Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2273 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-42570 TF-92459) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 20.00 MILLION (US$30.00 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE FOR THE PROMAPUTO: THE MAPUTO MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM February 28, 2012 Urban and Water Unit Country Department AFCS2 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective February 28, 2012) Currency Unit = New Mozambique Metical (MZN) US$1.00 = MZN 27.55 US$1.00 = SDR1.553 FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS APL Adaptable Program Loan CCM City Council of Maputo ESMF Environmental and social management framework GIZ German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) IDA International Development Association IFMIS Integrated financial management information system IO Intermediate outcome M&E Monitoring and evaluation MMDP I and II Maputo Municipal Development Program, phases 1 and 2 PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PPIAF Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility PPP Public Private Partnerships RPF Resettlement policy framework Vice President: Obiageli K. Ezekwesili Country Director: Laurence Clarke Acting Sector Manager: Alexander E. Bakalian Project Team Leader: Uri Raich ICR Team Leader: Uri Raich REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE PROMAPUTO: THE MAPUTO MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1.   Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................................... 2  2.  Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ................................................................... 6  3.  Assessment of Outcomes............................................................................................................... 11  4.  Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................................. 19  5.  Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance .......................................................................... 20  6.  Lessons Learned (both project-specific and of wide general application) .................................... 24  7.  Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ............................... 26  Annexes Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing .................................................................................................... 27 Annex 2: Outputs by Component ............................................................................................................ 28 Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis ........................................................................................... 33 Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ....................................... 36 Annex 5: Citizens Report Cards .............................................................................................................. 38 Annex 6: Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR............................................... 41 Annex 7: List of Supporting Documents ................................................................................................ 49  Map of Mozambique ................................................................................................................................. 50  Data Sheet A. Basic Information ProMaputo, Maputo Country: Mozambique Project Name: Municipal Development Program Project ID: P096332 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-42570,TF-92459 ICR Date: 02/28/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: APL Borrower: MOZAMBIQUE Original Total USD 30.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 29.42 M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 30.00M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Maputo City Council (CCM) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 01/17/2006 Effectiveness: 04/25/2007 04/25/2007 Appraisal: 11/13/2006 Restructuring(s): Approval: 01/25/2007 Mid-term Review: 03/01/2009 04/20/2009 Closing: 08/31/2010 08/31/2011 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating Performance any) Potential Problem Project at Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time Quality of Supervision No None (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General industry and trade sector 4 4 Other social services 4 4 Roads and highways 20 20 Solid waste management 12 12 Sub-national government administration 60 60 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Municipal finance 22 22 Municipal governance and institution building 23 23 Other urban development 22 22 Participation and civic engagement 11 11 Urban services and housing for the poor 22 22 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Hartwig Schafer Country Director: Laurence C. Clarke Michael Baxter Sector Manager: Alexander E. Bakalian Jaime M. Biderman Project Team Leader: Uri Raich Kate Kuper ICR Team Leader: Uri Raich ICR Primary Author: Wendy Schreiber Ayres ii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) APL Phase 1: Strengthen the Maputo City Council's institutional and financial capacity to support achievement of long term service delivery goals, and to implement selected priority investments. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Project Development Objective for Adaptable Program Loan Phase 1 was not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Achieved Values (from Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target at Completion or approval Values Target Years documents) Indicator 1 : Nominal increase in Maputo City Council's own revenue over baseline. Value US$7.7 million US$9.8 million (180% quantitative or US$3.5 million (120% over baseline) over baseline) Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2006 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 Comments The actual value exceeded the original target value due to increases in solid waste fees and (incl. % improved collection of property and vehicle taxes. achievement) Indicator 2 : Urban solid waste collected and deposited in the dump (tons per day) Value quantitative or 253 tons per day 600 tons per day 650 tons per day Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2006 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 Comments The actual value exceeded the target value because the solid waste services provided in the (incl. % suburban areas of the city has increased services above those originally planned (from 110 to achievement) more than 120 lifts per day) to collect increased waste quantities of primary waste. Indicator 3 : Integrated financial management system in use and fully functional as designed. Integrated financial Complete databases of Value management system employees, providers, quantitative or None in use and fully and assets and payroll Qualitative) functional as functionality in place. designed. Date achieved 10/31/2006 08/31/2010 08/31/2011 Comments Activity was not completed during phase 1 of the program, implementation will continue (incl. % during the phase 2. achievement) iii (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Achieved Values (from Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target at Completion or approval Values Target Years documents) Organizational units with the new staffing table defined and existing personnel deployed Indicator 1 : (percent) The phase I reorganization has been Value 100% of completed. All 29 (quantitative None organizational units organizational units have or Qualitative) been covered by the exercise (100%) Date achieved 10/31/2006 08/31/2010 08/31/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 2 : Report card conducted and resulted disseminated annually. Three completed, with Value 2009/10 report card (quantitative Not done Done annually completed and or Qualitative) disseminated. Date achieved 10/31/2006 10/31/2010 12/31/2010 Comments Except for 2009, an election year, the report card has been administered and its results (incl. % disseminated every year since 2007. In 2010, the report card survey covered two years 2009 achievement) and 2010. Its results have been disseminated. Indicator 3 : Investment budget spent (percent). Value (quantitative 60% 80% 90% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 Comments Excluding funding under ProMaputo, 95% of the investment budget was spent. When the (incl. % program was designed and the target identified, investments were off budget. achievement) Indicator 4 : Roads rehabilitated under the project, non-rural (kilometers). Value (quantitative 0 kilometers 20 kilometers 85 kilometers or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2006 08/31/2010 12/31/2009 Comments This indicator substitutes for the original indicator to report on the core indicator for the (incl. % World Bank. The target was surpassed due to communities' preferences. achievement) iv G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 07/17/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.21 2 10/17/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.42 3 01/14/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 3.79 4 04/08/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.48 5 07/10/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.96 6 12/12/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.96 7 05/28/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 17.32 8 11/24/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 19.83 9 02/11/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 20.76 10 07/29/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 23.53 11 03/13/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 27.12 12 08/29/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 28.53 H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable I. Disbursement Profile v Highlights of Implementation Experience Taking innovative approaches to address challenges. The project included a number of innovative approaches that contributed to its success. These included:  Introduction of annual citizen report cards to solicit feedback from the public on the quality of services.  Recruiting recent university graduates under Bank-finance to work at the City Council of Maputo for a trial period, with successful candidates made permanent staff of the council.  Offering bonuses to high-performing council staff.  Fostering creation of microenterprises to collect solid waste in poor neighborhoods.  Implementing a communications program to engage citizens in service delivery through a variety of approaches, including organizing public forums at the neighborhood and district levels. Creating a strong partnership with government counterparts. The Bank team worked in close collaboration with the mayor and his team at the city council to design, prepare, and implement the project. The design of the ProMaputo Program became the manifesto of the mayor. Mainstreaming project implementation within the structures of the city council. The project was one of only two in the Bank’s portfolio in Mozambique in 2006 that was drawing on government structures, rather than on a professional project implementation unit, to implement a project. While this created challenges for implementation, particularly in the early years, it has also helped to ensure that staff of the city council obtain the skills they need to in the future effectively fulfill their service delivery mandates. Promoting inclusiveness by delivering services outside the city core, where about 90 percent of the population live, most of whom are poor. Prior to the project, only the city core enjoyed regular solid waste services. The project put into place services in the suburban areas of the city, which had never before benefited from solid waste collection. Recipients of services are gradually paying increasing tariffs to cover the costs of the services. Working in close collaboration with other development partners to ensure maximum development impact. The Bank team worked closely with the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) in designing and implementing the solid waste collection system, with GIZ providing technical assistance for the design of the system and the Bank financing its implementation. The need to tailor a financial management system in line with the capacity of the implementing agency. The one significant shortcoming of MMDP I was the inability to implement the integrated financial management information system as designed. The design proved too complex for the city council to manage. The city council under MMDP II is now designing a financial management information system that is in line with its needs and its capacity. 1 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal (brief summary of country and sector background, rationale for Bank assistance) 1. Country and sector background. Mozambique, like most African countries, is rapidly urbanizing and urbanization is projected to continue at a rapid pace. In the mid-2000s, over 30 percent of Mozambicans were residing in urban areas. With cities growing at about 3 percent a year, it is estimated that by 2030 the urban population will double to about 12 million people. 2. Maputo is Mozambique’s largest and most economically important city, accounting for about 30 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. In 2010 Maputo was home to about 1.1 million people, more than twice as many as lived in Matola, the country’s second largest city, and part of the Maputo metropolitan area. The population o Maputo swells during the day, as commuters come from the surrounding areas to work in the city. Maputo is also a city of extreme and growing inequality with approximately 70 percent of Maputo’s residents living in informal settlements and 49 percent living below the poverty line. Little investment has been made in the city’s infrastructure since independence, due in part to Mozambique’s long civil war which ended in 1992. As a result, most residents lack access to basic infrastructure services, including water and sanitation services, serviced and affordable land, roads, drainage, and electricity. 3. A lack of human and financial capacity has limited the ability of the City Council of Maputo (CCM) to deliver the services for which it is responsible: solid waste management, basic water and sanitation services, basic environmental quality, urban roads and drainage, urban planning, licensing of construction, municipal policing, and others. In 2005, only 1.5 percent of the CCM’s 2,500 staff had attended university, and only 7 percent had benefited from technical training. Even in key units, such as municipal finance, just 54 of 102 staff positions were filled. Of the 54 staff, only 18 had the required qualifications. Moreover, 11 of these occupied managerial positions, leaving just seven to staff to handle the technical work. Some 26 of the remaining 36 staff had only primary education. Yet, the financial directorate was better staffed than the others in the CCM. 4. In 2005 the total budget of the CCM amounted to US$6 per capita. The CCM faced substantial constraints in both own-source revenue generation and in budget planning and control. Only 5 percent of total properties in the city paid taxes each year. The city lacked an up-to-date property cadastre and other tools to assess and collect property taxes. It also lacked the means to levy and collect other municipal taxes and fees. On the expenditure side, the CCM was not able to effective plan, execute, and control expenditures. Without strengthening the capacity of the CCM, urban services and infrastructure would continue to worsen, threatening Maputo’s ability to serve as the engine of economic growth for the country. 5. Recognizing the crisis that lay ahead, the CCM, led by the Maputo’s second elected mayor, embarked on developing a 10-year municipal development program, called ProMaputo. Its goal is to raise the quality of life of municipal residents and create an environment conducive for investment and job creation. It would do this through improved delivery of services and 2 through mobilization of citizens and coordinated action between diverse actors. ProMaputo served as the basis for the Bank-financed ProMaputo: Maputo Municipal Development Program (MMDP), an eight-year program carried out two phases. The first phase of the MMDP is the subject of this Implementation Completion and Results Report. 