RESTRICTED For official use only Not for publication UNN42 Vol. 1 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INDUS BASIN DEVELOPMENT FUND STUDY OF THE WATER AND POWER RESOURCES OF WEST PAKISTAN VOLUME I General Report Prepared by a Group of the World Bank Staff Headed by Dr. P. Lieftinck July 28, 1967 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS 4. 76 rupees U. S, $1. 00 I rupee = U.S. $0. 21 1 million rupees U.S. $210,000 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT Washington, D.C. July 28, 1967 Mr. George D. Woods President International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as Administrator of the Indus Basin Development Fund Dear Mr. Woods: On November 1., 1963 you reached an understanding with Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, to the effect (among others) that the Bank would organize a Study of the water and power resources of West Pakistan which would serve as a basis for development planning in the water and power sectors of the economy. It was agreed that the first objective of the Study would be the com- pletion of a report covering the technical feasibility, construction cost, and economic return of a dam on the Indus at Tarbela. On February 15, 1965 I presented that report to you, as Part I of the Study. It reached the conclusion -- now confirmed in the second, com- prehensive phase of the Study -- that the Tarbela Project is techni- cally and economically feasible, and that in order to meet Pakistan's urgent needs for greater agricultural production and to derive the greatest advantage from the Project when completed, a major effort must be made in the interim to modernize agriculture by improvement of farm practices and wider use of technical inputs such as fertilizer. The second part of the Study, now presented, deals compre- hensively, as was intended, with West Pakistan's water and power resources as a whole. It considers the need for increased supplies of irrigation water, relative to other means of increasing agricultural production, and finds them essential complements to one another. It analyzes in detail the several alternative means of providing more water for irrigation purposes -- enlargement of canals to enable in- creased diversions from the rivers, storage of flood flows in surface reservoirs for release in winter when river flows are low, and devel- opment of West.Pakistan's extensive groundwater resources by means of tubewells. Implications of each alternative mode of water development for electric powgr p--both hydroelectric potential at dam sites and requirements of iYergy for tubewell pumping -- have been studied in the context of the long-term development of the entire electric power system of the Province. The potential of each mode of development - 2 - has been assessed in the light of the contributions it can make, both on the irrigation side and on the power side, to further economic develop- ment in West Pakistan. The report that follows consists of four volumes, with their various annexes. The first volume of the report is concerned with integrating the results of all the studies and relating these combined results to the context of development and development planning in West Pakistan. The second volume deals with the agricultural potential of the Province and the steps needed to realize that potential -- not only surface and ground water development projects but also policies and institutional measures to secure improvements in farming standards and wider usage of farm inputs. The third volume treats in detail the several alternative sites for surface water storage which have been identified -- in particular Tarbela, Kalabagh and High Mangla -- and sets forth a tentative schedule for their development. The fourth volume projects the long-term growth of power loads in West Pakistan and proposes a program for meeting those loads. Specific water development projects have been selected for execution in the years before 1975 and their relative priority has been assessed, on the basis of detailed studies of the long-term potential for integrated water resource development, assessment of what part of this potential it may be physically, administratively and financially feasible to realize before 1975, and preliminary studies establishing the technical feasibility of the specific projects, their anticipated investment and operating costs, and the benefits they could yield to the economy of West Pakistan. Beyond an Action Program proposed for development of agri- culture, irrigation and power in the years before 1975, the report also deals with prospects through the remainder of this century but especially with suggested steps for further development of the irri- gation and power systems of the Province in the decade 1975-85. These steps can only be formulated more tentatively than those needed in the early years, but it is intended that they should be a useful guide to future development possibilities. All the proposed programs, whether for the early period or for later years will need continuous revision and updating in the light of new information as it becomes available. I have been impressed by the priority which the Pakistani authorities are attaching to the development of agriculture and by the measures that they are taking in expression of this priority. I believe that greatest success will be achieved if increased em- phasis is laid on the role and the capabilities of the individual farmers and of those who advise them; technical and financial assistance to enable them to meet their needs, as they see them, must be made available in greater quantity, and incentives must be -3- structured in a manner which is conducive to the modernization of agri- culture. With such a framework of incentives the heavy burden which the programs proposed will lay on the public sector could be reduced by greater reliance on the private sector whose enterprise and activity are such a heartening feature of development in West Pakistan. Execution of the Study has taken longer than originally envisaged. The main phase of the work started in the spring of 1964 when the consultants who had been retained first gathered in Pakistan. Delays were inevitably encountered. Moreover it was found that the scope of the Study -- combining general planning to identify direc- tions of development in the sectors of agriculture, irrigation, surface storage and power, with preparation of feasibility reports for selected projects -- was such as to require more time than originally envisaged for investigations, analyses and final integration of results into phased multi-sectoral programs for systematic exploita- tion of West Pakistan's water resources. The Study has been made possible only by intensive inter- national cooperation -- as regards its financing and as regards the sources from which ideas and expertise have been drawn as well. Close contact was maintained throughout the course of the Study between the Bank Group, which formed my immediate team, and our consultants and between them and the Pakistani authorities and their consultants. We have had many rounds of discussions, both formal and informal, in Pakistan and the United States and at the European head- quarters of the consultant firms involved. These frequent contacts and the fruitfulness of them were practical expression of the spirit of international cooperation which was at the heart of the Study. I would like here to express my deep appreciation for the assistance afforded us by the Pakistani authorities and by our and their con- sultants. Our consultants accomplished a major task in preparation of their comprehensive reports, totaling more than thirty volumes, and their knowledge and technical judgment were invaluable to the Bank Group. In coordinating and directing execution of the Study and in preparing this final report -- following the one on Tarbela -- I have been assisted by selected staff members of the Bank. Jointly we formed the Bank Group for whose findings, opinions and recommen- dations, as expressed in these reports, I assume full responsibility. Each of the staff members associated with the Study has given a great deal of his thought and effort, some of them over a period of several years, to this challenging experiment in comprehensive sectoral planning. I feel deeply indebted and most grateful to them for their individual contributions, their spirit of cooperation and their unfailing loyalty. I want to thank you sincerely, Mr. Woods, for the opportunity you offered me to make this Study and for your confidence. I hope that, despite its shortcomings, which I fully recognize, the voluminous report I herewith submit will go some length in serving the purposes you had in mind when arranging for the Study with President Ayub and including it in your supplemental agreement with the members of the Indus Club. It was not an easy but certainly a most rewarding assignment you gave me. Sincerely, Pieter Lieftinck TARBELA DAM PROJECT MAY 1967 SOURCE: TIPPETTS - ABBETT - McCARTHY - STRATTON INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, CONSULTING IBRD - 1953R ENGINEERS FOR THE WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMIT AUTHORITY OF WEST PAKISTAN.  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE FROPOSED PROGRAMS AND PRINCIPAL RECO1MNDATIONS ................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... .. 1 II.- THE DEVELOPEENT OF THE IRRIGATION SYSTEM .................... 7 III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM ....................... 18 The Lag in Agriculture .................................... 18 The Shortage of Electric Power ............................ 20 Crop Yields and Agricultural Inputs ....................... 21 The Need for More Irrigation Water ........................ 24 The Choice Between Water and Other Inputs .................2 The Effect of the Indus Basin Works ....................... 28 IV. FOUR TECHNIQUES OF WATER DEVELOPMENT ........................ 32 Canal Remodeling and Enlargement .......................... 33 Surface Storage .................. 39 Private Tubewells ............. ...4................... .... 8 Public Tubewells ...o......0....................... So --V. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION ........................ 55 Identification of Irrigation Projects ..................... 57 Selection of Irrigation Projects .......................... 63 Sequential Analysis ................................... 66 Project And Program Review ................................ 67 Agricultural Development ............................... 68 The Formulation of the Power Development Program .......... 68 Joint Planning for Power and Irrigation ................... 69 VI. AGRICULTURAL IMPROVENENTS AND IRRIGATION PROJECTS ........... 72 Crops ... .. ... . .. .. ... ... . ... .. .. 73 Livestock 74. ................ 7h Farms And Farmers ......................................... 74 Fertilizer ............................................. 75 Improved Seeds .................................... 78 Plant Protection ......................................... 81 Agricultural Implements and Mechanization . 82 Livestock Development .................................. 83 Improved Farming, Physical Inputs and Water ............... 86 Irrigation Development -- Third Plan Period ............... 87 Irrigation Development -- Fourth Plan Period ... .*** 97 Irrigation Development -- Fifth Plan Period *************** 108 Irrigation Development -- Sixth Plan Period ..............* 111 Irrigation Development After 1985 ......................... 112 The Growth of Irrigation Supplies ......................... 113 Expected Results of Development ........................... 114 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont1d) Paae No. VII. SURFACE WATER STORAGE .......********** ***************** 120 Introduction ...... 120 Current Storage Development ...........................** 120 Future Storage Developments ............................. 121 Flows Available for Storage ............................. 122 Surface Storage Requirements ....................******** 125 Recommended Program of Surface Storage Development o... 126 First Stage Storage on the Indus ...................... 127 Tarbela and Kalabagh ............................... 128 The Benefits of Tarbela ............................. 133 The Silt Problem on the Indus ....................... 138 Financial Requirements for Tarbela .................. 141 Second Stage Storage on the Indus ..................... 141 Sehwan-Manchar Project ................................ 142 Four Major Alternatives ................... ......... 143 Side Valley Storage ........................... . 143 Upper Indus Sites ................................... 145 Thal Storage Scheme ...................... 146 Second-Stage Storage -- Assessment .................... 147 Further Storage Projects on Tributaries ............... 149 The Project for Raising Mangla ************************ 150 The Swat-Ambahar Project ****************************** 151 Chiniot Project on the Chenab ************************* 151 Financial Requirements of the Proposed Program ********** 152 VIII. ELECTRIC POWER ******************************************** 155 Introduction ............1..........g.................. 155 The Structure of the West Pakistan Power System ......... 155 Recent Growth of Electricity Consumption ................ 156 Load Forecast .............. .................. ........... 157 Agricultural Pumping .......*................. 159 Residential and Commercial Load Forecast .............. 159 Industrial Load Forecast ............. ........ 160 Contihgency LoAd Forecasting ................... 161 The Existing Power Situation and Current Pr6grams ....... 163 Stone & Webster Bulk Power Supply Program *****..******* 165 Bank Group's Adjustments to Stone & Webster's Program e.e 167 The Evaluation of Tarbela .......... e........... 168 The Scarcity Value of Thermal Fuel ........... . 169 EHV Interconnection Between the Major Power Markets ..... 170 The Timing of Interconnection ...................... 172 Operation of Mangla and Tarbela Reservoirs*****e**e*** 172 Annual Operating Decisions and Hydrological Uncertainty.. 175 Peaking at Mangla and Tarbela *************************** 176 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont' d) Page No. The,Peaking Role of Thermal Plant ..............*********** 176 Thermal Fuel Supply ........... ..........*...........*.*.. 177 Additions to the Power System during the Fourth Plan Period (1970-75) ... ...... ........** *********** 178 Utilization of Tarbela Potential and the EHV System ....... 180 Kunhar and Raising Mangla for Power ..........******* 180 Nuclear Generation ........0 .... ..........****** 181 Use of Indigenous Coal for Electricity Generation ......... 181 -System Development After 1980 ..............*..******** 182 The Bank Group's Proposed Power Program ...........******** 182 Distribution .............. . .. ....* *** **** 183 Financial Requirements ...................***************** 183 Tariffs and-Accounts ..................**.*************** 186 IX. ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION .................*****.. 188 Institutional Framework of Water and Power Development .... 188 "Implementation Capacity" ..............****************** 192 Project-Planning and Construction .................******** 193 Management and Operation of System and Projects .......... 195 Promotion of Farm Inputs .................... ..*******199 X. PROPOSED FROGRAMS AND PAKISTAN.rS-PLANS.........*********** 204 Agriculture and The Development Plans .... ........ 205 Sectoral Growth Rates ........ ...........* ......... 209 Investment Requirements of Proposed Programs .............. 210 Public Sector Financial Requirements ...................... 213 Private Investment ... o .... o ....... .................. 218 The Growth of Agricultural Employment ..................... 221 GLOSSARY ...... .....**..........e.................. s ...... . .. .. 223 MAPS Following Page No. 1. Indus Basin - bogation of Canals and Links ............. 16 2. Develdtent18M i-for the Indus River System ............ 30 3. Program 1965 to 1975 Project Areas ..................... 118 b. Tarbela and Kalabagh ............***** *............* 154 5. Main Power Stations and Principal Transmission Lines ... 186 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Following FIGURES Page No. 1. Historical Usage of Available Surface Water in the Indus River Basin of West Pakistan .................... 10 2. Mean Monthly Discharge: Indus, Jhelum and Chenab Rivers o.... . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . ..... 40 3. Derived Average Yields for Reference Years .............. 62 4. Cotton Yield Projections ................................ 68 5. Projected Usage of Available Surface Water in the Indus River Basin of West Pakistan ........................... 114 6. Revised IACA Program for Irrigation Development ......... 110 7. Average Annual Yield and Efficiency of Storage Capacity on the Indus and Jhelum Rivers ......................... 124 8. IACA's Estimate of the Total Mean-Year Demand for Stored Water on the Jhelum and Indus Rivers ................... 128 9. Tarbela Project - Water Course Requirements and Supplies by Sources ................................................ 134 10. Comparison of Tarbela With or Without Systemwide Inter- connection with Cheapest Alternative Programs .......... 168 11. Projection of the Economic Value of Natural Gas at Well Head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 170 12. The Absorption of Hydro-Energy .......................... 172 13. West Pakistan: Alternative Development Patterns with 4.1/2% Per Annum Growth in Agriculture ................ 208 The following is a brief table of contents of the other volumes of the Study. A detailed table of contents precedes the text of each of the respective volumes. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Page No. VOLUME II: Program for the Development of Irrigation and Agriculture in West Pakistan Chapters: Introduction ............ .... .......................... 1 I. Past and Present Performance of Agricultural Sector .... 3 II. Agricultural Development Potential ................... 25 III. Development of Water Resources ........................ 73 IV. Priority Development Projects ........... .......... 121 V. Program for Irrigation Development ..... ........... 167 VI. Agricultural Inputs and Supporting Services ............ 208 VII. Financial Requirements of the Development Program ...... 249 VIII. Comparison of Supply and Demand ....... ............ 262 IX. Conclusions and Recommendations ..... ............... 291 Annexes: 2.1 Watercourse Studies 2.2 IACA Agricultural Zones and Estimated Production 2.3 Factors Affecting Cropping Intensities 3.1 IACA Estimates of Cost of Groundwater Mining 3.2 Sequential Analysis 3.3 Priorities for Groundwater Development 4.1 Report on Project Content of Water Development Program 6.1 IACA Estimates of Area Covered by Fertilizer Applications 6.2 Prospects for Supply, Distribution and Use of Fertilizer in West Pakistan 6.3 The Program for Artificial Insemination in West Pakistan as Proposed by IACA 7.1 Indicative Estimate of Public Investment Expenditures for Water Development during Third and Fourth Plan Periods 8.1 Definition of Developmental Activities Employed in GFV Projections 8.2 IACA Projections of Growth of Agricultural Production 8.3 Bank Group's Projections of Growth of Agricultural Production 8.1[ Assumptions Used in Estimating Gross Value Added 8.5 IACA's Derivation of Elasticity-Coefficients of Demand for Agricultural Products 9.1 Terms of Reference, Memoranda to Consultants and Guidelines for the Study TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Page No. VOLUME III: Program for Development of Surface Water Storage Chapters: I. Introduction ........ . ........... . . . . . . . . . . II. Surface Water Hydrology ........0..0... 00............... 3 III. Historical Use of Surface Water ........................ 12 IV. The IACA Approach .................................... 17 V. Identification of Dam Sites and Comparison of Projects . 29 VI. Factors in the Operation of Surface Water Storage Reservoirs ........................ ... . .. ......... 63 VII. The Sequence of Projects for Developing Surface Water Storage ... .......... ............................. . ..... . 81 VIII. Program for Investigations ...................6......... 95 IX. Financial Requirements and Cost Comparisons ............ 10 X. Findings and Conclusions ............................... 112 Appendix: Terms of Reference and Guidelines for Dam Site Consultant Annexes: 1. Tarbela Project 2. Kalabagh Project 3. Gariala Project 11. Skardu Project 5. Ambahar Project 6. Kunhar Project 7. Mangla/Raised Mangla Project 8. Chasma Project 9. Sehwan/Manchar and Chotiari Projects VOLUME IV: Program for the Development of Power Chapters: I. Introduction ......... 0..............0.........****...... 1 II. The Existing Situation .......................1 III. Past Growth ................. .. .. . .. ... .. . 18 IV. Forecasts of Energy Requirements and Power Demands ..... 29 V. The Power Supply Program 1966-1985 .................... 62 VI. Evaluation of Stone & Webster Program .................. 82 VII. The Bank Group's Adjusted Power Program ................ 106 VIII. The Distribution Problem ............................... 131 IX. Tariffs and Organization ............................... 137 X. The Financial Requirements of the Power Development Pr ogram ......* .......... a a*... . . .... . ...... .. 145 .XI. Conclusions o............................................ 152 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Annexes: 1. Load Forecasting 2. The Industrial Load Forecast 3. The Residential Load Forecast L. The Overall Energy Situation -- Supply and Demand 5. The Price of Thermal Fuel 6. Hydroelectric Projects and Reservoir Operation 7. The Power Aspects of the Tarbela Project 8. The Development of Mangla's Power Potential 9. Energy Transmission: EHV Interconnection and Gas Pipelines 10. The Power System Simulation Model 11. Guidelines and Terms of Reference ECONOMIC ANNEX Part I. Programming Methods Used in The Study Part II. A Linear Programming Analysis of Irrigation Development Potentialities in The Indus Basin Part III. Proposed Programs and Economic Growth  PREFACE In November 1963 the World Bank was assigned the task of organizing a comprehensive investigation of the water resources of West Pakistan. The chief purpose of the investigation, which became known as the Indus Special Study, was to develop a program for the optimum exploitation, for agricultural and power purposes, of the water resources that would be available to Pakistan after implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. This report, in four volumes and their annexes, summarizes the conclusions that were reached in the course of the Study and outlines recommended development programs in the fields of agri- culture, irrigation, surface water storage and electric power for the next ten to twenty years. Dr. Pieter Lieftinck -- an Executive Director of the World Bank and former Finance Minister of The Netherlands -- accepted an invitation from the President of the Bank in January 1964, to head the Study. Several senior members of the Bank's technical staff were also assigned to assist Dr. Lieftinck in the organization and execution of the Study. This nucleus is referred to collectively in this report as the Bank Group. To provide the various skills required for the complex and detailed field work involved in the Study, the Bank Group obtained the services of a number of consulting firms. For the irrigation and agriculture aspects of the Study, three firms of international repute agreed, at the request of the Bank, to assume joint responsibility and to form, for this purpose, an Irrigation and Agriculture Consultants Association (IACA); the member firms were Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners and Hunting Technical Services Limited, both of the U.K., and Inter- national Land Development Consultants (ILACO) of The Netherlands. To handle questions concerning dam sites, Chas. T. Main International, Inc., a U.S. firm, was retained. For power aspects of the Study, the Bank retained the services of Stone & Webster Overseas Consultants Inc., also-from the United States. In addition to their role in IACA, Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners were responsible for overall coordination among the consultants. The Agreement between the President of the World Bank and the President of Pakistan which instituted the Study divided it into two distinct phases. In the first phase attention was concentrated on a proposal to build a large multi-purpose dam and reservoir on the Indus at Tarbela. This project was widely considered to be of high priority but it was also a center of controversy, and so the Bank Group had agreed to provide an interim report on the Tarbela Project separately. Draft reports on this project were prepared by the consultants by mid-November 1964; in early December a Pakistan delegation visited Washington to discuss the consultants' findings; and in February 1965, Dr. Lieftinck submitted the Bank Group's report on the Tarbela Project to the President of the Bank who transmitted it to the Pakistan Government. Immediately after completing their initial Tarbela studies the consultants moved into the second phase of the Study which was to result in comprehensive reports on the development of the water and power resources of West Pakistan. It was originally intended that discussion drafts of these comprehensive reports would be completed by early 1966, i.e. within two years of the Study's commencement. However, unavoidable delays were encountered and drafts of the reports were submitted at various times through 1966. It was recognized from the beginning of the Study that the time element and the scope of the problems made imperative the closest possible cooperation between the Bank Group, the Pakistan authorities and the consultants. All phases of the work, including such matters as the consultants' terms of reference, were therefore discussed in detail with the Pakistan authorities. To ensure a regular exchange of views and to guide the investigations along the most fruitful lines, certain tripartite committees were established: a Coordinating Committee in the sphere of irrigation and agriculture, which met on eight occasions; a Dam Sites Committee which also met on eight occasions; and an informal Power Consultative Committee which met twice. Although these committees had only an advisory role, they served to ensure that Pakistan and the Bank Group remained in agreement with the consultants on the scope of the work and the detailed methodology. The consultants' terms of reference were supplemented from time to time through the provision of additional written guidelines and other instructions from the Bank Group. The final reports of the consultants were submitted simulta- neously to the Bank and to Pakistan between May and November, 1966. One report, in 23 volumes, prepared by IACA, covers the irrigation and agriculture aspects of the Study. Another report, in six volumes, prepared by Chas. T. Main, covers surface water storage. And the third report, in two volumes, prepared by Stone & Webster, covers the power aspects of the Study. In addition Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, as coordinators among the consultants submitted two reports, one, entitled "Summaries of Reports by Consultants on Irrigation and Agriculture, Electric Power and Surface Water Storage", and a second, updating the information presented earlier on Tarbela. At the request of the Pakistan authorities and the Bank Group, Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners also under- took, with the assistance of Harza Engineering Company International, of Chicago, a sequential analysis of the power and irrigation programs recommended by the consultants. This analysis resulted in a special report entitled, "Sequential Analysis of a Programme for Irrigation and Power Development in West Pakistan". These reports, together with their supporting annexes, pro- vided a basis for discussion between the Bank Group and the Pakistan authorities in November 1966. Discussions were held with the Government of Pakistan in Rawalpindi and with the Government of West Pakistan and affiliated agencies in Lahore. Senior members of all the consultant firms which had shared in the Study participated in these meetings. Following the discussions in Pakistan in November 1966, the Bank Group prepared drafts of this four-volume document, which repre- sents the conclusion of the Study. The report is based on the work and findings of the consultants, on suggestions made by the Pakistan authorities and on studies carried out by the Bank Group itself. Pre- paration of the report had to be compressed into a short space of time. Drafts of the three main volumes -- on irrigation and agriculture, surface water storage, and power -- were sent to Pakistan in March 1267. A final round of discussions between the Bank Group and the Pakistan authorities was held in Lahore and Islamabad in mid-April on the basis of these drafts. Thus throughout the Study the Bank Group has had the benefit of frequent contact with the Pakistan authorities, who made many helpful suggestions and comments. At the last round of meetings in Islamabad in April 1967, Dr. Lieftinck stated that the main purpose of the Bank Group's report was to assist the Pakistan authorities