97600 June 2015 Working Paper Institutional Change, Political Economy, and State Capabilities: Learning from Edo State, Nigeria Justice, Security and Development Series Katherine Bain Doug Porter Michael Watts The Justice, Security and Development Series This research report is part of a series on Justice, Security and Development, produced with the generous support of the Bank- Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP). The series presents the findings and critical reflections of a three-year work program aimed at improving development approaches to justice and security stresses in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Drawing from reviews of current scholarship, in-depth field research, and engagement with development programs, the papers in the series seek to identify the key challenges and obstacles to effective development, and propose ways to re-frame the challenges and solutions as a basis for more effective development programs. The framing paper for this series, Justice and Institutional Change in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings: Re-Framing the Challenges and Solutions, presents the rationale, organizing logic and conclusions of this work. © 2015 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org Disclaimer This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Contact Details Justice and Rule of Law Governance Global Practice The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 USA worldbank.org/justice | justdevelopment@worldbank.org Cover Photo: Curt Carnemark/The World Bank LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA Working Paper June 2015 Institutional Change, Political Economy, and State Capabilities: Learning from Edo State, Nigeria Justice, Security and Development Series Katherine Bain Doug Porter Michael Watts Institutional Change, Political Economy, and State Capabilities: Learning from Edo State, Nigeria1 Introduction This paper is one of a series aimed at deepening contests and stresses associated with public order, the World Bank’s capacity to follow through on com- land or natural resource transactions, the allocation mitments made in response to the World Devel- of public wealth to services, and so on. opment Report 2011 (WDR), which gave renewed prominence to the nexus between “conflict, security, Thus a second purpose of these studies has been to and development” (World Bank 2011). The WDR inform debates within the Bank and other professional foregrounded the links between what the authors circles about a series of questions that flow from this termed “injustice stresses” and chronic problems realization. How do these institutions actually work, of institutional fragility and the weak legitimacy what are they capable of, and what are their limits of public authorities. As explained in the working and distributional consequences? How are these paper that provides the framework of questions and institutions—and the assemblages of rules, agents, concepts for this series (Berg, Isser and Porter 2015), networks, and resources they manifest—conditioned one purpose of this effort has been to examine the by the dynamics of political settlements between ways in which these injustice stresses manifest and economic and political elites? Prospectively, given are linked to institutional fragility and conflict. this dynamic of political economy and institutions, under what conditions do elites and everyday people Perhaps a more significant impact of the 2011 WDR invest trust, loyalties, and resources in institutions arose from its initial efforts to survey and distill the that could in turn effectively and legitimately contain experience of countries and regions that appear to and govern elite and ongoing social contests? have successfully “transitioned” away from chronic institutional fragility and a high propensity to relapse A third purpose of these studies, also exampled in into violent conflict. Although much had been written this working paper, has been to consider the role of about “what government should look like to facilitate external donor partners in relation to this dynamic development” (Andrews 2013, 12), across the widely between political economy and institutional change. (if too thinly) populated range of “successful exits,” This purpose reflects wider efforts underway at the very little was known about the actual functioning of intersection of scholarship and development practice the institutions that are responsible for handling the to craft adaptive, iterative, and politically informed 1 Katherine Bain (kbain@worldbank.org), Doug Porter (dporter@worldbank.org), and Michael Watts (mwatts@berkeley.edu) acknowledge the support of Debbie Isser and Alex Berg (World Bank), Zack Brisson (ReBoot), Musharraf Cyan (Georgia State University), Peter Lewis (Johns Hopkins University), and Ukoha Ukiwo (Department for International Development). We are grateful to the participants of the workshop, “Political Economy of Nigerian Governance,” held in Abuja on May 6–7, 2013 and at the Annual Bank Conference on Africa: Confronting Conflict and Fragility held at UC Berkeley June 8-10, 2015. The work discussed in this paper was supported by a UK Government-funded Governance Partnership Facility and by the Dutch Government-funded BNPP Trust Fund through the project Strengthening Security and Justice in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA III approaches to institutional reform (see for example, social levels (the village, chieftainship, ethnic group, Andrews 2013; Kelsall 2011; Moore and Unsworth federal state, corporation) and with the rise of a 2010). In common, these approaches place great militant group (the Movement for the Emancipation stead on diagnostically informed, network-savvy of the Niger Delta [MEND]) that in late 2005 proved authorizers, motivators, connectors and conveners, capable of compromising the entire state formation. resource providers, and problem identifiers—this is, for instance, the heart of “problem driven iterative This may be a classic WDR 2011 conflict story of adaptation” (PDIA) (see Andrews, Pritchett, and deepening social inequality and perceived injustice, Woolcock 2012) and of currently active communities fueled by intractable poverty in the face of burgeoning of practice around “doing development differently” wealth. But of particular interest in this paper is and “thinking and working politically”.2 At this wri- that the Niger Delta experience has also served to ting there appear to be few cases in which it is warn against uncritical acceptance of tropes of the possible to rigorously trace the impact of political fragile and conflicted state narrative that appear economy/institutional analysis or politically informed to foreclose the possibility of socially progressive programming on aid outcomes (Roche and Kelly change, and of too readily reading such situations 2012). At best, say observers, one may argue that through the lens of endemic institutional deficit and a “partial revolution” has occurred in practice, while dysfunction. In 2009, with two-thirds of oil fields shut routine bureaucratic procedure remains largely down, 200,000 people displaced, and the national intact (Carothers and de Gramont 2013; Yanguas economy in jeopardy, an amnesty was granted. and Hulme 2014) awaiting a completely different Thereafter, 26,000 MEND militants were drawn into approach to “thinking and working politically” a pact with federal and state governments, oil output (Fisher and Marquette 2014). In this light we examine recovered within months, and a mix of state coercion the Bank’s engagements in Nigeria. and patronage secured a stable if fragile peace. No one would be sanguine about the durability of that Nigeria is a remarkable illustration of how deeply political settlement, much less convinced that the intractable the cycle of poverty, conflict, and fragility array of injustices underpinning the conflict have can become when tied to the ferocious battles been appeased. Yet, the fact that such rapid shifts in associated with the political economy of oil. The trajectory can occur in contexts like the Niger Delta Niger Delta also illustrates that although the form and are not readily explained, let alone predicted and dynamics of conflict may be heterogeneous, it or instrumentalized, by public policy provides the is very commonly motivated by deep and powerfully context for this working paper. felt grievances and injustices. Here, the stresses of injustice play out in direct relation to actions This paper places the corpus of analytic and against oil companies (attacking assets and oil theft, programmatic work concerning institutional reform extorting payments, protesting spills); between and in conversation with a now substantial body of work within communities (disputing revenue, royalties, on resource politics and most especially, the debate and land rights and currying favor with oil companies, over the politico-institutional character (sometimes political elites, and donors); between youth groups called political settlements or pacting arrangements deployed as part of the electoral cycle; and between associated with the order of power) and reform citizens and the state, most notably in relation to the landscape of the petro-state. Recent “institution latter’s egregiously coercive security forces (Joab- reform” policy writing appears to have little to say Peterside, Porter, and Watts 2012). These injustice about the political and economic conditions in stresses mounted explosively in the early 2000s which crises and institutional disjunctures might and especially after 2006, when the region became authorize, and thereby enable, agents to embark on a zone of conflicts operating at and across many institutional reforms. A resource curse analysis often 2 See, for example, the efforts outlined by Adrian Leftwich with regard to the Development Leadership Program: Adrian Leftwich, “Thinking and Working Politically: What Does It Mean, Why Is It Important and How Do You Do It?” in “Politics, Leadership and Coalitions In Development. Policy Implications of the DLP Research Evidence Research and Policy Workshop, Frankfurt, Germany 10-11 March 2011. Background Papers” (Development Leadership Program, n.d.), http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4191&utm_ medium=rss&utm_campaign=gsdrc&utm_source=newsfeed; and the Doing Development Differently website, founded by Matt Andrews and colleagues (http://buildingstatecapability.com/the-ddd-manifesto/). IV LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA lacks the granular detail of institutions and seems all its instruments with “the political economy of incapable of accounting for why some institutions institutional reform” in Nigeria, its largest client experience decay and others do not, or of casting country in Africa. As such, this innovation and the light on why pockets of competence and efficacy questions that it raises have broader implications for appear at some times and places and not others. Our both researchers and development practitioners in contention is that filling these gaps would help make Nigeria and beyond. iterative and adaptive problem-oriented approaches to institutional reform more attuned to the local These two lines of interest are pursued through four orderings of power and thus potentially of more sections. In the first, we locate our argument in the value in addressing the inevitably context-specific context of Nigeria and the Niger Delta with respect question of what needs to be done, in addition to to the central debates about how institutional the more generic how, or the process through which, change