Context for the Evaluation

1. **Country Background.** Founded in 1821 by former American slaves, Liberia is today a representative democracy, with a multi-party system, an elected president and 15 counties under unitary central government. The legislature consists of a Senate with 30 elected members and a House of Representatives with 64 elected members. Rich in natural resources, Liberia has an abundance of iron ore, timber, diamonds, gold, as well as significant potential for hydro-power and offshore oil fields and a climate favorable to agriculture. Bordered by the Atlantic Ocean on the west, Sierra Leone in the north, Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire to the east, Liberia has a land area of 113,370 sq. km. (the size of Greece or the state of Virginia), a population of 3.5 million (in 2010) and a gross domestic product of almost one billion dollars (at market exchange rates).

2. **Civil War.** By the 1970s, Liberia was politically stable and a lower middle-income country. That was before precipitous calamities took hold. Against a backdrop of long-standing resentment among indigenous groups against the ruling elites – primarily descendants of African American settlers – food riots in 1979 and subsequent unrest culminated in a *coup d’etat* a year later. The ensuing military misrule generated political turmoil. Violence soon spread and intensified, engulfing the country in full-scale civil war. During a ceasefire in 1997, Charles Taylor was elected President. But the respite was brief. Four years later, fighting broke out again in the north and spilled over the border into Sierra Leone. The conflict ended in August 2003, when Mr. Taylor stepped down under intense international pressure.

3. **The Devastation.** All told, the war resulted in a scale of destruction seldom seen in the modern world. About 220,000 people (or 8 percent of the population) lost their lives; and twice as many were displaced. More than half of the women were sexually assaulted. Most schools and health facilities were destroyed. Infant and maternal mortality rose to shockingly high levels (196 per 1000 and 578 per 100,000 live births, respectively). In cities, water, electricity and other public services ceased. Roads crumbled under the erosion of perennial rains and lack of maintenance. The economy was in ruins. Between 1989 and 1995, real GDP contracted by nearly 90 percent. By 2003 when the violence stopped, four out of five workers had lost their jobs. Two-thirds of the population was in poverty. A generation of young Liberians never attended school – or saw their education severely disrupted.

4. **Peacekeeping.** After the war, the international community responded with uncommon vigor and consensus. Led by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), a large numbers of development partners soon arrived. Initially, the overriding goal was to disarm combatants and prevent the resumption of conflict. The agenda was large, encompassing security, humanitarian needs, human rights and rehabilitation of the economy. An international force of 15,000 was mobilized from 40
countries, including military personnel, civilian police officers and an all-female squadron as part of the mandate to protect women and girls.

5. Over time, more than 100,000 former combatants were disarmed and returned to normal life, although many remained unemployed. Nascent hostilities were effectively dealt with. More than 300,000 internally displaced people benefited from the support and facilities provided. Training was given to a large number of the police and military personnel. The international community also created the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) designed to curb corruption and restore integrity. In addition to official assistance, civil society organizations (CSOs) have played a crucial role. They have been active in health, education and civil rights. In health, CSOs managed some 60 percent of development partners’ funds in 2008, a role larger than that of the Ministry of Health. Three quarters of Liberia’s health facilities are now operated by nongovernmental (NGO) or faith-based organizations (FBO).

6. **Restoring Democracy.** From October 2003 to January 2006, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), which comprised the former belligerent groups and civil society, was temporarily in charge under extensive protection of international peacekeeping forces. The Presidential and legislative elections were held in November, 2005, and certified by independent observers as fair and transparent. Former World Bank economist Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (recently awarded the Nobel peace prize) won, becoming the first democratically elected female head of state in Africa. The latest general elections took place on October 11, 2011 (with a possible second round to be held on November 8), but as of the time of writing, the results were not yet known.

7. **Today.** Liberia is at peace, but still fragile, with isolated hostilities and a large number of refugees from Cote d’Ivoire. Violence against women has tapered off, but remains an issue of concern. Gradually, professionals, entrepreneurs and investors are returning. Farms and factories are being rehabilitated. As wartime embargos were lifted on timbers in 2006 and on diamonds in 2007, exports have now resumed. Aid flows have helped sustain the recovery, with GDP growth in recent years exceeding that of Saharan Africa.