6. Rationale for World Bank involvement. The World Bank’s involvement in the program was valuable for several reasons. First, the Bank is uniquely positioned to make the long-term commitment required for urban development, focusing first on institutional reform and building capacity for city administration and then on large-scale investment in infrastructure and services once the foundation is laid. Second, the Bank has developed considerable knowledge of what works and what does not in urban development through its support for urban and local government programs in Africa (including Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia) and in other regions, which it could draw on in designing support for Maputo. Third, it had experience working in Mozambique in supporting development of local government administrations under the Decentralized Planning and Finance Project, which closed in March 2009, and the Municipal Development Program that closed in 2006. Finally, the Bank is able to bring considerable human and financial resources to the effort, which has the potential of making a big difference in the delivery of infrastructure and services in Maputo. Recognizing these strengths, the government invited the Bank to take the lead in supporting a municipal development program for Maputo. 7. Contribution to higher-level objectives. The project was a central element of the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Mozambique for fiscal 2008–11, discussed by the World Bank’s Board of Directors on May 30, 2007. This is based on three pillars: (a) accountability and public voice, (b) equitable access to key services, and (c) broad-based economic growth. These pillars are aligned with the three pillars of with the government’s second poverty reduction strategy, Programa da Acção da Redução da Pobreza Absoluta II. The Maputo Municipal Development Program phase 1 (MMDP I) contributed to each of these pillars. It contributed to the accountability pillar by supporting a variety of initiatives aimed at involving citizens in planning, budgeting, and monitoring and providing feedback on government performance. Support for district participatory budgeting and the annual citizen report card are one such initiative. It contributed to the services and economic growth pillars by supporting improved city administration and investment in urban services and infrastructure. The project complemented others in the portfolio aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the public administration, including the Public Sector Reform Project, and the National Decentralized Planning and Finance Program, a multi-donor operation that scaled up to all districts the earlier Bank-financed Decentralized Planning and Finance Project. Finally, the MMDP I was fully consistent with the objectives of the Bank’s 2011 regional strategy for Africa, “Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It,� which are to increase Africa’s competitiveness and employment, to reduce its vulnerability to climatic and other shocks, and to improve governance and public sector capacity. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 8. The project development objective for phase 1 of the MMDP was to strengthen the Maputo City Council’s institutional and financial capacity to support achievement of long-term 3 service delivery goals, and to implement selected priority investments. Phase 1 was intended to create the foundation for large-scale investments in infrastructure and services to be financed under phase 2. 9. The project appraisal document specified three key performance indicators. These were:  Nominal increase in Maputo City Council’s own revenue over baseline.  Amount of solid waste deposited in the waste dump.  An integrated financial management system in use and fully functional as designed. 10. A table in annex 3 of the project appraisal document provides further information on the project’s monitoring framework, including intermediate outcome indicators, baseline and target values, and sources of information to track progress with the indicators. 1.1 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification: 11. Neither the project’s development objectives nor key performance indicators were formally revised. 1.2 Main Beneficiaries 12. The primary target beneficiaries were the inhabitants of Maputo city and its suburbs, estimated in 2010 to be about 1.1 million people, who were expected to gain from improved urban services and infrastructure. Inhabitants of poor neighborhoods were especially expected to benefit from improved solid waste collection and from improved access roads. Staff of the CCM were expected to be assisted from opportunities to upgrade skills, from working in a much more professional environment, and from improved relations with the public. Finally, businesses were expected to benefit from an improved investment climate linked to enhanced urban infrastructure and services. 1.5 Original Components (as approved): 13. The project comprised three components: (a) institutional reform and municipal governance, (b) municipal finance, and (c) planning and service delivery improvements. 14. Component A: Institutional reform and municipal governance (US$8.0 million, of which US$6.2 million IDA). This component comprised two subcomponents: (i) institutional reform and strengthening, and (ii) improved municipal governance. The first subcomponent was to finance (a) preparation and implementation of a restructuring plan for the CCM, (b) strengthening of human resources management, (c) simplification of administrative procedures, (d) creation of capacity of district-level authorities to plan and manage small-scale infrastructure and urban services, and (e) basic operating costs for the CCM. The second subcomponent was to support (a) citizen awareness campaigns, (b) training of municipal assembly members on their 4 roles and responsibilities, (c) workshops and other activities to facilitate communication among government agencies involved in delivering services in Maputo, and (d) development of public- private partnerships. 15. Component 2: Municipal finance (US$4.7 million, all IDA). This component comprised two subcomponents: (i) improved revenue collection, and (ii) improved expenditure management. The first subcomponent financed (a) a contract with a private firm to distribute bills for property taxes and measures to involve district administrations in revenue collection, (b) design and implementation of a single consolidated database and new systems for generating and distributing bills and for collecting taxes and fees, (c) improvements in the capacity of municipal service providers to collect fees, and (d) reform of tax legislation, and (e) training and capacity building to enhance the municipal revenue system. The second subcomponent financed training and capacity building in (a) budget preparation, (b) procurement and asset management, and (c) budget execution and control, including audits. 16. Component 3: Planning and service delivery improvements (US$26.3 million, of which IDA 15.1 million). This component comprised three subcomponents: (i) planning and management of urban space, (ii) infrastructure and service delivery improvements, and (iii) solid waste management services. The first subcomponent supported (a) preparation of spatial and sector plans and implementation of a municipal information management system, (b) creation of capacity in the CCM for strategic, spatial, and sector planning, and (c) improvements in the systems for land management. The second subcomponent financed (a) rehabilitation of existing roads and drainage, (b) construction of a new cemetery, (c) installation of street lights and traffic lights, and (d) construction of markets. The third subcomponent supported improvements in solid waste management. 1.6 Revised Components: 17. The components were not revised. 1.7 Other significant changes (in design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements and schedule, and funding allocations): 18. The project’s design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements, and activities were not changed significantly during project execution. However, funds were reallocated to account for changes in activities and underestimates in the costs of some services, particularly the costs of providing solid waste management services. 19. The project closing date was extended for one year from August 31, 2010 to August 31, 2011. The extension was granted to allow the development and implementation of the integrated financial management information system (IFMIS) to be completed. This was important because having the IFMIS in use and fully functional as designed was a trigger for phase 2 of the program. If this trigger were not met, the project team would have to seek a waiver from Bank management to proceed with processing MMDP II. The extension was also needed to permit the project to continue to finance contracts for solid waste management services until the contract- end dates. 5 20. The Financing Agreement was amended twice. The first amendment of March 31, 2009 allowed IDA to continue to finance 65 percent of the cost of solid waste contracts during the final years of the project, instead of 50 percent as envisaged in the original Financing Agreement. The change was needed because costs of supplying the services rose steeply in 2009, leaving the CCM short of funds. The second amendment of December 11, 2009 increased the procurement prior review thresholds for the project. The amendment permitted the Bank to identify the contracts that would be subject to prior review as part of its normal review of the procurement plan, rather than being bound by the thresholds specified in the Financing Agreement. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry (including whether lessons of earlier operations were taken into account, risks and their mitigation identified, and adequacy of participatory processes, as applicable): QAG–No QAG at entry. 21. Several factors of project preparation and design positively affected implementation. The design of the ProMaputo Program was based on extensive consultations with stakeholders to develop the vision, mission, and development program for Maputo. The stakeholders included the private sector, civil society organizations, national government officials, and members of Maputo’s municipal assembly (legislative branch) and city council (executive branch). The design also benefited from regular and open dialogue between the Bank’s task team and key staff of the CCM. The design of ProMaputo was also informed by the findings of municipal citizen report cards, and various studies on the province of Maputo. The design further drew on the findings of several studies, including the “Analysis of Current Human Resources in Maputo City Council (2005), studies of Maputo city revenues (2005), and of Maputo’s revenue potential (2006), a functional analysis of the CCM, and a public-private partnerships framework study (2006) financed under the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. These provided a comprehensive understanding of the situation of the CCM at the time of project preparation, and recommended measures for strengthening its operations and ability to deliver urban services. The project included activities focusing on each of these areas. 22. Project preparation and design also benefited from the personal commitment to the city of Maputo’s dynamic second elected mayor. The mayor brought substantial managerial and technical expertise to his position, reflecting his former positions as governor of the central bank and minister of finance. The mayor also enjoyed good personal relations with the national authorities, whose support would be needed to provide the CCM with the resources and autonomy it would need to be effective. The ProMaputo Program became the manifesto of the mayor. 23. The project appraisal document noted alternative approaches, the trade-offs between them, and the rationale for the final decisions. The document generally foresaw the risks the project would face and identified adequate mitigation measures, although it underestimated the risk regarding lack of qualified staff in the procurement department of the CCM, which it 6 regarded as moderate. It accurately noted as substantial the risk that the IFMIS would not be put into place by the time of project closing. 24. A thorough appraisal of procurement and financial management arrangements helped to ensure that resources were used as intended. The project was classified appropriately as environmental assessment category B (partial assessment), because the planned urban infrastructure and services were not expected to result in environmental damage or significant resettlement. All infrastructure investments for which sites would be identified during implementation were subject to review under the project’s environmental and social management framework (ESMF) and resettlement policy framework (RPF), which specified in detail procedures to be followed during the planning, design, construction, and operation phases of subprojects to identify and to mitigate potential adverse impacts. The ESMF and RPF report prepared for the project was publicly disclosed on October 21, 2006 in-country and on October 24, 2006 through the Bank’s InfoShop. The monitoring and evaluation framework was adequate, with well-specified project PDO outcome and intermediate outcome indicators and baseline and target values. The CCM and the Bank worked together to develop the results framework, which ensured that it reflected outcomes that both partners were committed to achieving. By the time of Board presentation the project implementation plan had been appraised and found to be realistic and of satisfactory quality, engineering designs and procurement documents for the first year’s activities were complete and ready for the start of project implementation. 25. Although the project appraisal document specified a large number of effectiveness conditions, these were appropriate in ensuring that the CCM had required management capacity prior to the start of implementation.1 The CCM quickly met the conditions, and the project became effective about two months after the Board date, as planned. In addition to the standard financial covenants, the Financing Agreement included covenants intended to ensure that the project met its objectives. These included covenants requiring preparation and submission to IDA a strategy to retain qualified and trained staff, entry into an agreement with the Electricity Company of Mozambique to allow the CCM to collect solid waste management fees, and agreement with IDA on bidding documents for the selection and employment of contractors to implement urban infrastructure and services. 26. In summary, the design was appropriate to meet the project’s objectives. 1 Conditions of effectiveness were: (a) CCM will have established an adequate financial management system capable of producing financial monitoring reports in form and substance satisfactory to the Association, (b) The CCM will have adopted the (i) a financial management manual, (ii) a procurement manual, and (iii) a project implementation manual, all in form and substance satisfactory to the Association, (c) the CCM’s 2005 audited financial statements will have been submitted in a manner satisfactory to the Association, (d) the CCM will have issued a request for proposals for selection of independent auditors for the audit of its 2006 financial statements, in form and substance satisfactory to the Association, (e) the CCM will have established the office of strategic and institutional development and appointed its head, (f) the CCM will have hired an institutional development advisor, with terms of reference satisfactory to the Association, (g) the CCM will have established a procurement department duly staffed by a qualified department head supported by a senior procurement officer, with terms of reference satisfactory to the Association, and (h) the CCM will have executed a Subsidiary Agreement with the Recipient. 