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ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.5 MILLION (US\$14.3 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE REPUBLIC OF

GUINEA-BISSAU

FOR A

BASIC EDUCATION SUPPORT PROJECT

December 22, 2005

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May, 5th 1997)

Currency Unit = Franc CFA
1 F.CFA = US\$ 0.0017226
US\$ 1 = 580.5 F.CFA

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

PCU: Project Coordination Unit
CAS: Country Assistance Strategy
COME: Teacher In-service Training Commission
EFA: Education For All
EMIS: Education Management Information System
FCFA: CFA Franc
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GEP: Planning Division
GER: Gross Enrollment Rate
HRM: Human Resource Management
INDE: National Development Education Institute
MOE: Ministry of Education
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
PIF: Education Staff Data Base
PIM: Project Implementation Manuel
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SIDA: Swedish International Development Agency
UAP: Teacher Resource Center (TRC)

Vice President:	Gobind T. Nankani
Country Director	Madani M. Tall
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GUINEA-BISSAU
Basic Education Support Project

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<i>Project ID:</i> P001015	<i>Project Name:</i> Basic Education Support Project
<i>Team Leader:</i> Robert J. Hawkins	<i>TL Unit:</i> WBIHD
<i>ICR Type:</i> Core ICR	<i>Report Date:</i> December 22, 2005

1. Project Data

Name: Basic Education Support Project *L/C/TF Number:* IDA-29600; PPFI-Q0460
Country/Department: GUINEA-BISSAU *Region:* Africa Regional Office
Sector/subsector: Primary education (70%); Central government administration (20%); Tertiary education (10%)
Theme: Education for all (P); Gender (P); Rural services and infrastructure (P)

KEY DATES	<i>Original</i>	<i>Revised/Actual</i>
<i>PCD:</i> 03/31/1996	<i>Effective:</i> 12/03/1997	12/03/1997
<i>Appraisal:</i> 04/07/1997	<i>MTR:</i> 07/01/1999	02/06/2002
<i>Approval:</i> 06/10/1997	<i>Closing:</i> 03/31/2002	06/30/2005

Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVT OF GUB/MIN OF EDUCATION
Other Partners:

STAFF	Current	At Appraisal
<i>Vice President:</i>	Gobind T. Nankani	Jean-Louis Sarbib
<i>Country Director:</i>	Madani M. Tall	Mahmood A. Ayub
<i>Sector Manager:</i>	Alexandre V. Abrantes	Ok Pannenberg
<i>Team Leader at ICR:</i>	Michael Drabble	Carmen E. Perez-Castano
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2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S
Sustainability: UN
Institutional Development Impact: N
Bank Performance: S
Borrower Performance: U

QAG (if available) ICR
Quality at Entry: S
Project at Risk at Any Time:

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

Background

At the time of the development of the project, the most pervasive problem in the education sector was insufficient access. The 53% gross (but only 26% net) enrollment rate (GER) in the 1994/95 school

year indicates that only one out of four children in the 7-12 age group was attending school. Girls were particularly excluded with only a 38% GER compared with 69% for same-age boys in 1994/95.

Moreover, school infrastructure was extremely poor, as many schools categorized as “barracas” were no more than shacks made of palm leaves or bamboo which provided one or two room classes that would flood when the rains came. This scarce provision of rural schools and classrooms affected the majority of the population as 80% live in rural areas. Infrastructure also limited progression through the system as only 50% of schools could accommodate a complete set of grades 1-4. Faced also with the relatively high direct (for fees, textbooks, and classroom materials) and opportunity costs, the poor often did not send their children to school.

When students did get access, keeping them there was yet another challenge. Approximately 52% of all primary school students were in the 1st and 2nd grades. Primary education provision ended at the 1st and 2nd grades in 10% and 23% respectively of rural schools. The system was also plagued with a high repetition rate of 31% and dropout rate of 35%. Distances from home, quality of education, religious reasons, economic necessity and safety were all factors in keeping students away from school.

Quality also presented a major challenge for the system. Teachers entered the profession with very little training and received very little professional development while on the job. Moreover, teachers were unmotivated due to chronically late salary payment. Textbooks and learning materials were scarce.

Lack of sufficient financial resources for recurrent costs posed a significant strain to expanding and improving the system. Between 1987 and 1994 for instance, education’s share of the Government's recurrent budget fell sharply from 15% to 10% or to 0.9% of GDP. This compared to an African average of 4% of GDP at the time. Primary education’s share of the recurrent budget also fell from 67% to 48% between 1983 and 1994.

The Ministry of Education badly needed reform. Systems for planning and measurement of impact were non-existent. Overall chaos prevailed in the recruitment, payment, and management of education personnel. Teacher salary payments were chronically delayed by 2-3 months while arrears in payment of allowances reached 2-3 years.

After project approval and effectiveness in June and December, 1997 respectively, Guinea Bissau has been plagued with conflict and instability which in turn affected the implementation of the project (see Annex 8 for chronology of major events and disruptions in Guinea Bissau and for the project since inception). As illustrated, the project did not really start implementing its original objectives until February 2002.

Original Objective

As stated in the Project Appraisal Document, the original development objective of the project was to: (i) expand moderately the coverage of basic education by overcoming impediments to school access and student progression in the school system; (ii) improve the quality of school inputs and the classroom environment; and (iii) improve human and financial resource management in basic education.

The project was designed to lay the foundation for a 10-year government reform program meant to establish the conditions necessary to expand and achieve quality basic education in the country by the year 2010. To address this issue of low, uneven, and dispersed supply of primary education the project would foster the universalization of grades 1-4 in existing schools; support the construction, rehabilitation, furnishing and maintenance of classrooms to increase enrollment; promote double school shift in both

urban and rural areas in order to make more efficient use of existing space and teachers' time; establish an EMIS to improve planning and management of the system; and encourage involvement of parents and communities in promoting girls' schooling.

On the quality front, the two main issues that needed to be addressed included the scarcity of textbooks and learning materials and teachers' lack of pedagogical preparation. The strategy focused on bringing improved teaching and new teaching materials directly into the classroom to enrich the learning environment. At the same time a few key pilot initiatives would guide future interventions including pilot testing an integrated 1-6 grade basic education curriculum.

Finally, the project would develop at Ministry of Education central and regional levels expertise in educational analysis and priority setting as well as take account of new social actors such as religious organizations, communities and NGOS.

3.2 Revised Objective:

The objectives were not revised during implementation.

3.3 Original Components:

The Basic Education Support Project had three major components:

Component I – Basic Education Access. This component aimed to: (i) expand enrollment capacity and begin to normalize student flow primarily through the basic education grades 1-4; (ii) improve the Ministry of Education's planning capacity, thus making reliable information available for policy formulation, decision making, system monitoring, as well as training staff members to use information technology; and (iii) promote girls' schooling and education, thus addressing one of the deepest problems among gender related issues in the country.

Component II – Basic Education Quality. This component aimed to: (i) produce and distribute textbooks and teachers' guides, thus reinforcing classroom activities, as well as training teachers for the adequate use of textbooks; (ii) establish an innovative in-service teacher training system and sustainable mechanisms of teacher support, thus increasing teachers' professional competence and motivation; and (iii) support pilot initiatives and studies in priority education areas, highlighting replicable good practices and gathering valuable information for planning future activities.

Component III – Education Management. This component aimed to improve management in the areas of human and financial resources; to prepare for future education projects; and provide support to the PCU. Efforts would focus on making viable a mechanism for the timely payment of teachers' salaries, installing an effective human and financial management system, assessing the MOE structure and organization, gathering the information for further developments in the sector, and supporting the PCU as a direct manager and instrument of technology transfer for the system.

3.4 Revised Components:

The components were not revised during implementation.

3.5 Quality at Entry:

ICR Rating: Satisfactory

In 1996, Guinea Bissau developed a 10 year education plan. The World Bank responded appropriately through a reasonable and modest intervention to assist the government to realize the objectives of their plan. The original project design did not attempt to do more than the system could handle at the time. The

project aimed to address the very basic sector constraints with regard to poor infrastructure, limited availability of quality inputs and low levels of management and planning across the system. The project design also responded to the CAS priorities of: (i) poverty reduction and development of human resources; (ii) sectoral reforms; and (iii) local capacity building and utilization.

During preparation, a few alternative project designs were considered and rejected. First, on the access front, the rapid expansion of primary education was rejected as the foundations for effective expansion first needed to be addressed. Next, with regard to quality, the project opted not to focus on curriculum reform or a pre-service training program, but rather to focus on improved teaching and bringing new teaching materials directly into the classroom. Also, the alternative of including secondary education in the project was also rejected for fear of diverting scarce resources needed for these very essential basic education inputs.

Further, while providing some basic inputs, the reform agenda would not be tackled directly but the project rather would focus efforts on pilots and studies to further inform this process. Lessons learned from prior experience guided the project development team to take this step-by-step approach to reforms and use the studies to inform future projects.

On the capacity front, the project development team recognized that implementation would be a challenge. The team therefore determined that a PCU needed to be established, and other social actors such as NGOs would need to be engaged. At the same time, the project would focus on building capacity at MOE central and regional levels to analyze policy options and set priorities.