**Figure 1. GDP Growth 2004-2010**

![GDP Growth 2004-2010](image-url)
The Program of the World Bank Group

8. Following an absence of 20 years, the World Bank Group (WBG) returned to Liberia in 2003. It has since played a crucial role in assisting Liberia’s reconstruction and development efforts, serving as one of the key development partners along with the United Nations (UN), the United States (US), European Union (EU) and African Development Bank (AfDB), among others.

9. **WBG re-engagement.** To find direction amidst desperate conditions, the WBG and other partners carried out a rapid needs assessment (the *Joint Needs Assessment*) with the Government. Completed in early 2004, it provided a basis for the Government’s Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) and the WBG’s Country Re-engagement Note (CRN), which led to the opening of a liaison office in Monrovia. Since then, assistance has been guided by the following three sets of strategic framework:

   - An Interim Strategy Note (ISN), issued jointly with the AfDB in March 2007.¹
   - A full country assistance strategy (CAS), also issued with AfDB, in March 2009.
   - A CAS progress report (CASPR) in June 2011.

10. In the early years, an impediment to aid flows was the large overhang of external debt – totaling nearly $5 billion, most of which was in arrears, including $401 million owed to the World Bank ($345 million to IBRD and $56 million to IDA). Support was financed primarily through the Low-income Countries under Stress (LICUS) Trust Fund and a tailor-made “Trust Fund for Liberia”. In December 2007, Liberia paid off the arrears and became eligible for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives (MDRI).

11. In 2008, the Government launched the Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (LPRS), which envisaged an outreach to segments of the population previously excluded from political participation and ownership of economic assets. The LPRS was prepared on the basis of broad consultations. It had four pillars: (i) deepening peace and security; (ii) revitalizing the economy; (iii) strengthening governance; and (iv) rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services. Policy objectives were linked to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but the targets were more modest. The World Bank-IMF Joint Staff Assessment, while endorsing the LPRS, indicated a few shortcomings including the need for (i) greater specificity of the growth strategy in agriculture and land administration; (ii) a specific plan for devolving political and financial authority to sub-national authorities; and (iii) broad-based participation in monitoring and evaluation.

¹ The ISN envisioned IFC support in selected areas, although IFC strategies were not formally incorporated.
Box 1. Objectives of the WBG in Liberia

“The overarching aim of the Joint Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of the World Bank Group is to support Liberia’s transition from post-conflict recovery to long-term development. The strategy addresses some key constraints on growth as well as enhancing the policy and institutional framework to ensure that growth is increasingly pro-poor. It is fully aligned with the pillars and objectives set out in Liberia’s PRSP. The CAS pursues three strategic themes:

- Rebuilding core state functions and institutions;
- Rehabilitating infrastructure to jump-start economic growth; and
- Facilitating pro-poor growth.

“These themes are fully aligned with the Poverty Reduction Strategy. The CAS will also focus on the crosscutting objective of capacity development. Gender and the environment are important elements of the strategy that will be increasingly mainstreamed into World Bank programs.”

Source: CAS FY09-FY11

12. **World Bank Group strategy.** Throughout the post-conflict period, the WBG has attempted to help Liberia achieve its societal goals through technical and financial support. The first two strategy statements (CRN and ISN) were guided by the RFTF and the Government’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy. The full CAS and CASPR were based on the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (“Lift Liberia”). The forthcoming CAS is expected to follow the same tradition -- to build on the Government’s new five year plan, also known as PRS II or “Liberia Rising 2030” now under preparation.

13. Within the framework of the CAS objectives (see Box 1), IFC engagement is guided by the strategy outlined in IFC’s *post-conflict initiative* which supports African economies emerging from civil war, of which Liberia is a pilot country. The strategy seeks to:

- Support economic recovery by helping improve the investment climate;
- Strengthen the domestic financial sector;
- Support private companies and participation infrastructure; and
- Support the sustainable development of small and medium enterprise sector.

