FROM THE WORLD BANK AND THE CARTER CENTER

FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE IN AFRICA AND LIBERIA
FROM CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL SOCIETY

The Transition from War to Peace in Guatemala and Liberia

THE WORLD BANK AND THE CARTER CENTER
As part of a global workshop series on the transition from war to peace, the World Bank, in collaboration with the Carter Center, held a workshop focusing on Liberia and Guatemala in Atlanta, Georgia between February 19-21, 1997.

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This report was prepared by Markus Kostner, Tales Nezam, and Colin Scott under the guidance of Nat J. Colletta. It has been reviewed by the Carter Center, the World Bank, and participants from Guatemala and Liberia. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and participants, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Carter Center, the World Bank, or any of the World Bank’s affiliated organizations.

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Ending violent conflict in countries suffering from chronic instability is a prerequisite for sustainable social and economic development. The transition from war to peace, however, is a complex process marked by the need to establish basic security (including disarmament and demobilization), protect the most vulnerable war victims, reintegrate displaced populations, rehabilitate basic infrastructure and productive assets, stabilize the economy, promote transparent and accountable government, restore social capital, and strengthen civil society. In recent years, as the number of countries undergoing violent conflict has increased, a growing number of governments and agencies have become involved in the war to peace transition process. Hence, lessons and experiences need to be shared on a more systematic basis and support measures synchronized in this relatively new discipline. It is also important to increase collaboration not only among the development community but also between the development community and the peoples and governments of the war-torn societies.

The Atlanta workshop sought to facilitate this process by promoting the exchange of knowledge and experience among politicians, policymakers, and practitioners to (a) build capacity, (b) provide opportunities for collaboration, and (c) improve coordination among different actors involved in war to peace transition.

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OBJECTIVE: Using Liberia and Guatemala as case studies, the workshop sought to enable discussion on resolving conflicts peacefully, facilitating the transition process, and preventing future outbreaks of violence.

ISSUES: Workshop discussions were organized around four issue areas or modules: (a) peace negotiations and demilitarization, (b) post-conflict governance and economic management, (c) social and economic reintegration of vulnerable groups, and (d) conflict transformation, restoration of social capital, and strengthening civil society.

ORGANIZATION: A plenary session and working groups were organized around each module. During the plenary sessions, resource persons with pertinent experience made keynote presentations. Participants and group facilitators then divided into three working groups to discuss the issues raised by the presenters. A workshop coordinator was responsible for the overall organization of the conference. For the workshop agenda, see Annex 1.

PARTICIPANTS: Workshop participants included senior government and opposition officials from Liberia and Guatemala, representatives from Liberian and Guatemalan civil society, and representatives from UN organizations (UNRISD, UNHCR, UNIFEM, UNDP/OPS, UNICEF, MINUGUA), multilaterals (World Bank, IMF, OAS, EU, OECD), regional organizations (ECOWAS), multilaterals (USAID, ODA, GTZ), donor governments (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), regional and international NGOs (CARE, ICRC, IOM), foundations (Ford Foundation), and the Carter Center. A list of participants is included in Annex 2.

WORKSHOP REPORT: The following report summarizes the presentations made by speakers during the plenary sessions and the ad hoc discussions of the working groups. It does not offer solutions independent of the ideas expressed by the workshop participants. While the report adheres closely to the actual presentations, discussions and observations, it does not present an exhaustive treatment of the issues. Examples from Liberia and Guatemala are given where possible; in cases where participants had extensive experience in other countries, examples are cited from those situations.
The Liberian civil war

Freed American slaves began to settle what is currently known as Liberia in the 1820s, often in the face of hostility from the local inhabitants. By 1847, the ex-slaves and their descendants had declared a republic and began a 150 year period of Americo-Liberian elite rule based on domination and exploitation of the indigenous population. In 1980, Americo-Liberian rule ended with a military coup staged by Samuel Doe. The ensuing regime, violently suppressed any form of opposition for the next ten years, creating deadly ethnic cleavages.

In late 1989, the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), under the leadership of Charles Taylor, began a rebellion in the north. When it reached the capital, Monrovia, during the summer of 1990, the NPFL was repelled by an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force (ECOMOG). Shortly after, President Doe was killed by a splinter faction of the NPFL and a Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) under the leadership of Amos Sawyer was installed.

Major peace talks started the subsequent year in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire failed and new factions emerged. The next five years witnessed factional fighting and numerous failed peace accords. Heightened conflict in 1992 and 1996 exposed ECOMOG's limitations in providing security for a comprehensive settlement. Violent clashes between armed factions around Monrovia in April of 1996 resulted in the evacuation of most foreigners and many Liberians. However, in August of 1996, a new peace accord was signed in Abuja and partial demobilization began a few month later. During the same period, ECOMOG forces were bolstered to enable them to secure most of the country. More recently, an electoral commission has been established, efforts to repatriate the refugees have begun, 25,000 ex-combatants have been demobilized, and elections are planned for May of this year.

