Document of The World Bank Report No: NCO00003109 NOTE ON CANCELLED OPERATION REPORT (IDA-49590 IDA-H7010) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 8.3 MILLION US$13.09 MILLION EQUIVALENT AND A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 6.8 MILLION US$10.71 MILLION EQUIVALENT TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC FOR A AGRO-PASTORAL AND RECOVERY PROJECT July 22, 2014 Agriculture Global Practice Country Department AFCC1 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective July 1, 2014) Currency Unit = CFA Francs CFA Francs 0.0021 = US$1 US$1.5300 = SDR 1 FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGETIP- Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Public (Agency for the Execution of CAF Works of Public Nature in CAR) CAR Central African Republic FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IPCU Inter-Prefectural Coordination Unit MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development NGO Non-Governmental Organization OPCS Operations Policy and Country Services PCU Project Coordination Unit PREVES Projet de Relance des cultures Vivrières et du petit Elevage dans les Savanes Project for Reviving Food Crops and Small Livestock Production in the Savannah Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Gregor Binkert Practice Sr. Director: Juergen Voegele Practice Manager: Severin Kodderitzsch Project Team Leader: Manievel Sene NCO Team Leader : Manievel Sene ii CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC NOTE OF CANCELATION FOR THE AGRO-PASTORAL RECOVERY PROJECT Table of Contents Data Sheet ....................................................................................................................................... iv 1. Context, Project Development Objectives, and design ............................................................. 1 A. Context and sector background ......................................................................................... 1 B. Bank rationale and project design ..................................................................................... 2 C. Project Cost and Financing Plan ....................................................................................... 4 D. Key Risks and Mitigating Measures ................................................................................. 4 2. Post-Approval Experience and Reasons for Cancellation ......................................................... 4 3. Assessment of Bank Performance ............................................................................................. 6 4. Assessment of Borrower Performance ...................................................................................... 7 5. Lessons Learned ........................................................................................................................ 8 Annex 1. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............................. 10 Annex 2. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................................... 12 Annex 3. MAP .............................................................................................................................. 13 iii Data Sheet A. Basic Information CAR-Agro-Pastoral Country: Central African Republic Project Name: Recovery Project Project ID: P124278 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-49590,IDA-H7010 NCO Date: 07/10/2014 GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: CENTRAL AFRICA REPUBLIC Original Total XDR 15.10M Disbursed Amount: XDR 1.02M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 1.48M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Co-financiers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 01/10/2011 Effectiveness: 03/31/2012 Appraisal: 03/28/2011 Closing: 09/15/2016 09/15/2016 Approval: 06/02/2011 C. Ratings Summary Performance Rating by NCO Outcomes: Not Applicable Risk to Development Outcome: Not Applicable Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Agro-industry, marketing, and trade 31 Animal production 17 Crops 31 Public administration- Agriculture, fishing and forestry 21 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Global food crisis response 89 Rural policies and institutions 11 iv E. Bank Staff Positions At NCO At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Gregor Binkert Mary Kathryn Hollifield Practice Manager: Severin L. Kodderitzsch Karen Mcconnell Brooks Project Team Leader: Manievel Sene Bleoue Nicaise Ehoue NCO Team Leader: Manievel Sene F. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 09/21/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 2 10/31/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 0.00 3 04/04/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 4 07/23/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.10 5 01/14/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.10 6 03/09/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.25 7 07/28/2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.25 8 03/20/2014 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 1.54 v 1. Context, Project Development Objectives, and design A. Context and sector background 1. Country context. At Project appraisal in March 2011, the Central African Republic (CAR) was one of the world’s poorest and least developed countries. The 2010 United Nations Development Program Human Development Report ranked CAR 159th out of the 169 countries that were evaluated. Since political and military hostilities ceased in 2003, economic growth has been sluggish, averaging only 2.5 percent per annum. The political and security situation were fragile. The national