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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

NIGERIA

**SECOND PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT NO. 3346)**

**UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT NO. 3711)**

June 26, 2008

*Sector Evaluation Division
Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)*

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Naira

Second Primary Education Project
(as of April, 2000, year of Approval)

1 Naira = US\$0.00987167
US\$1 = Naira 101.3

(as of April 2005, year of ICR)
1 Naira = US\$0.0075
US\$1 = Naira 130

Universal Basic Education Project
(as of June 2002, year of Approval)

1 Naira = US\$0.083
US\$1 = 120 Naira

(as November 2006, before ICR)
1 Naira = US\$0.01
US\$1 = Naira 128.12

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFDB	African Development Bank
CUBE	Capacity for Universal Basic Education
DPs	Development Partners
DCA	Development Credit Agreement
DFID	Department for International Development
EFA	Education for All
EMIS	Education Management Information System
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
FMOE	Federal Ministry of Education
FMOF	Federal Ministry of Finance
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IEGWB	Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)
ISR	Implementation Status Report
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LGA	Local Government Areas
LGEA	Local Government Education Authority
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MLA	Monitoring Learning Achievement
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NPEC	National Primary Education Commission
NPCU	National Project Coordination Unit
NIEPA	National Institute for Education Planning and Administration
PDO	Project Development Objectives
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PEP1	First Primary Education Project
PEP2	Second Primary Education Project
PSR	Project Status Report
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SESP	State Education Sector Project
SMOE	State Ministry of Education
STEPB	Science and Technology Post-Basic (refers to project)
SUBEB	State Universal Basic Education Board
UBE	Universal Basic Education

UBEC Universal Basic Education Commission
UBEP Universal Basic Education Project
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UNESCO United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

Fiscal Year

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IEGWB Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEGWB annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEGWB staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEGWB peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. IEGWB incorporates the comments as relevant. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

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This report was prepared by Maurice Boissiere, IEG consultant, who assessed the project in October-November 2007. Marie-Jeanne Ndiaye provided administrative support.

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PRINCIPAL RATINGS

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
SECOND PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3346)			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Institutional Development Impact**	Substantial	Modest	_____
Sustainability***	Likely	Likely	_____
Risk to Development Outcome	_____	_____	Moderate
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3711)			
Outcome	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Significant	Significant	Significant
Bank Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

**As of July 1, 2006, Institutional Development Impact is assessed as part of the Outcome rating.

***As of July 1, 2006, Sustainability has been replaced by Risk to Development Outcome. As the scales are different, the ratings are not directly comparable.

KEY STAFF RESPONSIBLE

SECOND PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3346)			
<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
Appraisal	Eileen Nkwanga	Rosemary Bellew	Yaw Ansu
Supervision	Brigitte Duces, Olatunde Adekola	Arvil Van Adams	Hafez Ghanem
Completion	Jacob H. Bregman	Laura Frigenti	Hafez Ghanem

UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3711)			
<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
Appraisal	Brigitte Duces	Arvil Van Adams	Mark Tomlinson
Supervision	Brigitte Duces, Halil Dundar	Laura Frigenti	Hafez Ghanem
Completion	Halil Dundar	Laura Frigenti	Hafez Ghanem

PREFACE

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the Nigeria Second Primary Education Project and the Nigeria Universal Basic Education Project. The first operation was financed through IDA Credit No. 3346 in the amount of US\$55 million (SDR40.1 million) and with planned government contribution of US\$3.5 million. The credit was approved on May 11, 2000, became effective on August 21, 2000, and was 97 percent disbursed when it closed on schedule on December 31, 2004. The second operation was financed through IDA Credit No. 3711 in the amount of US\$101.0 million (SDR76.3 million), a grant of US\$15.0 million from the United Kingdom Department for International Development, and with planned contributions of government (US\$13.0 million). The credit was approved on September 12, 2002, became effective on November 10, 2003, and was closed early on June 30, 2006 (2 years ahead of schedule) with SDR 27 million cancelled from the remaining credit. These two projects were chosen for a PPAR because of their importance to Nigeria's development strategy and to Africa's achievement of Education for All (EFA).

The findings of this assessment are based on a three-week mission to Nigeria conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), from October 22 - November 9, 2007. The mission met in Abuja with authorities and staff of the Federal Ministry of Education, the Universal Basic Education Commission, and development partners. The mission also visited school project sites in the states of Imo, Kano, Kaduna, Niger and Nasarawa as well as the Federal Capital Territory, where it met with education authorities, teachers, principals and students and assessed education inputs and activities supported by the Bank. A list of persons interviewed is given in Annex C. Key sources of evidence consulted include: (a) World Bank project files; (b) project-related reporting and evaluation; and (c) education data, studies, surveys and research by the government and development partners.

The IEG team gratefully acknowledges the assistance and support of the resident mission professional staff and, particularly, Ms. Ngozi Malife for her assistance in expediting the work of the mission. A special acknowledgement is due to all those in the Government and donor community who made time for interviews and provided documents and information.

Following standard IEG procedures, copy of the draft PPAR was sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and feedback. Their comments are presented in Annex D.

SUMMARY

Nigeria is a large country (140 million people 2006) with a complex federal structure with 36 states that has a direct bearing on the problems and prospects of the education sector. Education is a concurrent responsibility of the federal, state, and local governments, although the division of responsibility is still not clear, creating problems for governance and management of the education sector. Within this complex institutional environment, the education system faces challenges of expanding access and restoring quality after years of deterioration of infrastructure, materials and human resources.

Second Primary Education Project

The objectives of the Second Primary Education Project (PEP2) were to assist Nigeria in: (a) strengthening the human resource capacity in primary schools; (b) creating an environment conducive to effective teaching and learning in its primary schools; (c) improving the quality and availability of curriculum and other instructional materials in the primary schools; (d) developing an enhanced information base to facilitate decision-making; and (e) increasing national awareness of AIDS.

The project experienced a slow start-up due to project staff capacity and periodic problems with provision of counterpart funds. Staff was added and trained, counterpart funds problems were resolved and a mid-term review restructured and reallocated funds to community-based self-help schemes. Implementation then went as planned with the project disbursing the full credit amount by closing in 2004. During the last two years 4,500 teachers were trained, 10,354 classrooms were rehabilitated as part of community self-help projects, and 1,110 focus schools received curriculum materials. The Monitoring and Evaluation subcomponent conducted the school census, processed the data and organized the Education Management Information System (EMIS). The HIV/AIDS component produced a large amount of materials.

The outcome of PEP2 is rated **moderately unsatisfactory**, based on substantial relevance, modest efficacy, and modest efficiency. The achievement of the first three objectives was rated modest, and the achievement of the other two was rated negligible. The major achievement was an increase in enrollment in project schools from 830,580 (2000) to 1.1 million (2004), an increase of 34 percent versus the target of 15 percent. However, learning outcomes in the project schools did not increase significantly, the standardized test in the project schools going from a score of 35 percent (2000) to 38 percent (2004). The efficacy of the HIV/AIDS and self-help subcomponents could not be evaluated due to lack of data.

Bank performance was **satisfactory**. The quality at entry was satisfactory as the Bank recognized the difficult institutional environment for project implementation and made provisions for institutional development. The Bank responded appropriately when the project got off to a slow start. After mid-term review and some restructuring, implementation improved dramatically due in large part to the quality of supervision support by the Bank. Borrower performance was rated **satisfactory**. After initial start-up problems, capacity constraints were addressed by appointing more skilled project staff

and providing necessary training. The risk to development outcomes is rated as **moderate**.

Universal Basic Education Project

The objectives of the Universal Basic Education Project (UBEP) were to: (a) support implementation of Nigeria's universal basic education program; (b) strengthen the country's capacity to provide quality schooling; and (c) raise primary school admission, completion, and transition rates, with a priority to the poorest areas. The project had two major components, one for the federal level and the other for the 16 participating states, with numerous activities (10 for federal and 8 for the states).

The project ran into implementation problems almost immediately. Although approved in September 2002, the project did not become effective until November 2003 because of bureaucracy and the election cycle, resulting in the loss of more than one year for implementation. The TA aimed at institutional capacity building, financed by DFID, was not well coordinated with the project objectives to begin with. Thus another year was lost to slow implementation. The mid-term review in June 2005 proposed restructuring, which helped to accelerate progress, but not to the point of making up for the first two years of problems. Thus the government requested that the Bank close the project two years early and cancel 35 percent of the credit. The project was closed on June 30, 2006 after having disbursed US\$44.6 million.

The Federal Component delivered very little of its intended outputs, disbursing only 17 percent of its funds by project closing. The State Component responded better to the restructuring, which allocated more funds to community self-help schemes, with 4,250 classroom blocks being built and refurbished. Two million textbooks and 50,000 sets of learning materials were distributed. However, these self-help schemes were not evaluated under the monitoring and evaluation activities, and no learning assessment was carried out as under PEP2. The learning assessment was not included in the Monitoring and Evaluation design since it was felt that under this first decentralized education project state capacity and resources were lacking. The admission, completion and transition rates fell short of the targets.

The project overall outcome was rated **unsatisfactory**, based on substantial relevance, negligible efficacy and modest efficiency. The first objective was not rated, since it was treated as an over-arching objective that relies upon the achievement of the two more precisely stated objectives. The achievement of both the second and third objectives was rated negligible, with both of these objectives falling short of their targets. The performance of both the Bank and the borrower was also rated **unsatisfactory**. The quality at entry was unsatisfactory. During supervision the Bank was slow to recognize and respond to problems developing with the TA. The borrower also showed lack of commitment to the project by delays in signing, meeting conditions of effectiveness and providing counterpart funds. Given the weak institutional capacity at the start of the project, and limited progress on institutional capacity during project implementation, the risk to development outcomes is **significant**.

Lessons

- **Good performance during implementation cannot make up for fundamental design flaws in a project in which component activities are not well aligned with the project development objectives (PDOs).** UBEP suffered from too much complexity and spread limited resources too thinly among the 16 states and numerous federal agencies. The states did not have the capacity to implement such a complex design and spreading the resources too thinly did not allow for reaching the critical mass needed to have a catalytic impact upon the system;
- **Lack of readiness for implementation cannot be compensated for by imposing many conditions of effectiveness.** In hindsight the UBEP was not really ready to start implementation at the time of Board approval and the introduction of conditions of effectiveness could not make up for this lack of readiness;
- **Technical assistance (TA) needs to be closely aligned with the project development objectives and institutional capacity gaps, and closely supervised by the Bank and co-financiers to prevent it from drifting away from PDOs.** Although the TA was implemented by the DFID contractors, the Bank did not exercise close monitoring and evaluation initially. The broadly stated TOR led the TA providers to focus initially on school development and not on the strategic management competencies needed to manage a Bank supported project; and
- **Effective monitoring and evaluation of learning outcomes require a long lead time to design and develop and thus need to be addressed early in project design along with PDOs.** A major shortcoming in the UBEP design was its failure to build upon the measures of learning assessment built into PEP2. Learning assessments, or other measures for monitoring quality of outcomes, can be used to feed back into the improvement of curriculum, teaching and school management.

Perspectives for On-going and Future Support

There is a net positive contribution of Bank support for the education sector of Nigeria. The Bank needs to stay engaged in the education sector for the long term. However, this long-term engagement has serious resource implications in terms of economic and sector work, project preparation and supervision, monitoring and evaluation of quality, especially if a decentralized approach such as in the ongoing State Education Sector Project is to be scaled-up. Effective partnerships between the Government and Development Partners and among the Development Partners can help alleviate the resource constraints to some extent, but careful sector analysis and management will be needed to set achievable and relevant goals.

Vinod Thomas
Director-General
Evaluation

1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

GENERAL BACKGROUND

1.1 Nigeria's complex federal structure and its struggle to achieve social cohesiveness have a direct bearing on the problems and prospects of the education sector. After gaining independence in 1960 with four regions (roughly reflecting its major ethnic groups) under a parliamentary democracy, the devastating civil war of the late 1960s led to a series of military governments with only brief civilian interlude during 1979-83¹. There was also a proliferation in the number of states created over the years in an attempt to give Nigeria's various religious and ethnic groups more equitable voice in the affairs of national, state and local government. Changes in the constitution have given rise to the present situation in which there are 36 states plus the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Abuja under a presidential style Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) with an independent legislative branch (house and senate) and judiciary. While Nigeria is a large country with an estimated population of 140 million (2006 census), this is a large number of states when compared to other federated countries such as Brazil (26 states for a population of 184 million in 2006) or India (28 states for a population of 1.1 billion in 2006). Within this constitutional arrangement, education is specified as a concurrent responsibility of the federal, state and local governments, although the division of responsibility is still not clear, creating problems for governance and management of the education sector.

