All countries have a formal economy and an informal economy. But, on average, in developing countries the relative size of the informal sector is considerably larger than in developed countries. This paper argues that the larger informal sector has important implications for housing policy in developing countries. That most poor households derive their income from informal employment effectively precludes income-contingent transfers as a method of redistribution. Also, holding fixed real economic activity, the larger is the relative size of the informal sector, the lower is fiscal capacity, and the more distortionary is government provision of a given level of goods and services, which restricts the desirable scale and scope of government policy. For the same reasons, housing policies that have proven successful in developed countries may not be successful when employed in developing countries.

Richard Arnott, Distinguished Professor at the Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside.
Housing Policy in Developing Countries: The Importance of the Informal Economy

Richard Arnott
About the Series

The Commission on Growth and Development led by Nobel Laureate Mike Spence was established in April 2006 as a response to two insights. First, poverty cannot be reduced in isolation from economic growth—an observation that has been overlooked in the thinking and strategies of many practitioners. Second, there is growing awareness that knowledge about economic growth is much less definitive than commonly thought. Consequently, the Commission’s mandate is to “take stock of the state of theoretical and empirical knowledge on economic growth with a view to drawing implications for policy for the current and next generation of policy makers.”

To help explore the state of knowledge, the Commission invited leading academics and policy makers from developing and industrialized countries to explore and discuss economic issues it thought relevant for growth and development, including controversial ideas. Thematic papers assessed knowledge in areas such as monetary and fiscal policies, climate change, and equity and growth and highlighted ongoing debates. Additionally, 25 country case studies were commissioned to explore the dynamics of growth and change in the context of specific countries.

Working papers in this series were presented and reviewed at Commission workshops, which were held in 2007–08 in Washington, D.C., New York City, and New Haven, Connecticut. Each paper benefited from comments by workshop participants, including academics, policy makers, development practitioners, representatives of bilateral and multilateral institutions, and Commission members.

The working papers, and all thematic papers and case studies written as contributions to the work of the Commission, were made possible by support from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the U.K. Department of International Development (DFID), the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the World Bank Group.

The working paper series was produced under the general guidance of Mike Spence and Danny Leipziger, Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, and the Commission’s Secretariat, which is based in the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network of the World Bank. Papers in this series represent the independent view of the authors.
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Abstract

All countries have a formal economy and an informal economy. But, on average, in developing countries the relative size of the informal sector is considerably larger than in developed countries. This paper argues that this has important implications for housing policy in developing countries. That most poor households derive their income from informal employment effectively precludes income-contingent transfers as a method of redistribution. Also, holding fixed real economic activity, the larger is the relative size of the informal sector, the lower is fiscal capacity, and the more distortionary is government provision of a given level of goods and services, which restricts the desirable scale and scope of government policy. For the same reasons, housing policies that have proven successful in developed countries may not be successful when employed in developing countries.
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Housing Policy in Developing Countries: The Importance of the Informal Economy

Richard Arnott

1

1. Introduction

In the foreword to The Challenge of Slums (2003), published by the United Nations Settlements Programme, Kofi Annan wrote:

Almost 1 billion, or 32 percent of the world’s urban population, live in slums, the majority of them in the developing world. Moreover, the locus of global poverty is moving to the cities, a process now recognized as the ‘urbanization of poverty’. Without concerted action on the part of municipal authorities, national governments, civil society actors and the international community, the number of slum dwellers is likely to increase in most developing countries. And if no serious action is taken, the number of slum dwellers worldwide is projected to rise over the next 30 years to 2 billion.

While one may dispute the numbers and question the use of the word slum, with its socio-pathological connotations, there is no doubt of the magnitude of the housing problems in developing countries. The ideal would be massive redistribution from the overconsuming haves to the have-nots, eliminating poverty. But that is not about to happen. Given their scarce resources, what policies should developing countries employ to best deal with their housing problems, and, ruling out massive redistribution from rich to poor countries, what can the international community do to help?

Though the pace of economic research on housing in developing countries has increased rapidly in recent years, there is still very little empirical work analyzing housing policy in developing countries that is persuasive by modern standards in applied econometrics. Either the data are unreliable or insufficiently rich, or the empirical analysis suffers from obvious pitfalls. Case studies are suggestive but not conclusive. The housing policy experience of developed

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2 See Buckley and Kalarickal (2005) for an enlightening and informed review.
countries is considerably better documented and analyzed. Apart from adjustments that need to be made to reflect the income differences between the two classes of countries, can the received wisdom in developed countries on what constitutes good housing policy be applied to developing countries? Would housing policies that have been successful in developed countries necessarily be successful when applied to developing countries?

This paper will argue that the large size of the informal sector relative to the economy in developing countries, as well as the high proportion of housing that is informal, substantially alter the housing policy design problem, so that policies that have succeeded in developing countries may not work well in developing countries.

Table 1, which reproduces part of table 6.1 of United Nations Habitat (2003), presents data on the extent of informal employment by City Development Index (CDI) quintile. In the two lowest quintiles about 50 percent of workers are informally employed, which is more than double that for the two highest quintiles. In developing countries, the bulk of the poor work in the informal sector.

Informal employment is one aspect of the informal economy. Informal housing is another. Angel (2000) defines unauthorized housing to be housing that is not in compliance with current regulations concerning land ownership, land use and zoning, or construction, and squatter housing to be housing that is currently occupying land illegally. This paper will use the term informal housing as synonymous with Angel’s definition of unauthorized housing.

Table 1: GNP Per Capita and Informal Employment by City Development Index, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDI quintile</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita, US$</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>2,087</td>
<td>3,230</td>
<td>11,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal employment, %</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom (2006) contains essays that focus on different aspects of the informal-formal sector dichotomy. Some discuss alternative definitions, others the changing character of the informal sector and perceptions of it.

4 “Informal employment” is not precisely defined. The imprecise definition is that an informal employee is “an employee in an unregistered enterprise.” A note to table 6.1 states: “There is no clear distinction between informally employed and unemployed, which relates to actively seeking work in the formal sector. Quite often, officially unemployed people will work in the informal sector.”

The data were collected by the Housing Indicators Program, which was initiated by Stephen Mayo and Shlomo Angel at the World Bank, and has been continued by the World Bank and UN Habitat. The data were collected for one of the largest cities in each of the 57 countries in the sample.

5 To this definition of squatter housing, Angel adds the following footnote: “This definition fail[s] to include structures occupied illegally by squatters. Squatter settlements that are recognized by authorities as permanent settlements and that are provided with documentation to this effect have been excluded from the definition.”
Table 2: Rates of Owner-Occupancy, Unauthorized Housing, and Squatter Housing by Country Income Group, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country type</th>
<th>Low income</th>
<th>Lower middle income</th>
<th>Upper middle income</th>
<th>High income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owner occupancy, %</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized housing, %</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatter housing, %</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2, which reproduces part of table 23.2 of Angel (2000), presents data related to housing tenure type for four sets of countries, grouped by income. The most striking result in the table is that in 1990 about two-thirds of housing units in low-income countries were unauthorized, while essentially none in high-income countries were.

The main theme of this paper is that the larger relative size of the informal economy in developing countries imposes important constraints on government policy that are not present in developed countries. These constraints significantly influence the form of sound housing policy in developing countries and undermine the effectiveness of many housing policies that have been successful in developed countries. The gist of the argument runs as follows:

1. Since the bulk of the poor in developing countries work in the informal sector, government cannot accurately measure their incomes. This severely compromises the effectiveness of broad income-related transfer programs and more generally limits the scope for redistribution.

2. At least in low-income countries, most households, and probably therefore the bulk of the most needy households, live in unauthorized housing. Since governments are reluctant to subsidize unauthorized housing, their housing programs, with the exception of public housing and slum upgrading projects, are biased towards authorized housing and therefore against the neediest households. Furthermore, the inability to measure household incomes accurately effectively precludes broad housing assistance programs that are geared to income.

3. Holding constant the real income of an economy, the larger is the informal sector, the lower is its fiscal capacity—the maximum amount its governments can collect in tax revenue on a sustained basis. To meet the demand for public services in the face of reduced fiscal capacity, governments in developing countries impose high tax rates on formal-sector income and turn to other revenue sources that are inherently inefficient, resulting in highly distortionary fiscal systems. This diminished revenue-raising capability relative to the size of the economy restricts the scale and scope of expenditure programs that governments can and should undertake, and encourages the use of regulation, both to direct the economy and to collect fee revenue.
4. The consensus is that redistribution in developed countries is best undertaken by the central government since doing so reduces welfare-induced migration. In developing countries, however, local governments and community organizations are better able than the central government to identify the truly needy, which argues for more decentralized redistribution.

