ICRR 14310 Report Number : ICRR14310 IEG ICR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. Project Data: Date Posted : 12/30/2013 Country : Albania Project ID : P055383 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Social Services US$M ): Project Costs (US$M): 15.0 20.0 Delivery Project L/C Number : C3513; L7690 Loan/ US$M ): Loan /Credit (US$M): 10.0 15.0 Sector Board : Social Protection US$M): Cofinancing (US$M ): 2.5 2.5 Cofinanciers : Board Approval Date : 06/07/2001 Closing Date : 03/31/2008 03/30/2013 Sector (s): Other social services (57%); Central government administration (20%); Sub-national government administration (19%); General public administration sector (3%); Compulsory pension and unemployment insurance (1%) Theme (s): Other social protection and risk management (23% - P); Social analysis and monitoring (22% - P); Participation and civic engagement (22% - P); Poverty strategy; analysis and monitoring (22% - P); Social risk mitigation (11% - S) Prepared by : Reviewed by : ICR Review Group : Coordinator : Hjalte S. A. Sederlof Denise A. Vaillancourt Christopher D. Gerrard IEGPS2 2. Project Objectives and Components: a. Objectives: According to the Development Credit Agreement (DCA), the Project Development Objective (PDO) was to improve standards of living of the poor and vulnerable population of the Borrower through : (i) increasing their access to effective social care services; and (ii) assisting the Borrower to develop effective social care policy and improve its capacity for delivery and monitoring of social care services . The PDO in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was: “to improve standards of living of poor and vulnerable population groups in Albania by: (i) increasing their access to well -targeted and effective social care services; (ii) assisting the Government to develop, monitor and evaluate more effective social policy; and (iii) improving capacity for planning, managing and delivering social care services with increased involvement of local governments, communities and civil society . The PDO was revised on February 23, 2009, with the introduction of an IBRD Loan of US$ 5.0 million of additional financing for reform of the pension administration . In the Loan Agreement, the following was added to the original PDO in the Development Credit Agreement : ...and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the pension system in Albania through : (a) improving pension system administration; (b) institutional strengthening including improved capacity for pension policy development; and (c) improving public understanding of the pension system. The initial elements of the PDO were maintained . The new PAD had the same PDO as the Loan Agreement .. While the PDO statements of the PADs and Legal Documents are consistent, this assessment will be based on the PDOs in the two PADs. They provide more precision. Moreover, the term "social policy" (vs. "social care policy" in the DCA articulation) is more accurately reflective of the project's broader focus and intention, as clearly captured in the components . The original PAD included a number of key performance indicators that were revised during project mid -term review in 2006, and then expanded to cover outcomes for the new activities under accompanying supplementary financing in 2009. Key indicators are discussed in the Efficacy Section . b.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? Yes If yes, did the Board approve the revised objectives /key associated outcome targets? Yes Date of Board Approval: 02/23/2009 c. Components: Original components Component 1: Policy Development : (estimated base cost at appraisal US$ 2.06 million; actual cost US$ 4.70 million).. This component aimed at developing the organizational, human and material resources in the Government to design, implement, monitor and evaluate social policy . It had three sub-components: (i) Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation . The sub-component was to support the national statistics agency, INSTAT, in developing and applying a new survey tool for the periodic production of household level information for poverty monitoring and the evaluation of social programs . It was to support the establishment of a poverty unit in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, MOLSA, to analyze and disseminate information for monitoring and evaluating social programs . (ii) Social services policy development . The sub-component was to assist MOLSA in strengthening its policy formulation capacity; further develop the legislative and institutional framework for social services; develop capacity for policy monitoring, evaluation and program improvement; design and implement a national public awareness campaign on social exclusion; and design and apply a framework for financing social services . (iii) Strengthening the development and implementation of pension policy . The sub-component was to develop policy for addressing inadequacies in the data base on work histories; and improve business processes in the Social Insurance Institute, SII . Component 2: Monitoring and administration of social services : (estimated base cost at appraisal US$ 1.37 million; actual cost US$1.50 million). This component had two sub-components – one aimed at improving capacity to monitor and administer social services; and another to strengthen capacity for social work training : (i) General administration of social services . The sub-component was to ensure effective administration and monitoring of social care services at national and regional levels . At the central level of the General Administration of Social Services, GASS, it was to develop standards, guidelines, methodologies and quality control for the provision of social care services, and capacity to monitor policy implementation, as well as general management skills. Similar processes were to be introduced in regional GASS offices . In addition, the sub-component was to develop an MIS and related case management