1. Country and Sector Background

Conflict and Violence
Colombia’s long-standing internal armed conflict has increased in severity since the 1960s, and rates of violence have intensified significantly since 1996. From 1970 to 1991, homicide rates tripled, and despite a 20 percent decrease between 1992 and 2000 (due to a decrease in the three largest cities1), Colombia’s homicide rate remains three times higher than Brazil’s or Mexico’s. In fact, worldwide, Colombia’s homicide rate is surpassed only by that of El Salvador. Similarly, extortion, kidnapping, car theft, and armed robbery rates have continued to grow throughout the 1990s, leading Colombia in 1997 to a remarkable household victimization rate of more than 35 percent.

Multiple empirical studies have sought to explain the determinants of homicide and crime in Colombia, testing five alternative hypotheses: (i) illegal drug trade; (ii) impunity; (iii) the presence of extragovernmental groups (guerrillas and paramilitaries) that have taken over traditional governmental roles in parts of the country; (iv) poverty/income inequality; and (v) the possibility that Colombia’s decades of internal strife have created a population that is innately more “violence-prone”. The high homicide rates prevalent in Colombia today seem to be caused by two factors: the drug trade coupled with the presence of illegal armed groups. Sánchez and Núñez (2000) performed a comprehensive test of these alternative hypotheses with the best crime datasets available across different municipalities in Colombia. Their main findings indicate that socioeconomic variables such as inequality, poverty, political exclusion, and lack of education contribute to the crime rate. Despite regional and rural urban variations, jointly they explain only 6–12 percent of the total variability in the homicide rate. The rest of the sample variability (nearly 90 percent) is explained primarily by the intensity of illegal drug-trade activities and its interaction with the activities of illegal armed groups. According to Levitt and Rubio (2000) these findings are consistent with international evidence showing positive covariance between homicide rates and periods of intense illegal drug trade.

Violence generates increasing social costs and demands substantial public resources. Public expenditure on security and justice tripled as a share of GDP during the last decade, and the trend has accelerated

1 In fact, from 1990 to 1997 homicides appear to affect greater areas of the country. While homicide rates have decreased in Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín (where they still remain more than double the national average), they have increased in areas once considered less dangerous.
since 2000. On the social side, estimates of the conflict-related loss of human capital are estimated at least 1 percent of GDP, and investment, educational and labor-market opportunities are severely limited in an atmosphere of violence and insecurity. Healthcare costs likewise are affected, and the WHO estimates that violence-related health care costs represent 5 percent of Colombia’s GDP.

**Poverty and Vulnerability**

Social indicators mirrored changing economic conditions, worsening after 1995. The rising employment rate, evident since 1990, reversed itself in 1995; poverty and extreme poverty increased substantially; labor and household incomes fell, while coverage rates of the main social services stagnated or decreased. Urban unemployment went from 7.6 to 20.5 percent during the second half of the 1990s, doubling the historical rate and reaching the highest level ever recorded. Clearly, reducing unemployment is difficult in the absence of higher economic growth rates.

Notably, rising unemployment affected the youngest, the least educated and the poorest population segments more severely. For example, the unemployment rate (UR) for young people (ages 16-24) was 25 to 50 percent, depending on location. The UR for persons with low or intermediate education levels increased more than that for the highly educated. And after 2000, URs among the poor were more than double those among the non-poor. Wages have also been falling since 2000, with household incomes declining on average about 15 percent, with the income in poorest households declining at faster rates.

The late 1990s also saw a significant worsening in poverty. While between 1978 and 1995, poverty rates had been continuously improving at close to 1.5 percent per year, 1999 rates were close to those of 1988, and initial observations for 2000-2003 suggest the situation has not improved. The deterioration in poverty rates has been especially profound in urban areas. In rural areas, where dramatic improvements had been observed in the 1980s, the situation stagnated during the 1990s. The result is not only more poor people, but also deepening poverty, as evidenced by both the increase of extremely poor people and the rising the poverty gap (P2), which climbed 22 percent between 1995 and 1999.

**Violence, Poverty and Displacement**

One key factor contributing to the worsening poverty rate is the displacement of populations from areas of armed conflict. While data on the number of displaced is not always reliable, official reports account for 2,000,000 internally displaced people (IDP). Numbers of IDP have risen markedly, averaging 285,000 per year between 2000 and 2003. About 51 percent of the displaced are women, 49 percent are under 18 years of age, and about 13 percent are indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians. Overwhelmingly they are from rural households (90 percent), whose main source of income had come from agricultural activities.