14. The country-level strategy documents (i.e. CAS, ISN and CRN) did not make explicit reference to the objectives of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Nonetheless, MIGA activities are well aligned with the WBG pillar of facilitating pro-poor growth.

15. **World Bank activities.** Since FY05, the WB has approved 46 projects in Liberia for a total value of $ 1.1 billion, of which $ 777 million comes from IDA and the rest from Bank-administered trust funds. The WB portfolio, comprising IDA and trust fund-funded activities, consists of four sector groups: governance (46 percent), infrastructure (42 percent), social sectors (9 percent) and natural resource management (3 percent).
Table 1. World Bank Group Operations in Liberia since 2005, by Sector ($ mil)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Groups</th>
<th>WBG</th>
<th>IDA</th>
<th>Trust Funds</th>
<th>IFC</th>
<th>MIGA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure &amp; finance</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource management</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sectors</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrears clearance *</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Reengagement and Reform Support Program approved in FY08 for US$430 million was excluded from the governance sector group. This DPO was mainly used for the clearance of arrears with the World Bank.

16. Analytical and advisory services have also been a key component of Bank engagement, serving as an instrument to address capacity constraints and a service to the international community. Since FY05, the Bank has prepared 10 major studies (economic and sector work) and undertaken 18 technical assistance activities across sectors. Among the major knowledge products are: a review of land tenure; a study on power supply options ("Strategic Options Report"). In addition, through the help of a technical assistance project, Liberia became first EITI compliant country in Africa.²

17. **IFC activities.** Since FY06, IFC has approved eleven advisory services (AS) and seven new investments. Highlights of IFC’s AS activity are: establishment of a public-private dialogue mechanism (the Liberia Better Business Forum); design and implementation of a modern Business Registry; Liberia’s first Commercial Code and Commercial Court; a modern Investment Law; deployment of SME capacity development tools; the execution of a transaction advisory mandate for the tendering of a Management Contract for the Liberia Electricity Corporation ("LEC"). The new investments with a total commitment of $21 million are mainly in forestry (48 percent) and banking (52 percent).

18. **MIGA activities.** Since Liberia became a MIGA member in 2007, one guarantee has been approved to support a renewable energy project, for a gross exposure of $142 million. A second and smaller project is now under review.

19. **Risks to development effectiveness.** The WBG identified multiple risks, including external shocks; renewed conflict; lack of capacity; inadequate political support for new legislation; rising corruption; and environmental threats. To mitigate some of these risks, the WBG envisioned the following risk mitigation measures to be taken with other partners:
   - Creation of urban and rural employment programs, including community empowerment, and a program to increase agricultural productivity;
   - Technical assistance on macroeconomic policy responses to external shocks through programs of targeted budget support;

²EITI refers to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
• Building capacity at the project implementation level, support for civil service reform, and help for specific agencies in charge of implementing reforms;
• Support for programs dedicated to transparency such as GEMAP, EITI and other anticorruption efforts, capacity building and involvement of civil society;
• Allocating resources mainly through infrastructure programs to enhance the capacity in key agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Box 2: Partners’ Challenges in Fragile States

2011 WDR highlights a key feature of fragility and a challenge for development partners. “In allocating aid, donors consider two fundamental objectives: aid should follow need and aid should be well-used. Unfortunately, in fragile states, these two objectives are in conflict: needs are far greater than elsewhere, but governments lack the capacity to use aid well. This dilemma can be resolved by linking the objective of meeting needs to the volume of aid, and the objective of using aid well to the choice of delivery modalities. Fragile states need large volumes of aid, but aid delivery should look very different.

“The needs are manifestly greater than other environments and so the returns can be much higher. But to establish that the needs can be met effectively and to build long-term institutional resilience, new delivery modalities are required. They should encourage experimentation, show observable results, and respond quickly to success or failure.”


Approach and Methodology

20. Objectives. The main objective of this evaluation is to learn from the experience in Liberia and to draw lessons for improving the effectiveness of future assistance – both in Liberia and in other fragile states. To this end, it will review the outcomes of WBG interventions, including lending, non-lending services, debt relief and partners’ harmonization and alignment. The methodology will be applied holistically – with understanding, flexibility and a primary intent to learn. The evaluation will take into account Liberia’s circumstances, including the initial conditions of a fractured society, destruction of institutions and the overriding need to prevent renewed hostilities, all of which limit effectiveness and call for extra-ordinary care and vigilance.

