92223 A WORLD BANK STUDY Power for All ELECTRICITY ACCESS CHALLENGE IN INDIA Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee, Douglas Barnes, Bipul Singh, Kristy Mayer, and Hussain Samad Power for All A WO R L D BA N K S T U DY Power for All Electricity Access Challenge in India Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee, Douglas Barnes, Bipul Singh, Kristy Mayer, and Hussain Samad © 2015 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved 1 2 3 4 17 16 15 14 World Bank Studies are published to communicate the results of the Bank’s work to the development com- munity with the least possible delay. The manuscript of this paper therefore has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formally edited texts. This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. 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Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Contents Foreword ix Acknowledgments xi Abbreviations xiii Executive Summary 1 Status of Electrification Progress: Access and Reliability 2 Historical Progress in Providing Energy Access 3 Policy Recommendations for Moving Forward 5 Chapter 1 Introduction 9 Abstract 9 Commitment to Universal Access 9 Benefits of Electrification 10 Study Goal and Organization of This Report 11 Notes 11 Chapter 2 Closing the Electricity Access Gap 13 Abstract 13 Recent Growth Trends 13 Current Profile of Electricity Deficit 17 Estimated Benefits of Universal Access 21 Summary Remarks 22 Notes 23 Chapter 3 Barriers to Household Adoption 25 Abstract 25 The Gap between Electricity Access and Adoption 25 Impact of Power Reliability on Electricity Adoption 28 Household Affordability 30 Summary Remarks 33 Note 34 Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3  v vi Contents Chapter 4 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization 35 Abstract 35 Evolution of Rural Electrification 35 Institutional Organization 39 National Policies and the RGGVY Program 40 Summary Remarks 44 Notes 44 Chapter 5 Challenges to Sustaining Progress 47 Abstract 47 Near-Term Financing and Implementation Challenges 47 Long-Term Risks to Sustainability 52 Summary Remarks 55 Notes 55 Chapter 6 Lessons from International Experience 57 Abstract 57 Institutional Focus on Integrating Grid and Off-Grid Efforts 57 Planning and Load Development 59 Utility Cost Recovery and Supply Reliability 60 Lower Barriers to Adoption 61 Community Involvement and Service Orientation 62 Lower Construction and Operation Costs 63 Moving Forward 64 Notes 65 Appendix A Estimating Investment Needs for Universal Access 67 Appendix B Household Survey Data Description: National Sample Survey Organization 71 Appendix C Data Tables 75 Appendix D Regression Analysis 81 Appendix E RGGVY Fund Allocations 83 Appendix F RGGVY Processes, Institutional Roles, and Field Practices 85 Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Contents vii Appendix G RGGVY Quality Review Process 87 Appendix H Study Method To Calculate Cost of Rural Supply 89 References 91 Boxes 3.1 Key Definitions Used in This Study 26 3.2 Measuring Affordability of Electricity Service 32 5.1 Taking a Community Focus: State Lessons in Building Sustainability 50 5.2 Improving Utility Revenues: Lessons from Rajasthan 53 A.1 Envisioning Investment Needs: Two Load Scenarios 67 Figures 2.1 Comparative Growth in Household Electricity Access, 2000–10 14 2.2 Millions of People Who Gained Electricity Access, 2000–10 14 2.3 Growth in Electricity Access, 2000–10 15 2.4 Electricity Access Rates for Selected States, 2000 and 2010 15 2.5 Electricity Access Growth across States and Union Territories, 2000–10 16 2.6 Distribution of Nonelectrified Population 16 2.7 Distribution of Access Rates in States and Union Territories, 2010 17 2.8 Distribution of Monthly Household Consumption for Selected States, 2010 19 2.9 Distribution of Household Consumption Levels among States, 2010 20 3.1 Availability-Access Gap, 2010 27 3.2 Urban and Rural Barriers to Adoption, 2000, 2004, and 2010 27 3.3 Electricity Outages, by Rural Electrification Rates for Selected States, 2005 28 3.4 Effect of Supply Reliability on Household Adoption in Electrified Villages, 2005 30 3.5 Electricity Expenditure as a Share of Household Budget, 2000 and 2010 31 3.6 Consumption, Expenditure, and Effective Tariff, 2010 32 3.7 Affordability of Representative Monthly Electricity Bill 33 Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 viii Contents 4.1 National-Level Institutional Organization of Rural Electrification 40 4.2 Comparison of RGGVY Institutional Structure in Two States 42 5.1 RGGVY Project Cost Comparisons for Selected States, 2013 48 5.2 Assessing Commercial Viability of Rural Service Delivery for Selected States, 2010 54 A.1 Investment Needs for Universal Access by 2030 68 Tables 2.1 Household Cost Savings from Switching from Kerosene to Electric Lighting 21 2.2 Consumer Surplus for Switching from Kerosene to Electricity in Rural India 22 3.1 Extent of Kerosene Used for Household Lighting in Rural India, 2005 29 3.2 Power Outages and Kerosene Use for Households with Grid Electricity, 2005 29 4.1 Timeline in the Evolution of India’s Rural Electrification 36 4.2 RGGVY Implementation Features, by State 43 4.3 RGGVY Projects Managed by Central Public Sector Utilities 44 5.1 REC Cost Norms for RGGVY Projects 51 B.1 Total Sample Size for the Three Household Surveys 72 C.1 Percentage of Population Using Electricity as Main Lighting Source 75 C.2 Percentage of Population Using Kerosene as Main Lighting Source 77 C.3 Power Consumption for Households with Electricity Connection 78 C.4 Percentage of Income Spent on Electricity for Households with Connection 79 C.5 Electricity Spending as a Percentage of Household Energy Expenditures 80 D.1 Determinants of Household Access to Electricity in Rural India 81 Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Foreword Today India’s rural electrification program has reached a crossroad. By late 2012, the national electricity grid had been extended to more than 90 percent of rural villages. Yet, the policies and institutions that contributed to this impressive achievement are now constraining efforts to connect the 311 million people who remain without electric power—the last mile of the electricity grid. Of these, more than 100 million currently are beyond reach of the grid and could be reached using decentralized household or village systems. The other 200 million live in villages that already have electricity. Ironically, many of these potential consumers are choosing not to adopt a supply even though the draw of having electricity to take advantage of modern lighting and labor-saving devices is quite strong. This book examines the main barriers to electricity adoption in rural India and offers lessons from successful state programs and international experience that point the way toward closing India’s electricity access gap. The study draws on data collected from several annual rounds of India’s National Sample Survey conducted during 2000–10 and the 2005 Human Development Survey. The research finds that the state utilities responsible for operating the network do not receive enough revenue from rural consumers to provide reliable service. Unreliable supply, in turn, discourages poorer households from spending scant income on intermittent service, further eroding the customer base and revenue flow. In villages with electricity, the extent of power outages and household adoption rates are linked. In addition, the institutional organization of rural elec- trification is unwieldy, with often overlapping responsibilities. India must confront the reality that power reliability has become a major problem. The goal of extending electricity to the country’s poorest rural custom- ers has overshadowed the need to provide reliable, quality service to all house- holds with electricity. The current grid program provides capital for new invest- ments, but has overlooked policies that create supply shortages for the new households adopting electricity. Past investments in rural infrastructure are gen- erating little revenue, infrastructure for providing electricity to village lines is underfinanced and unreliable, and the revenue stream from rural households is insufficient to secure a financially sustainable distribution system. The difficulty of pricing electricity appropriately while ensuring household affordability exac- Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   ix x Foreword erbates these issues. Many states within India have achieved near universal ser- vice following well-established utility practices. But service reliability remains a problem throughout the country. India can achieve its goal of universal electrification by 2030. The required financial investment is quite affordable, estimated at $2.4–3 billion annually. Success depends on complementing these investments with innovative solutions and policies aligned with global principles that are followed by developing coun- tries and that have reached even their poorest and most remote populations. For example, India would benefit from a central institution with responsibilities that extends to include providing higher-quality service, charging consumers and providers a fair price, taking a customer-service focus, involving rural communi- ties in the process of electrification, and customizing systems and technical standards to meet low levels of rural demand. One caveat is that the best inter- ­ national practices are mutually reinforcing and must be implemented together to achieve positive results. As India transitions to the final phase of its rural electri- fication program, the key challenge will be balancing access for all of its citizens with a stronger focus on providing higher-quality service. Jack Stein Director Sustainable Development Department The World Bank Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Acknowledgments This study was carried out at the request of the Planning Commission and the Department of Economic Affairs of India, under the auspices of the umbrella work program on the India Power Sector Review, led by Sheoli Pargal and Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee. The core team for this study comprised Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee, Douglas Barnes, Bipul Singh, Kristy Mayer, and Hussain Samad. A consulting team from PricewaterhouseCoopers, led by S. Johnny Edward, car- ried out a background study and supported the team. The team gratefully acknowledges the advice and suggestions of Technical Advisory Panel members of the India Power Sector Review, notably Shantanu Dixit of the Prayas Energy Group (India). Thanks are also extended to I. A. Khan and Somit Dasgupta of the Planning Commission for their constructive inputs throughout the preparation of this report. The team thanks peer reviewers Shahidur Khandker and Dana Rysankova for their substantive comments. It is also grateful to Rohit Mittal, Kwawu Gaba, Laurent Durix, Sheoli Pargal, Mohua Mukherjee, Mani Khurana, and Ashish Khanna for their constructive ideas and discussion at various stages of this work. Norma Adams edited the report. Finally, the authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), South Asia Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) Trust Fund, and Asia Sustainable and Alternative Energy Program (ASTAE). Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   xi Abbreviations APDRP Accelerated Power Development and Reforms Program APL above poverty line AREP Accelerated Rural Electrification Program ARR Annual Revenue Requirement BDS Business Development Services BPL below poverty line CPSU Central Public Sector Utility DDG Decentralized Distributed Generation GDP gross domestic product GW gigawatt HT high tension IEA International Energy Agency IREDA Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency JVVNL Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited kg kilogram klm-hr kilolumen-hour kV kilovolt kWh kilowatt hour LT low tension MNRE Ministry of New and Renewable Energy MOP Ministry of Power NGO nongovernmental organization NSSO National Sample Survey Organization PIA Project Implementing Agency PMGY Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana PV photovoltaics REC Rural Electrification Corporation REST Rural Electricity Supply Technology RGGVY Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   xiii xiv Abbreviations RVE Remote Village Electrification SERC State Electricity Regulatory Commission SHG self-help group SHS solar home system T&D transmission and distribution TPIA Third-Party Inspection Agency W watt Currency Equivalents All amounts are in Indian rupees unless otherwise indicated. All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars. Indian rupees are converted to dollar amounts using the year- specific exchange rates taken from the World Development Indicators. Year ranges with a slash (such as 2003/04) indicate fiscal years. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Executive Summary India has been one of the world’s leading developing countries in providing elec- tricity to both rural and urban populations. The country’s rural energy policies and institutions have contributed greatly to reducing globally the number of people who remain without electricity access. By late 2012, the national electric- ity grid had reached 92 percent of India’s rural villages, that is, about 880 million people. Yet, owing mainly to its large population, India still has by far the world’s largest number of households without electricity. About 311 million people still live without electricity, and they mostly reside in poor rural areas. Among these, 200 million live in villages that already have electricity. Less than half of all households in the poorest income group have electricity. Even among households that have electric service, hundreds of millions lack reliable supply, experiencing power cuts almost daily. Achieving universal access to electricity by 2030 is not financially prohibitive for India. The challenge of providing electricity for all is achievable, ensuring that India joins such countries as China and Brazil in reaching out to even its most remote populations. The estimated annual investments necessary to reach uni- versal access are in the range of Rs. 108 billion ($2.4 billion) to Rs. 139 billion ($3 billion). Considering that the country already spends about Rs. 45 billion ($1 billion) a year on new electricity lines through the current government pro- gram, the additional investments needed to achieve universal access by 2030 are quite reasonable. Investments are not the only hurdle to providing electricity to those presently without service. Policies will need to be aligned with the princi- ples followed in other successful international programs. The potential benefits of electrification for those without service are quite high. The benefits of lighting alone would approximately equal the investments necessary to extend electricity for all. When households that adopt electricity switch from kerosene lamps to electric light bulbs, they experience an enormous price drop for lighting energy and can have more light for a range of household activities, including reading, studying, cooking, and socializing. Households with electricity consume more than 100 times as much light as households with kero- sene for about the same amount of money. The potential value of the additional Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3  1 2 Executive Summary lighting can be as large as 11.5 percent of a typical household’s monthly budget. If universal access is achieved by 2030, the cumulative benefit for improved lighting alone would equal about Rs. 3.8 trillion ($69 billion) or Rs. 190 billion ($3.4 billion) in annual benefits. This is greater than the cost of providing elec- tricity service, and does not even include such benefits as improved communica- tions, household comfort, food preservation, and income from productive activi- ties. With electric lighting, households can generate more income, and children can have better educational outcomes and income-earning potential. Without quality energy services, households often face entrenched poverty, poor delivery of social services, and limited opportunities for women and girls. Status of Electrification Progress: Access and Reliability Despite progress, India’s population without electricity is still both large and poor. Of the 311 million people without electricity, about 93 percent live in rural areas and 40 percent are in the poorest income group. Among the 289 million rural residents without access, 70 percent are in the lowest 40 percent income groups. Among the wealthiest income group, only about 4 percent or some 10 million people lack access, compared to 53 percent or 125 million in the poorest income group. Just five states account for more than four-fifths of the people without electricity access. Bihar has the lowest overall access rate, at 25 percent, followed by Uttar Pradesh at 43 percent, Orissa at 56 percent, West Bengal at 59 percent, and Rajasthan at 77 percent. By contrast, 13 states have successfully provided electricity to more than 90 percent of their poorest populations. Connecting poor households would not require huge additional investments in generation. For households with electricity access, average monthly power consumption for urban and rural areas is relatively low, at about 76 kilowatt- hour. Rural households consume only 54 kilowatt-hour per month on aver- age—about half that of the average urban household. About 16 percent of all connected households consume less than 25 kilowatt-hour per month, equiva- lent to powering four light bulbs and a television set for a few hours a day. Households in the wealthiest quintile consume three times more electricity as those in the poorest quintile. Across states, average household power consump- tion ranges from a low of 25 kilowatt-hour to a high of about 181 kilowatt- hour in Delhi, where nearly three-fifths of households consume more than 100 kilowatt-hour per month. Thus, the investments necessary can be downscaled to meet the low electricity demand of the new households provided with ­electricity. Poor power reliability curtails the electricity benefits. Most rural households that adopt electricity experience costly power outages. Only about 7 percent of rural households with electricity report no power outages, while 18 percent report outages of up to four hours a day. About one-fifth experience intermittent power supply throughout most of the day even though electricity lines run to their homes. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh—the two states that lag farthest behind in terms of both village coverage and household adoption—face the highest average Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Executive Summary 3 daily outages. About 70 percent of grid-connected households use kerosene as a backup lighting source. In addition to the required minimum outlay on electric- ity service, these households must also spend an average of Rs. 26 ($0.6) per month on kerosene lighting, equivalent to purchasing 10 kilowatt-hour of elec- tricity. The substantially higher amounts they pay to meet their monthly lighting needs also represent lost revenue for the state utility companies. Poor power reliability limits the adoption of electricity. The extent of power outages and the rate of household adoption in villages with electricity are linked. Households living in villages with unreliable electricity supply probably question whether they should pay minimum monthly charges for a service that comes on and off during the evening hours, when electricity is used the most often. For example, in communities with daily service outages of 20 hours or more, the household adoption rate is just 38 percent, compared to more than 80 percent for those with few or no outages. After controlling for such factors as family size, education, and electricity price, raising the availability of electricity by just one hour per day increases the probability of household adoption by nearly 2 percent. Thus, providing both access and service reliability are keys to increasing India’s electricity adoption rate. For most without electricity, paying for new electric service is quite affordable. About 90 percent of rural consumers and even 82 percent of those in the poorest income quintile can afford to pay Rs. 90 ($2.0) a month for service—about the same amount of money poor households in India typically would pay for electric- ity. It is also about 5 percent of a poor household’s budget, so this amount would be quite affordable. In addition, at an average tariff of about Rs. 3 ($0.07) per kilowatt-hour, Rs. 90 ($2.0) will buy 30 kilowatt-hour, which is consistent with the government’s vision of ensuring minimum household consumption of 1 kilowatt-hour a day. Historical Progress in Providing Energy Access The Government of India is committed to achieving universal electricity cover- age, recognizing the many benefits that electrification affords households and the constraints on those that lack access. India’s government has emphasized electri- fication in its national policies, having allocated substantial resources, particularly in the past decade, to increasing electricity access. Given India’s large population, efforts to achieve universal access nationally will contribute greatly to achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Energy for All initiative, whose target is univer- sal access to modern energy services by 2030. Historically, India’s rural electrification policies have shifted from line exten- sion to villages to agricultural production, rural development, and finally access by the poor. Prior to the late 1960s, India’s growth in rural electrification was extremely slow. At the time of the country’s independence in 1947, only 1,500 villages had electricity. By the late 1950s, coverage had been extended to 18,689 villages, but only 350 of the originally targeted 856 towns had been reached. In direct response to severe droughts and food shortages suffered in the early 1960s, Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 4 Executive Summary the government began to emphasize rural electrification’s importance for improving productive uses, including irrigation and commercial development. From the late 1960s through the 1970s, government policies, including low elec- tricity tariffs for agriculture, encouraged farmers to adopt electric pump sets and irrigation practices. A major institutional push occurred in 1969 with the cre- ation of the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC). On recommendation of the All India Rural Credit Review Committee of 1966–69, the REC was established as a financing institution to promote investment in rural electrification, with a focus on agricultural production. In the late 1970s, the government widened its attention toward rural development and household access. In the late 1990s, rural electrification began to be viewed more as a prime mover of rural development. Since 2000, growth in grid and off-grid household access has accelerated, par- ticularly in poorer rural areas. At the national level, India’s electricity sector is governed by the Ministry of Power (MOP) and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE). Established in 1992, the MOP is responsible for developing the electricity sector and implementing the landmark Electricity Act of 2003. The MNRE is in charge of developing new and alternative energy technologies and promoting renewable energy. With the 2005 launching of the flagship rural electrification program, Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY), progress toward achiev- ing electricity access and supply goals has gained momentum. RGGVY’s main objectives are to electrify all village and habitations with more than 100 people, install small generators and distribution networks where grid extension is not considered cost-effective, and provide free electricity connections to households below the poverty line. Complementing RGGVY is the MNRE-implemented Remote Village Electrification (RVE) program. During the last decade (2000–10), the RGGVY and MNRE programs gener- ally have been effective in expanding access to electricity. India’s electrification rate reached 74 percent by the end of the decade, an increase of 15 percent from 2000. Seventy percent of the newly electrified population resided in rural areas, reflecting the country’s focus on rural electrification, as well as the relative satu- ration already achieved in urban areas. About 65 percent of the access increment kept pace with population growth, meaning that the remaining 35 percent or 99 million electricity users were added over and above the population increase. Across states, growth in electricity access varied substantially relative to popula- tion growth. In Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, growth in electricity adoption outpaced population growth by more than 10 million people. However, in the larger states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, electricity adoption failed to even keep up with population growth. The RGGVY program has succeeded in expanding electricity adoption, but policy reform has failed to keep pace. Today the sustainability of the RGGVY program is challenged by the little revenue being realized from past investments in rural infrastructure. Over the longer term, the program faces two challenges. The first is that the infrastructure for providing electricity to the village lines is both underfinanced and unreliable. The second is that the revenue stream from Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Executive Summary 5 rural households