88846 1 NIGERIA STRATEGY COMPLETION REPORT REVIEW The Bank resumed its assistance in 1998-99 after Nigeria ’s peaceful transition from military rule. The government sought private sector led growth and identified corruption and governance as the proximate causes o f the economic decline. The Bank’s three objectives since 1999 were to (1) improve governance and economic management, (2) support economic growth through private sector development, and (3) develop local communities through empowerment. Bank assistance included considerable economic and sector work and 19 IDA financedprojects for US$1,545 million, but disbursements remain low and project implementation poor (see paras. 4, 11, and 17). The Strategy Completion Report (SCR) spans four interim strategy updates since 1999. The Bank’s three objectives were relevant, but were not attained to any significant degree. There were improvements in governance and economic management at thefederal level, but fiscal decentralization bas undermined these efforts: half of total government spending occurs at state and local levels, where controls are inadequate, monitoring is weak, and progress on improving economic management has not been commensurate with that at thefederal level. Private sector development, consisting o f privatization, removing infrastructure bottlenecks and promoting agriculture, was not achieved, although there was some privatization o f state owned enterprises. Finally, there was little progress toward empowerment and local community development. Overall, the outcome o f Bank assistance is rated unsatisfactory. Government Objectives, Bank Strategy, and Overview o f Implementation 1. The Strategy Completion Review (SCR) covers the period since the Bank reactivated i t s assistance in mid-1999 after the retired Gen. Obasanjo was elected to head Nigeria’s democratic government. The Bank had stopped preparing new projects and economic and sector w o r k (ESW) in 1993 because o f poor governance and economic management, although discussions o n reforms and the supervision o f ongoing projects continued. When the Bank reactivated its program, the government had yet to articulate a comprehensive strategy, so the Bank considered the government’s priorities to be those in the 1997-98 Vision 2010 document that sought better governance and private sector led economic growth. In 2004, the Obasanjo administration articulated a development strategy (National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, or NEEDS and SEEDS, its state counterpart) after extensive consultations. This strategy forms the backdrop to the current CAS. 2. The Bank prepared four interim strategy reportshpdates (May 2000, M a y 2001, February 2002, and June 2004 plus an additional information note in M a y 2002) instead o f a CAS, and these reflected the evolving country situation. Coming after several years o f limited involvement by the Bank, consisting only o f supervising ongoing projects and limited analytic w o r k and n o new lending, the f i r s t update was optimistic in outlook but cautious with lending. I t proposed (a) continued discussions o n government priorities; (b) sector studies to update the Bank’s CAS Completion Report Review 2 Operelisns EvaluaGon Department knowledge; (c) advising o n govemance, economic management, and privatization; (d) preparing small projects to alleviate poverty and spur private investment; and (e) working with the IMF and others to resolve disputes with external creditors. None o f the interim strategies had explicit outcome targets. 3. The Bank dropped a proposed adjustment loan because o f concems about the authorities’ commitment to reform, including macro-economic stability’, which led to a more cautious second strategy update in M a y 2001. The third update in February 2002 repeated these concerns, and after further reviewing developments in M a y 2002, the Bank moved to the “low case” lending scenario, dropping many planned projects and ESW. Following the appointment o f a reformist economic team after Obasanjo’s re-election in 2003, the fourth update in M a y 2004 proposed a larger Bank lending program. 4. Actual lending and E S W fell short o f proposals in the interim strategies (Annex Tables 2 and 3). Since 1999, nineteen projects have been approved for US$1,545 m i l l i o n (of which only US$308 m i l l i o n disbursed as o f mid-April 2005). Some o f these projects followed earlier ones which had unsatisfactory outcomes2 and progress o n their implementation reflects inadequate leaming from earlier project experience. Others were not able to address the most critical issue^.