns It is not currently possible to estimate rates of return to different categories of public expenditure for the three countries under study: the limitations of available methods and the lack of reliable and comprehensive data preclude accurate and compelling analysis. Even if it were possible, such modeling would not provide conclusive evidence on the causes of the differential rates. 16 Expenditure patterns can be examined however, in terms of their intersectoral balance, their stability and predictability, the shares of recurrent and capital expenditures, and labor versus operating costs in the total, and, to some degree, the extent to which resources were returned to the agriculture sector. Such an analysis was carried out for Tanzania by the World Bank in 1983, and was undertaken for Kenya and Malawi by the MADIA project. The detailed results are published in Lele and Meyers (1987); here I summarize key findings. Tanzania had a higher overall share of government expenditures in GDP at the end of the 1970s than Kenya and Malawi, despite having a lower share at the beginning of the decade. Over the 1967 to 1984 period, on average, Tanzania had the highest fiscal deficits and central bank claims on the govern- ment (as a share of GDP), the highest inflation rates, and the lowest share of investment in GDP (see table 1). Tanzanian programs focused heavily on indus- trial promotion, while Kenya and Malawi had smaller spending programs and a more even intersectoral balance of expenditures. Malawi's expenditures on social services were the lowest of the three. Tan- zania's gains in the social sector, while impressive on several fronts (especially primary education), remained limited in public health and secondary education. Despite Kenya's and Malawi's relatively favorable expenditure patterns com- pared with Tanzania's, the efficiency in the use of public funds, including development projects undertaken with donor assistance, was low. Of the twenty-four agricultural and rural development projects supported by the World Bank in Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania and completed in the period 1965 to 1985, ten had zero or negative rates of return (Jones 1985). In Malawi, for example, construction of office buildings and housing for field staff has consti- tuted a much larger share of agricultural investments than is standard for other countries in the region according to the World Bank's analysis. These expendi- tures, while necessary at early stages of development, reduce the funds available for more directly productive uses, such as agricultural research and dissemina- tion-which helps to explain the problems of slow technological adoption by small farmers (discussed below). In both Kenya and Tanzania agroprocessing (excluding tea and coffee in Kenya) and integrated rural development projects in marginal areas (supported by the World Bank and other donors) had very low economic rates of return. Within the agricultural sector, development projects financed in Tanzania experienced greater and more frequent shortfalls in recurrent and operating expenditures than in the other countries, and less stability and predictability. Taxation of Agriculture Because agriculture constitutes such a large proportion of total exports in these countries, any taxation of exports will fall mainly on the agricultural sector. One measure of the taxation of agriculture is the differential between producer and international prices for export crops. The differential has several components: that due to exchange rate disequilibrium, processing charges, marketing costs (transport, storage, and administration), and the proportion held by marketing agents above those costs. The extent to which exchange rate overvaluation has taxed agricultural exports is suggested by figure 3, which shows the paths of the exchange rates for the three countries over the 1970-86 period. Tanzania's exchange rate became increasingly overvalued, mainly due to higher levels of inflation (see table 1), while the rates of the other two remained relatively stable or depreci- ated. The differentials between producer and international prices for the main export crops of the three countries are shown in table 5. The extent of proces- sing differs between the crops, and the marketing margin, partially due to different unit transportation costs, varies across the three countries, being highest in Malawi. 17 Figure 3. Index of Trade- Weighted Exchange Rates at Purchasing-Power Parity, 1970-86 130 120- 110 - 10 N 90 80 t 70 - 60 - 50 - 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 Key: - Kenya------ Malawi ---Tanzania Note: Purchasing power parity exchange rates were calculated using geometric weighting: Real exchange rates = RER, = E, p, where E, = 7r(ed,), p' = 7r ()" e,= bilateral exchange rate between home country i and trading partner] in units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. ,= inflation rate inj (CPI) a,= share of partnerj in trade of country i P, = domestic inflation (cpi) j = main trading partners (j = 1 . . . 10) i= domestic/home country (i = 1, 2, 3) Source: Ansu (1986). Table 5. Ratios of Producer to International Prices, 1970-86 Kenya, Smallholder Malawi Tanzania, Smallholder Smallbolder Estate tobacco Year Coffee Tea tobacco Burley Flue-cured Tobacco Cotton Coffee 1970 0.85 0.56 0.22 0.42 0.56 0.41 0.68 - 1971 0.88 0.66 0.24 0.39 0.66 0.49 0.59 - 1972 0.98 0.63 0.23 0.40 0.63 0.46 0.57 0.57 1973 1.02 0.64 0.24 0.59 0.95 0.45 0.35 0.44 1974 1.01 0.57 0.25 0.68 0.92 0.40 0.31 0.41 1975 1.02 0.64 0.25 0.52 0.73 0.41 0.45 0.32 1976 0.89 0.59 0.23 0.53 0.76 0.37 0.39 0.29 1977 0.94 0.71 0.30 0.70 0.88 0.40 0.43 0.33 1978 0.90 0.61 0.30 0.58 0.86 0.44 0.52 0.37 1979 0.92 0.65 0.29 0.53 0.77 0.37 0.51 0.29 1980 0.98 0.75 0.27 0.54 0.46 0.31 0.47 0.37 1981 0.86 0.64 0.21 0.81 0.62 0.23 0.42 0.36 1982 0.82 0.56 0.28 0.59 0.59 0.16 0.39 0.28 1983 0.94 1.02 0.26 0.31 0.44 0.20 0.35 0.24 1984 0.77 0.64 0.26 0.31 0.40 0.13 0.32 0.23 1985 0.87 0.74 0.22 0.27 0.36 0.15 0.46 0.23 1986 0.96 0.85 0.25 0.50 0.52 0.25 0.88 0.26 -Not available. Note: Exchange rates estimated at purchasing-power parity. Source: Lele (1988a). In Kenya, the producer prices of its two main export crops-coffee and tea- were determined directly by international prices, with only processing and marketing costs being deducted. Kenya also offered the same price incentives to smallholder and estate tea and coffee producers (barring the slightly higher costs involved in the marketing of small farm production). 18 In Malawi the right to grow burley and flue-cured tobacco has been reserved for estates, which sell their output at open auctions. Smallholders are only allowed to produce dark-fired, sun-cured, and oriental tobacco, and must sell their crops directly to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corpora- tion (ADMARC), A monopsony marketing parastatal. Small farmers receive on average one-half the price earned by estates and one-quarter of the world price. This has increased the subsistence orientation of the smallholder sector, and the demand for establishment of new estates (see the discussion of land policies below). Smallholder producer prices for tobacco and coffee in Tanzania were substan- tially below world prices in the early 1970s, and in the 1980s an overvalued exchange rate further reduced their value to one-quarter of the world price. Although cotton price ratios remained somewhat better, the poor general struc- ture of incentives has dampened export production in Tanzania. Kenya's pricing policies have favored the production of coffee and tea vis-a-vis maize. The maize producer price was fixed by the government and increased at about 10 percent annually to correct the low prices set in the early 1970s. After reaching parity with world prices, it has subsequently been ad- justed annually to remain by and large in line with international prices. The high returns to coffee and tea producers in Kenya also reflect the premium earned on world markets for Kenya's high quality arabica coffee and small- holder tea. In contrast, official prices for export crops in Tanzania and for the small- holder sector in Malawi have provided incentives for production of food crops (table 6). In 1972, the ratio of producer prices of coffee to maize favored coffee production twice as much in Kenya and Tanzania as it did in Malawi. By 1984, however, Kenyan prices favored coffee over maize at a ratio more than twice that paid in Tanzania and nearly three times that in Malawi. Tobacco-to-maize price ratios in Tanzania were three times the levels found in Malawi in 1971; in the early 1980s the ratios were roughly parallel, and by 1985 the Tanzanian ratio dropped below that of Malawi. Tanzania's informal maize market prices were 100 to 800 percent higher than official prices, depending on year and location, so that export crop production was even more disadvantaged than the price ratios in the table suggest. Table 6. Ratios of Official Export Producer Prices to Maize Producer Prices, 1967-85 Coffee Cotton Tobacco Year Kenya Malawi Tanzania Malawi Tanzania Malawi Tanzania 1967 - 9.79 - 2.67 - 6.09 - 1968 - 10.07 - 3.23 - 4.30 - 1969 - 14.69 - 3.38 - 6.83 - 1970 27.2 11.66 - 3.28 - 7.84 - 1971 19.1 8.03 - 3.37 4.23 7.71 22.31 1972 20.0 9.90 18.75 2.87 4.S8 7.32 24.17 1973 23.7 9.49 15.96 3.43 4.35 5.97 21.88 1974 21.7 10.73 13.33 4.34 3.42 4.86 18.91 1975 15.3 11.19 7.00 3.77 2.73 6.05 14.29 1976 32.9 8.75 10.00 2.25 2.50 5.40 9.66 1977 44.7 8.70 18.75 3.52 2.50 6.24 10.90 1978 31.7 11.28 12.81 3.94 2.71 7.80 10.67 1979 36.8 12.54 10.67 4.19 2.82 7.88 10.51 1980 27.6 8.94 11.42 3.25 3.00 6.31 8.95 1981 22.6 7.58 12.36 3.24 3.20 6.53 9.64 1982 25.8 4.50 9.93 2.45 2.47 4.03 7.41 1983 22.7 9.35 8.67 3.39 2.69 7.56 9.96 1984 22.0 8.33 10.40 3.31 2.73 6.61 7.61 1985 21.2 - 6.75 3.56 2.10 8.11 6.30 - Not available. Source: Lele and Meyers (1987). 19 Since the introduction of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, cor- rection of exchange rate and producer price distortions has shifted some re- sources from food to export crops. But growing food demand, heavy popula- tion pressure on land, and stagnant productivity are tending to push food prices upward. Achieving a significant aggregate agricultural supply response will require raising productivity which involves a range of nonprice factors at the sectoral level. It is to these factors that we now turn. IV. SECTORAL POLICIES AND FACTORS INFLUENCING GROWTH Agricultural yields vary significantly among the three countries, with Kenya's coffee, tea, and maize yields being two to three times as high as Tanzania's or Malawi's (Lele 1988a). A substantial part of the differential can be explained by the fact that more than 60 percent of the maize-growing area in Kenya is under hybrid varieties, compared with less than 5 percent in Malawi and 10 percent in Tanzania. A supportive price regime is clearly critical to Kenya's success in this area. Nonetheless, other factors are also of importance: land and labor policies, the access of farmers to inputs and the output of agricultural research, and institutions providing credit, extension, marketing, and informa- tion. These and other nonprice factors can critically affect the ability of pro- ducers to apply their labor in ways that enhance yields. Land The production environment in the three countries has been profoundly affected by the way production units in each country have been legally defined and by the differential rights of these units to cultivate, own, or transfer land and to produce specific crops. Access to markets also varies according to the type of production unit. Some key features of each country's landholding ar- rangements are summarized below. In Malawi, customary rights to cultivate and transfer smallholder land are conferred by traditional tribal chiefs, while the expansion of estate agriculture has been determined by explicit government policies. Burley and flue-cured tobacco production has been reserved for estates through a licensing policy that accompanies the establishment of leaseholds on unused customary land. The size of a landholding alone is not a criterion for specification of status in Malawi. The rapid growth of Malawi's estate agriculture has brought a more unequal distribution of rural land. Between 1970 and the 1980s estate tobacco cultiva- tion grew from 10,000 to 39,000 hectares and estate sugar area from 2,600 to about 15,000 hectares (Ranade 1985, 1986). Although the mean area of to- bacco estates has fallen from 34 hectares in 1976 to 11 hectares in 198S, the average estate is still far larger than the average smallholder farm-55 percent of smallholdings are 1 hectare or less. In addition, much of the growth of estates has been in the Central and Southern regions, where population pressure on the land is most severe, and evidence suggests that at least 75 percent of estate land is unutilized (Minster Agriculture Limited and others 1982). There is little new registration of customary land, and no land market exists for holdings operated in customary areas. In Kenya, land titles and licenses to grow export crops have been far more freely available than in Malawi, as shown by the fact that smallholder tea hectarage has increased almost tenfold between 1970 and 1985, and coffee hectarage has doubled. Land registration drives in smallholder farming have also been more extensive in Kenya than in Malawi or Tanzania. In 1983, well over 80 percent of the land in Western, Nyanza, Central, and Eastern prov- inces, where 62 percent of the population lives, had been registered. There is also an active land market. While the spread of institutional credit for small 20 farmers is much greater in Kenya than in the other two countries, significant barriers to land access remain as a result of small farmers' limited access to institutional finance. In Tanzania the traditional tribal village authority was abolished and replaced with public ownership of land, without the individual right of ownership, sale, or registration. The government nationalized many private estates in the 1970s and prevented the development of further private landownership. In the early 1970s large commercial farms and private corporate estates accounted for more than 90 percent of official wheat sales; by the early 1980s they handled only 5 percent, with public estates making up the rest. Private corporate estates made up 25 percent of official tobacco procurement in the early 1970s; the share had fallen by the early 1980s to 5 percent, with peasant producers (with holdings of less than 10 hectares) producing 90 percent. The policy of forced "villagization" resulted in the resettlement of more than 9 million people (about 60 percent of the population) into 6,000 villages by mid-1975. A communal cultivation policy was also introduced, whereby hus- bandry practices and acreage for different crops were dictated by local heads of the (then) Tanzanian African National Unity (TANU) Party. Given the fragile nature of the soils (the original reason for sparse population settlements), increased population density caused by villagization led to rapid soil degrada- tion. The poor siting and large size of the new villages increased walking distances to farms and fuelwood costs and caused deforestation. Because more labor was required to obtain the necessary fuelwood to cure these crops, this had a highly adverse effect on smallholder tobacco and pyrethrum production. The government's response-to promote collective village wood lots-met with little success. Labor Labor markets and policies have evolved in different ways in the three coun- tries. As a result, although all three rely heavily on highly labor-intensive handhoe cultivation, intercountry labor costs vary widely, and like the differ- ences in allowable land use, these differences have had an impact on agricul- tural output. In Kenya, the de jure minimum wage is not enforced and is higher than that paid in the smallholder sector, where hired labor accounts for as much as 50- 60 percent of tea and coffee employment (Lele and Meyers 1986). Despite rapid population growth, employment opportunities have grown commensu- rately, particularly in areas of high-value crops, and real wages have fallen much less than in Malawi or Tanzania. In Malawi, a shortage of land in the smallholder sector, discriminatory price and land policies, and the return of migrants from Zimbabwe and South Africa have tended to increase wage employment, part-time employment among women from households with little or no land (Christiansen and Kydd 1983), and tenancy in the estate sector. Agricultural wage employment grew from 38,000 in 1969 to 148,000 in 1978 and to 194,000 in 1983, almost half of total estimated wage employment (Ranade 1986). As macroeconomic difficul- ties have mounted since the early 1980s, the real rural wage rate in Malawi has declined. Owing to the preferential treatment of estates in Malawi, gross margins (that is the difference between cash revenue and cash costs, excluding labor costs, as a proportion of the value of sales) for estate producers have been much higher than for smallholder cultivation-two to three times higher for some crops. Tenant farmers receive from the estate owner only a third of the auction price on burley tobacco-their situation has been much worse. While returns per hectare have been slightly higher for burley than maize, the reward for the labor involved is much lower, and where access to land makes it possible, 21 tenants have moved into maize production (Minster Agriculture Limited and others 1982). Gross margins 1981/1982 (kwacha) Burley Flue-cured tobacco tobacco Maize Per hectare Estate 1,228 Smallholder 398 794 Tenant 151 138 Per person-day, per hectare 0.47 1.84 In Tanzania, labor shortages have resulted from enforcement of minimum wage laws, restriction of movement of labor across regional boundaries, en- couragement of trade unions on estates, and political pressure (before 1986) that discouraged the use of hired labor by small and medium-size farmers. This has created a disincentive for the production of labor-intensive crops such as coffee, tea, sisal, and tobacco. Despite regulation of the money wage, real wages in Tanzania have fallen more sharply since the early 1970s than in the other two countries, reflecting the overall decline in the economy. Fertilizer A major factor in efforts to raise crop yields is the availability and application of fertilizer, especially under conditions of heavy population pressure on land and dwindling reserves of uncultivated arable land. The use of fertlilizer is influenced by the ratio of its nutrient price to the output price, and the physical response coefficients of the technology employed. Information and access through extension, credit, and marketing services may also influence adoption of fertilizer. As table 7 shows, nutrient prices relative to maize prices are higher in Malawi (even after a small subsidy on fertilizers) than in Kenya, partly reflecting Ma- lawi's higher transportation costs and frequent devaluations. More than 60 percent of fertilizer consumption in Malawi is now estimated to be used by small farmers, and more than 80 percent of that is on maize. In Kenya less than 43 percent is used by small farmers, and only 20 percent of that is used on maize, the rest being applied principally to tea, coffee, and sugar. Fertilizer Table 7. Ratios of Fertilizer Nutrient Price to Maize Price and Rates of Explicit Fertilizer Subsidy in Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania, 1972-87 Kenya Malawi Tananzia Price Subsidy Price Subsidy Price Subsidy Year ratio rate (percent) ratio rate (percent) ratio rate (percent) 1972 4.6 0 8.7 - - - 1973 6.2 0 8.7 - - - 1974 5.9 0 15.6 - - 75 1975 7.3 0 10.5 - 7.0 66 1976 6.5 0 10.5 - 6.6 - 1977 4.2 0 10.5 - 6.6 - 1978 4.5 0 10.5 - 5.6 50 1979 5.6 0 7.5 - 8.1 - 1980 7.0 0 8.8 - 6.0 - 1981 7.2 0 7.8 - 5.1 60 1982 6.9 0 9.1 - 4.1 60 1983 6.1 0 9.0 25 5.6 60 1984 5.6 0 9.9 29 6.0 60 1985 - 0 12.2 23 5.5 0 1986 3.7 0 12.5 23 5.0 0 1987 3.4 0 10.0 17 5.0 0 - Not available. Note: The fertilizer prices are transformed to reflect their nutrient contents, and the ratios are computed as: price of 1 kilogram of nutrient per the price I kilogram of maize. Source: Lele, Christiansen, and Kadiresan (1988). 