The IDP have tended to move to the departmental centers to stay close to their land, or migrate to larger urban areas, such as Bogotá, Medellín, Barranquilla, and Cartagena, fueling urban poverty growth. A survey of 200 IDP in Bogotá, Medellín, and Cartagena suggests that households relocating to departmental urban or periurban centers may be undertaking “preventive displacement” as they predict an escalation of conflict at the local level. Those heading to larger and more distant cities may be trying to escape direct threats to their lives.

The increasing numbers of IDP coupled with the limited capacity of the urban sector to absorb them have left these vulnerable groups at risk. Because their agricultural skills have little value in urban labor markets, IDP are very likely to be unemployed. In addition, limited to urban slums or spontaneous settlements, IDP face inadequate housing options and poor access to public services. The combination of major economic losses, psychological hardship, and other strains on household structure (disintegration of families, single-parent households, etc.) put their members at risk of resorting to begging, prostitution, and delinquency, ultimately falling into a circle of extreme poverty. The well-being of children of IDP
households is of special concern, as food security in those households is jeopardized and educational opportunities shrink.

The full economic and social effects of forced migration are not well known. One effect may be the concentration of landholdings in the “expulsion” areas, and the increasing weakness of property rights for any kind of real assets. This, in turn, gives rise to perverse efficiency effects on the remaining rural population through its obvious discouragement of private investment. Another effect may be the creation of a new highly vulnerable group of returnees or relocated IDP who may not be able to come back to their original income-earning strategies owing to the loss of assets or household members. On the other hand, rural population loss could possibly lead to local labor shortages and, thus, rising wages.

**Government Policy and Program Strategy**

In response to the sectoral issues described here, the Government of Colombia (GOC) has designed a comprehensive policy to fight poverty, address the increasing incidence of violence and displacement, and tackle displacement-related effects on the welfare of vulnerable and displaced populations. The goal is to minimize displacement and assist displaced people through targeted regional development interventions that: (i) reduce vulnerability, and thereby prevent displacement; (ii) return displaced families to their home communities or relocate them elsewhere; and (iii) consolidate democratic governance within the regions.

A key strategy of the government policy, aimed to strengthen governance and democracy and to promote social equity in deprived and conflict-affected regions, is the promotion of regional development programs. These programs focus on three integrated components: (a) productive investments and income generation; (b) institutional and community strengthening; and (c) construction and improvement of social and physical infrastructure. A central element of this general strategy outlined in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2002-2006 is the implementation of the Peace and Development Programs (PDPs) and the Laboratorios de Paz.

The Peace and Development Project, Phase I of a two phase APL requested by the government, comprises these three aspects. Specifically, the project addresses the NDP’s priority to “Desarrollo en zonas deprimidas y de conflicto” and “Atención y prevención del desplazamiento forzado” Toward this end, the project aims to draw upon the lessons learned from the successful implementation of the two Magdalena Medio Regional Development LILs (MM I and II) and expand these to other conflict-affected regions of the country. The project identified five geographical regions to receive specific displacement-mitigating interventions. These areas were selected based on high poverty rates, displacement intensity (number of expelled IDP per 100,000 inhabitants), displacement pressure (number of received IDP per 100,000 inhabitants), absolute numbers of expulsion and reception of IDP, and geographical linkage with EU-funded “Laboratorio de Paz” areas. The chosen areas are: Magdalena; Oriente Antioqueño; Macizo Colombiano; Norte de Santander; and Montes de María.

The Project is based on the following three premises on vulnerability and conflict. First, populations with greater social, economic and environmental assets are less likely to choose to displace themselves when they perceive the risk of exposure to conflicts because they have more means to mitigate the potential negative impact of that exposure. Second, displaced populations, having already lost such assets, would require a temporary safety net to prevent further deterioration of their living conditions before they can start re-engaging themselves to build new assets. Third, responsible governance through broad-based participation tends to deter the occurrence of conflict-driven violence. The validity of these premises has been proven in the movement of Asambleas Municipales such as those of the municipalities of Mogotes in Santander, Versalles in Valle, Sonson and Granada in Antioquia, the Indigenous Resguardo of La Maria in Cauca or the locality of Micoahumado in Bolivar and the experience of the MM …
2. Objectives

The objective of the project is to reduce the vulnerability of the poor population in five conflict-affected regions of Colombia. The project will help to reduce the vulnerability of families and communities to violence and poverty, and to create conditions for peaceful coexistence within priority regions of the country. As indicated before, the project assumes that building assets is a measure that contributes to mitigate the risk of displacement, and that restoring a basic safety net to displaced families is a first step in their social and economic stabilization. In addition, the project does not address directly the problem of conflict and violence but supports people to reduce and mitigate the risk of the conflict and violence.

