


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International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Volume II
Country Analyses

Sharon Stanton Russell,
Karen Jacobsen, and
William Deane Stanley

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Africa Technical Department Series

International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Volume II

Sharon Stanton Russell,
Karen Jacobsen, and
William Deane Stanley

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FOREWORD

Population migration is a perennial phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, its causes and impacts are highly varied across the region, and its scale fluctuates significantly over time as well as among the different geographic areas of the continent. To provide a perspective on this dimension of population dynamics as it relates to development, the Education Division of the Africa Technical Department commissioned a review of published literature, and, to the extent possible, the "fugitive" literature of the 1980s.

One of the principal objectives of this review was to assess the broad development policy implications of international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. Another important objective was to collate and facilitate access to migration information as a contribution to better understanding of country-specific settings in which World Bank operations are designed. Although these two objectives are complementary and are met by drawing upon the same information base, for the convenience of users, the objectives are addressed in two separate volumes.

The first volume provides an overview of migration scale, trends, and characteristics, and the relationship of migration to development issues in selected sectors. That volume also reviews Sub-Saharan African countries' policies toward international migration. The second volume summarizes, by country, demographics and migration patterns, migration policies, and selected migration and sectoral relationships for 42 Sub-Saharan African countries.

It is expected that either or both volumes of the study will be of interest to a wide range of audiences, including development policy analysts and development program designers in Sub-Saharan African governments and international assistance agencies as well as the academic community. By contributing to an improved understanding of the dimensions of international migration and development, it is hoped that the quality of Sub-Saharan development policies and programs can be enhanced.



Hans Wyss
Director
Technical Department
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ABSTRACT

This two-volume study provides a "state of knowledge" analysis of important interactions between international migration and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Based upon a critical review of more than 900 documents as well as original quantitative analysis, Volume I documents the scale and magnitude of migration trends and their interrelationships with remittances, labor markets, highly skilled manpower, education, health, and agriculture. Policies toward population movements and the subject of refugees are also treated. An extensive selected bibliography and subject index are included. Volume II summarizes major findings on a country-by-country basis.

It has been estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa contains 35 million international migrants (almost half the world's total) although the region accounts for less than 10 percent of the world's population. While East Africa has a history of labor flows, migration in this sub-region has been dominated in recent years by refugees. Approximately 80 percent of SSA's 4 million refugees originate from and find asylum in East Africa. Refugee movements are no longer confined to the Horn, however, as was the case earlier in the decade. Mozambique now accounts for nearly 30 percent of the region's refugees, and Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe together receive almost a quarter of the total.

Central Africa is distinguished from other sub-regions by a high degree of variation in types of migration depending upon nationality of origin and country of destination. West Africa, on the other hand, is distinctive for having the highest concentration of migrants, with apparently rising proportions of women and children among them. Southern Africa has been characterized by the predominance of migration to South Africa. However, in the past decade there have been substantial changes in these historical patterns, resulting from legislative and policy changes in South Africa, with potentially profound impact on the labor-sending countries of the sub-region.

Overall, the review of data on the scale and magnitude of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa found no evidence to suggest that the volume of international migration will be substantially reduced in future.

Although it is difficult to estimate the total volume of migrants' remittances, official flows are known to be of considerable importance for specific countries. At various times during the 1980s, remittances have financed 80 percent of the current account deficit in Botswana, represented over 50 percent of GNP in Lesotho, and amounted to almost 70 percent of total commodity export earnings in Sudan. For individual households, remittances are also important, representing the primary source of subsistence for over 40 percent of households in Lesotho (the extreme case), and the major source of income for over 5 percent of rural Nigerian households.

While it is frequently argued that migrants and their families tend to use remittances for consumption, the more recent and rigorous work reviewed in this study provides evidence that on balance, once subsistence needs are met, migrants do use remittances for investment purposes including education, livestock, farming, and small scale enterprise. The uses and consequences of remittances are found to differ sharply depending upon whether

the financial flows are small and regular, or large and "lumpy", and upon factors such as household structure, ownership rights of women, the availability of alternative sources of wage income and investment capital, and even seasonality.

Remittance flows also play an important role in linking geographically separated family members, thereby serving to blur presumed distinctions between urban and rural economies and calling into question the utility of simple two-sector models.

Recent research on the relationship between migration and labor markets has highlighted the importance of interactions among labor market characteristics (in not only sending and receiving locations, but also non-origin/non-destination areas) and characteristics of migrants themselves, their households, and communities. Changes in international employment opportunities are seen to have major consequences for domestic labor markets.

In contrast to the commonly held view that migrants tend to be concentrated in the informal sector, this analysis found that available evidence does not support this contention, although the few studies that distinguish migrants by sex suggest females may experience such concentration, and migration appears to contribute to development of the informal sector. There is also little evidence that wages of migrants differ significantly from those of nonmigrants in either the formal or informal sectors, once data are controlled for age and education. There are differences, however, between own account workers and employees as regards both earnings and migrant status.

Reduced opportunities for migration to developed countries, together with increased economic differentiation among African countries and rapid expansion of educational output, have combined in recent years to shift the direction of skilled migration from off-continent to within-Africa. Although the emigration of highly skilled manpower continues to create shortages in selected sectors (such as health and education) and in certain countries (eg. Sudan, Uganda, some countries of Southern Africa, and recently Nigeria), prevailing attitudes toward skilled migration have changed. Faced with rapid increases in supplies of trained graduates and unemployment among them, few governments have taken concerted action to stem these flows.

Examination of recent evidence on the relationship between education and migration suggests that, while it is generally the case that education increases the propensity of individuals to migrate, there are substantial differences in the educational attributes of migrants according to destination and sex. There is also evidence that the positive effects of education on rural development are greater for migrants than nonmigrants and, in turn, that migrant parents are both more likely and more able to send their children to school.

Much of the literature on interactions between migration and health has focussed on refugees, among whom the highest levels of morbidity and mortality are found after arrival in refugee camps. However, their health status is also negatively affected by prior deterioration of health services in areas of origin and by movement to new ecological zones. For economic migrants, the availability of remittance income has been found to increase

demand for health services and to have a positive effect on the probability of seeking modern care, contributing in part to observed increases in fertility in SSA cities.

Although the data are sparse, a growing body of research on the role of migration in the geographical spread of HIV infection has linked population movements to rising infection rates in some rural areas and secondary cities. At the same time, both African governments and the World Health Organization are seeking to reduce--not raise--obstacles to international mobility arising from concerns about AIDS.

The view that migration is an alternative to agricultural work is disputed by evidence that, in many countries, the two are necessary complements. Similarly, purported negative effects of migration on agricultural productivity are not supported conclusively by the literature. Rather, recent econometric work has found that while outmigration may be accompanied by a short-term drop in traditional crop output, in the long run migrant wage income serves to raise productivity by enhancing the working or fixed capital available to rural areas. In general, the effects of outmigration on agriculture are seen to vary considerably according to the type of migration, distance, age and sex composition of migrants, household structure, land availability, modes of production, and the existence of alternative sources of wage income.

The study reviews current government policies toward entry, exit, and status of international migrants, as well as bilateral and regional arrangements affecting population movements. Of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, only 12 view current levels of immigration as too high, and all but one of these have explicit policies to lower existing levels. Of 18 countries reporting significantly high levels of emigration, only 8 have policies to reduce the outflow. A growing number of countries are including migration as an aspect of national population policy.

While some investigators have observed an increase in the imposition of policies to control entry, there is little indication that the volume and importance of international migration will decline in Sub-Saharan Africa. Only the most rigorous enforcement of policies has a substantial effect on migratory flows, and strict enforcement may simply result in a shift from legal to clandestine movements.

The concluding chapter analyses major trends in refugee flows, their causes, types, and implications for source and asylum countries as well as for international assistance agencies. The number of official refugees in SSA increased nearly 15 percent between 1987 and 1988, to 3.9 million in the latter year. Mozambique is now the major source of refugees, followed by Ethiopia, Angola, Sudan, and Somalia. Despite significant voluntary repatriations in recent years (notably from Sudan, Malawi, and Rwanda), large numbers of refugees remain in camps and spontaneous settlements, posing a major challenge to development planning and the provision of services in host countries.

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The quantitative analysis of regional migration benefitted immeasurably from the census data files made available by Drs. Birgitta Bucht and Hania Zlotnick of the United Nations Population Division, Trends and Structure Section. Thanks are due to Dr. Thomas Merrick and the staff of The Population Reference Bureau in Washington for assistance with database searches and access to country policy files, and to Dr. Lydio Tomasi and his staff for their kindness during library research at the Center for Migration Studies in Staten Island. The authors acknowledge with appreciation permission to reprint Table 4 and Figure 1, previously published in World Development by Pergamon Journals Ltd., Oxford, United Kingdom.

Many research colleagues took time to assist with identifying and providing work in progress, as well as "fugitive literature" from their personal collections. The help of Professor Reginald Appleyard and Dr. Sally Findley is especially acknowledged. Professor Robert Lucas served as external reviewer for the final study report and its organization and content benefitted from his thoughtful comments. Any errors of omission or commission, however, remain the responsibility of the authors.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

CEAO	Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CEPGL	Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
EAC	East African Community
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ILO	International Labour Office, Geneva
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OCAM	Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne
PTA	Eastern and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SALC	Southern Africa Labour Commission
TOKTEN	Transfer of Know-How Through Expatriate Nationals Programme
UEAC	Union des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale
UDE	Union Douaniere Equatoriale
UDEAC	Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale

Throughout this study, monetary values given in local currencies have been converted to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate prevailing in the referenced time period. The values have not been adjusted to reflect exchange rate fluctuations, which in some cases (eg. Nigeria) have been dramatic over the decade.

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I. EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS: SCALE AND MAGNITUDE OF MIGRANT STOCKS

Among the most promising sources of information for estimating stocks of migrants are national census reports delineating numbers of foreign born or foreign nationals. If such data from comparable time frames were combined, they could provide a fairly solid, conservative baseline estimate of the numbers of migrants.

As a preliminary step, this study obtained available census reports for 29 countries and entered data on foreign nationals or foreign born residents into a data matrix. By cross tabulating individuals by source and destination country, one can roughly estimate the proportion of each country's population composed of migrants, as well as how large a number of people are outside of their home country, relative to its resident population. (See Tables 2 and 3 in Volume 1).

The data for the present report have a number of shortcomings which should be rectified in future research. First, the various census surveys were taken over an extended period of time, ranging from 1967 to 1982, with the bulk having been taken in the mid to late 1970s. Given shifting economic fortunes as well as rapidly growing populations, the long time span over which these surveys were taken introduces potentially large measurement error into any estimate of the number of people who moved to or from a particular country. Second, insufficient information is available at this writing concerning whether undocumented immigrants were counted in the various national surveys. Third, certain guest worker categories may not have been counted by some surveys. Exclusion of guest workers from census counts may explain discrepancies we found between our estimates of numbers of immigrants from specific national origins and estimates by other analysts.

Bearing in mind the shortcomings of the data, some exploratory analysis was conducted to find if expected relationships held between the overall percentages of immigrants and emigrants of each country and various social and economic indicators. It was expected, for instance, that relative economic performance in terms of growth of either aggregate GDP or GNP (in both absolute and per capita terms) would be positively related to the stock of migrants due to economic pull factors. It was also expected that economic performance would be negatively related to the stock of emigrants.

Regression analysis failed to support these expected relationships. This may reflect the weakness of the data. It may also suggest that the role of remittances in economic growth may be sufficient to flatten out over time any relationship between economic performance and stocks of migrants.

The one expected relationship that is supported by regression analysis is that countries of the West African region have higher proportions

of their resident populations made up of immigrants than countries of other regions; the relationship is statistically discernible at the .012 level. (See regression results in Figure A, below.) West Africa is generally held to have greater migration than other parts of Africa because of relative ease of travel, the existence of a regional economy with deep historical roots, and greater regional unity during the colonial period. With the present data, a dichotomous (dummy) variable for the West Africa region had a statistically significant positive shift coefficient with respect to the percentage of immigrants in countries' populations. This general finding held with various model specifications.

Three other tentative findings suggest interesting questions to pursue in future research. First, rates of natural population increase are positively related to the percentage of immigrants in countries' populations ($\text{prob}(t)=0.021$). In other words, countries with larger immigrant populations have higher natural rates of population growth, excluding growth resulting from immigration. This suggests that immigrant groups, due to their demographic characteristics, may have a particularly high natural growth rate.

A second empirical relationship which seems to invite further inquiry is that the percentage of primary school age population actually enrolled in school in the country of origin is negatively related to the stock of emigrants as a percentage of resident population in that country ($\text{prob}(t)=0.002$). This correlation runs counter to the positive relationship one would expect due to heightened employment expectations resulting from primary education. One possible explanation of this finding is that the data on school enrollment are more recent than most of those for emigration. The finding would be far more convincing if data for percentage of primary school enrollment for an appropriate age cohort were used.

The third point of interest is the positive relationship found between the rate of growth of the urban population and the stock of emigrants as a percentage of resident population ($\text{prob}(t)=0.008$). This correlation suggests that internal and external migration may be closely linked, that the same process through which a significant proportion of a population participates in migration to urban areas may also involve emigration.

No serious conclusions of any kind can be drawn from this analysis, in view of the shortcomings of the data. These statistical patterns are presented to point out that further data gathering efforts might well yield important and unexpected findings regarding the relationship between international migration and such vital development concerns as economic performance, population growth, education, and rural to urban internal migration.

Figure A

Regression I

Dependent Variable:

(LOGIMM) the natural logarithm of African immigrants as a percentage of resident population.

Independent Variables:

(NATINC) the annual rate of natural population increase

(WEST) dichotomous variable for West Africa region

Variable	Coefficient	T-Stat	Prob(T)
NATINC	1.25	2.46	0.021
WEST	1.5	2.72	0.012
CONSTANT	-3.85		

Corrected R-Squared	.24		

* A natural log transformation of the original variable was necessary because a handful of cases had dramatically different immigrant percentages, making it inappropriate to estimate a linear relationship. The slope estimates for both of these regressions should be interpreted as proportionate changes in the dependent variables associated with unit changes in the independent variables.

Regression II

Dependent Variable: (LOGOUT) natural logarithm of emigrants as percentage of resident population.

Independent Variables: (PRIMARY) enrollment in primary school as percentage of primary school age group.

(URBANGRO) annual growth rate of urban population.

Variable	Coefficient	T-Stat	Prob(T)
PRIMARY	-.033	-3.56	0.002
URBANGRO	.30	2.99	0.008
CONSTANT	-3.73		

Corrected R-Squared	.36		

COUNTRY DEPARTMENT I

BENIN

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Benin's first and last census was in 1979; but results published in 1983 and reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration show only the total number of foreigners by sex, but not their distribution by nationality. According to these data, there were 41,284 foreign born in Benin (of whom 48 percent were female) comprising 1.24 percent of total population. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Benin's population size was 4,043,000, with a 3.26% population growth rate. In 1985, life expectancy was 50 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 115/1000 live births. Benin is 16% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 4.7%.

(See Tables 1, 2 and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Benin views both immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and emigration as significant and satisfactory. Its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.) Benin is reportedly attempting to integrate demographic variables into economic and social development planning, and is taking steps to formulate a comprehensive national population policy (J.May:1989).

Regional Organizations. Benin is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) which was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.) The Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Union Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, and an intergovernmental treaty was put in force in 1974. The original members, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, were joined by Benin in 1984 and Togo has observer status. Under CEAO's fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was signed on 28 October 1978. The Accord d'Assistance Administrative Mutuelle en Matiere Douaniere, Commerciale, et d'Immigration, was concluded in December 1984 among Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo. In 1983, Benin was one of several countries to close its borders to migrants being expelled by Nigeria.

CAMEROON

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The first and last national census in Cameroon was in 1976. Actual population at the time of the census was 7,132,077. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Cameroon's population size was 10,191,000, with a 3.51% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 56 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 89/1000 live births. Cameroon is 39% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 8.4%. Rapid growth of secondary cities has been associated with successful agricultural policies.

The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 2.81%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 2.6%. Emigration is mainly to Nigeria, Gabon, and CAR. In 1988 and early 1989, 3,500 Chadian refugees were repatriated from Cameroon as well as CAR and Sudan. Immigration is mainly from Nigeria, Chad, and CAR. Immigrants from Zaire had the highest sex ratio (259) implying temporary migration largely by males. The palm plantations in Cameroon have been destinations especially for workers from Nigeria.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Cameroon views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.) In an effort to provide for migration of selected skill groups, Cameroon concluded agreements with Gabon and with Niger concerning migration of teachers. The May 1977 agreement between Cameroon and Gabon allowed for recruitment of migrant workers in Cameroon but stipulated that contracts for employment had to be vetted by the Ministry of Labor.

Of the 12 African countries that have ratified ILO conventions, Cameroon is one of the three (the other two are Kenya and Burkina Faso) that have ratified both of the two ILO conventions (97 and 143) that are open to ratification. The nine other countries having limited themselves to ratification of one or another of the instruments therein (See Chapter on Policies for more detailed discussion.).

C. Education/brain drain

Gabon is reported to have attracted skilled as well as unskilled labor from Cameroon. Cameroon is part of the Return of Talent Program sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to re-attract skilled migrants who have left the country.

D. Health

A role for migration in the geographical spread of HIV infection (AIDS) is suggested by a study concerning urban-rural differentials in Central Africa. A study of 9000 people living in 6 UDEAC member states, including Cameroon, found that urban areas were significantly more affected than rural areas (Merlin et al. 1987:5). A prevalence survey involving Zaire, Cameroon, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda--7 countries in which HIV1 infection is "quite common", found no evidence of HIV2 infection (Kanki et al. 1987).

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The first and last national census in CAR was in 1975. Actual population at the time of the census was 1,781,029. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, CAR's population size was 2,583,000, with a 2.74% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 50 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 137/1000 live births. CAR is 44% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 4.6%.

The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 2.5%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 2.32%. The proportion of recorded emigrants abroad is 1.1% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Cameroon, and to a lesser extent, the Congo. In 1988 and early 1989, a number of CAR refugees were repatriated from Cameroon. Immigration is mainly from Chad, Zaire, and Cameroon.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of CAR views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.)

The CAR is a member of UDEAC (Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale), which has provisions for the free circulation of people and rights of establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for further discussion.)

C. Education/brain drain

Reliance upon foreign institutions for high level manpower development (notably those in Western Europe, the US and --more recently--the USSR) was found to be most pronounced in the Congo and the Central African Republic.

D. Health

A study of 9000 people living in 6 UDEAC member states (Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon) found that urban areas were significantly more affected by HIV than rural areas (Merlin et al. 1987:5; Gresenguet, et al. 1988). In the Congo and Central African Republic, 5 to 10 percent of surveyed adults and 2 percent of surveyed children under three were infected with HIV1.

COTE D'IVOIRE

A. Demographics and migration patterns

At the time of the 1975 census actual population was 6,678,049. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Cote d'Ivoire's population size was 10,072,000, with a 3.5% population growth rate. In 1985, life expectancy was 54 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 105/1000 live births. Cote d'Ivoire is 44% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 8.5%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Cote d'Ivoire experienced a net migration of 250,000. According to the 1975 data, the proportion of the population constituted by immigrants was 22.08%, and the proportion of African immigrants was 21.52%. More recently, the proportion of immigrants has been estimated at upwards of 25% of total population. The estimated proportion of emigrants abroad is 1.1% of the resident population.

In SSA, Cote d'Ivoire has by far the highest proportion of immigrants per population, and since the 1960s, Cote d'Ivoire has supplanted Ghana as the major pole of attraction in West Africa. Migration to Cote d'Ivoire has included large numbers from Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, and Niger, as well as other countries in the region. Recent flows to Cote d'Ivoire have included more women and children, indicating a shift toward family migration. Emigration is mainly to Burkina Faso and Ghana.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

The future of migration to Cote d'Ivoire is somewhat uncertain at present. Given historical trends, it seems unlikely that any significant reductions in flows will occur. On the other hand, there are reportedly high levels of unemployment among educated Ivoirians. Although the occupational concentrations of migrants and nationals are different, such circumstances have been known to generate "filtering down" of nationals into previously less attractive jobs, as well as a less welcoming response to immigrants.

B. Policies

Cote d'Ivoire is one of the 12 SSA countries which views current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and has policies to reduce these levels. (See Table 5.)

Bilateral agreements facilitating the migration of workers have been used in the region since the 1960s. In 1960, an agreement was concluded between Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Cote d'Ivoire to replace the former system of recruitment directly by Ivoirian employers.

Regional Organizations. Cote d'Ivoire is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment and 97 percent of Cote d'Ivoires immigrants are ECOWAS citizens. The Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Union Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, and an intergovernmental treaty was put in force in 1974. The original members, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, were joined by Benin in 1984 and Togo has observer status. Under CEAO's fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was signed on 28 October 1978 and 83 percent of foreigners in Cote d'Ivoire are from CEAO member countries. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.).

Agricultural Policies. Policies to develop labor-intensive agriculture programs have influenced the direction of both internal and international migration in Cote d'Ivoire. Efforts there to induce youths to remain on or return to the land have been largely unsuccessful (Adepoju 1988:132).

C. Labor markets

For Cote d'Ivoire, where the third of urban dwellers who are migrants constitute 50 percent of informal sector workers, Fargues has argued that urban population growth, rather than being decried, should be credited with urban economic growth, particularly in the informal sector, which has benefitted from both the manpower and the consumers that migration has provided, at very low levels of capital intensity. He notes that international migrants also play a role in this segment of the labor market, with non-Ivoirian proprietors of informal sector enterprises often recruiting workers from their home villages (Fargues 1986:200).

D. Education/brain drain

It has been argued that much of the demand for skilled labor in Cote d'Ivoire is met by the French; however, in-migration of skilled workers has been noted from Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, and Guinea.

In a study of Cote d'Ivoire based upon 1974-75 data, Saint Vil (1982) found that, on average, only 34 percent of students in each department are natives of that department (with proportions ranging from 32 to 70 percent), suggesting substantial amounts of migration by students for purposes of study. He notes that distances are small for migrants at primary level (12 km or less) but increase as lyceum and secondary students seek opportunities in larger cities. Saint-Vil argues that the migration of students (which he calls a topic almost ignored by researchers) began to accelerate in the 1940s and continues today as a consequence of several factors, including official assignment to a distant school, parental change of residence, rejection of a previous place because of poor living conditions, and recruitment by school authorities. Among the consequences he notes are growth in the urban population (adolescents account for over 25 percent of total population in

over a dozen cities) and alterations in the male:female sex ratios of student age groups (prevailing ratios reported in 1978-79 ranged from 177:100 to 277:100). Without further analysis, it is unclear how much of the demographic impact claimed is directly attributable to student migration; however evidence as to the existence of rural-to-urban student migration stands and has been noted elsewhere in the region.

A World Bank study (1988) concludes that Sub-Saharan Africa today generally produces relatively too much high level manpower and not enough research or development advisory services (1988:70). The conclusion is suggested by the growing number of un- and underemployed graduates. A 1985 survey in Cote d'Ivoire revealed that 37.5 percent of people with university diplomas in Abidjan, and more than 50 percent of such people in other cities, were economically inactive or unemployed. More than half had been in that situation continuously for the full year prior to the survey. Of those with vocational and technical diplomas, 33 percent were without jobs in Abidjan, and 26 percent in other cities. About 10 percent of graduates had taken up work in the informal sector as self-employed entrepreneurs.

E. Health

Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in countries like Cote d'Ivoire where there is a sizable fee-for-service sector, migrants from surrounding countries may choose to return home for treatment of health conditions that would require large out-of-pocket expenditures.

HIV2 is the predominant form of HIV infection in West Africa. Cote d'Ivoire was among the countries in which surveyed adults were found to have prevalence rates of 1 to 16 percent in the general population and 15 to 64 percent among high risk groups (Myers and Henn 1988). Myers and Henn note that there is now evidence that HIV1 is spreading in rural areas of most affected countries and is also spreading westward to Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria.

In contrast, a study in Cote d'Ivoire (Ouattara 1987:88) found that, while earlier surveys noted a generally low prevalence of HIV1 infection, sera from patients with AIDS tested in June 1986 showed that 30 percent had antibodies to HIV1 alone, 20 percent to HIV2 alone, and 50 percent had antibodies to both. A survey of prostitutes in Abidjan showed that about half had antibodies to both HIV1 and HIV2, indicating (among other things) that infection by one strain of HIV virus does not protect against the other. In a subsequent study Ouattara et al. (1988) found that while levels of HIV-1 and HIV-2 seropositivity changed little in the general population of Cote d'Ivoire between 1985 and 1987, the AIDS epidemic has increased dramatically in the rapidly growing secondary cities of Man, Bouake, Korkogo, and Bondonkoo. The proportion of hospitalized patients who were seropositive increased from 0 percent in 1985 to 18 percent in 1987. In the country side, however, seropositivity has remained stable.

F. Agriculture

Commercial agriculture is the principle economic sector in terms of labor employment, for all countries of the region (Hart 1982; Adepoju 1988). Agricultural migration occurs principally from the savannah hinterland to Cote d'Ivoire cocoa plantations. More than elsewhere in tropical Africa, migration is of a seasonal nature, on a north-south axis, and largely spontaneous and uncontrolled (Adepoju 1988).

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census was in 1983, although results have not been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Equatorial Guinea's population size was 373,000, with a 2.23% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 46 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 135/1000 live births. Equatorial Guinea is 57% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 4.6%. (See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

By 1979, Equatorial Guinea had lost almost half of its 400,000 population through emigration of Spaniards and others. Equatorial Guinea's cocoa plantations were traditionally worked by migrant labor from Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, since the Bubi, the indigenous population of the island, refused to work on the plantation. Bad treatment of these migrant workers under the Macias regime led to an exodus in 1976, and subsequent drop in cocoa production. The post-Macias government of Equatorial Guinea had difficulty in re-attracting these workers after the overthrow of the regime in 1979.

B. Policies

Equatorial Guinea reports that immigration is significantly too low and that their policy is to raise it. (See Table 5.) Bilateral agreements facilitating the migration of workers have been used in the region since the 1960s. Accords between Nigeria and the Spanish authorities sought to organize the migration of Nigerians to what is now Equatorial Guinea. Some agreements, such as those initiated by Equatorial Guinea, have sought specifically to engage source countries in cooperative efforts to control illegal migration.

Regional Organizations. Equatorial Guinea is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.) Equatorial Guinea is also a member of UDEAC (Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale). It is concerned with economic integration, coordination in the planning of development and fiscal legislation, policies for industrial investment, and for transportation. In 1964, UDEAC adopted a convention on the situation of people and conditions of establishment. On 22 December 1972, member states adopted a common convention on the free circulation of people and rights of establishment.

C. Health

In a cross-national study of cities and rural areas of Congo, Chad, Gabon, CAR, Mozambique, and Equatorial Guinea, HIV prevalence was found to be lowest in rural areas, highest in major cities, and increasing in semi-rural towns and small cities (Gresenguet, et al. 1988).

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Actual population at the time of the 1974 census was 1,319,790. Results of the 1984 census had not been reported to the UN Population Division as of the time this study was completed. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, the Congo's population size was 1,872,000, with a 3.59% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 59 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 77/1000 live births. The Congo is 55% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 5.5%.

Based on the 1974 census data, the proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 3.88%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 3.46%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is 5.44% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Uganda and to a lesser extent, South Africa and the CAR. Congolese emigrants are also noted to be active in the informal sector in Gabon. Immigration is mainly from Zaire, and CAR.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Analysis of sex ratio data in various Central African countries suggests that there is considerable variation in types of migration by nationality and country of destination. In the Congo (1974) immigrants from Zaire had a sex ratio of 95 implying the existence of family migration and more permanent settlement (Adepoju 1988:22).

B. Policies

The Congo government views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.)

The Congo is a member of UDEAC (Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale), which has provisions for the free circulation of people and rights of establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for further discussion.)

C. Education/brain drain

Reliance upon foreign institutions for high level manpower development (notably those in Western Europe, the US and --more recently--the USSR) was found to be most pronounced in the Congo and the Central African Republic. Students and salaried Zairians were amongst those expelled from the Congo. Gabon is reported to have attracted the skilled as well as unskilled from the Congo.

D. Health

A study of 9000 people living in 6 UDEAC member states (Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon) found that urban areas were significantly more affected by the HIV-1 virus than rural areas (Merlin et al. 1987:5). While seroprevalence has been found to be highest in major cities, it is increasing in semi-rural towns and small cities (Gresenguet et al. 1988). In the Congo and Central African Republic 5 to 10 percent of surveyed adults and 2 percent of surveyed children under three were infected with HIV1.

GABON

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last census in Gabon was in 1980, but results have not been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Gabon's population size was 997,000, with a 2.6% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 52 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 112/1000 live births. Gabon is 39% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 4.6%. (See Tables 1,2 and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Gabon with its mineral deposits, has become a major area of in-migration as infusions of investment capital has created jobs for skilled and unskilled workers. Timber industries have drawn workers, especially from Nigeria, while the informal sector is manned mainly by immigrants, mostly from Senegal, Mali, Benin, Cameroon, and Congo.

B. Policies

Of the 18 countries reporting significantly high levels of emigration, Gabon is one of the 8 which has policies to reduce the outflow. Gabon is one of the 12 SSA countries which views current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and also has policies to reduce it. (See Table 5.) According to Azonga (1986) Gabon has spent over CFA 1 billion to design and produce a credit-card sized "totally unfalsifiable" residence permit, which will be used in conjunction with optical scanning devices and a computer network linking airports and local police stations. In order to receive the card, immigrants are required to obtain work permits from the Ministry of Labour, which also must approve contracts for work in either the public or private sectors. Several new fees have been introduced as well: a "repatriation fee" equal to the price of a return ticket to the migrant's home country--plus 20 percent to cover administrative costs; a fee of CFA 50,000 (approximately USD 172) for a long term visa; and an exit visa fee of CFA 25,000 for migrants wanting to visit outside the country and reenter. The Parti Democratique Gabonais (PDG) has called for a census of all foreigners and expulsion of immigrants who remain illegally.

Bilateral agreements facilitating the migration of workers have been used in the region since the 1960s. A 1973 agreement between Upper Volta and Gabon sought to organize the flow of workers toward the latter country, although this agreement was suspended by Burkina in 1977, and since 1979 Gabon has had an expressed policy of reserving job opportunities for Gabonese. The May 1977 agreement between Cameroon and Gabon allowed for recruitment of migrant workers in Cameroon but stipulated that contracts for employment had to be vetted by the Ministry of Labor. Some agreements have sought specifically to engage source countries in cooperative efforts to control illegal migration. Others have been undertaken to provide for migration of

selected skill groups: Gabon has concluded agreements with Cameroon concerning migration of teachers.

Regional Organizations. Gabon is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.) Gabon is a member of UDEAC (Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale). It is concerned with economic integration, coordination in the planning of development and fiscal legislation, policies for industrial investment, and for transportation. In 1964, UDEAC adopted a convention on the situation of people and conditions of establishment. On 22 December 1972, member states adopted a common convention on the free circulation of people and rights of establishment.

