1 IMPACT BONDS Impact Bonds and Maximizing Finance for Development June 2019 2 @2019 The Global Partnership for Results-Based Approaches The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 USA Website: http://www.gprba.org/ Contact us at: rbfinfo@gprba.org All rights reserved This work is a product of the Global Partnership for Results-Based Approaches (GPRBA), part of The World Bank Group. GPRBA provides innovative financing solutions that link funding to achieved results. GPRBA’s results-based financing (RBF) approaches provide access to basic services like water and sanitation, energy, health and education for low-income families and communities that might otherwise go unserved. By bringing together public and private sector funders to maximize resources and designing effective incentives for service providers to reach underserved low-income communities, GPRBA gives people the chance for a better life. 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All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to GPRBA, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; e-mail: rbfinfo@gprba.org. 3 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION4 MAXIMIZING FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT THROUGH IMPACT BONDS 5 Addressing critical financing gaps for service delivery  5 Fostering innovation and entrepreneurship  5 Promoting market competition, market discipline and scale  6 Optimizing the use of scarce public resources and risk management 6 Mobilizing new money for the Sustainable Development Goals 6 OPERATIONALIZING IMPACT BONDS UNDER THE MFD APPROACH 6 QUESTIONS AND DEBATES 7 Do Impact Bonds represent new money, or do they simply make better use of existing public spending in return for greater project impact?  7 Does the evidence support the viability of impact bonds for maximizing finance for development? 8 Are impact bonds large enough to make significant contribution to the World Bank’s goal of maximizing finance for development?  9 Do the costs justify the use of the instrument? 10 Selected Bibliography 11 4 INTRODUCTION WBG’s role as a global hub for MFD and provide an This paper outlines the potential contributions of opportunity to be a leader in the development, testing impact bonds to the World Bank Group’s (WBG) and scaling of impact bonds by means of outcomes Maximizing Finance for Development (MFD) approach. funds. These innovative financing vehicles can support The MFD approach is in part a response by the World MFD efforts to attract private capital and investment, Bank Group to the 2030 Sustainable Development as well as blend, along with blending concessional Agenda. This agenda calls for multilateral development and private resources for development challenges. banks (MDBs) to foster greater private investment, Impact bonds can also be used to address binding public spending efficiency, and private participation in constraints (in the physical, operational, regulatory or development activities. MDBs have further committed enabling environments) that impede private solutions. to the Hamburg Principles, which urge the crowding-in At a minimum, the WBG can foster the scaling of of private financing by 25 to 35 percent between 2017 impact bonds through various forms of support for and 2020. These resources will be needed in order to project analysis, structuring, negotiations, relevant help bridge a financing gap of about $2.5 trillion per reforms, capacity building, project identification and year1 in order to reach the Sustainable Development preparation, among other areas. The learning gained Goals (SDGs). The human costs of this shortfall can will enable the WBG to advise clients and become a be seen clearly as a result of the poor state of service knowledge leader in the application of impact bonds provision in low- and medium-income countries, where for the SDGs. delivery often falls far short of policy objectives and hampers progress on the SDGs. Impact bonds create a performance contract between public and private stakeholders, in which a Improving, Expanding, the quality of services provision government stipulates quantifiable improvements in low- and medium-income countries presents an in social or environmental outcomes. As part of this extraordinary opportunity for increasing life expectancy, contract, private investment is raised to pre-finance reducing income inequality, and making progress on the cost of delivering services. Payment is made the SDGs. Expansion of quality of services provision by the government or a third party to reimburse in low- and medium-income countries presents an the initial investment, plus a financial return—but opportunity to foster increased life expectancy, reduce only after outcomes are achieved. This return on income inequality, and make progress on the SDGs. investment is typically conditioned by the degree Improving the impact and efficiency of service provision to which outcomes improve, thereby mitigating in these countries is one of the most effective ways to performance risk for public actors and incentivizing address critical SDGs, particularly in health, education, private actors to meet or exceed requirements in poverty, clean water and sanitation, greater equality, development interventions (see Figure 1). and other areas of need. Public service provision is a prime candidate for improvement in developing countries, and impact bonds can facilitate this process Figure 1. Basic Anatomy of an Impact Bond by bringing to bear private partnership and expertise in finance, innovation, design, execution, and new metrics INVESTORS for performance. Return on investment 6 Impact bonds are an innovative financing vehicle that 1 Money in depends on success harness private capital and expertise for efficient, PARTNER 5 high-impact service delivery. Impact bonds enable GOVERNMENTS can perform