is dialectically shaped, constrained, and institutional change might be fostered. enabled by, and in turn can impact upon, the nature of underlying political and material conditions. The We focus on Edo State for two reasons. First, it does second section explores the conditions under which not on its face appear to be an obvious location a reformist governor emerged in Edo in 2008 and in which to explore a reform experience, given its how these conditions shaped, if not compelled, an entanglement in the Niger Delta conflict and the orientation toward particular problems—and thus maladies typically associated with state fragility. Yet reforms. since 2009, the governor has been applauded at home and abroad for his accomplishments in road We follow this in section three with new empirical construction and the capital sector more generally, data on Edo’s performance between 2009 and 2012 in internal revenue generation, and in political to foreground two questions: how did pre-existing succession. Although it would be premature and conditions—structures, forces, circumstances, and so foolhardy to suggest that Edo represents a full-on on—impact on the institutional choices available to break from certain forms of path dependency and the new administration, and what kinds of institutional structural constraint (rent-seeking), there may be modalities and political pacting were required and in the Edo story the beginnings of what Orihuela made possible by pursuing reforms in a particular (2013) calls a “resource-curse escape.” Second, institutional arena? Section four steps back to reflect Edo is of interest also because of the changes that on how agencies like the World Bank could, and its experience is contributing to the World Bank indeed have begun to, engage more authentically country team’s effort to engage operationally across with the political economy of reform. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA V 1. The Ordering of Power in a Petro-State Nigeria customarily features as a showcase of the state regulation, and service delivery (Lewis 2011; catastrophic failures of oil-led national development Adebanwi and Obadare 2010; Humphreys, Sachs, (Collier 2007). Although annual economic growth and Stiglitz 2007, 265). Massive government outlays appears to have averaged 7–8 percent in the on campaigns to rebrand the country’s image have past decade, the stark reality is that poverty rates not dented the pervasively bleak predictions about remain chronically high at more than 60 percent of Nigeria’s future. the population, much higher than in neighboring countries like Niger and Benin.3 Although estimated As oil production became an indelible part of the rates of both economic growth and poverty since country’s political, economic, and social fabric, oil 2010 have recently been revised downward, there revenues severed public taxation from state rev- remain glaring contrasts between rural and urban enue and fed what Slater (2010) in another setting areas (where growth in wealth is concentrated in the calls a “provisioning pact,” in which the rapid southwest part of the country, particularly the Lagos centralization of power around ferocious battles over agglomeration), and the economic divide between oil revenues drove societal fragmentation, splintering, North and South appears to be even starker than and dispersion in what had always been a fractious earlier estimates suggested (World Bank 2014, and competitive multi-ethnic federal system. In 18–20). As parsed in one International Monetary the wake of the return to civilian rule in 1999 after Fund (IMF) report, Nigeria’s oil revenues have “not nearly two decades of military government, ethnic, significantly added to the standard of living of the religious, and political violence escalated, as Nigeria average Nigerian” (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian succumbed to two home-grown insurgencies: one 2003, 4). Inevitably these failures and seemingly draped in the language of resource control emerging intractable structural impediments cast a long from the oilfields of the Niger Delta, the other (still shadow over any optimistic assessments of Nigeria’s in train) speaking of true Islam and the restoration of short-term future. the Caliphate. Thus Nigeria became a poster child of the “fragile and conflicted state,” condemned to State capture of large oil revenues is largely seen to embark on a “post-conflict transition.” be responsible for Nigeria’s litany of development failures, its currently precarious political dynamics, A declensionist narrative of this sort is, of course, and by implication, its existing portfolio of available a quite familiar Nigerian story (Okonta 2008; Smith policy choices. The Dutch Disease, revenue volatility, 2007). The varied terms used to describe Nigeria’s and poor fiscal management have produced a political architecture—predatory rule, “spoils poli- well-catalogued list of endemic state deficits and tics,” prebendalism,4 felonious systems, etc.—almost dysfunctions. Many forms of public authority are always refer back to the vast neo-patrimonial edifice seen to be illegitimate and/or unjust and also of a rentier state in which political networks are display features that erode effective forms of deeply intertwined with public office to provide vast fiscal accountability, bureaucratic competence, opportunities for illicit gain (Oliveira 2007; Joseph 3 We are aware that in the wake of the “rebasing” of the Nigeria national accounts data, there is a debate over numbers, poverty rates, human development trends, and so on (see World Bank 2014). The fact remains that unemployment is massively underestimated, while the aggregate picture of income and human development indices of poverty during the period of oil-led development has been disastrous. The total poverty headcount rose from 27.2 percent in 1980 to 65.6 percent in 1996, and recent figures from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) show that between 1980 and 2000, the share of the population subsisting on less than US$1 per day grew from 36 percent to more than 70 percent (from 19 million to a staggering 90 million people). In half of Nigeria’s 36 states, the estimated poverty headcount (and indices of multi-dimensional poverty) increased between 2004 and 2010; in some northern states, the figure is close to 80 percent. 4 This term refers to political systems in which elected officials and other government workers believe they have a right to use government resources to directly benefit their supporters. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 1 1987). The construction of Nigeria’s elite cartel— control through both public and private institutions, perhaps the most durable feature of the country’s to co-opt elites while redirecting and placating state building in the petroleum era—is the product popular discontent, to secure oil installations and of an exclusionary political settlement that, though infrastructure, and to provide the political foundation opting for redistribution rather than growth (Ajakaiye, needed for the system to reproduce itself and Collier, and Expo 2011, 245, 249), limited most gains withstand shocks. to a narrow stratum of notables from specific regions and social classes. The logic of the political order entails buying off powerful groups and individuals THE LIMITS OF THE RESOURCE CURSE ANALYSIS (co-optation); permitting some benefits to trickle There is a grave danger of seeing Nigeria exclusively down to purchase consent and legitimacy; and through the monochromatic and often deterministic building powerful “despotic apparatuses” (Mann lens of the resource curse. Revenue management, 1986) to ensure compliance (coercion) (Humphreys, the boom and bust cycle, and countercyclical Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007, 264). interventions have certainly challenged the Nigerian government. While the politics of oil analysis are prone to conclusions drawn in the aggregate (Ross INSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY: 2012; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003), they THE EXAMPLE OF THE NIGER DELTA are also reductive, where agency is reduced to the In Nigeria as elsewhere, exclusionary political “survival of the fattest” and “big man/godfather settlements and extractive institutions are associated rule” or crowded out by the heavy structural hand with high levels of violence and political conflict. The of oil’s political economy (Collier 2007). Yet, this Niger Delta is a particularly condensed and explosive model does not explain the institutional asymmetry, concatenation of subnational “pacting” founded in other words, why some institutions perform better on patronage, socio-spatial fragmentation, state than others and why some pockets of institutional dysfunction, and the rise of a raft of non-state armed competence and efficacy exist but not others. groups (Watts 2005, 2012; Obi and Rustaad 2011). This resource curse model also does not describe Yet as noted earlier, the inventory of institutional the conditions under which elites will invest trust, failures should not obscure the achievements of the loyalties, and resources to create these patterns. In a 2009 amnesty and subsequent restorative events; capacious and complex multi-ethnic federal system in other words, the operations of the provisioning held together by a contentious system of revenue pact in one of the country’s most contentious allocation to federal, state, and local levels, it is regions exhibited capabilities that, though volatile, inevitable that a resource curse analysis covers over unstable, and limited, have nonetheless conferred all manner of subnational institutional variation and a sort of political durability. The state has been markedly different forms of state capability.5 informalized for specified purposes, vested with certain capabilities and made “functional” (networks, We underpin our account of contemporary events in pacts, coalitions) in particular ways. Put another way, Edo State not with a political economy condemned its institutional capabilities are asymmetric. Clearly by the institutional traps of the resource curse, the state does not have the capacity required for but rather from the viewpoint of Nigeria’s petro- fully representational politics that would enable state as a political settlement through which there it to promote economically productive or socially is a particular ordering of power (Slater 2010) that equitable investments or to deliver public goods, is dynamic over space and time. This ordering is such as justice, security, services, livelihoods, certainly at odds with the admittedly authoritarian effectively and democratically. Nevertheless, the but ultimately developmental state-building state has grown the capacity to extend security and protection pacts that feature in Slater’s account of 5 Ajakaiye, Collier, and Expo (2011, 254–6) do acknowledge subnational variation and provide vignettes to contrast the key elements of fiscal governance in Cross Rivers and Akwa Ibom, two oil-producing states in the delta region, and Kano and Lagos, both major city states in Nigeria, over the 1970–2003 period. Their purpose is to show how in some cases, decision makers deviated from national patterns, where others reproduced practices that characterized the entire society. Our modest next step in this paper is to cast some light on why and how deviation occurred in the Edo case. For a more general view on such subnational and comparative capabilities within and between oil states, see Heilbrunn (2014). 