The above line of argument is static and takes the degree of informality as exogenous. Over the medium and long term, however, the size of the informal economy relative to the formal economy, as well as the proportion of housing that is informal, are endogenous. Both firms and individuals decide whether to participate in the informal or the formal economy on the basis of perceived self-interest. All else equal, the government would like to increase the proportions of the economy and of the housing market that are formal, since doing provides them with greater control and expands fiscal capacity. Increasing the degree of formality, either by making formal participation more attractive or informal participation less, may entail some sacrifice of short-run efficiency. For example, in the short run the government would like to regularize informal housing not only to collect more in tax revenue and to extend its control over housing delivery, but also to facilitate public service provision to the poor. Doing so however would encourage new unauthorized settlements, which conflicts with its goal of increasing the housing sector’s degree of formality. One can pose this tradeoff as a conflict between short-run and long-run objectives. But probably a more useful way of framing the problem is to enquire into the optimal transition path from the status quo to a more formal economy—that is, to treat the policy design problem as dynamic rather than static.

The paper distinguishes between developed and developing countries. When we speak of developing countries as a group, we have in mind the poorer developing countries. Some of our arguments need to be qualified when applied to emerging developed countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and China, or to countries that were formerly in the Soviet Bloc.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the welfare economics of housing policy in developed countries, and Section 3 that for developing countries. Section 4 gives a thumbnail history of the housing policy experience in developed countries. Section 5 briefly reviews the housing policy experience of developing countries, and relates differences in the policy experiences between developed and developing countries to informality. Section 6 draws together the discussion and provides concluding comments.

The main theme is that in developing countries the primary role of the central government in the housing sector should be to act as a facilitator, both enabling housing markets to work and taking a leadership role with respect to policy. In assisting low-income households achieve adequate housing, it should avoid expensive and broad-based housing programs and should instead assist local governments and community organizations to provide housing assistance
to the neediest households. A subsidiary theme is that loans from the international community to help developing countries finance urban infrastructure would go a long way towards easing the strains deriving from their rapid urbanization.

2. The Welfare Economics of Housing Policy in Developed Countries

In almost all housing policy debates, economists argue for less government intervention in the housing sector than other groups of experts. Most economists have at least qualified faith in the efficiency of markets and argue for government intervention to oil the wheels of the market mechanism. They hold this view of the housing sector as well, arguing that the principal roles of government with respect to housing should be to enable housing markets to work and to ensure the adequate provision of infrastructure—a public goods problem. Much of housing policy in developed countries is redistributive in nature, having the ideal of providing “decent and affordable” housing for all. Economists tend to respect consumer sovereignty—that households know best how to spend their incomes—and therefore tend to favor income redistribution (which Tobin, 1970, referred to as general egalitarianism) over redistribution in kind (specific egalitarianism), though many believe that social justice entails ensuring that all households enjoy at least basic levels of “merit goods”—decent housing, adequate nutrition, clothing, sanitation and health services, a safe and healthy environment, and access to at least a decent basic education for children. One may question whether homelessness is consistent with human dignity, even in the poorest countries, and reasonably maintain that the government should bear responsibility as the landlord of last resort.

The foundation on which economists have built their belief in the efficiency of markets is The Invisible Hand, as formalized in the theory of competitive general equilibrium. The First Theorem of Welfare Economics states that, under conditions of perfect competition, a market economy is efficient in the sense that it is impossible to make one person better off without making another worse off. Since the conditions of perfect competition are unrealistically strict, the Theorem provides a benchmark. Government intervention to improve the efficiency of markets may be justified because the real world economy deviates from the assumptions of perfect competition.

For many years, the dominant view among economists concerning the role of government was based on the classic theory of market failure (see, for example, Bator, 1958). There are two central elements of the theory. The first is that there are three principal sources of market failure—natural monopoly (increasing returns to scale), externalities, and public goods. Government intervention may be justified on efficiency grounds to deal with each. The second
is that equity and social justice should be achieved through the lump-sum redistribution of income. Since natural monopoly and public goods are unimportant in the housing sector per se, and since housing-related externalities can be dealt with on a piecemeal basis (for example, land use externalities are dealt with via zoning, and social capital externalities partially through the subsidization of home ownership), adherents of the classic market failure view of the role of government argue for limited government intervention in the housing market to improve efficiency, and income transfers rather than housing assistance to improve equity. According to this perspective, government does however have an important role to play in the provision of urban infrastructure, including urban residential infrastructure, since it has public goods elements and some natural monopoly characteristics.

While many housing economists continue to base their policy arguments on the classic theory of market failure, over the last few decades new perspectives have emerged. On one hand, public choice theorists emphasize that there are government failures as well as market failures. Politicians may be more concerned with getting reelected than with efficiency or equity; bureaucrats have an incentive to increase the size of their bureaus, whatever the social value of the services they provide; governments are power hungry; and so on. When account is taken of government failure, there is no presumption that market failure justifies government intervention—it may or it may not, depending on the economic and political circumstances. On the other hand, developments in economic theory, particularly the theory of optimal economic policy under asymmetric information, point to a potentially expanded role of government.

The theory of optimal economic policy under asymmetric information is now presented since it is central to this paper’s argument. In the theory of market failure, efficiency is achieved by correcting market failures, equity via lump-sum redistribution. Lump-sum redistribution would be feasible if the government could observe need directly, but it cannot, and instead must imperfectly infer need on the basis of what it can observe. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that individuals differ only in ability, so that a needier individual is simply a less able individual, and that there is a single generic consumption good. Suppose, too, that the government can observe an individual’s income, but not his ability nor how many hours nor how hard he works (since the individual knows his ability, hours worked, and work effort better than the government, this is where asymmetric information enters the problem). Then the government must redistribute on the basis of income, which it does through income taxation. Faced with a positive marginal tax rate, an individual has an incentive to work fewer

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6 Most economics principles textbooks contain a section “proving” that income redistribution is more efficient than income-related housing allowances. They do this by assuming that income redistribution is lump sum and that the housing market is perfectly competitive.
hours and less hard, which leads to inefficiency. Thus, perfectly efficient redistribution is impossible. The (second-best) optimal income tax system has the property that the marginal social benefit of a dollar transferred from a richer to a poorer individual equals the marginal social cost, the efficiency loss caused by the transfer.

Now expand the model to include two consumption goods, one of which is more complementary to leisure than the other. The good that is more complementary to leisure should be taxed since this reduces the labor-leisure distortion due to the income tax. Now expand the model to include another dimension of need, such as health status. The government cannot observe an individual’s health status directly but it can observe her expenditures on medical care. Second-best redistribution then entails an income tax that adjusts the tax payable or the transfer made on the basis of health expenditures, plus commodity taxes and subsidies. The general point is that, when account is taken of the limited information the government has relevant to redistribution, the form of second-best redistribution may be complicated, entailing not only an income tax with many deductions, exemptions, and credits, but also the taxation of some commodities, the subsidization of others, and the rationed provision of yet others. The model can be extended further to treat public services. In deciding on the level of various public services, the government should take into account the implicit redistribution they entail. A second-best tax/expenditure package might entail the free provision of clean and safe drinking water, for example.

Since the menu of second-best redistributive policies might include housing subsidy programs, consideration of asymmetric information provides a potential basis for an expanded role of government in the housing sector, beyond correcting for the classic market failures. But this argument is too broad. Is there good reason to believe that housing is an efficient commodity on the basis of which to redistribute? After controlling for other signals of need such as low income and high health expenditures, is housing consumption strongly positively correlated with need? And how strong are the adverse incentives associated with providing housing assistance? Many developed countries attempt to come to terms with these issues in the design of their housing allowance programs. Housing need is typically measured by housing expenditure in excess of a certain fraction of income, and the possible adverse

7 Inefficiencies are associated with substitution effects. Income taxation generates substitution effects away from labor and towards leisure, and towards less effort.
8 The term “second best” is employed when there is some unalterable constraint that precludes attainment of the first best. Here the constraint is the government’s inability to observe individuals’ ability, work hours, and effort.
9 The optimal income tax problem was first formulated by Vickrey (1945) and later reformulated and solved by Mirrlees (1971). Their shared perception of asymmetric information as an essential feature in the formulation of optimal policy was the principal reason they were co-recipients of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1996.
incentive effects of housing allowances on housing consumption are typically dealt with by relating the housing subsidy for a particular demographic group to the market rent of a basic housing unit for that group.