22 use on coffee and tea is more profitable than on maize in Kenya as international tea and coffee prices are passed on to Kenyan farmers. The timely distribution of fertilizer to tea and coffee producers by the Kenya Tea Development Author- ity and by the coffee cooperatives has also supported its use. In the period 1974 to 1985, fertilizer nutrient consumption grew more rapidly in Malawi and Kenya; Tanzania experienced a decrease in usage. Increasing fertilizer use iX a major issue in Kenya and Malawi, owing to growing population pressure on land. In the 1980s, Malawi subsidized fertil- izer. Kenya has had difficulties in expanding fertilizer use due to import restric- tions reflecting shortages o foreign exchange for imports and problems in the distribution of the appropriate products and amounts at the right times. Almost all of Tanzania's fertilizer is financed by aid donors, but internal distribution is a problem far worse than in Kenya or Malawi. Not only is transport infrastruc- ture poor, but in 1983 all fertilizer had to be distributed through only thirteen retail outlets. Elsewhere I have argued that given the growing land pressure, limited purchasing power of rural households, and rising food and fertilizer prices, a subsidy on fertilizer for the benefit of resource-poor farmers is critical to ensure their food security (Lele, 1987; Lele, Christiansen, and Kadiresan, 1988). Research Increasing the application of fertilizer depends critically on the ability of national agricultural research systems to develop profitable technological pack- ages adapted to the conditions of each agricultural region. Both Kenya and Malawi have had excellent agricultural research systems for their major export crops financed through levies on these crops. Foodcrop research presents a mixed picture. While very weak on adaptive on-farm research, Kenya's hybrid maize program has been quite successful in developing an improved seed distri- bution program and in ensuring its rapid adoption. These successes are re- flected in the high percentage of Kenya's total maize area under improved maize-but much of this gain was achieved in the 1960s, and relatively little subsequent progress has taken place. Malawi's hybrid maize research program faces the question whether research should focus on flint or hybrid dent maizes. Hybrids are more sensitive to growing conditions and thus their yields are more variable, though higher on average than traditional varieties. Low current adoption of hybrid dent varieties reflects the small farmers' inability to bear the risk of variable output, as well as strong consumer preference for flint maize, its better storability, and inadequate access to credit and extension. Tanzania's research system collapsed in the 1970s in part because of the breakup of the East African Community, upon which Tanzania had depended for research, especially in tea and coffee. Cotton research suffered from the sudden withdrawal of the British Cotton Research Corporation (CRC) in 1975, while tobacco research was plagued by shortages of qualified personnel, lack of continuing and reliable funds for recurrent expenditures and foreign ex- change for critical supplies, and the breakdown of the transport system. The recent decision of many external lenders and aid agencies to invest in agricul- tural research is long overdue but seems to be overloading the country's capac- ity to manage such research effectively. Similar problems with financing for research have surfaced in Malawi and Kenya. Another common defect of these efforts has been excessive emphasis on the provision of physical capital and external technical assistance; the substance of research and the optimal use of available human capital have begun to receive attention only recently, but much progress is needed on this front for research to have any impact. 23 V. FOOD SECURITY: COUNTRY POLICIES AND DoNOR RESPONSE The role of government in food price stabilization has tended to acquire increasing importance with the increased dependence of rural households on the market for food. For example, in Malawi's Southern Region and the semi- arid marginal areas in Kenya more than 80 percent of the rural households regularly have a food deficit. With their low purchasing power, even an effi- cient market could not meet the consumption needs of low-income households, especially those in remote rural areas. If the burden of adjustment is not to fall most heavily on these households, especially given the frequency of droughts and shortages referred to earlier, government assistance is required. Despite major differences in ideology and approach, the governments of Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania have each pursued the objectives of food security. Objectives and Means Government policy has aimed to provide protection for producers, consum- ers, and the government itself. (As usual, of course, not all the objectives are fully consistent.) Specifically, governments have tried to: * Increase total food output, including production in more remote areas * Stabilize prices and supplies by providing a guaranteed market for food- crop production and a fixed official pan-territorial producer price' * Ensure adequate supply of white maize to the politically sensitive urban areas at fixed consumer prices, to maintain political support and limit inflation and pressure for increased wages * Control external food trade and thus the internal food situation * Reduce the commercial activities of Asians and other ethnic minorities. Means to achieve these goals generally have been similar in the three coun- tries. National buffer stocks of maize have been created in all three, funded by donors or with borrowed capital. Marketing agencies in each country have increasingly attempted to replace private traders as purchasing agents and greatly expanded their purchasing centers during the 1970s-by the early 1980s Kenya had 600 centers and Malawi had 1,000. Likewise, the three discouraged the commercial activities of Asians (and in Kenya's case, of other African ethnic groups), and Malawi prohibited Asians from living in all but the four major cities. Kenya and Tanzania both established restrictions on the movement of stocks by private agents regardless of ethnic origin-restrictions more strictly implemented during periods of shortage to facilitate government purchases. Agencies in both countries located sales points mainly in a few major urban centers, and both have been criticized for purchasing rural grain surpluses without making active efforts to sell them in rural areas. Malawi, through its bush markets, however, has had a more active rural sales policy for food and fertilizers. In periods of shortages, increased sales by government agencies in urban areas can indirectly alleviate pressure on rural food supplies by discouraging private agents from buying rural supplies at high prices (the Malawian govern- ment's inability to protect rural food supplies after the liberalization of the grain market and rising urban prices in 1987 reflects this point). These objectives, and the methods used to achieve them, have often been at odds with some of the conditions specified in donor-supported structural ad- justment programs. Adjustment programs have attempted to increase (1) the private sector's role in grain marketing, (2) reliance on external trade in addi- 1. Cleaver and Westlake (1987) have argued that inelastic aggregate demand and large year-on-year supply shifts would be likely to produce substantial price variation under a free market. Our study of Nigeria, where public intervention in most traditional foodcrops is absent, supports this observation (Lele, Oyeiide, Bumb, and Bindlish 1988). 24 tion to domestic production, (3) the efficiency of the public-sector marketing boards, and more recently, (4) the food security of the population. The liber- alization of domestic and foreign trade implied in these programs has faced considerable resistance in Kenya and Tanzania and has also produced misgiv- ings in Malawi. The role of donor advice and conditionality in the policy reforms of the 1980s has been extensively examined in the World Bank's research project, Managing Agricultural Development in Africa, and a range of material has been produced on this issue. The following section merely touches on some of the findings of these documents as they relate to the critical issue of food security. The interested reader is referred to the comprehensive volumes (Lele and Meyers 1987, Lele and others 1989) or to the original sources on which they are based for further information. Outcomes Judgments about the effects of these policies are controversial, partly owing to differences in interpretation, but also because of a continued lack of consen- sus on the real purpose of the policies. For example, disagreements over the desirability of price stability or domestic self-sufficiency continue to arise. The budgetary effects are probably the least contentious issue. All three governments have subsidized maize operations, although maize producer prices have been brought into line with international prices, and official consumer prices have increased substantially. In Tanzania, the National Marketing Cor- poration's overdrafts were about 2.8 billion shillings (around US$250 million; billion is 1,000 million) in 1983, while a recent European Economic Commu- nity study of the National Cereals and Produce Board in Kenya estimates accumulated losses to be nearly 5 billion shillings (about US$300 million). These compare with total central government expenditure on agriculture of K Shl31 million in Kenya for 1986 and T Sh545.1 million for Tanzania in 1983. Employment in foodcrop parastatals has also grown significantly, even as their operations have declined (Lele and Christiansen 1988). While the costs involved are significant, and the need for improved parastatal efficiency is universally accepted, mitigating factors have been noted. For in- stance, year-to-year price stabilization and other government objectives are loss-making but may be regarded as legitimate functions and are not under- taken by the private sector (Cleaver and Westlake 1987). In addition, donors have tended to attribute parastatal losses to managerial and administrative inefficiency, while the boards have often had very little latitude in the tasks with which they have been charged. For instance, governments want to set consumer prices low to maintain urban political support and low wages, but the consequent low producer prices preclude sufficient procurement of grain to meet urban demand, which is already encouraged by the low prices. While high producer prices increase the supplies marketing parastatals can command, rais- ing producer prices narrows or eliminates the marketing margin needed to cover the operating costs of parastatals. Governments have been unwilling to allow prices to vary to reflect transport and storage costs, even though studies show that allowing greater price variability will reduce the cost of supply stabilization operations (Pinckney 1986). The costs of borrowing capital to cover operating losses have made up a large percentage of total costs, yet parastatal capitalization has received little donor attention. Some critics, while noting that lack of funds to pay for grain purchases has contributed to the poor performance of parastatals, have called for retrenchments rather than improvements in financing. Adjustment pro- grams have imposed limits on the growth of credit, which have induced food- crop parastatals to issue script for purchases or to cut their procurement. The shortage of working capital has undermined the stability and predictability of 25 food prices and supplies. This has had an adverse effect on small farmers' willingness to diversify their meager resources out of foodcrops into export crop production (Lele 1988b and forthcoming). There is, however, little rec- ognition in donor circles of the fundamental importance of a stable and pre- dictable food policy on household food security, and in turn on the allocative decisions of rural households which affect the production of export crops. To help with promoting exports, donors have shown greater willingness to relax credit ceilings for the purchase of export crops, but this, while necessary, is not sufficient to increase production. Some donors have criticized the boards for building larger than needed grain stocks and relying less on external trade. Increasing dependence on trade, however, brings some problems. Kenya and Tanzania's growing food imports, referred to earlier, have amounted to between 10 and 20 percent of their annual export earnings. Given the instability of and the stagnant or declining dollar- denominated value of their export earnings, policymakers cannot be certain that foreign exchange will be available to meet the increased food import bill. Moreover, sharply fluctuating food surpluses and deficits internally and in neighboring countries, poor early warning systems, and the demonstrated un- reliability of food imports and aid have made governments nervous about increasing their reliance on trade. The volatility of the food situation is illus- trated by Malawi's rapid change from a regular food exporter to food importer, due to the influx of refugees. High domestic transport costs from ports to consuming areas, and physical limits on transportation capacity caused by poor infrastructure, further raise the costs and risks of increased trade dependence. Finally, there is the matter of consumer preference; imported yellow maize is not a perfect substitute for white maize, and this affects the political popularity of governments. Reducing spatial and temporal price variability has been a major aim of government policy. Enthusiasm for a government role in this area may depend on one's belief about the strength of the markets in question-how stable prices would have been in the absence of government intervention is not known in East Africa. However, the West African MADIA countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, and Senegal), which have few restrictions on internal trade or prices, have experienced more volatile and higher food prices because private markets are not as well integrated in these countries as is believed by many (Lele and Candler 1981, Lele 1987). Kenya has a relatively strong private sector, while Tanzania suffers from poor internal transportation and an inadequate flow of timely and reliable market information. Malawi lacks adequate credit for traders, who also face increased costs and shortages of vehicles and fuels. These problems were exac- erbated by an import compression policy dictated by external transport bottle- necks at the same time that reform programs were reducing the number of government buying centers (Lele and Candler 1981; Lele and others 1989). The adjustment process in all three countries has tended to cut the role of the public sector. To be successful, however, such measures require alleviation of the constraints on the operation of the private sector and the establishment of a regulatory and facilitating role for government; efforts to do this have just begun but are too slow in relation to the speed of the attempted reduction of the public sector's role. Meanwhile, government restrictions on Asian traders have exacerbated the weak commercial system; due to the weak indigenous trading sector this policy has reduced private trading activity in the short run and in some eyes has increased the need for government involvement (Lele and Meyers 1986). The extent to which inadequate markets for foodcrops limit the adoption of new technology and the importance of price support are additional important issues which are no longer given the importance assigned to them in donor 26 advice in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, despite their long-term merits, programs for liberalization of grain markets have faced a dilemma in practice. Economic crises and external shocks are more likely to induce government adoption of reform programs than are calmer periods, but the crises have resulted in inadequate preparation as liber- alization programs are adopted. Bad luck has also played a part: in Kenya, for instance, a donor's call for liberalization in 1983 was followed by the worst drought of the century and in Malawi in 1987 by an increased flow of refugees. The mixed outcomes from liberalization have tended to reinforce the faith of governments in the importance of public intervention. Receptivity to the prin- ciple of liberalization is greater now in Africa than ever before, however, and many adjustment programs have been in the right general direction if not at the right speed. VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The common and contrasting experiences of Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania in the postindependence period indicate the complexity of the task African policymakers have faced in spurring agricultural growth. The extent, direction, and distribution of growth is the product of the interaction of the policies adopted toward the economy and the agricultural sector, and of factors beyond a government's control-initial resource endowments and external events. Evidence from the MADIA project has shown that Kenya was the luckiest of the three countries and made good use of its inheritances to achieve healthy growth. Kenya now faces major problems, however, as opportunities for rais- ing output through area expansion dwindle away. In particular, the issue of land distribution and the need for policies and institutions that will increase the productivity of resources need to be addressed. While the increasing levels of food aid and imports could suggest to some a need to diversify out of their (very successful) export crops and into food crops, available evidence shows that some countries that have diversified too quickly out of their existing exports have done poorly. Of the three countries, Malawi has operated against the heaviest odds, has produced commendable rates of economic growth in the agricultural sector, and has responded positively to external shocks and donor advice. The estate orientation may have been seen to be necessary given the desire to stimulate rapid growth and the limited resources available to achieve this (Lele and Agarwal 1988). Malawi's poorer record on equity, however, suggests that government policies must support, rather than discriminate against, the small- holder sector if growth is to be broadbased and sustained-the quick resump- tion of overall growth in Malawi may now be constrained by the extreme poverty of most of its populace. Although Tanzania had good initial endowments and has enjoyed substantial donor support, it lost ground relative to Kenya and Malawi in the growth of its agricultural sector. Some of Tanzania's social achievements appear to have been bought at a considerable cost in terms of agricultural output and could not be sustained. Finally, the findings of the MADIA project excerpted here highlight the intri- cacy of the relations among the wide range of factors that shape development and economic performance. In particular, the example of food security policies and problems illustrates the need for a better understanding of the interplay between macroeconomic and sectoral policies and constraints (and between donor and recipient perceptions of policy priorities) to improve the prospects for long-term, sustainable, and equitable growth. 27 REFERENCES Ansu, Yaw. 1986. "Macroeconomic Shock, Policies, and Performance: A Study of Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania, 1967-1984." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. Balassa, Bela. 1987. Policy Responses to External Shocks in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1973-76. 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Agriculture and Structural Transformation: Economic Strategies in Large Developing Countries. New York: Oxford University Press. Jones, Christine. 