1.2 In early 1998, with the sudden death of the last military head of state, there began the transition to civilian government. In early 1999, the transition from military to civilian rule was completed with the election and inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo after almost two decades of military rule. Most observers of Nigeria would characterize the years of military rule as showing deteriorating economic conditions (despite having significant oil resources), increasing inefficiency and corruption, as well as reductions in civil liberties². This took its toll on all aspects of Nigerian society, the education sector included. Thus the transition to an elected civilian government brought about optimism for Nigeria's future, and the Bank and other Development Partners (DPs) again resumed a more active partnership with the FGN after years of only minimal involvement. It is an encouraging sign that two more civilian elections were held, in 2003 re-electing President Obasanjo, and in 2007 electing the current President Yar'adua.

GOVERNMENT EDUCATION POLICY AND STRATEGY

1.3 In 1999 President Obasanjo announced a major new education initiative of free and compulsory Universal Basic Education (UBE) to be achieved by 2015. Nigeria had

¹ For a bit more background, see Annex B for a timeline of selected political and education events in Nigeria along with key education sector support activities of the Bank.

² See "This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria" (2000) by Karl Maier for a journalist's account of the 1990s in Nigeria up to the inauguration of the new civilian president in 1999. The book also draws upon scholarly work as well first hand experiences of many Nigerians.

signed onto the Education for All (EFA) declarations in 1990 (Jomtien) and 2000 (Dakar) as well as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2002. Nigeria's formal education system has a 6-3-3-4 structure with six years of primary school, three years of junior secondary school, three years of senior secondary school and four years of tertiary education. Basic education as defined in Nigeria includes 6 years of primary education plus 3 years of junior secondary education. The rationale for going beyond the goal of Universal Primary Education (UPE) to that of UBE was the necessity for laying a firm human capital foundation for the economic growth strategy Nigeria is pursuing. The necessary levels of literacy and numeracy as well as other life skills would require at least the basic education level. Then students could continue to 3 years of senior secondary education or proceed to some type of training to prepare them for the job market.

1.4 Nigeria had come close to achieving Universal Primary Education (UPE) during the 1970s when a booming oil sector allowed for rapid expansion of educational facilities. However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s economic decline set in as oil prices fell and economic mismanagement and corruption became a too familiar pattern. Financing for education was inadequate, and the gains in primary education were lost³. Teachers were not being paid and teacher attendance became a serious problem. School buildings deteriorated and textbooks and materials were in short supply. Thus, in 1999 President Obasanjo declared the UBE policy of the government to rectify this dismal situation in the education sector.

1.5 Looking at trends in primary school enrollment, it appears that the euphoria surrounding the end of military rule and the UBE declaration could have had some effect, *inter alia*. Total enrollment in primary education fluctuated during the 1990s, and then showed a marked increase starting in 1998 with a much larger one in 1999 in the year 2000 followed by a leveling off in 2001 (see Table 1.1 below).

Table 1.1: Primary Enrollment: Levels (millions) and Rates (percent) by Year

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Enrollment	13.8	14.8	15.9	16.2	15.7	14.1	14.7	16.0	17.9	19.2	19.4
Percent Growth		7.2	7.4	1.9	-3.1	-10.2	4.3	8.8	11.9	7.3	1.0
Net Enrollment Rate	n.a.	55.0	56.0	55.5	52.5	46.7	51.3	52.8	n.a.	63.0	n.a.

Source: World Bank (2004)⁴. The NER from the year 2000 is from the Bank's EDSTATS.

³ World Bank (2004) points out that data from a sample of 12 states suggest that education spending was about 2.3 percent of GDP in the late 1990s, a significant decline from previous decades and low compared to most other African countries.

⁴ World Bank (2004) gives a good analysis of the sources and problems of Nigerian education statistics that make it difficult to get a good picture of the sector.

1.6 The Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) was formed by presidential decree in 2001 (and by law in 2004) in order to expedite the rapid implementation of the UBE program. UBEC is a parastatal agency legally under the Federal Ministry of Education (FMOE) although it enjoys a considerable amount of autonomy with respect to its budget and operational authority. It is the successor to a similar parastatal, the National Primary Education Commission (NPEC), formed during the 1990s to facilitate the drive for UPE. Corresponding to the federal level UBEC there are State Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs). These state level boards as well as the State Ministries of Education (SMOE) work with the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) and the Local Government Education Authorities (LGEAs) to provide education, thus creating a complex institutional environment within which individual primary schools must function and Bank supported education projects, such as the two under assessment here, must navigate.⁵

WORLD BANK SUPPORT

1.7 The Bank has been involved in the education sector in Nigeria since the 1960s when it first started lending for education. There were three education projects in Nigeria in the late 1960s/early 1970s, but then Nigeria did not borrow much after that because oil revenues were increasing significantly during that time. Nigeria used its increasing oil revenues during the 1970s for reconstruction after the civil war in the late 1960s and made significant progress in expanding education enrollment, in particular almost achieving universal primary education. However, as the oil price decline of the 1980s took place, the education sector faced budgetary pressures that did not allow for sustaining the previous progress. During the 1980s the situation of primary education in particular deteriorated, and years of military government after 1983 with mismanagement and corruption made the situation worse.

1.8 Economic and sector work (ESW) in 1987 documented the issues faced by the education sector.⁶ Although the Bank also supported other education sub-sectors, such as the Federal Universities Development Project (1990), the sector work led to a focus on primary education and the preparation of the first Primary Education Project (total cost US\$158.4 million equivalent, 1991-2000). PEP1 had five objectives: (a) upgrade the quality of primary education; (b) improve resource allocation to allow for more non-salary spending; (c) increase enrollments; (d) strengthen public institutions responsible for primary education; and (e) stimulate future planning for the next phase of the

⁵ For more detail on the institutional reforms and developments since 1999, see World Bank (2007), which provides a comprehensive matrix describing the allocation of education functions and responsibilities to various levels of government. While that is too complex to quickly summarize here, this must be taken into account when designing and implementing education projects, especially a decentralized one such as UBEP.

⁶ "Nigeria: Primary Education Subsector Study", June 30, 1989 (Report No. 7389-UNI). No education ESW was done during the 1990s and during preparation of PEP2. Only during the preparation of UBEP was there more ESW, published later as two separate sector reports in the African Human Development series -- World Bank (2004) already cited and Orbach (2004) dealing with organizational capacity to deliver UBE.

program. The project had the following components aimed at the above objectives: (1) Provision of Books/Materials and Teacher Training for Quality Primary Education, (2) Improving Resource Allocation through the National Primary Education Fund and Local Cost Sharing, (3) Increasing Enrollments through “enlightenment” campaigns, and (4) Strengthening Institutional Capacities in management, planning and establishing a management information system (MIS). The Bank was one of the few external donors who remained engaged in education in Nigeria during the 1990s and followed only a low scenario assistance strategy that allowed for support to education and health.

1.9 The PEP1 got off to a slow start and by 1997 (the original closing date) had disbursed only 10 percent of the US\$120 million credit. The FGN requested and received an extension of the credit closing date in 1997, but also canceled US\$30 million of the original credit. The performance of the project improved, resulting in completion of the project by 2001 with full disbursement of the remaining credit after 10 years of implementation. However, the project overall was still rated unsatisfactory as the more rapid implementation and disbursement over the last years did not make up for the problems experienced throughout most of the project, such as extremely slow procurement of textbooks.

1.10 The objectives and component activities under PEP1 were continued into the Second Primary Education Project (PEP2), the Universal Basic Education Project (UBEP) and even the recently approved State Education Sector Project (SESP), albeit under differing institutional and implementation designs. As the focus shifted from universal primary to universal basic education, many institutional changes took place and the implementing agencies have changed, but the overall goals and implementation challenges have remained remarkably constant over the past decade or so.

OTHER DONOR SUPPORT

1.11 Other major donors resumed support for education in Nigeria after the return to civilian government in 1999. The PPAR does not have a quantitative compilation of all donors financing, but meetings with the main donors gave a qualitative understanding of the role of donor support for education. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) is one of the major partners in Bank supported projects as well as running its own set of programs. DFID was a co-financier of the UBEP as well as the newly approved SESP. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is supporting primary education, focusing on a few states, and is also actively supporting a number of technical areas of educational activities, e.g, improving education statistics and their dissemination. The Japanese Agency of International Cooperation (JICA) is supporting the construction of primary schools in three states (Kaduna, Plateau and Niger) in addition to strengthening science and mathematics education. UNESCO has helped in providing science kits made from local materials, and UNICEF has been promoting programs of education for girls. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has also been involved in supporting the areas of skills training and development for Nigerian youth, a problem that is getting more serious with rapid population growth of about 2.3 percent and the increasing numbers of primary and junior secondary graduates. It appears from the Country Partnership Strategy (2005) that, after the Bank, which is the

largest donor, DFID, Japan and USAID are the largest in relative magnitudes for the education sector.

2. SECOND PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT

OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN

2.1 The second Primary Education Project was approved on May 11, 2000 for US\$61.1 million and became effective on August 21, 2000. It was financed by a US\$55.0 million equivalent IDA credit (or 40.1 million SDRs) with a government counterpart contribution of US\$6.1 million equivalent. According to the Development Credit Agreement (DCA), the objectives of PEP were to assist Nigeria in:⁷

- a) strengthening the human resource capacity in primary schools;
- b) creating an environment conducive to effective teaching and learning in its primary schools;
- c) improving the quality and availability of curriculum and other instructional materials in the primary schools;
- d) developing an enhanced information base to facilitate decision-making; and
- e) increasing national awareness of AIDS.

2.2 The project was national in scope, designed to assist all 36 states, and its objectives were in line with the poverty reduction and improved social services goals of the Interim Country Strategy Note (April 2000). PEP2 consisted of five components and various subcomponents of activities that closely matched each of the objectives (see Box 2-1).

2.3 PEP2 started off during a difficult time of political transition from military to civilian government. It was designed to be implemented under a decentralized environment with fiscal federalism as a guiding principle and the states were also keen to assert their constitutional authority in the domain of education after years of central control. PEP2 was designed as a bridging project between PEP1 and a future UBE project with the intent of injecting much needed resources into the primary education system across all of the 36 states. There was no major ESW that fed into the preparation of the project, which was prepared in only six months during late 1999. Since PEP1 performed well with respect to increased disbursements and outputs in its last two years (although unsatisfactory overall in terms of outcomes and sustainability over the whole time period 1991-2000), the idea was to continue those activities in order to provide immediate Bank support to the newly elected civilian government, while preparation was ongoing for the UBEP. However, the AIDS awareness objective of PEP2 was a

⁷ The formulation of project objectives in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is basically the same, except that the PAD refers to strengthening 1,000 primary schools in objective (a).

substantially new addition, which was intended to fit into FGN's multi-sector HIV/AIDS program, also supported by the Bank and other donors.

Box 2-1: Components of the Second Primary Education Project

A. Strengthen Human Resource Capacity in Schools (US\$10.2 million, 16.7 percent of the total). Sub-component 1: Training of primary school teachers in essential aspects of delivering primary education (pedagogy, continuous assessment, etc.). Sub-component 2: Training education personnel in procurement and education management information systems.

B. Create a Conducive Physical Environment for Teaching and Learning. (US\$30.8 million, 50.5 percent of the total). Sub-component 1: Providing a secure storage for books and materials in about 740 rehabilitated primary schools (also referred to as focus schools). Sub-component 2: Carrying out small scale self-help projects by participating communities and providing matching grants for these self-help projects. Sub-component 3: Monitoring and evaluation of the self-help projects and the results of PEP1.