3. Rationale for Bank Involvement

The Bank has acquired considerable experience in CDD over the past 10 years and, based on lessons learned in projects in many countries, it has a comparative advantage in the design and supervision of such projects. The Bank also has considerable experience in post-conflict situations in various regions of the world including such countries as Chad, Croatia and Sri Lanka. Among the important lessons learned in these experiences are the need to promote confidence building activities in conflict-affected areas in order to rebuild not only the economic but also the social linkages and institutional ties that are so important to mitigate or reduce the consequences of violence. CDD experience has also shown the importance of empowering communities to make decisions regarding their own welfare and the need to develop inclusive decision-making mechanisms. The Bank’s experience most directly related to the proposed project comes from two highly successful LILs carried out in the Middle Magdalena River basin from 1998 to 2004. Through these experiences, the Bank has formed a close partnership with the GOC and civil society organizations on issues of social development and is, perhaps, uniquely qualified to work with the GOC and other partners in the design and implementation for the proposed project. Finally, the APL is an instrument well adapted to the GOC’s aims of scaling up of this project over an extended period of time.

4. Description

The primary beneficiaries of the Project will be poor and vulnerable families living in the regions, currently displaced families, community organizations, associations of small producers, or micro-enterprises and municipal governments. Components A and B have been defined on the basis of the populations served, e.g. poor and vulnerable residents of the regions (Component A) and displaced families that return to their place of origin or relocate to the target regions (Component B). The activities of component A and B are similar, but the allocation of resources follow rules that are specific to each populations as will be explained later. The project components are:

**Component A, Building of Social, Economic and Environmental Assets. Us$ 10,995,000**

The objective of the component is to equip poor and vulnerable populations in rural and urban communities with means to mitigate the negative impact of possible exposures to conflict. The method utilized under this component would be the grant financing of small-scale community subprojects that would facilitate the building of social, economic and environmental assets at the local level. The activities and targets of the component are the following:

(i) Food security to about 80,000 families. This intervention seeks to promote the production of basic staple food crops for self-consumption and to reduce the costs of purchased foods. Preferably, the supported food crops will be part of an economic activity in the area. Subprojects will fund technical advice, inputs, small equipment, and capacity building to promote or consolidate organizations and knowledge.

(ii) Generation of income or employment through farm and non-farm productive and small business activities for about 20,000 families. The component will support organizations of small producers to embark on new productive activities or improve the productivity of existing ones through funding of technical studies, technical assistance, and purchases of inputs and equipment. Funding will also support capacity building to improve business skills, consolidate organizations, and establish partnerships and linkages with agro-industrial firms or financial institutions. The majority of the investment funding for productive subprojects will be provided by sources other than the project, particularly by helping beneficiaries access the co-financing mechanisms of FINAGRO and BANCOLDEX.
which have allocated about US$40 million to support farm and non-farm productive projects for vulnerable populations in high conflict regions of the country. Beneficiary contributions for each subproject will be no less than 10 percent, and transfer to individual subprojects will not exceed US$100,000.

(iii) Promotion of access to social networks and the enhancement of a culture of development and peace in the region to about 100,000 citizens. The component will give priority to increasing educational and employment opportunities for youth, disseminating information and awareness about rights to education and health services, improving the quality of these services, and enhancing networks for regional development, a sense of belonging, and peaceful coexistence. It will also support basic sanitation and home improvements of about 2,000 households, following the guidelines established by RSS.

(iv) Promotion of activities with a positive impact on the environment. The emphasis will be on education, awareness, and actions geared to protect or enhance environmental assets such as watershed protection; conservation of the natural landscape; and sustainable use of natural resources such as water, soil, and biodiversity.