2 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA postcolonial Southeast Asia. In Nigeria, a viable (the conditions of “ungovernability”), they were protection pact was undercut by the state capture of nevertheless in toto durable because of the twin oil revenues, which instead produced a provisioning capabilities of centrally governed coercion (national pact that, though exclusionary, obviated the need for police and military power) and patrimonialism elites to invest in forms of public authority that would (through fiscal federal arrangements). garner legitimacy by delivering public goods. If the Biafran war posed an “endemic” political threat that Uneven capabilities are not best explained merely might have pushed elites to forge a protection pact, as artifacts of “low capacity” or insufficient com- the ascendancy of abundant oil rents redirected mitment by policy makers. Nor are episodes of capa- political contest toward the design of a patrimonial- bility and efficacy merely the product of heroic distributive system through which oil wealth was leaders or serendipity. Rather, it is more useful to see to be disseminated. This contentious and corrupt asymmetries as the product of dynamic interaction distribution system (labeled “fiscal federalism”) between political settlements and the institutional became the principle and enduring site of elite arenas through which economic and political elites contest (Watts 2014). meet, compete, and/or make durable agreements. It follows that even within so-called dysfunctional Nigeria’s provisioning system redirected political states, there are pockets of effectiveness amid state competition toward the subnational level, toward deficits (see Leonard 2008; Roll 2011, 2011a). The the fragmenting forms of public authority—secular, conditions of possibility for moving beyond the religious, chiefly, and so on. If these forces competed “persistent failure” of “capability traps” (Pritchett, for near-term spoils and were unstable and always Woolcock, and Andrews 2012) reside even in the uncertain about their ability to contain the politics inhospitable climes of political conflict and natural of dissent (the “crises of authority”) or conflict resource dependency. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 3 2. Edo State in the Nigerian Federal System Although not a major oil-producing state compa- education and patterns of class and demography rable to Bayelsa or Rivers, Edo State (see map 1) were more than incidental to the rise and election nevertheless was affected by the system of fiscal of Comrade Adams Oshiomhole, a charismatic and federalism, the contentious politics, and the violent well-connected populist and trade union leader, in insurgencies that took shape after the return to 2008. With a population of approximately 3.5 million civilian rule in 1999. Edo is the product of the division people—close to the average population of a typical of the former Midwestern State (renamed Bendel Nigerian state—Edo is part of the South-South State in 1976) into two states in 1991. Edo retained regional zone of Nigeria (otherwise known as the the capital city of Benin and most of the physical and Niger Delta region). administrative infrastructure, but it lost substantial oil-producing territory to its neighbor, Delta State. Historically, Edo had been one of the best performing Historically, Edo’s close association with the dominant states in the country. The poverty rate, for instance, political factions in western Nigeria socialized the is approximately 20 percent lower than the national Edo people into the culture of oppositional politics, average (table 1), the product of the mass free edu- and this relationship has historically made it possible cation of the Action Group Government of the (prior) for politicians and so-called political “godfathers” to Western Region. Favored with well-qualified human draw support from the dominant political machine resources, it also was a beneficiary of oil resources in the southwest without incurring the wrath of Edo after the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, 1967–1970 (from nationalists (Ukoha 2014). Relatively high levels of which it did not directly suffer). Various state gov- Map 1.   Edo State in the Nigerian Federation SOKOTO KATSINA JIGAWA ZAMFARA YOBE KANO BORNO KEBBI BAUCHI KADUNA GOMBE NIGER ADMAWA FEDERAL PLATEAU CAPITOL KWARA TERRITORY OYO NASSARAWA TARABA EKITI KOGI OSUN BENUE OGUN ONDO EDO ENUGU LAGOS EBONYI ANAMBRA DELTA IMO ABIA CROSS RIVER BAYELSA AKWA RIVERS IBOM 4 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA ernments, notably the long-serving governments of power. On this landscape, any governor would need Dr. Samuel Ogbemudia and Professor Ambrose Alli, to confront not just popular opinion but also the were credited with pioneering several initiatives in much-heralded performance of his predecessors, the areas of human capital and infrastructure devel- who governed a larger and better-resourced state, opment. These pioneer administrations became the if Edo was not going to be dwarfed by its oil-rich reference points—in effect the source of a “golden neighbor, Delta State. age” narrative—for judging the performance of suc- cessive governments (Ukoha 2014). Any occupant of Governor Oshiomhole assumed office in November the Benin Government House was therefore likely to 2008 following a successful court appeal to retrieve confront the litmus test of high public expectations. the mandate given to him by the people of Edo. Eighteen months earlier, the Independent National The ability of Chief John Oyegun, the first elected Electoral Commission indicated that the PDP’s governor of Edo, to meet these high expectations Oserhiemen Osunbor had won. Following protracted was not tested, due to the return of military rule in hearings, the Court of Appeal found in Oshiomhole’s 1993. Inevitably, the reference point for Chief Lucky favor. Oshiomhole’s legal challenge was endorsed by Igbinedion, elected governor in 1999 after the return a constellation of powerful social forces buttressed to civilian rule, remained the aforementioned golden by a variety of interest groups. His social class base— age of Ogbemudia and Alli. By the time he departed workers, peasants, small-scale traders, unionists, and in 2007, Igbinedion had failed, and the allegations sections of the middle and technical classes—carved of corruption leveled against him contributed to the out a reform space capable of serving a range of protest vote against the ruling People’s Democratic purposes and constituencies. Arguably the most Party (PDP) that catapulted Adams Oshiomhole into popular president of the Nigeria Labor Congress Table 1.   Edo State and Nigeria: Key Indicators INDICATORS EDO NIGERIA Population 3,463,629 151,300,000 Per capita in US $ 327.62 1,156.82 Population using improved water source (%) 60.7 49.1 Unemployment rate (%) 12.2 14.7 Life expectancy at birth (years) 47 50 Net primary school enrolment (%) 96.9 61 Adult literacy (%) 76.2 64.2 Incidence of poverty 33.1 54.4 Human development index 0.481 0.513 Inequality (measured by Gini index) 0.4585 0.4882 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on National Bureau of Statistics figures. (NLC), Oshiomhole’s victory at Edo’s 2007 guberna- affecting the entire country, including the pressing torial elections reflected his charisma, national and urgent legacy of two decades of deepening visibility, and leadership and unionist skills, but it was conflict in the oilfields and the high expectations of also an unequivocal vote against the perceived poor 26,000 militants, surrendering their weapons and governance in the state under PDP rule. If Oshiomhole moving from the creeks into the urban areas of states rode a wave of popular support into state office, like Edo to escape their troubled pasts. at the same time he confronted wider problems LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 5 3. The Edo Reforms: The Dialectics of Power, Institutions, and Reform Movement within our cities and across the State back on political aspirants as “public expectations.” will be progressively made less hazardous through Oshiomhole’s inaugural speech paid due homage to the provision and maintenance of good road these pent-up demands and expectations, but it was networks. […] We will accelerate the installation clear to the governor and his executive team that not of enduring infrastructure which will support rapid all options had equal political merit with the public industrialization of our State and provide massive or the business or donor communities, nor did each employment opportunities. carry the same institutional possibility (potential) of being implemented. In other words, the politico- —Edo State Governor Adams Oshiomhole, institutional space of reform opportunity, the amount November 2008 inauguration speech of potential resistance and support, the level of technical competence, and so on were complex and uneven. Reform would demand considerable powers of navigation, alliance and coalition building, Upon his election, Oshiomhole embarked on and improvisation, as well as a subtle reordering of and implemented an ambitious, highly successful authority. statewide program of road construction and repair in Edo. Why might a newly elected governor, inheriting Other kinds of signaling paid significant dividends, a particular set of political legacies and challenges too. A promise to enact a new law on public in a volatile and contested oil-producing region, procurement, benchmarked to Organisation for bet his immediate and longer-term prospects on Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) an unprecedented road construction program?6 In standards, along with commitments to transparency our view, it is worth reflecting on what we will call and public access of information, indicated to the “institutional political economy” of roads in the donors that the governor shared their views. This Edo case. Understanding why executive priority signaling delivered two immediate fiscal prizes, was granted to this sector and not others will help each carrying considerable political credibility and to explain how the fiscal, political, and technical popular legitimacy. First, the World Bank approved capabilities were created to pursue this priority and budget support valued at US$225 million; thus Edo, assets were delivered such that Oshiomhole was able along with Lagos, would be one of only two states to gain resounding support for his second mandate in Nigeria to receive Bank payments directly into through the polls in 2012. the state’s budget. Equally important would be the Bank’s branding of Edo as a “high-performing reform Before and after the 2009 amnesty, there was no state,” enabling it to garner credibility with the pu- shortage of far-reaching commitments by federal blic at large and with subscribers to a NGN 25 bil- and state governments, donors, and civil society lion bond successfully floated in 2010. As mentioned, organizations to “break with the past” and deliver the governor’s team was able to secure World something qualitatively new across a wide range of Bank funding for a large share of road construction policy priorities. Frenetic signaling by political elites spending by declaring its commitment to enact a on health, education, agriculture and food security, modern procurement law and to make information youth employment, good governance, urban crime on contracts publicly available as the beginning of and security, and infrastructure priorities was also institutional reforms under a programmatic series promoted by vibrant public media and projected of Development Policy Loans. The attention to 6 A lively scholarly literature is debating the impact of infrastructure spending on political competition and conflict (see the review by Voth and Voigtlander 2014). 