household survey carried out in 2008 showed that 62 percent of the population was living below the poverty line. The same survey found that poverty was concentrated in rural areas, which accounted for 62.8 percent of the population: in rural areas, 69.4 percent of the population was classified as poor. 2. Agricultural sector. At the time of appraisal, agriculture in CAR was contributing to about 52 percent of gross domestic product, 72 percent of the employment, and more than 75 percent of food consumption. However, the performance of the sector was very far from its potential. The underperformance of the sector was attributed in part to the after-effects of the prolonged civil conflict that gripped the country for decades. Productivity in the sector was low, and extensive areas of land suitable for cultivation or grazing were underutilized due to security concerns. In addition, most cropping and livestock systems were extensive, while commercial agriculture based on modern technologies and purchased inputs were underdeveloped. Above all, the institutions that support agriculture were very weak. As a result, the country faced chronic structural food deficits. However, the agricultural sector of CAR could be turned around. 3. The run-up in global commodity prices, coming less than two years after a similar soaring food prices in 2008, combined with the surge in world oil prices, threatened to reduce incomes and undermine food security. In a post-conflict setting where institutions remain fragile, these developments posed a very real threat to macroeconomic stability and social order. For these reasons, ensuring the rapid recovery of the rural economy remains an urgent priority for the Government and for the World Bank Group. 4. Government response. Following the outbreak of the 2008 food crisis, the Government adopted a number of macroeconomic measures designed to mitigate the effects of food price increases, particularly with respect to imported foods. These measures were complemented by the World Bank-supported Food Crisis Response Project approved on July 31, 2008 and which has had many positive impacts, initially through activities designed to strengthen school feeding programs, and subsequently through activities designed to improve agricultural productivity and boost food production. Over the longer term, the Government of CAR had identified agriculture as a key sector that has the potential to make an important contribution to economic growth, poverty alleviation, and employment. With donor support, it has prepared a Rural Development Strategy based on recommendations emerging from the stocktaking exercise (Etat Généraux) carried out in December 2007. With the goal of sustaining 1 agricultural growth, the Government had appealed to key development partners (European Union, World Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development) to scale up their investment in agriculture. B. Bank rationale and project design 5. When the CAR Agro-Pastoral and Recovery Project was appraised on March 28, 2011, rapid recovery of the rural economy was an urgent priority for the Government. In 2011, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) recognized that given the vast amounts of unused cultivable land in CAR, there was a strong potential to grow food and produce seeds to mitigate the effects of the country’s protracted crisis, even in the zones where insecurity was still high. In order to support families affected by insecurity, FAO worked on strengthening the capacity of close to 5,000 households to grow vegetables and provide safe and quality food to the urban markets. FAO also distributed agricultural tools and seeds, goats and poultry to poor households. The project beneficiaries also received training in agricultural production, veterinary support and basic materials to build shelters for animals. In addition, FAO had plans to bolster farming-capacity growth through support to local government counterparts. 6. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was active in CAR at the time of the Project appraisal through the Projet de Relance des cultures Vivrières et du petit Elevage dans les Savanes (PREVES). IFAD project’s goal was to help enhance food security and raise the incomes of poor rural producers in four sub-prefectures in the Savannah region of CAR. PREVES aimed to support the government’s development objectives by increasing smallholders’ productivity, mainly through infrastructure development, and strengthening service delivery by public-sector agencies and private operators. The main implementing partners for PREVES were the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, with considerable contributions made by additional ministries. Other key partners included producers’ organizations, international and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), local authorities (both elected and traditional), existing savings and loans networks, and a range of service providers and ongoing development initiatives. 7. At the request of the Government of CAR, the World Bank decided to support the Government of CAR to intensify agricultural development efforts and the policy dialogue (as well as the coordination of the key development partners engaged in the agricultural sector) by financing the Agro-Pastoral and Recovery Project. 8. The Project Development Objective was to increase productivity and production of selected food crops and livestock species in the Project area. The Project was structured as follows: 9. Component 1: Support to agricultural production (US$17.90 million) was designed to support activities designed to enhance the capacity of households in the Project area to increase productivity and production of selected food crops and livestock species. Support to targeted households aimed to increase production of crops and animals, first to meet their own consumption needs, and second to take advantage of 2 market opportunities. Component 1 included two sub-components focusing respectively on food crops and livestock. Consistent with the emergency nature of the operation and the urgent need to generate rapid and substantial impacts, a large proportion of the available IDA funding was allocated to Component 1. 10. Sub-component 1.1. Increasing food crop production (US$13.96 million). The objectives of sub-component 1.1 were to provide households in the target area with the knowledge, skills, and means needed to increase productivity and production of selected food crops. Activities supported under sub-component 1.1 will included: (i) provision of consumable inputs for crop production; (ii) provision of capital equipment for crop production and processing; (iii) provision of infrastructure to reduce post-harvest losses; and (iv) provision of crop production advisory services. 11. Sub-component 1.2. Increasing animal production (US$3.94 million). The objectives of sub-component 1.2 were to provide households in the target areas with the knowledge, skills, and means to increase productivity and production of livestock (small ruminants, poultry, and fish). Activities supported under sub-component 1.2 included: (i) introduction of parent stock of improved breeds, (ii) provision of livestock management advisory services; and (iii) strengthening of veterinary support services. 12. Component 2: Institutional strengthening and capacity building (US$2.20 million) was designed to strengthen capacity of the institutions charged with agricultural development in CAR including public agencies, non-governmental organizations, and producer organizations and other community-based groups. 13. Component 3: Project coordination and management (US$2.51 million) aimed at supporting Project coordination and management activities, including: (i) Project administration; (ii) financial management; (iii) procurement; (iv) monitoring and evaluation of Project performance and impacts; and (v) safeguards compliance. 14. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) had the overall responsibility for Project implementation. A small Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was established within MARD to manage the Project. 15. An Inter-ministerial Project Steering Committee was established to oversee Project implementation. It was designed to decide on major strategic orientations for Project implementation and related execution modalities. 16. PCU was responsible for day-to-day Project implementation. The staff was recruited on a competitive basis. 17. Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Public (AGETIP-CAF). Implementation of activities funded through the Project Preparation Advance, as well as Project activities during an initial phase until the establishment of the PCU, were delegated to AGETIP-CAF through a memorandum of understanding between MARD and this agency. 3 18. The central PCU was represented at the prefectural level by two decentralized Inter-Prefectural Coordination Units (IPCUs) in Boda and Berberati in charge of field coordination, guidance, and supervision of Project activities. 19. The Component 1 was designed to be implemented by service providers, which included public and parastatal agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, and/or private firms. Public and parastatal agencies included the Central African Agronomic Research Institute, the National Agency for Livestock Development, the Central African Agency for Agricultural Development, and the Central African Federation of Breeders, among others. C. Project Cost and Financing Plan 20. The total cost of the Project was US$24.65 million, of which US$23.8 million from International Development Association and US$0.85 million from beneficiaries’ contribution under the conditional productive asset transfer scheme. No counterpart funding was provided by the Government. D. Key Risks and Mitigating Measures 21. Apart from the overarching political and security risks described earlier, the Project faced systemic risks related to the national context and to the weak capacity of implementing partners. To mitigate this risk, which was considered high, the PCU was staffed with personnel trained in World Bank financial management and procurement procedures. Before the establishment of the PCU, responsibility for implementation was delegated to AGETIP-CAF, which has experience in working with Work Bank-funded projects. The World Bank task team planned to carry out two on-site implementation support missions per year, in addition to desk reviews of all technical and fiduciary documents. 2. Post-Approval Experience and Reasons for Cancellation 22. Nine months after the Project was declared effective, the country context changed and the political and security situation deteriorated significantly. The repeated crises left public institutions of CAR at their minimum functioning capacity and in many instances completely non-functional. Most of the Project’s intervention areas were inaccessible and the assets of the PCU were looted. The main 2014 maize, sorghum and millet planting seasons, which started in March and May respectively, will unlikely be able to turn around the declining situation of food security. The current country context calls for a set of rapid responses to limit the impact of the crisis on population groups. Due to the crisis, there has been no implementation of Project activities since the suspension of Bank missions to CAR (early 2013) and the exhaustion of the funds in the Project’s designated account. The Project's progress towards achieving Project Development Objectives is rated "Unsatisfactory" and the implementation progress is also rated "Unsatisfactory". 