Despite these positive aspects, the project preparation team could have done more to mitigate potential risks. For instance, the commitment and ownership of the government to the project was most likely not appropriately evaluated. While the government gave many indications of support, past instability and crisis were not sufficiently accounted for in the design. Also, partnerships among other donors were most likely not broad enough as the project did not sufficiently spread its risks and exposure across a larger number of donors. While SIDA was originally expected to finance 18.5% of project costs and the government was to cover 5.4%, the Bank ended up being the sole financier for this project. Institutional capacity could have been better analyzed from the beginning and where important gaps existed the project could have built in a more explicit capacity building program. Finally, the indicators used to evaluate the project could have been strengthened. For instance, two of the quality measures are actually output not outcome indicators.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

ICR Rating: Satisfactory

The project has attained 4 of its 5 originally stated impact indicators. The achievement of the project's objectives is rated therefore as satisfactory based on the following:

- (i) Access – the project exceeded its gross enrollment target. The GER for the project rose from 53% to a 2004 estimate of 97% -- far above the original 63% target.
- (ii) Quality – the project met its reduction in repetition rate target as well as attained the basic output measures for text book provision and teacher training.
- (iii) Education Management – the project failed to produce any tangible and lasting results in developing capacity and systems for improved education management at the regional and central levels. The failure in this area however is largely attributed to the constant flux and instability of the Ministry of Education and the government as a whole.

The primary weight for evaluating these outcomes is based on the achievements of the project inputs and outputs (cf.: key performance indicators outcome/impact indicators annex #1). Although these outcomes seem modest, it is nonetheless quite remarkable that were achieved in the context of an extremely difficult post-conflict environment that prevailed during most of the life of the project. One could say that without the project and the achievement of most of its expected outcomes, the education system would be in much worse shape than it is today.

Large Expansion of Primary Education Access

At the beginning of the project in 1997, the GER for primary education was 53%. The target for the project was to increase the GER to 63%. According to the latest statistics, the GER at the end of the 2003/04 school year stood at 97%. Student attendance in primary education schools increased from 118,723 students in 1997/98 to 232,292 in 2003/04. This represents an introduction of 113,569 students into the system or a 95% increase in student enrollment over these years. A rough estimate reveals that classroom construction component of the project account for around 22% (the construction of 311 classrooms with 40 students per classroom and two shifts would accommodate around 24,880 new students in the system assuming that all 311 classrooms were new as opposed to replacement classrooms). Rehabilitation, especially following the end of the conflict contributed a lot to add and increase existing capacity to the education system. Another key factor that contributed to a large increase in GER is the Government's decision advocated by the Bank (HIPC decision point) to eliminate tuition fee in primary. Of course, the project also contributed through its other activities, namely provision of school inputs, training and payment of teacher salary arrears to support and stimulate demand for education which impacted positively on access. Finally, girls' access has also risen during the course of the project with girls representing almost 46% of students or a parity index of 0.9 in grades 1-4.

Despite these gains, opportunities for progression through the system remain limited with disparities in access across regions. Moreover, while parity for girls has been achieved in the early grades, girls quickly leave school in ensuing years leaving the parity index at 0.6 for grades 5-6 and 0.4 for secondary school.

Improvement in Quality Inputs

The reduction in repetition rates between grades 1-2 from 35% to 26% is another outcome measure for the project. The project has also surpassed this measure as repetition rates dropped to 14.6% for the 2003/04 school year.

The project also aimed to have 90% of schools provided with textbooks and 100% of teachers engaged in in-service teacher training. Two textbook distribution activities took place with project funding – one in the 2001/02 school year and one in the 2003/04 school year. In 2001/02, for 201,116 students in the system, a total of 170,329 textbook packages were distributed reaching approximately 85% of the students. In the latest distribution taking place in 2003/04, a total of 196,149 textbook packages were distributed reaching 84% of the 232,292 students in the system.

With regard to teacher training, the project has involved on average 85% of the teachers in an in-service teacher training plan. From 2002 to 2005, 25 in-service training sessions took place reaching 3,299 teachers in every region of the country. Also 100 master teachers were trained in order to provide on-going pedagogical support.

There is no student assessment system (besides formal end of cycle exams) in Guinea-Bissau, so it is not possible for instance to measure the impact of teacher training on student learning outcomes. But one could say from empiric observations that despite the project essential contributions to the functioning and

improvement of the education system, the overall quality of education remains low.

Education Management

The Ministry has no planning process in place, no budgeting system, no payroll system, and no overall education management system. While some strides have been made with regard to developing limited statistical competencies and beginning to organize a human resources database, much still needs to be done to allow the Ministry to access and analyze the data necessary to make effective policy and planning decisions.

It is important to state that the project was implemented in a conflict and post-conflict environment where institutional stability was practically non-existent for most of the duration of the project and institutional leadership was constantly in flux. The project to a large degree therefore was instrumental in supporting the education system and to a large extent the functioning of the education administration. Despite some shortcomings in quality indicators and education management, the access component which represents 62% of the project was implemented well under exceedingly difficult country conditions and the key performance indicators were met.

4.2 Outputs by components:

Component 1: Moderate Expansion of Basic Education Access.

ICR Rating: Satisfactory

This component aimed to help to improve access to basic education through the rehabilitation and construction of classrooms, latrines, wells, and the provision of furniture. As of the project closing date, 311 classrooms had been constructed, 319 classrooms rehabilitated, 90 latrines built, 40 wells dug, and 6,779 pieces of furniture procured. The provision of these new classrooms has created space for approximately 24,880 students in 90 schools across the country.

Construction of 266 classrooms and rehabilitation of 304 classrooms. This component originally included the construction of 266 new classrooms including furniture; 50 latrines with 4 cabins in each one; and rehabilitation of 304 classrooms. From 1997 to 2001, the project had financed rehabilitation of 261 classrooms as well as the purchase of 5,220 desks (20 desks each for the 261 classrooms) for students. After the conflict, in 2000, the project financed the rehabilitation of an additional 58 classrooms bringing the total number of classrooms rehabilitated by the project to 319.

In 2003, the government decided to dedicate the remaining resources to new construction only as opposed to rehabilitation. At this time, the partnership program with NGOs was also introduced and the component was divided among work that was contracted directly to construction companies and construction that was managed by NGOs (for a breakdown of construction completed by NGOs and companies see Annex 9). As a result of this construction, the Ministry believes that communities are now more likely to send their kids to these new schools than to the old “barracas” that existed before the project. The experience of the partnership program has been praised as an important innovation in mobilizing the construction realized in this project. Seven partner NGOs were involved in the program. The incorporation of these NGOs into the project resulted in a much faster roll out of the construction program. Indeed, 69% of the total number of completed classrooms (equivalent to a grand total of 311 classrooms built during the life of the project) was finished by the NGO partners. Moreover, the NGOs have been much more effective in completing classrooms with a 96% completion rate versus only 46% for the companies. Also, the unit costs for the NGOs are on average 50% those charged by the companies. The lower costs, however, were not achieved with equal quality. The PCU stressed that the classrooms built by companies were clearly of higher quality.

The project also financed the construction of the PCU building in 1997. Also, as a result of the conflict, the project rehabilitated a number of Ministry of Education buildings. These buildings include: INDE (in-service teacher training); Teacher Training college; Directorate of the Inspector General; Directorate of Human Resources; Directorate of Financial Administration; Directorate of School Infrastructure; GEP; and the Ministry building itself. Moreover, a new conference room was built as well as 11 teacher resource centers across the country. The NGO partners also constructed 6 teacher residences with 54 rooms in total. All of these teacher houses are complete.

Routine maintenance was also planned to be accomplished on 450 classrooms through the project, but the priority on new construction took precedence and this maintenance was never financed. Maintenance however remains an important consideration for the sustainability of the above investments.

System of Education Management and Planning (EMIS). While this sub-component was originally under the Access component in the PAD, it is addressed in this ICR under Component III – Education Management as a more logical fit.

Girls' Schooling. The “Action Plan for Promoting Girls' Education” carried out through the project, was completed in 1998 with UNICEF. The most notable measure incorporated into the yearly plan of project activities was the construction of latrines -- 90 latrines completed under the project. Implementation of specific policy recommendations was limited.

Component II: Improvement in Quality Inputs

ICR Rating: Satisfactory

The component is rated satisfactory based on attainment of the outputs originally stated in the project appraisal document in the areas of: (i) provision of text books; (ii) provision of in-service training; (iii) pilot educational initiatives

Increased supply of teaching materials – textbooks and pedagogical materials.

During the course of the project two procurements of materials were executed by the PCU and another was executed jointly by the PCU and UNDP through the donor emergency fund. Textbook packages were procured for the 2001/02, the 2003/04 and 2004/05 school years. A packet of books for grades 1-4 included Portuguese, Math, Science and Social Science books; the package for grades 5-6 included Portuguese and Math books only. In 2001/02, a total of 170,329 textbook packages were distributed covering 85% of the students in grades 1-6. In 2003/04 a total of 196,149 textbook packages were distributed. This represented coverage of 84% of the students in grades 1-6. Moreover, Teachers' guides were distributed once over the course of the project to around 3,500 teachers. These teachers' guides were incorporated into two in-service training sessions in February 2005.

While textbooks were distributed for the past two school years a some problems were identified. First, actual distribution of the textbooks has consistently been late only arriving at the schools in April or May of the existing school year (one could sit is more a problem of bad planning, because it nonetheless benefited the next school year). Second, conservation and care of the textbooks are poor, although the Ministry has organized awareness raising seminars in the preservation of textbooks.

Materials were distributed at specific times between 2002 and 2005 to support school functioning. The decision to purchase a more comprehensive school kit of supplies was taken late in the project and as a result just arrived in June 2005 for the 2005/06 school year. The school kits have chalk, pens, paper, pencils, and pencil sharpeners.