C. Education/brain drain

Oil and mineral wealth in Gabon has led to manpower requirements roughly double the internal supply, and thus to inflows of skilled as well as unskilled labor, notably from Cameroon and the Congo. The French also continue to provide skilled manpower in Gabon.

D. Health

Gabon is among the six countries in a recent cross-national study of cities and rural areas in which HIV-1 prevalence was found to be lowest in rural areas, highest in major cities, and increasing in semi-rural towns and small cities (Gresenguet, et al. 1988).

GUINEA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Guinea's first census was in 1983, but results have not yet been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Guinea's population size was 6,166,000, with a 2.64% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 43 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 153/1000 live births. Guinea is 26% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.3%.

The stock of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 246,325 or nearly 4% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Cote d'Ivoire, and to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Liberia and Mali.

(See Tables 1,2 and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Zachariah and Conde (1981:35) estimated that Guinea was the largest source country for migration to Senegal. Guineans are also noted to have longer average residence outside than other migrants (Adepoju 1988:64,75).

B. Policies

The government of Guinea views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain this level. Of the 18 countries reporting significantly high levels of emigration, Guinea is one of the 8 which has policies to reduce the outflow. (See Table 5.)

C. Agriculture

There is a long-standing tradition (over 130 years) of immigration by "strange farmers" from Senegal, Mali, and Guinea to groundnut schemes along the Gambia river. Swindell (1982: 101) calls this, "One of the oldest forms of labor migration associated with cash cropping in Africa." Informal sector employment supplements groundnut farming during the dry season (Swindell 1982). The availability of this kind of supplementary work makes the receiving country more attractive for agricultural migrants, and encourages the transformation of seasonal migration into permanent settlement.

D. Health

HIV2 is the predominant form of AIDS infection in West Africa. Guinea and Guinea Bissau were part of a survey which found prevalence rates of 1 to 16 percent in the general population and 15 to 64 percent recorded among high risk groups (Myers and Henn 1988). Evidence of both HIV1 and HIV2

infection have been reported in Guinea and Guinea Bissau as well (Katlama et al. 1987:176; Antunes 1987:178).

TOGO

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Togo's most recent census was in 1981, but results have not been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. As of the 1970 census, actual population was 1,950,646, of which 7.36% were immigrants. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Togo's population size was 3,038,000, with a 3.26% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 50 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 97/1000 live births. Togo is 22% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.6%.

Migration movements have tended to be toward the surrounding regions of in-migration: Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote D'Ivoire. However, flows to Nigeria were interrupted in 1983, when Nigeria expelled 1.5 million migrants, and Togo closed its borders with Nigeria for a period of time. (See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Togo views both immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.)

Regional Organizations. Togo is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.) The Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Union Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, and an intergovernmental treaty was put in force in 1974. The original members, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, were joined by Benin in 1984 and Togo has observer status. Under CEAO's fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was signed on 28 October 1978. The Accord d'Assistance Administrative Mutuelle en Matiere Douaniere, Commerciale, et d'Immigration, was concluded in December 1984 among Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo.

Agricultural Policies. A study by Becker and Morrison (1988) found that successful agricultural policies in Togo were associated with growth of secondary (as distinct from primary) cities.

COUNTRY DEPARTMENT II

ETHIOPIA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The first national census in Ethiopia was in 1984, but the results have not been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Ethiopia's population size was 42,271,000, with a 3.00% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 47 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 168/1000 live births. Ethiopia is 15% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.0%. (See Tables 1, 2 and 3.)

The main population flows have been in the form of refugee movements out of Ethiopia to Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti, as well as movements in Ethiopia from Somalia and Sudan.

(See Table 6 and 7 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The Ethiopian government views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5; also Brain Drain section below.)

Ethiopia is among the countries that have instituted resettlement policies either to stem migration to urban areas, or to alter population densities in rural areas, ostensibly to facilitate delivery of services or to improve agricultural production. A May 1985 study, The Experience of the World Bank with Government-sponsored Land Settlement documents some of these efforts. In the early 1980s the Ethiopian government decided to move over 33 million people into nucleated villages over the next nine years. In 1984 the Ethiopian government announced its intent to move 1.5 million people from the overpopulated north to the "unpopulated" south, and justified it "on humanitarian and economic grounds" (Cohen and Isaksson 1987:16). From November 1984 to 1986, between 700,000 and 800,000 people were moved. The resettlement program has been criticized both internally and by the west, on organizational and conceptual grounds, on humanitarian and environmental grounds, and for political reasons. International criticism led the government to declare a temporary moratorium on resettlement in March of 1986. However, Ethiopia has announced its intention that the program will continue (op. cit.:18). The Ethiopian government's villagization campaign has received extensive international criticism, based on the consensus that "the government acted unwisely in instituting so disruptive a program at a time when the

nation is recovering from a terrible famine and will have food deficits for the foreseeable future." (Cohen and Isaksson:20). The government's resettlement program has resulted in substantial disruption both of the environment and of the agricultural base (Cohen and Isaksson 1987; Clay and Holcomb 1986).

The Ethiopian government has viewed peasants as a base of support for rebel movements, and retaliated with actions that limit the ability of peasants to deal with drought conditions. These include heavy taxes, burdensome agricultural policies that discourage crop production beyond consumption needs, and the failure to support peasants in times of drought. These actions may have contributed to refugee flows.

C. Education/brain drain

Detailed data are not available for Ethiopia, but skills shortages have been observed as a result of both insufficient output from higher education and the exodus of highly trained skilled and professional manpower at the time of the revolution. Ethiopia has expressed concerns about brain drain to the Arab Gulf, and is reported to have mounted campaigns to effect the return of skilled nationals, but the success of these efforts is not generally known (UN ECA 1988:1).

D. Health

Movement to new ecological zones has been seen to increase susceptibility to disease among non-immune populations. For example, refugees from highland areas of Ethiopia developed a high prevalence of malaria after moving to camps in malaria-endemic areas of eastern Sudan and Loewenson (1988) cites evidence from Ethiopia that parasitic and other communicable diseases have been transmitted by movements of migrants for employment. Such findings stress the need for regional cooperation among relief agencies, especially in the development of adequate disease surveillance systems.

E. Refugees

Warfare between the Eritreans and the Ethiopian government, as well as between the government and the Tigrayan and Oromos liberation fronts, has resulted in the highest number of refugees in Africa. Current estimates range from 1.1 to 1.4 million, with most of the refugees in eastern Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti. Returnees and repatriates are replaced by new refugee flows. Tigrayans, who fled the famine conditions brought on by the drought in 1984-5 have returned; Eritreans fleeing the war have not.

The number of Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti declined by nearly 50 percent between 1982 and 1985, owing to a voluntary repatriation operation conducted by the two countries (UN 1988). However the repatriation program for Ethiopians set up with the help of the UNHCR in 1983, was marred by controversy; many observers suggested repatriation was not entirely voluntary (See Clark 1987 for discussion). Nonetheless, further repatriations from

Djibouti took place in 1988 and early 1989. (World Refugee Report 1988:34; Price, Williams and Associates 1989.)

Voluntary repatriation from Somalia to Ethiopia was successfully accomplished in 1986, partly as a result of aid programs set up in Ethiopia to draw refugees back home. An official repatriation program was set up between the Ethiopian and Somali governments at the end of 1986. Clark (1987) states that:

The programs which have been established to encourage further spontaneous resettlement into the Harargh region.., and additional ones for which funds are being sought, are both creative and controversial. Their creativity lies in trying to circumvent the blockages which now exist to setting up a mass official repatriation from Somalia. The controversy lies in how successful these programs actually are, and whether they are supported by the Ethiopian government primarily as a way of extending its control over rebellious nationalities.

In an important recent policy decision, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the main source of international assistance to refugee-receiving countries, has decided that it will withdraw its assistance to Ethiopian refugees in Somalia by mid-1990. According to the UNHCR, this is because the conditions giving rise to the refugees' flight no longer exist, as witnessed by the recent large-scale spontaneous repatriations. However, as reported in World Refugee Survey (1989:44), "Other sources claim that persistent corruption in Somalia's refugee assistance program and the strained relationship between UNHCR and the Somali government have been equally important factors in UNHCR's decision."

Ethiopia is also a country of asylum and its refugee burden more than tripled between 1987 and 1988, from 220,000 to 700,500 making it the top ranked asylum country in SSA. Beside Sudan, the other major contributor of refugees to Ethiopia was Somalia. Refugee flows into Ethiopia began in 1983, with Sudanese fleeing from the renewed civil war in southern Sudan. They have been assisted at a UNHCR-sponsored camp in western Ethiopia (near Gambella), and a sizable number live outside the camp. There have been attempts at an agricultural settlement program, but these are thwarted by poor soil, new refugees, and floods. In 1988, a major escalation of the civil war in northern Somalia led to a 2,233 percent increase in the stock of Somalian refugees in Ethiopia. The destruction of the town of Hargeisa left more than 300,000 people homeless and sent many refugees fleeing into Ethiopia.

KENYA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Kenya reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration was in 1979, at which time actual population was 15,327,061. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Kenya's population size was 20,375,000, with a 4.05% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 56 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 91/1000 live births. Kenya is 17% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 8.0%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Kenya experienced a net migration of 10,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants in 1979 was 1.03%, down from 1.45% in 1969. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 0.83% of the resident population, with emigration being mainly to Uganda and South Africa. Data on immigration by country is not yet reported. In the 1969 census results, immigrants were mainly from Uganda and Tanzania. However, the numbers from Tanzania undoubtedly dropped after borders between the two countries were closed.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The Kenyan government views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.)

Of the 12 African countries that have ratified ILO conventions, Kenya is one of the three (the other two are Burkina Faso and Cameroon) that have ratified both of the two ILO conventions (97 and 143) that are open to ratification. The nine other countries having limited themselves to ratification of one or another of the instruments therein. Kenya is among those countries that have concluded agreements to supply contract labor to the Arab oil-producing countries of the Middle East (Adepoju 1988:32-44). The 1989 Monitoring Report points to the fact that Kenya is among a number of African countries that have adopted policies to regulate undocumented or illegal migration.

Regional Organizations. Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), however there is no documentation as to provisions of this organization for free circulation of people. (See Chapter on Policies for more detailed discussion.).

Kenya has experimented with a number of policy initiatives to affect internal migration and settlement, including land reform and resettlement schemes, efforts to induce youths to remain on the land as

farmers, and the promotion of rural non-farm employment opportunities. The latter may have had some effect. In a study of 41 districts in Kenya, Barber and Milne (1988:1194) found that "a 1 percent increase in the modern sector employment rate in districts other than the origin or destination district will result in a 5.3 percent decrease in the migration flow from district i to district j" (1988:1194). Kenya's experience with land reform and resettlement has been generally more positive than in other SSA countries, perhaps because the size of holdings was small, allowing more families to be resettled, and the Kenyan government charged each settler-family for the land and other development assets (repayable over varying periods). Kenya has also experienced some success in upgrading urban squatter settlements with World Bank assistance.

C. Remittances

Early evidence that remittances have been positively associated with improvements in rural areas came from a study by Knowles and Anker (1977) who found that both the inter-sectoral and the overall degree of income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) in Kenya declined as a result of urban to rural remittances.

One of the ways in which migration has been linked to education is through the use of remittances for educational purposes. In villages of Western and Nyanza provinces in Kenya, where 74 to 81 percent of off-farm income derives from migration to Nairobi, and where investment in education is of particular importance for continued access to urban labor markets, nearly half of this income is used for school fees (Gould 1988:4.1.49). Nor is the effect on rural education simply at the individual or household level. Elsewhere in Kenya, Bradshaw (1988) has found that migrant remittances have been crucial to financing expansion of educational facilities in rural areas, especially through Harambee projects--a fact that makes rural education vulnerable to any increase in urban unemployment and concomitant reduction in remittance flows.

Not all the reported effects of migration on education are positive, however. Bradshaw argues that, in Kenya, urbanization (as measured by the proportion of an entire district that resides in urban areas) has a strong negative effect on urban secondary school enrollment ratios.

D. Education/brain drain

In East Africa, international manpower movements have been found to be generally less prominent than other types of population mobility (eg. refugeeism). Little is known about intra-African migration of skilled workers in the sub-region since the free flow of labor among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania ended with the collapse of the East African Community in the early 1970s. Until recently, Kenya was a major receiver of educated Ugandans, but since the early 1980s, the increasing availability of skilled Kenyan graduates has placed pressures upon the Kenyan labor market, and as a result, skilled Ugandans are moving to other locations within and outside Africa. The flow of

students from Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam to Uganda was also reduced with the development of local universities and political upheavals in Uganda.

The closing of the borders to passenger and goods traffic between Tanzania and Kenya from 1977 to 1984 also is likely to have reduced manpower flows at all levels. However, the recent introduction of work permits (notably for Ugandans in Kenya as of 1982) signals the continuing outflow of Ugandans (among whom the well-educated are thought to be particularly represented) and the increasing demand of skilled Kenyans for attractive positions held by non-nationals.

The Ndegwa Commission in Kenya was part of an effort to establish salary structures that would be competitive with international markets for high level manpower (cf. the 1967 Mills-Odoi Commission in Ghana; the Mohammed Taha Commission in Sudan in 1979; and the Elwood report on Nigeria in 1966). With the economic deterioration and structural adjustments of the 1980s, however, these efforts have "fizzled away". Prevailing low salary levels for high level manpower are now credited with creating significant outflows of university personnel and (by a WHO study) 'catastrophic' outflows of African health manpower.

Long and lengthening job searches have been reported in Kenya, where a World Bank (1988) sector policy study reports that:

a 1985 longitudinal study of University of Nairobi graduates between 1970 and 1983 documented job searches lasting from one to three years and in addition found that over the course of the study graduates became more likely to accept temporary employment and less likely to use their formal training on the job.

In the case of Kenya, the international orientation of much training for highly skilled jobs makes this country particularly vulnerable to brain drain during periods of economic austerity. Kenya was one of the first African countries to join the Return of Talent Program sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to re-attract skilled migrants who have left the country. (See Chapter on migration of the highly skilled for a full discussion of the program.)

E. Health

Voluntary moves often are associated with improvements in migrants' health status in the destination area. In their study of Kenya, Bilsborrow et al. (1986, p. 43,46) found that child mortality rates in the area of origin were positively related to magnitudes of outmigration, regardless of whether the data were controlled for income or not. Although the study found that health factors are not a major contributor to outmigration (relative to other factors), the authors conclude that the voluntary migrants in their study move from less healthy to more healthy areas. Bilsborrow et al. (1986) also found that fertility has a significant, positive effect on migration, as long as urbanization variables are included in the analysis. The authors' interpretation is that increased recent fertility "causes increases in population density which reduces per capita income, providing an incentive to some families to seek alternative employment or housing" (p. 43).

Kenya was one of the countries involved in a prevalence survey in which HIV1 (AIDS) infection was found to be "quite common". The survey found no evidence of HIV2 infection (Kanki et al. 1987). Migration has been implicated in the spread of AIDS in Kenya: 90 percent of AIDS cases reported to the Ministry of Health in Kenya have been found to come from major urban areas, all of which are located along the TransAfrican Highway linking the west coast to the east coast of Africa (Gachihi and Mueke 1988).

MAURITIUS

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Mauritius was in 1983. Actual population at the time of the census was 966,863. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Mauritius's population size was 1,020,000, with a 1.18% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 67 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 25/1000 live births. Mauritius is 55% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 3.4%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Mauritius experienced a net migration of -10,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 0.51%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 0.08%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 0.5% of the resident population.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Mauritius views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain this flow. Mauritius reports that emigration is significantly too low and that its policy is to raise it although emigrants are required to register with the government. Specific measures adopted by that country to promote exit of nationals include participation in temporary worker schemes with Botswana, Nigeria, and Zambia. The government Employment Service advertises vacancies, helps to select emigrants, and prepares them for departure. (See Table 5.)

Work permits are issued only to immigrants with skills not locally available and under the condition that the migrant train a local counterpart. Mauritius is reported to require residence permits, but it is not known how the use of residence permits correlates with that of work permits. Legal migrants in Mauritius are allowed to bring dependents, although family members are not allowed to seek employment. Employers are required to provide housing, education, and health facilities for migrants.

Regional Organizations. Mauritius belongs to the Eastern and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area (PTA), which includes Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. There is no documentation about this organization as to provisions for free circulation of people. (See Chapter on Policies for further discussion.)

Mauritius is one of only three SSA countries which have not become signatories to the UN Protocol and/or Convention (the others are South Africa and the Comoros). The 1989 Monitoring Report notes that Mauritius is among a number of African countries that have adopted policies to regulate undocumented or illegal migration.

SOMALIA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Somalia's first and last census was in 1975, but results have not been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Somalia's population size was 5,384,000, with a 3.03% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 47 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 152/1000 live births. Somalia is 33% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 5.5%.

The main population flows have been in the form of refugee movements from and to Ethiopia. (See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The Somali government now views both immigration and emigration levels as satisfactory, and seeks to maintain current levels (in the case of immigration) or not intervene (in the case of emigration). (See Table 5.) Somalia is a member of the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), however there is no documentation as to this organization's provisions for free circulation of people.

C. Brain drain/education

In Somalia, the output of graduates is estimated to be more than 5 times demand; a factor that has contributed to emigration of the highly skilled and growing concerns about brain drain. According to Adepoju, the large scale movement of refugees in East Africa conceals an increasingly significant loss of highly skilled manpower from Somalia as well as Ethiopia to the Arab Gulf. Somalia was one of the first countries to join the Return of Talent Program sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to re-attract skilled migrants who have left the country. (See Chapter on migration of the highly skilled for a full discussion of the program.)

D. Refugees

In 1988, Somalia ranked fourth among countries of eastern and southern Africa hosting large numbers of refugees, having dropped from third place in 1987. Although estimates vary and US State Department and UNHCR figures are higher, according to the 1988 World Refugee Survey, there were 365,000 official refugees in Somalia, virtually all from Ethiopia, and refugees constituted nearly 7% of total population (see Tables 6, 7, and 8). Spontaneously settled refugees can only be guessed at, a mid-range guess is 200,000-300,000 (Clark 1987). The majority came in 1977-1980, during heavy fighting in Ethiopia. Other waves came in 1984-5, and then again in 1985-6. Refugees reported fleeing the villagization program, the fighting, and the drought.

There has been spontaneous repatriation, partly as a result of aid programs set up in Ethiopia to draw refugees back home, as well as an official repatriation program set up between the Ethiopian and Somali governments at the end of 1986. Several significant voluntary repatriations have taken place.

Most of the longer-term refugees in Africa have been able to find land and become self-sufficient in agriculture. However, as populations expand, land becomes less available, and such options disappear. Already in Somalia and Djibouti, refugees have not been locally integrated. The Somali government has been willing to allow the establishment of rural settlements as an alternative to care-and-maintenance camps, but actual implementation has been minimal. Care and maintenance camps may come to predominate in the future. The frustration resulting from the inability to find durable solutions or viable self-sufficiency programs, coupled with continuing economic hardship, may lead to the erosion of the principle of asylum (Nanda 1986; Clark 1987). Repatriation policies that begin as voluntary, may cease to be considered so (see the case of Djibouti). In a number of asylum countries there has been increasing reluctance to set up rural settlements for fear of creating incentives for permanent settlement.

Since 1987, Somalia has also become a major source of refugees. The second biggest flow of refugees in 1988 was that from Somalia. The stock of Somalian refugees in Ethiopia rose 2,233 percent in 1988, from 15,000 to 350,000, increasing Somalia's ranking from 12th largest refugee sending nation to 5th largest. A major escalation of the civil war in northern Somalia which led to the destruction of the town of Hargeisa, left more than 300,000 people homeless and contributed to this flow.

SUDAN

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Sudan was reportedly in 1983, but only data from the 1973 census have been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. Actual population at the time of the 1973 census was 12,265,028, although after adjustment for under enumeration of nomads and cotton pickers, this figure was revised upward to 14,113,590. Based upon the lower figure, 2.03% of total population was foreign. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Sudan's population size was 21,931,000, with a 2.84% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 49 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 112/1000 live births. Sudan is 20% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 5.5%. (See Tables 1,2, and 3.)

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Sudan experienced a net migration of -50,000. Labor emigration is mainly to the Arabian Gulf. There were an estimated 693,600 refugees in Sudan in 1988 (a drop of some 400,000 since 1985). Despite this reduction, Sudan is the second major asylum country in the region, and refugees continue to constitute an added burden to Sudan's economic distress, and high population growth. Since the recommencement of the civil war Sudan is also the source of a large and recently increasing number of refugees.

See Tables 6,7 and 8 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Since the mid-1970s, the Middle East has become a favored destination for some African countries, especially Sudan. In 1978, Sudan's Ministry of Labour calculated that there were 180,000 Sudanese workers in the oil-producing countries --35,000 in Saudi Arabia alone (Ricca 1989:99). By 1983, it was estimated that there were 334,000 Sudanese abroad (Choucri 1985:5) and by 1985, ILO reported some 500,000 Sudanese working outside Africa (UN ECA 1988:1). Although the downturn in oil prices has occasioned concern about large-scale returns of migrants from the oil producing Arab countries, so far this has failed to happen. Among the highly skilled segments of the urban population, emigrants are a disproportionately large number, estimated at 60% of the total national stock of skilled workers. (See below for further discussion.)

B. Policies

Sudan has not reported on its population policies since 1973 and at that time viewed immigration as significant and too high, and policies were to lower these levels. Emigration was viewed as insignificant and satisfactory. (See Table 5.) Although official policy was to maintain then-current levels, practices over the years have reflected ambivalence toward emigration. Most policies have been directed not toward promotion or restriction of emigration per se, but rather toward the rights and privileges of emigrants. Only the 1980 Ordinance of Sudanese Employment Abroad imposed any direct restriction on migration abroad, and that was merely to require

that emigrants register with the Labour Department. Other policies certainly had the implicit effect of encouraging emigration. At various times, incentive exchange rates have been established; in the late 1970s, the Land for Emigrants programme allowed nationals to sell foreign exchange for purchase of land in Khartoum at "attractive" prices, and as of 1982 Sudanese abroad were permitted to own residence plots in Sudan without living in the country. Until its abolition in 1979, The Nil Value Customs policy gave migrants full or partial customs relief. Many of these measures have been modified over time, but less because of changing attitudes about emigration than in response to concerns about controlling foreign exchange.

Before their abolition in 1978, various measures adopted by Sudan tended to encourage emigration and the attraction of remittances. Land for building houses was sold to migrants under favorable terms, and goods, material, and equipment purchased abroad were allowed exemptions from customs duties (Ricca 1989:99). By the 1980s, there is evidence that Sudan was taking some steps to reduce outmigration, prompted by concerns not only about brain and skill drain but also about regularizing the emigration process and obtaining better estimates of the numbers going abroad. In 1983, the Employment Discipline Act and Pension Act were amended to deter civil servants from leaving their posts overseas and there were reported efforts to control emigration of civil servants from within Sudan. However, these were never publicized and their nature was unclear (Choucri 1985:2-13). Whether these various measures themselves were ineffective, or their implementation lacked the force of political will, once the outflow had begun, it proved nearly impossible to stem it through regulatory mechanisms (Ricca 1989:99). Attempting to restrict the movements of workers in Sudan would be politically unacceptable.

C. Remittances

In Sudan, as elsewhere, only a portion of remitted funds flow through official channels and are recorded in the statistics. In 1980, Galaleldin found that only 24 percent of sampled migrants transferred hard currency earnings through the banking system; in 1983, Choucri estimated that only 11.3 percent of remittances were flowing into Sudan through formal channels (Choucri 1985:1-10, 5). In some cases remittances are repatriated in the form of goods or other in-kind transfers, and there is considerable variance reported in the ratio of in-kind to cash transfers. In Sudan, Abdullah found that in-kind remittances were only about 20 percent of the total. The mechanisms by which remittances are transferred differ by migrants' origin, destination, and group. Amongst the Rashaayda Bedouin of Sudan, remittances from international migration to the Gulf are commonly hand-carried in the form of gold jewelry, which serves simultaneously to compensate to women for their extra labor and stress during the absence of males, and as a more reliable store of wealth than the Sudanese Pound (Young 1987:212). In contrast, transfers to the Southern Darfur region of Sudan by internal migrants have been found to be primarily in the form of consumer goods, although those who had returned from abroad had transferred an average of 6500 Pounds (USD 2772) (Heinritz and El Manguri 1987:19).

Findings based upon a survey of Sudanese migrants abroad in 1983 suggest that the value of remittances from the country's 334,000 emigrant workers amounted to \$3.06 billion, a figure that would amount to about 40 percent of GDP and 370 percent of export earnings. However, officially recorded remittances for 1983 were only \$346 million--even so, an amount representing almost 70 percent of Sudan's total commodity export earnings in the previous year (Choucri 1985:5,1-10).

Choucri notes a number of anomalies in Sudan's situation: only a small fraction of remittances are on the formal record; domestic currency has deteriorated despite large inflows of capital, as has the balance of payments; the Central Banking authorities appear unable to manipulate policy to affect target variables; and overall there is little evidence in indicators of the formal economy that the massive capital inflows noted earlier are taking place. To explain these anomalies, she postulates the existence of a large, effectively organized informal monetary market. In view of this situation, Choucri argues it makes little sense for government to undertake efforts to encourage workers to remit greater portions of their earnings or otherwise to increase the volume of remittances--they are already large. Rather, it is necessary to determine where hard currency actually goes (indeed, whether it is entering the country at all); what is the role of financial intermediaries; and what is happening on the monetary side of the economy, especially what are the workings of the financial markets, including demand for foreign exchange. The policy prescription Choucri recommends for Sudan is to bring informal exchange markets within the scope of government control by progressively adjusting the exchange rate and transferring transactions from non-official to official markets. (Choucri 1985:7, 6-22-25).

Choucri (1985:2-9) notes that the conventional wisdom on remittances in Sudan has tended to stress their use for consumption, land acquisition, and housing construction. Galaleldin (1979) reported land purchase, construction, purchase of consumption goods, and establishment of small business enterprises as the principal uses of remittances. Al-Ghul (1982) found building houses to be the most popular form of "investment", followed by "business transactions" and agriculture. Abdullah Ali found that between 1979 and 1981, while the percentage of Sudanese in Yemen who planned to build houses increased, the percentage planning to use their remittances for marriage, agriculture, and the purchase of cars actually decreased. Abu Gabal (1984) found ownership of houses, and the purchase of land, taxis, and canteens to be the most popular uses of remittances. Amongst the Rashaayda Bedouin of Sudan, remittances have been used to finance a number of business investments, including the purchase of pickup trucks to run transport services. Some migrants have also entered into business partnerships with wealthier and more educated urban Sudanese for the purchase of agricultural land, modern farming equipment, and seed (Young 1987:212). Although many of these ventures have proved to be short-lived, Young points out that they have contributed substantially to breaking down social boundaries. The use of remittances for bride-price has also resulted in new relationships outside the traditional tribal affiliations. Altogether, Young concludes that, "the character of exchange between two categories of Rashaayda, the 'free' and the 'offspring of slaves' is now significantly more egalitarian." In her own

study of Sudanese migrants abroad, Choucri found that approximately two-thirds of remittances were allocated to "consumption" including basic needs. The remaining one third was apportioned between liquid and non-liquid assets (a non-trivial rate of savings). She concluded that, "[c]ontrary to common belief, there is little evidence of lavish expenditures on weddings and luxury items" (p. 6).

D. Education/brain drain

The numbers of emigrants described above do not convey adequately the dimensions of the exodus from Sudan. In 1978, while 60 percent of the general population was illiterate, 90 percent of migrants were literate and young (between 20 and 39 years), and 80 percent were qualified--10 percent at the university level. Migration had siphoned off substantial proportions of selected professional groups: 17 percent of physicians and dentists, 30 percent of engineers, 45 percent of surveyors, and 20 percent of university teaching personnel (Ricca 1989:99). By 1985, ILO estimated that two-thirds of Sudan's professional and technical workers had left the country.

It has been recommended by the World Bank that the best method to attract migrants back into Sudan would be to "improve economic prospects at home and increase the salary spreads between the skilled and unskilled." The ECA points out that, in the 1960s and 1970s, there were efforts to establish salary structures in Africa that would be competitive with international markets for high level manpower. One such was the Mohammed Taha Commission in Sudan in 1979. (cf. the 1967 Mills-Odoi Commission in Ghana; the Ndegwa Commission in Kenya; and the Elwood report on Nigeria in 1966). With the economic deterioration and structural adjustments of the 1980s, however, these efforts have "fizzled away". Prevailing low salary levels for high level manpower are now credited with creating significant outflows of university personnel and (by a WHO study) 'catastrophic' outflows of African health manpower.

Sudan participates in The Return of Talent Program, which was launched in Africa in 1983 in collaboration with the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and financed by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States government. Its aim is to attract "all Africans who desire to return after acquiring very high professional qualifications in the Western Countries".

E. Agriculture

Government inputs into agriculture have taken the form of agricultural schemes and settlements, which have created an increased demand for labor (Harris 1986; Khogali 1982). Western Sudan and Chad are the main labor suppliers to Gezira (mainly seasonal cotton pickers), and Khashm el-Girba, where there is an increasing occurrence of permanent settlers (Khogali 1982). Autochthonous residents are nomads, not given to agricultural work, therefore there is a need for population mobility. This has contributed to the depopulation and underdevelopment of western areas, but Khogali argues

this is necessary, given Sudan's stage of development, and the need to utilize available resources, in order to build up the agricultural schemes in eastern Sudan.

F. Health

Movement to new ecological zones has been seen to increase susceptibility to disease among non-immune populations. For example, refugees from highland areas of Ethiopia developed a high prevalence of malaria after moving to camps in malaria-endemic areas of eastern Sudan. Godfrey and Kalache (1989) have pointed out that health status in the place of origin may affect who becomes an officially recognized refugee: older adults constitute only a small proportion of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan's camps precisely because many were too ill or disabled to flee. Those who remain behind continue to be in need of health assistance in the home area. Such findings stress the need for regional cooperation among relief agencies, especially in the development of adequate disease surveillance systems.

G. Refugees

As noted above, Sudan is both a host and asylum country for refugees. As of 1988 estimates, Sudan hosts the second largest number of refugees in Africa (after Ethiopia), mainly as a result of the continuing civil war in Ethiopia. In addition to 660,000 Ethiopians, Sudan still hosts 25,000 refugees from Chad, 5,000 from Zaire, and 3,600 from Uganda. In 1988, some 86,000 Ugandans and 20,000 Chadians were repatriated from Sudan. In three camps in western Sudan, there were still some 24,000 Chadian refugees as of January 1989, with an estimated 50-55,000 Chadians suspected to be outside the camps (Price Williams, 1989 (February):8). Another 2,000 of these refugees were reported to have repatriated to Chad in February 1989 (Price Williams, 1989 (April):8). The continuing civil war in southern Sudan, has been the source of refugee flows to Ethiopia (205,000 in 1987), Uganda, and elsewhere.