4 23. CAR has been experiencing upheaval since December 2012. A rebel coalition known as Séléka, which had initially threatened to take over the capital city, Bangui, signed a cease-fire and political agreement with the Government in January 2013 and eventually carried out a coup in March 2013 which forced the then President to flee the country. Under the aegis of the Economic Community of Central African Countries, a transitional government was entrusted with restoring law and order and paving the way for democratic elections within 18 months. However, the acts of brutality by various rebel groups and lack of Government control over armed elements led to clashes and violence in the country which have, since August 2013, led to the displacement of large numbers of the population, and to a growing humanitarian crisis. 24. Often referred to as the “forgotten” conflict, violence in the CAR has risen to extreme levels sending the nation into wholesale unrest that proceeded to take a sectarian turn in the following months. Though the leadership that had assumed power after the coup stepped down, the country is still in a precarious situation. 25. As a result of instability and violence in CAR, the United Nations’ Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated in early 2014 that about one million persons are internally displaced, including over 500,000 in the capital city of Bangui alone. About 2.6 million people are currently estimated to require humanitarian assistance and 1.3 million people are food insecure. The results of the Multi-sectorial Initial Rapid Assessment undertaken in January 2014 by FAO, World Food Program and other partners, indicate that the average number of meals has declined to a single meal a day in the assessed areas. Household food stocks are running out, indicating that households will rely on humanitarian assistance or purchases. Food prices across the country have increased substantially due to the disruption of transportation services, markets and trade. Almost all communities report not having enough seeds to plant for the next agricultural season, which raises the risk of a very poor agricultural harvest in 2014. 26. In the face of the deteriorating situation, the international community increased its mobilization during the fall of 2013 which provided an umbrella for the intervention of French forces and the establishment of an African Union-led military presence. The Bank responded actively to the CAR crisis developments, initially in a crisis management mode (including evacuation of Bank staff twice since December 2012 and the triggering of OP7.30, with a selective resumption of disbursements authorized in November 2013). More recently, in the light of the new developments both in CAR and internationally, Bank management presented to the Board in January 2014, a US$100 million emergency response for CAR drawing on the restructuring of the existing country portfolio. The emergency response included reallocating or amending the modalities of existing projects, including the cancellation of an equivalent to US$21,097,125 which was remaining on the accounts of the CAR Agro-pastoral Recovery Project. 27. Given the above reasons, the Government of CAR, in consultation with the Bank, requested in early February 2014 the cancellation of the undisbursed balance on the Project's accounts and recommitted the funds to preparing a new Emergency Food Crisis 5 Response and Agriculture Re-launch Project which was designed to address the impact of the ongoing crisis on rural population groups and support farmers in the next planting season in order to avoid a national food security crisis. On March 13, 2014, the Bank officially approved the cancellation of the Project. The new Emergency project was approved in March 8, 2014 for a total amount equivalent to US$20 million and has disbursed an equivalent of US$17,695,000 (87.4% of the total commitment) as of July 2014. 28. The cut-off point for “significant implementation” is defined for Investment Project Financing as final actual disbursement of less than five percent of the initial commitment or US$1 million (whichever is smaller), excluding any Project Preparation Facility and front-end fees. The Project’s disbursed amount is a little more than US$1 million and could have been considered for restructuring. Restructuring the Project was not a viable solution especially because of the absence of required minimum capacity for implementation of Project activities (especially in terms of Financial Management and procurement) on the ground. On May 2, 2014, the Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) granted the Africa Region a waiver to prepare a Note on Cancelled Operations for the Project instead of an Implementation Completion Report. 