1985. "A Review of World Bank Agricultural Assistance to Six African Countries." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. Lele, Uma. 1984. "Tanzania: Phoenix or Icarus?" In Arnold Harberger, ed., World Economic Growth. San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies. - 1987. "Structural Adjustment, Agricultural Development and the Poor: Lessons from Malawi." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Depart- ment. Washington, D.C. Processed. . 1988a. "Agricultural Growth, Domestic Policies, the External Environment and Assistance to Africa: Lessons of a Quarter Century." In Colleen Roberts, ed., Trade, Aid, and Policy Reform: Proceedings of the Eighth Agricultural Sector Sym- posium. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. - . 1988b. "Comparative Advantage and Structural Transformation: A Review of Africa's Economic Development Experience." In Gustav Ranis and T. Paul Schultz, eds., The State of Development Economics: Progress and Perspectives. New York: Blackwell. Lele, Uma, and Mohan Agarwal. 1988. "Smallholder and Large Scale Agriculture: Are There Tradeoffs in Growth and Equity?" World Bank Special Studies Division, Coun- try Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. Lele, Uma, and Wilfred Candler. 1981. "Food Security: Some East African Considera- tions." In Alberto Valdes, ed., Food Security for Developing Countries. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. Lele, Uma, and Robert E. Christiansen. 1988. "Markets, Marketing Boards, and Co- operatives: Their Role in Agricultural Development." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. Lele, Uma, Robert E. Christiansen, Paul Fishstein, and Mathurin Gbetibouo. 1989. "Food Security in Africa: Lessons from the MADIA Countries." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. Lele, Uma, Robert E. Christiansen, and Kundhavi Kadiresan. 1988. "Issues in Fertilizer Policy in Africa: Lessons from Development Policy and Adjustment Lending Experi- ence in MADIA Countries, 1970-87." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. 28 Lele, Uma, and John W. Mellor. 1988. "Agricultural Growth, Its Determinants, and Its Relationship to World Development: An Overview." Paper presented at the Twen- tieth International Conference of Agricultural Economists, August 24-31, Buenos Aires; Argentina. Lele, Uma, and Richard L. Meyers. 1986. "Agricultural Development and Foreign Assistance: A Review of the World Bank's Experience in Kenya, 1963 to 1986." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. . 1987. "Growth and Structural Change in East Africa: Domestic Policies, Agri- cultural Performance, and World Bank Assistance, 1963-1986, Parts I and II." World Bank Development Research Department Discussion Papers 273 and 274. Washing- ton, D.C. Lele, Uma, A. T. Oyeiide, B. Bumb, and V. Bindlish. 1988. "Nigeria's Economic Development, Agriculture's Role, and World Bank Assistance, 1961 to 1986: Lessons for the Future." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Depart- ment. Washington, D.C. Processed. Lipton, Michael. 1987. "Limits of Price Policy for Agriculture: Which Way for the World Bank?" Development Policy Review 5: 197-215. Mellor, John. 1984. "A Structural View of Policy Issues in African Agricultural Devel- opment." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 665-70. Minster Agriculture Limited and Thomas, Peter and Associates for Government of Malawi Ministry of Agriculture. 1982. Tobacco Sector Study. Mkandawire, Richard M., and Chimimba David Phiri. 1987. "Malawi Land Policy Study: Assessment of Land Transfer from Smallholders to Estates." World Bank Eastern and Southern Africa Projects Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. Mundlak, Y. 1988. "Capital Accumulation, the Choice of Techniques, and Agricultural Output." In John W. Mellor and R. Ahmed, eds., Agricultural Price Policy for Developing Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pinckney, Thomas C. 111. 1986. "Production Instability and Food Security in Kenya: Measuring Trade between Government Objectives." PhD. diss., Stanford University. Stanford, Calif. Ranade, C. G. 1985. "Note on Implicit Taxation of Various Crops Grown by Small- holders on Customary Land in Malawi." World Bank Special Studies Division, Coun- try Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. . 1986. "Agricultural Marketing and Pricing in Malawi." World Bank Special Studies Division, Country Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Processed. Seka, Pierre. 1987. "Macroeconomic Shocks, Policies, and Performances: The Case of Three West African Countries-Cameroon, Nigeria, and Senegal." World Bank Spe- cial Studies Division, Country Economics Department. Washignton, D.C. Processed. World Bank. 1984. Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action. Washington, D.C. 1985. Social Indicators of Development. Washington, D.C. 1986a. Social Indicators of Development. Washington, D.C. 1986b. World Development Report 1986. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. World Development Report 1987. New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. World Development Report 1988. New York: Oxford University Press. This article first appeared in The World Bant Economic Review (January 1989) and has been reproduced here with the permission of the editors. 29 The Development of National Agricultural Research Capacity: India's Experience with the Rockefeller Foundation and Its Significance for Africa Uma Lele and Arthur A. Goldsmith World Bank Introduction Technical change is one of the critical elements that determine the pace pare and contrast India's agricultural transformation experience in the of agricultural growth in developing countries. International agricul- 1960s with the position in African agriculture today. Our reasons for tural research centers currently initiate much of the scientific work this choice, despite the obvious differences in sizes of populations, necessary for technical change, but individual countries also need to be farming systems, available natural and human resource endowments, able to identify what is relevant in the existing stock of international and politicalVadministrative structures, are as follows. First, today's knowledge, to conduct adaptive research and farm-level tests, and thus general perception of Africa as the region most directly threatened by to tailor techniques discovered in the laboratory to the specific require- intractable food crises finds its most natural parallel in the 1960s per- ments of different farming locations.' These functions require invest- ception of the Indian subcontinent as the primary arena in which the ments in national scientific and technical institutions. The public sector battle to avert catastrophic famine had to be fought and won. Second, is heavily involved in this enterprise because agricultural research re- Africa has recently become the focus of unprecedented flows of exter- quires lumpy investments, involves externalities, gives rise to public nal development assistance designed to support agricultural research goods, and is subject to long gestation lags. As a measure of the scale and development efforts, specifically including investments explicitly of the effort of multilateral and bilateral official donors in supporting designed to build national agricultural research systems of individual farm technology development at the national and international lev- countries. These flows can be very large indeed (e.g., the World Bank, els, the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research USAID, the French govermnent, and the government of Senegal have (CGIAR) spent $163 million worldwide in 1985.2 recently committed over $100 million to promote agricultural research Despite these expenditures, the process by which countries de- over a 6-year period in Senegal, with a population of only 8 million-an velop their own agricultural research capacity is little understood, as investment that is itself potentially only the first tranche of an even are the links in the long chain of research, experimentation, adaptation, more ambitious program). and dissemination of technology. The theory of induced innovation, for It seems sensible to us, therefore, to seek to derive useful lessons instance, which explainis technical change and institutional innovation about the necessary conditions for the success of such efforts from a as the result of relative factor scarcities, tends to treat as a "black comparison between contemporary Africa and the locus of the previ- box" the process of national capacity-building.3 Others have postu- ous large-scale breakthrough of this kind, that is, India in the 1960s. lated that the demand for technical change reflects pressures from We will argue that top-level political support for research is generaly interest groups, but this approach has limited value as an explanation absent in Africa and that this has hampered institutional development for institution building and technology transfers in most less developed in that region.8 The exceptions to this rule, such as Kenya and Zim- countries.4 The fact is that interest groups are rarely well organized in babwe, have occurred where weOl-organized export crop producers countries that are at early stages of development and are not able to have pressed their governments to develop new technology and to express their preferences for technology-and yet technical change maintain a well-functioning research system. stiOl takes place.5 Another school of thought emphasizes that social In addition, of course, the job of planning research systems for structures can skew the direction of innovation, but again this does not meeting the needs of African agriculture in the 1990s involves many give much insight into the initiation and administration of the process.6 more (and more complex) variables than India had to deal with in the This article presents a short case history of a particularly success- early decades after independence. To take just one example, Indian ful effort to promote technical change in agriculture. While a wide agriculture was overwhelmingly dominated by two foodcrops (wheat range of institutions and individuals in India and the United States and rice) in terms of area planted, output, and consumption. In the made significant contributions to the change process that we shaU de- African case, not merely are there more crops to consider; there is also scribe-notably the U.S. land-grant colleges supported by the U.S. the problem that different criteria for determining research priority- government and the Ford Foundation-many of their contributions such as demand growth, contribution to employment, calorie provi- have been recognized and written up elsewhere. The main protago- sion, and potential for technological breakthroughs-point to different nists in the story told here, however, are the Rockefeller Foundation crops (in these cases, to rice, sorghum/millet/cassava, and maize, re- and the government of India, whose crucialy important interactions spectively), not to mention Africa's export crops, which currently re- have not yet been comprehensively documented. Part of our purpose main neglected. wil also be to show how India's bureaucratic and intellectual elites led Another problem for agricultural research in Africa today that was the drive to increase national technological capacity and to discover absent in postindependence India is that of the sheer range of disci- new sources of agricultural productivity. Even their entrepreneurial plines now needed to support appropriate research. Not only have the activities bore fruit only after the highest levels of government gave relevant physical science disciplines subdivided and become more spe- their support, after a crisis in agriculture lent political urgency to In- cialized, but successful adoption of new varieties may now also require dia's technological shortcomings. At that time the availability of high- inputs from a variety of social scientists (e.g., economists, anthropolo- yielding wheat varieties from Mexico and rice varieties from Taiwan gists, sociologists, demographers, health/welfare specialists, environ- (via the Philippines) made improving the nation's scientific and techni- mentalists, etc.). cal capacity in agriculture a feasible and politically attractive option for In addition, research planning for African agriculture has to take the national leadership. into account a number of built-in anomalies and imbalances in the While it would be possible in principle to use any other large existing framework of agricultural development. These include: (a) the country or regional grouping as a comparator, we have chosen to com- anomaly whereby research institutes are concentrating their efforts on This article first appeared in Economic Development and Cultural Change (lanuary 1989) and has been reproduced here with the permission of the editors. © 1989 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 30 rain-fed agriculture (which currently dominates production) while Afri- system has benefited from a more stable form of government, a stron- can governments have been emphasizing investment in irrigated ag- ger base of technical manpower, more extensive irrigation, and the riculture as the prime source of future growth; (b) the imbalance be- presence of fewer major crops on which to concentrate research. It is tween on-farm and on-station research (in the former case notably instructive to remember, however, that India has 30% more arable and through Farming Systems Research), which has often tended to lead to permanent crop area than Africa, that its population during the 1950s poor cooperation between on-farm adaptive researchers and research was larger than Africa's today, and that it has received much less station scientists; and (c) favoring funding, especially recurrent fund- foreign assistance on a per capita basis, indicating that some of the ing, of extension over research. problems of organizing agricultural research were more difficult in In- Finally, with the partial exception of maize, there have been no dia. With this in mind, we will focus on the way Indian and Anterican dramatic research breakthroughs resulting in "miracle" varieties of experts interacted, and how similar recipient/donor interactions might food crops that might "prime the pump" of political demand for adap- help any country to mount a more effective research effort. tive research in sub-Saharan countries as happened in India in the As already noted, we have chosen tp focus in this article on one 1960s. facet of the Indian story that has hitherto received relatively little Demand articulation, political will, and promising international attention-the catalytic role played by the Rockefeller Foundation in research are only partial preconditions for developing a viable indige- helping to transform food-grain production. nous research capacity, however. Equally important are the manage- Material for our narrative of the India/Rockefeller interface comes ment policies and organizational techniques that facilitate the genera- from previously unavailable internal documents of the Rockefeller tion of such capacity.9 In the sections that follow, we will show how Foundation (especially from the diaries kept by key Rockefeller staff India obtained access to high-quality knowledge about how to improve when they were involved in helping to build the Indian research sys- its national research system, and we will suggest some of the reasons tem, but also from memoranda, letters, and reports contained in proj- why most African countries have hitherto been unable to replicate ect and general correspondence files).12 The comparative data for sub- India's success in this area, despite the growth of international and Saharan Africa come from a major current research project directed by national expenditures on agricultural research. Uma Lele, "Managing Agricultural Development in Africa" India's progress toward food self-sufficiency was helped by many (MADIA). The project includes studies of the political and institutional predominantly U.S. sources of assistance, including the U.S. govern- environments in each of six African countries, of the effects of domes- ment and the Ford Foundation, as well as its own efforts. In this tic economic policies on their agriculture, and of eight donors' foreign article, we concentrate on the Rockefeller Foundation's role in trans- assistance programs for those countries since the mid-1960s. ferring information about research techniques and organization to In- We will argue that at least four critical factors underlay the Rocke- dia in the 1950s and 1960s, though we recognize that other U.S.-based feller Foundation's ability to act as a catalyst for technical and institu- agencies also made important contributions to this process-for in- tional change in India, and that their absence in other countries with stance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Rockefeller programs-Nigeria or Uganda, for example-has under- establishing agricultural universities, and the Ford Foundation and the mined this ability. First, the demand for Rockefeller Foundation assis- Agricultural Development Council in supplying training. tance was not primarily the result of an aid donor's initiative but The USAID and the Ford Foundation stories are relatively well originated in India's own perceived need for help. The country's known and widely documented, as is the part played by land grant search for high-level expertise led it to the foundation, which had al- colleges in supporting agricultural education and extension in India. ready started several small-scale agricultural projects in India, as well Many of the details of the financially more modest but catalytic role of as to other U.S. donors. This mutuality of interest between donor and the Rockefeller Foundation, however, have hitherto remained buried recipient contrasts sharply with the situation in Africa, where the im- in foundation files. Furthermore, while all these donor projects had petus for agricultural research too often stems chiefly from a donor's synergistic interactions, the Rockefeller Foundation's central function conception of a recipient's technical assistance needs. Second, the in the technological transformation of Indian agriculture is specifically foundation was simultaneously involved in upgrading several inter- recognized in prestigious government of India reports."0 Finally, the related activities that were crucial for building India's agricultural India/Rockefeller story is a paradigm of how much can be achieved by research capacity. These included the development of graduate ed- a combination of donor financial parsimony and long-term commitment ucation in agriculture, the setting up of coordinated research for com- of human resources, which contrasts all too sharply with the currently modities, the reorganization of the agricultural research system, and popular recipe of large expenditures on bricks and mortar but relatively the introduction of imported high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat short term secondment of technical experts. and rice for diffusion at the farm level. The third important factor was We thus believe that the story of India's experience with Rockefel- the long-term nature of the foundation's program in India, involving ler is relevant for contemporary policymakers in developed and devel- the same individuals (in particular, the program's director Ralph Cum- oping country institutions concerned with agricultural research and its mings, but also his associates) for a decade or more. The fourth critical payoffs. Foundation staff and their Indian counterparts carried out a element was the fact that the "message" about how to proceed was highly effective institution-building program in India between 1953 and always coherent and consistent even though it may not have been the 1974. The program cost an extremely modest $7.9 million (about $23 only possible one. million in current prices) over the entire period" and