Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity

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Economic theory of public bureaucracies as complex organizations predicts that bureaucratic productivity can be shaped by the selection of different types of agents, beyond their incentives. This theory applies to the institutions of local government in the developing world, where nationally appointed bureaucrats and locally elected politicians together manage the implementation of public policies and the delivery of services. Yet, there is no evidence...

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Author

Habyarimana,James Paul;

Khemani,Stuti;

Scot,Thiago;
Document Date
2018/12/12
Document Type
Policy Research Working Paper
Report Number
WPS8673
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Country
Uganda,
Region
Eastern And Southern Africa,
Disclosure Date
2018/12/12
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
Keywords
quality of service delivery

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Citation

Habyarimana,James Paul; Khemani,Stuti; Scot,Thiago.

Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity (English). Paper is funded by the Knowledge for Change Program (KCP)|Paper is funded by the Strategic Research Program (SRP)|Policy Research working paper|no. WPS 8673 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/573111544644789517

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