in achieving the maximum feasible rate of economic development. The Study had been concerned with col- lecting as much basic data as possible and analyzing it with a view to clarifying the potential for growth and identifying priorites, particu- larly for the Third and Fourth Plan periods. Dr. Lieftinck said he hoped that the report would serve as a useful background document to the Pakistan Government in taking decisions about future development and to the World Bank in assessing Pakistan's progress and plans. The reportwas in no sense intended to be binding, either-fcr Fakistan or for the World Bank, which would, he felt sure, continue to reassess Pakistan's need for assistance on a year-to-year basis. The report now presented consists of four volumes, of which this general volume is the first. Volume II presents in detail the recommended program for the development of irrigation and agriculture in West Pakistan. Volume III covers dam sites and puts forward a tentative schedule for their development. Volume IV discusses the prospective growth of demand for electric power and proposes a plan for the develop- ment of resources to meet that demand. Each of these three volumes has a number of supporting annexes, discussing individual projects or topics in greater detail. An Economic Annex to the Report presents some of the economic work undertaken in the course of the Study. The Bank Group's work was carried out under the personal responsibility of Dr. Lieftinck. Under him the Bank Group consisted of A. Robert Sadove as Deputy Head of the Study; Thomas C. Creyke in charge of Irrigation and Agriculture; General Herbert D. Vogel in charge of Dam Site Engineering; and A. D. Spottswood in charge of Electric Power. From the beginning Willi A. Wapenhans was principal assistant to Mr. Creyke in supervising the work and preparing the reports on Irrigation and Agriculture. Christopher Willoughby assisted Mr. Sadove in the preparation of Volume I of the report and was primarily respon- sible for the background work on electric power; he drew heavily on the assistance of Dr. Henry D. Jacoby of the Harvard Water Program who prepared a simulation model of the West Pakistan power system. Heinz Vergin assisted Mr. Sadove in the economic aspects of the Study and carried out the linear programming analysis of investment in irrigation and agriculture with direction from Professor Robert Dorfman of Harvard University. E. P. Delaney and K. B. Norris, on assignment in Washington from Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, assisted considerably with engineering aspects of the Study. To assist in the preparation of Volume II an agricultural group was established, consisting of James B. Hendry, Harold Manning and Kyaw Myint, all of the Bank's staff. Added to this group for a period of several months at Bank headquarters were key members of the Irrigation and Agriculture consultant groups, in- cluding W. R. Rangeley, James Turtle and Roger White, of Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, Thomas Jewitt of Hunting Technical Services, and Pieter Mulder of International Land Development Consultants. Other Bank staff members who made substantial contributions to the work of the Bank Group are: Firouz Afrouz, Stanley P. Johnson, Gary G. Luhman and Miss Huda S. Qubein. Thomas B. Winston assisted with editing at the later stages of the Study. Each of these staff members contributed many months to the Study, but the report could never have been completed without the valuable cooperation of many other people in the Bank, particularly those responsible for the task of accurately reproducing large volumes of written material. - 1 - PROPOSED PROGRAMS AND PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS i. This report deals with the development prospects of agriculture and electric power in West Pakistan. Agriculture is the most important single sector in the economy. It is responsible for nearly 45 percent of the output and 75 percent of the foreign exchange earnings of the Province, and about 70 percent of the population are directly dependent on it for their livelihood. Much of the industrial activity in the Province is con- cerned with processing the products of agriculture and, to an increasing extent, with manufacturing farm inputs. The power sector is, in comparison, small in its contribution to total provincial output, but electric energy is a critical element in much of the economic activity of the Province; farming is beginning to become dependent on electricity for provision of additional supplies of irrigation water pumped from underground by means of tubewells. ii. Growth of the agricultural sector has in the past lagged seriously behind the growth of other sectors of the economy. Increasing amounts of food have had to be imported and agricultural exports have grown slowly. Total agricultural output grew between 1950 and 1960 at a rate of only about 1.5 percent per annum; population was probably grow- ing during this period at about 2.5 percent per year. During the Second Plan period (1960-65) the performance of agriculture improved sharply, reaching an annual average growth rate of 3.8 percent, and agricultural exports grew from about PRs 500 million at the beginning of the period to about PRs 800 million in each of the last two years. Nevertheless, by the end of the Plan period, agricultural production per head of pro- vincial population was still below what it had been 15 years earlier, in 1950. Output of electricity has grown extremely rapidly -- at an aver- age rate in excess of 20 percent per annum between 1950 and 1965. How- ever electricity has been almost continuously in short supply, so that load shedding and heavy voltage fluctuations have been commonplace. The shortage of electric power grew to particularly serious proportions dur- ing the past year when upwards of 20 percent of the load on the largest power system in the Province had at times to be shed. These shortages of electricity have constrained the growth of industrial and agricultural output. iii. West Pakistan is aiming for an annual growth rate of about six percent in total provincial output. It is the view of the Bank Group that this implies a need for at least 4.5 percent annual growth in gross value added by agriculture -- and more if agriculture is to make any con- tribution to easing the acute foreign exchange stringency from which the economy suffers. As regards power, the Bank Group believes that a six percent annual growth in total output implies a need for about 13 percent annual growth in generation of electricity by public utilities over the next decade -- though, of course the need may be higher in some parts of the Province and lower in others. Over the decade 1965-75 the population of West Pakistan is expected to increase by about one-third. The target rates of growth just mentioned imply that over the same decade total - ii - provincial output must nearly double, total agricultural output must increase by a minimum of about two-thirds and total utility production of electricity must more than triple. Over a 20-year span West Pakistan is aiming to have total provincial output triple, almost doubling current per capita income levels; agricultural output would have to nearly triple and electricity production increase eight times over. Sustained perfor- mance in agriculture of this magnitude and on the scale required for the Province is almost without precedent. Its achievement, however, is a necessity if major crises in food supplies are to be avoided. iv. The Bank Group is in no doubt that a much higher level of ag- ricultural production than is presently achieved or has been projected in this report is technically feasible. The basic resources, soils, climate, water availability and the farmers are all capable of supporting a program even more ambitious than the one presented here. The means by which it could be accomplished are also generally known. The real im- ponderable is the time it would take. This is primarily dependent upon policy to provide incentives, confidence and stimulation; availability of funds for both public and private investment; and above all administrative, managerial and implementation capacity. Policy attitudes generally appear to be well attuned to the needs of the situation. Availability of funds will always be a problem but does not appear to be the most stubborn con- straint. The key consideration is implementation capacity as it relates to policy implementation, construction and operation of projects and the development of institutional support to provide goods and services to back up the program and to mobilize all the available resources and ensure their integrated application. v. The program proposed is heavily dependent upon the public sec- tor, but events may prove that greater reliance can be placed on the pri- vate sector. The Bank Group attaches great importance to the careful monitoring of progress and in the light of experience ensuring that pre- occupation with the public sector is not allowed to damp down the vital contribution which can and must be made by the conspicuously active pri- vate sector. The fundamental point that must never be lost from sight is that in the last resort it is the farmers who will decide whether agricultural production grows at three percent or five percent and hence whether per capita provincial income will stagnate or will double in the next 20 years. Only if the farmers have the incentives, the supplies and the knowledge together with confidence and conviction will they produce the results desired. Incentives and confidence are of outstanding impor- tance and policy determinations, prices and marketing opportunity must be kept under constant review to ensure that farmers have the required in- centives. vi. The growth of agricultural production is severely constrained both by shortage of irrigation water and by the standards of husbandry employed including the slight use that is made of other yield-increasing inputs such as fertilizer, good seeds and insecticides. Past water re- source development has already harnessed about one-half of West Pakistan's renewable water resources for irrigated agriculture on about 26 million - iii - acres of land. Up to now this extensive irrigation system has supported a traditional form of agriculture in which little use was made of modern technology and production aids. However the farmers have shown themselves ready to adopt means to increase production when they appear profitable. The most profitable results can be achieved when the various inputs are applied at the right time and in the right balance. To achieve such re- sults the farmer needs increased knowledge -- which must be provided lar- gely by the extension service at the present time -- and greatly improved availability of the various inputs as well as incentives to use them. It is not possible, on a general basis, to identify water or any other single input as being most critical. Most of the inputs are in short supply in most parts of the Province, including the irrigated areas which account for about 80 percent of agricultural production. Rapid progress in one, be it water or any of the modern production aids, would only show up more acutely the lack of the others. There are also technical, adminis- trative and social limits to the rate of progress that can be achieved on any single front. A concerted effort is needed on all, and the Bank Group has endeavored to prepare a program which maintains a proper balance bet- ween progress on the agricultural front (i.e. better farming, more agricul- tural inputs, etc.) and further water development. The Tarbela Dam vii. The centerpiece of the programs put forward by the Bank Group is the Tarbela Dam on the Indus. Completion of this dam by 1975/76 is a crucial element in the strategy outlined in this report formeeting West Pakistan's need for additional supplies of irrigation water and electric power. The detailed programs proposed have been built on the assumption that the dam would be completed on schedule, and the importance of the project is so great that this expectation has influenced and conditioned almost all the other proposals made regarding future development. The Tarbela Dam is estimated to cost the equivalent of about $775 million, ex- cluding duties, taxes and interest during construction and all the costs of power plant and its housing. The main purpose of the dam would be to store water from the summer flood season, when Indus discharges are greatly in excess of the amount that could be used for irrigation purposes even with an expanded canal system, to the rabi (winter) season when the main food crops are grown but natural river flows are low and variable and irrigation deliveries consequently unreliable. At its initial capacity, the Tarbela Reservoir will store sufficient water to increase rabi river flows on the Indus in a mean year by about one-third and those in a dry year by about one-half. viii. The Tarbela Dam is such a strategic element in the integrated. programs proposed that it is extremely difficult to quantify the contri- bution which it makes itself to increased production. Nevertheless the Bank Group tried to measure this contribution and it believes that, to the extent it is measurable, a reasonable conservative range for the rate of return would be about 9-13 percent. The Bank Group also attempted to weigh the costs that would be involved in a 10-year delay of Tarbela by comparing the costs of the recommended program with the costs of a hypothetical - iv - alternative making up for the 10-year lack of Tarbela water by the use of groundwater mining techniques that have potential in Pakistan but have not yet been tested there; the alternative program worked out $50 million more expensive in terms of the present worth of economic costs and it could not provide a degree of security comparable with that provided by a program including Tarbela in 1975. However this alternative program was the cheapest of several alternatives considered; it involved interim developments in power and irrigation significantly different from those that would be best in a program built around Tarbela. Thus unforeseen delay in the execution of Tarbela, even of shorter duration than 10 years, would likely result in greater losses than those stated above in financial terms and in terms of increased risk, because it would mean that no integrated program could be firmly chosen and that other parts of the recommended program, which are undertaken, would be out of step. ix. The Bank Group's estimates suggest that about three-quarters of the benefits of Tarbela would accrue to agriculture. System analyses indicate that deliveries direct from Tarbela storage would account for more than 10 percent of total rabi supplies of irrigation water in 1985 and 25 percent of the water delivered to farmers additional to that which they now receive in rabi season. The availability of additional surface water in rabi season is particularly important to further development in those areas which are not underlain by fresh groundwater -- about [0 percent of the Punjab and 80 percent of the Sind. Additional rabi canal supplies are a sine qua non of further irrigation development in areas with the most saline groundwater (about 11 million acres or 35 percent of the canal irrigated area) and, in the 15 percent of canal irrigated area underlain by groundwater of intermediate salinity, additional rabi canal supplies can be mixed with pumped groundwater and can thus have a multiplied effect on total rabi water supplies in such areas. Neverthe- less the total addition to rabi canal deliveries that would come from Tarbela Reservoir is only one part of the benefit that the project would confer on agriculture. Existence of a large reservoir on the Indus will make it possible to regulate to a significant extent the time pattern of river discharges and hence to match canal deliveries, in combination with supplies pumped from the groundwater aquifer, to the rather inflexible time pattern of crop-water requirements in a way that has not been poss- ible in the past. x. About one-quarter of the total benefits of Tarbela relate to the hydroelectric potential of the dam according to the Bank Group's ,:tudies. The Bank Group proposes installation of 12 turbine generators, each of nominal rating 175 mw, over the years 1975-80. With this develop- ment of its hydroelectric potential Tarbela will contribute more than one- quarter of the total amount of electric energy required by West Pakistan over the decade 1975-85. By 1985, according to the Bank Group's projec- tions, Tarbela will be contributing some 10 billion kwh or more than one- third of the Province's total annual requirements of electric energy at that time. Under mean year flow conditions 12 turbines would be capable of generating 12 billion kwh, and the additional 2 billion kwh, which would be produced almost entirely in the summer flood months, would be - v - absorbed gradually after 1985 as loads on the power system grow. In the course of its analysis of the effects of a 10-year postponement of Tarbela the Bank Group found that completion of Tarbela in 1975 would save some 700 trillion Btu of natural gas -- or about 10 percent of West Pakistan's known usable reserves of gas -- that would otherwise have to be devoted to generation of electric power over the decade 1975-85; such a saving is im- portant because known gas reserves are limited and gas is required as feed- stock for the production of badly needed fertilizer. xi. These figures make it clear that Tarbela will have a very large impact on the irrigation and power systems of West Pakistan and they thus underline the importance of careful planning in advance to make sure that the systems in existence by 1975 are well prepared to absorb the irriga- tion and power supplies from the dam as quickly and as effectively as poss- ible. It is not only the scale of the project which emphasizes the need for a very active development effort in the meantime to prepare the way for Tarbela. The project is also very expensive; irrigation supplies from Tarbela have advantages of flexibility as mentioned, but they will cost Pakistan about three times as much per acre-foot as water pumped from the groundwater aquifer within the limit of annual recharge by seep- age from the surface; theoretically substantial additions to rabi water supplies could be made at lower cost for a number of years by pumping be- yond this level or 'mining' the groundwater aquifer in some areas, but this technique would not serve to increase water supplies so rapidly as surface storage, it would be less flexible, it might be hazardous, it would be inconsistent with the optimum integrated pattern of water- resource development and in the long run it would be more expensive. Thus any substantial addition to rabi irrigation supplies would inevit- ably be costly. This emphasizes the need to make sure that water is used-to the greatest possible advantage. The time required for construc- tion of Tarbela -- it could not be completed before 1975 -- also under- lines the need for other immediate efforts to improve agricultural produc- tivity. Increased production of food and fiber are required immediately, and Tarbela will be of no help for another eight years. Action Program for Agriculture, Irrigation and Power xii. Examination of West Pakistan's needs and resources in a long- term perspective and in the light of the anticipated completion of the Tarbela Dam by 1975/76 has led to the preparation by the Bank Group of a Ten-Year Development Program for Agriculture, Irrigation and Power. This program spans the Third and Fourth Flan periods (i.e. July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1975). In compiling the public-sector costs of the program in Table 1 below the Bank Group has tried to follow cost concepts used in Pakistan's Five Year Plans so that the figures will be directly comparable. (The breakdown of the costs presented in Table I by five-year plan periods is presented in Chapter X). Table I shows that the costs that would be in- curred within the two plan periods for construction of the main reservoir structures at Tarbela, excluding interest during construction, would rep- resent about 17 percent of the total public-sector costs of the recommen- ded program. - vi - Table I Public Development Expenditures for Proposed Program, 1965-75 a/ (Million PRs) Tarbela Dam b/ 3,862 Other Surface Storage Projects -- Raised Chasma 116 Sehwan Manchar a1 22 Surface Storage Investigations 115 Irrigation and Drainage Projects Ongoing Public Tubewell Schemes 991 Proposed New Public Tubewell Schemes 1,563 Canal Remodeling and Other Irrigation 1,002 Surface Drainage 900 Tile Drainage 223 Investigations 431 Flood Protection 149 Miscellaneous 25 Agriculture -- Fertilizer Subsidies 1,200 Plant Protection Subsidies 800 Extension and Research 440 Mechanization, Forestry, Others, etc. 4,051 Capital Liability for Agricultural Credit 528 7,019 Electric Power e/-- Generation 2,070 Transmission 1,115 Distribution 3,070 General 62 6,317 Total 22,735 a/ Including duties, taxes and interest during construction at six percent per annum, where appropriate. Interest during construction is not included in the figure for Tarbela. b/ Costs through 1974/75 only, and excluding civil engineering and all mechanical and electrical items for power plant. c/ Expenditures commence at the end of decade, but project not scheduled for completion until 1982. d/ See details in Table II. e/ See details in Table III. - vii - The figures shown under Agriculture in Table I represent in effect the allocations to Agriculture, mainly the Department of Agriculture, that the Bank Group believes would be necessary to implement the proposed program. The other groups of expenditures cover water and power development works that would be undertaken largely by the West Pakistan Water and Power Develop- ment Authority (WAPDA) and by the Irrigation Department, except for a small portion of the allocation under Electric Power which represents the cost of the nuclear power plant being built by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission outside Karachi. Agricultural Development xiii. Proposed public sector expenditures on agricultural development represent the largest single block -- more than 30 percent -- of the total program costs shown in Table I (an annual average of nearly $150 million equivalent) and this is consistent with the very great emphasis that, in the opinion of the Bank Group, should be placed on this aspect of the development effort. It would serve two purposes. First, it could lead to immediate and rapid growth of agricultural production. Second, it represents the most vital part of the job of preparing the way for Tar- bela. Only if farming standards are greatly improved over the next decade will the large agricultural benefits anticipated from Tarbela in fact be realized. Increase of water supplies alone, upon which so much emphasis has been placed in the past, will do no more than extend and prolong the traditional agriculture of low productivity; technological improvement in farming, on the other hand, could, with a large enough effort to spread it widely, raise agriculture in West Pakistan to an entirely new plane of productivity. xiv. Existing water supplies could be used to much greater advantage than they are now if they were combined with better irrigation farming practices and more physical inputs such as fertilizer, improved seed and plant protection. Application of improved methods depends on the farmers themselves; public policies and investments can only provide the environ- ment within which the farmer must employ the means put at his disposal to the best of his ability. It is thus vital for the future of West Pakistan that its farming community be equipped as a matter of urgency with know- ledge of modern agricultural technology. This puts all those concerned with training, education, and dissemination of information on better hus- bandry practices and the use of non-water inputs in a position of the ut- most importance. The Bank Group believes that the status of the men serving the farming community in these ways must be raised to a level com- mensurate with the responsibility they carry and that they must be provided with more material support if the requisite improvement in general farming standards is to be achieved. xv. Among the physical inputs required for increased production fer- tilizer has the greatest immediate potential. The Bank Group is convinced that substantially larger amounts of fertilizer could be beneficially ap- plied in conjunction with the existing water supplies. Every effort should be made to make available to farmers at reasonable costs and in timely supply - viii - all the fertilizer that they will absorb, and the use of fertilizer should be energetically promoted through all means available to the Government. Fertilizer consumption in each of the years 1964/65 and 1965/66 was estimated at about 90,000 nutrient tons. The Bank Group considers that off-take tar- gets of 350,000 nutrient tons (equivalent to 1.6 million tons of ammonium sulphate) in 1969/70 and 700,000 nutrient tons in 1974/75 are feasible provided that appropriate arrangements are made for supplies and distri- bution, and the costs to the farmers are kept at levels which generate in- centive to continuing use. The 1975 target includes about L70,000 nut- rient tons of nitrogen and 230,000 nutrient tons of phosphate. These tar- gets for 1970 and 1975 are about double those adopted by the Bank Group's consultants and represent rates of increase in the use of fertilizer of about 30 percent per annum through the Third Plan period and 15 percent per annum through the Fourth Plan period. The large allowance shown in Table I for fertilizer subsidies is calculated on the basis that the price of fertilizer to the farmer will not be allowed to increase significantly from its present subsidized level but the amount of subsidy required per ton of fertilizer will fall as a result of reduced procurement costs. xvi. Improved seed material, particularly of superior varieties of wheat, cotton and rice, constitute a second major agricultural input which could have significant impact within the next decade with adequate research and promotional effort. High-yielding varieties of wheat and rice have reached an advanced stage of development, but further research is still required on these crops and on others. Achievement of produc- tivity increases from this source will depend mainly on the establishment of effective multiplication and distribution networks capable of main- taining the quality of the seed and on the extent to which farmers adopt the cultivation practices and complementary inputs which lead to best re- sults. To the fullest possible extent private entrepreneurs should be encouraged to participate in the multiplication of improved varieties, under 'Government supervision to ensure maintenance of quality. The Bank Group has assumed that about 50 percent of the wheat acreage (about six million acres) and one million acres of rice will be covered by improved varieties by 1975. Seed experts in Pakistan have predicted faster rates of growth which would be highly desirable if they could be achieved with- out any sacrifice in terms of seed quality. The Bank Group feels that achievement of its projections would already represent a very important advance in terms of organization. xvii. Effective plant protection could increase current yields sig- nificantly and, as potential yields grow as a result of increased use of other inputs, it will become increasingly important. It is believed that at present about 15 percent of potential production is lost due to lack of plant protection. Timeliness of application is critical to obtaining good results from insecticides, and therefore much depends on the farmers' awareness of the problems, their cooperation and the ready availability of effective service. The existing system of plant protection services rendered free through the Governmental extension service is inadequate, lacks efficiency and diverts scarce extension personnel from their im- portant functions of disseminating agricultural knowledge. Plant - ix - protection is an area where private sector participation could play an in- creasing role because there would be a merging of the interests of the sup- pliers and the -needs of the farmers for improved protection. As the impor- tance of plant protection is not yet widely accepted, subsidies will prob- ably need to be continued for some years. Other important Government contributions would be research to develop simple, practical procedures which can be readily employed by the farmers and continuation of aerial spraying against epidemic attacks such as from locusts. Since protective measures will probably not improve much before the use of fertilizer and better husbandry become more general, the Bank Group has not projected large increases in the acreage sprayed until the years after 1975. xviii. Mechanization of farm operations will be important in the pro- gress towards more intensive and highly commercialized agriculture, per- mitting tighter cropping schedules, freeing fodder acreage and enabling better and more timely land preparation. Use of mechanical equipment is confined to very few farms at present and it will spread slowly on small farms, but even before farmers reach the stage of mechanizing their operations they could be assisted by improved hand tools and animal-drawn equipment. A larger research and promotion effort is needed for