Most of the study of welfare economics does not deal specifically with children, but it should. Adults may bear some responsibility for their condition of poverty, but children do not. Every social system that purports to be just should provide children with minimal conditions needed for good health, security, and educational opportunity. Since almost all social systems around the world are family based, covering the basic needs of children entails covering some of the basic needs of other household members as well.

What priority should be accorded to providing decent and affordable housing compared to providing clean water, healthy sanitary and sewage conditions, educational opportunity, and adequate nutrition and clothing? A common response is that these other needs should be accorded higher priority, since they are what matter most for the well-being of children. One rejoinder is that decent and affordable housing is necessary for healthy living conditions and for childhood development, another that respecting consumer sovereignty entails allowing households to make the tradeoff between these other desiderata and better housing themselves.

Although the theory of optimal economic policy under asymmetric information has not generated clear policy prescriptions concerning redistributive policy, it has strongly influenced public policy in another way. It has highlighted how large the efficiency losses generated by distortionary taxation can be. Public policy makers are now quite conscious that the social cost of raising an extra dollar of revenue—the marginal cost of public funds—may considerably exceed one dollar, and that this argues for less revenue-intensive policy intervention. This has been a major impetus in the regulated privatization

10 There is a body of literature that examines the effects of overcrowding in housing on the health status of adults and children and on childhood educational achievement, and finds that overcrowding is correlated with adverse outcomes. Generally speaking, the literature fails to establish causality since it does not adequately control for other factors, such as past poverty that may cause both overcrowding and the adverse outcomes.

A notable exception is Cattaneo et al. (2007), which analyzes the effects of a Mexican housing program, Piso Firme. Under the program, the government covered the dirt floors of participating households with concrete, without charge. Households within a well-defined geographic area whose housing units had dirt floors were eligible to participate. The study found “significant decreases in the incidence of parasitic infestations, diarrhea, and the prevalence of anemia, and a significant improvement in children’s cognitive development” and in household happiness (p. 2). The study also found that the program is significantly more cost effective than Mexico’s well-known, anti-poverty, conditional cash transfer program called OPORTUNIDADES and previously called PROGRESA. The success of Piso Firme indicates the potential value of specific, well-targeted housing programs but not for general housing assistance to the poor.

11 When the government extracts as much tax revenue as it can from the economy, given its limited information, the marginal cost of public funds is infinite. If the government raises tax rates beyond this point, the economy is “on the wrong side of the Laffer curve”—distortion increases and tax revenue declines.
and contracting out of “public” services, in the establishment of public-private partnerships, and more generally in the push to enable markets to work and in the withering away of the welfare state.\footnote{Consciousness of asymmetric information has impacted government policy in many other ways as well. For example, it is now well recognized that the asymmetric information faced by banks in mortgage markets, and more generally financial institutions in primary and secondary credit markets, gives rise to market failures that may justify extensive credit market regulation.}

Another issue related to the welfare economics of housing policy is the level of government that should undertake it. The standard argument, deriving from the literature on fiscal federalism, is that the central government should undertake broad-based redistributive policy because its doing so generates less welfare-induced migration and according to some standards is fairer. Contrary to this is the argument that local governments are better informed about local conditions and are better able to judge which households are the most needy. In the United States, broad-based housing programs are set up and funded by the central government but are administered at the local level.

Much of the literature on housing policy overlooks spatial aspects. Where a household lives determines its access to public services, including education, and jobs, as well as neighborhood quality.\footnote{This theme is taken up by the essays in De Souza Briggs, ed. (2005), The Geography of Opportunity.} A housing program that is otherwise well designed may lead to its beneficiaries being socially isolated and having poor access to job opportunities. More generally, housing policy can have long-term effects on the spatial structure of cities,\footnote{Under perfect competition, markets provide the right signals for efficient spatial development. Market failures, such as unpriced traffic congestion and distortionary policy, can lead to inefficient spatial development, whose social costs can be considerable. Squatter settlements can occur at locations that are better suited for other land uses and are efficiently developed at different densities; they may, for example, be in prime locations that are better suited to office buildings or in locations that have poor transportation access to job opportunities. But ill-advised zoning can lead to such inefficient outcomes too. In both cases, the market provides signals for the correction of mistakes. Property owners in centrally located squatter settlements respond to high rents by increasing density; informal firms have an incentive to relocate to squatter settlements with poor job access; and if land is zoned for an inefficient land use, the market makes it profitable for it to be rezoned in its highest and best use. Since informal sector developers are likely to be more responsive to market pressures than planners, the spatial pattern of urban development may well improve with increased informality.} influencing especially the social composition of neighborhoods.

The discussion thus far in this section has tended to treat housing policy in the abstract. But most actual housing policies are targeted towards either renters or homeowners, and are directed at either the supply side or the demand side of the market. Governments almost everywhere favor home ownership, perceiving it to foster social stability, even though home ownership for the poor is highly risky, as the recent rapid rise in U.S. subprime foreclosures has shown. Since the bulk of poor households are—and should be—renters, redistributive housing policies should be directed primarily at the rental housing market. Whether
redistributive housing policy should be targeted on the demand side or the supply side of the housing market will be touched on later.

3. Informality and the Welfare Economics of Housing Policy in Developing Countries

In the theory of optimal economic policy, the benevolent government chooses policies so as to maximize social welfare, subject to a variety of constraints. These constraints reflect not only the scarcity of resources but also how the government’s lack of information restricts its policy choices.

The Informal Economy

The larger is the informal sector, the less well informed is the government about the economy, which constrains its policy choices. In the optimal income tax problem reviewed in the previous section, it was assumed that the government cannot observe an individual’s ability, effort, or work hours, but can observe her income. Those informational assumptions are reasonable for a developed country with only a small informal sector. But in developing countries, where the informal economy is more important, the optimal policy problem needs to take into account that the government cannot observe informal wage and capital income. The government can apply the income tax only to formal wage and capital income, which is both inefficient and unfair, inefficient since it encourages individuals and firms to operate in the informal sector, and unfair since a low civil servant pays more in income tax than does a wealthy, informal sector entrepreneur. The presence of a large informal sector also sharply diminishes the effectiveness of income-contingent, in-kind transfer programs, such as food stamps and housing allowances, as redistributive devices.

A large informal sector affects optimal policy in other ways as well. First, since income taxes are collected from only a fraction of the population, the government must turn to other sources of revenue. The tax bases of many other revenue sources too will be eroded by the unobservability of transactions in the informal sector. All else equal, the government should raise revenue from those sources that are the least subject to evasion. Import and export taxes are effective since the bulk of goods that are imported and exported are done so legally. So too is value-added taxation applied to registered and government enterprises, including multinationals, since it encourages them to purchase their inputs from other registered enterprises. Gordon and Li (2005) argue along these lines in explaining the “puzzling” fiscal structures that developing countries employ.

Second, since the effectiveness of income taxation and income-contingent, in-kind transfer programs as redistributive tools is severely compromised by a large informal sector, other tax policy instruments, as well as other types of government expenditure programs, need to be used to achieve distributional
goals. The theory of optimal taxation investigates the optimal tax rates on commodities when there is no income taxation. As intuition would suggest, necessities should be subsidized and luxuries taxed, and in order to reduce distortion the rates of taxation and subsidization should be higher the less elastically are the goods supplied and demanded. In developing countries, these rules must be adapted to take into account the evasion that occurs in the informal sector. An obvious but important point is that taxes are evaded but subsidies are not. These considerations explain why many developing countries heavily subsidize the basic staple. The basic staple is an inelastically demanded necessity and subsidizing it generates no evasive activity. The theory of optimal commodity taxation has also been extended to treat public services. The government can improve the lot of the poor by changing the composition of public services to their benefit by, for example, providing free health clinics, and by charging for services that disproportionately benefit the rich, such as tolling urban freeways.