C. Improving the Quality and Availability of Curriculum Materials (US\$13.6 million, 22.3 percent of the total). Sub-component 1: Acquisition and provision of teachers' guides for all primary 1 core subjects, laminated teaching aids, library books and other materials for 740 refurbished schools. Sub-component 2: Acquisition of equipment for production of educational video programs and production as well as dissemination of these programs.

D. Develop an Enhanced Information Base for Decision Making for UBE (US\$5.2 million, 8.5 percent of the total) Sub-component 1: Collection, collation and processing of information gathered under PEP1, development of a comprehensive information base for UBE, and carrying out a program of studies related to issues of quality teaching for UBE. Sub-component 2: Preparation of plans for the training of teachers under the Nigerian Distance Education Scheme.

E. Increase HIV/AIDS Awareness among Education Staff, Children and Communities (US\$1.3 million, 2.1 percent of the total). Sub-component 1: Design of an appropriate AIDS Education Plan aimed at increasing awareness about AIDS related issues to be targeted primarily at children and young adolescents. Sub-component 2: Carrying out of the AIDS Education Plan in Nigeria within primary schools as well as appropriate mass media campaigns.

IMPLEMENTATION

2.4 The National Primary Education Commission (NPEC) had been the implementing agency for PEP1. However, the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), created in 1999, was responsible for implementing PEP2. Although some staff remained from NPEC, the UBEC lacked experience and capacity at the outset. Further, over the four and a half year duration of the project, there were three ministers of education, two permanent secretaries and two project coordinators. These factors led to slow implementation and disbursement. Thus, implementation of the project was rated as unsatisfactory by the supervision mission in October 2001, retaining that rating until September 2003.

2.5 The Mid-Term Review (MTR) mission (December 20, 2002) restructured the project and improved performance. It was agreed that resources be allocated to faster moving activities, especially to the community-driven self-help activities. Credit Funds were moved from Goods and Equipment (US\$38.3 million at appraisal versus US\$17.4 actual) to the Self-Help Grant (Sub-component 2 of Component B, US\$3.7 million at appraisal versus US\$26.6 million actual) under local shopping procurement procedures.

The Special Account was increased from US\$1.0 million to US\$3.0 million and the ceiling raised on items procured via local shopping from US\$3.4 million to US\$21.8 million). This proved to be very popular as almost all communities wanted to make physical improvements or additions to school infrastructure and disbursements improved rapidly as a result. The number of focus schools was also increased from 740 to 1,110. The Early Childhood Education subcomponent of Component C was dropped and replaced with a sub-component to address primary school age children in nomadic communities. The net effect of restructuring left the development objectives unchanged, but more emphasis (in terms of disbursement) was placed upon Component B (Teaching and Learning Environment) above and its subcomponents.

2.6 After steady improvement in disbursements as a result of the restructuring at MTR and closer supervision by the Bank, the project moved back into satisfactory performance by September 2003 and was closed, as planned on December 31, 2004, with 97 percent of disbursement, all physical targets met, and the credit fully disbursed (see Table 2.1 below for total project costs). The reallocation of disbursement from goods to self-help grants referred to above took place mainly within the Components 2 and 3, as self-help schools were built and supplied (see note /a/ in Table 2.1 below). It should be noted that the original credit was SDR 40.1 million, at that time equivalent to US\$55.0 million. However, changes in the exchange rates and the composition of currencies in the SDR basket wound up to be US\$65.6 million.

Table 2.1: PEP2 Project Costs by Component

Component	Appraisal Estimate (\$US million)	Actual (\$US million)	Actual as % of appraisal
A. Strengthening Capacity	10.29	11.35	110
B. Conducive Learning Environment /a/	31.41	29.80	95
C. Quality of Curriculum Materials	13.72	21.69	158
D. Enhanced Information Base	5.25	4.57	87
E. HIV/AIDS Awareness	1.27	2.90	228
Total Cost (incl. contingencies)	61.94	70.31	114

Source: ICR for PEP2 (2005)

/a/ The self-help activities are located in this component. Given the large increase in self-help according to the disbursement categories as mentioned above, it is puzzling that there is no corresponding increase in Component B. The largest increase in actual versus appraisal is in Component C. A table that cross-tabulates components by disbursement category could help to resolve this puzzle, but the mission could not find such data.

2.7 The fiduciary and safeguards aspects of the project were appropriate and satisfactory. According to the PAD, there were no particular safeguard issues the project needed to address. In the PAD the project design recognized financial management weakness within the Project Accounts Section (PAS) of the Special Projects Unit of UBEC, the implementing agency. To develop the capacity of the PAS to provide fiduciary management, a Financial Action Plan was developed which included strengthening the capacity of the PAS to play its role.

2.8 The timing of outputs from the components all came in the second half of the project as a result of the delays in the first half. The MTR improved performance. However, reviewing the sequence of project reports shows that the outputs of the first

three components were delivered almost in the same time frame in the last two years of the project. By the last year of the project, much teacher training had been done, classrooms added and renovated, and curriculum materials delivered, all of which could have had some impact by the end of the project.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

2.9 Design. The design of M&E followed up on some features that were intended to be part of PEP1. The standardized tests of PEP1, although developed and tested, were not completed and so the administration of these tests for the focus schools was incorporated into the M&E plans for PEP2. There was no provision in the design of the standardized tests for a control group to compare to the focus schools. In addition, much of the data collected for PEP1 was not collated and analyzed as planned and this activity was also brought into PEP2. The design of EMIS activities, tracking data on pupils, teachers, and facilities, was intended to introduce new features that would lead to a better picture nationwide of progress towards the goals of EFA and UBE. There was no provision for a design to evaluate the HIV/AIDS component and the community self-help scheme was to be evaluated, but no design was provided for this evaluation.

2.10 Implementation. The implementation of M&E in PEP2 had some important achievements. The pre-test (baseline test) and post-test for learning achievement in the focus schools were administered as scheduled in 2000 and 2004. After a slow start-up, the procurement of computer and networking equipment, as well as software and training, for the EMIS was also implemented for the most part. The School Census, funded mainly by the project, was also carried out to give a baseline year of data for 2001 and later for 2003. Within the states and federal ministries, capacity was created to collect, analyze and distribute nation-wide statistics as part of a credible education data system. However, the planned monitoring and evaluation of the self-help sub-component, the plans for which were not developed in detail in the PAD, was not done.

2.11 Use of data for decision-making. The improved data, albeit still lacking in many important ways, was used in the preparation of the UBEP (2002). While only the baseline data was available for the preparation of UBEP, the baseline data combined with the project's compilation of data from the late 1990s was used in the sector study on enrollment trends by K. Hinchliffe (2004) that gave an improved picture of the situation in primary education for policy makers. It also highlighted areas for policy makers where priorities should be placed in improving the data available. Later this improved data base was used for preparation of the new SESP (2007) and the Education Public Expenditure Review (2007).

OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES BY OBJECTIVE

Strengthen human resources at the school level

2.12 The planned training of classroom and head teachers was carried out following a school based approach, meaning the training takes place in the schools or nearby so that teachers can apply their training. This built upon similar activities under PEP1 and

developed national and state level cadre of trainers. Overall about 4,500 classroom teachers (versus target of 4,000) received training in new methods of curriculum delivery, subject matter of core curriculum and learning assessment/record keeping.⁸ About 1,100 head teachers (versus target of 1,000) were trained school management, procurement and use of EMIS. However, only 500 of the 1,110 focus schools prepared School Development Plans as called for in the project logframe.

2.13 Baseline data from the school census shows that attendance has risen from 70 percent in 2000 to almost 100 percent in 2004. The PPAR mission asked about teacher attendance at most of the schools visited (17 schools) and was told that it would be about 90 percent or more (consistent with observations of the mission if the school was open). While project inputs may have contributed to this improvement, other non-project factors also intervened, the main one being the more regular payment of teacher salaries. Previously, non-payment of salaries had led to teacher strikes and poor attendance. Now strikes have been eliminated.

Create a conducive environment for teaching and learning

2.14 There were 9,650 community self-help projects completed, especially after mid-term restructuring, which led to physical improvement in badly run-down infrastructure. One reason for the increase in self-help was the elimination of the matching grant required of the community. Repairing these problems, and in many cases, adding classroom blocks alleviated overcrowding and led to improved pupil attendance as well. As a result, 10,354 classrooms were rehabilitated in 5,177 schools (compared to about 50,000 public primary schools in the country), 878 latrines were built and 599 schools were provided with water wells. Yet, still much more remains to be done. In many cases, the PPAR mission observed damaged roofing that leaked during rainy season and was thus unusable for a large part of the year.

2.15 The main outcome of this component was the increase in enrollment in project schools from 830,580 (2000) to 1.1 million (2004), an increase of 34 percent versus the target of 15 percent. This can be attributed in part to the expanded facilities from renovation activities and the increased attractiveness of more child friendly and better equipped schools. However, a controlled comparison was not made with non-project schools.

Improve the quality and availability of curriculum and other instructional materials in the primary schools

2.16 About 2.2 million supplementary readers were supplied to 1,110 schools, and 120 libraries were established with 2,000 books for central libraries. The PAD did not specify numerical targets, except for providing 740 focus schools with these supplementary

⁸ This number of teachers trained must be a small percent of the total, probably less than 1 percent. There is an estimate of 494,259 primary teachers of school year 2004/05 (PAD for SESP 2007, which cites FMOE and NEMIS). Reliable data on teacher employment trends is not available according to the Education Public Expenditure Review.

materials, which was increased to 1,110 focus schools. The video program subcomponent was also modified during restructuring to include Interactive Radio Instruction (IRI) for nomadic and migrant fishing communities. The IRI program had not reached the classroom by project closure, but it was continued and materials were produced after the project.

2.17 Although the libraries and supplementary materials did not receive a separate evaluation, the teachers at schools visited by the PPAR mission felt they were definitely helpful, and the mission observed a number of well maintained libraries, which were being used by students in a few cases observed by the mission when school was in session. A number of IRI lessons were produced which the PPAR mission observed to still be in use, especially in science lessons. This can be useful in the early grades to help teachers who do not have in depth training in subject areas like science. Instructional radio programs were also introduced. The Nomadic Education Department in Kano pointed out that this was especially used in the activities for nomadic education, which replaced the early childhood education sub-component during mid-term restructuring. However, no systematic research or evaluation of the IRI was carried out.

Develop an enhanced information base to facilitate decision-making

2.18 Better school data became available as result of school censuses being completed. There was baseline data for 2001 and followed up with the 2003 School Census.⁹ The PPAR mission visited the EMIS departments in Kano and Kaduna states; they were still functioning along with the computers and other equipment after project completion. According to the UBEC coordinators at the national level, most state level MIS's from the project are functioning. During discussions with interviewees, only the teacher-training study seemed to have some impact as it was commented upon by some people. The main conclusion is that the National Certificate of Education (NCE) does not provide an appropriate qualification for primary school teachers. In some respects, it over qualifies by presenting too much of a theoretical training in subject matter, almost university level. In other respects it does not supply enough practical pedagogical training for the real life situation of Nigerian primary schools.

Enhance HIV/AIDS awareness nationally

2.19 A large amount and variety of materials were produced for this purpose, including 943,500 copies of posters were produced and distributed, a radio/television campaign with jingles was developed, 1,000 copies of the Family Life and Health Education (FLHE) curriculum were produced and distributed, and 450,000 copies of a booklet "Yes to Life and No to AIDS" were produced and distributed, aimed at teachers and their students in the last two grades of primary (ages 10, 11 and overage students). One hundred and eleven people were trained as master trainers and in turn trained 79,000 school teachers, head teachers, supervisors and LGA personnel.

⁹ The school census had a very rich questionnaire of over 20 pages with many details on school characteristics. Apart from the most basic tabulations on enrollment, teachers, etc., it has not yet been exploited and fully analyzed for policy purposes.

2.20 The mission observed some of these posters in a number of places, but not that many in the schools visited. Although, when some head teachers were asked about it, they mentioned it as a big improvement in attitudes and awareness. There was no systematic monitoring and evaluation in the project to help judge the ultimate success in improving awareness. Thus, no indicators are available that could document the outcome of the HIV/AIDS activities in terms of actual increase in awareness. A number of interviewees responded to the PPAR mission that the awareness level had been raised, but this is just based upon impressions not backed up by data from a good research design. The fact that these activities were to be continued in UBEP indicates that much still remains to be done.