a range of DEVELOPMENT Payment DONOR payment-by-results (PbR) models to draw private roles, including as IMPACT based on OUTCOMES “outcomes funder” PARTNERSHIP impact FUNDER(S) capital to pre-finance projects that address critical needs, as demonstrated in Africa, Asia and Latin Up-front America. The experience to date includes projects 2 capital and performance 4 aimed at improving youth unemployment, extreme management poverty, educational outcomes, and the quality of Independent verification basic service delivery, including to areas affected SERVICE of agreed-upon metrics by humanitarian crises. An impact bonds portfolio PROVIDERS financed by the WBG could be a major innovation 3 Service delivery platform in development finance. This will reinforce the TARGET 1 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2018/05/15/ BENEFICIARIES leveraging-innovative-finance-for-realizing-the-sustainablede- velopment-goals. 5 In addition to their money, investors also contribute growing rapidly, and early evidence is promising, their managerial capital to impact bonds. This includes more needs to be learned before impact bonds can advice and assistance in organizing and monitoring be scaled to their transformational potential. projects and vetting service providers with rigorous due diligence. Private actors promote a strong analytical MAXIMIZING FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT and empirical rigor in operations, helping to establish THROUGH IMPACT BONDS performance metrics and baselines for outcomes. Going forward, official development assistance will Impact bonds offer a more robust approach to diminish as a proportion of overall development verifiable outcomes than is found in most measurement funding flows. This trend, along with secular fiscal and evaluation (M&E) and impact evaluation systems. constraints, means that developing countries must seek more private capital to meet the growing demand Impact bonds offer a number of potential benefits for high quality and accountable public services. MDBs for participating stakeholders and for the broader are now recognizing impact bonds as a promising MFD agenda, including for: mechanism for blending private philanthropic • Governments and others who pay for outcomes and commercial capital with traditional forms of (also referred to as commissioners) can gain development finance. To date, eight impact bonds fiscal flexibility, efficiency, and greater focus have been piloted in developing countries. The Inter- on funding intervention services. By specifying American Development Bank (IADB), for example, has and incentivizing outcomes and inviting private already launched two impact bonds in Colombia, and participation, governments reduce the costs of is structuring bonds in Brazil and Argentina. The World failure and promote greater innovation in solutions. Bank’s portfolio to date includes impact bonds in West Bank and Gaza, Uzbekistan and Cameroon. • Service providers who deliver outcomes are given latitude in the delivery of services through Impact bonds can help maximize finance for a contracting structure that shifts from a focus development in several ways, including: on activities to outcomes. Impact bonds also help to overcome a traditional impediment facing Addressing critical financing gaps for service service providers in conventional contracts—a lack delivery of working capital—by introducing investors who Impact bonds can attract financing to results-based provide the upfront capital to cover delivery costs, contracting models that provide working capital in whole or in part. This fosters the growth of the for service delivery before the repayment is made. market for service providers and their businesses. Recent UK Department for International Development (DFID) research shows that many service providers, • Investors who provide the upfront capital to deliver particularly non-governmental organizations the outcomes are attracted to impact bonds (NGOs) and small- and medium-sized enterprises because the instrument offers the chance to (SMEs), face serious financing hurdles in payment- diversify their portfolio and invest in entrepreneurial by-results contracts.3 This is because payment is solutions in a range of social and environmental usually made only after services are delivered and issues. The alignment of incentives in impact bonds results are achieved. Hence, service providers must assures investors that counterparties are all furnish upfront financing from their own internal focused on the same outcomes and goals. These cash reserves, or less commonly, from commercial same incentives encourage a degree of flexibility not loans and philanthropic funds. These constraints found in other investment operations. Furthermore, limit the service providers to those organizations impact bonds signal the commitment of a with significant cash reserves or a strong financial government and/or donor to the improvement of a track record, thereby limiting opportunities for SMEs, specific issue, and can act to establish a price that entrepreneurs and non-profit organizations. funders are willing to pay for similar outcomes in the future. This becomes a powerful market benchmark for funders, investors and service providers. Fostering innovation and entrepreneurship Impact bonds incentivize innovation and an As of June 2019, 138 impact bonds have been entrepreneurial approach to problem solving, which launched globally, representing more than $400 are typically absent in public service provision. million in private finance mobilized to resolve complex social challenges.2 While this model is 3 Chinfatt, Sherene and Melissa Carson, Supplier Access to Prefinance in Payment by Results Contract, Dalberg Intelli- 2 Brookings Institution, Global Impact Bond database. gence, 2017. 