these. The Bank Group believes that every encouragement should be given to the spread of mechanization in the form of credit, advice on suitability of machinery for particular conditions and purposes, instruction in opera- tion, ensured supplies of machinery and parts, and adequate service faci- lities. Mechanization will continue to be adopted mainly by the larger farms, but in view of the preponderance of small farms careful considera- tion should be given to the stimulation and support of contract mechaniza- tion service and the cooperative use of farm machinery. xix. Animals will continue to be the main source of power on the farm for a long time to come and livestock products which now account for some 35 percent of total agricultural output will be increasingly important because demand for milk and meat is likely to grow more rapidly than de- mand for other agricultural products. Despite the very great importance of the livestock sector very little is known about it and it has not been possible to assess its development potential with any degree of reliability. The Bank Group's consultants have drawn an outline of a massive program of artificial insemination designed to build up an improved Zebu milk herd to replace the existing buffaloes as the main source of milk, but even with an early start on this program large-scale results are not expected to occur until well after 1975. The livestock sector is so little understood that the Bank Group suggests it be made the subject of a special comprehensive study to establish the sector's present status more accurately and to provide a basis for deciding the requirements for future development., Irrigation and Drainage Works xx. Expenditures on irrigation and drainage projects represent about 23 percent of the total public-sector costs of the Action Program outlined in Table I or an annual average of about $110 million equivalent. A break- down of these expenditures by project areas is given in Table II. In the -x - Table II Irrigation and Drainage Program 1965-75 Canal Commanded Completion Date Area ('000 acres) Cost (PRs. mlns.) Ongoing Public Tubewell Projects 1971 SCARP II (Chaj Doab) (2510) b/ 1,600 281 1970 SCARP III (Thal Doab) (1470) 900 165 1973 SCARP IV (Rechna Doab) (3270) 1,700 366 1969 Khairpur (568) 300 179 4,500 991 New Tubewell Projects Proposed in Program 1969 Wagah 50 13 1970 Shorkot Kamalia (426) 29h 53 1974 Rohri North (180) 598 156 1973 Panjnad Abbasia (1623) 878 190 1973 Dipalpur above B-S Link (630) 372 75 1973 Shujaabad (725) 379 84 1974 Ravi Syphon-Dipalpur Link (780) 595' 109 1976 Bahawal Qaim (924) 522 107 1975 Fordwah Sadiqia (665) 359 79 1977 Rohri South (1,500) 528 136 1977 Sukkur Right Bank (820) 273 82 1977 Dipalpur below B-S Link (850) 611 103 1976 Begari Sind (880) 349 92 Other small tubewell projects 36 Project investment after 1975 c/ -67 Initial work on further projects 315 5,808 1,563 Canal Remodeling and Other Irrigation Khairpur East and West 454 5 Panjnad Abbasia 100 63 Ravi Syphon -- Dipalpur Link 330 48 Lower Bari Doab 70 8 Shorkot Kamalia (Haveli) 60 8 Other irrigation works in canal commands 482 Other irrigation works outside canal commands 337 1,014 1,000 Surface Drainage Sukh Beas Scheme 191 Lower Indus Left Bank Outfall (start) 374 Other smaller schemes 335 900 Tile Drainage Shorkot Kamalia (Haveli) 40 16 Lower Bari Doab 70 h6 Tando Bago 90 96 Khairpur East 30 45 Kalri Baghar (Ochito and pumps) (start) 120 20 350 223 Investigations 431 Flood Protection 149 Miscellaneous 25 Total 5,284 a/ Costs including taxes, duties and interest during construction @ 6 percent per annum. F/ Figures in parentheses represent number of wells to be completed from July 1, 1966. c/ Investment required after 1975 to complete the listed tubewell projects. - xi - view of the Bank Group the main emphasis in irrigation development in the years up to 1975 should be on getting more water onto the land. The drainage effect of public tubewells will be important, especially in some areas where the groundwater table needs to be lowered before additional surface supplies from Tarbela can prudently be absorbed, but the past pre- occupation of public tubewell development with reclamation of saline and waterlogged lands should be reduced in favor of efforts to exploit ground- water resources as rapidly as possible for irrigation purposes in areas where the wells can yield the highest returns. At the same time public tubewell development should on no account be undertaken in any large areas where private wells are spreading rapidly. Thus the recommended public tubewell program tries to steer a middle course, including projects in areas which are predominantly underlain by fresh groundwater and where the reclamation problems are not the most severe but excluding areas where the technical, social and hydrological conditions are most favor- able to continued rapid growth of private tubewells. E&tensive surface drainage schemes are included in the program which will help to lower the water table and thus provide valuable support to tubewells, whether pri- vate or public, and enable additional surface supplies from Tarbela to be absorbed subsequently. The recommended public tubewell projects generally cover substantially smaller areas than those that have been initiated in the past to enable more discrimination with respect to water quality and drainage needs and to leave for private development all poss- ible areas where private wells can make a substantial contribution. xxi. Nearly 50 percent of the public-sector expenditures on irri- gation and drainage works in the recommended program are allocated to public tubewells. The program foresees the installation and energizing of some 6,700 public tubewells between July 1, 1966 and June 30, 1970. 5,900 of these wells would be in the four projects that WAPDA has under way, while the remainder would be in four high priority projects -- Wagah, Shorkot-Kamalia, Rohri North and Panjnad Abbasia -- that the Bank Group recommends for early initiation. Wagah is a small project, identi- fied but not studied in detail by IACA, in an area which will cease re- ceiving surface supplies once the Indus Treaty is fully implemented and where tubewells would therefore be fulfilling a replacement function. The other three projects belong to a group of 12 for which the Bank Group's consultants prepared detailed project feasibility reports and the Bank Group made project reviews. These projects which were identified on the basis of a survey of all canal commands and with a view to the prospec- tive completion of Tarbela by 1975, cover some 5.8 million acres. Most of the work on them would be undertaken during the Fourth Plan period, in the course of which a total of about 11,000 public tubewells would be installed under the recommended program. This program excludes SCARP V, a major tubewell project proposed by WAPDA, because there are good pros- pects of strong private tubewell development continuing over most of the area that would be covered by the project, and the small portion where hydrological conditions are more difficult is included in one of the recommended smaller public projects. xxii. The Bank Group found that all the 12 projects proposed would yield high rates of return and it has included each of them in the - xii - recommended program -- although some would not be completed until after the end of the Fourth Plan period. The Bank Group attaches particular priority to eight of the projects. The remaining four, all in the Bari Doab, have only marginal advantages over the alternative of continued private development. The indications are that the substantial private development which has already taken place in the Bari Doab will continue in the absence of public tubewell projects -- and that it is likely to be sufficiently dense to provide some drainage effects. Therefore this may well be an area where economies can be made in the public development program, so that effort may be concentrated on other areas where there are good opportunities for groundwater development but the private sec- tor is less enterprising. Since designation of an area for public tube- well development naturally tends to discourage installation of private wells -- even though the first water from the public wells may not materialize for some years -- the Bank Group feels strongly that these areas in Bari Doab should not be announced as public tubewell areas until there is complete assurance that WAPDA will be able to carry through all or at least most of the recommended tubewell program. xxiii. No provision is included in Table II for private tubewell development because expenditures shown are only those for which the public sector would be responsible. Nevertheless the Bank Group attri- butes very great importance to a continuation of private tubewell in- stallation. The public part of the water development program recommended is believed to be at the limit of administrative feasibility and it alone will not suffice to support the increases in agricultural production that are needed. The Bank Group recommends that the Pakistan authorities im- plement policies conducive to rapid private development as an insurance against shortfalls in public sector performance. Projections underlying the proposed development program assume that the number of private wells in operation would rise from about 34,000 in 1965 to some 55,500 by 1970 and then decline slightly to 52,500 by 1975 if the public tubewell program maintains the schedule called for. However it is likely that, given appropriate incentives, the private sector could sustain a higher instal- lation rate than this and would do so in certain areas if public projects were not going forward. Most recent information suggests that the rate of installation of private wells has continued to accelerate during the time the Study has been under way so that there may be about 50,000 currently in existence in West Pakistan, and the Bank Group believes that this num- ber might well grow to about 66,500 by 1970. It is important that, until the successful implementation of consecutive public-well fields appears assured, private development be given proper encouragement, even in areas that may later be scheduled for public development. xxiv. Following the public and private tubewells the Bank Group attributes most importance to some of the drainage works proposed, es- pecially the Sukh Beas Nallah Drainage Scheme. This project, originally formulated by the Government of Pakistan and substantially revised by the Bank Groupts consultants, comprises a 327-mile drain using mainly the old Beas River bed and having a catchment area of 3.3 million acres in the Bari Doab. It would reduce flood damage in one - xiii - of the most productive agricultural areas in the Province and also re- duce the recharge to the aquifer, thereby contributing to control of the water table in a large part of the Bari Doab. The Bank Group also be- lieves that work should be started at an early date on the Lower Indus Left Bank Outfall Drain. The drain, which would be 267 miles long and have a maximum discharge of 15,000 cusecs, is expected to take 16 years to build; its purpose would be partly to drain away surface run-off but mainly to remove to the sea saline sub-soil water from most of the irri- gated area on the left bank of the Indus below Khairpur. Studies and site investigations must be carried through without delay to enable commencement of construction by the recommended date of 1968. The Ac- tion Program includes a number of other smaller drainage schemes, besides Sukh Beas and the Left Bank Outfall Drain, primarily in the Rechna Doab and in the Sind. xxV. Under canal remodeling and other irrigation works the recom- mended program includes a number of schemes both inside and outside the canal-irrigated area which WAPDA and the Irrigation Department already have under way. But about PRs 200 million of the proposed allocation under this head would be devoted to enlargement of canals serving alto- gether about one million acres. Most of the areas proposed for canal remodeling are parts of the areas covered by ongoing and recommended tubewell projects where the underlying groundwater is brackish, so that additional surface water is needed to increase irrigation supplies and to enable the cropping intensity to be raised there. Generally it is the distributaries and minors which require remodeling rather than the main canals. xxvi. The program also includes five small tile drainage projects, chiefly in the Sind. These projects, which cover about 350,000 acres in all, are mainly intended as pilot projects which would provide ex- perience with this form of development under the specific conditions encountered in various parts of the Indus Basin. Tile drainage may subsequently become an important mode of development in the saline groundwater zones. Surface Water Storage xxvii. Apart from Tarbela, there are two small but important com- ponents to the Bank Group's program for surface water storage develop- ment up to 1975: raising of Chasma Barrage to provide storage of 0.5 MAF and a major program of investigations in connection with the sil- tation problem at Tarbela and identification of the best site for second-stage storage development on the Indus. Expenditures would also commence within the Fourth Plan period on the Sehwan-Manchar Project, which would provide a small amount of irrberseasonal storage in the Sind. xxviii.. Chasma Barrage is being built on the Indus nearly 200 miles downstream of Tarbela as part of the Indus Basin Works to divert water into the Chasma-Jhelum Link Canal. The project included in the recom- mended program covers only the costs of building the barrage structure - xiv - some six feet higher than would have been necessary simply to serve the Link and extending bunds on either side. This will serve to provide some 0.5 MAF of storage at relatively low cost. The project should be comple- ted in 1971. xxix. The Bank Group is of the opinion that there is an urgent need to start major investigation of the problem presented by the silt load of the Indus. Calculations on the basis of data from a few years of record indicate that all but one MAF of the live storage capacity of Tarbela will be lost within about 50 years; siltation could be more rapid if com- pletion of the dam happened to be followed by some high flood years or if bed load is larger than expected. Additional points should be established on the Indus for measurement of silt, and attention needs to be given to identifying the sources of both suspended sediment load and bed load and to discovering means of checking the movement of silt or reducing the rate at which it will deplete Tarbela storage capacity. In conjunction with the study of silt in the Upper Indus geological and hydrological data should be collected on potential dam sites in the area, which might be developed for small scale local purposes or for large-scale regulation of the Indus or its tributaries supplementary to Tarbela. xxx. The Bank Group found that there are four projects which, on the basis of present knowledge, can be considered contenders for second stage storage development of the Indus -- Kalabagh, Gariala, Skardu and the Thal Scheme. Though the Bank Group believes that the best of these may be Kalabagh, with a conventional structure and a firm power capa- bility of about 350 mw, insufficient is known about any of the four alter- natives to permit a firm judgment at this stage. The need for major second- stage storage on the Indus may be expected to arise during the late 1980's or early 1990's. Since it may take seven years or more to construct the necessary structures and because, if one site proves to have significantly less favorable conditions than now believed, there must be time to in- vestigate other sites before construction of second-stage storage has to be commenced, the Bank Group recommends early efforts to carry investi- gations further. Skardu should be studied in connection with the Upper Indus investigations mentioned in the previous paragraph. The Thal scheme is little more than a concept at present and the Bank Group thinks it would be worth giving some early attention to general aspects such as foundation conditions, seepage rates, siltation rates, actual feasible reservoir capacity, evaporation problems, and suitability of local paterials for embankment construction in order to provide a firmer idea of the feasibility of the concept. More detailed investigations should be undertaken at Kalabagh, at latest early in the Fourth Plan period, and they should include subsurface exploratory works and seismic studies, detailed survey of the site, access routes and reservoir area, sediment sampling and material analysis. xxxi. Maintenance and expansion of the network of stations for gather- ing basic hydrological and meteorological data is of utmost importance, for the storage sites which now seem to be the most attractive for fur- ther development may not prove to be so as techniques of dam design develop and as more is learned about geological conditions along the rivers. - xv - xxxii The Sehwan-Manchar Project is not scheduled in the recommended program for completion until 1982, but intensive investigations and initial works would have to be started about 1974 in order to meet this schedule. The project is in fact the most important single irrigation work proposed by the consultants who have been investigating water resource development in the Lower Indus area. It is designed to increase water supplies to some of the best agricultural land in the Sind at the lower ends of Rohri and Nara canals on the left bank of the Indus. It would comprise a new barrage across the Indus at Sehwan, which would provide about 0.8 MAF storage, bunds around the existing Lake Manchar some four miles away on the right bank of the river creating storage capacity there of about 1.0 MAF, expanded channels linking Lake Manchar to the river and a large 36,000 cusec feeder canal to carry water from Sehwan to the Rohri and Nara canals. Electric Power Development xxxiii. Proposals in the field of electric power account for about 28 percent of the cost of the Action Program outlined in Table I or an annual average of about $130 million equivalent. Proposed allocations for power development appear to represent a significantly higher propor- tion of total plan investment than has been devoted to this sector in the past. This is accounted for by several facts. First, the power system has been expanding so fast in recent years that a serious backlog has arisen in maintenance, renovation and expansion of the distribution sys- tem and the proposed program includes provision for making up this back- log. Second, in view of the planned completion of Tarbela in 1975, the Bank Group recommends an early start on the installation of a 380-ky transmission system to interconnect all the main power markets of the Province. Third, the Bank Group's program includes sufficient generat- ing plant to make up the backlog in system capability that has developed in recent years and to raise the margin between generating capacity and anticipated loads to a more adequate level than it has been possible to attain in the past. The Bank Group's plans are generally based on pro- vision of about 10 percent reserve generating capacity in the 10-day period when the hydroelectric plants reach their lowest capability. The nature of the main power system in West Pakistan is in a transition- al phase which began with the recent completion of the first units at Mangla. These units will have greatly fluctuating capability over the course of the year, depending mainly on the height of water in the reservoir. As a result, if reserves are reasonably adequate at the time when the reservoir level is at its lowest, then they will be ample at other times in the year. Taking account of this aspect of hydro- electric development, of the need for improvement in reliability of power supply and of the uncertainty inevitably attaching to load fore- casts the Bank Group believes that the level of reserves built into its program is appropriate. Nevertheless it recommends further considera- tion of the reserve problem in light of these factors and the increasing importance that will attach to the tubewell pumping load with its de- pendence on variable climatic and meteorological conditions. - Xvi - xxxiv. The Bank Group expects that the peak power loads on the public utilities in the main power markets of the Province will rise from a com- bined total of about 560 mw in 1965 (650 mw, had there been no load shedding) to about 2,300 mw in 1975. The Bank Groupts power consultant thought that load growth would be more rapid in the south of the Province than in the north. Despite the rapid development of tubewells anticipated in the north, the effect of this on total loads would be outweighed by faster growth of industrial loads in Karachi and the Sind. The Bank Group concurred with the power consultant and adopted a main load forecast rising from a ncnsuppressed peak of 473 mw in 1965 to about 1,400 mw in 1975 in the Northern Grid and from 136 mw in 1965 to 640 mw in 1975 in Karachi; load growth in the Sind would be even more rapid than in Karachi but loads are presently very small there and they would remain less im- portant in the overall picture. These peak loads are all calculated on the assumption that most of the public tubewells would be shut off in the evening hours of peak load, which would serve to reduce peaks in 1975 by about 100 mw from what they would otherwise be. xxxV. There is a possibility that the figures mentioned above and used in most of the Bank Group's planning may somewhat exaggerate the extent to which loads in the North will grow slower than those in the South. For a number of reasons the situation in the North is rather uncertain: load shedding has grown to such significant proportions in recent years that the actual current level of demand is not clear and there is also doubt about the extent to which the transfer of Government from Karachi to Islamabad and the Government's emphasis on industrial development outside Karachi may result in greater growth of large-scale commercial and industrial load in the Northern Sind and the Punjab. Some of these uncertainties will be reduced by 1968 when installed capability should be adequate, for the first time in several years, to meet demand during the critical period on the system. The Bank Group recommends that in 1968/69 a careful reappraisal of prospective loads in the early 1970's be undertaken, but in the meantime it has adopted an alternative contin- gency load forecast for the Northern Grid which leads to a peak of about 1,600 mw in 1975, some 200 mw higher than the figure used in the main load forecast. xxxvi. The Bank Group believes that, provided existing construction schedules are adhered to, then loads in all areas can be adequately covered between 1968 and 1970 inclusive, whether loads in the Northern Grid are at the higher or the lower of the two levels projected. The top portions of Table III list the main generating units which are under construction or which are recommended in the proposed program. The third unit at Mangla is expected to be ready for service late in 1968, and the fourth unit late in 1969. Negotiations for supply of two 100-mw steam units from Czechoslovakia for installation in the Upper Sind about 1970 or 1971 are being finalized by WAPDA. A double circuit 132-ky link between the Northern Grid and Upper Sind is also being completed so that the Northern Grid would be able to draw about 120 mw from the Upper Sind. The World Bank has-recently approved a loan to Karachi Electricity Supply Corporation (KESC) for addition of a 125-mw steam unit at Karachi, which - xvii - Table III Power Program. 1965-75 Installed Capacity Cost V Completion Date (mw) (PRs mins.) Electrical Generation: Units Completed or Under Construction 1966 Lahore Gas Turbines 26 15 1967 Sukkur Steam Units 25 17 1967 Lyallpur Steam Units 124 44 1967/69 Mangla Units 1, 2 and 3 300 115 1967 Kotri Gas Turbine 13 10 1968 Lahore Gas Turbines 52 37 1968 Kotri Gas Turbines 26 19 1969 Korangi Unit 3 ("C" station) 125 99 1971/72 Karachi Nuclear Station 125 286 642 Electrical Generation: Units Proposed 1970 MAngla Units 4, 5 and 6 300 100 1970 Mari Steam Unit I 100 98 1970 Hyderabad Gas Turbines 26 19 1971 Mari Steam Unit II 100 98, 1973 Mangla Units 7 and 8 200 86 1974 Mari Gas Turbines 200 146 1975 Tarbela Units 1 and 2 350 278 1975 Korangi Unit 4 125 99 197L Quetta Units 19 31 Initial Work on further units _73 1,428 Electrical Transmission (lines only) 1969 220 kv Mangla-Wah 33 1968/72 220 kv Mangla-Midway 68 1968/72 220 kv Midway-Lyallpur 31 1969 220 kv Midway-Kotlakhpat 11 1969 220 kv S. Lyallpur-Montgomery 1 1975 220 kv Montgomery-Mltan 23 1969/73 220 kv Wah-Tarbela 12 1971 380 kv Lyallpur-Mari 99 1971 380 kv Mari-Hyderabad-Karachi 101 1974 380 kv Mari-Karachi 65 1975 380 kv Tarbela-Lyallpur 61 Other (line Terminals, Transformers, 33, 66 and 132-ky lines) 600 1,115 Distribution (600 v/1 kv lines, oustme omnections, etc.) Third Plan Period 1,180 Fourth Plan Period 1.890. 3,070 General b/ 62 Total 6,317 a/ Including taxes, duties and interest during construction at six percent per annum. V/ Including buildings, offices, miscellaneous equipment, etc. - xviii - should be completed by mid-1969. The main point is that by the critical period on the northern system, at the time of lowest reservoir level at Mangla, in March of 1970 the minimum requirement is that either Mangla units 5 and 6 or both the 132-ky line between the Northern Grid and Upper Sind and the first 100-mw Czech unit should be fully completed. Either of these sets of installations would provide sufficient capacity to meet loads projected on the main load forecast with adequate reserves and enough to cover those projected on the contingency load forecast, though with inadequate reserves. The Bank Group's recommended program includes more than this bare minimum -- Mangla units 5 and 6 as well as the 132-ky link and the first Czech unit -- which would provide sufficient capacity to meet the highest anticipated loads with adequate reserve. If Mangla units 5 and 6 cannot be completed by the Spring of 1970 then the Bank Group feels that completion of the second Czech unit in the Upper Sind would be warranted by that time. In the South the situation would be somewhat similar: provided that the 132-ky line between Karachi and Hyderabad is completed on schedule in 1968 and generating plant is in- stalled as noted in Table III, then projected 1970 loads could be covered, but the Bank Group's program includes an additional 26 mw of gas turbines in order to raise reserves to a more adequate level, close to the size of the largest single unit on the system at the time (125 mw). xxxvii. The most critical concept in the Bank Group's program for the Fourth Plan is 380-ky transmission interconnection between all main power markets; and the earlier this can be completed after 1970 the better, in the Bank Group's view -- which means that work on these lines should be initiated at the earliest opportunity. Province-wide EHV interconnection will be especially valuable after the completion of Tarbela in enabling more rapid absorption of the dam's hydroelectric potential. It will also serve to reduce the amount of reserve generating capacity required in the Province and the amount of gas-pipeline capacity which must be installed to provide fuel for thermal generation. However, if EHV interconnection is warranted after Tarbela, then it should be installed as soon as poss- ible in order to develop the power system in the interim into a pattern appropriate to the expeditious absorption of Tarbela power. The Bank Group considers that there would be advantages in having a complete EHV line between Lyallpur in the Northern Grid and Karachi in the South by 1971 or 1972. However highest priority for early completion attaches to the northern section of the line between Lyallpur and the Upper Sind be- cause it would enable the development of a better geographical pattern of thermal generation (concentration of capacity at the gas fields in Upper Sind) and it would reduce problems that would otherwise arise in supplying large quantities of fuel -- gas or fuel oil -- to plants in the Northern Grid for short periods during the year. Nevertheless the Bank Group recommends that the southern half of the proposed EHV line, between the Upper Sind and Karachi, should also be installed at latest by 1975, and preferably earlier, because without it West Pakistan will lose some of the main potential benefits of the proposed system -- such as consolidation of Province-wide generating reserves, reduction of re- liance on gas (with its significant opportunity cost) and fuel oil - xix - (with its heavy foreign exchange component) and rapid realization of the power benefits of Tarbela. xxxviii. The Bank Group's proposals regarding installation of generating equipment during the Fourth Plan period are built around the concept of the EHV transmission lines linking Karachi, the Sind and the Northern Grid. The main additions to generating capacity during the Fourth Plan would be at Mangla and at the Mari/Sui gas fields in the Upper Sind. Mangla units 5-8 are scheduled for early completion because they would provide much base-load power for the Northern Grid and, once the EHV interconnection was in place, much of the base-load energy which they would produce in some six to nine months of the year in excess of Northern Grid requirements could be exported to the South. Thermal units at