never involved Thirty-five countries of sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to have more than a dozen expatriates at a time. Nevertheless, it had a very spent a total of $385 million on agricultural research in 1983, while high payoff in terms of enhanced food supplies as a result of improved donors contributed another $307 million for international and national institutional capabilities and the transfer of technological information. research systems in the region that year.'3 The quality of these expen- It is one of the outstanding examples of catalytic aid, where a donor ditures is questionable, however. In the case of the Senegal project stimulates improvements in recipient institutions that enable them to mentioned earlie., over one-third of the financing was for expatriate develop the indigenous capacity to adapt more productive technology. technical assistance and a further 16% was for civil works, vehicles, Comparisons between India's food crisis of the 1960s and Africa's and equipment-expenditures that are called further into question by current difficulties have become a commonplace of the agricultural the fact that they weke undertaken before detailed plans for actual development debate. India's agriculture is frequently cited as an ex- research programs were completed, with the result that, for example, ample of a hopeless situation turned into a success that ought to be the research station built in St. Louis, Senegal, had been designed and emulated in Africa, and it is often suggested that the Indian experience constructed in the wrong location for the research it was expected to offers directly relevant lessons for managing the development of na- carry out. The imbalance between spending on expatriate assistance tional agricultural research systems in other developing nations. We and buildings/equipment, on the one hand, and indigenous research share these perceptions but believe that our findings apply to Asia and work, on the other, also raises issues about the allocational appropri- Latin America as well. ateness of the funds deployed. Another agricultural research project, in Obviously, many differences separate the Indian and African Malawi and funded by the International Development Association and cases. India is one very large nation state, while sub-Saharan Africa USAID, suffers from similar flaws. consists of several dozen smaller ones; moreover, India's research Meanwhile, apart from a few countries (such as Zimbabwe, 31 Kenya, and the Ivory Coast) that have done well with selected crops, the other-a linkage that some Indian authorities in the field consider most countries of the region have been unable to borrow from the to have weakened in more recent years. The key factor underlying the accumulated stock of scientific agricultural knowledge or to articulate successes of the 1960s and 1970s, moreover, was not so much the clearly their needs for developing location-specific applications suited absolute quantity or quality of agricultural science in India but, rather, to their particular resource endowments. Inadequate natiunal research the way in which it was organized and deployed, with which Rockefel- and inability to adapt technology to diverse local conditions-espe- ler's efforts were in turn intimately connected. cially to the needs of small farmers-are major reasons for the poor supply of new technology for agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. In Institution Building turn, the lack of suitable technology holds back productivity and con- Despite initial shortcomings, India did have the institutional underpin- strains rural development generally.14 ning for improved research. Perhaps equally important, India's com- There is as yet little sign in most of Africa of emerging coalitions of paratively well developed intellectual infrastructure had endowed it bureaucratic and political elites of the kind that were instrumental in with an intellectual elite whose members were both temperamentally developing India's agricultural research capability. The weakness or disposed to seek out "cutting edge" research findings from anywhere absence of such groupings helps to explain the ineffectiveness of re- in the world and competent to internalize and utilize them. While the search systems in much of that continent, despite massive expendi- resulting ability to borrow from the international intellectual exchange tures on research. Much of the effort to improve farm technology is is hardly a sufficient condition for fruitful technological change, it is being undertaken at the insistence of different donor countries or in- certainly a necessary one-and one that can be expected to reduce the stitutions, and the lack of national input and support subjects it to gestation lag between foreign laboratory or research station findings, major weaknesses. It is inevitably piecemeal (in contrast to Rockefel- on the one hand, and local trials, on the other. The comparatively ler's holistic approach in India) and is too frequently modeled on a unfavorable position of most African countries at independence (and donor's idea of what a recipient needs. It is generally short-term in even in more recent years) hardly needs to be stressed. nature, which militates against the development over time of close and India was therefore relatively well positioned to make good use of effective interactions between donor and host-country personnel. The new directions in agricultural science. After independence, civil ser- resulting fragmentation of (frequently unsolicited) expert views from vants, scientists, and some farsighted political leaders began to seek to myriad donors can lead to confusion rather than to the co-option of improve their research system by drawing on the experience of more policymakers in Africa. advanced countries. Lacking multilateral sources of assistance, they In the sections that follow, we outline India's experience with the turned to the United States out of a perception that it was the world Rockefeller Foundation from the 1950s until the early 1970s and note leader in science-based agriculture.20 some of the main ways this experience differs from attempts of African The United States had much to offer Indian agricultural science in countries to improve agricultural technology. The article concludes the early 1950s.2' The basic organizational principle followed by the with a summary overview of the lessons to be drawn by donors and Americans was to unify teaching and research so as to force attention African recipients alike from the India/Rockefeller interactions that we onto practical problems. They had also had considerable success with describe in earlier sections. adaptive research that used interdisciplinary teams to develop "pack- ages" of improved farming practices.22 Washington used formula fund- India: Defining Research Priorities and Approach ing to subsidize research at state agricultural stations, an approach that When it achieved independence in 1947, India already possessed what seemed very relevant to officials in New Delhi who also worked within might be termed an "intellectual infrastructure" that put it head and a large, federal system. Coordination at the federal level enabled shoulders above most developing countries of the 1940s and 1950s-or American plant breeders to exchange information and planting material indeed of the 1980s. The universities of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta regularly and to identify the most promising crop combinations in had been established for nearly 100 years; India had awarded its first specific regions by adopting uniform trials throughout the country. Ph.D. in the same year that Harvard graduated its first holder of the This arrangement gave the U.S. research system a degree of unity of same degree; and an Indian had won a Nobel Prize (for physics) in purpose, while simultaneously allowing field-level scientists the auton- 1930. In the specific area of agricultural science, India had inherited a omy needed to conduct resea-ch under diverse conditions and thus to research system that was reasonably sophisticated for its time but that determine the comparative advantage of different crops and regions, offered a relatively poor payoff in terms of new technology.'5 Its which is so crucial in developing an efficient agricultural sector. largely indigenous staff had made some breakthroughs with sugar and The lack of alternative sources of assistance may have been a other cash crops, but critics at the time, such as A. B. Stewart, argued blessing in disguise. It concentrated India's attention on a single set of that the overall system of research was unduly fragmented."6 Separate institutional models, while still permitting reliance on different sources commodity committees studied the major cash crops, and the Indian within the United States that seemed appropriate at the time-that is, Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), which had been established on the Rockefeller Foundation for help with the development of the in 1929 on the recommendation of the Royal Commission of Agricul- national research system, on USAID for investment in land-grant type ture, did not exercise leadership to focus research on pressing prob- agricultural universities, and on the Ford Foundation for assistance lems or promising opportunities. with farm extension work. It greatly reduced the search cost typically Contemporary observers also condemned what they perceived to so high for developing countries with limited trained manpower and be overemphasis on theoretical over applied research, a legacy other diverse sources of supply. countries (such as Kenya) appear to have inherited from Britain as - well. 17 This theoretical orientation was seen as partly resulting from the Adaptive Research British style of higher education, which neglected the practical applica- In addition to its interest in institutional reform of the country's re- 5 tion of technical knowledge. In contrast to the African countries that search system, the postindependence Indian government made an became politically independent in,the early 1960s, there were already early decision to promote adaptive research on hybrid maize, a crop 17 degree-granting agricultural institutions in India at independence, that had experienced outstanding technical breakthroughs in the but only five offered advanced training as of 1951.18 The National Com- United States and had spread to Europe and elsewhere.23 Maize may mission on Agriculture noted that agricultural education "was gener- have seemed a curious choice for India, however. Only about 3% of ally formal and bookish rather than seeking to develop practical skills India's gross cropped area was under maize in the 1950s, compared to and ability to solve field problems." 19 30% under rice and 10% under wheat (see below for discussion of later As we shall show, the crucial factor that enabled Indian agricul- work on these two crops). At least three factors prompted the initial tural research to deliver so handsomely in terms of field-level applica- emphasis on maize rather than rice or wheat. First, the Indian Agricul- tions during the 1960s and 1970s was precisely the transformation of tural Research Institute (IARI) believed that programs for the latter agricultural research and higher education from this "bookishness" crops were well underway and therefore needed no external assis- into a powerful tool for linking the latest advances in agricultural sci- tance. Second, some policymakers recognized that failure to develop ence on the one hand with the production needs of Indian farmers on improved varieties of maize would have a smaller opportunity cost to 32 India than in the case of rice or wheat. Third, maize was the subject of obtaining the foundation's help in setting up a graduate program in little ongoing work in India; there were thus fewer scientists and ad- agricultural sciences. Meanwhile, Rockefeller's managers had their ministrators who might feel threatened by new approaches to maize own objectives in becoming more extensively involved with India and research. their own conditions for participation. Six were of particular impor- The leading repository of knowledge about maize in developing tance. countries was the Rockefeller Foundation, which had been running First, they were interested in working in India because of the maize programs in Mexico since 1943 and in Colombia since 1950. challenge (and potential prestige) of working in a large country; they Vishnu Sahay, India's Secretary of Agriculture, contacted the founda- also expected to achieve scale economies in their provision of technical tion for help in 1953, seeing no reason to go over ground already assistance to India. Second, the foundation wanted to make the most of covered in Latin America. But Rockefeller officers expressed concern its own comparative advantage. It was better able than official donor that India might be rushing into commercial maize production without agencies to work on long-term institutional problems because it was doing sufficient adaptive research. Two foundation experts invited to unconstrained by the vagaries of annual donor government budgeting India in 1954 confirmed this judgment, citing the lack of adaptability of processes or by changing degrees of political support for particular American hybrids to Indian conditions and the need for crossing with recipient countries (both of which plague official bilateral aid programs local material. These recommendations led to a formal request (in and planners). Moreover, as an endowed philanthropic agency with no 1955) that Rockefeller help the Ministry of Agriculture with the neces- need to show immediate success to continue projects with long gesta- sary hybrid maize research. tion periods and/or uncertain prospects (such as adaptive research on Rockefeller officials decided that the most useful way to proceed maize), it could afford, and wished, to take a long-term approach. in India would be to replicate the approach to adaptive hybrid maize Therefore, the foundation's interest in helping India with graduate edu- research that had been successful in the American South during the cation and maize research depended on whether it could expect to be 1940s. This meant continuing experimental work at existing state re- involved in programs of 10 years' duration or more. search facilities but coordinating it from the center to avoid duplication Third, senior Rockefeller officers always required that their re- and oversights. It was necessary in turn to set up uniform crop trials, a sources be concentrated on major ongoing schemes that could ulti- consistent record system, and means for unrestricted exchange of seed mately have significant payoffs and not be diluted over many small material. American experience had also proved the value of interdisci- "starter" projects. They saw the foundation's role as providing the plinary research for developing ways of controlling disease and pests marginal input needed to raise to very high standards programs to and for building a base of information on cultural practices to comple- which the national government had already committed itself. ment new strains of maize: Rockefeller therefore wanted to ensure that Fourth, and of special importance, was the foundation's insistence the Indian program would involve teamwork among scientists from on participating in all relevant aspects of developing the indigenous different backgrounds.24 One key decision was to cooperate with exist- agricultural research capability and adapting new crops to local needs. ing Indian institutions rather than to build new ones, as had been the Its involvement thus ranged very widely-from designing aspects of foundation's practice in Latin America.25 the education system and the maize research program, to training In- Despite delays and administrative conflicts of various kinds, the dian professionals in scientific and pedagogical techniques, to imple- project soon found varieties that had test yields of up to 140 bushels per menting an "action program" over which it initially insisted on retain- acre, versus an average yield in India of about 16 bushels. By 1960, it ing managerial authority. Furthermore, it also tried to ensure that the proved possible to recommend four double-cross hybrids for release to same individuals who helped India design programs were also involved Indian cultivators. The diffusion of these varieties was slower than in training nationals and grooming them for line management positions. anticipated, however, partly because net returns for rice, which com- Fifth, the foundation was determined that its senior staff working petes with maize, turned out to be far higher. Hybrid maize accounted on India should be individuals whose credentials would ensure that for only one-quarter of maize acreage in 1980-81, after 20 years of their advice carried weight with their Indian counterparts. Much the use.26 same could be said about other American agencies at that time. The There was also important organizational fallout from the maize key Rockefeller, Ford Foundation, and U.S. government personnel project. The relatively rapid development and release of new varieties involved in India-Ralph Cummings, U. J. Grant, and Albert Mose- proved to many Indian experts the advantage of central-state coopera- man (Rockefeller), Douglas Ensminger (Ford), and Frank Parker (U.S. tion and interdisciplinary research-although the vested interest of Technical Cooperation Mission)-were men of recognized stature in researchers in other organizational models meant that the all-India the U.S. agricultural community; they had all also been extensively coordinated system of research was not used for other crops until the involved in working with large-scale agricultural development pro- mid-1960s. grams in developing countries and/or in operating national agricultural Some scholars and practitioners consider that the technical prog- research programs. Moreover, they had a common background in sci- ress achieved in coarse cereal production in the mid-1960s was also ence-based agricultural research: this homogeneity meant that India sufficiently important to be considered "revolutionary."2" It certainly received consistent advice, both from the representatives of the indi- appears that by 1966 major improvements had been made in jowar vidual assistance agencies at a given point in time and from the agen- (sorghum) and bajra (millet) varieties-crops that had been added to cies as a group over time. the Rockefeller program following its initial work on maize.25 In the Sixth, senior Rockefeller advisers were permitted to work on In- case of millet, a male sterile line developed by Dr. Ratchie of the dian programs for extended tours of duty (10 years in Cummings's Rockefeller Foundation and laterreleased by Punjab Agricultural Uni- case, 5 in Moseman's, not counting his prior experience working with versity played an important role in raising yields. that country for the U.S. Department of Agriculture dating from 1949). - A yield expansion in millet (but not sorghum) in the late 1960s is This helped them with the crucial task of creating a constituency of confirmed by our own research. Nevertheless, two caveats must be supporters within the cadres of the Indian government concerned with entered. First, although the yield increases achieved in the late 1960s agricultural research. Coalition building of this kind is crucial to sustain. were impressive in percentage terms, they were quite modest in abso- the efforts required to develop new institutional capabilities in devel- lute terms. Second, the 1960s expansion lasted for only 3 years before oping countries. Without it, the new institutions tend to last for little succumbing to downy mildew. Early sorghum research (to which longer than the secondment tours of expatriate personnel. Finally, the Rockefeller scientist L. R. House made a notable contribution) led to extended time frame within which Rockefeller staff were able to oper- release of an initial hybrid sorghum strain in 1965: it was to be some ate, together with their freedom from yearly budgetary pressures, also years, however, before sorghum hybrids were to contribute to yield meant that they had no need to point to immediate dramatic results. increases. Senior managers of the Rockefeller Foundation were willing to judge the administrators of their Indian Agricultural Program on their ability Rockefeller's Approach to Technical Assistance to help India establish and operate over time an effective agricultural Simultaneous with its request to Rockefeller for help in hybrid maize research system-not on the speed with which they could complete research, the Indian government had begun to explore the possibility of particular project components. 