Impact on Learning Outcomes

2.21 Despite the satisfactory implementation resulting in improved inputs and outputs, the anticipated impact on learning achievement did not materialize. The project attempted to address learning achievement by measuring baseline and post-project achievement in the 1,110 focus schools for grade 5 language and mathematics. This could be viewed as an outcome connected especially to the first three objectives in the results chain of the Logical Framework. Teacher development, infrastructure provided through self-help and improved learning materials should show up in improved learning.

2.22 The results showed only a marginal increase from a standardized score of 35 percent in 2000 to 38 percent in 2004.¹⁰ There was no attempt at comparison to a control group of a sample of non-project primary schools.¹¹ The results of a larger study (World Bank, 2007d), which drew upon the Monitoring of Learning Achievement (MLA) conducted in Nigeria by UNICEF/UNESCO in 1996 and 2003, showed larger gains in English language, although at still low levels, and marginal gains in mathematics (see Table 2.2). This larger study of learning achievement covered a random sample of all primary schools.

Table 2.2: MLA Result at Primary Grade 4 (Percent of items correctly answered)

Subject	1996	2003
English Language	25	35
Mathematics	32	34

Source: World Bank 2007d

2.23 The PPAR mission visited 17 schools (from either PEP2 or UBEP) in various cities and nearby rural areas. The physical condition of almost all of these schools visited could only be described as poor to very poor, despite having participated in self-help projects that added classrooms or repaired major damage. Textbook availability varied, but none was better than two children sharing a basic class 6 English book. The mission

¹⁰ The mission requested the PCU to provide a breakdown of test scores by language and mathematics. This has not yet been provided.

¹¹ Future efforts at evaluation should include such control groups. Efforts could also be made to look at state-level primary exams grade 6 for analysis and comparison. There is no longer any national primary school certificate, but some states have their own exam systems, e.g., the PPAR mission was told during its visit to Imo state there is still a primary leaving exam.

conducted a rapid reading assessment at the schools visited and found that only about 12 percent of the students tested could read fluently at the grade 6 level.¹²

2.24 Given that PEP1 and PEP2 provided resources to schools over the time period tested (1996 to 2004), larger gains from a low base in learning achievement might have been expected. However, the resources provided by these projects were small in the grand scheme of primary education needs in Nigeria¹³ and they appeared not to have any catalytic effect that would spill over into the sub-sector as a whole. The project logframe was hoping for such a spillover, distinguishing focus schools, all schools and system wide. Perhaps the improvement in inputs/outputs was not enough to cross the threshold needed to get the desired outcomes, even in focus schools. Another factor to consider is that enrollment increased in the focus schools. An influx of students from lower socio-economic backgrounds can lower average learning outcomes even if the quality of instruction is unchanged. It is also possible that learning outcomes for the poor could increase even when the average learning outcomes remain unchanged or decline. Thus, care is needed in interpreting trends in average learning outcomes without other information about the distribution of results.

3. UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT

OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN

3.1 The \$129 million *Universal Basic Education Project* (UBEP) was approved on September 12, 2002, and became effective on November 10, 2003 with an initial closing date of June 30, 2008. It was financed by a US\$101 million IDA credit with a government counterpart contribution of US\$13 million equivalent and DFID grant financing of US\$15 million equivalent for the TA. The broad purpose of the TA was to develop and implement a sustainable UBE program in the 16 states, with priority on the educationally disadvantaged LGAs. The implementation arrangements for this TA followed DFID procedures and priorities and were not sufficiently harmonized with the initial capacity needs of project entities, resulting in implementation problems (see para. 4.14). Extensive ESW during preparation was financed by a PHRD Grant of

¹² The mission also conducted rapid reading assessments for 23 students randomly chosen from some of the grade 6 pupils. Only about 12 percent of this sample (admittedly not scientific) could read near grade level, in line with what would be expected from the assessments above. The method used was to select a passage of about 150 to 200 words from their class 6 English textbook. Only students in grade 6 were selected (24 in total) to keep some degree of comparability. By grade 6 all pupils have been studying in English since grade 3, while prior to grade 3 they started reading in their mother language. The students read the passage out loud and were timed on how long they took, whether or not they read fluently or stumbled, and then were asked a few questions to check comprehension. They were assigned a score on a scale of 1 to 4 based on reading fluency and comprehension. For a full explanation of rapid reading assessment methodology, see Abadzi et al. 2005.

¹³ The latest Education Public Expenditure Review (World Bank 2007c) estimates that for the nine states covered in the review an amount (US\$178 million) close to 7 times larger than current total state and local government spending will be needed annually for new infrastructure in basic education during the next ten years.

US\$725,000 and a Norwegian Trust Fund Grant of US\$254,600.¹⁴ This project took 20 months to prepare versus 6 months for PEP2. The statement of project objectives varied among the main documents—the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and the DCA. The statement in the DCA is the most clear among these and it is taken as the basis for evaluation. The project’s objectives were to: (a) support implementation of Nigeria’s universal basic education program; (b) strengthen the country’s capacity to provide quality schooling; and (c) raise primary school admission, completion, and transition rates, with a priority to the poorest areas.

3.2 The first objective is an over-arching objective that relies on achievement of the more precise statements of objectives two and three, especially in terms of the outcome/output indicators as given in the Logical Framework (see Annex 1, PAD). The second objective relates to the capacity to provide quality schooling. By implication from the reference to the borrower’s program of UBE in the DCA, quality must involve most students achieving at an acceptable standard of learning. Government documents on UBE clearly state that learning achievement is currently very low and the aim of the UBE program is to restore quality in terms of learning achievement for the vast majority of students who complete their basic education. Thus, the UBE program of the government was concerned with increasing learning achievement as well as universal enrollment. However, improved learning outcomes are omitted from explicit mention in the PDOs and no indicators related to learning outcomes are part of the project design, a step backwards from PEP2 in this respect. The project had only two major components -- organized not by objective, but by implementer. Although the project had no specific sub-components as described in the PAD, there was a list of eight activities that could be in each of 16 state programs and 10 activities at the federal level (see Box 3-1). With respect to the State components, the project had a decentralized design (the first one tried in Nigeria for education) with each state expected to design a UBE plan within which these activities that could vary by state. Resources were provided for the federal agencies, but there was no implementation plan in the project documents.

¹⁴ The ESW during project preparation is that already cited --“The Capacity to Deliver Universal Basic Education” by Orbach (2004) and “School Education in Nigeria: Preparing for Universal Basic Education” by World Bank (2004).

Box 3-1: Components of the Universal Basic Education Project (UBEP)

A. State Programs (US\$100.3 million, 77.8 percent of total): Provision of support to Participating States (16 selected from the 36) to: (a) strengthen their organizational, managerial and operational capacity and that of the LGAs, to provide basic education; (b) develop Education Management Information Systems (EMIS); (c) manage, monitor and evaluate Project Implementation; (d) carry out Subprojects to construct new classrooms, renovate, reconstruct or furnish existing schools under community management; (e) train teachers to upgrade skills to required specifications and provide them with professional support, and provide incentives to teachers in remote areas; (f) establish school libraries, purchase library books, provide textbooks and instructional materials, and train teacher librarians; (g) strengthen community schools, and provide incentives to increase access to education for disadvantaged groups; and (h) provide assistance for the establishment of State PCUs, and for Project management and monitoring of implementation.

B. Federal Program (US\$28.7 million, 22.2 percent of total): Provision of support at the Federal level to: (a) strengthen the capacity of the education system to prevent HIV/AIDS, and to carry out appropriate HIV/AIDS education information and communication (IEC) campaigns; (b) establish capacity to assess the impact of HIV/AIDS on the education system; (c) develop alternatives for providing basic education to AIDS orphans; (d) strengthen the capacity of NIEPA to develop and deliver basic training programs for education planners and policy makers; (e) collect, analyze and publish education statistics; (f) develop policy in the education sector; (g) provide capacity building of the National Commission of Colleges of Education, the Directorate for Planning, Research and Statistics, and other Federal agencies; (h) reform the Inspectorate's roles and responsibilities to support educational reform; (i) provide assistance for Project coordination by the NPCU and for Project management and monitoring of implementation; and (j) achieve the goals of the EFA program.

IMPLEMENTATION

3.3 The UBEP almost immediately ran into problems. Typically, there is a period of 90 to 120 days during which the DCA should be signed by Government and Bank representatives. Although state and national elections were not scheduled until April 2003, according to the Project Supervision Reports (PSRs), political activity related to elections practically paralyzed the federal bureaucracy by the end of 2002 (elections were due in March 2003). For whatever reason, there was not enough effort or ownership in the FGN and FME to expedite the DCA through the various bureaucratic steps to get it signed. It was noted in the first PSR (February 2003) that delayed signing of credits is a problem across the Nigeria portfolio and needed to be addressed in the next Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR). The PSRs at that time did not indicate any high level push from Bank management to expedite the process. The project DCA was not signed until May 2003, a full eight months after Board approval. Such a delay in signing is often an indication of some significant issue concerning Government commitment to the project, but in this case, according to those interviewed, it appeared to be the Nigerian political cycle and slow bureaucracy in the year prior to an election.

3.4 The delay in signing was compounded by the delay of over a year in project effectiveness, the next stage in the legal process before the Credit funds can be accessed. In large part, this was due to the federal and state governments having difficulty in meeting stringent conditions of effectiveness.¹⁵ Bank project staff and management felt

¹⁵ There were seven conditions of effectiveness for UBEP: (1) subsidiary agreements between the FGN and three states (of the 16 participating ones); (2) three states (of the 16 participating ones) establish PCUs; (3) Project Implementation Manuals adopted by the NPCU and three state PCUs; (4) independent auditor

the conditions were necessary to ensure the project would be ready to implement. But to a significant degree, the difficulties in meeting conditions of effectiveness also stemmed from a lack of strong ownership and commitment. It took more than a year (November 2003) after approval for the UBE project to become effective. By this point a full year of implementation was lost and the project was already rated as unsatisfactory.

3.5 The technical assistance (TA) for capacity building was financed through DFID and provided by a consortium under the British Council - Capacity for Basic Education (CUBE). Although acknowledged to be critical for project success, since it was known from the ESW during preparation that state level capacity was very weak, the TA did not deliver as anticipated. There were 16 PCUs (one for each participating state) that needed support from this TA, which was spread too thinly. Through misunderstandings about priorities in the basic objectives, CUBE did not initiate strategic capacity building for the management agencies of the project. Rather, they focused their initial efforts at the school level, which should have come later. Also, the initial TA only provided one advisor per state, clearly not sufficient in view of the quantity and quality of institution building required. Moreover, it took more than a year to get the TA contracts signed and a year and a half (around mid-2004) to get the state-level advisors in place. The year 2003 was lost to slow legal procedures and the year 2004 was largely one of loss from delay in the TA for implementation and capacity building.

3.6 Thus, early in 2005 discussions were held concerning restructuring the project, whose implementation had been rated unsatisfactory in almost every PSR up to that point. By June 2005 only 9 percent of the credit had been disbursed nearly three years after project approval. There was clear frustration in the Bank and in DFID as well as in the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMOF) in Nigeria, and this project was only one of several problem projects in the country portfolio. The operating environment of all projects in the country was acknowledged to be difficult because of the complexity of federal, state and local inter-relationships and steps were needed to improve the overall portfolio performance. Although it was observed by supervision missions that a few of the states were beginning to improve their performance, it was clear that some project restructuring, if not outright cancellation, was in order.

3.7 Based upon the potential for improvements shown in some states cited above, during the May 2005 supervision mission the project restructuring was planned. The project objectives remained the same, but some implementation changes were made: (a) inclusion of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in the project because it showed motivation and commitment, providing its own counterpart funds before restructuring was officially approved; (b) eliminating the need for counterpart funds, allowing the Credit to fund 100 percent of activity costs; and (c) allocating more funds to community self-help activities as was done in the previous PEP2 restructuring, which would help speed up disbursement .

appointed for Federal and States Special Account; (5) Resettlement Policy Framework adopted by FGN; (6) detailed and satisfactory procurement and work plans for first year by three states; and (7) Project Accounts opened by FMOE and three states with initial deposits. Having so much to be done by the states with their weak implementation capacity proved difficult. But even standard actions, such as establishing project accounts, were delayed by the FGN.