Historical tribal and political divisions have been exacerbated by the continuing struggle for power and material gain. Wholesale profiteering and looting have been key factors in the continuation of war. Illegal resource trading is an estimated $350 million per year business. And at the combatant level, living by the gun has become a way of life. A dangerous external and internal equilibrium has developed in a country where the state apparatus has almost completely disappeared. Hence, a major component of any peace process will be handing control of natural resources over to civil society; breaking oligopolistic access to the large profits which have underwritten the violent conflict. To date, both international donors and the UN system have been ambivalent about supporting security measures and more willing to provide humanitarian assistance rather than making a long-term commitment to reconstruction measures.

The Guatemalan civil strife

Twentieth-century Guatemalan history has two key characteristics: authoritarianism and instability. With 6 coups d'état, 5 constitutions and 35 different governments (15 of them military juntas) in 96 years, the Guatemalan people have suffered widespread physical and human destruction, and wide-scale social fragmentation and polarization. Effectively, the civil war began in 1960 with a group of young army officers revolting against corruption, accompanied by the training of anti-Cuban forces
on Guatemalan territory. The revolt failed but the officers disappeared into the rural areas, formed a guerrilla army, and began a war against the government.

Initially, the movement was aligned with Cuban revolutionary forces and concentrated in the Ladino areas of the country. However, over the next two decades, political and social reforms became a rallying point, with the indigenous populations playing a major role. The government counter-insurgency campaign, characterized by large-scale human rights violations, successfully restrained the guerrilla movement. Yet, the struggle continued, partly due to the strength of guerrilla movements in neighboring countries. In 1982, the groups united into the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).

The transition to peace began in the early to mid-1980s with a new constitution, the election of a civilian president, political pluralism, and personal liberties such as freedom of speech. In 1987, the Guatemalan president, in concert with other Central American heads of state, signed a declaration outlining procedures for the establishment of sustainable peace in the region. For Guatemala, an important component of this agreement was the establishment of National Reconciliation Commissions (NRC).

The next three years were spent preparing for the negotiations. This process included a series of NRC consultations with political parties, the private sector, religious groups, academics, labor unions, and other members of civil society. These meetings were mediated by the Catholic Church and a UN observer. In 1991, formal discussions began between the URNG and the newly formed government commission for peace (COPAZ).

Three years later, civil society was explicitly brought into the negotiations with the establishment of a Civil Society Assembly. The ensuing agreement bringing together accords on democratization, human rights, displaced populations, indigenous rights, socioeconomic issues, and the role of civil society and the military took almost six years to reach and was signed in December 1996.

**From civil war to civil society**

Though the transition from war to sustainable peace is multifaceted and nonlinear, we can distinguish the three overlapping phases of making peace, keeping peace and sustaining peace, with each phase requiring a mix of political, security, humanitarian and developmental activities. Yet, it is difficult to determine which set of activities will achieve its objectives in a given situation. Moreover, the appropriate timing of and the interaction between the various interventions is not well understood. The international community is working within a multidisciplinary and inexact science.

The following report has four main sections: the three overlapping phases of war to peace transition and a brief conclusion. The first section, making peace, discusses the peace process, including the role of civil society and the international community. The second section, keeping peace, addresses post-conflict governance, elections and issues related to implementing the peace accords. The third section, sustaining peace, explores reconstruction and reconciliation. The final section concludes by emphasizing the need for an integrated strategic framework—a coherent approach to sustainable peace.
The peace process

The essential element of a peace process is political willingness by all warring factions to enter into negotiations and a security framework to maintain the peace. This usually requires extensive investments in time and money before the parties are brought to the negotiating table. In particular, the various parties must overcome the lack of interpersonal trust that has developed during the conflict. Another important component is the need for all involved to view the negotiations as a "way out" of the conflict where not all demands will be met. As conflict results from differing societal perceptions, even the best peace process will result in a compromise.

However, to minimize discontent, maintain momentum and reach the "largest common denominator," the process needs to be comprehensive, transparent, and inclusive. This means that all social, economic and political aspects of the conflict should be addressed in an open forum, allowing all interested members of the society an equal opportunity to participate. Throughout the process, no sector of society should dominate. Civil society, including women's associations and even the combatants who may be responsible for atrocities, should be represented. To expedite the process, each group and/or faction should have a negotiator with a clear mandate. Marginalization of a significant group or issue often leads to more violence.