Third, informality reduces fiscal capacity. Consider the following conceptual exercise. Increase the size of a country’s informal sector, while simultaneously reducing the size of the formal sector. Because the informal sector evades taxes, the country’s fiscal capacity falls. Holding fixed the set of taxes employed, raising a given amount of revenue requires higher tax rates. Taxation should be carried to the point where the marginal benefit of an extra dollar of revenue raised equals the marginal cost. Since the marginal cost curve is higher when fiscal capacity is diminished, the optimal amount of revenue to collect, and therefore the size of the government budget, falls. Furthermore, since the marginal cost is higher at the optimum, the optimum tax system entails higher tax rates and is more distortionary. In the face of a larger informal sector, the government should not only apply higher tax rates to conventional tax bases, but should also collect revenue from sources that developed countries avoid because they entail intrinsically high distortion. An important example is setting permit fees above processing costs and requiring permits where they are unnecessary, even though doing so discourages entrepreneurship (see, for example, De Soto, 2000) and encourages informality.

One can think of the optimal tax structure design problem facing governments in developing countries at different levels of conceptual sophistication. In the simplest model, the proportion of various types of economic transactions that are informal is taken as exogenous, and the

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15 Important contributions to the theory of optimal commodity taxation include Ramsey (1927), Corlett and Hague (1953), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), and Diamond (1975).

16 These simple results are derived from partial equilibrium analysis, which ignores income and cross-price effects. Taking these effects into account in a general equilibrium analysis considerably complicates the optimal commodity tax results.

17 Pinto (2004) argues that the redistributive target efficiency of public expenditure programs can be improved by geographical targeting and by “self-targeting”—taking advantage of differences in participation costs (such as crowding and delay in service) across households.
government has to raise a given amount of revenue in an optimal manner. In a more sophisticated model, the government budget is endogenous. The government decides simultaneously on the tax structure and the level and composition of government expenditures. As noted above, an increase in the level of informality reduces the (second-best) optimal size of the government budget and hence government expenditures, raises the optimal tax rates applied to formal-sector tax bases, and encourages higher permitting fees. In an even more sophisticated model, the degree of informality as well is treated as endogenous. Each economic agent decides whether to participate in the formal or informal sector, or perhaps how to divide his time between the two, keeping in mind the tax rates applied to formal sector activity and the size of permit fees. If the government changes the composition of public expenditures so as to favor the formal sector, some agents will switch from informal-sector to formal-sector participation, reducing the tax base erosion due to informality.

Excessive and dysfunctional regulation by government is a pervasive theme in the development economics literature. There is a ubiquitous tendency among civil servants to overregulate. Yet there seem to be no well-articulated explanations of why developing country governments regulate more excessively. Perhaps one reason is civil servants’ wishful thinking in the face of an informal sector over which they have little control—irrationally hoping that regulating an outcome will make it happen. Impose minimum quality standards for housing and magically all housing will be built according to those standards. Another, more rational reason is that bureaucrats see regulation as a way of increasing revenue for their cash-strapped bureaus, through fees and fines. If the government were a single decision-making entity, it would not be rational for it to set fees and fines so high that compliance shrinks to the point where fee and fine revenue less enforcement costs is on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. But a dysfunctional outcome is likely if there are many levels of government, or many bureaus within a level of government, each competing for a slice of the pie. Thus,

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18 There are several papers that model the determinants of informality. Lucas (1978) assumed that managerial ability differs across agents in the economy, with high-ability agents becoming managers and those with low ability workers. Rauch (1991) adapted Lucas’ model to investigate the determinants of informality, by assuming that agents with the highest managerial ability become formal managers, those with intermediate ability run informal firms, whose size is limited by assumption, and those with the lowest ability become workers. De Paula and Scheinkman (2007) in turn adapted Rauch’s model, giving formal firms access to cheaper credit.

Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007) document the changing character of the informal labor market in Brazil. The standard view, formalized in the Harris-Todaro model (Harris and Todaro, 1970), is that workers in the informal sector queue for better jobs in the formal sector. However, the recent pattern in Brazil of worker transitions between formal and informal employment are similar to the job-to-job dynamics in the United States. This is consistent with the view taken in this paper that enterprises and workers choose between formal and informal sector participation based on perceived profitability.

McKenzie and Sakho (2007) empirically compare the profitability of registered and unregistered firms in Bolivia by firm size.
excessive regulation can be rational at the level of the individual bureau, and at the same time be dysfunctional from the perspective of the government as a whole.

It was argued above that the high cost of public funds encourages governments in developing countries to collect revenue from sources that developed countries would not employ because they are too distortionary. One can carry this line of reasoning further, and more controversially, to provide an explanation for why many developing countries have such high degrees of public corruption. Civil servants have information on the basis of which “tax and fee discrimination” can be exercised. Pay a civil servant a low salary and implicitly allow him to supplement his salary with bribes. The bribe may be paid to avoid being audited, to speed up the processing of a permit application, or to prevent prosecution for illegal activity. Based on his experience, the civil servant can vary the bribe he demands according to his perception of the briber’s willingness to pay. This amounts to fee discrimination. From the perspective of the government, turning a blind eye to public corruption has pros and cons. On one hand, the cash-strapped government can pay low civil service salaries and, through tax and fee discrimination, the public sector (including the civil servants) is able to extract more revenue from the private sector. On the other hand, corruption undermines the ability of the government to control the economy, sours the climate for foreign investment, and probably discourages entrepreneurship.

One could say that the government is caught in a Pareto inferior equilibrium. If all economic activity were magically formalized, everyone could be made better off. The expansion of tax bases would allow tax rates and fees to be reduced and the revenue collected by the government to rise at the same time. This would allow the government to upgrade the public services it provides and also to redistribute on the basis of income. Poor households would benefit from improved public services and redistribution through the income tax system. Rich households would benefit too from reduced tax rates and an improved business environment. But this way of looking at the problem is misleading. With the exception of the previously Communist Bloc countries, today’s developing countries had economies that used to be even more informal. Globalization, and the increase in trade that has come with it, has encouraged some informal enterprises to formalize their activities, so as to gain access to international markets, and other informal enterprises that supply services to exporting companies to follow suit. Also, urbanization weakens the bonds of trust and the discipline of reputation in economic relationships, increasing the benefits from formal contracts. It is therefore more appropriate to view developing country economies as on a transition path to increased formality. Government can encourage private sector agents to participate in the formal economy by lowering tax rates on formal sector income, concentrating expenditures on services that benefit formal enterprises, facilitating formal sector investment by easing
permitting requirements and reducing fees, providing formal sector firms with even more preferential access to credit, and by harassing informal activity. Unfortunately, this policy strategy likely helps the rich at the expense of the poor, and big business at the expense of small business. The design of the optimal time path of policy is evidently delicate.

**Housing**

It will be useful to begin with a discussion of some salient features of informal housing markets.

In many respects the distinction between formal and informal housing is analogous to the more familiar distinction between formal and informal labor and product markets. Land and property owners are analogous to the owners of informal enterprises, and renters to workers. Owners decide whether to develop their properties formally. The advantages of formal development include access to formal credit markets, preferential provision of public services, and reduced uncertainty. The disadvantages include payment of property-related taxes and compliance with onerous and profit-reducing regulation. Renters too decide whether to participate in the formal or informal market; informal housing has lower rents and more flexible lease arrangements but reduced security of tenure and probably lower-quality public services. But there are also important differences. Squatter housing entails the illegal occupation of land, which is more serious than tax evasion and noncompliance with regulation. Also, in many developing countries, the bulk of households cannot afford to live in formal housing, so that informal housing is to a larger extent housing for the poor than informal employment is employment for the poor. Thus, issues related to poverty loom larger in policy debates about informal housing than they do in debates about informal labor and product markets.

In most developing countries formal housing markets are overregulated. This is argued forcefully in De Soto (2000) and is also widely acknowledged (see, for example, World Bank, 1993; Angel, 2000). The construction permitting process is expensive and may take several years, and building and zoning standards are unrealistic given the country’s state of development. One reason is that cash-strapped local governments use permitting to generate revenue, another that many planners strive in vain to enforce their vision of the City Beautiful against the power of market forces. Whatever the reasons, the overregulation makes formal housing unaffordable for the poor and much of the middle class too. It is also dysfunctional, since by encouraging the construction of noncompliant housing, it reduces the power of planners to influence the spatial development of the city.