the gas fields would provide supplementary power for the Northern Grid in the months when hydroelectric capability was low and they would also be used to help meet loads in the South; their role in the South would be largely semi-peaking, base load being met by the Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear plant and by hydroelectric energy from the North and peak load being met by local thermal units in Karachi and Hyderabad. Concentration of thermal develop- ment in this period on the gas fields would eliminate the need for ex- pansion of the gas pipelines to meet the needs of the power plants after 1970, it would facilitate the operation of the EHV transmission intercon- nection, and it would usefully complement the proposed hydroelectric developments. The generating units proposed in Table III are scheduled to meet the main load forecast adopted by the Bank Group, but if loads should at the end of the Third Plan period appear likely to be closer to the contingency load forecast during the Fourth Plan, then the extra 200 mw of capacity required should also be installed at Mari/Sui. Taking account of the relative prices of gas turbines and conventional steam turbines, the value that can be attributed to the natural gas reserves and the largely semi-peak role that would be played by the plants at Mari/Sui, the Bank Group concluded that a relatively large proportion of the generating capacity installed there during the Fourth Plan -- possibly as much as one-half -- should be gas turbines. At the very end of the Fourth Plan the first 380-ky line between Lyallpur and Tarbela would be completed and the first two Tarbela units would come into operation. xxxix. Nearly half the cost of the proposed Action Pro- gram for electric power relates to the last stage of power supply -- distribution lines, customer connections, meters, etc. The Bank Group considers that the allocations proposed for this part of the program are vital; without sufficient effort on this side of development, which has been somewhat neglected in the past, the distribution system will deterio- rate and become more dangerous, there will continue to be wasteful delays between the time when tubewells are installed and the time they become operational, and the projected loads will simply not materialize. Accord- ing to the Bank Group's projections, WAPDA needs to connect about 516,000 new customers during the Third Plan period (including 16,000 public and private tubewells) and about 725,000 new customers during the Fourth Plan period (including 25,000 public and private wells). The Bank Group esti- mates that this will involve construction of about 23,000 miles of 11-ky - xx - and 400-volt distribution line during the Third Plan and 35,000 miles during the Fourth Plan, compared with an actual achievement of about 15,000 miles during the Third Plan. In the Bank Group's opinion there are three main steps required to improve performance in the construction of distribution lines. First, adequate funds must be provided and allo- cations for distribution work should not be made to bear the brunt of budget cuts, as has sometimes happened in the past. Second, an improved system of inventory control must be established to make sure that com- ponents are ordered sufficiently early and distributed in such a way that they are available at the time and place required. Third, more emphasis needs to be given to training of labor in distribution-line work, and the training provided should be given a much more practical bent than it now has. Organization and Implementation xl. The capacity of the public authorities to implement projects to increase the supply of electric power, irrigation water and agricul- tural inputs and the capacity of the farmer to absorb new agricultural techniques and inputs were assessed by the Bank Group and its consultants and accepted as factors limiting the size and composition of the recom- mended development program. Nevertheless, as the size of the resultant program makes clear, the targets adopted are ambitious and some of them are very ambitious. They will not be realized without substantial im- provements in organization and management in the near future, especially in some fields. In the view of the Bank Group these necessary improve- ments will be achieved most quickly and effectively by adjusting the existing organizational structure and improving coordination among its parts rather than by establishing wholly new organizations or other radical structural change. x1i. It has been suggested, for instance, that some of the res- ponsibilities of WAPDA's Power Wing might be transferred to a new or- ganization, but the Bank Group is not convinced that this would be a prudent move at the present time. The Power Wing has done a reasonably good job under rather difficult circumstances and through trial and error has gained much valuable experience. Establishment of a new organization would not ease the basic problem of shortage of qualified and experienced people; indeed it would icre likely only exacerbate this problem since the new organization would have to have its own separate management hierarchy, and more people in both the new and the old organizations would have to devote time to ensuring proper coordination between them. New organizations, such as municipal power distribution agencies, would also likely encounter even more difficul- ties than WAPDA does in securing adequate financing for distribution work because they would lack the financial strength of WAPDA. The Bank Group believes that reassignment of responsibilities in different organizations at this time would tend rather to delay than to expedite work on the expansion of the distribution and transmission systems that will be necessary if the large amounts of hydroelectric and ther- mal energy that will soon become available are to be marketed. It - xxi - would be more prudent to concentrate on strengthening the Power Wing. The General Manager should have sufficient authority to make all the de- cisions that would normally be made by the management of a commercial power company. x1ii. The Bank Group believes that much more effective coordination among Government departments and between the departments and other en- tities working in related fields is required in all phases of the develop- ment effort. Planning needs to be better coordinated to reduce the present duplication of effort and to enable all departments and agencies to re- view plans at an early stage and give their best advice. This applies es- pecially to the public tubewell projects which must necessarily be a cooperative effort if -they are to be successful because of the many con- tributions required -- installation of wells under WAPDA's Groundwater and Reclamation Division, electrification of wells by WAPDA's Power Wing, operation of wells by the Land and Water Develolment Board or the Agricul- tural Development Corporation, coordination of surface water supplies under the control of the Irrigation Department, concentration of exten- sion effort by the Agriculture Department and distribution of farm inputs by various of these public agencies and by private enterprise. The need for coordination in planning also applies to the power sector; the Bank Group believes that WAPDA load forecasting and system planning should be much better coordinated both with similar work in KESC and with general economic planning and forecasting. Because plans must be constantly re- vised and updated long-term relationships are needed among these various bodies. Sometimes these relationships will best be handled by commit- tees -- a joint economic and power group has been suggested, for instance, for work on load forecasting -- but often coordination among agencies will best be handled by the Planning and Development Department which has over- all responsibility for the development effort. This Department needs strengthening in terms of numbers of technically and professionally qualified personnel to enable it to do a more effective job. x1iii. Installation of the public tubewells proposed by the Bank Group and their electrification account directly for some 15 percent of the total costs of the Action Program for Water and Power Development put forward in Table I. If this important component of the total program is to be im- plemented all phases of tubewell project work from initial identification and preparation to final connection of the wells with the electricity distribution system must be urgently streamlined. The program proposed foresees coverage of nearly 10 million acres by public tubewells between now and 1975, implying an average rate of completion of a little over one million acres a year. This rate of achievement, equivalent to about 1,600 public wells per year, has been recommended by others in the past. WAPDAss Master Plan envisaged a faster rate of accomplishment, reaching over 2,000 wells per annum by 1966. In practice less than 200 public wells were energized in each of the fiscal years 1964/65 and 1965/66, and the highest rate of achievement so far attained was 1,000 wells in 1960/61. This gives a measure of the improvement in organization re- quired. Electrification of wells has been one important bottleneck in the past and some of the measures needed to break it were discussed - xxii - above in connection with the general problem of expansion of the distribution system. But the other phases of project preparation and execution have also to be raised to a new plane of efficiency if the program is to be achieved. The experience that has now been gained in execution of public tubewell pro- jects should make it possible to develop a standard routine for organizing much of the work. The smaller scale of the projects recommended by the Bank Group than of those undertaken in the past should also make their construc- tion and completion on schedule more manageable. x1iv. The Bank Group attaches great importance to the development of management cadres and organizational structures for each tubewell project which will be able to put the wells into effective operation immediately upon completion; lack of these may in fact prove a more serious obstacle to progress than the difficulties on the construction side. Again the Bank Group does not believe that establishment of new organizations would serve much purpose; rather the existing project management institutions, such as the Agricultural Development Corporation and the Land and Water Development Board should be strengthened and improved. Initially the Bank Group strongly favors integrated project management with direct and undivided responsibility for increased supply of both water and other in- puts like fertilizer and correct use of them. This may entail some diffi- culties arising from the corollary fact that responsibility for water supplies will be divided between the Irrigation Department responsible for surface water, and the local project management responsible for groundwater. But the Bank Group attributes such importance to improve- ment of farming practices and use of material inputs that it thinks the gains from strong integration at the project level will far outweigh the difficulties on the water supply side. Project Directors should be appointed early so that they can begin the very important tek of monitor- ing progress starting from pre-project conditions. They will have to be supported by extension officers and technical specialists seconded from other Government departments but responsible to the Director while they work on the project. Once a project is well under way and operating smoothly the project management would withdraw in favor of an organiza- tion more representative of the farmers, and support functions would be performed by the line departments directly. x1v. New agricultural inputs and improved farming practices will not be widely adopted, whether inside or outside the project areas, with- out a drastic improvement of the agricultural extension service. This service, which is the critical link in getting innovations to the stage of actual adoption and showing farmers how to make best use of new inputs, has suffered from inability to attract and hold well-qualified personnel. Halfhearted measures at improvement will not suffice. Sufficient numbers of agricultural personnel will probably be available from the agricultural universities under current expansion plans and from the training colleges for Field Assistants provided that the latter are expanded as recommended. But the quality of the education needs substantial improvement. At present, moreover, many of the best students who could be attracted into Government service in agriculture are lost because of more attractive opportunities elsewhere. To alter this situation -- and it is extremely - xxiii - important to alter it -- the Agriculture Department must be able to offer better career opportunities, involving more status, better pay and better working conditions. Relief from some tasks, such'as the actual handling of plant protection materials which are not directly related to extension, and provision of improved facilities, such as transport, could greatly increase the effectiveness of the service. The extension service cannot be effective unless it is backed by a research branch that is imagina- tive and oriented to solving farmers' day-to-day problems. A dynamic research program is vitally needed to deal with such matters as con- tinuing varietal improvement, more efficient treatment of insect infes- tation and plant disease, better understanding of soil, crop, water and fertilizer relationships and improvement of farm implements. Building an efficient and contributing research branch requires dedicated leader- ship, generous financial support, understanding of the uncertainties inherent in research and infusion of a spirit of service to the agricul- tural community. Immediate steps towards securing a greater contribution from research would be better pay and conditions, as with the extension service, and better coordination with the extension service in order to focus attention on farmers' urgent problems. xlvi. Shortage of well-qualified personnel, especially at the lower levels, is of course a general problem and not one confined to agricul- tural services. Indeed the shortage of engineers may be more acute. It is estimated that at most about 3,800 engineers will graduate during the Third Plan period compared with a figure in the Third Plan document of 7,000 for the increase in requirements of graduate engineers over the same period. The Bank Group's consultants have estimated that the recommended program of irrigation and drainage development will require by 1975 1,000 engineers for project planning and construction activity and 300 engineers for supervision and operation of tubewell projects. More rapid expansion of engineering education is difficult, without sacrificing quality, because of the shortage of good teachers. The shortage of engineers for the program could be reduced by on-the-job training of promising young men who lack formal engineering education but could handle supervisory tasks well. More advantage could be taken of consultants for training purposes. Nevertheless there will continue to be serious shortages. Foreign consultants and contractors cannot fully make up for the lack of people with extensive local experience, but continuing heavy reliance will have to be placed on them. x1vii. The shortage of good Government staff does emphasize the need for making as much use as possible of private enterprise. It is very important that public agencies do not try to undertake more than they can really achieve because, besides overextending their staff re- sources and making them less effective, they also thereby reduce the scope for private enterprise, whether in groundwater development or in promotion of agricultural inputs. As supplies of fertilizer increase maximum use should be made of both private enterprise and Government - channels to spread it widely. Multiplication of improved seed on pri- vate farms and distribution through private enterprise channels will be essential means to securing rapid advances in the use of the new crop - xxiv - varieties now becoming available; the role of Government would be limited to production of basic seed stock and supervision of multiplication and distribution to ensure that quality is maintained down to the level of the individual farmer. Private enterprise could also gradually come to play a major role in distributing and encouraging use of other needed inputs like plant protection materials and agricultural machinery, under general Government supervision regarding quality and regarding regularity of ser- vice; this would help to leave the Government agricultural officers free for their main job of giving advice to farmers and breaking bottlenecks in supply of needed inputs. Subsidies will probably continue to be needed on fertilizer and plant protection materials, to encourage their adoption, but they should be arranged in such a way as to minimize the administrative burden on Government agricultural officers. x1viii. The Bank Group also recommends a more positive Government effort to promote private tubewells. As pointed out, continuedrgrowth of private tubewells occupies a very important place in the recommended program for the coming years. Apart from the installation subsidy on wells put in by the Agriculture Department, the most significant Govern- ment contributions to private tubewell development so far have been rather indirect -- such as increasing imports of materials for tubewell manufacture, providing more funds to WAPDA for tubewell electrification, and reserving certain areas for private wells. The Government could, without interfering with private enterprise activity, do more to promote private tubewells and other forms of private water development and, since WAPDA will not be able to cover more than a limited area by 1975, it should do so. In particular farmers and landowners should be en- abled to get advice easily regarding procurement and construction - matters, types of equipment available and suitable, quality of ground- water underlying their farms, irrigation requirements and water manage- ment. The need for advice about ways to organize cooperative installa- tion and use of wells will become more important as continued growth of private tubewells comes to depend more on the smaller farmers; credit will equally become important and a more aggressive credit policy on the part of the Agricultural Development Bank would help. The extension service should give special attention to farms with private wells, to help the farmers make best use of additional water supplies. xlix. The Bank Group believes that provision of technical advice and assistance which would not otherwise be available is a better way for the public authorities to support private tubewell development than outright subsidies. The Bank Group is also very doubtful whether the subsidized price at which electricity is sold to farmers for pumping purposes has had much effect in promoting private tubewells. Since the Power Wing's rate of return on capital invested is already below what the Bank Group would consider a reasonable level, and since one of the most important factors limiting the extension of the distribution system for further tubewell electrification is shortage of funds, serious con- sideration should be given to raising the price charged the farmer for electricity. Subsidies on fertilizer, plant protection and improved farm machinery, on the other hand, do appear to play an important promotional - XXV - role and, in consonance with its general emphasis on the maintenance of a price framework for farmers which gives maximum incentive to modernization, the Bank Group recommends retention of these subsidies until the value of the new inputs is so widely recognized among the farmers that they are pre- pared to buy adequate quantities at unsubsidized prices. Maintenance of a price structure for farm products that provides adequate returns to far- mers for their effort and risk is also critical to success. In the view of the Bank Group a more appropriate way to increase public savings than reduction in subsidies on the new inputs or in farm product prices would be increased water charges. Water is an accustomed input, the critical importance of which is already widely understood by the farmers, so that increased water charges should have no disincentive effect. Indeed, higher charges for water, more commensurate than those presently levied with the heavy costs involved in building and operating the irrigation system, could help to improve the utilization of water just as the much higher costs of private tubewell water have apparently led to more care- ful and productive use of water obtained from that source. 1. Efficient operation of the irrigation and power systems becomes increasingly important as more money is invested in them and they become more tightly integrated and interdependent with one another. The Bank Group recommends that a Provincial Irrigation Authority be constituted at the highest level to give adequate recognition to the broad range of administrative, legal, sociological and technical considerations related to water resource policy. This body would be responsible for basic policy decisions on barrage allocations, reservoir release patterns and drawdown levels and other major policy issues such as the use of tubewell fields in relation to surface water deliveries, and it would be concerned with both power and irrigation aspects of these matters. Broad policies affecting the distribution of available water supplies have remained little changed for decades, but it is essential to subject them to thorough review in light of the existence of Mangla dam, the forthcoming completion of the IBP works, changes in the design discharges of canals and gradual expansion of the public tubewell system. These policies will need to be continually adjusted as the complex irrigation system evolves. Provision has now to be made, for instance, for the filling of Mangla Reservoir in kharif and allocations will soon be needed for diver- sion from the Indus and the Jhelum into the link canals to supply the needs of canal commands which have in the past depended on Sutlej and Ravi flows. Additional to its main interseasonal storage function, Mangla will be able to provide important benefits in the form of regu- lation of natural flows, particularly in the later part of the rabi season, to match them more closely to crop-water requirements; but securing these benefits will depend on careful operation of the reser- voir. Stored surface water will yield highest benefits if it is released and allocated on a basis which recognizes the advantages accruing to power from keeping up the level of water in the reservoir for as long as poss- ible, which considers irrigation releases in terms of the actual needs of canal commands rather than theoretical historic allocations, and which takes account of the extent to which these irrigation needs in different months can be met by groundwater pumping. - xxvi - li. The Provincial Irrigation Authority would be charged with res- ponsibility for ensuring that all Government agencies concerned with irrigation should cooperate in the framing of new policies for water allocations, but it would not itself be expected to undertake the de- tailed analyses of water distribution. The Bank Group believes that for this purpose there should be set up a semi-independent study group or working party staffed by, say, the Irrigation and Power Department, WAPDA, the Agriculture Department and the Planning and Development Department. The study group would need to be well staffed with tech- nical officers competent to carry out the detailed calculations and analyses required and fully conversant with the practical problems of irrigated farming and of operating the irrigation system. It may re- quire assistance from consultants during the early stages. lii. Representation of WAPDA's Power Wing in the derivation of policies for operation of the works, such as Mangla Reservoir and the tubewell fields, which have implications for power as well as irrigation, will be important but improvement is also vitally needed in operations of the Power Wing less directly related to water resources. The chief dispatches of the power systems must be clothed with sufficient autho- rity to direct the flow of electricity from generating stations to load centers as required and to order the start up or closing down of generating stations to meet fluctuating demands. After the power sys- tems in the North and the South are interconnected by EHV transmission lines a central dispatching station will be needed. The Power Wing's billing, collecting and accounting procedures need improvement. The present accounting system does not provide management with sufficiently detailed and up-to-date statistics to analyze operating results and trends and to know where responsibility for successes and failures lies. Losses on the WAPDA systems are presently unduly high -- about 20 per- cent of the total energy sent out from the generating stations; even a small reduction could lead to substantial increase in net income, but a sizable reduction should be possible with improvement of the distribution system, better meter reading and billing procedures, and more efficient operation of a denser distribution and transmission network. Irrigation and Agriculture Development after 1975 liii. In deriving the recommended program for development over the decade 1965-75 the Bank Group has given considerable attention to the longer term potential of the irrigation system, and the report discusses the main lines of development that should be followed after 1975, as far as can now be foreseen. Parallel improvements in the supply of water and of other agricultural inputs should continue through this period. There will remain substantial scope for increasing productivity by such means as greater use of fertilizer, development and wider distribution of im- proved seed varieties and more widespread adoption of effective plant protection measures. Mechanization should take place at an increasing rate. - xxvii- liv. Completion of Tarbela in 1975.will mean a substantial increase in rabi water supplies and, if properly integrated with other sources of irrigation water, it would make it possible to match irrigation supplies to the water requirements of crops on an expanding cropped acreage to a much greater degree than will have been possible before 1975. Full inte- gration of groundwater and surface water supplies should be achieved in the decade 1975-85. It is at this stage that coordinated control of the tubewell fields will become important in order to permit substitution of surface supplies by groundwater in some canal commands and reallocation of these quantities to other areas. The availability of more rabi sur- face water and the existence of effective water table control by means of public tubewells will make it worthwhile to expand the canal enlargement program substantially. As more areas with brackish groundwater are brought under development there will be increasing need for drainage works. lv. The Bank Grcup's outline program for irrigation development after 1975 foresees coverage of virtually the entire area underlain by usable groundwater with public tubewell projects by 1980. This would mean construction of public projects covering about seven million acres between 1975 and 1980, additional to the twelve million acres which would be covered by 1975 under the recommended Action Program. Whether it will really be necessary to replace private wells with public wells in all areas in order to enable sufficiently integrated operation of the sys- tem in fact remains to be seen. The program envisages that once the usable groundwater areas needing public tubewells have been covered, then the tubewell construction program would shift to the saline ground- water areas. Not all of the 10 million acres of canal-irrigated area underlain by saline groundwater have aquifer of suitable characteristics for tubewell pumping, but generally in those areas where tubewells can operate effectively they would be installed for drainage purposes, while in other areas surface or subsurface drainage works would be required. lvi. The availability of additional rabi water, from Tarbela, will make it possible to develop the areas not underlain by fresh groundwater to higher cropping intensity, but in most of these areas, where less use can be made of groundwater for irrigation purposes, the canals will need to be expanded to carry sufficient surface supplies. The long-term program envisages completion of canal remodeling in five million acres over the decade 1975-85 and in a further ten million acres before the end of the century. It appears that by the early 1980's an additional link canal across the Punjab will be required to deliver water from the Indus to the expanded canals in areas with saline groundwater in the eastern Punjab. The Bank Group's consultants have suggested that this new link canal should take off from the tail reach of the Chasma-Jhelum link, but its alignment would need to be further considered in due time. lvii. In the Lower Indus the main work in the decade after 1975 would be canal remodeling, in connection with the expansion of tubewells and tile drainage in saline groundwater zones, and surface drainage works. Canal enlargement here hinges essentially on the Sehwan barrage project which was mentioned above for commencement of construction late in the - xxviii - Fourth Plan period. As now proposed, the Sehwan Barrage and Sehwan- Rohri feeder are scheduled for completion in 1982, and the Rohri-Nara feeder is scheduled for completion after 1985. The very large Left Bank Outfall Drain which would have been started in the Third Plan period, would be brought to completion around 1985. A parallel drain on the right bank, which would drain the effluent of the Gudu and Sukkur Right Bank areas into the Indus downstream of Sehwan Barrage would be built over the years 1980-90. 