33 India: Human Capital Development and Institutional Reform TABLE 2 It would seem intuitively obvious that a program for creating or up- INDIAN REcIPIENTS OF ROCKEFELLER FELLOWSHIPS AND SCHOLARSHIPS, 1956-70 grading a national research capability should begin by concentrating on human resource development (in terms of projects for skill enhance- INSTITUTIONAL ment) and on institutional change: in fact, however, a persistent flaw in AFFILIATION' Ph.D. M.S. Postdoc, None Total efforts of this kind in developing countries has been undue donor em- Within India phasis on investment in "bricks and mortar." The Rockefeller Founda- College/university 39t 12 13 8 72 tion's approach in India avoided this trap, spending less than $1 million Government 9 2 1 4 16 (only 12% of total expenditures) on buildings and equipment (table 1). Research institutes 8 4 2 1 15 The Indian government was also independently determined to ensure Ou-sigde Indtia g5 ... 1 6 that the foundation not be diverted by capital projects. A request fronm IARI for the construction of a student hostel by the foundation was Total 64 19 16t I5 ' actually turned down by the prime minister, out of concern that this SOURCE.-Rockefeller Foundation, Directory of Fellowships and Scholarships, would distract the foundation's attention from the more important task 1917-1970 (New York, 1972). of transferring knowledge.29 NOTE.-The data cover only persons who had completed their study programs by 1968. * Reported as of 1969 or 1970. TABLE ~~~~~~~~~~~t Includes one Ed.D. TABLE I t Includes one person for whom no institutional affiliation was reported. ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION EXPENDITURES FOR AGRICULTURE, INDIA (in Thousands of Dollars) 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 Total perhaps never return from their studies at all. While this problem may Agricultural program .. . 1111 1,640 2,578 501 5,830 have been less serious in India than in most other developing countries, Buildings, equipment, Rockefeller's involvement in promoting several aspects of agricultural and books 197 435 252 63 ... 947 research gave it a number of ways in which it could protect its invest- Experimental stations ... -. 560 ... .. 560 Travel grants 69 188 148 ... 404 ment in human capital. These included (i) awarding scholarships to job Other grantst 100 36 18 ... ... 154 holders in Indian institutions with guaranteed positions upon comple- Total 297 1,651 2,658 2,789 501 7,895 tion of their education; (ii) supporting several candidates from the same institution to build up an indigenous staff with a shared background of SOURCE.-Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Reports (New York). expatriate training; and (iii) making small grants of critical equipment NOTE.-Totals may not sum due to rounding. and facilities to the institutions in question. More generally, Rockefel- I Includes support for IARI Post-Graduate School and all-India coordinated proj- ects for maize (1956), wheat (1964), and rice (1965). In-country cost of Rockefeller ler's role in reformulating the Indian research system allowed it to help Foundation staff not included for all years. create an overall environment in which Indian scientists could operate t Includes $100,000 grant for rural training institute at Etawah Project (Lucknow). effectively. Astonishingly, three-quarters of former holders of Rocke- feller grants reported working at Indian agricultural schools or research organizations at the end of the 1960s. Only 5% said they were working The underlying point-that support for research and its technologi- outside of the country (see table 2). cal applications will ideally be human resource intensive and will put much less emphasis on funding physical plants-is absolutely crucial Reorganizing Agricultural Education in framing an effective strategy for building research capacity any- A major postindependence concern of the Indian government was the where in the world. We have already noted Rockefeller's financial need to strengthen higher education generally, and rural and technical parsimony: in the subsections that follow, we shall illustrate the human education in particular. The Radhakrishnan Committee, the first of a resource intensity of its approach and, illustrating another theme series of blue-ribbon panels that would examine the issues involved, touched on earlier, the central role in the foundation's strategy of was set up in November 1948. The prestigious nature of its member- promoting organizational change in existing systems (as opposed to ship (both the chairman and another member were later to become funding additional onses). Specifically, Rockefeller's contribution to presidents of India) indicates the importance attached to its subject building India's agricultural research capacity took three direct forms: matter-a sense of priorities for which it would be hard to find many (i) human capital investment through grants and fellowships; (ii) plan- parallels in Africa today. Nevertheless, the committee's basic proposal ning the reorganization of the higher education programs at the Indian for rural higher technical education in agriculture took approximately Agricultural Research Institute; and (iii) helping the Indian government 15 years to reach fruition. to reorganize the Indian Council of Agricultural Research. Each of The first concrete steps were taken by the early 1950s, when the these activities is briefly examined below. United States became involved in a major effort to develop state ag- ricultural universities on the land-grant model.32 The Rockefeller Foun- Investing in Human Capital *dation agreed to help set up the IARI Post-Graduate School. Institu- Few Indians knew how the American research system worked: in 1957, tion-building efforts of this sort typically need careful preparation and therefore, Rockefeller began to send key personnel to the United substantial local commitment and input if they are to take root. A key States for a firsthand look at agricultural schools and experimental element in Rockefeller's project was the joint preparation and execu- stations. Over the next dozen years, 90 short-term travel grants were tion of plans by foundation staff and Indian counterparts. After Ralph awarded to Indian leaders at a cost of $400,000 (table 1). Cummings took up his post as the foundation's field director, he was ) The foundation also provided a long-term fellowship program to careful not to rush into the IARI project with preconceived ideas: upgrade the formal skills of Indian researchers and students. Rockefel- instead, he devoted a 6-month stay in India in 1957 simply to learning ler solicited a limited number of nominations from official organiza- about the country prior to developing proposals for the new educa- tions each year for graduate or postdoctoral training overseas, usually tional program.33 This approach is very different from the current ten- at U.S. land-grant schools. One hundred fifteen trainees finished their dency among donors to try to address long-term needs through short- course of study between 1956 and 1970 (table 2).30 The U.S. govern- term project preparation missions. ment had a much larger parallel program of training that sent over 2,000 Set up in 1905, the IARI was primarily a research institute, though Indians to the United States for advanced education in agriculture and it provided nondegree training in agronomy, botany, chemistry, en- natural resources within roughly the same time frame.3 tomology, and plant pathology. Its established status had both benefits One of the most frequently heard objections to investing in formal and costs in terms of institution building. On the one hand, institutional skills upgrading (especially through degree courses at higher education development could move quickly by using existing facilities as a base; institutions in the developed world) is that the individuals concerned on the other, reorienting professional staff to new patterns of behavior will come home to inadequate opportunities and/or compensation-or was a considerable problem. Once Cummings had sufficient informa- 34 tion to begin making proposals, he suggested that graduate education at and Americans in 1955 and 1960) remained on the shelf because they IARI adopt the American pattern of major and minor fields of study, were politically sensitive.4 Nevertheless, in 1963 the vice-president of written and oral comprehensive examinations, and theses supervised ICAR; A. D. Pandit, requested the Rockefeller Foundation to put to- by an advisory committee. gether yet another Indo-American committee to study the problems of These innovations required major adjustments on the part of IARI agricultural research. staff. Instead of the familiar system of standardized curricula and ex- This Agricultural Research Review Team repeated many earlier ternal examinations, instructors would now become responsible for proposals.35 It laid out two main objectives: creation of an incentive developing their own courses and measuring students' performance. system that would encourage more research from professional person- The curriculum was also expected to change, with a new emphasis on nel, and establishment of an organizational framework that would en- deductive reasoning, problem solving, and a broad grounding in sci- able them to focus on the most urgent problems. Specific ideas in- ence. Finally, the teaching and research staff at IARI were now ex- eluded freeing agricultural scientists from the constrictions of civil pected to be chosen on the basis of merit rather than seniority, as was service regulations and pay scales, abolishing the commodity commit-. the common Indian practice. tees, and eliminating the ICAR itself and starting again with a new These were radical proposals. The existing staff were wary of central organization to coordinate research at the state level. many of them, although they broadly accepted the basic principles There was still no political support for administrative reform when involved. Active collaboration between institutions and individuals- the Agricultural Research Review Team submitted its report in March Indians at IARI, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance, 1964, and the Indian government made no effort to implement the the Planning Commission, and the University Grants Commission, to- group's proposals. It is probable that nothing would have been done, gether with their Rockefeller counterparts-made it possible to adapt but for the fact that Chidambaram Subramaniam, then minister for Cummings's ideas to suit Indian conditions, and the new school was steel, heavy industry, and mines, was appointed minister of food and inaugurated in October 1958. Its short (1-year) gestation period is a agriculture in June 1964 to deal with India's agricultural crisis. Per good indicator of the high degree of Indian commitment to reorganizing capita food-grain production was stagnant, and grain imports had risen agricultural education-and reflects special credit on the University to equal 8% of the Indian output of these crops (fig. 1), making it clear Grants Commission, which had been expected to object to handing that India's agricultural policy was not working. The country had over responsibility for graduate education to IARI. turned increasingly to concessionary supplies provided under U.S. The issue of how to adapt U.S. organizational structures to Indian Public Law 480, leading to concerns about dependency in both Wash- conditions remained, however. Division heads at IARI were disin- ington and Delhi.. During this period the prestigious Bell mission to clined to change completely to the U.S. committee-based system of India from the World Bank stressed the need for pro-agriculture postgraduate examinations proposed by Cummings. They preferred policies, along with a currency devaluation, as a condition of bank retraining some external examiners to avoid favoritism and ensure the program support during the fourth 5-year plan. objectivity of committee members. The reluctance of Indian adminis- trators to delegate decision powers and their preference for keeping seniority a major consideration in personnel matters were seen as prob- lems by Cummings, who had become the school's first dean (on an acting basis because no qualified Indian was willing to occupy this post until its authority and prestige were clear). Cummings also had reserva- tions about the admissions process at IARI, which was adjusted to favor government personnel already working in agriculture but lacking a degree. He worried that this reduced the research system's ability to draw the best students from the widest possible pool, but after exten- 2 / sive discussion he concluded that lower standards for public employ- , bimo ees were in fact appropriate in the Indian context, where civil servants lacked the means for professional advancement available in the United : States. The availability of a suitable internal candidate for dean led Cummings to step down in November 1960 to be succeeded by A. B. Joshi and, in 1965, by M. S. Swaminathan.Sor,s The performance of the IARI Post-Graduate School is not easy to measure. Certainly, the output of the program grew rapidly. Within a decade the number of students grew to roughly 400, half of them at the 50 19I55 I 1975 1 doctoral level: the school accounted for about one out of six graduate degrees in agriculture awarded in India each year, and there were FIG. 1.-Availability of food grains in India. Solid line denotes gross production; dashed line denotes total availability (gross production plus net typically 10 applications for each available place. On the other hand, imports). Source.-Government of India, Directorate of Economies and Sta- critics have complained that the administration of IARI pays too little tistics, Bulletin on Food Statistics, 31st ed. (1981-82), table 15. attention to the running of the school and that seniority and connec- tions still play too prominent a role in personnel matters. Reorganizing the Research System Subramaniam recognized India's need to deploy its scientific re- Reforms of higher education institutions and curricula can improve the sources with the utmost efficiency to boost food production, and his availability and qualifications of potential research personnel, but if the lack of strong ties to the agricultural establishment put him in a better institutional framework for the research effort is itself flawed, the ulti- position than his predecessors had been to experiment with basic re- mate output will suffer. In this section, we briefly explore the history of forms in the structure of agricultural research. He therefore eagerly. proposals to reorganize India's agricultural research capability, some seized on the Agricultural Research Review Team report that the of the obstacles to reorganization, and how they were overcome. Rockefeller Foundation had recently financed.36 Working with an advi- Propositions for reforming India's agricultural research system sory group of Indian scientists, he adjusted the latest proposals to fit had been discussed since 1947. Critics had repeatedly suggested that political realities. He chose not to abolish the ICAR in favor of a the ICAR was too tied to civil service regulations to be effective, that stronger body, though he achieved virtually the same result by giving it the pay and job conditions of agricultural scientists were poor, and direct control of national research institutes such as IARI, together that the work of the major agricultural research facilities was weakly with greater funding power so that it could more actively coordinate coordinated. By the early 1960s, despite the consensus among ad- research undertaken by the states. ministrators that the research system needed revision, proposals for To give agricultural sciences prestige in a status-conscious Indian reform (suggested most recently by U.S.-sponsored teams of Indians bureaucracy and society, the position of director general of ICAR (oc- 35 cupied traditionally by the civil service) was turned over to profes- sure on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to im- sional scientists as the Parker Committee recommended. B. P. Pal- pose conditionalities for devaluation and give priority to agriculture.) the first scientist to hold this office-subsequently developed the Cummings's generally low profile in India, his tendency to give Agricultural Research Service, an elite corps with clear career paths, credit to Indians for all accomplishments, and his reticence about his pay scales that could be supplemented for outstanding work, and the interactions with Indians now paid off. He approached Subramaniam possibility of promotion irrespective of vacancies at higher levels.37 to see if the new agriculture minister would be willing to throw his Subramaniam argues that the primary gain from these reforms was the support to accelerating the process of introducing the HYVs. Sub- ability of Indian administrators to redirect research priorities, turning ramaniam acknowledges that he decided to follow Cummings's advice scientists toward specific, nationally determined goals as opposed to ad quickly, and began to formulate a strategy for using the new varieties hoc projects formulated on an individual basis.3" to combat India's increasingly desperate food situation.' Did the Rockefeller-backed reorganization of ICAR succeed? Cost-benefit analysis shows the research system to have had high re- turns, though these are not all attributable to the reorganization.39 The The 1965 Food Crisis post-1965 system has been able to develop and release a large amount In the summer of 1965 matters came to a head: the worst drought in of genetic material, especially for rice. The status of agricultural scien- mernory led to a 20% decline in grain production. President Lyndon tists improved greatly, although their discipline is still said to rank Johnson, believing that India was not serious about policy reform, put below certain others in prestige within the Indian scientific commu- India on a "short tether" regarding food aid to increase pressure on its nity.40 Putting a technical person in charge of ICAR may have been a government.45 Meanwhile, the consortium of India's donors led by the misstep, since it did not ensure more professional administration and World Bank were discussing program support to help India meet criti- dynamic leadership.4' Also, new structures and procedures do not by cal balance-of-payments needs, but wanted it contingent on India's themselves guarantee changes in the behavior of individuals within an willingness to devaluate and to reorient its economic strategy away organization.42 Not surprisingly, the ICAR underwent a further re- from import-substituting industrialization and toward accelerated ag- structuring in 1973. According to the vice-president of ICAR, M. S. ricultural development. Randhawa, the objectives were again to give it greater autonomy, de- The Indian situation in the mid-1960s differed from the current centralized decision making, and a more flexible personnel system.43 difficulties in sub-Saharan Africa in several major respects. First, world food stocks were much lower then than they are today, so that India: Food-Crop HYVs and Adaptive Research India could not count on continued food aid to bail it out-a point that One of the important issues facing technical assistance personnel in was underlined by President