system in GASS and undertake renovation of facilities. (ii) Strengthening capacity for social work training . The sub-component was to develop systematic training and re-training of social workers to improve the quality of social work provided in community -based social care services. Component 3: Community based social services : (estimated base cost at appraisal US 11.04 million; actual cost US$ 7.90 million). This component had two sub-components: the establishment of a fund for developing locally relevant community based social care services; and capacity -building for local government and social service provider capacity building . (i) Fund for community based social services . The sub-component was to provide grants to local governments, NGOs, community based organizations, and others, to establish community -based social services for defined vulnerable groups (home deliveries for elderly, youth centers, day -care services for children, counseling services for families in crisis). The services were to be co -financed with participating local governments . The component initially was to be implemented on a pilot basis and subsequently expanded nationwide . (ii) Local government and social service provider capacity building . The sub-component was to improve capacity of staff in social service facilities and local government offices to respond more effectively to their clients’ needs. Component 4: Project management, information system and monitoring : (estimated base cost at appraisal US$ 1.62 million; actual cost US$ 1.60 million). The component was to ensure an efficient and effective implementation of project activities, develop an MIS for the project and monitor implementation . Revised components Community based social care services were to be piloted in four regions and subsequently expanded nationwide. However, due to difficulties of implementation – slow decision-making on decentralization, capacity constraints and affordability considerations at local levels in taking on responsibility for providing social care services – the Government and the Bank team agreed to limit expansion of the pilot experience only to four additional regions (vs. all 12 regions). To take advantage of savings due to foreign exchange gains, two additional activities were introduced into components 1(i) and 1(iii), relating to pension reform and survey work : development of central archives in the SSI for work histories; a detailed action plan for administrative reform of the Albanian pension system; capacity building among SII staff; and development of a Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) questionnaire and training of interviewers. With the additional financing, the following new component was introduced : Component 5: Pension system reform : (estimated cost at introduction US$ 6.7 million; actual cost US$ 5.83 million). The component included administrative reforms in the Social Insurance Institute (SII) involving revision of business processes and establishment of a central registry; capacity building for pension policy development; and public education on the pension system . d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates: Project cost and financing. Project cost at appraisal was estimated at US$ 15 million. The actual project costs were US$ 20.0 million. Financing was provided by IBRD (US$ 5 million), IDA (US$ 10.0 million), and DFID (US$ 2.5 million). Borrower contribution. The Borrower contributed US$ 2.5 million (US$ 1 million in joint financing with IDA; and US$ 1.5 million in taxes).. Dates. The project was approved on June 7, 2001. The original Closing Date was March 31, 2008. It was extended twice to accommodate changes to the project : a first time on March 31, 2008, to take advantage of cost savings resulting from fluctuations in international exchange rates, to address new government priorities relating to the pension administration; a second time on February 23, 2009, to provide additional financing for the changes that were being introduced in the pension administration; and a third time on July 25, 2012, to ensure completion of activities related to the SII . The final Closing Date was March 30, 2013. 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design: a. Relevance of Objectives: Relevance of objectives is high. high At the time of project preparation, Albania was spending 6.5 percent of GDP on social protection programs that were considered inefficient and ineffective . Social assistance was badly targeted; social care services were undeveloped; and management and administration of social assistance, social care, and pension programs was weak. The focus of government policy was to transform the social protection system to better conform to the requirements of a market economy . The effort to transform social protection systems and improve their efficiency and effectiveness has continued throughout the past decade and remains an element of current government strategy. The same focus also has been present in Bank country assistance strategies throughout the period, and also is reflected in the FY 2011-2014 CAS, which includes improving the effectiveness of social protection systems as a major strategic objective . The original PDO as well as the subsequently revised PDO for additional financing addressed two major areas of concern – social care and pensions . They also addressed the broader challenges of social policy and poverty monitoring and evaluation . b. Relevance of Design: Relevance of design is rated modest . The original project design was consistent with the PDO, aiming at introducing better social policy -making and stronger and more accessible social care services . These measures were likely to contribute to reducing poverty risk and vulnerability among the population . The additional pension-related and poverty monitoring activities that were introduced in March 2008, also were relevant to the original PDO . At the same time, the original project design may have been too optimistic with regard to the pace of implementation, and the readiness of local governments to absorb a national -level expansion of a largely decentralized social care service model . Likewise, the results framework offered a mixed picture . Although it offered a logical framework for monitoring the project, it did not include measurable and clear outcome indicators and targets . This was only done during mid-term review where indicators were clarified, new ones added and baselines and targets defined . Other indicators appear to have been added to the results framework during implementation to track changes in project design . 