is insufficient to secure a financially sustainable electricity distribution system. These issues are exacerbated by the difficulty of appropri- ately pricing electricity while ensuring household affordability. The program focuses on providing capital for new investments, but does nothing about the policies that create supply shortages for the new households adopting electricity. Reversing the problems of India’s rural electrification program will require innovation and policy reforms. For the future, solutions are needed to expand electricity access in financially responsible ways that encourage investment in the operation and maintenance of rural systems. With the passage of time, there has resulted a complex web of various well-meaning policies and institutions that now are constraining efforts to connect the remaining populations without elec- tricity—the last mile of the electricity grids. Solutions to reach these households might include extension of the existing electricity grid, guaranteed electricity reliability, new private or cooperative distribution companies, or off-grid renew- able systems. Achieving the right balance between these and other options is a challenge that will last well into the future. Policy Recommendations for Moving Forward Many international programs have dealt with the same challenges now facing India in its final phase of expanding electricity access to its poorest and most remote populations. Experiences in such diverse countries as China, Mexico, and Chile show that success in rural electrification can be achieved in many ways. Mexico has a large national electricity company that gets annual operating sub- sidies to lower electricity prices for consumers. Today, China has mostly public electricity companies that generate and transmit electricity to about 1,000 county distribution utilities. Chile has private, vertically integrated electricity companies with defined service territories that apply to a government program for grants that can be used to extend electricity access. Positive financial rates of return for the companies and also positive economic rates of returns for the country are required for all communities in the grant applications. Despite this diversity of approaches, the countries all follow a similar set of principles to implement their successful rural electrification programs. These principles range from having sustained government commitment over a long period of time to having pricing or subsidy policies that allow electricity companies to recover costs and reinvest in maintaining lines and equipment, enabling them to provide a high quality of service. India has a long history of government commitment, but also has a poor record of providing local electricity companies the right incen- tives to provide rural customers high-quality service. The best international prac- tices point the way forward to achieve universal electricity access in India. But they cannot be adopted in a piecemeal fashion because they reinforce each other in ways that will lead to positive results in providing electricity for all. India would benefit from a more focused institutional approach that inte- grates grid and off-grid efforts in rural areas. Today, the rural electrification puzzle is broken up into various pieces: the MOP, MNRE, REC, and State Electricity Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 6 Executive Summary Boards. A more integrated approach between the MOP and MNRE is needed to coordinate grid and off-grid schemes. One agency needs to be in charge to coor- dinate efforts guided by a transparent, long-term vision. At a minimum, the REC should consider ways to transfer knowledge management practices from the Central Public Sector Utilities (CPSUs) to the state utilities. The building and transferring of lines to the state electricity companies is financially easier, but fraught with ownership problems for the states. A close working relationship between the CPSUs and the state utilities would contribute to successful RGGVY program implementation through better project management practices, with enforceable oversight from a central agency responsible for rural electrifica- tion. In addition, concessions based on minimum necessary subsidies to attract the private sector operating distribution franchisees in rural areas might be con- sidered. Currently, new franchises are hampered by having to adhere to the same rules as the state electricity companies. India needs to harness the potential of the utilities, private sector, regulators, communities, and financial institutions to cre- ate preconditions so that each of them can individually benefit from and contrib- ute to the universal access goal. Planning and load development require monitoring the quality of service and connection information, encouraging productive uses to increase demand, and supporting local generation and supply. Currently, distribution companies tend to underfund investment in rural electrification, perceiving that it generates insufficient revenue; this, in turn, leads to unreliable supply. Thus, subsidies or incentives to build lines need to ensure appropriate investments are in place to maintain them. Also, state distribution companies need to systematically keep track of regional power supply reliability and report outages on a regular basis to the state regulator and government. Load development can be improved through bundling complementary services that encourage productive electricity uses. For communities beyond the grid, solar home systems, local generation, energy-effi- cient lights, and other new technologies are available at reasonable cost. Grid and off-grid options are not mutually exclusive and can be implemented in parallel. To improve utility cost recovery, rural customers need to pay monthly bills based on tariff levels that provide the utilities incentives to service them. Utility officials have indicated that the revenue from supplying new below poverty line (BPL) consumers in some instances is too low to cover even bill collection. Most of the service provided under the RGGVY scheme involves flat-rate tariffs, which result in losses for the utilities. Lessons from innovative metering and col- lection systems developed in many countries might be implemented to reduce the utilities’ commercial risks and give rural households more control over their consumption. Increasing access for the poor is likely to require a relatively mini- mal increment of additional generation capacity. Thus, it is essential that this capacity be available and reliable to serve newly connected rural consumers. The goal is for rural areas to eventually become a source of profit, rather than finan- cial loss, for the electricity companies. This may not materialize in the short term; however, it should be clear that rural areas will contribute to, not take away from, Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Executive Summary 7 the long-term financial health of the electricity companies. Ironically, increasing the prices that rural customers pay for electricity may actually provide the incentive necessary for companies to provide higher-quality service. This, in turn, will result in more, rather than less, household and productive use of electricity. This is the virtuous cycle that has led other countries to have successful rural electrification programs. Barriers to adoption can be lowered by improving maintenance of rural distri- bution lines and providing above poverty line (APL) households free connections to improve load and financial return. In India, ensuring a reliable electricity sup- ply is critical to improving household adoption rates in villages with grid service. Improving rural distribution systems must be assigned a higher priority, as better reliability will lead to higher numbers of new connections. This will require a large financial investment for India. Since most of the country’s rural households without electricity are poor, having an artificial poverty line that gives priority to those at the very bottom of society, however noble, would only serve to compli- cate the process of implementing universal electricity access. APL households, which are excluded from the free connections received by BPL households, may not be able to afford the up-front costs of adopting electricity service. A caveat is that free connections, combined with low electricity prices, would be quite problematic for the long-term financial viability of rural service delivery. A review of connection fees, reconnection charges, minimum charges, and service reliability would be a priority to understand why many of the poorest households in villages with power are choosing not to adopt electricity. India’s electricity sector needs to focus more on community involvement and service orientation. International experience confirms that involving local com- munities from a program’s outset results in multiple benefits—better designed programs, gaining of local support, mobilization of cash and in-kind contribu- tions, and increased local ownership—that contribute to operational sustainability. Pathways need to be developed to improve interaction between customers and the electricity companies. Local units within companies could be created to handle and develop solutions for rural service problems. In most developed coun- tries, for example, community-outreach liaison officers are a standard feature. Overall, better trust is needed between the utilities and their customers. Improving relationships might involve community representatives that can report problems or request new service for customers. Today’s low level of local participation in the RGGVY process is putting the future sustainability of rural service delivery at risk. States that have already begun involving local self-help government entities, women’s self-help groups, and other community-based organizations offer useful lessons. Most of the 200 million people in villages with electricity that have not adopted it can afford to pay for electricity. Given the already high sunk capital costs in reaching communities, having high percentages of people not adopting electricity is a significant financial loss for the electricity companies. Improvements in service reliability, application procedures, and local community involvement will help companies reach customers near power lines Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 8 Executive Summary that still have not adopted electricity. These customers can be considered the “low-hanging fruit” for making rural electrification a more financially sound pro- gram for the state electricity companies. India has major opportunities to redesign its rural electricity infrastructure to match design standards to actual demand and ensure capital construction for new lines does not overshadow operating costs. Lessons from other countries indicate that using expensive technical designs to extend electricity in rural areas can cost up to 30 percent more than those more appropriate for rural levels of demand. Where the main expected household uses of electricity are lighting and running small appliances, the rural distribution system can be designed for such low loads. Rural customers often consume no more than 30–50 kilowatt-hour per month. At the same time, the electricity industry should not lose sight of the significant levels of lost revenue from the hundreds of millions of customers that experience outages, as well as those who choose not to connect to the grid because of poor service reliability. State regulators need to effectively monitor and encourage higher service standards, but this does not necessarily imply high- cost electricity systems. One possible way to promote better customer service may be to develop a system of subsidy payments linked to reliability with clearly defined quality parameters for electricity customers. India can achieve universal electrification by 2030. Success of the access expansion program will fall to the state electricity companies, but they will need support. At present, they are provided incentives to string lines through capital and other subsidies, or other contractors are building the lines and turning them over to the state electricity companies. Thus, these companies have little incen- tive to serve those living along the lines due to low electricity prices and/or lack of subsidies for operation and maintenance. The results have been poor reliabil- ity and loss of benefits for those with electricity service, and a disincentive for those without electricity to adopt a connection. Though the problems have been politically hard to overcome, the solution is not complicated. It can be accomplished by having a central institution respon- sible for more than just providing subsidies for lines. It should also be responsible for providing higher-quality service, charging a fair price to consumers and pro- viders alike, paying more attention to customer service, involving rural communi- ties more in the process of electrification, and developing systems and technical standards more appropriate for rural levels of demand. As India enters a new age of modernization, it is important that electricity not only be provided to all of its citizens; the service offered should also be closer to the levels found in the rest of the developed world. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 CHAPTER 1 Introduction Abstract India has led the developing world in addressing rural energy problems. By late 2012, the national electricity grid had reached 92 percent of India’s rural villages, about 880 million people. In more remote areas and those with geographically difficult terrain, where grid extension is not economically viable, off-grid solu- tions using renewable-energy sources for electricity generation and distribution have been promoted. The positive results of the country’s rural energy policies and institutions have contributed greatly to reducing the number of people globally who remain without electricity access. Yet, owing mainly to its large ­ population, India has by far the world’s largest number of households without electricity. More than one-quarter of its population or about 311 million people—the vast majority of whom live in poorer rural areas—still lack an electricity connection; less than half of all households in the poorest income group have electricity. Among households with electricity service, hundreds of millions lack reliable power supply. Commitment to Universal Access The Government of India recognizes the many benefits that electrification affords households and the constraints on those that lack access to quality energy services. Without electricity, households are entrenched in poverty, suffer poor delivery of social services, and have limited opportunities for women and girls. In the last decade, the government has increased the emphasis of national policies on electricity access, and has backed up this commitment with substantial resources. India’s national policy vision of universal electricity coverage also is consistent with achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Energy for All initia- tive, whose target is universal access to modern energy services by 2030. Efforts to achieve universal access nationally will require extending coverage to 573 million more people—the 311 million without electricity today, along with 263 million that will be added as a result of population growth. By 2030, Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3  9 10 Introduction 218 million urban residents will require new electricity service connections, com- pared to 355 million in rural areas.1 Thus, the future electrification challenge will be balancing the needs of a growing urban population with the backlog of demand in rural areas. Both grid and off-grid solutions will be needed to achieve the universal access goal. The grid system already reaches more than 90 percent of India’s villages, so the remaining 10 percent will be serviced by a combination of grid expansion, mini-grids, and solar home systems (SHSs). In urban areas, where all new connections will be grid based, the challenge will be how to ser- vice poor residents in densely populated slums and other disadvantaged communities. Achieving universal access to electricity will not be financially prohibitive for India, and the potential benefits are enormous. The annual investment over a 20-year period (2010–30) is estimated at $2.4–3 billion (Rs. 108–139 billion).2 India already spends about $1 billion (Rs. 45 billion) per year on new electricity lines through Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY), its flagship rural electrification program, so this goal is quite achievable. For improved light- ing alone, universal electricity access would generate cumulative consumer sur- plus benefits of $69 billion (Rs. 3.8 trillion) or $3.4 billion (Rs. 190 billion) annually. Many additional socioeconomic gains also would continue to accrue well beyond 2030. Benefits of Electrification The socioeconomic benefits of electrification are well established (Nieuwenhout, van de Rijt, and Wiggelinkhuizen 1998; Cabraal, Barnes, and Agarwal 2005; Asaduzzaman, Barnes, and Khandker 2009; Khandker, Barnes, and Samad 2013). Switching from the dim, polluting light provided by kerosene lamps and lanterns to higher-quality, less polluting electric lighting has the immediate effect of increasing children’s evening study hours, which can improve their educational outcomes and longer-term income-earning potential (Barakat et al. 2002; Khandker, Barnes, and Samad 2012). The reduction in household air pol- lution from kerosene substitution also is linked to a decreased risk of respira- tory disease and related illnesses, particularly among women and young children. With electric lighting, household businesses can extend their hours of opera- tion to generate more income, and farm households can switch from manual to electric tools and machinery to increase their productivity and profits. Family members, particularly women, will read, watch television, and listen to the radio, thus gaining valuable access to knowledge that can help with their decision- making power within the household. Additional benefits of electrification include a greater sense of public security and more time in the evenings for socialization and entertainment. The cumulative impact of all these benefits is an improved quality of life. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Introduction 11 Study Goal and Organization of this Report This study analyzes India’s remarkable progress toward achieving universal access to electricity, particularly since 2000, and identifies the remaining challenges ahead.3 Key supply-side and demand-side barriers to adoption, as well as program sustainability issues, are examined. The study also draws on lessons from interna- tional experience to formulate a set of recommendations for reaching universal access. The target audiences for the report are primarily central policy makers responsible for setting overarching electrification policies and state utilities and regulatory commissions that implement rural electrification projects and set electricity tariffs. The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 highlights the recent growth trend in electricity access, identifies population groups that remain without a supply, and estimates the benefits of rural electrification. Chapter 3 presents the main barriers to rural household adoption. Chapter 4 then outlines the history of India’s rural electrification and institutional organization for grid and off-grid programs. Chapter 5 evaluates the access challenges under the current grid-based program and highlights successful state strategies that have overcome them. Finally, chapter 6 offers lessons from international experience for India to con- sider as it moves forward. Notes 1. Details are available at http://esa.un.org/unup/. 2. Appendix A provides details. 3. The study draws from data collected from three selected annual rounds of the National Sample Survey conducted during 2000–10 and the 2005 India Human Development Survey, which included extensive questions on delivery of energy ser- vices (appendix B). It also draws on information from a background report prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers. The report used a combination of detailed desk-based research on all states and a well-structured, systematically administered primary sur- vey; this was supported and validated through targeted field visits and consultations with multiple stakeholders in 12 states representative of a wide array of access situa- tions (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal). Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 CHAPTER 2 Closing the Electricity Access Gap Abstract India has made dramatic strides toward providing all of its citizens access to electricity. Between 2000 and 2010, about 283 million people were connected— a much higher figure than the natural population increase. By 2010, the coun- try’s total population with electricity had reached 881 million. Despite this remarkable progress, 311 million people, mainly poorer rural households, remain without power. This chapter examines recent growth trends in electrification in urban and rural areas and across income groups, generally characterizes the population groups without electricity, and estimates some of the minimum ben- efits of electricity for households that gain access. Recent Growth Trends Most households that gained access to electricity between 2000 and 2010 resided in rural areas, reflecting India’s focus on rural electrification and the fact that urban coverage was nearing saturation (figure 2.1a). Over that decade, rural access rates grew by 18 percentage points, 13 percentage points higher than for urban areas, where coverage had already reached 89 percent by 2000. Adoption rates for households in the poorest quintile grew by 15 percentage points, com- pared to only 6 percentage points for households in the wealthiest quintile, 90 percent of whom already had electricity in 2000 (figure 2.1b). Rural and urban residents, respectively, accounted for about 70 percent and 30 percent of the access gains (figure 2.2a) during 2000–10, which were distrib- uted rather evenly across income groups, with the three middle-income quintiles accounting for about two-thirds of those connected (figure 2.2b). Over the decade, the states of Bihar, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh had the most suc- cessful programs for providing electricity to those without service. Population growth means that India has many newly established households that must be serviced by the electricity companies. Between 2000 and 2010, annual population growth was about 1.5 percent, while annual electricity Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   13 14 Closing the Electricity Access Gap Figure 2.1  Comparative Growth in Household Electricity Access, 2000–10 a. Rural/urban b. Income group % of households with electricity 100 100 % of households with electricity 90 94% 90 89% 93% 80 80 64% 74% 70 70 59% 66% 60 60 50 56% 50 48% 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 2000 2004 2010 2000 2004 2010 Year Year Total Urban Rural Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Source: National Sample Survey 2000, 2004, 2010. Figure 2.2  Millions of People Who Gained Electricity Access, 2000–10 a. Rural/urban b. Income quintile Quintile 5: 47 Quintile 1: 49 Urban: 82 Quintile 4: 61 Quintile 2: 59 Rural: 199 Quintile 3: 66 Source: National Sample Survey 2000, 2010. adoption grew by 2.4 percent overall. This means that about 65 percent of the new electricity adoption simply kept pace with population growth, while the remaining 35 percent or 99 million electricity users were added over and beyond the population increase. Growth rates across rural and urban areas and income quintiles were similar, with middle-income groups having the highest reported growth rates (figure 2.3). The states in India that have been the most successful at rural electrification also had small increases in the percentage of people that adopted new connec- tions during 2000–10. By 2000, more than 90 percent of households in Goa, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, and Punjab already had electricity. The two states with the highest rates of electricity adoption over the decade—Uttarakhand Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Closing the Electricity Access Gap 15 Figure 2.3  Growth in Electricity Access, 2000–10 300 3.0 2.8% 250 2.5% 2.6% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5 2.3% 200 2.0% 2.0 2.0% Percent Million 150 1.5 100 1.0 50 0.5 0 0.0 Total Urban Rural Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Population growth Access growth Annual growth in access (% of population) Source: National Sample Survey 2000, 2010. Note: Percent annual growth rates by income level were 2.0 (quintile 1), 2.5 (quintile 2), 2.8 (quintile 3), 2.6 (quintile 4), and 2.0 (quintile 5). Figure 2.4  Electricity Access Rates for Selected States, 2000 and 2010 Goa Delhi Himachal Pradesh Punjab Sikkim Nagaland Haryana Gujarat Maharashtra Mizoram Tamil Nadu Karnataka Manipur Andhra Pradesh Kerala Madhya Pradesh Chattisgarh Rajasthan Meghalaya Thirpura Uttar Pradesh Uttarakhand West Bengal Assam Orissa Bihar Jharkhand Other Other 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Percent 2010 2000 Source: National Sample Survey 2000, 2010. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 16 Closing the Electricity Access Gap and Jharkhand—started out with quite low electrification rates in 2000. States with adoption rates below 90 percent in 2000 that performed poorly over the decade include Chhattisgarh, Mizoram, and Uttar Pradesh, which had rate increases ranging from 4 to 10 percentage points (figure 2.4). Over the decade, growth in electricity adoption varied substantially across states, especially when considered in relation to population growth. In the larger states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, access growth did not keep pace with popula- tion growth. Uttar Pradesh experienced its largest gains in the early part of the decade, but then failed to keep pace in the latter half. Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal recorded the largest absolute increases in population with electricity; Figure 2.5  Electricity Access Growth across States and Union Territories, 2000–10 16 14 Number of states and 12 Uttarakhand union territories D & N Haveli Goa 10 Jharkhand Lakshadweep 8 Daman and Diu Chandigarh 6 Meghalaya Uttar Pradesh 4 2 0 More than Between 3 and 4 Between 2 and 3 Less than 4 percent percent percent 2 percent Source: National Sample Survey 2000, 2010. Figure 2.6  Distribution of Nonelectrified Population 311 million people without access Distribution by geography Distribution by income Urban, 7% Q5, 3% Q4, 10% Q3, 18% Q1, 40% Rural, 93% Q2, 29% Source: National Sample Survey 2010. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Closing the Electricity Access Gap 17 access growth outpaced population growth by more than 10 million people. Uttarakhand grew at the fastest pace, at 6 percent annually, followed by Jharkhand at 4.3 percent. For most states, the populations with electricity grew by an average of 2–4 percent per year (figure 2.5). Current Profile of Electricity Deficit The task remaining for India is to have a program that reaches out to those people that still lack electricity. Statistics from the National Sample Survey con- firm that India’s remaining 311 million people without electricity include the country’s poorest people living in the most remote areas. About 93 percent of those without electricity reside in rural areas, and approximately 40 percent are in the poorest income quintile (figure 2.6). For the 289 million rural residents without access, 70 percent are at the bottom 40 percent of income groups. In contrast to these stark figures, only about 4 percent or some 10 million people in the wealthiest income group lack electricity. Variations in Access Rates across States Out of India’s 35 states and union territories, just five states account for more than four-fifths of people without electricity access (figure 2.7a). Bihar has the lowest overall access rate, at 25 percent, followed by Uttar Pradesh at 43 percent, Orissa at 56 percent, West Bengal at 59 percent, and Rajasthan at 77 percent (figure 2.7a). For these five states, along with Assam, electricity access rates for the poorest income group are well below the 47 percent all-India average for the Figure 2.7  Distribution of Access Rates in States and Union Territories, 2010 a. People without electricity b. Rural/urban and income group 120 100 35 Millions of people 30 80 Number of states and union territories 25 60 20 40 15 10 20 5 0 0 n UP r ja l n a al t Qu e 2 3 4 t l Ra ga ta ha es es iss ba ha r e e Ru To til til til or ch n Bi Or Ur st Be in in in Po Ri Qu Qu t es W Less than 25 percent Between 25 and 50 percent Between 50 and 75 percent More than 75 percent Source: National Sample Survey 2010. Note: UP = Uttar Pradesh. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 18 Closing the Electricity Access Gap poorest households. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar alone account for half of the popu- lation without electricity in both the richest and poorest quintiles. At the oppo- site end of the spectrum, 13 states have provided electricity to more than 90 percent of even their poorest income groups. The heterogeneity of access rates across states is greater for rural areas, com- pared to urban ones (figure 2.7b). Thirty states and union territories report urban access rates above 90 percent. Bihar exhibits the lowest urban access rate, at 70 percent. Five states have electrified less than half of their rural populations, with Bihar (19 percent) and Uttar Pradesh (32 percent) at the low end. Only 19 states report rural access rates above 90 percent. Consumption Patterns across States The level of household power consumption is relatively low, averaging 76 kilo- watt-hour per month, but varies considerably across states and between rural and urban areas. Delhi has the highest at 180 kilowatt-hour (table C.3, appendix C). Since Delhi is mostly an urban conglomerate, it would be expected that households there would consume more electricity compared to states with high numbers of rural households. More than three-fifths of households in Delhi consume more than 100 kilowatt-hour per month (figure 2.8). By contrast, nearly four-fifths of households in Bihar consume no electricity, mostly because they have no electric connection. Even in Nagaland, where access rates are higher, 95 percent of households consume less than 100 kilowatt-hour per month. Overall, rural households consume an average of only 54 kilowatt-hour per month, about half as much as urban households (table C.3, appendix C). About 16 percent of all households with electricity consume less than 25 kilo- watt-hour per month—equivalent to powering four light bulbs and a television set for a few hours a day. The relationship between electricity access rates and average household power consumption is not straightforward. The union territories of Delhi and Chandigarh have high rates of electrification and also have the highest consump- tion rates. But some states at or near universal access have only modest levels of electricity use. For example, Tripura and Sikkim have universal access, but their consumption levels are similar to those of Bihar, which has the lowest consump- tion and access rates (figure 2.9). Thus, one must look to other factors, such as supply reliability and household income, to understand patterns of electricity consumption. Determinants of Household Adoption Many factors may be related to the percent or number of people without elec- tricity. The states appear to play a major role, and the financial health and com- petence of the electricity companies also appear highly related. In addition, vari- ous household-level factors appear quite important in determining whether a household adopts electricity. These include the educational level of the house- hold head and the household’s primary income source. In households with Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Closing the Electricity Access Gap 19 Figure 2.8  Distribution of Monthly Household Consumption for Selected States, 2010 Delhi Haryana Maharashtra Sikkim Gujarat Tamil Nadu Punjab Uttarakhand Kerala Himachal Pradesh Karnataka Andhra Pradesh Nagaland Meghalaya Mizoram West Bengal Tripura Orissa Chhattisgarh Rajasthan Madhya Pradesh Jharkhand Assam Manipur Uttar Pradesh Bihar Other Other 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent No Electricity <30 30−100 k 100−300 k >300 Source: National Sample Survey 2010. Note: States are ordered by GDP per capita (2010 figures). electricity, the literacy rates of household heads are 86 percent in urban areas and 66 percent in rural areas, compared to only 57 percent and 48 percent, respec- tively, in households without electricity. Having a regular wage also makes it quite likely that a household adopts elec- tricity. In urban areas, 40 percent of households with electricity are regular wage earners, compared to only 16 percent in households without electricity. This trend is followed closely by household expenditure, a proxy for household Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 20 Figure 2.9  Distribution of Household Consumption Levels among States, 2010 Dadra & Himachal Nagar Haveli Daman and Diu Lakshdweep 100 Nagaland Pradesh Pondicherry Andhra Pradesh Other Delhi Karnataka Punjab Goa Gujarat Haryana Sikkim Uttaranchal Kerala Maharashtra Manipur Mizoram Andaman & Nicobar Islands Chandigarh Madhya Pradesh Meghalaya 75 Chattisgarh Rajasthan Tripura Other West Bengal % electricity access Orissa Jharkhand y = 0.002x + 0.6736 50 R2 = 0.1815 Assam Uttar Pradesh Bihar 25 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Average monthly consumption, kWh Source: National Sample Survey 2010. Closing the Electricity Access Gap 21 income. In rural areas, the monthly expenditure of households without electricity (Rs. 781) is nearly one-third less than that of households with electricity (Rs. 1,209). No doubt, this means that income is an important factor in the deci- sion to adopt electricity service. However, it should be cautioned that some of these patterns may be caused by the long-term benefits generated by adopting electricity. The next section considers some of the minimum benefits of having electricity, while the patterns of electricity adoption are examined more closely in chapter 3. Estimated Benefits of Universal Access When households gain access to electricity, they use it as their primary lighting source, replacing the dim, low-quality lighting provided by kerosene wick lamps or hurricane lanterns. Households with electricity spend somewhat more each month on electricity than households without electricity spend on kerosene (Rs. 66 [$1.5] versus Rs. 46 [$1]). But they spend substantially less per unit of light- ing because of electric lighting’s higher efficiency. Households with electricity get more than 100 times as much light as do households with kerosene for about the same amount of money. Thus, households that adopt electricity can realize sub- stantial cost savings per unit of lighting (table 2.1).1 To estimate the benefit of adopting electricity, the study applied the consumer surplus method. Consumer surplus has long been used in economics to estimate the benefits of public projects (Marshall 1930; Varian 1978).2 When households switch from kerosene to electricity, they experience an enormous price drop for lighting. Households with electricity pay only Rs. 0.2 per kilolumen-hour, com- pared to about Rs. 10 per kilolumen-hour paid by those who use kerosene. As a result of the lower per-unit price, households with electricity can enjoy the ben- efits of a substantially larger amount of lighting. Consumer surplus estimates the Table 2.1  Household Cost Savings from Switching from Kerosene to Electric Lighting Household type Without electricity With electricity Lighting source Kerosene Grid electricity Amount spent (Rs./month) 46 66 Quantity used per month 2.76 liters 28.4 kWh Lighting energy received 2.6 (wick lamp), 307.9 (40-W bulb), (klm-hrs./month)a 4.4 (hurricane lantern) 348.5 (60-W bulb) Cost per unit of lighting energy 17.7 (wick lamp), 0.21 (40-W bulb), (Rs./klm-hr.) 10.5 (hurricane lantern) 0.19 (60-W bulb) Savings per unit of lighting energy (%) — 98–99 Source: India Human Development Survey 2005. Note: The exchange rate used is $1 = Rs. 44.1 (World Development Indicators figures for 2005). a. Lighting energy is calculated by multiplying the quantity used by a conversion factor of the following values: 0.95 for kerosene wick lamp, 1.58 for kerosene hurricane lantern, 10.84 for 40-W incandescent bulb, and 12.27 for 60-W fluorescent bulb. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 22 Closing the Electricity Access Gap Table 2.2  Consumer Surplus for Switching from Kerosene to Electricity in Rural India Consumer surplus Consumer surplus as a (value of improved lighting) share of income Switching type (Rs./month) (%) From wick lamp to 40-W bulb 245 11.2 From wick lamp to 60-W bulb 252 11.5 From hurricane lantern to 40-W bulb 216  9.9 From hurricane lantern to 60-W bulb 223 10.2 Source: India Human Development Survey 2005. Note: The sample is restricted to households that use kerosene or electricity for lighting only; the exchange rate used is $1 = Rs. 44.1 (World Development Indicators figures for 2005). total potential savings that results from using such larger amounts of lighting at lower prices. The benefit called consumer surplus is derived from consumers’ ability to make use of more lighting at a lower cost than kerosene or other alter- native lighting sources. For India, consumer surplus can be calculated for the four alternate possibili- ties for switching from kerosene to electric lighting. Moving from either a kero- sene wick lamp or hurricane lantern to even a minimal substitute 40-W or 60-W bulb can generate substantial additional value for households. Among the four possibilities, switching from a kerosene wick lamp to a 60-W bulb results in the largest gain in consumer surplus (Rs. 252 [$5.7]), while switching from a hurri- cane lantern to a 40-W bulb yields the smallest gain (Rs. 216 [$4.9]) (table 2.2). Obviously, the benefits of improved lighting to the consumer household are much higher than the cost incurred. The potential value to consumer surplus can be as large as 11.5 percent of the monthly household budget. Consumer surplus for the household can be extrapolated to the entire population without electricity. If universal access is achieved by 2030, the cumu- lative consumer surplus would equal about Rs. 3.8 trillion ($69 billion), assum- ing each household achieves Rs. 616 ($14) in consumer surplus upon connecting to electricity.3 This translates to about Rs. 190 billion ($3.4 billion) in annual ­ benefits resulting from switching from kerosene to electricity.4 Importantly, this is the lower bound of the benefits of electricity. Other socioeconomic benefits accrue on top of this and are likely to continue well beyond 2030. Thus, this is a conservative estimate of the total benefits that achieving universal electricity access will have for households in India. If the right policies can be put in place to promote universal electricity access—those that do not deter electricity com- panies from providing service—the benefits of the program will be substantial and far reaching. Summary Remarks India’s program to achieve universal electricity access has been quite successful overall, yet two key challenges remain. Many states now have only the final 5–10 percent of their populations without electricity, and only a handful have large Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Closing the Electricity Access Gap 23 nonelectrified populations. Even so, the numbers of people without electricity total the large figure of about 311 million. Of these, about 200 million live in communities that already have electricity. The more than 100 million beyond the electricity grid can be reached by extending the grid system or using decentral- ized household or village systems. Encouraging the 200 million that live in com- munities with electricity to adopt it will be quite challenging since these people are mostly rural and poor. But reaching them will not be extremely difficult or expensive since grid electricity is already nearby. The next chapter examines the barriers to household adoption to better understand the policy alternatives nec- essary for reaching those without electricity. The benefits of reaching those who have not adopted electricity will be quite large for both these households and India as a whole. Notes 1. This exercise focused on lighting-only users to ensures that the costs computed were limited to lighting service. 2. The application of consumer surplus to value the benefits of electricity occurred as early as the mid-1970s (Anderson 1975). A more elaborate exploration of the concept followed in the mid-1980s (Pearce and Webb 1985). This increasingly popular approach has been applied in rural electrification projects implemented in such diverse countries as the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Lao PDR, Peru, and the Philippines (World Bank 1985, 2006, 2008; O’Sullivan and Barnes 2006). 3. The 2005 consumer surplus figure of Rs. 245 (that is, switching from a kerosene wick lamp to a 40-W bulb) is projected to 2010 using inflation to Rs. 616. 4. It is assumed that consumer surplus for lighting is cumulative over 20 years and that cash flow is discounted at a rate of 5 percent. The consumer-surplus scenario assumes that, for those without electricity, population and population growth would be the without-intervention case. For those that already have electricity, population growth would be covered under a business-as-usual scenario; their benefits are not included in these figures even though they would have to be covered by utility investments. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 CHAPTER 3 Barriers to Household Adoption Abstract India’s brisk pace of village electrification has not been matched by adoption at the household level. Even where electricity service has been locally available, many village households choose not to adopt a connection. Yet, with appropriate policies in place, electricity service could be within reach for most households, including even the poorest ones. This chapter examines the main barriers to achieving high household connection rates in India’s rural and urban areas to better understand the policies needed to encourage even the poorest households to adopt electricity. The next section summarizes the literature review on barri- ers to grid extension in India. Subsequent sections identify key factors that influ- ence rural households’ decision making, including power supply reliability and the affordability of adopting electricity. The Gap between Electricity Access and Adoption The impediments to India’s extension of grid electrification in remote rural vil- lages and at the household level have been fairly thoroughly studied. The main reasons for not adopting grid electricity appear to be the remoteness of the vil- lage, India’s electricity pricing policies, household characteristics of families, and reliability of the power supply. Kemmler (2006) and Oda and Tsujita (2010) find a significant negative cor- relation between the remoteness of an area and both household and village elec- trification. Kemmler observes that in India rich agricultural areas tend to have high village electrification rates. In addition, Modi (2005) discusses the sheer number of households without electricity in remote villages. This fact, combined with India’s population growth, is a potential hindrance to rural grid extension. Modi concludes that there is a lack of capacity in manpower, materials, and insti- tutional support at the district and state levels for creating the necessary fran- chises to manage distribution systems. In terms of household energy-use patterns, Bhattacharyya (2006) concludes that rural electrification projects are unlikely to Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   25 26 Barriers to Household Adoption be financially viable without expansion of productive uses, a finding consistent with Kemmler’s view of the importance of electricity in agricultural areas. High connection charges and tariffs, as well as poor-quality power supply, which can negate households’ benefits from electricity, may explain why many poor households living in villages that already have power lines and transformers choose to remain without electricity (World Bank 2002; Modi 2005). While Kemmler (2007) finds that tariffs and per capita expenditure have a relatively small effect on household adoption, he too suggests that quality of power supply affects household adoption rates; he also highlights the important role of educa- tion in a household’s decision to adopt electricity. Another potentially significant characteristic found to discourage household adoption include the unsuitability of home construction materials and complex bureaucratic procedures for obtain- ing a supply (World Bank 2002). Determining why household-level adoption continues to lag behind village electrification requires a better understanding of the supply-and-demand prob- lems that characterize the gap between village availability of grid power and a household’s decision to connect (box 3.1). According to India’s National Sample Box 3.1  Key Definitions Used in this Study This study applied the following definitions used in India’s National Sample Survey to disag- gregate the electricity deficit of households in rural and urban areas: • Availability rate refers to the number of households for which electricity service is available as a proportion of the total number of households in the community. Electricity is consid- ered available if at least one person in the primary sampling unit (4–8 households) uses electricity at home. • Hook-up rate refers to the number of households using electricity service as a proportion of the number of households in communities where service is available. • Access rate refers to the number of households using electricity service as a proportion of the total number of households; it is calculated as the availability rate multiplied by the hook-up rate. • Unserved population equals 100 percent minus the access rate. • Pure demand-side gap equals the availability rate minus the access rate. • Supply-side gap equals the unserved population minus the pure demand-side gap. • Pure supply-side gap equals the supply-side gap multiplied by the hook-up rate. • Mixed demand- and supply-side gap equals the supply-side gap multiplied by 100 minus the hook-up rate.º • Proportion of deficit attributable to demand-side factors only equals the pure demand-side gap as a proportion of the unserved population. • Proportion of deficit attributable to supply-side factors only equals the pure supply-side gap as a proportion of the unserved population. • Proportion of deficit attributable to mixed demand- and supply-side factors only equals mixed demand- and supply-side gap as a proportion of the unserved population. Source: World Bank. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Barriers to Household Adoption 27 Survey, household adoption rates in villages with electricity increased by 9 per- centage points between 2000 and 2010, narrowing the overall availability-access gap from 26 percent to 17 percent over the decade. In 2010, the gap was nearly four times greater in rural areas compared to urban ones, suggesting that rural households are much less likely their urban counterparts to connect to locally available electricity service (figure 3.1). Today in India, demand-side issues figure more prominently than supply-side issues in explaining the access gap (figure 3.2). The current Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) focus on creating village electricity infrastructure is alleviating much of the supply-side barrier, and most people fail to adopt electricity for reasons other than unavailable power supply. This is not to say that India should discontinue extending electricity lines to the last 10 percent of its villages without power. However, it also means that the policies Figure 3.1  Availability-Access Gap, 2010 100 6% 80 17% 22% 60 Percent 40 20 0 National Urban Rural Availability (%) Hook-up (%) Access (%) Source: National Sample Survey 2010. Figure 3.2  Urban and Rural Barriers to Adoption, 2000, 2004, and 2010 2000 2004 2010 100 80 60 Percent 40 20 0 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Demand side Supply side Both demand and supply side Source: National Sample Survey 2000, 2004, 2010. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 28 Barriers to Household Adoption that create barriers to household adoption in villages with power have an equally important impact on India’s remaining populations without electricity access. Impact of Power Reliability on Electricity Adoption Unreliable power supply undermines India’s large investments in rural electrifi- cation and its significant benefits to both individual households and the country overall. Without lighting in the evenings, children cannot study and people can- not watch television. In farmers’ fields, water cannot be pumped to crops, thus lowering yields. People without electricity are less likely to adopt service, reason- ing that they should not have to pay monthly costs for a service that is unavail- able at the times they need to use it. There is no use in investing in lines, trans- formers, and poles if power does not flow through them. Poor reliability also reduces the amount of revenue collected by the electricity companies, which, in turn, provides them little incentive to invest in maintaining service. Rural India’s power reliability problem is not limited to a few regions. Only about 7 percent of rural households with electricity report having no power out- ages. About one-fifth of households with electricity report outages of up to four hours a day, and the same number experience intermittent power supply throughout most of the day. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh—the two states that lag farthest behind in terms of both village coverage and household adoption—face the highest average daily outages (figure 3.3). Figure 3.3  Electricity Outages, by Rural Electrification Rates for Selected States, 2005 24 20 Bihar Hours of electricity outages per day 16 Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Rajsthan Other Haryana 12 Assam Karnataka Punjab Uttarakhand Andhra Pradesh 8 Jharkhand Chhatishgarh West Bengal Maharashtra Gujarat 4 Delhi Orissa Kerala Goa Himachal Pradesh 25 50 75 100 Percent Electrification rate Source: India Human Development Survey 2005. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Barriers to Household Adoption 29 To cope with the unreliable electricity supply, about 70 percent of grid-­ connected households use kerosene as a backup lighting source (table 3.1). These households generally pay a required minimum charge for electricity service regardless of the amount of electricity consumed. In addition, they spend about Rs. 26 ($0.6) per month on kerosene lighting, equivalent to purchasing 10 kilo- watt-hour of electricity, assuming an indicative tariff of Rs. 2.5 ($0.06) per kilo- watt-hour. The substantially higher amounts these households pay to meet their monthly lighting needs results in lost revenue for the state utility companies. The reliability of power supply is directly related to the amount of money households have to spend on alternative fuels for household lighting. The 7 per- cent of grid-connected households that enjoy a reliable electricity supply use only 0.8 liters of kerosene for lighting each month. Conversely, the 18 percent of households that experience power outages more than 16 hours a day burn 2.2 liters of kerosene a month (table 3.2). In effect, such households are required to pay for two power sources to light their homes. Lack of a reliable electricity supply is not just an inconvenience; there is a direct correlation between the extent of power outages and a village’s household Table 3.1  Extent of Kerosene Used for Household Lighting in Rural India, 2005 Households without grid electricity In villages In villages In all Households with Kerosene use variable without grid with grid villages grid electricity Households that use kerosene for lighting (%) 89.7 83.9 85.4 69.8 Kerosene used for lighting (liters/ month) 2.72 2.21 2.34 1.76 Expenditure on kerosene used for lighting (Rs./month) 47.7 36.0 39.1 25.7 Source: India Human Development Survey 2005. Note: The exchange rate used is $1 = Rs. 44.1 (World Development Indicators figures for 2005). Table 3.2  Power Outages and Kerosene Use for Households with Grid Electricity, 2005 Household group by Distribution of Households that use kerosene Kerosene used for power outage duration households for lighting in each group lighting (hours/day) (%) (%)a (liters/month)a No outage  6.8 47.8 0.77 1–4 18.0 62.4 1.24 5–8 21.2 73.5 1.99 9–12 15.9 70.9 1.69 13–16 19.8 71.7 1.90 >16 18.3 77.6 2.21 Source: India Human Development Survey 2005. a. Restricted to households that use kerosene exclusively for lighting. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 30 Barriers to Household Adoption Figure 3.4  Effect of Supply Reliability on Household Adoption in Electrified Villages, 2005 90 81 Household electrification rate 80 71.6 73.1 69.7 70 60 56.4 50 40 37.9 30 20 10 0 No 1−5 6−10 11−15 16−20 20−24 outage Average hours of outages per day Source: India Human Development Survey 2005. rate of grid electricity adoption. For example, in communities with daily service outages of 20 hours or more, the household adoption rate is just 38 percent, compared to more than 80 percent in villages with few or no outages (­ figure 3.4). After controlling for such factors as family size, education, and electricity price, greater reliability of electricity supply is associated with a higher probability of adopting electricity in villages where it is available. Raising the availability of electricity by just one hour per day increases the probability of household adop- tion by nearly 2 percent (appendix D). Many of the 200 million people living in villages with electricity would adopt power service if they could depend on electricity to be available to them when they flip the switch on their lights and appliances. Household Affordability The rationale often given for households not adopting electricity service is the expense involved in rural electrification. India’s remaining households without electricity are poor, and the question is whether they can afford to pay a reason- able amount of their monthly income for electricity. One should keep in mind that such households already pay for kerosene for lighting. If power reliability in India were good, then nearly all of the kerosene expense could be directed toward paying for the benefits of electricity. The patterns of power use in India confirm that electricity is quite affordable, even for the poorest households. For households with an electricity connection, the expenditure on electricity service accounted for just 3.4 percent of the aver- age budget in 2010, a 7 percentage point increase over the previous decade. This expenditure level was remarkably similar across income quintiles. People with higher incomes tended to increase their spending on electricity, resulting in spending levels similar to those of other, less fortunate households; that is, elec- tricity consumption increased at about the same rate as income. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Barriers to Household Adoption 31 Figure 3.5  Electricity Expenditure as a Share of Household Budget, 2000 and 2010 5 4.0 4 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.9 3 2.7 2.6 2.8 Percent 2.3 2.5 2.3 2 1 0 Total Rural Urban Poorest 2nd 3rd 4th Richest quintile quintile 2000 2010 Source: National Sample Survey 2000, 2010. Between 2000 and 2010, spending on electricity as a share of the total h ­ ousehold budget rose for all income groups (figure 3.5). Over the decade, monthly electricity consumption increased by an average of 34 kilowatt-hour (from 42 kilowatt-hour to 76 kilowatt-hour). Poorer income groups exhibited the largest growth in electricity consumption proportionate to total household spending, reflecting the value they place on having electricity. The findings show that as people add more appliances over time, their use of electricity grows. Many of the factors holding back further use of electricity are related to its poor reli- ability, combined with the minimum monthly charges for service. Rural and poorer households consume less electricity, and yet pay a similar price per unit as urban and richer households. The poorest households pay about Rs. 2.4, compared to Rs. 2.8 paid by the wealthiest households. This means there is little cross-subsidy between India’s rich and poor households, a tariff feature used by many countries to make electricity affordable to their poorest people. The poorest households with electricity spend Rs. 92 ($2.0), compared to Rs. 363 ($7.9) spent by the wealthiest households. Monthly rural spending averages Rs. 133 ($2.9), less than half the amount of urban spending (figure 3.6). Spending also varies widely across states, from a high of more than Rs. 500 ($10.9) per month in Chandigarh and Delhi to a low of about Rs. 90 ($1.9) in Jharkhand, Sikkim, and Tripura, among others (appendix C). Measuring the affordability of electricity service—an often-cited reason for poor people not adopting electricity—requires a number of assumptions. Given that households with electricity spend more than 4 percent of their income on electricity, the estimated affordability was assumed at 5 percent of the total household budget (box 3.2). For example, a household with a monthly income of Rs. 1,000 ($22) and a 5 percent affordability threshold could afford to spend a maximum amount of Rs. 50 ($1.1) per month on electricity service. If that amount were to exceed the representative monthly power bill, then electricity Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 32 Barriers to Household Adoption Figure 3.6  Consumption, Expenditure, and Effective Tariff, 2010 Monthly consumption 400 3.0 expenditure (Rs) 300 2.8 E ective tari (kWh) and (Rs./kWh) 2.6 200 2.4 100 2.2 0 2.0 Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Rural Urban Total 1 2 3 4 5 Consumption (kWh) Expenditure (Rs) E ective tari (Rs/kWh) Source: National Sample Survey 2010. Box 3.2  Measuring Affordability of Electricity Service To develop inferences on affordability, the study considered and compared two elements— the monthly electricity bill and the affordability threshold—drawing on a method developed by Foster and Yepes (2006) and subsequently used by Banerjee et al. (2008). The monthly electricity bill is based on the spending patterns of households with elec- tricity. For example, the poorest quintile spends about Rs. 90 ($2.0) per month on electricity, while the wealthiest quintile spends about Rs. 360 ($7.9) on average. At an average effective tariff of about Rs. 3 ($0.07) per kilowatt-hour, Rs. 90 ($2.0) will buy 30 kilowatt-hour, which is consistent with the government’s vision of ensuring minimum household consumption of 1 kilowatt-hour a day. While there are no specific guidelines on setting the affordability threshold for electric- ity, more than 10 percent is considered prohibitive in the literature (Frankhauser and Tepic 2005). In this study, the affordability threshold was set at 5 percent of the household budget, which is the upper bound of what households spend on electricity today. Source: World Bank. would be considered unaffordable. Understanding affordability is important because the financial sustainability of electricity delivery depends on how much rural and lower-income consumers can afford to pay for service.1 Based on the 5 percent assumption, most rural households in India can afford to pay for electricity service. About 90 percent of rural consumers and 82 percent of the poorest income groups can afford to pay Rs. 90 ($2.0) per month, which is in line with what poor households typically pay for electricity service. However, if India were to raise electricity rates for the poorest households, their affordabil- ity would decline precipitously. At Rs. 180 ($3.9) a month, only 22 percent of the poorest consumers and 52 percent of rural consumers overall could afford to pay for electricity on a monthly basis (figure 3.7). At higher rates, the percent- ages decline even further. Thus, for the poorest income groups, the current level Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Barriers to Household Adoption 33 Figure 3.7  Affordability of Representative Monthly Electricity Bill Percentage of households that can 100 a ord monthly electric bill 80 60 40 20 0 90 180 270 360 450 Representative monthly electricity bill (Rs./month) Total Rural Urban Richest quintile Poorest quintile Source: National Sample Survey 2010. Note: Exchange rate in 2010: $1 = Rs. 45.7. of expenditure on electricity is about the maximum they can afford. Policies to ensure the financial viability of the electricity companies must charge higher rates for those in the higher-income groups to make up for the affordability limits of the poorest households. Summary Remarks Many of India’s 200 million people living within easy reach of electricity lines in villages with power choose not to obtain a connection from the state electricity companies. For even the poorest of these households, the draw of having electric- ity to take advantage of modern lighting and labor-saving devices is quite strong. This research finds that the barriers to electricity adoption involve power reli- ability; minimum monthly charges for electricity service; and, for a very small group, affordability of monthly electric bills. A surprise finding is that villages with unreliable power supply have high numbers of households that choose not to adopt electricity. Regardless of the quality of local service, the electricity com- panies charge a minimum monthly fee. In villages where power is unavailable during evening hours, potential customers obviously hesitate to spend a substan- tial portion of their monthly income on service that is not forthcoming. Increasing electricity adoption in rural India will require enhancing the reli- ability of power supply. In addition, for those communities that have experi- enced many brownouts and blackouts, perhaps the level of minimum charges should be reviewed. Another possibility would be to provide consumers in vil- lages with poor service reliability some type of rebate to compensate for substan- dard service. With appropriate service standards, the 200 million people without electricity could gain substantial benefits once they connect to the rural electric- ity grids. In addition, the electricity companies would benefit from improved revenue flows from already existing lines. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 34 Barriers to Household Adoption Electricity is quite affordable for the majority of even the poorest people in India. But the most minimal service might be unaffordable for the poorest house- holds, who pay about the same or slightly lower tariffs than do wealthier house- holds. Higher-income households could pay slightly higher electricity rates to make up for the lower revenues from those in the poorest income groups. Such cross-subsidy policies are fairly typical in many other countries with successful rural electrification programs. One should keep in mind that rates would not have to be drastically changed. The poorest income groups consume very little electricity, so only marginal increases in contributions from the higher-income groups would be needed to compensate for the lower prices paid by the poorest groups. Note 1. As mentioned in chapter 4, RGGVY provides consumers below the poverty line (BPL) free household connections; however, they must pay a monthly charge like households above the poverty line (APL), who also pay the full connection charge. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 CHAPTER 4 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization Abstract For the past 60 years, India has had a strong program in place to promote rural electrification. The result has been dramatic progress in extending electricity service to the country’s vast population. The past decade, in particular, has wit- nessed accelerated household adoption rates in poorer rural areas. This long-term growth in rural electrification has been accompanied by institutional problems that generally plague India’s electricity sector. These include the poor financial condition of the state electricity companies, poor revenue recovery from agricul- tural pumping, lack of enough investments in operation and maintenance, and meddling by politicians in electricity expansion and service plans. These prob- lems are fairly common, and have been experienced by many countries strongly committed to expansion of rural electrification. This chapter begins by examin- ing how India’s commitment to providing rural electrification has changed over the years, followed by overviews of institutional organization of rural electrifica- tion at national and state levels and ongoing grid and off-grid programs. Evolution of Rural Electrification Prior to the late 1960s, India’s growth in rural electrification was extremely slow. At the time of the country’s independence in 1947, only 1,500 villages had elec- tricity. With the enactment of the Electricity Supply Act in 1948, power was extended to semi-urban and rural areas through the creation of the electrical grid system. But during that time, no mention was made of rural electrification. By the early 1950s, the focus of rural electricity supply had shifted to irrigation projects and village-level electrification. The goal was to provide electricity to 1 out of every 200 villages (table 4.1). The latter half of the 1950s saw a continued focus on village electrification. Also, special emphasis was placed on covering all towns with populations of 10,000 or above. By the end of the decade, coverage Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   35 36 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization Table 4.1  Timeline in the Evolution of India’s Rural Electrification Five-year planning period Feature Activity focus/event Key policies and programs Electrification targets achieved I (1951–56) Irrigation projects 4,231 villages II Rural electri-fication 14,458 villages; 350 towns (1956–61) (out of 856 targeted) III efficiency and Sector ­ All-India Rural Credit Review Committee More than 25,955 villages (1961–66) poverty alleviation recommends creating the REC. (out of 37,000 targeted) IV–V Electric pump sets; REC created (1969); Minimum Needs More than 202,094 villages (1969–79) ­village grid Program initiated (1974). connections VI–VII (1980–90) Rural energy projects Kutir Jyoti Yojana created (1989) More than 237,371 villages VIII Economic use of rural MOP created (1992); MNRE created (1994); More than 11,666 villages (1992–97) power accelerated rural electrification program launched. IX Rural electrification as PMGY initiated (2001). Some 13,317 villages; 86 (1997–2002) prime mover of rural ­ percent village electrifica- development tion achieved (2001) X Rural electrification AREP, REST mission, and RVE initi- More than 63,445 villages (2002–07) ­redefined (2004) ated (2002); Minimum Needs Program (including de-electrified) updated (2002); passage of Electricity Act ­ (2003); National Electricity Policy created (2004); RGGVY launched (2005); Rural Electrification Policy created (2006). XI Rural Village Electrification Project, Special More than 73,769 villages (2007–12) Packages, and Jawaharlal Nehru National (including deelectrified) Solar Mission launched. XII 100 percent coverage 92 percent village electrifica- (2012–17) expected by 2017 tion achieved (2012) Sources: Krishnaswamy 2010; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012; RGGVY website. Note: AREP = Accelerated Rural Electrification Program; MNRE = Ministry of New and Renewable Energy; MOP = Ministry of Power; PMGY = Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana; REC = Rural Electrification Corporation; REST = Rural Electrification Supply Technology; RGGVY = Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana; RVE = Remote Village Electrification. had been extended to 18,689 villages; however, only 350 of the originally tar- geted 856 towns had been provided with electricity. Productive-Use Emphasis in 1960s and 1970s Followed by Goal of Rural Development In direct response to severe droughts and food shortages suffered in the early 1960s, India began to emphasize rural electrification’s importance for improving productive uses. The goal was to encourage development by providing electricity for irrigation and commercial activities. The advent of higher-yielding grain vari- eties, as part of the Green Revolution, was one reason for rural electrification’s emphasis on irrigation; without a steady water supply, the new seeds were Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization 37 ineffective. A by-product of the focus on productive uses was increased village electrification. Extending electricity to farmers and commercial enterprises meant that electricity was available in many rural communities. However, pro- viding electricity to households was considered secondary. Power lines passed directly over households as they made their way to farmers’ fields and commer- cial establishments. From the late 1960s through the 1970s, the government encouraged farmers to purchase electric irrigation pumps. Electricity tariffs for agriculture were quite low. Also, credit schemes were put in place for farmers to purchase electric- powered irrigation pumps to create demand. Households were a second priority and would have to wait in line to be approved for gaining access to electricity service (Prayas Energy Group 2011). These policies actually succeeded quite well. Farmers adopted electric pump sets in massive numbers. However, the tariff subsidies, which outlived their original goal of converting farmers from rainfed to irrigated agriculture, remain in place even today. Owing to concentrated seasonal demand for electricity, the high expense of providing electricity lines for limited use, and the continuing subsidies for agriculture, the electricity companies lacked a strong financial incentive to service and maintain the electricity lines. On recommendation of the All India Rural Credit Review Committee of 1966–69, the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) was established in 1969 as a financing institution to promote investment in rural electrification, primarily for agricultural production. The REC’s main objectives were to encourage elec- tricity sector efficiency and alleviate poverty. It was also charged with extending financial assistance to state utilities for establishing generation, transmission, and distribution systems. Throughout the 1970s, the principal focus was on pump-set electrification and providing electricity to villages with populations above 5,000. Within a decade (1969–79), more than 202,094 villages had been provided with electricity. The REC’s original mandate was broadened beyond agricultural pro- duction to include all forms of rural electrification. In 1974, rural electrification was included as a component of the Minimum Needs Program; thus, policies had shifted to serve rural households, but the strong emphasis on productive uses remained. Finally, in the late 1970s, the Government of India turned its attention to rural household access to electricity. Starting in the 1980s, the government’s successive Five-Year Plans have embodied conscious efforts to ensure investments in elec- trification through appropriate national-level schemes and programs. During the 1980s (sixth and seventh Five-Year Plans), the focus shifted to innovative rural energy projects. Such initiatives as the Integrated Rural Energy Program and Kutir Jyoti Yojana were put in place to address low rates of electrification in rural areas, especially among the poorest households. For example, under the Kutir Jyoti Yojana, the government provided a 100 percent grant to provide electricity for a single-point light source to households below the poverty line. Other pro- grams centered on improved cookstoves (chulhas) and biogas plants, among oth- ers. Over the decade, a record 237,371 villages were provided with electricity. In the 1990s, the eighth Five-Year Plan (1992–97) emphasized economic use of Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 38 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization rural power. Subsequently (1997–2002), rural electrification began to be viewed more as a prime mover of rural development. Accelerated Grid and Off-Grid Efforts in Early 2000s Since 2000, growth in both grid and off-grid electrification has accelerated, par- ticularly in poorer rural areas. Under the Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana (PMGY), initiated in 2001, the government provided states a 90 percent loan and 10 percent grant for basic minimum services, including electrification. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), created in 1994, launched the Remote Village Electrification (RVE) program in 2002 to provide lighting to remote villages using stand-alone, solar photovoltaics (PV) and other nonconven- tional energy sources. That year, the Minimum Needs Program was updated, whereby states with rural electrification rates below 65 percent were given 100 percent loan facilities to reach 100 percent electrification levels. Other major programs launched in 2002 included the Rural Electrification Supply Technology (REST) and the Accelerated Rural Electrification Program (AREP). Under REST, renewable energy and decentralized technologies generated electricity for vil- lages from locally available resources. In addition, the AREP provided electricity companies with subsidized loans from the REC and other sources to promote rural electrification. In 2005, the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) was launched to achieve the National Common Minimum Program objective of full household electrification within five years. All existing grid-related rural electri- fication programs were folded into the RGGVY. During the 11th Five-Year Plan, such national schemes as the Rural Village Electrification Project, Special Packages, and Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Missions were initiated. The cur- rent expectation is that 100 percent coverage will be achieved under the 12th Five-Year Plan (2013–17). The Electricity Act of 2003 established the legislative mandate and guidelines for improving electricity supply and delivery in rural areas. Through the 2004 National Electricity Policy and in compliance with the United Progressive Alliance’s National Common Minimum Program, the central government announced the ambitious goal of achieving universal electricity access by 2009. In 2006, the Rural Electrification Policy laid out implementation guidelines through respective grid and off-grid programs. Recent Policies, Institutional Roles, and Changing Definitions The consequence of all the overlapping mandates for rural electrification is that, since the early 1990s, the institutional responsibility for rural electrification has grown more complex. The central government established policy and legislative frameworks to provide funding for centrally sponsored schemes. The states’ role was to implement projects that were centrally designed and funded, along with their own state-financed schemes. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization 39 Reflecting the overlapping institutional mandates and shifts in program emphasis, key definitions have evolved.1 In 1997, the government changed the definition of the term rural electrification to emphasize its critical role in rural development. That same year, it modified the definition of village electrification to specify use for any purpose in the inhabited locality of the village’s revenue area. In 2004, rural electrification was again redefined. That same year, the definition of village electrification was expanded to include criteria for basic infrastructure (for example, having distribution transformer and lines in more decentralized locations, including Dalit basti hamlets), presence of electricity in public places (for example, schools, local government offices, health centers, dispensaries, and community centers), and minimum requirements to be considered as having electricity (for example, connection of at least 10 percent of village households). Institutional Organization India’s complex history of rural electrification has meant that several ministries and many agencies are responsible for the program. Although these institutions’ roles have evolved over time, today their configuration is the result of this his- tory; no doubt, there are ways to streamline these various responsibilities. This section describes the institutional responsibilities for rural electrification as they are currently organized in state and national organizations. At the national level, India’s electricity sector is governed by two ministries: the Ministry of Power (MOP), established in 1992, and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), created in 1994 (figure 4.1). The MOP is respon- sible for general development of the electricity sector and implementing the landmark Electricity Act of 2003. The Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) and the MOP have overall responsibility for financing grid-based rural electrifica- tion. The MNRE is in charge of developing new and alternative energy technolo- gies and promoting renewable energy. Finally, the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) is the government’s financing agency for off-grid and renewable energy–based rural electrification projects. State-level institutions implement and at times cofinance projects that are developed by the central-level institutions. Government power departments lead state-level policy making in the electricity sector, including rural electrification policies.2 Independent State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) regu- late state-level electricity sectors. Distribution companies or state electricity boards are responsible for urban and rural service delivery, as well as implement- ing rural electrification projects; typically, rural electrification is assigned to plan- ning or engineering departments within these utilities. No state-level agencies or subagencies are dedicated exclusively to grid-based rural electrification. State- level agencies also serve as nodal institutions for promoting new and renewable energy development and off-grid electrification. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 40 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization Figure 4.1  National-Level Institutional Organization of Rural Electrification Rural Electri cation Projects Financed Financed by MoP Grid Connected O -Grid by IREDA and REC Ministry of Power Ministry of Power MNRE Conventional Nonconventional Nonconventional Energy Sources Energy Sources Energy Sources Implemented by STATE INSTITUTIONS (POWER DEPARTMENT, UTILITIES) Source: Deloitte 2012. Note: IREDA = Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency; MoP = Ministry of Power; REC = Rural Electrification Corporation. National Policies and the RGGVY Program Since the 2005 launching of Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY), India has made significant progress toward achieving universal elec- tricity access. The National Electricity Policy of 2005 laid out the ambitious goals of achieving 100 percent household access by 2009 and fully meeting power demand by 2012, with power supply to have achieved specified reliability and quality standards. This would be accomplished through improved system effi- ciency and reasonable electricity rates. By 2012, households were to have been provided a minimum subsistence consumption of 1 kilowatt-hour per day. RGGVY’s main objectives were to extend electricity to all villages and habita- tions with more than 100 people, install small generators and distribution net- works where grid extension was not considered cost-effective, and provide free electricity connections to households below the poverty line.3 The MOP gave the REC responsibility for implementing the RGGVY. The 2006 Rural Electrifica­ tion Policy established the guidelines, definitions, and institutional structure for the RGGVY program. Complementing the RGGVY is the Remote Village Electrification (RVE) program, implemented by the MNRE. Supported by state-level renewable energy development agencies, this program provides financial support for provid- ing decentralized energy sources to census villages in remote areas. It covers Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization 41 remote hamlets without electricity in villages that already have electric power. For hamlets in villages where grid extension is not cost-effective or covered under the RGGVY, the MNRE has programs using renewable energy to provide basic levels of electricity for lighting and other household needs.4 RGGVY projects focus on the following areas: • Rural Electricity Distribution Backbone. Construction of 33/11 or 66/11 kilo- volts substations and lines in blocks where they do not already exist. • Village Electricity Infrastructure. Electrification of villages without electricity and habitations with populations greater than 100, which can be reached with electricity lines. The goal is to provide distribution transformers of ap- propriate capacity in every village and habitation with electricity. • Decentralized Distributed Generation. Installation of small generators and dis- tribution networks in villages where grid extension is not cost-effective and which are not covered by the MNRE’s separate remote electrification pro- gram. The generation source can be conventional or renewable fuels, which- ever is most suitable and economical. • BPL Electrification. Provision of free electrification with 100 percent capital subsidy for all households without electricity below the poverty line (BPL) and nonsubsidized connection charges for households above the poverty line (APL). The rural electricity distribution backbone, village electricity infrastructure, and decentralized distributed generation were envisaged to encourage the pro- ductive use of power for agriculture and other activities. These would include irrigation pump sets, small and medium-sized industries, khadi (cloth) businesses, and other village industries. Electricity could be used for refrigeration, health care, education, and information technology. Businesses provided with electricity would receive 90 percent capital subsidies, with the remaining 10 percent financed by REC loans or state finances. The priority assigned to rural electrification and RGGVY depends on each state’s level of electrification. For example, in Tamil Nadu, the electric utility’s rural electrification department was quite active until the late 1980s, when the state achieved near universal electrification. At that point, the focus of the state electricity company shifted to strengthening its electric grid systems. Today, over- all responsibility for the RGGVY rests with the state’s chief engineer (planning), who also manages the Accelerated Power Development and Reforms Program (APDRP), the central government’s flagship program for distribution loss reduc- tion (figure 4.2a). Madhya Pradesh, by contrast, continues to assign a high priority to rural elec- trification and RGGVY implementation. As of 2010, the state had provided 79 percent of its households with electricity. The state utility still lacks a rural elec- trification department. Instead, a project cell is headed by a chief general man- ager, who has a four-person management team dedicated to implementing rural electrification schemes (figure 4.2b). Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 42 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization Figure 4.2  Comparison of RGGVY Institutional Structure in Two States a. Tamil Nadu Chief Engineer (Planning) Superintending Superintending Superintending Engineer [Planning] Engineer [RE & I(D)] Engineer [APDRP] Executive Engineer (RGGVY) Assistant Executive Assistant Executive Engineer 1 Engineer 2 b. Madhya Pradesh Chief General Manager (Projects) General Manager (RGGVY) Additional General Manager (RGGVY) Manager [RGGVY] Manager [RGGVY] Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012. Note: APDRP = Accelerated Power Development and Reforms Program; RGGVY = Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana; RE & I(D) = Rural Electrification and Improvement (Distribution). In the rest of India, some states follow the Tamil Nadu pattern of RGGVY implementation, while others follow the Madhya Pradesh example (table 4.2). Similar to Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal assign mid-level officials responsibility for rural electrification. Like Madhya Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh assign rural electrification a higher priority, and thus give top-level officials direct responsibility for rural electrification and RGGVY implementation. The implementation of RGGVY project works are managed either by the state utilities or selected Central Public Sector Utilities (CPSUs), which have high levels of expertise in electricity project management. The CPSUs include Grid Corporation Ltd., National Thermal Power Corporation, National Hydro- electric Power Corporation, and Damodar Valley Corporation. The CPSUs hire appropriate local contractors to complete the electricity infrastructure projects. On completion, project assets are turned over to the relevant state utilities, which must then service new customers in the project areas. Under the RGGVY, Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Table 4.2  RGGVY Implementation Features, by State RGGVY BPL Participation of Officers in First RE plan Update to State program on APL Distribution connections CPSUs as implement- Dedicated RE Manager of RGGVY cell after launch of RE plan connections (yes/no; franchisees State (number)a ing agency (yes/no) unit (yes/no) RGGVY cell (title) (number) RGGVY (year) (yes/no) ­comment) (yes/no) Andhra 2,702,633 No No Superintendent 3 2011 No No Yes Pradesh Engineer Assam 818,711 Yes Yes General Manager 5 2006 No No Yes Bihar 2,172,686 Yes Yes Chief Engineer 8 n.a. No No Yes Gujarat 806,365 Yes No Superintendent 2 2008 No No Yes Engineer Jharkhand 1,275,252 Yes Yes Assistant Execu- 2 n.a. No No; Atal Gramin Electri- Yes tive Engineer fication Scheme was announced but not implemented. Madhya Pradesh 735,662 Yes No General Manager 4 2009 No No Yes Orissa 2,750,947 Yes No Assistant 2 2009 No Yes; Biju Gramin Jyoti Yes ­Manager Yojana. Rajasthan 1,056,009 Yes No Superintendent 4 2008 No Yes; Mukhya Mantri Sabke Yes Engineer Liye Vidyut Yojana. Tamil Nadu 501,202 No No Executive 2 2008 No No No ­Engineer Uttarakhand 230,558 No No Superintendent 2 n.a. No No Yes Engineer Uttar Pradesh 1,044,494 Yes No Chief Engineer 3 2009 No No Yes West Bengal 1,957,723 Yes Yes Executive 3 2008 No Yes; Rs. 379 ($8) per Yes ­Engineer connection for APL consumers. Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012. Note: APL = above poverty line; BPL = below poverty line; CPSUs = Central Public Sector Utilities; RGGVY = Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana; n.a. = data not available. a. As of April 2012.   43 44 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization Table 4.3  RGGVY Projects Managed by Central Public Sector Utilities Districts with RGGVY RGGVY projects Projects under CPSUs State projects (number) (number) (%) Assam  7  7  30 Bihar  35  35  81 Chhattisgarh  12  14  88 Gujarat  2  2  8 Jharkhand  16  16  73 Madhya Pradesh  2  2  6 Orissa  30  32 100 Rajasthan  7  7  18 Tripura  2  2  50 Uttar Pradesh  8  10  16 West Bengal  10  10  36 Other  7  7  50 India 138 144  25 Source: RGGVY website. Note: CPSUs = Central Public Sector Utilities; RGGVY = Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana. the CPSUs have been responsible for implementing rural electrification projects in some 138 districts across 12 states (table 4.3). The CPSUs are assigned the difficult work, while RGGVY responsibility within the utilities is assigned to relatively junior employees. For example, in Orissa, where privatized utilities have fewer employees compared to state electricity companies, assistant manag- ers are responsible for rural electrification and the RGGVY. Summary Remarks The institutional organization of rural electrification is complicated, spanning two national ministries, a national financing agency for renewable energy, state electricity companies, and state renewable energy nodal agencies. With overlap- ping responsibilities and no single institution in charge, conflicts are almost inevitable. The complicated responsibilities and incentives to serve rural ­ customers have led to challenges for program execution, which are examined in the next chapter. Notes 1. Details on definitions are available at http://rggvy.gov.in/rggvy/rggvyportal/def_elect_ vill.htm. 2. West Bengal is the only state to have established a dedicated rural electrification insti- tution, the West Bengal Rural Energy Development Corporation; however, in 2007, it was merged with the state distribution company. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 History of Rural Electrification and Institutional Organization 45 3. The RGGVY consolidated all currently ongoing rural electrification programs: Kutir Jyoti Yojana, National Minimum Needs Program, Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana, Accelerated Rural Electrification Program, and Accelerated Electrification of One Lakh Villages and One Crore Households. RVE program details are available at http://www.mnre.gov.in/schemes/offgrid/ 4. remote-village-electrification. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 CHAPTER 5 Challenges to Sustaining Progress Abstract Despite India’s accelerated pace of grid expansion, the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) program’s future sustainability is challenged by the little revenue being realized from past investments in rural infrastructure. Hundreds of millions of customers experience unreliable service, while another 311 million—more than one-quarter of the population—remain without power. This chapter identifies the near-term challenges that are placing upward pressure on the already high cost of extending rural grid electricity, as well as the longer- term concerns that could potentially compromise the program’s commercial viability. A number of the most successful state programs already have dealt with such problems, and they can provide useful lessons for overcoming the many challenges of rural electrification.1 Near-Term Financing and Implementation Challenges The increasing costs of building new rural infrastructure and focusing on new connections are the result of several factors. The subsidies under existing pro- grams are somewhat ineffective. The lines are built, but the state electricity companies have low incentives to serve those new customers. System planning is distorted by attempting to reach the poorest customers first, as most rural electrification plans move from those with potentially higher electricity use to those anticipated to have lower consumption. In some states, there is little attempt to improve the contracting efficiency of the state electricity companies. Finally, focusing on building lines, as opposed to serving those lines, results in a lower priority given to working with rural communities. Under the RGGVY grid program, the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) promises a 90 percent subsidy to cover the capital cost of grid extension and decentralized distributed generation (DDG) projects. In addition, a 100 percent subsidy is provided for covering new electricity connections for house- holds that fall below the poverty line (BPL). In practice, subsidy payments rarely cover the full costs of those connections, and disbursements are often delayed. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   47 48 Challenges to Sustaining Progress Figure 5.1  RGGVY Project Cost Comparisons for Selected States, 2013 Bihar Orissa Uttar Pradesh Jharkhand Assam West Bengal Madhya Pradesh Rajasthan Chattisgarh Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Maharashtra Uttarakhand Tamil Nadu Meghalaya Gujarat Manipur Himachal Pradesh Nagaland Other Other 20 40 60 80 100 120 Rs. billion Amount disbursed Revised sanctioned cost Estimated nal cost Source: RGGVY website. Note: The exchange rate used is $1 = Rs. 45 (average for 2005–12). RGGVY = Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana. This places a financial burden on the state electricity companies, which are responsible for taking over the lines after they are constructed. As of January 2013, REC’s total approved costs for all RGGVY projects represented just 58 percent of the estimated actual costs of power system construction and connec- tions—Rs. 342 billion out of Rs. 590 billion ($7.9 billion out of $13 billion). Furthermore, the government had disbursed only 84 percent of the approved costs.2 For all states, the amount disbursed for connecting new customers was less than the approved amount, ranging from 33 percent in Punjab to 90 percent in Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Challenges to Sustaining Progress 49 Uttarakhand. For all states except Chhattisgarh, the approved cost was less than the estimated actual cost (figure 5.1 and appendix E). Planning Gaps, Subsidy Inequity, and Lack of Community Focus The financing problems have been caused by several factors. First, states some- times have underestimated the funding required to meet RGGVY goals. Second, the central government has inadequate cost norms for the expense of expanding the grid systems to rural customers. Finally, once the actual costs are known, an unwieldy revisions process sometimes disallows their reimbursement. Several interlinked issues have resulted in states underestimating their cost requirements. The detailed project reports that states are required to develop to request funding outline the projects needed to achieve RGGVY’s goals. They include descriptions of the villages to be provided with electricity, the number of BPL households to receive free connections, and the new infrastructure required. However, these reports often have been based on out-of-date surveys. Also, the BPL household lists are sometimes based on general perceptions without sup- porting data. In addition, the RGGVY program does not extend free connections to households above the poverty line (APL). As a result, the cost estimates of many states have overlooked APL households. Furthermore, many states have failed to involve village panchayats (local self-government units) in planning, which has resulted in errors in estimating project requirements (box 5.1). Together, these problems have led to longer-term underestimates of cost and maintenance of the electricity network. The standardized cost norms for RGGVY projects developed by the REC often are lower than state estimates presented in development planning reports. Project cost norms take into consideration plains, hills, and tribal areas (table 5.1), but they do not account for other relevant factors, such as geography or local cost of living. In addition, REC village-level norms do not account for the infrastruc- ture capacity required to cover all residents. When state development planning report estimates differ from the cost norms, the REC advises the relevant agen- cies to either justify the difference or revise the projects (Lok Sabha Secretariat 2009). In several cases, this has meant that the REC approved lower amounts than those estimated by the states (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). The result is that many projects do not receive adequate financing. To account for such dis- crepancies, the REC revised the cost norms in 2008 (table 5.1); but some prob- lems remain in the procedures for estimating project costs in ways that are fair. The RGGVY now allows for originally approved costs to be revised upward by 29 percent.3 However, the cost revision process is lengthy and unwieldy. For such reasons, many states are deterred from applying for revisions (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). Changes of up to 20 percent of overall project costs can be approved directly by the REC chairman and managing director, but changes above that amount can only be approved by a high-level committee within the Ministry of Power. Finally, the REC does not cover revisions caused by project delays or variations in the cost of materials. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 50 Challenges to Sustaining Progress Box 5.1  Taking a Community Focus: State Lessons in Building Sustainability States that have taken a community focus and involved local villages in the RGGVY planning process from the start have experienced better field-level implementation and garnered greater local support and ownership, which have contributed to operational sustainability. In Madhya Pradesh, for example, comprehensive planning by the state’s three distribution companies established the electrification needs of villages and households across the state. The companies developed a system of community walk-through surveys to determine pos- sible clustering of villages and households with and without electricity. These surveys fed into overall state-level electrification requirements, submitted to the State Planning Commission. Because the survey findings were checked against data sets from the 2001 census and 2002 National Sample Survey, the companies were reasonably confident of the status of house- hold electrification. Rajasthan has an active rural electrification program predating the RGGVY that engages with local officials on key issues. At all stages of project planning and implementation, the state’s distribution company has worked directly with panchayati raj (local self-government units). A meeting organized with villagers, sarpanchs (village heads), and utility field staff de- tailed the proposed program and potential community benefits, giving community repre- sentatives a chance to ask questions. Twelve sarpanchs that provided particularly excellent input were each awarded Rs. 100,000 for their communities. As a result, both the distribution company and communities gained a better understanding of how projects would be imple- mented. Local support from villagers and political representatives improved field-level imple- mentation, particularly on issues related to obtaining rights-of-way clearance and overcom- ing other obstacles presented by APL households. In West Bengal, RGGVY project planning involved significant local participation. Gram panchayats and panchayat samitis (village-level institutions) were responsible for preparing development plans for their respective areas and monitoring project implementation. The power company obtained a list of BPL households from the panchayat and conducted an extensive walk-through survey, with the participation of local panchayats across all nonelec- trified villages, to identify target households. The state power company complemented the survey with a GPS-supported mapping system. Survey efforts only partially succeeded be- cause of conflicts between agencies, but the process improved planning for new electricity connections and brought state utilities closer to their customers. Source: World Bank. The RGGVY process for disbursing approved costs has many built-in delays. The procedure is for 90 percent of funding to be released in three tranches over the course of the project cycle. The final 10 percent is released after the project has been completed to the REC’s satisfaction. Project completion and conse- quently funds disbursement can be significantly delayed by project implementa- tion problems or difficulties in transferring ownership of the new infrastructure Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Challenges to Sustaining Progress 51 Table 5.1  REC Cost Norms for RGGVY Projects Cost norms (Rs. million) Project type Plains area Hill-desert tribal area Electrification of nonelectrified village 1.3, revised up from 0.65 in 2008 1.8, revised up from 0.65 in 2008 Intensive electrification of already electrified village 0.4, revised up from 0.1 in 2008 0.6, revised up from 0.1 in 2008 BPL connection 2,200, revised up from 1,500 in 2008 Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat 2009. Note: The exchange rate used was $1 = Rs. 45. BPL = below poverty line; REC = Rural Electrification Corporation; RGGVY = Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana. to service providers. Increased numbers of target beneficiaries and technical cor- rections in project design often are not reimbursed until projects are completed. Service Delivery Choices and Management Constraints To implement the RGGVY projects, states can engage either the state electricity utility or a Central Public Sector Utility (CPSU) to act as the project implement- ing and management agency.4 If the latter option is selected, the ­ infrastructure assets are taken over by the relevant state utility on project completion. Both choices have pros and cons, including implementation issues that are likely to delay project completion and increase project costs. Also, service delivery delays may incur legal costs that raise the indirect costs of projects or otherwise create cost increases that the REC will not reimburse. The CPSUs’ strong project management experience helps them to execute large RGGVY projects. However, most of the CPSUs are unfamiliar with elec- tricity distribution projects. As a result, they often subcontract the work out to local private “turnkey” contractors. As a result, the CPSUs are far removed from the projects and are unable to assist with the many irregularities that may arise during implementation. At times, the CPSUs’ heavy reliance on local contractors has not gone well, leading to the termination of some contractors because of nonperformance. In such cases, projects are turned back over to the state utilities. As one might expect, some local contractors have engaged the courts to be com- pensated for terminated contracts, sometimes resulting in even further project delays. The CPSUs often act independently and fail to interact with the local state electricity companies. The use of local contractors often delays integrating the new distribution system into the utility’s business system. In some states, issuance of bills for newly connected households is delayed by 6–12 months. Such issues cause delays or discrepancies in the certification and reporting necessary for the REC to release final project funds (appendix F). The perception of the state utili- ties is that the REC has bypassed them in favor of the CPSUs. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 52 Challenges to Sustaining Progress Like the CPSUs, the state utilities engage local contractors, but they have avoided the problems of the CPSUs owing to their greater expertise in distribu- tion projects and closer connection to on-the-ground situations. At the same time, the state utilities lack the greater project management expertise of the CPSUs and thus are more easily overwhelmed by the substantial household cov- erage of RGGVY projects. Also, the state utilities often have less-advanced moni- toring and reporting systems, which presents a challenge for reporting progress to the REC (appendix G). The RGGVY’s provision of free connections to only BPL households also has hampered the timely and cost-effective completion of projects. In many states, APL households have protested that they also deserve to be provided with elec- tricity. In some cases, they have blocked the extension of the electricity networks across their land. In other cases, they have obtained legal injunctions to redress the issue of lines passing them by in favor of BPL households. In some states, APL households have rebelled against the subsidizing of BPL households by illegally tapping into electricity networks rather than connecting as paying customers (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). To avoid such problems, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal have chosen to extend free connections to APL households at their own expense. Long-Term Risks to Sustainability Currently, the RGGVY program faces the dual challenges of physically unreli- able infrastructure that cannot accommodate full village load and a revenue stream from rural households that is insufficient to secure a financially sustain- able system. These issues are exacerbated by the difficulty of appropriately pric- ing electricity while ensuring household affordability. Rajasthan offers a promis- ing example of how states can implement innovative practices to overcome these obstacles (box 5.2). Inadequate Load Planning and Service Reliability Many states have planned for village electrification without considering that many APL households would connect to the grid. This was mainly because the RGGVY scheme offers only BPL households free connections. It is not surprising that those above the poverty line would want to gain access to electricity, but the focus on BPL households created a bias in the planning process. For example, many states installed transformers that lack the capacity to meet full village load. This resulted in the failure of distribution transformers and immediate service disconnection for some households. Over the long run, system reliability and the network’s ability to provide sufficient hours of supply were put at risk. The RGGVY’s current and past efforts have focused on funding the construc- tion of new rural infrastructure, largely ignoring the proportionate investments needed to strengthen system reliability. This problem has become particularly noticeable in states with high electrification rates that built their current systems in the 1970s and 1980s, which now are in need of repair and upgrading. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Challenges to Sustaining Progress 53 Box 5.2  Improving Utility Revenues: Lessons from Rajasthan Rajasthan’s distribution company—Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (JVVNL)—has taken several key steps to increase revenue flows from rural areas. These innovative practices have resulted in improved loads and revenues and a steady decline in distribution losses. Segregating rural feeder loads. JVVNL has separated its electricity lines for rural house- holds from those for irrigation pump sets. Revenue from households is more important to the distribution company. Since farmers are charged a low fixed rate for electricity, segregat- ing feeder loads allows the utility to supply households without experiencing the high elec- tricity use of agriculture in the same region. This leads to improved revenue flows, but also is a rather expensive way to make up for artificially low electricity tariffs for agricultural pumping. Eliminating electricity theft. JVVNL has come up with a relatively simple system for preventing the theft of electricity. The company systematically monitors electricity use through monthly random sampling of all consumers connected to the electricity network. Consumers who have illegally obtained electricity are then metered and presented with bills they must pay. As a result of these actions, the illegal use of electricity has declined, and JVVNL’s revenue flows have improved. JVVNL does not punish consumers who have stolen electricity by cutting off their service. Instead, they simply tell them they must pay their bills. In other states, by contrast, consumers that are disconnected may remain with- out power for long periods of time, which decreases the utilities’ customer base and rev- enue. Lowering barriers to adoption. Rajasthan has developed an innovative program— Mukhya Mantri Sabke Liye Vidyut Yojana—to extend electricity to people living in sparsely populated rural settlements or hamlets. The state has 16,652 hamlets that could benefit from the RGGVY program, but the cost of connecting individual households in such remote areas is not economically feasible. Instead, the distribution companies concentrate demand by cre- ating group connections. Each group of 4–10 households shares similar socioeconomic fea- tures. Group connections cost Rs. 3,500 ($76) per cluster, plus a Rs. 200 ($4.4) application fee. Such costs are shared to reduce connection charges per family. The group connections im- prove the load and revenue per kilometer of line, and increase the financial revenues col- lected by the electricity company. Source: World Bank. Insufficient Revenue and Commercial Viability of Utility Once the electricity networks are constructed, the RGGVY transfers responsibil- ity of funding service provision to the electric utilities or smaller franchisees envisioned to run the networks. But it is unclear whether these service providers can afford the investments required to maintain operable systems and assure households an adequate and reliable supply. The commercial viability of the service provider may be put at risk due to low prices and revenue streams not large enough to cover maintenance and upgrading of existing infrastructure. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 54 Challenges to Sustaining Progress Figure 5.2  Assessing Commercial Viability of Rural Service Delivery for Selected States, 2010 a. Revenue and cost 10 70 60 8 50 6 Percent 40 4 30 20 2 10 0 0 m t d r u sh h d n sh a l ga ha ra iss ad es ha an an sa de de ja en Bi ad Or st il N kh kh As Gu ra ra ja tB Pr ra ar rP aP m Ra es ta Jh ra Ta ta hy Ut W dh Ut ad An M Average revenue billed Cost of rural supply b. Total losses to utility 40 36.0 30 27.1 21.1 22.5 17.2 19.4 20 13.8 11.5 11.5 10 8.7 6.7 3.1 0 m t d d sh n h r h u l a ga ra ha iss ad ha es es an an sa de ja en Bi ad d Or st il N kh kh As Gu ra ra ja tB Pr ra ar aP rP m Ra es ta Jh ra Ta ta hy Ut W dh Ut ad An M Sources: PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012 (figures 5.2a, b); Power Finance Corporation 2012 (figure 5.2b). The reasons for the low cost recovery involve a number of actors. APL house- holds are a potential source of revenue, but they are not part of the RGGVY program. Many are economically challenged and cannot afford the internal house wiring and connection charges required to obtain service. The tariffs of BPL cus- tomers are lower than those of other consumer groups, and even APL customers do not pay full cost. In 12 states, the average amount billed to rural consumers comprises less than two-thirds of the estimated cost of supply, ranging from just 16 percent in Bihar to 65 percent in West Bengal (figure 5.2a; appendix H). Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Challenges to Sustaining Progress 55 Utility executives have confirmed that revenue from supplying new BPL con- sumers is too low to fund even basic revenue-assurance activities, such as cus- tomer billing and collection. On average in these 12 states, the loss to the utilities from supplying rural consumers is about The losses incurred by the electric utilities from serving rural consumers in these 12 states averaged about Rs. 3.6 ($0.08) per kilowatt-hour in 2010. The range of losses was also quite high, from a low of Rs. 1.9 ($0.04) per kilowatt- hour in West Bengal to a high of Rs. 7.5 ($0.16) per kilowatt-hour in Bihar. The states’ combined burden of serving rural consumers totaled just under Rs. 200 billion ($4.4 billion).5 In some states, the losses accounted for more than two- fifths of total distribution losses, illustrating the substantial burden on the utili- ties’ financial status (figure 5.2b). Summary Remarks The goal of extending electricity to India’s poorest rural consumers has overshad- owed the need to provide reliable, quality service to all households with electric- ity. These are not conflicting goals. Within India, many states have reached near universal service by following well-established utility practices. But throughout the country, service reliability is an issue that requires more attention. Much of the electricity infrastructure constructed 15–30 years ago is in need of significant upgrading. The necessary investments will require good planning to improve revenues from existing lines. Better pricing strategies or subsidies that are trans- ferred to the state electricity companies will be needed to improve power reli- ability. The current practice of building lines that cause the state utilities financial stress needs to be balanced with strategies that improve customer use of electric- ity and allow states to charge higher prices for more reliable service. Today the utilities responsible for operating the network do not receive enough revenue to provide reliable service. In turn, unreliable supply discourages potential household customers from adopting electricity, further eroding the customer base and revenue flow. Poor reliability also means that meters are not running, thus limiting the resources available to operate and maintain the grid system. Reversing this trend will require a new approach that incorporates les- sons from successful state strategies, along with international experience in suc- cessfully promoting rural electrification and achieving universal access. Notes This chapter is based on the findings of a background paper prepared by 1. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012). 2. Actual cost is estimated by calculating the cost per new connection released to date (that is, money disbursed divided by the number of connections released) multiplied by the total expected number of connections. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 56 Challenges to Sustaining Progress 3. As of January 2013. 4. CPSUs include the Power Grid Corporation (India), National Thermal Power Corporation, National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation, and Damodar Valley Corporation. 5. This loss figure is estimated by calculating the product of the total number of rural consumers (using 2010 National Sample Survey data) and the gap between average revenue and average cost. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 CHAPTER 6 Lessons from International Experience Abstract India has been one of the world’s leading developing countries in providing elec- tricity to both rural and urban populations. With the passage of time, however, there has resulted a complex web of various well-meaning policies and institu- tions that now are constraining efforts to connect the remaining populations without electricity—the last mile of the electricity grids. To reach these house- holds, new thinking and policy reforms are needed to provide solutions that best meet these consumers’ needs in financially responsible ways. The solutions might include extension of the existing electricity grid, guaranteed electricity reliability, new private or cooperative distribution companies, or off-grid renewable sys- tems. Achieving the right balance between these and other options is a challenge that will last well into the future. Based on international experience, a set of principles has been developed for the sound expansion of grid-based rural electrification programs (Barnes 2007). These principles include the sustained commitment of governments, as reflected in the development of effective institutions with a high degree of operating autonomy; the development of regularly updated rural electrification plans; and pricing electricity high enough to recover costs once lines are turned over to the distribution utility or other service provider. It is also important to work with communities to gain grassroots support for the program and lower the barriers to adoption for new customers desiring electricity. Finally, technical design stan- dards should be customized to meet the expected low demand levels typical of more remote rural areas as a way to minimize investment costs. Drawing from these global principles, the following suggestions can contribute to India’s efforts to improve electricity reliability and realize its goal of universal access. Institutional Focus on Integrating Grid and Off-Grid Efforts Create a new planning agency for grid and off-grid electrification. The most success- ful rural electrification efforts have benefited from dedicated agencies or units within existing electricity companies that focus primarily on encouraging, Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   57 58 Lessons from International Experience planning, and financing rural electricity lines that can be taken over and main- tained by the existing company in a way that makes financial sense. In India, the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) is a dedicated agency, but it deals mainly with financing and does not touch on the other issues. One way to deal with India’s fragmented approach would be to create a national planning agency that coordinates grid and off-grid investments throughout the country. Such an agency, either stand-alone or housed within a relevant stakeholder institution, would lead the development and regular updating of the rural electrification plans and maintain an overall view of grid and off-grid interactions throughout the country. Develop a coordinated approach between the Ministry of Power (MOP) and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE).1 The rural electrification pro- gram needs to be guided by a transparent, long-term vision for coordinating grid and off-grid efforts. This vision should be supported by studies of low-cost tech- nology options and public market studies of ability and willingness to pay. Deciding whether to implement a grid-based or off-grid solution requires a sys- tematic appraisal rather than the nearly random allocation of sites for off-grid technologies that occurs in India today. For example, the lack of robust consumer market research has created a disconnect between estimated and actual costs of Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) projects. For the future, a more integrated approach between the MOP and the MNRE is needed to coordinate grid and off-grid schemes. For this coordination to occur, more reli- able information is needed on populations without electricity, both in already electrified villages (for the electricity companies) and villages without power (for off-grid programs). Transfer knowledge from the Central Public Sector Utilities (CPSUs). The Government of India and the REC have directly engaged with the CPSUs because of their project management expertise for RGGVY implementation. But they have not considered the need to transfer such knowledge and manage- ment practices to the state utilities. A close working relationship between the state utilities and the CPSUs would contribute to successful RGGVY implemen- tation. In addition, building flexibility into the schemes would enable certain utilities—particularly those in states with better implementation capacity—to use their existing staff and resources, instead of hiring outside firms, to complete projects. This is important to ensure sustainability of the physical infrastructure and iron out implementation-related challenges. Promote franchises. As part of its effort to provide better electricity service, the RGGVY has supported the development of electricity franchises. To date, rural franchises have only been engaged in revenue collection. Few service franchises that act like retail electricity businesses that purchase bulk electricity from utili- ties and resell it to customers have come forward to participate in the RGGVY program. One requirement for such a franchise system is a reliable supply of electricity because selling electricity is a prerequisite for any type of franchise profitability. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Lessons from International Experience 59 Concessions based on minimum necessary subsidies to attract the private sec- tor operating distribution franchisees in rural areas might be considered. Such concessions could be awarded on a competitive basis, with a minimum assured supply from the distribution companies. For off-grid operators, an assured local generation plan could also be considered. The necessary subsidies to make such ventures attractive could be determined up front, based on existing experience with capital costs, or allocated according to the actual number of connections provided under an output-based aid mechanism. Such an approach would allow faster expansion and sustained operation of rural electricity services. Allowing for fair and flexible electricity pricing, rather than the prices charged by the state distribution companies, would provide incentives for the private sector to main- tain high-quality service. Planning and Load Development Monitor the quality of service and connection information. Currently, distribution companies tend to reduce investment and operating costs in rural areas because of the perception that the business of rural electrification generates insufficient revenue. This underfunding leads to unreliable electricity supply. Thus, subsidies or incentives might be needed to ensure that appropriate investments are made in rural infrastructure. Compounding the problem, state distribution companies do not systematically keep track of regional power supply reliability or report outages; however, this is the information they need for regular monthly monitor- ing and reporting to the state’s regulator and government. Encourage the productive use of electricity to increase rural demand. One way to improve load development is to offer a bundle of complementary services as part of an integrated rural development agenda that encourages the productive use of electricity. Complementary services include access to affordable microfinance and knowledge and information, including education and training, dissemination campaigns, and available and qualified human resources. Complementary infra- structure (for example, roads, schools, information and communication technolo- gies, and availability of business equipment) is also important. The experiences of such countries as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Peru, and Thailand suggest that the promotion of and capacity building for productive uses of electricity can increase the productivity of rural businesses, enable more efficient use of the supply infra- structure, and improve the revenues of distribution companies, thereby enhanc- ing the economics of electrification. In Peru, for example, a pilot project initiated in 2006 is expected to benefit some 9,000 families and microenterprises a using a Business Development Services (BDS) approach to promote productive uses of electricity. The imple- menting nongovernmental organization (NGO) uses BDS methods to assist home-based businesses and microenterprises to gather information, access credit, and address technology constraints through marketing and assistance campaigns. The strategy covers market assessment, preparation of business plans, marketing to the community and potential entrepreneurs, coordination with Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 60 Lessons from International Experience complementary institutions, and links with the distribution company. The pilot project concept has been integrated into the Peruvian government’s national rural electrification plan, which includes capacity building for productive uses as a key objective. Support local generation and supply. For communities beyond the grid, solar home systems (SHSs), local generation, energy-efficient lights, and other new technologies are now available at reasonable cost. These systems are not only competitively priced with grid systems; they are also quite reliable. In India, most efforts to promote such technologies have been based on central government approaches to product distribution, as opposed to development of markets by both retailers and NGOs. There are numerous contemporary examples around the world of rural energy agencies that provide the private sector, NGOs, and microfinance groups financing and grants to promote such initiatives. This can be done in coordination with the electricity distribution companies to create an incentive to lower peak loads typical of evening hours. Given the speed with which villages are gaining electricity under the RGGVY program, most if not all villages will have access to grid electricity in the not-too- distant future. This prospect may create uncertainty for off-grid operators, but it may also be beneficial. Some communities in India already have mini-grids and small electricity systems that use renewable energy to supplement grid electricity service. But the evening load by itself is not high enough to justify private genera- tion and supply systems because the costs outweigh the potential revenue. If these systems could sell electricity at marginal cost prices to regional or national electricity grids, as was done in Sri Lanka, many local generation projects could become financially viable. For this to happen in a coordinated way, cooperation on standards is needed to ensure that the grid and off-grid systems can work together. This is another reason why a national planning agency needs to be created. The conclusion is that grid extension and off-grid options are not mutually exclusive and can be implemented in parallel. India needs to harness the poten- tial of the utilities, private sector, regulators, communities, and financial institu- tions to create preconditions so that each stakeholder can individually benefit from and contribute to the universal access goal. India’s dynamic private sector has revealed its capabilities when good business opportunities are present. Creating an environment in which the private sector can be innovative is the responsibility of the government and regulators. Utility Cost Recovery and Supply Reliability Use innovative metering and collection systems. The tariffs paid by customers that connect to the grid typically do not cover the full cost of providing rural supply. This is particularly an issue with BPL households, which often pay lower tariffs than other consumers; it is also an issue with above-poverty-line (APL) house- holds. As discussed in chapter 5, the utilities are losing Rs. 3.6 for every kilowatt hour delivered in rural areas. Utility officials have indicated that the revenue Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Lessons from International Experience 61 from supplying new BPL consumers is too low to cover even the basic revenue- assurance activities, such as billing and revenue collection. Therefore, conditions need to be created that (i) enable rural customers to continue paying their monthly bills and (ii) provide the utilities incentives to service them. Bill collection from rural consumers—no matter how small the bills—is a priority. Most of the service provided under the RGGVY scheme involves flat-rate tariffs. While this reduces the additional burden of meter read- ing and bill distribution efforts and allows households to consume more electric- ity without added expense, the result is greater revenue loss for the utilities. In India, prepaid meters might be used to reduce the utilities’ commercial risks and allow rural households to have more control over their consumption. In fact, the pay-as-you-go system is quite familiar to rural users of mobile-telepho- ny, prepaid airtime cards.2 Innovative, prepaid metering technologies allow cus- tomers to determine the percentage of their household incomes to spend on electricity in a given period and interact with their electricity providers through text messaging and other means to check balances. Another option for bill col- lection might be to turn over the responsibility to respected figures in the communities. Other innovations, currently widespread in East Africa, allow rural consumers to make various payments