^ Projects that have closed and been rated since 1999 had much lower outcome, institutional development impact, and sustainability ratings than the Africa region and Bank averages, reflecting the particularly difficult environment in which these projects, all but one o f which were approved in 1993 or earlier, were implemented (Annex Table 4). Disbursement rates o f on-going projects have been low, and as o f this writing, 44 percent o f the projects (by number) are at risk, w e l l above the Regional average (26 percent), although this i s an improvement over the last three years. Implementationby Objectives 5. The SCR organizes the Bank’s interim strategies’ objectives as three pillars: (1) improving govemance and economic management, (2) economic growth through private sector development, and (3) developing local communities through empowerment. The Bank’s projects were generally consistent with these objectives, although they cannot always b e neatly grouped under each. The non-oil economy was stagnant and the President’s disputes with the National Assembly over doubling capital spending in the 2000 budget exposed the legal l i m i t s o f h s power under the 1999 Constitution. Procurement irregularities had plagued earlier projects in agriculture, including the 1992 Fadama-I project: the region’s procurement audit o f 6 agricultural projects resulted in 3 projects being closed and 29 companies and 7 people debarred for fraud. A $70 m i l l i o n Fadama-I1 project was prepared, although its approval was delayed until FY04. In education, since 90 percent o f the 1992 Primary Education Project (PEP-I) for US$158.4 million was undisbursed, it was extended to 2000, when it was cancelled with 35 percent o f the fbnds undisbursed. OED’s I C R Review notes that it provided “millions o f textbooks to students but did not train teachers in their use” and that neither the quality o f education nor student attendance increased. PEP-I1 for US$55m was approved in 2000. For example, work o n environment sought to build government capacity, although the strategy update notes that unrest and security prevented Bank staff visits to the o i l producing Niger delta with serious environmental problem. 3 Objective I:Improving Governance and Economic Management 6. Outcome. The SCR lists many government initiatives to improve governance that were supported by Bank projects and ESW: better Federal budgeting, greater accountability to Parliament and transparency to the public (e.g. Federal budgets immediately published and posted o n the web), starting to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, establishing 13 8 anti-corruption units in govemment agencies, starting procurement reforms, and prosecuting corrupt officials (although the SCR notes that the sole conviction o f a corrupt official was overturned o n appeal). Other recommended improvements to monitoring and control have not been implemented, or have been implemented too recently to have had an impact o n ~ SCR notes that “despite all o f outcomes, such as the audit o f the o i l and gas ~ o m p a n i e s .The these efforts, Nigeria continues to be ranked l o w o n governance and corruption in relationship t o other countries, including sub-Saharan countries.. ..[which] reflect the magnitude o f the challenge ahead.” 7. Economic management has improved, especially at the Federal level (e.g. inflation halved to under 12 percent in 2004 as seen in the graph under Annex Table 1 reporting annual data). The recent Fiscal Responsibility L a w formalizes the Federal government saving the recent surge in o i l revenues, and this i s currently being implemented. Fiscal decentralization poses challenges to these achievements, as h a l f o f total government spending i s n o w by the 36 state and 774 local authorities, where adequate control mechanisms or systems to monitor their effectiveness are not w e l l developed. Important sectoral policies remain distorted: for example, the foreign exchange allocation mechanism combined with inappropriate relative prices for o i l distillates, encourage gasoline smuggling and generating electricity from diesel. Consequently, despite notable improvements in public procurement and macro-economic management at the Federal level, and some progress at the state level, this objective has not been achieved. Objective 11:Economic Growth through Private Sector Development 8. Outcome. The SCR notes that about a third o f Bank commitments supported this objective, and that non-oil growth rose to 4.7 percent; but this reflects the spurt in 2003 following good rains. 