The government decided not to undertake the two pilot studies originally identified under this component – one on a borrow-and-return textbook experience and one on a rental service scheme for secondary students. The studies became irrelevant when the government made the policy decision to distribute free textbooks and teaching materials to the schools.

In-service teacher training. The in-service teacher training program was revitalized in the 2002/03 school year. Over the past two years, 23 sessions lasting one day (approximately 6 hours) have taken place. Each of these sessions was organized through 79 learning circles active throughout the country. Each learning circle contained anywhere between 30 to 80 teachers. Approximately 3,299 teachers across the country participated in these sessions over this time period. This represents on average around 85% of the 3,870 teachers at the primary education level. The seminars focused on classroom planning and pedagogical strategies. Also, two additional in-service training workshops were organized in February 2005. These workshops focused on consolidating lessons learned during the 23 prior workshops and introducing the teachers to the pedagogical guides that had been previously distributed.

Regional Technical Teams have also been organized consisting of 2 inspectors, one teacher trainer, and 1 regional director. Around 80 of these teams have been organized throughout the country. The inspectors are charged with visiting the schools, observing classroom practice, meeting with teachers in groups and discussing challenges and best practice.

While the project established the system for in-service training and delivered its output objectives, the sustainability of the in-service teacher training activities is doubtful. The distribution of a per diem (US\$7) contributed to get teachers' attendance by supporting transportation cost and a meal. Further, the quality of the training is unknown as no evaluations were conducted and the impact of these training in classroom quality is unknown. Although it is fair to say that neither the project nor the Government were in the capacity to conduct this type of impact evaluation. Nonetheless, in February 2005, the project undertook an overall external evaluation of the program which highlighted the positive impact of these training sessions on mobilizing and motivating teachers and providing some guidance for better teaching technics.

The project also established 11 Teacher Support Units (UAPs). These centers were meant to serve as teacher resource centers consisting of a basic collection of pedagogical texts, encyclopedias, audio-visual programs, pedagogical materials and classroom supplies, a computer and printer, a photocopier machine, and a power source. While a building has been identified and equipment has been procured for each of the centers, only one is active with most others non-operational. The project has: (i) established the rules for governance of the UAPs through the regional directors of education; (ii) established management committees in all regions; (iii) designed action plans for use of the centers; and (iv) elaborated a financial plan for purchase of gasoline and maintenance of generators, true ownership has still not developed and the loss of financing for recurrent costs will make it difficult for these centers to operate to their potential now that the project has closed. The project did encourage UAPs and local education authorities to partner with local NGOs.

Pilot educational initiatives. This sub-component was originally envisioned an assessment of NGO capacity and NGO pilot initiatives; and the implementation of at least 20 sub-projects including dissemination of the results of these pilots. After re-launch of the project, the government decided not to implement such a large number of pilots and focus instead on the NGO partnership program. Indeed, a very important learning experience emerged from the partnership program that was developed in 2002 with the local NGOs. This pilot evolved into a parallel decentralized implementation arm of the project. The seven NGOs were originally identified based on their work in the education sector and were approached to

develop proposals for the classroom, latrine, and well construction aspects of the project. Through this innovation, capacity has been developed for future interventions. The partnership also included a grant (US\$15,000) for NGOs to develop school-based quality activities. Six NGOs received this grant and completed activities in the last three months before closing of the project.

Component III: Education Management

ICR Rating: Unsatisfactory

This component is rated unsatisfactory as it was not fully realized. Considering the instability of the government and the Ministry of Education (MOE) during the course of the project, this component never really had an opportunity to take root. With nine separate Ministers over a four year period, policies never had time to develop and be implemented. The component aimed to promote management improvement in areas of critical concern to the MOE, especially human and financial resources. Needless to say, these issues prevail today.

Administrative and management systems. This sub-component contained a number of elements including: (i) an EMIS with all data on enrollment, classrooms, furniture, textbooks, teachers and training as well as student and infrastructure data; (ii) a human resource management system; (iii) a payroll system with the development of the timely salary payment fund; (iv) a budgeting system; (v) staff training (provide in-service training seminars on data analysis for policy making, program planning, monitoring and evaluation); (vi) office equipment; (vii) preparatory studies; and (viii) pilot studies. Additionally, sub-components originally allocated under component I of the project on school access and not covered above include: (i) development of a school map with quantitative and qualitative supply and demand data; (ii) production of annual statistics.

This EMIS component has only partially been realized with the outputs not achieving their original objectives. The Division of Planning of the MOE and the nine regional directorates have been equipped with IT equipment and have received limited training – approximately three workshops over the course of the project.

The process of data collection has progressed marginally. All data at the local and regional level is collected via pen and paper. Only at the central level is the data input into the databases. Today, there is only limited capacity at the regional level to collect data and limited capacity at national level to analyze data. The statistical yearbook has only been officially published once during the course of the project – in 1999/2000 school year. Data collection activities have taken place for the 2003/04 and the 2004/05 school years, but an official yearbook has yet to be published. The turbulent country-context and repeated teacher strikes in 2003 rendered the regular collection of education data difficult. The school map activity was never started because the Division Planning tried to focus on collecting and analyzing education data which happens to be quite a challenge.

The payroll and budgeting systems were also not accomplished. While the entire vision for the Human Resource Management System was not realized, the Ministry has set up the Processor Individual do Funcionario (PIF). Data has been collected in hard copy and is being entered into a central database in the Ministry. This database contains professional, academic, training experience, and professional career evolution including all professional changes over the course of a career. According to Ministry personnel, this data has allowed the government to make more informed decisions when appointing new candidates to posts and for determining human resource development needs across the sector.

Training activities under this component have been limited. The major capacity building for Ministry of Education staff took place from May to June 2003. During this training 30 technical staff participated in modules on public accounting and financial management and 24 staff participated in a module on human resource management.

Three preparatory studies have been realized.

- The first study focused on the assessment of the Ministry's organizational and functional structure. This study was however never implemented by the Ministry.
- The second study undertaken by the project addressed the unified basic education curriculum (EBU) reform. While much development and planning went into this pilot, the pilot was never able to fully get off the ground and no further progress has been made in moving this reform forward.
- Third, an education sector study has just recently been finished which analyses basic, secondary and tertiary education systems. During the ICR mission, a seminar was conducted to share the findings of the study and solicit feedback from education leaders in the country.
- Other studies that were defined for this component that were never initiated include a study on alternative pre-service teacher training programs and a study on alternative models of school construction.

Project Coordination Unit. The PCU has been the only stable implementation organization in the Education system over the life of the project. The PCU annual cost of operation was about US\$139,000 per year and over the course of the project accounted for around 7% of total project costs. The PCU was originally conceived to play the role of planning components, managing the credit resources, monitoring and continuing assessment of project activities, and facilitating an environment of cooperation and encouragement with the Ministry of Education. Due to the political conflicts and instability at the Ministry of Education, the PCU gradually took on a more active role and the full responsibility in implementing and managing the project. At the same time, the PCU was careful to fully consult and involve the MOE in all activities.

Payment of Teacher Salary Arrears. One of the major accomplishments of the project was the payment of past teacher salaries. The Timely Salary Payment Fund was originally established by the government at the beginning of the project. Soon however after the conflict started the funds were depleted and never replenished. Payment of teacher salaries has continued to be a nagging problem throughout the life of the project. The problem got so acute that in 2003, the government together with the Bank reallocated project resources to pay teacher salary arrears amounting to approximately US\$1.10 million representing 70% of the arrears owed. The activity has had a positive externality in helping the Ministry to clarify which teachers are active in the system. This payment of arrears was important output for the project as it assisted the government to bring teachers back to the classroom and created a platform to develop trust between the government and the teacher unions. The transition Government that took over in late 2003 was able to pay civil servants salaries more regularly by enforcing a more rigorous economic management policy.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

Not applicable

4.4 Financial rate of return:

Not applicable

4.5 Institutional development impact:

ICR Rating: Negligible

The institutional development impact is negligible. During the entire life of the project the political environment in the country has been highly unstable. As indicated above, the PCU acted as the only consistent and functioning institution delivering education services in the country. Little, if any, capacity development was passed on to the various institutional bodies of the Ministry of Education as they were constantly in flux. Moreover, very little training and capacity building took place during the course of the project. Almost the entire education management component of the project was never implemented leaving the Ministries planning and analysis capacities at the same low level as when the project began. On the positive side, increased institutional capacity has been developed among the NGO partners through their hands on experience with the school construction component. Capacity has also been developed at the PCU, however this capacity will be lost with the closing of the project. Overall, negligible institutional development has taken place to build upon for future interventions.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome


5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

The project was plagued with factors outside of its control that impeded its smooth implementation (see annex 8), namely civil conflict and political upheaval. Ministerial instability has persisted partially as a result of these external factors. The PCU therefore was forced to work with a Ministry that was ever changing – both in terms of personnel and policy.

The conflicts further affected the overall macroeconomic stability in the country influencing the government’s ability to collect taxes and thus pay for costs across the entire public sector. This instability has seriously impacted the Ministry of Education’s ability to retain and remunerate quality public servants. The political and economic instability has also impacted the willingness of donors to engage in the country leaving the government with very few resources to sustain the education system.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

The major factor under government control has been the commitment to the education sector and the allocation of resources in the government budget. The allocation from the government’s budget for education fluctuated between 11% and 17.3% during the life of the project. In neighboring countries this figure is closer to 25%. Defense and Security took the largest share of the budget. The education prioritization has clearly been impacted by the countries conflict as illustrated below in the comparison of budget allocation to education and defense from 1998 to 2004. This lack of commitment on financing of education is most evident in the persistent arrears for teacher salaries.