1viii. As regards surface storage, the Bank Group believes that, following completion of Tarbela in 1975, additional capacity will not be required until the 1980's. In the early 1980's Sehwan-Manchar will add some 1.8 MAF of capacity. Around 1985 further large-scale capacity will be needed to meet growing irrigation needs and to help replace capacity lost by siltation at Tarbela. The need might usefully be met by raising the Mangla Dam to provide additional storage on the Jhelum. Alternatively it may then appear best to go straight to second-stage storage on the Indus, which will anyway be required by about 1990. The alternatives for second-stage storage on the Indus that the Bank Group envisages were discussed above in connection with the need for an early program of investigations. The amount of additional surface storage capacity required in this period will depend on the extent to which in- terseasonal underground storage, which would require canal remodeling in fresh groundwater zones, is found to be a feasible alternative. Power Development after 1975 lix. The most important additions to the power system in the years following completion of Tarbela Dam will be generating units there and further 380-ky transmission lines linking Tarbela to the Northern Grid. The Bank Groupts projections suggest that it would be worthwhile install- ing all 12 units at Tarbela by 1981. By that time, according to the pro- posed program, there would be three 380-ky transmission lines between Tarbela and the Upper Sind. These lines will not provide sufficient capacity to carry the full potential output of Tarbela during the flood months, but the Bank Group believes that the energy which they could not carry would have to be taken to Karachi to find a market and that it would not be worth installing additional lines for this purpose. Some years later the extra energy produced in the flood months could be ab- sorbed locally or in the Northern Grid. lx. . At the same time as the Tarbela units are being installed it will be necessary to build additional thermal capacity that will pro- vide megawatts in the spring when the reservoirs are fully drawn down and will also help to stabilize the EHV transmission line. This ther- mal capacity will operate at low load factor because Tarbela and Mangla would provide the largest part of the energy required at most times in the year. The Bank Group believes that, as far as can now be foreseen, this capacity would best be based on natural gas. The outline program for the post-1975 period includes additional thermal capacity on the gas fields in the Upper Sind and in Karachi, where it would be fired by - xxix - Sui gas. It is in this period that it might become appropriate to develop the Lakhra coal field for large scale power generation according to the Bank Group's studies, but the Bank Group is doubtful whether the scarcity of natural gas by this time will be sufficient to warrant a change to coal burning power plant with its higher capital and operating costs. 1xi. By the early 1980's there will be a strong case for extensive development of nuclear generation in the South despite its relatively high foreign exchange costs. Before 1980 nuclear plant would not appear very attractive chiefly because, even in Karachi, the availability of energy from Tarbela would be such that it could not economically be operated at the high load factor necessary to make nuclear generation competitive with alternatives. According to the Bank Group's forecasts and system studies loads in the South would be adequate by the early 1980's to give a 400-mw nuclear unit a load factor of better than 80 per- cent; and by 1985 a second 400-mw nuclear unit could have a load factor, even after absorption of substantial quantities of hydro energy, of nearly 70 percent. Moreover, by the early 1980's, loads on an interconnected system would be growing fast enough to absorb reasonably quickly units of 400-mw, which may be the minimum size at which substantial economies will be obtainable from nuclear plant.  - 1 - I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 The subject of this Study is the Indus Basin of West Pakistan. The Indus River together with its six main tributaries -- the Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej -- forms one of the greatest river systems of the world. Diversion of the waters of the seven rivers for irrigation purposes has been going on for more than 3000 years. Mainly over the last century a vast network of barrages, weirs and canals has been constructed so that the area irrigated from the Indus and its tributaries is now more extensive than that irrigated by any other single river system. 1.02 Partition of the Indian subcontinent, and in particular of the Punjab, in 1948 between Pakistan and India placed a major obstacle in the path of further development of the Indus River system. But a decade of negotiation between the two new countries led eventually to signature of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, which provided for peaceful division of the river system. There was to be a ten-year transitional period at the end of which Pakistan would have the right to full use of the Indus itself and the two "western tributaries" (Jhelum and Chenab) while India would be entitled to divert all flows of the "eastern tributaries" (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) for her own use. 1.03 The engineering concept which underlay the treaty was a system of enormous "link" canals for transferring water from the Indus and, to a lesser extent, from the Jhelum and the Chenab, to meet the irrigation requirements of eastern portions of West Pakistan which had hitherto been served by the three rivers now made available in their entirety to India. To provide funds for implementing this concept an international agreement was signed, simultaneously with the Treaty, to establish the Indus Basin Development (I.B.D.) Fund. The World Bank was designated Administrator to the Fund. The parties to the Agreement were Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Bank. The Fund represented the equivalent of US$ 895 million, including an equivalent of US$ 174 million to be provided by India under the Treaty and a loan of US$ 80 million from the World Bank. The I.B.D. Fund was estimated to be sufficient to cover the total cost, foreign and domestic, of the works to be constructed in Pakistan envisaged by the Treaty. 1.04 As engineers began to take a closer look at the proposed works following the Agreement, it became increasingly clear that the cost of the works would far exceed the resources of the I.B.D. Fund. Revised estimates indicated that the total cost of the Indus works would be not less than twice the amount available to the Fund for this purpose. Negotiations were undertaken with a view to increasing.the resources of the Fund. However, the contributing governments were not ready to subscribe additional amounts to the full extent required. Furthermore, there were unresolved problems with regard to the precise works to be built under the Agreement. - 2 - l.0 As Administrator of the I.B.D Fund, the World Bank was directly concerned with finding a solution to this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The settlement finally worked out, in the latter half of 1963, was based on a.prospective addition of US$ 315 million to the Fund -- assurances from the contributing governments of additional subscriptions amounting to approximately US$ 257 million plus a US$ 58 million pledge from the World Bank. The availability of the various subscriptions to the Fund was subject to satisfactory appraisal of the projects to be executed. 1.06 At the time that this financial settlement was reached an order of priority was also agreed upcn for spending the available funds. First priority was given to the construction of an earthfill storage dam and related works on the Jhelum River (Mangla), link canals, barrages and other works set forth in Annexure D of the 1960 Agreement. Second priority was extended to a study of the Water and Power Resources of West Pakistan to be organized by the Bank as Administrator of the Fund. Thirdly, any remaining balance would go toward the foreign exchange costs of a dam on the Indus near Tarbela, if the Special Study proved it justified, or to other water projects agreed upon between Pakistan and the Bank on the basis of the Special Study. 1.07 A Memorandum of Understanding which outlined these arrangements was signed on November 14, 1963 by Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, and Mr. George D. Woods, President of the World Bank. After the Memorandum of Understanding had been approved by the contributing governments its substance was incorporated in the Indus Basin Development Fund (Supplemental) Agreement 1964. This Agreement, which was signed on April 6, 1964 by all parties contributing to the Fund, provided that Pakistan would accept the arrangements set forth as a full and complete discharge of all obligations, whether legal or moral, expressed or implied, of the other parties under the 1960 Agree- ment. 1.08 The study of Water and Power Resources mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Supplemental Agreement was to include a detailed survey of the basic water and power resources of West Pakistan and of farming conditions and prospects in the Province and it was to identify the most practical means of developing these resources in keeping with the needs of the Pakistan economy. The general character of the study was established in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding in the following terms: (1) The study would consist of a survey of the water and power resources of West Pakistan, primarily but not exclusively related to the potential for agricultural development. Its purpose would be to provide the Government of Pakistan with a basis for development planning within the context of successive Five Year Plans. It would be sufficiently detailed to assist the Pakistan Government in formulating a sound program for the systematic exploitation of the water and power resources of West Pakistan. - 3 - (2) While the study of the water and power resources of West Pakistan should be a continuing process, the Study presently proposed would be the initial stage and would serve to determine which of the several potential water and power projects are economically viable and feasible of execution during the next two Five Year Plan periods (1965-70 and 1970-75). The Study would take account of,and serve as a useful guide to the possible future development of water and power projects beyond 1975. It was stipulated that the first objective of the Study would be the completion of an interim report covering the technical feasibility, the construction cost and the economic return of a dam on the Indus at Tarbela. The second phase of the Study was to deal in a more comprehensive manner with West Pakistan's water and power resources as a whole, giving full emphasis to the broader aspects of development planning and the identification of other projects besides Tarbela suitable for early development. 1.09 To set the Study in motion as rapidly as possible, the Bank Group,under the leadership of Dr. Lieftinck, set out first to establish what information already existed on potential development in the Indus Basin and where the efforts of the Study should consequently be concentrated. A preliminary reconnaissance dedicated to this task was carried out by consultants in February-March 1964 -- Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners covering irrigation and hydrology, Hunting Technical Services reporting on agriculture, Stone & Webster dealing with electric power, and Chas. T. Main covering dam sites. Reports on this pre- liminary reconnaissance led to preparation by the Bank Group of terms of reference for the major part of the Study. These terms of reference were agreed with the Pakistan authorities and consultants were appointed to start work on May 1, 1964 -- Gibb, Hunting Technical Services and International Land Development Consultants forming the IACA consortium ,to cover irrigation and agriculture aspects of the Study; Stone & Webster again covering power; and Chas. T. Main, dam sites. 1.10 The consultants' teams gathered in Lahore during May and June of 1964, building up to an eventual resident expatriate strength of about 40, supported by nearly 100 Pakistanis most of whom were assisting the agriculturists. Gibb established a coordinating office and handled the administrative side of the Study. Continuous liaison with the Pakistan authorities was maintained through the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the main agency responsible for water and power development, and more specifically through Mr. Monawar Ali, Director General of Planning and Investigations. A forum was provided by monthly meetings which were devoted to an exchange of information and ideas; these meetings were attended by representatives of various govern- ment departments and agencies, such as irrigation, agriculture, planning and development, and Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), in addition to WAPDA. Members of the Bank Group maintained a fairly continuous contact with the consultant teams and visited them in Lahore on a number of occasions; it was at these times that the Coordinating Committees, providing the official link for the Bank Group, the Pakistan authorities and the consultants, were convened. 1.11 The consultants' first task, to prepare the special prelimi- nary reports on the Tarbela Project, was completed in what must be con- sidered record time. The consultants' reports were discussed with the Bank Group by a Pakistan delegation which visited Washington in early December 1964. The Bank Group's "Report on a Dam on the Indus at Tarbela" was submitted by Dr. Lieftinck, as Head of the Study, to the President of the Bank and by the President of the Bank to the President of Pakistan in February, 1965. The main conclusions of the report may be summarized as follows: (1) That the Tarbela Project as envisaged was technically feasible and its estimated cost would be more than compensated by the agricultural and power benefits which Pakistan should derive from it. (2) That the economic life of the Tarbela Project could beneficially be extended by the provision of side-valley storage or further development on the Indus main stem. (3) That the financial requirements for construction of the project would amount to about US$ 900 million equivalent including the first eight power units but excluding transmission, and without allowance for Pakistan duties and taxes. (4) That the Tarbela Project compared favorably with other studied alternatives for water storage on the main stem of the Indus and would yield an economic return in the form of agriculture and power benefits in the order of 12 percent. (5) That both with and without additional surface water, very considerable agricultural benefits could be obtained by the application of higher inputs for raising the produc- tivity of farm operations. 1.12 There were obviously certain difficulties involved in reaching judgment about a project that would have such far-reaching effects as Tarbela before completion of the comprehensive studies of the basin as a whole. When Dr. Lieftinck submitted the Bank Group's Tarbela Report to the President of the Bank he noted that "the obligation to study, as agreed, a specific project which would be part of a large and complex irrigation system before studying the system as a whole was rather cumbersome." To handle this problem certain priority areas were selected -- lower portions of Rechna and Bari Doabs and the Indus left bank from Khairpur to Bahawalpur for irrigation, and the Northern Grid area for electric power -- and studied intensively as a basis for estimating the main power and irrigation benefits of the project; and extrapolations and adjustments were made to cover benefits from water and electricity supplies which could not be absorbed within these areas. The reports on this phase of the Study were thus largely concerned with quantifying the potential benefits of the Tarbela Project by comparing it with alternative storage projects and alternative means of meeting power and irrigation requirements. 1.13 In undertaking the second phase of the Study, the preparation of comprehensive programs for water and power development in West Pakistan, the consultants were not moving into entirely fresh ground; indeed, it was specifically indicated to them that they should make full use of existing studies and field investigations and avoid duplicating previous work. The Indus Basin has been the scene of major engineering works for well over a century, and a vast number of reports have been prepared on different projects. The establishment of WAPDA in 1958 led to a rapid acceleration of work on planning and project preparation. Many studies have been carried out by personnel of the Irrigation Department and WAPDA. In addition, WAPDA has received substantial assistance over the years from its general consultants, Harza Engineering Company International, who have prepared a number of studies on specific projects as well as having been responsible for master planning activities. WAPDA has also drawn upon the resources of a number of other international consultant firms for studies of individual projects -- such as Common- wealth Associates and Kuljian on the power side, and TAMS (Tippetts-Abbett- McCarthy-Stratton) for Tarbela. 1.14 A very important study which appeared when the consultants were commencing their field work was the report on Land and Water Development in the Indus Plain by the U.S. White House Panel, usually referred to as the Revelle Report. This report which proposed a massive program of public groundwater development as a means to increase irrigation supplies and overcome the problems of waterlogging and salinity was prepared by a panel of American experts headed by Dr. Roger Revelle. The panel had been assembled by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 following a discussion with President Ayub Khan. 1.15 Special reference should also be made to two other groups of consultants to WAPDA who were in the field throughout the year and a half that the Special Study consultants spent in Pakistan. One is the so- called LIP (Lower Indus Project) Group, made up of Hunting Technical Ser- vices Limited and Sir Murdoch Macdonald & Partners. These two firms had been working in the Sind, in the southern part of West Pakistan, since 1959; in 1962 they were given responsibility for preparing a regional survey (focusing on the development of irrigation and agriculture) of the whole of the Sind. The other consultant to WAPDA who had responsi- bilities of particular relevance to the work of the Special Study is Tipton and Kalmbach, Inc. of Denver. This firm has published a series of reports over the years on individual public groundwater projects -- the so-called SCARFs, Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects. In - 6 - May 1962, Tipton and Kalmbach were given a comprehensive contract for preparation of a regional plan for the Northern Zone, somewhat similar to that of LIP for the Sind. The Special Study consultants kept in close touch with both these groups throughout their stay in Pakistan. As regards agriculture and irrigation they concentrated much of their effort in the North and drew heavily on the work of LIP for the South. The LIP team submitted a comprehensive regional report including some project identification and project preparation during 1966. Tipton and Kalmbach have been more concerned with the individual SCARP projects and they did not produce a draft of their comprehensive regional plan for the North until February 1967, after most of the work on the Special Study had been completed. II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRRIGATION SYSTEM 2.01 The Province of West Pakistan is bordered on the west and north by mountain ranges, with desert areas lying inside the mountains along much of the lower western portion. The common boundary with India on the east also consists of desert over roughly its southern half. The major agricultural areas lie within the basin formed by the Indus River and its tributaries, which run in a general northeast/ southwest direction from the points where the rivers enter Pakistan to the mouth of the Indus at the Arabian Sea east of Karachi. Over the years the reliance on the major rivers as a source of water for irrigation has led to a high concentration of population, irrigation investment, infrastructure and markets in this basin. 2.02 The irrigation system which exists today has been built up over the course of more than a century by means of a series of engineer- ing works, many of them unprecedented in the world at the time they were undertaken. The result of this lengthy effort has been to increase the area irrigated from something which must have been in the order of a few hundred thousand acres to a contemporary canal irrigated and cropped area in the neighborhood of 26 million acres. In the process of expansion the irrigation system has been totally transformed. Little more than one hundred years ago it consisted simply of a series of inundation canals which could capture some water for irrigation purposes when river stages happened to be high. Today it consists of some 38,000 miles of canals and a series of river barrages and canal headworks which control the diversion of river flows into the canals. Many of the canals are very large indeed; 15 of them have capacities of between 10,000 and 22,000 cusecs. The largest barrage, at Sukkur on the Indus, nearly a mile long and completed in 1932, alone diverts water into seven large canals, which currently irrigate some five mil- lion acres. Map 1, at the end of this chapter, shows the main canal system as it will be after works currently underway are completed, about 1970. 2.03 The most productive agricultural area in West Pakistan is the Punjab -- the northeast region watered by four important Indus tributaries, the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej Rivers. This was the scene of the initial development of the modern canal system, under the auspices of British colonial administrators and engineers. The heartland of the Punjab is composed of three doabs (areas between rivers) the names of which are acronyms -- Bari, once between the Beas and the Ravi but now between the Sutlej and the Ravi; Rechna, between the Ravi and the Chenab; and Chaj, between the Chenab and the Jhelum. This was the most densely populated part of northwest India a hundred years ago and it included the administrative capital of Lahore. The tributary rivers, each with annual flows a fraction of those on the Indus, were easier to control. Moreover there were extensive areas of flat land in the doabs suitable for irrigation development; the land slopes to- wards the sea at about one foot per mile on average. These same advantages caused problems. The tributaries of the Indus are more - 8 - dependent on monsoon rains than the Indus itself and consequently more variable in flow and subject to destructive flooding. The first major modern canal, the Upper Bari Doab Canal, took off from one of the most variable of all the rivers, the Ravi (the portion of this canal which lies in West Pakistan was renamed the Central Bari Doab Canal after Partition and is so shown on Map 1); it was originally designed to extend 247 miles through the northern part of Bari Doab but the minimum discharge of the Ravi had been considerably over- estimated and the canal had to be tailed out 100 miles short of its goal. It was finally opened in 1859, and irrigation began in 1861. Difficulties arose with siltation at the entrance to the canal and the canal itself had been designed with too steep a gradient so that it began to erode its banks. A design had to be developed which would minimize both the scouring that occurred when the gradient was too steep and the sediment deposition that resulted from too slight slopes. Nevertheless these and other problems were overcome and by 1900 canals had been built to command some five million acres of agricultural land in the doabs. When consideration was given to further expansion of the system it was decided to continue develop- ment in the same area rather than to attempt any work on the main stem of the Indus. In 1905 the Government of India approved the Triple Canals Project, a landmark because it included three canals (the Upper Jhelum Canal, Upper Chenab Canal and Lower Bari Doab Canal), each of which would take off from a western river, supply some water for irriga- tion purposes as it crossed the doab and finally discharge into the next river to the east, thus making available more water for irriga- tion in the eastern areas. The headworks on the Jhelum for this project were built at Mangla and the series of three canals in the project served in effect to transfer water from the Jhelum, where it was surplus, for use in the Rechna and Bari Doabs; this in turn meant that the flows in the easternmost rivers, the Beas and the Sutlej rather than being used to water land in Bari Doab, could be preserved for use in the independent states of Bikaner and Bahawalpur downstream. The Triple Canals Project clearly contained the essentials of the Link Canal concept later used to help solve the dispute between Pakistan and India. 2.04 Southwest of the Punjab, between the confluence of the Indus with its major tributaries and the Arabian Sea, lies the Sind. In those earlier years of canal development, the question of whether to build irrigation works on the Indus was essentially a question of whether to develop the Sind or Lower Indus area. The question was debated for decades. Almost a hundred years elapsed between the time that the Rohri Canal, now one of the longest and largest in the Province, was first mooted and the time it was finally built as part of the Sukkur Barrage Project, the first major development on the Indus itself, in the early 1930's. Many factors contributed to the delay -- the sheer magnitude of any barrage spanning the shifting beds of the Lower Indus and doubt as to the technical feasibility of such a project, shortage of funds for additional irrigation investment (and the early developments in the Punjab were not considered very remunerative), a feeling that Sind was receiving enough water from the Indus itself via - 9 - inundation canals to support its relatively sparse population, and questions as to whether sufficient cultivators would settle in the area to make a heavy investmort in irrigation infrastructure worth- while. Attention was given to improvement of the old inundation canals, but no major engineering work was undertaken before the Sukkur Barrage. 2.05 Simultaneously with the massive Sukkur Project, designed to irrigate a culturable commanded area (CCA) of 7.5 million acres, work went ahead on a series of further irrigation developments in the Punjab, this time on the far eastern side, and in downstream Bahawalpur. The project, known as the Sutlej Valley Project, com- prised nine separate major canals. The areas to be developed lay on either side of the Sutlej. It was the first irrigation project to include large areas -- some five million acres -- designated for non- perennial supply only. Canals supplying those areas would be open only during kharif season when river flows are high. Design of such a large area, some 60 percent of the total, for non-perennial canal irrigation was indicative of course of shortage of water in rabi season, but also of an important change in attitude; the pre-1900 canals had been mainly designed to encourage wheat production for use elsewhere in India, but the main crop that was expected to be grown in these non-perennial areas was cotton for sale abroad. In the event, flows in the Beas and Sutlej turned out to be even less than what the project had been designed for. This, together with the shortage of finance and the unwillingness of people to settle there in the disturbed state of affairs resulting from the world depression of the 1930's, led to abandonment of extensive portions of the project area. 2.06 Apart from the Sind and the Punjab there is one other important area of canal development, somewhat removed from them -- the Peshawar Vale in the northwest. It is much smaller in size hut very inpcr- tant in the production of certain crops, such as fruits, sugarcane and tobacco. It draws water mainly from the Swat River, a tributary of the Kabul, which joins the Indus from the west. Canal development in this area dates from the 1890's. The Peshawar Vale, with its more northern and higher location has more plentiful rainfall and greater seasonal variations in temperature than occur in the other canal irrigated areas. In terms of relative levels of agricultural develop- ment it equals, or may even exceed the Punjab but it is of less significance because of its much smaller area. 2.07 Since World War II, Partition and Independence, the irrigation system has been greatly expanded, particularly along the main stem of the Indus. Some nine million acres have been added to the culturable area commanded by canals, new link canals have been built to transfer water from the Jhelum and Chenab to the Ravi and Sutlej, and the ground- water aquifer has been brought into extensive use as a source of irriga- tion water. Average annual irrigation diversions have increased from about 65 MAF to about 85 MAF, with most of the increase concentrated in the kharif (summer) season. - 10 - Table 1 Average Annual Irrigation Withdrawals from hivers in West Pakistan 1947/48 to 1965/66 (MAF at Canal Head) Kharif Rabi Total 1947/48-1950/51 44.4 20.7 65.1 1951/52-1955/56 51.3 22.8 74.1 1956/57-1960/61 52.4 27.0 79.4 1961/62-1965/66 57.6 27.2 84.8 The table indicates that average kharif diversions have increased sub- stantially over the last decade, while average rabi (winter) withdrawals have remained little changed. Rabi withdrawals in 1965/66 of about 25.8 MAF were actually almost the same as rabi withdrawals in 1956/57, of about 25.6 NAF. Figure 1, which illustrates the development over a longer period shows that average withdrawals between 1952 and 1963 in the rabi months between October and March were almost equivalent to the mean monthly flow in the rivers over the same period. 