From 1982 to 1986 eastern and southern Africa experienced a severe drought that led to widespread famine, resulting in massive refugee flows. In 1987-8, drought and famine conditions again struck Sudan, and in 1988, a locust infestation has spread from the Horn across the Sudan into West Africa, further aggravating the effects of the drought. The drought has prompted previously spontaneously settled refugees to move into settlements, further straining resources. There is no government or UNHCR support for urban-based refugees (Weaver 1985), perhaps because the government prefers that they remain in settlements, and discourages urban spontaneous settlement. This means urban-based refugees constitute a strain on urban resources that is not offset by aid.

Toole and Waldman (1988) found that crude mortality rates (CMR) of refugees in Somalia, Sudan, and Thailand were up to 40 times higher than those for non-refugee populations in the host countries. In 1984-85, approximately 5 percent of the population in eight refugee camps in eastern Sudan died

within three months of the emergency. It took 12 months for CMRs to drop to levels comparable to those of the host country. Mortality rates for under-fives in the Sudanese camps (32.6 per 10,000) were six times those prevailing in the world's least developed countries, and in one camp reached 114 per 10,000 per day amongst malnourished children. Causes of death (infections, diarrheah, malaria, measles, undernutrition) are those susceptible to prevention by adequate food, clean water, immunization and oral rehydration programs.

A Report to the Secretary-General of the U.N. General Assembly reviews the efforts by the Sudanese government and the international community towards implementation of the recommendations proposed by the 1986 inter-agency mission for a comprehensive program of assistance for refugees in the Sudan. In view of the war in southern Sudan, this report is incomplete (it does not mention the war). However it identifies a number of issues that were of concern in 1987, and continue to be so. "The precarious economic situation . . . , in particular the high rates of inflation experienced in recent years, has taken its toll on the psychological and behavioral attitudes of citizens.." The movement of displaced people into the urban areas has provoked citizens to "attribute their sufferings and deprivations to the "intruders"." In the first half of 1987, refugees "[ran] the risk of being pushed out to the countryside where their urban background would make them misfits." The report discusses the need for a comprehensive study of the impact of refugees on the Sudanese economy. It states that the pressure of large numbers of refugees competing for already inadequate municipal services, "exacerbates an already critical situation." The report identifies existing refugee-related projects by sector (water; food, agriculture and livestock; education; health; employment and income-generation), and recommends that refugee-related projects should be coupled with development plans in the Sudan.

The presence of refugees sometimes has positive effects. In the northeastern Sudan, refugees ease the seasonal labor shortages on agricultural schemes. World Bank studies have noted that since there is no scarcity of land in Sudan, it might be possible to absorb refugees in the rural economy, particularly if a program of this nature were initially be supported by foreign aid programs, given that there is a high demand for seasonal labor in Sudan, that could supplement the meager rural incomes that a settlement program would be able to generate.

In 1988, with 350,000 of its nationals in Ethiopia and 5,000 in Uganda, Sudan ranked fourth among countries that are a source of refugees. The war in southern Sudan between the Islamic Arabized north and the non-Islamic African south resulted in the deaths of at least 260,000 civilians, the disruption of food production and distribution, and the targeting of ethnic Dinka for violence by Sudanese militias. Tens of thousands of young Dinka men and boys trekked hundreds of miles into Ethiopia. As many as a quarter did not survive the journey, and they arrived in Ethiopia in physical conditions described by relief workers as the worst they had encountered of any refugee flow in decades. UNHCR officials in Ethiopia report that the numbers of new arrivals in Ethiopian camps increased in March 1989 from those in February, then fell off again in April (Price Williams,

April 1989:9). These are mainly the women and children of men already on the camps. In addition, there are untold numbers of internally displaced civilians in Sudan, of whom a million have made their way to Khartoum, where they remain largely unassisted. In August of 1988 they were the worst hit by the Nile's flooding. The Sudanese government's responsibility for, and reaction to the Dinka plight has prompted accusations of genocide (William Frelick in World Refugee Report). The Sudanese government has prevented international observers from entering the country to investigate allegations of widespread, systematic murder, and has blocked relief efforts by threatening to expel humanitarian agencies working in the north if they venture into the south.

There has been an influx of humanitarian relief to northern Sudan from the international community, but administering the relief has strained port and rail facilities and has overburdened an already demoralized administrative infrastructure. Harris (1986: 60) argues that, if anything, this commitment to humanitarian assistance has partly substituted for economic aid and general balance of payments support that might otherwise be forthcoming.

UGANDA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

It should be noted that the internal disturbances of recent years make demographic statistics very unreliable, and the following figures should be interpreted with caution. Much of the population movement into and out of Uganda has been in the form of refugees from the internal strife, and their subsequent return.

The last national census in Uganda reported to the United Nations office responsible for monitoring migration was in 1969, although a census was conducted in 1980. Actual population at the time of the 1969 census was 9,543,545. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Uganda's population size was 14,680,000, with a 3.21% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 48 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 108/1000 live births. Uganda is 7% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 0.3%.

In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Uganda experienced a net migration of -75,000. Emigration was traditionally mainly to Kenya and Tanzania.

See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".

Traditionally, Uganda was a region of in-migration from neighboring countries, mainly Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania, to the cotton plantations. At the time of the 1969 census, immigrants were 5.68% of the total population. However, recent developments, including immigration policies, and the civil disturbances have wrought changes (Makinwa-Adubeso 1987). Political and economic collapse in Uganda has generated outflows of population. In 1972, Uganda expelled some 40,000 Asians who had been resident since colonial times (Ricca 1989:63). Until recently, Kenya was a major receiver of educated Ugandans. However, since the early 1980s, the increasing availability of skilled Kenyan graduates has placed pressures upon the Kenyan labor market, and as a result, skilled Ugandans are moving to other locations within and outside Africa.

B. Policies

The Ugandan government views the immigration level as significant and satisfactory and desires to maintain current levels, although Uganda is one of a number of African countries identified by the 1989 Monitoring report as having adopted policies to regulate undocumented or illegal migration. Emigration is now viewed as too high and government recently indicated its desire to lower the outflow. Its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.)

Regional Organizations. Uganda is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area (PTA), however there is no documentation about this organization as to provisions for free circulation of people.

C. Health

The high prevalence of measles among Ugandan refugees in southern Sudan has been attributed to disruptions in the measles immunization programs in Uganda during the several years preceding the refugee movements, and pre-existing but only partially treated TB cases have been found to become rapidly infectious in camp situations.

It is generally agreed that the area of SSA most affected by HIV1 is the region of Central Africa which includes Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Zambia. Here, there are a number of cities and rural areas where over 20 percent of surveyed adults are infected. The results of two sero-epidemiological surveys in rural northern Uganda found that, between 1984 and 1986, overall HIV1 sero-positivity increased from less than 1 percent to 13.2 percent, suggesting the "dramatic spread of the epidemic even in remote rural areas of Central Africa" (de Lalla et al. 1987:177) and more recent observations (de Cock 1988) have linked these increases to migration, as well as social disruption. A prevalence survey involving Zaire, Cameroon, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda--7 countries in which HIV1 infection is "quite common", found no evidence of HIV2 infection (Kanki et al. 1987).

D. Education/brain drain

Uganda is reported to have lost more than half its high level professional and technical manpower during the regime of President Amin and is still suffering the consequences (UN ECA 1988:1). Uganda is among those countries in which education has expanded faster than the absorptive capacity of the economy, leading to disparities between supply and demand of highly skilled manpower, and concomitant outmigration of trained workers unable to find suitable jobs at home.

In East Africa, international manpower movements have been found to be generally less prominent than other types of population mobility (eg. refugeeism). Little is known about intra-African migration of skilled workers in the sub-region since the free flow of labor among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania ended with the collapse of the East African Community in the early 1970s. Certainly the flow of students from Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam to Uganda was reduced with the development of local universities, and political upheavals in Uganda. However, the recent introduction of work permits (notably for Ugandans in Kenya as of 1982) signals the continuing outflow of Ugandans (among whom the well-educated are thought to be particularly represented) and the increasing demand of skilled Kenyans for attractive positions held by non-nationals.

Tanzania and Uganda are reported to have instituted measures to restrict emigration of professionals and civil servants, including bonding, foreign exchange restrictions, and review of applications for travel abroad (Adepoju 1988:44) but evidence of continuing outflows (at least from Uganda) noted earlier suggest they have had little effect.

In 1987 Uganda joined the Return of Talent Program sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to re-attract skilled migrants who have left the country. (See Chapter on migration of the highly skilled for a full discussion of the program.)

E. Refugees

The intense out-flow of refugees from 1979 to 1985 (see Clark 1987 for a summary of Uganda's history) has ceased, and there has recently been significant repatriation. With the return to more responsible governance in Uganda, the number of Ugandans in refuge has dropped from over 282,000 in 1985 to 9,600 in 1988. The latter figure represents a drop of 90 percent from 1987, largely as the result of a sizable repatriation from Sudan (see Tables 6,7, and 8). Returning people need substantial assistance, particularly in areas (such as the Luwero Triangle) where much of the land is devastated.

Uganda has also been host to Zairean and Rwandan refugee populations, (est. 135,000) who came in the 1960s, and whose children have been born in Uganda. The eight official settlements, which contain mainly Rwandans, have suffered damage to their infrastructure from violence in the areas. Aid was curtailed in 1985 because of fighting in the area, but has now been resumed.

COUNTRY DEPARTMENT III

BURUNDI

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The first and last national census in Burundi was in 1979. Actual population at the time of the census was 4,028,420. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Burundi's population size was 4,696,000, with a 2.92% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 49 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 118/1000 live births. Burundi is 2% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 3.2%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Burundi experienced a net migration of -15,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 2.05%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 1.98%. Immigration is mainly from Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 1.63% of the resident population and is mainly to Uganda and Rwanda as well as Tanzania. However, declining international migration from Burundi has been linked to accelerated internal migration.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Burundi views the level of immigration as significant and too high, and its policy is to lower the inflows. The level of emigration is viewed as insignificant and satisfactory, and government's policy is to maintain current levels. (See Table 5.)

Regional Organizations. The Comunaute Economique des Pays des Grands lacs (CEPGL) was founded in 1976 and includes Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire. It emphasizes cooperation in economic, commercial, scientific, cultural, political, military, financial, technical, and tourism areas. In September 1978, it adopted a convention concerning social security of nationals who had worked in another member state, and in December 1985, a convention on free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, and rights of establishment in member countries. Burundi and Rwanda are also members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area (PTA), however there is no documentation about this organization as to provisions for free circulation of people.

Burundi has had restrictions on internal migration. Permanent settlement outside the home "colline" is controlled by provincial and communal administrations, and requires both permission to leave the home commune and certified, approved residence and employment in the receiving area. The World

Bank has concluded that such restrictions have served to hamper development of non-farm employment, especially of artisans and traders. Furthermore, by limiting flows of rural labor toward urban areas, the policy has resulted in current wages far above the minimum wage. The periodic forced withdrawal of illegal (internal) migrants has been noted also to have a negative effect on the informal sector, private investment, and the viability of small scale enterprise and helps to account for the fact that Burundi's informal sector is much less active than in other African countries, with 85 percent of informal non-farm employment concentrated in rural areas. World Bank studies have noted that migration policies that force artisans to locate in peri-urban areas increase these workers' costs of reaching their clientele.

Burundi is among the countries that have instituted resettlement policies either to stem migration to urban areas, or to alter population densities in rural areas, ostensibly to facilitate delivery of services or to improve agricultural production.

C. Brain drain/education

In Central Africa, the common market among Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda specifically provides for skilled migrants in its convention on the free flow of labor. Although, low prevailing skill levels have kept the movement of high level manpower among these countries to a minimum (in Burundi only about one in 17,000 was a tertiary graduate), Burundi is among those countries that have recently expressed concern about brain drain.

Rwanda and Burundi rely heavily upon foreign institutions (notably those in Western Europe, the US and--more recently--the USSR) for training high level manpower. However, in Burundi, expatriates are only a small percentage of the total work force (0.6 percent) and "Burundianization" has proceeded rapidly in lower levels of both the public and private sectors, although expatriates have been needed to fill shortages in middle and higher level technical and managerial positions (World Bank 1988:57).

D. Health

It is generally agreed that the area of SSA most affected by HIV1 is the region of Central Africa which includes Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Zambia. Here, there are a number of cities and rural areas where over 20 percent of surveyed adults are infected. However, a prevalence survey of 7 countries, including Burundi, in which HIV1 infection is "quite common", found no evidence of HIV2 infection (Kanki et al. 1987:63).

E. Refugees

Burundi is both an asylum and a source country. (See Tables 6,7, and 8.) Burundi hosted 76,000 refugees in 1988 from Rwanda (65,800), Zaire (9,600), Uganda (400), and elsewhere (200). Longstanding ethnic conflicts have been at the root of periodic flights from Burundi. Tanzania is host to the Hutu and Tutsi who arrived from the upheavals in Burundi in the early 1960s. The Tutsis (19,800) were offered citizenship by Tanzania some years ago. Hutus (137,000) live in three settlements, which have been handed over

to the Tanzanian government by the UNHCR, and have received large amounts of post-handover aid via ICARA II projects (Clark 1987). Integration problems persist and the Hutu are isolated from local populations.

Refugees from Burundi are also in Rwanda (20,600) and Zaire (10,000). Most recently, ethnic violence killed thousands in August 1988, forced the flight of more than 50,000 Hutu refugees into Rwanda, and created the internal displacement of tens of thousands other Burundians (World Refugee Report 1988:38).

THE SEYCHELLES AND THE COMOROS

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The Seychelles. The last national census in the Seychelles was in 1977. Actual population at the time of the census was 61,898. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, the Seychelles's population size was 65,000, with a 1.0% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 70 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 14/1000 live births. The Seychelles is 37% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.2%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, the Seychelles experienced a net migration of -2,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 3.12%, but in the cases of Seychelles and Reunion, census data do not permit estimation of the numbers of African immigrants.

The Comoros. The last national census in the Comoros was in 1980. Actual population at the time of the census was 335,150. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, the Comoros's population size was 454,000, with a 3.64% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 56 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 88/1000 live births. The Comoros is 21% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 10.1%.

The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 4.14%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 3.99%. Immigration is mainly from Madagascar.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

Comoros views current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and current policy is to reduce these levels. The Comoros has also recently adopted policies to regulate undocumented or illegal migration. Emigration is viewed as significant but satisfactory and policy is to maintain current levels of outflow. The Seychelles views current levels of immigration as insignificant and satisfactory, and emigration is viewed as significant and too high, but government policy is to maintain current levels of both immigration and emigration. (See Table 5.)

The Comoros belongs to the Eastern and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area (PTA), however there is no documentation about this organization as to provisions for free circulation of people. The Comoros remains one of the three countries in the SSA region (along with South Africa and Mauritius) that have not become signatories to the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

C. Education/brain drain

In the Comoros, the demands of debt servicing have strained public finances so that public sector workers may now wait months before receiving back pay in installments. Strained public finances have also resulted in low levels of support for universities and research institutions and a concomitant lack of tools, equipment, books, and other resources crucial to the productivity of the technically trained. This has led in some cases to the out-migration of professionals and other highly trained people, and expressed government concern about brain drain.

DJIBOUTI

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Djibouti's first and last census was in 1983, but results have not been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Djibouti's population size was 339,000, with a 3.2% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 49 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 132/1000 live births. Djibouti is 67% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.8%. (See Tables 1,2, and 3.)

The main population flows have been in the form of refugee movements from Ethiopia. (See Tables 6, 7, and 8 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The Djibouti government views immigration levels as significant and too high, while emigration levels are viewed as insignificant and satisfactory. The government's policy is to maintain both existing levels. (See Table 5.) Djibouti is a member of the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), however there is no documentation for this organization as to provisions for free circulation of people.

C. Refugees

Djibouti has been the recipient of refugees from Ethiopia. However, owing to a voluntary repatriation operation conducted by the two countries (Clark 1987) their numbers declined by nearly 50 percent between 1982 and 1985. Between 1985 and 1988, the number of Ethiopians in Djibouti declined from 16,700 to 2,000.

Most of the longer-term refugees in Africa have been able to find land and become self-sufficient in agriculture. However, as populations expand, land becomes less available, and such options disappear. Already in Somalia and Djibouti, refugees have not been locally integrated. Care and maintenance camps may come to predominate in the future. The frustration resulting from the inability to find durable solutions or viable self-sufficiency programs, coupled with continuing economic hardship, may lead to the erosion of the principle of asylum (Nanda 1986; Clark 1987). Repatriation policies that begin as voluntary, may cease to be considered so. The case of Djibouti illustrates this. The voluntary repatriation program for Ethiopians set up with the help of the UNHCR in 1983, was marred by controversy; many suggested repatriation was not entirely voluntary (See Clark 1987 for discussion).

Djibouti, in trying to limit its burden of refugees, has begun to pursue less welcoming refugee policies. Djibouti has set up Africa's first 'humane deterrence camp', a camp located in an inhospitable area. The motive is to force refugees to choose between return and life in the camp's "austere

conditions". It is also to act as a deterrent to new arrivals who do not have serious fears of persecution at home.

MADAGASCAR

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The first and last national census in Madagascar was in 1975. Actual population at the time of the census was 7,603,790. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Madagascar's population size was 10,212,000, with a 3.21% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 54 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 109/1000 live births. Madagascar is 20% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 5.5%.

The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 0.7%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 0.01%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 0.18% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to the Comoros.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Madagascar views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain levels of both (See Table 5.) although some concern about brain drain has been expressed. Migrants to Madagascar are required to have government permission to take up employment (to prevent 'an excessive and uncontrolled increase in the number of foreign workers') and a written contract approved by a labor inspector (to ensure that the worker is protected under the law with respect to housing, travel costs, etc.).

RWANDA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Rwanda was in 1978. Actual population at the time of the census was 4,831,527. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Rwanda's population size was 6,026,000, with a 3.42% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy currently was 49 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 127/1000 live births. Rwanda is 5% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.6%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Rwanda experienced a net migration of -10,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 0.87%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 0.76%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is 4.34% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Uganda, and to a lesser extent, Burundi and Tanzania. Immigration is mainly from Burundi.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

Rwanda views levels of immigration as insignificant and satisfactory, and emigration as insignificant and too low; nonetheless official policy is to maintain both inflows and outflows. In the Fourth inquiry on Population, Rwanda reported to the UN that it was exploring the possibility of agreements with labor receiving countries (UN 1982:16,44). The government views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain these inflows. Work permits are now required in Rwanda. (See Table 5.)

Regional Organizations. The Comunaute Economique des Pays des Grands lacs (CEPGL) was founded in 1976 and includes Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire. It emphasizes cooperation in economic, commercial, scientific, cultural, political, military, financial, technical, and tourism areas. In September 1978, it adopted a convention concerning social security of nationals who had worked in another member state, and in December 1985, a convention on free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, and rights of establishment in member countries. Burundi and Rwanda are also members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area (PTA), however there is no documentation about this organization as to provisions for free circulation of people.

C. Brain drain/education

In Central Africa, the common market among Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda specifically provides for skilled migrants in its convention on the free flow of labor. However, low prevailing skill levels have kept the movement of high level manpower among these countries to a minimum. Rwanda

and Burundi rely heavily upon foreign institutions (notably those in Western Europe, the US and--more recently--the USSR) for training high level manpower.

D. Health

It is generally agreed that the area of SSA most affected by HIV1 is the region of Central Africa which includes Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Zambia. Here, there are a number of cities and rural areas where over 20 percent of surveyed adults are infected.

E. Refugees

Rwanda ranks sixth among SSA countries that are sources of refugees. Uganda is host to some 118,000 Rwandan refugees many of whom came in the 1960s, and whose children have been born in Uganda. The eight official settlements, which contain mainly Rwandans, have suffered damage to their infrastructure from violence associated with armed conflict. Aid was curtailed in 1985 because of fighting in the area, but has now been resumed. Refugees from Rwanda are also located in Burundi (65,800); Tanzania (21,000); Zaire (11,000); and Kenya (2,000).

Rwanda also hosts some 20,600 refugees from Burundi, where ethnic violence killed thousands in August 1988, and forced the flight of more than 50,000 Hutu refugees into Rwanda. (See Tables 6,7, and 8.)

ZAIRE

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The first national census in Zaire was in 1984, however results show only the total number of foreigners, not their distribution by nationality. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Zaire's population was 30,557,000, with a population growth rate of 3.07. In 1985 life expectancy was 53 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 102/1000 live births. Zaire is 38% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.9%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Zaire experienced a net migration of 5,000. Emigration is mainly to Zambia, Burundi and Rwanda, the Congo, CAR, and Tanzania. Zaire's population growth has been accompanied by rapid urbanization, and a significant influx of immigrants and refugees from neighboring countries. In the 1984 census, immigrants were 2.15% of total population.

(See Tables 1,2,3,6 and 7 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Analysis of sex ratio data in various Central African countries suggests that there is considerable variation in types of migration by nationality and country of destination. In Cameroon (1976), immigrants from Zaire had the highest sex ratio (259) implying temporary migration largely by males; in the Congo (1974) immigrants from Zaire had a sex ratio of 95 implying the existence of family migration and more permanent settlement (Adepoju 1988:22). In general, however, migration in the subregion is thought to be largely temporary. Gabon and Zaire, both with mineral deposits, have been major areas of in-migration as infusions of investment capital created jobs for skilled and unskilled workers.

B. Policies

The government of Zaire views the immigration level as significant and satisfactory, and emigration as insignificant and satisfactory. Its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.)

Zaire expelled undocumented workers in 1971 (Addo 1982:34 in Brennan). The expulsion involved mostly West Africans and has been linked to high prevailing rates of unemployment and adverse balance of payments (Adepoju:1988:32,40). The zairianization and nationalization measures of 1973/74 may also have affected the status of immigrant workers, but little documentation of this has been identified.

The Comunaute Economique des Pays des Grands lacs (CEPGL) was founded in 1976 and includes Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire. It emphasizes cooperation in economic, commercial, scientific, cultural, political, military, financial, technical, and tourism areas. In September 1978, it adopted a convention concerning social security of nationals who had worked in

another member state, and in December 1985, a convention on free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, and rights of establishment in member countries.

Zaire issued a population policy in May of 1987. The policy statement observes that, for this country, "there is almost no imbalance in international migration. In fact, it is generally considered that the number of immigrants is quite close to the actual number of emigrants" (The Futures Group 1989:113). Goals, objectives, and strategies outlined in the policy document all pertain to population redistribution within the country and emphasize rural development.

C. Education/brain drain

About 120,000 Europeans (who controlled over 80 percent of commercialized production) left Zaire at independence and their departure had a substantial effect on agriculture. Current reliance on foreign institutions for high level manpower development (notably those in Western Europe, the US and --more recently--the USSR) was found to be pronounced in Zaire.

In Central Africa, the common market among Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda specifically provides for skilled migrants in its convention on the free flow of labor. Zaire lacks skilled and managerial manpower in the public and private sectors. The problem of unemployment concerns unskilled workers. Zaire, like a number of countries in the region, is characterized by an oversupply of elementary school graduates; this is indicated by long and lengthening job searches.

D. Health

It is generally agreed that the area of SSA most affected by HIV1 is the region of Central Africa. Here, there are a number of cities and rural areas where over 20 percent of surveyed adults are infected. In Zaire, 5 to 10 percent of surveyed adults and 2 percent of surveyed children under three were infected. A study of changes in prevalence rates in a rural province of Zaire found that while prevalence in the general population did not change significantly between 1976 and 1986, notable increases were observed in selected risk groups (pregnant women and prostitutes) and, further, that previous residence outside the area was a discernible risk factor. Among the persons infected in 1976, one (20%) had travelled outside the region (to Kinshasa). Among hospitalized patients infected in 1986, travel outside the region was significantly associated with seropositivity ($p < 0.03$). The authors concluded that traditional village life carries a low risk of HIV infection, but that "disruption of traditional lifestyles and the social and behavioral changes that accompany urbanization may be important factors in the spread of AIDS in central Africa" (Nzilambi, de Cock et al. 1988:279).

E. Refugees

Zaire was a major source country for refugees in the 1960s. Refugees went to Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania. Many of these refugees have remained in their asylum countries, and their children have been born there. Freund and Kalumba (1986) estimate some 10,000 Zaireans are spontaneously settled in Zambia's Northwest province. There are some 16,000 Zaireans in Tanzania (US Committee for Refugees, 1987). Refugees from Zaire are also found in Angola, Burundi, Sudan, and the Congo (see Tables 6,7, and 8).

Zaire ranks fifth among refugee asylum countries. The civil war in Angola has resulted in continuing flows of refugees into Zaire, as well as Zambia and Botswana. In 1988, there were an estimated 298,700 Angolan refugees in Zaire, as well as older existing populations from Rwanda (11,000) and Burundi (10,000). Spontaneously-settled refugees have had some positive effects on the country. Refugees potentially replace rural workers lost in the exodus to the cities, thereby making possible agricultural expansion, especially by growing food for urban areas. This has been the case with Angolan refugees in Zaire. However, as has been pointed out in the chapter on Refugees in Volume I, spontaneously settled refugees also impose a strain on the resources of local populations.

COUNTRY DEPARTMENT IV

GHANA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Ghana reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration was in 1970, although a census was conducted in 1984. Actual population at the time of the 1970 census was 8,559,313. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Ghana's population size was 12,710,000, with a 3.21% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 54 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 94/1000 live births. Ghana is 38% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 5.3%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Ghana experienced a net migration of -10,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 6.57%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 6.39%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated at 0.90% of the resident population, but this figure does not include emigration to Nigeria and is undoubtedly an underestimate. Emigration is mainly to Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, and to a lesser extent, Burkina Faso. Immigration is mainly from Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and Togo. Political and economic collapse in recent years has generated outflows of labor, and Ghana has not been viewed as a primary country of immigration during the latter years of the 1980s.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

Ghana is one of twelve SSA countries which views current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and one of the eleven which has policies to reduce them. (See Table 5.) Ghana is reported to require residence permits, but it is not known how the use of residence permits correlates with that of work permits. Among policies directed toward limiting the economic activity of non-nationals is Ghana's Business Promotion Act No. 334 (1970) which restricts participation of aliens in several areas: ownership of businesses over a certain size; trade (including hawking and small trade); selected activities reserved only for Ghanaians (commercial transport, baking, printing, beauty culture, manufacture of cement blocks, advertising, publicity). Foreign owners who are not restricted by the act are required to provide training programs.

Regional Organizations. Ghana is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.) Ghana is also a

member of the Accord d'Assistance Administrative Mutuelle en Matiere Douaniere, Commerciale, et d'Immigration, concluded in December 1984 among Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo,

The movement of Ghanaians into Nigeria beginning around 1976 included workers who filled higher skilled jobs in Nigeria's public sector, as well as large numbers of illegal migrants. The undocumented component of this flow has been attributed in large part to the free movement provisions of the ECOWAS protocol. It is thought that most immigrants did not understand the restrictions in the protocol, but rather assumed it gave them right to unlimited stay and access to employment. The result was the closing of frontiers to illegal immigration and Nigeria's expulsion of clandestine workers in the 1980s. Ghana was one of several countries that initially closed their borders to expelled migrants in 1983.

Earlier in 1969, under the Aliens Compliance Order, Ghana itself had expelled an estimated 200,000 foreigners, mostly originating from Nigeria, Niger, and Upper Volta.

C. Education/brain drain

As in many countries, education has expanded faster than the absorptive capacity of the economy in Ghana. This has led to disparities between supply and demand of highly skilled manpower, and concomitant outmigration of trained workers unable to find suitable jobs at home. Ghana is among a number of African countries that have expressed concern recently about brain drain.

In West Africa, the most notable intra-regional skills migration in the 1970s and early 1980s was to Nigeria, especially by Ghanaians who concentrated in public sector jobs as teachers, doctors, and nurses, filling posts left vacant by Nigerians who had taken higher paying positions in the private sector (Obasi 1983 in Gould 1985:10-11). Although there were a number of skilled workers in the expulsion of January 1983, those who had legally obtained jobs (ie. with work permits, etc.) were reportedly less affected than the many undocumented unskilled workers (Adepoju 1988:68). The 1983 survey of migrants found that 25 percent were skilled and another 14 percent were semi-skilled. Ghana is reported to have mounted campaigns to effect the return of skilled nationals, but the success of these efforts is not generally known (UN ECA 1988:1).

The 1967 Mills-Odoi Commission in Ghana was part of an effort to establish salary structures that would be competitive with international markets for high level manpower (cf. the Ndegwa Commission in Kenya ; the Mohammed Taha Commission in Sudan in 1979; and the Elwood report on Nigeria in 1966). With the economic deterioration and structural adjustments of the 1980s, however, these efforts have "fizzled away". Prevailing low salary levels for high level manpower are now credited with creating significant outflows of university personnel and (by a WHO study) 'catastrophic' outflows of African health manpower.

Ghana is part of the Return of Talent Program sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to re-attract skilled migrants who have left the country. (See chapter on migration of the highly skilled for a full discussion of the program.)

D. Health

In Ghana, the highest number of HIV infected people has been recorded in the Eastern Region, from which thousands of Ghanaians have migrated to work in neighboring countries (Yeboah-Afari 1988).

GUINEA-BISSAU

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Guinea-Bissau was in 1979 at which time actual total population was 767,739. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Guinea-Bissau's population size was 886,000, with a 2.04% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 39 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 143/1000 live births. Guinea-Bissau is 26% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 7.2%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Guinea-Bissau experienced a net migration of -5,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 1.68%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 1.57%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 4.04% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Senegambia. (See Tables 1,2, and 3.)

B. Policies

The government of Guinea-Bissau views both the immigration and emigration levels as significant and too high, and its policy is to lower levels of both. (See Table 5.) According to the 1989 Monitoring Report, Guinea-Bissau is among a number of African countries that have adopted policies to regulate undocumented or illegal migration, and that have expressed recent concerns about brain drain.

C. Health

HIV2 is the predominant form of AIDS infection in West Africa. Guinea and Guinea Bissau were part of a survey which found prevalence rates of 1 to 16 percent in the general population and 15 to 64 percent recorded among high risk groups (Myers and Henn 1988). Evidence of both HIV1 and HIV2 infection have been reported in Guinea and Guinea Bissau as well (Katlama et al. 1987:176; Antunes 1987:178). In the latter country, rates of sero-positivity for HIV1 or HIV2 antibodies in two rural areas were found to range from 3.8 to 12.5 percent for HIV1 and 4.2 to 26.9 for HIV2.