9. Government actions that the Bank supported to develop the private sector were (i) privatizing parastatals; ( ii) improving complementary infrastructure (e.g. electricity, roads), and ( i ii) agriculture. Privatization also improves governance (Objective I )because the oversight and controls that apply to Ministries do not apply to parastatals’ procurement. Bank financed technical assistance under the 2001 Privatization Support Project supported the sale o f several f i r m s (e.g. some truck manufacturing, newspapers, hotels etc.), but many o f considerable economic importance (e.g. o i l refineries) remain unsold, as the SCR notes, “probably due to entrenched interests and lack o f a strong government commitment.” This project has been restructured with lower goals. See “The Review o f F l o w o f Funds in the Nigerian Petroleum Sector” (May 2000) and Nigeria: Petroleum Revenue Management (October 2004, Report 303 16-NG) for the many recommendations to improve revenue collection and reporting. CAS Completion Report Review 4 Optations Evaluation Department 10. Physical transport bottlenecks (e.g. roads, bridges, railways) inhibit private sector growth. The Bank’s three infrastructure projects addressed these bottlenecks, but implementation has run into difficulties and they did not always address institutional issues and policy distortion^.^ For example, Lagos accounts for much o f the non-oil economic activity, but the SCR notes that the Bank project to improve transport infrastructure was “hindered by a failure o f co-ordination between the Federal and state authorities regarding roads under federal responsibility.’’ B a n k strategy envisioned the private provision o f infrastructure, but laws permitting the private provision o f electricity that the Transmission Development Project expected in September 2001 only passed in December 2004, the regulatory entity i s not adequately staffed and many price controls remain (especially in o i l and gas) inhibiting investments. Except for cellular telephones where technology has driven down costs, privatization has not induced investment. 11. Agriculture i s an important private activity especially for the poor, but improper procurement plagued earlier agricultural projects and additional lending awaited the resolution o f these fiduciary issues. The SCR notes that “the Bank undertook Rural Sector Strategy Study and other analytical work; regretfully, their impact o n either policy or lending was very limited.” The first Fadama project in 1992 to improve small holder cultivation in the lowlands h a d raised yields but poor roads kept crops from markets; consequently, Fadama-I1 provided for rural roads, but it i s on-going and experiencing some implementation problems. Despite the Bank’s efforts, progress in the three areas discussed above fell short o f interim strategy objectives. Objective HI:Empowerment and Local Community Development 12. Outcome. Over h a l f the Bank’s commitments since 1999 supported empowerment through several projects, but the SCR notes that they sometimes lacked clear objectives and often lacked proper monitoring and evaluation systems. Overall, the delivery o f health and education has not improved: the SCR and other Bank reports note that only 60 percent o f those eligible attended primary schools in 2003 (worse in the northwest where only 34 percent o f girls attend, although data are unreliable and official Bank statistics reported in Annex Table 1 differ), and the immunization rate o f children barely changed. The SCR notes success with polio eradication. 13. The unsettled relations between the Federal and state governments and the inexperience o f state or local governments may hmder the effectiveness o f on-going community development projects. As the SCR notes, the design o f C D D interventions varied across operations, “which arguably has affected their effectiveness.” The I C R o f the closed FYO O Small Towns Water Project notes that despite high projected rates o f return (26 percent), only one o f the 16 systems i s functioning and the Federal government did not involve local communities o r cede control. OED’s review o f the ICR notes that the Bank did n o t cancel the project despite the fact that “corruption, mismanagement and poor governance at the Federal level plagued the project from start to finish” and that “the project, contrary to design, deepened the gulf between local and The US$lOO million (Electric) Transmission Development Project supports many measures to reduce technical losses, some engineering (e.g. raising the voltage o n selected lines using more step down transformers), some pricing and some staffing; the US$120 m i l l i o n National Urban Water Sector Reform project to improve publicly owned utilities (with