7 2.2 Implementation (including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable): 27. Several factors affected implementation. The most important was the decision to mainstream implementation of the project within the administration of the CCM. In the mid- 2000s, this was one of only two projects in the Bank’s portfolio in Mozambique not using a professional project implementation unit for management. This decision led to implementation delays due to challenges with procurement, financial management, and contract management. None-the-less, mainstreaming implementation is critical for building lasting administrative capacity in the CCM. The CCM over time bolstered its capacity for project implementation by contracting advisors to provide assistance and training in the fields of project management, institutional development, strategic planning, infrastructure, revenue generation, expenditure management, social accountability, procurement, human resources management, engineering, IFMIS, information technology, and solid waste management. The CCM also enhanced its capacity by making special efforts to recruit recent university graduates to work in the administration and by offering bonuses to high-performing staff. These measures helped the CCM improve its performance over time. 28. Another critical factor affecting implementation was the intensive support provided by the Bank’s task team. The Bank team responded to start-up challenges with intensive supervision, and downgraded the project’s ratings for progress towards the development objective (to moderately satisfactory) and for implementation progress (to moderately unsatisfactory) in January 2008, nine months following effectiveness. The downgrades reflected slow progress with undertaking activities to expand the cadastre and in specifying the design of the proposed IFMIS. Both were critical activities required to improve Maputo’s revenues and financial management. The downgrades also took account of delays in activities related to the city information management system, in the development of the urban plans by the Department of Urban Planning, and in finalizing contracts with solid waste firms. The downgrades were intended to focus the attention of the CCM on finding solutions to key issues delaying implementation. The Bank team worked with the CCM to develop an action plan to overcome the obstacles. Recognizing that many of the factors required for the project to meet its objectives were outside the control of the CCM, the Bank team consistently encouraged the CCM to strengthen its linkages to key national ministries and departments and to utilities. Proactive supervision led to improved implementation performance and an upgrade in April 2006 to moderately satisfactory and in July 2006 to satisfactory in the rating for implementation progress (progress towards the development objective remained moderately satisfactory during this period, due to slow progress with designing and implementing IFMIS). 29. A third factor supporting implementation was an effective communications program that enabled the CCM to engage citizens in improving service delivery in Maputo. The CCM organized regular public forums at the neighborhood and district levels to discuss the findings of the annual citizen’s report cards and to hear specific ideas of how the CCM could improve its services to residents. Such forums were also used to learn citizens’ priorities for investments and budgets for the coming financial years. More recently, it has carried out public awareness campaigns through newspapers, television, radio, and the internet to encourage people to pay 8 their property and business services taxes. The CCM also conducted public awareness campaigns intended to address HIV/AIDS. These measures have increased the profile of the CCM. They also encouraged residents to get involved in improving the quality of life in Maputo. 30. The midterm review provided a comprehensive assessment of progress towards development objectives and implementation performance. The midterm review confirmed the overall relevance of the project, its objectives and key performance indicators, design, and implementation arrangements. It also identified implementation challenges and recommended extending the project’s closing date by one year to allow sufficient time to complete key activities and achieve its objectives. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization: 31. Design. The project appraisal document included a results framework with well- specified PDO outcome and intermediate outcome indicators, and with baseline and target values for all indicators. All three outcome indicators served as triggers for phase 2 of the APL, in addition to two of the four intermediate outcome indicators. The three PDO outcome indicators address aspects of the project development objective. Specifically, increases in own-source revenues and implementation of the IFMIS reflect the CCM’s strengthened institutional and financial capacity. Increases in tons solid waste collected and deposited in a dumpsite is an indication of the CCM’s ability to implement priority investments. Consistent with good practice, all the indicators were measurable and the targets were generally realistic. Due to their efficacy, many of the indicators have been retained to monitor progress under phase 2 of the program. 32. Implementation. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was integrated with other systems of administration, with line managers of each directorate assigned responsibility for collecting data in their areas of purview and providing them to the CCM’s Office of Strategic and Institutional Development, which is responsible for the overall program coordination and monitoring. Not surprisingly, the implementation of the M&E system took longer than expected, due to the CCM’s lack of experience with M&E. To address this weakness, the head of the Office of Strategic and Institutional Development prepared monitoring reports using the traffic light approach that makes clear who is complying with his or her responsibility to provide data and who is not. The reports formed the basis for weekly staff discussions on implementation progress and for periodic presentations to the mayor, the municipality’s consultative council, the municipal assembly, and other stakeholders. Using such graphic reports proved effective in focusing attention on the issues; data collection and reporting improved markedly once in place. The Bank team reported on the functioning of the project’s M&E system in each aide memoire, noting steady progress in implementation during the project’s life. The project also financed three municipal citizen report cards to measure trends in citizens’ views of the quality of services being delivered by the CCM. 33. Utilization. The CCM and Bank teams used the monitoring information as the basis of their discussions during each implementation support mission. Specifically, they used the information to identify areas of particular challenge and to identify measures to address them. 9 For example, the teams observed slow procurement of several major contracts (human resources management, IFMIS, CCM restructuring) and agreed on actions (such as hiring more procurement officers under Bank-finance) to speed up the process. The CCM used the monitoring reports to report on implementation progress to the mayor, the municipality’s consultative council, the municipal assembly, and other stakeholders. This helped to motivate CCM staff to contribute to the project. It also helped further the dialogue with national authorities on issues such as the need to mobilize own-source revenues to effectively deliver urban services and infrastructure. The findings of the annual citizen report cards were widely disseminated and played an important role in focusing the attention of the CCM staff on their responsibilities to deliver services to residents. Public forums led by the president and the councilors to discuss the findings with city officials proved instrumental in strengthening accountability of the CCM to citizens. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance (focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable): 34. The CCM struggled to comply with the Bank’s fiduciary policies in the early years of implementation. Quarterly financial monitoring reports were often late, and many contained errors. Several annual audit reports were not submitted on time. Early audit reports revealed accountability issues at the CCM. Financial management was rated moderately satisfactory during most of the project implementation period, including at closing. It was rated moderately unsatisfactory in two Implementation Status Reports (November 24, 2009 and February 11, 2010). This rating arose from late submission of the 2008 audit report (which was due in February 2009, but was received only in November 2009), and to its qualified opinion on the CCM’s financial statements, for reasons including the inability of the auditors to verify assets, and some issues related to the project’s system of internal controls and accountability. 35. The CCM had difficulty complying with the Bank’s procurement procedures, particularly in the early years of implementation, which led to delays in project execution. The challenges were due in part to the decision to use the CCM structures to implement the project, rather than a specialized project implementation unit. In accordance with Bank advice, the CCM sent four staff for training on the Bank’s procurement procedures. It also contracted advisors to bolster capacity of the municipal procurement department. However, turnover of procurement staff was very high (as is true with many donor-financed projects), necessitating continuous recruitment and training of new procurement specialists. Some weaknesses remained at project closing in the procurement filing system and in contract management. 36. The project complied fully with the Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies. Several missions included Bank safeguard specialists, who visited project sites, interviewed project affected people, and held discussions with district and municipal staff and with officials from the Ministry of Environmental Coordination. They found that resettlement associated with road upgrading was carried in full compliance with the project’s RPF, prior to the commencement of the works. They also noted that the solid waste firms and microenterprises were generally providing workers with protective clothing and with training aimed at encouraging its use. Several activities with potential environmental and social impacts that were 10 initially programmed for phase 1 were shifted to phase 2. These included closure of a waste dump. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase (including transition arrangement to post- completion operation of investments financed by present operation, Operation & Maintenance arrangements, sustaining reforms and institutional capacity, and next phase/follow-up operation, if applicable): 37. The MMDP I was conceived as the first phase of an eight-year program. Although the closing date for phase 1 was extended by one year, phase 2 was approved on September 30, 2010 and became effective on January 21, 2011, less than six months later than originally planned. The project development objective of phase 2 is to improve the delivery and sustainability of priority municipal services in Maputo municipality. Phase 2 thus builds on the institutional foundation laid under phase 1, as planned. Phase 2 is also supporting reforms and capacity building left incomplete under phase 1. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation (to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy): Overall rating: Highly Satisfactory 38. Objectives. The overall objectives of MMDP I were and remain highly relevant. They reflect the importance of strengthen the institutional and financial capacity of the CCM to effectively deliver services and infrastructure. As mentioned in section 1.1, the project’s objectives are consistent with the objectives of the CCM’s ProMaputo Program and with Mozambique’s second poverty reduction strategy, covering 2006–09. The project’s objectives are in conformity with the objectives of the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy for fiscal 2008– 11, which explicitly names accountability and public voice, equitable access to key services, and broad-based economic growth as critical goals. 39. Design. The design was and remains highly relevant. The overall design was appropriate to support the substantial institutional reforms and capacity building required to enable the CCM to effectively deliver services and infrastructure for which it was responsible. The design was based on extensive consultations with stakeholders, and on analytical work covering all aspects of the CCM’s functions and institutional setup. The consultations and analytical work highlighted the weaknesses in CCM’s organizational structure, management systems, accountability arrangements, and financing, among others, and recommended approaches for addressing them. The work formed the basis of the CCM’s 10-year ProMaputo Program and the Bank-financed MMDP, which is continuing under phase 2. 40. Implementation. Implementation arrangements were and remain highly relevant. The Bank team appropriately mainstreamed implementation of the MMDP I within the CCM organizational structure. This was aimed at both facilitating the transfer of knowledge and promoting sustainability of capacity built. The MMDP I supported advisors in the fields of 11 project management, institutional development, strategic planning, infrastructure, revenue generation, expenditure management, social accountability, procurement, human resources management, engineering, IFMIS, information technology, and solid waste management, and others as needed. The advisors ensured that implementation stayed on track, and helped build capacity of CCM staff through on-the-job training. The project also financed the contracts of young university graduates for a fixed period, as a means of rapidly enhancing staff capacity at the CCM. At the end of the trial period, the successful young people were offered staff contracts at the CCM under CCM financing. The project’s M&E arrangements were highly relevant, with detailed monitoring reports highlighting achievements and implementation challenges. These reports formed the basis of discussions with both staff and high-level decision makers, which helped to focus attention of project implementers on finding solutions to obstacles. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 41. MMDP phase 1 largely achieved its objectives to strengthen the Maputo City Council’s institutional and financial capacity to support achievement of long-term service delivery goals, and to implement selected priority investments. Through introduction of reforms and strengthening of capacity, the CCM is now much more capable of delivering on its mandate and contributing to an improving quality of life in Maputo than it was prior to the start of the project. All but one of the PDO outcome targets were achieved. All of the intermediate outcome indicators were achieved and most of the component-level targets were met. Specifically:  Maputo City Council’s own revenue rose. Revenues rose from US$3.5 million in 2006 to US$9.8 million (annualized) by March 2010. This is a gain of 180 percent over baseline, and significantly higher than the 120 percent original target value. Revenues rose due primarily to increases in solid waste fees and improved collection of property and vehicle taxes.  The quantity of urban solid waste collected and deposited in the dump rose. Quantities rose from 253 tons per day in 2006 to 650 tons per day by August 2011. Improvements in solid waste management was one of the significant achievements of the MMDP I. The project financed two solid waste collection contracts, with one firm covering the urban core and the other focusing on the suburbs. This provided for the first time services outside the city core, where about 90 percent of residents live and are poor. The number of people served with regular solid waste collection services thus rose from about 100,000 in 2006 to 1 million in 2011. The firms deposited large collection containers at regular intervals and emptied them at least once a day. The project also supported the creation of microenterprises to collect refuse in densely populated poor neighborhoods, which are best served with handcarts manned by two operators on foot. The handcart operators empty their bins into the large containers, which are situated on the major roads. The large firms and the microenterprises, along with municipal employees, thus form part of an integrated system of solid waste management. Solid waste collection fees have been gradually increased to cover the costs of solid waste collection, and the CCM will progressively take responsibility for paying for the services. See box 1 for more information on the role of the microenterprises in the overall system. 12 Box 1: Microenterprises collect waste and create jobs for neighborhood residents One of the major challenges for waste collection is the access to the densely populated suburban neighborhoods where about 90 percent of Maputo’s residents reside. CCM introduced a solution that is based on a two-step waste collection system. The first step, primary waste collection, is operated by locally-based microenterprises that provide a simple door-to-door waste collection service twice a week with locally available handcarts. The handcart collectors deposit the waste in large dumpsters that are placed at regular intervals along the main thoroughfares. A large firm under contract with the municipality empties the dumpsters once a day and transfers the waste to the municipal waste disposal site. In 2011, the CCM extended this service to all 43 suburban neighborhoods, providing services for the first time to about 900,000 residents. Each microenterprise employs 8–30 workers, and collects waste from 2,000–8,000 households. The employees are all recruited from the same neighborhoods served by the microenterprises, which promotes trust, and thus the sustainability of the services. Some 35 microenterprises selected through a competitive process are now employing about 590 workers. They collect an average of 400 tons of waste per day. The microenterprises have a formal service contract with CCM, based on the population and settlement characteristics of each neighborhood. The total costs of the services in 2011 were US$104,000, or roughly US$0.65 per household per month. The service is fully covered through the waste fee, collected through the electricity billing system. 