The government had difficulty coming up with its 5% counterpart funding for the project. This resulted in implementation delays. The issue was eventually resolved in August 2003 with an agreement on the part of the World Bank to cover 100% of project costs. This decision applied to all projects in Guinea Bissau.

While the project has generated some reports guiding the government toward policy reform, no action was ever taken. The unified basic education curriculum remains unresolved; the structural and organizational reforms in the Ministry itself have not been addressed; and a clearer path for teacher career development remains open.

Finally, more efforts for coordination between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education on the issue of information sharing, database harmonization and teacher salary payments could have been initiated but were not.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

The PCU led implementation of the project activities during a very unstable environment. One important factor was its willingness to collaborate with NGOs in implementation of project activities. This innovation helped to decentralize the execution of the classroom construction component and accelerated implementation. Moreover, the initiative provided a valuable learning experience for the PCU, the Ministry of Education and the NGOs themselves in how best to share responsibilities and leverage all of the talent and resources that the country has for the betterment of education. In addition, the PCU was careful to involve the Ministry's staff and senior managers in all project decisions. They were regularly informed and they guided most of the decisions made by the PCU in terms of project implementation

5.4 Costs and financing:

Total costs for the project were approximately US\$14.3 million. Of this total about 62% was allocated to the access component – specifically the classroom construction activities. About 17% was dedicated to quality enhancements with 9% spent on textbooks, 5% on teacher training and 20% on various consultancies and studies. The PCU absorbed around 7% of total costs and the remaining 8% was spent on the payment of teacher salary arrears.

No other donors contributed in a significant way to the sector during the life of the project. Although SIDA was originally allocated to assume 18.5% of project costs, they withdrew funding after the war leaving World Bank funding as the only source of capital for education sector investment.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

ICR Rating: Unlikely

The project outputs and outcomes are not sustainable. The project has to a large degree substituted for an absent Ministry of Education. With the closing of the project and no immediate follow up project (a CDD-Education is currently being prepared) the gains made through the project will probably be lost and the education sector will most likely experience a further set back.

Institutional Aspect

The project has been implemented by the PCU with very little Ministry of Education intervention over the course of the project. While limited capacity building has been achieved with the Ministry at both the central and regional levels, without project funding further capacity building and institutional strengthening will most likely not occur in the short term. Furthermore, with the end of the project the PCU will be

dissolved and the staff will go their separate ways. Some may be retained in education sector projects, but the investments that have been made in building this capacity will for the most part be lost as the unit dissolves.

The project components are also left without strong institutional ownership. It is unclear the extent to which in-service teacher training will continue under INDE or the extent to which the Teacher Resource Centers will be managed and sustained by the Ministry of Education. Without a stable, financially solvent entity like the PCU pushing these activities forward, it is highly probable that the Ministry will not step into the breach to manage the components going forward. Moreover, without government commitment to the basics of paying its civil service on a regular basis, the incentives for Ministry personnel to pick up the management of the various project components are non-existent.

The most successful aspect of the project in terms of institutional development has been the partnership program and the decentralization of school construction to the NGOs at the community level. Building on the lessons learned through this innovation and deepening this multi-layered collaboration will be important for the sustainability of this intervention. Furthermore, the plans for Bank budget support to the government to cover civil servant salaries would be an important step toward institutional commitment to the sector.

Financial Aspect

Recurrent cost support has been a constant problem. Teacher salary payments represent the most fundamental area. At ICR review, the investments were suffering from lack of basic resources for recurrent costs – gas for the generators, paper and toner to print, per diems for teachers to come to training, etc. After project completion, the larger investments are certain not to continue for the same reasons -- facilities will not be maintained, teacher training centers will not be managed, teachers will not have the resources to come to the facilities for training, inspectors will not have resources to visit schools to oversee teachers' classroom practices, in-service training will not take place for lack of per diems and coordination honoraria, etc.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

“Firkidja” means foundation. The fact that there is no immediate follow-up project obviously affects the sustainability of inputs and achievements that have been made thus far. With the outbreak of the conflict, the concept of building the foundation was largely lost and replaced with activities designed to simply keep a system functioning at a minimum level. The one option is to continue to work through and strengthen NGOs as implementing arms at the community level until the Ministry of Education is able to stabilize itself enough to take on increased responsibilities. The Bank is considering this approach with a community driven development project with an education focus. Finally, an IDA budget support operation was expected to go to the Board in December 2005 until it was delayed because of a change of Government in Guinea-Bissau.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank

7.1 Lending:

ICR Rating: Satisfactory

The Bank's performance during preparation was satisfactory. The Bank team worked with the government to develop a project that aimed to achieve relatively modest outputs and outcomes and that would address the government's priorities for human resource development as outlined in the Country Assistance Strategy.

7.2 Supervision:

ICR Rating: Satisfactory

Bank performance during supervision was satisfactory. The Bank did a good job adjusting to a very fluid and difficult country context. In the face of poor overall implementation capacity, it initiated the Partnership program to engage local communities and expand the number of development actors involved in project implementation. The Bank team also worked with the government to help address the problem of repeated teacher strikes as a result of teacher salary arrears. On this issue, the team responded to the crisis by re-allocating part of the credit to pay teacher salary arrears and end the strike. The Bank also responded very positively to the capacity needs of the PCU in the area of procurement by allocating a Senegal-based staff member to interact and provide support to the PCU on a more regular basis. Finally, the Bank demonstrated flexibility in reducing the counterpart funding agreement from 5% to zero in light of the government's fiscal constraints. On the negative side, the Bank however was never able to address the issues of sustainability and the realistic recurrent cost burdens necessary for medium term progress. The Bank could have considered a restructuring of the project as a LICUS country at the mid-term review.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

Based on the factors described above, the overall Bank performance is rated satisfactory.

Borrower*7.4 Preparation:***ICR Rating: Satisfactory**

Government's performance during preparation was satisfactory. By accounts reflected in the Project Appraisal Document, the government was highly engaged in the preparation of the project with the Bank and the Minister himself assumed a strong leadership role in the preparation meetings. The Minister mobilized action within his own Ministry, engaged in dialogue with the Ministry of Finance, frequently interacted with the preparation and appraisal missions, and offered prompt responses to Aide Memoire recommendations. Moreover, the installation of counterpart teams for the preparation produced a strong feeling of ownership on the part of the government. Further, the government had agreed to increase the financial resources for the education sector as well as take steps to address the problem of timely payment of teacher salaries by establishing a buffer account.

*7.5 Government implementation performance:***ICR Rating: Unsatisfactory**

The government never had a long enough continuous presence to take a leadership role. As described above, the project was led by the PCU. While Editora Escolar played a role in distribution of text books and INDE was empowered to run the teacher training in-service program as well as the curriculum reform projects, the government took few other decisive steps to ensure project success. Major failings include discontinuation of the teacher salary buffer account, lack of clear plans for sustainability and payment of recurrent costs; and inaction on major policy decisions for which the project generated technical analysis.

Nonetheless, the decision to eliminate tuition fees in primary was an important and crucial step made by the Government a few months after the end of the conflict. It created an overnight tidal wave for education.

*7.6 Implementing Agency:***ICR Rating: Satisfactory**

The implementation agency's performance is rated satisfactory. The PCU held the project together. Despite a turbulent external environment, the PCU management team was able to support almost single handed all project activities. The PCU should be commended for maintaining a presence in the education sector while most other activities in the country came to a halt.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

Based on the factors described above, the overall Borrower's performance is rated unsatisfactory

8. Lessons Learned

The project has generated a number of lessons that can be applied to future projects in countries with fragile states.

NGO Partnership program. An important innovation for the project and a key factor in the classroom construction program was the incorporation of a larger number of development actors in the implementation of the project. Considering the political turbulence that the country endured during the initial years of the project and the subsequent weakened state of the Ministry of Education, the decision to reach outside of the traditional public sector institutions to assist with the delivery of the project was an important adjustment to the originally conceived project design. The initiative has helped build capacity among the NGO sector, provided an important learning experience for the government in understanding the capacities of the various NGOs in the education sector and how they can be effectively used, and has built a broader network of development actors in the field of education who can be called upon again to assist where government capacity may be weak.

Risk Assessment. It is very difficult for a sector project to be implemented and to achieve its outcomes in a post conflict country if there is no sustained commitment from the Government. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the level of risk was obviously very high even once order and peace were restored in late 1999. The undertaking of a serious, detailed risk assessment by the country team would have probably help to steer the project in a more sustainable path and/ or to find other strategies to support a failing education sector.

Preserving Investments in Institutional Capacity. As the project draws to a close, it is evident that much of the hands-on experience and formal capacity training that has been directed at the PCU over the years of the project will now be lost. This loss is particularly acute in a post-conflict country such as Guinea Bissau where the conflict has weakened public administration and a unit such as the PCU represents the sole organ that remained operational throughout the years of turbulence. A potential solution would be to build in a transition strategy for the PCU itself at project inception to evolve the organization into an NGO or Foundation at the end of the project.

