



Project Information Document (PID)

Concept Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 13-May-2019 | Report No: PIDISDSC23394



BASIC INFORMATION

A. Basic Project Data

| | | | |
|--|--|--|---|
| Country Niger | Project ID P164271 | Parent Project ID (if any) | Project Name Governance of Extractives for Local Development Project (P164271) |
| Region AFRICA | Estimated Appraisal Date Sep 09, 2019 | Estimated Board Date Oct 15, 2019 | Practice Area (Lead) Governance |
| Financing Instrument Investment Project Financing | Borrower(s) Ministry of Finance | Implementing Agency Ministry of Planing | |

Proposed Development Objective(s)

The project development objective is to improve the deployment of the state’s human and financial resources and enhance the extractive sector’s contribution to local development.

PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US\$, Millions)

SUMMARY

| | |
|---------------------------|--------|
| Total Project Cost | 100.00 |
| Total Financing | 100.00 |
| of which IBRD/IDA | 100.00 |
| Financing Gap | 0.00 |

DETAILS

World Bank Group Financing

| | |
|---|--------|
| International Development Association (IDA) | 100.00 |
| IDA Credit | 100.00 |

Environmental and Social Risk Classification

Concept Review Decision



Substantial

Track I-The review did authorize the preparation to continue

Other Decision (as needed)

B. Introduction and Context

Country Context

1. **Niger is exposed to multiple challenges adversely impacting its development:** (i) regional insecurity and violent extremist groups threaten stability, fuel pre-existing tensions and cause population displacement including refugees; (ii) high population growth and a large population of youth with few economic opportunities; (iii) an improved macro-fiscal situation which nonetheless remains exposed to multiple external shocks due to dependency on agriculture and extractives; (iv) increased rural poverty and in the number of poor; (v) deep inequalities, particularly gender inequalities.
2. **There is significant scope to improve basic service delivery.** Niger ranked 189 out of 189 on the 2018 Human Development Index, reflecting low education and health outcomes. The net enrollment rate in primary education was 63 percent (58 percent for women) in 2016. The child malnutrition rate was 42.2 percent (2017) and life expectancy was 60 years (2016). Service quality is the main challenge. A third of primary school teachers are not in the classroom and 41 percent have the minimum knowledge required to teach. About a third of health workers are absent and two thirds do not correctly diagnose more than two out of five tracer conditions. Half of the health facilities do not have functional basic equipment, and less than a quarter of the facilities have water, sanitation and power.¹ High population growth, the size of the country, increased insecurity, limited state presence and capability as well as insufficient resources make it challenging to respond to increasing demand for basic services.
3. **The macro-fiscal situation has improved but Niger remains highly exposed to external shocks.** Real annual growth rates averaged 6.4 percent between 2012 and 2017 compared to 5.1 percent between 2001 and 2007 and 1.6 percent the previous decade. Growth is highly volatile and predominately driven by agriculture, subject to climatic shocks. The extractive sector is subject to commodity price fluctuations. The continued challenging security situation stifles economic activities and strains the fiscal situation given increased security spending and costs related to the humanitarian crises. Revenues from trade also dropped due to the economic downturn in Nigeria. The decline in uranium prices reduced government mining revenues by 30 percent between 2014 and 2016. The recent public spending increase² was financed by petroleum revenue increase and public debt increase.³

Sectoral and Institutional Context

Public Sector reform: towards the deployment of State financial and human resources

4. **The geographical concentration of financial and human resource is a major service delivery bottleneck that the Government of Niger (GoN) has started to address.** While 80 percent of the population live in rural areas, about 90 percent of the budget is spent in Niamey and 65 percent of public Human Resources (HR) are based in the capital.⁴ This limits resource availability to frontline service providers. To address the challenges, the GoN issued decrees and the 2018-

¹ Service Delivery Indicators (SDI 2016).

² Public spending: 22.5 percent of GDP in 2012; 32.28 percent of GDP in 2015; and 26.8 percent of GDP in 2017.