42. Although progress was made, one outcome target has been more difficult to meet than expected. This is:  Integrated financial management system in use and fully functional as designed. Early during project implementation, a World Bank IFMIS specialist advised the CCM on general design issues and assisted with drafting terms of reference and bidding documents for procurement of an IFMIS firm. After significant delays, a contract was signed in December 2008 with a firm to design and implement an IFMIS. The CCM enhanced its capacity to oversee the work by recruiting an IFMIS advisor to be part of its team. The Bank also supported the activity by providing advice through its own IFMIS expert. However, designing and implementing the IFMIS proved more difficult than expected. One issue is a very comprehensive public financial management law in Mozambique that requires government entities to adhere to standards set by the Ministry of Finance before they can introduce an IFMIS. The Ministry of Finance was slow in providing agreeing on the proposed design, delaying the start of the work. The proposed design then proved to be too complex to implement in a context of low capacity in the CCM. The firm was also unable to meet either the agreed standards or the timetable for the work. By January 2010, it was clear that this activity would not be completed by August 31, 2010, the closing date of the MMDP I. The Bank approved an extension of the closing date for one year to August 31, 2011 to allow the activities that were underway to be completed. The Bank team sought a waiver for the trigger that could not be met on the grounds that the project had otherwise been implemented satisfactorily, that 13 the work on the IFMIS would continue under the MMDP II, and that the lack of an IFMIS would not jeopardize implementation of the second phase. The Board approved the MMDP II on September 30, 2012. At the close of the MMDP I, the CCM had in place only a complete database of employees, providers, and assets, and payroll functionality in place. Under MMDP II, the CCM is preparing a paper laying out the alternatives to a full IFMIS for its financial management. In consultation with the Bank team and with support of the MMDP II, it will design and implement the most appropriate system for its needs and capacity. Specifically, CCM has asked the Ministry of Finance to lead the design work to ensure that the system conforms to the national standards. An institute under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, the Centro de Desenvolvimento de Sistemas de Informação de Finanças (Center for Development of Public Finance Information Systems), is overseeing the design and implementation of the IFMIS at the CCM. 43. All four intermediate outcomes were achieved. Specifically:  Organizational units with the new staffing table were defined and existing personnel deployed. Following significant delays, related in part to changes in the mayor and key personnel at the CCM following the elections of October 2009, a new staffing table had been prepared for all 29 organizational units of the CCM and staff had been deployed in line with the staffing table. Those staff found to lack the necessary qualifications to fill the new positions, were offered training to acquire the skills or positions in other parts of the government. The rationalization of the human resources of the CCM is a major step forward in increasing its capacity to perform.  Report cards were conducted and their results disseminated annually. Three report cards were completed under the MMDP I, covering 2007, 2008, and 2009/10 to account for the election year. The report cards have proved to be very valuable tools in furthering the dialogue between the CCM and the residents of Maputo and its suburbs. While citizens previously expected little from the CCM, the report cards have focused attention on the mandates of the CCM and have led to a significant increase in demand from citizens for services. Staff of the CCM are required to participate in forums with citizens to discuss the findings of the report cards. Staff at the CCM report that this interaction is motivating them to improve delivery of services and thus the scores in the next citizen report card.  The proportion of the investment budget spent rose. The proportion of the CCM’s capital budget spent (including ProMaputo) rose from 60 percent in 2010 to 90 percent in 2010. Excluding ProMaputo, 95 percent of the CCM’s capital budget was spent in 2010.  Roads rehabilitated under the project, non-rural, reached 85 kilometers by end 2009. This is significantly higher than the original target of 20 kilometers for MMDP I. The target was surpassed because people living in the periphery of Maputo identified improved access roads as a priority for them. The CCM responded by focusing attention on improving access roads in the later years of the project. 14 3.3 Efficiency (Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return, cost effectiveness, e.g., unit rate norms, least cost, and comparisons; and Financial Rate of Return): 44. Efficiency and cost effectiveness of the roads investments were satisfactory. The project appraisal document provided estimates of the economic rate of return and net present value of upgrading various roads in the Maputo area, including one—the Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote—that the project ultimately supported. The main benefits were due to reductions in vehicle operating costs due to improvements in the quality of the road. Traffic was assumed to grow by 4.1 percent per year. In actuality, traffic grew by 5.5 percent per year, and vehicle operating costs fell by more than projected. The current estimate of the net present value and of the economic rate of return are presented in the table below. Table 1: Cost benefit analysis for the Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote: Current calculations compared with appraisal estimates Current estimates Appraisal estimate Avenida Sebastião Net present value (US$) 3.6 million 3.2 million Marcos Mabote Economic rate of return 103 percent 100 percent 45. The original economic analysis referred to a number of nonquantifiable economic benefits, such as savings in travel time, increases in values of properties that become more accessible, and reduced costs of repairing roads, structures, and property arising from improved drainage. The actual nonquantified benefits are likely to be significant. The Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote connects the expansion areas of the city to the downtown. These areas are in the suburbs of the city, and are being developed to accommodate people resettled from the core city to make way for infrastructure and to house the increasing numbers of rural to urban migrants. The extension of the Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote has led to much reduced travel times between the core city and the suburbs, allowing residents to get to their jobs and access services. It has also led to rising property values, as land is converted from agricultural uses for housing and business use. Inclusion of drainage systems has reduced stormwater damage to the road and to nearby structures. Creation of walkways has led to improved traffic flow and greater comfort for pedestrians. The story is similar for Avenida Nelson Mandela. This major thoroughfare connects the core city to outlying areas. Both roads also connect to the highway that connects Maputo to the northern parts of the country. Cost effectiveness 46. The MMDP I supported three roads projects in addition to the rehabilitation of Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote. Table 2 shows the details of all the road projects supported under the MMDP I. 15 Table 2: Details of roads projects supported under MMDP I Street Traffic Length Lanes Width Total cost Cost per Nature of work count (kilometers) sidewalks (US$) meter (annual (m) lane/kilometer average daily traffic) Avenida 26,235 5.6 4 3 $4,748,961 $212,007 Rehabilitation and Sebastião extension (paved), Marcos including addition Mabote of drainage systems and sidewalks Avenida 13,202 5.4 3 4 $3,939,351 $243,170 Rehabilitation and Nelson extension (paved), Mandela including addition of drainage systems and sidewalks Unpaved 40 2 0 $654,793 $8,185 Excavation, roads in regraveling, addition municipal of drainage ditches, districts 2, signaling, 3, and 5 landscaping. Unpaved 34 2 0 $665,621 $9,789 Excavation, roads in regraveling, addition municipal of drainage ditches, districts signaling, Catembe landscaping. Total 85 $10,008,726 47. The unit costs of rehabilitating and regraveling roads under the MMDP I were well below the average for African countries, according to a background paper prepared for the World Bank’s 2008 Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. These costs are presented in table 3. The unit costs of rehabilitating the Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote were below the average of the lowest quartile and the rehabilitation of Avenida Nelson Mandela was only slightly higher than the average. Notably, the unit costs of regraveling were substantially lower than the average of the lowest quartile for this type of work. Table 3: Unit costs of road construction and maintenance in Africa, 2008 Type Unit Lower quartile Median quartile Upper quartile Rehabilitation US$/lane/km $220,186 $352,613 $505,323 (paved) less than 50 kilometers Regraveling US$/lane/km $12,835 $15,625 $19,490 Source: World Bank, 2008. “Unit Costs of Infrastructure Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa,� Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, background paper 11, June. 16 Solid Waste Management Cost effectiveness 48. Cost effectiveness of the investments in solid waste services was satisfactory. A cost benefit analysis for the investments in solid waste management was carried for the appraisal of the MMDP I. This calculated the internal rate of return to be 20 percent and the net present value of the cash flow at a discount rate of 12 percent to be US$650,000. Unfortunately, data are not available to permit an update of the estimates from the original economic analysis. 49. However, a comparison of the costs of delivering solid waste services in Maputo with those in other medium-size cities in developing indicates that costs in Maputo are well within the norms. See table 4 for details. Table 4: Average per capita and per ton costs of solid waste services in Maputo compared with medium size cities in developing countries (US$m) Cost per capita per year (US$) Cost per ton (US$) Maputo 2010 3.67 20 Medium-size cities 2006* 3.33–4.00 17.78–26.67 Source: Shantha R. Parthan, Mark W. Milke, David C. Wilson and John H. Cocks. 2011. “Cost Function Analysis for Solid Waste Management: A Developing Country Experience.� In Waste Management and Research, November 10, 2011. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating (combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency): Rating: Satisfactory 50. Achievement of the objectives of the MDP I is rated satisfactory. The operation objectives, design, and implementation arrangements were and remain highly relevant. The operation achieved nearly all of its intended outcomes. The CCM’s institutional and financial capacity to support achievement of long-term service delivery goals and to implement selected priority investments has been significantly strengthened. Efficiency and cost effectiveness of investments in roads were satisfactory. The roads projects supported under the MMDP I generated an economic rate of return of 103 percent and a net present value of US$3.6 million. Unit costs of all roads projects were lower than average for roads projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. Solid waste services were delivered cost effectively. The project’s one shortcoming was the failure to put into place a functioning IFMIS prior to the closing of the project. However, MMDP II is supporting implementation of a computerized financial management system, so its absence under MMDP I does not pose a risk to the sustainability of the development outcome of the project. High relevance and satisfactory achievement of objectives justifies an overall outcome rating of satisfactory for the operation. 17 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (if any, where not previously covered or to amplify discussion above): (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 51. The MMDP I did not have a specific poverty, gender, or social development focus. However, the expansion of solid waste services to poor suburban neighborhoods has been a major benefit for the poor who no longer have to live with unsightly and often unhealthy informal garbage dumps. The creation of the solid waste microenterprises has also generated hundreds of jobs for local residents, many of whom are women. The project also supported the construction of a facility where waste pickers can sort through trash in safe working conditions and has promoted the use of protective clothing by trash collectors. Upgrading of access roads that link suburban areas with downtown Maputo is also disproportionately benefiting the poor, who can now access jobs and services more quickly and at lower cost than previously. As noted above, the undertaking annually of the municipal score card survey has shifted the dynamic between the CCM as a provider of services and Maputo residents, who now much more vocally demand services to which they are entitled. Over time, this is expected to lead to greater transparency and accountability of the CCM to citizens, and to promote social development more broadly. The MMDP I supported the definition and implementation of an HIV/AIDS strategy, a workplace policy, and an action plan, aimed at reducing the risk of transmitting HIV/AIDS and of mitigating the impact of those affected. Specific activities included awareness campaigns, voluntary testing and counseling services, workplace advocacy, and provision of nutritional support to family members living with HIV/AIDS, among others. Support for such activities will continue under MMDP II. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening (particularly with reference to impacts on longer- term capacity and institutional development): 52. The project helped to bring about key institutional reforms intended to increase the capacity of the CCM to effectively and efficiently deliver services. Specifically, it supported the restructuring of the CCM to align its organizational structure with its functions, strengthening of human resources management, adoption of modern information management systems, improvements in budgeting, revenue mobilization, and accounting. These far-reaching reforms are already resulting in improved services for Maputo households and businesses. 53. The project also supported significant reorganization in the way solid waste services are delivered. It encouraged the CCM to focus on the core functions of policy development and planning of solid waste services, while contracting out to private firms and microenterprises the job of collecting and disposing of garbage. The firms and microenterprises are paid on the basis of performance, so have a strong incentive to deliver the services. Residents have noticed that services have improved and are now paying increasing amounts to sustain them. The project facilitated the creation of some 25 public private partnerships. Private enterprises are now managing and maintaining municipal parks and gardens, parking lots, and public sanitary facilities under public-private partnership arrangements. See box 2 for more on public private partnerships. 