Sustainability Plan. In a post-conflict environment where the Ministry of Education can not pay teacher salaries, alternative arrangements need to be considered for any investments requiring recurrent cost financing. For instance, the investments made in the teacher resources centers suffer from lack of funds for electricity, toner, paper, technical support, etc. Additionally the resources for teacher travel and inspector travel to the centers are lacking. A solution that the PCU had begun to investigate during the ICR mission was to partner with a Portuguese NGO focused on promotion of Portuguese language to assume responsibility for the management and maintenance of the centers.

Stronger Incentives Structure. While payment of salaries is always a strong incentive, the system lacks other basic non-monetary incentives to motivate its public servants. Training seminars could incorporate some type of certificate or recognition for those teachers who attended these sessions. Implementing a clearer career path which encourages professional development, may provide an additional incentive for teachers to attend training workshops and implement these lessons in the classroom. Particular incentives also need to be developed for maintenance for textbooks and classrooms.

Restructuring of Project. In retrospect, the project should have been restructured after the conflict to

more clearly delineate the revised scope of the project from one laying the foundation for a follow up project to one that simply helped to keep the system together in a post-conflict environment. This restructuring would have given the Bank and the task team a clearer mandate for assisting the government with issues such as payment of teacher arrears.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

See Annex 10

(b) Cofinanciers:

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

10. Additional Information

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

A. Outcome/Impact Indicators

Outcome/Impact Indicator	Baseline	Target	Actual/Latest Estimate at the end of the IDA operation in June 2005
1. Gross Enrollment Rate in primary increased from 53% to 63%	53%	63%	Exceeded. 2003/04 GER figure was 97%
2. 90% of primary schools provided with textbooks	Unknown	90% of primary schools provided with textbooks	Achieved. Two textbook distributions undertaken by the project in 2001/02 and 2003/04 reaching 85% and 84% of students respectively. At least 90% of schools would have been covered. Textbooks were again distributed nation-wide to all primary students enrolled in April-May 2005 financed through the emergency fund.
3. 100% of primary teachers participating in in-service teacher training	N.A	100% of primary teachers have participated in in-service teacher training	Achieved. 3,299 teachers participated in the in-service training program representing approximately 100% of the teachers in the system.
4. Repetition rates in 1st and 2nd grades reduced from 35% to 26%	Repetition rate in 1st and 2nd grade is 35%	Repetition rate in 1st and 2nd grade is 26%	Achieved. Average repetition rate in primary was estimated at 15.5% in 2003/04. It was estimated at 14.6% and 16% in first and second grade, respectively.
5. Human resource and financial management improved and teachers paid on-time	N.A	Human resource and financial management improved and teachers paid on-time	Not Achieved. Teachers' salary arrears stood at 4-6 months at the time of the ICR mission. US\$1.1 million was paid for teacher salary arrears by the Credit.

B. Output Indicators

Output Indicator	Baseline	End of Operation Target	Actual Output
Increased access to basic education			
1. 266 primary classrooms built and 304 classrooms rehabilitated. 418 classrooms furnished.	NA	266 primary classrooms built and 304 classrooms rehabilitated. 418 classrooms furnished.	Achieved. 311 classrooms (90 latrines, 54 teachers' residences and 40 wells) have been built and equipped. 120 classrooms remain to be completed (civil works progress overall is 72%). No rehabilitation done. 319 classrooms rehabilitated. Approximately 600 classrooms have been furnished.
2. Action plan to promote girls' schooling prepared by 1998	NA	Action plan to promote girls' schooling prepared by 1998; measures incorporated into yearly project activities; workshops organized with parents and teachers; and	Partially Achieved. Plan prepared with Unicef and integrated in the in-service teacher training plan executed in 2002-2004. Meetings with parents and communities and social assessments never took place.

		development of social assessments.	
Quality			
3. Textbooks for grades 1-4 in three subjects (Portuguese, Math and Science) distributed in 90% of primary schools by year 20 00/01. Textbooks for grades5-6 in two subjects (Portuguese and Math)	Unknown	Textbooks for grades 1-4 in three subjects (Portuguese, Math and Science) and grades 5-6 in two subjects (Portuguese and Math) distributed in 90% of primary schools by year 2000/01	Achieved. Two textbook distributions undertaken by the project in 2001/02 and 2003/04 reaching 85% and 84% of students respectively. At least 90% of schools would have been covered. Textbooks were again distributed nation-wide to all primary students enrolled in April-May 2005 financed through the emergency fund.
4. Teacher' guides for three subjects provided for each grade of primary education. Teachers introduced to textbook use in grades 1-4.	NA	Teacher' guides for three subjects provided for each grade of primary education	Mostly Achieved. Teacher's guides distributed for 3 subjects in 2001. A teacher pedagogic guide (based upon in-service teacher training delivered in 2003/04) distributed to 3,500 primary teachers in 2004/05 and incorporated into in-service training. Teachers not introduced to textbook use in grades 1-4.
5. About 800 primary schools supplied with notebooks, maps and pedagogic materials	NA	About 800 primary schools supplied with notebooks, maps and pedagogic materials	Partially Achieved. Project financed the purchase of kits of basic school supply to be distributed at the beginning of the school-year 2005/06 to 1,300 primary schools. Materials arrived 2 weeks before project closing. Materials were also distributed in 2003 & 2004.
6. Two pilot studies conducted on textbooks.	NA	Borrow and return policy and secondary school textbook rental studies to be completed.	Not Achieved. Ministry implemented policy for free textbooks making studies irrelevant.
7. About 660 (20%) of grade 1-4 teachers participate in in-service teacher training (COME - Study Committee) in 1998; 1,650 in 1999; 2,475 in 2000; and 3,300 in 2001. Teachers participate in 16 Teacher Study Committee sessions.	NA	About 660 (20%) of grade 1-4 teachers participated in in-service teacher training (COME - Study Committee) in 1998; 1,650 in 1999; 2,475 in 2000 and 3,300 in 2001	Achieved. All primary teachers (around 3,200) participated in in-service training from May 2002 to June 2004. 23 sessions lasting 6 hours each were conducted.
8. Some 60 school inspectors and 25 trainers of trainers (pedagogic facilitators) recycled into regional technical team (RTT) and teacher support unit	N.A	Some 60 school inspectors and 25 trainers of trainers (pedagogic facilitators) recycled into regional technical team (RTT) and teacher support unit	Achieved. Staff trained (more than 80). 9 Regional teams have been set up to provide pedagogical support and have led in in-service teacher training (COME).
9. Regional teacher support unit operational in all 9 regions	None	Regional teacher support unit operational in all 9 regions	Not Achieved. 11 Teacher Resource Centers have been built and equipped. Only three TRC though are truly

			operational and these are not sustainable.
10. Handbooks for school teachers, principals and pedagogical facilitators distributed by 1999.	None	Handbooks for school teachers, principals and pedagogical facilitators distributed by 1999	Achieved. See intermediate indicator #4. A teacher pedagogic guide was elaborated (based upon in-service teacher training delivered in 2003/04) and distributed to 3500 primary teachers in 2004/05.
11. Some 20 innovations reported and lessons learned disseminated within the sector. Assessment of NGO capacity and pilot initiative.	NA	Launch a partnership with NGOs to implement school-improvement activities	Partially Achieved. Activity modified. Partnership agreement signed with 7 NGOs to build and equip primary classrooms and implement small scale community-based quality activities in newly built schools (2005). None of the 20 innovations implemented.
Education Management			
12. Central and regional level educational information management system installed and staff trained and operational for planning and managing sector operations routinely (e.g.: school map).	NA	Central and regional level educational information management system installed and staff trained and operational planning and managing sector operations routinely (e.g.: school map).	Not Achieved. No education management information system (EMIS) in place. Limited training provided for central and regional managers and statisticians (limited and weak impact).
13. All data on enrollment, classrooms furniture, textbooks, teachers, training among others entered in the EMIS and analyzed	NA	All data on enrollment, classrooms furniture, textbooks, teachers, training among others entered in the EMIS and analyzed	Not Achieved. Education data collected in 2000 and again in 2004 and 2005. Data are fairly complete, but there is no operational EMIS at MOE.
14. Human resource management system includes appropriate recruitment, employment, and supervision procedures, including individual file system for tracking personnel	NA	Human resource management system includes appropriate recruitment, employment, and supervision procedures, including individual file system for tracking personnel	Partially Achieved. Database on MOE staff was updated three years in a row. Each staff has an individual file including information relevant to employment history. HRM remains weak without ways to ensure compliance
15. Payroll system automated and operational; teachers paid on time each month	NA	Payroll system automated and operational; teachers paid on time each month	Not Achieved. There is no automated payroll system. Information on payroll is submitted on a monthly basis to the Minister of Finance (list of personnel on paper). Teachers arrears stood at 4-6 months at time of ICR mission.
16. Financial Directorate trained and equipped.	NA	Financial Directorate trained and equipped	Partially Achieved. Computer equipment and limited training provided. Impact limited.
17. Studies completed as the basis for the next project and policy	NA	Studies completed as the basis for the next project and policy	Partially Achieved. Various studies completed: EFA action plan, PRSP (Education) and education sector

framework prepared.		framework prepared.	diagnostic. National Consulting Meeting on Education was also organized. Alternative models of school construction and alternative pre-service training program not completed. None of the policy recommendations from the studies have been implemented.
18. PCU team uses PIM to develop project management system and establish process to coordinate activities of all stakeholders. Project monitoring and evaluation system established and operational	NA	PCU team uses PIM to develop project management system and establish process to coordinate activities of all stakeholders. Project monitoring and evaluation system established and operational	Mostly Achieved. PIM exists and was used during the project implementation. Monitoring and evaluation system is operational but was not very effective in identifying and addressing issues.

