Document of The World Bank Report No: NCO00004670 NOTE ON CANCELLED OPERATION REPORT (IDA-53630) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 52.2 MILLION (US$80 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN FOR A SOUTH SUDAN – EASTERN AFRICA REGIONAL TRANSPORT, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITATION PROJECT FIRST PHASE OF PROGRAM April 9, 2019 Transport Global Practice Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective September 30, 2018) Currency Unit = South Sudan Pound (SSP) SSP149.32 = US$1 SDR1 = US$1.39525000 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank ASA Advisory Services & Analytics CPMS Corridor Performance Monitoring System DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo EAC Eastern Africa Community EATTFP East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment FSI Fragile States Index GDP Gross Domestic Product GRSS Government of the Republic of South Sudan ICT Information and Communication Technology IDA International Development Association IEG Independent Evaluation Group IPF Investment Project Financing JIMC Joint Inter-Ministerial Committee KeNHA Kenya National Highway Authority KICTA Kenya Information and Communications Technology Agency KRA Kenya Revenue Authority MoFCEP Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Planning MoTI Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Kenya MoTPS Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services MTRB Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges, South Sudan OPRC Output and Performance-Based Road Contract OSBP One Stop Border Post PIU Project Implementation Unit PMT Project Management Team SETIDP Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project SOP Series of Projects SSCS South Sudan Customs Services SSNBS South Sudan National Bureau of Standards SSRA South Sudan Roads Authority TA Technical Assistance UN United Nations UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Carolyn Turk Practice Manager: Maria Marcela Silva Project Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed NCO Team Leader: Emmanuel Taban NCO Primary Author: Alan G. Carroll The World Bank (P131426) Africa South Sudan- Eastern Africa Regional Transport , Trade and Development Facilitation Program (Phase One) TABLE OF CONTENTS D A T A S H E E T ............................................................................................................................................. 2 A. BASIC INFORMATION ................................................................................................................................ 2 B. KEY DATES .................................................................................................................................................... 2 C. RATINGS SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 2 D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES .................................................................................................................. 2 E. BANK STAFF .................................................................................................................................................. 3 F. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs ............................................................................... 4 1. CONTEXT, PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN ............................................. 5 2. POST-APPROVAL EXPERIENCE AND REASONS FOR CANCELLATION.................................... 12 3. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................... 15 4. LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................................................................................... 18 ANNEX 1: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES . 20 ANNEX 2: LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................... 23 M A P .................................................................................................................................................................. 24 Page 1 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) DATA SHEET A. BASIC INFORMATION South Sudan- Eastern Africa Regional Country: Africa Project Name: Transport, Trade and Development Facilitation Program (Phase One) Project ID: P131426 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-53630 NCO Date: 01/07/2019 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH Financing Instrument: IPF Borrower: SUDAN Original Total USD 80.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 1.84M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 9.57M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Roads and Bridges Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. KEY DATES Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 01/17/2013 Effectiveness: 12/31/2014 12/22/2014 Appraisal: 11/25/2013 Closing: 12/30/2019 09/14/2018 Approval: 05/20/2014 C. RATINGS SUMMARY Performance Rating by NCO Outcomes: Not Applicable Risk to Development Outcome: Not Applicable Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES Page 2 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Information and Communications Technologies ICT Infrastructure 19 19 Transportation Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 59 59 Public Administration - Transportation 15 15 Industry, Trade and Services Public Administration - Industry, Trade and 7 7 Services Original Actual Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Economic Policy 63 63 Trade 63 63 Trade Facilitation 63 63 Private Sector Development 22 22 Jobs 12 12 Job Creation 12 12 Public Private Partnerships 10 10 Urban and Rural Development 24 24 Rural Development 12 12 Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 12 12 Urban Development 12 12 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 12 12 E. BANK STAFF Positions At NCO At Approval Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Makhtar Diop Country Director: Carolyn Turk Bella Bird Practice Manager: Maria Marcela Silva Supee Teravaninthorn Tesfamichael Nahusenay Project Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Mitiku NCO Team Leader: Emmanuel Taban Page 3 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) NCO Primary Author: Alan G. Carroll F. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) Moderately 0.00 1 08/26/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 0.60 2 04/09/2015 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 2.33 3 12/01/2015 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately 2.80 4 06/28/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Moderately Moderately 1.70 5 03/23/2017 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 1.81 6 03/06/2018 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Page 4 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) 1. CONTEXT, PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN Country Context 1. The South Sudan - Eastern Africa Regional Transport, Trade and Development Facilitation Project (SS-EARTTDFP) was conceived as a key element of a multi-country program (see the next section). By 2013, when this project was identified and prepared, the Bank had been supporting regional integration through multi-country programs for a number of years. This approach was first formalized in 2008, with the publication of the Bank’s Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. 1 A subsequent Bank strategy document, Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It, 2 issued in 2011, reinforced the importance of the regional development approach, which was seen as especially relevant from the infrastructure and trade perspectives, to overcome the physical disadvantages of land-locked countries such as South Sudan. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) of the SS-EARTTDFP laid out the regional development rationale and expected benefits in detail.3 2. The economy of South Sudan, which became an independent country in 2011, has been dominated by oil exports. The country is dependent on its principal southern neighbors, Uganda and Kenya, for its flows of formal trade with the outside world. These links are restricted due to limited transport access and logistical/institutional bottlenecks. South Sudan remains extremely fragile, lacking many of the basic conditions to support development. At the time of appraisal of the SS-EARTTDFP, South Sudan was estimated to have a population of about 12.3 million and a GDP of US$9.3 billion (2012). With a land area of about 648,000 sq. km, South Sudan is endowed with abundant natural resources, including a large amount of good quality rain-fed agricultural land, potentially irrigable land, aquatic and forest resources, and significant oil reserves. Yet, in 2016, more than 82 percent of South Sudanese were living under the international poverty line (poverty headcount), placing South Sudan amongst the poorest countries in the world. Currently, South Sudan ranks 181 out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index, including an average life expectancy of only 56 years.4 The continuing internal conflict has impeded the application of effective macroeconomic policies and aggravated South Sudan’s economic collapse, as reflected in significant monetization of the fiscal deficit, high inflation, a wide spread between the official and the parallel market exchange rates, and disrupted trade flows.5 3. The World Bank had been a partner since 2005 in the establishment of the Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund-National (MDTF-N) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS). These MDTFs were intended to follow up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan signed in January 2005.6 1 The World Bank, Report No. 43022-AFR, March 18, 2008. 2 The World Bank, February 2011. See various parts of the document; see especially “Box 9: Regional approaches as game changers”. 3 Project Appraisal Document, South Sudan – Eastern Africa Regional Transport, Trade and Development Facilitation Project, First Phase of Program, Report No. PAD646, April 15, 2014, pp. 1-6. 4 South Sudan Economic Update, July 2018, World Bank. 5 Op. cit. 6 The 2005 CPA was an accord signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The CPA was meant to end the second Sudanese civil war, develop democratic governance, and share oil revenues. It also set a timetable for a Southern Sudan independence referendum. Page 5 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) 4. The history of the SS-EARTTDFP, from its inception, has been intertwined with prolonged armed conflict. The end of the second Sudanese civil war in 2005 ushered in a period of relative calm leading to the foundation of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. Immediately thereafter in 2012, the country started to experience scattered inter-ethnic warfare, and South Sudanese forces carried out a short-lived seizure of the Heglig oil fields in lands claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. In December 2013, fighting broke out between forces loyal to the President his former deputy, igniting the South Sudanese civil war. Ugandan troops were deployed alongside South Sudanese government forces against the rebels. The United Nations sent peacekeepers to the country as part of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This phase of the conflict focused mainly on the Upper Nile and Jonglei regions in the north of the country. Numerous ceasefires were mediated and subsequently broken. A peace agreement was signed in Ethiopia in August 2015 under threat of United Nations sanctions for both sides. The conflict erupted again in July 2016, this time extending south to the Equatoria regions where the SS-EARTTDFP-financed regional road was located. Violent military operations caused massive population displacement and the destruction of livelihoods, which in turn fueled the creation of multiple localized armed groups. In September 2018, a “Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan” was signed between the government and the opposition in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, armed conflict and violence against civilians have continued. 5. Throughout these years of warfare, thousands of civilians have been killed, widespread human rights abuses have been documented, essential civilian infrastructure such as clinics, hospitals, and schools, have been looted, destroyed, and abandoned, and more than four million people have been forced to flee their homes, about 200,000 of whom are sheltering in United Nations compounds and hundreds of thousands as refugees in neighboring countries.7 Through the end of 2018, about 400,000 people were estimated to have been killed in the war. As of the writing of this NCO, the food security situation has continued to deteriorate, with nearly seven million people, or two-thirds of the country, facing extreme hunger, according to leading international aid agencies. Sectoral Context 6. As of 2012, South Sudan’s road network totaled 12,642 km, of which around 4,000 km were all- weather gravel roads and the rest were tracks and trails. Maintenance was weak, so that most roads were in poor to very poor condition, especially in rural areas that are largely inaccessible during the six-month rainy season (April to October). These conditions made transportation in South Sudan slower and more expensive than almost anywhere else in Africa. This, in turn, hindered farmers’ access to key inputs and their ability to move their products to local and regional markets.8 Shortly before the SS-EARTTDFP was prepared, the World Bank had assessed the country’s transport sector management institutions as being “at a formative stage”, with the capacity of the Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MRB), which had the overall responsibility for the road infrastructure, as weak.9 More recently, the Bank has observed that, since the conflict re-started in 2016, no road works of any kind have been carried out, and sector institutions have become dysfunctional. 7 Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/africa/south-sudan# 8 Implementation Completion and Results Report, South Sudan Rural Roads Project, Report No: ICR00004114, World Bank, June 12, 2017. 9 Op. cit. Page 6 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) 7. Soon after South Sudan was founded, when there was considerable goodwill in the international community toward the country, the World Bank and other development partners sought opportunities to support activities that would produce substantial development impacts while being relatively simple and straightforward, in view of the country’s very limited capacity. As a result of a 2013 donors consultative meeting focused on South Sudan and Kenya, the improvement of the key Juba-Nadapal road section within South Sudan of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor (extending into Kenya) provided a good prospect for an intervention that met the aforementioned criteria. The engineering design studies for this road segment had been carried out under a project financed by the MDTF-SS. 8. The PAD for the SS-EARTTDFP observed that, geographically, the southeastern states of South Sudan are the closest to the sea ports and agricultural markets in the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya. The development potential along the Juba-Nadapal road includes agriculture production (forestry, fishery, tea, coffee, cereals, live-animal and animal products); cement and lime industries; and mining of gold and semi-precious stones. The improved road also would facilitate the delivery of social and administrative services and promote commercial services, including storage facilities and road-side businesses. 