Component B, Return or Relocation of Displaced Families. US$11,350,000

The objective of the component is to provide a basic safety net to 20,000 currently displaced families who are willing and able to return to their place of origin or to relocate. The activities and targets of the component are: (i) providing food security to about 20,000 families (52.6 percent of the total displaced population in the target regions) to produce basic staples for self-consumption as in component 1; (ii) promoting access to health and education services of the municipality and the quality of these services to which the displaced population is entitled by law; (iii) developing social and economic opportunities for 17,000 families as they begin to stabilize. The types of subprojects are similar to those of component 1; (iv) providing basic sanitation elements to 6,000 families to ensure minimum living conditions, including minor home improvement, water supply, and sanitary equipment. Eligibility and the amount of the support provided for basic sanitation will follow the guidelines established by RSS.

The selection of these beneficiaries and the allocation of resources for families arriving at the municipalities targeted by the Project will follow the protocol of the RSS for return and relocation. This protocol, Manual de Procedimientos para el Apoyo a los Procesos de Retorno de Población Desplazada Victim del Conflicto Armado, the official norm established in the government program, specifies eligibility criteria, procedures, and amount for each type of support. Target numbers and the budget for the component were based on these support costs. The manual is one of the documents of the Project file.

Component C, Strengthening institutions and governance at the local level. US$ 5,950,000

The objective of this component is to develop the capacity of regional leadership of RSS, the PDPs, local governments, and the territorial committees of the SNAIPVD (Sistema Nacional de Atención Integral a la Población Vulnerable y Desplazada) to implement the Project and promote responsive public institutions. Strengthening leadership and public institutions is geared to enhance their capacity to promote community-led social, environmental, and economic activities to benefit poor and vulnerable families living in the area of influence, as well as to assist the return or relocation of displaced families.

The component will support the incremental staffing, goods, services, learning, and technical assistance needs of the national RSS and its territorial units, and PDPs to implement the project. Special attention will be given to the required training of the staff of the Project Management Unit and PDPs in Bank norms and procedures, particularly procurement, financial, and safeguard matters. The project will also support training, technical assistance, diffusion of information, and special studies needed to enhance the capacity of the members of SNAIPVD’s Territorial Committees to adequately fulfill responsibilities regarding preparation of Integrated Master Plans and the provision of services to the displaced populations. The Project’s budget shows the distribution of the resources of the component among the five target regions.

Component D, Project Management Unit and M&E
The objective of the component is to support the establishment of the PMU and the monitoring and evaluation system. The overall functions of the PMU are described in Annex 6.

The component will support at the national level, a general coordinator, three specialists that combine sector and regional skills, including an environmental and an a monitoring and evaluation specialist, a lawyer, an administrator, an administrative and financial assistant, and a technical assistant. Each one of the five regions will have a small unit comprised of a management specialist and a M&E assistant.

5. Financing
Source: ($m.)
BORROWER 0
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 30
Total 30

6. Implementation

National Level. The Project will be implemented over a period of three years under arrangements similar to those which proved effective during the implementation of the first and second Magdalena Medio Regional Development LILs. The RSS is the government agency responsible for the Project, and will execute it and manage the loan through a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) based at the central level. The main functions of the PCU are outlined in annex 6.

A National Technical Committee (NTC) presided by the RSS and composed by the National Planning Department (DNP), and one representative of the nongovernmental organizations implementing PDPs, will oversee the Project as well as play a role in orienting and coordinating efforts towards an integrated and consistent program. Representatives from the European Union Delegation, the Bank, and other NGOs implementing PDPs could be invited to participate in the NTC meetings. DNP will assume the Technical Secretariat of the NTC. DNP will also play an important role coordinating the Project’s external evaluations and overseeing the Project’s overall performance among other governmental initiatives being implemented at the territorial level (see functions of the NTC in annex 6).

Regional level
The RSS will execute the Project at the regional level with the support of the PDP’s non-governmental organizations operating in each region. Therefore, the decentralized implementation of the Project will be responsibility of these five NGOs acting as project implementation units. The PDP will work in close coordination with the territorial units (TUs) of the RSS in the selection of subprojects, the preparation of the Annual Operation Plans, and the monitoring of their implementation, following the norms and procedures of the Field Operations Manual. In each case, they will define the type of partnership arrangement and coordination that is best for the project, taking into consideration the coordinating, information providing and guidance role of the TUs on behalf of the RSS in each region. The RSS (at the national level) will enter into subsidiary agreements with each PDP. The detailed terms of the Project’s implementation arrangements will be spelled out in administration and execution contracts, satisfactory to the Bank, which are to be entered by the RSS and each PDP implementing the Project at the regional level.