18 Box 2: Public private partnerships have enhanced the capacity of the CCM to deliver a variety of services The CCM’s program of public private partnerships (PPPs) began in 2005 during the formulation phase of MMDP I. Through the World Bank, the CCM made preliminary contacts with the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), whose staff expressed strong interest in supporting a PPP program at the municipal level. The resulting grant from the PPIAF funded an initial two-year program of support comprising strategic assessments, legal analyses, definition of procedures and guidelines for project development, training for CCM personnel, and direct technical assistance for the preparation of the municipality’s first PPP projects. In addition to an emerging PPP portfolio, under MMDP I a PPP department was established in the municipal directorate of economic activities and staffed with university graduates in key specializations of law, economics and engineering. With further short term assistance funded by PPIAF, the municipality developed a portfolio of over 25 PPPs, ranging from private management of public parks to the development of municipal parking lots, transport terminals, and commercial facilities in high traffic public transit areas. More recently the CCM contracted a private operator to establish paid hourly parking in the central commercial and business district, mobilized private investors to rehabilitate degraded municipal buildings, and ceded municipal land tied to private investments in a multistory parking structure. In addition, with credit support the CCM has prepared a municipal bylaw to adapt new national PPP legislation to the specific legal and institutional situation of a municipality. While these initial experiences have been broadly positive—and private capital and management has been mobilized to improve the coverage and quality of municipal facilities—the CCM continues to face both operational capacity constraints in the identification, appraisal, negotiation, and supervision of PPP projects as well as in clarifying the strategic potential of PPPs in developing municipal facilities and services. As a result, before the end of MMDP I CCM contracted an assessment of the PPP program to assist in the further development of both its internal capacities to formulate and manage PPPs and to assist the municipality in refining its strategies and criteria for the identification of suitable potential PPPs. The analysis and recommendations of this PPP assessment consultancy provided guidance for plans for consolidating and gradually enhancing the scope and quality of CCM’s PPP program, with support from the MMDP II. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive and negative): 54. The project did not result in any significant unintended consequences. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Negligible to low 55. The risk to development outcome is rated low or negligible. The CCM has demonstrated its commitment to improving its functioning since it developed the ProMaputo Program. With some delays, due primarily to weaknesses in capacity, it has consistently implemented the program as designed. In addition, the new mayor reiterated his commitment to the program shortly after taking office. The Bank’s continuing engagement with the CCM under the MMDP 19 II will help ensure that the CCM continues to strengthen its capacity to effectively deliver on its mandates. 56. The benefits of the capacity building support of the project are likely to be sustained—the major objective of mainstreaming implementation of the MMDP within the CCM’s structure— although challenges remain. The majority of staff trained and mentored under the project in financial management, procurement, contract management, urban and strategic planning, human resources management, communications, and information management remain in the CCM. Many of the young university graduates recruited to enhance staff capacity also remain in place. The CCM has instituted a policy of rewarding high performing staff with bonuses that can effectively double their salaries. This has proven to be a strong incentive for the best qualified staff to remain at the CCM. 57. Sustainability of the infrastructure and services financed under the MMDP I is likely. The CCM has already developed a plan to increase fees for solid waste services to full cost recovery levels by 2017, assuming it is operating a new more expensive landfill by then. Maintenance of roads is likely due to the CCM’s current practice of establishing annual budgets and work plans for maintenance of roads, started under the MMDP I. In addition, the CCM has strengthened its capacity for managing routine maintenance contracts. District administrations have also been trained to undertake spot repairs to unpaved roads after each rainy season. Support to further improve operations and maintenance will be continued under the MMDP II. 58. Sustainability of the operations of the CCM will also depend on its ability to mobilize increasing amounts of own-source revenue. Several activities under the MMDP II are aimed at helping the CCM do this. For example, it is supporting (a) the expansion and updating of properties information in the municipal cadastre, (b) improved practices for property assessments, (c) enhanced municipal billing and collection systems, including through private sector participation, (d) public information campaigns to encourage and inform citizens of their tax obligations, and (e) updating of municipal tax regulations and procedures. The project is also supporting overall improvements in public financial management, including through implementation of an IFMIS and strengthening of procurement and internal controls. These measures are intended to improve value for money spent. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry (i.e., performance through lending phase): Rating: Satisfactory 59. The Bank’s overall performance in ensuring quality at entry was satisfactory. The Bank’s performance in identification was satisfactory. The Bank maintained a continuous and close dialogue with the mayor of Maputo and his management team at the CCM soon after he was elected. The Bank supported a number of important pieces of analytical work that brought into stark relief the weaknesses in the CCM—including organizational setup, and financial and 20 human resources—that limited its ability to deliver on its mandates. The Bank also provided assistance to facilitate the CCM’s consultative workshops that informed the ProMaputo Program. Acknowledging the strong relationship that the Bank had established with the government in the area of local government and its ability to make a long-term commitment to urban development, the government asked the Bank to support the ProMaputo Program. The Bank responded appropriately, preparing an eight-year adaptable program loan, and providing extensive advice with design and safeguard issues. The project’s design reflected lessons learned from the Bank- financed Mozambique Decentralized Planning and Finance Project, the Municipal Development Program, and from experiences in other countries with urban development. 60. The Bank’s performance in preparation and appraisal was satisfactory. The project implementation plan had been appraised and found to be realistic and of satisfactory quality. Procedures for environmental screening of small infrastructure projects had been agreed. Processes for procurement and fiduciary management had been assessed and steps agreed to ensure that funds were used as intended. A well-designed results framework had been prepared, with well-specified indicators and baseline and target values. Arrangements for monitoring and reporting had been agreed. Appraisal of implementation arrangements was satisfactory with agreements reached on the roles and responsibilities of the various directorates of the CCM in implementation. A capacity building plan had been prepared. Engineering designs and procurement documents for the first year’s activities were complete and ready for the start of project implementation. (b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies): Rating: Highly Satisfactory 61. Bank performance in supervision was highly satisfactory. Supervision was intense throughout the period of MMDP I implementation. Although the project has had two task team leaders—one from identification until mid-2008, and the other from mid-2008 until the project closed—the transition was seamless, because the second team leader had served as a team member from the beginning. He subsequently moved to Maputo to provide daily support to the CCM. The Bank’s management team has actively overseen project implementation to help ensure that the project remained on track to meet its objectives. The senior operations officer in her comments on implementation support noted that the project was one of the best performing in the Bank’s Mozambique portfolio. 62. The Bank fielded some 11 implementation missions during the project’s four and 1/2 years of implementation. Missions took place at least two times a year, with smaller missions (often in combination with implementation support for other projects) taking place in between the formal missions. Missions lasted one to two weeks each and typically comprised ten or more members, including foreign and local consultants with expertise in urban development, local government administration, IFMIS, environmental and social safeguards, monitoring and evaluation, procurement, and financial management. To ensure very regular contact with the project implementers, the Bank team held video and audio conferences with the CCM between missions on key issues arising during implementation. 21 63. Aide memoires were of exceptionally high quality, with frank analysis of key issues and practical recommendations of how to address obstacles. Implementation support routinely reported on progress with activities under each component, performance of the CCM and its individual departments in implementing the project, progress towards the PDO outcome targets, financial management, procurement, and compliance with safeguards and with legal covenants. 64. The team responded proactively to challenges as soon as they arose and tried to find effective solutions to them. For example, when issues arose in designing the IFMIS, the task team brought a Bank IFMIS specialist to Maputo to assess the situation and advise the CCM on options for such a financial management information system. It also advised the government to recruit an IFMIS under MMDP I finance to oversee the work at the CCM. In addition, the task team also sought guidance from Bank management, procurement, financial management, and legal departments. 65. The Bank team consistently rated project performance indicators realistically. It rated implementation performance moderately unsatisfactory nine months after effectiveness. It carefully reviewed both progress towards development and implementation performance during each mission, and generally provided a justification for the ratings in the aide memoires. 66. The Bank team also played a key role in ensuring that development partners’ contributions to the development of Maputo supported the broad ProMaputo Program. For example, it partnered with the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) in designing the solid waste management system, with GIZ supporting the development of the 10-year strategic plan for solid waste management (2008–2017), assisting with creation of the solid waste collection microenterprises and providing equipment, and the Bank financing the large solid waste services contracts. The Bank is continuing to play an important role in coordinating development partners’ contributions to Maputo’s development through its leadership of the Decentralization Working Group, which comprises all the major partners contributing to development of urban and local governments. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 67. The Bank’s overall performance was satisfactory. In lending, the Bank assisted the CCM with analytical work and facilitation support to develop the ProMaputo Program. It responded to government’s request to finance a Maputo urban development program by preparing the eight- year MMDP, based on lessons learned from working in Mozambique and in other countries. Quality at entry was satisfactory. 68. In implementation support, the Bank played a critical role in helping the CCM overcome significant capacity constraints and proceed with implementation. Bank implementation support was instrumental in keeping implementation on track; the project closed with only a one-year delay and all funds were utilized. Implementation support missions regularly reviewed compliance with fiduciary, environmental, and social safeguards. The Bank maintained a close dialogue with CCM policy makers and technical staff, and with GIZ throughout implementation. 22 The Bank responded proactively and effectively to find solutions to challenges. A rating of satisfactory for ensuring quality at entry and a rating of highly satisfactory for supervision justify an overall rating of satisfactory for Bank performance. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory 69. The government’s performance in implementation was satisfactory. The central government, particularly the Ministry of Finance, The Ministry of Planning and Development, the Ministry of State Administration, and the Ministry of Environmental Coordination played important roles in helping to create the capacity of the CCM for municipal service delivery. For example, the ministry of finance consistently provided its counterpart funds for the MMDP on time, facilitating smooth implementation. The Ministry of Environmental Coordination quickly responded to requests its review of potential environmental impacts of infrastructure subprojects. And the Council of Ministers on December 27, 2010 approved a decree allowing revaluation of urban properties, which substantially increases the revenue potential for the CCM. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance: Rating: Satisfactory 70. The performance of the CCM was satisfactory. The CCM quickly complied with all the conditions of effective presented in the project appraisal document for the MMDP I. It established a strong team in its Office of Strategic and Institutional Development to coordinate overall project implementation, and appointed as its head a highly-qualified person with experience in managing diverse teams. It also established a procurement department staffed with qualified specialists and a financial management system capable of producing satisfactory financial monitoring reports. It encouraged staff of the entire CCM to participate in all aspects of project implementation, including the capacity building activities. It participated fully in designing and implementing the CCM restructuring plan and the improvements in human resources management. It ensured that the project complied fully with environmental and social safeguards. It consistently provided in counterpart funds on time and in the agreed amounts. And it complied with all the legal covenants, although with some delays in the early years. Finally, it adopted a scheme to pay bonuses to high-performing staff, thereby overcoming a key factor discouraging people from working for government institutions, low salaries. However, the CCM did not manage to retain qualified procurement staff, leading to delays at various times during implementation. Financial management remained a weakness throughout, in part because of the inability of the CCM to advance with implementation of the IFMIS. 71. The Office of Strategic and Institutional Development, which led project implementation, performed capably throughout implementation. It responded to weaknesses in staff capacity at the CCM by recruiting advisors with expertise in a large range of areas. The Office of Strategic and Institutional Development prepared quarterly project progress reports on time, which 23 consistently reported on implementation of activities progress towards outcomes. It used them effectively to motivate staff and to focus attention of policy makers on key issues. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance: Rating: Satisfactory 72. The overall performance of the borrower was satisfactory. The Ministry of Finance consistently provided its agreed counterpart funds. Other ministries and government entities played supportive roles. 73. The CCM performed adequately. The Office of Strategic and Institutional Development effectively provided overall leadership in project management, and ensured that the project remained on track to meet its objectives, with only minor delays. Ratings of satisfactory for both borrower and for implementing agency performance justify a rating of satisfactory for overall borrower performance. 6. Lessons Learned (both project-specific and of wide general application)  Basing the design of the project on strong analytical work and on consultation with stakeholders will help ensure that the design addresses the key issues. Prior to preparing the MMDP, the Bank supported studies on all areas of the functioning of the CCM. These included studies on functions and human resources, revenues and revenue potential, public private partnerships, information and communications technology, and anti-corruption measures, and others. The findings and recommendations of the studies provided a strong evidence base to guide the project design. Consultations with a wide range of stakeholders on key issues and solution provided further input to the design and helped to create ownership for the significant institutional changes to come.  