LIBERIA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Liberia reported to the United Nations office responsible for monitoring migration was in 1974, although a census was conducted in 1984. Actual population at the time of the 1974 census was 1,503,368. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Liberia's population size was 2,204,000, with a 3.34% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 51 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 127/1000 live births. Liberia is 38% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.1%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Liberia experienced a net migration of 5,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 3.95%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 3.17%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 0.77% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire. Immigration is mainly from Guinea, Ghana, and Sierra Leone.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Liberia views the immigration level as significant and satisfactory, and emigration as insignificant and satisfactory. Its policy is to maintain levels of both, (see Table 5), although measures have been adopted to regulate undocumented migration. Liberia issued a population policy statement in April of 1987. Liberia's principal concern regarding population mobility is with rural to urban migration. Specific strategies to slow this flow include establishment of small-scale and agro-industries in rural areas, extension of clean water and rural electrification, strengthening secondary and medium-sized cities, and upgrading slum areas in cities other than Monrovia. The importance of unspecified 'indirect policy measures' is noted for both internal and international migration (The Futures Group 1989: 135-138).

Regional Organizations. Liberia is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.).

C. Education/brain drain

Nigeria has attracted workers skilled in engineering, applied science, and medicine from Liberia (Fadayoumi 1986:10). As in many SSA countries, education has expanded faster than the absorptive capacity of the

economy, leading to disparities between supply and demand of highly skilled manpower, and concomitant outmigration of trained workers unable to find suitable jobs at home and Liberia has expressed concern about brain drain.

NIGERIA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Nigeria's population size was 99,669,000, with a 3.42% population growth rate. (See Table 1.) Actual census data from Nigeria are not available after 1963, but it is well known that immigration flows to that country increased substantially during the 1970s and were largely from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Niger, and Chad. By 1982, it was estimated that there were 2.5 million non-nationals in Nigeria, roughly 2.5 percent of total population. However, a September 1983 survey of migrants in Nigeria found that only 23.3 percent of them were legal, so their numbers and proportions may be higher (Adepoju 1988:64; Makinwa-Adebusoye 1987:23). Data on migration flows remain inadequate in Nigeria, for example, the National Population Bureau prepares a quarterly and annual migration abstract based on border station reports. The entry and exit cards provide sufficient data for 11 cross-tabulations on factors such as nationality and reason for entry. But in the last quarter of 1985 only 18 of 43 land border posts and 7 of 16 seaports provided data to the Bureau. (Makinwa-Adebusoye 1987:1261)

B. Policies

The Nigerian government views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain these levels. (See Table 5.) However, in the wake of experiences in the 1980s, regulation of undocumented migration has become a major concern throughout the ECOWAS region, better documentation of citizens, and education as to the rights and obligations of movement are planned, along with tightened border security. Nigeria itself has reportedly planned to establish another 100 border posts throughout the country, to strengthen national security and reduce illegal immigration (U.N. 1989:398). Nigeria requires residence permits, but it is not known how the use of these correlates with that of work permits. The Enterprise Promotion or Indigenization Decree of 1970 imposes restrictions on migrants that limit their economic activity (Adepoju 1988:70).

Regional Organizations. Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.) Nigeria participates in temporary worker schemes with Mauritius.

The movement of Ghanaians and others into Nigeria around 1976 (illegal and largely undocumented) has been attributed in large part to the free movement provisions of the ECOWAS protocol. It is thought that most immigrants did not understand the restrictions in the protocol, but rather assumed it gave them right to unlimited stay and access to employment. The

result was the closing of frontiers to illegal immigration and even massive repatriation of clandestine workers in the 1980s. In 1983 Nigeria expelled between 1.2 and 2 million irregular migrants-- one of the largest expulsions in recent history, but certainly not the only one, indeed Nigerian workers were expelled from Ghana in 1969.

Nigeria was amongst the first countries of the region to issue a population policy. Promulgated in November 1985, Nigeria's policy statement specifically notes that, while international migration was not of major significance in the country's demographic situation prior to the mid-1970s, the "influx of aliens...[since then] has dramatically changed this situation", with notable impact on urban areas (The Futures Group 1989:89). Internal migration in Nigeria is multidirectional (rural to rural, urban to rural, and rural to urban), but the latter is most salient, and the need "to achieve a more even distribution of population between urban and rural areas" is the only articulated policy goal related to migration. Nonetheless, strategies pertaining to spatial distribution assert that, "Special and appropriate measures shall be taken to regulate, protect and assist international migrants and refugees, to safe-guard their property and respect their cultures" (op. cit.:101-102).

C. Remittances

Remittances are a significant source of income even in higher income countries like Nigeria, where over 5 percent of rural households reported that remittances were the major source of income (Adepoju 1984:34-35). A 1983 survey in Nigeria found that 60 percent of international migrants remitted funds to their families, but neither the absolute nor the proportionate value of these transfers was reported. Based on average earnings of 180 naira per month and the assumption that 50 percent is spent on the migrant's basic needs, it was estimated that about 120 million naira per annum were sent out of Nigeria (Orubuloye 1986 in Makinwa-Adebusoye 1987:27). Such estimates, however, are obviously crude.

D. Labor markets/informal sector

Nigeria presents evidence to suggest that migration plays an important role in development of informal activities in rural areas. Adepoju (1984) found migration within rural areas linked to rapidly expanding informal sector activity: cottage industries, handicrafts, services, and petty trading, as well as a small wage sector employing a handful of professionals and artisans. In his survey, over 50 percent of migrants cited non-farm activity as a major source of income, compared with only 32 percent of non-migrants. In subsistence cropping villages, migrants were even more likely than non-migrants to be active in informal sector activities.

Other evidence from Nigeria suggests however, that findings on the relationship between migration and the informal sector may be sensitive to the sex composition of comparison groups. Peil (1988:574) found that non-migrants, as well as female in-migrants and returnees, are more likely than

male in-migrants or returnees to take up self-employment in the informal sector. The mode of agriculture in the region under investigation may also influence these results.

E. Education/brain drain

Adepoju (1984:44) found substantial differences in literacy levels between migrants and non-migrants in subsistence villages versus cash-cropping villages in Nigeria. In subsistence villages, a higher proportion of non-migrants (36 percent) than migrants (29 percent) were illiterate. In cash-cropping villages, the reverse was true: only 29 percent of non-migrants were illiterate, as compared with nearly 44 percent of migrants, findings that suggest considerable mobility among uneducated agricultural workers and "destination selectivity" on the part of rural-to-rural migrants with different educational attributes. Similarly, Lacey's findings concerning interurban mobility in Nigeria support the notion that the effects of education on migration are considerably more complex than is generally recognized, and further, that these effects need to be examined by sex as well as by destination. She found that interurban male migrants were more likely than rural to urban migrants to arrive in cities with established urban skills and educational training to embark on urban careers. Women, on the other hand, whether interurban or rural to urban migrants, were found generally to arrive in urban locales with low levels of education and either no occupational experience, or only informal sector work experience (Lacey 1985 and 1986).

International migrants from Nigeria have been found to be highly educated, frequently having been abroad for study as well as work (Peil 1988:570). In 1987, it was estimated that 70,000 high level Sub-Saharan Africans were "regularly installed" in EEC countries, and in 1984, the number of highly skilled Nigerians alone settled in the U.S. was thought to be 10,000 (Ricca 1989:93-94). Since the mid-1970s, the Middle East has become a favored destination for Nigerians (UN ECA 1988:2).

Within West Africa, the most notable intra-regional skills migration in the 1970s and early 1980s was to Nigeria, especially by Ghanaians who concentrated in public sector jobs as teachers, doctors, and nurses, filling posts left vacant by Nigerians who had taken higher paying positions in the private sector (Obasi 1983 in Gould 1985:10-11). Although a number of skilled workers were included in the expulsion of January 1983, those who had legally obtained jobs (ie. with work permits, etc.) were reportedly less affected than the many undocumented unskilled workers. In addition to Ghanaians, Nigeria has attracted workers skilled in engineering, applied science, and medicine from Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (Fadayoumi 1986:10). Although in general, Gould concludes that migration of skilled workers tends to be between countries of similar colonial background, he also notes the presence of Dahomeans and Togolese in Nigeria.

High level technical assistance manpower has characteristically been provided by the aid agencies of industrialized countries. In 1987, however, Nigeria launched a new era with initiation of its Technical Aid Corps

programme, in which skilled personnel will be sent to African countries requesting assistance. Participating countries will pay accommodation, while Nigeria will be responsible for salaries of Corps personnel (Makinwa-Adebusoye 1987:46).

A 1986 survey of 14 West and Central African countries found that most (10 of the 14) had reportedly achieved self-sufficiency in high level manpower required from humanities and the liberal arts. However, only Nigeria reported self-sufficiency in science and technology, and an oversupply of graduates is indicated by long and lengthening job searches. In the wake of the precipitous decline in oil revenues and the adoption of a Structural Adjustment Program, Nigeria has been experiencing large scale emigration of highly skilled, internationally qualified, personnel. Particularly hard hit are medicine, the universities, and the airlines. Data on this new brain drain phenomenon are confined to a few types of skills, but nonetheless indicate an alarming pattern. In medicine, over 260 specialist doctors are working outside the country, most having left in the last three years. The University College Hospital has lost over 40 specialists. 25 of 50 Nigerian orthopedic surgeons have gone abroad. (Obadina 1988:1569 and Igiebor 1988:16-18) Anecdotal accounts emphasize the departure of some of Nigeria's most highly skilled medical and academic specialists. They also suggest that lower level skilled manpower, such as university trained engineers, are finding it more difficult to locate work abroad. Hence, the exodus may not run as deep as journalistic accounts imply. Nigerian professionals are migrating chiefly to the Middle East, and secondarily to Europe and the United States. Salary differentials between source and destination countries are frequently stark: Nigerian Professors who earn \$5,870 at home could receive between \$50,000 and \$80,000 in Saudi Arabia. (Obadina 1988:1572)

F. Health

A study of the effects of maternal migration on child health, conducted at the Igbo-Ora Rural Health Center in Western Nigeria, was undertaken when it was noted that a number of children were missing clinic appointments because their mothers were out of town on business. Nearly 25 percent of mothers in the study regularly migrated for work. The mothers, 84 percent of whom were traders, were absent for an average of 2 months during a single visit, and 3.7 months a year; however, 13 of the 19 migrant mothers carried their children with them (the remainder left their children in the care of relatives). Despite the fears of the researchers, no significant difference in child growth was found between children of migrant and non-migrant mothers. In fact, a high (though not significant) positive association was found between child growth and cash income available per child (Brieger 1984, pp. 262-264).

In a study of the relationship between duration of residence and fertility in Lagos, Adewuyi (1986) examined the extent to which rural to urban migrants adopted urban fertility patterns over time. Multivariate analysis confirmed that migrant fertility is higher than that of non-migrants, even when controlled for education. The fertility of those whose rural origins were farther from Lagos was higher than that of shorter distance migrants.

Although recent migrants (0-4 years) at all ages and levels of schooling had fewer children ever born than native urban dwellers, the fertility of migrants did not become more like that of native dwellers with increased duration of residence. Rather, over time they pursued the child-bearing patterns of their rural origins. These findings are consistent with earlier studies in Nigeria (Adepoju 1976; Arowolo 1979; Adewuyi 1983) which did not control for duration of residence but did find rural migrants' fertility to be higher than that of native urban dwellers. Adewuyi postulates that the migration process may interrupt child-bearing (thus explaining the lower fertility of recent migrants) but that rural fertility patterns resume after settling-in.

Watts (1987) has linked transmission of Guinea worm in Nigeria to various forms of population circulation, from daily water collection to seasonal and long term labor migration. However, the largest volume of recent literature on the subject of migration and disease transmission has focussed on AIDS. Myers and Henn (1988) note that there is now evidence that HIV1 is spreading in rural areas of most affected countries and is also spreading westward to Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria.

Ironically, the flight of faculty from some of the most technologically sophisticated medical specialties in Nigeria may be increasing the number of medical students who choose more representative specialties such as obstetrics, gynecology and internal medicine. (Igiebor 1988:22) In the long run, this could contribute to a better fit between the distribution of medical specialties and the needs of the population.

G. Agriculture

A recent case of resettlement has occurred in Nigeria, with the relocation of the capital from Lagos to Abuja. Part of the process involved moving the original inhabitants of the territory to new areas, where they would not be affected by the process of building the town's new infrastructure. Okafor (1988) describes the change in land use patterns for the resettled people from the Abuja area, and the resulting ecological disruption of the resettlement areas. Prior to resettlement, subsistence agriculturalists in the region had evolved a pattern of land use (bush fallow, migration with livestock during dry months) that was in equilibrium with the ecological capacity of the environment. With resettlement, problems have arisen: the new housing built by the government is too hot and under-ventilated in the summer, too few houses were built, and these are congested, and over-crowded. Increased population density has resulted in changed patterns of land use. Limited facilities for grain storage have meant many households have suffered grain losses. Incidences of famine have been reported, and some villagers have migrated away, or joined nomadic groups. Okafor argues that the resettlement effort has disrupted the ecological balance attained in presettlement land use patterns, by failing to ensure that those things necessary for subsistence were replicated in the new environment. The speed at which the resettlement program is being carried out prevents a thorough study of ecological variations in the resettled areas, which might guard against disruptions.

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census was in 1981. Actual population at the time of the census was 96,611. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Sao Tome & Principe's population size was 108,000, with a 2.77% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 65 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 69/1000 live births. Sao Tome & Principe are 32% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 5.3%.

The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 6.85%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 6.66%. Between 1974 and 1979, Sao Tome and Principe lost 80 percent of its immigrant population, including 90 percent of its Europeans.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Sao Tome views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory. Policies are to maintain flows. (See Table 5.)

SIERRA LEONE

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Sierra Leone was in 1974. Actual population at the time of the census was 2,735,159. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Sierra Leone's population size was 3,657,000, with a 2.48% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 41 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 175/1000 live births. Sierra Leone is 23% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 3.3%.

The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 2.78%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 2.46%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 0.26% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Liberia. Immigration is mainly from Guinea and Nigeria.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Sierra Leone views the level of immigration as significant and too high, and government policy is to lower the inflow. Emigration levels are viewed as insignificant and satisfactory, and policy is to maintain the outflow. (See Table 5.)

Regional Organizations. Sierra Leone is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.).

C. Education/brain drain

Nigeria has attracted workers skilled in engineering, applied science, and medicine from Sierra Leone and Liberia (Fadayoumi 1986:10). In Sierra Leone, education has expanded faster than the absorptive capacity of the economy, leading to disparities between supply and demand of highly skilled manpower, and concomitant outmigration of trained workers unable to find suitable jobs at home. Government has expressed concern about this outflow.

COUNTRY DEPARTMENT V

BURKINA FASO

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The first and last national census in Burkina was in 1975. Actual population at the time of the census was 5,638,203. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Burkina's population size was 7,885,000, with a 2.77% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 46 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 144/1000 live births. Burkina is 11% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 4.8%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Burkina experienced a net migration of -56,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 2.14%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 1.91%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is 16.97% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Cote d'Ivoire, and to a lesser extent, Ghana, and Mali. Immigration is mainly from Mali, Ghana, and Cote d'Ivoire, as well as surrounding countries.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

It is estimated that about 0.6% of the population (or one-fourth of the natural increase) emigrates permanently each year. Half of these are working age males. Recent trends have been towards the emigration of families, and the employment of emigrants in urban areas rather than on the coastal cocoa plantations. There is also evidence to suggest that more recent migrations have become medium to long term (as opposed to short term) among Burkina-ba migrants. Emigration has served to relieve population pressure on the densely populated central plateau.

B. Policies

The government of Burkina Faso views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and policy is to maintain current levels. Emigration is now viewed as significant and too high. As of 1988, policy is to lower levels of outflow. (See Table 5.)

Bilateral agreements have facilitated the migration of workers in West Africa since the 1960s. In 1960, an agreement was concluded between Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Cote d'Ivoire to replace the former system of recruitment directly by Ivoirian employers. Similarly, a 1973 agreement between Upper Volta and Gabon sought to organize the flow of workers toward the latter country, although this agreement was suspended by Burkina in 1977.

Regional Organizations. Burkina Faso is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the

region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.)

The Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Union Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, and an intergovernmental treaty was put in force in 1974. The original members, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, were joined by Benin in 1984 and Togo has observer status. Under CEAO's fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was signed on 28 October 1978.

Of the 12 African countries that have ratified ILO conventions, Burkina Faso is one of the three (the other two are Kenya and Cameroon) that have ratified both of the two ILO conventions (97 and 143) that are open to ratification. The nine other countries having limited themselves to ratification of one or another of the instruments therein (See Chapter on Policies for more detailed discussion.).

C. Remittances

Emigration has enabled an annual inflow of remittances amounting to about 8 percent of GDP. These savings are an important source of income for rural households.

D. Health

HIV2 is the predominant form of AIDS infection in West Africa. Burkina Faso is among the five surveyed West African countries (others were Senegal, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d'Ivoire) where prevalence rates of 1 to 16 percent have been recorded in the general population and 15 to 64 percent recorded among high risk groups (Myers and Henn 1988). Myers and Henn note that there is now evidence that HIV1 is spreading westward to Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria.

CAPE VERDE

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The most recent census was in 1980, but results reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration do not show distribution of migrants by nationality. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Cape Verde's population size was 327,000, with a 2.41% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 65 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 75/1000 live births. Cape Verde is 27% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 3.4%. (See Tables 1,2, and 3.)

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Cape Verde experienced a net migration of -11,000.

B. Policies

The government of Cape Verde views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory. Emigration is viewed as significant but satisfactory. Policies are to maintain both flows. (See Table 5.) However, Cape Verde has adopted measures to regulate undocumented migration.

C. Health

Although internal migration may be a factor in the spread of infection in rural areas, few studies have sought explicitly to determine the extent to which migration may be a risk factor. A study in the Cape Verde Islands that did so (Brun-Vezinet et al. 1987:211) found no significant difference between positive and negative groups as regards travel to other African countries.

CHAD

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Chad has never had a census, and there is a notable absence of migration data. In 1985, as projected from reports by Zachariah and Vu, Chad's population size was 5,018,000, with a 2.45% population growth rate. In 1985, life expectancy was 46 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 138/1000 live births. Chad is 20% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.6%.

(See Table 1 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Chad views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and emigration as significant and satisfactory. Its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.)

Regional Organizations. The Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) is an extension of the Union Douaniere Equatoriale (UDE) established in 1959 which included Congo, Gabon, CAR, and Chad. UDEAC was founded in 1964, incorporating the four UDE countries, plus Cameroon. In 1968, the Central African Republic and Chad withdrew to join with Zaire in forming the short-lived Union des Etats de l'Afrique centrale (UEAC). CAR rejoined UDEAC in 1968; Equatorial Guinea and Chad did the same in 1983 and 1984, respectively. Membership at present includes Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, CAR and Chad. It is concerned with economic integration, coordination in the planning of development and fiscal legislation, policies for industrial investment, and for transportation. In 1964, UDEAC adopted a convention on the situation of people and conditions of establishment. On 22 December 1972, member states adopted a common convention on the free circulation of people and rights of establishment.

C. Health

A cross-national study of cities and rural areas of Congo, Chad, Gabon, CAR, Mozambique, and Equatorial Guinea, found that HIV1 prevalence was lowest in rural areas, highest in major cities, and increasing in semi-rural towns and small cities (Gresenguet, et al. 1988).

D. Refugees

In Central and West Africa Chad has been a source of long-term refugees, mainly to Sudan, Benin, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and Nigeria. Between 1985 and 1987, the number of official Chadian refugees declined from 176,300 to 65,520, as the result of significant voluntary repatriation, notably from Sudan. In 1988, the number dropped further, to 41,300 with further repatriations from Cameroon, CAR, and Sudan. (See Tables

6,7,8, and 9. In three camps in western Sudan, there were still some 24,000 Chadian refugees as of January 1989, with an estimated 50-55,000 Chadians suspected to be outside the camps (Price Williams, 1989 (February):8). Some 2,000 of these refugees were reported to have repatriated to Chad in February 1989 (Price Williams, 1989 (April):8).

SENEGAL AND THE GAMBIA (SENEGAMBIA)

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Senegal. The first and last national census in Senegal was in 1976. Actual population at the time of the census was 4,997,885. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, the population size was projected at 6,567,000, with a 3.01% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 48 years, and the infant mortality rate was 137/1000 live births. Senegal is 34% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 3.8%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Senegal experienced a net migration of 40,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 2.38%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 1.86%. According to the 1976 census, there were close to 119,000 immigrants in Senegal; however, Zachariah and Conde (1981:35) estimated the number of immigrants in that same time period to be in the range of 355,000 (with Guinea being the largest source country) and it is this latter figure that has led to the characterization of Senegal as having become "a significant country of immigration" (Adepoju 1988:64). Taking the lower figure, immigrants amounted to 2.38 percent of total population; the higher figure is closer to 7 percent of total population. The proportion of emigrants abroad for Senegal is estimated to be 1.63%. Immigration and emigration are mainly between Senegal and the Gambia. Senegal also sends a large number of migrants to Cote d'Ivoire, and Mauritania. (See Tables 1,2, and 3.)

The Gambia. The last national census in the Gambia was in 1973. Actual population at the time of the census was 493,499. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, the Gambia's population size was 748,000, with a 3.13% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 43, and the infant mortality rate was 174/1000 live births. The Gambia is 30% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.5%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, the Gambia experienced a net migration of 15,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 11.05% for the Gambia, and the proportion of African immigrants is 10.8%. The proportion of emigrants abroad for the Gambia is estimated to be 1.55% of the resident population. Immigration and emigration are mainly between Senegal and the Gambia. Guinea is also an important source country for the Gambia.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The Gambia is one of the 12 SSA countries which views current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and has policies to lower

existing levels of immigration. However, Gambia has adopted policies to regulate undocumented migration. Levels of emigration are viewed as insignificant and satisfactory, and government policy is to maintain current outflows. Senegal views current immigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and emigration levels as significant and satisfactory. Senegal's policy is to maintain these flows. (See Table 5.) Conde et al. (1986:124ff) in describing policies of Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, have noted a discernable divergence between "established legal standards and current practices". Senegal is relatively liberal as regards entry and residence of aliens, although the authors speculate this stance may change as economic conditions worsen.

Regional Organizations. The Gambia and Senegal are members of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.)

The Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Union Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, and an intergovernmental treaty was put in force in 1974. The original members, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, were joined by Benin in 1984 and Togo has observer status. Under CEAO's fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was signed on 28 October 1978.

International Agreements. Senegal maintains bilateral agreements with France, covering not only issues of entry, residence, and departure, but also occupational and social rights, participation in trades unions (as members and staff delegates but not in administrative or management capacities), and social security rights (sickness and maternity insurance, disability, old age, accident and family allowances).

C. Remittances

Conde et al. found that 84 percent of Senegal River migrants to France send money home regularly, at least once a quarter, while less than 2 percent do not remit at all. Fully a third send remittances on a monthly basis; nearly a quarter remit every two months (1986:108).

Aggregate monthly remittance flows from France to Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania are estimated to be FF 50 million or CFA 2.5 billion (approximately USD 8.6 million). This represents an annual transfer of FF 600 million or CFA 30 billion (USD 103 million). By comparison, exports from these countries were CFA 119,616 million from Senegal (1981), CFA 31,350 million from Mali (1979), and CFA 17,863 million from Mauritania (1981). Remittances were thus sufficient to largely offset trade balance deficits from these countries in the early 1980s, and especially those with France (Conde et al. 1986:109). This last point underscores the potential trade repercussions of efforts by migrant receiving countries to reduce immigration from countries of origin that are also trading partners.

Sahelian migrants to France send 36.3 percent of remittances by hand, 33.3 percent by post office, 12.9 percent by a combination of these two modes, and only 6 percent via banks. The remainder are sent by unspecified modes. Particular problems have been noted with postal money orders, which may take as long as three months from Paris; then, post offices at home frequently do not have the cash to pay against the order. As a result, migrants have developed other means of transfer, including sending funds to a correspondent in the capital city, or (in Senegal) arranging for wholesale purchase of food through local distributors.

Evidence continues to vary concerning the primary uses of migrants' remittances, and debate continues as to their effects. The Sahelian migrants' households spend over three-quarters of their remittance income on basic necessities: 42.2 percent on food and 36.3 percent on clothing and toiletries. Interestingly, the third major expense item for this group is tax payments, which consume (on average) 10.2 percent of remittance income. There are considerable country differences, however: taxes absorb 28.4 percent of remittances in Mali, but less than 1 percent in Senegal, and do not appear as an expenditure item in Mauritania (where the poll tax was abolished between 1973 and 1985). Other expenditures include those for building (2.8 percent), and savings (2.8 percent). Miscellaneous expenses (3.4 percent), include health care, school fees, wages for seasonal workers needed to replace men absent in France, improvements to housing, and religious observances.

Investment in enterprises by migrant households in the Senegal River Valley is reported at less than 1 percent overall (non-existent in Mali and Senegal and 1.1 percent in Mauritania). However, it should be recalled that migrants in France are saving nearly 20 percent of their monthly wages, and direct investment in communities is being channeled through migrant associations rather than households themselves. In addition, mandatory gifts are frequently income-producing in nature; these include equipment (such as machine tools) that can be hired out by families, vehicles or canoes for transport; or cash for the purchase of cattle or establishment of a shop (Conde et al. 1986:43, 114). Findley has observed that, while investment by Sahelian migrants is more likely to be in tertiary enterprises than in agriculture, there is nonetheless a demonstrable link between remittance income and the feasibility of irrigated agriculture. Similarly, other studies in the Senegal River area have shown that remittances were necessary to pay water fees and to purchase agricultural inputs (Findley 1989: 7, 16; see also Agriculture chapter of this study).

D. Education/brain drain

Recent studies of Senegal River Valley migrants have produced some conflicting findings about education and the propensity to migrate among those in the Senegal River Valley study. Conde et al. (1986) reported that, while (in the aggregate) these migrants have very low levels of education (58.2 percent were illiterate in French), they are better educated than the general population, 80 percent of whom are illiterate in French. They conclude that there is a positive correlation between level of education and the rate of migration.

Collective action for improvement of education has been reported amongst Senegal River Valley migrants in France, where members of the same community tend to form "secondary villages" that maintain strong ties with the "primary village" at home. In addition to their individual remittances, which are used for "lumpy" school fee payments amongst other purposes, these migrants participate in or have total responsibility for social undertakings in the home village, including building and furnishing schools. Migrant associations in France frequently organize subscriptions for such projects; contributions, which average FF 30 per month, range from FF 10 to FF 700, and it is estimated that over 70 percent of migrants participate in some kind of subscription scheme. (Conde et al. 1986:108)

The relationship between education and internal migration in Senegal was the subject of a study of Senegalese students enrolled in higher education, by Johnson (1985:139) who found that 50 percent preferred to work in an urban location (from which he concludes that higher education contributes to rural outflow). However, although only 8 percent explicitly preferred to work in a rural area, 42 percent said they had no locational preference as between urban and rural worksites. The preference for work in urban areas was more marked among students from higher socio-economic groups (as compared with those of middle and lower socio-economic status). Johnson (1985:136) also found that a considerable number of higher education students in Senegal came from outside Dakar: 34 percent were from small towns or villages and another 11.8 percent from non-capital towns of 10,000 or more.

Since independence, there has been a trend toward replacement of European expatriates by Africans generally, and country nationals in particular. However, despite evidence reported of increased intra-African migration, only Gambia cited Africa as a potential source of additional high level manpower. Gambia's own experience in providing scientists and medical personnel to Nigeria may have contributed to this view.

E. Health

A joint WHO-Ministry of Health study conducted in Senegal between 1970 and 1973 compared the health and mental well-being of rural to urban Serer migrants with a sample of rural residents (Benyoussef 1977, pp. 407-408). No differences were found between the two groups with respect to precursors of coronary heart disease, except that urban migrants had higher levels of cholesterol and males smoked more cigarettes. Schistosomiasis was common among both urban and rural samples, and the frequency of various psychiatric conditions was similar between the two groups. Anemia, malaria, intestinal parasites, tuberculosis, depression, and fatigue were found to be more prevalent among rural residents. There was no difference found between urban migrants and rural dwellers with respect to the ways they perceived and dealt with health problems; however, while males in both samples tended to rely on both traditional and modern medicine, females tended to favor the latter form of treatment.

Evidence suggests that the Senegal River migrants to France may be subjected to new types of health problems in their destination locations. Although these migrants tend to come from villages with greater access to

health units (Findley 1989:14), surveys of migrants resident in worker hostels in France found that serious overcrowding and poor sanitation have resulted in the notable prevalence of four diseases: tuberculosis, nervous breakdowns, ulcers, and venereal diseases. Cases of depression so severe as to require repatriation have also been reported amongst this population (Conde, Diagne, and Ouaisou 1986:36).

A recent study of Senegal River Migrants to France, which examines male fertility (Conde et al. 1986) finds a demonstrable effect of international migration on fertility. The average number of children per married migrant man was 2.25 (below the average for non-migrant men), the result of the large number (53 percent) who had no children and the substantial number (16 percent) who had only one child. Although the fertility of migrant men over forty was closer to that of non-migrant men, the average number of "live-born" children to women with migrant husbands was reported to be "far less" than the number born to women with non-migrant husbands. The authors offer two principle explanations for these differential fertility rates. First, migrant men have a high and increasing age at first marriage (27.5 years); second, the migrants to France spend (on average) only three months with their wife or wives every two or three years, thus significantly reducing fertility possibilities.

HIV2 is the predominant form of AIDS infection in West Africa. Senegal is among the five surveyed West African countries (others were Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d'Ivoire) where prevalence rates of 1 to 16 percent have been recorded in the general population and 15 to 64 percent recorded among high risk groups (Myers and Henn 1988).

F. Agriculture

Commercial agriculture is the principle economic sector in terms of labor employment, for all countries of the region (Hart 1982; Adepoju 1988). Agricultural migration occurs from the savannah hinterland to the groundnut schemes of the Senegambia. There is a long-standing tradition (over 130 years) of immigration by "strange farmers" from Senegal, Mali, and Guinea to groundnut schemes along the Gambia river. Swindell (1982: 101) calls this, "One of the oldest forms of labour migration associated with cash cropping in Africa." Swindell describes the social and economic patterns associated with traditional seasonal migration to the groundnut farms of the Gambia. Migrants have a particular status in the villages they go to work in, depending on how well known they are to their hosts. Migrants are not paid by their hosts, but engage in sharecropping: a portion of the host's land is allotted to each migrant in return for work on the host's fields. Remittances take the form of a lump sum at the end of the season, derived from profits migrants make from their own groundnut crops. Informal sector employment supplements groundnut farming during the dry season. The availability of this kind of supplementary work makes the receiving country more attractive for agricultural migrants, and encourages the transformation of seasonal migration into permanent settlement.

Sally Findley (1989:7) found that in the Senegal River Valley, a poor harvest often resulted in spontaneous migration to other African destina-

tions. This type of migration became a stop-gap measure in a family's survival strategy, when a poor harvest required additional cash earnings for taxes, clothing, and food.