Johnson's policy of holding up PL 480 developing countries is the resistance of local nationals to changes that shipments. Second, the Mexican wheat, and to a much lesser extent undermine their own position. We noted earlier that Indian agricultural the Taiwanese rice, could be taken "off the shelf" and applied to experts in the 1950s assumed they had enough knowledge about wheat India's immediate food problems. Third, despite Johnson's percep- and rice for external advice on these crops to be unnecessary. As with tions to the contrary, India was fully able by 1965 to put its political and the reorganization of ICAR, high-level political pressure from within administrative machinery into gear to make use of the new varieties the country was needed to change their minds. The U.S. government and to implement a sophisticated agricultural policy that included such and the Ford Foundation contributed to this process, but the role of the components as fertilizer distribution, price supports, storage, and mar- Rockefeller Foundation, and of Ralph Cummings in particular, was ket development, in addition to research. especially significant. Even so, Subramaniam faced an uphill battle in convincing his countrymen to move ahead quickly with the semidwarf varieties.46 The Background Being uncertain about the returns, the planning commission was con- In 1962, Indian researchers successfully tested two Mexican semidwarf cerned about the foreign exchange costs of importing the additional varieties of wheat, which they had acquired through the U.S. Depart- fertilizer needed for application to the HYVs in a period of a severe ment of Agriculture's international rust nursery system. This led to a balance-of-payments crisis. Leading economists B. S. Minhas and tour in 1963 of the wheat-growing regions of India by Norman Borlaug T. N. Srinivasan questioned the payoffs to intensive fertilizer use in from Rockefeller's agricultural program in Mexico. He dispatched 400 limited areas as opposed to more extensive use.47 State governments kg of four varieties for trials in India, two of which-Lerma Rojo and worried that adoption of HYVs would reduce their autonomy in ag- Sonora 64-outyielded domestic control varieties by 30%. ricultural research and extension. Sociologists argued that the new An exciting rice variety was also identified-a semidwarf called varieties would harm small farmers and the landless. Senior agricul- Taichung Native I that originated in Taiwan. In 1964 the general man- tural scientists objected to the new varieties because of their likely ager of India's National Seeds Corporation obtained some TN-1 from susceptibility to disease. Radical politicians worried about the implica- the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines tions of shifting to the HYVs for future dependence on "western" (which had recently been set up with Ford and Rockefeller funds). It scientists and fertilizers. Of all the groups Subramaniam consulted, he had good results, and the next year the Ford Foundation purchased I felt that he had the support of only the younger agricultural scientists, ton of the seeds for wider trials in India. who thought introduction of HYVs should occur quickly and on a large In contrast to their inclination in the 1950s to move quickly into scale. commercial production of hybrid maize, Indian scientists and adminis- While the debate raged, the Indian cabinet initially avoided taking trators were very cautious about the Mexican wheat and Taiwanese a position for or against widespread introduction of the HYVs. How- rice varieties. Dependence on imported food was the leading national ever, the food emergency enabled Subramaniam to prevail on Prime issue at that time, and the political costs of failure with commodities of Minister Shastri and, after his death in 1966, on his successor Mrs. supreme importance in Indian diets were enormous. Also, Indian sci- Gandhi to support the proposed strategy on two main grounds: (i) entists had a greater professional stake in wheat and rice research than continued dependence on foreigners for food imports was risky in the in maize and wanted to generate their own varieties suited to local extreme, and (ii) semidwarf wheat and rice were the only realistic conditions. short-term options for attaining domestic food self-sufficiency. Work- By 1964, Ralph Cummings felt that sufficient testing had been ing with the key support of the secretary of agriculture, B. Sivaraman, done in India to begin releasing the imported wheat and rice varieties to Subramaniam was able to announce plans in 1965 to introduce HYVs Indian farmers, especially given the impending food crisis (see fig. 1). on 32.5 million acres of India's cultivable land over the next 5 years.48 His evaluation was based on longstanding knowledge of Indian agricul- In the summer of 1966, India bought 18,000 tons of Mexican wheat tural conditions, but his ability to make an effective recommenda- seed with Rockefeller help, the largest single seed transaction in his- tion also depended on his credibility at the highest levels of the In- tory. According to Subramaniam: "The stakes were so high it was just dian government-during a period of widespread antipathy toward like gambling.... In retrospect, it was historical compulsion, compul- American policies. (The United States was using its own aid as a sion of circumstances, which enabled me to force through in one month source of "leverage" on India in the mid-1960s and was putting pres- critical decisions which might otherwise have taken years."49 36 Adaptivce Researc/h and HYV Adoption Subramaniam's gamble had slim chances of long-term success in the and 1965, to a level almost double that for imported wheat. Rice did not absence of a major adaptive research program. Breaking the resistance benefit from such strong incentives. Its wholesale price rose a mere of domestic pressure groups to the large-scale importation and in- 13% during those 2 years and was only marginally above that borne by troduction of the HYVs was only a first step. The political and eco- the world market. Wheat continued to enjoy a much larger subsidy nomic success of the new strategy depended partially on the accept- until the early 1970s, when the domestic price for both commodities ability of the new varieties to Indian consumers-and the high-yielding dropped beneath the import cost (though wheat still tended to be hybrids were not fully acceptable in their initial form owing to their slightly more protected than rice).53 It is worth noting, however, that cooking quality and color. Problems of disease and pest resistance, the real wholesale prices in 1985 of wheat and rice (deflated by India's particularly for rice, also necessitated continuous development of a consumer price index) were below their 1967 levels by 35% and 45%, large number of area-specific varieties. The new responsiveness of the respectively. national research system to these requirements was critical to the con- The overall impact of the new varieties on the agricultural sector tinued spread of new varieties. The HYVs, in turn, gave a boost to the can be assessed by analyzing sources of growth in aggregate productiv- reform of the research system by providing ajustification for extending ity (measured in value terms on the basis of constant crop prices). the coordinated crop research model (first tried with maize), for devel- Vishva Bindlish has decomposed this growth among five components, oping a time-based program of research, and for focusing efforts on which are summed over individual crops.54 As table 3 shows, wheat concrete problems like grain color and pest and disease resistance.50 alone accounted for an astonishing 99%o of the increase in aggregate The research system was able to deliver successfully. Indian sci- productivity between 1969 and 1982. Along with yield increases, entists quickly identified two Mexican wheat lines that performed bet- changes in cropping patterns away from less-productive crops explain ter in the field and the kitchen than the imported varieties, leading to most of the gains attributable to wheat. Rice contributed 15% to the the release of the Kalyansona and Sonalika varieties in 1967. Fifteen increase in aggregate productivity over the same period. Because the years later, these remained the most popular wheat varieties in India. conh-ibutions of other crops were marginal or (as in most cases) nega- Semidwarf wheat spread very fast, accounting for about one-third of tive, the combined contribution of wheat and rice accounted for over total wheat acreage after only 3 years and for more than half the acre- 100% of aggregate productivity growth. age after 7 years. In 1983-84, 76% of the land under wheat was using Finally, it should be reiterated that the success of wheat and rice semidwarfs.5t Equally important was the absolute growth of acreage HYVs in India stemmed from external as well as domestic sources. under wheat, owing to shifts away from competing but lower-yielding The research that produced the new wheat varieties (for which Nor- crops. man Borlaug was to win a Nobel Peace Prize) had originated at what is A much more extensive improvement effort was needed in the now called the Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo case of high-yielding rice, for the initial varieties brought irn from IRRI (CIMMYT) in Mexico, while the rice varieties had been developed at in the mid-1960s had poor cooking quality and were susceptible to IRRI in the Philippines-in both cases with the support of the Rocke- disease. As of 1983, Indian rice research had resulted in the release of feller Foundation among other donors. But these exogenous break- 221 varieties; the need for so much adaptive research reflects the many throughs could not have been so successfully translated into staple adoption problems encountered with rice (in contrast to experience food crops for India, had it not been for the indigenous ability of the with wheat, which is raised under more homogeneous growing condi- Indian research system to borrow the new technologies and adapt them tions). Nonetheless, in 1983-84, 18 years after the first semidwarf rice to Indian conditions. The story of the wheat and rice HYVs is thus a was released, Indian farmers were planting 54% of their rice area in prime example of mutually reinforcing foreign and local research ef- high-yielding varieties; this proportion would unquestionably have forts. The development of the new varieties overseas provided an op- been far lower without an effective research program.52 portunity for solving India's chronic food problem relatively quickly- Price policy facilitated the introduction of HYV wheat-with do- and this in turn gave added impetus to efforts to build an effective mestic wholesale prices for this commodity surging 50% between 1963 indigenous agricultural research capability. TABLE 3 CROPFWSE CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDIVIDUJAL EFFECTS TO THE CHANGE IN AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY, BY PERIOD (Rupees per hectare) 1956/57-1968/69 1968/69-1981/82 Cropping Cropping Location Pure Pattern Location Pure Pattern Pure Pure Inter- Cropping Inter- Pure Pure Inter- Cropping Inter- Yield Location action Pattern action Sum of Yield Location action Pattern action Sum of CROP Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effects Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effects Bajra 3.53 -.23 -.03 -2.09 .14 1.37 (.78) .72 -.24 -.45 -6.65 - .17 -6.80 (-2.57) Barley 1.54 -.06 .20 -10.03 -.97 -9.32 (-5.33) t10 .21 -.14 - 15.37 -2.45 - 16.66 1-6.29) Cotton 2.81 .05 -.07 -33.44 .55 -30.t0 I- 17.20) 3.77 1.08 .20 -4.64 -2.63 -2.23 - .84 Groundnuts - 1.36 .16 .18 14.48 -2.57 10.89 (6.22) 2.66 -.06 .83 -9.50 -.39 -6.46 (-2.44) Jowar -.16 .18 .01 -4.t5 -.17 -4.29 I-2.45) 6.69 -.31 - .1 -7.46 - 1.66 -2.86 (1.08) Maize 1.17 .09 .19 19.39 2.29 23.14 (13.22) .07 .20 .20 -9.31 .09 -8.74 (-3.30) - Pulses 2.11 1.40 -.68 - 15.87 .20 -12.83 (-7.33) - I15 - 1.88 .69 6.23 .44 4.33 (1.64) Ragi .03 -.01 .0t -3.68 .10 -3.54 (-2.02) 2.05 -.09 -.03 - L.61 -.20 .11 (.04) C Rice 25.45 .88 .00 16.24 7.71 50.09 (28.62) 20.41 3.51 1.50 10.88 3.01 39.30 (14.84) Sugarcane .77 .37 .00 - 1.03 .15 .25 (.14) .56 .17 -.01 12.33 .51 13.57 (5.12) Small millets -.09 -.01 .02 -6.49 .09 -6.48 (-3.70) .30 -.22 .08 -10.25 -.16 -10.25 (-3.87) Wheat 20.05 1.23 1.42 95.12 38.00 155.82 (89.05) 32.07 2.93 .40 206.01 20.11 261.51 (98.75) Total 55.86 4.04 1.12 68.45 45.52 174.99 (100.00) 69.24 5.28 3.15 170.65 16.4 264.83 ,100.00 (31.92) (2.31) (.64) (39.12) (26.01) (100.00) (26.15) (1.99) (1.19) (64.44) (6.23) ()I0.)()0) SOTRCE.-Vishva Bindlish, Sources of Productivity Growth in Indian Agriculture. 1956-57 to 1981-82.' Development Strategy Division, World Bank (forthcoming). NOTE.-Parentheses indicate percentage of the sum of the effects for the period. 37 Africa and India: Some Comparisons and Lessons for the Future seriously. We observed this phenomenon in India; similarly, in Kenya, We have shown how the Indian government, the Rockefeller Founda- the Rodenhiser Committee Report identified weaknesses in the re- tion, and other U.S.-based or supported organizations were able to search system in 1968, but genuine consideration of the proposed reor- collaborate in a uniquely beneficial partnership for developing an effec- ganization did not begin until 1984. tive national research system. By comparison, the relations between Moreover, even when a decision to act on a proposed program is the nations of contemporary Africa and the many donor agencies in- finally taken, African countries are often hampered, in a way that India volved with them have been much less productive. In this section, we was not, by the diversity of aid sources and consequently the high show how Africa's experience with building its agricultural research search cost of obtaining suitable expertise. This cost can be prohibitive capacity has fallen short of India's, and we will try to identify some of for the smaller recipients, and most countries in the region tend to the causal factors involved, particularly those over which African gov- accept a particular official donor institution's technical assistance re- ernments and western donors have some potential influence. We con- gardless of whether that institution is best qualified to provide appro- clude by listing a number of crucial lessons for the future, derived from priate staff.58 In the case of official bilateral aid, recipients may also India's and Africa's contrasting experiences. find it hard to obtain certain kinds of agricultural knowledge, because aid-giving governments will tend to avoid giving assistance to possible Africa's Comparative Disadvantages future competitors. Considerations of potential rivalry, for example, In some ways that are independent of donor/recipient behavior and have prevented the United States from helping with crops such as palm relationships Africa has been less fortunate than India-for example, oil and citrus and the Danish government from aiding the livestock the scale difference between Indian agriculture and that of individual industry. Such considerations may also have indirectly helped encour- African countries, the greater technical endowment of one large coun- age the CGIAR to emphasize work on food crops, despite the fact that try compared to many small ones, or the absence from the African the donor community's advice to Africa has focused on the region's scene of new "miracle" food crop varieties. Political instability has need to exploit its comparative advantage in export crops. been a particular difficulty, undermining the institutional development African countries' experience with technical assistance has fallen programs of donors such as the Rockefeller Foundation in Nigeria and short of India's experience with Rockefeller in other crucial respects. Uganda. These failures help to underline the importance of the kinds of For example, we have noted the foundation's determination to make a preconditions we identified earlier as essential for successful develop- long-term commitment to its India Agricultural Program. This is very ment of a national agricultural research capability in developing coun- unlike the highly unstable aid commitments to Africa associated with tries. In Nigeria and Uganda, for example, the absence of strong and the changing political importance of individual recipient countries to consistent demand for such a capability from indigenous elites, to- aid givers. The USAID's staff in Kenya and Tanzania, for instance, fell gether with the lack of well-articulated politicallinstitutional support sharply (by 53% and 22%, respectively), during the presidencies of for its implementation over time, meant that Rockefeller's activities in Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, only to rise again (by 65% and 43%) these countries could not have the kind of impact they had in India. But under President Jimmy Carter. many other disadvantages faced by African countries in building ag- The long-term tours of duty of individual Rockefeller personnel ricultural research systems are causally linked to the history of their and the relative homogeneity of views among Rockefeller, Ford, and relationships with foreign assistance agencies; it is these with which we U.S. government officials in India is another factor that differentiates are concerned below.55 India's early experience from contemporary Africa's. It meant that We have shown that numerous key people in the postindepen- advice tended to be more consistent over time and among individuals dence Indian government appreciated the country's needs for research than is generally the case in Africa, where different donors offer mu- capability and were willing to work with outside experts to solve na- tually contradictory recommendations and procedures. Thus India tional problems. This capacity for competent self-diagnosis differ- avoided the Balkanization of agricultural research that has occurred in entiates India from many of contemporary African governments. In the many African countries."9 The internationalization of agricultural re- latter, the lack of scientific manpower (and of trained manpower in search in the last 20 years has actually aggravated the problem of general) at independence has meant that technical considerations and inconsistency since the CGIAR's international centers do not represent long time horizons have more readily given way to political impera- any national philosophy of research and lack home bases of institutions tives and short-term results when defining research needs or priori- on which to draw for further technical assistance. Multinational teams tizing investments in agriculture. It is astonishing under these cir- of experts put together by the International Service for National Ag- cumstances that donors have invested less in advanced agricultural ricultural Research (ISNAR) are handicapped in ways that Rockefel- education in Africa than they did in India (where human resources ler's American advisors were not. It is also difficult today to find were already comparatively rich by the late 1940s). ., uniquely qualified people like those who came to Rockefeller with In East Afn, a, for example, the United Kingdom had trained few directly transferrable expertise from running other national research African researcherL before independence-a marked contrast with In- systems. dia-with the result ihat the research system was staffed by expatri- Another factor that makes it more difficult for contemporary Afri- ates in long-term employment conditions. This scientific work force did can countries to benefit from agricultural research to the degree that excellent work on cash crops during the 1940s and 1950s; when the India did a quarter-century ago is that they are experiencing a much United Kingdom began to withdraw its personnel in the 1960s, how- greater turnover of research staff. For example, 51% of researchers in ever, serious staffing gaps opened up.56 Former French colonies in Kenya in 1984 had been on the job less than 2 years. Only 9%o had more Africa have hitherto suffered less from the loss of personnel because than 10 years experience. In the case of trained national personnel, it is French expatriates continued to dominate agricultural research in clear that in Africa investment in human capital by donors and national Francophone African countries for a much longer period after indepen- governments is far below the region's needs, especially since African dence. On the other hand, this has meant that indigenous research countries' numan capital resources at independence were far more capacity in these countries remained even weaker-with the result that limited than India's, and subsequent flows of external assistance for their ability to mount autonomous programs of adaptive research may expanding these resources have lagged far behind the financing of well be behind that of Anglophone countries.57 The weak tradition of physical capital resources in the form of plants and equipment.' advanced educational development and scientific enquiry also means In the case of expatriate personnel, official bilateral donor agen- that elites in African governments have simply not accorded science cies in Africa do not encourage their technical assistance staff to take and technology the priority and the social esteem necessary to build up long-term residence in individual countries. On the contrary, they national capacity. appear to promote diversity of country experience. The CGIAR's in- It is important to remember the time lags that characterize the ternational centers provide some incentives to build up single-country institutional development process. Because diagnoses of research sys- expertise, but their contribution to improvements in national research tem shortcomings and needs have typically been made by expatriate systems (as distinct from carrying out their own coordinated trials) is advisers or middle-level research staff (who lack the high-level political limited. None of th.