2.08 Before World War II a solution had been sought to the problem of water shortage in the Sutlej Valley Project in the form of additional canals to bring water from the west together with a dam and large storage reservoir at Bhakra on the Sutlej. Partition left Bhakra in India and aggravated the problem of shortages in the Sutlej Valley canals. The headworks of the old Upper Bari Doab canal at Madhopur and those at Ferozepore on the Sutlej had also been awarded to India. Pending final settlement of the Indus Waters Dispute it became a matter of urgency for Pakistan to move swiftly ahead with measures to secure some supply of water for the Upper Bari Doab and the Sutlej Valley. The 63-mile Marala-Ravi Link was built between 1954 and 1956, the 102-mile Bombanwala-Ravi-Bedian-Dipalpur Link between 1948 and 1959 and the Balloki-Suleimanke Link between 1951 and 1954, all as means of bringing additional water from the Ravi and Chenab to the east. 2.09 The main additions to the irrigated area have occurred in connection with the construction of four barrages on the Indus main stem. Jinnah Barrage, the furthest north of the existing barrages on the Indus, was completed in 1947 and feeds the Thal Canal which irrigates an extensive portion of Thal Doab, between the Indus and the Jhelum. Lower down in the same doab is the Muzaffargarh Canal, also fed from a barrage on the Indus at Taunsa which was completed in 1958. Some 70 miles upstream of Sukkur is Gudu Barrage, from which canals take off to left and right of the Indus to irrigate the most northerly part of the Sind; it was completed in 1962. Far downstream, close to Hyderabad, is the Ghulam Mohammed Barrage, completed in 1955. With the completion of Gudu Barrage in 1962 almost all the old inundation canals have been converted into more permanent structures controlled from headworks on the river; such conversion had become more and more necessary over the VOLUME I FIGURE I HISTORICAL USAGE OF AVAILABLE SURFACE WATER IN THE INDUS RIVER BASIN OF WEST PAKISTAN (FLOWS, WITHDRAWALS - MAF) 40 1 1 1 40 - COMPOSITE HYDROGRAPH OF INDUS RIVER SYSTEM PRIOR TO DIVERSION OF THE THREE EASTERN RIVERS. BASED ON THE PERIOD 1952-1963 HISTORICAL WITHDRAWALS 1952-1963 AVERAGE 35 - HISTORICAL WITHDRAWALS 1931 -1946 AVERAGE 35 HISTORICAL WITHDRAWALS 1926-1931 AVERAGE *****.*** HISTORICAL WITHDRAWALS 1921 - 1926 AVERAGE 30 30 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 i / . 5 . ... . .............. 0 0 OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP MEAN YEAR (2R)IBRD-3222A  - 11 - years in order to provide any reasonable pattern of irrigation supply, especially in the Sind, because the increase in upstream diversions naturally resulted in a general lowering of downstream river stages. Large portions of the nine million acres which those postwar barrages and their accompanying canals were designed to command are still under development, but more than 50 percent of the total have been designated for non-perennial supply, indicating that on the Indus, as on the tributaries, virtually all dependable rabi flows have already been committed. 2.10 Besides the link canals of the 1950's and the Indus River barrages and canals a third important development since World War II has been a series of small hydroelectric projects on the canals and on some of the smaller rivers. In 1947 there was only about 70 mw total capacity installed in the public utilities of West Pakistan -- 20 mw in a hydroelectric station in the Malakand Hills northeast of Peshawar and all the remainder in small diesel and oil-fired plants at various of the more important towns in the Province. However the demand for electric power was growing extremely rapidly; it is estimated that total utility generation grew between 1950 and 1955 at a rate of about 30 percent per annum, and since supply was unable to keep up with the growth of demand, demand may in fact have been growing faster. To help meet the load growth the Malakand project was extended by construction of a long canal along the edge of the hills to carry water to a new 20-mw station at Dargai, from which the water discharges into the Swat River and canal system. In the 1950's and 1960's a number of small low-head hydroelectric stations were added to two of the canals originally built under the Triple Canals Project -- Upper Chenab Canal and Upper Jhelum Canal. These are perennial canals receiving fairly reliable supplies, and when the canals are running full the power plants can provide a steady base-load output. Hydro- electric capacity of much more significant size -- some 160 mw -- was introduced in the early 1960's at Warsak, a major multipurpose dam with a small storage reservoir on the Kabul River. Besides passing water through the turbines, the dam also serves to divert water into two canals, one on each bank, which are designed to bring an additional 120,000 acres under irrigation in the Peshawar Vale. By 1965 Warsak and the other small hydroelectric plants were generating some 40 percent of the total amount of electricity produced in the Province. 2.11 Not unrelated to these hydroelectric developments has been a fourth major development of the postwar period -- a tremendous upsurge in the exploitation of groundwater for agricultural purposes. Much of the most dynamic class of sales by the electrical utilities has been sales for agricultural purposes -- almost entirely for pumping groundwater by tubewells. Electricity used for pumping purposes rose from about 90 million kwh in 1960, or some 7 percent of total utility generation, to about 540 million kwh in 1965, or about 17 percent of total utility generation. The vast plains of the Indus Basin are covered with a deep layer of alluvial silt, sand and clay laid down by the Indus and its tributaries, and this alluvium constitutes a groundwater aquifer containing - 12 - very large quantities of water and generally suitable for pumping. Groundwater has in fact been a traditional source of irrigation water, especially in the Punjab. Several methods of raising water from open wells were used, but the predominant method was their so-called Persian wheel; it is estimated that about 200,000 of these wheels still exist. A large wheel is placed vertically across the center of a shalloi well and on it is suspended an endless chain of buckets. The wheel is connected with a drive shaft which is operated by draught animals walking round and round. The change which has come about in the last 10-20 years has been the introduction of the far more efficient tubewell. A Persian wheel can lift about one-tenth of a cusec (cubic foot per second) from 20-40 feet. One of the smaller modern tubewells can deliver one cusec with a well depth of about 100 feet, and the larger wells can deliver four or five cusecs with a well depth of 200-300 feet. 2.12 There have been two rather different types of tubewell development in West Pakistan, the first from an historical viewpoint on any significant scale being Government-operated or public wells. These are generally larger wells, ranging between two cusecs and five cusecs. A few were introduced prewar and a few more in the late 1940's and early 1950's; the first large-scale development came in 1959 with commencement of the Government's Salinity Control and Reclamation Project No. 1 (SCARP I) in central Rechna Doab. This project, as its name implies, was largely designed to overcome salinity in the soil which had made its appearance in many parts of West Pakistan but was particularly severe in this area; it would do this by pumping large quantities of water from the aquifer and spreading them over the land which would result in leaching down the surface salts. Since the water was being pumped from the aquifer this also meant that the groundwater table was being lowered. SCARP I was intended to be the first of a series of projects. Over the decades there had been a continuous debate about the merits and demerits of high groundwater. Some had emphasized the beneficial effects it could have on water supplies, particularly for rabi when river flows were low, by greatly increasing the potential of the Persian wheels with their shallow draft and by causing water which was stored in the river banks during kharif to percolate back into the river during rabi. Others stressed the dangers of waterlogging and soil salinization. Soil salinity is not in fact confined to areas of high groundwater table, but since it arises from the upward capillary action of moisture which contains salts and subsequent evaporation of this moisture near the surface, it tends to be particularly prevalent in areas of high groundwater. The debate about the pros and cons of high water table grew particularly strong when the first link canals were proposed around the turn of the century for these would cut across the natural drainage lines which sloped towards the sea. In any event the surface irrigation system was greatly expanded, as described above, and percola- tion to the aquifer is estimated today to be some three or four times what it was in the original state when some kind of natural equilibrium between recharge and discharge was maintained. As a result the water table has risen to within 10 feet of the surface over some 12 million - 13 - acres of the canal commanded'areas. Soil salinity is believed to affect some 15-25 percent of the canal commanded areas, sometimes so drastically as to put them right out of production, more commonly sufficiently seriously to have important yield-reducing effects. Evidence gathered by IACA and others suggests that there is no continuing net loss of land to salinity. Actual losses being more than offset by current efforts at reclamation, generally of small scale, and expansion of cropped acre- age. Nevertheless waterlogging, salinity and the related problem of alkalinity do have severe effects on production in wide areas. Natural- ly they became major concerns of the Pakistan authorities, and the large program of SCARPs was initiated as the main effort to deal with them. 2.13 The other type of tubewell development which has occurred, primarily in the last seven years, or since SCARP I was initiated, was somewhat different in nature. It has been almost entirely the work of private enterprise -- on the part of small-scale manufacturers in the towns of the Punjab who produce pumps, engines, strainers and well casings, entrepreneurs who handle the well drilling with primitive rigs and farmers who pay for the wells and put them to use. The growth has been extremely dramatic; it is estimated that by 1965 private wells were producing some six IAF annually, more than twice as much as the public wells. Generally about one cusec in size, private wells have been installed by large farmers, by groups of small farmers and even by landless artisans who pump water for sale to farmers. The numbers of private wells apparently increased from about 5,000 in 1959/60 to about 34,000 in 1964/65. About 6,500 private wells are believed to have been drilled in 1963/64 compared with only a little more than 1,000 in 1959/60. Latest information, suggesting that about 8,500 wells were sunk in 1965/66, indicates no slackening in the private tube- well movement. Well development so far has been very heavily con- centrated in the Bari and Rechna Doabs, the best and wealthiest farming areas, but beyond this general consideration there is no clear explana- tion of why wells grew rapidly in some areas and not in others; growth of wells has not shown much correlation with other data available about the farms in an area, such as farm size or land tenure structure. Initial development of private tubewells appears to have occurred mainly in areas which were close to power lines, but in the last four years large numbers of diesel-powered wells have been installed, and diesel wells, though they seem to be much more expensive to operate, now represent some two-thirds of the total number of wells installed. Private wells are installed according to the desires and -capacities of individual farmers rather than in the coordinated pattern,planned for the public tubewell projects; in some areas they appear to be quite dense, averaging one per 60 acres, while in other areas they are quite isolated. Reclama- tion of saline land or lowering of the water table appear to be relative- ly minor considerations for the private tubewell owner and they are generally achieved only to the extent that they are incidental to his main concern -- which is partly to increase the certainty of water supply, especially at certain critical moments in the farming cycle, and partly to permit an increase of the acreage which he crops each year. - 14 - 2.14 Table 2 briefly summarizes the discussion in this chapter and shows the role of each of the major areas in the broad picture of agriculture and irrigation in West Pakistan. The areas covered by the Sutlej Valley Project are divided between those on the right bank of the Sutlej which lie within Bari Doab and those on the left bank which are grouped together. Areas commanded from Jinnah and Taunsa Barrages are grouped together under Thal Doab and Indus Right Bank. And the whole of the Lower Indus area is treated in one group. 2.15 The canal commanded area (CCA) indicated in this summary totals 29.4 million acres (18.6 million acres perennial and 10.8 mil- lion acres non-perennial) which is some four million acres less than the area actually officially designated as canal commanded (33.5 mil- lion acres, of which 20.3 million acres perennial and 13.2 million acres non-perennial). The 29.4 million acres constitute the canal commanded area used for purposes of analysis in this report, omitting 0.5 million acres of the present designated CCA which will be needed for roads and canals, etc., and another 3.5 million acres of presently designated CCA which the consultants believe is presently very largely underdeveloped, and which is basically unsuitable for development in conditions where water is the limiting factor. The LIP consultants maintain that about 3.5 million acres of the total designated CCA in the Sind is land of very inferior quality and has been abandoned or is basically unsuitable for development in conditions of water shortage. From a Province-wide point of view IACA found that in the long run there did not appear to be enough water, even with full development of all groundwater and surface water potential, to meet in full the irrigation requirements of all the presently designated CCA; it would of course be possible to spread the water more thinly to cover a larger area, but IACA contended that there are strong economic reasons for intensifying irrigated agriculture rather than extending it into new areas: primarily, reduction of the infrastructure needed and minimization of uncultivated and fallow lands within the cultivated area because they are particularly susceptible to soil salinization. Thus, while the area designated for canal irrigation might eventually be reduced from the current 33.5 million acres to 29.4 million acres, the area actually receiving irrigation supplies would increase from some 26 million acres to about 29.4 million acres in the long run and the cropped area watered by canals would increase from about 26.7 million acres to about 42.0 million acres. The Bank Group believes that decisions regarding the areas to be brought under canal irrigation should be based on conditions existing at the time when alternatives may come under consideration, but the limited extent of the water resources must be kept prominently in mind when planning for development. 2.16 Table 2 brings out the importance of the three oldest areas of modern canal development-- Bari Doab, Rechna Doab and Peshawar Vale -- in the total economic and agricultural activity of the canal-irrigated areas in the Province. They include only 38 percent of the total canal - 15 - commanded area and they receive only 30 percent of annual canal water supplies, but they contain about 50 percent of the population of the canal-irrigated areas, 85 percent of the tubewells, and they are responsible for more than 50 percent of the total agricultural production in the canal-irrigated areas. On average, they have higher cropping intensities than other parts of the Province. 2.17 Table 2 shows the estimated distribution of irrigated water among the different parts of the Province, in terms of water actually available at the watercourse head, under mean-year river flow condi- tions with the irrigation system in the state of development reached by 1965. Within the canal commanded areas groundwater contributed some 9.7 MAF or about 15 percent of total irrigation supplies. The groundwater component is made up as follows: private tubewells 5.3 MAF, public tubewells 2.7 NAF, and Persian wheels 1.7 MAF. These figures illustrate the dominant position of private wells at the current stage of groundwater development. Private tubewells and Persian wheels also exist in some places outside the canal commands and it is estimated that they may supply about 1 MAF there each year, as indicated in Table 2. 2.18 - The canal-irrigated areas already discussed account for virtually all the cash crops produced in the Province and for about 80 percent of food crops. The remaining 20 percent of food crops is produced in the three areas listed at the bottom of Table 2 , which are also important in the livestock sector because of the extensive grazing lands which they provide. The least significant of these areas, areas outside the major canal commands but irrigated from small private dams, ponds, springs and hill torrents, probably account for barely more than one percent of food crop production. Somewhat more important is the riverain area, covering an estimated 2.9 million acres and extending up to a few miles on either side of the rivers; it may account for three percent of food crop production and it provides much good quality grazing land because of its proximity to the rivers. Being mostly on active flood plain, it is cultivated chiefly in winter, though some of the higher areas are cropped also in summer, sometimes with the aid of wells. Since they are so close to the river, these areas tend to suffer severely from the high floods in the rivers which result from periodic torrential monsoon downpours. 2.19 Most significant of the areas outside the canal commands, both in terms of extent and of agricultural production, are the areas of rainfed or barani agriculture. Some 10 million acres of barani land are believed to be cultivated, mainly in the northern Punjab, in areas around Peshawar and in some places to the west of the Indus. Together, these areas may be responsible for some 15 percent of total food crop production. They depend almost entirely on winter rains, which are not reliable, and the moisture-retaining capacity of the soils. Farming is consequently risky and, in addition, many of the barani lands are subject to erosion, which is a serious problem in the heavy rainfall areas of the North. Agriculture is much less developed than in the - 16 - canal commanded areas. Crop yields are thought to be only about half those attained in the canal commanded areas. The average wheat yield in the barani regions, for instance, is believed to be about six maunds (500 lbs.) per acre compared to an average of twelve maunds in the canal commanded area. Nevertheless, these areas are important, supporting large numbers of people and of livestock. They are respon- sible for some 25 percent of total wheat produced, 50 percent of maize and 70 percent of millets. In some places rainfall is supplemented with water supplies from small wells, tanks (ponds) and streams, with privately built diversion systems, but the scope for tubewell develop- ment is limited due to the rapid drawdown of the groundwater table that typically results from pumping due to the nature of the aquifer in these areas. STUDY OF THE WATER AND POWER RESOURCES OF WEST PAKISTAN COMPREHENSIVE REPORT INDUS BASIN-LOCATION OF CANALS AND LINKS VOLUME I MAP I A F G H A N l S T A N.- x PROPOSED DAM SITES X P HAWA PROPOSED LINKS EXISTING LINKS "•BANNU . . ........... . EXISTING CANAL SYSTEM O T O .-.. RIVERS K TERSF\ + + INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY op JAMMU AND xASHMIR BOUNDARY JSLAMABAD APPROXIMATE CEASEFIRE LINE XAMWALI RAWALPIND - BOUNDARY OF INDUS BASIN . -KH N x PROPOSED OUTFALL DRAINS (LEFT AND RIGHT BANKS) m MAN6LA DAMIII JHELUM W E S T P A K W S T A N <1slo ×I - DL KHAN NL 'e, E A E IN D1 A S*....... .NTG. EHAREl lxt R x E.. .. .. . /.YDERABADER,, --5 NND|i - x JULY 1967 IR -91 LAKS tS.-1931  - 17 - Table 2 Agricultural Regions, 1965 Water Supply, 1965, at watercourse Year of initial Canal Area Cropping Total a.f. Number of Value of Population Gross modern Commanded Cropped Intensity Ground- Surface- per cropped tubewells Agricultural (1965) Area canals Area, 1965 (1965) (1965) water wateral acre in existence Production (Millions) (M1n. acres) (M1n acres) (Mln. acres) T- _TMF W (PRs min.) Bari Doab 8.8 8.2 1859 5.9 6.0 102 3.1 9.0 2.0 15,000 1,677 Sutlej/Panjnad Let tank 3.0 5.1 1926 3.5 3.2 92 0.6 6.4 2.2 1,400 744 Rechna Doab 8.0 7.9 1892 h.7 5.0 lo6 h.6 6.6 2.3 12,000b/ 1,h09 Chaj Doab 3.6 3.7 1915 2.0 2.1 104 0.6 3.2 1.8 1.100s/ 609 Thal and Indus Right Bank 3.0 7.9 1947 3.6 2.3 64 0.7 5.6 2.7 1,200 449 Peshawar and Swat 2.4 1.2 1890 0.7 0.9 135 - 1.7 1.8 - 307 Lower Indus (Sind) 10.2 13.0 1932 9.0 6.0 67 0.1 25.5 2.9 700 1,575 Subtotal, canal-irrigated 39.0 47.0 29.4 25.5 9.7 58.0 31,500 6,770 Other Irrigated Area ) ) 1.6 Riverain Area ) 12.0 ) 24.0 - - 2.9 - ) 1.0 - - ) 5,000 ) 1,928 Barani Area ) ) 10.0 Total 51.0 71.0 29.A 40.0 10.7 58.0 36,500 8,698 a/ These are notional figures, derived by IACA on the basis of actual canal diversicns in recent years, and supposed to portray the situation in a mean-flow year. b/ Including about 2,200 SCARP I wells. c/ Including about 300 SCARP II wells. - 18 - III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM The Lag in Agriculture 3.01 Despite the tremendous investments which have been made over the years in irrigation works, agricultural production has grown slowly -- to the point that in recent times West Pakistan, though more than 50 percent of her labor force is employed in agriculture, has had to import an increasing proportion of her food requirements from abroad. Between 1950 and 1965 the real income of West Pakistan grew at an average annual rate of about four percent per annum, or some 1.5 percent faster than the population of the Province; but agricultural output grew less rapidly than the population, at only about 2.3 percent per annum. Table 3 illustrates some of the implications of this lagging agricultural growth rate. Table 3 West Pakistan: Growth of Per Capita Output, 1950-65 (Constant prices of 1959/60) 1949/50 1954/55 1959/60 1964/65 Gross Provincial Product (PRs) 342 354 366 I28 Food Grains Production (kg) 188 14 151 153 Total Agricultural Output (PRs) 187 174 171 181 Agricultural output per head of population declined seriously in the early 1950's and by 1965 it had still not regained the level reached in 1950. The figures also show that total output of goods and services per head of population in West Pakistan has risen throughout the 15-year period, but much more rapidly in the last five years when agricultural production also moved ahead at more than twice the pace achieved in the 1950's. 3.02 The most serious deficiency in agricultural production has been in the production of food grains. Table 3 suggests that production of food grains per head of population has fallen from nearly 190 kilos per annum in 1950 to an average of about 150 kilos per annum over the Second Plan period (1960-65). The lowest level of production per head of popu- lation may in fact have beEn reached during the mid-1950's; since that time production of food grains appears to have increased slightly faster than the population. But this has not prevented the need for continuing increases in food imports, for nonagricultural incomes have been increas- ing and high proportions of additional income have been spent on food. Table 4 shows the trend of wheat imports over recent years. - 19 - Table b West Pakistan's Average Annual Iheat Imports Imports as % of Period '000 Tons Provincial Production 1950-54 330 10 1955-59 522 14 1960-64 1,025 25 Thus this part of the Indus Basin, which was formerly called the granary of India and which exported wheat outside the subcontinent, is now not feeding the 54 million people of West Pakistan. 3.03 To some extent deficiencies in wheat might be considered an in- direct result of the fact that wheat was generally available on relatively easy terms from the United States throughout the period covered by the above table. Efforts were made to produce other crops for which West Pakistan was also well suited that could be sold abroad for hard currency. Recent years have seen some concentration on rice, with this point in mind, for West Pakistan's top quality rice is highly desired in certain parts of the world, and exports of rice have risen from little or nothing in 1959/60 to about PRs 120 million in 1964/65. Nevertheless rice re- mains a small export compared to cotton, the export staple of the Province, and cotton, when examined in the same time perspective as wheat in Table 4, shows very much the same picture. Table 5 Pakistan's Average Annual Production and Exports of Cotton ('000 long tons lint or lint equivalent) Net Foreign Production Exports (all forms) 1951/52-1954/55 266 190 1955/56-1959/60 290 132 1960/61-1964/65 350 131 Cotton production has grown at an average annual rate of a little more than three percent over these years, slightly faster than the population is assumed to have increased. Nevertheless exports have fallen. Actual exports have in fact fallen more sharply than the above table implies, but there has also been a 'major transition from a state in which Pakistan exported raw cotton and imported cotton manufactures to a situation where Pakistan manufactures most of the cotton goods it needs and also manufactures a portion of the cotton it exports. Therefore the above Table 5 shows Pakistan's exports of cotton, raw and manufactured, net - 20 - of all imports of cotton, raw and manufactured. Pakistan exports and imports are taken in this case, because East Pakistan produces vir- tually no cotton and West Pakistan must supply the east wing with cotton manufactures. Net exports of cotton appear to have fallen substantially through the mid-1950's. Since that time growth of domestic consumption has effectively taken up all the increased pro- duction of cotton. Figures prepared by the International Cotton Advisory Council suggest that per capita consumption of cotton in Pakistan rose from an average of about 1.5 kilos per annum in the first five-year period to about 2.4 kilos per annum during the Second Plan period, or at an average rate of some 5-6 percent per annum. The figures of Table 5 also suggest that consumption of cotton is growing fast, perhaps three times as fast as population. 