6 Prioritizing final outcomes over a focus on activities as chronic health conditions), or unemployment. allows service providers greater autonomy and Greater prevention will reduce fiscal burdens in the flexibility, fostering innovation and risk-taking during longer term, and ultimately create net savings for implementation. Outside investors often bring market governments. But these may not yield cashable discipline and a results culture to impact bonds savings that are directly reflected in budget lines. This operations, advising on evidence-based M&E and on is often the case in developing countries where social performance-management systems. The interaction safety nets are already very thin. Even so, by paying of investors with local service providers, particularly only for successful outcomes, governments can enterprises, can be a powerful stimulus for private more efficiently allocate public resources to the most sector development and entrepreneurship. By freeing effective programs and providers, thereby transfering governments to focus on preventive measures in the risks of innovation to private investors and underserved populations, service providers are incentivizing better performance per unit of outcome. incentivized to target populations with the greatest needs and with the highest potential payback in Mobilizing new money for the Sustainable social and financial benefits. Moreover, in many Development Goals countries, these target populations have large To date, impact bonds have raised more than $400 untapped market potential. In the course of providing million for challenges that have not previously services for an impact bond, entrepreneurial benefited from private finance. A diverse set of service providers may also identify future business investors are participating in impact bonds. These opportunities in these markets. include institutional investors (such as Goldman Sachs, QBE, and Munich Re); impact investment Promoting market competition, market funds (such as the Calvert Foundation); development discipline and scale finance institutions (DFIs); the Multilateral Investment Private investors contribute more than their money to Fund; and high-net-worth individuals on the wealth impact-bonds operations. They also contribute their management platforms of UBS and Bank of America/ expertise and experience by advising on execution Merrill Lynch. Additionally, impact bonds are a and strategies, helping to vet service providers, and mechanism for introducing global philanthropy to instilling a results-focused culture. Going forward, new funding modalities and social challenges. For private partnerships and know-how will be critical for instance, three of Colombia’s largest foundations scaling impact bonds. While most service providers have repurposed low-risk securities for social missions to date have been small non-profit organizations, and are investing in an impact bond through their scaling will require working with larger companies respective endowments. Impact bonds are also and value chains with high delivery capability— attracting foundations that wish to pay for specific underscoring the growing need for deep private outcomes, which represents a source of new money sector knowledge and experience. A new platform for for social services. For example, in the Cameroon promoting scale and market competition in impact Cataract Impact Bond, the Fred Hollows Foundation bonds is the outcomes fund. Outcomes funds vary is paying the investor, and the Overseas Private in design, but in most of these structures, outcomes Investment Corporation, the cost of the outcomes of payers engage multiple service providers on the the operation. same target outcomes and the same set of metrics. Over multiple contracting rounds, prices adjust and OPERATIONALIZING IMPACT BONDS providers that produce the most outcomes at the UNDER THE MFD APPROACH lowest price get the job. This process attracts new The MFD, the Hamburg Principles, and the 2030 firms and entrepreneurs with creative and cost- Agenda for Sustainable Development all reflect effective solutions, while less competitive providers an inflection point in the framing of development exit or avoid the market altogether. Outcomes funds finance. MDBs now face growing aspirations in are prime vehicles for moving from single, pilot developing countries on the one hand, and the projects to longer-term programmatic funding. demand by donors for greater value for money, crowding in of private capital, and verified Optimizing the use of scarce public resources development impact through the SDGs on the and risk management other hand. This inflection point presents serious Impact bonds have a solid record of attracting tensions that seek resolution through instruments financing for prevention-oriented services. Examples that address the SDGs while also mobilizing private of these include operations aimed at preventing capital and greater domestic revenue in middle- and costs associated with prison, health care (such low-income countries. 