Combining institutional strengthening with improved delivery of services. While the CCM was undergoing a restructuring to align staff with functions, improving its governance, and strengthening fiduciary management, it was also addressing service delivery constraints, primarily in the areas of solid waste management, urban planning, and roads. Combining institutional reforms with service delivery helps in building the capacity of the implementing agency to carry out its mandate through learning by doing. It also helps to facilitate engagement with the citizens who are benefiting from the improved services.  Building effective institutions requires a long-term commitment. Organizational change is a slow and difficult process that often stalls due to resistance of those who fear they may be made worse off due to the changes or due simply to inertia. Convincing people that change is in their interests requires solid analysis, considerable consultation and willingness to address concerns, investments to upgrade skills of existing staff to give them a place in the new organization, and determined leadership. Reflecting this lesson, the MMDP is providing long-term support for institutional change through the eight-year adaptable program loan. 24  Mainstreaming project management helps to build and sustain capacity of government entities. Although relying on a weak government entity with no previous experience in executing a Bank-financed project can be risky, it also powerfully assists in building sustainable capacity of the entity through learning by doing. By drawing on the CCM’s departments responsible for human resources management, financial management, engineering, strategic and urban planning, and others, each of which was bolstered by one or more external experts and specialized training, the project helped to develop key skills of the CCM staff. The MMDP II is now benefiting from CCM’s much stronger capacity as it scales up support for infrastructure and service delivery. Mainstreaming project implementation within government structures is considered good practice in development.  Skilled external experts who support the government entity with advice speeds the process of capacity building and help to smooth implementation. The CCM benefited from the assistance of at least 10 advisors during project implementation, each with skills in different areas. They facilitated learning in the organization by offering advice and on- the-job assistance. They also maintained a focus on implementation, helping to resolve issues that threatened to block forward movement.  Design of financial management information systems must be appropriate for the institutional context to succeed. Both governments and external advisors often propose the most modern system for managing financial and other information. However, such systems often do not function where organizational, technical, and human capacity is weak. Implementation of such systems also sometimes encounters resistance from people who benefit from the traditional way of doing things. Experience suggests that simplified phased outputs and a longer implementation timeline may help in implementing a computerized financial management information system. Leadership at the highest levels of government is also essential.  Innovative approaches help in providing solid waste management services in poor neighborhoods. Many poor neighborhoods in cities around the world are marred by uncollected trash. Private trash services concentrate on rich neighborhoods whose residents are willing to pay, while municipal services often serve only the city core, if they work at all. Following the severe flooding in Mozambique in 2000, a French nongovernmental organization helped to mobilize poor neighborhoods to collect trash. The approach involved organizing microenterprises for trash collection that would hire staff from the same neighborhoods in which they would work. The municipal government would initially pay for the services to demonstrate their value to residents, but would phase in user charges over time. The MMDP I scaled up this successful approach and will expand services further under the MMDP II.  The process of carrying out citizen report cards generates benefits beyond the data they collect. Report cards are often seen as an unreliable source of information on quality of services, because they ask people their opinion of services rather than report on objective measures of service delivery. Thus, people may say services are declining 25 when they are actually improving, because their expectations have risen. In Maputo, regardless of their findings, the report card surveys have proven to be a valuable tool in furthering the dialogue between service providers and citizens. Each year, staff of the CCM meet with Maputo residents in public forums and must address questions raised by participants. This has proven critical in motivating CCM staff to focus on service delivery, and appears to be changing the balance of power between citizens and municipal government. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies: See annex 6. (b) Cofinanciers: None. (c) Other partners and stakeholders: None. 26 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Estimate Actual /Latest Estimate Percentage of Appraisal Components (US$ million) (US$ million) A: Institutional development 8.0 10.8 135% B: Municipal finance 4.7 5.3 113% C: Improved service delivery 26.3 25.0 95% Total Baseline Cost Physical Contingencies 1.4 Price Contingencies 1.4 Total Project Costs Project Preparation Facility 1.2 (PPF) Front-end fee (IBRD only) Total Financing Required 43 41.1 96% (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Source of Funds Type of Financing Estimate Estimate Appraisal (US$ million) (US$ million) Government 13 11.68 90% IDA 30 29.42 98% PPIAF grant World Bank- 0.29 0.08 28% administered trust fund 27 Annex 2: Outputs by Component Component A: Institutional reform and municipal governance Subcomponent 1: Institutional reform and strengthening  A restructuring plan for all organizational units was defined and implemented (modeling processes, job description manual, staff table, competencies profile assessment, and redeployment plan defined and implemented). All 27 organizational units of the CCM were restructured and staffed with people with the appropriate skills. Key departments that were restructured included the departments of finance, human resources management, and procurement.  A strategic and operational planning methodology was defined and implemented.  A human resources management plan (recruitment of new qualified technicians and integrated in organizational units) was developed and implementation started. Implementation is continuing under MMDP II.  An integrated human resources management system was defined (strategy, global, and specific policies were defined and a manual of procedures was prepared).  A study on simplification of process processes was completed, and implementation of its recommendations commenced.  District-level authorities received capacity building support to plan and manage small- scale infrastructure and urban services.  An HIV/AIDS strategy, a workplace policy, and an action plan were developed. Implementation of activities has been continuous.  Annual training courses were offered in leadership, project management, and various other areas of municipal relevance.  A strategic plan for information systems was defined and implementation started. Subcomponent 2: Improved municipal governance  A draft communication strategy was prepared. However, it requires more practical recommendations before it can be fully implemented (planned for MMDP II).  An anticorruption strategy was prepared and many of its recommendations implemented.  A deconcentration plan for municipal districts was defined and implemented. 28  A public private partnership strategy was prepared. Its recommendations provide for the installation for the first time of a public private partnership unit in the municipality, and for the legal framework and model for public private partnership that has already produced 25 such partnerships.  Three citizen report card surveys were undertaken and their results widely disseminated through newspapers, television, radio, public forums, the internet, and other media. Component B: Municipal finance Subcomponent 1: Improved revenue collection  Improvements in the distribution of property taxes bills and fees for economic activities were made. In a first step, a private firm was contracted to distribute property tax bills, focusing on the urbanized and richest areas of the city. In a second phase, municipal capacity was built to take on the permanent distribution of bills. This required the reorganization of the department, creation of field brigades, and investment in training and acquisition of goods and equipment (maps of routes, uniforms, vehicles, and the like).  The existing property cadastre more than doubled its number of registries (from 6,000 to 13,000) by merging a series of databases. At the same time, the cadastre team under the supervision of the revenue department completed a field survey, adding 15,000 new registries. The process of data cleaning and cadastre expansion will continue during MMDP II, which has a strong focus on property tax collection.  A very important property tax regulation (decree 61/2010) was approved by the Council of Ministers to allow for the reassessment of properties, with reference to market values. This regulation is of national scope so will bring big benefits to all the 43 municipalities in the country.  Regulations for fees on economic activity were prepared and approved by the Municipal Assembly, allowing for more efficient fee calculation and collection.  Measures to increase revenues from markets—including launching of a market vendor cadastre and approval of new regulations by the municipal assembly—were put into place.  Advertising campaigns on fiscal education were carried out in journals, radio, and television.  Extensive training for managers and technicians in municipal revenue management took place. A training program was organized and delivered a few times during the implementation of the MMDP I. The training included lectures on national legislation, as well as practical classes in which the revenue department team elaborated and discussed proposals of regulations for municipal taxes and fees. 29 Subcomponent 2: Improved expenditure management  Design of the IFMIS and implementation of some modules commenced. However, the design proved too complex for the CCM. The selected firm did not complete the work within the agreed timeline. Options for an alternative system are being assessed under MMDP II. The Ministry of Finance is taking the lead in design and implementing the system for the CCM.  A planning and budgeting methodology was revised and approved by the CCM.  Audits of municipal financial statements were completed for 2008, 2009, and 2010.  A study proposing approaches to revaluing properties in Maputo was completed.  An evaluation of municipal assets was conducted.  A medium-term expenditure framework was developed, which is regularly updated to reflect the fiscal position of the municipality. Component C: Planning and service delivery improvements Subcomponent 1: Planning and management of urban space  Urbanization plans for Zimpeto, Magoanine (A, B, and C), Laulane, Ferroviário, 3 de Fevereiro, Mahotas, Costa do Sol, and Albazine were completed. Implementation commenced, and will continue under MMDP II. The urbanization plans will form the basis for the issuing of land use rights to users.  The urban structure plan was completed. Implementation started and will continue under the MMDP II.  The municipal geographic information system (including aerial photography) and associated cadastres were developed. Implementation—including provision of technical assistance, training, equipment, and data collection and processing services— commenced. Implementation will continue under MMDP II.  Environmental impact assessments have been prepared for the proposed Michafutene/ Marracuene cemetery and for the rehabilitation of the Julius Nyerere Avenue. Subcomponent 2: Infrastructure and service delivery improvements  The rehabilitation and extension of Avenues Sebastião Marcos Mabote (5.6 kilometers) and Nelson Mandela (5.4 kilometers) were completed. These connected the central business district of Maputo to expansion areas on the outskirts of the city, which are home to poor people resettled from the urban core and to new migrants. 30  Street lights were installed along Avenues Sebastião Marcos Mabote and Nelson Mandela.  Unpaved roads were regraveled (74 kilometers), improving connectivity in the suburban districts of the city.  Designs for two cemeteries were completed. Construction completed at one. The other will be completed under MMDP II. Subcomponent 3: Solid waste management services  Solid waste services in the central city and the suburbs improved visibly. Collection increased from 250 tons per day to over 650 tons per day. A specific focus was given to improving and extending the services in the previously severely under-serviced suburban areas. The total number of containers in these areas increased from 35 to 110 by the end of MMDP I.  Primary waste collection was initiated in 25 suburban neighborhoods, using microenterprises to provide collection services. This was the first regular municipal service provided in these settlements. At least 590 jobs have been created for local residents.  The municipal disposal site was improved. Specifically, the entrance was rehabilitated, a weighbridge was installed, and specialized heavy equipment was put into operation.  Studies were completed to improve the organizational setup and financial sustainability of future solid waste services.  Collection of the waste fee rose from US$900,000 in 2006 to US$3.3 million in 2011. 31 The table below presents the indicators and outputs by component, as presented in the results framework of the Project Appraisal Document.2 Table 1: Results framework, component level outputs Baseline Original Target Actual Value 2006 Values Achieved at Completion August 2010 Project outputs from each component Component A: Institutional reform and municipal governance Average time to process a new request for a 8 months 3 months 28 days construction license Number of districts to which decentralization of 0 7 7 agreed functions has occurred Staff reached by HIV/AIDS awareness programs 0 percent 80 percent 80 percent under the project Component 2: Municipal finance Number of additional taxpayers registered in the 13,000 18,000 28,000 universe of property tax payers Own revenues/current expenditures 0.8 At least 1 1.13 Audit finalized within six months of the end of the Not done Annual Done for 2008, financial year and findings made publicly available 2009, 2010 Component C: Planning and service delivery improvements Sebastiao Marcos Mabote Avenue rehabilitated Not done Completed Completed under the project. Number of new cemeteries built under the project 0 1 1 Financial contribution of CCM to solid waste US$700,000 US$1.8 million US$2.4 million management 2 For indicators not already reported on in the data sheet. 32 Annex 3: Economic Analysis Economic Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) Efficiency (net present value/economic rate of return, cost effectiveness, e.g., unit rate norms, least cost, and comparisons): ROADS INVESTMENTS Efficiency 1. Efficiency and cost effectiveness of the roads investments were satisfactory. A cost benefit analysis for the rehabilitation and extension of the Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote to be supported under the MMDP I was carried out as part of project appraisal. This was based on the assumptions that the investment cost would be US$4.7 million, that 83 percent of traffic comprised light vehicles and 17 percent was made up of heavy trucks, and that traffic would grow by 4.1 percent a year. The road was assumed to have an economic life of 15 years and to require periodic maintenance every seven years. The discount rate was assumed to be 12 percent. 