The following premises were suggested for effective negotiations: (a) dialogue between factions allows for the conceptualizing of peace; (b) an agreement on how to identify issues, participants and procedures, thereby legitimizing the process and actors; (c) a consensus that the substantive agenda should include economic, social and political issues, addressing the major underlying causes of the conflict; and (d) a prioritizing of issues, negotiating the substantial areas before dealing with operational aspects.

For the peace to extend beyond the negotiating table to the larger society, a number of transformations need to occur. First, behavior must be altered from the application of violence to more peaceful forms of dispute settlement; second, a transition from a wartime to a peace mentality needs to occur; third, the...
The nature of war determines the
nature of peace

system of risks and rewards should encourage peaceful pursuit of livelihoods, rather than intimidation, violence and rent-seeking; fourth, adversaries must come to view each other as members of the same society, working toward a common goal a peaceful and prosperous future; and fifth, structures and institutions must be amended at all levels of the society to support these new peaceful transformations.

Participants also noted that the “nature of war determines the nature of peace.” This means that the factors which produce and sustain the conflict will directly impact the ensuing peace settlement.

The Guatemalan peace process offers many lessons: first, transparent processes increased trust and reduced suspicion; second, participation by most of the stakeholders built a sense of partnership among the various components of society, legitimizing the process and outcome; and third, the agreements addressed the root causes of the conflict, providing a blueprint for socioeconomic development. In this manner, the agreements went beyond addressing military arrangements to provide a comprehensive package for a new nation. Participants stressed that the peace was brokered by the Guatemalans themselves, not imposed by outsiders.

The role of civil society

Civil society can play an important role during the peace process by: (a) ensuring that discussions and recommendations take into account the needs of the larger society, and (b) monitoring the implementation of these very recommendations. In this manner, the agreements become an exercise in national conflict resolution and reconstruction. As already noted, civil participation legitimizes the peace process and outcome.

However, participation by civil society requires that the factions open the process to all interested members of society; that institutional mechanisms are in place to guarantee civil participation, and that resources are available to support local peace-building and conflict management efforts. A workshop participant described this as “inclusiveness in meaningful institutions.” This process may be very difficult in a highly militarized society.

Involving civil society in the peace process can contribute to psychosocial healing. Civil society, the network of informal and formal relationships, groups and organizations which bind a society together can provide the environment within which the levels of trust and sense of community necessary for durable peace are constructed. By allowing civil society to participate in the peace settlement, reconciliation becomes part of the peace-making process itself.

The displacement and destruction associated with conflict usually has an adverse effect on civil society. Yet, some aspects of civil society usually survive and can be built on. This is the case, even in Liberia, where civilians were targeted by the
various warring factions. Involving civil society in the peace process is a way of articulating social capital (societal trust and cohesiveness), the backbone of every society, in the political arena.

The international community can support civil participation by “creating space” for civil society to realize its full potential both as peacemaker and peacekeeper. Local methods of dispute settlement, reconciliation, and institution-building should be encouraged.

During the Guatemalan peace process, civil society played a unique role. It was instrumental in defining the issues and agreements, and nurturing the peace process itself. This potential has yet to be realized in Liberia, conceivably threatening the emerging peace. The establishment of a multi-sectoral electoral commission with broad representation could be a fundamental transitional political instrument for bringing Liberian civilians into the peace process.

The role of the international community

The international community plays an important role in facilitating or expediting peace processes. Development institutions and donor governments can provide technical and financial support, as well as programs which strengthen civil society. The “Group of Friends,” an organization of countries supporting the Guatemalan peace process, played a critical role in that country’s conflict resolution. The United Nations, which is considered more impartial than any one government, can fill another important role. However, the United Nations can only play a meaningful role if (a) its participation is based on an understanding of and sensitivity to the problem, and (b) it is invited by all warring factions.

Peace that is not “home-grown” tends to be weak and short-lived

The international community should be careful not to contribute to or exacerbate the conflict. Often, foreign intervention lacks coherence or even a common desired outcome. Moreover, external solutions may not be able to influence the source of the conflict. It is important for external assistance to go beyond settling competing local claims to engaging the factions in more comprehensive dialogue. However, outsiders should not impose a peace process or agreement on the local population; peace that is not “home-grown” tends to be weak and short-lived, as the case of Angola illustrates.

Regional organizations also may be instrumental in the process, especially where refugees and regional support for different factions produce a regional dimension to the conflict. Regional bodies may be better-placed to assist the peace process because their judgments are based on a more comprehensive understanding of the conflict and its regional implications. In Central America, for example, the Contadora Group has influenced the settlement of several conflicts. However, in West Africa, attempts by ECOWAS and ECOMOG to bring about a resolution to the Liberian civil war by intervening militarily have demonstrated that regional solutions also can be hindered by regional politics.
The peace accord

The end of violence does not mean the end of conflict. Disputes and differing views on social, political and economic development will continue. Moreover, the signing of an accord is just the beginning of a lengthy and arduous process of building a society on a nonviolent foundation. Sustainable peace requires accommodating the divergent needs and timetables of various segments of society. This usually means the reconciliation of competing agendas and addressing the many factors which lead to the conflict.