Even with limited contract enforceability, informal housing markets function in much the same way as do formal housing markets.19 Units are bought and sold

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19 World Bank (1993) and Angel (2000) report on the results of a long-term empirical research program at the World Bank comparing the operation of housing markets across countries, and
and rental markets are active. Informal housing markets do differ from formal housing markets in one important respect, however. In formal housing markets, a durable structure meeting building codes is constructed on a titled plot of land. Over the years, densification may occur through legal add-ons and in-fills, as well as demolition and reconstruction at higher density. In areas of informal housing, this process is more continuous and incremental. The initial structure on a site is often no more than a shack. As the owner of the shack accumulates savings, he replaces the shack with the first floor of a durable structure, and then adds rooms and floors as he can afford to do so, often financing the expansion by renting out part of the structure. Squatter housing differs from other informal housing in being built on illegally occupied land. In the past, many governments in developing countries were hostile to squatter settlements and undertook slum clearance programs. One reason was to discourage urban-rural migration, which used to be widely viewed as excessive, another was to deter the illegal settlement of land, and yet another to discourage unauthorized housing. The tide has been changing. The ideological pendulum has been swinging away from the state attempting to micromanage the economy to its harnessing and channeling market forces by enabling markets to work. Also, cities are now widely viewed as engines of economic growth. Accordingly, most governments in developing countries today view squatter settlements, and more generally informal housing, as an inevitable albeit unwelcome byproduct of the economic growth they wish to foster. As experience with them has developed, squatter settlements are being increasingly viewed more benignly as nascent communities.

make a persuasive empirical case that housing markets in developing countries respond in the way textbook models predict. They argue on this basis that “housing policy matters” in developing countries, and that developing country governments should employ policies that enable housing markets to work, which includes easing regulation of land, housing, and housing financial markets. Malpezzi (1999) argues along the same lines.

20 In his essay for the Commission, Duranton (2007) provides a masterful overview of the empirical and theoretical literatures on the subject.

21 To Western observers, squatter settlements remain a puzzling phenomenon. Why do governments in many developing countries tolerate the “theft” of land by squatter groups when they do not tolerate what appear to be more minor infractions of the law? Does not doing so undermine respect for private property and the law, and pose a serious threat to the wealthy? Economic models of squatting do not provide fully satisfactory answers. The current orthodoxy, originally articulated in Hoy and Jimenez (1991) and recently elaborated by Turnbull (2008), is that landowners tolerate squatting only as a temporary land use. They tolerate it only because the cost of opposing the temporary occupation exceeds the benefit, and only until their land becomes ripe for development, at which time they will evict the squatters. According to this view, squatter settlements are akin to downtown surface parking lots—strictly a transitional land use. This may have been an accurate view when eviction and slum clearance were the norm, but today most squatter settlements are permanent.

In many cities in developing countries, governments have large tracts of land in central areas that remain undeveloped (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006, give the example of Dhaka.). Perhaps the government is simply allowing “the market”—as represented by squatters—to determine how this land will be used. Even if sound, this line of reasoning fails to explain squatting on private land. In a paper written for the Commission, Brueckner and Selod model a game between a private
The previous subsection discussed how a large informal sector constrains government policy. A large informal housing sector further restricts the ability of the government to deal with urban housing and related problems.

Governments have little information about their informal housing communities since they are largely undocumented. Not having a clear idea of the size and income-demographic composition of a settlement’s population, or the characteristics of its housing stock, including the degree of overcrowding and sanitary conditions, makes diagnosing housing needs and prescribing effective housing policy more difficult. Governments’ lack of information also reduces the target efficiency of policies. While local governments likely have a good idea about the relative poverty and housing conditions of different neighborhoods, they do not have information on which households are the most in need, and must therefore tailor policies to neighborhoods rather than to specific households.

The defining characteristics of informal housing are that it is in violation of land ownership laws, zoning regulations, and/or building codes, and evades property-related taxes. Thus, almost by definition, local authorities have limited influence on informal housing through taxation and regulation. Furthermore, just as informal productive activity erodes the income tax, commodity tax, and value-added tax bases, so too does informal housing erode the bases of property-related taxes. In many countries, the central government takes the plum taxes, leaving local governments to collect fees and property taxes that are best administered at the local level. While local governments are better able to assess local housing needs than the central government, and therefore better informed to administer redistributive housing policies, their fiscal ability to implement such policies is limited.

The limited fiscal capacity of developing country governments makes the provision of urban infrastructure, including transportation, water, electricity, solid waste disposal, sewage, fire and police protection, schools, and medical facilities, more difficult. In informal settlements, these problems are compounded by the government’s poor knowledge of their current state and inability to control their future development. Furthermore, even a benign government faces a policy dilemma in deciding on the quality of infrastructure to provide informal settlements. On one hand, if it turns a blind eye to violation of regulations and provides the same level of services to informal as to formal settlements, it encourages the development of more informal settlements in the future. This problem is particularly acute for squatter settlements, since the government is

landowner and a squatter leader, in which the squatter leader chooses the amount of land to occupy and the amount of defensive expenditures to undertake to just make it unprofitable for the landowner to evict the squatters.

I conjecture that the degree of tolerance of squatting is the outcome of class conflict, as mediated through the political process, with populist and democratic governments being more tolerant than governments that are autocratic or represent the interests of elites.
naturally loath to implicitly endorse settlements that were established through the expropriation of government or private property. On the other hand, informal settlements contain the bulk of poor households, who would benefit considerably from the provision of at least basic public services. Also, not providing informal settlements with basic services encourages crime and contagion, externalities that hurt all residents, and produces neighborhoods that will remain blighted for years to come.

In the countries of Western Europe, over the last 50 years the pressure on city center infrastructure has diminished. Their levels of urbanization have leveled off, their demographic transitions have been completed, and rising automobile ownership rates have resulted in decentralization of both residence and employment. The same can be expected to happen in due course in developing countries, but over the next 50 years the inadequacy of their city center infrastructure will become critical. The urban population in developing countries has been growing at rates that have no historical precedent (Williamson, 1990, table 1.1). Since developing countries have not yet passed through their demographic transition, since their rural-urban migrations are still underway, since per capita incomes are likely to continue to grow steadily, and since only a fraction of the population currently owns cars, there is every reason to believe that the pressure on urban infrastructure in the city cores will continue to grow rapidly over the next 50 years. Most cities in developing countries are already nasty—ugly, choked with traffic, and foul with pollution—any many are disease ridden as well. Unless there is a radical change in infrastructure policy, the poor quality of life they provide will deteriorate even further. Why does such misery need to be endured along the transition path to a likely prosperous and pleasant future?

The growth rate of the urban population in developing countries is similar to that experienced by Western European countries during their industrial revolutions, and is indeed somewhat higher. How did the countries in Western Europe cope with the infrastructure needs of their rapidly growing cities during their industrial revolutions, and do their historical experiences provide any insights for today’s developing countries? Britain’s experience has been well documented. In *Coping with City Growth during the British Industrial Revolution* (1990), Jeffrey Williamson documents the low level of social capital investment during the British Industrial Revolution, then estimates the social rate of return.

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22 “Investment requirements during the late eighteenth century were kept modest by allowing the stock of social overhead [residential housing plus public works and public buildings] to fall, contributing, presumably, to a deterioration in the quality of life.... This growth strategy continued for the first three decades of the nineteenth century, although not with the same intensity. Per capita stocks in public works continued to decline, but dwelling stocks per capita began to rise. The latter did not rise enough to regain the levels of 1760.

By 1830, therefore, Britain had accumulated an enormous deficit in her social overhead stocks by pursuing seventy years of industrialization on the cheap. It cost her dearly, as the social reformers were about to point out. Between 1830 and 1860, there is some evidence of catching up in...
on investment in city social overhead in the 1830s and 1840s, and finding it to be considerably higher than the rate of return on private investment during the period, asks why investment was so low when social returns were so high. He supports an hypothesis developed by Wohl (1983) that “the public failure lay with an inefficient and unjust tax system” (p. 295), and argues that a turnaround occurred in the 1860s when the central government offered municipalities loans at below-market interest rates. The situation in developing countries today is different in many respects from that in Britain during its industrial revolution: in developing countries, on average, cities despite all their problems are healthier places to live than the countryside; also, the capital intensity of urbanization has been higher. But the main insight from the British experience, that an inefficient tax system failed to raise enough revenue to finance much-needed urban infrastructure but subsidized loans succeeded, is most germane. From the perspective of intergenerational equity, it makes no sense for the entire infrastructure costs associated with the present rapid urbanization in developing countries to be borne by the current generation, when future generations that will benefit from the investment will be considerably wealthier. To ensure a reasonable quality of life over the next half century, cities in developing countries will need to increase their rates of investment in urban public infrastructure, and a strong case can be made that this investment should be debt financed. But who is to provide the loans? In contrast to the British experience in the 1860s, the public finances of central governments in developing countries are not much healthier than local governments’, largely due to the extent of tax evasion arising from informality. The desirability of loans from the international community seems clear cut. Yet, as shall be commented on in Section 5, which deals with the housing policy experience in developing countries, recent donor aid to support urban infrastructure has been niggardly. This needs to change.