7 This inflection point and the growth trajectory of data, capable providers, and an enabling legal impact bonds are well timed for WBG efforts on framework? MFD. The MFD approach prescribes a decision rule, or cascade framework, that aims first to optimize • Is there a need for working capital for providers to the use of scarce public funds by seeking, wherever deliver the service? possible, to engage commercial finance and broader • Can blended finance help reduce the investment private sector participation in development activities. risk to make the project viable? The possible integration of an impact bond in this process should be considered at an early stage of A simple impact bond decision tree for the cascade is the cascade decision tree. The process can begin by shown in Figure 2 below. asking the following questions: • Is there an existing competitive market solution? QUESTIONS AND DEBATES • Is there a commercial, user-pays solution? Do Impact Bonds represent new money, or do they simply make better use of existing public • Is there potential for delivery through the private spending in return for greater project impact? sector? A common question regarding impact bonds and • Can you achieve better value for money if paying MFD is whether this form of financing represents new for results? funding for development. The answer is a qualified “yes,” based on the recognition that this funding is • Are the enabling conditions for an outcomes/ not usually in the form of an immediate net-positive results-based project present, such as good inflow of resources into public coffers. Recall that Figure 2. Impact Bond Decision Tree for the Cascade Framework Is there a competitive market solution? Yes No Let the private sector Is there a commercial provide the solution or user-pays solution? Yes No Consider a traditional Is there potential of delivery PPP through the private sector? Yes No Can you achieve better Delivery through the value for money if public sector paying for results? Yes No Is there a well-defined target popilation, an Fund through a enabling legal framework, and strong pool of traditional input- or service providers with a track record of results? output-based contract Yes No Consider building capacity Is there a need for or contracting based on working capital? inputs/outputs Yes No Consider an impact Consider other results- bond based instruments Source: Levoca Impact Labs, 2018. 8 in a successful impact bond, the investor is repaid bonds pursue verified social outcomes based on its principal plus a return. Furthermore, impact hard evidence and metrics, thereby generating bonds typically do not operate on a pure user-pays gains that should be significantly higher than those model, such as electricity tariffs or traffic tolls, as is delivered by traditional public projects, making this common in PPPs. Instead, most impact bonds work approach ideal for promoting the SDGs. Despite with vulnerable populations, where the end users their best efforts, public actors will be hard-pressed typically do not pay for the full cost of service. Public to equal the rigor of private investment operations expenditures that are repurposed from inputs to that are incentivized on well-defined outcomes. outcomes are typically a core part of the model. It While successful impact bonds operations may not might be argued, therefore, that impact bonds are generate an immediate net inflow of money, they not “new money” or a net positive inflow of resources will generate benefits, synergies and budgetary into the economy. This interpretation overlooks a few savings that over time do represent new money in an important points. economy. First, impact bonds free public planners to focus more Does the evidence support the viability of on prevention, rather than continually responding impact bonds for maximizing finance for to current crises. Successful prevention outcomes development? in areas such as crime, health and education will reduce pressure on public budgets over time and Much of the early evidence from existing impact deliver multiple economic and social benefits to bonds is promising. The first impact bond was individuals and communities. These can include gains in Peterborough Prison in the United Kingdom in future wages, livelihoods, tax bases, and business and targeted a reduction in recidivism rates. opportunities, among other spillovers. Without impact The operation ended in 2016 with a nine percent bonds, these prevention-related benefits would not reduction in recidivism, with investors receiving likely have happened. their full investment plus the expected return. India became the first developing country to launch an Second, impact bonds are not simple substitutes impact bond in 2014, with an operation to improve or alternatives to traditional public sector funding, educational outcomes for 18,000 children in 160 but are a different funding modality that focuses schools. In the first two years of the contract, 88 on outcomes rather than activities. Impact bonds percent of the enrollment targets and 50 percent of create synergies by blending different financing the learning targets had been achieved. Both impact sources, stakeholders, decision analytics and, bonds, as shown in Figure 3, experienced improved importantly, different incentives than those found in results over time, lending support to the idea that public funded social projects. Furthermore, impact impact bonds have an incentive set that encourages Figure 3. Peterborough and Educate Girls Social Impact Bonds The first SIB: Results from the Peterborough SIB The first DIB: Results from the Educate Girls DIB showed a significant reduction in reoffending showed a significant increase in learning outcomes 12% 10,000 9,000 9.7% 10% 9% 8,000 8.4% 7.5% 7,000 8% 6,000 6% 5,000 4,000 4% 3,000 2,000 2% 1,000 0% 0 Target Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Weighted Target Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Average Source: Levoca Impact Labs, 2018. 