through their mobile phones (M-Pesa system). This arrangement could be tried in India to further reduce transaction costs for all parties. It may be beneficial for some state utilities to explore management con- tracts with private operators who are able to deploy such new metering technology. Improve reliability through dedicated generation capacity. Increasing access for the poor, particularly those at a subsistence level of consumption, is likely to require a relatively minimal increment of additional generation capacity. Indeed, the generation capacity to support India’s access expansion in 2000–10 was 7 gigawatts, as compared with the total incremental capacity of 58 gigawatts the country added over this period. The generating capacity available for universal access must increase not only to provide for current households without electric- ity but also to improve reliability for currently served rural consumers. As the Prayas Energy Group (2011) suggests, this could mean allocating new pithead- based coal stations or central-sector hydro stations to serve newly electrified households. The other options are to manage current capacity shortages using a transparent system of scheduled load shedding, which can be publicly announced using media outlets, and strengthening the rural transmission and distribution infrastructure to reduce system losses and increase the amount of energy that can be delivered. Lower Barriers to Adoption Improve maintenance of rural distribution lines. Essential to the success of lowering connection costs is a political commitment to examining the various low-cost electrification approaches as part of a broad plan to improve access. In India, Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 62 Lessons from International Experience having reliable electricity supply is critical to improving rates of household adop- tion in villages that already have grid electricity service. Thus, improving the rural distribution systems must be assigned a higher priority to achieve a better bal- ance with the focus on establishing new connections. Provide free connections to APL households to improve load and financial return. At present, the RGGVY program provides BPL households free connections. But APL households, which often reside in the same neighborhoods as BPL house- holds, may be unable to afford the upfront costs of electricity service (for exam- ple, internal house wiring and connection charges). As discussed in chapter 5, the exclusion of APL households has caused various problems, including illegal tap- ping of electricity networks and not consenting to the extension of the electricity network across land under their ownership. In some cases, legal injunctions have been obtained to prevent project discrimination on economic grounds. To avoid such problems, some states (for example, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, and West Bengal) have chosen to extend free connections to APL households at their own expense. Since most of India’s rural households without electricity are poor, having an artificial poverty line that gives priority to those at the very bottom of society, however noble, would only appear to make imple- menting universal electricity access for all a more complicated process. Most countries worldwide have at least a minimum service fee for gaining access to grid electricity. Free connections for those without electricity would not be prohibitively expensive for India, but for first-time users, some type of afford- able minimum charge is necessary to cover basic paperwork. A review of connec- tion fees, reconnection charges, minimum charges, and service reliability would be a priority to understand why many of the poorest households in villages with power are choosing not to adopt electricity. A caveat is that free electricity con- nections, combined with low electricity prices, would be quite problematic for the long-term financial viability of rural service delivery. Community Involvement and Service Orientation Improve avenues of customer interaction. Pathways need to be developed for cus- tomers to have more contact with electricity companies. Local units within companies could be created to deal with rural service problems and develop solutions. Community-outreach liaison officers are a standard feature in most developed countries. The electricity companies need to give higher priority to, and perhaps enhance the job status of, those dealing with customer service, sys- tem reliability, and reduction of power outages. Overall, better trust needs to be developed between the electricity utilities and their customers. Improving rela- tionships might involve community representatives that can report problems or request new service for customers. In many countries, consumer meetings were held before the arrival of electricity, helping to avoid costly and time-consuming disputes over rights-of-way and construction damage. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Lessons from International Experience 63 Increase community participation and sense of ownership. Today, the low level of local participation in the RGGVY process is putting the future sustainability of rural service delivery at risk. International experience confirms the many benefits of involving local communities from the outset, including better designed pro- grams (for example, Indonesia, Peru, and Vietnam), gaining of local support (for example, Bangladesh), mobilization of cash and in-kind contributions (for example, Nepal and Thailand), and increased local ownership, contributing to operational sustainability. Communities can be involved in rural electrification in various ways. Authorized community members or political representatives can participate in bill collection or reporting outages or other problems to the electric utilities. Today, outages often go unnoticed for long periods, causing disenchantment among current and potential customers in the service area. Also, once the utility companies begin focusing on electricity problems in rural areas, they can hold regular meetings to inform consumers about the steps being taken to improve service. Other suggestions might involve such innovations as allowing bill pay- ments by mobile phone or installing prepaid meters. As discussed in chapter 5, some states in India have already begun to involve panchayati raj (local self-government entities), women’s self-help groups (SHGs), and other community-based organizations in rural electrification pro- grams. For example, Orissa’s Nayagarh District, which already has more than 154 women’s SHGs engaged as micro-franchisees, aims to create an additional 5,000 such groups to replicate the success across all distribution companies. Under the micro-franchising model, women’s SHGs in West Bengal and Uttaranchal are actively engaged in more than 1,169 and 5,321 villages, respectively. But the lack of requisite skills sets and financial capability impedes the activities in which such village-level groups can be involved. For example, it would not be advisable for panchayat-level personnel to undertake operations and maintenance or capi- tal-expenditure activities; however, they could be involved in registering new customers, meter reading, billing and collection, and disconnections/ reconnections. Lower Construction and Operation Costs Redesign and change technical standards. Major opportunities exist to redesign India’s rural electricity infrastructure to match design standards to electricity demand and ensure that operating costs are not overshadowed by capital con- struction for new lines. Where the main expected household uses of electricity are lighting and small appliances, typical of many rural areas, there is no reason to apply design standards used for more heavily loaded urban systems. The rural distribution system can be designed for actual loads, often no more than 30–50 kilowatt-hour per month. Consumption usually grows at a slow pace; thus, if the necessary design provisions are made, systems can be inexpensively upgraded later on. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 64 Lessons from International Experience A new program may be necessary for the 200 million people in villages that already have electricity. The electricity industry should not lose sight of the lost revenue from the hundreds of millions of customers that experience outages, as well as those who choose not to connect to the grid because of poor service reliability. Strengthening existing distribution systems, along with providing ­ remote-switching technology and smart grids, could lower costs by routing elec- tricity on an on-demand basis. Have regulators monitor service quality and create a linked system of incentives. Major investments have been made in rural electricity infrastructure, but little revenue is being realized from these massive investments because of power out- ages, low or flat-rate tariffs, and people not connecting because of low-quality service. State regulators need to effectively monitor and encourage higher service standards. One way to promote customer service would be to develop a system of subsidy payments linked to reliability with clearly defined quality parameters for electricity customers. Another option would be to allow electricity companies to charge higher prices once a certain level of service quality has been achieved. However, a careful balance is required between effective monitoring by regula- tors and allowing space for the development of innovative models by private- sector providers. Moving Forward The RGGVY program has made significant contributions to meeting India’s challenge of rural electrification, having reached more than 90 percent of villages. Unfortunately, many households in those villages have not chosen to adopt elec- tricity, which is quite unusual, considering the many benefits of electricity for rural households. It would appear that the vast majority of those households have the ability to pay for service, but are not convinced that it is in their best interest. Applying the principles outlined in this chapter can contribute to closing the access gap for the more than 200 million residents in grid-electrified rural villages that have not adopted electricity, as well as the 100 million more without access in remote off-grid areas. India can achieve universal electrification by 2030. Success of the access expansion program will fall on the state electricity companies, but they will need support. At present, they are being provided with incentives through capital and other subsidies to string lines, or contractors are building the lines and turning them back over to the state electricity companies. Thus, owing to low electricity prices and/or lack of subsidies for operation and maintenance, the state electricity companies have had little incentive to serve those living along the electricity lines. The results have been poor reliability and loss of benefits for those with electricity service and a disincentive for those without electricity to adopt a connection. Though the problems have been politically hard to overcome, the solution is not complicated. It can be accomplished by having a central institution Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Lessons from International Experience 65 responsible for more than just providing subsidies for lines. It should also be responsible for providing higher-quality service, charging a fair price to consum- ers and providers alike, focusing more on customer service, involving rural com- munities more in the process of electrification, and developing systems and technical standards more appropriate for rural levels of demand. As India enters a new age of modernization, it is important that electricity not only be provided to all of its citizens; the service offered should also be closer to levels found in the rest of the developed world. Notes 1. Since June 2014, the two ministries are headed by the same minister. 2. More rural residents have cell phones than electricity connections. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 APPENDIX A Estimating Investment Needs for Universal Access The study developed two load scenarios to estimate the investment needs for achieving universal electricity access by 2030 (box A.1). The first scenario is aligned with the central government’s vision of providing each household at least 1 kilowatt-hour of daily consumption, while the second examines a more basic level of access through mini-grids or solar home systems (SHSs). Under the first scenario’s assumption of 1 kilowatt-hour per day, the annual investment needs until 2030 would be valued at Rs. 139 billion ($3 billion), with a cumulative cost of Rs. 2 trillion ($62 billion) over the 2011–30 period.1 The second scenario would require an annual investment of Rs. 108 billion ($2.4 billion), with a total investment of Rs. 2,160 billion ($48 billion). Although the required annual investment under either load scenario exceeds the $1 billion that the govern- ment currently spends on the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) program each year, this would be quite affordable, constituting only a small share of India’s gross domestic product (GDP). Box A.1  Envisioning Investment Needs: Two Load Scenarios Scenario 1. This scenario assumes that each rural and urban household would have a de- mand of 1 kilowatt-hour per day (that is, 200-watt for five hours each day). In urban areas, the estimated unit cost per grid connection would be Rs. 13,500 ($300), and twice that amount for rural areas (Rs. 27,000 [$600]).The average unit cost per connection through mini-grids and SHSs is estimated at Rs. 36,000 ($800) and Rs. 18,000 ($400), respectively. These are ball- park estimates drawn from currently available pricing information. For example, a 100-watt solar mini-grid system with battery storage that permits running basic household services (that is, lights, phone charger, refrigerator, and television set), for 10 hours a day, would cost about $800 per connection. Similarly, a 100-watt SHS would cost about Rs. 18,000 ($400) per box continues next page Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   67 68 Estimating Investment Needs for Universal Access Box A.1  Envisioning Investment Needs: Two Load Scenarios (continued)  household. In this scenario, the annual cost of supply for achieving universal access by 2030 is estimated at Rs. 139 billion ($3 billion), with a cumulative cost of Rs. 2 trillion ($62 billion) over the 2011–30 period. Scenario 2. In this scenario, rural households would be expected to consume less power than in scenario 1, owing to lower rates of appliance ownership and daytime usage, while urban loads would be higher. The new types of mini-grid systems and SHSs envisioned are designed for rural loads of about 50–100 watts. The energy-efficiency improvements of new- er appliances in the last two-to-three years have dramatically reduced household power needs for basic energy-consuming tasks. Today, a 50-watt solar mini-grid, which comfortably allows for lighting, phone charging, and running a television set, costs about Rs. 18,000 ($400) per household. A 10-watt SHS used four hours a day costs about Rs. 9,000 ($200). In this sce- nario, the urban load is assumed to be twice the rural load (400 watts versus 200 watts) or about Rs. 22,500 ($500) per household. The total cumulative investment through 2030 is esti- mated at Rs. 2,160 billion ($48 billion), with an average annual investment of Rs. 108 billion ($2.4 billion). Source: World Bank. Nearly three-quarters of the required investment would be directed to rural areas, reflecting current access differences in rural and urban areas, along with the high cost of rural supply (figure A.1). Most of this investment would be directed to the poorest rural communities, thus helping to alleviate the vast divide between rural and urban, as well as rich and poor, households. Figure A.1  Investment Needs for Universal Access by 2030 a. Population increase, 2011–30 b. Annual investment needs, 2011–30 700 120,000 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 600 100,000 500 Millions of people 80,000 Rs., million 400 355 60,000 300 40,000 200 289 100 218 20,000 65 0 0 2010 2030 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Grid Mini-grid Individual home sysems Source: World Bank. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Estimating Investment Needs for Universal Access 69 Achieving universal access to electricity by 2030 is not financially prohibitive for India. The load scenarios presented above show that the required annual investments range from Rs. 108 billion ($2.4 billion) to Rs. 139 billion ($3 ­billion). Considering that the country already spends about Rs. 45 billion ($1 ­billion) a year on new electricity lines through the RGGVY program, this goal is quite achievable. Note 1. This figure is much lower than that the $12 billion estimated by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2011). Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 APPENDIX B Household Survey Data Description: National Sample Survey Organization The study relied on data collected from household consumer expenditure sur- veys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) during 2000–10. Data were collected from three annual survey rounds, and the com- bined household sample size was 250,795 (table B.1). Households were selected using random sampling, and most of the country’s geographical area was cov- ered. In this report, coverage figures are population weighted, and expenditure figures are household weighted since electricity payments are usually made at the household level. Information on electricity and other fuel and light sources is located in the household consumer expenditure schedules (Schedule 1.0) of the surveys. These schedules collect information on quantity and value of household consumption with reference periods of “last 30 days” and “last 365 days.” They also collect data on the main fuel sources for household lighting and cooking. This enables com- putation of access- and affordability-related measures by a range of variables, including state and income quintiles. Because all three National Sample Surveys were undertaken using the same method, the data are comparable across surveys. Limitations of the Data Household survey data have several inadequacies. First, data on energy spending can be fraught with inaccuracies because the data are self-reported by the sur- veyed households. The questions are based on actual payments rather than billed amounts, and it is difficult to distinguish between arrears and current payments. In addition, the surveys do not ask questions about metering, so it cannot be known whether household payments are based on specific billing and collection practices of the utilities. Second, wording of the survey questions can be confus- ing. Surveys may ask respondents to declare the payments they made “last Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   71 72 Household Survey Data Description: National Sample Survey Organization Table B.1  Total Sample Size for the Three Household Surveys 55th round 60th round 66th round (July 1999–June 2000) (January–June 2004) (July 2009–June 2010) Composition First-stage units Households First-stage units Households First-stage units Households Rural  6,208  71,385 4,908 18,975  7,512  59,119 Urban  4,176  48,924 2,708 10,656  5,272  41,736 Total 10,384 120,309 7,616 29,631 12,784 100,855 Source: National Sample Survey 2000, 2004, 2010. month,” even though payments were not due monthly in many cases. Third, information on quality of service provision is negligible. Surveys indicate whether electricity service is available and affordable, but not whether it is reliable or responsive to consumer needs. Sometimes spending patterns reflect reliability problems; for example, households and businesses incur tremendous losses from unreliable and infrequent electricity service, meaning that they must spend funds for alternative energy sources. Such information, where available, has significant policy implications. Variation in Access Rates Households answer several survey questions on electricity use, including their primary source of energy for lighting and cooking, how much they spend on electricity, and associated kilowatt hours of consumption. Whenever a household reports zero electricity expenditure, it also reports zero kilowatt hours of con- sumption; however, it is unclear whether this is a natural occurrence or the outcome of the survey design. In the majority of cases, when a household reports using electricity for cooking, it also reports using electricity for lighting. Nearly all households report electricity expenditures if they cite electricity as their primary energy source for lighting; the converse is also true. However, approximately 0.5 percent of households report using electricity as their primary energy source for lighting, yet report no electricity expenditures. Similarly, 1.6 percent of households that report nonzero electricity expenditures do not cite electricity as their primary energy source for electric lighting and, in most cases, cooking. In this context, there are two alternate methods for defining electricity access: (i) whether a household reports using electricity for such basic activities as light- ing and (ii) whether a household reports paying for electricity consumption. Given the anomalies described above, these two measures yield slightly different access rates. Defining “access” as using electricity for lighting generates an access rate of 73.9 percent, while defining it as having electricity expenditures yields an access rate of 74.6 percent (2010 figures). If it is defined as using electricity for lighting or having nonzero electricity expenditures, an access rate of 75.7 percent Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Household Survey Data Description: National Sample Survey Organization 73 is obtained. However, this is likely a flawed methodology; that is, it corrects for households that report paying for electricity but do not report using it for light- ing, but not for households that report no electricity consumption yet report using electricity for lighting. Using census data instead of the Nation Sample Survey data suggests a lower access rate of 67 percent. Both the census and the National Sample Survey col- lect information on energy sources for lighting. In the census, households are asked about their “main” source of fuel for lighting (that is, electricity, kerosene, solar energy, other oil, any other, no lighting), whereas the National Sample Survey asks households about their “primary” source of lighting for the last 30 days preceding the survey date. The 65th survey round notes that electricity for domestic use might be for lighting, cooking, or both. Moreover, electricity might be used legally or illegally, and electricity might be supplied to the household through public agencies, corporations, or private suppliers. However, if the household devised its own electricity arrangements, using either a generator or solar panels, the household was not considered as having electricity. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 APPENDIX C Data Tables Table C.1  Percentage of Population Using Electricity as Main Lighting Source 2010 2000 2004 State or union territory Total Total Total Rural Urban Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Andaman and Nicobar Islands 74  87  91  87  97 100  60  58  89  98 Andhra Pradesh 75  81  95  94  96  89  93  94  97  97 Assam 31  34  51  45  88  27  37  59  77  93 Bihar 14  13  25  19  70  14  23  35  39  76 Chandigarh 96  96  87 100  85 100  87  81  97  87 Chhattisgarh n.a.  60  78  75  92  71  83  83  84  97 Dadra and Nagar Haveli 95  98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Daman and Diu 99  86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Delhi 96  96  99 100  99  56  97 100  98 100 Goa 96 100  99  99  99 100 100  95 100  99 Gujarat 84  85  93  91  96  81  86  92  98  99 Haryana 85  90  96  95  97  75  91  96  98  99 Himachal Pradesh 95  94  98  98  95  97  97  98  97  98 Jharkhand n.a.  34  55  45  92  33  54  67  76  91 Karnataka 80  86  97  96  98  96  97  94  97 100 Kerala 73  82  94  93  96  85  89  92  94  96 Lakshadweep 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Madhya Pradesh 70 79  79  73  98  72  73  81  88  99 Maharashtra 84 83  90  85  97  74  82  90  93  98 Manipur 76 85  91  90  96  72  88  94  97  99 Meghalaya 56 63  81  77  99  60  73  84  83  98 Mizoram 81 92  86  76  98  56  60  86  92  97 Nagaland 88 99  99 100  99 100  96 100  99 100 table continues next page Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   75 76 Data Tables Table C.1  Percentage of Population Using Electricity as Main Lighting Source (continued) 2010 2000 2004 State or union territory Total Total Total Rural Urban Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Orissa 27 40  56  51  87  33  59  79  88  96 Pondicherry 86 90 100 100 100 100 100  98 100 100 Punjab 95 93  96  95  98  94  91  95  97  99 Rajasthan 59 60  77  71  96  53  65  78  84  94 Sikkim 93 92  96  95 100  71  88  99  98 100 Tamil Nadu 80 86  97  96  98  90  95  97  99  99 Tripura 50 68  77  73  95  53  70  74  89  99 Uttar Pradesh 36 39  43  32  80  21  34  49  61  77 Uttarakhand n.a. 68  94  93  96  76  86  92  97  99 West Bengal 36 46  59  48  92  38  48  57  80  93 Other 47  55  72  65  95  51  63  63  77  88 Other 97  98  97  97  99  97  98  96  98  98 Total 59 64  74  66  94  47  63  77  87  96 Source: World Bank. Note: n.a. = not available. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Data Tables 77 Table C.2  Percentage of Population Using Kerosene as Main Lighting Source 2010 2000 2004 State or union territory Total Total Total Rural Urban Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Andaman and Nicobar Islands 24 12  9 13  3  0 40 42 11  2 Andhra Pradesh 24 19  4  5  1 11  6  5  2  1 Assam 68 66 48 54  8 72 62 41 23  2 Bihar 85 86 74 80 27 84 76 64 59 23 Chandigarh  4  0  1 0  1  0  9  8 2  0 Chhattisgarh n.a. 40 17 20  4 25 12 11 12  1 Dadra and Nagar Haveli 5  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 Daman and Diu 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 Delhi 2  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  0  0 Goa 3  0  1  1  1  0  0  5  0  1 Gujarat 15 15  7  9  4 19 14  8  2  1 Haryana 12  9  2  3  1 22  4  2  1  0 Himachal  4  5  2  2  1  3  3  1  2  1 Jharkhand n.a. 65 44 54  7 66 45 33 23  8 Karnataka 20 14  3  4  2  4  3  6  2  0 Kerala 26 18  5  6  3 15 10  7  5  2 Lakshadweep  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 Madhya Pradesh 30 21 20 26  2 27 26 19 11  1 Maharashtra 16 16  9 14  2 26 16  9  7  1 Manipur 22 15  8 10  3 27 11  6  3  0 Meghalaya 42 36 18 22  1 40 26 14 16  2 Mizoram 10  7  9 15  0 31 23 10  5  1 Nagaland 10  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0 Orissa 72 59 43 49 12 67 40 21 12  2 Pondicherry 13 10  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  0 Punjab  4  4  1  2  1  5  6  2  0  0 Rajasthan 39 38 21 27  4 46 32 21 15  5 Sikkim  5  7  4  4  0 29 12  1  1  0 Tamil Nadu 19 14  3  4  2  9  5  3  1  1 Tripura 50 31 23 27  5 47 30 26 10  1 Uttar Pradesh 62 60 56 67 16 78 66 50 37 15 Uttarakhand n.a. 31  5  6  4 21 12  7  3  1 West Bengal 63 53 40 52  7 62 51 42 20  6 Other 32 31 14 17  3 26 22 20  9  4 Other  1  2  2  3  0  3  1  4  2  1 Total 40 35 25 34  5 52 36 23 12  3 Source: World Bank. Note: n.a. = not available. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 78 Data Tables Table C.3  Power Consumption for Households with Electricity Connection (kWh/month) 2010 2000 2004 State or union territory Total Total Total Rural Urban Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Andaman and Nicobar Islands  77  94 104  86 129   3  33  64  92 117 Andhra Pradesh  61  56  68  56  99  39  52  62  69  99 Assam  43  55  47  44  58  27  37  43  57  66 Bihar  39  51  39  32  56  33  35  39  41  59 Chandigarh 106  98 178 140 187  50  60  57 129 199 Chhattisgarh n.a.  57  64  51 115  37  59  77 106 135 Dadra and Nagar Haveli  35  36  52  44  72  26  38  60  79  67 Daman and Diu  43  53  78  36 136  46  31  91  62  98 Delhi 179 123 180  87 187  61  89  93 129 218 Goa  79 103 151 128 202  50  81  73 120 196 Gujarat  61  56  82  60 110  39  46  63  82 125 Haryana  68  69 111  72 188  41  51  62  79 188 Himachal Pradesh  66  75 117 114 150  84  98 111 114 136 Jharkhand n.a.  42  51  33  84  29  38  41  55 121 Karnataka  50  45  56  37  86  30  33  43  59 101 Kerala  53  71  77  66  108  43  50  55  67 100 Lakshadweep  89 109 149 120 182 138 176 158 141 151 Madhya Pradesh  50  69  52  36  89  31  44  52  60  98 Maharashtra  66  70  83  50 119  40  47  52  72 135 Manipur  49  65  54  54  56  50  57  54  51  56 Meghalaya  52  59  70  63  94  53  59  61  77 106 Mizoram  52  71  63  49  77  32  42  47  62  85 Nagaland  24  27  48  48  48  38  37  43  48  55 Orissa  88  92  80  73 105  59  71  88  91 115 Pondicherry  70  87 143  91 167  36  61  81 107 184 Punjab  93 103 126 101 167  44  57  79 107 188 Rajasthan  61  55  72  56 107  46  51  56  75 118 Sikkim  30  24  40  36  65  19  22  37  44  50 Tamil Nadu 138  63  87  60 118  44  59  65  87 144 Tripura  37  42  41  35  63  23  31  35  44  72 Uttarakhand n.a.  74  66  57  97  46  56  65  74  67 Uttar Pradesh  44  64  71  50 102  47  52  57  73 122 West Bengal  65  71  59  44  81  36  40  47  60 102 Other  20  22  26  25  27  23  19  21  25  31 Other  57  62  79  67 112  55  55  66  78 116 Total  70  66  76  54 111  39  49  58  75 126 Source: World Bank. Note: n.a. = not available. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Data Tables 79 Table C.4  Percentage of Income Spent on Electricity for Households with Connection 2010 2000 2004 State or union territory Total Total Total Rural Urban Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Andaman and Nicobar Islands 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.9 1.0 1.1 2.4 2.9 2.6 Andhra Pradesh 2.8 3.7 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.7 Assam 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.2 2.7 Bihar 1.8 2.5 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.4 Chandigarh 3.0 3.5 4.7 5.4 4.5 4.0 4.9 3.4 5.3 4.6 Chhattisgarh n.a. 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.6 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.1 Dadra and Nagar Haveli 1.7 2.2 3.2 2.9 3.7 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.1 Daman and Diu 2.4 3.4 3.9 3.2 4.9 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.9 Delhi 3.0 4.9 5.4 4.8 5.4 4.0 5.5 5.1 5.6 5.3 Goa 1.9 2.7 2.4 2.1 3.2 1.4 2.3 1.9 2.0 2.9 Gujarat 3.5 4.5 4.6 3.9 5.4 4.5 3.9 4.4 4.8 4.9 Haryana 4.0 4.8 4.0 3.6 4.8 5.3 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.9 Himachal Pradesh 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.0 Jharkhand n.a. 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.0 Karnataka 2.4 3.1 2.6 2.3 3.1 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.1 Kerala 1.5 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 Lakshadweep 4.0 6.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.3 4.1 3.0 2.8 2.5 Madhya Pradesh 2.7 5.0 4.1 3.7 5.0 4.1 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.9 Maharashtra 2.6 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.2 Manipur 2.6 4.4 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.1 Meghalaya 1.6 2.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.3 Mizoram 1.3 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.4 Nagaland 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4 Orissa 4.4 4.4 3.5 3.6 3.1 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.1 2.4 Pondicherry 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.6 3.6 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.5 Punjab 4.5 5.4 5.1 4.6 6.0 4.7 4.5 4.9 5.3 5.4 Rajasthan 3.1 4.5 4.4 3.9 5.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.7 4.6 Sikkim 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 2.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.5 Tamil Nadu 2.0 2.6 2.0 1.7 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 Tripura 1.6 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.1 Uttarakhand n.a. 3.5 2.6 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 1.7 Uttar Pradesh 2.3 3.4 3.6 3.0 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.9 West Bengal 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.2 4.2 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.8 Other 0.9 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 Other 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.1 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.0 Total 2.7 3.7 3.4 3.0 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 Source: World Bank. Note: n.a. = not available. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 80 Data Tables Table C.5  Electricity Spending as a Percentage of Household Energy Expenditures 2010 2000 2004 State or union territory Total Total Total Rural Urban Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Assam  9.4 10.7 16.8 14.7 31.6  7.3 11.6 20.4 26.7 33.6 Bihar  3.7  5.0  6.9  4.9 22.6  3.6  5.8  9.4 12.3 26.5 Chandigarh 42.8 45.7 53.3 52.1 53.6 32.1 29.2 26.2 48.2 57.0 Chhattisgarh n.a. 20.4 24.3 21.5 37.7 18.1 25.5 28.7 32.8 42.1 Daman and Diu 33.2 57.5 45.9 39.9 54.1 39.9 42.4 44.4 42.0 49.7 Delhi 37.1 54.0 64.7 61.3 64.9 17.5 48.6 49.9 55.3 72.3 Gujarat 35.6 38.8 42.0 33.5 53.9 26.4 27.9 34.9 45.6 58.4 Haryana 34.7 44.1 38.7 33.9 48.6 29.6 29.5 32.8 36.8 47.8 Himachal Pradesh 20.8 21.7 28.2 27.2 36.8 28.0 25.7 25.1 26.2 32.9 Jharkhand n.a.  8.3 12.3  8.0 28.6  5.5 10.3 11.5 21.8 34.4 Madhya Pradesh 20.0 34.6 27.9 21.6 47.0 21.2 22.6 27.0 32.5 51.9 Manipur 19.4 31.1 29.8 28.6 32.9 20.4 29.4 29.8 33.8 28.8 Meghalaya 13.9 18.2 25.2 22.5 37.8 20.8 21.8 22.3 27.2 41.1 Mizoram 14.2 19.9 15.2 10.8 20.7  6.4  9.4 12.1 15.6 21.9 Nagaland 11.8 17.0 19.0 18.6 19.8 13.8 20.1 16.4 19.6 20.6 Orissa 11.9 19.7 19.4 16.7 35.1 10.2 22.1 22.7 30.0 42.9 Punjab 39.0 50.3 43.4 38.4 51.8 34.5 29.8 35.5 40.9 54.1 Rajasthan 20.5 26.7 31.8 24.8 51.9 16.6 21.8 28.0 35.9 52.7 Sikkim 19.7 14.0 19.9 15.8 43.0  5.6  8.0 12.6 17.6 34.8 Tripura 12.4 19.3 18.5 16.4 27.3 10.3 17.4 17.0 19.6 30.3 Uttarakhand n.a. 24.1 40.1 40.9 37.0 18.9 20.0 23.9 30.4 69.1 Uttar Pradesh 10.4 15.3 16.4 10.6 36.9  7.0 11.3 16.7 24.0 39.6 West Bengal 12.4 18.4 21.3 14.0 41.6 11.0 14.4 18.0 29.0 45.5 Other  5.0  8.3 12.5 10.3 19.7  9.2  9.9  9.3 14.0 16.3 Other 25.2 30.7 26.2 22.5 37.2 24.2 24.8 24.4 26.1 30.2 Source: World Bank. Note: n.a. = not available. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 APPENDIX D Regression Analysis Table D.1  Determinants of Household Access to Electricity in Rural India profit estimates with sample selection Selected explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Age of household head (years) 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 (0.16) (0.23) (-0.67) Sex of head (1 = male, 0 = female) -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 (-0.84) (-0.77) (-0.63) Highest education of adult male in household (years) 0.012** 0.012** 0.011** (8.40) (8.39) (7.18) Highest education of adult female in household (years) 0.016 ** 0.016 0.014** (9.53) (9.56) (8.57) Household size -0.001 -0.002 0.008** (-0.65) (-0.88) (3.21) Log household’s landownership (acre) 0.010** 0.010** 0.006** (5.05) (5.05) (3.19) Fuelwood price (Rs./kg) 0.018 0.018 0.017 (1.42) (1.43) (1.36) Kerosene price (Rs./liter) 0.003 0.003 0.003 (1.34) (1.35) (1.31) Liquefied petroleum gas price (Rs./kg) 0.002 0.002 0.003 (0.27) (0.26) (0.55) Electricity price (Rs./kWh) -0.084* -0.084* -0.061 (-1.74) (-1.72) (-1.23) Average electricity availability in village (hours/day) 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** (7.64) (7.66) (7.96) Log household per capita income (Rs./month) — -0.006 — (-1.02) Log household per capita expenditure (Rs./month) — — 0.108** (8.49) Pseudo R2 0.377 0.301 0.345 Number of observations 24,191 24,191 24,191 Source: India Human Development Survey 2005. Note: Marginal effects are reported. Figures in parentheses are t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the village level. Regression includes additional control variables at the household and village levels, including households’ various nonland possessions, village infrastructure, and wage and consumer price variables. In addition, state-level dummy variables are used to control for any state-level unobservable characteristics that may influence household access to electricity; * and ** refer to significance levels of 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. — = not available. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   81 APPENDIX E RGGVY Fund Allocations Originally Revised Extent of Amount Amount ­ disbursed as Projects approved ­project p ­ roject cost revisions d ­ isbursed share of revised cost State (no.) cost (Rs. million) (Rs. million) (%) (Rs. million) (%) Andhra Pradesh 26  8,405  8,988  7 8,002 89 Assam 23 16,600 27,610  66 24,137 87 Bihar 43 29,759 44,920  51 38,735 86 Chhattisgarh 16 11,391 11,681  3 8,103 69 Gujarat 25  3,604  3,955  10 2,870 73 Haryana 18  1,974  2,080  5 1,778 85 Himachal Pradesh 12  2,053  3,410  66 2,906 85 Jharkhand 22 26,626 34,683  30 30,616 88 Karnataka 25  6,001  8,919  49 7,417 83 Kerala  7  1,343  1,328   -1 937 71 Madhya Pradesh 32 15,334 18,933  23 14,606 77 Maharashtra 34  7,134  8,161  14 5,849 72 Manipur  9  3,578  3,818  7 2,972 78 Meghalaya  7  2,904  4,420  52 3,833 87 Mizoram  8  1,043  2,680 157 2,382 89 Nagaland 11  1,112  2,697 143 2,267 84 Orissa 32 36,151 38,109   5 33,087 87 Punjab 17  1,546  1,839  19 599 33 Rajasthan 40 12,545 13,390  7 11,038 82 Sikkim  4 571  1,965 244 1,729 88 Tamil Nadu 26 4,474  4,474  0 3,173 71 Tripura  4  1,315  1,973 50  1,757 89 Uttar Pradesh 64 27,195 37,913 39 34,010 90 Uttarakhand 13  6,439  7,601 18  6,858 90 West Bengal 28 23,446 27,482 17 22,776 83 Other 16  5,377  9,754  81 7,378 76 Other 14  6,359  9,332  47 7,841 84 India 576 26,428 34,176 29 28,766 84 Source: Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) Management Information System Report January 2013 (http://rggvy.gov.in/ rggvy/rggvyportal/index.html). Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   83 APPENDIX F RGGVY Processes, Institutional Roles, and Field Practices Responsible institution State Process/activity REC ­government Utility Panchayat CPSU Field practice Rural electrification Yes Yes Yes Comprehensive rural electrification plans were plan developed and published by various states after 2007; involvement of panchayat officials was minimal. Detailed project re- Yes Yes Yes Yes Needs-based specific projects were quickly identi- ports and plans fied. Planning was carried out based on either for RGGVY secondary data or through walk-through sur- veys. Involvement of panchayat officials occurred in only a few states. Panchayats provided the list of BPL households. In some cases, the list dated back to 2001 census data. Project plan Yes Yes Most states had to revise costing, mainly because of ­revision inappropriate initial planning. Project approval Yes Where extent of deviation was greater than 20 percent, approvals were to be carried out by the Ministry of Power. Multiple iterations led to delays. Loan agreement Yes Yes Yes Tripartite agreement is duly signed. Project awards Yes Yes Yes Direct contracting of CPSUs by the REC for eight states and selected projects. Material audit Yes Yes Quality check and approval by the utility created unnecessary delays in some states. Project Yes Yes Time overruns were quite common; in some cases, ­implementation there were high-cost implications, which were borne by the utility. Monitoring Yes Yes Yes On projects contracted out to the CPSUs, utilities have not conducted monitoring. Sample check on household electrification depended heavily on third-party inspection. Panchayat certification was secured for village electrification. Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012. Note: BPL = below poverty line; CPSU = Central Public Sector Utility; REC = Rural Electrification Corporation; RGGVY = Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   85 APPENDIX G RGGVY Quality Review Process The Ministry of Power (MOP) has established a third-party, quality-assurance process for approval and acceptance of projects implemented under the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) program scheme.1 Operations are organized into three tiers: • Tier 1 involves a third-party audit through a third-party inspection agency (TPIA) engaged by the Project Implementing Agency (PIA); the audit covers a randomly selected sample of 50 percent of villages under the project to ensure that all materials are utilized and workmanship conforms to the pre- scribed specifications. • Tier 2 involves TPIAs, called Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) Quality Monitors, engaged by the REC; the audit covers a randomly selected sample of 10 percent of villages under the project to ensure that all materials are uti- lized, workmanship conforms to the prescribed specifications, and a preship- ment quality check of major materials is completed at the vendors’ outlets. • Tier 3 involves TPIAs, called National Quality Monitors, engaged by the MOP; the audit covers a randomly selected sample of 1 percent of villages under the project. Despite the quality-assurance process in place, recent studies have highlighted that some villages recorded under the RGGVY scheme as being electrified were still without access (Greenpeace India Society 2011a, 2011b; IDE 2012). These reports provide grassroots-level evidence of the quality-assurance mechanism’s inadequacy. In light of these findings, Greenpeace recommended incorporating a social-audit mechanism into the final layer of verification and inspection of proj- ect completion. Note 1. Notified by the MOP as Annexure-I of File No 44/37/07-D(RE) dated February 6, 2008, and incorporated into the REC’s Quality Control Manual dated April 7, 2008. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   87 APPENDIX H Study Method to Calculate Cost of Rural Supply To estimate the financial burden on states from rural service delivery, this study developed a method to calculate the cost of rural supply and the gap between per unit cost and revenue earned from rural areas. Cost of supply refers to the cost of delivering one unit of electricity to the end-user consumer (that is, rural household consumer). The average cost of supply is calculated for a state’s over- all consumer base, based on the values approved by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) in the various Annual Revenue Requirement (ARR) orders. To analyze how much revenue is recovered from consumers and the uncov- ered cost gap, the per unit revenue assessed for a rural household consumer at the average rural domestic tariff is also calculated. The per unit revenue is then subtracted from the per unit cost to obtain the uncovered gap per unit of elec- tricity. This gap is either borne by the state government as subsidy support, appears on the utility’s books as financial losses, or is borne by other consumers as a cross-subsidy. Data Sources The data sources used are the ARR and tariff orders issued by the respective SERCs for FY 2010/11. Assumptions • The rural cost of supply is more than the average cost of supply primarily because rural consumers are supplied through long low-tension (LT) lines, and transmission and distribution losses (T&D losses) for rural consumers are higher than losses for other consumer categories. • For simplicity, it is assumed that other cost elements (for example, power purchase and operation and maintenance) for rural consumers are the same as for other consumers. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   89 90 Study Method to Calculate Cost of Rural Supply • The overall T&D loss of the utility comprises losses on high-tension (HT) and LT consumers. The T&D loss for HT consumers is assumed to be 5 percent. The balance of losses for the utility is attributable to LT consumers. The T&D loss for rural consumers is assumed to be the same as the balance of LT losses. The average revenue for rural consumers is assumed to be the average tariff rate for the utility’s domestic consumers, who use 0–100 kilowatt-hour per month. Formula The average cost of supply (Av. CoS) for a distribution utility or state is calcu- lated using the following equation: Av. CoS = (total ARR)/total units billed or sold. ARR and units billed are the values approved in the last ARR and tariff order issued by the respective SERC. The total sales approved by SERC are categorized into HT and LT sales. Then, the T&D losses for rural consumers are calculated as follows: total units billed × overall T&D losses (%)/ Overall T&D losses (units) =  (100 − overall T&D losses (%)) otal sales to HT consumers × 5/(100 − 5) HT losses (units) = t {as specified above, HT loss is assumed at 5 percent} LT losses (units) = overall T&D losses (units) − HT losses (units) LT losses (%) = LT losses (units)/(LT losses (units) + Sales to LT consumers) The calculated cost of rural supply is expressed as follows: Cost of rural service = Av. CoS × (100 − overall T&D losses (%))/ (100 − LT losses (%)) Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 References Anderson, Denis. 1975. “Costs and Benefits of Rural Electrification: A Case Study of Costa Rica.” World Bank Public Utilities Report No. RES 5, World Bank, Washington, DC. Asaduzzaman, M., Douglas F. Barnes, and Shahidur R. Khandker. 2009. “Restoring Balance: Bangladesh’s Rural Energy Realities.” Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), Special Report 006/09, World Bank, Washington, DC. Banerjee, Sudeshna, Quentin Wodon, Amadou Diallo, Taras Pushak, Hellal Uddin, Clarence Tsimpo, and Vivien Foster. 2008. “Access, Affordability, and Alternatives: Modern Infrastructure Services in Africa.” Background Paper 2, Africa Infrastructure Sector Diagnostic, World Bank, Washington, DC. Barakat, A., M. Rahman, S. Zaman, A. Podder, S. Halim, N. Ratna, M. Majid, A. Maksud, A. Karim, and S. Islam. 2002. “Economic and Social Impact Evaluation Study of the Rural Electrification Program in Bangladesh.” Report submitted to the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) International, Dhaka. Barnes, Douglas F., ed. 2007. The Challenge of Rural Electrification: Strategies for Developing Countries. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. Bhattacharyya, S. 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Frankhauser, S., and S. Tepic. 2005. “Can Poor Consumers Pay for Energy and Water?” EBRD Working Paper 92, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London. Greenpeace India Society. 2011a. Failed Aspirations: An Inside View of the RGGVY. Bengaluru, India: Greenpeace India Society. http://www.greenpeace.org/india/Global/ india/report/RGGVY%20 national%20report.pdf. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3   91 92 References ———. 2011b. RGGVY–Progress Unlimited: Decentralised Energy = Energy Equity. Bengaluru, India: Greenpeace India Society. http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/ publications/RGGVY-policy-brief/. IDE (Institute of Developing Economies). 2012. “Progress and Issues in Rural Electrification in Bihar, India: A Preliminary Analysis.” IDE Discussion Paper No. 333.2012.3, Institute of Developing Economies, Chiba, Japan. IEA (International Energy Agency). 2011. World Energy Outlook 2011. Paris: International Energy Agency. IRADe (Integrated Research for Action and Development). 2007. “Evaluation of Franchisee System.” Report on Bongaigaon, Assam, India. Kemmler, A. 2006. “Regional Disparities in Electrification of India: Do Geographic Factors Matter?” Centre for Energy Policy and Economic Working Paper No. 51, Centre for Energy Policy and Economics, Zurich. ———. 2007. “Factors Influencing Household Access to Electricity in India.” Energy for Sustainable Development 11 (4): 13–20. Khandker, S. R., D. F. Barnes, and H. A. Samad. 2012. “The Welfare Impacts of Rural Electrification in Bangladesh.” Energy Journal 33 (1): 199–218. ———. 2013. “Welfare Impacts of Rural Electrification: A Panel Data Analysis from Vietnam.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 61 (3): 659–92. Krishnaswamy, Srinivas. 2010. Shifting of Goal Posts—Rural Electrification in India: A Progress Report. Bangalore, India: Vasudha Foundation. Lok Sabha Secretariat. 2009. 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Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 Environmental Benefits Statement The World Bank is committed to reducing its environmental footprint. In support of this commitment, the Publishing and Knowledge Division leverages electronic publishing options and print-on-demand technology, which is located in regional hubs worldwide. Together, these initiatives enable print runs to be lowered and shipping distances decreased, resulting in reduced paper consumption, chemical use, greenhouse gas emissions, and waste. The Publishing and Knowledge Division follows the recommended standards for paper use set by the Green Press Initiative. Whenever possible, books are printed on 50 percent to 100 percent postconsumer recycled paper, and at least 50 percent of the fiber in our book paper is either unbleached or bleached using Totally Chlorine Free (TCF), Processed Chlorine Free (PCF), or Enhanced Elemental Chlorine Free (EECF) processes. More information about the Bank’s environmental philosophy can be found at http://crinfo.worldbank.org/wbcrinfo/node/4. Power for All  •  http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0341-3 I ndia is a leading developing country in providing electricity to rural and urban populations. By late 2012, the national electricity grid had reached 92 percent of India’s rural villages, or about 880 million people. Yet, approximately 311 million people—mostly those in rural areas—still live without electricity. Less than half of all households in the poorest income group have electricity. Even among households with electricity, hundreds of millions lack reliable supply and experience power cuts almost daily. Achieving universal access to electricity by 2030 is not financially prohibitive for India. The challenge of providing electricity for all is achievable, ensuring that India joins such countries as China and Brazil in reaching out to even its remotest populations. Policies will need to be aligned with the principles followed in other successful international programs. The potential benefits of electrification for those without service are quite high. The benefits of lighting alone would approximately equal the investments necessary to extend electricity for all. Households with electricity consume more than 100 times as much light as do households with kerosene for about the same amount of money. Without quality energy services, households often face entrenched poverty, poor delivery of social services, and limited opportunities for women and girls. This book will be of interest to a wide audience, including policy makers, experts and managers in the international development community, and those in academia. The World Bank Studies series is available for free download online through the Open Knowledge Repository (https://openknowledge.worldbank.org). ISBN 978-1-4648-0341-3 SKU 210341