The provision of basic urban infrastructure to a neighborhood in which most housing is informal “regularizes” it (gives it quasi-legal status). By strengthening property rights, regularization stimulates investment in the neighborhood’s housing. Regularization of a neighborhood in which housing is simply in violation of code may encourage the development of more housing that is in violation of code, and may well be unsightly and poorly planned, but surely this is better than the status quo. Regularizing squatter settlements on vacant government land that is poorly used seems sensible too. Appropriate policy with respect to squatter settlements on government land that has been left vacant for good reason or on private land is more problematical.

We conclude this section by summarizing the major constraints informality imposes on the design of housing policy in developing countries, which provides a backdrop for Section 5’s broad-brush review of these countries’ housing policy experience.

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public works, but the gap in growth rates between dwelling stocks and all other fixed capital per capita increased.” (p. 273)
Recent housing policy experience in developed countries, which will be reviewed in the next section, indicates that demand-side, income-related housing subsidy programs are generally more effective in getting decent and affordable housing to the needy than public housing and other supply-side programs (Olsen, 2003). Unfortunately, in most developing countries, because of the large informal sector, household income cannot be measured at all accurately, which effectively precludes broad-based, income-related, demand-side housing programs, such as housing allowances and housing vouchers, being employed. This consideration by itself suggests that supply-side housing subsidy programs might be relatively more effective in developing countries than developed countries. Examples of such programs include public housing in poor neighborhoods and the subsidization of the basic building materials used in self-help housing.

But other considerations call into question the effectiveness of broad, supply-side, housing policy generally as a redistributive tool in developing countries. Research in developed countries suggests that the target efficiency of such policies is low (Olsen, 2003). Also, as explained above, the fiscal constraints on governments in developing countries are more severe than those in developed countries, which limits the scope for redistribution. The poor might be better helped by stimulating economic growth through channeling market forces—a rising tide lifts all boats—than by undertaking ambitious redistributive expenditure programs. And other redistributive expenditure programs, such as subsidizing basic staples, and upgrading the infrastructure in poor neighborhoods to ensure adequate basic education, health, and sanitation, are likely more cost effective redistributive tools. However, geographically targeted slum upgrading projects that combine infrastructure provision with subsidies for housing upgrading have proved to be effective.

4. Housing Policy Experience in Developed Countries

Olsen (2003) and Green and Malpezzi (2003) provide expert reviews of the current state of housing policy in the United States, as well as some of its history. The federal government plays a dominant role in low-income housing policy, though in recent years local governments have been playing a larger role. There are three types of federal rental housing assistance programs, none of which are entitlement programs. The first is public housing, housing projects that are owned and operated by local public housing authorities established by local governments but funded primarily by the federal government. The second are projects that are owned privately, either by nonprofits or for-profit firms, and receive subsidies from the government. The third is tenant-based assistance in private housing—housing allowance and housing voucher programs. All the programs have exhibited considerable, indeed rather bewildering, variation over
time, in terms of the form and magnitude of the subsidies provided to building owners, as well as tenant eligibility criteria and tenant rent formulae. Less than half of the 14 million renter households that satisfy the eligibility criteria actually receive rental assistance. Over the past four decades, there has been a steady movement away from public housing and towards housing allowances calculated according to tenant household income, so that now only about 30 percent of federally subsidized housing units are in public housing. The current majority view, based on numerous empirical studies, many of which are reviewed in Olsen (2003), is that demand-side, income-related, rental assistance policies are more efficient than supply-side rental assistance policies, according to a variety of criteria. As well, the bad experience with public housing has led policy makers to favor the “deconcentration of poverty populations” and broader housing choice for rent-assisted tenants. Most owner-occupied housing assistance comes via the income tax system, in particular the deductibility of homeowner mortgage interest payments for households that choose itemized deductions. Since most poor households pay less income tax by not itemizing, the income tax provides little encouragement to poor households for homeownership.

There seem to be no overall reviews of housing policy in Europe comparable to Olsen’s and Green and Malpezzi’s for the United States. Several differences from the U.S. experience during the post–World War II era are, however, evident, as well as similarities to it. First, especially in Northern Europe in the 40 years after World War II, government involvement in the housing sector was far more extensive than in the United States, to the extent that in some countries most housing units were built and allocated by the state. In some countries, this was due to different social philosophies; the Nordic countries especially were more socialistic and less market-oriented, placing more emphasis on equity and less on efficiency. In other countries, housing institutions set up to respond to the critical housing situation after the War were only slowly dismantled. The application of first-generation rent control programs to private rental housing was ubiquitous. Second, in response to both the inefficiencies created by overregulation and the heavy fiscal burden of government-provided housing, over the last 20 years all European countries have been gradually withdrawing from the housing sector, by deregulating and moving towards greater reliance on markets in the provision of housing, with rental housing assistance being increasingly geared to income. Third, there has been the same trend as in the United States towards demand-side, tenant-based housing allowances, and away from supply-side, construction-based subsidies. And fourth, while European countries have moved to greater reliance on the market in the provision of housing, the sentiment lingers that it is the responsibility of government in a civil society to ensure decent and affordable housing for all its citizens.
5. Housing Policy Experience in Developing Countries

Since housing policy in developing countries is poorly documented, this section will review the World Bank’s experience with housing policy assistance to developing countries, which is generally well documented. The World Bank has supported a series of housing policy initiatives. Public housing projects were dominant during the 1960s and are now widely acknowledged to have been a failure. Funds were often made available for construction but not for maintenance, and most rents fell sharply in real terms due to rent control, leading to rapid deterioration of housing units. The evolution of the Bank’s housing policy from 1970 to 1992 is expertly documented in “Housing: Enabling Markets to Work” (World Bank, 1993, pp. 51–69). Quotes from those pages follow:

The evolution of the World Bank’s housing policy through two decades can be divided into three stages. The first decade of Bank housing policy focused mainly on “sites and services” and slum-upgrading projects; the second gradually shifted the emphasis to housing finance development; and recently there has been a gradual shift to “housing policy development” loans.

Sites-and-services and slum upgrading projects, initiated in Senegal in 1972, signaled the first fundamental shift in housing policy in the postwar years—from total public housing provision to public assistance in private housing construction. The shift was based on the realization that in most developing countries legal housing produced by the private sector was not affordable for most urban residents; the mass production of enough high-standard housing to meet urban needs required massive subsidies that most governments in market-oriented economies were either unwilling or unable to afford; that low-income countries were building affordable housing through an evolutionary process, with self-help and self-management of the building process; and that providing secure land tenure and basic infrastructure services increased the incentives of households themselves to invest their savings, labor, and management skills in housing.

Sites-and-services and slum upgrading projects sought to translate these observations into practical solutions by implementing more affordable building standards and providing basic infrastructure services or core-housing units instead of finished units. In this manner, the serviced sites, with secure titles and long-term leases, would provide households with an affordable foothold in the housing sector without requiring subsidies. These projects, although in some cases relatively large, were conceived as experimental demonstration projects seeking to meet three primary objectives: the provision of affordable adequate housing for low-income families; cost recovery from beneficiaries resulting in the elimination of public subsidies; and replicability of such
projects by the private sector, demonstrating that it could move downmarket to produce affordable housing in large numbers.

The first objective of these projects, physical provision of low-cost housing units, was broadly achieved. Unfortunately, the large majority of projects met neither the second nor the third objectives. A detailed 1987 Bank study [Mayo and Gross, 1987] on subsidies in sites-and-services projects observed substantial interest rate subsidies in [most] of the projects carried out. A detailed study of subsidies in Bank-assisted projects … yielded estimates of subsidies ranging from 50 to 75 percent of the true economic cost … for five of the seven projects....

The third, objective, replicability … was generally not met because key features were not replicable [by the private sector] on a large scale. The waiver of zoning, land use, and building regulations, availability of foreign and domestic expertise, access to government land at below-market prices, and interest rate subsidies were important aspects of such projects that either were not or could not be replicated.