³With the start of petroleum production, extractive sector revenue went from 2 percent of GDP in 2010 to 7 percent of GDP in 2016. Debt increased from 26.1 percent of GDP in 2012 to 49.7 of GDP in 2017

⁴ World Bank (2017) Technical Assessment of Service Delivery Challenges, unpublished



2021 plan to transfer competences and resources to Local Governments (LG) in education, health, hydraulics and environment. Implementation of the plan has been slow and will require substantial and sustained support (cf. annex 2). Public sector reforms have mostly been focused at the central level and need to be extended to the deconcentrated and decentralized levels: (i) program-based budgeting (since January 2018); (ii) Treasury Single Account (TSA); (iii) ongoing civil servants' biometric census and functional reviews will result in revised public sector organization and Human Resource Management (HRM) processes by 2020.⁵

5. **Institutional capability at central, deconcentrated and LG level is required to scale up the deployment of state financial and HR resources.** Roles and responsibilities in the existing legal framework for decentralization particularly in the areas of planning, budget management, monitoring and oversight have yet to be clarified. Key policies, legislation and regulation such as the policy for the deconcentration of central level civil servants, LG civil servant legislation, and detailed regulations of the LG Public Financial Management legislation (PFM)⁶ remain to be established. LGs have limited HR capacity⁷ and training possibilities at the LG training center (*Centre de Formation en Gestion des Collectivités Territoriales*, CFGCT), are limited due to its limited resources (cf. Annex 3).

6. **Mechanisms to finance LGs need to be operationalized.** Nearly all LGs have local development and annual investment plans.⁸ Their implementation is limited due to lack of resources. The GoN created the National Agency for Financing Territorial Communities (*Agence Nationale de Financement des Collectivités Territoriales*, ANFICT) in 2008. It consists of a technical assistance (TA) window and two funds: (i) the Decentralization Support Fund for recurrent spending; and (ii) the Equalization Fund for investments. Transfers and TA from ANFICT are volatile and limited due to insufficient financing and capability. Transfers of the Legally required 15 percent of oil and mining revenues to the LGs of the region of the extraction sites are partially transferred and using a direct transfer mechanism. This mechanism encounters similar challenges as ANFICT: inadequate oversight, PFM and institutional capabilities at central, deconcentrated and LG level. Limited transfers are justified by limited capabilities which creates a vicious cycle as low transfers also contribute to perpetuate limited capacity (cf. Annex 3).

The potential of extractive industries for revenue mobilization and local development

7. **The extractive sector (petroleum and large scale, artisanal and small-scale mining) is key for revenue mobilization for financing local development and LGs play de facto an important role in its management.** The 2006 mining code and the 2014 petroleum code stipulate that 85 percent of the extractive industries revenues are allocated to the state budget and 15 percent to the regions and local councils in areas impacted by resource extraction and processing. Effective LG and deconcentrated authorities are critical for sector development, as they de facto manage the tensions between extractive industries and communities. Meanwhile, there is potential to strengthen the sector's upstream or downstream links with the rest of the economy, its impact on development and poverty reduction.

8. **The extractive sector is a unique opportunity for structural transformation.** The economy is mostly informal and driven by the agriculture sector (39 percent of GDP) and the extractive sector (7 percent of GDP). Extractive sector exports accounted for 50 percent of total exports and 22 percent of government revenues in 2017. Opportunities to transform the economy are limited but the Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) identified two potential avenues: intensifying trade with the large market in Nigeria, and further developing the extractive sector, which requires both better public management and new private sector investments.

⁵ Supported by the Public Sector Capacity and Performance for Service Delivery (PCDS, P145261, US\$40m)

⁶ Decree 2016-302-PRN-MISPDACR-MF of June 29, 2016

⁷ About a third of local counsellors have not completed primary education cycle, about half of local government staff (cadre) have not completed high school. Republic of Niger (2018) Local Government Census

⁸ Republic of Niger (2018) Local Government Census



9. **The potential for extractive industries development is high.** The downturn in prices, and lower cost options in other countries, resulted in a scale-back of mining projects in Niger. Uranium mines around Arlit are likely to be closed in the foreseeable future, yet no environmental or social closure plans exist. There is significant potential for industrial scale mining of gold, iron, copper, nickel, molybdenum, vanadium, phosphate and salt. The finalization of a pipeline for export of crude oil is expected to increase the production to 110,000 barrels/day in 2022 from 20,000 barrels/day in 2019. The 2013 discovery of large deposits of gold in the Agadez region have resulted in a proliferation of artisanal mining sites and employ an estimated 500,000 persons.⁹ Improved regulation and state capability to manage the sector and monitor production and processing sites could double artisanal mining production.¹⁰ Recent improvements include a new mining and petroleum code, the modernization of the mining cadaster and the construction of a new mineral laboratory.¹¹ Yet there is scope to further improve management capacity, regulations and procedures, particularly its implementation at the regional level.