- CGIAR research institutions with practical experi- support needed to achieve effective reform), even well-conceived re- ence in carrying out actual research have the mandate to develop na- form programs generally languish for many years before being taken tional research systems. In fact, international research centers can 38 divert donor resources from national institutions, as occurred, for in- agricultural research capacity in Africa is encouraging. Less hopeful is stance, with the Rockefeller Foundation and the International Institute the fact that many of the preconditions for technological change that for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria.6' existed in India in the 1950s are absent in Africa in the 1980s. To begin Shortages of qualified personnel, combined with rapid turnover of with, the continent's agricultural research problems are far more com- staff, also make it difficult to build up an effective national research plicated than India's. Africa's soils are more diverse, its climate more program. In Senegal, for instance, 46% of expatriate researchers in varied, its pest and disease hazards more pronounced, its farming sys- 1985 had been in the country fewer than 3 years. Whether the size- tems more complex. based advantages of a country like India in attracting and retaining The magnitude of these scientific and technical problems is out of quality personnel can be duplicated in Africa is an issue that needs all proportion to the limited scale of the indigenous human and financial more international attention. It is worth noting, however, that even a resources that individual African countries are able to devote to their large country like Nigeria has not devoted the resources and the po- solution; and these resource limitations in turn militate against scale litical priority needed to developing a national agricultural research economies in agricultural research and technical assistance. At the system.62 same time, the superficially attractive alternative of creating regional Two more general factors inhibit the effectiveness of current do- agricultural institutions for Africa has been hampered by institutional nor programs of research capacity development in Africa. First, do- rivalries and domestic political instability. In any event, such institu- nors tend to separate their training programs from institutional devel- tions cannot-by their nature-substitute for the kinds of well-funded opment and actual research projects rather than integrating them. The national systems that are needed to deal with the enormous intercoun- United States, for instance, has been effective in its support for higher try (and intracountry) variations in African agriculture. agricultural education in Africa but has paid little attention to the de- The Indian case, nevertheless, suggests five broad lessons for im- velopment of agricultural research institutions. In Malawi, the UK proving the odds for successful research in Africa. The first is that maize breeding project has done good work, but left a gap when political will at the highest level is required to build an effective science finished because of its failure to provide training from the outset. Only and technology capacity and (as in India) that severe external shocks recently has formal training been supplied there by the United States. are more conducive than tranquil times in facilitating the resolution of Even within the CGIAR system, different agencies are often responsi- many controversial questions associated with institutional innovation ble for preparation and implementation of projects, resulting in a loss and technology transfer. The droughts, global economic trends, and of conceptual continuity. For example, ISNAR designs proposals for donor disenchantment of the 1970s and early 1980s have already re- reorganization that are assigned to one or more aid donors for im- sulted in a sharpened awareness of Africa's problems. This is a neces- plementation. Also, the CGIAR research centers focus too heavily on sary but not a sufficient condition for technological innovation, and short-term training, a poor substitute for in-depth education in promot- many of the kinds of decisions that India made in the mid-1960s in ing the development of national research capacity. order to build its research system remain to be made by African coun- Second, the growth of disciplinary specialization that charac- tries. terizes contemporary scientific enquiry in the developed countries has Second, African countries and donors need to adopt a holistic concentrated more on esoteric problems. Consequently, Africa today approach to developing national research capacity, by achieving a bet- has generally less immediate use for "cutting edge" knowledge from ter interaction and balance between the development of scientific man- laboratories in the developed world than India did for the new findings power and the provision of physical capital (which usually takes prece- of the 1950s and 1960s. This limits the sources of assistance available to dence in donor financing of research). Another prerequisite for success most African countries, especially with the attrition of the traditional is better integration of the planning of research efforts and assuming British and French technical expertise on African problems. African the responsibility for their implementation. While current agricultural countries have no choice except to rely heavily on the CGIAR sys- research projects designed by ISNAR and funded by the World Bank tem-a dependency that India did not experience in the 1950s and are more comprehensive in theory, in practice donors tend to divide up 1960s. the 'pie" among planners and implementors as well as by crops, re- Another difference between India and Africa stems from Rockefel- gions, stations, scientific disciplines, or subject matter-thus making it ler's determination to limit its involvement to major research projects impossible to develop a coordinated research program.67 with large identifiable payoffs rather than spreading its support to many Third, donors need to reduce the "noise" of competing projects smaller projects. Rockefeller's approach in India was very different and research designs. While it may not be possible in Africa to achieve from that of most donor agencies in Africa today. The latter tend to the homogeneous advice supplied by American organizations to India, support large numbers of relatively low priority projects, including more interagency coordination is certainly essential. This requires un- isolated "island" projects on individual crops and regions, mostly with tying technical aid to ensure that assistance is forthcoming from both an extension focus, that deplete rather than enhance national technical the most qualified and the most cost-effective sources. Also, the capacity.63 The emphasis on extension compared to research is particu- CGIAR system needs to develop the capacity to help developing coun- larly troubling: more funds and attention were allotted to the former tries select the most competent bids and to assure that they can pick activity than to the latter in East and West Africa in the 1980s-the from among unified teams of technical assistance experts. This may reverse of the pattern in South Asia.' frequently involve choosing proposals that keep physical equipment to Finally, donors in Africa have not been as sensitive as the Rocke- an absolute minimum in the initial stages of research development. feller Foundation in assessing the adaptability of imported farm tech- The fourth general lesson is the need for long-term commitment of nology to local conditions, considering Africa's widely varying and personnel-both by African governments of their own nationals in key often unique physical and environmental conditions. The result has technocratic positions and by donor agencies of expatriate counter- been premature investment in production and extension programs.65 parts. Too often inexperienced or short-service technical assistance The U.S./North Cameroon Seed Multiplication Project, for example, personnel are expected to work with middle-level technocrats to de- wrongly assumed in 1975 that sorghum and groundnut seed could be velop new institutions. The CGIAR and governments need to devote tested, extended, and multiplied among farmers within 5 years. After greater attention to long-term career opportunities for seconded per- 10 years, the project had still made only limited progress toward this sonnel to maximize the institutional effectiveness of their work. goal. Yet American officials continued to miscalculate the appropriate This raises the fifth, and perhaps the most important lesson. It is sequencing of research and seed multiplication as they planned addi- fundamental for African elites to recognize the long gestation lags in- tional agricultural research activities.' However, USAID in Cameroon volved in the creation of a national scientific research capacity in ag- has been at the forefront of involving IITA in the development of riculture. In India, a decade of cooperation between the same Indian Cameroon's national agricultural research system-one of the few ex- and American officials eventually made it possible to focus national amples of an effective collaboration between an international and a political energy on improving this capacity. Only a similarly long-term national research system for the purposes of building national research commitment by African policymakers can hope to promote and sustain capability. appropriate research institutions in the unique environment of Africa. Some Lessons for the Future African future development will depend critically on scientific ad- The donor community's growing interest in building country-based vances in agriculture adapted to African conditions. 39 Notes not available, but the totals appear to be significantly lower in absolute terms. * Uma Lele is chief, Special Studies Division, Country Economics De- 14. For overviews of agricultural research issues in Africa, see Dunstan partment, the World Bank. Arthur A. Goldsmith teaches management at the S. T. Spencer, "Agricultural Research: Lessons of the Past, Strategies of the University of Massachusetts at Boston and is Consultant to the Special Studies Future," in Strategyfor African Development, ed. Robert J. Berg and Jennifer Division. Permission from the Rockefeller Foundation to examine its archives Seymour Whitaker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); and Hans is gratefully acknowledged. We are especially grateful to Mr. Laurence Stifel, E. lahnke, Dieter Kirschke, and Johannes Lageman, The Impact of Agricul- former vice-president of the Rockefeller Foundation and now director general tural Research in Tropical Africa, CGIAR Study Paper 21 (Washington, D.C.: of the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, for his role in release of World Bank, 1987). the archives. 15. Carl Pray estimates that the internal rate of return was no higher than This is a substantial revision of a discussion paper prepared for the World 22%, a respectable figure compared to many public investments, but low com- Bank's Development Research Department. The following persons provided pared to what is usually found in agricultural research programs; see Pray, invaluable feedback on the earlier draft and have enabled us to focus much "The Impact of Agricultural Research in British India," Journal of Economic more sharply on the issues: Nyle Brady, Wilfred Candler, M. P. Collinson, History 44 (June 1984): 429-40. Ralph Cummings, Sr., Dana Dalrymple, Robert Evenson, Curtis Farrar, David 16. See A. B. Stewart, Report on Soil Fertility Investigations in India with Hopper, D. Gale Johnson, Bruce Johnston, J. S. Kanwar, Richard Lyman, Special Reference to Manuring (Delhi: Army Press, 1947). John Mellor, Albert Moseman, Vernon Ruttan, J. S. Sarma, Edward Schuh, 17. See Barbara M. Jamieson, "Resource Allocation to Agricultural Re- T. W. Schultz, B. Sivaraman, T. N. Srinivasan, Laurence Stifel, L. D. Swin- search in Kenya" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1981). dale, Norman Uphoff, T. S. Walker, and Donald Winkelman. Peter Bocock 18. Twenty-seven institutions offered higher-level technical and profes- provided excellent editorial assistance. We are responsible for whatever errors sional training in agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa around 1960 but most were of fact or interpretation that remain. The views are our own and should not be new, small, and did not grant degrees. Fewer than 600 postsecondary students attributed to the World Bank. were studying agriculture and forestry in the region at that time. For data, see 1. The importance of national research institutions is stressed in Robert The Development of Higher Education in Africa (Paris: Unesco, 1963). Evenson and Yoav Kislev, Agricultural Research and Productivity (New Ha- 19. Government of India (n. 10 above), 1:185-86. ven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973). 20. T. W. Schultz reports in a personal communication that he accom- 2. For an overview of CGIAR activity, see Consultative Group on Inter- panied Jawaharlal Nehru on a tour of Illinois farms in November 1949. The national Agricultural Research, Summary of International Research Centers: prime minister had been impressed by advanced U.S. agriculture and wanted A Study of Achievements and Potential (Washington, D.C., 1985). to see what technology might be relevant for India. The next year, Albert 3. See Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: Moseman was sent to India by the U.S. government as part of a special team to An International Perspective, rev. and expanded (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins discuss possible agricultural projects under the new Point IV Program. University Press, 1985); and Hans Binswanger and Vernon W. Ruttan, eds., 21. It should be emphasized that the U.S. pattern that interested Indians Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions, and Development (Baltimore: was the one that had blossomed from about 1920 to 1950. Albert Moseman Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). notes in a personal communication (November 1985) that, since that time, 4. An example of this approach is Joel M. Guttman, "Interest Groups and American society and the associated research system have evolved in ways the Demand for Agricultural Research," Journal of Political Economy 86 that have tended to weaken the links between farmers and the educational and (June 1978): 467-84. research establishment. 5. It is important to remember the elite origins of the U.S. land-grant 22. See Albert H. Moseman, Building Agricultural Research Systems in college system, which was established with little grassroots pressure, but was Developing Nations (New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1970). the result of collective action by scientific, administrative, and political elites, 23. According to a historian writing at that time, it "is truly one of the whose share of the total benefits from new technology was relatively small. most important advances made in all the thousands of years since man first Most of the bottom-up demand occurred later, as the result of ex post percep- began cultivating special food-bearing plants"; see A. R. Crabb, The Hybrid- tions of the benefits of technical advancement. See. e.g., Mary Jean Bowman, Corn Makers: Prophets of Plenty (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University "The Land-Grant Colleges and Universities in Human Resources Develop- Press, 1947), p. xv. Robert Evenson notes in a personal communication (1985), ment," Journal of Economic History 22 (December 1962): 523-46. however, that Rockefeller's experience in Mexico should have alerted it to the 6. See Alain de Janvry and' Jean-Jacques Dethier. Technological Innova. limited potential of maize research in the tropics. tion in Agriculture: The Political Economy of Its Rate and Bias, CGIAR Study 24. Edward Schuh points out in a personal communication, however, that Paper no. I (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1985). the foundation neglected the role of social science in agricultural research. 