promised ERR o f 16 to 25 percent); and the US$lOO million Lagos Urban Transport project covers several improvements to roads, buses, and bridges. CAS Cmpletian Report Review 5 OpwaMns Evaluation D e p a r h “ federal govemments.” Fiduciary concerns remain an issue.6 The SCR notes that one ongoing project, the Community Poverty Reduction Project (CPRP), has had positive results, and that an ongoing review o f C D D interventions will guide future operations and provide a common framework. Overall, i t i s too soon to assess whether the objectives o f empowerment and local community development have been achieved. Overall OED Assessment 14. OED finds the interim strategies’ three broad objectives to be relevant, congruent with the Federal govemment’s priorities, and the Bank’s activities (ESW, technical assistance and projects) to be consistent with them. Despite better economic management and governance at the Federal level especially since 2003, the fiscal decentralization represents a major challenge to this objective, and corruption indicators show little improvement. Private sector development has been modest. The only project that has closed that addressed empowerment and local community development was unsatisfactory and otherwise, it i s too soon t o assess whether this objective has been achieved. Overall, OED rates the outcome o f Bank assistance as unsatisfactory. 15. Bank support was w e l l calibrated to progress with reform; the Bank began cautiously in 1999, appropriately scaled back its planned lending while remaining engaged when reforms slackened in 2002, and resumed lending in 2003 when reforms resumed. OED agrees with the SCR’s warnings o n the dangers o f total disengagement as occurred prior to 1999, especially with respect to non-lending services, which makes re-engagement more challenging. 16. Despite appropriately calibrated overall support, OED finds that the Bank could have focused more on project design and implementation issues. First, OED agrees with the SCR that “the Bank did not take stock o f the lessons from past involvements.. . covering health, education, roads, agriculture, electricity, water and sanitation.” A Country Assistance Evaluation w o u l d have been useful, but the region regularly reviews i t s portfolio and prepares ICRs, which also offer opportunities to learn. Second, the Bank’s current portfolio problems reflect project design issues, as, for example, social sector projects, which represented two-thirds o f Bank commitments, did not appropriately reflect the division o f responsibility in Nigeria’s federal system. Third, the approach to community development needed to be more cognizant o f fiduciary and capacity issues and consistent across interventions. Fourth, the emphasis o n the social sector came at the expense o f physical infrastructure that constrains private sector growth. Finally, the Bank did little analytical work o n external debt, an issue that the M a y 2000 strategy identified as important. Assessment of Completion Report 17. The SCR describes the recent experience candidly, especially the Bank’s portfolio difficulties and inability to discuss policies without adjustment lending. The SCR’s “The Effectiveness o f World Bank Support for Community Development: An OED Evaluation” (CODE2005-0038, May 16, 2005) notes that in Nigeria internal controls are reported to be weak or inoperative and provide negligible assurance that the funds are being used entirely for their intended purposes. 6 recommendation that the Bank concentrate i t s efforts in a few states for all its projects seems appropriate and based o n recent project and governance experience, but as the recent OED evaluation o f Bank support to community development recommends, any scaling up should only follow careful evaluation. The SCR primarily focuses on projects and ESW undertaken and neglects omissions such as the external debt issue. Finally, the SCR should have focused more o n past achievements, rather than discussing future actions and possible outcomes. Lessons and Findings 18. Nigeria requires reforms to be sustained at the Federal level, and increased attention to similar issues at the state level. The Bank program during this period and the current portfolio problems have suffered from neglecting the lessons from earlier projects that also performed poorly. Sound analytical work and careful project design have had success in Nigeria, and this needs to be broadened and sustained. In designing projects during the next CAS period in Nigeria, the Bank must consider their vulnerability to changes in the pace o f reforms, and should include adequate safeguards to mitigate such risks. 