

Report No. 25110-SL

Sierra Leone Strategic Options for Public Sector Reform

August 5, 2003

AFTPR, Africa Region



Document of the World Bank

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit: = LE
December 2002: US\$1 = LE 2,080

FISCAL YEAR
January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB	African Development Bank
AG	Auditor General
APC	All People's Congress
ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
ADO	Assistant District Officers
CFAA	Country Financial Accountability Assessment
CSTC	Civil Service Training College
CDF	Civilian Defense Forces
DDR	Democratic Republic of Congo
DFID	Department for International Development
DC	District Council
DO	District Officers
EPRU	Economic Policy and Research Unit
ES	Establishment Secretary
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOSL	Government of Sierra Leone
GRS	Governance Reform Secretariat
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team
IPAM	Institute of Public Administration and Management
MDA	Ministry, Department and Agency
MODEP	Ministry of Development and Economic Planning
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NA	Native Administration
NACSA	National Commission for Social Action
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NPAC	National Policy Advisory Committee
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PC	Paramount Chief
PMO	Personnel Management Office

PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PS	Provincial Secretary
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PSMSI	Public Sector Management Support project
PSC	Public Service Commission
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TA	Town Administration
TC	Town Council
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leon
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
ECOMOG	West African States Military Observer Group

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STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM IN SIERRA LEONE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Issues

Years of corrupt and ineffective government, causing, as well as compounded by, civil war, have left Sierra Leone with poor access to basic services especially outside Freetown, with substantial dependence on NGOs, in particular relief agencies:

- 70 per cent of health facilities are not functioning; many services are funded by NGOs
- many young people have missed 6 to 7 years of schooling; many schools depend on private funding
- road quality is poor and access to public transport difficult
- officials based in the districts lack phones, cars and basic office equipment

Human capacity is weak throughout the public service:

- the public service is under-qualified rather than over-staffed
- many senior positions are filled with donor funded consultants
- many positions are filled with unqualified staff
- training institutes have neither the staff nor the facilities they need

The management of policy and programs is highly centralized in Freetown and in the Office of the President and the Ministry of Finance.

Public service pay is too low to attract, motivate and retain the key staff needed to improve performance and lead reform. Salaries for senior staff are a fraction of equivalent salaries in the private and parastatal sectors.

Expenditure management is weak. There is no medium term budget that links policy to resources. Budget outturns vary substantially from the approved allocations. The management of cash is excessively centralized, with relatively minor expenditures having to be approved by the President.

There is no effective accountability. The last audit report covered 1996-97. Parliamentary oversight is almost non-existent. Of the many reports submitted to the Attorney General by the Anti-corruption Commission, some have gone to court, but not one case has been finalized.

Many reform programs are underway that will begin to address the structural and capacity weaknesses. Donors are supporting decentralization, anti-corruption, public

service reform, economic and financial management, the restoration and reform of the chieftaincies, security and the salaries of key staff.

Reform Objective

In his speech to Parliament following the elections, President said: "...we have mandate, indeed an obligation, to repair the physical damage inflicted on our country, the shattered lives of its people, and restore the pride and image of a once peaceful and confident nation."

Many people told the authors that the objective of the reforms must be to restore the confidence of the people in the state.

Strategic Options

There is a strong consensus in favor of reforming the policy process (to make it better informed and transparent), expenditure management (to improve discipline), and accountability (to make it possible to hold people accountable for their uses of public resources).

There is an ever stronger determination to decentralize the delivery of basic services. Those contacted during the study saw the excessive centralization of the state and destruction of local government, with the associated rise in corruption, as the root cause of the condition the country found itself in after years of civil war.

The "options" concern the rate of decentralization. There is agreement that the aim should be to return to the pre-1972 situation (local government was effectively abolished in 1972). Local authorities effectively executed responsibilities for primary and secondary education, basic health care and feeder roads in the years before and following independence.

Concerns were raised about the speed at which the pre-1972 situation could be restored. There is little worldwide experience to suggest that rapid devolution can work in terms of improving service delivery. Many of those interviewed were concerned about capacity problem: there are no local councils now; capacity building would just about have to start from scratch. Staffing will prove difficult since the locally based NGOs and some national programs have "captured" the kinds of staff local councils would wish to recruit. Sierra Leone will need to be creative about the capacity issue: capacity does not have to be produced by the public sector, but capacity existing elsewhere can be effectively utilized by the public sector.

On the other hand, there is no political option but to move quickly. Local council elections will take place in the near future and the council will immediately have to be staffed, or expectations will be dashed. Also, a time of widely perceived crisis is a very good one to make radical changes.

So the recommended option is to act aggressively to build capacity to support the soon-to-be newly elected local councils. And to be sure to allocate the funds needed to support their responsibilities for basic service delivery, which would be expanded as the councils demonstrate their capacity to perform.

INTRODUCTION

Sierra Leone is emerging from a decade of violent conflict that had a deep impact on its institutions and governance. While the deterioration started well before the war, the conflict further weakened state capacity to fulfill basic functions and deliver core services. The end of the conflict opened a window of opportunity radically to reform the public sector. Until recently Sierra Leone could be viewed as an example of failed-state whose institutions did not perform the minimal function of providing security to its citizens through, as political scientists say, a monopoly of the use of violence. The post-conflict context presents the opportunity to be bold. It gives Sierra Leone the opportunity to reform or re-invent institutions that will best address the country's needs and characteristics.

Objectives

The purpose of this paper is to outline strategic options for the reform of the public sector. The strategic options will be based upon an analysis of the public sector emerging from the civil war and a longer period of deterioration and decline. The strategy will be expressed in very broad-brush form; detailed planning will only be possible once the basic strategic decisions have been taken. It will be long term; even in relatively stable and advanced countries, major transformations of the public sector have taken decades rather than years. Account will be taken of the special needs of a country emerging from conflict, in particular the need to sacrifice some long-term development and sustainability to the need to simply get things working again and to maintain stability. The strategy does not include specific consideration of legal and judicial sector reform and private sector development issues; these are being addressed in separate studies. Security issues are only addressed in passing.

This paper is more a think-piece than a plan. Its purpose is to provide a basis for discussions by Sierra Leoneans and their cooperating partners on what to do next to reform the public sector to alleviate poverty and avert future civil wars. We have tried to do this in two ways:

1. Assembling data on the characteristics and quality of the public sector
2. Suggesting structural reforms and capacity building that might be required to improve the quality of the public service.

Definition

We define public sector as "all market or non-market activities, which at each institutional level are controlled and mainly financed by public authority. It is composed

of a general government sector and a public corporation sector.”¹ In this study, we are paying a special attention to governance issues of transparency and accountability, economic and financial management, social services delivery, decentralization and restructuring the state, the center and local government. The overall objective of the reform of the public sector is to restore key state functions (credible policymaking, adequate and predictable resources, flexible service delivery and enforceable regulation) by addressing structural and capacity needs.

Analytical framework

This paper adopts a specific framework to evaluate public sector by isolating the qualities of well performing public institutions², which include: credible policymaking and planning, adequate and predictable resource flows, flexible service delivery arrangements and enforceable regulations (see Table 1.1). Credible policymaking and planning focuses on the “institutional arrangements and processes” which are necessary to formulate good macroeconomic and sectoral policies.³ Adequate and predictable resource flows regard directly the quality of financial management including a transparent process of budget formulation and execution as well as the implementation of the necessary procedures and institutions to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of public financial resources. Flexible service delivery supposes cost effectiveness and widespread access to social services. Enforceable regulations include the body of rules, laws and institutions that assure the predictability and the respect of processes of public management. These four qualities of a well performing public sector are evaluated against the existing structural and capacity conditions for institutional performance. In Chapter 2 and 3, this framework is used as a diagnosis tool to describe the existing structural and capacity conditions of public sector qualities in Sierra Leone and the current reform agenda of the Government of Sierra Leone that is supported by donors. In Chapter 4, the same framework is employed to prescribe options for reform by setting the necessary conditions (structural and capacity) for the optimal transformation of public sector in Sierra Leone.

¹ Hammouya, Messaoud, *Statistics on Public sector Employment: Methodology, Structures and Trends*. Working Papers, International Labor Organization, 1999.

² The analytical framework used in this paper is drawn from Girishankar, Navin, *Evaluating Public Sector Reform*, The World Bank, OED Working Paper Series, 2001.

³ Girishankar, p. 8-9.

TABLE 1.1 ELEMENTS AND INDICATORS OF EFFICIENT TRANSFORMATION

Elements	Structural Conditions	Capacity Conditions	Institutional Quality Indicators	Front-line Performance Indicators
CREDIBLE POLICYMAKING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delegation to technocratic enclaves for macroeconomic policymaking Participation, open debate over costed alternatives for sectoral policymaking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skills in economic and policy analysis Robust database on key economic variables 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Volatility Inconsistency Incoherence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ACCESS UTILIZATION TIMELINESS SATISFACTION COST EFFICIENCY
ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hierarchical and transparent budget processes Competitive terms of services (wages, grading and evaluation systems) Binding restraints on cabinet decision-makers Wage and non-wage incentives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skills in budgeting, financial management, procurement Well-trained staff in post for budgeting, personnel management Information on pay-personnel, financial management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Budget variance Composition of recurrent and capital expenditures Degree of leakage Vacancy rates in key posts 	
FLEXIBLE DELIVERY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decentralize authority to control inputs with accountability for results De-monopolization to introduce voice and choice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity in local government, among private providers Statistical base, particularly of clients Hardware, infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unfunded mandates Standards over outputs, not inputs or processes Number of alternative providers per jurisdiction 	
ENFORCEABLE REGULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arms-length, independence of auditors and evaluators Inclusive and open evaluative processes Tight links between evaluation and resource allocation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skills in auditing, survey design, and evaluation Information network for 'live databases' from sectors Adequate capacity and resources for independent bodies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incidence of corruption and resource leakage Frequency in changes in the formal rules Learning by doing Changes in policies and program design due to M&E findings 	

Source: Based on Manning and Knack, 1999.

Methodology

This paper draws upon open-ended interviews, group discussions and widespread consultations with key stakeholders in Sierra Leone: government officials (in Freetown and in the districts), political parties, international NGOs, civil society, donors, project managers, and lawyers. Quantitative data is used to describe some of the characteristics of the public sector, including staffing and expenditure.⁴ The paper also draws upon the deliberations of a focus group of senior Sierra Leonean officials, trades unions' and employers' leaders, and project staff that met to discuss institutional constraints to the public sector, guided by a diagnostic questionnaire that has been applied in a number of countries (see Annex 1). Finally, available socio-political analyses of governance issues and the conflict in Sierra Leone are used to help us understand the state and society in which the reforms will take place.

Structure of the report

The first three chapters describe the environment for reform. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the main events of Sierra Leone's recent history and briefly discusses some characteristics of the organization of the state and governance trends in Sierra Leone. Chapter 2 describes the public sector in Sierra Leone as it is today by describing central institutions, local government and service delivery. More precisely, it addresses the quality of policymaking and financial management institutions, the composition of civil service, the characteristics of local government and the current model of service delivery. Chapter 3 summarizes the GOSL's current agenda for the reform of the public sector and donor participation in the different reform programs. Chapter 4 presents the options for public sector reform.

The present study was prepared by a team comprising Ana Paula Lopes, Operations Officer (SDVCP); Yongmei Zhou, Economist (AFTPR); Smile Kwawukume, Public Sector Management Specialist (AFTPR); Wolfgang Koehling (YPP); Mbuba Mbungu, Senior Procurement Specialist (AFTPC); and Harry Garnett, Team Leader/Senior Public Sector Management Specialist (AFTPR). Peer Reviewers for this report were Michael L.O. Stevens, Lead Public Sector Development Specialist (AFTPR); Ian Bannon, Manager, Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction Team (SDVCP); and Klaus Rohland, Country Director (EACVP). Mats Karlsson, Country Director (AFC10), Peter Harrold, Country Director (SACSL), Brian Levy, Sector Manager (AFTPR), and L. Ground, Country Manager (AFMSL) provided inputs and guidance to the team. We would like to thank Oshu Cokes, Joe Lappia, Ousman Barrie, John Karimu and the team assembled by the Government of Sierra Leone, for their contribution to the preparation of this report.

⁴ We would like to thank Ousman Barrie, of the Sierra Leone's Ministry of Finance, for the preparation of the data.

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND TO PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE IN SIERRA LEONE

Perceptions of reform needs are driven as much by past experience as by current circumstances. Current circumstances are dire; Sierra Leone is the least developed country in the world in terms of the UN's Human Development Index. However, it is the memory of the institutions that once worked decades ago and their destruction by those who stole the state from the people that influenced many of the responses to the team when we discussed options for the future. It is significant that everyone we spoke to talked of the collapse of institutions as the root cause of the civil war not diamonds (although it would be naïve to suppose that greed did not play a major part in the capture of the state). The collapse resulted in a signal failure to provide public services equitably and an almost total failure to maintain a just dispute resolution system.

We will discuss the background to the decline in public sector performance in this chapter.

1.1 British Colonial Rule and State Organization

Although some argue that the recent lawlessness has its roots in the colonial past, many at least recognized that some effective institutions were established during the colonial period. While British colonization did not bring prosperity to the country (the country was extremely poor at independence with a literacy rate of 7.7%)⁵, it did help to establish some key institutions. Sierra Leone had the first higher education institution in Western Africa (Fourah Bay College, founded in 1827) and its public administration was efficient (older Sierra Leoneans met by the team recalled the merits of the civil service during British rule).

Sierra Leone was founded in 1789 as a British colony for freed slaves following the abolition of the slave trade. The former slaves settled mostly in Freetown and for a long time were considered (and to a certain extent still are) the cultural and political elite of Sierra Leone. This the 'creole' population (or krios, in vernacular) had more opportunities to access social services than the inland populations.

There has been a long tradition of decentralized governance. During colonial rule, until World War II, Sierra Leone was split in two different administrative zones: the Western Area, including Freetown and its surroundings, and the Protectorate, comprising the remaining areas of the country. While British law and political institutions applied in

⁵ Fyle, Magbaily C. (edited by), *The State and the Provision of Social Services in Sierra Leone since Independence, 1961-1991*, Codesria Book Series, 1993.

the Western Area, the Protectorate was ruled indirectly through traditional law, although British law remained the ultimate point of reference – there were circuit courts. The Protectorate was governed by Paramount Chiefs and supervised by district commissioners. For administrative and political purposes, the protectorate territory was divided into in a large number of chiefdoms (the number of chiefdoms went from 100 in 1896 to 217 in 1925).⁶ This indirect rule under which the chiefs were given substantial fiscal and administrative autonomy, was thought to be cost effective.

However this decentralized rule based on the chiefs did have significant costs. The quality of administration was often poor and many chieftaincies became highly corrupt. To improve matters, the British introduced the Native Administration (NA) in 1937 under which the responsibilities and rights of chiefdom administrations were defined and fixed salaries for Paramount Chiefs were introduced. Chiefs could join the NA on a voluntary basis. In the 1950s there were widespread riots against the taxation system (especially the Government's suggestion that a house tax replace the poll tax) and corruption in the chiefdoms' administration.

The chiefs remained important for public administration following independence in 1961. The 1964 Tribal Authorities Act defined the composition of the chiefdom administration, electoral process for chiefs and councilors, governance structure, relationship with the local courts system, fiscal and financial rights and responsibilities. While under revision (see Chapter 3), this Act still governs local administration.

1.2 Poor Governance and State Failure

The public administration institutions that were working reasonably well began to deteriorate from the mid-to-late 1960s onwards. Some observers date the decay of Sierra Leonean institutions on the arrival of Siaka Stevens at the head of the government.⁷ Many of those interviewed by the team also attribute the decline of local government to the Stevens regime. After winning the country's second general elections in 1967 (after independence in 1961) under his All People's Congress (APC) political party, Stevens was finally installed as prime minister after a military counter coup in 1968. Stevens remained head of the government until 1985 when he appointed his successor, Joseph Momoh. Momoh was removed from government by a military coup in 1992.

The Siaka Stevens' period is usually seen as having had a negative impact on country's institutions in two ways: through the dismantlement of public institutions at the center as well as at the sub-national level and the criminalization of the state apparatus, the two being intertwined processes. Stevens inherited a decentralized government with chiefdoms and District Councils being responsible for most service delivery. Stevens

⁶ See Fyle, p. 86.

⁷ See Chege, Michael, 'Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead', *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:3, Summer 2002.

diverted state revenues, in particular mining resources, to finance his own patronage networks by increasing opportunities for corruption for government officials in exchange for political support.⁸ The disarray of public finances led to a reduction, at periods dramatic, of fiscal transfers from central to local government. Under accusation of mismanagement and inefficiency of local government, state responsibilities and functions were taken away from local authorities and concentrated in Freetown. Prior to the Stevens' government, accusations of financial impropriety had led to various attempts to reform local government and even suspension of their prerogatives. However, local authorities were also a substantial political threat to Siaka Stevens.⁹ In 1972, Stevens abolished District Councils, transforming local government into local administrations.