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy): The overall project (including revisions and additional financing ) had a general objective to improve standards of living of the poor and vulnerable population groups in Albania , and four specific objectives : (a) increasing […] access to well targeted and effective social care services; (b) assisting the Government to develop, monitor and evaluate more effective social policy; (c) improving capacity for planning, managing and delivering social care services with increased involvement of local governments, communities and civil society; and (d) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the pension system […]. The fourth specific objective included three intermediate objectives : (i) improving pension system administration; (ii) institutional strengthening including improved capacity for pension policy development; and (iii) improving public understanding of the pension system . Efficacy is assessed for all four specific objectives and for the general objective . Specific Objective 1: increasing access [of the poor and vulnerable population ] to well -targeted and effective social care services Achievement of specific objective 1 is rated substantial . Outputs Standards for service delivery in social care facilities were defined, guidelines and manuals developed, and a service provider monitoring system was established to monitor quality standards Under specific objective 3 below, 1,200 government staff at central and local levels, contracted professionals, and 500 NGO representatives, were trained in the delivery of social care services according to the new standards Outcomes 100 percent of social care service centers are functioning according to defined national standards in all eight regions (the project regions), in line with the mid-term target; and their performance is monitored by the State Social Inspectorate 93 percent of targeted vulnerable groups (i.e. families and individuals at risk) have access to effective social care services, as measured by service care capacity; compared to a target of 50 percent of such groups established during mid-term review All 145 social care services are operational in the eight project regions in line with the mid -term target 43 daily care centers are operational, providing services to 25,000 clients according to defined standards, and indirectly serving some 50,000 family members 14 residential care centers are operating according to defined general standards and 8 according to standards that apply to clients with specific needs State social services agencies in all eight target regions are using the social services reporting and monitoring system to monitor and provide feedback to the social care service centers, daily care centers and residential care centers Quality of care has improved in all residential and daily care facilities in the eight regions, as measured by facilities that meet service standards Specific Objective 2: Developing, monitoring and evaluating more effective social policy Achievement of specific objective 2 is rated substantial . Outputs A new law on social assistance and social services was approved, and secondary legislation completed . The law with accompanying legislation defined the responsibilities of MOLSA and the State Social Services Agency A comprehensive social services strategy and related action plan was adopted by the Government A financing framework for social care services for which local governments are responsible has been adopted Service and performance standards for social care service providers were developed Outcomes The new law and secondary legislation is being applied in the provision of social care services, and in strengthening coverage and improving targeting of social assistance schemes The comprehensive social services strategy is being implemented according to the action plan, in line with the target set at mid-term review. It forms the basis for a new national social protection strategy, and provides a framework for community level administration of social care services A financing framework for social care services has been introduced in all eight participating regions, defining the financial responsibilities of the central and local authorities, in line with the target set at mid-term review. (A scaling up to the national level did not prove feasible within the project .) MOLSA uses reports on effectiveness of social policies to inform social protection policies, in line with the target set at mid-term review: three evaluations have so far been produced to inform the design of the social assistance scheme (which is being addressed under a social assistance focused project ) A system of regular household surveys is in place and its data utilized to inform social policy, in line with the target set at mid-term review. The outcomes listed above provide tools for more effective social policy making – notably the legislative measures, arrangements for more rigorous monitoring and evaluation, and the piloting of community social care . These have been introduced through this project, but also drawing on the leverage provided through the Social Sector DPL (P116937) for promoting evidence-based reform, and they are being applied to improve social policy under the new Social Assistance Modernization Project (P122233). Specific Objective 3: improving capacity for planning, managing