Yet, as mentioned above, it is important to recognize that no accord will comprehensively address all demands. Even with the Guatemalan accord, perhaps the most comprehensive set of peace agreements signed in the post-cold war era, opposition continues from a small number of groups who feel that they gained comparatively little.

The peace accord is a critical step toward restoring the fundamental element of a functioning society: confidence. Confidence rests on the mutual understanding that former adversaries will not take up arms again. A participant noted that confidence also demands mutual respect.

Building confidence often involves a trade-off between justice and reconciliation. A society emerging from conflict has to balance the quest for justice for the victims of violence with the need to get on with life as one society. In some cases, further conflict can erupt when judgments are deemed excessively harsh. In other cases, the process becomes time-consuming and expensive without contributing to reconciliation. A “culture of impunity,” on the other hand, could undermine the reconciliation process and encourage people to take the law into their own hands. A participant suggested that “justice as opposed to vengeance” may be the appropriate balance.

Post-genocidal Rwanda is a daunting example of the difficulties of balancing justice with reconciliation. So far, the process has been expensive, mismanaged and time-consuming, with little justice or reconciliation. The process in Guatemala, on the other hand, is illustrative. The reconciliation process began with a “national dialogue” where over one hundred organizations “learned” to communicate about previously shrouded issues. Next, arrangements were made to identify the needs of direct victims of violence and create conditions for them to pardon their aggressors. These arrangements were then institutionalized into a commission to investigate human rights violations. However, a participant questioned the validity of comparing genocide with civil war.
Post-conflict governance

In the final analysis, two important elements of successful peace accords are active involvement by civil society and skillful governance. With the state apparatus and civil society both weakened by conflict, good governance—the management of resources on behalf of all citizens with fairness and openness—is an important goal. Successful governance, in this and other contexts, has several key features:

Transparency, which requires budget, debt, expenditure, and revenue disclosure. Who pays and who benefits must be apparent to all.

Accountability, which means that the governing body will be responsible for how it is generating revenue and allocating expenditure.

Rule of law, which demands a legal framework by which government and society conduct themselves.

Institutional pluralism rather than unitary structures, which supports the foregoing conditions.

Participation, which implies the involvement and empowerment of all those affected by governance.

Participants suggested that the following considerations might ease the burden on post-conflict governing bodies and facilitate good governance. To the extent possible, authority should be decentralized to increase the participation of civil society. Community-centered development and increasing capacity at the local level may produce quick impact and sustainability. Decentralization may also avoid a “winner takes all” scenario. Another important consideration is that the relatively weak administrative capacity of the government means that it should concentrate on a few priorities. A small number of targets should be set and pursued with vigor. Overly ambitious programs may produce public dissatisfaction and loss of faith in the process. Moreover, while establishing a macroeconomic framework may be necessary to reduce inflation and stabilize the economy, regulatory and administrative procedures should be kept to a minimum. Incentives for good behavior, however, need to be included early on.

Participants also emphasized that good governance does not always require political democracy. Unelected regimes can manage public resources openly and fairly, while democratically elected gov-

![Good governance does not always require political democracy](image)

erments can be corrupt and incompetent. Such distinctions have important implications for societies emerging from conflict. While ill-advised to follow political blueprints, such societies should seek to establish the institutional basis for a move toward democracy.

In search of a representative government

Although democracy may not always coincide with good governance, popular participation in decision-making does encourage transparency and accountability. These are two key features of good governance, and in the long term, good governance is correlated with socioeconomic development. Representative government—and elections as a means of achieving it—
becomes an important consideration for post-conflict societies.

If conflict is about power, then elections are a peaceful method of allocating power. They can be a first step in the peace-building process where political institutions are created to represent political positions and manage diversity without violence. Elections are also a way of admitting the “public into the negotiations.” However, elections must not be seen as an end in themselves. As a workshop participant warned, “Once on the right road, it is important to keep moving, otherwise you risk being run over by subsequent events.”

Although there appears to be little consensus on the necessity of preconditions for elections, it is important to build trust and legitimize the process by involving all factions and civil society (including refugees and the displaced). International actors can add legitimacy to the process by allaying suspicions of rigging or intimidation. Peer contacts, such as meetings between British Parliamentarians and their South African counterparts, can be very useful. Another critical factor is the role assigned to the loser. As the success of a democracy is often contingent on how it treats its losers, it is often wise to define this role before elections take place.