The dismantlement of local government caused a halt to many services in the areas outside Freetown. At independence, Sierra Leone had inherited a small and professional civil service with a functioning parastatal sector. Until 1972 local government provided some services and fulfilled some of the government's main responsibilities; District Officers and Sector Ministry staff worked well together and supervised some significant community development work. The consequences of the Stevens' transformation of public institutions were economic decline, widespread corruption, decay of state financing of social services, disruption of fiscal revenues, disorganization of public administration, weakening of political institutions, leading to what is characterized as state failure, i.e. the incapacity of a state to perform its minimal function by having the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence.

1.3 A Decade of Civil War

The weak institutions, poor governance and the declining economy certainly prepared the ground for civil war. Rebel forces had ready recruits. Even the forces of the state easily became rebellious; such was the level of desperation in the country.

The conflict started in 1991 when a rebel group led by a former corporal, Foday Sankoh, supported by Liberian rebel-leader and current president Charles Taylor, launched from Liberia their first attacks into Sierra Leonean territory. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF)'s soldiers were unemployed and disaffected youth with no other objective than the gains to be made by looting civilians and by mining alluvial diamonds. Many of the young people were abducted and branded so that they could not return to their villages. The Sierra Leone regular army and the Sierra Leonean police were quickly shown to be unable to deter the RUF. In response to government's failure to defeat the rebels, civilian militias (what came to be named the Civilian Defense Forces (CDF), among which the Kamajors, traditional hunters, is the best known group) were created in

⁸ For a description of what the author calls the Shadow State see: Reno, William, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

⁹ See Fyle, p. 95-98.

the southern Mende region of the country, to defend, with considerable success, the civilian population. In fact, the RUF never gained control of the major towns in the southern province. As the war progressed, some members of the Sierra Leone Army began acting as rebels, often allying with the RUF. For instance, after the military coup of 1997, the RUF participated in the army led government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The 'sobels', as they were known, were soldiers turned into rebels using the same terror tactics to plunder, rape and murder civilians. Some were active in Eastern Province before AFRC came to power.

No ideological motivation is attributed to the RUF even though at its beginnings Foday Sankoh claimed to want to overthrow the corrupt political elite and destroy the one-party system. However, RUF brief inclusions in power-sharing governments (after the signing of the Abidjan and Lomé accords) showed that improving governance and promoting democracy were not its priorities. RUF participation in the government quickly led to more violence and destruction. During the decade-long war, several attempts were made to bring a negotiated peace to the country. However, it was by means of restoring security that peace prevailed. After the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) had failed to restore security, the military government of Valentine Strasser hired Executive Outcomes in 1995, a private military operations group with links to mining. This considerably weakened the RUF. Challenged militarily, the RUF entered into negotiations with the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in 1996. As a condition for a ceasefire, the RUF demanded the withdrawal of the Executive Outcomes. Pressured by the IMF to cut military expenditure, the Government agreed and the country's security was left in the hands of the Sierra Leonean army. The army led the 1997 coup, which resulted in the renewal of violence. Several attempts to restore security and bring the RUF to the negotiation table failed. Freetown was finally secured through the involvement of British forces. Eventually, the presence of British forces and the arrival of the UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) of 17,500 members restored security throughout the country. In January 2002, some 45,000 members of the RUF, CDF, other militias and 'sobels' of the Sierra Leone army were demobilized and are now being reintegrated into civilian life.

The civil war left the country at its lowest ebb ever. Out of a population of 5.2 million, 70,000 people had been killed, half the population displaced or sent to exile, and 10,000 maimed as a result of their limbs being chopped off by rebels, 'sobels' and other armed groups. One hopeful consequence of all is that most of the people from all walks of life interviewed by the team want nothing but peace; they have little interest in another armed uprising, whatever their dissatisfaction with the Government.

CHAPTER 2. THE PUBLIC SECTOR EMERGING FROM CONFLICT

The chapter will begin with a summary of the quality of the public sector today in terms of the four basic public management objectives referred to in the Introduction to the report: credible policymaking, adequate and predictable resources, flexible service delivery and enforceable regulations. It will continue by describing the functions, processes and structure of central and local government. There will then be a brief review of the ways in which key services are delivered to people today, including the roles of the ministries and NGOs.

2.1 Quality of the Public Service

The Minister for Presidential Affairs assembled a group of senior civil servants, including the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Presidential Affairs, and the Establishment Secretary, representatives of employers and trade unions, and consultants to advise the team on the quality of the public service under each of the headings in the analytical framework: the four public service functions (policy, resources, services and regulation) and the strategic and capacity constraints. The views of this focus group are as summarized in Box 1. The questionnaire completed by the focus group is shown in Annex 1.

The focus group highlights moderate to severe capacity and structural constraints under each heading, especially so in service delivery and regulation. Underlying those constraints, across the board, are difficulties in hiring, motivating and retaining staff because of low pay, as well as low skill levels. Data problems hinder policy-making and, to a lesser extent, accountability and regulation. On the plus side there is some participation in both policy-making and regulation. The group (mainly comprising staff at the very center of government) thinks that there is a great deal of scope for decentralization.

BOX 1. SURVEY OF INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

The Government constituted a focus group of senior officials to answer a series of questions on the four functions defined in the analytical framework: policy making and planning, resource management, service delivery and regulatory enforcement. This is a summary of the findings (see Annex 1 for the complete results).

1. Credible policymaking and planning

- Macroeconomic policymaking is “somewhat” isolated from political influence
- The vacancy rate for key technocratic enclaves is about 10 per cent
- The vacancy rate for managerial and technical posts is between 20 and 35 per cent
- Staff are “occasionally” underskilled
- The statistical basis for macro policymaking is “somewhat” weak; for sector policy it is “weak”
- Macro policymaking is “somewhat constrained” by equipments and supplies inadequacies; for sector policy the answer is “constrained.”
- The policymaking process is open to a broad range of stakeholders
- Civil society is involved in setting system-wide goals and in discussing types of services to be provided
- Professional staff are “frequently” underskilled
- Subnational level participation is significantly hindered by poor knowledge of sector policy, unfamiliarity with procedures, and the absence of sector specialists at the local level; communities participation is hindered even more by similar problems
- *Capacity constraints generally have a “severe” impact on policy credibility*
- *Structural constraints have a “moderate” impact*

2. Adequate and Predictable Resource Management

- Budget execution is governed by a “generally transparent” process
- It is “somewhat likely” that resources would be leaked during budget execution
- Weak internal and external auditing practices are the most significant factor contributing to resource leakage; capacity constraints and weak sanctions against corrupt practices are also factors
- The vacancy rate for budgeting and accounting is about 10 per cent
- Staff are “occasionally underskilled”
- The main source of unpredictable budget flows is “problems in hiring and keeping qualified staff”
- The ratio of highest-to-lowest salary is 25:1; from managerial-to-technical 5:1
- Public sector salaries are generally 35 to 50 per cent of private sector salaries; the exception is 50 to 65 percent for semi-skilled
- Low pay is a “very significant” source of the vacancy rates
- Difficulties in hiring and retaining qualified staff have a “significant” impact on the effectiveness of core functions
- *Capacity constraints generally have a “severe” impact on the adequacy and predictability of human and financial resource flows*
- *Structural constraints have a “moderate” impact*

3. Flexible delivery of services

- The focus group thought that there is “a great deal” of scope for further decentralization of service delivery
- The focus group reported that when there were active district councils in Sierra Leone (before 1972) there was substantial decentralization of the authority to hire staff, allocate resources and deliver services
- However at the moment there are severe capacity constraints in terms of audit and regulatory personnel and, even more so, for IT and vehicles.
- Significantly there are thought to be far fewer capacity constraints for the private sector and civil society
- *Generally the focus group thought that there are “severe” structural and capacity constraints on flexibility in delivery systems*

Box 1 (continued)

4. Enforceable regulation

- Financial, human resource and physical assets controls over line agencies are “somewhat loose”
- External audit and M&E functions are significantly weakened poor pay, compromised sources of funding, and resource scarcity
- In-year accounting and internal audits are “just about on time”; external audit tends to be 18 months late
- Parliament typically does not act on the reports from the Auditor-General
- There is local level participation in monitoring frontline performance; data are distributed to districts and published in local and national media.
- However, M&E is “somewhat ignored” as a management tool and “completely ignored” as part of the policymaking and budgeting process
- Audit and evaluation bodies have “very little” independence in terms of arms-length status from government, and “little” in terms of access to information
- Vacancy rates for external and internal audit are about 10 per cent, and for evaluation posts 35 to 50 per cent
- Basic accounting staff are “occasionally underskilled,” watchdog staff “frequently underskilled”
- There is an IFMIS linking core economic management bodies
- *Generally there are “severe” structural and capacity constraints on the enforceability of regulation*

Source: Government focus group, September 2002

2.2 Central Government

Staffing and expenditure patterns

The public service can be defined in terms of where the people work and where the money flows. Generally, staffing expenditure patterns more or less follow those of other poor countries, with variations attributable to Sierra Leone’s somewhat unique post conflict circumstance.

Staffing (Table 2.1). Police staffing is relatively high by SSA standards, at twice the average, but military staffing (technically not part of the civil service) is average – this may mean that many are off the payroll – and of course there are many foreign soldiers in Sierra Leone, including a UN force of 17,500 troops, plus almost 1,000 support staff. The Sierra Leone Army has 15,000 soldiers. Consideration is being given to reducing this number to 8-12,000.

TABLE 2.1 STAFFING DISTRIBUTION 2002

Ministry	Number	Percentage	% Population	SSA Average %
Total	61,871			
Education	23,158	37%	.5	.6
Health	5,193	8%	.1	.3
Agriculture	3,141	5%		
Military	14,033	23%	.3	.3
Police	7,451	12%	.14	.07

Source: establishment and payroll records, 2002

Staffing for education is slightly lower than average, and health much lower. This may reflect the fact that the health sector is dominated by NGOs, which run the hospitals and clinics and pay the staff, thus take pressure off the health budget. Teachers are funded by “transfers to educational institutions,” 90 per cent of which is for personnel.

Staffing levels have fluctuated. The public service work force (including teachers, but excluding the military and the Police) was about 74,300 in 1991, and it was reduced to about 63,000 in 1992 mainly through redundancy of daily wagers. Subsequently, the number of day rated workers has come down from 19,200 in 1993 to under 3,000 in 2002. The military and Police totaled around 12,500 – 14,000 in 1991. The military expanded from under 5,000 in 1991 to about 17,000 in 1996, and then down to 15,000 by 2002. The number of teachers has also increased by about 35% during the last 10 years.

It should be pointed out that although the public service has almost 62,000 staff, the civil service itself has only about 36,000 established posts. The “establishment” excludes the large numbers of teachers (Education has only 1,718 established posts) but includes the police. The numbers in the civil service “proper” declined from 20,291 in 1991 to 15,733 in 1996.

Expenditure (Table 2.2). As in all countries Education absorbs more of the national budget than any other sector: almost 30 per cent of the total personnel budget, with the Police absorbing 9 per cent, Foreign Affairs 7 per cent and Agriculture and Health each about 4 per cent. Health, as a proportion of the total is lower than is normally the case. This is because of high levels of NGO funding in the post-conflict period. The budgets for special programs, RRR and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration are almost as high as for education. The personnel budgets for the special programs such as RRR and Disarmament are negligible because funding is outside the budget. Actual expenditure on education is even higher since the RRR and SAPA programs fund some school reconstruction.

TABLE 2.2 BUDGET DISTRIBUTION: LE BILLION

Ministry	Recurrent			Development		Total
	Personnel	Capital (Equipt., etc.)	Other Recurrent (Fuel, etc.)	Domestic	Foreign	
Total	134.0	21.0	263.0	14.0	215.0	647.0
Education	40.0	0.6	37.0	0.5	7	84
RRR	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.5	50	51
Energy and Power	0.3	0.7	3.0	1.0	45	50
Health	6.0	2.0	16.0	-	19	43
Works	0.8	8.0	1.0	3.0	31	43
Police	12.0	1.0	11.0	0.4	-	24
Disarmament	-	-	-	3.0	17	20
Transport	0.2	4.0	0.6	-	14	18
Agriculture	5.0	0.2	4.0	-	5	15
Foreign Affairs	9.0	-	7.0	0.2	-	16

Source: Recurrent and Development Estimates, FY 2002-2004

Recurrent travel, utilities, maintenance, etc. exceed personnel expenses. The ratio is 40:60 (personnel to recurrent), when it would be more normal for the ratio to be 60:40. The “other recurrent” budget for Health is almost three times the budget for personnel and both budgets are about the same for Education. The Police budget is the exception.

One reason for the 40:60 ratio is that some personnel expenses are captured under other headings – for example, the grant to education referred to above. Also the salaries of some senior staff are paid by donors (and they do not show up in either of the tables), although the number is small (about 100), and many frontline health workers are paid for by NGOs.

The data reveal a somewhat centralized public service. When the team met with key stakeholders inside and outside government, and inside and outside Freetown, the common view was expressed that one of the key causes of the civil war and peoples’ disenchantment with the state was the extreme centralization that started in the 1970s.

Two aspects of centralization can be considered: a relatively high proportion of staff working at the center of government – especially Finance and the Presidency; and few non-direct service providers working at the district level.

Turning to the first of these, there are about 1,000 staff (or 1.7 per cent of the total) in the parts of government that manage human and financial resources and policy, such as the Office of the President (which has 155 staff), the Ministry of Finance (74) and the Establishment Secretariat (108). There are also the staff funded by donors in those central agencies, including some chief executives, for example, some PSs, the Head of the Police and the Accountant General. National commissions headquartered in Freetown, such as RRR and Disarmament, run many programs. Some institutions are under the Office of the President: Ombudsman and National Assets Commission. There tend to be more relatively highly graded staff in these central agencies, too. The Office of the President has 15 staff at grade 10 or higher out of total of 155 staff. Education has about the same number of policy/executive staff for a much larger number of staff (23,000) and budget (LE 84 billion). However their role is not to manage the teachers – the missions and private providers do that—but to oversee the performance of the sector. (In this way, Education could serve as a model for the future public service – with central staff focusing on policy and monitoring). The Ministry of Presidential Affairs has only 12 staff on the government payroll, but it is responsible for a number of public sector reform and governance projects, whose staff are paid through foreign credits or grants.

On the second point, although many posts are outside Freetown, the actual staff may not be. Two-thirds of the non-military public servants have posts located at the district level (see Annex 3). As might be expected, Education, Health, Agriculture and the Police are the most decentralized in terms of the locations of posts. However, even though 68 per cent of staff are allocated to district administrations, many civil servants remain physically in the capital. One reason for this phenomenon is that there are few incentives to encourage staff to relocate because remote area allowances are too small to attract any teachers. NGOs and missions have to top up some teachers' salaries.

Foreign sources fund 94 per cent of the development budget. This cuts across all sectors. Reflecting Sierra Leone's special circumstances, top funding is RRR, almost a quarter of the total. This is followed by Energy and Power (almost as much), Works, Health, Disarmament and Transport – all key to putting the country back together again. The programs for Agriculture and Education together amount to less than Transport.

Salaries

The focus group and others interviewed inside government identified the salary issue as critical: if services are to be improved, the staff responsible for their delivery must be much better paid than they are now. Table 2.3 illustrates the disparities between the salaries of civil servants, and those employed by parstatals and financial houses.

TABLE 2.3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PAY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE AND SOME PARASTATALS AND FINANCIAL HOUSES IN SIERRA LEONE

	Civil Service	SLComm Bank	Stan Chart Bank	Rokel Comm Bank	BSL (Central Bank)	SLState Lottery	Union Trust Bank
Chief Executive	24,131,750	59,250,000	60,565,789	79,500,000	50,080,000	53,560,000	56,354,992
Top Management (Heads of Dept.)	14,994,000	37,620,000	39,600,000	55,125,000	31,116,663	30,258,482	31,837,500
Middle Management	6,650,387	13,862,264	14,170,109	18,600,000	11,716,830	17,772,552	18,700,000
Clerical	3,196,360	7,200,000	10,800,000	6,030,000	5,631,433	3,309,907	5,550,000
Middle Level Support Staff	1,696,136	4,836,264	6,701,330	4,696,319	3,705,826	2,841,767	4,023,746
Junior	979,137	2,472,528	2,602,661	3,362,638	1,780,220	2,373,627	2,497,493
CR*	25	24	23	24	28	23	23

Note: - The above Pay Rates in each case were estimated by incorporating the base rates and the following allowances:

- Rent, Telephone, Electricity, Domestic Staff and Leave Allowances. In each case the rate is the mean of the lowest and the Rate in the Category. The respective allowances for housing, telephone and electricity were imputed for civil servants for parity of assessment
- The imputations for rent are based on notional market rental values for housing in Sierra Leone
- The following provisions were excluded in all cases: Car, Driver and Fuel; Medical cover; Lunch
- As can be seen, the Compression Ratios were calculated as by the [OECD] averaging method, to avoid extreme influences

It should be noted however that although salaries levels are very low, and many civil servants have salaries that are close to or below the poverty threshold, on average salaries in the public service are much higher than outside the public service. The ratio of the average public service salary to per capita income is about 8 in Sierra Leone compared with 5 for SSA as a whole.