Local level
The PDPs responsible for the implementation of the Project, or the NGOs designated to fulfill a similar role in the respective region, will enter into agreements with producer organizations and/or with other community-based organizations (final beneficiaries of the Project) to transfer the Project funds as grants, for the execution of subprojects at the local level. A Subprojects Manual, which sets the ground rules for approving and implementing subprojects at the local level, will be put in place.
Implementation Mechanisms
Annual Operating Plans, Regional Annual Operating Plans, Semi-annual Monitoring and Evaluation Reports, External Evaluations by an independent entity, and Operational and Subproject Manuals will be put in place. The Project will coordinate with the European Union Peace Laboratories in those Regions where the two coincide (Magdalena Medio, Macizo Colombiano-Alto Patía, Oriente Antioqueño and Norte de Santander) and, to the extent possible, will integrate procedures that meet the requirements of both donors.

Flow of Funds
In accordance with the institutional and implementation arrangement described above, funds will flow from RSS to PDPs and from PDPs to community organizations.

7. Sustainability
The Project is high risk because of the internal conflict that affect the selected regions. But it also offers a great opportunity to reduce the impact of that conflict on many people, using a tested and validated approach based on partnerships and a highly inclusive process of development. There are several factors that would contribute to the sustainability of project impact, including political support, the credibility of key partners, the building of long-term capacity and low fiscal risk.

First, there is an increasing institutionalization of the Government’s efforts to support the poor and the vulnerable populations in Colombia. The establishment of SNAIPVD, the requirement of territorial authorities to allocate resources and to develop and implement Integrated Master Plans with a high degree of broad participation, the allocation of approximately US$40 million for the financing of farm and non-farm productive and small-scale business activities for vulnerable populations through FINAGRO and BANCOLEX, for example, are factors raising the probability of medium to long-term sustainability of the Project and its impact not only from an institutional point of view but also a financial point of view. One additional contributing factor to this is the strong interest and the level of support rendered by international organizations including the Bank, the EU and the United Nations system.

Second, the extraordinary commitment and credibility of the members of PDPs (civil and business leaders and church groups). Although past Bank support of peace initiatives in Colombia has been limited to the two LILs in Magdalena Medio, the network of 15 PDPs have been courageously active, persistent and successful for several years in closely supporting vulnerable populations in their respective region, in spite of the conflict and violence. Needless to say, PDPs have gained a high level of trust from the communities and from all interested stakeholders, and thus their continued presence and contributions are two of the most critical success factors.

Third, the success of project itself, which is yet to be seen. Asset building (Component A), provision of a temporary safety net (Component B) and improved governance and the creation of capacities that last long (Component C) in combination, not in isolation, would increase the chance of the long-term sustainability of the Project. The chance of success is reasonable, given the validity of the Project’s operational model, proven to be successful through the experience and partnership of the Government, civil society and the Bank in the last five years. That is, the Project is based on a solid real life experience.

Lastly, the fiscal sustainability would not be a major concern, given that the Project consumes only a very small percent of the Central Government’s fiscal resources, and that no activity will demand recurrent costs.

8. Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector
**About the operational Model for CDD in a conflict affected region.** The operational model tested and validated during the two LIL’s is characterized by the following basic elements: (i) it is sustained by a change agent (the PDP’s in this Project) which enjoys high credibility among all the stakeholders; (ii) it is based on community and individual participation in the making of decisions about the community’s development, and establishes specific mechanisms for this participation (e.g. the nucleos of the citizen’s network, the operation of sub-project initiatives); (iii) it is based on a methodology that takes into account the capacity and ‘initial state’ of the citizens, and from this base initiates the learning and capacity building of community organizations so that they are able to take charge of their own development. Further, it recognizes and supports existing organizations and previous experiences in these communities; (iv) it encourages communities to define a long-term development strategy for their community, municipality and region, while supporting “learning by doing” around more concrete and immediate goals and actions; (v) the change agent (PDP’s) operates in a decentralized manner; (vi) the change agent’s staff (PDP’s) act consistently in accord with defined values of respect, transparency, autonomy, and defense of the public interest; (vii) it maintains close monitoring and analysis of the sociopolitical situation allowing the adaptation to a changing environment.