6 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA institution building under the first of the Edo budget EXPLOITING OPPORTUNITIES: support operations demonstrated the Bank’s backing THE BENEFITS OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION as well as its desire to see institutional mechanisms Compared to implementing time-consuming and strengthened so that progress could become less complex reforms of social services or creating job- dependent on personalities. friendly economic growth, road projects in particular offer a way to concentrate available resources into Although all of this yielded resources that the relatively few clientage relationships (Tilly 2005) governor and his team would effectively harness, it that visibly and directly connect the highest office was abundantly clear that local legitimacy (and thus, with on-the-ground results. Spending on roads both regime stability in the short term and a positive (and associated drains, pathways, lighting, etc.) is a result in the 2012 elections) hinged on actually high-profile, relatively quick way to deliver political delivering on commitments made during the fiercely assets that can appeal to a range of constituencies, fought 2008 electoral campaign. Here the governor generating jobs, facilitating commercial activity delivered in an unequivocally effective and dramatic and private sector investment, promoting access to way. A public commentator, assessing Oshiomhole’s markets and services, and bringing order and tidiness performance in 2012, noted that the “tales of woe” to urban environments. of Oshiomhole’s predecessors had been replaced by a “success story… felt in all parts of the state, from Oshiomhole moved quickly to assemble and deploy Benin City the state capital to Ososo in Akoko Edo; impressive fiscal, political, and technical capabilities. from Uromi in Esan North-East to Ozalla in Owa West The first of two batches of road construction contracts the report is the same: Oshiomhole is working. The was commissioned in December 2009, amounting to governor’s magic wand is seen across the 18 local 43 percent of the total outlays on roads up to 2013 government areas in the three senatorial districts.”7 (the second batch occurred in October 2011, ahead of the 2012 elections). In the first term in office, 43 contracts were issued for more than 450 kilometers of roads, totaling NGN 108.8 billion (see map 2).8 Map 2.   Regional Distribution of Road Spending 40.7 billion spent on 226 km road development of roads built 44% of total spending 8.4 billion spent on 48 km road development of roads built 43.9 billion spent on 176 km 8% of total spending road development of roads built 48% of total spending Source: Data & Design, Reboot.org 7 See Peter Okhiria, “Why Edo People Want Oshiomhole to Return in 2012,” The Nation (Lagos), November 19, 2011, http://issuu.com/thenation/docs/november_19__2011. 8 This section draws heavily for data and conclusions on Porter et al. (2015). This work—referred to locally as the “fiscal ethnography” study— followed a series of workshops involving officials from the governor’s Economic and Strategy Team (EST), key state ministries, departments and agencies, and Edo civil society groups. It was conducted during 2013 and was the focus of consultations with state authorities and within the World Bank in 2014. The study team included 13 members drawn from the Niger Delta Social Accountability (NDSA) project (World Bank funded, with DfID support), officials and consultants from Edo State agencies, and members of the Edo State Conference on NGOs (CONGO) and the Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform (NDCBP). LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 7 By end-2013, 85 percent had been completed, and with statutory personal income taxes—contributed independent engineering tests concluded that the primarily by civil servants on whom the governor was quality of the roads was adequate or above par. The not critically dependent—as well as deals with high- contrast with the previous administration of Governor income taxpayers and Benin City businesses. Both Lucky Igbinedion was stark, a time when allocations constituencies found appeal in the way the governor for the entire transport sector ranged from NGN personalized his commitments right from the start. 4.4 billion in 2005 to NGN 7.1 billion in the election He maintained an exhausting schedule of visits year of 2008. Oshiomhole’s administration more to road project sites accompanied by TV cameras than doubled this outlay in 2009; spending on road that would project him, often with hammer in hand, construction then climbed to NGN 16.2 billion in remonstrating with contractors against a backdrop of 2012 and increased from 14 to 20 percent of total strategically placed billboards declaring “Your taxes spending between 2008 and 2012. at work!” Such political optics were used to leverage new property and consumption taxes, as evident A key point we hope to convey is that the fiscal, delivery on roads both weakened the capacity of political, and technical capabilities needed to turn the privileged classes to resist the taxes and proved these contractual liabilities into political gain were attractive to business and finance houses. not readily at hand in 2009. They required the deft crafting of elite pacts and specific institutional Although Oshiomhole was not immediately con- modalities to raise resources, attract trust and strained by dependence on political “godfathers” or loyalties, and project authority across multiple confronted by serious political challenges, the larger deconcentrated sites of investment activity. political context here was one of internal struggles Moreover, the governor’s networking efforts with within the elite pact and most especially within the traditional authorities, private financiers and banks, nationally ruling PDP party. Frictions between key contractors, and business actors delivered additional PDP leaders in Abuja, most dramatically the face-off legitimacy, fiscal flexibility, and talent. This type of between President Olusegun Obasanjo and former strategy clearly demonstrates the premise that if a Minister of Works and Housing Anthony Akhakon talented leader is to be pivotally important, he or Anenih over the chairmanship of the PDP Board of she is likely to be embedded in networks of social, Trustees, provided the political space and autonomy economic, and political power in which others are Oshiomhole needed, as neither proved capable enrolled and through which rents and revenues are of marshaling forces against him after the 2008 mobilized and projected (Whitfield and Therkildsen inauguration. Crucial too was Oshiomhole’s decision 2011; Andrews 2013; Craig and Porter 2014). In what to forge an alliance with Edo’s preeminent traditional follows we provide an abridged account of a highly ruler. The Oba of Benin, reportedly incensed that the problem-focused and adaptive set of institutional major PDP power brokers in the state, notably Anenih modalities that were conditioned by, and in turn and Chief Gabriel Igbinedion, the Esama of Benin, conditioned, the political economy. did not accord him due respect and courtesies, joined hands with Governor Oshiomhole and declared that The fiscal environment was highly uncertain and he had adopted him as a grandson. Legitimated by appeared to offer little room to maneuver. Edo’s the substantial cultural and social capital of the Oba capital spending, as in other Nigerian states, (half of the Edo population belongs to his sphere depends on federal transfers for around 90 of influence), Oshiomhole possessed a powerful percent of revenue, and 70 percent of the balance, vehicle for enrolling support for his administration internally generated revenue (IGR), depends on and reform initiatives (Ukoha 2014). local taxation. Edo’s revenue forecasts over this period were routinely twice the actual receipts. A substantial tranche of political capacity was The administration had no ability to influence the matched with technocratic expertise through volume of transfers, but Oshiomhole nonetheless parallel strategies by Oshiomhole to minimize dramatically increased IGR—in real terms—by an the risk that the civil service would sabotage his average of 20 percent each year between 2008 plans. Although his commissioners—heads of and 2012. A staggering 72 percent increase in IGR agencies—were handpicked, below this level, he to NGN 8.22 billion was achieved in 2009 through inherited civil service functionaries whose loyalties an adroit mix of political strategy and networking. were uncertain, reflecting long PDP incumbency Working class support was garnered by beginning in the state. Moreover, the civil service’s principal 8 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA modus operandi of using public office to delay, play Second, as discussed above, it was necessary to gatekeeper, and extract rents posed major risks “reach around” the civil service. Road building is to the new governor’s project. It was known to be transaction intense; it requires centrally concentrated incapable of attracting top people, rewarding good capabilities that can be reliably deployed at multiple performance, or credibly justifying actions at odds sites. Here lies the classic challenge of bureaucratic with the governor’s agenda. reforms: typically they can be instituted at the top end by fusing political and executive power, but they are especially difficult to superintend across multiple, APPLYING PRAGMATIC widely dispersed sites of action. The administration’s (IF UNCONVENTIONAL) MEASURES ability to reach from the EST to the project sites was Quite swiftly, four kinds of political and technical made possible by several initiatives. Hand-picked capacity were put in place. Given the focus on delivery Special Advisors (SAs) and Senior Special Assistants and the institutional landscape that the governor and (SSAs) were placed in all strategically and politically his team had inherited, the nature and quality of this important agencies. These individuals, technically capacity did not always coincide with best practice proficient but also connected back to private sector principles. First, although functioning de facto networks, were made responsible for advising, but prior to the elections, in March 2009, the governor this function linked their expertise to the “shadow announced the formal formation of an Economic and of the governor” in every agency in which they were Strategy Team, the EST, which became a textbook deployed. For example, at the Ministry of Works, case of what Jessop (2008) refers to as state powers which is responsible for capital budget execution, an inscribed in “institutional ensembles.” The EST’s SSA checked on the progress of project revisions or political and technical capabilities would provide certificates of progress and reported directly to the the administration with an institutional ensemble, governor and the EST. Additionally, although Edo or group of cadres, that gave it the capacity to under Oshiomhole is not alone in this practice, the “grasp” (i.e., mobilize resources) and “reach” (i.e., regime retained private sector engineering outfits as exercise control over contracting, payments, and so project consultants to a greater degree than in other on at multiple sites) and therefore deliver specific states. Formally, these consultants were recruited institutional outcomes. The EST exemplified, in to augment line ministry