and delivering social care services with increased involvement of local governments, communities and civil society Achievement of specific objective 3 is rated substantial . Outputs A structure for assessing and planning central and local level training needs in social care was established Regional level planning committees were established in each of the eight regions, responsible for assessing social service needs in their region; and each region developed community social care plans, in line with the target set at mid-term review Training and capacity building in new social services standards, and study tours, were provided to local governments, government staff, social workers, residential care staff and NGO representatives (see also specific objective 1) A public information system and awareness raising strategy was developed to engage a broad selection of stakeholders in social care activities . Outcomes This objective was closely linked to specific objective 1, providing the capacity building for planning and implementing the expansion of the social care network at the local level . While the direct benefits accrue to participating local governments and other local stakeholders, the measure of success is recorded in the outcomes related to specific objective 1 – improved access to social care services that were operating according to defined standards . Specific objective 4: improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the pension system Achievement of specific objective 4 is rated substantial a. Improving pension system administration Outputs A strategic plan for the Social Insurance Institute (SII) and an accompanying business plan were developed New business processes were introduced in SII A central registry of participants was introduced in SII An inter-office IT network was introduced in the SII Outcomes The central registry is operational SII has increased capacity to detect fraud; since the introduction of the registry in 2012, SII has identified some 300 cases of fraud. The number of documents required for applying for a pension benefit reduced from 8 on average to 5, as compared to a target of 3 The number of days to respond to pension applications has been reduced from 60 to 25, against a target of 30 days The number of contributors with electronic records has increased from zero to 500,000, compared to a target of 400,000 450,000 beneficiaries have had their eligibility and benefit levels checked as compared to an initial 40,000 and a target of 120,000. b. Institutional strengthening including improved capacity for pension policy development Outputs SII established a pension policy analysis and identification unit Outcomes Actuarial projections have been drafted to form basis for discussions on reform options The number of SII staff doing actuarial projections has increased from one to two, against a target of five . c. Improving public understanding of the pension system Outputs SII development and implemented a public communications strategy, and undertook a public education campaign Development and implementation of a public education campaign SII undertook two public opinion surveys on how well informed the public is about their rights under the pension system Outcomes The share of participants who know their pension rights increased from 80 percent to 95 percent. The number of participants who indicate that they have improved access to information about their benefits and contributions increased from 50 percent to 75 percent, equal to the target . Understanding of the pension system among the general public increased from 44 percent to 75 percent The share of clients who believe that client services have improved rose from 49 percent to 75 percent, compared to a target of 70 percent Overall Objective : to improve standards of living of the poor and vulnerable population Achievement of the overall objective is rated substantial The outputs and outcomes indicated under the specific objectives contributed to the overall objective . The activities under the specific objectives were mutually supportive, and all four contributed to improving living standards among poor and vulnerable groups . Available indicators, and the introduction of monitored performance standards, make it reasonable to assume that services are of better quality and more accessible to families and individuals at risk, and that levels of well -being consequently have improved . That said, there is an absence of measurable indicators, drawing for instance on the periodic household surveys that were introduced under the project, to more definitely establish that assumption . Still, poverty declined substantially in Albania during the life of the project, with a slight rise recorded in recent years attributed to the financial crisis . This is likely due to a number of factors, including good economic performance up to the crisis, and better performance than in other European countries during the crisis . It is also plausible to assume that enhancements in social policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation and social care and pension improvements have contributed to enhancing the standard of living of the poor and vulnerable and preventing impoverishment of those accessing such services . 