3. Assessment of Bank Performance 29. Quality at Entry rating was “Moderately Satisfactory”. The design of the Project was sound and the main supported activities aimed at contributing to the recovery of agriculture production after the support of the previous Food Response Project: (i) enhancement of the capacity of households in the Project area to increase productivity and production of selected food crops and livestock species; (ii) strengthening the public agencies, non-governmental organizations, and producer organizations and other community-based groups. Lessons learned from Bank-supported emergency food production operations in CAR and from fragile states were reflected in the Project design including two prominent features: (i) Technology transfer and adoption to address all key determinants of technology transfer, including the provision of advisory services and training, the provision of inputs and small equipment (processing units, mills) and storage, and the use of modern communication tools to facilitate access to market information; and (ii) Providing access to capital through Conditional Productive Asset Transfers as an appropriate mechanism for supporting provision of productivity-enhancing goods and services, particularly in fragile states. However, the readiness for implementation was weak as evidenced by the fact that key activities related to effectiveness and disbursements conditions (Contract between MARD and AGETIP-CAF, Project implementation manual, safeguard documents) were not initiated at approval. 30. Supervision and implementation assistance rating is “Satisfactory”. As reflected in the different nine Implementation Status and Results reports that have been archived before the cancellation of the Project, no supervision mission was implemented before the change of Task Team Leader in September 2011. Because CAR is a fragile state that is still emerging from a post-conflict situation and constrained by weak institutional 6 capacity, from September 19, 2011 and December 1, 2012 the Bank team implemented intense formal implementation and support missions (5 missions in total: a mission every three months on average) involving two experts from FAO who supported the PCU in the preparation of a capacity building plan for the key actors of the Project and of sub- projects for producer organizations, and in training the Project teams on the implementation manual and procedures. Because of the current crisis that started in the end of December 2012, and as per suspension of missions to Bangui for Bank staff, the team did not implement any implementation support missions up to cancellation of the Project. In addition, frequent audio and videoconferencing meetings were organized with the Project team and key actors to support implementation. As reflected in the eight last ISRs, the team used a problem solving approach that permitted identification of key bottlenecks and enforcement of relevant measures. 31. The team also ensured (i) joint missions with other partners such as IFAD and (ii) a strong coordination and synergy for the support to the seed sub-sector between the Project and the IFAD-financed CAR-PREVES evidenced by the preparation and financing of a joint work program and budget for the revamping of the seed sub-sector: (a) joint purchase of foundation seeds from the Cameroon Agricultural Research Institute for Development, (b) harmonization of the methodology and activities for the multiplication and distribution of seeds, and (c) close coordination and harmonization of the rehabilitation of seed multiplication centers. 32. Compliance with Bank policies has been rated “Satisfactory”. The Project complied with OP 8.00 since it was designed to support objectives that included the restoration of economic activities and the restoration of physical and productive assets. In addition, as showed in the Project Appraisal Document, the Project was well aligned with the national poverty reduction strategy, as embodied in the Government’s as well as with CAR’s Country Partnership Strategy. 4. Assessment of Borrower Performance 33. Borrower’s performance is rated “Moderately Unsatisfactory”. The Government performance rating is based on the following considerations: (i) fulfillment of effectiveness conditions (adoption of the Project implementation manual, and signing of the delegated contract management agreement by the Government of CAR and AGETIP- CAF); (ii) fulfillment of disbursement conditions (preparation and approval of three safeguard documents: the Environmental and Social Management Framework, the Pest Management Plan, and the Indigenous People Plan); and (iii) implementation readiness. 34. As reported in the different Implementation Status and Results reports, in spite of an intensive supervision and strong support from the Bank team, the Project suffered from great delays in meeting effectiveness and disbursement conditions as well as in implementation readiness. In fact the Project was approved on June 2, 2011 and signed more than three months after on September 14, 2011. The Project was declared effective on March 1, 2012 and disbursement conditions met only on May 2, 2012. Overall, the 7 Project implementation readiness was judged to be satisfactory for the 2013 growing season as per the findings of the November 26-December 1, 2012 mission. To this regards, the following activities have been completed: • Establishment and functioning of the PCU in Bangui and of the two IPCUs in Berberati and Boda: (i) Selection and recruitment of the Project staff; (ii) Rehabilitation and equipment of buildings for the PCU and IPCUs; (iii) Procurement of vehicles and motorcycles. • Initiation of the baseline on target value chains (cultivated areas, yields, varieties, animal species, productions) on the existing Producer Organizations in Berberati and Boda, the two target regions of the Project. • Revamping the seed sector: (i) Preparation and signing of an Arrêté for the registration of; (ii) Preparation and signing of an Office Memorandum for the regulation of commercial seeds; and (iii) signed an Office Memorandum creating the National Committee for the Review of the Seed Legislation; (iv) Preparation and validation of a Seed Legislation on November 27, 2012 with the key actors, and