19. The recent emphasis on community development and social sector projects came at the expense o f infrastructure whose inadequacy s t i l l constrains private sector development. Projects to improve roads and electricity also reduce poverty by raising economic growth, and these projects appear to have performed better in Nigeria. The Bank needs to improve monitoring and evaluation for all projects and to ensure that community development projects reflect recent experience. 20. The emphasis o n governance was appropriate, but this should be at all levels o f government. The SCR’s recommendation o f working with selected states i s sound, but the attempt should be carefully evaluated before lending i s substantially increased. 7 * 0 2 0 0 N If .- I r-- 8 9 ,nnex Table 3: Nigeria CAS Coi detion Report-OED Review, Propc Non-LendingProposedin I n t e r i m Strarea and Gpdaler Actlrol Abn-Lending1 ~erob1e.i yosed I rual I porf .Yo (Dare) Comment1Report Name 'ategy 2000 Financial Sector .Assessment Sep99 2000 Financial Sector Asessment Completed Fy 00 941 (05:0l/2000) Fmancial SectoiReview Vol 1-3 Workshop for Parliamentmans on-99 2000 Workshop for Parliamentarians T.4 732, 12246 (0613012000, County Procurement Assessment ReporW CPARCFM Apr4O 2000 CPARCFM Completed FY 00 .06J2000) Country Financd .4ccountabiiityReport Audit ofoil Sector JunOO 2000 .4udit of011Sector TA htiComption Survey lun40 2000 AntiComption Survey TA R d Sector Siiategy May40 2000 Rural Sector Siiategy Completed FY 01 470 (06i2812001) Rural Sector Strategy Study Vol l-2 Health Sector Study Mar41 2001 Healthy Sector Study Completed FY 04 EducationSenor Sep40 2003 Education Senor Assessment Completed FY 04 Changed l o Education County Status Report Water ResowcesManagement Smtegy Feb4l 2001 Water Resourceshlanagement Strategy TA PSD Mar41 2001 Private Sector Assessment Completed Fy 02 idale ZOO1 AntiComption Survey 2002 2002 AntiComplionSurvey Conqleted FY 04 Led to State Governance project proposed for FY State G o v e m n t Capacity Study (Phase 2) 2002 2002 State G o w m n t Capacity SNdy (Phase 2) Rivate Sector Assesmnt phase 2) 2002 2002 Rivate Senor Assessment (Phase 2) Completed FY 02 Fiscal FederalismStudy 2002 2002 Fiscal Federalism SNdy CompletedFY 02 S l E Technical Assistance 2002 2002 SME Technical Assistance TA iM279,29678 (OZOl~Z004,Nigeria Smtegic Gas Plm Tiigeda Lp gas sectoi OiVGas Study 2w2 2002 OjVGas Study TA /0112004) improvement study PovertyAssessment 2003 100312004 Povertyhlpis TA Macroemormc Assessment 2002 2003 MacroeconomicAssessment Completed FY 04 CAS 2003 2003 Couny Assistance Siiategy Board NO 5 idate Note 3~2002 Sources ofPovertyReducivg GroWh 10312004 Sources ofPoverty Reducing Growth Completed FY 04 115 (0613012003) Policy Options for Gmwh and Stability Vol 1-2 Country Gender Assessment 0312004 Gender Assessment Completed FY 05 711 (081l0~2CQ4) Strategic Counrp Gender Assessment Development Forum 0312004 Development Forum Completed Nigeria Policy Notes 10312004 Nigeria Policy Notes TA Strategic Conflict Assessment 03'2004 Strateg,c Conflin Assessment CompletedFY 03 Gas Utilization Policy 03~200.1 Gas CtiliTdtionPolicy TA Civil Semce Reform 0312004 Ciiil Senice Reform Completed FY 04 Public Expendime Work at Federal and State 03'2004 Public Expenditure Work at Federal and State Levels TA Idate 1004 Health CSR 2005 2005 Health Couny Statu3 Report TB CompletedFY 06 Lagos Svategy for Economic Deielopment and Lagos Strategy fo Economic Development and Povefly PovertyReduction 2005 2005 Reduction TB Completed FY 05 PFhK Support 2005 2005 PFMU Support TA PovertyAssessment 200512006 005'2006 Poverty Assessment TB Completed FY06 CountryPortfolio Performance Reiiew CPPR 2005 2005 Couny Portfolio Performance Reiiew Completed FY 05 CountryEcanomic Memorandum 2005 2005 County Economic Memorandum hloved to FY06 Debt hlanagement 2005 2005 Debt Management TA Telecom TA 2005 2005 Teleconmmcations TA TA EITI Management/Gasand Oil Sector Policy 2005-2007 2005 ET1ManagemenV Gas and Oil Sector Policy TA Comunications Outreach 2005 2005 Comunications and Outreach TA Agiculture Sector Reiieu - 2006 2006 Agiculrure Sector Reiiew TB Coqleted FY 05 UnplannedActual- Undenmy J 2000 RdFinance Completed FY 00 2000 Capital Budget Rerieu- Completed FY 01 2001 PublicExpenditwe Review Completed FY 01 2002 States Governance CompletedFY 02 447 (07123'2002) State and LoFal hiemane inYigeria 2002 R d lnstitutions Capacity Assessment (with FAO) CompletedFY 03 2002 Kigeria Health Semice Delivery Survey CompletedFY 03 2002 Social Risk Assessment Completed FY 02 2003 State Finances Study Completed FY 03 710 (0410112003) States Finance Study Poveny Enviromntal Linkages in the Natural Resource Senor- Empirical Evidence b m the Nigerian Case studies with policy implications 2003 Enviromnt'herty Completed f Y 03 972 (06:30/2003) and recommendations 2004 Power Sector Policy TA 2004 Pensions ReformDialogue Completed FY 04 2004 Macro & Grouth Completed FY 04 State ofLagos Financial Accauntability Lagos State Financial Accountability AssessmenVState 141,29593 (03'0112004, .