5. Efficiency: Project efficiency is rated modest . The project did not include economic or financial analysis, nor did it analyze the potential fiscal implications of the reforms that were being introduced . A cost effectiveness analysis would have been justified, considering that a motivation behind the kind of social care reforms that were being introduced is to de -emphasize costly institutionalization. An accompanying analysis of the fiscal implications of the reforms would also have been appropriate. The ICR to some extent discusses the cost effectiveness aspect . While there is no rigorous measurement available to determine efficiency gains from the operation, it is reasonable to assume that they may be significant over time, deriving both from the scaling down and improvement in the provision of care services; and from a more efficient pension administration, in particular as a result of the introduction of a central register and actuary capacity . The improved monitoring, evaluation and targeting of social assistance, albeit separate from social care or pensions (and not listed in the outcomes towards the PDO ), also should contribute to increased efficiency in the overall social protection system . These gains may be attributable in part to the project, but also to the Social Sector DPL . ERR )/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) FRR ) at appraisal and the re- re -estimated value at evaluation : Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope* Appraisal No ICR estimate No * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome: While the project objective was revised with the introduction of additional financing, the revision consisted of an addition of one more specific objective (“improving the pension system�) to the project; otherwise, the PDO remained unchanged. Separate ratings for the original and revised PDO would not change the outcome rating . Therefore, the project outcome is assessed against the revised project objectives . Relevance of the PDO to high reflecting its focus on matters of priority both to the Government Government and Bank priorities is rated high, and in the CAS. Relevance of design is rated modest , due to weaknesses in programming of the project, which did not fully take into account limited implementation capacity in government agencies; and an uneven results framework. Efficacy was rated against four subsidiary objectives and the overall objective . Efficacy was rated substantial for all four specific outcomes: the quality of and access to social care services improved, albeit with some uncertainty regarding measurable improvement in the absence of such indicators; measures aimed at more effective social policy appear solid, although attribution of this outcome is shared with the Social Sector DPL; and administration of the pension system showed measurable improvement . The overall objective of improved well-being among poor and vulnerable groups was rated substantial, drawing on the results in developing more effective social care services, which should improve the ability of beneficiaries to cope with psycho-social and economic risks. Efficiency was rated modest : while the operation contained elements that could represent an efficient use of Bank resources, only limited efforts were made to assess cost effectiveness (in the ICR); and no analysis was made of fiscal /financial costs. a. Outcome Rating : Moderately Satisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating: A key feature, and a central risk, of the project is the successful anchoring of the social care services in the local community, challenging local authorities to provide the skilled human resources, directly or through contracting with private providers, as well as much of the financial cost of providing facilities and services . This should be seen in conjunction with increased transfer of responsibilities for the social assistance program to local levels . So far, a combination of central and government has successfully supported the program in most cases, and the ICR indicates that some local governments have taken over full responsibility of provision of care . Commitment to social care services appears to be strong at all government levels and among other stakeholders . a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Moderate 8. Assessment of Bank Performance: a. Quality at entry: The project (the original one and supplementary financing ) were strategically relevant, and addressed three areas that were in particular need of reform in transition economies, including Albania - social assistance, social care and pensions . The emphasis on community based services was appropriate in introducing a design that was gradually becoming international best practice when moving away from institutional care, especially of children. The pension component that was introduced with additional financing appears well prepared and applied a comprehensive blueprint of reform that could be expected to significantly improve efficiency in pension administration . Major institutional and fiscal/financial risks were identified and successfully incorporated into project design . Preparation was weaker in shaping the results framework for social care services with insufficient attention paid to outcomes beyond putting institutions in place . Here, the pension component was much stronger in its results framework . at -Entry Rating : Quality -at- Moderately Satisfactory b. Quality of supervision: Supervision was thorough. A diverse and experienced team focused on ensuring that sometimes complex institutional changes were implemented . At the same time, they were alert to government needs . The team also struggled with improving indicators, with only partial success : in particular, the extent to which institutional arrangements became more efficient or sustainable was not thoroughly assessed . The partial disconnect between project activities and the PDO also remained throughout project implementation . A much better job in terms of the results framework was done on pension administration, where a significant reform effort was designed and completed within a reasonable period of time . Performance reporting, as reflected in ISRs, was appropriate. Quality of Supervision Rating : Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance: a. Government Performance: Government ownership of the project appears to have been strong, both with regard to the original objectives and the revised ones. This commitment is likely to have played an important part in mitigating the institutional and fiscal-financial risks that the Bank team had identified during preparation . In particular, this commitment is reflected in the significant resources that it was prepared