21. While the standard approach to country assistance evaluation will serve as organizing framework, the evaluation will incorporate the following considerations:

• First, the test of relevance will be fragility-sensitive, recognizing special factors such as the need to support state legitimacy and social inclusiveness, in addition to the alignment with Government plans and WBG strategies.

• Second, the evaluation will look beyond the achievement of objectives to consider, inter alia, unintended effects of pursuing targets and reasons why progress is less than expected. It will also review the speed and responsiveness of interventions.
• Third, the evaluation will place a special emphasis on learning. In considering the success of a project, it will observe and analyze the broader requirements of social stability. It will also ask what modalities best fit local conditions.

22. The Liberia CPE will also provide a platform to review some of the key issues faced by fragile states, such as those highlighted in the 2011 World Development Report. The primary challenge, according to the WDR, is to break the cycles of violence by strengthening legitimate institutions and enabling them to provide security, justice and jobs. Liberia suffered from external sources of stress, including cross-border criminal violence caused by the poaching of timber and diamonds. The evaluation will ask whether Liberia also experienced limitations in the support of development partners, including slow internal processes, limited capacity to build confidence through “quick wins” and segregated operations among partners – say, between agencies specialized in security and in development. WBG engagement in Liberia provides a case study on the ways these issues have been tackled and the extent to which progress has been made.

23. Target audiences. An important audience is the Board, for whom the evaluation would help inform future discussion of country strategies and new operations on Liberia and other fragile states. Other key audiences are: WBG management and staff, the Liberian Government, development partners (including the AfDB, which has issued joint strategies with the WBG). IEG will engage WBG management on the lessons that may be gleaned from the operational experiences. In addition, the schedule of this study is dovetailed with the cycle of CAS preparation so that the Government and WBG management can benefit from an opportunity to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of WBG assistance. IEG also envisions an outreach plan in Liberia to share the findings with in-country stakeholders, including civil society organizations and the general public.

24. Scope of evaluation. The evaluation will take FY04-FY11 as the period of review, corresponding approximately to the interval between the release of the Country Re-engagement Note (March 2004) and the release of the CAS Progress Report (June 2011). IEG will assess the range of WBG activities, irrespective of whether they are funded by IDA or trust-fund resources. The role of the WBG in harmonizing development partners’ activities and coordinating aid flows will also be examined. In addition, this evaluation will provide a comprehensive analysis of IDA, IFC, MIGA and trust funds programs in an integrated manner. IEG will review the performance of the WBG as a whole in achieving its common objectives.

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3 The AfDB is not planning to conduct a review of its assistance to Liberia in the near future.
25. **Logical framework.** As a basis for this assessment, IEG will rely on the results framework of the 2009 CAS, which provides a detailed results chain linking interventions to intended outcomes (see Figure 2). While the particular definition of objectives and pillars has varied somewhat over time, the sectors of interventions and activities have been stable.

26. **Evaluation questions.** The evaluation will review the following main questions:
   - Was WBG assistance sufficiently fragility-focused?
   - How relevant were the WBG objectives in the context of Liberia?
   - How relevant was the design (strategies and delivery modalities)?
   - To what extent were results achieved and what were contributing factors?
   - How effective were efforts in harmonization and alignment?
   - What can be learned from the experience in Liberia?