The wage bill is relatively high, at about 8 per cent of GDP compared with an average of 6 percent for SSA countries. The ratio expanded from 3.5 per cent in 1996, to 4.8 per cent in 1998. 6.1 per cent in 1999, 7.1 per cent in 2000, 7.4 in 2001 and about 8.1 per cent in 2002. Personnel expenses as a proportion of total government recurrent expenditure, at 32 per cent, is about average for SSA. The high current figure is partly attributable to salary increases -- there was a general increase of 45 per cent in mid-1998 -- and partly grade creep. The introduction of a new social security scheme, with 5 ½ per cent from the beneficiaries and 12 per cent from the Government, has also increased public expenditure.

To address the incentives issue, donors have stepped in to fund the salaries of key staff, perhaps to a greater extent than in any other country in Africa. Donors are paying the salaries of about 100 such senior staff ("consultants" in line management positions). In some cases expatriates have been placed in senior civil service positions. Some officials admitted that eventually the Government will be able to pay the salaries of the key professional staff it needs, and that those staff will be civil servants not consultants.

The salary issue is aggravated at the central and local levels by the competition among donors, including NGOs, for the well qualified people are in very short supply because of the brain drain during the war. This applies at all levels: NGOs pay teachers and health workers in the provinces more than the Government does. The disparity will become a serious problem when the facilities funded and run by NGOs are eventually handed over to Government. Both the shortage of key staff in government and the need for donors and NGOs to pay the salaries of public service providers, is likely to continue for sometime, given the fiscal constraints.

The grading system for civil service which has not been updated in many years is another problem. Generally, the senior grades are 10 – 14; the intermediate grades 5 – 9; while grades 0-4 should constitute junior and junior support staff. The distinction amongst administrative, executive and clerical is not straightforward from the grading structure. For instance, the administrative cadre can belong anywhere from grade 7 and above; the clerical staff generally stop at grade 8. The way the grading system has been applied has not helped the development of a transparent system scaled to create the right incentives. According to the Report on Public Sector Pay Reform Framework (CoEn Consulting, March, 2002), "jobs have been placed on different grades for the sole purpose of providing increases in pay, without considering the duties and responsibilities of jobs in those grades. Even the initial grading was not based on job analysis but a ranking of qualifications."

Human resources management and training

The Public Service Commission (PSC) is a permanent body whose members are appointed by the President for 3 years. The Commissioners are not civil servants. The Commission's main area of responsibility is recruitment, promotions and discipline of permanent staff of the civil service. It is advised by the Establishment Secretary (ES) on these issues and considers recommendations from the ES.

The Secretary to the Cabinet is the Head of the Civil Service. The Establishment Secretary is the personnel manager of the civil service. He maintains personnel records, collaborates closely with and advises the PSC on issues of recruitment, promotions, disciplinary action, etc.

Civil servants cannot easily be fired. Hiring and firing falls within the purview of the PSC on the recommendation of the ES. The PS of any ministry can, however, make recommendations to the ES. Where vacancies exist in his ministry, the PS requests the necessary recruitment through the ES. If approved the vacancies are then declared and advertised, and the recruitment process takes place through job interviews conducted by the PSC.

Improving the quality of staff is a major challenge according to the focus group. Many reported to the authors that building the capacity of their counterparts has not been a principal responsibility of the highly paid expatriate consultants. Senior officials told the team that the normal consultant-counterpart relationship has not been as successful as it might be in terms of capacity building because of the low quality of counterparts. Training capacity is weak. Although the Civil Service Training Center is being rebuilt and the Institute of Public Administration and Management offers some courses for civil servants, there is general agreement that substantial training capacity building is needed.

Expenditure management and accountability

The legal foundation for accountability is confusing. The 1996 Decree of the National Provision Ruling Council amended the 1992 Public Budgeting and Accounting Act diminished the role of the Auditor-General and Parliament and strengthened the role of the Executive. The decree permits the Executive to authorize expenditures it deems fit through supplementary budget provisions and to exceed expenditure limits through Excess expenditure provisions. The decree also annulled the requirement that the accounts be submitted to the Auditor-General. However, decree is in conflict with the 1991 Constitution, which is clear on the role of Parliament and the Auditor General. The Auditor General does not lack statutory authority; what the office lacks is authority to carry out its functions and capacity, and that is partly due to low pay, according to the focus group.

Budget Formulation

The budget has some of the elements of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework. The budget does cover three years, but the next year's budget is obtained by applying simple percentages to the current years. The budget is not presented in the form of programs but administrative and economic categories of expenditure, although this is

planned for the future. However, a mission statement, together with departmental objectives, activities, timeframe and expected outputs, precedes departmental expenditures. A move towards programmatic budgeting would require substantial capacity building. The budget does include all public funds, including donor funds. Parliamentary capacity to review the budget is thought to be extremely weak.

The budget execution process facilitates variations from the budget approved by Parliament resulting. Actual expenditures deviate substantially from the original budget.

The commitment control system has been re-instituted during the last 3 years to ensure that MDAs stay within their budgetary provisions. The system tracks commitments against the votes on a regular basis and ensures that no department commits government beyond its own budgetary allocation in any quarter. The quarterly allocations themselves are prepared on the basis of projected trends in resource flows and each MDA's expressed in-year spending pattern at the programme level.

Auditing

Internal control is weak. The Internal Audit Department, which is poorly staffed and limits its work to pre-audit functions, is subordinate to the very office it should be auditing, the Accountant-General's Department. The computerized financial management system, which should provide the data needed by the Internal Audit Department to do its job has been designed by and is controlled and only used by the Accountant-General.

External audit is particularly weak largely because of capacity problems. The Auditor-General is unable to obtain the Government's account in a timely manner. The Auditor-General's last audit report covered 1996-1998. To make matters worse, the CFAA reports that the AG lacks authority to gain access to banking data to verify the reconciliation of fiscal and banking accounts. The final link in external audit, parliamentary oversight is perhaps the weakest of all. According to the focus group, oversight by elected representatives or local government is weak. Not only has the 1996 Decree diminished Parliament's role, but also they simply lack the technical capacity to review reports from the Auditor-General.

Budget Execution

The 2001 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) tracked flows of funds from the central ministry in Freetown to the regional and district offices and measures improvements in the quality of service delivery at facility and community levels using indicators from the 2000 Baseline Delivery Survey. The study has identified some areas where expenditure management and other reforms are needed: the management of funds is over-centralized; there are poor records of NGO activities; the recurrent cost implications of development expenditure are not taken into account; there is a lack of information on the non-disbursement of funds to regions; coordination between headquarters, regions and districts is weak; there is not sufficient participation in the budget process at the local level.

The Government's human resources capacity for expenditure management and accountability is weak, with many of the key staff, some foreign, some Sierra Leonean, funded by donors. It was reported to the team that little capacity has been transferred to staff of the Ministry of Finance and the other accountability agencies. Substantial training is needed, but even that would be ineffective if the incentive issue is not addressed.

Policy formulation

The process by which policies are formulated, brought to Cabinet, decided upon, implemented and monitored was studied five years ago.¹⁰ Little has changed since then. There is a standard procedure, with a standard format for Cabinet Memoranda, but the quality of policy proposals is poor. Cabinet meetings are characterized by a large agenda and poorly prepared policy proposals. Policy formulation capacity in the sector ministries is weak, coordination in the preparation of policies is almost absent, and there is little participation of civil society in reviewing policy options and evaluating result. Too much policy is too ad hoc, as evidenced by the frequent departures from the approved budget, and according to many observers, the sectors are too weak and the center too dominant in policy decisions.

A small Cabinet Secretariat that prepares papers for Cabinet meetings but until recently there was no specialist review of these papers on behalf of the Chair of the Cabinet, the President, prior to Cabinet meetings. Now the President can draw upon advice from the National Policy Advisory Committee (NPAC), eminent Sierra Leoneans from outside Government. This group can and does make its own proposals from reforms to the President. The President can also obtain advice from the Ministry of Presidential Affairs, the Secretary to the President, the National Security Council and the project teams administratively located in his office, such as the governance and public sector reform staff. Monitoring support is available for the Oversight and Monitoring Office. Now as back in 1997, the President, and the NPAC, believe that there is a need to review the functions of the central policymaking and coordination machinery.

While the Ministry of Finance is responsible for macroeconomic policy, the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP) is responsible for supervision of the design and implementation of development projects; coordination of NGO activities; mobilization of resources for funding development projects; preparation of the development budget and monitoring of its implementation; and preparation of planning guidelines for sector ministries.

Positive Developments

There are a number of reform programs in the Ministries of Finance and Development that will have an impact on the public sector as a whole. A National

¹⁰ The study was carried by USAID funded consultants.

Commission for Privatization has been established to implement the divestiture program. An independent National Revenue Authority has been established. The Poverty Alleviation and Strategy Coordinating Office, which is responsible for the preparation of the full PRSP, will include public sector reform and governance issues in its work. Consultation with line ministries in the preparation of the most recent budget was much stronger than in the recent past.

Other agencies are also being reformed. The Central Statistical Office is also being reestablished with Bank support. The Auditor-General is receiving capacity building support from the ADB, and the Accountant General from EU.

Legal affairs, governance and anti-corruption

The Bank is carrying out a separate legal and judicial sector assessment, which will cover two of the cornerstones of anti-corruption, the judiciary and the Office of the Attorney General.

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is another cornerstone of the Government's good governance policy. Parliament ratified the Anti-corruption Act in February 2000 and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was created in August 2000. The ACC is set to investigate any report of corruption in the public sector and has indeed investigated many complaints. The actions of the ACC are broadly reported in the newspapers. For example, the arrest of the last Government's Minister of Transportation in charges of diamond smuggling received broad coverage in the press. Based on the Hong Kong model (where the ACC is generously funded by Government), the ACC is a government-funded independent agency that initially received strong personal support from President Kabbah. The ACC receives funding from DFID; it expects to raise more funds from other donors in order to expand its activities. ACC investigates but does not prosecute; that is the responsibility of the Attorney General. ACC has prepared over 60 cases; none has been brought to completion (one was, and its is under appeal).

2.3 Local government

The GOSL is currently restoring civil authority and basic administrative functions to the Eastern and Northern Provinces, which were not accessible until late last year. In the absence of new regulations for local government, the Government of Sierra Leone decided to reinstall the local government system prior to 1972, when District Councils were abolished, with a few modifications. It is a transitional and anachronistic system with regulations sometimes dating back to the colonial period (see Chapter 3 for the current reform agenda for local government reform). Annex 2 presents the current sub-national government structure as well as the new model the GOSL intends to create. The Government administration and governance structures at the Provincial, District, Town and Chiefdom levels can be briefly summarized as follows:

Provincial Administration

The Provincial Administration is responsible for the provinces administration (Northern, Eastern and Southern provinces) and is under the direct responsibility of the Provincial Secretary (PS) who is the direct representative of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) in the Province and responds to the MLGRD and the vice-president. The Provincial Administration oversees the district offices and the Districts, Towns, and Chiefdoms' budgets. The Budget Bureau within the Ministry of Finance now prepares these budgets. The Provincial Administration is composed of a Provincial Secretary, a Deputy Provincial Secretary, a Confidential Secretary, a Senior Assistant Secretary, a Chief Clerk who oversees the clerks (who should count around 20). The clerical services consist of civil servants (which are confirmed by the Public Service Commission) and daily wage workers. Personnel is also allocated to serve the Provincial Secretary's personal needs. Senior officials and senior clerks have non-monetized benefits such as housing and transportation or expect to have it in the future as part of their civil servants benefit package. All salaries within the administration are paid by the central government in Freetown despite the fact that there are bank facilities (there are branches of the Treasury Department and the Bank of Sierra Leone (central bank) in Kenema and Bo, two of the provincial capitals. The lack of communication facilities, low salaries, the lack of housing, the need for more training and the lack of accountants were considered the most urgent needs mentioned by the civil servants in the Provincial Administrations.

District Offices and District Councils¹¹ (currently appointed Management Committees)

The District Officers (DO) have the responsibility to administrate the District (there are twelve Districts in Sierra Leone¹²), coordinate all ministries district teams, oversee the management of the District hospital and District schools, supervise the financial management of Town administrations, Town Councils, and Chiefdoms, supervise the administration of the Paramount Chiefs, approve Chiefdom administrations' budgets, review all rulings of Local Courts as well as supervise their financial management. The DO is the principal spokesperson for the government. However, according to one District Officer, the District Officer's responsibilities in particular that of coordination among ministries district teams are not entirely clear as the level of deconcentration of some ministries (Education, Health, Agriculture, Transportation, and Mining) have not yet been defined. Some of the DO functions have apparently died out (for instance, support to Chiefdoms to formulate their budget) given the limited human resources.

¹¹ District Offices are the administrative branch while District Councils are the legislative branch of local government.

¹² The Eastern Province comprises three districts: Kenema, Kailahun and Kono; the Southern Province is formed by four districts: Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba and Pujehun; the Northern Province comprises five districts: Bombali, Kambia, Port Loko, Koinadugu and Tonkolili.

The ad hoc nature of the present administrative and fiscal arrangements and institutional relations between the Chiefdom's, Town's administration and the District's poses problem for the DO to fulfill its functions of financial oversight, according to one District Officer. The District Officer¹³ now serves as secretary to the District Council (DC) (they were two different positions before 1972) in what was seen as an effort to strengthen collaboration between DO and DC. However, the relations between DO and DC prerogatives are unclear. The DCs were dissolved in 1972 and re-appointed as temporary Management Committees in 2000. Elections for District Councils should take place in 2003. District Council activities are still governed by the District Council Act of 1960. However, not all the DC prerogatives have been reinstated. In the past, a considerable part of the DC source of revenue by a precept on the chiefdom tax. Central government grants were also a source of revenue. The revenue source of District Councils is nowadays not specified and mostly relies on fiscal transfers from the central government. Also, in the past, District Councils took up the responsibility for social service delivery and oversight as Chiefdoms were willing to transfer their responsibility for service delivery to the districts. In the past, District Councils were often, but not always, dominated and composed primarily by the Paramount Chiefs.¹⁴

The District Office budget is prepared by the central government. The District Office is usually formed by the District Officer, three Assistant District Officers (ADO), a Financial Clerk, a Customary Law Clerk, plus 20 other clerks and daily wage workers. All senior officers and clerks are civil servants. The District Office receives quarterly grants from central government for an amount of Le 600,000 per month for recurrent expenses plus Le 1,000,000 per quarter for fuel and transportation. All salaries and seating fees for the members of the District Council are paid by the central government. Each Councilor can receive up to Le 240,000 per quarter in seating fees (this cap has apparently been decided by the President). There are in between 15 and 20 Councilors. The estimated salary of the Kenema District Officer amounts to Le 192,000, which appears to equal the salary of an experienced teacher. The District Council are proposing that they levy taxes on some economic activities (instead of restoring a precept on the chiefdom tax) so they would have fiscal autonomy. However, this inflicts on the fiscal bases of Townships and Chiefdoms. The major complaints received from the District Officers are low salaries, delays in the transfer of quarterly grants, the lack of housing for senior officers, transport and communications equipment, and the imprecise definition of responsibilities and functions of District Offices and District Councils.

¹³ During British colonial rule, the District Commissioners were the administrators for the districts, comprising the protectorate.

¹⁴ President Kabbah made an effort to include representatives of all political parties when he appointed the members of the Management Committees.

Town Administrations and Town Councils

The Town Administration (TA) and Town Council (TC) have the responsibilities (specified in the 'Townships Regulation Document') to maintain streets, roads and graveyards within the town perimeter, build markets and bridges, establish and look after pre-schools (central government pays for teachers), to maintain sanitation and undertake trash collection, to support small development initiatives such as women's organizations through the administration of a micro-credit scheme. There are only four townships in Sierra Leone: Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Koidu. The main sources of revenue of Towns are the grants from central government (Le 1,300,000 for 2001, disbursed quarterly), market duties (Le 200 per day for shops selling locally produced goods and Le 300 for those selling imported goods), taxes on shops¹⁵, licenses (stalls, houses, etc.). The Town Administration¹⁶ is composed of Clerks (Town Clerk, Treasurer and others) and the Town Council Police (altogether 22 people), market dues collectors (42), grave diggers (12), sanitation workers (20), road laborers (24) and a variety of other daily wage workers during the rainy season. All salaries are paid from the Town budget. Kenema Town's budget for 2001 was Le 221,550,000. They had an estimate of Le 874,000,000 for 2002. In Kenema, the Town Council (presently an appointed Management Committee) is composed by 14 councilors (2 elected per ward (4 wards) and 6 appointed (DMO, technocrats, etc.) which should be elected for a three years mandate.¹⁷ Each councilor receives Le 150,000 per month in seating fees (one meeting per month). The Town Council elects the Mayor. The president of the Town Council is traditionally the Paramount Chief of the Chiefdom where the Town is located. There are various committees in the TC (Housing, Health, Education, By Laws, etc.) All meetings are open to the public, which has no right to intervene during the session.

District Officers, Town Officers, Clerks in Kenema and Kailahun and in the Provincial Administration of the Eastern Province received training in 2001 organized by the Office of the Establishment Secretary.

Chiefdom Administrations and Chiefdom Council

The chiefdom administration is the lowest level government administrative structure and the Paramount Chief (PC) is the representative of his or her people, whose appointment is approved by the President, through the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. As such he/she is prevented by law to be involved in party politics. However, Paramount Chiefs have historically been at the heart of party politics in Sierra Leone. The PC is the custodian of the land. The Chiefdom administration has the responsibility to enforce the customary law, oversee local court system, and levy taxes. The

¹⁵ Shops are classified as A=Le 100,000, B=Le 50,000, C=Le 25,000.