9. From the regional standpoint, intra- and inter-regional trade and development were being hampered by the relatively poor transport links between the countries of Eastern Africa, the unsatisfactory performance of the ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam, the high cost of internet access in South Sudan, and an array of technical, political and policy-related factors.10 The Juba - Nadapal - Eldoret road was envisioned as an extension of one of the East African Community (EAC) road corridors linking South Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, and further connecting to the Dar-es-Salaam – Dodoma – Isaka corridor, which joins the Trans East African Highway at Dodoma. The Juba - Nadapal - Eldoret road also was seen as a complement to the Kampala-Juba-Addis Ababa corridor development, facilitated by the African Development Bank (AfDB), which shares the Juba – Kapoeta section (240 km) and links South Sudan to Djibouti port. Rationale for Bank involvement 10. By the time that South Sudan gained independence, the World Bank had become invested as a leading development partner for the country, to some extent because of its role as the manager of the MDTF-SS. Over the period from late 2012 through the end of 2013, when the EARTTDFP was prepared and appraised, South Sudan, despite suffering from some low-level, localized conflicts, was judged by the Bank and other development agencies to offer good prospects for socio-economic progress, provided that international support would be forthcoming. 11. The South Sudan project was packaged as part of a regional program (see below). At that time, the World Bank considered that it had developed a valuable body of experience and expertise with regional (multi-country) operations, making it well placed to take the lead in the proposed EARTTDFP. 12. Another significant element of the Bank’s involvement was that, at the time that the project was prepared, the Bank had declared itself ready to increase assistance to fragile and conflict-affected countries 10 High logistics costs, cumbersome customs regulations, informal cartels, and limited competition in the trucking industry. Supply chains to South Sudan are long and rely on a sequence of discrete operations involving many procedures, agencies and services, all of which are prone to rent-seeking and over-regulation. Page 7 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) (FCCs).11 The Bank was in the process of establishing a fragile states hub in Nairobi, and had, in the “Africa’s Future” report of 2011, expressed its willingness to take risks in supporting fragile and conflict affected countries, as reflected in the document’s statement, “As an operating principle, we should view the Bank’s primary reputational risk in fragile and conflict situations as the risk of operational inefficacy, that is, of not achieving results in peace consolidation and early development.”12 Project Development Objective 13. The project development objective was to enhance regional connectivity and integration of the Recipient with its Eastern Africa neighboring countries, and its access to sea ports. Program and Project Components 14. Multi-Country Program. The EARTTDFP program was to be implemented as a three-phase Series of Projects (SOP) using Investment Project Financing (IPF). The program met the guidelines for IDA Regional Program Funding. The provisional scale of the overall program was estimated at about US$1.3 billion. The first project, which is the subject of this NCO, had a total cost of US$255 m., of which US$80 m. were to be from an IDA credit, US$150 m. were to be provided by the China Export Import Bank as a loan (parallel financing), and US$25 m. were to be counterpart funds from the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS). 15. The second phase of the regional program (P148853), covering Kenya, was approved by the World Bank’s Board on June 11, 2015, with a closing date of December 31, 2021. It has a total cost of US$676 m., comprising an IDA credit of US$500 m. to the Government of Kenya and US$176 m. in government counterpart funding. Component 1 covers upgrading the Lokichar-Nadapal/Nakodok road in Kenya up to the limits with South Sudan. Component 2 includes support for the implementation of trade facilitation measures, including designing a One Stop Border Post on the border of South Sudan and Kenya, a social infrastructure needs assessment, design and implementation of pastoralist roadside markets, and implementation of trade and development facilitation measures, including designing export processing zones, provision of site and services, and certification of products. 16. The third project in the program, as yet not prepared, was intended to enhance support to trade facilitation measures along the priority corridors linking South Sudan to Mombasa and Djibouti seaports and finance the rehabilitation of the remaining sections of the Nadapal - Eldoret road in Kenya not financed under the first and second projects. This project was estimated to cost about US$175 million. 17. The South Sudan project covered the following: a) Component 1: Support to the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges (MTRB) (US$222 million of which IDA financing was US$47 million). The sub-components were: (a): Upgrading of approximately 125 km of the Juba-Torit road section of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor. This was to be financed mainly by a loan from the China EXIM Bank (as parallel co-financing to the project). (b): (i) Construction and rehabilitation, within the Recipient’s territory, of bridges between 11 Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It, op . cit., p. 34, para. 99. 12 Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It, op . cit., p. 37, para. 113. Page 8 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) Kapoeta and Nadapal and upgrading of approximately 40 km of the Kapoeta- Narus road section of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor and (ii) related supervision costs. (c): Road repairs of approximately 190 km of road sections, within the Recipient’s territory, between Torit and Kapoeta, and Narus and Nadapal. b) Component 2: Facilitation of Regional Transport, Trade and Development (US$12 million of IDA financing). This component aimed to support promotion of sound transport, trade and development facilitation measures, increasing the efficiency of the corridors. This included: (a): Support to the Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Planning (MOFCEP) and the South Sudan Customs Service (SSCS) in the facilitation of regional trade and transport through the establishment of an institutional base and legal framework, including: (i) the harmonization of customs procedures and the legal establishment of a One Stop Border Post (OSBP) in Nadapal; (ii) the provision of advisory services for the modernization of the Recipient’s custom services; (iii) the implementation of an integrated border management system; and (iv) the provision of advisory services and equipment for the establishment of a trade information platform within the MOFCEP. (b): Support to MTRB in the facilitation of regional trade, transport and development, including: (i) the carrying-out of a trade and development facilitation study and transport review on key national corridors; (ii) the preparation of a transit transport agreement protocol and related support to the Recipient’s national corridor management committee; (iii) the preparation