27. Each main question will assess other sub-questions. For instance, to determine whether the assistance was sufficiently fragility focused, related issues like the rapidity of WBG support in addressing urgent needs and flexibility of the WBG in response to changing circumstances will be reviewed. In turn, these main questions will be applied to each of the pillars and cross-cutting themes of assistance. The three pillars are: (i) Rebuilding core state functions; (ii) Rehabilitating infrastructure; and (iii) Facilitating pro-poor growth. While the constituent elements of the pillars have varied somewhat, the underlying objectives have remained the same. In addition, three cross-cutting themes (key objectives that transcend individual projects or sectors) have been highlighted: Capacity building, gender equity and environmental sustainability. Thus, the relevance and efficacy of assistance in the following areas will be reviewed:

### A. Rebuilding core state functions and institutions
- Public financial management
- Civil service reform
- Judicial reform
B. Rehabilitating infrastructure to jump-start economic growth
- Transport
- Water and sanitation
- Energy
- Urban development

C. Facilitating pro-poor growth
- Agriculture and aquaculture
- Natural Resource management
  - Forestry
  - Mining
- Private sector development
  - Access to finance
  - Investment climate
- Human Development:
  - Health
  - Education
  - Social protection / community-driven development

D. Cross-cutting themes
- Capacity building
- Gender
- Environmental sustainability

28. Methods. To answer these questions, the evaluation will employ multiple analytical methods, including
- Desk reviews – of project and program documents, including ISRs and ICRs, economic and sector work, technical notes and policy briefs.
- Structured interviews and consultations will be conducted in Washington with WBG managers and staff and in Liberia with development partners, stakeholders, civil society, private-sector representatives and public officials. Where appropriate, survey results and opinion polls will also be incorporated.
- Sector and thematic analysis to review consistency with corporate strategies, guidelines and safeguards.
- Comparisons of results with those in conflict-affected states, including, for example, Nepal, Timor Leste and West Bank and Gaza;
- Reviews of administrative arrangements, including staffing and budgets across tasks and pillars, between lending and analytical work, and over time, to assess the value for money, efficiency and sustainability.

29. IEG will be conducting its first evaluation of the overall WBG assistance in Liberia, although many aspects of operations involving the country have been reviewed. For example, IEG reviewed the Implementation Completion Reports of the two projects closed since 2004: the Re-engagement and Reform Support Credits (part I and part II). The outcomes of both were rated satisfactory. IEG also undertook a detailed Liberia case study for the Governance
and Anticorruption (GAC) evaluation. Furthermore, IEG has in the past conducted a series of evaluations of WBG assistance in other conflict-affected states, including Cambodia, Nepal, Timor Leste, West Bank and Gaza and Yemen. In addition, a recent IEG global program review (2011) examined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which in recent years has represented an important area of assistance in Liberia.

30. The evaluation will recognize that data quality – and availability – will be limited in many areas. Hence, data analysis will be supplemented by the knowledge and understanding of stakeholders, as is generally the case with IEG evaluations (see attachment I).

**Administrative Arrangements**

31. **Evaluation Team.** The task team will be led by Chad Leechor (Senior Evaluation Officer, IEGCC) and comprise Lauren Kelly (Evaluation Officer, IEGPS) responsible for natural resource management; Mary Breeding, (Consultant, IEGPS), capacity building; Peter Freeman, (Consultant; IEGPS) infrastructure; Basil Kavalsky, (Consultant; IEGPS) governance and core state functions; Albert Martinez, (Consultant, IEGCC) private sector development; Ursula Martinez, (Consultant, IEGPS) gender and social protection; Carla Pazce, (Consultant, IEGCC) aid coordination, John Redwood, (Consultant, IEGCC) environmental sustainability; and Elaine Ooi (Consultant, IEGCC), health and education. Vikki Taaka (Program Assistant, IEGCC) will provide administrative support. The report will be prepared under the guidance of Ali Khadr (Senior Manager, IEGCC) and Stoyan Tenev (Manager, IEGPE). Stephen O’Brien (Consultant, IEGCC) and Navin Girishankar (Lead Evaluation Officer, IEGPS) will be peer reviewers.