3.8 As a result of these actions and the gradual build-up of capacity in some states, disbursement of the credit increased dramatically, with cumulative disbursement rising from US\$3.2 million (December 7, 2004) to US\$44.5 million (June 30, 2006) at the time of closing. Most of this increase in disbursement came about in the activities under the State Component, especially the community self-help activities, while those activities under the Federal Component, which were aimed mainly at administrative and planning, showed very little improvement as a whole. The HIV/AIDS activities were especially disappointing, showing only about 15 percent disbursement of its allocated funds. However, given the project design, the State Component did not depend for its success upon the Federal Component. As in the case of PEP2, most of the progress in project performance at the state level was in the self-help projects.

3.9 Nonetheless, it was finally judged that the project would not ultimately achieve its objectives. After discussions among the Bank, which wanted to clean up its portfolio of projects at risk, and DFID, not happy with the progress of its TA provider, the FGN, now with two new reform and results oriented ministers in Finance and Education, formally requested to close the project two years early (June 30, 2006 instead of June 30, 2008) and to cancel a large part of the Credit (SDR 27 million)¹⁶. However, according to the Beneficiary Assessment conducted in late 2005, the states and Local Government Education Authorities (LGEAs) were not sufficiently consulted in the process and ultimate decision to close the project early. Some states reported that they were caught unaware by the early closure decision. Although the decision that the project would not likely achieve its objectives was justifiable, the manner in which the early closure was handled is the issue. The communication with the states and other stakeholders had left the impression, according to interviews of the PPAR mission, that a new and better designed project would be quickly forthcoming.

3.10 By the time of early closure the outputs delivered by the project were much less than envisaged at appraisal, especially for the Federal component. The table below shows that the federal component disbursed only 17 percent of the appraisal amount. The State component disbursed more of its appraisal amount (70 percent), but almost all of it in the last year of the project and most of that in the community self-help activities. The more detailed financial and cost tables showing how much was disbursed by the activities under each component are not shown here. These tables are extremely long for all activities in all sixteen states and the numerous federal agencies.

Table 3.1: UBEP Project costs by Component (US\$ Million Equivalent)

Component	Appraisal Estimate	Actual	Actual as % Appraisal
Federal Programs	21.0	3.5	17
State Programs	80.0	55.6	70
Total (incl. contingency)	101.0	59.1	59

Source. ICR for UBEP (2007). DFID provided US\$15 million equivalent in parallel co-finance for the project TA (not included in the above total).

¹⁶ Changes in ministers of education, as well as project management staff, present a serious implementation problem in Nigeria. There were three national Ministers of Education during the time of UBEP. Seven ministers of education have held office since 1999. While the Bank cannot control such events, in such an environment, broad commitment at the state level is critical, especially for a decentralized project.

3.11 The PAD for UBEP recognized the weaknesses in financial management. There was a Country Financial Assessment for Nigeria (CFAA) that revealed that the systems for planning, budgeting and financial management did not provide reasonable assurance that funds would be used for intended purposes. The financial and procurement management systems for the project were designed to address the issues raised in the CFAA. There was a State Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) set up in the Accountant General's office to provide financial safeguards. Since the ICR mentions problems of political interference and with ICB procedures, the PPAR mission followed up on this with the country procurement staff. In most cases, it was the result of PCU staff not understanding procurement and having ministers insist on following Nigerian government procedure. During the preparation of procurement documents these problems sometimes surfaced, but the procurement officers in the Bank reported that there was no misprocurement. The other safeguard in the project was resettlement policies with respect to existing school land, which turned out not to be an issue in the project.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

3.12 Design. The outcome and output indicators in the Logical Framework of the PAD are consistent with the objectives of the DCA except for monitoring quality of schooling. Neither the DCA nor PAD gives a clear operational definition of "quality schooling". The outcome indicators, outputs and targets chosen in the project document are not the most pertinent for producing evidence on this objective because, unlike PEP2, no attempt to measure or assess learning outcomes was part of the project design. Given that this was the first attempt at a decentralized education project in Nigeria, where the states implemented their own program of activities and resources were limited, the M&E design did not include a learning assessment activity. However, the PAD does not include enough discussion of this design issue, given that standardized tests were already available from PEP1 and PEP2, and some states may have been able to administer these tests in project and non-project schools. Even though the School Census is still being carried out, very little provision was made to define and collect relevant data for indicators at the level of project schools (and comparable non-project schools) that would help to see what the project contributed with respect to community self-help schemes, learning impact and impact on HIV/AIDS awareness¹⁷. In a country as large as Nigeria with over 50, 000 public primary schools, use of nation or state wide indicators is not likely to show project impact.

3.13 Implementation. Collection of other indicators and implementation of the MIS subcomponent was hampered by the generally slow start up of project implementation. However, the TA for the MIS activities was satisfactory in helping with collection and analysis of educational data from the states into a national framework. But the overall,

¹⁷ With respect to HIV/AIDS, hardly any use of information existing at the time of project preparation was used. For example, the 1999 Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey was available and had useful information about education and HIV/AIDS awareness, which could have helped establish some baseline. The NDHS (1999) shows that primary school as a source of information about HIV/AIDS ranks low among sources of information. After these two education projects with HIV/AIDS components, there is still no base-line established against which impact can be assessed. Likewise, for community self-help schemes, no provisions were made during preparation and restructuring to evaluate them for effectiveness.

beyond the publication of the annual statistical yearbook for education, implementation is negligible. Given the definition of basic education, the project schools included both primary and junior secondary schools. Complicating the implementation was the institutional arrangement whereby primary schools come under the SUBEBs and the JSS schools come under the state level MOE. Some states decided to provide resources only to primary schools. However, data on implementation is not broken down by the primary and JSS category.

3.14 Use of the data for decision-making. The data from the monitoring and evaluation system was hardly used during the implementation phase of the project. The project level monitoring system was weak. Information on project schools versus non-project schools was not used, which could have been done to assess project impact. Despite various efforts, the Bank did not receive a consolidated M&E report based upon the format agreed during supervision. Progress reports were submitted by the NPCU and several state PCU's, but these did not contain sufficient information to determine project progress and impact. However, the education sector data provided through NEMIS at least gave useful indicators for the transition rates in the state component. But given the emphasis of community self-help activities, there was little emphasis on the evaluation of these activities and hence very little useful information for community self-help activities came out of the monitoring and evaluation system. On the positive side, efforts at improving NEMIS continued with support from DFID and USAID after UBEP closed. As a result, some improved data was used in the preparation of the SESP (2007) and Education PER (2007).

OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES BY OBJECTIVE

Strengthen the capacity to provide quality schooling

3.15 The Results Framework for the project took implementation of state plans (at least 70 percent of the plan) by project-supported states as the indicator of this capacity. By the time of closure, most states developed their annual implementation plan, but none of them were able to implement up to 50 percent of their plans. It appears that delays in starting up and in providing appropriate TA reduced the potential of the TA to build capacity. Parental and community participation, defined as participation in PTA or school-based management meetings, was also taken as an indicator for this objective, which increased from 1,920 cases (September 2002) of participation to 3, 538 cases (June 2006). However, it was noted that most of this revolved around self-help projects and not much involvement in school, curriculum or textbook issues. The project also financed the purchase of about two million textbooks and 50,000 sets of learning materials, e.g., science kits, but no project sponsored training was provided for teachers in the best use of textbooks.


Raise primary school admission, completion, and transition rates, with a priority to the poorest areas

3.16 The admission rate into class 1 of primary increased from 46 percent (September 2002) to 55 percent (June 2006). Many of these states include the poorest ones as well as

conservative ones of the northern part of the country. This indicator at the end of the project did show an improvement of 9 percent, but well below the target increase of 20 percent for the project. Many other factors other than the project could be responsible for the observed increase, for example, the UBE awareness campaign of the government, which has been on-going since the announcement of UBE in 1999. If the Monitoring and Evaluation part of the project had tried to keep track of the participating schools and communities versus control group schools, greater attribution of these quantitative indicators to the project investments would have been possible.

3.17 According to the data collected by the project, primary completion rates (PCRs) showed an increase from 65 percent (September 2002) to 70 percent (June 2005) in the participating states, an increase of only 5 percentage points compared to the project target increase of 20 percent. Prior to the project, during 1996 to 2002, it is difficult to say what the year by year PCR trend was. However, the sector study by Hinchliffe (2003) presents a time series for the PCR from 1990 to 1998 showing a steady increase and then decline in the PCR to about 65 percent for both boys and girls (Figure 3.1). The increase in the PCR of about 5 percent came about in the mid-1990s when Bank projects were not very active, PEP1 being very slow during implementation at the time. The point of this is to show that modest changes in the PCR can occur as result of fluctuations in enrollment and demographic trends, without being attributable to a project.

Figure 3.1: Trend in Primary Completion Rates 1990s



Source: World Bank (2004)

3.18 The modest increase of 5 percent in the PCR from 2002 to 2006 could have been the outcome of UBEP, but it could also be the lagged impact of PEP2 (2000-2004) or the final years of more intense PEP1 activity (late 1990s). It could also be the impact of other government investments and the overall awareness campaign of the government since a similar increase of 5 percent came about in the mid-1990s as noted above without Bank project attribution. The PCR nation wide increased from about 62 percent in 1998 above to about 80 percent in 2005 (the Bank's EDSTAT data base), representing 18 percent increase over seven years versus the 5 percent increase in project states over six years. However, the underlying data and the method of calculating PCRs over time must be examined carefully before conclusions can be drawn. This should have been built into the M&E component given its importance as one of the project's outcome indicators.¹⁸

¹⁸ The PCR is usually defined as the ratio of completers to the population of completion age (usually the age range near the end of primary cycle). The large increase in the national rate to 80 percent might come

3.19 The transition rate (percent of primary completers who enter junior secondary) to junior secondary school also showed a modest increase of 7 percent from 38 percent (September 2002) to 45 percent (June 2006). This is far short of the project target rate of a 20 percent increase in the transition rate. In each of the targets for the indicators, there is no justification or rationale given in the PAD for the chosen value of 20 percent. There were no enrollment and progression projections to justify this target. If more JSS school places were constructed during the UBEP, this would contribute to the increased transition rate by providing more JSS classrooms. 4,250 classroom blocks were built and refurbished, but the project database does not break this down by primary and JSS, which should have been done for the project monitoring system.

3.20 The project's objective of raising admission, completion and transition rates also mentioned focusing efforts on the poorest areas. No indicators with respect to poorest areas could be found. The gender gap in primary schools was lowered by increasing girls' participation in class 1 primary from 43.6 percent in September 2002 to 47 percent June 2006 (World Bank 2007a). Although not indicated in the statement of objectives, the gender gap target is listed in the LogFrame of the PAD, with a target of 50/50 admission into class 1 by the end of the project. The gender indicator is relevant, but it should also have been planned how to get data about the poorest areas.

3.21 Still, most of the project participants in the states visited by the mission thought the project was improving in its third year (calendar 2005) and that they were not given enough of a chance to improve performance. When asked the counterfactual question about what if there had been no project, the answer typically was that the self-help activities would not have happened. Although anecdotal information supports the belief that these were effective, a systematic evaluation of their contribution of the 2,223 self-help projects to access and quality objectives should have been undertaken. Now community participation has become a regular way of doing business for them. Most of the state officials met by the mission contended that their states would have finished the project on time if there had not been early cancellation.

3.22 When discussing the counterfactual question of "what if no early cancellation" with Bank and DFID staff, it was admitted that maybe the project might have disbursed nearly all of the funds after restructuring, especially for the state component. Nonetheless, they believed that the objectives would still not have been achieved because the investments were too diluted by being spread over so many states. That a project can fully disburse and still not achieve its objectives is an indication of a design flaw, an issue to be discussed later in the lessons and perspectives section.

about from increased enrollment levels and low repetition rates, which are amenable to government and project interventions. In fact, FME official statistics show an increase in primary enrollment from 19.8 million (2002) to 22.3 million (2005), an increase of 13 percent. But rapid demographic changes in the relevant age group that comprises the denominator of the PCR can also fluctuate.