10. **The extractive sector is hampered by limited human resources and technical capacity.** The sector is constrained by human resources. Although local universities have mining engineering and geology programs, their training capacity is limited. Thus, Large-Scale Mining (LSM) rely on foreign expertise and most Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners (ASM/SSM) lack the means and skills (i.e. in technical, business, finance and environmental management) required for well-organized and managed ASM/SSMs. Key areas to develop include all aspects of modern mining management, including tax and auditing, and mineral extraction and processing technologies.

11. **Limited availability of reliable geoscientific data is a constraint to promote and develop the sector.** Available data on geological resources covers less than 15 percent of Niger's territory. More detailed and targeted analytical and geodata interpretation work is necessary to assess and market the mineral potential of the country. This is particularly relevant as Niger does show untapped potential for several strategic or 'battery' minerals (i.e. lithium, copper, cobalt). Investing in geodata will ultimately result in greater interest by exploration firms due to reduced costs and risks and will contribute to strengthen the GoN's capacity to attract and secure more favorable terms with investors.

12. **Niger has recently re-committed to revenue transparency and good governance in extractive industries.** Niger was an active member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 2005. In October 2017 Niger was suspended from EITI due to inadequate progress in implementing the 2016 Standard and insufficient civil society engagement. The GoN since confirmed its intention to re-commit to EITI and is currently working on submitting their renewed application.¹² Re-joining EITI will be an important signal towards the investment community.

13. **There is room for boosting extractive sector upstream and downstream economic linkages.** When done right, developing local content around the extractive industries can transform community livelihoods and the economy, while supporting companies' operations. However, despite progressive local content clauses in the new mining and petroleum legislation, upstream and downstream job creation from the oil and mining sector is very limited in Niger. This represents a large untapped potential.

14. **Local authorities de facto have filled the void in terms of ASM monitoring and supervision to the extent of their capacity.** Many tasks delegated to the State Mining Company (*Société du patrimoine des mines du Niger*, SOPAMIN) on

⁹ Grégoire, E. and Gagnol, L. 2017. Figures corroborated by the Ministry of Mines in official communications.

¹⁰ 2012, World Bank : Niger - La Modernisation du Commerce pendant un Boom Minier

¹¹ Supported by US\$50m Competitiveness and Growth Support project (P127204). A Trust Fund (P150108) supports GoN to negotiate extractive contracts and monitor operations to maximize socio-economic benefits.

¹² GoN has established a high-level Ad Hoc Committee to prepare a new EITI strategy; appointed a new Permanent Secretary; and drafted a new EITI Decree currently under review by a multi-stakeholder group.



ASM have not yet been implemented¹³ and government representatives are largely absent from the ASM sites. The situation has been exacerbated by insecurity constraining access to mining areas. As a result, local authorities have filled the gaps and de facto control the sector, levying taxes on an ad hoc basis, with limited coordination. Confusion over mandates and responsibilities has led to the development of a vast but informal mining sector which receives neither support nor extension services and which contributes little to revenue mobilization (cf. Annex 4).

15. **ASM is potentially both a driver of fragility or an opportunity for resilience.** Gold ASM represents a significant portion of mineral production, is located in some of the most remote areas and played a significant role employing youth.¹⁴ Mining in these areas provides alternative livelihoods, safety net, and opportunities for local development, as revenues are often reinvested locally.¹⁵ Most gold mining and trading is being carried out informally, creating a potential source of fragility in the border areas with Burkina Faso and Mali. The mining boom also resulted in a raft of socio-economic, health, environmental and security challenges. Remuneration is often insufficient to ensure a decent standard of living. In addition, ASM comes with potential social and environmental challenges, related to conflict, pollution, environmental degradation, child labor and, gender inequality. Formalizing ASM, combined with capacity building and provision of access to technical and financial resources, is key to increase transparency, stability, economic benefits, tax revenues and address social and environmental challenges. Clear property rights enable recipients to capitalize their possessions and strengthen the position of both male and female miners. Because of reciprocal obligations and the access to more efficient technologies formalized ASM actors tend to operate in a more sustainable manner, while social and environmental norms regulating their activity can be enforced by the government.

Main challenges to address

16. **The geographical concentration of state's human and financial resources combined with declining revenue from extractives industries are major constraints to service delivery, local development, and stability.** The geographical concentration of financial and human resource is a major service delivery bottleneck. Institutional capability at central, deconcentrated and LG level is required to scale up the deployment of state's financial and HR resources to address this challenge. Deploying the state will require additional resources, while extractive industries is a major source of revenue. The extractive sector is key to finance state deployment policy and local development while the geological potential is relatively unknown, the investment climate challenging, integration in the local economy and contribution to local development of both large scale and artisanal scale mining limited. Ultimately, the deployment of state's resource in rural areas and extractives industries well managed and integrated in the local economy can contribute to mitigate fragility risks.