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US\$ 000 equivalent)

Project Component	Appraisal Estimates	Actual/Latest (or Final) Estimate	Actual as a Percentage of Appraisal
<i>I - Basic Education Access</i>			
(i) Basic education infrastructure	7,233.60	6,924.19	95.7%
(ii) Education planning and management system	549.40	1,395.26	254.0%
(iii) Girls schooling	187.00	571.69	305.7%
<i>Subtotal</i>	7,970.00	8,891.14	111.6%
<i>II - Basic Education Quality</i>			
(i) Textbooks and pedagogical organization	4,922.40	1,223.10	24.8%
(ii) In-service teacher training	1,193.00	742.30	62.2%
(iii) Education pilot initiatives	448.20	394.97	88.1%
<i>Subtotal</i>	6,563.60	2,360.37	36.0%
<i>III - Education Management</i>			
(i) Human and Financial resource organization	259.40	1,532.38	590.7%
- Teacher salaries */	-	-	-
(ii) Preparatory studies	555.10	424.98	76.6%
(iii) Project coordination unit	1,370.10	1,085.50	79.2%
<i>Subtotal</i>	2,184.60	3,042.86	139.3%
Total Baseline Cost	16,718.20	14,294.37	
Physical Contingencies	723.00		
Price Contingencies	1,375.50	-	
TOTAL PROJECT COST	18,816.70	14,294.37	76.0%
TOTAL FINANCING REQUIRED	18,816.70	14,294.37	76.0%

PROJECT COSTS BY PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS (Appraisal Estimate)
(in US\$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category	PROCUREMENT METHOD					TOTAL COST (including contingencies)
	ICB	NCB	Other (a)	Consultant Services	N.B.F	
1. Civil Works						
a. Rehab. & New Construction		6.28	0.05			6.33
		(5.93)	(0.04)			(5.97)
b. Small Repairs & Maintenance					0.62	0.62
					(0.00)	(0.00)
2. Goods						
a. Pedagogic Equipment	0.38		0.07		0.18	0.62
	(0.38)		(0.04)		(0.00)	(0.42)
b. Office Equipment	0.12	0.08	0.10			0.30
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.10)			(0.30)
c. Vehicle	0.13					0.13
	(0.13)					(0.13)
d. Furniture		0.37	0.02		0.79	1.18
		(0.37)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.39)
3. Textbooks & Ped. Materials	1.06		0.12		1.54	2.72
	(1.06)		(0.12)		(0.00)	(1.18)
4. Consultant Services						
a. International Consultants				1.83	0.39	2.22
				(1.83)	(0.00)	(1.83)
b. National Consultants				1.31	0.28	1.59
				(1.31)	(0.00)	(1.31)
5. Training						
a. Local training			0.09			0.09
			(0.09)			(0.09)
b. In-service Training			1.58		0.26	1.84
			(1.58)		(0.00)	(1.58)
c. Study Tours			0.12			0.12
			(0.12)			(0.12)
6. Pilot operations			0.30			0.30
			(0.30)			(0.30)
7. Incremental Operating Costs						
a. Operating costs			0.47			0.47
			(0.45)			(0.45)
b. Support Service					0.04	0.04
					(0.00)	(0.00)
8. PPF			0.26			0.26
			(0.26)			(0.26)
TOTAL	1.68	6.73	3.17	3.13	4.10	18.82
	(1.68)	(6.37)	(3.12)	(3.13)	(0.00)	(14.31)

Notes: Figures in parentheses are the amounts to be financed by IDA, including contingencies and excluding taxes and duties. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

a Other procurement methods include shopping, selection of consultants following Bank/IDA guidelines, expenditures following Government's administrative procedures acceptable to IDA, direct purchasing of goods, and community participation in work.

PROJECT COSTS BY PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS (Actual/Latest Estimate)
(in US\$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category	PROCUREMENT METHOD				N.B.F	TOTAL COST (including contingencies)
	ICB	NCB	Other (a)	Consultant Services		
1. Civil Works						
a. Rehab. & New Construction		2.80	0.15			2.95
		(5.93)	(0.04)			(5.97)
b. Small Repairs & Maintenance					0.00	0
					(0.00)	(0.00)
2. Goods						
a. Pedagogic Equipment	0.28		0.19		0.00	0.47
	(0.38)		(0.04)		(0.00)	(0.42)
b. Office Equipment	0.10	0.06	0.27			0.43
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.10)			(0.30)
c. Vehicle	0.35					0.35
	(0.13)					(0.13)
d. Furniture		0.30	0.10		0.00	0.40
		(0.37)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.39)
3. Textbooks & Ped. Materials	0.90		0.28		0.00	1.18
	(1.06)		(0.12)		(0.00)	(1.18)
4. Consultant Services						
a. International Consultants				0.56	0.00	0.56
				(1.83)	(0.00)	(1.83)
b. National Consultants				2.24	0.00	2.24
				(1.31)	(0.00)	(1.31)
5. Training						
a. Local training			0.15			0.15
			(0.09)			(0.09)
b. In-service Training			0.52		0.00	0.52
			(1.58)		(0.00)	(1.58)
c. Study Tours			0.07			0.07
			(0.12)			(0.12)
6. Pilot operations			2.22			2.22
			(0.30)			(0.30)
7. Incremental Operating Costs						
a. Operating costs			1.00			1.00
			(0.45)			(0.45)
b. Support Service					0.00	0.00
					(0.00)	(0.00)
8. PPF						0.00
			(0.26)			(0.26)
10. Payment of Teacher Salary Arrears			1.10			1.10
			(0.00)			(0.00)
11. Payment of Teacher Salary			0.40			0.40
			(0.00)			(0.00)
TOTAL	1.63	3.16	6.45	2.80	(0.00)	14.04
	(1.68)	(6.37)	(3.12)	(3.13)	(0.00)	(14.29)

Notes: Figures in parentheses are the amounts to be financed by IDA, including contingencies and excluding taxes and duties. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

a Other procurement methods include shopping, selection of consultants following Bank/IDA guidelines, expenditures following Government's administrative procedures acceptable to IDA, direct purchasing of goods, and community participation in work.

Annex 2c: Project Financing by Component

Project Financing by Component (in US\$ million equivalent)

Component	Appraisal Estimate			Actual/Latest Estimate			Actual as a Percentage of Appraisal		
	IDA	Govt.	CoF. (SIDA)	IDA	Govt.	CoF.	IDA	Govt.	CoF.
I. Basic Education Access	6.83	0.36	1.80	8.79	0.10	0.00	128.6%	27.8%	0.0%
II. Basic Education Quality	5.61	0.30	1.48	2.32	0.04	0.00	41.3%	13.5%	0.0%
III. Education Management	1.86	0.10	0.49	2.93	0.11	0.00	157.4%	112.3%	0.0%

Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

Not Applicable

Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:

Stage of Project Cycle	No. of Persons and Specialty (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)		Performance Rating		
	Month/Year	Count	Specialty	Implementation Progress	Development Objective
Identification/Preparation					
	02/12/1995	3	TASK TEAM LEADER (1); EDUCATION SECTOR FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); EDUCATION STATISTICS (1)		
	03/16/1996	7	TASK TEAM LEADER (1); OPERATIONAL SPECIALIST (1); PLANNING SPECIALIST (1); EDUCATION STATISTICS SPECIALIST (1); INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST (1); EDUCATION QUALITY SPECIALIST (1); AND EDUCATION FINANCE SPECIALIST (1)		
	06/14./1996	6	TASK TEAM LEADER (1); OPERATIONAL SPECIALIST (1); EDUCATION STATISTICS SPECIALIST (1); INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST (1); EDUCATION QUALITY SPECIALIST (1); AND EDUCATION FINANCE SPECIALIST (1)		
	09/25/1996	1	TASK TEAM LEADER (1)		
Appraisal/Negotiation					
	01/20/1997	8	TASK TEAM LEADER (1); IMPLEMENTATION SPECIALIST (1); PLANNING SPECIALIST (1); EDUCATION STATISTICS SPECIALIST (1); INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST (1); MONITORING AND EVALUATION SPECIALIST (1); EDUCATION FINANCE SPECIALIST (1) AND ECONOMIST (1)		
	04/09/1997	4	TASK TEAM LEADER (1); IMPLEMENTATION SPECIALIST (1); PLANNING		

	04/20/1997	5	SPECIALIST (1); AND EDUCATION FINANCE SPECIALIST (1) TASK TEAM LEADER (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST (1), LAWYER (1); AND SENIOR EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1).		
Supervision					
	09/14/1997	3	TASK TEAM LEADER (1); GIRLS EDUCATION (1); IMPLEMENTATION SPEC. (1)	S	HS
	01/31/1998	1	TTL (1)	U	U
	11/29/1999	2	TEAM LEADER (1); ARCHITECT CONSULTANT (1)	U	U
	04/14/2000	1	TASK TEAM LEADER (1)	U	S
	03/19/2001	3	TASK TEAM LEADER (1); FINANCIAL MANAGT. SPEC (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1)	S	S
	05/18/2002	5	TEAM LEADER (1); EDUCATION SPEC. (1); COMPUTER SPEC. (1); LAW SPEC. (1); FMS (1)	S	S
	10/26/2002	1	TTL (1)	S	S
	02/21/2003	4	TASK TEAM LEADER (1); CONSULTANT/EDUC. SPEC. (1); LANG. PROGRAM ASSIST. (1); LIAISON OFFICER (1)	S	S
	08/21/2003	4	TTL (1); OPERATIONS OFFICER (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); LIAISON OFFICER (1)	U	U
	11/22/2003	1	TTL (1)	S	S
	06/24/2004	3	TTL (1); Education Specialist (1); Liaison officer (1)	S	S
ICR		1	TTL (1)	S	S

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle	Actual/Latest Estimate	
	No. Staff weeks	US\$ ('000)
Identification/Preparation		

Appraisal/Negotiation		
Supervision	108	228,297.51
ICR	14.07	24,963.59
Total	122.07	253,361.10

Data for identification and appraisal not available.