¹⁶ The numbers are for the Kenema Town Administration.

¹⁷ There is only one female councilor in the Kenema Town Council.

PC is supported by a Speaker and the Chiefdom Administration. The Nongowa Chiefdom administration is composed by one treasurer clerk, one assistant, four court clerks, one bailiff, three revenue collectors, two health overseers, four midwives (Traditional Birth Attendants, TBA), and seventeen chiefdom police officers. The Chiefdom governance structure includes a Council of the Elderly and a Chiefdom Committee. Some chiefdoms have Development Committees, which are composed of members of the communities within the Chiefdom and are set to advise on development priorities for the Chiefdom.

The Chiefdoms are supposed to be fiscally autonomous. However, the team was told that, on a temporary basis, the central government is paying the salaries of the Paramount Chief (Le 100,000 per month) and Speaker (Le 50,000 per month). All the salaries in Chiefdoms administration are paid by the Chiefdom budget. The Chiefdom administrations levy taxes on individuals (Le 500 per year) and other licenses. Chiefdoms in the mining areas also receive grants from central government.¹⁸ Chiefdoms in the mining areas also receive payment for mining licenses (Le 50,000 per license). All Chiefdoms receive additional grants from central government.

Provincial, District, Town, and Chiefdom Administrations are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.

2.4 Service delivery

The delivery of social services became responsibility of local government in the aftermath of independence in 1961. However, this arrangement was never fully implemented given the limited revenue basis of Districts and Chiefdoms. By lack of fiscal autonomy, local government depended on grant transfers from central government to finance basic social services such as education and health. In the past, central transfers to Chiefdoms were used by central government as a political tool that benefited allied chiefs and penalized potential political enemies. Historically, service delivery in Sierra Leone has been concentrated in the urban areas and, in particular, in Freetown. The war has dramatically worsened this pattern. As the war progressed fewer services were available in the chiefdoms and rural areas. As usually in the context of civil war, several international non-governmental organizations provided urgency services to the vulnerable populations substituting to inexistent social services.

Health

Health is certainly the sector where state failure in delivering basic services was compensated by emergency medical healthcare provided by international organizations. The current situation is still mostly that of an emergency situation though there is a growing partnership between international NGOs and the Ministry of Health, at the central

¹⁸ The Nongowa Chiefdom received Le 26,000,000 in grants in 2001 from the central government trust fund for the mining areas.

as well as at the district level. International NGOs such as International Rescue Committee, Médecins Sans Frontières, Merlin and others currently fund several health initiatives in Sierra Leone and they often run government health facilities. This is particularly the case of the District Hospitals. International NGOs provide a few expatriated staff (doctors and nurses), supplies, and transportation and usually supervise junior staff, working alongside the District Medical Officer (DMO) when there is one appointed to the district. International medical NGOs also supervise and provide supplies and training for junior staff of the MOH placed in Primary Health Centers at the village level.

The health sector in Sierra Leone suffers from over concentration in the urban areas and thus it is difficult to relocate health workers to the rural areas. Historically, most health services and the best ones were located in Freetown and therefore health personnel was concentrated in the Western Area and reluctant to go to the Districts and the rural areas. Again, the war accentuated this pattern and most health workers seem to be concentrated in the Western Area. At the same time, some international NGOs have hired some of the state best qualified health workers. While many NGOs have scaled down their operations in Sierra Leone (for instance, MSF have departed from the Bo and Pujehun District hospitals) some health workers are still employed by the non-governmental sector, diminishing the availability of trained staff in the public health sector. Also, some NGOs have paid top ups to health workers in the hospitals they support.

Overall, Sierra Leone is faced with a mixed health system, and largely insufficient to respond to population needs, where an incipient health system exists because of foreign support. While this allows for some service delivery for the general population and gives time to the re-organization of the health sector, it puts specific demands on the Ministry of Health which they have not yet successfully been able to respond in terms of coordination, policy formulation and monitoring of existing initiatives. Also, a health sector that is based on independent activities by a plethora of NGOs lacks predictability and creates regional disparities. According to the Ministry of Health, 70 percent of health facilities in Sierra Leone are not functioning.¹⁹

The GOSL intends to decentralize the health system to the lowest level, i.e., the Community Health Centers at sub-Chiefdom level, which would follow the decentralization of local government. Currently, privately run hospitals, usually by religious congregations, have the right to ask for the payment of patient fees. Drugs are supposed to be free provided by the government. A cost-recovery scheme is supposed to be implemented in the future in all health system despite the fact that the GOSL has in 2001 determined free health care for children under five, all school going children, pregnant women and breast-feeding mothers. To ensure proper financial management, transparency and accountability, the decentralization of the management of health services would be achieved by the creation of Regional Health Boards and Hospital Management

¹⁹ Interview with Dr. Clifford Kamara, Ministry of Health, and Dr. Joaquim Saweka, WHO representative in Sierra Leone, December 2001.

Committees. Human resources are however a major concern as there is very few qualified doctors and nurses.²⁰ Health personnel have not received formal training in many years, despite some in-job training provided by NGOs. Corruption in the health system seems to affect most public and private services as there is no proper financial management of health facilities.²¹

Education

The education sector in Sierra Leone had, at one point in time after independence, been deconcentrated on the district and chiefdom level. District Councils had then the responsibility for the secondary schools, while the Chiefdoms had control over primary schools. Government resources for the education via grants to districts and chiefdoms were insufficient to cover the education needs and private schools were created to respond to the demands of the population. Again, the war accentuated this trend. Nowadays in Sierra Leone about 90 percent of schools are the result of a partnership between the public and private sectors, run by private groups, in particular, by the different religious denominations in the country. While continuing providing education during the conflict, an undefined number of these schools were transferred from their original districts and have been operating in Freetown for several years. Schools followed their displaced students who relocated to Freetown, in particular, those from the Northern and Eastern provinces. Those were the most affected by the conflict (according to the Ministry of Education, there is a large number of the youth that has not had any access to school for the past 6 or 7 years due to the war)²². However, it is very difficult to give numbers about the relocation of schools back to their original communities. When visited in March 2002, most of primary schools in Bombali District run by the Catholic Church were still functioning in Freetown despite the disarmament of the District in November 2001. It was expected that the schools would have returned to the area in September 2002 when a new academic year starts. The relocation of schools to their original communities will happen if teachers and students return and if there are school premises to host them. The reconstruction of schools has started in many areas. Housing and financial benefits (remote area allowances) are considered key by the Ministry of Education to attract and retain teachers in the rural areas.

There are three kinds of schools in Sierra Leone regarding its public or private management. Governmental schools are run and fully funded by the central state. Apparently there are few secondary government schools according to the Ministry of Education. There are the government assisted schools, which receive financial support from central government but are run by private groups. The government pays for teachers'

²⁰ There are three main training institutions for health workers: School of Hygiene, School of Nursing, School of Midwives.

²¹ See *The Health Sector in Sierra Leone. Key problems, Strengths and New Policy Thinking*. Campaign for Good Governance, mimeo, 2001.

²² Interview with Mr. Dupigny, Ministry of Education, December 2001.

salaries and allowances per student. These schools are supposed to raise funds privately, in part through school fees. Finally, the private schools do not receive government subsidies. Public transfers to the central administrations of religious congregations and other private groups pay for teachers and allowances per student. Some assisted schools pay top ups to teachers. There is a large number of NGOs (national and international) providing supplies. Teachers have not been trained in many years and the few teacher's vocational schools have been closed because of the war. Even though the GOSL declared in 2001 free school fees and public school examinations for primary education, there are allegations of extensive corruption practiced by teachers demanding bribes and favors in exchange for school enrollment and exams.

The GOSL plans to decentralize education with public funds being provided directly to schools that would match funds raised locally or contributions from local government. Responsibility for education would be devolved to communities. Schools would be run locally by a Board of Governors that would oversee schools' financial management. The Ministry of Education would have the responsibility for policy, monitoring and evaluation. The decentralization of education services would include the presence of Inspectors of Education at the district level as well as some sort of education inspector at the chiefdom level.

2.5 Summary

It is useful to summarize public sector characteristics in terms of the key public management functions of the public service: ensuring credible policymaking, adequate and predictable resources, flexible delivery of services, and enforceable regulation. Table 2.4 describes each of these functions in terms of structural and capacity conditions, institutional quality indicators and front-line performance indicators. The public service is clearly characterized by centralized structures, weak incentives, limited capacity, low institutional quality, a dependence on NGOs, and a failure reach many of the poor. The objective of any program to reform public management must be to improve capacity and motivation to perform the four main public management functions..

TABLE 2.4: SUMMARY OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS, CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE

Function	Structural Conditions	Capacity Conditions	Institutional Quality Indicators	Front-line Performance Indicators
CREDIBLE POLICYMAKING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy making highly centralized • Large Presidency handling many major post-conflict programs • Limited public participation on most policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited skills in economic and policy analysis • Senior external advisors to President on Policy • Limited policy staff in Presidency • Inadequate data on key economic variables 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy coordination is weak • Weak policy-resources linkage: MTEF not in policy or programmatic form • Most policies not implemented as planned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • POOR ACCESS, INEFFICIENT PROVISION, LONG DELAYS, LOW SATISFACTION, SUSTAINABILITY CONCERNS
ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Budget process opening up • Weak incentives for staff to perform • Key staff paid by donors • Presidency and Accountant General vary resource flows almost at will 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very few with skills in financial management, budgeting and procurement • Financial management information narrowly distributed • Insignificant oversight by OAG and Parliament 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Substantial budget variance • Donor funded development budget • Recurrent budget exceeds personnel • All expenditure on budget 	
FLEXIBLE DELIVERY OF SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most basic services funded by donors and NGOs • Post conflict programs run from center • Little accountability to users • No choice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little chieftaincy capacity • Local government yet to be restored • Infrastructure destroyed by war being restored • Lack of data on needs, ability to pay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many areas of country have very poor access to basic services • Numerous NGOs have varying standards • No alternative providers 	
ENFORCEABLE REGULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak internal audit • No effective external audit • Many conflicts of interest • Independent Anti-Corruption Commission • Attorney-General responsible for prosecutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of auditing and survey skills • Poorly resourced accountability institutions • Understaffed, under trained Office of Attorney General • High quality staff in ACC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High incidence of corruption • Some high level interference to protect the corrupt • Some prosecutions of ministers, judges 	

CHAPTER 3. CURRENT REFORM AGENDA FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN SIERRA LEONE

A series of reforms for the public sector were launched during the first mandate of President Kabbah, initiated in 1996. The AFRC coup of May 1997 brought to a halt these efforts and the ensuing violence and instability made it difficult for institutions and donors to pursue their reform goals.

However, initial discussions around these reforms laid the groundwork for some of the GOSL's current reform agenda. This is, for instance, the case with the decentralization process supported by the UNDP. In 1997, the GOSL launched a 'Position Paper on the Reactivation of Local Government and Decentralization in Sierra Leone' and, in 1998, held National Consultations on decentralizing government. The reforms of the police and economic management also began some time ago. The police reform was launched in 1999 and a new Inspector-General of Police, a British national, hired. The reforms to strengthen economic and financial management agencies were initiated either during the first Kabbah government or even prior to 1996; the World Bank support under the first Public Sector Management Support project (PSMSI), to the Ministry of Finance, the Central Statistics Office and the Bank of Sierra Leone is such a case.

Many current initiatives are emergency ones, intended to restore basic government functions now that government has gained control of the whole of its territory. In May 2002 the Government presented a "Recovery Strategy for Newly Accessible Areas,"²³ which aims at restoring government presence and core administrative services in almost two thirds of Sierra Leone's territory. Aside from reintegration and development activities, the goal is to restore civil authority to recently liberated areas. The intent is to establish quick actions to rebuild infrastructure (administrative offices and housing for government officials and Paramount Chiefs), provide training to civil servants redeployed to those districts, build police structures in all Districts and re-start civil and local courts.

Government and donors are now thinking longer term. In August 2002, the Government and UNDP organized a Governance Roundtable the objective of which was to strengthen dialogue between the GOSL and main donors on governance issues. The discussions during the Roundtable focused on four sets of issues: decentralization and local governance; justice, rule of law and human rights; public services and public sector reform; and security.²⁴

²³ Republic of Sierra Leone, "Recovery Strategy for Newly Accessible Areas", National Recovery Committee, May 2002.

²⁴ See UNDP Sierra Leone Governance Round Table summary of discussions, August 2002.

The GOSL long term reform's addressing public sector issues can be classified in six areas: decentralization and local government reactivation, anti-corruption, public service reform, economic and financial management, chiefdom reform and security sector. Ongoing and planned programs will be discussed below.

3.1 Decentralization and local government reactivation

The reform of local government is a high GOSL priority. As a justification for its intentions, GOSL said back in 1997 that "(since 1972) local authorities became more or less the instrumentalities of the Central Government It is now desired that a devolutionised system of Local Government should be established with re-oriented roles and responsibilities which will make them more responsive to the present realities of the Sierra Leonean situation."²⁵ UNDP is currently funding a revision of the Local Government Act which will re-define aspects of the administrative and governance structures of districts and towns. The new Local Government Act will clarify powers to be devolved to the District Councils and fiscal arrangements between District Councils, Town Councils and Chiefdoms. DFID is also providing support for this devolution. While the functions and responsibilities of central and local government have not yet been specified, the GOSL is committed to the following:

1. Formulation of a new local government framework;
2. Local government elections;
3. Reconstruction of provincial, district and town government administrative offices;
4. In-service training for provincial administrators, district officers and their staff;
5. Civic education for civil servants in local government positions; and,
6. Implementation of district recovery funds.

There is a joint government-donor task force on decentralization chaired by the Minister of Local Government and Rural Development. The task force meets weekly and is planning extensive consultations in early 2003. A framework for the organization of government at sub-national level will be required. Implementing some of the above activities prior to such a strategic policy decision will result in an inefficient use of resources.

3.2 Anti-corruption

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is a key initiative undertaken by the government to improve governance. Parliament ratified the Anti-corruption Act in February 2000 and the Anti-Corruption Commission was created in August 2000. The ACC has investigated report of corruption in the public sector, with widespread coverage

²⁵ Republic of Sierra Leone, "Position Paper on the Reactivation of Local Government and Decentralisation in Sierra Leone", Prepared by: The Task Force on Local Government and Decentralisation, February 1997.

by the press. One of the more high profile cases resulted in the arrest of the previous Minister of Transportation in charges of diamond smuggling. Such high profile cases are rare for anti-corruption programs in Africa.

The ACC, based on the Hong Kong model, is a government-funded independent agency. The members of the ACC are not part of the civil service, which supports its independent and allows for higher salaries. ACC receives technical support from DFID; its deputy commissioner is a British and funded by DFID. Government funding for the ACC is assured for the next three years under the MTEF. It expects to raise more funds from other donors, including the World Bank, in order to expand its activities. Despite indications of the concrete results achieved by the ACC within its mandate, there are questions about its overall impact. Though the ACC has the mandate to investigate any corruption allegation, the judicial system is responsible for prosecuting and sentencing the cases. Some of those the team met with pointed to the judicial system in Sierra Leone is seen as the weak link in the anti-corruption initiative.

A study of households', civil servants' and businesses' perceptions and experience of corruption will be completed early in 2003.

3.3 Public service reform

The GOSL has initiated a reform of the public service with support from donors, in particular DFID. The World Bank is also providing limited support for reforms within central policy-making bodies like the Office of the President, Cabinet Secretariat, and the creation of an Oversight and Monitoring Unit. However, funding for all the planned activities has not yet been secured. Under the responsibility of the Public Service Reform Unit, within the Governance Reform Secretariat, the goal is to move away from the current traditional British civil service model to a modern human resources management system. However, the level of decentralization of human resources management or other characteristics of this new system have not yet been presented. A series of preparatory studies are underway. The objectives stated by the GOSL for the reform of the public service are as follows:

1. Reorganization and restructuring ministries: the initial intent is to start with four key Ministries – Agriculture, Education, Health and Local Government and Rural Development – after functional and managerial reviews have been made; most have now been completed.
2. Conversion of the Office of the Establishment Secretary into a Personnel Management Office (PMO): the objective is to modernize civil service by establishing new training policies, personnel regulations, new pay and grading policies, and computerized system for civil service personnel records. The employment of daily wage workers will be regularized. A task force has begun work on a training policy.
3. Records management in general will be improved: problems in records management have been highlighted in the functional reviews of Education and Health.

4. Improvement of central policy-making and coordination in central government machinery: the goal is to improve policy formulation, coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation within central government. A task force is looking into the restructuring of the Office of the President.
5. Restoration of training institution to build the capacity of civil service: the goal is to resuscitate the Civil Service Training College (CSTC), which was closed in 1981. Sierra Leone has already an academic institution that has trained civil servants, the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM). Provision has been made in the FY03 budget for the rehabilitation of CSTC.