7. For information on the special role played by the U.S. land-grant col- Even today social scientists have not been integrated with biological and physi- leges in helping with the development of a system of agricultural universities in cal scientists in India, to the detriment of the research effort. In Africa, where India, see K. C. Naik and A. Sankaram, A History of Agricultural Universities improvement in productivity rests on reorganization of existing production (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH, 1972); see also H. Read, Partners with India: systems, the need for social scientists in agricultural research is corre- Building Agricultural Universities (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1974); Ar- spondingly greater. thur A. Goldsmith, "The Management of Institutional Innovation: Lessons 25. U. J. Grant, who initially ran the maize project, thought this approach from Transferring the Land Grant Model to India," Public Administration and was unworkable because of central state conflicts, and he left the Indian pro- Development (in press). gram in 1959 to take a post in Colombia. Conflict between the center and the 8. Our argument should not be misconstrued to mean that bottom-up states is endemic even in the American system, however, and James T. Bon- input to the research process is not important. But attempts to link up with nen actually suggests that such tension is a source of strength for the American farmer demand (e.g., through farming systems research) have not been suc- research system, because it forces it to confront new problems; see James T. cessful in the absence of political commitment at the top. Bonnen, "The Role of Science Based Technology, Human Capital and Institu- 9. Generating capacity must be distinguished from generating research tions in United States Agrarian Development," in United Stales-Mexico Rela- results, a function that has predominated in the CGIAR system. Donald Wink- tions: Agriculture and Rural Development. ed. Bruce Johnston et al. (Stan- elman and M. P. Collinson both observe in personal communications that the ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987). Albert Moseman in a personal international centers devote up to one-half their manpower to capacity build- communication strongly disagrees, however, and argues that cooperation was ing, but most of this is in fact short-term training and consulting rather than the the American research system's most important asset until the 1950s, when the type of long-term program that took place in India. The World Bank's recent advent of project grant support for research created a more individually establishment of the Special Program for African Agriculture Research oriented system. (SPAAR) may mark the beginning of an effort to put more emphasis on institu- 26. Similar patterns are observed in Africa. In Kenya, e.g., hybrid maize tional development. The SPAAR will try to coordinate donor research support, had achieved adoption rates of 50%-100% in humid areas by 1983, but adop- serve as a clearinghouse for information on new technology, and develop na- tion was much spottier in transitional and semi-arid areas. This is reported in tional and regional research programs and networks. D. Jha, "Diffusion and Generation of New Agricultural Technology in Africa," 10. See, e.g., Government of India, The Report of National Commission prepared for Managing Agricultural Development in Africa Project (World of Agriculture (New Delhi, 1976), t4:312. For agricultural universities, see Bank, 1986). Consumer resistance has also been a problem. In many African Naik and Sankaram; Read. countries, national scientists still have only a limited capacity to develop the 11. The current figure was obtained by converting Rockefeller's outlay characteristics in maize demanded by consumers (e.g., white maize). They each year to 1983 prices by using the implicit U.S. GDP deflator. The phaseout have also failed to improve sufficiently the milling and storing qualities of of the Indian program in the early 1970s was due to the foundation's strategic maize (e.g., in Malawi). The resulting consumer resistance to hybrid maize in decision to concentrate its resources on international research activities. Africa has reduced its marketability and slowed its adoption-an outcome that 12. Our review of foundation documents was preceded by Lele's conver- is frequently but mistakenly ascribed to the absence of a "technical package." sations with M. S. Swaminathan, 0. P. Gautam, Ananta Rao, and several For details on maize research in Africa, see the proceedings of the First East- others then involved on the Indian side and was followed by intensive inter- ern, Central and Southern African Regional Maize Workshop, To Feed Our- views with Ralph Cummings, Albert Moseman, and W. David Hopper on the selves (Mexico: CIMMYT, 1986). Rockefeller side. We also draw on two secondary sources: E. C. Stakman, 27. Personal communications (1985) from J. C. Kanwar and T. S. Walker. Richard Bradfield, and Paul C. Mangelsdorf, Campaigns against Hunger 28. John W. Mellor, Thomas F. Weaver, Uma J. Lele, and Sheldon R. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1967); and Carroll P. Streeter, A Partnership to Simon, Developing Rural India: Plan and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni- Improve Food Production in India, Special Report from the Rockefeller Foun- versity Press, 1968). dation (New York, 1969). 29. India's ability and willingness to finance its own development is in 13. Personal communication with Peter Oram (1985). The data are in 1980 marked contrast to Africa, where foreign assistance frequently accounts for dollars and should be interpreted cautiously because of variations in donor and half of government revenues. Even during the peak years of aid to India (1956- national government reporting procedures. Comparable figures from India are 65), net foreign resource transfers averaged only one-fifth of central govern- 40 ment expenditures. a variable. In the case of India, however, it is clearly possible to attribute 30. The fellowships were not officially part of the Indian program. The technological change directly to the dramatic shift in varietal use that took foundation awarded them on an international basis, with candidates from India place in the mid-1960s; see Dana Dalrymple, "Changes in Wheat Varieties and competing with those from other countries outside the United States. The Yields in the United States, 1919-1984" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for competition, which involved no national quotas, was not generally advertised. International Development, 1986). Instead, Rockefeller staff tried to use their contacts to identify promising indi- 55. These issues will be analyzed more fully in a paper by Uma Lele and viduals who might benefit from a fellowship, using the international award others that will draw on the MADIA study to discuss shortcomings of the procedures to avoid the danger of influence peddling that a purely national CGIAR system; see Uma Lele, T. A. Oyejide, B. Bumb, and V. Bindlish, program might present in selection of awardees. Nigeria's Economic Development, Agriculture's Role and World Bank Assis- 31. The American commitment to formal high-level education of agricul- tance, 1960-1986 (World Bank, 1980). tural scientists contrasts with the World Bank's current approach to research, 56. The British did provide budgetary aid to maintain the research system which its Operations Evaluation Department has criticized for underemphasiz- but (partly due to political pressures from African governments) began to with- ing formal training and relying excessively on on-the-job training. In six out of draw these funds too early and too quickly. Further, the research supported by 10 countries studied, fewer than l0o of research staff had doctoral degrees; in the United Kingdom since independence has tended to have a much more eight countries, at least 40% of the staff had bachelor degrees or less; see short-term orientation than earlier research work. Between 1970 and 1984. 55% ar Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, Strengthening Agricultural of the British man weeks spent on research and advisory visits to Kenya, Research and Extension: The World Bank Experience (Washington, D.C.: Tanzania, and Malawi involved assignments of less than 4 months. This is World Bank, 1983). reported in Kenneth Anthony, "UK Agricultural Research Aid to Kenya, Tan- 32. See Read (n. 7 above); Naik and Sankaram (n. 7 above). zania, and Malawi," draft prepared for Managing Agricultural Development in 33. The importance of a "learning-process" approach to institutional de- Africa Project (World Bank, 1986). velopment is well known among development administration experts; see, e.g., 57. For example, in Senegal in 1979, only 26% of the scientists engaged in David Korten, "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning agriculture and livestock research were Senegalese, according to World Bank, Process Approach," Public Administration Review 40 (September-October Senegal Agricultural Research Project Staff Appraisal Report, report no. 1980): 480-51 i. 3073a-SE (August 19, 1981) 34. This cycle of proposals for reform being followed by political inaction 58. See Bruce F. Johnston and Allan Hoben, )A Preliminary Assessment is familiar in Africa, as documented for the Kenya case by Uma Lele and of USAID Activities to Promote Agricultural and Rural Development in Af- Richard Myers, "Agricultural Development and Foreign Assistance: A Review rica " draft prepared for Managing Agricultural Development in Africa Project of the World Bank's Experience in Kenya, 1963 to 1985," prepared for Manag-(,World ing Agricultural Development in Africa Project (Worid Bank, 1986). It could 59 Bank, 1986). produce near immobility in India: the first 5-year plan, e.g., had challenged the 59. The dispersal of research resources and failure to assemble a critical "comartmntaizaton"of te cop-wse sudis carie Outby ommoity mass of personnel is a particular problem in Kenya, with its II national sta- "compartmentalization'' of the crop-wise studies carried out by commodity tions, eight regional stations, 10 substations, and 14 other research facilities. committees. The plan proposed setting up a research center for each crop Some 53 different research programs are currently being backed by donors in region a.nd strengthening the ICAR so it could review and approve the research Kenya. See D. Jha, "Diffusion and Generation of New Agriculturai Technol- programs being carried out by subordinate institutions. See India Planning ogy" (International Food Policy Research Institute, 1986, typescript). M. P. Commission, First Five Year Plan (New Delhi, 1953). Ten years later, the Collinson in a personal communication (1985) would put greater emphasis on system remained the same. the shifting preferences of Kenyan authorities in explaining this phenomenon, 35. Marion W. Parker et al., Report of the Agricultural Research Review however. Team (New Delhi, 1964). 60. The construction of physical facilities continually preoccupies the 36. In his authoritative account, Subramaniam recalls: "My first concern World Bank's research endeavors in Africa, e.g., in Senegal where implemen- was how to make agricultural science in India more effective and efficient so tation of the Agricultural Research Project agreed to in 1981 was delayed that it might contribute to greater production. I therefore tried to find out the several years while the government decided where to build the headquarters. state of the organization of agricultural science because that mattered most" 61. Personal communication from Albert Moseman (November 1985). (see C. Subramaniam, The New Strategy in Indian Agriculture [Delhi: Vikas, The resultant problems in technology adoption are documented in Uma Lele, 1979], p. 13). This book was made possible by a member of the Bell mission, T. Oyejide, B. Bumb, and V. Bindlish, "Foreign Assistance and Agricultural Sir John Crawford, who invited Subramaniam to deliver a series of lectures at Development: The World Bank Experience in Nigeria,' prepared for the Australan National University. Managing Agricultural Development in Africa Project (Washington, D.C.: 37. For discussion, see B. P. Pal, '"The Indian Agricultural Research World Bank. 1988). Institute, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, and the All-India Coor- 62. The U.S. withdrawal of bilateral aid after Nigeria joined OPEC set dinated Agricultural Research Program," in Strategies for Agricultural Educa- back the Nigerian agricultural research effort. Much of the earlier U.S. effort in tion in Developing Countries, Rockefeller Foundation Working Papers (New training of Nigerians and establishing institutional capacity was lost, even York, 1974), pp. 90-123. though Nigerian expenditures on agricultural research increased until about 38. Subramaniam, p. 29. 1981. Also, see Francis S. Idachaba, Agricultural Research Policy in Nigeria 39. See Robert Evenson and D. Jha, "The Contribution of the Agricul- (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1980). tural Research System to Agricultural Production in India," Indian Journal of 63. For a discussion, see Uma Lele, "Growth of Foreign Assistance and Agricultural Economics 20 (October-December 1973): 212-30; A. S. Kahlon, Its Impact on Agriculture," in Accelerating Food Production in Southern Af- P. N. Saxena, K. K. Bal, and D. Jha, "Returns to Agricultural Research in rica, ed. John W. MeDlor, Christopher Delgado, and Malcolm J. Blackie (Balti- India," in Resource Allocation and Productivity in National and International more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). Agricultural Research, ed. Thomas Arndt, Dana Dalrymple, and Vemon Rut- 64. Nevertheless, public sector expenditures for agricultural research in tan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); R. Mohan, "Contribu- Africa represent a higher percentage of the value of agricultural product than tion of Research and Extension to Productivity Change," Economic and Polit- is the case in India. For data, see Robert E. Evenson, The International Re- ical Weekly: Review ofAgriculture 9, no. 39 (September 1974): A97-A104; and search Centers, CGIAR Study Paper 22 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, K. Singh, "Retums to Investment in Agricultural Research," Progress Report 1987). This is partly a reflection of the high cost of expatriate scientists in of the Special Panel for the Study of Returns to Investment in Agriculturai' Africa, which in turn reflects the lack of investment in national human capital. Research (New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1974). 65. Albert Moseman in a personal communication (November 1985) 40. Robert S. Anderson, "Cultivating Science as a Cultural Policy: A blames excessive emphasis on farming systems research for this problem. He Contrast of Agricultural and Nuclear Science in India," Pacific Affairs 56 notes that similar approaches did not yield high returns when tried in the (Spring 1983): 38-50. United States in the early 1900s or in developing countries under the Point IV 41. For instance, B. Sivaraman says in a personal communication (1985) Program in the 1950s. that a strong, professional administrator may be needed to implement multidis- 66. William Jaeger, "US Aid to Cameroon: Its Impact on Agriculture and ciplinary research programs. Appointment of civil servants may also give ag- Development," draft prepared for Managing Agricultural Development in Af- ricultural research a broader constituency and a hearing in the Indian govern- rica Project (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1986). ment-something that may now be desirable, given the need to revitalize 67. In Kenya, e.g., eight to 10 donors have expressed interest in financing Indian agricultural science so that it can absorb and build on recent biogenetic the new research program. It is also important for donors to avoid situations of breakthroughs. 4. A report from the Centre for Management in Agriculture came to h the kind that arose earlier in Kenya, where requests to the United Kingdom to he develop maize research capacity in the 1970s were changed with detrimental concmusion that the 1965 reorganization of ICAR did not work as expected consequences. The Overseas Development Administration ended up splitting because there was no retraining of personnel. Changes in formal organization the work artificially between basic and adaptive research and basing the project apparently failed to change informal behavior patterns. See K. Chowdhry et at the research station in Kitale (an area typical of high potential growing al., An Organization Study of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research conditions) while dropping plans for studies in centers located in other ecolog- (Ahmedabad: Centre for Management in Agriculture, 1972). ical zones. The Maize Agronomy Research project led to many useful publica- 43. See M. S. Randhawa, A History of the ICAR (New Delhi: Indian tions and an excellent seed production program, but the evaluation of the Council of Agricultural Research, 1979). In the early 1980s, the government project found it to have left behind very little national research capacity. Even approved a World Bank project to expand the research network and give it a reports and other scientific papers were no longer readily available at the more apped Orientation. library of the National Agricultural Research Center at Kitale because expa- 44. ubaniam (n. 36 above), pp. 232-38. triate researchers had removed some of the working files and primary data to 45. Johnson's effort to exercise power with food was largely ineffective, the United Kingdom to prepare their own reports. See D. P. Gibbon, J. C. H. For a review of this major example of U.S. conditionality, see Robert L. Morris, and H. Rees Jones, An Evaluation of the Maize Agronomy Research technology variable in production functions indirectly, by looking at fertilizer Project, Kenya, 1972-1978 (London: Overseas Development Administration use ora time variable, Rarely do they treat the introduction of new varieties a, 1983). The same problem is now being noted in Malawi. THE MADL STUDY Although many generalizations have been made about the agricultural crisis in Africa, relatively few detailed country and cross-country studies of African agriculture based on systematic data analysis have been conducted. Similarly, although foreign aid has constituted a large part of total government expenditures in Africa for close to fifteen years, there has been little analysis of the role of external assistance in African countries that goes beyond political criticism of official assistance or the alleged self- serving objectives of donors. The impetus for the study "Managing Agricultural Development in Africa" (MADIA) was to begin the process of filling this gap and to explain the nature and sources of the agricultural crisis, particularly the extent to which it originated in resource endow- ments, historical and contemporary events, external and internal policies, and the economic and political environment. The MADIA study involved detailed analysis of six African countries- Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Senegal. In addition to the World Bank, seven donors, USAID, UKODA, DANIDA, SIDA, the French and German governments, and the EEC participated in the study. The analysis of country policies and performance during the last 20-25 years was carried out with the benefit of substantial input from the governments and nationals of each of the countries represented. The study had three main areas of focus: (I) the relationship between domestic macroeconomic and agricultural policy and agricultural performance, (2) donors' role in the development of agriculture, and (3) the politics of agricultural policy. The MADIA study was the result of encouragement and support from many people. Anne Krueger, former Vice President for Economic Research Staff in the World Bank, encouraged the establishment of these studies on aid and development in 1984. Gregory Ingram, former Director of the Development Research Department, provided unstinting support for the study. During the reorganization of the World Bank in 1986, the strong support from Benjamin King, then acting Vice President for Economic Research Staff, proved invaluable. Barber Conable, President of the World Bank, and Mr. Edward V. K. Jaycox, Vice President for the Africa Region, have played a key role by ensuring support for the study's completion, as did Stanley Fischer, the Vice President for Development Economics. Yves Rovani, Director General of the Operations Evaluation Department, was particularly helpful as the MADIA study drew heavily on the works of OED. A special debt of gratitude is owed to the World Bank's Research Committee, which provided the initial funding for the study, and to the MADIA Steering Committee. In particular the strong support of the chair of the Steering Committee, Stephen O'Brien, has been of critical importance. Finally, without the active and continued encouragement of many African policymakers and donor officials, including numerous colleagues in the World Bank, this study would not have provided new perspectives. This support has taken the form of numerous reactions to written and oral presentations, and refinement of the analysis to identify the areas of consensus and continuing controversy. CD X The World Bank Headquarters 1818 H Street, N.W. _ Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. Telephone: 1202) 477-1234 Facsimile: (202) 477-639 I Telex: WUI 64145 WORLDBANK RCA 248423 WORLDBK Cable Address: INTBAFRAD C WASH INGTON DC CD European Office < CD 66, avenue d'lna O 751 16 Paris, France Telephone: (1) 40.69.30.00 D Facsimile: (11 47.20.19.66 Telex: 842-620628 Tokyo Office Kokusai Building X 1-1, Marunouchi 3-chome Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo i 00, Japan Telephone: (3) 2 14-5001 Facsimile: (3) 214-3657 Telex: 78 1-26838 0 3- 0-82 13-1 31 8-