**About structure and strategy.** Regarding the organizational structure of the Peace and Development Programs, one of the lessons learned is that the Operational Manual and its stated criteria for productive sub-projects was a sufficient filter when applied by the technical teams of the Magdalena Medio Peace and Development Program at the ground level. This suggests the need to maintain a decentralized operation close to the beneficiaries and to further strengthen capacity in the field. However, particularly with less experienced programs, caution must be exercised. Field level organizations will vary enormously in their capacities and most will still require, at least initially, strong strategic guidance (which projects to undertake and how), technical advice (agronomic, marketing, investigative), and organizational (management, information systems or M&E) support.

**About division of labor.** This last point brings out another lesson, that of combining the promotion, motivation, organization building, resource management and monitoring and evaluation capacities of PDP’s with the more technical and business skills of other organizations. Productive projects, in particular, need greater rigor and more up-front analysis for more complex ones. This kind of rigorous support will likely have to come from specialized organizations (i.e. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Trade Associations, SENA, FAO, *Centros Provinciales de Gestión Empresarial*, a Business Development Services office.). The PDP’s can be strengthened by working closely with those type of organizations, instead of trying to have in their own staff people with these skills.

**About time and process.** A clear lesson from the two LILs about methodology in the operation is that projects in zones with high levels of instability need to be process-oriented and patient. They take much longer than anticipated and thus cannot disperse efforts in too many directions. They would consequently be well advised to focus attention and resources on a few key areas, learn lessons, and build on those successes.

**About partnership.** The government recognized the value of working in association with a trusted third party thus contributing to strengthening the presence of the State at the local level. This requires working in partnership, which is a new way of working for most people. This new way of working demands agreeing on a shared objective, complementary contributions, sharing of risks, and recognition and respect for the different perspectives and objectives of each partner.

The project will use these lessons as a reference, recognizing that the conditions in each region and each municipality within regions is specific to that context, and therefore requires adaptations.
The key safeguard policy issues raised by the project relate to ensuring the environmental appropriateness and oversight of productive subprojects included in Component One, and ensuring that project benefits are extended to indigenous populations who live within three of the project areas of intervention. These issues are being addressed through an Environmental Assessment (EA) and an Indigenous Development Plan (IPDP) currently under preparation.

**Environmental Assessment**

In accordance with OP 4.01, an EA is being undertaken to identify the potential impacts associated with the types of subprojects envisioned for the Project, and developing appropriate mitigation measures to offset those impacts. The EA will evaluate the potential presence and location of critical natural habitats (as defined by OP 4.04), and ensure measures to prevent the approval of any subprojects that could negatively affect those areas. Additionally, the EA will include assessment of the existing capacity for environmental management, and the environmental procedures used, by the five PDPs. The EA will set forth a framework outlining the environmental criteria and procedures to be followed in approving subprojects and monitoring their environmental impact during implementation, as well as recommending areas for strengthening. The environmental procedures will promote the securing of necessary licenses by the PDP, rather than by the community groups responsible for subproject implementation. Special care shall be paid to identifying and offsetting any cumulative impacts arising from the implementation of multiple small-scale projects over the project areas. Additionally, the EA framework will set forth procedures to address pest management issues through promoting the minimal use of approved pesticides within the context of an Integrated Pest Management approach. Consultation of beneficiaries is being undertaken as part of EA development, and the draft and final products will be publicly available locally and through the InfoShop prior to project appraisal.

**Indigenous Peoples**

As the project areas include indigenous territories (*resguardos*) and indigenous beneficiaries within three of the five areas (Cauca, Norte Santander, and Montes de María), the Project is developing an IPDP in accordance with OD 4.20. The IPDP will take the form of a framework (IPDF) outlining the steps to be taken to ensure that the Project benefits indigenous peoples in the target regions in culturally compatible manners. The IPDF will set forth specific recommendations regarding the form and level at which project interventions can be directed in each region. The IPDF will recommend that Project-sponsored activities take into account the *Planes de Vida* developed for each indigenous territory, and consider supporting the

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*By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the disputed areas*
implementation of some portion of these plans consistent with project objectives. The IPDF will be
developed assuring the consultation of indigenous beneficiaries, and the final IPDF will be publicly
disclosed in Colombia and in the InfoShop.
10. List of Factual Technical Documents

DNP – Documento CONPES 3278, authorization to contract an external credit operation in order to finance the Program “Peace and Development”, March, 2004.
Santamaria Mauricio, Country and Sector or Program Background, March 2004.

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