The Public Service Reform Unit and the Establishment Office have organized training for middle and senior civil servants, piloted a performance appraisal system, revived the Civil Service Training College, prepared proposals to computerize personnel records and organized reviews by the Steering Committee on Good Governance of diagnostic studies carried out by consultants.

3.4 Economic and financial management

The improvement of financial and economic management capacity of core central institutions has been a goal of donor support, in some cases, since the early 1990s. The need for better financial management grew of the implementation of structural adjustment programs. The main donors supporting economic management are the World Bank, the European Union, the African Development Bank and DFID. So far, the kind of support provided is through technical assistance by placing consultants in core management positions. Among the economic policy institutions receiving donor technical support are:

1. The Auditor-General's Department: the position of Auditor-General and others within the same office are supported by donors. The goal is to enable the office to carry out its key institutional functions of auditing all institutions.
2. The Economic Policy and Research Unit (EPRU) and the Budget Bureau within the Ministry of Finance: the unit was created to strengthen GOSL capacity to formulate economic policy and execute budgeting functions. Consultants, from outside the civil service, paid by donors occupy all the positions within these agencies.
3. The Bank of Sierra Leone: the support is to upgrading the computing capacity of the Bank of Sierra Leone.
4. The Central Statistics Office: the goal is to restructure, re-organize and re-establish a statistical system. This is done through donor support for core consultancy positions and equipment.
5. The Accountant General's Office: the goal is computerize payroll operations linked to valid nominal roll in the Establishment Secretary's Office and provide equipment to the Accountant General's Office. Again, the support is provided through consultancy positions and equipment.

Donors are funding consultancy services and new equipment. Some concern has been expressed concerning the failure of the build sustainable capacity – consultants have in some cases assumed line positions without training someone to take their place.

3.5 Restoration and reform of chieftaincy

The intent is to restore the chiefs as the lowest level government representatives, reform some of the chieftaincy traditional elements, and improve the quality of chiefdom administrations. A Chiefdom Governance Reform Program was created within the Governance Reform Secretariat. DFID is the primary donor. The major goals of the program are:

1. Proper election of Paramount Chiefs in the vacant Chiefdoms: to that extent, consultations are held with the local population prior to the election to have its views on how to prevent improper functioning of Chiefs and Chiefdom administration. A Code of Practice has been prepared to guide Chiefs' electoral process. Houses for Chiefs are under construction in all the Chiefdoms.
2. Improve Chiefs behavior by raising Chiefs awareness of populations' perceptions and past misconducts and by formulating a code of conduct for Chiefs.
3. Limit Chiefs' powers by dissociating the Chiefs and Chiefdom Administration from the Local Courts and guaranteeing Courts' independence. For that matter, a review of the customary law has been initiated under Legal and Judiciary Reform.

The restoration of the chieftaincy is a controversial issue in Sierra Leone. Consultations held with rural populations²⁶ indicated that people resent Chiefs' past abuses and the mismanagement of Chiefdoms' affairs. Lack of transparency in financial management, chiefs' interference in the local courts systems, lack of interest by some chiefs for development activities are common complaints of local communities. The lack of effective mechanisms of checks and balances within the Chiefdom system makes that good governance depends on the good will of some Chiefs, creating large disparities in the administration and government of Chiefdoms' affairs.

3.6 Security

As seen in Chapter 1, the restoration of security was imperative to bring peace to Sierra Leone. The GOSL, DFID and the Commonwealth have undertaken the reform of the Security Sector with the intent to improve the structural (institutional) and capacity of security forces. On one hand, the goal is to carry out an administrative reform of the Ministry of Defense by improving departmental planning and effectiveness, on the other hand, to build the capacity of security forces. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) is receiving military training from British Forces and the British-led International

²⁶ See Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme, Summary of Reports on Consultation Workshops, The Government of Sierra Leone, December 2001.

Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT). The Police has undertaken an administrative restructuring and is building the capacity of its force with the support of DFID and the Commonwealth.

TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY OF CURRENT PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS

Function	Structural Conditions	Capacity Conditions
CREDIBLE POLICYMAKING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of central policy-making and coordination machinery • Conversion of Establishment Secretary's Office into a Personnel Management Office • Creation of the Oversight and Monitoring Unit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultants doing the recurrent research and policy work • Restoration of training institutions for civil service (Civil Service Training College) • Consultants placed at the Central Statistics Office
ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulation of new local government framework, including new fiscal arrangements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultants formulating MTEF and overseeing PETS • Computerization of Accountant General's Office link to the Establishment Secretary's Office • Planned in-service training for provincial and district administrations • Upgrading computing capacity of the Bank of Sierra Leone
FLEXIBLE DELIVERY OF SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Functional and managerial reviews of key ministries • Decentralization of health services with Hospital Management Boards • Formulation of new local government framework 	
ENFORCEABLE REGULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultants execute the work at the Auditor General's Depart. • External consultant support the ACC

CHAPTER 4. STRATEGIC OPTIONS

This chapter discusses the reforms required to improve public sector performance in Sierra Leone.

The first section presents reforms necessary to enhance three of the core functions outlined in the analytical framework described in the introduction: policy formulation, financial management, and enforcement of regulations. We believe that there are few options here. There is a strong consensus on what needs to be done.

The second section discusses areas where there clearly are strategic options, mainly in terms of the organization of the public service for service delivery. These are in effect decentralization options.

The third section of this chapter addresses cross-cutting reform issues such as accountability, training needs, risks, flexibility, and management arrangements that will need to be taken into consideration in planning and implementing the reform agenda. Incentive and sequencing issues will also be discussed in this section. A possible phasing of the reforms, which combine some of the options, is suggested in section four.

4.1 Reform objective

The objective was stated by the President in his speech to Parliament on July 12, 2002: “ we have a mandate, indeed an obligation, to repair the physical damage inflicted on our country, the shattered lives of its people, and restore the pride and image of a once peaceful and confident nation.” This reflects what the authors of this report were told repeatedly, words to the effect: “The objective of the reforms must be to restore the confidence of the people in the state.”

4.2 Reforming the Policy Process, Expenditure Management, Accountability and Regulation

It is difficult to imagine that there are any choices of a strategic nature in three of the public management functions: reforming the policy-making process, ensuring adequate and predictable resources, and enforcing regulation. Under any circumstances and any decentralization scenario, there needs to be an effective Presidency and Ministry of Finance, the two agencies mainly responsible those first two public management functions. Both suffer from structural and capacity problems. The same could be said for the central accountability agencies. The proposed changes to structural and capacity conditions under those three public management functions are shown in the first, second and fourth rows in Table 4.1.

TABLE 4.1 REFORMING POLICY PROCESS, EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND REGULATION

Function	Structural Conditions	Capacity Conditions	Institutional Quality Indicators
CREDIBLE POLICYMAKING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement standardized policy formulation process • Establish policy unit in Presidency • Introduce program or activity based budgeting as part of MTEF • Link MTEF to PRSP • Make policy and monitoring the principle central sectoral responsibilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train staff throughout Government in policy analysis and formulation • Build M&E capacity in Presidency and sectors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy resources link established in all policies • Most policies implemented as planned • More public confidence in policies
ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve budget execution discipline • Broaden consultation on budget variances • Design and implement sustainable pay policy that will improve incentives • Restructure ministries in accordance with fiscal constraints and PRSP goals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train staff in all aspects of budgeting, auditing, and computing • Build capacity of training institutions • Streamline budgeting, execution and accounting systems • Computerize budgeting, cash management and accounting systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low budget variances • More funding getting through to frontline service providers • Fewer vacancies • Lower turnover of key staff
FLEXIBLE DELIVERY OF SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>See options below</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>See options below</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>See options below</i>
ENFORCEABLE REGULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Parliament's oversight role • Eliminate conflicts of interest in accountability and budget execution • Reaffirm zero tolerance policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build capacity at Attorney-General • Train MPs for oversight role • Provide technical support for MPs • Ensure ACC is adequately staffed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AG able to deal with all cases prepared by ACC • Government accounts current • OAG audit of government accounts within a year

These reforms include improving the process by which policies are prepared, implemented and monitored. It is important to strengthen policy capacity because under all of the decentralization options discussed below, the main business of the center of government will become policy and monitoring. The National Policy Advisory Committee is keen to implement proposals that were made some years ago to improve the quality of policy proposals presented to the Cabinet and introduce management arrangements that will ensure the implementation of policies. This may involve establishing a unit in the Presidency to ensure coordination in the preparation of policies, including coordination with Finance on the funding of projects through the MTEF, high quality cabinet memoranda, and effective monitoring of the implementation and impact of policies.

Some reform in the expenditure management and accountability systems, and substantial capacity building, will be required. The focus group identified capacity constraints as very severe in all the expenditure management and accountability agencies. A reform agenda would include strengthening the MTEF, which in essence links policy to resources, including key expressions of policy such as the PRSP. Capacity will have to be developed to cost policies so that choices can be made taking account of fiscal constraints. Systems will have to be introduced to link budget allocation to cash management and accountability, so that budget performance can be tracked and assessed. Capacity improvements will be required not only in the Ministry of Finance, but also in the Office of the Auditor-General and in Parliament, which provides final oversight. It will also be important that the information generated through auditing and parliamentary oversight be used to discipline malpractice. The Anti-corruption Commission and the Attorney General have important roles in this regard, the first to prepare cases (as well as educate and prevent) and the second to carry out prosecutions. Again, capacity building will be required.

Pay and incentives will have to be improved. The public service cannot now pay high enough salaries to attract the key staff it needs (Table 2.3 shows the gap between civil service and other salaries). Within the resource envelope defined by the MTEF, and guided by its priorities, a medium term pay strategy will have to be prepared that will allocate a sufficient proportion of future resources available for personal emoluments to key technical and professional staff to enable the public service to attract, motivate and retain the skills it needs.²⁷ They typically consist of the preparation of a plan to raise salaries to levels that will enable the public service to attract, motivate and retain key technical and professional staff, but to levels that can eventually be supported, in the medium term by the national budget. Support for the higher salary levels in the interim period, until such time as the budget can support the higher salaries, is provided by donors through project or budget support. Typically, the salaries of those benefiting from this support are linked to performance. In Sierra Leone's case the "medium term" after which the budget will fully support the salaries, may be relatively long term.

4.3 Decentralization Options

Two sets of options are considered. The first set refers to intergovernmental arrangements, in effect, deconcentration (ministries moving their staff into the districts) versus decentralization (district councils taking over responsibility for the delivery of services). The second refers to the respective roles of the current chieftaincy system versus an elected government at the chiefdom level. The role of communities, NGOs, and the private sector in the delivery of services is also considered in light of the different options.

These should not be considered mutually exclusive options: It is not a matter of **either** decentralization **or** deconcentration. Responsibility for the delivery of some services will be devolved to the shortly to be elected district authorities. And many services will

²⁷ Similar strategies are being implemented in a number of other African countries.

continue to be provided by deconcentrated staff of central ministries under almost any circumstances. The Chiefs will also continue to have role in the delivery of services. The options are matters of sequencing and emphasis: relatively more or less devolution to district councils (and chiefdoms), or perhaps earlier rather than later substantial devolution, for example.

Intergovernmental Arrangements: Deconcentration versus Decentralization

The most significant strategic choice concerns the institutional route by which services would be delivered, which itself has implications for the flows of funds, fiscal autonomy and the management of human resources. Two options are illustrated in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.

Option 1A Deconcentration. The first, labeled deconcentration, would deliver services through the relocation of staff and funds from the center to districts, with staff still reporting to their ministries at the center (as stated in Chapter 2, many ministry staff are based in the districts). Mechanisms would be put in place to ensure coordination among ministries at the district level, but even those mechanisms would be under the control of central government, even if decisions were made after consultation with community groups.

Option 1B Decentralization. The second option, labeled decentralization, would also involve staff relocation to districts, but in this case district councils not ministries would employ them. Funds too would be allocated to districts, but a substantial portion of them in a fungible form – in other words, local councils not central government would decide on their use. Under this option there would be some changes in the other public management functions. There would be some shift of policy and resource allocation responsibilities to district councils. Similarly, there would be greater reliance on district councils to ensure accountability. As Boxes 2 and 3, summarizing some decentralization experience, show primary education and primary health care are the two services most commonly devolved to subnational government, as was the case in Sierra Leone prior to 1972.

TABLE 4.2 OPTION 1A DECONCENTRATION

Function	Structural Conditions	Capacity Conditions
CREDIBLE POLICYMAKING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See 4.1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •
ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See 4.1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •
FLEXIBLE DELIVERY OF SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most ministry staff to work in districts • Central staff to focus on policy and monitoring • Coordination mechanisms at district level • Interaction between deconcentrated staff and communities • Introduction of regional service providers where appropriate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build ministerial restructuring design and implementation capacity • Provide incentives for ministries to restructure through performance improvement fund • Equip district offices • Train staff for new roles
ENFORCEABLE REGULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See 4.1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •

TABLE 4.3 OPTION 1B DECENTRALIZATION

Function	Structural Conditions	Capacity Conditions
CREDIBLE POLICYMAKING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant policy making for service delivery at district council level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build district council policy skills
ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More fungible resources allocated to district councils • Incentives for staff to move to districts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build skills in planning, financial management, procurement and human resources management skills at local level
FLEXIBLE DELIVERY OF SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic services provided through district councils • Deconcentrated staff report to local councils • Partnerships between district councils and NGOs • Fungible funds allocated to local councils 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equip local councils • Train council staff in service delivery • Train councilors for oversight role
ENFORCEABLE REGULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACC and Auditor General active locally • Community involvement in monitoring and evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build local databases on service performance

BOX 2. LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF DECENTRALIZATION *

Latin America's experience of elected local government is fairly recent. Although Mexico has had provincial and municipal government since 1917, most Latin American countries only had their first local elections after 1980. In most cases the decentralization of central government functions has been to the provincial not municipal level. A limited range of functions have been decentralized where the transfer to the municipal level has taken place: primary education and health for Chile; only the physical assets for primary schools and clinics in the case of Bolivia; and increases in revenue sharing in Guatemala. The sub-national share of total spending is between 10 and 15 per cent in those three cases.

Studies have shown that transferring management responsibilities to local government may not be enough. To quote Burki et al: "It is only when management is decentralized to community boards and school directors that positive impacts from decentralization appear." Improvements are correlated with community influence over hiring and dismissal of school directors and the influence of school directors over recruitment, promotion and dismissal of teachers.

There is also evidence that decentralization may not be the most important change. Burki et al report that in the health sector the most important structural reform has been the fundamental shift in the public sector role from provider to an insurer of health care provided by the private sector. The privatization of road maintenance has had a more marked impact on road performance than the decentralization of parts of the network to sub-national governments.

The technical competence of local government has been in some cases handicapped by difficulties in transferring staff. Many of Peru's highway engineers chose to retire rather than accept employment in local government, leading to a collapse of this decentralization effort. Clearly it is important to make the conditions of employment sufficiently attractive at the local level. Even with equivalent pay, smaller local administrations found it difficult to attract and retain competent staff.

Concern is sometimes expressed that decentralization increases overall expenditure levels. An econometric study of 32 industrial and developing countries, some from Latin America, showed that the decentralization of spending by transfers (most common in relatively poor countries) tends to increase the size of government thus overall spending. However this is not the case where local government raises relatively more of the resources it needs from their own taxes.

* *From Burki, Shahid, Guillermo Perry, and William Dillinger, Decentralizing the State, World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 1999.*

The principal argument against the rapid devolution of authority to the district councils is the lack of local capacity. There are no district councils and no district council staff right now; there are only the very poorly equipped representative of central government, including the district officer. Such services that are provided are supported by NGOs or national programs such as the National Commission for Social Action (NACSA). So capacity building would have to start from zero. It may even be difficult to attract the staff whose capacity needs to be built since local government will find it difficult to compete with the salaries paid to NGO-supported staff or even those funded under the national programs.

BOX 3. OTHER DECENTRALIZATION EXPERIENCE **

Uganda. The delivery of primary health care and primary education has been decentralized. In health, staffing decisions are made at the district level, but district funding largely comes in the form of conditional grants from the center, with explicitly identified uses. The curriculum and most funding for primary education flow from the center, but decisions about personnel, school construction, and operation and maintenance are made locally. The reason given for the tight controls from the center on local government through the conditional grants is because of weak financial management capacity at the local level.

Philippines. Most health spending has been devolved to subnational governments, though central government retains responsibility for public goods such as immunization and communicable disease control. (This is not the case in Uganda, where decentralization is said to be one of the causes in the fall in immunization rates). In education, central government is still responsible for budgeting and hiring, but local governments are responsible for operating and maintaining schools and are often involved in hiring teachers.

Social funds and decentralization. There is some evidence that the promotion of social funds and local government reform and capacity building programs sometimes work at cross-purposes. Social funds aim to empower communities by enabling them to participate in the selection, implementation and maintenance of development projects. In contrast, decentralization focuses on formal government institutions, both political and administrative. As central governments reallocate responsibilities for providing basic services to subnational governments, the potential increases for the community-oriented social fund approach to conflict with the constitutionally mandated changes in local responsibilities. Communities participating in a social fund, tend to select projects from a menu. Thus the social fund approach is participatory but the process does not cover the full range of community development needs. This can only be achieved by transferring service delivery responsibilities to local governments. Social funds provide direct funding for community-driven development. But these are often parallel sources of funds outside the official channels covered by the budgetary process. This, according to a recent World Bank review of social funds, means that they can only be sustained if the donor's support continues. This parallel funding conflicts with the need under a decentralization policy to build accountable local government. For all these reasons it is important that social fund mechanisms be linked to and incorporated in to local political decision-making and administration.