3.0 The specific cases of cotton and wheat are merely illustra- tive of the basic problem. Population in West Pakistan is growing rapidly, between 2.5 and 3.0 percent per annum. In addition the cur- rent level of living is very low, with a per capita income at the official foreign exchange rate of about $90; as a consequence a rela- tively high proportion of any additional income is spent on agricultural commodities. It follows that agricultural output must grow nearly as fast as the total output of the economy as a whole simply to meet in- creasing domestic demand; if it grows at less than this rate, then domestic consumption eats into the surpluses that were previously avail- able for export. It is estimated in Chapter X that the expenditure elasticity of demand for directly consumed agricultural products is in the neighborhood of 0.85. This in turn implies, according to the Bank Group's analysis, that if provincial income grows at 6 percent per annum then value added in agriculture must grow at about 5 percent per annum simply to keep up with the growth of domestic demand. Agriculture in West Pakistan has not grown since World War II at this rate; between 1950 and 1960 it grew at about 1.5 percent while provincial product grew at about 3.2 percent, and between 1960 and 1965 it grew at about 3.8 percent while provincial product was growing at nearly six percent per annum. The latter rate of growth in provincial product cannot be sustained for very long without a substantial step-up in agricultural production, unless foreign aid is made available in amounts and on terms that are, in the current world situation, becoming more and more difficult to sustain. The Shortage of Electric Power 3.05 The electric power sector of the West Pakistan economy has grown rapidly in recent years, but not rapidly enough to keep up with the growth of demand; shortages of electricity have recurred frequently and, in most parts of the Province, the capacity of each new generating set added to the system has been fully absorbed almost within a matter of months of its completion. The recurring shortages have had an un- favorable effect on the growth of industrial production and, to the extent that they continue, they would have increasingly serious effects on agricultural production as electrified tubewells become more widespread. - 21 - Per capita consumption of electricity remains extremely low -- at about 70 kwh in 1964 -- but this compares with only about six kwh in 1950. Electricity production grew between 1950 and 1965 at an average rate of about 20 percent per annum; the rate of growth slowed down somewhat between 1955 and 1960 but it has been boosted again in recent years by the great increase in demand for electricity for agricultural pumping purposes. 3.06 The availability of electricity in the Province is still largely confined to the towns and to the areas surrounding them, so that most of the villages and most of the farmers have to rely on kero- sene for lighting, dung and firewood for heating and cooking, and animal power or diesel oil for wells. Kerosene and diesel oil are costly in foreign exchange, firewood is becoming rapidly more scarce as the popu- lation grows and the use of dung for fuel deprives the fields of needed organic material. Stone & Webster estimated that some five percent of the houses in rural areas (defining rural, or non-urban, as any place with less than 25,000 inhabitants) are connected to the electricity dis- tribution system. Most of the rural electrification that exists is the work of the last 12 years; between 1955 and 1960 many villages in the Peshawar area were electrified in connection with the hydroelectric pro- jects there. Between 1960 and 1965 many villages in Chaj Doab and parts of Rechna Doab were electrified in connection with the public tubewell program. By 1965 about 2,000 villages throughout the Province had been connected to the electricity distribution system out of an estimated total number of villages in West Pakistan of about 40,000. All the pub- lic tubewells are operated by electricity, but only about one-third of the private wells: taking account of the assumed numbers of public and of private wells in existence, it can be estimated that about half of the total amount of groundwater pumped is raised by diesel-powered wells. Provision of diesel fuel for these pumps probably cost about PRs 20 million in direct foreign exchange expenditure in 1966. Crop Yields and Agricultural Inputs 3.07 One aspect of the lag in agriculture in West Pakistan is the very low level of yields obtained-on most crops, whether in irrigated or unirrigated areas. Table 6 presents some comparative data in this regard. The yields presented for other countries are national averages, covering irrigated and unirrigated areas combined, so that they are most comparable with the Province-wide average for West Pakistan, given in the first line of the table. - 22 - Table 6 Comparative Average Crop Yields (Maunds/acre) Wheat Rice a/ Cotton b/ Maize Sugarcane c/ West Pakistan Province-wide average 9.2 10.3 2.9 11.5 376 (1962/63-1964/65) Irrigated d/ Peshawar 12.0 14.0 2.3 16.5 360 Punjab Cotton Region 13.5 14.0 3.0 13.0 360 Sind Cotton Region 10.6 13.0 2.6 6.0 220 Other Countries (national averages) e/ Japan 21.7 51.8 - 26.0 1,760 Egypt - 36.3 5.9 24.5 - Mexico 19.5 - 5.9 9.2 590 USSR 10.5 23.5 6.8 11.7 - USA 16.6 [1.4 5.2 .5 670 Punjab Progressive Farmers Average 25-35 30-40 5-7 20-30 600-800 Maximum 66 80 13 84 1,900 a/ Unhusked. b/ Lint. / Cane. d/ IACA estimates for 1965. e/ Averages 1961-63 from FAQ Production Yearbook 1965. The last two lines of the table present data collected by IACA on the yields now obtained by a small number of progressive farmers in the Pun- jab. The table suggests both that current average yields in West Pakistan are among the lowest in the world and also that it is perfectly feasible to obtain high yields which compare well with those obtained in other coun- tries. 3.08 There is universal agreement that a large part of the reason why yields are currently so low is poor farming and irrigation practices and in- adequate use of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and plant protection. Insufficient attention is given to land leveling, seed-bed preparation, post- planting cultivations and weed control. The soils of the plains are generally well suited for irrigated agriculture. But illustrative of the need for - 23 - careful seed-bed preparation is the fact, for example, that in some areas where fine silts are present a crust can form which interferes with water infiltration and so with seedling emergence. As far as the chemical composition of the soils is concerned, there is a widespread deficiency of nitrogen and organic matter, as is typical of countries with the hot dry climate of West Pakistan. Experiments with nitrogenous fertilizer have shown high response rates in both Sind and Punjab, par- ticularly with certain crops such as wheat. Phosphate, when used in combination with nitrogen also gives a good response, particularly in the Punjab. Yet phosphatic fertilizer is scarcely employed at present and use of nitrogenous fertilizer, though it has expanded rapidly in recent years, remains at very low levels. Application of nitrogenous fertilizer was estimated at about 90,000 tons nutrients in 1965/66 or, assuming that virtually all was applied to irrigated areas, an average of only nine lbs. per cropped acre, which is less than five percent of the level applied in Japan andTaiwan and hardly ten percent of use in such countries as Ceylon, Egypt and Korea. Plant protection, which is particularly important for certain crops such as cotton, rice, and sugarcane, is provided almost entirely by the Agriculture Department and according to the observations of IACA much of it is ineffective be- cause of wrong timing or inadequate number of applications. The quality of the seed typically used at present also leaves much to be desired; even when it goes under the name of an improved variety, it frequently has low germination rates due to adulteration and improper handling of the seed. 3.09 There is no doubt that improved farming, together with greater use of farm inputs, could produce substantially greater output from the existing cultivated area with its current water supply, and subsequent chapters of this report make some general recommendations regarding ways in which the adoption of improved practices and inputs can be stimulated. Major efforts are currently being made by the public authorities in Pakistan to promote the use of fertilizer and of the improved wheat, rice, and maize varieties which are being developed. There are signs that an increasingly large number of farmers are reacting to profitable opportu- nities here with something of the same alacrity with which they have taken to private tubewells in recent years. Nevertheless it would be misleading to plan on the assumption of widespread adoption of new in- puts, and of all the improved cultural practices that must go along with them for best results, in the near future. Even the tubewells are still only affecting a relatively small proportion of the farmers; there may be about 50,000 private tubewells in existence in West Pakistan now and some of the wells are providing water to several farmers, but there are about 5,000,000 farmers in the Province. The modernization of agriculture will likely be achieved by means of a gradual increase in the use of some of the inputs, with particular emphasis on one or two inputs at a time. Adoption of the practices that should accompany use of such inputs would gradually follow. To secure these increases on any large scale tremendous improvement will be required in both Government and private services responsible for agricultural research and extension work and procurement and distribution of farm inputs, as made clear in - 2.4 - later chapters. If large numbers of farmers are to take the steps necessary to increase yields, they must be informed of the proper steps, and by people who can demonstrate convincingly the reliability of the in- formation they convey. Such people are presently in very short supply. The Need for More Irrigation Water 3.10 Greater and more regular supplies of irrigation water, lack of which is another major factor accounting for the comparatively low crop yields in West Pakistan, are also urgently needed by the farmers. The most obvious evidence of this is the demand for water which has trans- lated itself into installation of private tubewells. The amount of water pumped by private wells probably increased from about one MAF in 1960 to about 6.5 MAF in 1965, despite the fact that private tubewell water is much more expensive than canal water. It is hard to make a direct com- parison between the cost of canal water and the cost of tubewell water since farmers are charged for canal supplies (at rates that appear un- economically low for modern conditions) on the basis of acres of in- dividual crops planted and harvested rather than the amount of water ac- tually used. Cotton is an important cash crop, for which water char- ges are relatively high and to which the farmers tend to give priority in use of available water. Water charges for an acre of cotton are about PRs 11, and a reasonable average figure for the amount of water re- quired is about two acre-feet. For this crop then the average cost of an acre-foot of canal water is in the neighborhood of PRs 6. The actual cost to the farmer, including capital costs amortized over 10 years with eight percent interest, of an acre-foot pumped by a diesel well is about PRs 26 and the cost of an acre-foot pumped by a private electric well (at the subsidized price for electricity) is about PRs 13. These figures can only be rough, but the relative prices together with the great increase in use of the more expensive source of water give some indication of the strength of demand for water. The facts about actual private tubewell development, however, cannot show how many farmers there are who want water but are unable to install private wells because the aquifer is un- suitable, the necessary equipment is unavailable, loans cannot be ob- tained at a reasonable interest rate, etc. Water is an input to which the farmers of West Pakistan are very accustomed; they realize its value and they are ready to pay quite a high price for additional supplies. The Choice Between Water and Other Inputs 3.11 Demand for more water is undoubtedly great and there is also evidence of heavy demand for larger supplies of certain farm inputs in some areas. At the same time Government funds and foreign exchange are in short supply, so that the public authorities face a choice, and some- times a very clear choice, between investing funds in water development and investing them in provision of additional farm inputs. Seen in this light, moreover, the choice as to budgetary allocations is very hard to make, for the costs and likely benefits of each type of investment prob- ably vary greatly among different areas, are hard to forecast and are not really indicated by any market mechanism. - 25 - 3.12 As a practical matter, however, there are very definite limits to the range of choice that exists between expenditures to in- crease supplies of farm inputs and expenditures to increase irrigation water deliveries, and this is so for a number of reasons. There is no doubt that the farm inputs discussed are essential ingredients of the modernization of agriculture and that they should be given much more emphasis than in the past; just because they are new and unaccustomed to most farmers in Pakistan a major extension and demonstration effort is needed to apprise farmers of profitable opportunities for their use. The relative novelty of the improved techniques also means that the pace of progress is limited by constraints which are real, though hard to define with precision: first, an organizational constraint limiting effective expansion of the extension and distribution services and, second, an absorption constraint, resulting from lack of knowledge and financial resources on the part of the farmer, limiting the rate at which he will respond to the new opportunities as they become available. Therefore, while the maximum effort that is feasible in terms of adminis- trative and educational resources is made with farm inputs, there is still a need for a major effort with the traditional input, water, which the farmers already know how to handle. Farm inputs -- other than water -- alone cannot increase the rate of agricultural growth to the levels required for balance with the rest of the economy, let alone increase the foreign exchange earnings of the agricultural sector to the extent required. 3.13 The constraint of absorption capacity suggests the need for allocation to water development of resources left as,a residual after a maximum effort has been made with farm inputs; but in fact the range of choice between public efforts on water and on farm inputs is further limited by technical complementarities between water and other inputs at the farm level. On most farms of the Province shortages are such that increased water supplies and increased applications of farm inputs yield best results when used together. The complementarities apply whether additional water is used to expand the cropped acreage by in- creasing cropping intensity or whether it is used to increase the irri- gation applications to the existing cropped acreage. The typical re- sponseof the farmer so far to increased supplies of water, either from canals or from private tubewells, has been to extend the acreage which he crops each season by reducing fallow or the land which in the past he left totally unused, rather than to increase the water delta applied to the acreage he was already cultivating. Agronomic studies suggest that, as long as traditional crop varieties are grown and little use is made of other agricultural inputs, production can be increased more by bringing additional land under cultivation than by concentrating the water -- at least in the short term before prolonged under watering leads to salinization of the top soil. Reduction of fallow in areas of high water table, for example, is also attractive because fields left unculti- vated and therefore unwatered are particularly prone to salt efflorescence, which tends to reduce yields or even make land uncultivable. But to sustain a higher cropping intensity over a period of years means to re- duce the time given to land for rest, and so chemical supplements in the - 26 - form of fertilizer have to be applied to the soil to maintain its ferti- lity. As more fertilizer and other farm inputs come to be used the need for additional amounts of water per acre cultivated increases. For example, for a variety of reasons, acreage under new crop varieties such as Mexican wheat yields best at higher applications of water per acre than the old varieties. In addition, as more money is invested by a farmer in inputs which require additional water to interact with one another to best effect, it becomes more important to increase the water delta on each acre. Table 7 compares the estimates of current irrigation water availabilities in different areas, presented in Chapter II, with IACA's estimates of the average annual amount of water required per cropped acre for best results with full recommended supplies of other farm inputs. Table 7 Approximate Indication of Water Supplies Available Now and Needed with Inputs Acre-feet per Cropped Acre 1965 Condition Ultimate Bari Doab 2.0 3.0 Sutlej/Panjnad Left Bank 2.2 3.4 Rechna Doab 2.3 2.6 Chaj Doab 1.8 2.6 Thal and Indus Right Bank 2.7 2.8 Peshawar and Swat 1.8 2.3 Lower Indus (Sind) 2.9 3.5 The table suggests that there are wide variations in the adequacy of water supply in different areas. Thal and Indus Right Bank are reasonably well provided for their existing cropped acreage because of the relatively recent start to development there although the water available is ill- distributed between the months of the year and in the different parts of the region. The figures for Rechna Doab show the effects of heavy public and private tubewell development there. Bari Doab and the Sutlej and Panjnad Left Bank show up as the areas of most serious water shortage in these very global terms. The table also brings out the relatively higher requirements of canal irrigation water per cropped acre in the more southerly portions of the Basin than in the North, due to lower rainfall and higher evaporation in the South. 3.14 While these figures show the general technical inadequacy of current water supplies for supporting an improved agriculture they fail to bring out what may be the most critical aspect of irrigation in West Pakistan at the present stage -- the unreliability of water avail- ability at particular times during each cropping season. To make it worthwhile investing in other inputs the farmer must be assured that he will receive the amounts of water needed to realize the benefits of the - 27 - inputs and hence a good return on his investment; and the water must be available in sufficient quantity at certain critical times of high crop- water requirements. Watercourse studies undertaken by the irrigation and agriculture consultants brought out strongly the obstacle that in- security of water supply is to acceptance of other inputs. Many far- mers, for instance, were found to be sowing at much below recommended densities, because of uncertainty as to whether or not sufficient water would be available at critical times. It was mentioned before that one of the most important purposes of the private tubewells appears to be to ensure the reliability of total irrigation supplies. Available evidence suggests that there has been quite a strong correlation be- tween acceptance of new inputs such as fertilizer and installation of a private tubewell. 3.15 Thus the effect of water shortages is actually considerably more severe than would be the case if these shortages were spread evenly over the year and over large areas as the rather global estimates in Table 7 imply. The general period of water shortage, it is true, is the rabi season when most of the available river flow is already be- ing used. But the shortage tends to be more acute in some months than in others, depending on varying crop-water requirements and year-to-year fluctuations in the time pattern of river flows, and it also affects kharif crops in a number of areas because of the need for irrigations, overlapping in time with rabi irrigations, at the time of sowing of kharif crops and at their final maturing. When the Sukkur Barrage was built large areas on each bank of the Indus that had previously depend- ed entirely on inundation canals and therefore received little but kharif water were converted into perennial areas; and there was a large expansion of the acreage cropped in rabi. But the more critical con- tribution of the Sukkur Barrage was actually in lengthening the kharif season for these areas. To secure the best flowering and boll forma- tion cotton needs to ripen when temperatures are still moderately high and days long but nights are still cool; cotton does best in the Sind, therefore, when planted relatively early, between late April and late May. Sukkur served to increase substantially water supplies in this period, at the very beginning of kharif, and so it made possible ear- lier planting of cotton and better harvests. The critical periods for water supply remain a few months in the year -- particularly those around the beginning of each season, when water is required for pre- planting and sowing irrigation and at the end of each season when water is required for final maturing. October is a critical month because it represents the time when most kharif crops, particularly cotton, are maturing and many rabi crops, particularly wheat, are beginning to be sown. March is also a critical month because it represents the time when final waterings are being given to the wheat crop. The extent to which water requirements are peaked in different months is of course intimately dependent on the crops and the varieties of crops grown; new varieties, with shorter growing seasons or requiring different planting and harvest- ing conditions, can have an important effect on the pattern of water re- quirements over the year. - 28 - The Effect of the Indus Basin Works 3.16 The largest water development works presently underway in West Pakistan are those provided for by the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 as a means of maintaining irrigation supplies to those eastern parts of the Punjab which have in the past depended on the flows in the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. The total measured discharge entering the Indus Plains in Pakistan and India averages about 175 MAF per year. At present, about 167 MAF enters West Pakistan, of which some 70 MAF remains unused and discharges into the Arabian Sea. From March 31, 1970 -- or from some time between then and March 31, 1973 if Pakistan decides to make use of the extension of the transition period provided as a contingency in the Treaty -- India will have the right to divert virtually all the flows in the Ravi and Sutlej, which have an average annual discharge of 25 MAF. Thus the average annual flows remaining available to West Pakis- tan will be 142 MAF, in the Indus, Kabul, Jhelum and Chenab. Some sup- plementary supplies will inevitably be provided from occasional flows in the Ravi and Sutlej Rivers and there will also be minor contributions of a few MAF each year from lesser tributaries within West Pakistan; flows from these two sources will fluctuate greatly from year to year being very dependent upon monsoon rains and they are unlikely to occur to any significant extent in the winter. The lowest combined flow of the Indus, Kabul, Jhelum and Chenab which has been experienced within the last 40 years are 116 MAF in 1961/62. 3.17 There are two main components of the Indus Basin Works, as now being implemented -- on the one hand, a number of barrages and link canals designed to transfer water from the Jhelum below Mangla and from the Indus to the eastern tributaries and, on the other hand, the Mangla Dan Project. The following description of the works, which is inevit-a- bly rather complicated, is illustrated by the pull-out map at the end of this chapter. Three of the link canals are remodeled and enlarged ver- sions of those built by Pakistan in the 1950's, close to the Indian bor- der, between the Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej -- Marala-Ravi (22,000 cusecs), Bambanwala-Ravi-Bedian-Dipalpur (5,000 cusecs) and Balloki-Suleimanke (18,500 cusecs) (see Map 2). A new barrage is also being built at Marala because, although not originally included in the Treaty, it was found that this would be cheaper than remodeling the old one. Two more of the link canals give the Balloki-Suleimanke link a direct supply from the Jhelum; they are Rasul-Qadiribad (19,000 cusecs) and Qadiribad- Balloki (18,600 cusecs); a new barrage at Qadiribad was provided for in the Treaty and it was subsequently found that a new barrage was also necessary at Rasul, a short distance downstream of Mangla. Tvo other links are designed to convey water from the Indus to the Jhelum: Taunsa-Panjnad (12,000 cusecs) in the south a short distance upstream of the confluence of the Indus with its tributaries and, the largest link, Chasma-Jhelum (22,000 cusecs) just below Jinnah Barrage. It was originally envisaged that the Jinnah Barrage at Kalabagh would form the terminus of this link on the Indus, but careful investigation showed that even if remodeled it could not perform this function ef- ficiently in addition to serving the Thal canals. So it was decided - 29 - to build another barrage under the Treaty, at Chasma, and to take the link off from there. The last of the eight links referred to in the Treaty was one between the Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej which would be able to transfer Indus water delivered by the Kalabagh-Jhelum link across the lower parts of Rechna and Bari Doabs to the heart of the Sutlej Valley Project area. It was described in the Treaty as the Trimmu-Islam link (11,000 cusecs) with two new barrages, one on the Ravi and one on the Sutlej. Further studies led to various changes in concept, and the pro- ject finally built was the Trimmu-Sidhnai-Mailsi-Bahawal link, with a new barrage at Sidhnai on the Ravi and a syphon for transferring water overhead, known as the Mailsi Syphon, on the Sutlej. Most of these works have now been built, and the links from the Indus should also soon be completed -- Taunsa-Panjnad in 1969 and Chasma-Jhelum in 1971. 3.18 The other main component of the Indus Basin Works, Mangla Dam, the largest dam of its type in the world, is being brought in largely to replace the historic deliveries from the Ravi and the Sutlej to the canal commands in Bari roab and on the left bank of the Sutlej in the rabi season. October-April flows on the Ravi and the Sutlej average about 4.2 MAF. With an initial live storage of about 5.3 MAF (with drawdown level of 1040 feet), or more than 20 percent of the average annual discharge of the Jhelum of 23 MAF, Mangla Reservoir will greatly alter the pattern of flows on the river. By transferring this amount of water from kharif to rabi, it will result in more than doubling mean-year discharges in the rabi season and it will increase discharges in this season under critical year conditions by some 130 percent. Quite apart from its function of transferring the availability of water to the season when it is in short supply, Mangla will also play a very important role in regulating the discharges of the river over the course of each season and particularly the rabi season. The Jhelum, being quite heavily dependent on monsoon rains, is an exceedingly variable river. Annual recorded flows on the Jhelum at Mangla range between 65 percent and 135 percent of the mean flow of 23 MAF, and this variability operates in the rabi season as much as in kharif. Recorded discharges between the beginning of October and the end of March range between 65 percent and 165 percent of the mean of 4.7 MAF. Variability of discharges in a single month is of course even greater, as implied by the following table. - 30 - Table 8 Recorded Rabi Discharges of Jhelum at Mangla, 1922-63 (MAF) Mean Maximum Minimum October 0.85 1.78 0.49 November 0.54 1.57 0.34 December 0.48 1.64 0.32 January 0.53 1.o6 0.34 February 0.73 1.94 0.33 March 1.56 2.99 0.68 Maximum recorded flows in a month are in some cases as much as five times minimum flows in that month. From the point of view of agricul- ture it is the availability of water at a particular time which counts. The barrages have been able to even out water deliveries to some minor extent, but Mangla will make it possible for the first time to control a sizable proportion of the total flow. 3.19 The other major contribution to economic growth in West Pakistan which will be made by the Mangla Project is in the form of electric power. The Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement included provision for installation of the first three units. Two units each rated 100 mw have come into operation during 1967; the large fluctuation in reservoir content and consequently in the head on the turbines over the course of the year will cause the capability of each unit to vary between a minimum of about 45 mw in the spring when the reservoir is fully drawn down and a maximum of about 135 mw in the summer after the monsoon floods have refilled the reservoir. But flows will be sufficient to generate a large amount of base load energy throughout the year; the first two units will produce about 1,800 million kwh under mean year flow conditions or nearly 50 percent of the total amount of electric energy generated in West Pakistan in 1965. The rapid growth of electricity con- sumption in the Province means that most of this output will soon be absorbed, and additional units will have to be added. The powerhouse is presently being built for eight units, but there are five tunnels and since each tunnel is designed to take two units the ultimate installation could be 10 units, with a combined minimum capability of about 450 mw and a combined maximum of 1,350 mw; together these units would be able to use virtually all the water passing through the dam for power genera- tion, except at times when the reservoir is very low or when floods are exceptionally high, and they would produce an average of about 6,000 million kwh per year. 3.20 Completion of Mangla Dam makes it possible to store a large proportion of the summer flow on the Jhelum which is surplus to kharif irrigation requirements. Indeed in years of low kharif flow it will store virtually all of the surplus. As irrigation develops further VOLUME I MAP 2 u 5 S R C H I N A N L Å M M u SKARDU Ch los s 0, A N D Dorbo d aou una WAT GORGE.. Muzaff abad wARSAK Nowshera ARBE RLA tSr,nagar - ESHAWAR AItock K A S H M lR GARIALA RAWALPIND KALABAGH Jhelum UPer ,/ennahLLLPRs N/W heIu Marcia N/W Bo, ,,ge SUhOco IONA i RASUl. tSlk0 Chsa CHASMA Å OADIRABAD Barg JMELu LINI .I.n* RA/WL INK r O H IN o, oG ',r INl K SargodhoVADIRARAD,RR LLoK s N 8MBANWALA a PALPUR LYALLPURO B&"*/ TRIMMUR TAUNSA L NK g6 ALLOKIE PANJNA~ SULEM AN.E LINK 0 L NKS N N D l A re .s... M ontgoM ery HIW MAILSI 0 Que1t I oMULTRAN A AL DOGKhan I 0 oha«a pur 0Jocobabod 0 STUDY OF THE WATER AND POWER RESOURCES OF WEST PAKISTAN CO0M PR E HE N SlVE REPORT DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE SEHWAN/ LAKE MANCHAR INDUS RIVER SYSTEM ,NCHOTIARI --LINK CANALS m BARRAGE AND HEADWORKS COMPLETED OR Ghu/a \..UNDER CONSTRUCTION oHYDERABAD ADAMS COMPLETED OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION POSSIBLE STORAGE SITES KARACHI 0 10 203.0 405.0 1? 