A frequently-voiced concern about the effects of migration on agriculture is that the absence of migrant males reduces available agricultural labor, with deleterious effects on production. A recent study suggests it is important to look at the characteristics of households (and communities) when analyzing this issue. Findley examined the differences between households that send migrants from the Senegal River Valley to France and those that send migrants to African destinations. Based upon simple bivariate analysis, it appears that migrants to France are more likely to come from polygamous households (where there are more men per household and larger household size, therefore a greater "human resource element". However, in more complex, multivariate models, when the number of men is controlled for, it became clear that it is the number of men, (not the household structure per se) that explains this result. When number of men is controlled, it is in fact monogamous households that are more likely to send men to France. (Findley, 1989:19)

MALI

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The first and last national census in Mali was in 1976. Actual population at the time of the census was 6,394,918. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Mali's population size was 7,511,000, with a 2.5% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 47 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 174/1000 live births. Mali is 19% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 4.4%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Mali experienced a net migration of -161,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 1.2%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 1.13%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 6.47% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Cote d'Ivoire, and to a lesser extent, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Senegal. Immigration is mainly from Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania, and Cote d'Ivoire. There is evidence to suggest that more recent migration has become medium to long term (as opposed to short term) among Malian migrants.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

B. Policies

The government of Mali views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and emigration as significant and satisfactory. Its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.) Labor inspection services in Mali try to ensure that migrants are legally employed (Brennan 1984:418). According to Conde et al. (1986:124ff) Mali's existing laws concerning migration are quite old (dating from 1932), contain a number of unenforceable provisions, and have not been adapted to more recent increases in population mobility.

Regional Organizations. Mali is a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This was established in 1975, and is the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment. (See Chapter on Policies for more discussion.)

The Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Union Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, and an intergovernmental treaty was put in force in 1974. The original members, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, were joined by Benin in 1984 and Togo has observer status. Under CEAO's fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was signed on 28 October 1978.

International Agreements. Mali maintains bilateral agreements with France, covering not only issues of entry, residence, and departure, but also occupational and social rights, participation in trades unions (as

members and staff delegates but not in administrative or management capacities), and social security rights (sickness and maternity insurance, disability, old age, accident and family allowances). (Conde et al. (1986)

C. Remittances

Aggregate monthly remittance flows from France to Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania are estimated to be FF 50 million or CFA 2.5 billion (approximately USD 8.6 million). This represents an annual transfer of FF 600 million or CFA 30 billion (USD 103 million). By comparison, exports from these countries were CFA 119,616 million from Senegal (1981), CFA 31,350 million from Mali (1979), and CFA 17,863 million from Mauritania (1981). Remittances were thus sufficient to largely offset trade balance deficits from these countries in the early 1980s, and especially those with France (Conde et al. 1986:109). This last point underscores the potential trade repercussions of efforts by migrant receiving countries to reduce immigration from countries of origin that are also trading partners.

Evidence continues to vary concerning the primary uses of migrants' remittances, and debate continues as to their effects. The Sahelian migrants' households spend over three-quarters of their remittance income on basic necessities: 42.2 percent on food and 36.3 percent on clothing and toiletries. Interestingly, the third major expense item for this group is tax payments, which consume (on average) 10.2 percent of remittance income. There are considerable country differences, however: taxes absorb 28.4 percent of remittances in Mali, but less than 1 percent in Senegal, and do not appear as an expenditure item in Mauritania (where the poll tax was abolished between 1973 and 1985). Other expenditures include those for building (2.8 percent), and savings (2.8 percent). Miscellaneous expenses (3.4 percent), include health care, school fees, wages for seasonal workers needed to replace men absent in France, improvements to housing, and religious observances.

Investment in enterprises by migrant households in the Senegal River Valley is reported at less than 1 percent overall (non-existent in Mali and Senegal and 1.1 percent in Mauritania). However, it should be recalled that migrants in France are saving nearly 20 percent of their monthly wages, and direct investment in communities is being channeled through migrant associations rather than households themselves. In addition, mandatory gifts are frequently income-producing in nature; these include equipment (such as machine tools) that can be hired out by families, vehicles or canoes for transport; or cash for the purchase of cattle or establishment of a shop (Conde et al. 1986:43, 114). Findley has observed that, while investment by Sahelian migrants is more likely to be in tertiary enterprises than in agriculture, there is nonetheless a demonstrable link between remittance income and the feasibility of irrigated agriculture. Similarly, other studies in the Senegal River area have shown that remittances were necessary to pay water fees and to purchase agricultural inputs (Findley 1989: 7, 16; see also Agriculture chapter of this study).

D. Education/brain drain

In his study of Mali, Mazur (1984) found that neither age nor education had a controlling influence on the decision to undertake long term migration; rather, higher socio-economic class was associated with higher rates of long term (and lower rates of short term) migration. Mali has reportedly estimated that 15 percent of its students in France will remain there, and the ECA has used a figure of 20 percent to estimate potential losses of African students to Western European countries (UN ECA 1988:11).

In Mali, as with a number of countries, the demands of debt servicing on public finances means that public sector workers may now wait months before receiving back pay in installments. Strained public finances have also resulted in low levels of support for universities and research institutions and a concomitant lack of tools, equipment, reagents, books, and other resources crucial to the productivity of the technically trained. The public sector in Mali is expected to be able to absorb fewer than 15 percent of graduates from tertiary institutions and absorptive capacity in the private sector is even lower (World Bank 1988:70).

E. Health

A recent Bank study on the demand for health care in rural Mali (Birdsall et al. 1988) suggests that participation in migration may influence both the propensity to seek health care and the type of health services sought: the availability of remittance income was found to increase demand for health services and to exert a significant positive effect on the probability of seeking modern care.

F. Agriculture

Commercial agriculture is the principle economic sector in terms of labor employment, for all countries of the region (Hart 1982; Adepoju 1988). Agricultural migration occurs principally from the savannah hinterland to Cote d'Ivoire cocoa plantations, and to the groundnut schemes of the Senegambia. There is a long-standing tradition (over 130 years) of immigration by "strange farmers" from Senegal, Mali, and Guinea to groundnut schemes along the Gambia river. Swindell (1982: 101) calls this, "One of the oldest forms of labour migration associated with cash cropping in Africa." Informal sector employment supplements groundnut farming during the dry season (Swindell 1982). The availability of this kind of supplementary work makes the receiving country more attractive for agricultural migrants, and encourages the transformation of seasonal migration into permanent settlement.

COUNTRY DEPARTMENT VI

BOTSWANA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Botswana was in 1981, when total population was 941,027. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Botswana's population size was 1,070,000, with a 3.25% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 57 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 76/1000 live births. Botswana is 22% urban, with an 11.1% urbanization rate, one of the highest in Africa. (See Table 1.)

As of 1981, it was estimated that 1.66 percent of the total population of Botswana were immigrants (a total of 15,619). 0.93% of the total population were African immigrants. Source countries are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Lesotho, Angola, and Malawi, and Swaziland--as well as a handful from Nigeria and Ghana (see Tables 2 and 3). It is estimated that 6.14% of Botswana's population is residing outside the country. Emigration has generally been temporary and oscillatory, predominantly to South Africa. Patterns of emigration in Botswana depend on education, cattle ownership (draught animals), access to arable land, and capital stock (Harris 1981: 9-10). Until recently individuals with low socioeconomic status tend to migrate to South Africa; those with higher status move to Botswanan towns.

Labor emigration is predominantly by younger men (18-40 years) to South African mines (Harris 1981: 10). Men spend one to one and a half years away, with a few months at home in between (Palmer 1985). In addition to migration of mineworkers, organized through labor recruiters, there was--up to 1963--a considerable amount of clandestine migration by workers, and by accompanying women and children. In 1963, South Africa imposed strict immigration control regulation which curtailed both undocumented migration and family migration, and further prohibited BLS migration to South Africa except for work in mines and agriculture (Adepoju 1988:47).

B. Policies

Botswana views current levels of immigration to be insignificant and satisfactory; and the policy is to maintain current levels. While levels of emigration also are reported to be insignificant and satisfactory, Botswana is one of the 8 SSA countries which have policies to reduce the outflow. (See Table 5.) Botswana requires work permits of immigrants. Labor inspection services are responsible for ensuring that migrants are legally employed (Brennan 1984:418).

Regional Organizations. Botswana is a member of both the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), but there is no documentation as to provisions for free circulation of people. Botswana is also a member of the Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC), which is a

flexible structure that periodically brings together ministers or commissioners responsible for migrant workers in 8 countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It aims to harmonize policies and practices concerning worker migration to South Africa. (See Chapter on Policies for a full discussion.)

C. Remittances

The subject of remittances has received more attention in Botswana (and Lesotho) than almost anywhere else in the region, with the possible exception of Sudan. In Botswana, migrant remittances are recorded in summary balance of payments under "Service Payments" (outflows) and "Service Receipts" (inflows). Remittances from Botswana workers abroad were about US \$50 million in 1981-82; despite an outflow of US \$30 million from expatriate workers in the country, remittances (along with other non-export receipts) have been credited with playing an important role in financing the persistent current account deficit, which was close to US \$60 million in the same year.

In Botswana, neither agriculture nor migration alone provide the necessary means (income in-kind or wages) for rural subsistence, so the practice of both is necessary. Rural dependence on remittances is seen as especially problematic in southern Africa, where migration to the Rand mines has become a part of life, resulting in what some observers view as an economically "unhealthy" dependence on remittance income.

A different view of the effects of remittances is offered by Lucas (1987), who found that, while out-migration in Botswana was accompanied by a short term drop in traditional crop output, in the long run, migrant wage income served to raise productivity by enhancing the working or fixed capital available to the rural sector. This long run positive effect of migration on rural productivity may take place through "mechanisms of productivity enhancement" such as the financing and importation of new technology, physical investment, or as a result of insurance permitting experimentation with riskier methods. Such mechanisms serve to lower the shadow cost of labor taken from agriculture.

In an analysis of data from the Botswana National Migration Study (1978-79), Lucas and Stark showed that remittances rise steadily with the earnings of migrants, and there is a positive association between the amounts remitted and per capita household income from other sources. Evidence from Botswana, and other southern African countries, suggests that remittances have been positively associated with improvements in rural areas. In Botswana, poorer households use remittances to supplement agricultural output to achieve subsistence level consumption. Some remittances are used to purchase ploughing services and other replacements for labor withdrawn from rural areas. Remittances may also be used to accumulate cattle, and build houses (Harris 1981: 10).

D. Labor markets

Botswana, is experiencing the effects of declining mine recruitment in South Africa. Unemployment there stood at 25.3 percent in 1984-85, up from approximately 13 percent in 1981. Hardest hit are those with least education, particularly males aged 20 to 39, who had previously been able to count on finding employment in South Africa. These developments have exacerbated preexisting mismatches between local labor market opportunities and qualifications of the labor force, and have triggered new efforts at employment creation and training (Majelantle and Mhozya 1988:19-20,29).

E. Brain drain/education

In a study of migration in Botswana, Lucas (1985) used personal characteristics of migrants (age, sex, and education) to predict potential wages and employment probabilities in alternative locations, a method that allowed him to disaggregate the effects of education on wage differentials and probability of employment, and the effects of these, in turn, on migration. He found that the probability of employment rises with education at the rate of approximately two percentage points for each year of schooling (p. 369). However, the pattern of earnings, when controlled for education, sex, and experience, is less clear-cut. Men aged 30 years with 10 years of schooling consistently earn more in urban areas than in rural areas. For women, on the other hand, this is not the case, especially for the less educated. For less educated men, as well, there was little difference observed between earnings in the capital city and those in the large village catchment area (v.c.a.) under study; for this group, wages were highest in a third location, a mining town with demand for unskilled labor. Amongst women with 10 years of schooling, those aged 15 earn more in the large v.c.a than in the mining town; but for those aged 30, this pattern was reversed.

Botswana participates in The Return of Talent Program, which was launched in Africa in 1983 in collaboration with the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and financed by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States government. Its aim is to attract "all Africans who desire to return after acquiring very high professional qualifications in the Western Countries".

F. Health

A WHO-sponsored study on the effects of mining and migration in Botswana (ILO 1988) found no conclusive association between TB or pneumoconiosis and minework, although results may have been confounded by the earlier repatriation of infected workers. In general, mineworkers to South Africa were found to be somewhat more likely to be in good health than either internal migrants to Botswana mines or those in the non-migrant control group.

G. Agriculture

Approximately 90% of Botswanan households have a wage worker; less than 1/4 of households rely on the agricultural economy alone. 78% of the labor force is involved in the agricultural sector, but agriculture contributes only 35% of total rural income. Over 50% of households are below the poverty level, and most must rely on a variety of income sources for subsistence. Of rural households, 68% have absent wage earners while 45% have 1 or more wage earners present. Absent wage earners work mainly in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in Botswanan towns (44%) and villages (22%), and lands and cattlepost locations (5%), in South African mines (19%), and other jobs in South Africa (8%). In Botswana 25-35% of all rural households are female-headed.

In areas of high male out-migration, female headed-households constitute a disproportionately high number of the poorest households, and a high proportion of their real income is in the form of remittances. Female-headed households may not be able to find, or pay for men to help them plough; this leads to decreased farm yields as women are able to work less land. Palmer (1985) found that female-headed households plant a smaller percentage of their holdings, and plow less frequently than male-headed households. They also spend less time on crops and more on cash income producing activities than other households. Women supplement their cash incomes with informal sector activities such as beer-brewing (Adepoju 1988). Where there is no male labor, cattle-holdings "fluctuate around a long-term decline" (Palmer 1985: 29). Palmer (1985) found that investment opportunities in agriculture are poor, and that migrant earnings are spent on consumption items. Male absence affects land preparation and harvesting. Fertility rates remain high.

H. Refugees

From 1985 to 1987 Botswana's refugee population fluctuated around just over 5,000 persons. Botswana's stock of refugees dropped to 2,700 in 1988 as the result of repatriations to Zimbabwe. Botswana has hosted refugees from many of its neighbors, including South Africa, Zaire in the 1960s, Zimbabwe in the 1970s, and most recently refugees from the war in Angola. (See Tables 6,7, and 8.) Refugee sites in Botswana have been subject to military attacks by South Africa. After Zimbabwe attained independence, the numbers of Zimbabwean refugees in Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia dropped from nearly 191,000 to 1,300 still present in Botswana (World Refugee Survey 1988).

Some African asylum states have dealt with their refugee populations by opting for programs that generate a degree of self support among refugees as quickly as possible. Such programs have the potential of reducing the economic burden created by refugees, and benefitting the host country by integrating the refugee settlements in remote or under utilized

areas into national development objectives. Botswana has implemented such a strategy. The Etsha scheme was successful because of its manageable size, because the refugees wanted to participate, and because effective and sympathetic administration was available to make the scheme work (Rogge 1985).

LESOTHO

A. Demographics and migration patterns

Lesotho's most recent census was in 1976, but results do not enumerate foreign born or foreign nationals. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Lesotho's population size was 1,545,000 with a 2.67% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 56 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 106/1000 live births. Lesotho is 13% urban with an urban population growth rate of 21.4% (the highest in SSA).

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Permanent international migration from Lesotho is negligible; temporary, oscillatory migration to South Africa is the predominant pattern. It is estimated that about 60% of the adult males between the ages of 20 and 44 are employed in the mines of South Africa, and approximately 70% of rural households have at least one member who is a migrant (Plath et al. 1987). In a 1978 survey of migrants in Lesotho, 23 percent of respondents who had worked in South Africa were women. Female internal migration, is even more pronounced: nearly 55 percent of migrants to Maseru were female; 49 percent of them reported they had migrated for economic reasons, and 38 percent were unmarried (Wilkinson, Momsen and Townsend 1987:225-239).

B. Policies

Lesotho views levels of immigration as insignificant and satisfactory, and government policy is to maintain them. Emigration, however, is considered significant and too high, and stated policy is to lower the outflow. (See Table 5.)

C. Remittances

The subject of remittances has received more attention in Botswana and Lesotho than almost anywhere else in SSA, with the possible exception of Sudan. The primary role of remittances in Lesotho's economy has become part of the debate in the literature about the positive and negative consequences of remittances for sending countries. Lesotho is often cited as an example of the problems that arise from remittance dependence, but it should be noted that Lesotho is not typical of sending countries.

In Lesotho, remittances are reflected in "Net Factor Income From Abroad". Remittances from the estimated 140,000 Basotho workers in RSA were about US \$274 million in 1986 and represented over 50 percent of total GNP in that year. With imports currently 15 times greater than exports, remittances are credited both with generating demand for commodity imports and with financing them.

Lesotho has a legal requirement that 60 percent of all mineworkers' salaries be channelled from the mine companies directly to the

Bank of Lesotho. There are reports of legal provisions that a substantial portion of these funds be retained for lump sum transfer at the end of the contract period. However, in a 1973 survey, it was found that while 66 percent of earnings were repatriated in the form of remittances, transfers of deferred wages, goods, and cash brought by hand, the last category amounted to 42 percent of the total amounts (Palmer 1985:18), suggesting some flexibility in the official system.

The extent to which governments may have attempted to tax workers' remittances is unknown. In Lesotho, it is reported that mineworkers' remittances currently are not taxed and it is thought that implementation of a proposed tax would be both problematic and a disincentive to remit. The alternative of enforcing existing legislation enabling taxation of mine wages by withholding at the source has not met with cooperation on the part of RSA companies.

In SSA, much of the characterization of remittance use and effects draws upon evidence from BLS countries, especially Lesotho. In Lesotho, the ways in which remittances are transferred, the underlying conditions in agriculture, and the structures of households all appear to have an effect upon the uses and consequences of remittances. Whether as a function of government policy or migrants' preferences, remittances tend to flow in two ways: smaller regular sums and larger, less frequent lump sum transfers of accumulated earnings. Mueller (in Palmer 1985:20) notes that the effect of this is to separate migrants' savings and choices about their uses into two distinct streams. Small regular remittances are allocated between day-to-day living expenses (including such items as soap, candles, tea, and sugar) and farming expenses--although remittances were noted to be inadequate for hiring extra farm labor; lump sum transfers are allocated among education expenses, livestock acquisition, improved housing and household effects, and clothing. In her survey of migrant families, Mueller found substantial agreement between husbands and wives as to the priority uses of lump-sum savings: education was first, followed by household effects and livestock. Lump sum transfers were not found to be used for maintaining farm output.

This portrait of remittance use is somewhat in conflict with other characterizations concerning Lesotho. Adepoju (1988:53-54) assumes that remittances are used primarily for consumption, with little channelled to domestic investment. World Bank studies have asserted that mineworker remittances are generally spent on imported consumer goods, although they are also used to purchase domestically produced foodstuffs and other items; investment is asserted to be primarily in construction of new housing in rural areas (an expenditure not noted by Mueller's survey respondents) and livestock. Other World Bank studies have drawn an association between remittances and the deterioration of agriculture in Lesotho. The fact that remittances are a major source of rural household income "explains...the prevailing stagnation of agricultural production and sharp decline of area under cultivation", according to the Staff Appraisal Report, Fourth Education Project (1984:1). The expansion of herds is seen as the most reliable form of investment and wealth accumulation, and has led to overgrazing and soil erosion as well as to lower school attendance by boys. While this latter finding is undoubtedly true for Lesotho, it is neither a complete picture of

the effects of remittances in Lesotho, nor necessarily generalizable to other countries. Indeed, Lucas observes that wage income (including that from remittances) is seen to have a positive effect on animal husbandry in Botswana and Malawi and that Lesotho is a notable exception because of its massive soil erosion and general neglect of crop production (Lucas 1987:323).

Some recent studies of remittance patterns in Lesotho have signalled the importance of household structure and the role of women. Palmer (1985:19) found that whether a wife actually receives remittances or not, and the extent to which she has control over them, depends upon her stage in the life cycle, the extent to which she is under control of her mother-in-law, and whether she and her husband have established a separate nuclear household. Results from Mueller's survey suggest that such mediating factors may have an effect on the ultimate uses of remittances. Women (especially younger women) were found to favor the education of daughters over that of sons, reportedly on the grounds that daughters are more loyal to their natal families than sons, and that educated daughters would have an alternative to marriage. Such links may help to explain the increasing rate of rural to urban migration noted among young women in Lesotho (see C. Williamson in Momsen and Townsend 1987:227).

Overall, despite some contradictions, the burden of evidence on remittances suggests that they are a crucial source of income for many families. Their importance is probably most pronounced in Lesotho, where 42.1 percent of households report income from mine laborers as the principal source of subsistence, and another 6.1 percent report mine remittances as a subsidiary source of income. The data also suggest caution in generalizing about the effects of remittances from the case of Lesotho alone.

D. Labor markets

The significant aspect of labor migration in Lesotho is her dependent relationship with South Africa. Lesotho is heavily dependent on RSA for employment and the resulting remittances. During the 1980s, Lesotho was the largest supplier of labor to South Africa, followed by Mozambique and Malawi. The role of Lesotho expanded as Mozambique and Malawi cut back dramatically on their contribution of labor in both absolute and percentage terms. Recently, however, RSA has reduced its recruitment of foreign labor, and opportunities for international mine labor immigration are expected to decline over the next few decades (Plath et al 1987; Harris 1981). The economic consequences for Lesotho are potentially very serious, unless agricultural production can be improved.

According to World Bank studies, the number of migrant Basotho employed in RSA mines has declined at an annual rate of 1.3% since 1977, reaching 116,000 in 1985. The major factor bringing about recent changes in Southern African migration, has been legislative and policy changes in South Africa. The number of registered foreign black workers (excluding those from Namibia) dropped by 37.6 percent between 1975 and 1986. Although there still

remain a large number of undocumented international migrants, increasingly tight restrictions are expected to reduce these flows even further. In 1973, migrant workers comprised 80 percent of the South African labor force, with over half of those from Malawi and Mozambique; labor from those two countries accounted for only 13 percent of the total labor force in 1986 and, following the expulsion of legal Mozambican workers in late 1986, is likely to have declined further.

With reductions in labor opportunities in RSA, migrants from Lesotho are already known to have begun seeking and finding work in "homelands" areas in RSA (as have nationals from other countries in Africa).

E. Agriculture

Rural dependence on remittances is seen as especially problematic in Lesotho where the availability and level of migrant incomes has been seen as acting as disincentives for local economic activity. It has been argued that in Lesotho, where 42% of households report migrant income as their principal source of subsistence, "migrant income has eclipsed agriculture to become the principal component of national income"; this has resulted in "indifference" to, and decreased investment in agriculture (Plath et al. 1987: 158). This view argues that, while it may be rational on an individual household basis not to invest in risky agriculture and to rely rather on remittances from male family members, the social costs of doing so may be high, leading to a "culture of migration dependency" and reduced inputs into agriculture.

An alternative view, however, stresses that, in understanding the effects of migration, it is also important to take into account the role migration has played over long cycles within particular regions. Murray, looking at studies of Lesotho, shows that because household investment in agriculture is principally derived from migrant earnings, it is misleading to describe migrant earnings as "supplementary" [or detrimental] to income from agriculture. He suggests that migrant wage-earning capacity, rather than farm income, is the critical the independent variable for understanding the manner in which individual households dispose of their resources. (Murray, 1987:238). Murray also argues that the inverse relationship between the size of landholding and incidence of labor migration is most probably explained by differences in these variables associated with households at different stages of their development cycle. The acquisition of land title is subsequent (not alternative) to having had a migration career in South Africa. This means that "the development cycle of the household--the way in which its size and composition change through time--must be built into any explanation of observed differences in wealth and income between rural households" (op. cit.:238)

In Lesotho, the absence of a large proportion (about 60%) of the male labor force has prevented up to half of available acreage from being plowed and planted, resulting in lower crop yields (Plath et al. 1987). Plath predicted that as opportunities for wage work in South Africa decline, there will be renewed interest in agriculture. Agricultural income, if high enough, would dissuade workers from engaging in migration and reduce dependency on South African mine labor. However, the production risks associated with agriculture in Lesotho mean that agricultural technological innovations (such as growing fruit trees instead of traditional crops) are necessary to raise agricultural incomes. New technology helps create an economic surplus that would meet the shadow costs of migration. But it was found that the use of the new technology, while more lucrative than the old, was constrained by the need for substantial investment in fixed capital and variable inputs; the need for higher levels of management and knowledge about the new technology; and the need for full-time work, which would entail the quitting of mine work. Some of these constraints could be addressed by development efforts; for example, extension officers could supply know-how, and "enhanced informal and formal credit sources can supply needed capital" (Plath et al.: 170). The production risks associated with agriculture mean that while migration opportunities exist in South Africa, it is more rational to pursue that line of work. As a result, Plath et al. argue that technological innovation should be aimed at relaxing the labor constraint.

A Bank study conducted in the late '70s concluded that the state of the agricultural sector of Lesotho is both a determinant and a consequence of the male migration from that country to South Africa. The paper explored aspects of the performance and potential of the agricultural sector from a generally overlooked perspective, that of the women and families left behind by the migrants, whose absences are pushing the women to perform agricultural tasks to which they were unaccustomed. The study focuses attention on specific interventions directed at women for improving the returns to their efforts in agriculture and discusses the role of the Women's Bureau.

F. Health

Kanno (in Lindsay 1985, pp 113-25) cites evidence that workers returning to Lesotho from South African mines suffer disproportionately from tuberculosis and other communicable diseases. Kanno argues that, in a country where migration plays a major role in its economy, the country's national health policy must consider the special needs of migrants. Returned migrants from RSA often have poorer health than before they migrated. Rural-urban migrants also often have declining health, in part because rural-urban migration tends to modify the traditional rural life style built on subsistence agriculture. For example, city life is more expensive than country life, so less is spent on food. Kanno argues that primary health care for the Basotho needs to take into account the rural, traditional, and migration-dependent nature of the country.

G. Education/brain drain

Creation of the "homelands" in the Republic of South Africa and the attractive salaries and other benefits available there are observed to have attracted skilled labor (including teaching staff from university and other levels) from Lesotho, creating manpower bottlenecks to expansion of the absorptive capacity of the domestic economy.

MALAWI

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Malawi was in 1977. Actual population at the time of the census was 5,547,460. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Malawi's population size was 7,044,000, with a 3.18% population growth rate. Life expectancy currently stands at 46 years for both sexes. The infant mortality rate is currently 156/1000 live births (one of the highest in SSA). Malawi is 11% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 7.3%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Malawi experienced a net migration of -20,000. The proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 5.2%, and the proportion of African immigrants is 5.08%. The proportion of emigrants abroad is 1.04% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to South Africa and Zambia. Earlier, migration was reported to Tanzania. The predominant in-flows have been refugees from Mozambique.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Malawians have migrated abroad since early in the colonial period (1891-1964) to find better employment opportunities. This pattern began to change in the early 1970s, when large numbers of Malawians returned home, and fewer left the country. Out-migration was mainly to RSA until 1974 when President Banda prohibited nationals from migrating to South Africa, but these strictures were reduced in 1978.

The majority of net internal migration is rural to rural. Christiansen (1984) documents the pattern of internal migration for the 1966-76 and 1976-77 periods, and attempts to connect some of its specific aspects with details of economic changes by using a simple econometric model. Net migration prior to 1966 was predominantly out of the Northern region to the Central and Southern regions, with the majority moving to the Southern region. Changes in the economy which took place after independence together with the relocation of the national capital to Blantyre, caused the majority of new employment opportunities to become available in districts located primarily in the Central region.

B. Policies

According to its most recent official report to the United Nations (1977) the government of Malawi views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and emigration as significant and satisfactory. Its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.) Since 1986, however, Malawi has experienced an overwhelming inflow of refugees from Mozambique, and official views on immigration have undoubtedly changed.

In 1974, Malawi became the first of several countries to withdraw its labor from South Africa. The number of Malawian mineworkers fell to 37,676 from 137,676 the previous year. (Migrant Labour 1987:33). Despite Malawi's removal of those strictures in 1978, Malawi's share of minework dropped from 21.1 percent in 1970 to 3.3 percent in 1985. The reasons for the Malawi government's termination of mine migration to South Africa, have been subject to speculation. Lucas (1983) argues that this action occurred apparently to protect local estate owners from competition for labor, thereby reviving in extreme form an earlier British colonial practice.

This policy action of the Malawi government resulted in the pursuit of a "parallel or dual" development policy (Christiansen 1984). The government promoted large scale agricultural export crop production, and at the same time offered assistance to small-scale peasant production. The estates presented new employment opportunities, leading to new migration patterns during the 11-year intercensal period. The differential pricing policy for estate- and peasant-produced output affected the economic returns to peasant labor; and the geographical distribution of new employment opportunities created new migration movements. Migration in Malawi is now predominantly rural-rural, rather than international, representing a migratory response to structural changes which created new economic opportunities.

Regional Organizations. Malawi is a member of The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), but there is no documentation as to these organizations' provisions for free circulation of people. Malawi is also a member of the Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC), which aims to harmonize policies and practices concerning worker migration to South Africa. (See Chapter on Policies for a full discussion.)

C. Remittances

Remittances have been positively associated with improvements in rural areas. Lucas (1987) observes that wage income (including that from remittances) is seen to have a positive effect on animal husbandry in Malawi.

D. Health

Anecdotal evidence suggests that countries like Malawi which experience large and sudden inflows of unassisted refugees (such as from Mozambique) may find their indigenous health services overburdened. However, much more information is needed as to the effects of refugee or migrant inflows on health services.

Myers and Henn (1988) note that there is now evidence that HIV1 is spreading southward to Malawi, Angola, and Mozambique. Most studies that have sought explicitly to examine the role of international migration in the geographical spread of AIDS have focussed on southern African migrants to minework in South Africa. Brink et al. (1987:6) tested nearly 30,000 specimens systematically selected from 330,000 bloods drawn on migrant workers from southern and central Africa returning to work in South Africa. They

confirmed low prevalence of HIV infection among these migrants, although when stratified by country, Malawians had a higher prevalence of infection. These cases of infection were thought to have been contracted in Malawi. A survey of selected Malawian populations found relatively high rates of HIV1 sero-positivity among female prostitutes (56 percent) and male prisoners (31 percent), but in a selected sample of sera from female prostitutes, there was no evidence of HIV2 infection (Gurtler et al. 1987:179).

E. Refugees

Because of the massive inflow of refugees from the war in Mozambique (from a base of zero in 1985 to over 630,000 in 1988), Malawi now ranks third (after Ethiopia and Sudan) among the top asylum countries in Africa. Refugees now constitute about 9% of Malawi's total population. (See Tables 6,7,8, and 9.)

In November 1987, Malawi acceded to the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, by which action Malawi agrees to treat refugees in accordance with the prescriptions of the Convention and Protocol.

There has been some repatriation to Mozambique, as part of the Special Programme of Limited Assistance to Mozambican Returnees begun in March 1987 (United Nations 1989). However, requests have been made to the UNHCR from relief agencies and refugee groups to stop this process, as the safety of returnees is not yet assured. In reviewing the repatriation agreement signed by Malawi, Mozambique, and the UNHCR in December, which concerns the voluntary repatriation of Mozambican refugees from Malawi, the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) "believes that conditions in Mozambique do not yet warrant repatriation.." (Frelick 1989).