of legal agreements and regulations for the establishment of a vehicle overloading control system; (iv) the development of a legal framework on traffic and safety, and the carrying out of a road safety audit along part of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor within the Recipient’s territory; (v) the implementation of a Corridor Performance Monitoring System (CPMS); and (vi) the carrying-out of studies and ESIAs for the simplification of export-import processes, the certification of products and the provision of services at rest stops. c) Component 3: Institutional Development and Program Management (US$6 million of IDA financing), including: (a): Strengthening of MTRB’s institutional capacity through the provision of advisory services and training, and the preparation of a sectoral governance and anti-corruption strategy. (b): Provision of advisory services to MTRB to strengthen its safeguards management capacity. (c): Provision of advisory services, training and logistical support, including office equipment, materials and supplies, and operating costs as required to sustain the management and coordination of project implementation activities, including audits, and the monitoring and evaluation of progress achieved in the execution of the project. d) Component 4: Connecting Juba with Fiber Optics (US$15 million of IDA financing). Construction of a fiber optic cable, alongside the part of the road located in the Recipient’s territory, from Juba to Lokichoggio in the Republic of Kenya at the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor. Project costs and funding 18. Table 1 summarizes the cost and funding of the SS-EARTTDFP. Page 9 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) Table 1: Project Cost and Funding (US$ million) Components IDA GRSS China EXIM Total Support to MTRB 47 25 bank 150 222 Transport, trade and development facilitation 12 12 Institutional development and program management 6 6 support Connecting Juba with fiber optics 15 15 Totals 80 25 150 255 Implementation Arrangements 19. The project implementation agencies were MTRB and SSCS, with the former as the lead agency. SSCS was responsible for implementing the trade facilitation component. MTRB established a Program Management Team (PMT), and SSCS established a Project Implementation Unit (PIU). MTRB was responsible for the financial management and procurement of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) component on behalf of the Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services (MoTPS). The Bank’s policy on “Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints”, which permits some alternative implementation and preparation provisions, was not triggered in the Bank’s appraisal of the project.13 Risk Analysis 20. The overall risk of the EARTTDFP was rated “high” at appraisal, as part of the program was to be implemented by a country affected by conflict, and implementation required the engagement of two countries and multiple agencies. The program also required that significant financial resources be contributed by multiple development partners. The Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF) presented in the PAD for the South Sudan project was comprehensive, and it rightly highlighted the highest risks and main mitigation measures as being in the areas of implementation capacity, governance, construction costs, insecurity, and armed conflict. The ORAF did not explicitly address the risk that the country (including the project area) might be engulfed by more widespread warfare with resultant adverse impacts on local populations. Technical and management capacity risks and gaps in financial management, procurement, and safeguards capacity were to be mitigated by the engagement of consultants. Governance risks were to be addressed by a Governance and Anti-corruption (GAC) Action Plan, but the PAD did not specify how this would be carried out. The risk ratings are listed in Table 2. 13 Under the Bank’s policy for Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints in force at the (then under OP 10.00, paragraph 12), the following exceptional arrangements could be applied in a project: (i) defer environmental and social requirements to the project implementation stage; (ii) use exceptional alternative legal and operational implementation arrangements; or (iii) consolidate the normally sequential stages of identification, preparation and appraisal into a single review. Page 10 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) Table 2: Risk Ratings at Appraisal Risk Rating: H (High Risk); S (Substantial); M (Moderate Risk); L (Low Risk) Rating Project Stakeholder Risks ggggg S Implementing Agency Risk gggg - Capacity H - Governance H Project Risks - Design H - Social and Environmental S - Program and Donor S - Delivery Monitoring and H Sustainability - Other (Optional) H Overall Implementation Risk H Quality at Entry 21. The program design had taken into consideration the recommendations of an evaluation by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of regional (multi-country) programs.14 These focused on country commitment, matching the scope to national capacities, delineation of roles at the regional and national levels, and accountable governance arrangements. Also, the program had been intended to reflect the early lessons gained from the East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP) (implemented between 2006 and 2015) regarding the need be realistic in terms of scope, timeline and outcomes. 22. In the event, although the project design contained relatively simple and straightforward roadworks under Component 1, it also included challenging institutional modernization, reform, and capacity-building elements under Components 2 and 3 which, in retrospect, were overly ambitious given the country and institutional contexts. 23. The decision to use parallel co-financing for the project’s major civil works component greatly increased demands and risks in project coordination and implementation. The SS-EARTTDFP was designed as one of the first initiatives of a joint partnership between the World Bank and China EXIM Bank to enhance growth and poverty reduction in Africa. An agreement had been signed in September 2013 between the President of the World Bank and the Chairman of the China EXIM Bank spelling out the core principles to guide projects to be co-financed between the two entities. 24. Despite the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, the Bank’s senior management agreed, in April 2014, to send the project to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors for approval, acknowledging that the project was high risk and that armed conflict could disrupt or even halt the project, citing the 14 The Development Potential of Regional Programs - An Evaluation of World Bank Support of Multi-country Operations, World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2007. Page 11 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) country’s “instability and insecurity” and noting that “The anticipated benefits of this project have to overcome the challenges of implementing the project in a conflict-affected country with limited capacity, spot insecurity and land mines, and raising the finance required to meet the huge investment.” The Board approved the project on May 20, 2014. The World Bank Financing Agreement (FA) was signed on June 12, 2014, and the credit became effective on December 22, 2014. 2. POST-APPROVAL EXPERIENCE AND REASONS FOR CANCELLATION This section provides a summary of the key factors that affected the project’s implementation and led to its cancellation. Readers are referred to the supporting documents listed in Annex 2 for details on all aspects of project implementation. 