17. **To address those challenges, the Government 2017-21 development strategy includes improved public sector management and extractive development to foster shared prosperity and mitigate conflict.** The PDES II (*Deuxième Programme de développement économique et social*) Pillar II focus on promoting gender and job creation for youth. Pillar III targets (i) promoting the economic autonomy of women in rural areas; (ii) strengthening PFM, including domestic resource mobilization; (iv) improving economic management, including better planning and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E); and (v) developing mining and petroleum value chains, including formalizing artisanal mining and increasing geological knowledge. Pillar IV focuses on improving public services and decentralization / deconcentration. Pillar V centers on environmental protection and sustainable development.

¹³ In 2017, Niger's modified mining law defines ASM/SSM mining permits modalities and put SOPAMIN in charge of the supervision and monitoring of ASM. SOPAMIN, also responsible of gold exports supervision, is trying to get a grip on the Gold ASM value chain by setting up mobile buying offices

¹⁴ Gold ASM started in the Liptako in the 1980s, and in 2013 in the Djado and Aïr; where it provided jobs for hundreds of thousands of men, particularly youth, fleeing the war in Libya and with limited alternatives.

¹⁵ This has been particularly important in Northern Niger, where heavy droughts and the closing of the Sopamin-Areva uranium project left ASM the only remaining viable economic activity in the region



18. **The project will support government efforts in deploying human and financial resources to LG, investing in geo-data and extractive sector management, and supporting ASM sustainable development.** By supporting deconcentration and decentralization reforms, the project will increase financial execution and access to service delivery outside Niamey. Investing in geo-data, extractive sector management and transparency will attract investors, foster an extractive sector more integrated in the local economy, mitigate the associated social and environmental risks, foster job creation and boost revenue mobilization. Formalizing ASM and enhancing oversight capacity will foster the sector as a driver of resilience rather than of fragility. Increased transparency and participation on local governance and extractive industries at all levels will contribute to strengthen accountability and state credibility.

Relationship to CPF

19. **The proposed project is aligned with the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) on decentralization, governance and extractive industries.** Niger's CPF for the period FY18-22 emphasizes the role of governance and well-managed extractive industries, to: (i) ensure transparency, accountability and transfers of extractive revenue to LGs to mitigate fragility risks; (ii) increase revenue mobilization; (iii) promote jobs; and (iv) adopt a citizen centric approach to improve service delivery.

20. **The project will contribute to the Bank's Twin Goals and IDA 18 priorities.** The focus on increasing capacity for service delivery and resource management at the local level, from individuals to public sector institutions, will contribute to strengthen the government's development capability and governance of the mining sector. It will also contribute to maximizing beneficial impacts of the extractive industries for poverty reduction, through jobs and revenue mobilization.

21. **This project financed by IDA18 Risk Mitigation Regime Financing (RMR) will contribute to mitigate fragility risk.** Niger is exposed to multiple conflict and fragility risks, which stem from a combination of deep-rooted structural causes and short-term drivers. The project will contribute to mitigate these risks by contributing to improving: (i) a positive state presence across the country, service delivery, state capacity to monitor and address conflict at local level and foster participation; (ii) extractive industries' management; and (iii) livelihood of artisanal miners, especially women and youth.

C. Proposed Development Objective(s)

22. The project development objective is to improve the deployment of the state's human and financial resources and enhance the extractive sector's contribution to local development.

Key Results (From PCN)

23. Proposed PDO-level results indicators are:

- Share of Budget executed at deconcentrated and decentralized level
- Share of public HR effectively posted outside Niamey
- Number of new requests for mining exploration permits
- Number of registered and formalized artisanal and small-scale miners/mining cooperatives (disaggregated by gender)

D. Concept Description

24. The project will combine Disbursement-Linked Indicators (DLIs) and technical assistance to support government reforms. Support on the legal framework and policy formulation at the central level, and large-scale capacity-building at both the central and local level will target core ministries (Interior, Finance, Planning, Civil Service) and targeted line ministries (e.g. Mines, Education, Health, Water, Environment, Petroleum) to effectively roll-out state's resource deployment and budget execution at the local level; and develop extractive sector's contribution to local development.