In many cases, elections, or “first-class democracy,” may not provide immediate answers. Winner-takes-all solutions may not be appropriate as the cases of Angola and Cambodia illustrate, especially if the state is a major employer and can withhold or provide various benefits based on political affiliation. Power-sharing alternatives such as South Africa’s transitional government of national unity may prove more effective in the medium-term. Democracies can have various forms of articulating participation. In Guatemala, the peace process involved almost six years of negotiations and involved three different governments. When elections were held, the voter turnout was relatively low given the level of civil involvement in the electoral process. This may have been due to the fact that elections had become meaningless after many years of authoritarian rule. Still, democracy not only preceded but also influenced the peace process.

In Liberia, the election process remains in doubt: 700,000 refugees have not returned and will not be able to participate from their camps, offering an advantage to any faction that can transport its own ethnic supporters. The time frame is tight, an electoral register has not been established, and the media is dominated by one faction. In addition, elections will largely depend on security, especially the continuation and sustainability of the demobilization program. Given the current state of affairs, elections present a formidable challenge.

The success of a democracy is often contingent on how it treats its losers.

Implementing the peace accord

Challenges
Once a transitional or elected governing body is in place, it faces the complex task of implementing the peace accords. Major challenges in this area include:

- Avoiding business as usual. Conflict and the subsequent peace need to be viewed as a means by which society can recreate itself establishing a new set of behaviors, mindsets, institutions, etc. Otherwise, a return to violence is inevitable. An end to the
fighting is one stop on the long road toward improving the living standards of society.

- **Meeting expectations.** In order to achieve consensus among warring factions and other groups with competing agendas, peace accords often offer a wish list, ignoring resource constraints. Translating political discourse into concrete actions will require a more realistic approach and timetable.

- **Restructuring the wartime economy.** Conflict societies undergo fundamental economic changes, which may take years to reverse. The implementation of peace accords can restore confidence and promote the return of private capital. Legitimate activities must replace the exploitation of resources that sustains the warring factions.

- **Targeting high-payoff interventions.** Given the weak economic base that characterizes most post-conflict societies, targeted interventions with immediate impact are essential. Access to land and alternative sources of income, and support for civil society and women’s groups, inter alia, should be considered.

- **Neutralizing private violence.** The instability caused by the transition period coupled with sluggish implementation of the peace accord often leads to an increase in crime rates. Reductive measures in this area need to include “carrots” (counseling, training and employment generation programs for vulnerable groups, especially ex-combatants) and “sticks” (a civilian security force and justice system).

**Human and indigenous rights**

Neglected during conflict, human rights protection and promotion are crucial in war to peace transitions. To begin the process, human rights could be incorporated in peace accords, including protection for indigenous identity and rights where necessary. The Guatemalan accords were very successful in this area. If human rights monitors are deemed necessary during the transition process, their role should be clearly defined.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recognizes five roles for human rights monitors: (a) dissuasive presence in the rural area, (b) human rights verification and monitoring, (c) strengthening and training the justice system, i.e., civilian police, prisons, judges and courts, (d) facilitating the return of internally displaced populations (IDPs) and refugees, and (e) human rights promotion, institutional development and support for civil society.

Participants suggested the following measures to improve a country’s human rights situation, increase social cohesion and prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions: (a) drawing on revered intermediaries (teachers, lawyers, etc.) from different groups, (b) promoting economic autonomy at the group and, where possible, individual level, (c) providing a predictable degree of rule of law, (d) ensuring absorptive capacity in the economy to encourage private investment, and (e) encouraging ethnic identity and heritage development, including reconstruction of historic and religious sites. All members of society, including the different ethnic groups and factions, should participate economically, socially and politically.
Participants stressed that achieving a lasting peace requires time and patience. The impact of war is profound and resentments run deep. It usually takes years for the economy to take off and generations for the wounds to heal. Achieving the peace dividend is even more challenging for poor, multi-ethnic states. Involving civil society in the process is one way of buying social patience and consensus, sharing the burden of waiting and ensuring that everyone receives a bit of the pie as it becomes available. In Guatemala, for example, a national consensus has emerged that taxes need to be raised to pay for the reconstruction effort.

Post-conflict economic management

Peace also requires a wide range of confidence-building measures (e.g., job creation, training for ex-combatants, road rehabilitation) in the area of economic management. Otherwise, as one participant noted, the society will begin to wonder: what is peace for, if not improved living standards?