25. Activities carried out. Up to mid-2016—when the World Bank put project implementation on “hold” (also referred to as a “pause” in some documents) due to a renewal of widespread armed conflict— various preparatory activities were carried out, including repackaging of the road upgrading contracts, recruiting technical assistance consultants, preparing Terms of Reference for priority studies and assignments, formation of PIUs in SCSS and MoTPS, and preparation of bidding documents for the ICT components. A consultancy services contract was signed in March 2014 for preparation of the Output and Performance Based Road Contracting (OPRC) bid documents and the design review for reconstruction of bridges, culverts and the gravel sub-base between Kapoeta and Nadapal. The consultant encountered difficulties in fielding experts to South Sudan due to the perceived insecurity in the country and had to deploy a locally-based firm to carry out the reconnaissance survey and comparison of the original design with the situation on the ground. In October 2014, the consultant submitted its interim report, a draft of the OPRC bidding document, and the updated feasibility report and conceptual design report with confidential engineering cost estimates. These cost estimates came out to be about 80 percent higher than the original 2011 estimates, mainly due to the addition of significant margins to cover the new insecurity related risks, price increases over the intervening three years, and the inclusion of asphalt overlay works at the end of the OPRC period, which were considered essential for establishing all weather connectivity on the corridor. These cost escalations were addressed on the Bank-financed side by reducing the length of the gravel sub-base works and on the China EXIM side by increasing the loan from US$ 116 million to US$ 169 million. 26. The GRSS signed a commercial contract on November 30, 2015 with a consortium of Chinese contractors to undertake the upgrading works from Juba to Torit (including the Torit by-pass), funded by the co-financing loan from the China EXIM Bank. The contractors had mobilized their equipment in Juba and had started site inspection before the mid-2016 resumption of armed conflict. 27. By the time of the project’s closure in September 2018, disbursement of the IDA credit remained very low, at US$1.84 m. (2.3 percent of the original committed amount as of January 2018). 28. Armed conflict. By far the leading factor that affected the project’s implementation was armed conflict (see the brief chronology under Country Context, above). The Bank’s Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR) No. 2 of April 2015 noted substantially decreased performance of the Government’s main Project Management Team (PMT) due to the worsening security situation. The procurement processes for the civil works, monitoring, and institutional development consultancies had been planned Page 12 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) to commence in the third quarter of 2016, but the Bank decided to halt all project activities in July 2016 due to the uncertain security and fiscal environments, the resultant continuing decline of capacity of the implementing agency, and the inaccessibility of the road works area. As of March 2017, nearly three years after the project’s approval and nearly two and a half years after the credit’s effectiveness, very few substantive outputs had been produced. 29. Limited government implementation and financial capacity. The Bank’s Aide Memoire of September 2015 noted that “The combined effects of the conflict and complexity of the project are causing delays and cost overruns, which over time may lead to failure to achieve the objective of the project and may [require] looking into alternative project management arrangements, including engaging a project management firm like United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) that could operate in the current working environment in South Sudan.” The numbers and scope of the contracts to be managed were evidently overtaxing the capacity of the implementing agencies, apart from the effects of the conflict. The capacity of the PMT was further weakened following the exit of key staff, including the project coordinator, after the outbreak of the wider conflict in July 2016. The Government appointed another project coordinator whom the Bank felt was not adequately qualified. Overall, in the last two years of the project, the GRSS was unable to maintain effective implementation capacity. On the financial side, in March 2015 the GRSS informed the Bank that it would not be able to meet its commitment to provide the counterpart financing (US$ 25 m.) due to the financial crisis associated with the conflict and the declining international price of oil. Up to the date of cancellation of the credit, no government counterpart funds had been disbursed to the project. 30. Delay in Co-Financing with China EXIM Bank. The China EXIM co-financing was to fund the major civil works under the project and was essential to fulfilling the project development objective. The expectations of the GRSS and the World Bank of materializing this co-financing contributed to prolonging the project until mid-2018. Even so, the World Bank’s Financing Agreement did not prescribe any “cross conditionality” with China’s loan. A covenant in the Bank’s Agreement merely gave a deadline of 12 months from the effectiveness date of the Bank’s credit for the effectiveness of the Chinese Co-financing Agreement. On the other hand, China EXIM’s “Facility Agreement” with GRSS included a “Condition Precedent of Initial Utilization” [of China EXIM’s loan facility] that GRSS mu st produce documentation from the World Bank confirming that “the procurement process for the works, monitoring, and several consultancy services as described in the letter delivered by the World Bank . . . dated July 20, 2017, has successfully completed and that the World Bank is ready to disburse under the IDA Financing Agreement”. 31. As early as mid-2015, the Bank started to consider whether the South Sudan project may have to be restructured to achieve the connectivity objective, in case the planned parallel financing from the China EXIM Bank for the upgrading of the Juba-Torit road did not come through. Alternatives considered included limiting the project to reconstructing bridges and rehabilitating the existing gravel road. Nevertheless, the Bank’s emphasis remained on trying to consummate the Chinese financing. The China EXIM Bank approved a loan of US$169 million on December 27, 2015. Subsequently, China EXIM notified the World Bank that the loan signing could not occur as planned in July 2016, due to the renewed conflict in South Sudan.15 The Bank’s management provided two extensions for the deadline of the credit 15 According to project documentation, apart from the direct effects of the security situation on the feasibility of carrying out road works, the China EXIM Bank was concerned about the effects of the drop in international oil prices and the consequent risk of economic collapse of South Sudan, given that their loan agreement with South Sudan was based on a barter arrangement for South Sudan’s oil. Page 13 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) covenant regarding the signing of the Co-Financing Agreement, with the last one expiring on August 31, 2016. Finally, on September 7, 2017, the GRSS and China EXIM signed the loan agreement in China.16 Up to the time that the World Bank credit was cancelled in August 2018, work under this contract was limited to surveys and design work. 32. Based on information obtained from representatives of China EXIM for this NCO, China EXIM’s loan agreement has lapsed and is now invalid because the GRSS did not meet its conditions for effectiveness and disbursement (including the condition about World Bank readiness to disburse as mentioned above). 