25. **Component 1. Deploying the state’s resources and leveraging extractive sector’s contribution to development (US\$65.0m).** The objective of the component aims at providing the incentive through DLIs for the actual availability of human and financial resources at local level and outside the capital city to ultimately improve service delivery, as well as for a well-managed extractive sector contributing effectively to local development. The component 2 will provide the required technical assistance to support the implementation of those policies.

Table 1. Disbursement-Linked Indicators

| # | Potential DLI | US\$m |
|--|--|-----------|
| <i>Prior</i> | | |
| 1 | Civil service deployment plans adopted for the targeted ministries ¹⁶ | 7 |
| 2 | Implementation decrees for local civil service for targeted ministries adopted | 7 |
| 3 | Niger EITI membership request submitted | 6 |
| <i>Deploying human resources</i> | | |
| 1 | Number of deconcentrated services and LG with core staff ¹⁷ in the targeted regions | 10 |
| 2 | Number of core and targeted deconcentrated services, LG core staff, and local councilors trained on core curricula ¹⁸ | 5 |
| <i>Deploying financial resources</i> | | |
| 3 | Share of budget executed at regional, departmental and LG level | 10 |
| 4 | Annual average delay for LG payments in targeted regions to be processed by Treasury below 90 days | 5 |
| <i>Enhancing extractive sector contribution to local development</i> | | |
| 5 | Number of Artisanal miners formalized and trained on good practices | 10 |
| 6 | Access to key up-to-date extractive sector information online (geo-data, cadaster, contracts, EITI reports) | 5 |
| Total | | 65 |

26. **Eligible Expenditure Programs (EEPs).** A preliminary analysis of the program budget identified the following EEPs as suitable for project financing: salary and wages, training, operating cost and grants.

Table 2. Estimation of Eligible Expenditure Programs (EEPs)

| Identified EEPs (est. in US\$ million) | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | TOTAL |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Min. of Interior - salaries (DGDCT, DGATD, IGAT, DEP, DAJ) | 11.23 | 11.23 | 11.23 | 11.23 | 11.23 | 11.23 | 67.39 |
| Min. of Interior - functioning (DGDCT, DGATD, IGAT, DEP) | 2.44 | 2.44 | 2.44 | 2.44 | 2.44 | 2.44 | 14.66 |
| Min. of Finance - salaries (DGTCP) | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 98.75 |
| Min. of Civil Service - salaries | 1.99 | 1.99 | 1.99 | 1.99 | 1.99 | 1.99 | 11.96 |
| FAD - LG - functioning | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 5.30 |
| ANFICT - subsidy - salaries & recurrent | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 2.41 |
| ANVD - subsidy - salaries & recurrent | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 4.86 |
| ENA - subsidy - recurrent | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 4.86 |
| SOPAMIN - salaries | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 4.00 | 11.52 |
| Min. of Mines - salaries | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.80 | 5.49 |

¹⁶ Targeted Ministries would be: Min. of interior, Min. of finance, Min. of Civil Service, Min. of Mines

¹⁷ The detailed list will be determined during project preparation. For example, LG core staff are the minimum required staff for LG to manage LG’s administrative and financial management, from LG Secretary to Treasurer.

¹⁸ Core curricula is here related to *Plan TCR*



| | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Min. of Mines - functioning | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 1.50 | 2.35 |
| EITI secretariat - salaries | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.55 |
| EITI secretariat - functioning | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.99 |
| TOTAL EEP | 37.91 | 37.91 | 37.91 | 37.91 | 37.91 | 41.52 | 231.09 |
| DLI est. in \$USm | 20.00 | 10.00 | 11.00 | 12.00 | 12.00 | 0.00 | 65.00 |

27. **Component 2. Deploying the state’s resources and leveraging extractive sector’s contribution to development (US\$29.0m).** The objective of the component 2 is to provide the technical assistance to support the deployment of state’s human and financial resources and the development of extractives.

28. *Sub-component 2.1 Strengthening the system for state deployment (US\$5.0m).* This sub-component will complement the incentives provided by the DLI by providing technical assistance and capacity-building to support both human and financial resource deployment in the targeted sector:

- (i) support the redeployment of human resources to deconcentrated services and LGs through technical assistance on (a) Local Civil Service Management (*Fonction Publique Territoriale*); (b) the training of local civil servants on PFM and HRM, including the mainstreaming of participatory approaches in local governance and local conflict mediations, in partnership with the National School of Administration;
- (ii) support to strengthen the legal framework and procedures for deconcentrated management of public resources and LG financing in line with the Western-Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) directives, including the deployment of the Treasury Single Account (TSA) e-system at regional and district levels
- (iii) strengthen the capacities of the units supporting decentralization processes within the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Hydraulics, the Ministry of Primary Education, the Ministry of Health, and ANFICT, to monitor and support LG;
- (iv) support the harmonization of data collected on risks of fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) into a national consolidated FCV risks monitoring system.