4. RATINGS FOR EACH PROJECT

4A. PEP2

Outcome

4.1 Overall PEP2 is rated as **moderately unsatisfactory** based upon the triad of factors—relevance, efficacy and efficiency. With respect to **relevance**, the first three objectives of PEP2 were aligned with the CSP 2005 strategies of improving social service delivery for human development and empowering the community through participation in self-help schemes. The objective of the fourth component to improve statistical and monitoring capacity was in line with developing the federal level monitoring and planning functions. The HIV/AIDS awareness objective is also in line with the health sector objectives of the CSP 2005, which emphasized combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. However, PEP2 was not in line with the new CSP objective of emphasis on lead states and stuck to the old design of a nation-wide project implemented from the national level (UBEC was the lead federal agency for implementation) with investments in project schools scattered across all of the states. Also, the design of monitoring and evaluation was lacking in the HIV/AIDS component, as there was no baseline survey of awareness and no method of monitoring the project's impact on HIV/AIDS awareness. The project did provide for measuring enrollment and learning outcomes in the project schools, but without a control group for comparison. Overall, considering shortcoming in both objectives and design features, the relevance of PEP2 is substantial.

4.2 PEP2 is rated modest with respect to **efficacy**. The first three objectives all work together to give a modest outcome (see Section 2). The first component trained a large number of teachers and principals, but there were no follow-up evaluations. The second component expanded facilities and allowed for substantial increases in enrollment. The third component provided books and learning materials that could contribute to both teaching and learning. The standardized tests indicate that there was a marginal increase in learning achievement, despite a large increase in enrollment in the project schools. Likewise the fourth objective concerning the project MIS made progress towards its intended outputs/outcomes. Without the standardized tests and school census, almost nothing would be known about project outcomes. The fifth component concerning the HIV/AIDS awareness objective produced many posters and other materials, but the impact of these was negligible. However, the weight of the HIV/AIDS component was small relative to the other components. Taken altogether, these considerations result in a modest efficacy.

4.3 When it comes to **efficiency** considerations, there is not enough project or country wide education data to do a quantitative assessment of how much activities cost relative to benefits. On the cost side, the cascade method of training, community involvement in construction and procurement, and the production of HIV/AIDS materials all involved relatively low cost methods. Thus, increased access was provided at low cost. Given that the gain in cognitive skills was only marginal, the benefits also would be modest. The recent Bank evaluation of support to primary education found that much of the benefit

from primary education comes from the cognitive skills acquired, not just from the years spent in school (World Bank 2006). Thus, efficiency is rated as modest.

Risk to Development Outcomes

4.4 The risk to development outcomes of this project is **moderate**. By the time of project completion, the staff of the UBEC (which was the successor to the NPEC under PEP1) had developed capacity in project management in general and Bank procurement/disbursement in particular. There was a tendency to staff turnover, but at least some of the staff have remained and now occupy senior management positions within UBEC. Although UBEC played a significant role in the preparation of the UBEP, its role was limited during and after the negotiations of UBEP (during 2002) because its legal status had not yet been confirmed by the UBE law (2004). Thus, full advantage was not taken of the management capacity developed during PEP2.

Bank Performance

4.5 Bank performance is rated **satisfactory**. The project was prepared rapidly (in only six months) and there was not enough time to address the capacity building needed, thus reducing the quality at entry. The Bank supervision team recognized these problems and responded appropriately and in timely fashion. The team recognized the need for substantial institutional capacity building while also providing the needed support in Bank procurement and disbursement procedures. Efforts were also made during supervision to get the monitoring and evaluation back on track, though this was only partly successful (the last PSR in December 2004 acknowledged that the project was not strong on measuring outcome indicators). After the MTR and appropriate restructuring and reallocation of funding for components, the project performance improved dramatically and agency counterpart staff showed improvement in their own capacity to manage and implement the project.

Borrower Performance

4.6 Borrower performance is rated **satisfactory** overall, despite a slow start-up and periodic problems with provision of counterpart funds. A more skilled team was deployed after supervision missions pointed out staffing and capacity problems. A few of the core staff, who are still with the current UBEC, informed the PPAR mission that they had been trained under PEP1 when they were NPEC staff at that time. Once the problems with counterpart funds were resolved and project funds were reallocated to pilot self-help schemes, this small core staff was able to improve the procurement and disbursement performance.

Monitoring and Evaluation

4.7 Monitoring and Evaluation is rated as **modest** overall. PEP2 took over and completed some of the monitoring and evaluation tasks that were supposed to be done under PEP1. For example, the standardized tests for baseline and post-project evaluation were to be done under PEP1. These standardized test results were used in conjunction

with the UNESCO/MLA study to get a trend of achievement levels in primary education. However, the PEP2 tests of project schools did not provide for a control group. Other features of PEP2 included collating and analyzing data collected under PEP1, so there was some continuity and follow-up. Although many individuals trained under PEP2 have moved on, the PPAR mission met with a few of the individuals trained under PEP2 so that there appeared to be some minimal institutional memory that was achieved under the monitoring and evaluation activities. However, shortcomings include the failure to evaluate the self-help and HIV/AIDS activities.

4B. UBEP

Outcome

4.8 Overall UBEP is rated as **unsatisfactory**. With respect to **relevance** UBEP is rated overall as substantial. The first objective of supporting the capacity of the government to provide quality schooling and the second objective of focusing on admission, completion and transition rates were relevant to the government program and the Bank's CSP 2005 for human development. The emphasis on the community participatory approach through self-help schemes also supported the CSP's strategy of community empowerment. However, the project had design flaws. As a result of selecting two states from each of the six geo-political zones plus including the DFID project states, the project covered too many states and spread resources thinly (US\$5.0 million per state irrespective state size). This is not in line with the current Bank strategy of focusing on a few lead states, although it was noted before that the project objectives were relevant to the interim CSP (2001) at the time of approval. Many of the states included in the project were poor ones, making the project objectives relevant to the poverty emphasis of the country strategy.

4.9 The **efficacy** of UBEP is rated as negligible. The first objective of supporting capacity to provide quality schooling does not have good indicators related to quality. The PAD specifies state plans and community participation as indicators, but the state plans fell short of the target and there was no target set for community participation. When the state plans were produced, they were inadequate and had to be redone. There was no indicator for learning outcomes or quality of education planned for in the project. Given the delays in the first two years of implementation (only about 3 percent of the loan was disbursed in the first two years), no outputs were produced during the first two years that could have had an impact on outcomes for both objectives. Concerning the admission, completion and transition rates of the second objective, outputs in terms of additional classroom space from self-help projects were delivered mainly in the fourth year of the project and could hardly have had a significant impact on those rates. Thus this objective is rated negligible for efficacy.

4.10 The **efficiency** of UBEP is rated as modest. Lack of quantitative data precludes a precise evaluation in terms of rate of return on investment. With respect to costs, much of the spending in the state component consisted of self-help activities, which are relatively low cost ways of adding or renovating classrooms, resulting in capacity to enroll more students for UBE goals or alleviate classroom overcrowding in many cases. The many project staff changes and need to re-start activities as a result with new staff

also undermined efficiency. The Federal component disbursed 17 percent of funds without much benefit, except for some progress on the EMIS. On the benefit side, the quality of the low cost, self-help construction was lower than that of a private contractor, resulting in only a modest benefit. When the PPAR mission visited schools, the contrast between buildings done by community self-help versus private contractor was easily visible. On the other hand, the community self-help classrooms were still sufficient for the purpose of teaching and learning if adequate teachers and books were provided. Beneficiary surveys and observations by the PPAR mission indicate that community empowerment itself was also a benefit from this approach. Thus, overall the efficiency comes out as modest. Given the substantial rating on relevance, the negligible rating on efficacy, and the modest rating on efficiency, the **overall UBEP rating is unsatisfactory**.

Risk to Development Outcomes

4.11 The risk to development outcomes is **significant** for this project given that it closed two years early and the implementation problems encountered from the beginning did not allow institutional changes at the federal or state level to take root. The objective of increasing capacity to provide quality schooling was not really achieved by the increased pace of school construction and renovation in the last year of the project. The emphasis there was more quantitative, making space to reduce over crowding or to increase access. The objective of increasing access and completion can be partially maintained as UBEC is still providing funding to the SUBEBs for self-help projects in local communities. While this is a good development, the emphasis is still too much on the physical infrastructure and not enough on the other elements of what comprises an effective school.

Bank Performance

4.12 Overall the Bank performance is rated as **unsatisfactory**. With hindsight it seems clear that the quality at entry was unsatisfactory. One indication of this is the large number (seven) of conditions of effectiveness and the nature of these conditions, some of which should have been fulfilled by appraisal in order to consider a project ready for implementation. For example, one condition was to have the Project Implementation Manual, including a chapter on procurement, adopted by three states. Another was to have three states furnish their first year work and procurement plans. Such conditions are more appropriately done by appraisal or negotiations so that there is assurance the project is ready to implement. There were a number of pressures on the Bank team and management to get resources quickly to the new civilian government so that it could deliver on its poverty alleviation agenda. The project suffered as a result of the Bank's desire to provide early support for the new civilian government, as well as the Bank's unrealistic optimism in believing the FGN could deliver on its promises to fulfill these conditions.

4.13 Bank supervision of the UBEP project is also rated unsatisfactory overall. Problems developed immediately after Board approval (September 2002) and the project was rated unsatisfactory even before it became effective more than a year (November

2003) after Board approval. This could have been taken as a sign that aggressive supervision would be needed, but the schedule of PSRs does not indicate any special actions. On the other hand, PPAR mission conversations with staff and donors indicate that the FGN and state governments tend to regard such projects that spread funding thinly over many states as relatively unimportant, especially given that Bank funding is small relative to overall government spending. Also politics during the election campaign in early 2003 almost paralyzed the FGN bureaucracy with no one willing to take simple decisions to push the signing of the DCA through the necessary legal steps in the government. Thus, more than a year was wasted.

4.14 The arrangement and TOR for the DFID provided TA after effectiveness was not adequately designed and the TA drifted out of alignment with the PDOs and the implementation program. The initial TA was conceived in terms of broad capacity development objectives (see para. 3.1). Apart from being insufficient in quantity it was also inadequate in terms of focusing on specific priority activities, such as project management, procurement, financial management, etc. Based upon the PSRs and discussions with project staff, overall Bank supervision was slow to catch and rectify this gap in the design of the TA. So a second year (calendar 2004) was in effect wasted with little progress to show on the ground. By then, it was apparent to some people interviewed that the project was flawed and would not achieve its stated PDOs and discussion of restructuring and outright cancellation began.

Borrower Performance

4.15 The performances of the borrower (FGN) and its implementing agencies (FME and individual states) are rated **unsatisfactory**. The FGN did not expedite the signing of the DCA, allowing it to languish in the bureaucratic steps without taking ownership. Although the aide-memoires and PSRs cite electoral politics as a reason, a committed borrower could have dealt with the signing of the DCA seven months prior to an election (Board approval was in September 2002 and the elections were March 2003). For whatever reasons, it appears the Bank misread the commitment of the FGN, FMF and FME to this project. Even though there was a federal component along with a state component, the federal component was small in the scheme of their interests with small amounts of funding scattered among many federal agencies so there was not much interest in the project at the federal level, where much of the conditionality was placed, and which is responsible for signing and effectiveness.

4.16 Although most of the states wanted to proceed quickly, since they were more direct beneficiaries of project funds, they were hampered by the FGN delays in signing and providing counterpart funds. The Federal Component was a very mixed bag of activities and agencies, none of which showed a great deal of interest and commitment. With no real ownership, there was no internally generated pressure to push for conditions of effectiveness. The states were also hampered by their own capacity limitations. Most had completed plans, but the TA providers reported that these plans were not of sufficient quality and had to be revised substantially. Also, as mentioned before, the TA was delayed coming on stream and did not provide the type of project management TA needed to start up a Bank funded project.