to invest to ensure functional local services . The involvement of NGOs and private sector practitioners was recognized as an essential feature of the structure. A certain measure of instability was produced by relatively frequent changes at ministerial and senior official levels in the central government agencies involved . Still, core staff was retained, which mitigated disruptions. While the government was supportive of the project, it was not always timely in resolving issues as they arose, which delayed implementation . Government Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance: A project coordinating unit had been set up in MOLSA, including ministry staff, and NGO and practitioner representatives. SII became the implementing agency for the pension component . The MOLSA project coordinating unit experienced considerable turnover that at times caused delays in implementing care services and developing a social policy platform . While financial management and reporting was handled in a timely fashion, procurement did cause problems, as SII did not turn out to have adequate capacity in this area. Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization: a. M&E Design: M&E design was preceded by a needs assessment that provided baseline data on vulnerable people for the social care services component of the project . Under the project, structures (project coordinating unit; poverty monitoring unit) were put into place for monitoring and evaluating overall project progress, and for broader poverty data analysis to support policy making . While these design elements should have served as a strong basis for project related M&E on system performance and outcomes, the initial results framework provided an insufficient basis for monitoring implementation and results beyond institutional outputs . Later, the structures in place would allow the mid-term review to introduce indicators with baselines and targets . b. M&E Implementation: Implementation focused on monitoring compliance with regulations and standards . Administrative data was regularly collected on indicators in the results framework, as well as through surveys . However, this information does not appear to have been drawn together in a way that would permit determination of outcomes beyond institutional changes. There appears to have been little information collected on quality; in particular, neither ISRs nor the ICR provides any information drawing on quality indicators, even to the extent of standards being met or processes correctly applied . c. M&E Utilization: The M&E design formed a basis for regular monitoring of activities that allow for adjusting policy as necessary . MOLSA is able to draw on administrative data from social service centers; poverty data analysis provided by a poverty monitoring unit; and the results of social strategy monitoring . These activities draw on regular household surveys, and local surveys of facilities, feedback from beneficiaries and inspectors . M&E Quality Rating : Modest 11. Other Issues a. Safeguards: The project triggered no safeguard policies . There were no significant deviations or waivers from the Bank safeguards and fiduciary policies and procedures during the implementation of the project (PAD, page 31; ICR, page 20). b. Fiduciary Compliance: Financial management. The financial management system including accounting, controls, auditing and reporting was adequate and satisfied the Bank ’s financial management requirements . All reports were submitted on a timely basis and found to be satisfactory . The financial audit reports were all received on time and the opinions in the Management Letters were “unqualified� in regard to the project’s financial statements. Procurement. Procurement of all works, goods and technical services under the project followed the Procurement Guidelines. In terms of capacity, in 2006, the person in charge of procurement left the project coordinating unit, and procurement activities suffered due to lack of experience of the person who succeeded her. This, in return, caused delays in project implementation . To compensate for this, a part -time employee was appointed to work on procurement packages, and project procurement staff was trained by the Bank . c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative): n.a. d. Other: n.a. 12. Ratings : 12. ICR IEG Review Reason for Disagreement /Comments Outcome : Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Risk to Development Moderate Moderate Outcome : Bank Performance : Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Borrower Performance : Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Quality of ICR : Satisfactory NOTES NOTES: - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons: ICR Monitoring indicators and a system for data collection and evaluation need to be established at the beginning of the project, as does the development of adequate skills for monitoring and evaluation at all levels. Building local procurement and financial management capacity right at project start -up is crucial for smooth implementation; and designated, well trained procurement professionals should be routinely be included in the implementing team. ICRR evaluator A rigorous results framework needs to be in place to guide implementation, especially when the project is used as a mechanism to adapt to government priorities as they arise . 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No 15. Comments on Quality of ICR: The evidence as provided in the ICR was difficult to follow, in part reflecting the absence of a results framework (especially the use of one in the ICR ) that could have served as a roadmap . The emphasis of the ICR was on description rather than analysis . The report was internally consistent, and it was consistent with OPCS guidelines, except for the absence of any analysis on financial management or procurement . With a main text of 40 pages, the ICR was unnecessarily long . a.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory