



<b>1. Project Data:</b>		<b>Date Posted :</b> 07/25/2000	
<b>PROJ ID:</b> P035495		<b>Appraisal</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Project Name :</b> Social Protection Project	<b>Project Costs (US\$M)</b>	418	614
<b>Country:</b> Argentina	<b>Loan/Credit (US\$M)</b>	152	152
<b>Sector(s):</b> Social Funds & Social Assistance	<b>Cofinancing (US\$M)</b>		
<b>L/C Number:</b> L3957; LP257			
	<b>Board Approval (FY)</b>		96
<b>Partners involved :</b>	<b>Closing Date</b>	06/30/1998	09/30/1999
<b>Prepared by :</b>	<b>Reviewed by :</b>	<b>Group Manager :</b>	<b>Group:</b>
<b>2. Project Objectives and Components</b>			
<b>a. Objectives</b>			
(i) Protect critical social programs in 1995 and 1996 whose budgets had been reduced due to the fiscal crisis; (ii) Provide income support to the poor; (iii) Improve the focus and management of social programs by promoting transparency and efficiency, participation of civil society and better targeting of social services to the poor . The objectives supported the CAS objective of reducing poverty and developing human resources and complemented the objectives of the IDB Social Sector Adjustment Loan .			
<b>b. Components</b>			
The project consisted of three components : (i) priority social and income support programs - \$116 m; (ii) pilot participatory social investment fund (FOPAR) - \$26 m; (iii) improvement of social information, targeting and monitoring social programs (SIEMPRO) - \$10 m			
<b>c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates</b>			
The total project costs were \$614 m (\$ 418 m at appraisal), of which the Bank financed \$ 152 m (\$152 m including up to \$30.4 m of retroactive financing at appraisal), and the Government of Argentina financed \$ 462m (\$266 m at appraisal).			
The Bank preparation, completion, and supervision costs were 219.8 staff weeks or equivalent of \$0.8 m.			
<b>3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:</b>			
Project objectives were successfully achieved . Federal spending on protected social programs exceeded the target of \$300m in 1995 and 1996. As a result of the project, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Participatory Social Investment Fund (FOPAR), and the Program of Information, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Targeted Social Programs (SIEMPRO) achieved substantial institutional development which strengthened their ability to conduct policy and program analysis, evaluate and design social programs, and develop methodologies and approaches improving technical assistance and training programs .			
<b>4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:</b>			
(i) The budget for social programs exceeded the target of \$ 300 m in 1995 and 1996. The monitoring of public spending and funding, and information feedback into the budget were enhanced . As a result, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security changed some policies, redesigned programs, and integrated small overlapping programs . (ii) FOPAR financed 806 sub-projects totaling \$29.5 m including counterpart resources and contributions of beneficiaries. 1/5 of sub-projects were focused on institutional development of community organizations . FOPAR reached 215,000 beneficiaries in 6 provinces representing 45 % of the population with unmet basic needs . Targeting the poor was highly effective . About 80% of beneficiaries met the poverty criteria . 5,800 beneficiaries were employed for an average length of 80 days in sub-projects. FOPAR supported micro-enterprises, and approximately 1000 beneficiaries received loans . (iii) SIEMPRO produced and made available information on social conditions and programs, and conducted a household survey in cooperation with the National Statistical Institute . Additionally, SIEMPRO disseminated social information and methodologies to staff of federal and provincial level governments, and provided large scale training on a variety of topics including social information, evaluation, and social program management.			
<b>5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):</b>			
1) In implementation of the third project component, there was some overlap in the responsibilities of the Ministry of			

Economy and SIEMPRO. As a result, implementation arrangements were hampered by inadequate cooperation and coordination. 2) The loan supported existing public social spending budgets, i.e., there was no additionality.

6. Ratings:	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
<b>Outcome:</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
<b>Institutional Dev .:</b>	Substantial	Substantial	
<b>Sustainability:</b>	Likely	Likely	
<b>Bank Performance:</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
<b>Borrower Perf .:</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
<b>Quality of ICR:</b>		Satisfactory	

**NOTE:** ICR rating values flagged with '\*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

**7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:**

An important lesson is that, during project preparation, the Bank should focus on institutional interrelationships in order to avoid potential overlaps in mandates and responsibilities .

**8. Assessment Recommended?** ☐ Yes ☒ No

**9. Comments on Quality of ICR:**

The quality of the ICR is satisfactory . It covers all pertinent information about the project's background, design, and implementation. It also provides a good review of the sustainability of the project's achievements and the role of follow-up operations.