33. Relation to Kenya SOP2 project. Another consideration in prolonging the project was the wish of the stakeholders to try to preserve the integrity of the regional SOP program, with its expected synergies of development benefits for South Sudan, Kenya and other neighboring countries. As noted above, the second phase project of the regional SOP had been signed with Kenya in mid-2015. In the end, when overriding considerations caused the Bank to cancel the South Sudan project (see Assessment of Operational Risks, below), it was determined that the Kenya project would still be economically and socially viable on its own. An analysis performed in 2018 showed that estimated traffic demand on the Lokichar-Nadapal/Nakodok road in Kenya would be reduced by about 20 percent; the net present value, considering an already expected 20 percent increase in costs, would decrease by US$176.2 million (from US$504.5 million to US$328.3 million); and the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) would be reduced from 24.5 percent to 19.2 percent, remaining well above the threshold of 12 percent. Apart from this, the upgrading of the Kenya road will facilitate provision of humanitarian aid to South Sudan. 34. Assessment of Operational Risks. In late 2017, the World Bank carried out an assessment of the operational risks to and the feasibility of the project going forward. This was originally conceived as a joint assessment with China EXIM, but in practice it was carried out by the Bank between December 2017 and May 2018. The main findings of this assessment were as follows: • At the time, the armed conflict had spread across much of the country, and the conclusion of the assessment was that the situation was unlikely to change for the better soon. • The fragmented political process showed few signs of improving or bringing peace, the security situation in the country was on the downside, and the raging civil war posed an extraordinary risk to the implementation of the project. • Lack of access to project sites and severely weakened institutional capacity created insurmountable challenges in supervising works and safeguards compliance, verifying outputs achieved, and conducting audits of activities executed in project sites outside Juba • Furthermore, due to the passage of time and the changes since the project’s approval, the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) no longer provided coverage of all project impacts. The environmental and social risk profiles of the project had increased significantly. Based on the assessment, the World Bank considered that it 16 The agreement called for the Juba-Torit road to be constructed by a consortium of Chinese contractors using the “Engineering, Procurement, and Construction” (EPC) contracting model which was a pre -requisite for China EXIM loan approval. Page 14 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) was improbable that the Government would be able to meet its safeguards obligations in view of its eroded capacity to plan and implement. 35. Suspension and cancellation. As a result of the findings of the risk assessment, the Bank’s management decided to cancel the project. Bank management met with officials of the China EXIM Bank to inform them of the Bank’s position and obtain their views. In accordance with normal procedures under Section 6.02 of the applicable General Conditions, the Bank first notified the GRSS on June 29, 2018 of the suspension of the credit, citing the existence of “an extraordinary situation . . . which makes it improbable that the Project can be carried out or that the Recipient or the Project Implementing Entity will be able to perform its obligations under the Legal Agreement to which it is a party” and that “make it improbable that the Program, or a significant part of it, will be carried out.” 36. The World Bank officially notified the GRSS of the cancellation of the project in a letter to the Minister of Finance dated August 15, 2018, and the cancellation officially took effect on September 14, 2018. 3. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE Rating: Moderately Satisfactory During project preparation 37. The documentation for the South Sudan project indicates that the project was prepared with due attention to the Bank’s technical, fiduciary, and safeguards standards, and that the project was thoroughly reviewed at the concept, quality enhancement, and appraisal stages. Nonetheless, the Bank failed to take into account that the project’s design—involving not only road works but also advanced customs and trade reforms, institutional development, and fiber-optics development—was too complex relative to the very weak institutional capacity and skills of a newly-established and extremely poor country. Appraisal of the ability of the institutions involved in the project—MTRB, SCSS, MoTPS, and MoFCEP—to absorb capacity and system strengthening interventions was inadequate. 38. The Bank had been pro-active in facilitating the financing of feasibility studies and detailed designs for the road under a previous Bank-financed project, Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project (SETIDP, P095081). The Bank worked actively with the GRSS during project preparation to obtain the services of a consultancy firm to prepare the OPRC documents before commencement of the procurement of the civil works contracts. In the event, this process was delayed as a result of the crisis that erupted in December 2013, and the consultancy services started after project approval. 39. The Bank’s decision to approve the project in May 2014 could be questioned, in light of the outbreak of armed conflict in the country in December 2013. But, at that time, the scope of the conflict seemed limited, and it was impossible to foresee how the civil war would expand in geographic coverage and severity over the next several years. The momentum behind the project was enormous, fueled by intensive technical preparation, a high-visibility financing partnership with China, and the fact that the project was part of a regional integration program with Kenya and potentially other countries. In this Page 15 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) context, it is worth quoting at length from the final Board-approved PAD, which reflects a somber assessment of the project’s risks: “The project is located in areas so far not affected by the violence which broke out in December 2013. It remains a top priority for the Government given the country’s landlocked status and the need to develop an efficient regional development corridor through Kenya to the sea port of Mombasa. The corridor is an alternative safe and efficient route for humanitarian aid operations transiting through Kenya. If the conflict is not resolved quickly, it may pose some risks, including: (i) diverting the attention of the Government from development projects implementation; (ii) the ability of the government to ensure law and order in the project area could be weaker and safety of contractors working on the project would be at risk, and may lead to abandonment of the works; (iii) the risk level of the country will be high and responses to invitation to bid may not only be limited but costs of construction could go beyond the expected limit; (iv) the ability of the government to implement the project may be compromised and an independent project management firm or a UN Agency like United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) may have to be engaged to be manager of the civil works contracts and deliver the monitoring and supervision services of the road improvement and fiber installation, as well as the technical assistance to the modernization of the SSCS; and (v) the government contribution to the project may not flow as expected.”17 40. Although the Board approved the project, it is relevant to note that three members of the World Bank’s Board abstained from voting to approve it. Their governments reportedly shared the view that South Sudan was not ready for such a long-term development investment and should continue to receive only humanitarian assistance. During implementation. 