A recent study entitled The Emergency Situation in Mozambique (United Nations. Office for Emergencies in Africa 1989) describes and assesses the Special Programme, including implementation problems (security constraints and logistic problems which include transport problems, distribution of food aid, lack of qualified staff), new developments, and a sectoral review of assistance (food, transportation, domestic needs, water supply, health and nutrition, shelter, education, agriculture and fisheries, and operational support). There is a financial summary of expenditure commitments and additional requirements, and statistics on returnees. New developments include the assessment that assistance to returnees should be linked with assistance to refugees in neighboring countries. For example, the governments of Malawi and Zimbabwe have agreed to follow the Mozambican curriculum in primary schools for Mozambican refugees.

As a result of these conditions, Mozambican refugees have been arriving in Malawi in poor health and in dire need of medical attention, placing heavy burdens on health services in Malawi, whose Minister of Health

was planning for over 700,000 refugees by the end of 1988 (Crisp 1988). The in-migration of refugees into Malawi has led to food shortages and fears about hunger in the Shire Valley and parts of the northern and central regions (Somerville 1988). Malawi can no longer boast food self-sufficiency.

MOZAMBIQUE

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Mozambique was in 1980, although these results had not been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration by the time this study was prepared. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Mozambique's population size was 13,791,000, with a 2.82% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 48 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 123/1000 live births. Mozambique is 17% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 10.2%.

The migration rates, and proportions of the population constituted by immigrants and emigrants could not be estimated as of this date. These flows include a large number of refugees from the current internal disturbances. Emigration and refugee flows are to Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

(See Tables 1,2,3,6,7, and 8 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Migration in Southern Africa has generally been characterized as temporary and oscillatory, historically and in the present shaped by migration to South Africa, principally from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS) but also from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. In addition to migration of mineworkers, historically organized through labor recruiters, there has been a considerable amount of clandestine migration, both by male workers and by accompanying women and children, especially in the eastern border areas of South Africa, where there are coffee and banana plantations. With recent increased legal controls on migration to South Africa, the number of illegal migrants in search of agricultural, as well as other types of employment is bound to rise. The war in Mozambique has further increased this flow.

The number of Portuguese residents in Mozambique fell from 250,000 to 15-20,000 between 1974 and 1976, affecting many sectors of the economy. The port and railway sector alone lost approximately 8,000 skilled and semi-skilled workers, and emigrants included most of the plantation and factory owners, settler farmers, shopkeepers, government administrators, and professionals.

In 1986 a number legally employed Mozambican migrant workers were expelled from South Africa (see Centro de Estudos Africanos/ILO 1987).

B. Policies

According to its most recent (but undated) report to the U.N., the Mozambican government views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain this level. Emigration is regarded as significant and satisfactory, but Mozambique's policy is to reduce this flow. (See Table 5.)

Mozambique is a member of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and the Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC), which aims to harmonize policies and practices concerning worker migration to South Africa (see Chapter on Policies for further discussion).

The Mozambican government has adopted explicit population redistribution policies in urban and rural areas. Maputo had been flooded with unemployed workers after Independence, especially as a result of South African reductions in labor recruitment. In an effort to encourage unemployed workers to leave the city and find employment in the "green zones" surrounding the city, the government issued resident cards only to those who could demonstrate that they held a job. Resident cards were required to use urban facilities like buses and health clinics.

In the rural northern part of the country the government set up communal villages (aldeias comunais) in order to combat the dispersal of the rural population in Mozambique which had been seen as a constraint on economic and political development.

C. Remittances

Since remittances are private transfers, they have tended worldwide to elude government control. A traditional mechanism for overcoming this difficulty has been to require that a given proportion of workers' income be remitted through official channels, and to secure the assistance of governments and employers abroad in enforcing such provisions. This kind of arrangement has worked to the benefit of several parties--other than the workers themselves. Mozambique, which historically provided more than 80,000 workers per year to RSA mines, is a case in point: Under agreements with the Portuguese Government, 60 percent of the workers' wages were withheld, and an equivalent amount in gold, at the official price of USD 34.13 per ounce, was credited to Portugal, which sold the gold at the higher market rate. Given that workers received the deferred wages in escudos at the official rate of exchange, the difference between the official price of gold and its free market price represented a profit for Portugal.

Since independence (1975) remittance earnings have been reduced as South Africa cut back the number of Mozambicans working in the mines, beginning in 1976. In 1978, South Africa unilaterally stopped paying a part of the expatriate miners' salaries to the Mozambican Government in gold at below market prices, ending an agreement that had been in effect for 50 years.

In Mozambique, remittances are used to finance grinding mills, tools, sewing machines, water tanks, wells, and transport vehicles, as well as brides, houses, and furniture. Remittances have been found to be virtually the sole source of financing for ploughs and oxen (M. Russell 1984:601).

D. Labor markets

During the 1980s, Mozambique was the second largest supplier of labor to South Africa, after Lesotho. The role of Lesotho expanded as Mozambique and Malawi cut back dramatically on their contribution of labor in both absolute and percentage terms. The proportion of Mozambican workers with the Chamber of Mines fell from 25.2 percent in 1970 to 10.1 percent in 1985. (The trend for Mozambique has not been monotonic, however: it sent more workers in 1985 than 1980, 51,700 compared to 41,000.) Data on Mozambican emigration since 1985 were not available, but the trend is probably downward, since the South African government suspended new recruitment of Mozambican workers in 1986 following a border incident.

The subsequent expulsion of Mozambican migrants in late 1986 resulted in the rapid repatriation of approximately 68,000 workers, with another 10,000 projected to return by 1990 (Centro de Estudos Africanos 1987:2). The toll on unemployment in Mozambique has not been tallied, but it is expected that these massive returns will radically restructure the economies in that country's southern provinces, and are likely to have effects on labor markets in other countries of the region that receive the continuing outflow of Mozambican refugees.

E. Education

In Mozambique, school systems (along with health systems) have been RENAMO targets. According to a UNICEF-funded study by the Mozambican Education Ministry, violence forced the closing of more than 2,700 schools between 1983 and 1987, displacing 460,000 students and 7,350 teachers. It is reported that 193 teachers have been killed and another 185 kidnapped during the same period (Askin 1988). The traumatic effects of the violence also create special needs amongst the student population that the education system will be hard-pressed to meet for some time to come.

F. Health

Myers and Henn note that there is now evidence that AIDS (HIV1) is spreading in rural areas of most affected countries and is also spreading southward to Malawi, Angola, and Mozambique. A cross-national study of cities and rural areas of Congo, Chad, Gabon, CAR, Mozambique, and Equatorial Guinea, found the prevalence to be lowest in rural areas, highest in major cities, and increasing in semi-rural towns and small cities (Gresenguet, et al. 1988).

Often, the conditions that promote refugee movements in the first place contribute as well to the deterioration of health services and health status in the area of origin. This has recently been the case in Mozambique, where health units and personnel have been the target of South African-backed destabilization. In Mozambique, following independence in 1975 and subsequent implementation of a concerted primary health care policy, considerable strides had been made in the development of health services. The number of peripheral health units had risen from 425 in 1975 to 1900 by the early 1980s; over 3900 paramedical workers had been trained during the same period. Focused attacks on health services began in 1982. By 1985, 198 health posts and health

centers had been destroyed, and another 288 looted or forced to close, leaving only 1416 still functioning (Cliff and Noormahomed 1988, p. 717). At least 21 health workers had been murdered and fear had driven out all but a handful of physicians: the doctor:population ratio rose from 1:161,000 in 1982 to 1:443,000 in 1985. Community participation (including that of village health workers) had also been drastically reduced (op. cit.: 718). The Mozambican government has altered its health strategies to adjust to war conditions by accelerating immunization programs and raising coverage targets in urban areas, and adopting mobilization approaches in rural areas. As a result, despite damage to the health system, between 69 and 83 percent of children in rural areas aged 12-23 months have been fully vaccinated. To compensate for the difficulties in maintaining supervision, emphasis has been placed upon retraining at the district levels. Nonetheless as a result of the deteriorated condition of health services in Mozambique, Mozambican refugees have been arriving in Malawi in poor health and in dire need of medical attention, placing heavy burdens on health services in Malawi, whose Minister of Health was planning for over 700,000 refugees by the end of 1988 (Crisp 1988).

G. Refugees

Mozambique has been one of the major sources of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s. The number of refugees originating from Mozambique increased from 219,300 in 1985, to 1,147,000 in 1988, and in 1988 Mozambique became the first ranked source country accounting for almost 30 percent of the region's refugees. Refugees have fled the fighting between the Mozambican government and the rebel guerrilla movement (RENAMO, or the Mozambique National Resistance), as well as direct attacks on peasants (news reports indicate in excess of 100,000 people have been killed). Refugees have flowed into Malawi (630,000), Zimbabwe (171,000), Swaziland (64,000), Tanzania (72,000), Zambia (30,000) and South Africa (180,000). In addition to refugees, the internally displaced people are estimated to number 1.5-1.85 million.

The influx of Mozambican refugees has led to problems with their organization and protection in receiving countries. Zimbabwe has been subject to raids by RENAMO in which civilians have been killed, and has taken steps to tighten security. In 1987 the Zimbabwean government forced some 12,000 Mozambican refugees back across the border. Later that year Zimbabwe recognized the remaining Mozambicans as refugees entitled to protection, but this action has created problems for non-refugee Mozambicans in the country. The Zimbabwe government now defines all Mozambicans as refugees. This means that

tens of thousands of long-settled [Mozambican] economic migrants in the country can be required to reside in official refugee camps. At least some of the Mozambicans who had been working in the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe have been moved to the camps. The Zimbabwe government considers this decision as another means of protecting its security--pointing to the fact that RENAMO

infiltrators can live amongst the Mozambicans, or use them to gain information. (USCR 1988:26).

South Africa forcibly repatriates Mozambicans refugees found trying to enter the country, or who have entered and tried to obtain employment. Each month South Africa either deports or forcibly repatriates some 2,000 Mozambican immigrants and refugees. In the first eight months of 1988 some 21,000 refugees were forcibly returned. Zimbabwe also forcibly repatriated some 8,000 Mozambican refugees in 1988, asserting that these refugees were RENAMO sympathizers.

A report written for the State Department by Robert Gersony (1988), entitled "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique" has been influential in changing US policy towards Mozambique and the RENAMO forces involved in the insurrection there. The report recounts interviews with refugees in Zimbabwe and Malawi who describe RENAMO-inflicted murder, torture, kidnapping, and forced labor.

In March 1987 UNHCR launched a Special Programme of Limited Assistance to Mozambican Returnees. The initial beneficiaries totalled 15,000; however, by the end of 1987 the number of spontaneous returnees stood at 47,000. In view of this, in February 1988 the High Commissioner expanded the volume and period of the Programme from \$US 1.2 million to \$US 7.7 million, covering a two-year period from 1 March 1987 to 28 February 1989. The number of returnees has increased: by 31 December 1988 the estimated number of returnees, excluding some 20,000 expelled from South Africa, was 116,000. Returnees have come from Malawi, Zimbabwe (14,600), and South Africa (indications are that RSA plans to expel more Mozambicans).

A great number of spontaneous returnees have been able to return to their districts of origin, where they have been assisted with reintegration into their communities. Those unable to return to their communities receive assistance in transit in accommodation centers, or in settling in areas with good agricultural potential. Because many of the returnees have rural backgrounds, the Special Programme has endeavored to help them achieve agricultural self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. Tools, seeds, and basic food and relief items are distributed, and it is estimated that about 43,000 returnees will become self-sufficient in food production by July 1989.

A report by the United Nations Office for Emergencies in Africa, 1989 describes and assesses the Special Programme, including implementation problems (security constraints and logistic problems which include transport problems, distribution of food aid, lack of qualified staff), new developments, and a sectoral review of assistance (food, transportation, domestic needs, water supply, health and nutrition, shelter, education, agriculture and fisheries, and operational support). There is a financial summary of expenditure commitments and additional requirements, and statistics on returnees. New developments include the assessment that assistance to returnees should be linked with assistance to refugees in neighboring countries. For example, the governments of Malawi and Zimbabwe have agreed to follow the Mozambican curriculum in primary schools for Mozambican refugees.

The conflict aggravated the drought conditions of the early 1980s, leading to food shortages, and there have been renewed drought and famine conditions in 1987-88. International donations of food were prevented from reaching the affected population because of attacks on supply routes by Renamo.

SWAZILAND

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Swaziland was in 1976. Actual population at the time of the census was 494,534. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Swaziland's population size was 757,000, with a 3.5% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 55 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 129/1000 live births. Swaziland is 18% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 12.8%.

Based upon the 1976 census, the proportion of the population constituted by immigrants was 5.35%, and the proportion of African immigrants 4.50%. However, based upon the 1985 population estimate, refugees alone constituted over 9% of total population, giving Swaziland the highest proportion of refugees in SSA. Migration is mainly to and from South Africa, with increasing numbers of immigrants and refugees from Mozambique.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".

B. Policies

The Swazi government views the immigration level as insignificant and satisfactory, and emigration as significant and satisfactory. Its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.) Policies encouraging the development of sugar and citrus plantations and cattle ranches have led to a decline in external migration from 18% of adult male population in the 1960s, to 10% in 1976 (Palmer 1985: 36).

Regional Organizations. Swaziland is a member of two regional organizations: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), founded in 1980, and the Eastern and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area (PTA). However there is no documentation for these organizations concerning provisions for free circulation of people. Swaziland is also a member of the Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC), an organization that periodically brings together ministers or commissioners responsible for migrant workers in 8 countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It aims to harmonize policies and practices concerning worker migration to South Africa. (See Chapter on Policies for further discussion.)

C. Remittances

Evidence from Swaziland suggests that remittances have been positively associated with improvements in rural areas. Remittances are often repatriated in the form of goods or other in-kind transfers, and there is considerable variance reported in the ratio of in-kind to cash transfers. In Swaziland M. Russell (1984) has recorded non-cash transfers as high as double the cash amounts. Remittances are reportedly invested in cattle, housing, education, and agriculture, as well as in brides and consumer durables.

A 1978-79 government survey in Swaziland found that returns from increasing maize production cannot be retained by women as their own income and, accordingly, women invest remittances in productive activities that yield income over which they have "undisputed control" (Palmer 1985:40).

Evidence of close ties between migrants and their families is given by M. Russell in her anthropological study of Swaziland. She asserts that there are unwritten rules for the distribution of money and that these rules are "a powerful mechanism for redistribution, which goes some way to modify alleged inequalities between town and country, and between one homestead and another" (1984:595). Russell cites evidence from a 1983 survey that found rural homesteads receive most of their income from urban workers who are also likely to be members of the homestead. Sixty-eight percent of respondents in that survey reported they belong to an umuti in a rural area, and two thirds of those reportedly visit their rural homestead between one and five times a month. In a separate survey of urban households, Russell and Testerink found that 46 percent of house owners and 66 percent of tenants were members of rural households and three-fourths of these returned to the rural area at least once a month.

D. Education/brain drain

Shortages of skilled manpower have been identified as a factor constraining economic growth in Swaziland. While "inappropriate output" from the educational system is the primary cause noted, the fact remains that, as of the 1976 census, 7.01 percent of the total population (34,649 people out of 494,534) were outside the country (mostly in South Africa) and less than half of these were engaged in minework and farming. While the educational characteristics of these emigrants are not known, the existence of a brain drain problem cannot be ruled out.

It is estimated that there are about 1,500 professional, administrative, or skilled expatriate workers in Swaziland. They hold over half the higher level management and professional positions in the private sector and about 10 percent in the public sector, where approximately 300 are posted under technical assistance arrangements.

According to the World Bank's recent study of education policies in SSA, Swaziland, like other small SSA countries, has experienced a surplus of school graduates, which points to the likelihood of increased migration. Swaziland is part of the Return of Talent Program sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to re-attract skilled migrants who have left the country. (See Chapter on migration of the highly skilled for a full discussion of the program.)

E. Health

Loewenson (1988) cites evidence from Swaziland that the resurgence of malaria there has been attributed to the recruitment of Mozambicans to work on sugar estates.

F. Refugees

Swaziland hosts a relatively small (6,700-7,000) long-standing population of refugees from South Africa. In recent years, Swaziland has also been one recipient of refugee flows from the disturbances in Mozambique. (See Tables 6,7, and 8.) There is little recorded evidence so far of negative effects, but the inflow has been rapid, with the number of refugees increasing from 4,800 in 1986 to 64,000 in 1988, and thus is a potential for these refugees to become a political and economic burden on the small country.

TANZANIA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The most recent census results reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration are for 1978, when total population was 17,512,611. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Tanzania's population size was 22,242,000, with a 3.56% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 53 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 110/1000 live births. Tanzania is 14% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 8.6%.

In 1985, as estimated from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Tanzania experienced a net migration of 10,000. The proportion of the population constituted by foreign-born immigrants is 2.37%, but data on immigrants by country of origin are not yet available. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 0.39% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Zambia. Immigration is from Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, and Uganda, and increasingly, Mozambique. Some of these were undoubtedly refugees or people in refugee-like circumstances. (See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Two issues are significant in Tanzania: one is that Tanzania is an important refugee asylum country; the other is the impact of the villagization program, which has affected population movements within the country. Migration flows throughout the East African region were disrupted with the collapse of the East African Community in the early 1970s, the disturbances in Uganda, and the war in Rhodesia. Tanzania and Kenya closed their borders to passenger and goods traffic between 1977 and 1984, and the Tanzanian government prohibited migration to South Africa by its nationals soon after independence. Regional political changes in the form of independence for Zimbabwe in 1980, the re-opening of borders between Kenya and Tanzania in 1984, and relative calm being restored to Uganda in the past year may signal renewed migration movements.

B. Policies

Tanzania is known to be both a labor sending and a labor receiving country and has explicit policies to govern such movements. The government views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.)

Tanzania enacted laws soon after independence prohibiting nationals from working in South Africa (Adepoju 1988:40). In an effort to regulate undocumented migration and control foreign labor competition with nationals, employers in Tanzania are required to report to immigration officials on all migrants in their employ. Tanzania is reported to require residence permits, which have been used in lieu of work permits to regulate immigration. The country's three classes of residence permit (A, B, and C) are issued for an initial period not exceeding three years, and may be renewed for no more than two additional years (UN 1982:45).

The Villagization program. In 1967, President Nyerere instituted his program of ujamaa vijijini--socialism in the villages. Nyerere initially envisaged this as a system of voluntary, self-constituted, and self-reliant cooperative communities, which would form the basis of the rural sector (Young 1982: 112). Villagization proceeded slowly and voluntarily until 1975, when implementation of the program was considerably speeded up, and resettlement became mandatory. By 1976 91% of the rural population were living in ujamaa villages (Young 1982: 114).

There have been several recent empirical research studies on the effects of villagization on migration patterns. McCall (1982) argues that the concentration of the population in villages is likely to mean less long distance interregional migration. There are few reliable estimates of population redistribution as a result of villagization. One reason for this is that the statistical record from which one would calculate distance moved is fragmentary. Thomas (1982) devised an indirect method for obtaining estimates for each village. Whereas mean distances moved per person were relatively small, the aggregate movement created by the villagization was immense. Further, there are differences in relocation distances between individuals, administrative areas, and ecological areas which may be a factor of considerable importance for the future development of villages. Tanzania's resettlement policies may have had the effect of stemming migration to urban areas, or altering population densities in rural areas. A May 1985 study, The Experience of the World Bank with Government-sponsored Land Settlement documents some of these efforts. Boesen, et al. (1986) report that between 1970 and 1975, the Tanzanian government has claimed to have moved some 85% of the rural population into nucleated villages of 250 people or more. Traditional settlement patterns that prevailed until the early 1970s became highly disaggregated. This process has had a number of effects, including environmental ones, with implications for future agricultural production. Phil Raikes, in looking at how traditional agricultural systems can be used as basis for further improvement, notes several problems with this approach, including "that the extent of natural fallowing has been drastically curtailed during the past decade, by the villagization of the population." (Boesen op.cit.:111) Villagization has increased travelling time to the fields and resulted in greater concentration on nearby fields, to the detriment of their long-term fertility and soil structure. Increased travel time has also reduced the time available for cultivation. Concentration of firewood requirements has led to deforestation in areas near villages (Nilsson in Boesen op.cit.:159-172), and to increased time for women and children to gather firewood. Villagization has also had negative effects on soil conservation (Christiansson in Boesen op.cit.:143-157). Kjaerby argues that villagization has contributed to the rapid expansion of ox-ploughing, thus relieving labour constraints and reducing costs of tillage and transport. However, he points out, villagization has also introduced new constraints on further expansion of ox-ploughing because grazing and land for fodder

* These estimates were obtained by using the dot distribution map of the district compiled from the results of the 1967 population census, the village location map compiled in 1974-75 and the estimated village population size for April 1974 (Thomas 1982).

production have been reduced, and cattle have been moved out of dense cultivation areas surrounding villages, thus separating crop and animal production. This has created need for lighter ploughs that can be drawn by two (rather than four) oxen (Kjaerby in Boesen op.cit:173-190).

Regional Organizations. Tanzania is a member of The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), but for both of these regional organizations there is no documentation as to provisions for free circulation of people. Tanzania is also a member of the Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC), which is a flexible structure that periodically brings together ministers or commissioners responsible for migrant workers in 8 countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It aims to harmonize policies and practices concerning worker migration to South Africa. (See Chapter on Policies for a full discussion.)

C. Brain drain/education

Little is known about intra-African migration of skilled workers in the sub-region since the free flow of labor among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania ended with the collapse of the East African Community in the early 1970s. Certainly the flow of students from Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam to Uganda was reduced with the development of local universities and political upheavals in Uganda. It is estimated that there were 7 students abroad per 100,000 population for Tanzania as of 1978, and these proportions are not thought to have changed markedly in the decade since, despite significant increases in university level educational opportunities within Africa (Ricca 1989:93).

Tanzania is also reported to have instituted measures to restrict emigration of professionals and civil servants, including bonding, foreign exchange restrictions, and review of applications for travel abroad (Adepoju 1988:44) but evidence of continuing outflows suggest they have had little effect.

In his review of the literature on international migration within Africa, Gould (1985) concluded that restrictive policies have not been very effective in reducing outmigration of highly skilled manpower. He notes that required national service (instituted in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania) has been the type of measure most in evidence but that, on balance, "The majority of African countries...still do not see their losses of high-level manpower as sufficient to warrant taking restrictive action" (Gould 1985:16).

Tanzania participates in The Return of Talent Program, which was launched in Africa in 1983 in collaboration with the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and financed by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States government. Its aim is to attract "all Africans who desire to return after acquiring very high professional qualifications in the Western Countries".

One of the most methodologically rigorous treatments of the relationship between migration and education is Barnum and Sabot's (1976) study of the relationship between migration, education, and urban surplus labor in Tanzania. This study is discussed more fully in the Chapter on education. It found that, despite relatively higher rates of unemployment among the educated, the probability of finding employment was significantly higher for migrants with higher levels of educational attainment. Barnum and Sabot concluded that, "while educational differentials in average and expected wages are reduced, the educational differential in migration rates is widened by an increase in educational opportunities. As the supply of educated workers expands and progressively encroaches on the unskilled labour market, the uneducated are squeezed out" (op. cit. p. 38). The authors observed that, at least in Tanzania, school leavers were evidently prepared to adjust their occupational expectations downward. Barnum and Sabot's findings led them to argue (op. cit.:76) that education has an effect on the propensity to migrate which is independent of income differentials and attributable to the effects of education on such utility factors as psychic costs and returns, and the improved ability to adapt in urban areas.

D. Health

In Tanzania the primary health care (PHC) system was developed in the context of the country's population relocation program. Government-sponsored resettlement of groups into ujamaa villages has been credited by some with overcoming the obstacles to delivery of health services posed by physical dispersement of populations (Benyoussef 1977:412).

As in much of central and east Africa, the HIV1 virus (AIDS) has been found in Tanzania, where 5 to 10 percent of surveyed adults and 2 percent of surveyed children under three were infected with HIV1 (Kanki et al. 1987:63). A recent survey of risk factors in Tanzania found that travelling outside the region but within the country was associated with increased risk from 5.6 percent to 13.6 percent in rural areas, but in urban areas, those who did not travel had the greater risk of seropositivity (53 percent to 37 percent) (Killewo et al. 1988)

E. Refugees

Tanzania is one of the oldest host countries in Africa, having given asylum to refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, Zaire, South Africa, and most recently Mozambique. In 1988, Tanzania was giving asylum to some 266,000 refugees (See Table 6, 7, and 8). The Hutu and Tutsi arrived from the upheavals in Burundi in the early 1960s. Tanzania was the first and only country in Africa to offer citizenship to refugees--the Tutsis (19,800) were offered citizenship some years ago, although implementation of the offer has been slow. The Hutus (137,000) live in three settlements, which have been handed over to the Tanzanian government by the UNHCR, and have received large amounts of post-handover aid via ICARA II projects (Clarke 1987). Integration problems persist; the Hutu are isolated from local populations. Spontaneously settled Zaireans (16,000) and Hutus (23,000) face definitional problems as refugees, as they left their countries before the explosive events which drove the main refugee flows.

Some African asylum states have dealt with their refugee populations by opting for programs that generate a degree of self support among refugees as quickly as possible. Such programs have the potential of reducing the economic burden created by refugees, and benefitting the host country by integrating the refugee settlements in remote or under-utilized areas into national development objectives. Two studies of refugee settlements in Rukwa Region, western Tanzania, provide insights about the utility of incorporating refugees into an asylum country's development plans. An FAO-sponsored study (Armstrong 1986) argues for the potential viability of planned refugee settlements, citing the case of Mishamo settlement. Mishamo, the most recently established permanent refugee settlement in Tanzania, was set up, like others in the region, to fulfil both the short-term objectives of providing a self-sufficient livelihood for refugees from Burundi and other countries, and the long-term objective of integrated rural development aimed at land colonization and increased food production (Armstrong 1986: 31). Armstrong says that although it is still too early to tell, good agricultural production and community development are favorable indicators of the potential success of Mishamo: after the arrival of the Burundi refugees in 1973, Rukwa region became one of the four major grain reserves in Tanzania. Two of the refugee settlements, Mishamo and Katumba, alone produce over 90% of food grain for the district. Mishamo settlement has been self-sufficient in food production since 1981; there are crop surpluses, and some cash crops (tobacco). (Armstrong 1986:49). Tanzania's experience at Ulyankulu, Katumba, and Mishamo has created, among a very large refugee community, a level of self sufficiency comparable to indigenous Tanzanians in the region (Rogge 1985).

ZAMBIA

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Zambia reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration was in 1980. Actual population at the time of the census was 5,661,801. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Zambia's population size was 6,704,000, with a 3.54% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 53 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 84/1000 live births. Zambia is 47% urban with an urban population growth rate of 6.5%.

According to the 1980 census the proportion of the population constituted by immigrants is 4.09%, (compared to 7.3 percent in the previous census) and the proportion of African immigrants is 3.26%. Zambian analysts believe that, despite the census numbers, the foreign born population is actually an even larger share of the population. (Population and Housing Census 1980:147) This suggests the possibility that more recent censuses may tend to underenumerate immigrants more than earlier censuses did. The proportion of emigrants abroad is estimated to be 0.37% of the resident population. Emigration is mainly to South Africa and Tanzania. Immigration is mainly from Malawi, Zaire, Tanzania, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Internal migration has affected Zambia's demographic structure. Zambia's urban population increased from 29% to 43% between 1969-80 (Nag 1983). In a study based on data from the 1980 census, internal migration flows towards the Copperbelt, Lusaka, and Central provinces, were found to have increased in relative importance since 1969. Inter-provincial migration was found to be growing continuously, according to patterns that have not changed markedly, but at declining rate. The characteristics of Zambia's internal migration are similar to those found in other developing countries, and are seen to have become more "mature"-- with flows and counterflows balancing each other, and involving more homogenous migrants. Female migration, although modest, played an important role in improving the sex ratio in urban areas. (Zambia, Central Statistical Office, 1985).

B. Policies

The Zambian government views both the immigration and emigration levels as insignificant and satisfactory, and its policy is to maintain levels of both. (See Table 5.) Zambia enacted laws soon after independence prohibiting nationals from working in RSA (Adepoju 1988:40). Zambia also imposed such restrictions on migration to Rhodesia after the unilateral declaration of independence. Zambia has adopted measures similar to those of Nigeria, which has reportedly tightened frontier procedures in an effort to control the number of undocumented workers entering the country. The Zambian Department of Immigration is reported to be closely monitoring aliens at ports

of entry. Border controls have been increased, and police assist immigration officials in apprehending undocumented migrants (Brennan 1984:417). Prospective immigrants must obtain a permit before entering the country, and employers are required to check a migrant's status before offering employment. To promote the employment of nationals in responsible positions, Zambia issues permits for such jobs to aliens only when a Zambian is not yet available, and then only for a limited period of time (UN 1982:45).

There is little documentation as to the social and political rights of migrants in their host countries. In Zambia, where migrants are legally entitled to equal treatment under employment law, they are also permitted by the Industrial Relations Act to form and join trade unions and to hold offices in unions. However, in 1971, Zambia expelled 150,000 undocumented workers and their families, most from Rhodesia, Botswana, Zaire, Tanzania, and Somalia.

Regional Organizations. Zambia is a member of The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), but for both of these regional organizations there is no documentation as to provisions for free circulation of people. Zambia is also a member of the Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC), which is a flexible structure that periodically brings together ministers or commissioners responsible for migrant workers in 8 countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It aims to harmonize policies and practices concerning worker migration to South Africa. (See Chapter on Policies for a full discussion.)

Internal migration. While Zambia has not issued a population policy statement per se, the Fourth National Development Plan dated January 1989 notes that this document is the first of that country's national plans "to systematically integrate population factors" (Republic of Zambia 1989:52) and, further, that a National Population Council is being established by the Party and its government to provide guidance on population matters and coordinate programs. Although no explicit goals or objectives related to migration are articulated in the Plan, the inflow of refugees is noted to be the most salient migration issue, followed by urbanization. Rural to urban migration is estimated to account for 45 percent of urban growth.

In a survey of migrant rural households in Zambia, Chilivumbo (1985) examined the effects of government implementation of agricultural cooperative movements, state farms, rural reconstruction centers, and improved rural infrastructure, and concluded that migrants were more likely to respond favorably to such projects than were non-migrants.

Until independence in Zambia, there were a number of restrictions on women's freedom of movement: they were not permitted to migrate unless accompanied by their husbands and in possession of a written permit from the traditional authority in their area. In 1952, courts were given power to remove women and children forcibly from urban areas unless they were accompanied by a husband or guardian. Zambia's constitution subsequently granted all Zambians freedom of movement (Chilivumbo 1985:7).