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

	<u>Rating</u>				
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Macro policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Sector Policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Physical</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Financial</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Institutional Development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Environmental</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<i>Social</i>					
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Poverty Reduction</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Gender</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Private sector development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input checked="" type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Public sector management</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance

Rating

- | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lending | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Supervision | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overall | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |

6.2 Borrower performance

Rating

- | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Preparation | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Government implementation performance | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input type="radio"/> S | <input checked="" type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Implementation agency performance | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overall | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input type="radio"/> S | <input checked="" type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

- “Anuario Estatístico for 1999-2000”, Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento Firkidja.
- “A Educacao na Guine-Bissau – Bases para uma estrategia pectoral renovada”, Joao Jose Huco Monteiro, June 2005.
- “Relatorio de Actividades da Assistencia Tecnica Recursos Humanos” Dr. Joao A. Fonseca Mendes, December 2002.
- “Velatorio da 1ª Fase Consultoria para o INDE – Guine Bissau.” Ana Rosa Abreu, August, 2004
- “Comites de Gestao das Unidades de Apoio Pedagogico (CG-UAP).” December, 2003.
- “Relatorio Final – Rectificativo” May 2005.
- “Inforemacoes Estatisticas das Escolas Ano Lectivo 2003/2004”. Huco Monteiro, May, 2005.
- “Evaluation de La Construction et du Mobilier Scolaires”, Daniel Dupety, May 2005.
- “Relatorio das Actividades Desenvolvidas no Quadro da Parceria”. Fundacao Educacao d Desenvolvimento. June 2005.
- “Avaliacao Final do Programa de Reactivacao e Aperfeicoamento das COME”. Maritza Rosabal; February, 2005-10-27
- “Relatorio Editora Escolar”. April, 2002.
- Various Aide Memoires and ISR reports.

Additional Annex 8. Key Project Events Timeline

Date	Event
1997 – June	Project approved by World Bank Board
1997 – December	Project becomes effective
1998 – June	Civil War breaks out in Guinea Bissau. All activities stopped for one year.
1999 – June	Project re-started with focus on emergency program to rehabilitate UCP, some structures of MEN as well as training colleges and INDE
2000 – most of year	Emergency reconstruction and classroom construction in Bissau
2001 – August	Mission visits Washington DC to re-launch most other aspects of the project. Decision made to abolish school fees and provide free text books
2002 – February	Mid-term review mission. Partnership program launched; in-service teacher training defined; process to revise curriculum initiated; teacher training resource center construction and equipment defined; procurement of school manuals; and construction of classrooms. Closing date also extended to March 2004
2003 – January	Teacher strike over payment of salaries ends school for rest of year. All students repeat the following year.
2003 – August	Mission decides to allocate around \$1.2 million of credit to pay past teacher salaries to end strike.
2003 – September	Coup de Etat which paralyzes project until November 2003. Another extension requested until June, 2005.
2004 – October	Assassination of Chief of the Army.
2004 – December	Interim President in place; Parliamentary elections; macro-economic program agreed with IMF and World Bank
2005 – June	Project closes.

Additional Annex 9. School Construction Totals by company and NGO

Table A: Companies

Construction	Planned	Completed	Outstanding	%
Classrooms	205	95	110	46.3%
Bathrooms	45	19	26	42.2%
Wells			0	
School Desk	4100	4100	0	100.0%
Residencies			0	
Schools	34	16	18	47.0%

Table B: NGOs

Construction	Planned	Completed	Outstanding	%
Classrooms	226	216	10	95.5%
Bathrooms	94	71	23	75.5%
Wells	63	40	23	63.4%
School Desk	4139	2679	1460	64.7%
Residencies	54	54	0	100.0%
Schools	78	74	4	94.8%

Table C: Total

Construction	Planned	Completed	Outstanding	%
Classrooms	431	311	120	72.1%
Bathrooms	139	90	49	64.7%
Wells	63	40	23	63.4%
School Desk	8239	6779	1460	82.2%
Residencies	54	54	0	100.0%
Schools	112	90	22	80.3%

The resources for the uncompleted classrooms have been transferred to the Ministry of Education who have now assumed responsibility for holding the companies to their contractual obligations of completing the unfinished classrooms.

The explanation given as to why only 46% of the company-contracted construction is complete is that the project experienced construction delays of 13 to 17 months for contracts which were originally for 4 months in duration. One of the reasons given for these delays is the Ministry of Education's imposition of a unit cost of US\$4,800 (2,660,000 FCFA) per room. The project implementation unit reasons that this unit cost only attracted the weakest companies and the best did not bother apply. Furthermore, the companies abandoned the hardest to reach areas of the country and many times did not have the proper supplies on hand. The actual unit costs for classrooms were approximately US\$7,000 for the company-constructed classrooms and US\$3,500 for the NGO-constructed classrooms. The difference in costs is related to quality of material and construction technique. For instance the companies used cement blocks where as the NGOs used adobe blocks for the walls. Moreover the support poles were made of concrete for the company built schools and wood for the NGOs constructed schools.

Additional Annex 10. Implementing Agency Comments

1. O sector da educação, está marcado pelo atraso crónico no pagamento de salários e pelas greves dos professores, dos quais a maioria não tem formação pedagógica de base. O Orçamento Geral do Estado não consagra mais do que 12% (1,7% do PIB) para o sector educativo, do qual 85% são para pagamento de salários do pessoal docente. O sistema educativo Guineense continua confrontado com graves problemas, nomeadamente: (i) oferta desigual e dispersa do ensino básico, dificultando assim a sua universalização; (ii) escassez de materiais didácticos e ausência de preparação pedagógica dos professores; (iii) inexistência de um Mapa Escolar, razão principal da inoperância do sistema que deveria gerir a informação orientada para o planeamento e a gestão do sector da educação, a nível central e regional e; (iv) grandes fragilidades na gestão do sistema educativo, particularmente a nível dos procedimentos da gestão financeira e de recursos humanos.

2. Baseando-se no documento de Estratégia de Desenvolvimento do Sector da Educação em que o Ensino Básico é eleito como prioridade, e depois de ponderar uma diversidade de alternativas estratégicas que permitissem a consecução desse objectivo, o Ministério da Educação Nacional, através do Projecto de Apoio à Educação Básica – PAEB/Firkidja optou por se concentrar na superação gradual das dificuldades que dificultavam o acesso da maioria das crianças guineenses à escola básica, minimizavam o aproveitamento escolar dos poucos que aí chegavam e impediam o funcionamento do sistema educativo a ponto de desfigurar e quase inviabilizar a própria escola.

3. Infraestruturas do Ensino Básico. A qualidade de execução das salas de aula é de uma forma geral pouco satisfatória e muitas melhorias deveriam ser introduzidas nos protótipos para que estes possam ser utilizados pelo MEN e por outros doadores/parceiros. De qualquer forma, o Projecto permitiu acrescentar uma centena de novas escolas que representam um pouco mais de 8.000 novos lugares para os alunos. Finalmente, a utilização das ONGs e a participação comunitária na construção das suas escolas, apesar de ser imperfeita e incompleta, é uma experiência positiva para o MEN e para o País.

4. A longo prazo, os resultados e a experiência adquiridos durante a execução desta sub-componente deveria servir à programação, à preparação e à execução doutros programas de construções escolares. É assim que o serviço técnico do MEN deveria antes do lançamento de um novo projecto executar as actividades seguintes: (i) a revisão dos protótipos das salas de aula começando com uma reflexão geral sobre a programação nomeadamente sobre a capacidade das salas de aula, as normas respeitantes aos números de cabine por latrina a ser construídas em função do número de lugares para alunos, a redução do número de gabinetes/armazéns e a integração de programas de reabilitação dos edifícios existentes; (ii) a revisão completa dos protótipos de blocos de latrinas; (iii) a preparação de documentos reais de execução para as obras com planos á escala 1/50; (iv) a revisão das dimensões das carteiras duplas com propostas por pelo menos duas dimensões correspondendo ao tamanho das crianças; (v) a revisão da convenção das ONGs e do manual de procedimentos de forma a incluir os elementos em falta, nomeadamente no que diz respeito ás informações que devem ser fornecidas pelas ONGs e as penalidades a aplicar no caso de um atraso na execução; e, (vi) a formação do pessoal de coordenação dos projectos (ONGs) no domínio das aquisições e gestão financeira.

5. A segunda componente do projecto previa melhorar a qualidade do ensino básico através da criação de condições mínimas que têm um impacto sobre o processo de ensino aprendizagem na sala de aula e sobre os resultados da escola. Por isso, foi previsto: (i) reimprimir e distribuir os manuais escolares nas disciplinas essenciais a todos os alunos do EB e distribuir os guias do professor; (ii) executar um programa inovador de formação contínua dos professores do EB e instalar centros de recurso para os professores a

nível regional e (iii) promover iniciativas piloto de melhoramento da educação.