*** This summary has been taken from the World Bank's Decentralization website.*

However, the option of moving straight to the decentralized option is a real one. Box 4 summarizes Indonesia's recent "big bang" approach to decentralization. Moving first in the direction of deconcentration may actually delay the development of the decentralization option; deconcentrated staff, and their head office ministers and managers, may tend to "dig in" and resist the final evolution to local district council control. The central government resistance is likely to be based on capacity issues – the ministries have the skills, or nearly do, but the yet-to-be-formed local councils do not. The risk of "local capture" may also be raised as an issue, especially since the capacity of the districts (and chiefdoms) is to be improved. Thus if decentralization (to district councils and chiefdoms control) is the ultimate goal, the intermediate step of deconcentration may delay its achievement.

Given the commitment to local government elections later this year, there will have to be a certain devolution of responsibilities. It may even be wise to create some district

council administrative capacity before the elections so that the councilors immediately have some staff to work with. Similarly, it will be necessary to allocate funds to the councils during the current budget cycle.

BOX 4. INDONESIA'S BIG BANG DECENTRALIZATION

Indonesia has adopted the big bang approach to decentralization. Following the fiscal crisis of 1997 and the resignation of the Soeharto government, in 1999 Parliament passed two laws requiring that drastic decentralization measures be implemented, the Law on Regional Governance and the Law on Fiscal Balance. As result the sub-national share of government spending will rise to more than 40 per cent, up from 19 per cent in 2000. Central government will share revenue from natural resources with sub-national governments as well as 20 per cent of personal tax revenue. At least 25 per cent of central government's revenue must be transferred through a general purpose allocation based on formulas aimed at equalizing fiscal capacities of sub-national governments to meet their spending needs. Ten per cent of this allocation will go to the provinces and 90 per cent to the districts. The Law on Regional Governance defines central government responsibilities (defense, religion, foreign affairs, debt and financial management), leaving everything else to sub-national government.

This is a bold and dramatic move. There is no transitional plan; no gradualism. Indonesia is moving straight to implementation by transferring large numbers of central government staff to the kabupaten (counties). Decentralization is not at all linked to capacity. No central capacity to monitor the process has been set up. No local taxing power has been established.

It is too early to tell if this big bang approach will improve service delivery and governance. But politically, it is probably irreversible.

A relatively aggressive decentralization program will require major support for capacity building both for the elected councilors and their staff. The development of local government training capacity will also be needed. It is probably not a good idea for the level of funding to move ahead of the capacity to handle those funds (as in the Indonesia case). However, it is equally important for central government not to be able to use the excuse: "We cannot decentralize as quickly as we would like to because there is no local capacity," to hold on to central power. It may be wise, as in other countries, to put in place a fiscal incentive system in pace. Those who do well with the funds given to them will be rewarded with additional resources, and perhaps even wider powers.

The Indonesian big bang shows that a rapid transfer of authority is possible. Thousands of civil servants were transferred from central government ministries to regional control; 348 local governments were activated; and block grants and formula based transfers were implemented. Nevertheless capacity is very weak at the local level and there is strong evidence of local capture, personal fiefdoms based on the funds now allocated to local government. Fiscal relations are still being elaborated. That said, many believe that the process is irreversible, and the "details" will be worked out.

The experience of South Africa and Indonesia seems to demonstrate that a time of major political change is a good one at which to promote decentralization. South Africa's decentralization governance was associated with the constitutional transformation from

apartheid; Indonesia's with the weak support for the post-Soeharto government of Habibie and demands for political and fiscal decentralization. Sierra Leone may be at just such a juncture. Settled social, political and bureaucratic structures can more easily capture a policy against their interests.

If there is a strong belief that decentralization will improve the access of the poor to services, then it may be best to move fairly aggressively and quickly, to set in motion a process that will be difficult to reverse. Perhaps any structural change should be made quickly. A gradual program may mean a delayed program, with more opportunities for reversal, as happened with Argentina's decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s.

Those interviewed by the team did express a strong belief that devolving substantial responsibility to the soon-to-be-elected district councils will improve the access of the poor to services. Again and again they referred to the good pre-1972 experience. There were no exceptions to this confidence in a revived local government. That being the case, if the policy intent is firm, then its implementation should be pursued with vigor. This will be a matter of revising the regulatory framework accordingly and aggressively building local capacity.

Chieftaincy Options

As shown in Chapter 3, the restoration of local government at the Chiefdom level is one of the priorities of the Government of Sierra Leone in this post-conflict phase. The GOSL intends to restore the Chieftaincy as the lowest level governing body. Although in the past, Chiefs' rule has led to mismanagement, power abuse and failure to ensure the delivery of decentralized services,²⁸ the Government believes that the restoration of the Chieftaincies is the fastest and most cost/effective way to restore the minimal necessary governance to the sub-district level. However, the Government does recognize that Chiefdom administrations and councils currently have little capacity to administer and govern local affairs. In parallel to the level of deconcentration and decentralization on to the district level discussed above, the responsibilities and governance structures of Chiefdoms could be reorganized as shown in Options 2A and 2B.

Option 2A, assumes that the Chieftaincies, as currently constituted, will be responsible for the delivery of some basic services. Under option 2B, would have similar service delivery responsibilities but would be directly elected by the people, thus improving the possibilities for better accountability. The options are summarized in tables 4.4 and 4.5.

Option 2A Revised Current Chieftaincy system and basic services delivery:
While financial responsibility for primary education, primary health posts and agriculture

²⁸ See Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme, Summary of Reports on Consultation Workshops, The Government of Sierra Leone, December 2001. In the past, Chiefdoms' failure to deliver services led to a re-centralization of those services to the District level.

extension services rests with the Chieftain Council, education and agriculture extension services are delivered by private groups. District Councils retains a substantive control and oversight over primary service delivery at the Chieftain level. The District Council would also exercise quarterly controls of Chieftain budget and approves recurrent Chieftain expenses above a pre-established threshold. Fiscal transfers from central government complement local sources of revenue (Chieftain tax). The Chieftain Council manages the Chieftain budget with the support of the Chieftain Treasurer. Paramount Chiefs and Speakers have a symbolic role in governing Chieftain affairs and need Chieftain Council approval of budget and expenditures that are then certified by District Councils. The Center Tender Board would be deconcentrated to the District level and approve Chieftain procurement. Chieftain Police would report to the Chieftain Council and District Chief Police Officer. Extensive capacity building would be needed at all levels of Chieftain governmental and administrative bodies.

Option 2B Fully elected Chieftain government and basic services delivery:

Option 2 assumes the direct election of Chieftains' Administrators (or fully elected Chiefs) and Chieftain Councils through established election cycles (perhaps every four years) thus allowing citizens to vote out leaders performing poorly. In this case, Chieftains will progressively gain autonomy as there is certification through recurrent audits of good budget management and accountability standards improve. Until audits are clear, Chieftain expenses (beyond a certain threshold) would need District Council pre-approval. Treasury functions would be transferred progressively to the Chieftain Council and Administration as the necessary capacity is built. Procurement would be decentralized once procurement procedures are respected by Chieftain procurement officer and approved by deconcentrated District procurement services. Service delivery would be decentralized and the responsibility of Chieftain administration, Council and elected Administrator. Line ministries staff deconcentrated on the District level would be responsible for policy implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

TABLE 4.4: OPTION 2A. REVISED CURRENT CHIEFTAINCY SYSTEM AND BASIC SERVICES DELIVERY

Function	Structural Conditions	Capacity Conditions
CREDIBLE POLICYMAKING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deconcentrated staff of line ministries on the District level for monitoring and evaluation • Communities, District Councils and Chiefdom Council participate in the formulation of development policies and priorities • Strong monitoring mechanisms of line ministries and central government institutions of governance issues at the chiefdom level • Strong and well performing Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well trained deconcentrated staff from line ministries, relocation incentives, rotary assignments • Capacity building for Chiefdom administration and Committees on re-organization of the state and chiefdom responsibilities • Functional review, re-structuring and capacity building for MRDLG
ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central government grants transparently and timely transferred to Chiefdoms • Re-distributive role of central grants • Transparent taxation of individuals, NRA oversight of Chiefdoms revenue base • Chiefdom Council fiduciary control over Chiefdom budget • District Council pre-approves Chiefdom expenses even if the necessary treasury capacity is built and audits approved • Central Tender Board functions deconcentrated on the District level, handles Chiefdom procurement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building for government officials and civil servants to oversee local public finances • Private/non governmental sector providing capacity building for local government in budget formulation and execution • Training of Chiefdom administration and Committee members and public information campaigns on fiscal arrangements and responsibilities between central government, Districts and Chiefdoms • Long term capacity building for decentralized procurement, auditing, treasury functions
FLEXIBLE DELIVERY OF SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary education and health and agricultural services deconcentrated on the Chiefdom level • Private/government partnerships for service delivery • Joint oversight power over service delivery (beneficiary involvement, Chiefdom Council and District Council) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building opportunities for private service delivery to promote competition • Capacity building opportunities for private groups to monitor and evaluate economic and social output of service delivery
ENFORCEABLE REGULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACC itinerant missions to Chiefdoms • Chiefdom police report to Chiefdom Council and District Police Officer • Six months audits of Chiefdom accounts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public campaigns on code of conduct of local administrations and officials and rights of local population • Capacity building for police at the chiefdom level

TABLE 4.5: OPTION 2B FULLY ELECTED CHIEFTAINCY GOVERNMENT AND BASIC SERVICES DELIVERY

Function	Structural Conditions	Capacity Conditions
CREDIBLE POLICYMAKING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deconcentrated staff from line ministries on the District level for monitoring and evaluation • Communities, District Councils and Local (Chieftaincy) Councils provide input on priorities and development policies • Strong monitoring mechanisms of line ministries and central government institutions over governance issues at the chieftaincy level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well trained deconcentrated staff from line ministries, relocation incentives, rotary assignments • Capacity building for Chieftaincy administration and Committees on reorganization of the state and chieftaincy responsibilities • Sensitization of chieftaincy populations on elected local governments composition, functions and responsibilities
ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central government grants transparently and timely transferred to local governments • Re-distributive role of central grants • Transparent taxation of individuals, NRA oversight of local government revenue base • Community involvement in budget formulation and execution • Chieftaincy Administrator (or elected Chief) and Local (Chieftaincy) Council share fiduciary control over Chieftaincy budget • District Council pre-approves Chieftaincy budget expenses for the initial 2 years or until the necessary treasury capacity is built • Central Tender Board functions deconcentrated on the District level, Chieftaincy handles procurement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building for government officials and civil servants to oversee local public finances • Private/non governmental sector providing capacity building for local government in budget formulation and execution • Training/public campaigns for Chieftaincy administration, Local Councils on fiscal arrangements between central government, Districts and Chieftaincies • Capacity building for decentralized procurement, auditing, treasury functions at the Chieftaincy level • Capacity building for community involvement in budget formulation
FLEXIBLE DELIVERY OF SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary education and health and agricultural services decentralized to the Chieftaincy level • Private/government partnerships for service delivery • Joint oversight power over service delivery (beneficiary involvement, Local Council and Chieftaincy administration) • Line ministries staff deconcentrated on the District level responsible for monitoring and evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building opportunities for private service delivery to promote competition • Capacity building opportunities for private groups to monitor and evaluate economic and social output of service delivery
ENFORCEABLE REGULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACC itinerant missions to Chieftaincies • Chieftaincy police report to Local Council, elected Chieftaincy Administrator (or Chief) and District Police Officer • Six months audits of Chieftaincy accounts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public campaigns on code of conduct for local administration officials, elected Chieftaincy Administrator and rights of local population • Capacity building for police at the chieftaincy level

Service delivery, Roles of Communities, NGOs and Private Sector in Service Delivery

Whether decentralization or deconcentration is chosen, or whichever form of local government is selected, there would be a series of options for the role of communities, NGOs and the private sector in the actual provision of services. The options would vary by sector. A full articulation of options at this level is beyond the scope of this report. However it is clear that NGOs have always had a major role in service delivery, a role that has been enhanced during the post conflict period. This role has in some instances included both construction and operation of facilities as well as the hiring of staff (for example, teachers). There may be a case for continuing even increasing NGO in the construction and operation of basic services, with the role of the public sector (the deconcentrated ministries or local councils) being setting standards and regulating performance. It will certainly be important to involve the communities themselves more in planning, constructing and even operating basic services

4.4. Other Reform Issues

Phasing relief and development

The strategy must as much as is feasible retain, even prolong, existing emergency service delivery arrangements supported by relief organizations while developing service delivery mechanisms that can be sustained with local resources. It is vitally important in a country such as Sierra Leone that the peoples' confidence in the public service be restored through immediate improvements in the delivery of public services, by whichever means can be arranged – through international NGOs, as today with health and education services, and through special programs such as RRR. However, it should be recognized that, since service delivery through relief programs does reduce the incentives for reform, other incentives will have to be found to promote sustainable reform and encourage capacity building. This will be discussed below.

Sequencing reform, training and incentives

Training alone is not the answer to capacity problems. It is often the case that major training programs are carried out before either the systems or the incentives are in place to make good use of the newly trained staff. Restructuring and reengineering should in general precede training. Step one is to identify those who will design and implement the reform programs and train them; also provide them with appropriate monetary incentives. Step 2 is to implement the reengineering and restructuring, including training larger in the skills required to work with the new systems.

Funding incentives

The key to rapid evolution (either straight to decentralization, or through deconcentration, whichever is thought to be most appropriate) will be for donors to be ready to fund the capacity building needs at each stage and for the government to have strong incentives to move rapidly through the process. Part of answer will be for the donors to provide funding in a form that will provide those incentives. Ministries committed to

reform, moving along the path from deconcentration to decentralization, would be rewarded with funds for training, equipment and consultancies, and even for enhancing the salaries of key staff. Additional funding would be made available as targets are achieved. Similarly, local councils that use funds allocated to them well would be rewarded with further funds. This concept underlies the “performance improvement fund” approach to capacity building that is being applied in a number of other African countries.

Role of accountability in driving the reforms

Another key set of incentives would be the development of strong accountability systems, including effective bottom-up pressures, early in the reform process. First, clear reform targets have to be set and announced to the public. Monitoring and evaluations systems will have to be set up to provide information on the effectiveness of the reforms. Then the capacity of Parliament and district councils (and eventually Local/Chieftdom councils) will have to be developed to hold government accountable for the achievement of those targets. Given the newness of local councils and the apparent weakness of Parliamentary oversight capacity (as reported in the preparation of this study), developing community capacity to hold government accountable will be important in the early stages of the process. Communities are already involved in decisions concerning service provision under current special programs of Government and NGOs.

Flexibility in the reform process

We should be clear that new options will emerge as the reform process proceeds. Some measures will succeed as expected, others will unexpectedly fail. New ideas will emerge. The long-term strategic objectives should be clear (for example, strong district council role in the management of the delivery of basic services), but the paths to get there will not. It will probably be possible to prepare reasonably detailed plans for the next three years, but not for longer. There will therefore need to be a very careful monitoring and adjustment process (what has worked? are we achieving our objectives? what is not working as expected? what can we do about it?). Pilots could be used to assess policy outcomes prior to full scale implementation of one option. It should be appreciated that the reform process will be a very long one, taking at least ten years for there to be widespread, sustainable results in terms of the four public management functions summarized in the above tables. Quick fixes will be possible (such as are being applied in the current post conflict crisis situation – relief rather than development); but sustainable reforms will take many years.

Management of the reform process

The institutional arrangements for the preparation and implementation of plans to reform the public sector will have to combine widespread consultation with decisive executive action. A wide range of stakeholders will have to buy into the plans and participate in their monitoring. There would also need to be a team dedicated to the preparation and implementation of the plans. It should be given substantial authority to act and be able to turn to the political leadership for help if it is unable to resolve issues of a more political nature. Someone should lead the secretariat with substantial authority on his

or her own account. In most countries, public sector reform secretariats such as this are institutionally located at the very center of government, usually in the presidency, since they have to draw upon authority over all other ministries. The personal involvements of presidents, prime ministers and heads of the public service in public sector reform is another key to success.

The Minister of Presidential Affairs has identified the Governance Reform Secretariat (GRS) as the leader of the reform program. It has been established, with support from DFID, as the focal point for public sector reform, local government reform and decentralization. The Steering Committee and sub-Committees will provide the machinery that can initiate, define and manage to the broad support required by the reform program. The GRS will be able to catalyze, shape, plan and oversee the implementation of the reforms.²⁹

Another key to successful management of the reform process will be to identify and support (with salaries, training and equipment) a cadre of mid-to-top level civil servants, centrally and locally, who understand and are committed to the reforms and would tend to benefit from them in terms of their future careers in a more effective public service. These technocrats will become the focal points for the reforms in the sectors and districts.