32. **Processing Schedule.** The report will be submitted to CODE in June 2012. The schedule has been set so that the evaluation will provide timely input for the preparation of the next CAS. Milestones include:

- **Approach Paper to CODE:** October 2011
- **CODE discussion of Approach Paper:** October 2011
- **Mission:** November 2011
- **IEG Draft Review:** March 2012
- **Management Comments:** April 2012
- **Government Comments:** May 2012
- **Submission to CODE:** June 2012
## Attachment I: Evaluation Design Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: WHAT WE WANT TO KNOW</th>
<th>Source of Data: WHERE WE GET THE INFORMATION</th>
<th>Collection Method: HOW WE GET IT</th>
<th>Data Limitations: HOW RELIABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fragility Focus</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In what way did the assistance improve state-society relations and legitimacy?</td>
<td>CSO; public officials; local citizens</td>
<td>Focus group; interviews</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How quickly did it respond to urgent needs?</td>
<td>Staff; officials; ISRs; PMU⁴</td>
<td>Interview; review of records</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How flexible was the WBG in modifying its approach and procedures?</td>
<td>Project officials; contractors</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What experimentation has taken place on new projects and modalities?</td>
<td>Project staff; PMU</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Need to verify with sector specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the assistance business as usual?</td>
<td>Public officials; beneficiaries; CSO</td>
<td>Interview; focus group</td>
<td>Need to verify with staff elsewhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance of Objectives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were they based on adequate need assessments and aid coordination?</td>
<td>Need assessments; AAAs; development partners</td>
<td>Interview; review of document</td>
<td>Varies by project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were they well aligned with the objectives of the Liberian Government?</td>
<td>Public officials; AAAs; beneficiaries</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were they compatible with the Regional and corporate priorities?</td>
<td>Regional staff; WBG management</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the expectations realistic in the context of fragility?</td>
<td>Public officials; CSOs; IEG evaluations</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Somewhat subjective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴ PMU = Project Management Unit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: WHAT WE WANT TO KNOW</th>
<th>Source of Data: WHERE WE GET THE INFORMATION</th>
<th>Collection Method: HOW WE GET IT</th>
<th>Data Limitations: HOW RELIABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality &amp; realism of results framework?</td>
<td>CAS; PADs; AAAs</td>
<td>Review of documents</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was adequate political-institutional analysis done to assess resistance?</td>
<td>Project document; staff; public officials</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Somewhat subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the key risks identified and mitigated?</td>
<td>Project documents; PMU</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the strategies implemented as planned?</td>
<td>Progress report; country team; CAS</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How appropriate were the budgets and staffing arrangements?</td>
<td>Management team; staff; ISR; ICR</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Somewhat subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent and how were CSOs involved in the assistance?</td>
<td>CSOs; public officials; PMU</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent was progress made relative to the baseline?</td>
<td>Beneficiaries; PADs; PMU</td>
<td>Case studies</td>
<td>Indicator or baseline may be missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent was progress achieved towards the MDGs?</td>
<td>Beneficiaries; PADs; PMU</td>
<td>Case studies</td>
<td>Indicator or baseline may be missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How good was the risk analysis?</td>
<td>Project staff; AAAs; PMU</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Need to verify with specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were mitigation measures effective?</td>
<td>Beneficiaries; PMU</td>
<td>Interview; review of documents</td>
<td>Need to verify with specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where progress was modest, what were the contributing factors?</td>
<td>Project staff; ISR; PMU</td>
<td>Case studies</td>
<td>Somewhat subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where significant progress was made, what were the main success factors?</td>
<td>Project staff; ISR; PMU</td>
<td>Case studies</td>
<td>Somewhat subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question: WHAT WE WANT TO KNOW</td>
<td>Source of Data: WHERE WE GET THE INFORMATION</td>
<td>Collection Method: HOW WE GET IT</td>
<td>Data Limitations: HOW RELIABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development partners’ Harmonization and Alignment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How was alignment &amp; harmonization done?</td>
<td>Development partners; public officials; beneficiaries</td>
<td>Interview; focus group</td>
<td>Can be verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How high were the transactions costs? How were they managed?</td>
<td>Development partners; public officials; beneficiaries</td>
<td>Interview; focus group</td>
<td>Somewhat subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well were activities aligned with those of development partners?</td>
<td>Country team; development partners</td>
<td>Interview; focus group</td>
<td>Somewhat subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent were country systems used?</td>
<td>Development partners; public officials; beneficiaries</td>
<td>Interview; focus group</td>
<td>Mostly reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What were the effects of development partners’ coordination on aid flows and effectiveness?</td>
<td>Public officials; staff; development partners</td>
<td>Interview; focus group</td>
<td>Can be verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lessons</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>How did fragility affect processes and outcomes?</td>
<td>Evaluation team</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could the successes in Liberia be replicated elsewhere?</td>
<td>IEG staff; Regional staff</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What can be learned from those areas where results fell short of expectations</td>
<td>IEG and Regional staff; PMU</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are lessons from experimentations and alternative delivery modalities?</td>
<td>Evaluation team; PMU</td>
<td>Discussion; interview</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What light does it shed on the</td>
<td>Evaluation team;</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question:</strong> WHAT WE WANT TO KNOW</td>
<td><strong>Source of Data:</strong> WHERE WE GET THE INFORMATION</td>
<td><strong>Collection Method:</strong> HOW WE GET IT</td>
<td><strong>Data Limitations:</strong> HOW RELIABLE</td>
</tr>
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<td>key issues highlighted in the 2011 WDR?</td>
<td>WDR core team</td>
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REPORT TO THE BOARD FROM THE
COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS
Subcommittee Report