Catalyzing the private sector is an important part of this confidence-building. This requires the reduction of three key constraints: lack of business confidence, lack of capital, and lack of infrastructure. Reducing uncertainty and boosting business confidence is a precondition for transforming the private sector into an engine of growth for the economy, permitting the flow of capital necessary for reconstruction. The removal of this constraint will catalyze the removal of the other two. Decreasing uncertainty requires: (a) reestablishing political authority and direction; (b) increasing security, i.e., demobilization, police and military reform; (c) providing a stable macroeconomic framework; and (d) establishing a transparent legal and regulatory environment. Yet, support for demobilization and police reform are often underfunded or not addressed up-front; and the process of stabilizing the economy (controlling inflation, consolidating fiscal management, improving the tax system, establishing a customs agency, setting up a legal framework, and normalizing financial intermediation) requires considerable effort, commitment, and capacity. Without political direction, authority and security, i.e., an enabling environment, the private sector will not rise to the challenge.

An enabling environment is also important in the context of a Marshall Plan-like...
Involving civil society in the process is one way of buying social patience and consensus

response during the post-conflict period. Some participants raised the issue of jump-starting the economies of recent post-conflict societies in the same manner as the European economies were revitalized after World War II. However, it was also mentioned that the absorptive capacity of the particular country is important. Typically, post-conflict economies undergo long periods of recovery with a slow buildup of business confidence and local investment.

Assistance to ex-combatants

Peace requires confidence, which is in turn contingent on security. When a country is transitioning from war, disarmament and demobilization become defining features of security and the subsequent peace. With peace, the most vulnerable and potentially destabilizing group is the ex-combatants. In this context, demobilization and reintegration programs (DRPs), which disarm soldiers and provide them an alternative to the gun, are critical.

To provide security, however, DRPs need to be designed and implemented in detail. Participants believed that the following should be addressed in the design and implementation of DRPs: (a) including a reintegration component to demobilization at the planning stage; (b) offering a credible and sufficiently lucrative alternative to violence; (c) sensitizing communities receiving ex-combatants, especially where atrocities had been committed by the returning veterans in the same community; (d) accommodating other vulnerable groups (refugees, IDPs, widows, the disabled) to avoid resentment; (e) timing and duration; (f) addressing the special needs of child soldiers; and (g) managing ethnic dimensions, which are often difficult for outsiders.

Local leaders can play a role in rekindling the social fabric around the veterans. Guerrilla and other forms of informal warfare, where casual fighting has become a coping strategy, present unique challenges during demobilization and reintegration. It may be difficult to get faction leaders to demobilize, especially when they are used to commanding many people and controlling lucrative resources.

Reducing uncertainty and boosting business confidence is a precondition for transforming the private sector into an engine of growth

In Liberia, previous DRPs have not been well designed or supported. The current demobilization is not linked to reintegration, and neither cantonment nor civic education were planned, though the resources were available. Moreover, the timetable of only ten weeks was unrealistic. There is thus a need for a more detailed preparatory exercise beginning with a profiling of the ex-combatant
characteristics, needs and aspirations. Reinsertion and reintegration opportunities should then be provided in the form of transitional safety nets and programs promoting sustainable livelihoods.

**Assistance to other war-affected populations**

The other main categories of war-affected populations include refugees, IDPs and those who stayed. The third group often suffers equal hardship but is frequently overlooked in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. These groups, like the ex-combatants, have special needs that must be addressed with well-designed programs. For example, a participant noted that the return of displaced persons should ensure their safety and dignity, and they should be provided legal documentation.

Reintegration programs for all war-affected groups should concentrate on addressing basic needs, i.e., food, health care, shelter, and building morale. Also, where possible, people should be empowered to meet their own needs, especially in the area of employment. However, providing basic primary education for all, training and large-scale employment will stretch an administratively weak transitional government. Experience in Latin America has shown that land reform and possibly access to credit can also be important for long-term reintegration, especially for the transitional poor.

An important subgroup within all of these groups is women. As single heads of households, they have unique socioeconomic needs; and as victims of sexual violence, they require particular attention during the reconciliation processes, especially since most of them will not disclose such information due to shame and fear of rejection.

**From emergency to development assistance**

As a society makes the transition from war to peace, the role of the international community changes from saving lives to sustaining livelihoods, from relief- to development-oriented activities. Sustaining livelihoods after a period of prolonged violence requires (a) rebuilding social, economic and political infrastructure, and (b) providing credible economic alternatives to avoid further conflict. In this context, the international community needs to consider the following set of issues to ensure successful reconstruction and sustainable socioeconomic development.

**PLANNING.** Preparation is crucial to the success of any reconstruction program. Often this process can begin before an official cease-fire is in place.

**CONTINUITY.** Building on the experience gained during the emergency phase, e.g., the secondment of relief staff, is important for informing reconstruction planning and implementation.

**COORDINATION.** To avoid duplication and improve collaboration, the international community, could work towards (a) joint training, (b) joint needs assessment, (c)
joint planning, (d) complementary interventions, (e) agreed indicators/measures of success, and (f) single leadership.

**Speed.** Procurement, funding, and reporting procedures need to be expedited during the transition phase. A trade-off exists, however, between quick disbursements, and transparent and accountable use of funds. Civil society can play an important role in ensuring that governments follow an acceptable set of principles.

**Limiting the Scope.** Immediately after a cease-fire, small-scale interventions play an important role in reducing the likelihood of renewed violence. When the situation becomes more stable, more elaborate projects and programs become useful.

**Working Capital.** Transitional support for current expenditures is important for financially restrained governments undertaking massive reconstruction programs.

**Reach.** The donor community needs to adopt more flexible and responsive procedures to reach beneficiaries.

**Security.** The reduction of illegal resource trafficking requires, inter alia, external sanctions (on the companies trading with the factions), and support for internal censures (policing) and incentives (job opportunities, training, access to credit).

**Long-term perspective.** The short-term interests of donors must not compromise the longer term interests of war-torn societies.

**On the ground.** Field presence is instrumental to ensuring appropriate interventions and necessary alterations.

The impact of any donor-sponsored measure ultimately depends on support at the local level. In this context, it is important for governments to set their own priorities and say "no" to projects and programs that do not conform to their agenda, even when they involve grants. Also, civil society can be empowered to assign roles to and responsibilities for the international community.
There is no continuum from peace-keeping to relief to development. All of these things have to go together. We need concurrent and integrated action on many fronts at once. Also, every country is different. We cannot have a standard recipe.

I have been struck by the number of what I would call dilemmas, paradoxes and tensions — poverty as one of the root causes of instability...excesses of riches in the wrong hands can become an incentive to maintaining a conflict...winner takes all is not a recipe for stability...power-sharing before the elections can equally be prejudicial to peace...conventional macroeconomic wisdom may run counter to political objectives...dilemma between reconciliation and justice...

How do we empower civil society? When do the outside players enter? How do they enter? A need for a realistic timetable and a realization that you are in for the long haul...the question of the timing of elections...what comes after the elections...democracy can take many forms...

...the need for a comprehensive approach...the need for partnerships, the need for pooling of resources, the need for complementary actions...downstream into the creation of livelihoods...upstream to give increased attention to emergencies.

I see an emerging consensus in two areas...the need for a broad gamut of confidence-building measures...[and] the need for new approaches and techniques.

We are faced with a plethora of actions and there are also a plethora of actors.

[The international community should approach] these situations with great humility because, after all, we do not have the answers. The answers are somewhere there at the local level. We can perhaps help to bring them about. Essentially our role is mediating and supporting, making the maximum use of national resources for peace. So the aim must be to foster national institutions, capacities and self-reliance. Now, in many cases this requires a very different mindset and approach.

The overriding objective is political in nature. We are trying to avert a relapse into conflict and that means that all actions must combine toward that end.

There is quite a consensus on what needs to be done in these situations, but, with the exception of certain countries, there is not sufficient political will to do something and put the money there.

Dame Margaret J. Anstee, former UN Under-Secretary General and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Angola

A theme that emerged repeatedly during the workshop was that the transition from war to peace is a highly complex process, laden with dilemmas, paradoxes and tensions. Moreover, each situation is unique and requires a singular approach. However, we have learned some lessons which can improve the design and implementation of future transition programs.

**PEACE HAS A PRICE.** During the transition phase, the overriding objective needs to be political. Financial assistance and peace become mutually dependent. Hence, the "wait-and-see" and "show-us-first" mentality which demands peace on the ground before funds are available is not appropriate. Limited political will needs to be overcome and risks taken.

**THERE IS NO CONTINUUM BETWEEN RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT.** Humanitarian and development agencies should work together to fill the gaps between their respective mandates. For example, relief agencies should consider the long-term economic impact of food aid, while development programs could take advantage of the lessons learned and institutional arrangements established during relief operations.

**POVERTY AND INEQUALITY OFTEN LEAD TO INSTABILITY.** Wealth in the wrong hands can exacerbate conflict.

**ELECTIONS DO NOT EQUAL DEMOCRACY.** Elections are not an end in themselves. And it is often important to have certain conditions in place before they take place. For example, it may be important to mitigate the divisive elements of the electoral process by assigning a clear role for the loser and avoiding a "winner-takes-all" scenario. Failed elections can lead to renewed violence and loss of faith in the democratic process as demonstrated by the Angolan experience. It is also important to recognize that democracy can take many forms such as power-sharing arrangements and a council of elders.

**TIMING IS IMPORTANT.** It is essential to (a) set a realistic timetable, (b) target peace from many angles, starting many interventions at
once but avoiding duplication, and (e) be committed to long-term objectives, not quick-fixes.