Risks and Mitigation

The strategy should show an awareness of risks and build in mitigating measures. The risks are of course particularly severe in a country emerging from civil war. The situation remains politically precarious. There is substantial dissatisfaction with the electoral process on the part of opposition political parties, which they believe was rigged in favor of SLPP. Eighty five percent of the army, which is now better trained and equipped than it used to be, voted for a candidate other than their Commander-in-Chief, and for the person who had led a military coup. The youth who formed the rebel armies have no jobs, even if some now have skills as a result of the DDR program. The immediate prospects for job creation are not good. Major mines have not been opened. Little private sector investment is taking place. There is still substantial “informality” in diamond trading, which has provided the fuel for rebels if not the cause of rebellions. Bordering countries remain unstable. The largest UN peacekeeping force in the world has been a key to the end of the civil war and the subsequent peace. It is expected that UNAMSIL will be progressively downsized starting in six months. The British force has already left.

In this somewhat bleak situation, it will be very important for the strategy to pay substantial attention removing as many of the root causes of rebellion as are within the control of the public service: make sure the people have food security (the number one priority in the President’s speech to Parliament), improve access to basic services, give people back their government, though reestablishing effective local government and encouraging community participation; and actively prosecute corruption, especially the “big fish”. It is probably also important to tip the balance a bit in favor of relief rather than

²⁹ Based on the letter from the Minister of Presidential Affairs to the team leader, September 2, 2002.

development, where development postpones the satisfaction of demand and resources are fungible. To do so it will be important to persuade the international NGOs to stay. Although these considerations are beyond the scope of this report, it is probably also important to keep external security forces in Sierra Leone for quite some time and to subsidize job creation. The bottom line is that major support from the international community will be required for many years to minimize these risks.

4.5 Possible priorities and sequencing

From the focus group survey and the data presented in Chapter 2, the following seem to be the most critical constraints under each of the public management functions:

Credible Policymaking and Planning

- High vacancies in managerial and technical posts
- Weak statistical base
- Lack of capacity and data at subnational level

Adequate and Predictable Resource Management

- Weak internal and external auditing capacity, too few, too poorly qualified staff
- Poor application of sanctions

Flexible Service Delivery

- Capacity constraints for audit and regulatory personnel at local level, including equipment
- Need to change structure of government to facilitate decentralized service delivery

Enforceable Regulation

- M&E not taken seriously
- High vacancy rates
- Weak application of controls
- Severe capacity problems in all agencies, including Parliament

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this summary:

1. Effective regulation is the public management function with the most problems. The focus group scored both structural and capacity constraints as “severe.”
2. Poor pay is common to all the capacity constraints.
3. Another common factor is poorly qualified staff.
4. In many cases the policies are fine; it is their application that is the problem.
5. Accounting systems might be reasonably satisfactory but accountability controls are not taken seriously.

6. Decentralization is a widely agreed objective; but achieving effective decentralization will require major capacity building and substantial structural change.

So perhaps this means that early attention should be paid to pay reform, training, and developing true political commitment to enforcing the rules, as well as establishing the legal, administrative and capacity basis for decentralization.

Thus, strategic priorities for a ten year program might be as follows, roughly in this sequence:

- *Improve expenditure management and accountability systems and legal framework, and build associated capacity*
- *Build local government capacity*
- *Restructure ministries to focus on policy and monitoring and to deconcentrate their management of service delivery, and build capacity for new role*
- *Increase funding for local government, as capacity is developed and performance improves*
- *Develop partnerships between local government, NGOs and communities.*
- *Support mechanisms to increase the demand for better governance at the local level.*

Throughout:

- *Gradually improve and decompress salaries*
- *Develop local training capacity*
- *Monitor progress and be prepared to make adjustments.*

ANNEX 1. MAPPING CONSTRAINTS AND INTERVENTIONS

1. This annex provides a detailed questionnaire for evaluators to rate the severity of structural and capacity constraints on policymaking, resource management, delivery, and regulatory enforcement using a simple six-point scale (0-5).

Diagnosing Initial Institutional Constraint

2. Each of the questions provided below has been coded to indicate structural (S) and capacity (C) constraints, as well as their impact on institutional quality (Q)

Credible Policymaking and Planning

3. *Macroeconomic* (monetary and fiscal) policies are most likely to be predictable, consistent, and coherent when policymaking processes are insulated. Typically, technocratic enclaves with arms-length relationships to the executive serve to buffer policymakers from populist pressures such as interest group capture. The following questions enable evaluators to rate the severity of initial constraints on macroeconomic policymaking.

i) To what extent was macroeconomic policymaking exposed to political interference by the executive or pressures from other interests? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Highly insulated	Insulated	Somewhat insulated	Somewhat exposed	Exposed	Highly exposed

ii) Were there any formal mechanisms to insulate monetary and fiscal policy from such pressures? (S) No

iii) If yes, which ones (mark an F for fiscal and an M for monetary)? (S)

Delegation to an autonomous entity M Financially endowed enclaves
 Fixed policy and bargaining rules F Binding international agreements F, M

iv) How frequently did politicians, bureaucrats, and other stakeholders abrogate formal rules and due process during monetary and fiscal policymaking? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Never	Occasionally	Frequently	Almost always	Always	

v) In your judgment, did structural constraints affect macroeconomic policy outcomes in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=no impact and 5=significantly increased. (S)

Volatility 2 Inconsistency 2 Incoherence 1

- vi) Estimate vacancy rate for managerial and technical posts in the central bank, Ministry of Finance, and other key technocratic enclaves. (C)

>50% _____ 35-50% _____ 20-35% _____ _____ ✓ <5% _____

- vii) To what extent were professional staff-in-post adequately skilled to carry out core economic management tasks? (C)

0	1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3	4	5
Never under-skilled	Rarely under-skilled	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Frequently under-skilled	Almost always under-skilled	Chronically under-skilled

- viii) What was the quality of the statistical base available to policymakers to carrying out core economic management tasks? (C)

0	1	2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	4	5
Very robust	Robust	Somewhat robust	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Weak	Very weak

- ix) To what extent were day-to-day functions of core policymaking bodies constrained by scarcity of complementary inputs such as hardware and software, infrastructure, stationery, etc.? (C)

0	1	2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	4	5
Completely unconstrained	Unconstrained	Somewhat unconstrained	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Constrained	Severely constrained

- x) In your judgment, did capacity constraints affect macroeconomic policy outcomes in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=no impact, and 5=significantly increased. (Q)

Volatility 1 Inconsistency 1 Incoherence 1

4. The credibility of *sectoral* policies is enhanced through inclusive—rather than insular—processes. Open and inclusive policymaking enables multiple stakeholders to reveal their preferences and debate alternatives. The questions that follow help evaluators rate the severity of structural and capacity constraints on sectoral policymaking processes.

- i) To what extent were sectoral policymaking processes closed to participation by a broad range of stakeholders? (S)

0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2	3	4	5
Completely open	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Somewhat open	Somewhat closed	Closed	Completely closed

ii) Which of the following mechanisms, if any, were in place to involve multiple stakeholders in sectoral policymaking? (If applicable, circle one or more of the options on the right) (S)

Sector working groups ✓ _____ If yes>> [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
 Sub-national committees ✓ _____ If yes>> Provincial [redacted] [redacted]
 Deliberation council ✓ _____ If yes>> [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
 Other _____

iii) In which of the following aspects of sectoral policymaking were sub-national or civil society actors with longer-term interests typically involved? (S)

[redacted] _____ ✓ Content standards _____
 Performance standards and benchmarks _____ [redacted] _____ ✓
 Role of private and civic actors _____ Other _____ None of the above _____

iv) To what extent were these policy and planning activities captured (by special interests or because of exclusionary practices)? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Completely open and transparent	Open and transparent	[redacted]	Somewhat captured	Captured and closed	Completely captured and closed

v) In your judgment, did closed or captured planning processes affect sectoral policy outcomes in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=very severely. (Q)

Volatility _____ 1 _____ Inconsistency _____ 1 _____ Incoherence _____ 1 _____

vi) Estimate the vacancy rate for managerial and technical posts in line agencies. (C)

>50% _____ 35-50% _____ [redacted] ✓ 5-15% _____ <5% _____

vii) To what extent were professional staff-in-post under-skilled to carry out basic line agency functions? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Never under-skilled	Rarely under-skilled	Occasionally under-skilled	[redacted]	Almost always under-skilled	Chronically under-skilled

viii) What was the quality of the statistical base available to carry out sectoral policymaking and planning? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Very robust	Robust	Somewhat robust	Somewhat weak	[redacted]	Very weak

ix) To what extent were the day-to-day functions of line agencies constrained by scarcity of complementary inputs such as hardware and software, infrastructure, stationery, etc.? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Completely unconstrained	Unconstrained	Somewhat unconstrained	Somewhat constrained	Severely constrained	Severely constrained

x) How severely did each of the following capacity constraints hinder sub-national authorities from participating in policymaking? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=severely hindered. (C)

Poor knowledge of sector policy 4 Unfamiliarity with procedures 4
 Absence of sector specialists at the sub-national level (for example, water engineers) 4
 Lack of information on sectoral performance 3
 Lack of basic literacy 3

xi) How severely did each of the following capacity constraints hinder communities from participating in planning? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=severely hindered. (C)

Poor knowledge of their entitlements in given sector 5 Lack of basic literacy 3
 Unfamiliarity with planning bodies 4 Informal exclusionary practices 2

xii) In your judgment, did capacity constraints impact sectoral policy outcomes in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=no impact and 5= significantly increased. (Q)

Volatility 3 Inconsistency 3 Incoherence 3

xiii) Make an overall judgment of the impact of structural constraints on policy credibility.

0	1	2	3	4	5
Non existent	Insignificant	Mild	Severe	Severe	Very severe

xiv) Make an overall judgment of the impact of capacity constraints on policy credibility.

0	1	2	3	4	5
Non existent	Insignificant	Mild	Moderate	Severe	Very severe

Adequate and Predictable Resource Management

5. Transparent yet hierarchical processes promote adequate, predictable *financial resource flows* to implementing agencies. They ensure that key decision makers do not renege on agreements over inter- and intra-sectoral allocations during budget execution. They also limit uncertainty in budget and personnel management.

- i) To what extent was budget execution governed by transparent and hierarchical processes, both of which have been associated with favorable fiscal performance? (S)

Degree of transparency	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Highly transparent		More transparent than opaque	More opaque than transparent	Opaque	Highly opaque

Degree of hierarchy	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Sufficiently hierarchical		More hierarchical than collegial	More collegial than hierarchical	Collegial	Highly collegial

- ii) How likely was it for cabinet-level actors to renege on agreements regarding inter-sectoral resource allocations in the middle of the budget cycle? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Very unlikely	Unlikely		Somewhat likely	Likely	Very likely

- iii) When reallocations are made during the budget cycle, where are they most likely to be cut first? Circle one or more. (S)

Social sectors _____ Infrastructure _____ SOEs _____ Economic management _____
 Defense and police _____ _____

- iv) If there were greater certainty that budgets would be executed as planned, would original allocations for any of the following items increase? Circle one. (S)

Wage _____ _____ Capital _____

- v) How likely was it that resources would be leaked during budget execution? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Very unlikely	Unlikely	Somewhat unlikely		Likely	Very likely

vi) How significant were each of the following factors in contributing to resource leakage? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all significant and 5=very significant. (S)

Unclear rules procedures for public financial accounting 1
 Lack of capacity to account for budgeting resources 3
 Weak internal and external auditing practices 4
 Weak sanctions against corrupt practices 3

vii) At which level of public management were resources most likely to be leaked? (S)

Between MoF and line ministries _____
 Within sub-national administrative units _____

viii) To what extent were off-budget sources of funding used to compensate for budgetary uncertainty? (S)

Sectors	Funding source (private/corporate, NGO, users, etc)	% of capital	% of recurrent
(1)	NGOs	8-10%	2-4%
(2)	Other donors	0	0.5%

ix) Were any of the following mechanisms used to publicize financial accounts and audits? (S)

Compliance with Freedom of Information Act _____
 Regular internal auditing, sent to MoF _____

x) In your judgment, did structural constraints affect budgetary flows in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=very severely. (Q)

Variance (between actual and budgeted funds) 2
 Expectations of variance 2
 Leakage 2

xi) Estimate the vacancy rate for posts directly involved in budgeting and accounting. (C)

>50% _____ 35-50% _____ 20-35% _____ <5% _____

xii) To what extent were professional staff-in-post under-skilled to carry out basic financial management tasks? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Never under-skilled	Rarely under-skilled	_____	Frequently under-skilled	Almost always under-skilled	Chronically under-skilled

xiii) In your judgment, did capacity constraints affect budgetary flows in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=very severely. (Q)

Volatility 2 Inconsistency 1 Incoherence 1

xiii) Did inadequate and unpredictable budgetary flows in turn contribute to any of the following delivery problems? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=very severely. (Q)

Problems in hiring and keeping qualified personnel 5
 Wage arrears 1
 Problems in meeting demand for services 3
 Arrears to procurement suppliers 3
 Cancellation of procurement contracts 1
 Problems in securing procurement contracts 1

6. Equally important are the availability and proper deployment of *human resources* in key government institutions. Attracting and retaining qualified personnel requires that public institutions offer incentives that are competitive, as well as generally favorable conditions of service. These include fostering a work environment conducive to professional development and insulated from political interference or patronage.

i) Estimate the vacancy rates that affected managerial and technical posts in the following institutions? Circle one. (S)

Core economic management ministries	<5%	<input type="checkbox"/>	15-20%	20-35%	35-50%	>50%
Sectoral ministries	<5%	5-15%	15-20%	<input type="checkbox"/>	35-50%	>50%
Sub-national institutions (highest tiers)	<5%	5-15%	15-20%	20-35%	35-50%	>50%
Sub-national institutions (lower tiers)	<5%	5-15%	15-20%	20-35%	35-50%	>50%

ii) Was overstaffing evident among the semi-skilled and low-skilled job classes? (S)

Yes No

iii) What were the approximate wage decompression ratio between the highest and lowest grades, between managerial and technical staff? (S)

Highest-to-lowest	<5:1	5:1	7:1	10:1	15:1	20:1	<input type="checkbox"/>	30:1	35:1	>35:1
Managerial-to-technical	<input type="checkbox"/>	5:1	7:1	10:1	15:1	20:1	25:1	30:1	35:1	>35:1

iv) How did the wage of public sector employees compare as a percentage of those of private sector comparators? Indicate relative wages for the different skill levels listed below. (S)

Managerial	<20%	20-35%	<input type="checkbox"/>	50-65%	65-80%	80-95%	>95%
Technical	<20%	20-35%	<input type="checkbox"/>	50-65%	65-80%	80-95%	>95%
Semi-skilled	<20%	20-35%	35-50%	<input type="checkbox"/>	65-80%	80-95%	>95%
Low-skilled	<20%	20-35%	<input type="checkbox"/>	50-65%	65-80%	80-95%	>95%

v) To what extent were grading systems too complex, rigid, and therefore opaque? (S)

0	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	3	4	5
Sufficiently streamlined	<input type="checkbox"/>	Somewhat streamlined	Somewhat complex	Complex	Highly complex

- vi) To what extent were line agencies and key civil service management institutions such as the Ministry of Public Service or Public Service Commission understaffed? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Never	Rarely		Frequently	Almost always	Always

- vii) What if any impact did the HIV/AIDS pandemic have on medium-term prospects for retaining and developing capacity in the civil service? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Not at all		Mild	Moderate	Significant	Very significant

- viii) What if any impact did pay and systems have on vacancy rates in the civil service? (Q)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	Insignificant	Mild	Moderate	Significant	

- ix) To what extent did pay and grading systems contribute to the following problems? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=very significant. (Q)

Grade creep 4
 Patronage hiring in lower posts 3
 Ghosts 4
 Other _____

- x) In your judgment, did difficulties in retaining and attracting qualified staff hinder government agencies from carrying out core functions such as budgeting, service delivery, and M&E? (Q)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	Insignificant	Mild	Moderate		Very significant

- xi) Make an overall judgment of the severity of structural constraints on the adequacy and predictability of human and financial resource flows.

0	1	2	3	4	5
Non existent	Insignificant	Mild		Severe	Very severe

- xii) Make an overall judgment of the severity of capacity constraints on the adequacy and predictability of human and financial resource flows.