41. The Bank’s project team carried out five missions to South Sudan after Board approval, supplemented by two reverse supervision missions in Kenya after mid-2016, when the security situation forced the halting of missions to the country. During the first two years of implementation, before the project was paused, the Bank was pro-active in various ways. It supported a project launch workshop in September 2014 that engaged key stakeholders, including MTRB, MoTPS, Customs, Commerce, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Physical Infrastructure Eastern Equatoria State, private transport operators, Members of Parliament, civil society, and Bureau of Standards, among others. The Bank followed up on the Project Preparation Advance, including reviewing the design of the Juba - Nadapal road, preparation of the bidding document for the OPRC contract, preparation of environmental and social safeguard instruments, recruiting technical and fiduciary specialists, and conducting training. The Bank also worked to facilitate the activation of the China EXIM loan by guiding the GRSS though the many required steps. The Bank’s detailed supervision missions and Aide Memoires, which included comprehensive lists of follow-up actions, helped the GRSS to keep the project on track. 42. As noted above, the Bank paused the implementation of the SS-EARTTDFP as of July 2016 due to the renewed outbreak of civil war and the inaccessibility of the project road area. The World Bank This text, under the heading “Impacts of the Conflict in South Sudan on the Project ” (paragraphs 15-17), was added to the final, 17 Board approval version of the PAD. Page 16 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) office in Juba was relocated to Nairobi as a security precaution. As part of the response to the restarted conflict, the Bank put in place a set of enhanced operational measures for assuring fiduciary oversight and compliance for the Bank’s portfolio. For the SS-EARTTDFP, a considerable flow of contacts continued over the next 18 months between the Bank, GRSS, and other stakeholders at the Bank’s senior management and technical levels. Between November 27 and December 1, 2017, the Bank and a delegation from the GRSS conducted a reverse mission in Addis Ababa to review the project’s status as the first step for carrying out the Assessment of Operational Risks. During the life of the project, the Bank team produced six Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) and six detailed Aide Memoires. 43. As of March 2017, according to the ISR of that date, the Bank team was still viewing the “pause” of project implementation as temporary and was seeking ways to continue the project, including extending the legal covenant for signing of the China EXIM Bank loan, relocating the staff of the Government’s Project Management Team to Nairobi to sustain capacity during the pause period, and considering a formal project restructuring. At the same time, there was consensus among all the key players---the Bank, China Exim Bank as well as the Chinese Ministry of Finance, that if the security situation continued to deteriorate and no signs of improvement were evident by the end of the year, the Bank would take steps to cancel this project. 44. By November of 2017, after the World Bank Annual Meetings, the Bank’s management had reached agreement that the project needed to be cancelled, in view of the continued deterioration of the country environment and the implausibility of achieving the project’s objectives. The challenge was to manage the cancellation process carefully in order to ensure support for the decision from key stakeholders, primarily the China EXIM Bank. The Bank proposed preparation of an Operational Risk Assessment as the key vehicle for this process (see above). The Assessment was carried out by Bank staff, vetted by Bank management, and shared with China EXIM. A senior Bank manager travelled to Beijing in March 2018 to present the findings and consult on the Bank’s decision to cancel the project, to which China EXIM agreed after some discussion. 45. It might be argued that the Bank should have cancelled the project much sooner, perhaps as early as mid-2017. At that point, one year had passed since the civil war had resumed and the project’s implementation had been put on hold. It did take the Bank a long time to sort out its views about the project, taking into account the pending Chinese co-financing and the need to ensure that the Kenya project of the IDA-financed regional program would remain politically and economically viable on its own. 46. Conclusion. The Bank’s performance can be assessed in two stages: (i) between entry and up to the implementation pause in 2016 and (ii) from the implementation pause onwards until cancellation. While there were some shortcomings in the project’s quality at entry, those might have been remedied by project restructuring if the project had not been derailed by the country conditions. The Bank’s original risk assessment was reasonable. Although the Bank knowingly took a high risk in deciding to approve the project in early 2014, this cannot be characterized as a reckless decision under the circumstances. During implementation up to the pause, the Bank took the necessary steps to support implementation and continuously monitored the situation, maintaining timely engagement with GRSS. On the other hand, during the last two years after the project was paused, the Bank’s performance had some important shortcomings related to: (i) managing the uncertainty of the project’s situation, leading to differences of opinion between the Bank’s Global Practice, the Regional VPU, and the Country Management Unit on Page 17 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) whether, when and on what basis to cancel the project, and (ii) processing the actual cancelation after the decision was made. Coordination of internal actions during the final months of the project could have been better. In retrospect, more decisive intervention at different levels could have led to an earlier cancellation of the project, avoiding extra administrative costs and risk exposure. 