submission for approval to the Commission of the Presidency in December 2012; and (v) purchase of cereal, groundnut and bean seeds and cassava seedlings for 2013 growing season intended to farmers as part of the support to the implementation of their Sub-Projects. • Conventions encompassing work plans and budgets signed between the PCU and key implementing agencies namely the Central African Agronomic Research Institute, the National Agency for Livestock Development, the Central African Agency for Agricultural Development. Work plans and budgets for implementing agencies contained activities that aimed at revamping the seed sector. • Capacity building: (i) Compiling list of NGOs to be involved in the implementation of the Project; and (ii) The preparation of a capacity building plan for the key actors of the Project. • Advisory services for farmers: A pilot business call center for farmers was created and functioning. • Institutional support to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development: supported workshops and meetings as part of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program process and the preparation of the Government’s National Agricultural Investment Plan that was completed in 2012. 35. The Government did not comply with one of the six covenants for the Project. An external independent auditor was not recruited for the Project at due date on April 12, 2012, since there were no more funds in the Project’s designated account. 5. Lessons Learned 36. The main lesson learned is the importance of Bank’s fast response in a situation of conflict and violence, building on the experience outlined in the World Development Report of 2011 on security and development. In particular, the possibility of leveraging key United Nations capacities and greater access to preserve human capital and prevent 8 further deterioration of conditions in CAR, with potentially vast implications for the Central African sub-region, is paramount. 37. Weak institutional capacity causes important delays in implementation that are difficult to be addressed on time especially while implementing an emergency operation in a fragile and post-conflict country. Institutional capacity within MARD is extremely weak and in spite of a strong support from the Bank team who used a problem solving approach, readiness for implementation suffered great delays. 38. Project-specific technical lessons. Large and active consultations allowed completion of key activities in the seeds sector: (i) preparation and signing of an Arrêté for the registration of varieties; (ii) preparation and signing of an Office Memorandum for the regulation of commercial seeds; (iii) signed an Office Memorandum creating the National Committee for the Review of the Seed Legislation; (iv) preparation and validation of a Seed Legislation on November 27, 2012 with the key actors, and submission for approval to the Commission of the Presidency in December 2012. Amongst the negative lessons learned the difficulty of working on the implementation readiness activities during the preparation of the Project caused important delays that did not permit the deployment of activities on the ground. In fact, the Government started working effectively on effectiveness and disbursement conditions as well as on the key activities related to implementation readiness, only after the recommendations of the first implementation support mission that took place from September 19-23, 2011. 9 Annex 1. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Bleoue Nicaise Ehoue Senior Agriculture Economist AFTA1 TTL Enagnon Ernest Eric Adda Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Financial Management Mamma Alim Ahmed Senior Executive Assistant AFCC1 Assistant Patrick Bangotha Consultant AFMGA Consultant Ananie Cyrille Ekoumou Forestry Specialist AFTN1 Forestry Abanda Stephane Forman Senior Livestock Specialist AFTA3 Livestock Lucienne M. M'Baipor Senior Social Development AFTCS Social Development Specialist Evelyne Huguette Madozein Team Assistant AFMCF Assistant Carine-Reine Mbedo Ngassia Team Assistant AFMCF Receptionist Emeran Serge M. Menang Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN1 Forestry Evouna Bienvenu Rajaonson Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN1 Environment Peter Ngwa Taniform Senior Transport Specialist AFTTR Transport Haoussia Tchaoussala Procurement Specialist AFTPW Consultant Supervision/NCO Manievel Sene Senior Rural Development AFTA2 TTL Specialist Marie Jeanne Uwanyarwaya Senior Executive Assistant AFTA2 Operations Marie-Claudine Fundi Language Program Assistant AFTA2 Assistant Nora Kaoues Senior Operations Officer AFTA2 Operations Officer Enagnon Ernest Eric Adda Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Financial Management Ananie Cyrille Ekoumou Forestry Specialist AFTN1 Forestry Abanda Lucienne M. M'Baipor Senior Social Development AFTCS Social Development Specialist Evelyne Huguette Madozein Team Assistant AFMCF Assistant Carine-Reine Mbedo Ngassia Team Assistant AFMCF Receptionist Emeran Serge M. Menang Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN1 Forestry Evouna Bienvenu Rajaonson Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN1 Environment Peter Ngwa Taniform Senior Transport Specialist AFTTR Transport Haoussia Tchaoussala Procurement Specialist AFTPW Consultant 10 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY11 41.10 252.36 Total: 41.10 252.36 Supervision/NCO FY12 16.61 100.53 FY13 17.19 92.81 FY14 9.58 65.56 Total: 43.38 258.90 11 Annex 2. List of Supporting Documents 1. Emergency Project Paper 2. Implementation Status and Results reports 3. Aide- Memoires 12 Annex 3. MAP 13