0	1	2	3	4	5
Nonexistent	Insignificant	Mild	Moderate		Very severe

Flexible Delivery

7. Delivery systems that are flexible are better able to produce outputs efficiently. Flexible delivery systems typically decentralize accountability for results (for example, for the provision of health services) along with the authority to control fiscal and administrative capacity. Once decentralized, service provision should also be de-monopolized. In other words, providers should also be subjected to a richer combination of checks and balances such as competition and beneficiary participation.

i) Were any responsibilities for service delivery assigned to sub-national tiers of government? (S)

No

ii) How much scope was there for further decentralization of service delivery, particularly of local public goods, to lower levels of government? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
None at all	Very little	Little	Some	Significant	

iii) If certain delivery responsibilities were decentralized, how much authority or discretion did sub-national units have to allocate financial and human resources or other inputs? (S)

0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2	3	4	5
A great deal		Some	Little	Very little	None at all

iv) To what extent were sub-national authorities constrained in exercising discretion over the following aspects of pay policy and personnel management? Score on a 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all constrained and 5=highly constrained. (S)

Hiring and firing personnel 0__ Career development (seniority vs. internal competition) 0__
 Term of employment (individually-determined contracts vs. uniform) 0__
 Setting compensation level (job evaluation vs. market-based) 0__

v) Did central authorities institute a system of conditional grants to sub-national government in order to ensure delivery of essential services? (S) No

vi) If yes, how severely did the conditionality in intergovernmental transfers constrain sub-national authorities from making legitimate allocative decisions? Score on a 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all constrained and 5=highly constrained. (S)

Between wage and non-wage recurrent 1 Between recurrent and capital 0
 Between items within non-wage recurrent 0

vii) Were sub-national governments legally authorized to raise own-source revenues (including user fees) to supplement transfers from the Consolidated Fund? (S)

0	1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3	4	5
A great deal	Significant		Little	Very little	Not at all

viii) Did the regulatory framework provide for service delivery under any of the following institutional options? If yes, designate the levels of government for which the law applies. (S)

Private sector participation	<u>District</u>	Federal	Provincial	District
Contracting out or outsourcing	<u>District</u>	Federal	Provincial	District
Autonomous public sector bodies	<u>District</u>	Federal	Provincial	District
NGO participation	<u>District</u>	Federal	Provincial	District
Turnover to users association		Federal	Provincial	District

ix) In your judgment, did these institutional constraints on flexibility adversely affect frontline performance in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=no impact and 5=severely undermined. (Q)

Usage 3 Cost-efficiency 3 Timeliness 3 Client satisfaction 3

xi) Rate the severity of the following capacity constraints on public institutions at the sub-national level. Score on a 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all; 5=severely constrained. (C)

Personnel in: Financial mgt. 3 Procurement 3 Audit 4 Regulation 4 Frontline 3
 Statistical base for: Fin. mgt. 3 Pay and personnel Frontline performance
 Complementary inputs: IT 5 Infrastructure 3 Vehicles 5 Other


xii) Rate the severity of the following capacity constraints on private and civic actors to undertake service delivery activities. Score on a 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all; 5=severely constrained. (C)

Personnel in: Financial mgt. 2 Procurement 2 Frontline (e.g., teachers) 1
 Statistical base for: Fin. mgt. 2 Pay and personnel 1 Frontline performance 1
 Complementary inputs: IT 2 Infrastructure 2 Vehicles 2 Other


xii) In your judgment, did these capacity constraints on flexibility adversely affect frontline performance in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=no impact and 5=severely undermined. (Q)

Utilization 3 Cost-efficiency 3 Timeliness 3 Client satisfaction 3

xiii) Make an overall judgment of the severity of structural constraints on flexibility in delivery systems.

0	1	2	3	4	5
Nonexistent	Insignificant	Mild	Moderate		Very severe

xiv) Make an overall judgment of the severity of capacity constraints on flexibility in delivery systems.

0	1	2	3	4	5
Nonexistent	Insignificant	Mild	Moderate		Very severe

Enforceable Regulation

8. Enforceable "regulation"—namely, controls over inputs, benchmarks for outputs, and evaluation of outcomes—not only safeguards the transformation process from various forms of arbitrariness, but also promotes "learning by doing" to support continual improvement.

i) How would you characterize input controls in line agencies, i.e., controls over financial and human resources as well as physical assets? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Very tight	Tight	Somewhat tight	[REDACTED]	Loose	Very loose

ii) Which of the following bodies were formally mandated with undertaking financial and operational audits? (S)

Supreme audit institutions (Auditor General or equivalent) Inspector General
 Internal audit bodies Non-governmental watchdog groups Other

iii) Were budgetary institutions governed by any of the following input controls? (S)

Organic finance act Treasury instructions
 Budget circulars Internal audits
 External audit Anti-Corruption Bureau or equivalent
 Regular expenditure tracking surveys
 Codes of ethics with specific provisions for fiduciary responsibility
 Reporting by external audit authority to parliamentary sub-committee
 Publication of audit findings in the media

iv) Was the independence of external audit or M&E bodies weakened in any of the following ways? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=severely weakened. (S)

Unclear legal mandate for the institution 1
 Weak legal provisions for access to information 1
 Inadequate pay for staff 4
 Compromised by source of funding 4
 Aggregate resource scarcity 5

v) How delayed were budgetary institutions in meeting their fiduciary responsibilities in the following areas? Circle one for each item. (S)

In-year accounting	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Internal audits	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
External audits	<6 months	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

vi) In the last 3-5 years, how typical was it for the legislature to examine formally and act on annual reports from the external audit authority (for example, the Auditor General)? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	5
very typical	Typical	Somewhat typical	Somewhat atypical	Atypical	Very atypical

vii) Which of the following were used to monitor frontline performance in the last 3-5 years? (S)

Household surveys of client satisfaction __ Report cards at the facility level __
 Firm-level surveys of service quality ____ Facility-level surveys of cost-efficiency __
 Village-level or local-level participatory evaluation _____✓_____ Other _____

viii) Were the data gathered from these exercises used in any of the following ways? (S)

Dissemination of data to officials across districts __✓_____
 Publication in local and national media __✓_____
 Incorporation in contractual agreements with heads of departments _____
 Other __✓_____ (Allocation of resources by district (and by facility in the case of health and Education))

ix) To what extent was M&E given due importance as a management tool across government agencies and departments? (S)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Given high priority	Given priority	Given some priority	Given little priority	Ignored	Completely ignored

x) Was it adequately linked into the policymaking and budgeting process? (S) Yes __No __✓

xi) Using the three criteria listed below, rate the degree to which the independence of audit and evaluation bodies was routinely compromised. (S)

Arms-length status from government	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Not at all	Very little	Little	Some	Significant	A great deal
Access to information	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Not at all	Very little	Little	Some	Significant	A great deal
Sources of funding	0	1	2	3	4	5
	Not at all	Very little	Little	Some	Significant	A great deal

xii) In your judgment, did these capacity constraints weaken any of the elements of intra-public sector regulation? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=severely weakened. (Q)

Checks and balances on arbitrariness (input controls) _____3
 "Learning by doing" or continuous improvement (output benchmarks) _____2
 Understanding outcomes and feedback into policymaking and budgeting _____3

xiii) Estimate the vacancy rate for posts in supreme audit institutions. (C)

>50% _____ 35-50% _____ 20-35% _____ 5-15% _____ <5% _____

xiv) Estimate the vacancy rate for accounting posts in line agencies including internal audit. (C)

>50% _____ 35-50% _____ 20-35% _____ 5-15% _____ <5% _____

xv) Estimate the vacancy rate for evaluation posts in line agencies. (C)

>50% _____ 35-50% _____ 20-35% _____ 5-15% _____ <5% _____

xvi) To what extent were professional staff-in-post under-skilled to carry out basic accounting and internal auditing? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Never under-skilled	Rarely under-skilled	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Frequently under-skilled	Almost always under-skilled	Chronically under-skilled

xvii) To what extent were professional staff-in-post in SAIs or watchdog institutions adequately skilled to carry out basic public sector financial auditing functions? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Never under-skilled	Rarely under-skilled	Occasionally under-skilled	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Almost always under-skilled	Chronically under-skilled

xviii) Were key budgetary institutions equipped with a functioning IFMIS? (C) Yes No

xix) If yes, which agencies or departments were networked? (C)

Core economic management bodies Sectoral ministries _____
 Sub-national government to the district level _____ Sub-district level _____

xx) Were "live" databases with data on sectoral output performance collected in the course of routine M&E? (C) Yes No

xxi) Rate the level of capacity available to maintain government information systems. (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Nonexistent	Insignificant	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Moderate	Significant	Very significant

xxii) How willing were local beneficiaries to be trained to undertake participatory evaluation in key sectors? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Very willing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Somewhat willing	Somewhat reluctant	Reluctant	Very reluctant

xxiii) How much scope did professional evaluators in the private and public sectors have for career development? (C)

0	1	2	3	4	5
Nonexistent	Insignificant		Moderate	Significant	Very significant

xxiv) Assess the "skills gap" in the following discrete areas of intra-public sector regulation. Score on a 0-5 scale, where 0=no skills gap and 5=severe skills gap. (C)

Financial auditing 2 Operational or performance auditing 4 Benchmarking 3
 Survey design 3 Participatory evaluation methods 2 Impact evaluation 2

xxv) In your judgment, did these capacity constraints weaken any of the elements of intra-public sector regulation? Score on 0-5 scale, where 0=not at all and 5=severely weakened. (Q)

Checks and balances on arbitrariness (input controls) 3
 "Learning by doing" or continual improvement (output benchmarks) 2
 Understanding outcomes and feedback into policymaking and budgeting 2

xxvi) Make an overall judgment of the severity of structural constraints on the enforceability of regulation.

0	1	2	3	4	5
Nonexistent	Insignificant	Mild	Moderate		Very severe

xxvii) Make an overall judgment of the severity of capacity constraints on the enforceability of regulation.

0	1	2	3	4	5
Nonexistent	Insignificant	Mild	Moderate		Very severe

ANNEX 3. SIERRA LEONE: SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES MDA BY REGION

Province	Ministry, Department, Agency (MDA)	Workforce
Eastern Province	Law Officer's Department	3
	Ministry Of Agriculture, Forestry And Marine Resources	422
	Ministry Of Development And Economic Planning	3
	Ministry Of Education, Youth And Sports	3,838
	Ministry Of Energy And Power	17
	Ministry Of Health And Sanitation	290
	Ministry Of Rural Development And Local Government	149
	Ministry Of Social Welfare, Gender And Children's Affairs	28
	Ministry Of Works And Maintenance	39
	Prisons Department	53
	Sierra Leone Police Force	1,063
	Income Tax Department	10
Eastern Province Total		5,915
Headquarters	Customs And Excise Department	38
	Law Officer's Department	98
	Marine Resources Division	46
	Ministry Of Agriculture, Forestry And Marine Resources	558
	Ministry Of Development And Economic Planning	21
	Ministry Of Education, Youth And Sports	2,543
	Ministry Of Energy And Power	32
	Ministry Of Health And Sanitation	674
	Ministry Of Rural Development And Local Government	68
	Ministry Of Social Welfare, Gender And Children's Affairs	50
	Ministry Of Works And Maintenance	311
	Prisons Department	59
Sierra Leone Police Force	963	
Income Tax Department	119	
Headquarters Total		5,580
Northern Province	Customs And Excise Department	30
	Law Officer's Department	3
	Marine Resources Division	3
	Ministry Of Agriculture, Forestry And Marine Resources	1,219
	Ministry Of Development And Economic Planning	3
	Ministry Of Education, Youth And Sports	5,887
	Ministry Of Energy And Power	25
	Ministry Of Health And Sanitation	1,054
	Ministry Of Rural Development And Local Government	358
	Ministry Of Social Welfare, Gender And Children's Affairs	27
	Ministry Of Works And Maintenance	71
	Prisons Department	89
Sierra Leone Police Force	1,159	
Income Tax Department	11	

Province	Ministry, Department, Agency (MDA)	Workforce
Northern Province Total		9,939
Southern Province	Customs And Excise Department	8
	Law Officer's Department	8
	Marine Resources Division	6
	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry And Marine Resources	707
	Ministry of Development And Economic Planning	5
	Ministry of Education, Youth And Sports	5,095
	Ministry of Energy And Power	22
	Ministry of Health And Sanitation	618
	Ministry of Rural Development And Local Government	261
	Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender And Children's Affairs	44
	Ministry of Works And Maintenance	55
	Prisons Department	67
	Sierra Leone Police Force	1,006
	Income Tax Department	9
Southern Province Total		7,911
Western Area	Customs And Excise Department	211
	Marine Resources Division	66
	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry And Marine Resources	339
	Ministry of Development And Economic Planning	43
	Ministry of Education, Youth And Sports	5,591
	Ministry of Energy And Power	67
	Ministry of Health And Sanitation	2,557
	Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender And Children's Affairs	57
	Ministry of Works And Maintenance	310
	Prisons Department	512
	Sierra Leone Police Force	3,107
	Income Tax Department	81
Western Area Total		12,941
GRAND TOTAL		42,286
Memorandum Items		
Total Workforce, all MDAs		61,872
of which		
Workforce not distributed according to region (Total)		19,586
Military		14,033
Foreign Missions		323
Other MDAs		5,230
Workforce regionally distributed as percent (%) of total workforce		68.3

ANNEX 4. LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

	Names of Individual/Designation	Ministry/Dept/Agency
1.	Abdulai Sheikh Fofanah , Senior Magistrate, Customary Law Officer	Northern Province, Consultant to DFID
2.	Action Contre la Faim	Bombali District
3.	Alhaji Amara Bunya Vagahun, Paramount Chief	Kenema District
4.	Alimamy Wurie, Director of Mines	Ministry of Mineral Resources
5.	Alan Doss, Deputy Special Representative	UNAMSIL
6.	Alice Lansana, Member	National Policy Advisory Committee
7.	A.S. Turay, Assistant District Officer	Makeni
8.	Bai Seboru Kassangba, Paramount Chief	Bombali Seboru Chiefdom
9.	Bishop Bigizu, Catholic Bishop at Makeni	Bombali District
10.	Bockari M. Jusu, Chairman	Kailahun District Council
11.	Claudius J. Thomas, Chairman	Private Sector Review Team
12.	Concern Worldwide	Freetown, S.L.
13.	Desmond Luc, Chief Justice	Supreme Court of Sierra Leone
14.	Director of SAPA/NACSA	Freetown, S.L.
15.	Dupigny, Director of Planning	Ministry of Education
16.	Eddie Turay, Party Leader	All People's Congress Party
17.	Edward Stanley, Executive Secretary	National Policy Advisory Committee
18.	Ferdinand Takatsch, Program Coordinator	GTZ
19.	Francis Gabbidon	Ombudsman
20.	Frederic Capelle, Technical Coordinator	MSF Belgium
21.	G. T. Cocker, Law Secretary	Administration of Courts, Attorney General's Office
22.	Garth Glenworth	DFID
23.	Gary Walker, Senior Partner	Associates for Global Change
24.	George Baye, Provincial Secretary	Bombali District
25.	Hari Politopoulos, European Union Tech. Asst.	Ministry of Dev. & Economic Planning
26.	Heads of District Department	Bombali District
27.	Honor Flanagan, Deputy Director	The British Council
28.	Ian Stuart, 1 st Secretary	British High Commission
29.	Jahhoh, Dr.	Public Enterprises Unit, MOF
30.	Joanna Van Gerpen	UNICEF Representative
31.	Joaquim Saweka	WHO Representative
32.	Joe Lappia, Coordinator & Project Manager	Governance Reform Secretariat

	Names of Individual/Designation	Ministry/Dept/Agency
33.	John Benjamin, Interim Party Leader	National Unit Party
34.	Julie Koenen-Grant, Program Director	USAID
35.	Kanja Sesay, 3R Commissioner	3R Commission
36.	Keith Biddle, Inspector General of Police	Freetown, S.L.
37.	Kona Koroma, Development Secretary	Ministry of Dev.& Economic Planning
38.	Lindsay Wallace	DFID
39.	Matthew M. Manah, Kenema District Officer	Kenema District
40.	Martin A.F. Carter, Acting Accountant General	Accountant General's Office
41.	Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland	Bombali District
42.	Momodou Koroma, Minister	Ministry for Presidential Affairs
43.	Musah Saloh Conteh, Kenema Town Clerk	Kenema District
44.	NACSA	Kenema District
45.	Neneh Dabo	Anti-Corruption Commission
46.	Noah Conteh	Ministry of Health
47.	O. O. Keshiro, Lt. Col., UNAMSIL NIBATT Commander	Bombali District
48.	Osho Coker, Coordinator	Public Sector Reform Secretariat
49.	Osman Kamara, Minister and Party Leader	Ministry of Trade & Industry & Party Leader: People's Democratic Party
50.	S. G. Pessina, Establishment Secretary	Freetown, S.L.
51.	R. S. Freeman	Local Govt. & Decentralization
52.	Regional Minister	Bombali District
53.	Rene Mally, Economic Advisor	European Union Delegation in Sierra Leone
54.	Ron Fennell, Consultant	Public Sector Management
55.	Samura Kamara, Financial Secretary	Ministry of Finance
56.	S. Senasi Daniel Nika, Speaker of Kenema Pramouncey	Kenema District
57.	Senasi Manasare, Dr., Chairman	Kenema District Council
58.	Sewa Marah, Leader of Govt. Business	SLPP Party Leader
59.	Solicitor General	Freetown, S.L.
60.	Solomon Berewa	Attorney General's Office
61.	Suleman S. Koroma, Kailhun District Officer	Kenema District
62.	Susan Purdin, Columbia University	IRC in Kenema
63.	Tunde Cole	Attorney General's Office
64.	Usman Boie Kamara, Deputy Dir. of Mines	Ministry of Mineral Resources
65.	Val Collier/Chairman, ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission

	Names of Individual/Designation	Ministry/Dept/Agency
66.	Wael Ibrahim, Country Manager	Oxfam
67.	Walter Nicol, Chief Electoral Commissioner	NEC
68.	Xena Bangup	MODEP/PRSP Steering C'ttee.
69.	Zainah Bangura, Coordinator	Campaign for Good Governance