functions, but in practice short, the operations of infrastructural power (Mann they often displaced these functions. They could 1988). By bringing political and technical modalities provide the EST with a direct source of intelligence, and capabilities to bear in supervising every aspect with lower entry and exit costs than are possible with of planning, contracting, procurement, payments, more unwieldy civil service systems. and so on, the EST simultaneously mobilized resources while extending territorial delivery to key Third, it is significant that five large contractors constituencies across the state. To play this role, the accounted for 83 percent of all road construction. EST necessarily included not just technical experts Contracts awarded to one of these, along with its but also individuals networked politically into key subsidiaries, amounted to 49 percent of the total constituencies, including private sector finance. The value of all state road contracts. This naturally chairman of the EST, Godwin Obaseki, is exemplar. exposed the governor to allegations of favoritism A successful investment banker who has played a and collusion, but it is important to understand the leading role in Nigeria’s capital market, Obaseki also political and institutional assemblage these figures served on national initiatives at pension reform and represented. The EST perceived the reputational knew how the public service sector worked. The EST risks to be outweighed by the fact that the five also included the influential chairman of the Board contractors had both financial depth and the links of Internal Revenue, the Commissioners of Finance to local banks that were needed to absorb the and of Budget and Economic Planning, and several impact of the state’s uncertain cash flows. In other other members with private sector experience and words, they could allow the inevitable arrears in networks. Perhaps taking a cue from his Action state government payments to accumulate without Congress of Nigeria (ACN) compatriot in Lagos interruptions in implementation. State, Oshiomhole empowered his team by creating an authorizing environment that encouraged Fourth, Banks are important players in any cons- freedom to operate and shielded the participants truction business, but in this case they assumed from corrosive political influences. a special prominence. As holders of government LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 9 accounts and guarantors of contracts, banks provide were sometimes unorthodox and ran counter to financial services to both the government and modern public finance management best practice its contractors. To be sure, these were lucrative principles. For example, they included agreements arrangements, but they alleviated cash flow problems that provided generous mobilization advances— on both sides and, as a member of the EST noted, sometimes up to 43 percent of the total value of “any bank that was willing to take the risk was welcome contracts—and allowed contractors to “design as to invest in Edo but there weren’t that many.”9 Banks you go” and adapt their work to environmental and would quantify risk in their contractual arrangements social conditions. The menu of methods included fre- and issue advance payment guarantees (APGs) quent revisions to contracts to allow for modifications based on their risk assessments. Such mechanisms to budgets at several stages and for new projects to created an informal and creative network of be inserted into existing contracts so as to reward accountability between banks and contractors. high-performing contractors and avoid transaction- By backing both parties, banks could lower their intensive rebidding processes. The latitude given and risk assessments, which increased profits but also the premium placed on trust were further reinforced created an enabling environment for uninterrupted by arrangements that enabled contractors to directly project execution. Here, “signaling” was important. negotiate “social settlements” along the route of Risk assessments relied less on the formal record of road construction, thus reducing delays, as savvy a contractor’s financial and technical capacities and local figures—custom leaders, retired officials, youth more on informal norms, the principal’s reputation, leaders, and residents—negotiated compensation future expectations, and other information to reduce and passage rights with the executive. transaction costs. The Oshiomhole administration’s history of honoring contracts and its assurances The risks of similar contests between contractors of increased future capital spending encouraged and certifying engineers typically oriented toward banks to spread their risk over a number of contracts. rent seeking were mitigated by displacing the conventional triangle of accountability between the These tactics networked external political and client, the supervising engineer, and the contractor. commercial power into the administration at the same Direct lines of accountability between the client and time as the executive “fused” the powers of policy contractor were encouraged by arrangements that making (politics) and bureaucracy (execution). The made engineers dependent on the contractor for EST was not simply populated by loyal technocrats the transfer of their fees, while at the same time, but also reflected a specific political settlement the norms of trust and loyalty between the client between political and commercial elites in order for and contractor were backed by the personalized technocratic expertise to yield fruit. Like many reform supervision of the government and the EST. By a efforts in Nigeria, the EST and the embedding of mix of allowing arrears to periodically accumulate handpicked advisors within the civil service were and (sometimes up to six months after the milestone remain an illustration of an institutional “hybrid” that had been certified) and issuing contract variations, introduces new skills and performance incentives high mobilization advances, and variable progress from the private sector into the public sector setting. payments, the administration set aside conventional It was simultaneously necessary to craft what we norms and crafted an unorthodox system of reward call operational “modalities” that could consolidate and sanction. Although in many contexts, such these political agreements inside and around the arrangements serve personal gain rather than the executive while promoting efficiency in the face of public good, in the case of Edo, they proved central high risks and uncertainties. At the same time, the to the story of successful delivery. institutional modalities used to deliver the services 9 Edo State official, personal communication with second author, June 18, 2014. 10 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 4. The World Bank and Engaging the Political Economy of Reform Mid-way through the process of research and the discussion on how politics, institutions, and dialogue that yielded the account summarized conflict affect the Bank’s business. above, at a seminar convened in Abuja by the World Bank in 2012 a senior figure in Nigerian academics and politics remarked that “the World Bank is RETHINKING HOW THE BANK DOES BUSINESS irrelevant.” The Bank participants found intriguing It was obvious that the implications went far beyond the fact that his comment did not reflect hostility to the decades’ long mantra to “take context seriously.” the Bank on ideological or political grounds—quite Rather, the Bank would have to face a complex the reverse. Rather, his point was that the Bank set of challenges in order to be a useful partner needed to provide more than astute analyses of the to reform-minded Nigerians. Clearly, it needed Nigerian political economy, and that as important to set aside, as the chosen entry point, normative would be the complementary talents and resources, prejudices about the “preferred model of the form instruments, and ways of working that would ensure government should take” (Andrews 2013) for several that better appreciation of real politik was reflected reasons. First, this lens would only reproduce the in how Bank interventions were designed and wide array of institutional deficits and dysfunctions implemented. already enumerated by conventional governance indices10 and thus continue to miss how “already These remarks accorded directly with the Bank’s existing governance” arrangements were mobilizing growing realization about its relationship with Edo and deploying institutional capabilities in inventive State, an issue to which we now turn. They also and effective ways. This fact had been starkly pointed to the critical reflection exercise under way illustrated in the Edo case by a Public Expenditure within the Bank’s Nigeria country team, as well as to Management and Financial Accountability Review the ongoing Bank-wide corporate reform process, (PEMFAR) conducted just as Oshiomhole came to which was in part informed by introspection— office (World Bank 2010). Contrary to the dynamic as noted in the introduction—within the global and adaptive reforming of institutions documented “community of practice” associated with governance by the “fiscal ethnography” (the local term for and institutional reform. Following on the heels of the analytic work on Edo’s roads expenditure, the 2011 WDR, which had challenged the Bank to summarized in the previous section, that animated overcome its risk-averse corporate culture, to take a series of workshops involving World Bank and seriously issues of conflict, security, and justice, and Edo State officials in 2013–14), the PEMFAR painted to embrace innovation (World Bank 2011), new senior a picture of an Edo state administration mired in a management in Nigeria provided an authorizing “capability trap” (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock environment to break with tradition and develop new 2012) and seriously deficient in each of the core instruments for and approaches to engaging with capabilities needed to competently run fiscal affairs: clients. This was not simply belated recognition of the ability to mobilize revenues, match spending to the obvious and the growing prominence of conflict, policy priorities, and respond to the public interest in security, and governance issues nationwide, but how resources are spent. more a reflection of how donor agencies—including the World Bank—had been complicit in what can Second, the lists of “deficits and dysfunctions” only be called mediocre development outcomes in yielded by these kinds of conventional public sector Nigeria, in part because of a reluctance to deepen governance and public finance reviews generally 10 Virtually all major governance indicators/indexes, including the Mo Ibrahim Index, World Governance Indicators, Corruption Perceptions Index, Global Integrity Indicators, and Open Budget Index, rank Nigeria very poorly. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 11 make it difficult to promote a constructive dialogue. pockets of knives, because the sharpest weapon we Rather, they tend to produce lengthy, pro forma have against the World Bank is our anger about the recommendations that lack any sense of sequencing, global injustice and poverty that these international comparative marginal returns, risks, or degrees of financial agencies were part of.” As the chuckles alignment with political incentives. One consequence died down, the governor then remarked, “But I’ve is that they reproduce what are derisively known learned something about the World Bank: if we’re in the development industry as “Christmas Tree” serious, and if we know what we want and are clear projects that are then implemented under a box- about this…then there are people in the World Bank ticking modality in which the incentives to “move who will come and listen. And they’ll think about the money” override a serious review of the fact what you say and what you’re doing, and they’ll offer that the projects are seldom “fit for context” or the very best advice that you can get anywhere. I actually deliver results (see Grindle 2007, 2011; would like to say that I have changed my opinion and World Bank 2011). Most importantly, however, they I am glad to have met them.” make it difficult to build lasting relationships with reform-minded leaders—emerging, in particular, While these sentiments had an immediate impact on in state governments—because their perceived the Bank’s relationship with the Edo State executive, moralizing and sometimes long records of failure the governor’s remarks perhaps also reflected an and inadequacy tend to corrode the trust needed for acute reading of the Bank and its internal political productive engagements. dynamics. This is to say that the process involved in the Edo fiscal ethnography was not a typical example It may be the case that in the fiscal ethnography, of how the Bank engages with its clients. In the the Edo State executive found appealing the Bank Edo case, it had deployed an experienced team to team’s commitment to examining how institutions work with state officials in situ over several months, actually function rather than simply measuring their augmented by senior Nigerian and expatriate experts departures from OECD conventions and norms (as on-call, without preconceived agendas or lending has often been with case with other performance imperatives. This approach was made possible reviews). Indeed, one key positive product of this by the Niger Delta Social Accountability program process was an improved level of trust between the (NDSA), which was supported by an unusually Bank and the Oshiomhole administration, particularly flexible funding source drawn from a Bank-managed given that the Bank was originally perceived by the trust fund to complement existing Bank projects and, trade union leader turned governor as a hostile more explicitly, to help tailor them to the political external actor. In October 2013, immediately circumstances of the Delta region states under the following the governor’s day-long briefing on the broad rubric of transparency, accountability, and fiscal ethnography team’s findings and proposals, he participation. addressed a crowded auditorium gathered to launch an Open Data Portal.11 At the end of his address, Despite the positive relations between the Edo Governor Oshiomhole set aside his notes and executive and the Bank team, as well as the unexpectedly remarked, “I want to say something authorizing environment created by the Bank’s about the help we’ve had from the World Bank.” He country director, initial feedback within the Bank on reminded people of his earlier life as a civil society the fiscal ethnography work showed the challenge activist and union leader and his leading role in for a large international organization in balancing protests around the Bank’s 50th anniversary, and also the precepts of long-term institutional reform with how he had met with the World Bank president at quick delivery. Also challenging was the need to the Bank’s headquarters in Washington, DC. Before build a consensus across what were at times quite presenting his protest, he had to go through metal deep doctrinal cleavages. On the one hand, some detectors, have his bags scanned, have his photo teams felt that the insufficient understanding of how taken, receive a visitor’s badge, and be escorted context and institutional change interact in Edo through the office complex. “I told the World Bank highlighted by the fiscal ethnography work could president that there was no point in clearing out our usefully be leveraged by other Bank-supported 11 See the account of the Portal at http://reboot.org/case-studies/open-data-for-public-service-delivery-nigeria/. 12 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA programs. However, it was also felt that there were Fostering favorable conditions for the work of the organizational risks to documenting deviations from Bank’s Nigeria country team became the purpose international best practices and that the Bank should of the Programmatic Approach to Governance. Two distance itself from them. pieces of analytical work were commissioned from two prominent scholars on Nigeria. The first aimed to acquaint the team with three defining narratives ADAPTING ENGAGEMENTS TO of the Nigerian political economy: (i) ethnic and THE LOCAL REALITY religious diversity, unresolved and sometimes This internal discussion mirrored a growing debate in volatile identity issues, and contentious politics; academic and development circles on how to move (ii) the structural forces associated with the petro- past policy signaling to the implementation of good state and the provisioning pact; and (iii) democratic practice in settings with uneven capabilities (Porter struggles, turbulent democracy, and crises of et al. 2012; Andrews 2013; Seligmann 2015). The authority (see Lewis and Watts 2015). As had the Edo discussion also reiterated what many others have fiscal ethnography work, the working paper showed demonstrated, namely, that the World Bank is in fact how the traditional lens of weak governance and the a heterogeneous institution and, much like Edo, that resource curse had for too long masked a much more it comprises a dynamic set of political settlements complex reality involving strong entrepreneurial that are continually being renegotiated as it evolves forces, pockets of efficacy, and capabilities that do and adapts to find more effective ways to represent allow, under some conditions, reformist institutional and support its diverse owners and clients. In these change to occur. At the same time, the paper had an discussions, contestation can be strong and the overarching and analytical focus rather than a policy power of agency and agreements is critical. In such prescription or pointers for Bank programming, and instances, leadership and the authorizing environment hence it was not intended to provide development provided by senior management are essential in practitioners with helpful suggestions on how to order to override dominant incentives that prefer build on current capacity and actual practices in singular, risk-free, and hands-off approaches where order to effectively partner with the country. practices deviate from international norms. In the same way that a political space had to be created, The second paper drew on seven case studies by navigated, and legitimated in Edo, a quite similar set seasoned observers of how institutional reforms of processes were required within the Bank. occur in Nigeria to examine why and when some reforms move forward while others falter and fail (see The country management team felt that the Bank’s Lewis and Watts 2015a). The case studies reaffirmed experience in Edo State should lead to a new what had been learned about successful reform in set of operating principles for the World Bank in other fragile and conflicted contexts, though with Nigeria. This shift was prompted also by the stream a particular but not exclusive Nigeria angle. For of political economy work carried out under the instance, examining the role of “systemic shocks,” Programmatic Approach to Governance12 (launched how leaders respond to various kinds of threats, in October 2012) and the intensive debate within and the importance of sequencing; establishing the country team itself on that project’s implications credibility early on in the process; delegating to for the Bank’s business mode. Ironically, the key competent technocrats; creating a constituency for elements of problem-focused, iterative, and adaptive reform; and managing potential opponents—all are approaches to institutional change (-or PDIA) then critical features of the reform process in Nigeria. being popularized by Matt Andrews with respect to The paper also demonstrated the more general developing country institutional reform (see Andrews utility of many of the features of the Edo case, 2013) were highlighted in a series of activities running including the combination of a strong commitment in parallel to the Bank’s Edo work that were already from the highest ranking politician along with a seeking to find practical ways to scale up more well-connected and strong technical team that can politically astute and adaptive learning strategies work, through hybrid mechanisms within the system, across Bank operations in Nigeria. while being protected from political interference. 12 This was a program initiated to help improve the Bank’s development effectiveness in Nigeria, through the more politically savvy tailoring of best practice approaches to the diverse local contexts by using “iterative and adaptive approaches” to implementation. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 13 Finally, the case studies also underscored the Four new instruments were also developed to trans- temporal dimension to, or discontinuous nature late these principles into practice within the Nigeria of, asymmetric capability—namely, that reforms in program. First was the formation of a Governance Nigeria are reversible and rarely seen as complete Consultative Group (GCG), a group of high-level or predictable, as reform opponents regain relative Nigerian opinion leaders who meet quarterly strength, leadership transitions occur, and reforms with World Bank officials on a specific theme and are unbundled and diluted. provide a sounding board, allowing Bank teams to hear diverse opinions on past experiences and new These pieces fed a new level of candor in the Bank proposals. Second was the Governance, Conflict and team’s discussions with Nigerian officials, academics, Gender Filter, which is used to screen all new lending and activists because they were based on robust and knowledge work to ensure that the conclusions case studies and gave voice to and legitimated a set highlighted as critical to effectiveness by the of widely held feelings and beliefs. Open discussion analytical studies noted above are incorporated at also led Bank staff to critically review whether the the design stage of each project or knowledge piece. Bank was equipped to: (i) respond to complex and Where attention to governance, conflict, or gender diverse contexts through the operations managed is felt to be lacking, support is provided through a through the Bank’s counterpart and shareholder, trust fund to enable additional analytical work. As Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Finance and Economy a result of this kind of expert analysis, a number of and (ii) identify reform opportunities and then operations have significantly modified their design, support and adapt them as contexts change. An content, and implementation arrangements. internal note was prepared to push debate farther by reviewing the country and corporate incentives and The third new instrument is the Program for Adaptive identifying a number of obstacles—many of them Learning (PAL). Through a series of retrospective within the Bank’s control—that needed addressing. case studies as well as adaptive learning processes This reviewed what might be called “positive built into ongoing projects (ranging from urban deviants” in the Bank’s Nigeria portfolio and served water supply to education reform, community-driven to articulate principles of good practice. development approaches, and