&sesmnt~LagosState Procurement 2004 RaolrementhsessmentRepon Completed FY 04 120'2003) Assessment Report 2004 EFA Reparation Suppart Strategy Completed FY 04 2004 Basic Agricultural Senices for Pwr Famers Completed FY 05 2004 StrenglheningtheForestrySector Completed FY 05 2004 Risk and Vulnerability Completed FY 04 Srrate@coptions for Re-VampingAgricultural Svategic options for Revampingagriculhlral 2004 Research and Extension Completed FY 05 910 (08/01/2004) researchand extension senc i es 2005 Financial Sector Assessment Update TB Completed FY 06 .?we Infomuon i e n hy CASCR mlbysglon 10 Annex Table 4: OED Project Ratings, Exit FY 99-05 Approval Inst Dev Exit FY Project ID FY Outcome Impact Sustainability FY99 Oyo State Urban (Id0 1990 Mod. Unsat. Modest Unlikely Population 1991 Highly Unsat Negligible Unlikely Fadama 1992 Sat. Modest Likely Economic Management 1993 Unsat. Modest Likely Lagos Drainage & San 1993 Sat. Negligible Uncertain FYOO Ag. Research 1991 Mod. Unsat. Modest Unlikely Health Systems Fund 1991 Sat. Substantial Likely Primary Education 1991 Unsat. Modest Unlikely Agric Tech 1992 Mod. Sat. Modest Likely Dev. Communication 1993 Unsat. Modest Non-Evaluable State Roads Ii 1993 Sat. Modest Unlikely FYOl Water Rehab 1991 Mod. Unsat. Modest Unlikely State Water I 1992 Unsat. Modest Unlikely FY04 Small Towns Water 2000 Unsat. Negligible Unlikely Total Outcome Inst Dev Impact Sustainability Evaluated % Sat % Subst %Likely Region (No) (No.) (No.) (No. Nigeria 14 35.7 7.1 30.8 AFUR 426 64.4 39.0 53.4 World Bank 1,635 75.2 48.0 70.4 Source: Business Warehouse as o f Apnl 19,2005. 11 Annex Table 5: Portfolio Status Indicators by Year, 1998-2005 (In USD million) Country F i s c a l year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Nigeria # projects 13 8 5 5 9 12 15 16 # projects at risk 3 1 0 0 8 9 8 7 % at risk 23.1 12.5 0.0 0.0 88.9 75.0 53.3 43.8 Net comm. amt 963.2 714.6 437.0 254.3 681.6 911.3 1,228.3 1,485.0 Comm. at risk 169.2 101.0 0.0 0.0 554.6 722.6 812.6 630.3 % commit at risk 17.6 14.1 0.0 0.0 81.4 79.3 66.2 42.4 Ghana # projects 29 28 23 23 21 17 14 16 # projects at risk 10 6 3 2 1 3 3 3 % at risk 34.5 21.4 13.0 8.7 4.8 17.6 21.4 18.8 N e t commit. amt 1,244.5 1,195.0 953.6 1,045.8 1,207.7 878.3 865.3 1,132.3 Commit. at risk 560.9 144.4 55.9 52.9 5.0 92.1 149.5 149.5 % commit. at risk 45.1 12.1 5.9 5.1 0.4 10.5 17.3 13.2 Kenya # projects 14 12 10 14 13 12 11 14 # projects at risk 11 10 3 3 5 5 5 2 % at risk 78.6 83.3 30.0 21.4 38.5 41.7 45.5 14.3 Net comm. amount 661.5 542.8 494.1 804.3 701.0 762.7 629.7 749.7 Commit. at risk 539.0 480.8 177.5 187.8 421.5 342.8 290.0 165.0 % commit at risk 81.5 88.6 35.9 23.4 60.1 44.9 46.1 22.0 South Africa # projectsj 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 # projects at risk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 % at risk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Net comm. amount 46.0 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 39.5 39.5 15.0 Comm. at risk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 % commit at risk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Tanzania # projects 21 18 21 18 22 24 23 23 # projects at risk 6 2 1 1 2 2 0 3 % at risk 28.6 11.1 4.8 5.6 9.1 8.3 0.0 13.0 Netcomm. amount 1,297.5 1,065.9 1,206.7 907.0 1,233.0 1,418.7 1,444.5 1,525.2 Comm. at risk 711.2 105.6 31.1 41.2 71.1 17.0 0.0 127.1 % commit at risk 54.8 9.9 2.6 4.5 5.8 1.2 0.0 8.3 Source: Business Warehouse as o f April 19,2005. 12 Annex Table 6: IBRD/ IDA Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report, FY 98-05 (In USD million) FY Gross dish Repay Net dish Interest and Fees Net Transfer 1998 257 322 -65 166 -231 1999 180 311 -131 151 -282 2000 102 29 1 -189 126 -315 2001 40 25 1 -21 1 94 -305 2002 26 196 -169 80 -249 2003 26 205 -179 73 -252 2004 127 226 -99 64 -163 2005 * 122 23 8 -1 16 61 -177 2006* 192 220 -28 45 -73 2007* 314 189 124 43 82 Total 1,386 2,449 -1,064 903 -1,966 *Projections Source: Controller's website as o f October 29,2004. i Gross Disbursements and N e t Transfers, 1998-2007 A 13 Annex Table 7: Nigeria-Millennium Deb opment Goals I h ERIA 7 1990 1995 2001 2002 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 2015 target = halve 1990 $1 a day