Reconciliation vs. Justice. A tension exists between getting on with reconstruction and building new lives and bringing those who have committed atrocities to justice. Each society needs to decide how it will address the reconciliation process.

Empowering civil society is an important way to inform the design, implementation, and monitoring of transition programs and to buy social patience during this volatile period.

Recognizing that conflict is part of social interaction and that the challenge is finding nonviolent forms of conflict management and resolution.

In terms of responding to these tensions, consensus is emerging in two areas. First, though every society is different and requires its own mix of interventions, there is a need for a broad gamut of confidence-building measures early in the transition process. These include restoration of economic processes (demining), demobilization, reintegration (training, job creation), good governance, human rights, security (neutral police, sound judicial system), democratic institutions, and empowerment of civil society and women. Second, new approaches and techniques are needed. Perhaps most important is the need to mobilize local human and financial resources for peace, and to identify and address demands at the local level.

What are the implications of these lessons and the emerging consensus? At the international level (UN Security Council and Secretary-General), there is a need for preventative actions and early warning systems, and more collaboration between the UN system, governments, and NGOs. Intervention should be limited to situations where they are deemed necessary and beneficial. At the country level, interventions should (a) reflect local realities and aspirations, (b) be homegrown and bottom-up, (c) be inclusive of political, social and economic institutions, (d) have clear objectives and priorities, (e) be flexible, (f) mobilize not displace local human and financial capital, and (g) be monitorable with distinct indicators.

In more general terms, the participants advocated an integrated strategic framework characterized by:

- a coherent and comprehensive approach by all actors;
- partnerships and coordination between the various members of the international community and the national government;
- a broad consensus on a strategy and related set of interventions;
- careful balancing of macroeconomic and political objectives;
- the necessary financial resources.

Perhaps most important, however, is a sense of humility. The international community should not underestimate its level of ignorance as to why conflicts occur and how they can be resolved. Also, the ultimate responsibility lies with the peoples and governments themselves. The international community can only play a supporting role, fostering local institutions, capacity and self-reliance. We have come a long way in our understanding of war-to-peace issues, activities and processes. We are beginning to know what needs to be done in general but the question often remains how. The answers are complex and ill-understood at the country level. As stated by a participant at the conclusion of the workshop, what is needed is “less intelligence and more wisdom.”
Annex 1

Workshop Agenda

Wednesday, February 19
The Carter Center, Atlanta
5:30pm Opening remarks: Greetings by President Carter and World Bank Vice President Ismail M. Serageldin; discussion of workshop objectives

6:15pm Plenary Discussion: Panel on Peace Negotiations and Demilitarization
Moderator: Nat Colletta, World Bank
Panelists: Jean Arnault, United Nations
Jimmy Carter, The Carter Center

7:30pm Reception for workshop participants

Thursday, February 20
The Carter Center, Atlanta
8:30am Continental Breakfast

9:00am Small Group Discussion

10:30am Coffee Break

10:45am Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

11:30am Plenary Discussion: Panel on Post-Conflict Governance and Economic Management
Moderator: Gordon Streeb, The Carter Center
Panelists: Robert Pastor, The Carter Center
Nils Borje Tallroth, World Bank
Ian Bannon, World Bank
Thomas O. Melia, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

12:45pm Lunch

2:00pm Small Group Discussion

3:30pm Coffee Break
3:45pm Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

4:30pm Plenary Discussion: Panel on Social and Economic Reintegration of Vulnerable Groups in Transition
Moderator: Anne Willem Bijleveld, UNHCR
Panelists: Carlos Boggio, UNHCR Guatemala
Ian Martin, University of Essex
Edelberto Torres Rivas, UN Research Institute for Social Development
Victor Tanner, Creative Associates

5:45pm End of day

Friday, February 21
Ritz Carlton Hotel-Downtown, Atlanta
8:00am Continental Breakfast

8:30am Small Group Discussion

10:00am Coffee Break

10:15am Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

11:00am Plenary Discussion: Panel on Conflict Transformation, Restoration of Social Capital, and Strengthening of Civil Society
Moderator: Harry Barnes, The Carter Center
Panelists: Mamadou Dia, World Bank
Roger Plant, MINUGUA
Christopher Mitchell, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
William Partridge, World Bank

12:15pm Lunch

1:30pm Small Group Discussion
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<tr>
<td>3:00pm</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:15pm</td>
<td>Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups</td>
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| 4:00pm | Plenary Discussion: Integrated Strategic Planning  
Moderators: Nat Colletta and Gordon Streeb  
Panelist: Margaret J. Anstee |
| 5:30pm | Closing Remarks |
Annex 2
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Position/Role</th>
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