agriculture), PAL is beginning to produce some systematic “learning by doing” on which institutional reform measures A NEW COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY seem to work in Nigeria. It thus draws on the country The country team then set about identifying what team’s knowledge of the local political economy and it could itself change. Recognizing that many sector issues and provides an opportunity for teams institutional incentive reforms lay out of its reach to discuss with clients why and how things did or did and were, in any case, being approached as part of not succeed. Feedback from client counterparts is a the new Bank president’s reform agenda, the team valuable addition to the Bank’s role. Finally, at the put forth a new set of principles to which it could state level, new initiatives to help deepen the Bank’s commit and which, it was felt, were likely to provide knowledge of context, including a benchmarking a more enabling environment and support for teams exercise to gauge state performance in service wanting to improve their effectiveness and impact. delivery, a third-party monitoring effort, the use The new Country Program Strategy (FY14–17) was of the academic community to provide candid presented to the World Bank Board of Directors a commentary, and a community of practice for states few months later, incorporating a number of these to exchange local know-how on and experiences of “change principles” and arguing that while the Bank successful public financial management reforms and is a relatively small player in Nigeria, its effectiveness state-level political economy efforts, are all building could be enhanced through: i) deepening and improving on the Edo experience. engagements at the state level, ii) investing heavily to garner a nuanced understanding of history, political Although these developments suggest that the Bank pacting, and priorities, and iii) proactively building can be a more flexible and innovative institution than networks within Nigeria and with key learning some outsiders give it credit for, the transformation institutions abroad (including groups within the of the Bank’s Nigeria country program over the Harvard Kennedy School and Manchester University) past three years remains vulnerable to changes in to create a continuous body of knowledge on how the very conditions that have fostered the positive institutional reforms in Nigeria go forward or fail. features of this period. As others have noted 14 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA (e.g., Yanguas and Hulme 2014), leadership and International Development Association (IDA) donors authorization frequently change in the workings of on how the Bank should conduct itself. In Nigeria, the Bank, and networks of committed staff able to it remains to be seen how the Bank engages, post- utilize funds largely with discretion also shift quickly, 2015 elections, with a new set of governors, some as does the mood of optimism and appetite for of whom are also likely, echoing Edo, to exhibit a change that typically accompanies the early stages “highly adaptive, personalized political executive of organization-wide reform. Thus, serious questions system that selectively signals and appeals to persist about whether such experiences will ever be multiple constituencies” to both manage turbulent scaled up in the World Bank more widely, given the daily realities and ensure the durability of their broader disbursement-oriented incentive culture political regimes. and the underlying political agreement among the LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 15 5. Conclusions We offer four sets of conclusions for discussion. First, would demand and enrich a wider discussion of Edo State’s recent institutional and political history how the modalities, crafted ad hoc and iteratively, runs against the grain of the largely structural and might become “institutionalized” in routine reductive accounts of Nigeria’s putative resource executive and administrative practice, including the curse. At the subnational level, the possibility of possibility that their character could morph and be new pacting arrangements even within a turbulent, reconfigured in unexpected ways. We have argued differentiated, and increasingly decentralized that this issue is not given sufficient attention in the federal system offers if not a radical upending of the “aid effectiveness” policy literature, which treats prevailing order of power, then at the very least the institution building largely in management terms and creation of a dynamic and significant reform space. is often preoccupied with the intricacies of externally The results in Edo, including the exceptional increases driven capacity building and the signaling of reform in IGR and capital expenditure and the fact that an implementation. unprecedented 85 percent of contracts produced assets at standards equal to or above par, would Second, there are challenges for institutions like be significant—indeed an accomplishment—in any the World Bank in undertaking the kinds of analysis context. That such a reform program was created recounted here. There are also challenges in bal- and implemented is a welcome advance from the ancing support for reform-minded governments to development and even scholarly approaches that all enable them to deliver on immediate goals through too often tend to focus on the resource curse and unorthodox arrangements while, at the same time, structure out alternative possibilities, or deny them a helping to foster long-term institutional capacity priori. This is not to suggest that these achievements to counter the stop-start nature of reform as, for are cast in stone, and in any case, the recent electoral example, is the case in Nigeria. Analytic work that results across other Nigerian states indicate that a reveals how institutions actually work can provide notable economic reform record is not necessarily useful ways to build mutual trust and respect. As a rewarded in the polls—a fact that may undermine result, the kind of work of Andrews and his colleagues the incentive for other state political leaders to (see Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2012) can invest substantial political energy and capital in mitigate the predilection for best practice reform groundbreaking reform projects. efforts to be routinely applied in ways that both thwart engagement by reform-minded counterparts The recent history of other reform-oriented governors and that wholly lack the possibility of follow-through. in Nigeria—and the fickleness of the electorate— might suggest that Edo’s “escape from the curse” The point of garnering and utilizing a more thorough could be short-lived.13 Time will tell. Any analysis understanding of the power structures at the of possible scenarios would need to consider the national, state, and local levels is not, however, to continuing tension between all the underlying divine more inventive ways of introducing global dynamics (of oppositional politics, federal-state reform conventions to counterparts in contexts like relations, and national and state elections, among Edo State. Rather, first and foremost, its merit is only the near-term influences), how these dynamics to remind the practitioner community that reforms play out in elite positioning and pacting, and how the translated from elsewhere typically express and kinds of institutional modalities discussed here might project qualities about the relationships between influence the “Edo pacts” and the fields of action political leaders, the public administration, and available to the elites who form them. Such scenarios citizens that may be at odds with how power is 13 Although the people of Edo State voted overwhelmingly at all levels for Governor Oshiomhole’s APC party, the state gubernatorial elections are “off cycle” and he will face reelection next year. 16 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA actually ordered in contexts like Edo. For instance, the more flexibly and adaptively in an array of contexts— members of Edo’s EST are fully acquainted with the within Nigeria and beyond—seems to be at the heart normative merits of institutional arrangements that of the debate. This is, in turn, stands at the heart of promote the principles of transparency, competitive the final point. contracting, and so on. They also candidly note that unless new practices are embedded within the Whether accounting for the reform experiences civil service, their track record could well be rolled and prospects in Edo State or for the World Bank in back. Yet at the same time, it is apparent that had Nigeria more generally, there is no doubt that political the Edo team not carefully managed the timing and institutional agency is crucially important. But and tailoring of the reforms, and indeed had they from Edo’s experience briefly recounted here, it not adopted institutional arrangements that were seems apparent that political choices were made substantially at odds with conventions on how public on the basis of what proved to be a sophisticated sector institutions should manage capital spending, analysis of “institutional political economy” (the they would have risked once again producing only comparative merits of a focus on roads versus teacher global analogues of “best practice” and reproducing performance or law and order, etc.). This revealed the binding logic of “capability traps” of the sort that some options were limited, but at the same time, described by Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews it identified feasible alternatives within a narrowed (2012). set of possibilities. Exercising these choices hinged on investing in a well-remunerated and networked Thus, our third point of conclusions follows logically expertise in the EST and on deploying political cover from the first two. Namely, there is growing evidence by the governor, both at the center and projected out that many counter-doctrinal attributes of the to crucial points where authority might be contested. modalities used, as in Edo, for instance, to “grasp” revenue (from local tax to global aid flows) and In sum, the Edo story reveals that a highly adaptive, thereafter “reach” from budget appropriations to personalized political-executive system was created project power in ways that would create assets on that selectively signaled and appealed to multiple the ground run against the sensibility of much that constituencies. It would be a radical misreading of is put forward as “good governance” practice. But the Edo experience to conclude that the necessary the short answer to questions about whether such conditions of adaptive, iterative pedagogies can arrangements will be sustained, continue to be readily be contrived ex ante by donors and the like. dynamically modified, or beneficially “up-scaled” To return to a point made at the outset, problem- lies not in the details of funding instruments, driven iterative adaptation requires an embedding leadership, or competent technical teams, or even in in, and a responsiveness to, local orderings of power. the pedagogies of the “adaptive iterative learning” In the Nigeria case, there is encouraging evidence of processes. Rather, it lies in the first instance in the an appetite for scaling up politically acute, adaptive political economy; in other words, it requires an acute iterative approaches on the part of both Bank task understanding of “context,” and then in light of teams and Nigerian counterparts. The question is the subsequently improved comprehension of how whether new norms and practices can be sustained power is ordered, it requires a flexible and tailored through the periodic regime changes within the set of programs not necessarily bound to fixed Bank, that is to say, the nature of the “institutional metrics and norms. How development organizations political economy” that will continue to structure the like the World Bank structure themselves to do this field of possibilities. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 17 Bibliography Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. New York: Crown Books. Achebe, Chinua. 1984. The Trouble with Nigeria. London: Heinemann. Adebanwi, Wale, and Ebenezer Obadare, eds. 2010. Encountering the Nigerian State. London: Palgrave. Ajakaiye, O., P. Collier, and A. Ekpo. 2011. “Management of Resource Revenues: Nigeria.” In Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction, ed. P. Collier and A. Venables, 231–61. London: Palgrave. Andrews, Matt. 2013. The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. 2012. “Escaping Capability Traps through Problem- Driven Iterative Adaptation.” Working Paper 299, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC. Barma, Naazneen, Elisabeth Huybens, and Lorena Vinuela, eds. 2014. Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts. Washington, DC: World Bank. Berg, Louis-Alexandre, Deborah Isser, and Doug Porter. 2014. “Beyond Deficit and Dysfunction: Three Questions toward Just Development in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings.” In The International Rule of Law Movement: A Crisis of Legitimacy and the Way Forward, ed. David Marshall. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Berg, Louis-Alexandre, Deborah Isser, and Doug Porter, (2015a). Justice and Institutional Change in Fragile and Conflicted Settings: Re-Framing the Challenges and Solutions, World Bank, Washington, DC. Biddulph, Robin. 2010. “Geographies of Evasion: The Development Industry and Property Rights Interventions in Early 21st Century Cambodia.” PhD thesis, University of Gothenburg. Blum, Jürgen René. 2015. “What Factors Predict how Public Sector Projects Perform: A Review of the World Bank’s Public Sector Management Portfolio.” Policy Research Working Paper 6798, World Bank, Washington, DC. Booth, David. 2012. Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of African Governance.” Policy Brief 9, African Power and Politics Program, Overseas Development Institute, London. Carothers, Thomas, and Diane de Gramont. 2013. Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Collier, Paul. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. London: Oxford University Press. 18 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA Craig, David, and Doug Porter. 2014. “Post-Conflict Pacts and Inclusive Political Settlements: Institutional Perspectives from Solomon Islands.” ESID Working Paper 39, Effective States and Inclusive Development, University of Manchester. Fisher, Jonathan, and Heather Marquette. 2014. “Donors Doing Political Economy Analysis: From Process to Product (and Back Again?).” Research Paper 28, Developmental Leadership Program, University of Birmingham. Francis, Paul, Dierdre Lapin, and Paula Rossiasco. 2011. Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta: A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Washington, DC. Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century. London: Profile Books. Grindle, Merilee S. 2007. “Good Enough Governance Revisited.” Development Policy Review 25 (5): 553–74. ———. 2011. “Governance Reform: the New Analytics of Next Steps.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 24 (3): 415–18. Heilbrun, John R. 2014. Oil, Democracy, and Development in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Humphreys, Macartan, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph Stiglitz, eds. 2007. Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia University Press. IDS (Institute of Development Studies). 2010. An Upside Down View of Governance. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2014. “World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.” Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank, Washington, DC. Jessop, Bob. 2008. State Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. Joab-Peterside, Sofiri, Doug Porter, and Michael Watts. 2012. “Rethinking Conflict in the Niger Delta: Understanding Conflict Dynamics, Justice and Security.” Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Paper 26, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Joseph, Richard A. 1987. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kelsall, Tim. 2011. “Going with the Grain in African Development?” Development Policy Review 29 (1): 223–51. Leonard, David K. 2008. “Where are ‘Pockets’ of Effective Agencies Likely in Weak Governance States and Why? A Propositional Inventory.” Working Paper 306, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton. Lewis, Peter M. 2007. Growing Apart: Oil, Politics and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. ———. 2011. Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 19 Lewis, Peter, and Michael Watts. 2015. “The Politics of Policy Reform in Nigeria.” Discussion Paper, Doing Development Differently Program, World Bank, Washington, DC. ———. 2015a. “Nigeria: The Political Economy of Governance.” Discussion Paper, Doing Development Differently Program, World Bank, Washington, DC. Lubeck, Paul M. 2014. “Explaining the Revolt of Boko Haram: Demography, Governance and Crisis in Northern Nigeria.” Presentation to the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, October 14. Mann, Michael. 1986. The Sources of Social Power, Vol.1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760. London: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1988. States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Moore, Mick, Anna Schmidt, and Sue Unsworth. 2009. “Assuring our Common Future in a Globalised World: The Global Context of Conflict and State Fragility.” Department for International Development, London. Moore, Mick, and Sue Unsworth. 2010. “An Upside-Down View of Governance.” Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/mick-moore-sue-unsworth/upside-down-view-of-governance. Obi, Cyril, and Siri Aas Rustaad, eds. 2011. Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence. London: Zed Press. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2012. Rethinking Policy, Changing Practice: DAC Guidelines on Post-Conflict Transition. Paris: OECD. Okonta, Ike. 2008. When Citizens Revolt. Trenton, NJ: African World Press. Oliveira, R. Soares de. 2007. “Business Success, Angola-Style: Postcolonial Politics and the Rise and Rise of SONANGOL.” Journal of Modern African Studies 45 (4): 595–619.Orihuela, José Carlos. 2013. “How do ‘Mineral States’ Learn? Path-Dependence, Networks, and Policy Change in the Development of Economic Institutions.” World Development 43: 138–48. Pollitt, Christopher, and Sorin Dan. 2011. The Impacts of the New Public Management in Europe: A Meta- Analysis (COCOPS World Package 1 - Deliverable 1). Brussels: Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS), European Commission. Porter, Doug, Matt Andrews, Joel Turkewitz, and Clay Wescott. 2012. “Managing Public Finance and Procurement in Conflicted and Fragile Settings.” International Public Management Journal 14 (4): 369–94. Porter, Doug, Musharraf Cyan, Panthea Lee, Zack Brisson, Osione Itegboje, and Adam Talsma. 2015. “Infrastructure Development in Edo State: Adapting to Constraints and Creating Capabilities.” Report 96160, World Bank, Washington DC. Pritchett, Lant, and Michael Woolcock. 2004. “Solutions When the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development.” World Development 32 (2): 191–212. Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews. 2012. “Looking Like a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for Implementation.” Working Paper 2012/63, UNU-WIDER, Helsinki. 20 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA Roche, Chris, and Linda Kelly. 2012. “Monitoring and Evaluation When Politics Matters: Notes from Program Experience.” DLP Background Paper 12, Developmental Leadership Program, University of Birmingham. Roll, Michael. 2011. “Can ‘Pockets of Effectiveness’ Trigger Public Sector Transformation in Africa?” Paper prepared for the Fourth European Conference on African Studies, Uppsala, June 15–18. ———. 2011a. “The State that Works.” Working Paper 128, Department of Anthropology and African Studies, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz. Ross, Michael. 2012. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, and Arvind Subramanian. 2003. “Addressing the Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria.” IMF Working Paper WP/03/139, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Seligmann, Renaud. 2015. “Public Financial Management Reforms - Signals or Real Change?” Governance for Development (blog), March 16. http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/public-financial-management-reforms-signals-or-real-change. Slater, Dan. 2010. Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in South East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Daniel Jordan. 2007. A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Soyombo, Omololu, and Waziri B. Adisa. 2011. “Public Perception of Criminal Justice Agencies in Nigeria.” In Crime Victimization, Safety, and Policing in Nigeria, ed. E. Alemika and I. Chukwuma, 116–145. Lagos: CLEEN Foundation. Tilly, Charles. 2005. Trust and Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ukoha, U. 2014. “The Politics of Policy Reform in Nigeria: a Comparative Analysis of Edo State under Comrade Adams Oshiomhole and Bayelsa State under Chief Timipre Sylva.” Paper prepared for the World Bank, Abuja. Voth, Hans-Joachim, and Nico Voigtlander. 2014. “Nazi Pork and Popularity: How Hitler’s Roads Won German Hearts and Minds.” VoxEU.org, May 22. http://www.voxeu.org/article/nazi-pork-and-popularity-how- hitler-s-roads-won-german-hearts-and-minds. Watts, Michael J. 2005. “Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex and Corporate Social Responsibility.” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 30: 373–407. ———. 2007. “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate?” Review of African Political Economy 144: 637–60. ———. 2012. “Blood Oil.” In Crude Domination: An Anthropology of Oil, ed. S. Reyna, A. Behrends, and G. Schlee, 49–71. Oxford: Berghahn. ———. 2014. “A Tale of Two Insurgencies: Oil, Authority and the Spectre of Terror in Nigeria.” In States of War Since 9/11, ed. Alex Houen, 103–129. London: Routledge. LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 21 Whitfield, Lindsay, and Ole Therkildsen. 2011. “What Drives States to Support the Development of Productive Sectors? Strategies Ruling Elites Pursue for Political Survival and Their Policy Implications.” DIIS Working Paper 2011:15, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. World Bank. 2010. “Edo State Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review: Analysis and Report.” World Bank, Washington, DC. Unpublished. ———. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. ———. 2014. “Nigeria Economic Report.” No. 2. Report 89630, World Bank, Washington, DC. Yanguas, Pablo, and David Hulme. 2014. Can Aid Bureaucracies Think Politically? The Administrative Challenges of Political Economy Analysis (PEA) in DFID and the World Bank. ESID Working paper 33. Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre. 22 LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA LEARNING FROM EDO STATE, NIGERIA 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433, USA