47. Taking into consideration the above, the Bank’s performance overall is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 4. LESSONS LEARNED 48. Simple project design. In this project, the World Bank failed to apply the well-established lesson, reinforced by numerous IEG reviews, that project designs should be kept simple in situations of weak client capacity. This example of the Bank’s support for an unduly complex project in a weak environment indicates a lack of rigor in appraising clients’ institutional absorptive capacity. It also reflects internal incentives to commit IDA resources18 and apply leading-edge concepts to projects (in this case, regional trade and transport facilitation) regardless of their appropriateness in a specific context. It is hoped that the experience of this project may contribute to an acceptance by the Bank that sometimes, very simple, unsophisticated project designs are for the best. 49. Co-Financing Risks. The decision to use the South Sudan EARTTDFP as one of the first vehicles for the World Bank-China EXIM partnership was made without considering whether such an arrangement was appropriate, given both the fragile country context and the fact that the two financing partners had very different motivations and perspectives. Moreover, the project depended on the Chinese co-financing for its primary justification, because China EXIM’s loan covered the upgrading of the main trunk road. In the event, these factors combined to produce a very long delay in approving the Chinese co-financing and a prolongation of decision-making on the project’s cancellation. In this regard, it is worth noting that the covenant in the Bank’s FA giving a deadline for the signing of the China EXIM agreement proved meaningless, as it and its repeated extensions were not met and the Bank did not enforce it. The experience of this project suggests various lessons: • Conflict-affected, fragile countries, especially where there are high risks to civilians, may not be the most appropriate settings for untested co-financing partnerships between entities that have very different outlooks and interests. • If co-financing in such situations is deemed necessary, the World Bank should ensure that it has very clear understandings and coordination arrangements with financing partners on how to deal with armed conflict outbreaks and their associated social and environmental consequences, including “worst case” scenarios. • As a general practice in co-financing, but especially in high risk, conflict-affected situations, the World Bank should ensure that projects are designed in such a way that preservation of a co- financing arrangement does not become the overriding consideration when severe problems arise. For example, the project could be designed to be economically viable without the co-financing and able to be quickly restructured should it become necessary. 18 The SS EARTTDFP was approved in May 2014, just before the end of IDA 16 in June 2014. Page 18 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) 50. Cancellation as a positive response. The experience of this project shows that the operating environment in a fragile and conflict-affected country can change quickly and unexpectedly, and that there are limits to what the Word Bank can do when armed conflict engulfs a project area or an entire country program. If measures such as changing the project’s geographical focus or using alternative implementation arrangements (e.g., a U.N. agency) are insufficient, cancellation may be the only option. In such circumstances, the Bank should not view cancellation as a failure, but rather as a necessary and appropriate response as part of its policy of making carefully considered investments in high-risk situations. 51. Bank management intervention to address critical conditions. In future similar situations, where country conditions become so severe that a project’s implementation has to be paused and Bank missions suspended for extended periods, decision-making on the project should be promptly and effectively escalated to higher management levels in the Bank. This is especially necessary where differing perspectives between internal Bank units may need to be harmonized and/or where there is potential for serious reputational risks for the Bank. In this regard, the Bank may benefit from drawing on its recent experience in establishing new practices and protocols related to the management of social safeguards risks in projects. Page 19 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) ANNEX 1: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending (from Task Team in PAD Data Sheet) Tesfamichael Nahusenay Sr Transport. Engr. AFTTR Team Leader Mitiku Josphat O. Sasia Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR Co-Task Team Leader Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Senior Finance Officer Hassine Hedda Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Finance Officer Senior Social Development Gibwa A. Kajubi AFTCS Senior Social Development Specialist Specialist Senior Social Senior Social Yasmin Tayyab AFTCS Development Specialist Development Specialist Regional Environmental Regional Environmental Alexandra C. Bezeredi AFTSG and Safeguards Advisor and Safeguards Advisor Senior Program Senior Program Ntombie Z. Siwale AFTTR Assistant Assistant Benqing Jennifer Gui Information Officer TWICT Information Officer Adenike Sherifat Sr Financial Sr Financial AFTME Oyeyiola Management Specialist Management Specialist Contractor Telesec Temporary Teguest Demissie E T Temporary AFTTR Services Svetlana Khvostova Operations Officer AFTSG Operations Analyst Maiada Mahmoud Abdel Finance Officer CTRLA Finance Officer Fattah Kassem Senior Trade Facilitation Senior Trade Facilitation Tadatsugu Matsudaira AFTTR Specialist Specialist Juliana C. Victor- Senior Monitoring & Senior Monitoring & AFTDE Ahuchogu Evaluation Specialist Evaluation Specialist Daniela Anna B. D. Senior Counsel LEGAM Senior Counsel Junqueira Muhammad Zulfiqar Sr Transport. Engr. AFTTR Sr Transport. Engr. Ahmed Senior Procurement Senior Procurement Joel Buku Munyori AFTPE Specialist Specialist Timothy John Charles Lead ICT Policy Lead ICT Policy TWICT Kelly Specialist Specialist Lucy Anyango Musira Program Assistant AFCE2 Program Assistant Suzan Poni Piwang Team Assistant AFMJB Team Assistant Page 20 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) Financial Management Financial Management Josphine Kabura Kamau AFTME Specialist Specialist Senior Procurement Senior Procurement Anjani Kumar AFTPE Specialist Specialist Emmanuel Taban Highway Engineer AFTTR Highway Engineer Bedilu Amare Reta Consultant AFTHE Environmental Specialist Supervision/NCO (from Task Team Members in all archived ISRs, if available) Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku Task Team Leader GTI01 Sr Transport. Engr. Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Task Team Leader (ADM) GTI01 Sr. Transport Engineer Emmanuel Taban Highway engineer GTI01 Highway engineer Jennifer Gui ICT Policy Specialist TWICT ICT Policy Specialist Wenxin Qiao Transport Specialist GTR07 Transport specialist Tim Kelly Lead ICT Policy Specialist GTI11 Lead ICT Policy Specialist Joseph Nyabicha FM Specialist/consultant GGODR FM Specialist Christine Kandaru Operations Analyst Operations Analyst Anton Baare Sr. Development Specialist GSU07 Sr. Development Specialist Dorothy Morrow Akikoli Program Assistant AFMJB Program Assistant Kenneth Ocheng Kaunda Consultant GGODR Procurement Specialist Jean Lubega Kyazz Operation officer Trade and competitiveness Sr. Financial Management Stephen Amayo GGO25 Sr. Financial Management Specialist Specialist Teguest Demissie Team Assistant GTIDR Team Assistant Grace Tabu Program Assistant AFMJB Program Assistant Ankur Huria Sr. Private Sector Specialist GTCTC Sr. Private Sector Specialist John Bryant Sr. Environmental Specialist GEN01 Sr. Environmental Specialist Syed Sada Team Assistant GTI01 Team Assistant Page 21 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) (b) Staff Time and Cost Actual Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including travel and Staff Weeks and Cost (Bank Budget Only) consultant costs) Lending Total: 92.46 / 361,248.83 602,799.06 Supervision/NCO Total: 126.63 / 510,273.1 679,181.3 Page 22 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) ANNEX 2: LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 1. Project Appraisal Document April 2014 2. Implementation Status and Results Reports • #1 August 2014 • #2 April 2015 • #3 December 2015 • #4 June 2016 • #5 March 2017 • #6 March 2018 3. Mission Aide Memoires • October 2014 • February-March 2015 • September 2015 • March-April-May 2016 • October-December 2016 4. Management letter, October 2015 Page 23 of 24 The World Bank (P131426) MAP Page 24 of 24