C. Remittances

Chilivumbo asserts that the Zambian government has traditionally viewed migration as destructive to rural areas (1985:xiii, 12). However, he points to contradictions between prevailing government attitudes toward migration and evidence as to the uses and effects of remittances. Chilivumbo notes a number of studies that have demonstrated the positive effects of migration and remittances on rural development. Jackman (1973), for example, found that returned migrants had a positive effect on the initiation of rural enterprises; Huckabay (1979) showed that development of fish growing industry in the Kaputa District was associated with migration; Roberts (1976) found returned migrants from South Africa and Zimbabwe were notably receptive to using new farming techniques, and Wood (1984) and Van Horn (1977) found similar results; in his study of Serenje District, Long (1968) found that farmers who adopted new agricultural techniques were, on average, older returned migrants.

The relative importance of remittances appears to differ by sex. Chilivumbo (1985:78ff) found that remittances provided 13.8 percent of all capital used for the purchase of fertilizer in the season preceding his survey. When analyzed by sex, however, it was noted that remittances provided 27.1 percent of such financing for female-headed households, compared with only 11.9 percent for male-headed households. A similar pattern was observed in the financing of buying or hiring oxen ploughs or tractors: overall, migrant remittances provided 5.6 percent of capital for both sexes combined, but 10.3 percent of financing for female heads, versus 7.6 percent for male heads. Chilivumbo related these findings to the fact that only 4.2 percent of female heads were able to obtain government-sponsored Agricultural Finance Company loans for fertilizer (compared with 14.8 percent of male heads) and only 2.8 percent of women had loans for ploughs and tractors (compared with 6.9 percent of men). In the case of non-farm enterprises, the importance of remittances to women was even more pronounced: they were the only source of financing available to female headed households.

Chilivumbo (1985) found that remittances are allocated among basic household needs (76 percent), agricultural improvements (8 percent), the establishment of "enterprises" (2 percent), building houses, and education (1 percent each). Although only 10 percent of migrants were able to set up non-farm enterprises (largely sewing machines, maize mills, grocery stores, bars or other shops) migration savings were found to be a crucial source of financing for those who did so, providing nearly 60 percent of such capital for both sexes. The tendency to invest in enterprises increased with the duration of migration and with levels of earnings.

Although construction of houses is often mentioned as an example of conspicuous consumption (cf. Sudan), the evidence from Zambia suggests, rather, that such expenditures are for relatively modest alterations that improve the quality of housing stock and signal commitment to rural areas. In Chilivumbo's study, migrants were more likely than non-migrants to have corrugated iron sheet roofs and houses with more than one room and windows, and houses of brick rather than wattle and daub.

Chilivumbo (1985: 59) also found that agricultural indicators, such as farm size, output, farm income and expenditure, farm labor, application of agricultural fertilizer, and farm tools, were on average more advanced among returned migrants than among non-migrants. Chilivumbo (p.80-81) concluded that the positive effects of migration were "repeatedly demonstrated," and that these effects increased with duration of migration.

D. Labor markets

In Lusaka, women now outnumber men, but they are largely excluded from domestic wage labor, where the preference is for older men (Jules-Rosette 1985). Jules-Rosette found that men placed in formal sector jobs through the Ministry of Labor's employment exchange services outnumbered women 29:10 in 1975. Several factors explain this finding. First, until independence, women were legally barred from establishing urban residences and thus there is not a longstanding tradition of formal sector female employment. Second, women have had limited educational opportunities, putting them in a less advantageous position for formal sector employment relative to men. The importance of informal sector employment for women is further induced by licensing procedures that favor men and effectively exclude women from organized markets. Women often sell vegetables in public and at home, but strictly speaking this activity is illegal.

Self-employment has become a major means of economic adjustment among Zambia's female migrants, and increasingly among men as well. Jules-Rosette found that women (and men) used informal sector activities such as marketing, beer brewing, and potting (often in combination, rather than as alternatives) as the basis for temporary self-employment during periods of unemployment and job search in the informal sector (Jules-Rosette in Lindsay 1985:82-112).

E. Brain drain/education

Zambia recently (1987) joined the Return of Talent Program sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to re-attract skilled migrants who have left the country.

Chilivumbo (1985:84-85) found that while the use of fertilizer and ownership of enterprise are both positively affected by increases in education generally, the effects of education are greater for returned migrants than for non-migrants, suggesting underlying differences in skill acquisition, initiative, disposable income, or other personal characteristics between migrants and non-migrants with the same educational qualifications. Similar effects were seen for ownership of improved housing.

Investment in children's education is one of the frequently noted uses of migrants' remittances, but few studies have sought to compare migrant with non-migrant behavior on this point. Chilivumbo did so in his study of Zambia (1985:90) and found that while returned migrants were only slightly more likely than non-migrants to have sent their children to school, that likelihood increases notably with the duration of migration. Since the data were not controlled for any association between parents' education or

socio-economic class and duration of migration, it is unclear whether the observation resulted from these intervening variables or related income effects.

Rural-to-urban migration is normally the pattern for those pursuing education. A somewhat different pattern of student migration has been described in Zambia by Kaluba (1985), who observed in the 1980 population census data a trend toward outmigration from urban to rural areas among 5 to 14 year olds. He attributed this student migration to the lack of school places in urban locales, which both limits access and results in over-age children in many classrooms. While it is difficult to discern explanations of such migration from census data and no more definitive study is known to have been undertaken, Bank staff confirm that Kaluba's conclusions are consistent with anecdotal evidence. In urban areas of Zambia, there may be as many as 70 to 80 children in a class, and those who are supposed to enter school at age 7 or 8 are often unable to do so for lack of places. At the same time, urban families with large numbers of children customarily send their offspring to the care of relatives in rural areas for acculturation in rural Zambian life. With overcrowding in urban schools, this practice may well have become even more attractive. Schools in rural areas are under-utilized--not because of population outmigration but because children are withdrawn at early ages for farm work and child-minding. It is not unusual for a school that begins with 40 children in grade one to have only 8 or 9 students in grades 7-8. Thus, rural school places are available for the student migrant from urban areas.

Zambia has been experiencing a serious exodus of highly skilled personnel, and one that has not been confined to the most elite levels. Of particular concern is the loss of university lecturers and public sector physicians. The Zambian Ministry of Health has a current shortfall of 549 doctors of a total establishment of 986. (Chiposa 1988:43) The departure of this many skilled personnel clearly has the potential to cripple the provision of health services.

Zambian academics are mainly drawn to other schools in the Southern Africa region. Salary differentials between source and destination countries are frequently stark: Zambian university lecturers earn roughly \$2,000 per annum, while the prevailing salary for such positions in the region is \$13,000 (Chiposa 1988:43).

Policies to prevent emigration of highly skilled personnel are seldom particularly efficacious. Despite this fact, a number of countries have sought to curb brain drain through state policy. Alarmed by the exodus of professors and lecturers from the University of Zambia, the university administration imposed a ban on leaves of absence. This policy has considerable potential for back-firing, as many lecturers have depended on leaves of absence as opportunities to improve their standing and to supplement their comparatively small UNZA salaries. Denial of such opportunities may well lead to increased numbers of permanent departures. (Chiposa, 1988:43)

In the short run, the causes of brain drain are relatively intractable: a country such as Zambia with wealthier neighbors and a severe

budget crisis can do little to avoid the loss of some of its highly skilled manpower.

F. Health

Chilivumbo (1985) found that, although migrant women reported a smaller preferred family size than non-migrants (4.2 versus 6.7), the average number of children ever born was actually higher among women with migration experience than among non-migrants (3.17 versus 2.81). The mean number of children born to migrants was also found to increase with the frequency of movements, and the "fertility inflation impact" increased when the destination was an urban location; rural to rural migration actually depressed fertility, as did female education. In partial contrast to Chilivumbo's results, a review of available literature on the relationship between rural to rural migration and fertility in developing countries generally (Conway 1984) found little evidence that this particular migration pattern reduces fertility.

In a study of health, nutrition, and agricultural development in Northern Zambia, Vaughan and Moore (1988) found a notable decline in nutritional status of children under five amongst the largest and most "progressive" maize cash-cropping households, despite the fact that these families were also the largest millet producers and retained more grain for household consumption than did other households. Evidence being assembled by the Overseas Development Administration suggests that it is not a food deficit but an increase in the agricultural and domestic work burdens of women in cash-cropping households that explains the decline in child nutritional status: with the rapid development of maize cash-cropping over the past ten years, these women simply have less time to prepare weaning foods. Given the migrant labor system, under which as many as 60 percent of able-bodied men may be absent from the area under study, the authors consider whether male outmigration may be implicated in the increased burdens on women and thus, indirectly, in the decline of child nutritional status. They found, however, that women in the study area are generally able to find replacement male labor. Rather,

It seems that in these [maize cash-cropping] households, the problem for women is not the absence of men, but the presence of men in conjunction with a new system of production with no culturally predetermined sexual division of labour. (p. 744)

It is generally agreed that the area of SSA most affected by HIV1 is the region of Central Africa which includes Zambia. Here, there are a number of cities and rural areas where over 20 percent of surveyed adults are infected. A prevalence survey of countries in which HIV1 infection is "quite common", which included Zambia, found no evidence of HIV2 infection (Kanki et al. 1987:63). In the case of Zambia, questions have been raised as to how much longer the mining industry should continue to invest in individuals with HIV infection (New Scientist 1988).

G. Refugees

Zambia has a long history as a country of asylum. In the past, it has received refugees from all of its neighbors, except Tanzania, as well as from South Africa and Uganda. Zambia hosts an estimated 149,000 refugees from Angola, Mozambique, Zaire, Namibia, and South Africa (See Tables 6,7, and 8). The main source of refugees is the civil war in Angola, but a number of refugees (about 30,000) have recently come from the war in Mozambique (Clarke 1987 USCR 1988).

Most refugees are spontaneously settled, in rural areas, although a significant number are in official settlements and in the refugee center run by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Freund & Kalumba (1986) estimate that there are 25,000 spontaneously settled refugees in northwest province: 15,000 Angolans and 10,000 Zaireans. 30,000 Namibians are in Western province, and some 20,000 refugees in other provinces or urban areas. These numbers are likely to increase, given regional instability (Freund & Kalanba 1986).

Although refugees constitute a burden on local populations and a drain on resources, there are also significant positive aspects associated with local settlements. Refugees may be productive workers--the Mechaba settlement produced a food surplus in 1977. However, refugees (both those spontaneously settled, and those in camps) also pose security threats in the form of retaliatory incursions from neighboring hostile states. If refugees are thought to harbor supporters of the other side, they may be pursued by government or rebel forces into asylum countries. South Africa's military attacked refugee sites in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in 1986 (US Committee for Refugees 1986).

ZIMBABWE

A. Demographics and migration patterns

The last national census in Zimbabwe was in 1982, but results have not been reported to the United Nations Population Division office responsible for monitoring migration. In 1985, as projected from national census reports by Zachariah and Vu, Zimbabwe's population size was 8,406,000, with a 3.37% population growth rate. In 1985 life expectancy was 58 years for both sexes, and the infant mortality rate was 77/1000 live births. Zimbabwe is 24% urban, with an urban population growth rate of 6.0%.

Emigration is mainly to South Africa, and to a lesser extent, Botswana and Zambia. Immigration is mainly from Mozambique (much of this is by refugees) and Zambia.

(See Tables 1,2, and 3 in "International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".)

Zimbabwe became a net emigrant nation in 1976 during the liberation struggles, with the loss of skilled whites. The volume of net emigration dropped in 1985, and Zimbabwe became a net immigrant nation in 1986.

Rural migration occurs from the communal areas, which are a source of labor for the formal sector, both in commercial farming and in the urban and mining areas. The most recent survey found that 47% of village households were headed by a migrant, and that 89% of non-migrant household heads had worked as a migrant in the past (Bonnievie 1987). The communal areas were also characterized by an unusually high proportion of female farmers-- 56.3%.

The proportion of household income accounted for by remittances was found to vary with different studies, ranging from a high of 52% (Bonnievie 1987) to a low of 11% (World Bank 1983).

B. Policies

Zimbabwe is one of twelve SSA countries which views current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and its policy is to lower these. Emigration levels are regarded as insignificant and satisfactory, and the policy is to maintain them. (See Table 5.) As a result of restrictions on migration by the governments of both South Africa and Zimbabwe, clandestine migration between the two countries occurs. Illegal agricultural migration from Mozambique, Botswana, and Zimbabwe has been going on for years, especially in the eastern border areas where there are coffee and banana plantations.

In a review of changing patterns of internal migration in Zimbabwe, Mazur (1986) notes that the Zimbabwean government has attempted to slow outmigration from rural areas by means of resettlement schemes; these are achieving a level of success in lowering rates of outmigration. However, Mazur also observes that adequate credit for the purchase of equipment and

cattle is necessary if outmigration is to be reduced. In assessing the outcome of Zimbabwe's Land Resettlement Program, which began in 1980, Due has concluded that while the government of Zimbabwe has moved rapidly to initiate the program as quickly as possible, the difficulty of attempting to improve equity in land ownership and incomes in the agricultural sector without unduly frightening commercial farmers or reducing total agricultural production requires great sensitivity.

Regional Organizations. Zimbabwe is a member of The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), but for both of these regional organizations there is no documentation as to provisions for free circulation of people. Zimbabwe is also a member of the Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC), which is a flexible structure that periodically brings together ministers or commissioners responsible for migrant workers in 8 countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It aims to harmonize policies and practices concerning worker migration to South Africa. (See Chapter on Policies for a full discussion.)

C. Education/brain drain

Although Zimbabwe has a growing labor surplus (both rural and urban), there is no excess of skilled labor, as a result of the net emigration of skilled Europeans during the UDI and early post-Independence period. Bank studies have noted that the emigration of whites has almost certainly led to a decline in the overall quality of the formal sector labor force. Emigration in 1981 alone created a loss in the professional, technical and administrative categories that was equivalent to as much as 5% of higher level formal sector manpower.

Zimbabwe was one of the first African countries to join the Return of Talent Program sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) to re-attract skilled migrants who have left the country. (See chapter on migration of the highly skilled for a full discussion of the program.)

D. Refugees

As a result of the refugee flows generated by internal conflict in Mozambique, Zimbabwe ranks eight among the top 10 asylum countries in Africa. The estimated number of refugees in Zimbabwe as of December 1988 was 171,500 (USCR 1988). (See Tables 6,7, and 8.) Four refugee camps were created in 1984, but most refugees are spontaneously settled. None of the camps has adequate land to enable self-sufficiency for all their population. (See Clarke 1987). The refugee sites in Zimbabwe have been among those attacked by South Africa's military forces in 1986 (World Refugee Survey 1986), and Mozambique's Renamo rebels have pursued refugees into Zimbabwe. In 1987 the Zimbabwean government forced some 12,000 Mozambican refugees back across the border. Later that year Zimbabwe recognized the remaining Mozambicans as refugees entitled to protection, but this action has created problems for non-refugee Mozambicans in the country. Zimbabwe also forcibly repatriated some 8,000 Mozambican refugees in 1988, asserting that these refugees were RENAMO

sympathizers. The Zimbabwe government now defines all Mozambicans as refugees. This means that

tens of thousands of long-settled [Mozambican] economic migrants in the country can be required to reside in official refugee camps. At least some of the Mozambicans who had been working in the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe have been moved to the camps. The Zimbabwe government considers this decision as another means of protecting its security--pointing to the fact that RENAMO infiltrators can live amongst the Mozambicans, or use them to gain information. (USCR 1988:26).

The governments of Malawi and Zimbabwe have agreed to follow the Mozambican curriculum in primary schools for Mozambican refugees.

During the independence struggles, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe was a source of refugees to Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia. After independence, the numbers of Zimbabwean refugees dropped from nearly 191,000 to less than 1,300 still present in Botswana (USCR 1988). In 1988, some 2,650 Zimbabweans were repatriated from Botswana). Potential future refugee flows may stem from internal political disruptions in Zimbabwe, and the spread of ethnic conflict.

TABLE 1

BASIC ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

(1) Country	(2) 1985 Population Statistics							GNP/Capita U.S. Dollars 1983 (3)	Annual GNP/Capita Growth	% of Pop Age 15-64	% of 1981 Labor Force In Each Sector			Urbanization Urban Pop Growth 73-83		Education % of Age Group by Educational lev & Enrolled % Enrolled % Enrolled		
	Total Population	Rate Nat. Increase	Population Growth Rate	Net (3) Migrants	Infant Mortality	Life Expect Both Sexes at Birth	African Immigrants as % Total Population				Agri.	Ind.	Service	% Urban	73-83	Primary	Secondary	Higher Ed
1. Mali	7511000	2.90	2.50	-161000	174	47	1.13%	160	1.2	50	73	12	15	19	4.4	27	9	(.)
2. Burkina	7885000	2.90	2.77	-56000	144	46	1.91%	190	1.4	52	82	13	5	11	4.8	28	3	1
3. Niger	4791000	3.05	3.05	..	140	45	..	240	-1.2	51	91	3	6	14	7.0	23	5	(.)
4. Somalia	5384000	3.03	3.03	-25000	152	47	..	250	-0.8	53	82	8	10	13	5.5	30	11	1
5. Gambia	748000	2.76	3.13	15000	174	43	10.80%	290	1.4	55	70	9	12	30	6.5	56	16	..
6. Chad	5018000	2.45	2.45	..	138	46	56	85	7	8	20	6.6	..	3	(.)
7. Ethiopia	42271000	3.00	3.00	..	168	47	..	120	0.5	52	80	7	13	15	6.0	46	12	1
8. Zaïre	30557000	3.07	3.07	5000	102	53	..	170	-1.3	51	75	13	12	28	6.9	90	23	1
9. Guinea-Bissau	886000	2.34	2.04	-5000	143	39	..	180	..	53	83	6	11	26	7.2	88	15	(.)
10. Malawi	7044000	3.23	3.18	-20000	156	46	1.34%	210	2.2	49	86	5	9	11	7.3	62	4	(.)
11. Uganda	14680000	3.31	3.21	-75000	108	48	5.10%	220	-4.4	50	83	6	11	7	0.1	60	8	1
12. Burundi	4696000	2.98	2.92	-15000	118	49	1.98%	240	2.1	53	84	5	11	2	3.2	33	3	1
13. Tanzania	22242000	3.55	3.56	10000	110	53	3.33%	240	0.9	50	83	6	11	14	8.6	98	3	(.)
14. Rwanda	6026000	3.46	3.42	-10000	127	49	0.76%	270	2.3	51	91	2	7	5	6.6	70	2	(.)
15. CAR	2583000	2.74	2.74	..	137	50	2.32%	280	0.1	55	88	4	8	44	4.6	70	14	1
16. Togo	3038000	3.26	3.26	..	97	50	..	280	1.1	50	67	15	18	22	6.6	106	27	2
17. Benin	4043000	3.28	3.26	-5000	115	50	..	290	1.0	50	46	16	38	16	4.7	65	21	2
18. Guinea	5166000	2.85	2.64	-12000	153	43	..	300	1.1	53	82	11	7	26	6.3	33	16	3
19. Ghana	12710000	3.23	3.21	-10000	94	54	6.00%	310	-2.1	49	53	20	27	38	5.3	76	14	1
20. Madagascar	10212000	3.21	3.21	..	109	54	0.01%	310	-1.2	50	87	4	9	20	5.5	100	14	3
21. Sierra Leone	3657000	2.48	2.48	..	175	41	2.46%	320	1.1	55	65	19	16	23	3.3	40	12	1
22. Kenya	20375000	4.04	4.05	10000	91	56	0.77%	340	2.3	46	78	10	12	17	8.0	104	20	1
23. Sudan	21931000	2.88	2.84	-50000	112	49	..	400	1.3	52	78	10	12	20	5.5	52	18	2
24. Mozambique	13791000	2.82	2.82	..	123	48	52	66	18	16	17	10.2	104	6	(.)
25. Senegal	6567000	2.87	3.01	40000	137	48	1.86%	440	-0.1	53	77	10	13	34	3.8	48	12	3
26. Lesotho	2545000	2.79	2.67	-10000	106	56	..	460	6.3	54	60	15	25	13	21.4	112	20	2
27. Liberia	2204000	3.30	3.34	5000	127	51	3.17%	480	0.8	53	70	14	16	38	6.1	66	20	2
28. Mauritania	1693000	2.90	2.56	-29000	132	48	1.53%	480	0.3	53	69	8	23	25	4.6	33	10	..
29. Zambia	6704000	3.54	3.54	..	84	53	3.29%	580	-1.3	49	67	11	22	47	6.5	96	16	2
30. Cote d'Ivoire	10072000	1.05	3.50	250000	105	54	21.52%	740	1.5	46	60	15	25	24	6.0	130	76	1
31. Zimbabwe	8406000	1.37	3.37	..	77	58	..	710	1.0	53	79	4	17	44	8.5	76	17	3
32. Swaziland	757000	3.50	3.50	..	129	55	4.44%	870	2.6	50	74	9	17	18	12.8	711	42	..
33. Botswana	1070000	3.25	3.25	..	76	57	0.85%	920	8.5	48	78	8	14	22	11.1	102	23	..
34. Mauritius	1020000	1.37	1.18	-10000	25	67	0.08%	1160	2.8	62	29	24	47	55	3.4	106	51	..
35. Namibia	1127000	3.07	3.07	..	110	53	52	51	25	24	49	5.6
36. Nigeria	99649000	3.42	3.42	..	109	51	..	770	3.2	50	54	19	27	22	5.1	98	16	3
37. Cameroon	10191000	3.51	3.51	..	89	56	2.60%	820	2.7	51	83	7	10	39	8.4	107	19	2
38. Congo	1872000	3.59	3.59	..	77	59	3.46%	1230	3.5	51	34	26	40	55	5.5	..	69	6
39. Gabon	997000	2.60	2.60	..	112	52	..	3950	3.2	58	77	11	12	39	4.6
40. Angola	8754000	2.69	2.69	..	143	44	0.10%	53	59	16	25	23	6.0	(.)
41. Sao Tome/Princ.	108000	2.77	2.77	..	69	65	6.66%	310	-1.3	56	56	8	36	32	5.3
42. Cabo Verde	327000	3.06	2.41	-11000	75	65	..	320	..	50	57	14	29	27	3.4
43. Seychelles	65000	1.91	1.00	-2000	14	70	0.00%	2400	3.4	57	17	24	59	37	6.2	95
44. Comoros	454000	3.64	3.64	..	88	56	3.99%	..	-0.6	51	64	23	13	21	10.1	103	25	..
45. Djibouti	339000	3.20	3.20	..	132	49	-3.6	52	2	21	77	67	6.8	32	8	..
46. Eq. Guinea	373000	2.23	2.23	..	125	46	58	76	8	16	57	4.6	78	11	..
47. Reunion	531000	1.48	1.48	..	124	70	0.00%	..	3.4	63	30	21	49	58	3.2

Notes:

(1) Countries are ordered in accordance with the income level and economic categories used in "Population Growth and Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa", World Bank, 1986. Categories are, in order, Low Income Semi-Arid, Other Low Income, Middle Income Oil Importing, Middle Income Oil Exporting, and Populations less than 500,000.

(2) 1985 Population Statistics from Zacharia and Vu. Economic and education indicators from World Bank "Population Growth and Policies" 1986. African immigrants as percent of total population authors' calculations from national census reports. Infant Mortality Rate from "World Development Report, 1987" and Population Resources Bureau World Population Data Sheet, 1986.

(3) Due to the lack of census data, "Net Migrants" figures are not available for a number of countries known to be experiencing substantial in or out migration.

(4) The symbol "(.)" denotes fractional value. The symbol "..." denotes missing data.

TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF STOCK OF MIGRANTS BY DESTINATION

DESTINATION	(1)	(6)	(2)		(9)			African				
	Country Categ.	Survey Date	Data Class	Region	African Immigr.	Non-Afr. Immigr.	Total Immigr.	Non- Immigr.	Not Stated	Total (5) Pop.	Imm. as % Total Pop	African Imm. as % Total Pop
Mali	LISA	1976	N	West	72365	4549	76914	6316381	1623	6394918	1.20%	1.13%
Burkina	LISA	1975	B	West	107517	13275	120792	5509012	8399	5638203	2.14%	1.91%
Niger	LISA	NA		West	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Somalia	LISA	NA		East	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Gambia	LISA	1973	B	West	53300	1254	54554	437636	1309	493499	11.05%	10.80%
Chad	LISA	NA		Central	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Ethiopia	OLI	NA		East	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Zaire	OLI	1984*	B	Central	0	0	637605	29033802		29671407	2.15%	0.00%
Guin Bia (4)	OLI	1979	B	West	12043	888	12931	754808		767739	1.68%	1.57%
Malawi	OLI	1977	N	East	281806	6938	288744	5257554	1162	5547460	5.20%	5.08%
Uganda	OLI	1969	B	East	486300	56114	542414	8998319	2812	9543545	5.68%	5.10%
Burundi	OLI	1979	B	East	79902	2820	82722	3945569	129	4028420	2.05%	1.98%
Tanzania	OLI	1978	N	East			415669	17096942		17512611	2.37%	0.00%
Rwanda	OLI	1978	B	East	36789	5122	41911	4788569	1047	4831527	0.87%	0.76%
CAR	OLI	1975	B	Central	41362	3221	44583	1699451	36995	1781029	2.50%	2.32%
Togo	OLI	1970		West	143620	0	143620	1801779	5247	1950666	7.36%	7.36%
Benin	OLI	1983*	B	West	0	0	41284	3286937	2989	3331210	1.24%	0.00%
Guinea	OLI			West	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Ghana	OLI	1970	N	West	547149	14983	562132	7997181		8559313	6.57%	6.39%
Madagascar	OLI	1975	B	East	1078	52237	53315	7549710	765	7603790	0.70%	0.01%
Sierra L.	OLI	1974	B	West	67164	8826	75990	2655745	3424	2735159	2.78%	2.46%
Kenya	OLI	1979*	B	East			157371	15169560	130	15327061	1.03%	0.00%
Sudan	OLI	1973*	B	East	0	0	249414	12015614		12265028	2.03%	0.00%
Mozambique	OLI			East	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Senegal	MIOI	1976	N	West	93072	25710	118782	4879103		4997885	2.38%	1.86%
Lesotho	MIOI			South	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Liberia	MIOI	1974	N	West	47654	11804	59458	1443910		1503368	3.95%	3.17%
Mauritania	MIOI	1977	N	West	23007	5161	28168	1310662		1338830	2.10%	1.72%
Zambia	MIOI	1980	B	East	184742	46612	231354	5430447		5661801	4.09%	3.26%
Cote d'Iv	MIOI	1975	N	West	1437319	37124	1474443	5203580	26	6678049	22.08%	21.52%
Zimbabwe	MIOI			East	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Swaziland	MIOI	1976	N	South	22248	4212	26460	468074		494534	5.35%	4.50%
Botswana	MIOI	1981	N	South	8733	6886	15619	925324	84	941027	1.66%	0.93%
Mauritius (8)	MIOI	1983	N	East	772	4137	4909	961892	62	966863	0.51%	0.08%
Namibia	MIOI			South	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Nigeria	NIOE			West	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Cameroon	NIOE	1976	B	Central	185558	14630	200188	6931846	43	7132077	2.81%	2.60%
Congo	NIOE	1974	N	Central	45703	5464	51167	1260055	8568	1319790	3.88%	3.46%
Gabon	NIOE			Central	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Angola	NIOE	1983	B	Central	7892	7338	15230	8184770		8200000*	0.19%	0.10%
South Africa	UNI	1985	B	South	1400108	462084	1862192	21523453		23385645	7.96%	5.99%
Sao Tome & P	SP	1981	N	Central	6432	188	6620	89991		96611	6.85%	6.66%
Cape Verde	SP			West	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Seychelles	SP	1977	B	East	0	1933	1933	59965		61896	3.12%	0.00%
Comoros	SP	1980	B	East	13377	501	13878	317658	3614	335150	4.14%	3.99%
Djibouti	SP			East	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Eq. Guinea	SP			Central	0	0	0			0	ERR	ERR
Reunion	SP	1982	B	East	0		2320	512521	1059	516000	0.45%	0.00%
Total Abroad					5407012	804011	6211023	193817920	79487	201612093	3.08%	(7)
Total Pop												
Abroad as % resident pop.												

Notes:

- (1) Country categories are from "Population Growth and Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," World Bank, 1986. LISA = Low Income Semi-Arid; OLI = Other Low Income; MIOI = Middle Income Oil Importing; NIOE = Middle Income Oil Exporting; UNI = Upper Middle Income; SP = Small Population (<500,000)
- (2) Region classifications from Aderanti Adepoju, 1983
- (3) Asia excludes USSR. Includes immigrants categorized as from Asia, China, India, Pakistan, S.E. Asia., Japan. Excludes Middle Eastern countries.
- (4) Unknown foreign born classified as "other Africa."
- (5) Total population figures marked with "*" are World Bank Estimates for mid-1983 from "Population Growth and Policies," 1986.
- (6) Censuses years marked with "*" are ones for which data on immigrants by country are not yet available.
- (7) Because several countries added to the table do not distinguish African from Non-African immigrants, the average percentage cannot be properly calculated.
- (8) Island of Mauritius only; does not include population of Rodriguez.
- (9) May include small number of African immigrants categorized under "undetermined foreigners" by several countries' censuses.