Slum upgrading projects … were, conversely, able to satisfy the replicability criterion, and to distribute subsidies more widely to the poor.... Although loans for such projects were smaller and more difficult to administer than housing finance loans, they will remain a critical component of Bank lending for years to come.

A significant shift in housing policy and practice within the Bank took place during the 1980s. Lending gradually moved away from sites-and-services toward lending to housing finance institutions. The shift was motivated by two broad objectives. First, there was a perceived opportunity for the Bank to address broader economic issues in the borrowing countries. A well-functioning housing finance system was seen as contributing to financial sector objectives through improved domestic resource mobilization, and to fiscal objectives by making subsidies more transparent and better targeted.

The second, and perhaps more immediate, objective was to affect overall policies and performance of the housing sector through the broad instrument of housing finance system development.

The monograph goes on to say that the main lessons learned at the Bank during the two decades were as follows: the macroeconomic and regulatory environments are important; the informal housing sector has significant contributions to make; projects have limited impacts; attention should continue to shift to the housing sector as a whole; and emphasis should shift from projects to institutional reform.

Thirty Years of World Bank Shelter Lending (Buckley and Kalarickal, eds., 2006) provides an updated history of World Bank shelter lending, presents current thinking at the Bank about which housing policies are effective and which are not, and discusses promising directions for future shelter lending. The monograph reports on significant improvement in the policy environment in most developing countries since the 1993 monograph was written; housing financial markets have been significantly liberalized. At the same time, reflecting
the reaction against the “Washington consensus,” it argues that that the withdrawal of governments and the World Bank from housing assistance to low-income households has been excessive. Also, reflecting the policy debate surrounding Hernando De Soto’s (2000) book, The Mystery of Capital, Buckley and Kalarickal place more emphasis on the importance of improving the functioning of urban land markets in developing countries while being skeptical of the value of expanding titling. Finally, reflecting the profession’s shift in policy analysis, there is more discussion of the political economy of housing and land market policy.

Housing finance system development is ongoing and is already widely credited with stimulating investment in formal, owner-occupied housing at the top end of the housing market in many developing countries, which has likely had a beneficial, trickle-down effect on the informal housing sector. But it has not directly stimulated informal housing sector production; banks have not been interested in getting involved, because informality is inconsistent with prudential management and because serving the poor is unprofitable. There is also widespread recognition that government plays two important roles in housing finance liberalization: (i) deregulating and fostering financial innovation but (ii) at the same time providing prudential regulation and macroeconomic management to avoid housing financial crises.

Most developing countries have substantial housing subsidy programs. For reasons discussed in Section 3, the bulk of these programs are aimed at middle-income owner-occupiers and so score poorly in terms of redistributive impact. The two exceptions are public housing and rent control,23 which have been widely condemned for their inefficiency. The rationale for most of these programs seems to be political rather than economic. The Bank has been active in assisting several middle-income countries (Brazil, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, and Russia) improve the economic efficiency of their subsidy systems. Buckley and Kalarickal’s discussion of housing subsidy programs is consistent with the argument made in Section 3 that in countries with a large informal sector the scope for redistributive housing subsidy programs is limited.

Buckley and Kalarickal’s discussion of land market issues is enlightening. De Soto (2000) argued that investment in housing in developing countries has been severely impeded by regulation, that investment in informal housing has been further impeded by ambiguous property rights, and that titling land with ambiguous property rights will sharply stimulate investment in low- and middle-income housing. On the first point he was right, as evidenced by the inelasticity of formal housing sector supply and the high price of titled land in most cities in developing countries. On the second point, he may or may not have been right, but on the third point he was largely wrong. Titling by itself appears to do little to solve land market problems. The titling process is costly

23 Rent control, in the form applied in most developing countries, can be regarded as a way of requiring landlords to subsidize their tenants’ housing.
and time consuming; titling land that is illegally occupied raises legal and compensation problems; titling may conflict with traditional property rights; and titling a property is not enough to obtain a mortgage. Nevertheless, De Soto succeeded in underscoring the need for deep reform to make the land supplied for development more responsive to price signals.\textsuperscript{24} Such reform would, however, encounter strong political opposition from landed elites.

Between 1972 and 1981, about 90 percent of World Bank shelter lending went to slum upgrading and sites and services projects. For the period 1992 to 2005, this figure fell to only slightly over 10 percent. The Bank has been reconsidering its withdrawal from direct involvement with low-cost housing, and is now advocating the expansion of lending for such projects but on a larger scale than before, under the principle of subsidiarity, and with extensive community participation. Most of these projects involve infrastructure construction or upgrading with self-help housing subsidies.

Over the past 15 years, there have been other initiatives in World Bank lending that do not involve housing policy per se but are intimately tied to housing. The first is “private participation in infrastructure” (PPI), which includes both privatization in the construction and provision of urban infrastructure services and private-public partnerships. Annez (2006) provides a thorough and thoughtful review of the policy experience with PPIs. Her conclusions are cautionary:

The private financing for urban PPI has been quite limited and undeniably disappointing in relation to the high expectations prevailing in the 1990s.\ldots\ PPI appears to be an unreliable source of finance\ldots. Those local governments strapped for funding and keen to expand their investments would be wise to recognize [the] limitations [of PPI] \ldots and [central] governments encouraging local governments to use PPI to support their investment programs need to recognize that PPI entails important fiscal risks as well. \ldots\ PPI is inherently limited in scope for financing urban infrastructure for the wide array of non-commercial infrastructure services cities need. Even for commercial services like water supply, subsidies are prevalent all over the world, and in many of the poorest, most rapidly urbanizing countries, it will be difficult to attract private finance for necessary expansions of the water network while restructuring subsidies to make them financially sustainable and socially acceptable.

The assessment of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) (2005, pp. 47–49) points as well to the adverse distributional effects of PPI in developing countries. As economic theory would suggest, privatization

\textsuperscript{24} The Bank’s Articles of Agreement have recently been amended to allow it to provide loans for the purchase of land. This may open up a new avenue for Bank policy.
is often profitable only when providers have effective monopoly power and exploit it.\textsuperscript{25}

The second such initiative in recent years is well known: microfinance. Chapters 6 and 7 of UN-HABITAT (2005) provide a well-informed discussion of recent developments. The chapters contrast four forms of loans: mortgage finance by banks, microenterprise finance, shelter microfinance, and community funds. Microenterprise finance is targeted to small entrepreneurs, shelter microfinance to households with land who wish to improve their structures, and community funds to those without secure tenure for the construction of basic housing and infrastructure. A dominant theme is that shelter microfinance agencies and community organizations need links to the state to provide funding on the required scale but that establishing these links carries with it the dangers of bureaucratization.

The Bank has also experimented with making its housing-related loans conditional on the recipient country’s streamlining its housing regulatory régime. And recently the Bank has been researching the effects of decentralized poverty alleviation programs (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005), whereby the central government allocates poverty alleviation funds to community organizations, which in turn decide on the allocation of funding across households. The tentative finding is that the community organizations do a better job of targeting funding to the neediest households than central governments do in allocating funding to the neediest communities.

It is noteworthy that, after public housing, the World Bank has provided little loan support to programs that give direct assistance to renters, even though the poorest households must be predominantly renters.

Funding is, of course, central to housing policy. In most developing countries, the central government collects taxes from the more attractive tax bases, leaving the less attractive tax bases to local governments. In recent years there has been a worldwide trend towards the decentralization of government expenditure functions. In developed countries, this has been accompanied by an increase in formula-based intergovernmental grants. In many developing countries, local governments have simply been left to do more with little or no increase in funding from the central government.\textsuperscript{26}

While cursory, this review of the housing policy experience of developing countries, from the perspective of the World Bank and UN-HABITAT, reinforces points made in the earlier section on the welfare economics of housing policy in

\textsuperscript{25} The privatization of water supply in a poor country seems a particularly dangerous ideological excess because of the extreme harm its faulty execution may cause.

\textsuperscript{26} Theory suggests that land taxation is an efficient revenue source for local governments. Even when account is taken of ambiguities in property rights for land and tax evasion in the informal sector, it is disappointing that local governments in developing countries do not generate more revenue from this source.
developing countries, particularly how severely the presence of a large informal economy constrains housing policy.

1. In discussions of housing policy in developing countries, there is little if any mention of income-related housing assistance programs, simply because the bulk of income received by poor households is derived from informal economic activity and is therefore undocumented. Whatever redistribution occurs via housing policy is done without being explicitly tied to household income. Furthermore, with the exception of public housing, direct assistance to renters is rare.

2. The lack of available funds to conduct housing programs at a national scale is of central concern in almost all developing country housing policy discussions. One might think that this simply reflects the relative poverty of developing countries. But cross-country studies (see, for example, Malpezzi and Mayo, 1987), as well as casual intuition, indicate that households in developing countries do not spend a larger proportion of their incomes on housing than households in developed countries. Thus, the greater difficulty developing countries have had in mounting national housing programs than developed countries, can be ascribed to the greater difficulty they have had in raising revenue, relative to the size of their economies, which derives from tax evasion in the informal economy eroding their tax bases.

3. Another common theme is the dysfunctionality of housing policy in developing countries. Not only do central governments fail to establish national housing programs but also governments at all levels set up numerous impediments to private housing development, primarily excessive and burdensome housing and land use regulation and excessive fees (Angel, 2000). It was argued earlier that this dysfunctional behavior is, at least to some extent, a rational response by government agents to low fiscal capacity relative to the size of the economy, deriving from the large relative size of the informal economy.

4. From the mid-1980s until very recently, the literature on housing policy in developing countries emphasized the importance of removing the impediments to the smooth operation of housing markets but contained little discussion of housing policy as a redistributive tool. Even UN-HABITAT, whose rhetoric concerning slums is decidedly left wing, said little about large-scale housing programs directed specifically at the neediest households. It seemed that the community concerned with housing policy in developing countries had resigned itself to the inability of government to provide “decent and affordable housing for all.” But the tide now seems to be changing.
Even though governments in developing countries face more severe constraints in the design of effective housing policy than do developed countries, the picture is not altogether bleak. The research consensus is that both formal and informal housing markets in developing countries respond to market and policy stimuli as textbook models suggest. Thus, housing policy can be effective. The poor information central governments have about household incomes precludes broad-based redistributive housing policy, and the high cost of public funds means that governments must choose their housing policies with care. But there is still scope for ameliorating housing policy. The central government should take the lead in enabling markets to work, which it can do by liberalizing but at the same time prudentially regulating housing finance markets and by instituting land market reform, and by reducing the regulatory burden it imposes and providing incentives for lower levels of governments to reduce theirs, and more generally by promoting policies that increase participation in the formal housing sector. It also has an important role to play in redistributive housing policy, albeit an indirect one, by accepting responsibility for ensuring that all households, especially those with children, are housed according to realistic minimum standards and receive basic infrastructure services, and by providing matching grants to local governments that institute policies to meet these standards. The tasks of local governments are to work with neighborhood and community associations to come up with policies that target neighborhoods with the greatest housing need, and to provide the tax revenues needed to partially fund the policies.

The international community can help in myriad ways, but one policy initiative stands out: Help national governments borrow to finance their urban infrastructure needs during their periods of rapid urbanization, so that the costs are not completely borne by the current generation. Doing so would not only relieve much misery today but would result in more pleasant cities for future generations.

6. Conclusions

Developing countries differ from developed countries not only in per capita income but also in having a relatively large informal sector. In the major cities of the poorest two quintiles of countries, about half of the labor force works in the informal sector, and a considerably larger proportion of the poorest households. As well, in the lowest income countries, almost two thirds of the urban population lives in informal housing, and again an even larger proportion of the poorest households. This paper has argued that the relatively large informal sector along with the relatively large proportion of informal housing in these countries substantially affects what housing policies will work and what will not,
so that much of the housing policy experience of developed countries is not transferable to developing countries.

In developed countries there has been a major reorientation in low-income, rental housing policy over the last three decades, away from public housing and subsidized construction of private housing units for the poor and towards housing allowances based on household income. Since governments in developing countries cannot observe informal sector incomes with any accuracy, any income-related housing assistance would have to be based on formal sector income. But since those with zero or very low formal income include not only the destitute but also wealthy, informal sector entrepreneurs, conditioning housing assistance on formal income would have very low target efficiency. Thus, a large informal sector effectively precludes income-related housing assistance.

A large informal sector affects housing policy in another important way. The larger is the relative size of the informal sector, the smaller is the proportion of economic activity that is taxed. Thus, holding constant the level of “real” per capita income—which includes both formal and informal sector income—in a country, the larger is the informal sector, the smaller is fiscal capacity. In turn, the smaller is fiscal capacity, the higher are the tax rates needed to raise a given amount of government revenue, the more distortionary is the tax system, and the lower is the optimal size of the government budget. If the same is true of the equilibrium as for the optimum, then one should observe governments in developing countries being hard pressed to finance even the basic level of public services commensurate with the average standard of living, and that is indeed what one observes. To some extent, one can also attribute some other characteristics of developing countries to their governments being strapped for cash: excessive regulation, excessive fees for permits, low-paid civil servants, and bureaucratic corruption.

Unauthorized housing is housing that violates regulations concerning land ownership, land use and zoning, and building construction. Squatter housing is housing that occupies land illegally. The large proportion of housing that is unauthorized has impacts on government housing policy too. If the government were to simply regularize unauthorized housing, developers would have little incentive to conform to regulations. Thus, the government must strike a balance between discouraging unauthorized housing and disrupting the informal housing market and hurting the needy.

Economists make a fundamental distinction between efficiency and equity. Most economists who are experts on housing in developing countries argue that housing policy can best achieve efficiency by enabling housing markets to work. There is abundant evidence that informal housing markets operate in essentially the same way as formal housing markets. Thus, enabling housing markets to work entails not only correcting market failures and reducing the excessive amount of government land use and housing regulation, but also tolerating and facilitating informal housing markets. Assisting community organizations in
setting up microfinance for informal housing and infrastructure investment is a promising new line of policy.

Achieving equity is more difficult. In developed countries, the primary tools for achieving equity have been redistribution via the income tax and the free or heavily subsidized provision of basic services—health, primary education, sewage, sanitation, and police. Providing subsidized housing for low-income households has also played an important role, especially in Europe. In developing countries, the scope for redistribution is considerably more circumscribed. Formal sector incomes can be taxed, but since the government cannot observe informal sector incomes, and since the bulk of the poor earn their living in the informal sector, redistribution through the income tax system would be ineffective. Redistribution via the subsidized provision of basic services to poor neighborhoods is potentially effective, but governments in developing countries are so strapped for cash that even the most benevolent would be hard pressed to provide adequate services for the poor.

What role should housing policy in developing countries play in achieving equity? Income-related housing assistance cannot be implemented effectively. One may reasonably argue that the poor need adequate food, clothing, and health care, and a clean and secure environment, more than they need more spacious housing. Even if this argument is correct (some recent evidence suggests that a minimal level of housing is important for both health and happiness), the issue remains of how best to provide housing to the very needy—the homeless, the destitute, and poor families with children receiving inadequate services. Since most very needy urban households are renters, and since income-related rental housing assistance is unworkable, perhaps the best that can be done for them is to ensure that the neighborhoods in which they reside receive adequate basic services.

Developing countries are urbanizing at an unprecedented rate and their cities are showing the strains. Enabling formal and informal markets to work will go a considerable way to relieving the strains, but active government intervention is also needed to ensure that adequate infrastructure for this period of rapid urbanization is provided and that the poor lead lives consistent with dignity. Unfortunately, the high proportion of economic activity that takes place in the informal sector and the high proportion of housing that is informal severely restrict the scope for redistribution and redistributive housing policy by government. The most promising avenue to achieving some degree of economic justice would appear to be the provision of a minimal level of public services—health, sanitation, sewage, primary education, and water—and this in turn will require the infrastructure needed to provide such services. Because infrastructure is durable, its costs should be shared across generations, but this is not an option for most developing countries without assistance from the international community.
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All countries have a formal economy and an informal economy. But, on average, in developing countries the relative size of the informal sector is considerably larger than in developed countries. This paper argues that the larger informal sector has important implications for housing policy in developing countries. That most poor households derive their income from informal employment effectively precludes income-contingent transfers as a method of redistribution. Also, holding fixed real economic activity, the larger is the relative size of the informal sector, the lower is fiscal capacity, and the more distortive is government provision of a given level of goods and services, which restricts the desirable scale and scope of government policy. For the same reasons, housing policies that have proven successful in developed countries may not be successful when employed in developing countries.

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