(Meeting of October 31, 2011)


Summary

2. IEG remarked that the Country Program Evaluation (CPE) will focus on learning in addition to the habitual assessment of program outcomes, highlighting lessons that can be taken forward to inform the upcoming CAS. On timeliness, IEG noted the CPE was aligned with the CAS cycle and coincides with the current electoral process. It added that the evaluation will look into the three pillars of the WBG’s assistance program: re-building core state functions, rehabilitating infrastructure and facilitating pro-poor growth as well as three cross-cutting areas: capacity building, gender and environmental sustainability. IEG also noted that the evaluation would look beyond IDA at IFC, MIGA and trust funds. It would also assess the WBG program against the 2011 WDR framework, although retroactive accountability for the use of this framework was clearly out of the question.

3. Both IEG and Management stressed proceeding with caution in the face of possible security concerns as the electoral process continues. IEG looked forward to engaging with government representatives as well as other in-country stakeholders. Management noted IEG had consulted with the country team and were grateful for the inclusive process, stressing the need for IEG to particularly take into account the country context that the WBG and donors confronted on the ground. In that sense, it welcomed IEG’s proposed focus beyond program outcomes. Management looked forward to the recommendations of the CPE, which it will factor into the upcoming CAS. If the evaluation was delayed due to security reasons, then Management would await its input, before finalizing the CAS.

4. Members welcomed the discussion and, in general, supported the paper. They also urged caution, given the current political process. They appreciated that the CPE would take into account the country and political economy context. Members noted the critical need to ensure feedback from stakeholders in the upcoming CAS, particularly from civil society organizations. Members asked that development partners’ participation be reflected in the CPE, including division of labor with the UN mission and the AfDB. They commented on the CPE’s fragility-focus and the need for the evaluation questions to explicitly address institution-building via WB programs. Members highlighted issues of social inclusion, regional disparities and internal conflicts. Other members underscored the importance of lessons learned in areas such as natural resource governance, social safety nets, micro-financing, environmental sustainability and trust fund impact. A member urged that the CPE make use of existing background analyses on Liberia, and encouraged IEG to also include African countries in comparisons with results of evaluations in other post conflict states. Members commented on gender equality and the need to look into the issue of violence against women. The Chair stressed the need to resolve, as best as possible, factual or methodological issues before the presentation of the evaluation to the Sub-Committee.

Recommendations and Next Steps

5. Both IEG and Management looked forward to continued cooperation during the upcoming evaluation. Members noted that insights from the proposed evaluation would provide valuable feedback for engagement in fragile and conflict-afflicted states, particularly for the Africa region. Looking forward, IEG noted that both the Approach Paper and the Report to the Board would guide the evaluation process.

Anna Brandt, Chairperson

Distribution:
Executive Directors and Alternates
President
Bank Group Senior Management
Vice Presidents, Bank, IFC and MIGA

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1 In accordance with the World Bank Access to Information Policy, the summary portion of this Report to the Board will be disclosed when it is finalized.