poverty and malnutrition rates Population below $1 a day (“A) 70.2 Poverty gap at $1 a day (“YO) 34.9 Percentage share o f income or consumption held by poorest 20% 4.4 Prevalence o f child malnutrition (“A o f children under 5) 35.3 39.1 30.7 Population below minimum level o f dietary energy consumption (YO) 13 8 8 2. Achieve universal p r i m a r y education 2015 target = net enrollment to 100 N e t primary enrollment ratio (% o f relevant age group) Percentage o f cohort reaching grade 5 (%) Youth literacy rate (“A ages 15-24) 73.6 81.1 87.8 3. Promote gender equality 2005 target = education ratio to 100 Ratio o f girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) 75.8 80 Ratio o f y o u n g literate females to males (% ages 15-24) 82.3 89.2 94.7 Share o f women employed in the nonagricultural sector (%) 36.4 Proportion o f seats held by women in national parliament (%) 4. Reduce child m o r t a l i t y 2015 target = reduce 1990 under 5 mortality by two-thirds Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000) 235 238 205 20 1 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 115 120 102 100 Immunization, measles (% o f children under 12 months) 54 44 40 40 5. I m p r o v e maternal health 2015 target = reduce 1990 maternal mortality by threefourths Matemal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 l i v e births) 800 Births attended by skilled health staff (% o f total) 30.8 41.6 6. Combat E I I V / A I D S , malaria a n d other diseases 2015 target = halt, and begin to reverse, AIDS, etc. Prevalence o f HIV, female (% ages 15-24) 5.8 Contraceptive prevalence rate (% o f women ages 15-49) 6 15.3 Number o f children orphaned by H I V I A I D S .. 1,000.0 thousand Incidence o f tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) 235 304.2 Tuberculosis cases detected under D O T S (%) 9 16 12.3 7. Ensure environmental sustainability 2015 target =various (see notes) Forest area (% o f total land area) 19.2 14.8 Nationally protected areas (% o f total land area) 3.3 3.3 3.3 GDP per unit o f energy use (PPP $ per k g o i l equivalent) 1 1.1 1.2 C 0 2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 0.9 0.2 0.3 Access to an improved water source (% ofpopulation) 53 62 Access to improved sanitation (% o f population) 53 54 Access to secure tenure (% ofpopulation) 8. Develop a G l o b a l Partnership for Development 2015 target = various (see notes) Youth unemployment rate (% oftotal labor force ages 15-24) Fixed line and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people) 3 4.1 8 Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 4.8 6.8 General indicators Population 96.2 million 111.3 m i l l i o n 129.9 million Gross national income ($) 25.5 billion 23.6 b i l l i o n 39.0 b i l l i o n GNI per capita ($) 270 210 300 Adult literacy rate (% ofpeople ages 15 and over) 48.7 56.4 65.4 Total fertility rate (births per woman) 6 5.7 5.3 L i f e expectancy at birth (years) 49.1 49.9 46.8 Aid (% o f GNI) 1 0.8 0.5 0. External debt (% o f GNI) 130.7 131.7 77.2 Investment (% o f GDP) 14.7 16.3 20.1 23.3 Trade (% o f GDP) 72.2 86.5 84.3 81.3 Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2004 ~ Note: In some cases the data are for earlier or later years than those stated. Goal 1 targets: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion ofpeople whose income is less than one dollar a day. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion ofpeople who suffer from hunger. Goal 2 target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. Goal 3 target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015. Goal 4 target: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, t h e under-five mortality rate. Goal 5 target: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio. Goal 6 targets: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of H N I A D S . Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. Goal 7 targets: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss o f environmental resources. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water. B y 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. Goal 8 targets: Develop further an open, rule-based,predictable, non-discriminatoly trading and financial system. Address the Special Needs of t h e Least Developed Countries. Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states. Deal comprehensivelywith the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable i n the long tenn. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries. I n cooperation with the private sector, make available t h e benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications. 14 I L I I I I I