6. À luz dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Projecto, a Estratégia de implementação das acções e actividades da Componente Qualidade da Educação Básica obedeceu ao princípio orientador de concentrar as intervenções na escola, o que levaria a alcançar mais pronta e eficazmente os alunos e as alunas. Para isso, procurou-se:

- reforçar o trabalho na sala de aulas de alunos e professores, mediante o uso de manuais e materiais escolares;
- elevar em serviço o nível de competência profissional dos professores, reactivando e revitalizando iniciativas e motivando-os no desempenho quotidiano das suas funções docentes;
- montar mecanismos sustentáveis de apoio pedagógico ao professor em serviço, através das Equipas Técnicas Regionais (ETRs);
- produzir e distribuir guias e manuais pedagógicos, nomeadamente o Dossier Pedagógico e outros suportes didáctico-pedagógicos, e
- apoiar e tirar lições de outras Iniciativas inovadoras.

Principais dificuldades:

7. Considerando os Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Projecto, face aos indicadores do sistema educativo nacional hoje, afigura-se oportuno fazer os seguintes comentários:

8. O contexto em que foi executado o projecto Firkidja não favoreceu a sua implementação nos moldes em que foi concebido e organizado, aliado a um conjunto de situações e factores adversos, nomeadamente mudanças constantes de liderança a nível do Ministério da Educação, levando à introdução de alterações de estratégia e de objectivos, agravado sobretudo com as perturbações político-militares num tempo de vida curto para um projecto como o Firkidja que tinha entre outras a missão de corrigir as distorções e superar os estrangulamentos que caracterizam hoje o sistema educativo guineense.

9. A existência de fracas capacidades a nível institucional que caracteriza a administração pública guineense, impossibilitou assim uma efectiva assessoria técnica por parte do projecto, e a de transferência de competências para o Ministério da Educação Nacional-MEN.

10. A conjuntura económico-financeira e a escassez de recursos no sector da educação comprometeram a sustentabilidade e a consolidação dos ganhos obtidos pelo Projecto Firkidja, bem como a prossecução dos objectivos e acções complementares e de reforço que deveriam conduzir ao verdadeiro desenvolvimento do sistema educativo nacional.

11. A ausência de uma avaliação geral da situação do País, focalizada em aspectos como a inexistência de bancos comerciais a operar a nível nacional, a ausência de um sector privado dinâmico, enfim, a ausência de instituições sólidas e estáveis, constituiria uma mais-valia para a adequação dos objectivos de desenvolvimento do Projecto ao contexto pós-conflito em que este decorreu.

12. A inexistência de um plano director adequado e actualizado que tivesse em conta as disparidades e especificidades regionais e que permitissem uma melhor avaliação da situação e consequentemente uma afectação racional dos recursos existentes, tendentes a corrigir as assimetrias regionais.

13. A pouca capacidade de coordenação, monitorização e de avaliação por parte do MEN, originou dificuldades na noção de apropriação dos vários projectos e programas por parte dos beneficiários, financiados por diferentes parceiros, pondo assim em causa a sustentabilidade dessas acções.

14. Uma atenção especial deverá ser dada aos sistemas de ensino e formação, isto é, torna-se urgente a introdução de reformas substanciais aos dois níveis, designadamente a reformulação e adopção de um currículo de ensino à luz das actuais necessidades do sistema educativo nacional, que tenha implicações directas sobretudo no currículo e outros instrumentos de porte da formação inicial e em serviço dos professores, em particular do Ensino Básico.

15. As Unidades de Apoio Pedagógico – UAPs são centros privilegiados de apoio técnico-pedagógico e de organização de acções de formação em serviço/capacitação dos professores do ensino básico em exercício de funções docentes que representam um alto investimento, mas que não cumprem na sua maioria a nobre missão para que foram concebidas e organizadas, quando as necessidades em apoio e formação e ou capacitação dos principais beneficiários se fazem sentir a todos os níveis e com maior intensidade. Portanto, devem ser dinamizadas e postas a funcionar para que possam efectivamente responder positivamente à citada missão. Para isso e em face do que já foi feito, são necessárias apenas pequenas intervenções pouco onerosas, tendo em atenção o binómio custos e benefícios. É uma aposta que vale a pena!

16. A experimentação da proposta de currículo integrado do ensino básico, em vista à sua generalização é uma medida que deve inequivocamente ser acompanhada de actividades de sensibilização das comunidades, formação sólida dos principais intervenientes e familiarização dos mesmos com os materiais experimentais, nomeadamente o programa experimental, o guia de utilização do programa e outros suportes julgados necessários, além da definição de mecanismos e instrumentos de seguimento e avaliação do processo e dos resultados das aprendizagens.

17. A formação dos directores de escolas nos domínios da administração e gestão escolar e pedagógica enquanto responsáveis primeiros da organização, gestão e avaliação do processo ensino-aprendizagem revela-se fundamental. A mesma necessidade se faz sentir com igual ou maior intensidade em relação à formação de mais inspectores formadores, para além dos que existem e que precisam de uma reciclagem maciça, na perspectiva de reforço e valorização das competências nacionais aptos para os desafios de desenvolvimento que se colocam ao País.

Lições aprendidas:

18. Perante o quadro que se vislumbra, afigura-se fundamental e urgente a construção pelo MEN de um plano estratégico que reflecta as necessidades globais de desenvolvimento do sistema educativo, e bem assim da melhoria dos sistemas de ensino, formação e valorização dos recursos humanos, com metas bem definidas numa perspectiva de médio e longo prazo.

19. È urgente conceber um sistema de incentivos que permitam focalizar no desenvolvimento humano e profissional do pessoal e, no reconhecimento e certificação particularmente dos professores e das escolas.

20. A eliminação dos custos da educação trouxeram aspectos positivos como o aumento exponencial das taxas de matrícula brutas mas acarretaram também problemas de sustentabilidade do sistema, particularmente a questão da conservação das escolas, a aquisição e distribuição dos manuais escolares e guias para os professores, a gestão escolar, etc...È necessário fazer-se uma análise dos factores positivos e negativos e daí retirarem-se ilações.

21. Uma coordenação e articulação estreita entre as estruturas centrais e locais do MEN revela-se de extrema importancia e necessária para a condução/implementação de políticas traçadas e medidas de reforma adoptadas e em perspectiva, marcadas pela assunção de responsabilidades e envolvimento de todas

e de cada uma das referidas estruturas, num quadro lógico e harmonioso.

22. O programa de parceria iniciado pelo Projecto com organizações da sociedade civil vocacionadas para o sector da educação, foi um êxito pois, permitiu acelerar a execução de algumas componentes nomeadamente das infraestruturas e acções ligadas á qualidade do ensino.

Algumas Conclusões e Recomendações:

23. Em termos globais, pode-se afirmar com alguma segurança que os resultados obtidos através das actividades programadas ou não e realizadas a nível da Componente Qualidade da educação básica durante a vigência do Projecto de Apoio à Educação Básica – PAEB/Firkidja são satisfatórios.

24. Entretanto, algumas preocupações se levantam e prendem-se com algumas acções e actividades realizadas ou iniciadas, mas não concluídas, nomeadamente: (i) reformulação do currículo e programas de formação inicial de professores do ensino básico, com implicações na formação em serviço; (ii) adequação dos manuais escolares aos objectivos e exigências actuais do sistema educativo, bem como às necessidades de desenvolvimento do ensino e formação; (iii) dinamização das Unidades de Apoio Pedagógico (UAPs) para que possam desempenhar o seu papel no quadro da formação em serviço dos professores do ensino básico; (iv) adopção de mecanismos e instrumentos de seguimento e avaliação dos trabalhos (a nível) das comissões de estudo, com vista a consolidar e garantir a sustentabilidade dos ganhos do programa COME, no âmbito do Firkidja, e reforçar o apoio e seguimento dos professores do ensino básico no desempenho das suas funções docentes², e (v) relançamento da experimentação da proposta de currículo integrado do ensino básico, obedecendo aos seguintes passos: desenho claro e objectivo do processo da experimentação, realização de actividades de sensibilização das comunidades para divulgação dos objectivos e resultados esperados da experiência e definição de mecanismos e instrumentos de apoio, seguimento e avaliação dos resultados da experimentação, bem como das aprendizagens dos alunos.

25. Na perspectiva da consolidação dos resultados positivos alcançados pelo Projecto Firkidja e promoção de novas intervenções que permitam o reforço da qualidade da educação básica, recomenda-se: (i) a introdução de reformas substanciais a nível da formação inicial de professores do ensino básico; (ii) a adopção de um currículo renovado que atenda às necessidades do sistema educativo, em geral, e do ensino e formação, em particular, e leve à adequação dos manuais escolares em uso no sistema de ensino guineense; (iii) realização de seminários de formação intensiva dos professores do ensino básico, em ordem a familiarizá-los com os novos programas e materiais didáctico-pedagógicos, habilitando-os para os novos desafios do sistema educativo guineense.

26. Estas intervenções e outras devem ser tomadas em consideração na perspectiva da aplicação dos seus resultados/produtos no ano lectivo 2006/07.

27. Foi concebida e elaborada uma proposta de projecto de seguimento e apoio aos Inspectores formadores, em Julho de 2004, com o objectivo de avaliar o desempenho dos mesmos, com vista ao seu enquadramento no próximo projecto. Mas, por razões de ordem financeira, supõe-se, a proposta em referência não foi aprovada.