2. The main benefits of the rehabilitation of the road and associated drainage were due to reductions in vehicle operating and benefits from generated and diverted traffic. The analysis showed that under the base case, the investment would generate an economic rate of return of 100 and net present value of US$3.2 million. The actual cost of rehabilitating Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote was very close to that projected in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) (see table 1). However, the average number of vehicles using the road each day has grown by about 5.5 percent per year, which is considerably higher than the 4.1 percent per year projected in the PAD (table 1). Table 1: Assumptions of the economic analysis Actual Appraisal estimate Avenida Sebastião Traffic count (annual average 26,235 19,084 Marcos Mabote daily traffic) Length (kilometers) 5.6 5.6 Total investment cost (US$) $4,748,961 $4,704,000 3. The larger traffic volume than estimated at appraisal has resulted in higher savings in vehicle operating costs. Thus, the economic rate of return and present value are higher than estimated at appraisal. Details are presented in table 2. Table 2: Cost benefit analysis: Current calculations compared with appraisal estimates Current estimates Appraisal estimate Avenida Sebastião Net present value (US$) 3.6 million 3.2 million Marcos Mabote Economic rate of return 103 percent 100 percent 4. The original economic analysis referred to a number of nonquantifiable economic benefits, such as savings in travel time, increases in values of properties that become more 33 accessible, and reduced costs of repairing roads, structures, and property arising from improved drainage. The actual nonquantified benefits are likely to be significant. The Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote connects the expansion areas of the city to the downtown. These areas are in the suburbs of the city, and are being developed to accommodate people resettled from the core city to make way for infrastructure and to house the increasing numbers of rural to urban migrants. The extension of the Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote has led to much reduced travel times between the core city and the suburbs, allowing residents to get to their jobs and access services. It has also led to rising property values, as land is converted from agricultural uses to housing and businesses. Inclusion of drainage systems has reduced stormwater damage to the road and to nearby structures. Creation of walkways has led to improved traffic flow and greater comfort for pedestrians. The story is similar for Avenida Nelson Mandela. This major thoroughfare connects the core city to outlying areas. Both roads also connect to the highway that connects Maputo to the northern parts of the country. Cost effectiveness 5. The MMDP I supported three roads projects in addition to the rehabilitation of Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote. Table 3 shows the details of all the road projects supported under the MMDP I. Table 3: Details of roads projects supported under MMDP I Street Traffic Length Lanes Width Total cost Cost per Nature of work count (kilometers) sidewalks (US$) meter (annual (m) lane/kilometer average daily traffic) Avenida 26,235 5.6 4 3 $4,748,961 $212,007 Rehabilitation and Sebastião extension (paved), Marcos including addition Mabote of drainage systems and sidewalks Avenida 13,202 5.4 3 4 $3,939,351 $243,170 Rehabilitation and Nelson extension (paved), Mandela including addition of drainage systems and sidewalks Unpaved 40 2 0 $654,793 $8,185 Excavation, roads in regraveling, municipal addition of districts drainage ditches, 2, 3, and signaling, 5 landscaping. Unpaved 34 2 0 $665,621 $9,789 Excavation, roads in regraveling, municipal addition of districts drainage ditches, Catembe signaling, landscaping. Total 85 $10,008,726 34 6. The unit costs of rehabilitating and regraveling roads under the MMDP I were well below the average for African countries, according to a background paper prepared for the World Bank’s 2008 Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. These costs are presented in table 4. The unit costs of rehabilitating the Avenida Sebastião Marcos Mabote were below the average of the lowest quartile and the rehabilitation of Avenida Nelson Mandela was only slightly higher than the average. Notably, the unit costs of regraveling were substantially lower than the average of the lowest quartile for this type of work. Table 4: Unit costs of road construction and maintenance in Africa, 2008 Type Unit Lower quartile Median quartile Upper quartile Rehabilitation (paved) US$/lane/km $220,186 $352,613 $505,323 less than 50 kilometers Regraveling US$/lane/km $12,835 $15,625 $19,490 Source: World Bank, 2008. “Unit Costs of Infrastructure Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa,� Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, background paper 11, June. Solid Waste Management Cost effectiveness 7. A cost benefit analysis for the investments in solid waste management was carried for the appraisal of the MMDP I. This calculated the internal rate of return to be 20 percent and the net present value of the cash flow at a discount rate of 12 percent to be US$650,000. Unfortunately, data are not available to permit an update of the estimates from the original economic analysis. 8. However, a comparison of the costs of delivering solid waste services in Maputo with those in other medium-size cities in developing indicates that costs in Maputo are well within the norms. See table 5 for details. Table 5: Average per capita and per ton costs of solid waste services in Maputo compared with medium size cities in developing countries (US$m) Cost per capita per year (US$) Cost per ton (US$) Maputo 2010 3.67 20 Medium-size cities 2006* 3.33–4.00 17.78–26.67 Source: Shantha R. Parthan, Mark W. Milke, David C. Wilson, and John H. Cocks. 2011. “Cost Function Analysis for Solid Waste Management: A Developing Country Experience.� In Waste Management and Research, November 10, 2011. 35 Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty Lending Kate Kuper Senior Urban Specialist AFTUW TTL Natalino Nascimento Engineer/Technical Consultant AFTUW Engineering Louis Helling Institutional Development Consultant AFTUW Institutional development Brighton Musungwa Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Financial management Joao Tinga Financial Management Analyst AFTFM Financial management Mafalda Duarte Capacity Building and Operations AFTUW Capacity building program Consultant Carolyn Winter Sr. Social Development Specialist AFTS1 Citizens report cards Luz Meza-Bartrina Sr. Counsel LEGAF Legal advice Slahhedine Ben-Halima Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Antonio Chamuco Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Suzanne Morris Sr. Finance Officer CTR Financial management Lurdes Malate Program Assistant AFCO2 Program assistance Salma Chande Office Assistant AFCO2 Program assistance Uri Raich Urban Specialist AFTU1 Project design Ali Alwahti Urban Specialist AFTU1 Project design Rildo Santos Program Assistant AFTU1 Program assistance Roberto Santoro Municipal Finance Consultant AFTUW Municipal finance Rafael Saute Communications Specialist EXT Communications Serigne Omar Fye Sr. Environmental Specialist AFTS1 Safeguards Diep Nguyen Van-Houtte M&E Specialist AFTQK M&E design Anne Louise Grinsted Junior Professional Officer AFCO2 Project design Supervision / ICR Ali Alwahti Urban Specialist LCSUW Project implementation Uri Raich Senior Urban Specialist AFTUW TTL Theresa Marissa J. Gamulo Procurement Analyst AFTUW Procurement António L. Chamuço Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Maria Isabel Nhassengo- Procurement Assistant AFCS2 Procurement 36 Massingue Amós Martinho Malate Procurement Analyst AFTPC Procurement Nilsa Ricardina João Comé Team Assistant AFCS2 Program assistance Daryoush Kianpour Senior Information Technology Specialist MNSPS IFMIS José N. Nascimento Consultant AFTUW Engineering Louis Helling Consultant AFTUW Institutional development Cary Anne Cadman Senior Forestry Specialist AFTSG Safeguards Kristine Schwebach Operations Analyst AFTCS Operations support Jutta Ursula Kern Sr. Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist AFTDE M&E implementation Elvis Teodoro Bernado Financial Management Analyst AFTFM Financial management Langa Arlete Quitéria Comissário Program Assistant AFCS2 Program assistance Kate Kuper Senior Urban Specialist AFTUW TTL Wendy Ayres Senior Economist (Consultant) AFTUW ICR primary author (b) Staff Time and Cost (from SAP) Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle No. of Staff Weeks US$ Thousands (including travel and consultant costs) Lending Fiscal 2007 103.82 463,259.78 TOTAL: 463,259.78 Supervision/ICR Fiscal 2007 2.43 7,358.37 Fiscal 2008 82.05 311,258.04 Fiscal 2009 73.71 286,391.93 Fiscal 2010 28.40 235,741.36 Fiscal 2011 21.73 82,032.11 Fiscal 2012 0.60 7,731.88 TOTAL 930,513.69 37 Annex 5: Citizens Report Cards 1. The first Maputo municipal citizen report card was introduced in 2005 as a contribution to project formulation for MMDP Phase I. Previously, there had been no systematic assessment of the quality and coverage of municipal services, nor of citizen priorities and satisfaction with respect to these services. The results of this first CCM were well received by municipal authorities and were employed as a reference in project design consultations with key public sector, private sector, and civil society stakeholders. The citizen’s report card assisted in identification of the main priorities for the municipality’s service improvement plans, reflected in investment priorities for IDA credit resources, as well as a way of measuring progress in the satisfaction of citizen priorities. 2. From the outset, the CCM and IDA teams agreed on the usefulness of this tool and committed to its regular (annual) application as a support to structured communication channel between citizens and authorities and to monitoring citizen perceptions of project outcomes. Specifically, there was agreement on the following objectives and strengths of the citizen’s report card:  Establish a system of open and effective communication between the CCM and the citizens in the all the municipal districts of the city (as the citizens report card is representative at the district level).  Identify the services that residents consider priority in each district to guide the priorities in the provision of services by the CCM.  Produce information on the provision and quality of services in the districts.  Assist in monitoring and evaluating the efficiency of delivery of such services  Increase the accountability of service providers before the CCM and citizens.  Strengthening the voice of the citizen and community participation. 3. As an illustrative example, figure 1 presents the graphic synthesis of the 2005 (baseline) citizens report card assessment of quality and importance of urban services in the form they were frequently presented and discussed by municipal authorities with both internal and external stakeholders. 38 Figure 1: Synthesis of the findings from the 2005 Citizen’s Report Card 4. Based on its acceptance during project formulation, the citizen’s report card methodology was employed throughout implementation: public dissemination of its results was used as a key performance indicator for governance improvement activities supported under the MMDP I. The regular use of this governance tool has allowed the management of CCM to permanently monitor service delivery and citizen satisfaction (or not) with municipal performance. Results are broadly disseminated both at the time of their release, including a formal presentation to the municipal assembly, and subsequently in neighborhood meetings and as a basis for civil society consultations. Specifically, the Mayor has adopted this tool as a thermometer of his own popularity and has used the results for strategic planning. 5. The CCM has continued to be employed both as a strategic planning tool and as a monitoring tool for citizen satisfaction with the provision of urban services. Further refinements of the methodology have introduced citizen assessments of service quality which complement satisfaction measures with descriptive characterization of frequency and coverage of service provision. The citizen’s report card has also increasingly collected and presented data at submunicipal level to assist in the geographical targeting of service improvement. As an illustration, matrix 1 presents differentiated priorities for each of Maputo’s seven municipal districts from the 2010 citizen’s report card. 39 Matrix 1: Service priorities by municipal district KaMubuk- KaMpfumu Nhlamankulu KaMaxakeni KaMavota KaTembe KaNyaka wana Solid waste Neighborhood Water Solid waste Solid waste Water Electricity 1 collection security provision collection collection provision provision Accessibility Accessibility Neighborhood Water Neighborhood Accessibility Water 2 security provision cleanliness provision Neighborhood Water Health Neighborhood Water Public Public 3 cleanliness Provision security provision transport transport Traffic Solid waste Solid waste Accessibility Accessibility Electricity Accessibility 4 Management collection collection provision Drainage Neighborhood Accessibility Health Electricity Health Neighborhood 5 cleanliness provision cleanliness Health Drainage Schools Public Neighborhood Solid waste Solid waste 6 transport security collection collection Markets Health Neighborhood Electricity Public Agriculture Markets 7 cleanliness provision transport Public Drainage Electricity Schools Health Schools Agriculture 8 transport provision Parks Markets Public Neighborhood Schools Neighborhood Health 9 transport Cleanliness cleanliness Municipal Public Markets Markets Fire fighting Markets Schools 10 police transport Source: 2010 Maputo citizens report card. 6. In conclusion, the Maputo municipal citizen’s report card has been broadly recognized as a useful basis for increasing the responsiveness of municipal policies, plans, and actions by aligning them with citizen concerns and preferences and for providing an objective reference underpinning dialogue and accountability between municipal officials and civil society. Because of this recognition, during project formulation it was agreed Maputo’s citizens report card will continue to play a significant role in municipal planning, monitoring, and governance for MMDP Phase II. 7. For the purposes of the project, the findings of the citizen’s report cards substitute for information that may have been collected from a project-specific beneficiary survey. 40 Annex 6: Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR 1. Assessment of the operation’s objective, design, implementation, and operational experience 1.1 Global Objective 1. The program development objective is “Strengthen the Maputo City Council’s institutional and financial capacity to support achievement of long-term service delivery goals, and to implement selected priority investments�. 2. The project has contributed decisively to create the basis for organizational and management tools on which the CCM may base its governance objectives in the medium and long terms. The project accomplished that through the creation or improvement of tools for strategic, operational, and urban planning; human resource management; information systems; communication; transparent and participatory governance. It sought to adjust the organizational structure to fit the Vision, Mission and Strategic Objectives of CCM. Also, it supported the financial pillars for financial management and revenue generation for the present and future sustainability of the organization. In addition, the project began to address the main problems of service provision, in particular the quality of roads and collection of municipal solid waste. 1.2 Project Rationale 3. The project was designed combining a long-term view, of provision of municipal services with quality and comprehensiveness (Component C), with the short and medium-term view of building a sustainable institution and revenue generation capacity (Component A and B) to support investment in municipal services and ensure their maintenance of quality. 4. The project was designed based on the following conceptual logic: a. The Vision: Maputo, as a prosperous, attractive, clean, secure, and united city b. The Mission: Enhance the coverage and quality of municipal services offered to residents of Maputo by strengthening institutional and financial capacity c. Program components to ensure the operational implementation of the Mission: Components A and B to ensure human resources, management capacity and financial resources for governance and service delivery to citizens; and component C focused on planning and Service Delivery Improvements. 