29. *Sub-component 2.2 Fostering extractive investment and integration in local economy (US\$24.0m).* The objective is to increase Niger’s fiscal space through extractive sector, and job creation by fostering a conducive environment for investors in sustainable mining, enhancing the integration of extractive industries in local economy. The sub-component will finance TA to:

- (i) support the completion and implementation of the regulatory framework, in line with the new 2018 Mining policy, to foster sustainable extraction and diversification of mineral production, through (a) drafting regulations with regards to mining, fiscal, environmental regulations including for ASM; (b) building capacity for the implementation, including the monitoring of licenses and contracts as well as ASM and local content;
- (ii) produce a social and environmental strategy for uranium mine closure around Arlit;
- (iii) develop geological knowledge to support investment in large scale mining, through (a) an airborne geophysical data collection and verification campaign; (b) design and implement an integrated information management system for extractive sector, to enable computerized geodata, mining cadaster management, environmental, fiscal and production data consolidation and management to facilitate access to data for monitoring purpose, service delivery to potential investors, and public accountability; (c) support the operation of the newly establishing mineral sector laboratory; (d) support investment promotion in large mineral deposits;
- (iv) support the development, regulations and monitoring of ASM to increase the contribution of ASM to sustainable development and livelihoods of women and men, and mitigate the risks associated with it, including (a)



elaborating a strategy for the formalization of the ASM value chain, (b) strengthening monitoring and implementation capacity and the institutional framework at the deconcentrated levels, including the management of social and environmental impacts, (c) supporting ‘model’ mining artisanal pilots, including training and demonstration centers, in the salt and gold sectors specifically targeting women engaged in the artisanal mining value chain.

30. **Component 3: Project management, GovTech and Change management (US\$6.0m).** The objective of this component is to strengthen project’s coordination and management, harness information technology for innovative solutions in public sector management and support change management.

31. *Sub-component 3.1. GovTech for LG service delivery monitoring (US\$1.0m).* The sub-component will provide the technical assistance and equipment to harness GovTech solution design and implement an Integrated Information Management System for monitoring LG performance, benefiting to the various actors supporting and overseeing LG, including piloting data collection from users on service delivery;

32. *Sub-component 3.2. Project Management (US\$5.0m).* The sub-component will support (i) day to day management of the Project; (ii) procurement and financial management; (iii) monitoring and evaluation; (iv) coordination of project activities across beneficiaries; (v) communication; (vi) support of training and advisory services needed for the overall performance of the Project; and (vii) leadership, change management and iterative problem-solving to address collaboration and cooperation challenges, e.g. through Rapid Result coaching within targeted ministries, such as line ministry units in charge of implementing the *Plan TCR 2018-2021*.

| Legal Operational Policies | Triggered? |
|---|------------|
| Projects on International Waterways OP 7.50 | No |
| Projects in Disputed Areas OP 7.60 | No |

Summary of Screening of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts

The project will not involve activities that could generate significant direct environmental or social adverse risks or impacts since it will support the Government in Niger mostly in soft activities. Due to the bad legacy reputation of the mining sector in general in the country, civil society organizations may share strong concerns. The quality of the Stakeholder engagement Plan and its good implementation will be able to reduce the reputational risk of the Bank. The revised SESA will also be a strong outcome of the project and will need to be well prepared. Key specific measures that will be identified in the SESA could also be implemented.

Note To view the Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts, please refer to the Concept Stage ESRS Document.

CONTACT POINT

World Bank

Abel Paul Basile Bove, Kirsten Lori Hund, Ragnvald Michel Maellberg
Senior Governance Specialist



Borrower/Client/Recipient

Ministry of Finance

Implementing Agencies

Ministry of Planing
Iro Souley
Director of Programmation
souleyiro@yahoo.fr

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT

The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: <http://www.worldbank.org/projects>

APPROVAL

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| Task Team Leader(s): | Abel Paul Basile Bove, Kirsten Lori Hund, Ragnvald Michel Maellberg |
|----------------------|---|

Approved By

| | | |
|---------------------------|--|--|
| Practice Manager/Manager: | | |
| Country Director: | | |