Monitoring and Evaluation

4.17 Monitoring and evaluation for UBEP is rated as negligible **overall**. The shortcomings in design and implementation were discussed previously. Many of those interviewed by the PPAR mission expressed the view that the NEMIS and the EMIS in many states are finally coming together (this is the third project to attempt to build up a MIS). There are still doubts about the accuracy of the data, but, as one knowledgeable observer put it, at least it is known where the problems are located and thus action can be taken to improve the situation.

5. LESSONS FOR FUTURE EDUCATION PROJECTS IN NIGERIA

LESSONS

Generic Project Lessons

5.1 Good performance during implementation cannot make up for fundamental design flaws. UBEP introduced too much complexity and spread limited resources too thinly among the 16 states and numerous federal agencies. The states did not have the capacity to implement such a complex design and spreading the resources too thinly did not allow for reaching the critical mass needed to have a catalytic impact upon the system, a lesson that can also apply to PEP2. In the case of UBEP, even though project performance improved dramatically during the last year before closure, nonetheless it was concluded that PDOs would not be attained due to design flaws. It is likely that projects with simple designs would be more cost-effective in Nigeria.

5.2 Lack of readiness for implementation cannot be compensated for by imposing many conditions of effectiveness. In hindsight the UBEP was not really ready to start implementation at the time of Board approval and the introduction of conditions of effectiveness could not make up for this lack of readiness. Although there were good reasons why the Bank management wanted to support the new civilian government after years of military rule, corruption and mismanagement, approving a project that is not ready in the end is counterproductive. It would be better to do simpler and more manageable projects in sequence in order to build up capacity or to use conditions of appraisal or negotiations to ensure the project is ready for implementation by Board approval.

5.3 It is critical for TA to be closely aligned with the PDOs and institutional capacity gaps and to be closely supervised by the Bank and co-financiers to prevent TA from drifting away from PDOs. Although the TA was implemented by the DFID contractors, the Bank did not exercise close monitoring and evaluation of TA initially. The broadly stated TOR led the TA providers to focus initially on school development and not on the strategic management competencies needed to manage a Bank supported project. Some PCU coordinators expressed the view that these advisors, while good

educational professionals, were not experienced enough in Bank procedures, resulting in a mismatch in the kind of critical TA support needed by the state PCUs.

5.4 Constant turnover of project staff cannot be prevented in many projects, thus requiring repeated training throughout project implementation in critical areas such as project management, financial management and procurement. Both PEP2 and UBEP suffered from this problem. As long as project staff who leave remain in country, the training they receive benefits the economy. However, it is not realistic to expect to train a PCU director at the start of a project and have that person remain with the project throughout. It is better to make provisions somehow in the project design to finance training for new project staff as a result of constant staff turnover. With respect to changes in ministers and high level officials, working with states that have already demonstrated strong ownership and commitment is essential, especially for a decentralized project such as UBEP.

Education Specific Project Lessons

5.5 Effective monitoring and evaluation of quality of education require a long lead time to design and develop and thus need to be addressed early in project design along with PDOs. A major shortcoming in the UBEP design was its failure to build upon the measures of learning assessment built into PEP2. Given that the learning assessments after PEP1 and PEP2 showed no significant improvements in achievement from 1996 to 2004, it was all the more important to continue learning assessments into UBEP, at least for those schools participating in the project. Also, despite changes in the average learning outcomes, it is necessary to use the monitoring and evaluation to understand the distribution of learning outcomes, especially for the poor. The average can remain the same or change, but results for the poor can move differently than the average. Moreover, learning assessments, or other measures for monitoring quality of outcomes, can be used in a way that feed back into the improvement of curriculum, teaching and school management.¹⁹

5.6 In addition to improved monitoring and evaluation of education projects, Nigerian education statistics are still deficient in coverage, lack of sufficient detail and reliability²⁰. Although recent improvements, with support from the donor community are acknowledged, there is a long way to go in obtaining education statistics that are needed for planning and assessing progress towards the MDGs and EFA. After taking stock of recent improvements, consideration could be given to a dedicated education statistical improvement program, supported by the donor community, without too many other components that would result in excess complexity.

¹⁹ The need to focus on learning outcomes and to evaluate them effectively is one of the main lessons from the IEG evaluation of Bank support to primary education, "From Schooling Access to Learning Outcomes: An Unfinished Agenda" (2006). UBEP is an example of the failure to do this, but the new SESP (2007), citing the IEG evaluation, will try to improve in this respect.

²⁰ Some donors commented that educational statistics were so unreliable for Nigeria that agencies often do not include them in their statistical compilations. For some years, UNESCO and the Bank's EDSTAT had many gaps in their education data for Nigeria compared to other countries. USAID and DFID also have been active in supporting improvements in Nigerian education data. Thus it appears international support to improve Nigerian educational standards up to international standards could be forth coming.

PERSPECTIVES FOR ONGOING AND FUTURE SUPPORT

5.7 Although only two projects – PEP2 and UBEP—are the subject of this PPAR, it is necessary to look at them in the historical context starting with PEP1 and looking towards the future with the newly approved SESP. The recently approved STEPB Project (2007), based upon extensive analytical sector work and preparation, also indicates the Bank's recognition of the importance of secondary and tertiary education as part of a balanced and high quality education sector strategy for Nigeria. This longer view highlights the need for the Bank to pay more attention to good design of projects from the concept stage, including a relevant and well funded program of ESW for the education sector as a whole, and to pay more attention to monitoring and evaluation as a necessary part of the design, not just as an add-on or as a separate component. Monitoring quality of education should be an essential part of this with quality defined not only with respect to the whole package of inputs but also with respect to learning achievement with an adequate distribution of learning outcomes. An essential aspect of monitoring and evaluation is that it feeds back into program management with the purpose of improving teaching and school management.

5.8 It is a step forward compared to UBEP that the CUBE team, which is again providing the TA, will conduct a baseline learning assessment and again at the end of the project. However, there is not much detail in the PAD as to how this will be planned, which should have been part of the project planning from the start. To understand attribution to the project these learning assessments must be linked with other variables, such as school quality and household characteristics, so that there can be analysis of the average and the distribution about that average for different socio-economic groups. There is still time to think about initiating a comprehensive learning impact assessment that can cover these three states in the project as well as future states that may decide to join the next phase of the SESP. The CUBE team might also look into using the results of JSS leaving examination still given for selection purposes to SSS level. While such exams are designed for selection of individual students as opposed to assessment of the system, some analysis of them can be useful in comparing project and non-project schools.²¹

5.9 In some respects the new SESP incorporates some important lessons learned above. The conditionality is much more limited and there is more front-loading of conditions as part of appraisal and negotiations. Also, the SESP will concentrate project resources on three states, which is a welcome departure from the past practice of including all six geopolitical zones of the country for political reasons. Yet there are some disturbing signs of the FGN again delaying effectiveness. This may well require very high level intervention from Bank management to avoid repetition of the UBEP experience.

5.10 If ESW is also factored into the Bank dialogue and support, the evidence suggests a positive contribution to the Nigerian education sector. The ESW included: (1) "School Education in Nigeria: Preparing for UBE", World Bank (2004) ; (2) the institutional

²¹ The mission observed that one JSS principal had a time-series chart of her school's performance on the JSS exam on the wall of her office. The trend of results was down from the late 1990s, which she attributed to more students in the school and less resources per student.

capacity for UBE study (Orbach 2004), (3) the science and technology ESW (2006) to prepare for the Science and Technology Education Post-Basic (STEPB) Project (2007), (4) the report "Language, Literacy and in Primary Schools" (Adekola2007), and (5) the extensive education public expenditure review (2007). This shows that the ESW is addressing relevant and tough issues for the education sector. In addition, the fact that the FGN is willing to abandon its political approach of distributing project resources equally over the six geo-political zones is a significant turning point. Even the failure of UBE was a lesson for the FGN as well as the Bank that pointed the way towards the new approach of focusing resources more as in the new SESP. The Bank needs to stay engaged in the Nigerian education sector for the long term, all the while being alert and ready with a pro-active response to developments that could be detrimental to performance of the portfolio. However, this long-term engagement has serious resource implications in terms of ESW, project preparation and supervision, monitoring and evaluation of quality, especially if a decentralized approach such as in the SESP is to be scaled-up. Effective partnerships between the Government and DPs and among the DPs can help alleviate the resource constraints to some extent, but careful sector analysis and management will be needed to set achievable and relevant goals.

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ANNEX A. BASIC DATA SHEET

SECOND PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3346)

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	61.11	70.31	115
Credit amount	55.0	65.55	119
Cofinancing ²²	6.11	4.76	77.9
Cancellation		0.85	

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY2001</i>	<i>FY2002</i>	<i>FY2003</i>	<i>FY2004</i>	<i>FY2005</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	24.5	53.5	54.8	55	0
Actual (US\$M)	0.50	3.07	8.95	37.58	57.29
Actual as % of appraisal	2.04	5.7	14.5	68.3	

Date of final disbursement²³: August 15, 2005

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Concept Note	06/21/1999	06/21/1999
Negotiations	01/10/2000	01/10/2000
Board approval	05/11/2000	05/11/2000
Signing	05/27/2000	05/22/2000
Effectiveness	08/21/2000	08/21/2000
Closing date	12/31/2004	12/31/2004

²² Government's contribution

²³ Application deadline was April 30, 2005, however a direct payment was received and processed on May 10, 2005 with payment value date of May 11, 2005.

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<i>FY2000</i>	<i>FY2001</i>	<i>FY2002</i>	<i>F2003</i>	<i>FY2004</i>	<i>FY2005</i>	<i>Total</i>
Appraisal/Negotiations	24.6						24.6
Supervision		22.6	8.9	25	54.9	51.3	162.7
Total	24.6	22.6	8.9	25	54.9	51.3	187.3

Mission Data

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Staff days in field</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	<i>Rating trend</i>	<i>Types of problems</i>
Identification/ Preparation	07/06/1999	5		TTL; Educ. Economist, Educ. Spec (3)	S	S	
Appraisal/Negotiation	09/22/1999	6		TTL; Educ. Spec (3); FMS, Proc.	S	S	
Supervision	10/27/2000	7		TTL; Educ. Econ, Educ. Spec (3); Mis. Spec.; Publishing Spec.	S	S	
	06/15/2001	1		TTL;	U	S	
	10/26/2001	9		TTL; Educ. Spec (3); Educ. Econ; Texbook Spec; School Cons. Spec; FMS (2)	U	U	
	05/17/2002	6		Head of mission; TTL; Educ. Spec (2); FMS; Proc Spec	U	U	
	12/20/2002	7		TTL; Sr. Educ Spec; Educ Spec (2); Proc. Spec; Sr. FMS; FMS	U	S	
	06/20/2003	7		TTL; Lead Educ. Spec; Educ. Consultant; Sr. Proc. Spec; Sr. FMS; FMS; Sr. Educ. Spec	S	S	
	02/13/2004	5		TTL; Educ Cluster Leader; Sr. FMS; Proc Spec; Educ Spec	S	S	
	07/30/2004	4		TTL; Educ Cluster Leader; Sr. FMS; Sr. Proc Spec;	S	S	
	11/15/2004	5		TTL; Lead FMS; Sr. Proc Spec;	S	S	

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Staff days in field</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	<i>Rating trend</i>	<i>Types of problems</i>
Completion	02/10/2005	8		Educ Spec (2) TTL and Educ Lead Educ Spec; Sr. Educ Spec; Educ Spec (2); FMS; Sr. Proc Spec; Team Assistant	S	S	

UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3711)

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	129	73.8	57.2
Credit amount	101	58.1	57.5
Cofinancing	15	15	100
Cancellation		42.2	

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY2003</i>	<i>FY2004</i>	<i>FY2005</i>	<i>FY2006</i>	<i>FY2007</i>	<i>FY2008</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	36.8	69.80	89.80	95.40	99.70	101.0
Actual (US\$M)						
Actual as % of appraisal		0.50	9.96	44.49	57.99	57.84
Date of final disbursement: 06/28/2007 ²⁴						

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Initiating memorandum ²⁵	06/21/1999	06/21/1999
Negotiations	08/07/2002	08/07/2002
Board approval	09/12/2002	09/12/2002
Signing		05/15/2003
Effectiveness	11/10/2003	11/10/2003
Closing date	06/30/2008	06/30/2006