9 feedback, learning and continuous improvement. are usually less innovative. There is some evidence Moreover, both examples underscore the fact that to suggest, however, that some impact bonds private partners can deliver in payment-by-results have been innovative in their execution processes, contracts, particularly in operations involving harnessing data and feeding it into new rounds of complex, long-term interventions. continual process improvements. Despite mounting interest in impact bonds, there • Claim: Impact bonds optimize the use of scarce have not yet been enough completed or mature public resources for development outcomes. transactions to fully assess the contributions of this instrument to MFD. The overview below is of Evidence: A major advantage claimed by impact available evidence for selected claims made in bonds is that this model promotes an optimal support of impact bonds. It is based on a review allocation of public funding to improved outcomes. of the literature and interviews with key players in Impact bonds that focus on prevention-oriented impact bonds. services can free up future fiscal space, and there is qualitative evidence of better outcomes, • Claim: Impact bonds and pay-for-results compared with typical contracting models. But operations address critical financing gaps. to date, only a limited number of evaluations of the impact- bond model have been done, and Evidence: There is strong evidence to support substantial evidence backing this claim is thus this claim. Impact bonds have increased social far lacking. One area impeding progress is the financing provided by mainstream investors, financial and transaction costs associated with crowded in private capital and expertise, and impact bonds and other forms of payment-by- enabled governments to shift more resources results contracts. These transaction costs must towards prevention. Consequently, impact bonds be streamlined and reduced in order to optimize can help open up fiscal space to finance critically scarce public resources. underfunded areas where there are both cashable and non-cashable benefits. Are impact bonds large enough to make • Claim: Impact bonds attract private sector significant contribution to the World Bank’s expertise and introduce market discipline. goal of maximizing finance for development? Most impact bond transactions are relatively small, Evidence: In general, this claim is well supported although there is a large range in transaction size, by the evidence. Compared with most other forms from $110,000 to more than $26 million. Scaling of aid, impact bonds have been notable for the impact bonds can contribute to the implementation degree of participation of private stakeholders in of MFD, mobilizing large amounts of capital for the operations. Where this has not occurred, it has SDGs. This will require a change in approach from that been due to: poorly designed contracts with weak employed by many of the early impact bonds. First, private incentives, overly complex terms and/or most of these have been precision-targeted on well- inadequate time for execution; outcomes outside defined populations, and have proven to be effective, the control of service providers; and/or other but too expensive per beneficiary. Most of these factors. operations are therefore not scalable for a systems- • Claim: Impact bonds foster innovation and wide provision of social services. Second, many impact entrepreneurship. bonds have been financed at the sub-national level, including cities, states and municipalities, where the Evidence: Impact bonds are innovative typical size of projects is still relatively small. Third, instruments by virtue of their structure and many services are provided by small social sector partnerships, but more evidence will be needed organizations with a presence among the vulnerable to prove the claim that impact bonds are prime populations the operation is targeting. Scaling these agents of innovation. For instance, evidence organizations and their interventions is often an suggests that compliance with standard incremental process. More data and lessons learned procedures for aid programs has hampered are needed. Certainly larger partners who can track innovation in some cases. In other cases, stringent and execute financial operations at scale will be investor demand for evidence of outcomes has needed. Twenty-three donor-development agencies had the unintended effect of shifting operations have formed the Impact Bonds Working Group, which toward known and proven programs and is exploring viable strategies for scaling impact bonds methodologies. Although these are effective, they and other performance-based programs. 10 Do the costs justify the use of the instrument? templates, standardized metrics, and evaluation Currently, impact bonds can incur relatively high systems. This process will drive down costs and transaction costs that add to the cost of capital and increase the volume of transactions that can be financing. These must come down over time in order commissioned within a specific period of time. In all for impact bonds to function as viable instruments cases, commissioners should analyze costs in the for development finance. These costs are driven context of a value for money case for any impact by legal fees, extensive negotiations, origination bond under consideration. costs; capital raising, coordinating parties across project approvals and appraisals, evaluation and These costs reflect the bespoke nature of impact project monitoring, performance management, design, the current size of the market, and a and participation in governance and oversight steep learning curve. With continued growth and committees, among other variables. Emerging associated learning, best practices and greater platforms for impact bonds, such as outcomes funds, standardization and specialization, the transaction will allow for greater streamlining of key elements costs of these operations should fall. Short of this, of the design process, through common contract the impact bond model will not scale. 11 Selected Bibliography USAID, “The Utkrisht Impact Bond: Improving Maternal and Gustafsson-Wright, Emily, Sophie Gardiner and Vidya Newborn Health Care in Rajasthan, India,” 2017. https:// Putcha, “The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds: www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1864/Utkrish- Lessons from the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide,” Impact-BondBrochure-November-2017.pdf. 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