1.3 Design 5. The design of the project was a participatory process of governance and an opportunity for organizational learning for the leadership and staff of CCM for the following reasons: 41  The development of a Logical Framework (survey of problems and identification of priorities) based on the collection of citizens' expectations during the election campaign, in consultative sessions with partners from the private and public sectors and civil society;  Different versions of the Logical Framework, developed with support from the IDA team, were presented and validated by the private and public sector partners, and civil society;  The development of the Logical Framework was the work of Councilors, Directors and Technicians of CCM (about 90 people) with the support of IDA. 6. Project was designed to ensure the full integration of local planning instruments (i.e. objectives, outputs and activities) into CCM work flow and routines, also in alignment with the activities and results identified in CCM’s Election Manifesto and Plan of Activities. 7. The mechanisms for project coordination and implementation were fully integrated to the existing management structures. The management and implementation of the project was under the direct responsibility of the mayor, Councilors, Directors and Staff of the CCM. 1.4 Implementation and the outputs 8. The global and specific objectives of the project were achieved almost entirely. Of the seven Performance Indicators Triggers, 6 were met or exceeded our targets for Phase 1 of PROMAPUTO, namely: -% of nominal increase of CCM revenues (Component B) - Additional km unpaved roads in good condition for each year (component C2) - Tons of Solid Waste collected and deposited in the waste dump (component C3) - Realization and Dissemination of Citizen Report Cards (Component A) -% of units with staff table defined and current employees redeployed (Component A) - Ratio of own revenue / expenses (Component B) 9. The indicator on design and implementation of SIGEF was not achieved in its totality. 10. We believe that the implementation of Phase 1 of PROMAPUTO was positive, even without reaching the "Trigger" of SIGEF, based on the following facts: - Level of Performance and Impact achieved internal and external - Level of Budget Execution - Establishing mechanisms and management systems with the potential to enhance the performance and sustainability for the future of the CCM - Level of cooperation and professionalism of the CCM and IDA teams 2. Assessment of the outcome of the operation against the agreed objectives 11. Taking into account the specific Objectives of each component of the project, we do the following assessment: 42 12. Component A on institutional development and municipal governance aims at: rationalizing the municipality’s internal processes for service delivery; improving the performance of the municipality’s functional units; and improving governance. 13. We believe that the overall objective of the component was achieved in a satisfactory way based on the evaluation of the main results planned and achieved: Results Assessment Strategic and operational planning Satisfactory methodology Restructuring Plan for all Organizational Satisfactory Units defined and implemented (Modeling Processes, Job Description Manual, Staff Table, Competencies Profile Assessment and Redeployment Plan) Annual Citizens Report Card implemented Satisfactory and results Integrated Human Resources Management System defined (Strategy, Global and Satisfactory Specific Policies defined and Manual of Procedures) Human Resources Reinforcement Plan Satisfactory (recruitment of new qualified technicians and integrated in Organizational Units) Annual Training Plans Satisfactory Deconcentration Plan for Municipal Districts Satisfactory HIV/AIDS Satisfactory Information and communications technology Moderately satisfactory Communication Moderately satisfactory Public Sector Relations Moderately satisfactory Anti-Corruption Moderately satisfactory Public Private Partnerships Program Satisfactory 14. Component B on municipal finance aims at: improve the municipal public finance systems by increasing its own-source revenues (local taxes and fees) and enhancing the budget planning, execution, and control functions. 15. We believe that the overall objective of the component was achieved in a moderately satisfactory way based on the evaluation of the main results planned and achieved: Results Assessment Number of additional tax payers registered in tax cadastre Moderately satisfactory (property taxes and business services taxes) Cadastre team Moderately satisfactory Database of property taxes Moderately satisfactory IPRA regulation Satisfactory 43 TAE regulation Satisfactory Collection of Fees Moderately satisfactory IFMIS design and implementation Not satisfactory Planning and Budgeting Improvements Moderately satisfactory Mid Term Expenditure Framework (CFMP) Satisfactory Selection of auditor for 2008 and 2009 financial years (FY) Satisfactory Consulting service for Evaluation of municipal real estate Satisfactory patrimonial 16. Component C on planning, infrastructure rehabilitation and service delivery improvements aims at: support urban planning and target investments to improve and rehabilitate critical urban services, including roads and drainage, solid waste management, a cemetery and street lighting. 17. We believe that the overall objective of the component was achieved in a satisfactory way, based on the evaluation of the main results planned and achieved: Results Assessment Baixa Marginal Urbanization Plan Not satisfactory (postponed for ProMaputo II) Zimpeto Urbanization Plan Satisfactory Magoanine A, B and C Urbanization Plan Satisfactory Urbanization Plan for Laulane, Ferroviário, 3 Satisfactory de Fevereiro, Mahotas Urbanization Plan for Costa do Sol Satisfactory Albazine Urbanization Plan Satisfactory Urban Structure Plan Satisfactory Municipal Geographic Information System: Satisfactory System Development Municipal Geographic Information System: Satisfactory Aerial Photography Municipal Geographic Information System: Satisfactory Hardware and software Environmental Impact Assessment for Satisfactory Michafutene/ Marracuene Cemetery Environmental Impact Assessment for Julius Satisfactory Nyerere Av. Av Sebastiao Mabote rehabilitation Satisfactory Increase street light network Satisfactory Rehabilitation of paved and unpaved roads Satisfactory Cemetery Construction Moderately satisfactory Solid waste collection in urban areas Satisfactory Solid waste collection in suburban areas and Satisfactory markets Primary Waste collection Satisfactory Operation of Municipal Dump Site Hulene Moderately satisfactory 44 3. Evaluation of the borrower’s own performance 18. We introduce our self-assessment for the various components of coordination and implementation of the project: 3.1 Coordination Model 3.1.1 Positive Aspects: Result: Level of results achieved (impact, disbursements) when compared with other programs Office of Strategic and Institutional Development: • Office of Strategic and Institutional Development with monitoring tools • Good leadership by the CCM • Monthly meetings between Office of Strategic and Institutional Development and IDA team Monitoring: • Weekly meetings to analyze the implementation process with the participation of heads of components Mainstream in the objectives and structure of the CCM • Convergence of the instruments of governance and priorities with the objectives of CCM • Insertion of the Project Implementation Unit of the CCM in the organizational structure and leadership of the Mayor. 3.1.2 Aspects to be improved: Information Flow • Information flow between various departments and Office of Strategic and Institutional Development can be more expedite • Management and coordination within the CCM must be improved Unclear roles and priorities • Communication CCM / World Bank was not always good • The role of the Office of Strategic and Institutional Development was not always respected by the executive areas • Coordination of components: planning and monitoring of each component head could be improved • Lack of prioritization Weak capacity • Office of Strategic and Institutional Development without national staff and implementing and coordinating assignments simultaneously • Need to decrease the operational role of Office of Strategic and Institutional Development and increase the coordination and facilitation role 3.2. Financial Management 3.2.1 Positive Aspects: • Ensuring resources facilitates the implementation • Model allows secure payments 45 • Commitment met in relation to new technical and bonus payments • Introduction of management philosophy that combines the planning and budget results 3.2.2 Aspects to be improved: Result: • Late payment of invoices Poor Information Flow • The sectors must improve their information on budget execution Unclear roles • Several commands in financial management Lack of knowledge of procedures • Problems resulting from lack of knowledge of the rules and procedures of financial management and in particular of IDA rules and regulations; • Lack of flexibility or redistribution of the work redesign activities by problems in the budgets • Management oriented to procedures not to results 3.3. Procurement 3.3.1 Positive Aspects: • Identified the problem of inefficiency and implementation process with the participation of heads of components • Creation of the Department of Procurement. Streamlined procurement unit to deal with IDA and non-IDA transactions • Of the 189 bids, almost all were performed. 3.3.2 Aspects to be improved: Result • Delay in issuing calls for tender • Delay in response to procurement processes Procedures and unclear priorities • Ambiguity of procurement procedures to be used in acquisitions of the Program and other acquisitions in the CCM (Need to improve harmonization) • Lack of domain rules of the World Bank by the technical, administrative and juries. • Stiffness in the procurement processes Poor communication • Lack of regular and rapid communication between the Purchasing Department, and other Departments, and Office of Strategic and Institutional Development Weak capacity and discontinuity of training • Many activities are delayed for lack of skilled personnel in the field • Moving systematic employee of the Department of Procurement (high turnover) • Continuous loss of key procurement personnel due to the limited Mozambican market. 46 3.4. Reporting 3.4.1 Positive Aspects: Result: • Financial Monitoring Reports clear and timely • Monitoring good fast and accurate • Achievement of agreed actions and timeliness of reports Role of Office of Strategic and Institutional Development • Office of Strategic and Institutional Development as systematizing information and responsible for preparing the final quarterly and annual report 3.4.2 Aspects to be improved:  Great demand by IDA: Level of IDA's requirement for the reporting (Financial Monitoring Reports) incompatible with the learning time of the CCM (since the responsibilities are integrated into existing structures) 3.5. Operations Manual 3.5.1 Positive Aspects: • Existence of an operations manual to guide the implementation • In general it was well implemented 3.5.2 Aspects to be improved: • Operations Manual requires adjustments for new challenges. 3.6. Technical Assistance Strategy 3.6.1 Positive Aspects: Result: The support necessary for the proper performance of the program was guaranteed Technical Assistants capable, qualified and available: • Technical assistance of good quality • Almost permanent availability of Technical Assistance 3.6.2 Aspects to be improved: Dependence of Technical Assistants: High dependence of Technical Assistants at the beginning of program Poor transfer of know-how: • Limited transmission of knowledge and know-how • Must work more with the respective areas and technicians with CCM. Unclear roles of Technical Assistants: Ambiguity regarding the role of technical assistance regarding advising vs. execution. This challenge was made more complicated because (i) there is an enormous lack on capacitated personnel to execute work, and (ii) existing municipal personnel already has full workloads and cannot easily take on new demands from the Project. 47 4. Evaluation of the performance of the Bank, any co financiers, or of other partners 19. The Bank has played fundamental role to keep the project on track as well as to achieve the main goal. The Bank missions has maintain close contact and dialogue with giving rapid and positive response for the problems and questions related to the implementation and management of the project. 20. During the project implementation the Bank mission was made regular visit to the project included field mission to supervise and monitor the implementation and discuss the progress and strategy related to the project. Supervision regularly reviewed compliance with fiduciary, environmental, and other safeguards. The Bank maintained a close dialogue with Mayor, councilors, technical staff, and development partners throughout implementation. The stability of the Team members of IDA between the stage of formulation, negotiation and implementation allowed a better understanding of the institutional and local levels and a very effective teamwork. 5. Assisting the preparation of the Bank’s ICR 21. The Bank’s ICR was prepared by a consultant that worked in strong collaboration with the Coordination of the project (Office of Strategic and Institutional Development). The preparation has included meetings with the managers and technical staff and some field visits on roads and Solid Waste projects in different municipal districts. In additional, the draft report was discussed and feedback provided to the Bank authorities. 48 Annex 7: List of Supporting Documents Project documents Project Concept Note Project Appraisal Document, December 21, 2006 Mozambique Country Partnership Strategy, April 24, 2007 Financing Agreement, February 9, 2007 Aide memoires Midterm Review, April 2009 Implementation Support Reports, 12 total from July 2007 to August 2011 Quarterly and annual progress reports prepared by the City Council of Maputo Other project files: back-to-office reports, financial audits. Background studies CESO. 2005. “Analysis of Current Human Resources of Maputo City Council.� Deloitte & Touche. 2005. “Studies on Maputo City Council Revenues.� Metier Consultoria and Desenvolvimento. 2006. “City of Maputo, Municipal Scorecard on Urban Services.� Faber, Robbert and Manuel Lourenqo Rodrigues. 2006. “Study to determine the revenue potential of the Municipality of Maputo.� Noronha, Joao. 2006. “Study on Revenues from Markets and Fairs.� Brandberg, Bjom. 2005. “Sanitation and Hygiene Study.� SAL and Caldeira Pty (ltd). 2006. “Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Public Private Partnerships Framework Study.� Universidad Europea de Madrid Faculty of Architecture. 2006. “Cities Alliance Phase I Report.� Consortium Usec, Ibam, Multiservicos. 2006. “Functional Analysis of CCM.� Cruz, Catarina. 2006. “Enlargement of the Cadastral Base of IPRA Contributors.� Borges, Alfredo. 2006. “Study on Information Technology System for reform of Municipal Finances.� Dray, Madalena. 2006. “Environment and Social Management Framework for ProMaputo.� Thompson, Gaye. 2006. “Resettlement Policy Framework for ProMaputo.� Metier Consultoria and Desenvolvimento. 2006. “City of Maputo, Basic Poverty Assessment.� Buendia, Miguel. 2006. “City of Maputo Anti-Corruption Strategy.� 49 Map of Mozambique 50 IBRD 33451R1 30° E 35° E 40° E 10° S 10° S Lake La ke TA N Z A N I A To Mtwara Malawi Mocimboa MOZAMBIQUE Mueda da Praia a end Lug Metangula CABO ssa lo DELGADO Pemba NIASSA Me Lichinga Lichinga ue Montepuez M A LAWI ALAWI Marrupa q Catur bi io To Chipata To m au a e Lúr ZAMBIA Lilongwe oz t Mualadzi To M Pla Nacala To Petauke Mangoche Cuamba NAMPULA Furancungo Ribáu Ribáuè 15° S To 15° S To Zomba Lusaka Fíngo Fíngoè Montes Namule Nampula Moçambique Lago de TETE Zam (2,419 m) Cahora Bassa be Gurué Guru Zumbo Songo ze To Alto Molócue Blantyre Ligo Moatize Milange n ha Tete Angoche un ZAMBÉZIA Lic go Changara Mocuba To Mutoko Namacurra Pebane Sena Za mb Quelimane ZIMBABWE Catandica ez e Gorogosa Inhaminga To Harare SOFALA Chimoio INDIA N O CE AN in To Masvingo MANICA a Pl Monte Binga (2,438 m) (2,436 Beira 20° S 20° S u e i To Bu z Masvingo i q Espungabera m b Nova Mambone e z a Sav Inhassôro To Rutenga M o Vilanculos Chicualacuala 0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers Machaíla To Messina INHAMBANE 0 50 100 150 Miles Chigubo Mapai GAZA Ch a Lim po M O Z A M B I QUE ngane op SOUTH o Massingir Inhambane AFRICA Panda SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS Guija Inharrime Chibito PROVINCE CAPITALS 25° S MAPUTO NATIONAL CAPITAL 25S To Xai-Xai Nelspruit This map was produced by RIVERS Manhica the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, MAIN ROADS Moamba colors, denominations and Matela MAPUTO any other information shown RAILROADS on this map do not imply, on To the part of The World Bank Mbabane Group, any judgment on the PROVINCE BOUNDARIES legal status of any territory, SWAZILAND Zitundo or any endorsement or acceptance of such INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES boundaries. 30° E 35° E JANUARY 2007