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<i>FY01</i>	<i>FY02</i>	<i>FY03</i>	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>	<i>FY06</i>	<i>FY07</i>	<i>Total</i>
Identification/Negotiations	20.8	42.2	39.4					102.4
Supervision				26.7	99.7	97.6	19.3	243.3
Total	20.8	42.2	39.4	26.7	99.7	97.6	19.3	345.7

²⁴ Final recovery of the Special Account

²⁵ Concept Note

PSR/ISR Ratings

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP
1	02/24/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
2	09/23/2003	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
3	04/08/2004	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
4	06/08/2004	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
5	12/07/2004	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
6	04/21/2004	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
7	05/27/2005	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
8	08/31/2005	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
9	11/28/2005	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
10	05/10/2006	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
11	06/30/2006	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory

Team Members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/Specialty
Lending			
Audrey Aarons	Consultant	SASHD	Education Specialist
Olatunde Adetoyese Adekola	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH3	Sr. Education Specialist
Bayo Awosemusi	Lead Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Sr. Procurement Specialist
Philip M. Cohen	Consultant	EASHD	Book Specialist
Brigitte Duces	Operations Adviser	SAROQ	Task Team Leader
Anthony Martin Hegarty	Chief Fin. Mgt. Off	OPCFM	Lead Financial Mgt. Specialist
James Keith Hinchliffe	Lead Education Economist	AFTH3	Economist
Karen Alexandra Hudes	Sr. Counsel	LEGKM	Sr. Counsel
John E. Jordan	Consultant	AFTH3	Economist
Rogati Anael Kayani	Consultant	SDNCA	Lead Procurement Specialist
William B. Marke	Division Manager	LOAG2	Lead Fin. Mgt Specialist
Edward Olowo-Okere	Manager	AFTFM	Lead Fin. Mgt Specialist
Eliezer Orbach	Consultant	AFTH1	Institutional Specialist
Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola	Sr. Fin. Mgmt Specialist	AFTFM	Fin. Mgt Specialist
Donald C. Taylor	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH3	Education Specialist
Supervision/ICR			
Olatunde Adetoyese Adekola	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH3	Sr. Education Specialist
Mary Asanato	Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Team Member
Bayo Awosemusi	Lead Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Sr. Procurement Specialist
Jacob H. Bregman	Lead Education Specialist	AFTH3	Education Sector Leader
Brigitte Duces	Operations Adviser	SAROQ	TTL (2000-2004)
Halil Dunder	Sr. Education Economist	AFTH3	TTL (2004-to date)
Nguyan Shaku Feese	ET Consultant	AFTH3	Team Member
Ngozi Blessing Malife	Team Member	AFCW2	Team Member
Peter Nicolas Materu	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH3	Team Member
Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola	Sr. Fin Mgt. Specialist	AFTFM	Team Member
Tanya Lee Lorraine Zebroff	Sr. Education Specialist	AFCW2	Team Member

ANNEX B: TIMELINE

Year	Nigeria	World Bank
1960	Nigeria achieved independence as a parliamentary democracy. Ethnic tensions caused problems in political stability among Northern, Eastern and Southwestern states.	
1967-1970	Nigerian civil war when 3 eastern states secede as Republic of Biafra. War ends with their re-integration into the country. Continuation of military rule.	
1970s	Increased oil revenues allow for financing educational expansion and universal primary almost achieved.	
1979	General Obasanjo (later elected president in 1999) prepares new constitution making Nigeria a federal system under an executive president with independent legislative and judicial branches.	
1979-1983	Elections bring in a period of civilian government which ends in another sequence of military regimes after military accuses civilian government of corruption.	
1988	Government established National Primary Education Fund. National Primary Education Commission (NPEC) also established to reverse declines that took place in education as oil revenues decline.	
1988		Bank policy study. <i>Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment, Revitalization, Expansion</i>
1989		Bank ESW report issued "Nigeria: Primary Subsector" (June)
1990		PEP1 approved (December)
1993	General Babangida allows elections to take place. But candidate not backed by military elected and an alternative civilian president appointed by military. Soon after General Abacha takes over as military head of state. Considered to be most repressive of military regimes.	
1997	Government requests extension of PEP1 which was due to close.	Bank approves extension of PEP1 (June)
1998	Sudden death of General Abacha. General Abubakar succeeds him and starts preparation for civilian government. (June)	

Year	Nigeria	World Bank
1999	--Former General and head of state Olusegun Obasanjo elected and inaugurated as President. (May) --President Obasanjo announces UBE program. UBEC established by presidential decree as successor to NPEC. (June)	Bank begins preparation of PEP2 as a "bridge" project to support new civilian government (June)
2000	PEP2 becomes effective 3 months after approval (August)	--PEP2 approved (May) --PEP1 closed after 3 year extension (June)
2001		Preparation of UBEP started (July)
2002		UBEP approved (September) Mid-term restructuring of PEP2 (December)
2003	--Second civilian elections. President Obasanjo re-elected for another 4-year term (April). --UBEP signed after more than 9 months since approval (May) --UBEP becomes effective after more than one year since approval. (November)	Sector report published on "Preparing for UBE" based upon ESW done during preparation of UBEP. Analyzed education finance, enrollment trends and management (October)
2004	UBE law finally passed after introduction in 2001 (May).	Sector report published on "Capacity to Deliver UBE" based upon ESW done during preparation of UBEP (April). PEP2 closed (June)
2005		UBEP mid-term review. Restructured (February).
2006		UBEP closed early. Remaining credit (\$44m) cancelled (June)
2007	President Yar'adua elected (April)	--State Education Sector Project approved. Follow up to UBEP (March). --"Language, Literacy and Learning in Primary Schools: Implications for Teacher Development Programs in Nigeria", ESW produced (April) --Draft sector report on "Nigeria: Review of Costs and Financing of Public Education" reviewed in Bank. (June)

ANNEX C. LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

World Bank

- Olatunde A. Adekola, Senior Education Specialist, AFTH3
- Mary Asanato, Procurement Specialist, AFTPC
- Jacob Bregman, Lead Education Specialist, AFTH3 (emails)
- Bayo Awosemusi, Lead Procurement Specialist, AFTPC
- Halil Dundar, Sr. Education Specialist, UBEP and SESP TTL, AFTH3 (phone)
- Brigitte Duces, Operations Adviser, SAROQ, Former PEP2 and UBEP TTL
- Simeon Ehui, Sector Leader, AFTAR, Acting Country Director
- Eileen Nkwanga, TTL PEP1 and PEP2 (emails), AFTH3
- Eliezer Orbach, Consultant, WBIHD, UBEP Team Member
- Tanya Zebroff, Education Specialist, Country Office

Development Partners

- Peter Hawkins, Education Officer, DFID, UK
- Ian Attfield, Education Advisor Northern Region, DFID
- Tris Bartlett, Project Administrator, CUBE Team, British Council
- Stephen Baines, Policy Advisor, CUBE Team, British Council
- Ms. Iyabo Fagbulu, UNESCO, National Professional Officer
- Mr. George Igelebai, Education Project Officer, UNICEF
- Dr. Sandy Olesky-Ojikutu, Senior Education Advisor, USAID
- Ms. Croshell Harris, Deputy Team Leader Education, USAID
- Mima Kyojin, Resident Representative, JICA in Nigeria
- Mr. Kuniaki Amatsu, Assistant Resident Representative, JICA in Nigeria
- Auandele M. Kola, Education Expert, JICA in Nigeria

Government

- Dr. Jamila Suara, Director of National Project Coordination Unit, UBEP-FME, Abuja FCT
- Alhaji Bello Kagara, UBEC, Project Coordinator PEP2, Abuja, FCT
- Alhaji Hussain Hialu Pai (and staff), Chairman, Universal Basic Education Board, FCT
- Mr. H.N. Jackden, Acting Director for Academic Programs
- National Commission of Colleges of Education (NCCE), Abuja FCT
- Alhaji Abubakar Sabuwa, Executive Chairman, SUBEB Nasarawa
- Alhaji Saleh Abdul, Assistant Director, SUBEB Nasarawa
- Alhaji Hudu Sari, Chairman SUBEB, Kano State
- Mr. S. Umer Yola, Director of Personnel, SUBEB, Kano State
- Mr. Bello Usaini, Director of School Services, SUBEB, Kano State
- Ms. Magajiya Usman, Coordinator for Girls Education, SUBEB, Kano State
- Dr. Bashir Balarabe (and staff), Executive Chairman, SUBEB, Kaduna State

- Mr. Monday Madaki, Deputy Director Projects, SUBEB, Kaduna State
- Esther Myahwegi, Director PCU-UBEP, Kaduna, SMOE
- Malam Uba Hassan (and staff), Executive Secretary, SUBEB Niger State
- Alhaji Salihu Baba Tetengi Lapai, Board Secretary, SUBEB Niger State
- Mr. M.A. Madugu, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Science and Technology (former Project Coordinator UBEP), Minna, Niger State
- Chief (Mrs) Comfort Chukwu, Honorable Commissioner for Education, Imo State
- Mrs. Clotilda Obinna, Permanent Secretary, Imo State Ministry of Education
- Mr. Andrew Ihegawa (and his staff), Project Coordinator-UBEP, Imo State
- Mr. E.C. Chukukere (and his staff), Head of PIU-PEP2, SUBEB, Imo State

ANNEX D. BORROWER'S COMMENTS



UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION COMMISSION


Office of the Executive Secretary

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REF: UBEC/SPU/WB/VOL.V

11th JUNE, 2008

The Country Director,
World Bank Country Office,
Asokoro District,
Abuja.



ATTENTION: John Heath
Acting Manager,
Independent Evaluation Group

RE: NIGERIA-SECOND PRIMARY EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT NO. 3346) AND UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION
PROJECT (CREDIT NO. 3711)

DRAFT PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

This is to acknowledge, albeit lately, the receipt of your letter dated April 22, 2008 on the above subject matter. I am to express happiness that the Project reviews went on successfully and satisfactorily.

Having carefully studied the Draft Project Performance Assessment Report, the Commission wishes to agree with the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) on its comments on Project background with regard to Concept, Government-policies, Implementation strategies and Government partnering relationship with the World Bank and other International Development Agencies.

Executive Secretary, Dr. Ahmed Modibbo Mohammed

Education for All is the responsibility of All

With particular regard to PEP II, the assessment of the attainment of physical targets, disbursement, fiduciary, safe guards and closure of the project are also found to be acceptable. It is also true that not much attention was paid in the project design to systematic monitoring and evaluation to help judge the ultimate success in improving HIV/AIDS awareness. However, this did not discountenance the fact that, a lot of progress was achieved through the strategies applied by the Project in creating awareness through production of posters, radio and television jingles and the multi-purpose master-trainers sensitization workshop for teachers and head-teachers.

The overall comment on the Project impact on pupils learning achievements was however found to be hastily made because, in our opinion, this is a long term issue that could not have been objectively assessed within the life span of the Project.

We also noted that, there is a significant shift among the ICR, ICR Review, PPAR and the current IEG ratings. Whereas the ICR, ICR Review and PPAR all concurred that the overall project rating was satisfactory, the IEG rating departs substantially from that position by giving the project an unsatisfactory rating. That PEP II was not in line with the new Country Strategic Plan (CSP) objectives of emphasis on lead States should not be faulted because the idea of lead States was built in the 2005 Country Strategic Plan (CSP) at a time PEP II was either being closed or had closed.

Thus, in our opinion, especially considering the physical targets met, which is acknowledged by the IEG, the overall rating of the project in terms of relevance, efficacy and efficiency should be at least 'satisfactory'. The Project, it should be recalled strategically and greatly too had improved the capacity of both the Federal and State staff in the planning and implementation processes of the Universal Basic Education Programme.

For the many implementation flaws observed at the take-off stage of UBEP I, we tend to agree with most of the ratings of the project. But we are aware that considerable effort was put by both the World

Bank and the federal Government in preparing the 12 states for the take-off of the project.

It is only hoped that the lessons learnt in running the two projects will guide the design and implementation of future World Bank supported education projects in Nigeria.

Thank you.



Dr. Ahmed Modibbo Mohammed
Executive Secretary