TABLE 3 STOCKS OF MIGRANTS IN AFRICA BY SOURCE AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES
PAGE 1 of 5

DESTINATION	(1)		(6)		(2)													
	Country	Survey Date	Class	Region	Mali	Burkina Faso	Niger	Senegal	Gambia	Chad	Ethiopia	Zaire	Guin-Biss	Mali	Uganda	Burundi	Tanzania	
Mali	LISA	1976	N	West														
Burkina Faso	LISA	1975	B	West	23984													
Niger	LISA	MA		West														
Senegal	LISA	MA		East														
Gambia	LISA	1973	B	West	5478													
Chad	LISA	MA		Central														
Ethiopia	OLI	MA		East														
Zaire	OLI	1984*	B	Central														
Guin-Biss (4)	OLI	1979	B	West														
Mali	OLI	1977	N	East														
Uganda	OLI	1969	B	East														
Burundi	OLI	1979	B	East														
Tanzania	OLI	1978*	N	East														
Rwanda	OLI	1978	B	East														
CAR	OLI	1975	B	Central	181													
Togo	OLI	1970	B	West														
Benin	OLI	1983*	B	West														
Guinea	OLI			West														
Ghana	OLI	1970	N	West	13412	159299	15787											
Honduras	OLI	1975	B	East														
Sierra L.	OLI	1974	B	West														
Kenya	OLI	1979*	B	East														
Sudan	OLI	1973*	B	East														
Hozambique	OLI			East														
Senegal	OLI	1976	N	West	8872													
Lesotho	OLI			South														
Liberia	OLI	1974	N	West	1987													
Hauritania	OLI	1977	N	West	3441													
Zambia	OLI	1980	B	East														
Cote d'Iv	OLI	1975	N	West	353448	774099	33532											
Zimbabwe	OLI			East														
Swaziland	OLI	1976	N	South														
Botswana	OLI	1981	N	South														
Hauritius (8)	OLI	1983	N	East														
Hauritius	OLI			South														
Nigeria	OLI			West														
Cameroon	OLI	1976	B	Central	490													
Congo	OLI	1974	N	Central	2850													
Gabon	OLI			Central														
Angola	OLI	1983	B	Central														
S. Africa	UNI	1985	B	South														
Sao T.& P.	SP	1981	N	Central														
Cape Verde	SP			West														
Seychelles	SP	1977	B	East														
Comoros	SP	1980	B	East														
Djibouti	SP			East														
Eq. Guinea	SP			Central														
Reunion	SP	1982	B	East														

Total Abroad 413975 954437 99316 5 7636 46610 0 79778 31016 57940 4900 65633 68416
 Total Pop 4394918 5638205 0 0 492499 0 0 29671607 767739 5547460 9543545 4028420 17512611
 Abroad as % resident p 6.47% 16.97% 0% 0% 1.53% 0% 0.27% 4.04% 1.04% 0.05% 1.63% 0.39%

Notes:
 (1) Country categories are from "Population Growth and Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," World Bank, 1984. LISA = Low Income Semi-Arid; OLI = Other Low Income; MIOI = Middle Income Oil Importing; MIOE = Middle Income Oil Exporting; UNI = Upper Middle Income; SP = Small Population (<500,000)
 (2) Region classifications from Adhrami Adopju, 1983
 (3) Asia excludes USSR. Includes immigrants categorized as from Asia, China, India, Pakistan, S.E. Asia, Japan.
 Excludes Middle Eastern countries.
 (4) Unknown foreign born classified as "other Africa."
 (5) Total population figures marked with * are World Bank Estimates for mid-1983 from "Population Growth and Policy," 1984.
 (6) Census years marked with * are ones for which data on immigrants by country are not yet available.
 (7) Because several countries added to the table do not distinguish African from Non-African immigrants, the average percentage cannot be properly calculated.
 (8) Island of Mauritius only; does not include population of Rodrigues.
 (9) May include African immigrants classified as "undetermined foreigner" by some countries' censuses.

TABLE 3 STOCKS OF MIGRANTS IN AFRICA BY SOURCE AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES
CONTINUED, PAGE 2 of 5

DESTINATION	Rwanda	CAR	Togo	Benin	Guinea	Ghana	Madagas	Sierra L	Kenya	Sudan	Mozamb.	Senegal	Lesotho	Liberia	Mauritan	Zambia
Mali					19394	322						3615			9664	
Burkina			3169	1544		19162						2300				
Niger																
Somalia																
Gambia					10442			582				27177			1779	
Chad																
Ethiopia																
Zaire																
Guin Bis (4)					5675							6368				
Malawi																
Uganda	161953								119614	65240						
Burundi	47750				8							147				
Tanzania																
Rwanda																
CAR				58						719		116				
Togo																
Benin																
Guinea																
Ghana			244735	33447											4584	
Madagascar																
Sierra L.					44504	1346									3213	
Kenya																
Sudan																
Mozambique																
Senegal					38821											11294
Lesotho																
Liberia			203	51	26337	8068		6440				197				
Mauritania					1555							17624				
Zambia											2904					
Cote d'Iv			12830	38403	99476	47431						20288			3824	
Zimbabwe																
Swaziland											2055					
Botswana						93								464		
Mauritius (8)								160								24
Namibia																
Nigeria																
Cameroon		12431	703	1141								616				
Congo		7101	442	1313								2817			438	
Gabon																
Angola					113							84				108
South Africa						495	704		7380		71209		136911			21041
Sao Tome & P												197				
Cape Verde																
Seychelles																
Comoros							12837		77							
Djibouti																
Eq. Guinea																
Reunion																
	209703	19532	262082	75957	246325	76917	13701	7022	127071	65959	78449	81265	137373	11421	22967	21148
	4831527	1781029	1950644	3331210	0	8559313	7603790	2735159	15327061	12265028	0	4997885	0	1903368	1338830	5461801
	4.34%	1.10%	13.44%	2.28%	ERR	0.90%	0.18%	0.26%	0.83%	0.54%	ERR	1.63%	ERR	0.77%	1.72%	0.37%

TABLE 3 STOCKS OF MIGRANTS IN AFRICA BY SOURCE AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES
CONTINUED, PAGE 3 of 5

DESTINATION	Cote d'I	Zimbab	Swazi	Botswan	Mauriti	Namibia	Nigeria	Cameroon	Congo	Gabon	Angola	So Afr	North Africa	Other Africa	Sub-tota Afr Imm
Mali	3917												321	8257	72365
Burkina	49141						2122						102	1478	107517
Niger															0
Somalia															0
Gambia														666	53300
Chad															0
Ethiopia															0
Zaire															0
Guin Bis (4)															12043
Malawi													281806		281806
Uganda								63998					1073		486300
Burundi													294		79902
Tanzania															
Rwanda													253		36789
CAR								8609	2774	195			1867		41362
Togo													143620		143620
Benin															0
Guinea															0
Ghana	18301						55539							2045	547149
Madagascar					276								802		1078
Sierra L.							8209						5353		67164
Kenya															
Sudan															0
Mozambique															0
Senegal													7185		93072
Lesotho															0
Liberia	1770						1940							1051	47654
Mauritania													367		23007
Zambia		48111		28821		516					27682		1295	8925	184742
Cote d'Iv							42415							11553	1437319
Zimbabwe															0
Swaziland												18678		1515	22248
Botswana		2375	125			521	99				403	3807		612	8733
Mauritius (8)												341	32	192	772
Namibia															0
Nigeria															0
Cameroon							135296		1502	729			275	2455	185558
Congo								1361		476	6218			1081	45703
Gabon															0
Angola						53			354			3		5886	7892
South Africa		96884	34524	28924	4567	51619			3154		3190		5339	898312	1400108
Sao Tom & P									4	9	965			5222	6432
Cape Verde															0
Seychelles															0
Comoros														271	13377
Djibouti															0
Eq. Guinea															0
Reunion															0
	73129	147370	34649	57745	4843	52709	245620	9970	71786	1409	38458	22829	7731	1391774	5407012
	6678049	0	494534	961027	966863	0	0	7132077	1319790	0	8640000	23385645			
	1.10%	ERR	7.01%	6.14%	0.50%	ERR	ERR	0.14%	5.44%	ERR	0.45%	0.10%			

TABLE 3 STOCKS OF MIGRANTS IN AFRICA BY SOURCE AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES
CONTINUED, PAGE 5 of 5

DESTINATION	Total Immigrants	Non- Immigrants	Not Stated	Total (5) Pop.	Immigrants	African
					as % Total Pop	Immigrants as % Tot. Pop
Mali	76914	6316381	1623	6394918	1.20%	1.13%
Burkina	120792	5509012	8399	5638203	2.14%	1.91%
Niger	0			0	ERR	ERR
Somalia	0			0	ERR	ERR
Gambia	54554	437636	1309	493499	11.05%	10.80%
Chad	0			0	ERR	ERR
Ethiopia	0			0	ERR	ERR
Zaire	637605	29033802		29671407	2.15%	0.00%
Guin Bis (4)	12931	754808		767739	1.68%	1.57%
Malawi	288744	5257554	1162	5547460	5.20%	5.08%
Uganda	542414	8998319	2812	9543545	5.68%	5.10%
Burundi	82722	3945569	129	4028420	2.05%	1.98%
Tanzania	415669	17096942		17512611	2.37%	0.00%
Rwanda	41911	4788569	1047	4831527	0.87%	0.76%
CAR	44583	1699451	36995	1781029	2.50%	2.32%
Togo	143620	1801779	5247	1950646	7.36%	7.36%
Benin	41284	3286937	2989	3331210	1.24%	0.00%
Guinea	0			0	ERR	ERR
Ghana	562132	7997181		8559313	6.57%	6.39%
Madagascar	53315	7549710	765	7603790	0.70%	0.01%
Sierra L.	75990	2655745	3424	2735159	2.78%	2.44%
Kenya	157371	15169560	130	15327061	1.03%	0.00%
Sudan	249414	12015614		12265028	2.03%	0.00%
Mozambique	0			0	ERR	ERR
Senegal	118782	4879103		4997885	2.38%	1.86%
Lesotho	0			0	ERR	ERR
Liberia	59458	1443910		1503368	3.95%	3.17%
Mauritania	28168	1310662		1338830	2.10%	1.72%
Zambia	231354	5430447		5661801	4.09%	3.26%
Cote d'Iv	1474443	5203580	26	6678049	22.08%	21.52%
Zimbabwe	0			0	ERR	ERR
Swaziland	26460	468074		494534	5.35%	4.50%
Botswana	15619	925324	84	941027	1.66%	0.93%
Mauritius (8)	4909	961892	62	966863	0.51%	0.08%
Namibia	0			0	ERR	ERR
Nigeria	0			0	ERR	ERR
Cameroon	200188	6931846	43	7132077	2.81%	2.60%
Congo	51167	1260055	8568	1319790	3.88%	3.46%
Gabon	0			0	ERR	ERR
Angola	15230	8184770		8200000 *	0.19%	0.10%
South Africa	1862192	21523453		23385645	7.96%	5.99%
Sao Tome & P	6620	89991		96611	6.85%	6.66%
Cape Verde	0			0	ERR	ERR
Seychelles	1933	59965		61898	3.12%	0.00%
Comoros	13878	317658	3614	335150	4.14%	3.99%
Djibouti	0			0	ERR	ERR
Eq. Guinea	0			0	ERR	ERR
Reunion	2320	512621	1059	516000	0.45%	0.00%
	6211023	193817920	79487	201612093	3.08%	(7)

Table 4 *The remittance system: Determinants and intermediate effects*

Potential determinants of remittances	Expected direction of relationship	Intermediate effects				
		Available pool of remittances	Decision to remit or not	How to remit	Amount to remit	Uses
Number of workers	+	x				
Wage rates	±	x				
Economic activity in host country	+	x				
Economic activity in sending country	+	x				
Exchange rate	±		x	x		
Relative interest rate between labor-sending and receiving countries	±		x	x		
Political risk factors in sending country	-		x			
Facility of transferring funds	+	?	x	x		
Ratio of females in population in host country	-		x		x	
Years since outmigration	±		x		x	x
Household income level	-		x		x	x
Employment of other household members	-		x		x	x
Marital status	+		x		x	?
Level of education	-		x	?	x	x
Occupational level of migrants	-		x		x	x




Figure 1. *The remittance system: a decision model.*

Source: S.S. Russell, "Remittances from International Migration: A Review in Perspective," *World Development*, June, 1986, 14(6):985.

TABLE 5 GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILITY

Country	Acceptability of Spatial Dist of Pop	Policy Toward Internal Migr	Acceptability of Current Imm Level	Policy Toward Immigration	of Current Emigration Level	Policy Toward Emigration	Percent Foreign Born	Year for Which Data are Given
Angola	Inappropriate	Reverse	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Satis.	Maintain		
Benin	Inappropriate	No Intervene	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	1.2	79
Botswana	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Lower	1.7	81.
Burkina Faso	Inappropriate	Accelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Too High	Lower	2.1	88
Burundi	Part. Appr.	No Intervene	Sig. Too High	Lower	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	2.1	88*
Cameroon	Part. Appr.	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	3.1	76
Cape Verde	Inappropriate	No Intervene	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Satis.	Maintain		88*
CAR	Part. Appr.	Reverse	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	2.5	75
Chad	Part. Appr.	No Intervene	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Satis.	Maintain		
Comoros	Part. Appr.	No Intervene	Sig. Too High	Lower	Sig. Satis.	Maintain	4.1	88*
Congo	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	4.1	74
Conte d'Ivoire	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Sig. Too High	Lower	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	21.3	75
Djibouti	Part. Appr.	Reverse	Sig. Too High	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		88*
Eq. Guinea	Inappropriate	Reverse	Sig. Too Low	Raise	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		
Ethiopia	Part. Appr.	Accelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		88*
Gabon	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Sig. Too High	Lower	Sig. Too High	Lower		
Gambia	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Sig. Too High	Lower	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	11.1	88*
Ghana	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Sig. Too High	Lower	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	6.6	70
Guinea	Part. Appr.	No Intervene	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Too High	Lower		
Guinea-Bissau	Part. Appr.	Reverse	Sig. Too High	Lower	Sig. Too High	Lower	1.7	88*
Kenya	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	1	79
Lesotho	Part. Appr.	No Intervene	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Too High	Lower		
Liberia	Part. Appr.	Decelerate	Sig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	3.7	74
Madagascar	Part. Appr.	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		
Malawi	Part. Appr.	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Satis.	Maintain	5.2	77
Mali	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Satis.	Maintain	2.3	76
Mauritania	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Too High	Maintain	2.1	88*
Mauritius	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Too Low	Raise	1.7	72
Mozambique	Inappropriate	Reverse	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Satis	Lower		
Namibia	Inappropriate		Insig. Satis.	Maintain				
Niger	Inappropriate	No Intervene	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		
Nigeria	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		
Reunion			Insig. Satis.	Maintain			4.5	82
Rwanda	Inappropriate	No Intervene	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Too Low	Maintain	0.9	88*
Sao Tome and P.	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		
Senegal	Part. Appr.	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Satis.	Maintain		
Seychelles	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Too High	Maintain	3.1	77
Sierra Leone	Inappropriate	No Intervene	Sig. Too High	Lower	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	3	88*
Somalia	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		88*
South Afr	Part. Appr.	Reverse	Sig. Too High	Lower	Sig. Too High	Lower	3.9	80
Sudan	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Sig. Too High	Lower	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	1.8	73
Swaziland	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Satis.	Maintain	5.3	76
Tanzania	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	2.4	78
Togo	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	3.1	70
Uganda	Part. Appr.	Decelerate	Sig. Satis.	Maintain	Sig. Too High	Lower		88*
Zaire	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Sig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		
Zambia	Inappropriate	Decelerate	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	Insig. Satis.	Maintain	4.1	80
Zimbabwe	Part. Appr.	Decelerate	Sig. Too High	Lower	Insig. Satis.	Maintain		

Sources: UN Population Policy Data Bank, Population Division, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs;

* Indicates policies updated in the Sixth Inquiry, as reported in World Population Trends and Policies: 1989 Monitoring Report

TABLE 6 REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE, 1985 through 1988.

PAGE 1 OF 5

(Source: World Refugee Survey (USCR) for 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988)

Asylum	Totals				Source													
					Angola				Burundi				Cameroon					
					1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988		
Angola	92200	92200	92000	95700														
Benin	800	4000	3700	3000														
Botswana	5100	5050	5200	2700														
Burkina	0	180	180	200														
Burundi	60700	61000	76000	76000														
Cameroon	13700	5000	7300	4700														
CAR	37000	15000	5100	3000														
Chad	0	0	0	0														
Congo	1000	1200	1200	2100												150	100	
Djibouti	16700	17000	13500	2000														
Ethiop	72500	110000	220000	700500														
Gabon			100	100														
Ghana	0	140	140	100														
Ivory C	600	600	600	800														
Kenya	8500	8050	9000	10600														
Lesotho	11500	2500	2000	4000														
Liberia	0	100	110	200														
Malawi	0	70000	420000	630000														
Mozamb	800	400	500	400														
Namibia	40000	0	0	0	40000													
Nigeria	7400	7300	4800	5000														
Rwanda	41000	19000	19000	20600					18000	19000	19000	20600						
Senegal	5200	5500	5600	5200														
Sierra L	0	180	200	100														
Somalia	550000	550000	430000	365000														
South A	160000	175000	180000	180000														
Sudan	1094000	919000	817000	693600														
Swazil	10800	11800	67000	70700														
Tanzania	179000	200000	266000	266200					153500	160000	160000	156000						
Togo	1800	1700	1700	500														
Uganda	151000	120400	120400	125500														
Zaire	328000	333000	338000	325700	282000	290000	310000	298700	10000	10000	10000	10000						
Zambia	102000	141000	151500	149000	76000	86000	94000	97000										
Zimbab	51500	66500	150500	171500														
Col. Tot	3042800	2942800	3408330	3914700	398000	376000	404000	395700	181500	189000	189000	186600	0	150	100			
Per chg.		-3.3%	15.8%	14.9%		-5.5%	7.4%	-2.1%		4.1%	0.0%	-1.3%						-33.3%

TABLE 6 REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE, 1985 through 1988.
CONTINUED, PAGE 2 OF 5

Asylum	Chad				Ethiopia				Ghana				Guinea-Bissau			
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988
Angola																
Benin	800	4000	3700	3000												
Botswana																
Burkina				200												
Burundi																
Cameroon	13500	5000	7000	4400												
CAR	37000	15000	5000	2900												
Chad																
Congo		700	700	1500												
Djibouti					16700	17000	13500	2000								
Ethiopia																
Gabon																
Ghana		119	120													
Ivory C				100					200	200	100	100				
Kenya					1800	1850	1800	2200								
Lesotho																
Liberia																
Malawi																
Mozambique																
Namibia																
Nigeria	4000	4900	4000	4200					400							
Rwanda																
Senegal													5000	5000	5400	5000
Sierra L																
Somalia					550000	550000	430000	365000								
South A																
Sudan	121000	93000	45000	25000	718000	656000	677000	660000								
Swaziland																
Tanzania																
Togo									1500	1200	1200	400				
Uganda																
Zaire																
Zambia																
Zimbabwe																
	176300	122719	65520	41300	1286500	1224850	1122300	1029200	2100	1400	1300	500	5000	5000	5400	5000
		-30.4%	-46.6%	-37.0%		-4.8%	-8.4%	-8.3%		-33.3%	-7.1%	-61.5%		0.0%	8.0%	-7.0%

TABLE 6 REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE, 1985 through 1988.
CONTINUED, PAGE 3 OF 5

Asylum	Source															
	Mozambique				Namibia				Rwanda				Somalia			
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988
Angola					70000	70000	70000	74000								
Benin																
Botswana																
Burkina																
Burundi									58000	58000	65800	65800				
Cameroon							100	100								
CAR																
Chad																
Congo																
Djibouti																
Ethiop														15000	350000	
Gabon																
Ghana																
Ivory C																
Kenya	200								1800	1900	1900	2000				
Lesotho																
Liberia																
Malawi		70000	420000	630000												
Mozamb																
Namibia																
Nigeria					1000	1000	100									
Rwanda																
Senegal																
Sierra L							160	160								
Somalia																
South A	160000	175000	180000	180000												
Sudan																
Swazil	3600	4800	60000	64000												
Tanzania			72000	72000								21000				
Togo																
Uganda									115300	118000	118000	118000				
Zaire									12000	11000	11000	11000				
Zambia	4500	33000	35000	30000	7300	7000	7500	7300								
Zimbab	51000	66000	150000	171000												
	219300	348800	917000	1147000	78300	78160	77860	81400	187100	188900	196700	217800	0	0	15000	350000
		59.1%	162.9%	25.1%		-0.2%	-0.4%	4.5%		1.0%	4.1%	10.7%				2233.3%

TABLE 6 REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE, 1985 through 1988.
CONTINUED, PAGE 4 OF 5

Asylum	Source				Sudan				Uganda				Zaire			
	South Africa				1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988
Angola	9000	9000	9000	9400									13200	13200	13000	12300
Benin																
Botswana	500	500	700	900												
Burkina																
Burundi									400	400	400	400	2300	2600	9600	9600
Cameroon																
CAR																
Chad																
Congo														350	400	300
Djibouti																
Ethiop					72000	110000	205000	350000								
Gabon																
Ghana																
Ivory C																
Kenya									4200	3500	4500	5600				
Lesotho	11500	2500	2000	4000												
Liberia																
Malawi																
Mozamb	400	150	200	200												
Namibia																
Nigeria	1000	1000	400													
Rwanda									2500							
Senegal																
Sierra L																
Somalia																
South A																
Sudan									250000	165000	90000	3600	5000	5000	5000	5000
Swazil	6900	7000	7000	6700												
Tanzania	6000	6000	6000						2500				15500	16000	16000	16000
Togo																
Uganda						1000	1000						31400	1400	1400	1000
Zaire									22500	17000	2000					
Zambia	3000	3000	3000	3200									9500	9500	9500	9000
Zimbab	500	500	500	500												
	38800	29650	28800	24900	72000	111000	206000	350000	282100	185900	96900	9600	76900	48050	54900	53200
		-23.6%	-2.9%	-13.5%		54.2%	85.6%	69.9%		-34.1%	-47.9%	-90.1%		-37.5%	14.3%	-3.1%

TABLE 6 REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE, 1985 through 1988.
CONTINUED, PAGE 5 OF 5

Asylum	Zambia				Zimbabwe				Others				Totals			
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988	1985	1986	1987	1988
Angola													92200	92200	92000	95700
Benin													800	4000	3700	3000
Botswana					3800	4200	4000	1300	800	350	500	500	5100	5050	5200	2700
Burkina										180	180		0	180	180	200
Burundi											200	200	60700	61000	76000	76000
Cameroon									200		200	200	13700	5000	7300	4700
CAR											100	100	37000	15000	5100	3000
Chad													0	0	0	0
Congo									1000			300	1000	1200	1200	2100
Djibouti													16700	17000	13500	2000
Ethiop									500			500	72500	110000	220000	700500
Gabon											100	100			100	100
Ghana										21	20	100	0	140	140	100
Ivory C									400	400	500	600	600	600	600	800
Kenya									500	800	800	800	8500	8050	9000	10600
Lesotho													11500	2500	2000	4000
Liberia										100	110	200	0	100	110	200
Malawi													0	70000	420000	630000
Mozamb									400	250	300	200	800	400	500	400
Namibia													40000	0	0	0
Nigeria									1000	400	300	800	7400	7300	4800	5000
Rwanda									20500				41000	19000	19000	20600
Senegal									200	500	200	200	5200	5500	5600	5200
Sierra L										20	40	100	0	180	200	100
Somalia													550000	550000	430000	365000
South A													160000	175000	180000	180000
Sudan													1094000	919000	817000	693600
Swazil									300				10800	11800	67000	70700
Tanzania									1500	18000	12000	1200	179000	200000	266000	266200
Togo									300	500	500	100	1800	1700	1700	500
Uganda									4300			1500	151000	120400	120400	125500
Zaire	1500									5000	5000	6000	328000	333000	338000	325700
Zambia									1700	2500	2500	2500	102000	141000	151500	149000
Zimbab													51500	66500	150500	171500
	1500	0	0	0	3800	4200	4000	1300	33600	29021	23550	16200	3042800	2942800	3408330	3914700
	-100.0%					10.5%	-4.8%	-67.5%		-13.6%	-18.9%	-31.2%		-3.3%	15.8%	14.9%

TABLE 7: REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE 1988

Page 1 of 2

(Source: 1988 World Refugee Survey (USCR))

Asylum	1987 Total	1988 Total	Source												
			Angola	Burundi	Cameroo	Chad	Ethiop	Ghana	Guin-Bis	Mozamb	Namibia	Rwanda	Somalia	South Africa	
Angola	92000	95700									74000			9400	
Benin	3700	3000				3000									
Botswana	5200	2700												900	
Burkina	180	200				200									
Burundi	76000	76000										65800			
Cameroon	7300	4700				4400					100				
CAR	5100	3000				2900									
Chad	100	0													
Congo	1200	2100				1500									
Djibouti	13500	2000					2000								
Ethiop	220000	700500											350000		
Gabon	100	100													
Ghana	140	100													
Ivory C	600	800				100		100							
Kenya	9000	10600					2200					2000			
Lesotho	2000	4000												4000	
Liberia	110	200													
Malawi	420000	630000									630000				
Mozamb	500	400												200	
Nigeria	4800	5000				4200									
Rwanda	19000	20600		20600											
Senegal	5600	5200								5000					
Sierra L	200	100													
Somalia	430000	365000					365000								
South A	180000	180000									180000				
Sudan	817000	693600				25000	660000								
Swazil	67000	70700									64000			6700	
Tanzania	266000	266200		156000							72000	21000			
Togo	1700	500							400						
Uganda	120400	125500										118000			
Zaire	338000	325700	298700	10000								11000			
Zambia	151500	149000	97000								30000	7300		3200	
Zimbab	150500	171500									171000			500	
Col. Tot	3408430	3914700	395700	186600	0	41300	1029200	500	5000	1147000	81400	217800	350000	24900	

TABLE 7: REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE 1988

Continued, Page 2 of 2

(Source: 1988 World Refugee Survey (USCR))

Asylum	Source						Totals
	Sudan	Uganda	Zaire	Zambia	Zimbab	Others	
Angola			12300				95700
Benin							3000
Botswana					1300	500	2700
Burkina							200
Burundi		400	9600			200	76000
Cameroon						200	4700
CAR						100	3000
Chad							0
Congo			300			300	2100
Djibouti							2000
Ethiop	350000					500	700500
Gabon						100	100
Ghana						100	100
Ivory C						600	800
Kenya		5600				800	10600
Lesotho							4000
Liberia						200	200
Malawi							630000
Mozamb						200	400
Nigeria						800	5000
Rwanda							20600
Senegal						200	5200
Sierra L						100	100
Somalia							365000
South A							180000
Sudan		3600	5000				693600
Swazil							70700
Tanzania			16000			1200	266200
Togo						100	500
Uganda	5000		1000			1500	125500
Zaire						6000	325700
Zambia			9000			2500	149000
Zimbab							171500
Col. Tot	355000	9600	53200	0	1300	16200	3914700

TABLE 8: ASYLUM AND SOURCE COUNTRIES RANKED BY REFUGEE STOCKS, 1988

Page 1 of 2

(Source: 1988 World Refugee Survey (USCR))

Asylum	1987 Totals	1988 Totals	% of Total	Cumul. Percent	Source							
					Mozamb	Ethiop	Angola	Sudan	Somalia	Rwanda	Burundi	
Ethiop	220000	700500	17.9%	17.9%				350000	350000			
Sudan	817000	693600	17.7%	35.6%		660000						
Malawi	420000	630000	16.1%	51.7%	630000							
Somalia	430000	365000	9.3%	61.0%		365000						
Zaire	338000	325700	8.3%	69.3%			298700			11000	10000	
Tanzania	266000	266200	6.8%	76.1%	72000					21000	156000	
South A	180000	180000	4.6%	80.7%	180000							
Zimbab	150500	171500	4.4%	85.1%	171000							
Zambia	151500	149000	3.8%	88.9%	30000		97000					
Uganda	120400	125500	3.2%	92.1%				5000		118000		
Angola	92000	95700	2.4%	94.6%								
Burundi	76000	76000	1.9%	96.5%						65800		
Swazil	67000	70700	1.8%	98.3%	64000							
Rwanda	19000	20600	0.5%	98.9%								20600
Kenya	9000	10600	0.3%	99.1%		2200				2000		
Senegal	5600	5200	0.1%	99.3%								
Nigeria	4800	5000	0.1%	99.4%								
Cameroon	7300	4700	0.1%	99.5%								
Lesotho	2000	4000	0.1%	99.6%								
Benin	3700	3000	0.1%	99.7%								
CAR	5100	3000	0.1%	99.8%								
Botswana	5200	2700	0.1%	99.8%								
Congo	1200	2100	0.1%	99.9%								
Djibouti	13500	2000	0.1%	99.9%		2000						
Ivory C	600	800	0.0%	100.0%								
Togo	1700	500	0.0%	100.0%								
Mozamb	500	400	0.0%	100.0%								
Liberia	110	200	0.0%	100.0%								
Burkina	180	200	0.0%	100.0%								
Gabon	100	100	0.0%	100.0%								
Sierra L	200	100	0.0%	100.0%								
Ghana	140	100	0.0%	100.0%								
Chad	100	0	0.0%	100.0%								

Col. Tot	3408430	3914800			1147000	1029200	395700	355000	350000	217800	186600	
% of Total					29.3%	26.3%	10.1%	9.1%	8.9%	5.6%	4.8%	
Cumulative %					29.3%	55.6%	65.7%	74.8%	83.7%	89.3%	94.0%	

(a) From Table 1, original source Zacharia and Vu, 1985.

TABLE 8: ASYLUM AND SOURCE COUNTRIES RANKED BY REFUGEE STOCKS, 1988
CONTINUED, PAGE 2 OF 2

Asylum

	Namibia	Zaire	Chad	South A	Others	Uganda	Guin-Bis	Zimbab	Ghana	Totals	Total Pop. (a)	Refs as % Total Pop
Ethiop					500					700500	42271000	1.7%
Sudan		5000	25000			3600				693600	21931000	3.2%
Malawi										630000	7044000	8.9%
Somalia										365000	5384000	6.8%
Zaire					6000					325700	30557000	1.1%
Tanzania		16000			1200					266200	22242000	1.2%
South A										180000	32432000	0.6%
Zimbab					500					171500	8406000	2.0%
Zambia	7300	9000		3200	2500					149000	6704000	2.2%
Uganda		1000			1500					125500	14680000	0.9%
Angola	74000	12300		9400						95700	8754000	1.1%
Burundi		9600			200	400				76000	4696000	1.6%
Swazil				6700						70700	757000	9.3%
Rwanda										20600	6026000	0.3%
Kenya					800	5600				10600	20375000	0.1%
Senegal					200		5000			5200	6567000	0.1%
Nigeria			4200		800					5000	99669000	0.0%
Cameroon	100		4400		200					4700	10191000	0.0%
Lesotho				4000						4000	1545000	0.3%
Benin			3000							3000	4043000	0.1%
CAR			2900		100					3000	2583000	0.1%
Botswana				900	500			1300		2700	1070000	0.3%
Congo		300	1500		300					2100	1872000	0.1%
Djibouti										2000	339000	0.6%
Ivory C			100		600				100	800	10072000	0.0%
Togo					100				400	500	3038000	0.0%
Mozamb				200	200					400	13791000	0.0%
Liberia					200					200	2204000	0.0%
Burkina			200							200	7885000	0.0%
Gabon					100					100	997000	0.0%
Sierra L					100					100	3687000	0.0%
Ghana					100					100	12710000	0.0%
Chad										0	5018000	0.0%
Col. Tot	81400	53200	41300	24900	16200	9600	5000	1300	500	3914700		
% of Total	2.1%	1.4%	1.1%	0.6%	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%		
Cumulative %	96.1%	97.5%	98.5%	99.2%	99.6%	99.8%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			

(a) From Table 1, original source Zacharia and Vu, 1985.

Table 9 Significant Voluntary Repatriations in Sub-Saharan Africa
1988-early 1989

<u>To</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
Burundi	Rwanda	53,400
Chad, CAR, Sudan	Cameroon,	3,500
Ethiopia	Djibouti	5,000
Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Malawi	31,800
Uganda	Sudan	86,400
Zimbabwe	Botswana	2,650

Source: Table 4, World Refugee Survey 1988

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