150 200 MilLES JULY 1967 IBRD-1921R3  - 31 - and kharif requirements increase, the margin of surplus will fall and a choice will arise between filling the reservoir so as to ensure greater availability in the following rabi season and allowing more of the kharif flow to go straight through the dam for immediate irrigation use. If all conceivable kharif irrigation obligations, even those which have not generally been met in the past, were to be taken into account then this choice would be real in some hydrological years even now. Mangla Dam has been designed and constructed in such a way that it could be raised 50 feet and the live storage capacity of the reservoir consequently increased 3.5 MAF; clearly the larger reservoir would be filled less frequently than the existing reservoir, given the same kharif irrigation requirements, but at some stage it might become attractive to accept this situation and to develop the full potential storage capacity of Mangla so that water could be held over from years of high flood for use in low-flow years. 3.21 From the point of view of the development of the irrigation sys- tem the main importance of the Indus Basin Works is in making traditional water supplies fully secure, initiating a new direction of development in the form of interseasonal surface storage and offering scope for further development. The works have been designed to be adequate for meeting their primary purpose of replacing historic deliveries from the Sutlej and the Ravi -- Mangla providing the rabi water and the links serving to transfer water from there in rabi and from the natural flows of the Indus and the Jhelum in kharif. They do add considerably to the flexibility of the sys- tem. The link canals built under the Treaty will provide a total capacity of 2.0 MAF/month for transfers from the Indus to the Jhelum and Chenab, while they, together with the canals built earlier under the Triple Canals Project (see Chapter II) will provide l.2 MAF/month capacity for transfers from the Jhelum and Chenab to Bari Doab and the Sutlej Left Bank. They will make it possible to compensate to some extent for hydrological fluc- tuations in flows on the Jhelum and Chenab by transfers from the Indus. Mangla, operated in an integrated fashion with the link canals, will enable deliveries from the rivers of the Punjab to be matched more closely to the time pattern of crop-water requirements than has been possible in the past. The flexibility added by these works will become increasingly valuable as the integration of the system is tightened by further development. The hydroelectric plant at Mangla should provide a cheaper and more reliable source of electricity than has yet been avail- able in the Province, and this will be especially important in connection with further tubewell development. Nevertheless most of the water storage and transfer capacities of the Indus Basin Works will be required for their main purpose of replacing flows released for use by India. There- fore, the works in themselves leave unresolved the fundamental problem of the inadequacy of irrigation water supplies for supporting the kind of modernized agriculture that West Pakistan so urgently requires. - 32 - IV. FOUR TECHNIQUES OF WATER DEVELOPMENT 4.01 With the Indus Treaty Works nearing completion as a means of ensuring that West Pakistan will continue to receive the irrigation sup- plies that have been available in the past, this report addresses itself to assessing the next steps that should be taken in development of the Provincets water resources. As noted earlier, the main water resources available, apart from rain falling directly on the irrigated lands, are surface water -- of which some 142 MAF will be available in a mean-flow year following full implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty -- and groundwater. The Indus Plain is underlain by a very extensive ground- water aquifer, of a gross area of the order of 40 million acres. The groundwater aquifer is believed to exceed 1,000 feet in depth over much of the area. It is estimated that about 14 million acres of the canal- irrigated area lies over groundwater of sufficient quality that it can be used directly for irrigation, while another five million acres have groundwater that is low enough in noxious chemical elements that it can be used for irrigation after mixing with surface water. The uppermost 100 feet of the usable groundwater aquifer in the irrigated areas con- tain about 300 MAF of usable water. The physical characteristics of the aquifer are generally favorable to groundwater development, except in parts of the Lower Indus Region (Sind) where it has low permeability and the groundwater is generally saline. 4,.02 Of the various ways in which water resources can be developed, there are four, shown in Table 9, which are particularly important to ,est Pakistan at its current stage of development. While the following pages make some reference to other techniques which may play some part, especially in later years, they focus primarily on the four -- canal en- largement enabling increased natural flow diversion, interseasonal sur- face storage, private tubewell pumping and public tubewell pumping to balanced recharge. All four modes of development are to some degree interdependent: none can be adopted alone without eventually creating the need to embark on one or more of the others. Each is in addition subject to administrative and technical constraints which limit the speed with which it can be pursued. Nonetheless, an impression of the rel-ative cost of the four different techniques and the ultimate scope for each can be gained by examining the tentative projections made by IACA. The unit cost of an acre-foot of water made available by each technique is roughly estimated by discounting to 1965 at eight percent both the costs and the water yield at watercourse head of projects or programs recommended later in the report using each of the four modes of development. The corresponding tultimatel potential is taken from IACAts projections for the reference year 2000. - 33 - Table 9 Four Techniques of Water Development Economic Costs 'Ultimate' Potential (PRs/acre-foot) Water Land'Supplied Surface Storage (total reservoir volume) 63 26 MAF/yr. Canal Remodeling (carrying capacity) 19 5 MAF/mo. 16 mln. acres Private Tubewells) ) (mean annual output) 16 44 MAF/yr. 19 mln. acres Public Tubewells ) The surface storage cost is estimated on the basis of the full development program set out in Table 48 of Chapter VII, using the total costs of the reservoir works and the amount of stored water which is estimated to be de- livered directly to watercourses from storage over the years. Each of the figures in the table is discussed in greater detail later in the report, but they are presented here together for rough comparative purposes. There is one other aspect of water development which is very important in West Pakistan but cannot be presented in a PRs/a.f. context; this is drainage, which is related to all the modes of increasing water supply listed above and it will receive considerable attention later in this chapter. Canal Remodeling and Enlargement 4.03 Gradual expansion of the modern canal system into new areas has been the traditional form of development over the last century and it is continuing into the present day in certain areas, such as from Thal, Gudu and Ghulam Mohammed Barrages on the Indus. However, it was indicated at the beginning of Chapter II that in recent years develop- ment on the Indus, the last of the rivers to be brought under barrage- controlled development, was having now to follow the course already trodden in the past on the tributaries: more and more of the develop- ment had to be designated non-perennial, since most of the rabi river supplies were already committed. Table 1 in Chapter II showed that while total canal diversions had increased substantially over the last 20 years, rabi diversions had increased little -- and scarcely at all over the last decade. Several consultants have recommended in favor of reducing rather than further increasing the area designated for canal irrigation supplies. 4.04 In practice, canal diversions have today to be rationed in most years by a tighter system than the perennial/non-perennial dis- tinction, since flows are seldom adequate to maintain delivery of the quantities of water that were originally allocated. The main lines of this rationing procedure are laid out in a document known as the - 34 - Sind-Punjab Draft Agreement which was prepared by the Chief Engineers of the Sind and the Punjab in 1945; it was never ratified, because agree- ment could not be reached on financial implications and then Partition ensued, but it is still closely observed. Under this Agreement it is generally the areas of longest established irrigation that have first claim on available flows. First right to the flows on the Jhelum and the Chenab, for instance, goes to the three canals built under the Triple Canals Project of 1905 (Upper Chenab Canal, Lower Bari Doab Canal and Upper Jhelum Canal) and to the two major canals in the vici- nity which were built before them (Lower Chenab and Lower Jhelum Canals). These, together known as the five linked canals, supply all the CCA in Chaj Doab, almost all the CCA of Rechna Doab and about a quarter of the CCA in Bari Doab. Monthly withdrawals by these five canals are generally within about 10 percent of mean levels. The re- mainder of the Bari Doab and all the area on the left bank of the Sutlej, forming essentially the Sutlej Valley Project area, depend primarily on the Sutlej but also receive supplementary supplies via the link canals. Nevertheless, the flows available for transfer down these links are often inadequate to make up the deficiency, and monthly withdrawals by the canals in the Sutlej Valley Project area often di- verge by more than 30 percent from the mean levels. On the main stem of the Indus the picture is similar: Thal Canal at Jinnah Barrage, furthest upstream, plus the canals at Sukkur Barrage and certain channels which used to receive supplies from old inundation systems share first priority and deliveries to the areas served by these canals are maintained at fairly consistent levels. The newer canals at Taunsa, Gudu and Ghulam Mohammed Barrages have lower priority and tend to bear the brunt of shortages on the Indus. 4.05 Some indication of the declining effectiveness of the perennial/ non-perennial distinction is given by the fact that it seems to bear ex- tremely little relationship to the existing pattern of crop production. One would expect that the areas allocated perennial canal supply would show a substantially higher cropping intensity in rabi season than those with non-perennial supply; or that, even if no difference was to be found in intensities, yields would be higher in areas benefiting from regular canal supplies in rabi. IACA found in general rather little difference between the rabi intensities in the non-perennial and perennial areas in the Punjab or between equivalent areas in the Sind. Actually, of nine agricultural regions into which they divided the irrigated area for purposes of analysis the area with the highest rabi intensity and the highest overall intensity is the non-perennial area on the right bank of the Indus commanded from Gudu and Sukkur; rabi crops are grown there largely on the basis of residual moisture re- maining in the soil at the end of kharif (quite high because the main kharif crop is rice which has high water requirements) or on the basis of one watering just before the canals are closed at the end of kharif. Rabi yields in this area are, it is true, quite low. But in the North there was not even noticeable difference in yields. What IACA did find were some indications of higher intensities in the areas with priority in water allocations -- such as the Chaj, Rechna and Upper Bari Doab areas and some of the areas commanded from Sukkur. - 35 - 4.o6 Even those areas with the highest priority for use of the available flow in the rivers suffer from an inadequate supply of canal water. Table 7 of Chapter III, which compared current water supplies per cropped area with the amount of water needed to support a modern agricul- ture, showed that all areas suffer from lack of water -- and the shortage appeared to be particularly acute, for instance, in Chaj and Bari Doabs. The current supply figures given there included water pumped by tubewells and Persian wheels, and if these were omitted, the shortages would of course appear greater. The rights to withdrawals from the rivers which have been built up over the years are in fact almost everywhere below actual water requirements. The reason for this is that the rights of each area were established on the basis of the original design of the various canals, and most of the canals were designed to support a much lower cropped acreage than has in fact come to be cultivated. Typical design cropping intensities were in the neighborhood of 80 percent, whereas actual cropping intensities in many of the older-established - areas of canal irrigation are around 100 percent. With adequate water- ings and applications of fertilizer, it is believed that most of the canal-irrigated area could support an intensity of 150 percent and in some areas more. There appear to be various reasons why the canal sys- tems were designed for cropping intensities so much lower than the land was capable of supporting. The British colonial administrators were con- cerned with settling large numbers of people and also with showing a good financial rate of return on their canal investments. Financial returns came mainly in the form of land revenue, the per-acre tax on land which was higher for irrigated areas, and proceeds of sales of Crown Land. Thus, to settle more people and raise more revenues there was advantage in designing for low cropping intensity or, in other words, for spreading the water thinly over the Basin. But there was another factor that also played some part in their considerations: realization that design for a higher intensity and subsequent heavier deliveries of canal water to a limited area would lead more quickly to waterlogging. 4.07 The canals in the best agricultural areas might now be ex- panded to give them sufficient delivery capacity to provide water for the much higher cropping intensities that these lands are capable of supporting, but this would be no solution, primarily for two reasons. In the first place, as pointed out earlier in connection with extension of the irrigation system, most of the river flows except in a very few months of the year are already committed. The present withdrawal capa- city of the canal system is about 13.3 NAF/month and this equals or ex- ceeds the combined natural mean flow of the Indus, Kabul, Jhelum and Chenab in all months except June, July and August. In those months flows are substantially larger -- often more than double. There are a few weeks in May and in September when river flows are also sometimes in excess of canal diversion capacity. But three to four months in the summer are barely sufficient to mature most summer crops. In the second place, the water table has indeed risen to high levels in ex- tensive areas, especially in some of the older-irrigated areas, and it is doubtful whether they could cope with additional large supplies of surface water unless extensive drainage works were also provided. - 36 - 4.08 The real scope for improving water supplies by canal remodeling occurs in close coordination with tubewell development. Tubewells can deal with both the problems mentioned in the preceding paragraph, for they can provide drainage and, in the extensive areas where the ground- water is usable for irrigation, they can provide irrigation water in the months when river flows are already fully committed thus making additional canal deliveries in other months far more useful than they could other- wise be. 4.09 When the scope for canal remodeling is examined in this light there is another aspect of the original design of the existing canals which becomes very important because it serves to limit the need for canal remodeling in the near future. Detailed crop-water requirements were not estimated in quite the precise way that is used today, but the requirements of the main crops like rice and cotton in kharif and wheat in rabi were carefully established. It was found that there were large differences between the amount of water required for a crop in winter and the amount required in summer. Temperatures in the Indus Plains range from mean monthly minima of 40 degrees Fahrenheit during Decem- ber and January to mean monthly maxima in excess of 100 degrees in June and July. They are generally higher in the Sind, particularly in the Upper Sind which does not benefit from the sea breezes which extend north of Hyderabad; Jacobabad, for instance, northwest of Sukkur, has one of the highest average temperatures in the world, reaching a mean maximum of 11140 Fahrenheit in June. Temperature is the main deter- minant of evaporation and thus of the water requirements of a plant. Rainfall is of importance in some areas, but it is largely confined to the summer, when the southeast monsoon drops in the Punjab what re- mains to it after its long journey across the Indo-Gangetic Plain in India and the southwest monsoon delivers to the Sind a small rainfall from the Arabian Sea. When the rain does come it is not uncommon for it to be either so light that it evaporates before reaching the crop roots or so torrential that it runs off the fields. Table 10 gives a broad indication of the seasonal and regional variation in evapora- tion and in estimated effective rainfall. Table 10 Computed Evaporation and Effective Rainfall (in inches -- rainfall in parentheses) North South Winter (October to March) 18 ( 3.6) 27 (0.8) Summer (April to September) 41 (15.6) 49 (2.6) Annual Total 59 (19.2) 76 (3.4) - 37 - The table indicates that evaporation net of effective rainfall is in each season almost twice as high in Sind as in Punjab and Peshawar and that in all parts of the Province it is nearly twice as high in summer as in winter. These are broad averages but they indicate why the amount of canal water needed to grow an acre of crops is significantly larger in Sind than in Punjab and why it is also much larger in kharif than in rabi. 4.10 These variations in requirements of canal water had to be taken into account in design of the canals, as did another fact, namely that the canals of West Pakistan, running on a principle of hydraulic equilibrium, were best operated either close to full or not at all. Tak- ing account of both these considerations, the perennial irrigation pro- jects were generally designed for a rabi cropped acreage between 1.5 and 2 times as great as the kharif cropped acreage; thus with an annual 80 percent cropping intensity, the design kharif intensity would be be- tween about 27 and 32 percent. The non-perennial areas, on the other hand, by way of compensation for the fact that they had a right to canal supplies only in one season of the year, were generally given canal capacities sufficient to support a somewhat higher kharif intensity, typically in the order of 30-40 percent. Thus the canals which exist today are generally larger and have greater delivery capacity per acre of canal-commanded area in the non-perennial than in the perennial areas. 4.11 In the areas of more recent development, moreover -- and it was shown in Chapter II that almost all the non-perennial development has taken place since 1920 -- areas designated for non-perennial canal supplies have generally been located where the groundwater was sweet, while perennial supplies have been allocated to areas with poor quality groundwater. This approach was adopted because it was considered that in areas of fairly shallow, fresh groundwater, Persian wheels and other wells could be used for both drinking water and for rabi irrigation, as previously practiced in the inundation canal commands. This distinction between perennial supplies for areas with poor groundwater and non- perennial supplies for areas with fresh groundwater was especially im- portant in the design of development in the Sutlej Valley, which con- stitutes a large proportion of the total non-perennial area in the Basin. 4.12 The result of this combination of circumstances is that there are extensive areas of fresh groundwater in West Pakistan which already have sufficient canal capacity to permit very large increases in irriga- tion supply to be obtained simply by the installation of tubewells. Since most of the recharge to the aquifer currently comes from canal seepage, these areas of non-perennial supply tend to have higher re- charge in kharif per acre of crop land than the areas of perennial supply with their smaller canals. By concentrating pumping in the months when existing canal capacities are the constraint (e.g. the overlap months between kharif and rabi) and in the rabi season when surface supplies are scarce, it is possible to produce enough water from surface and groundwater resources together in each month of the year to permit -a significant increase of cropping intensity. IACA estimated, for in- stance, that sufficient water could be provided by this means without any canal remodeling to meet full irrigation requirements at average - 38 - cropping intensities of about 135 percent in Rechna and in Bari Doabs, very large proportions of which are underlain by fresh groundwater. Al- together the areas with fresh groundwater where the aquifer could be developed sufficiently to permit obtaining a high intensity -- close to 150 percent -- without any canal remodeling are estimated to cover about 13 million acres, almost entirely in the Punjab. These high in- tensities would be obtained partly with the aid of additional surface supplies in the winter, in order to provide sufficient recharge within existing canal capacities. 4.13 Where canal remodeling is essential to gain any significant increase in timely irrigation supplies is in the areas not underlain by fresh groundwater. In these zones the groundwater is either not usable at all for irrigation purposes, because it is too saline, or it must be mixed continuously with fresh water before it can be applied to the crops. As pointed out, these are the areas which in general tend to have rather less existing canal capacity per acre of canal commanded area. This combination of characteristics obviously makes them some- what less attractive for development than the fresh groundwater areas discussed, but they are extensive (some 15 million acres) and could support much higher agricultural production if additional water were made available. They will be discussed more in connection with public tubewells below. 4.14 The large program of canal remodeling foreseen in Table 9 above -- 16 million acres before the end of the century -- covers vir- tually all the zones without fresh groundwater in the 29-million acre canal commanded area which has been adopted for planning purposes; it covers very few of the fresh groundwater areas. The unit cost of PRs 19/a.f. derived for water made available at watercourse head by means of canal remodeling refers to the estimated cost of this program. The cost figure may not be very reliable because, despite the enormous ex- perience that Pakistan has had in the extensive enlargement of complete canal commands, there has been very little experience in enlargement or large-scale remodeling of existing canals. Canal remodeling will in fact be a most complex and difficult process, particularly as regards acquisition of additional land in areas which, being near to canals, are often densely cultivated (though sometimes also waterlogged and useless), and as regards maintenance of essential water supplies to farmers during the time that the work is in progress. IACA thought that it would generally be easiest and most economical to build an en- tirely new canal alongside of, and eventually linked with, the existing canal whenever any extensive degree of canal enlargement was required. Preparation and design of any work in large-scale canal remodeling could not be done quickly. 4.15 While canal remodeling is not a prerequisite of substantial increase in irrigation supply and in cropping intensity in the areas underlain by fresh groundwater it could also be carried out there. The purpose would be not so much to increase irrigation supplies within these areas themselves as to release the surface water supplies that - 39 - they had been receiving in rabi for use elsewhere. Enlarged canals would enable more surface water to be brought in during kharif or when river flows happened to be high; the'recharge to the groundwater reser- voir would thereby be increased and all water requirements in the re- mainder of the year could be supplied from pumping. These areas would thus be rendered completely independent of rabi river flows. Canal re- modeling of this sort, enabling underground interseasonal storage, could be an alternative to some extent to surface storage. It would be a moderately expensive alternative, involving not only canal enlargement but also pumping for each additional acre-foot produced to replace sur- face water deliveries from storage. Surface Storage 4.16 Figure 1 in Chapter II pictured the high peak of flood flows on the rivers of West Pakistan between June and September and demon- strated that in the past a large proportion of this water resource has gone unused. Because that figure referred to past history, the composite hydrograph shown included the flows in the Ravi and Sutlej as they enter West Pakistan. Total river flows, including those in the Ravi and Sutlej, have averaged somewhat more than 130 NAF in the five months May-September, of which some 50 MAF have been diverted into canals in recent years. De- duction of the Ravi and Sutlej will leave Pakistan with a mean-year flow in these months of about 110 MAF. Completion of Mangla Dam and use of its reservoir for transferring flows from kharif to rabi will take about 5 MAF of kharif flows. Thus about 55 MAF, or half the total available in the rivers in a mean year, will still remain unused. 4.17 Most of this unused water will be in the Indus River itself. Of the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty the Indus (at Attock) itself represents about 65 percent of the total mean annual flow, but 70 percent of the mean flow in the four months June to September. The Indus is more highly peaked than the other two rivers, as illustrated by Figure 2 which shows the hydrographs of the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum separately. About 67 MAF, or 72 percent of the mean flow on the Indus occurs in the four months June to September. Flows in the Indus also vary proportionately much less from year to year than do those in the Jhelum and Chenab, as indicated by the following table. Table 11 Average Annual Discharge of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab Rivers (1922-63) (MAF) Discharge River Location Mean Minimum Maximum Indus Attock 93 72 110 Jhelum Mangla 23 15 33 Chenab Marala 26 19 37 l1 2 - 40 - Annual mean flow on the Indus at Attock is about 93 NAF and the range of flows recorded between 1922 and 1963 is from about 75 percent to nearly 120 percent of this. The greater regularity of Indus flows from year to year shows up especially in the rabi season. Where the maximum flows re- corded in several rabi months on the Jhelum are as much as five times the minimum flows recorded in the same month, as shown in Table 8 of Chapter III, the range between maximum and minimum is far less on the Indus, generally in the order of 3:1 or 2:1 in rabi months. Only in March and some of the early kharif months does the range of variation recorded parallel that experienced on the Jhelum. The greater reliability of the Indus is attributed mainly to its higher dependence on snowmelt from the Himalayas. The importance of snowmelt from the mountain peaks also accounts for the fact that the Indus typically begins to rise toward the end of February, about a month later than the Jhelum. Peak flows on the Jhelum tend to occur in July, peak flows on the Indus in August. 4.18 The massive extent of the kharif surplus on the Indus and the relative reliability of this surplus suggest that the next site for storage development, following completion of Mangla, should be on the Indus. However, the river presents no sites that, with present tech- niques of dam construction, would be both cheap to develop and capable of providing large storage capacity. The 2,000-mile long Indus rises in Tibet and traverses some 500 miles of Tibet and disputed territories in Kashmir before entering West Pakistan. Some-100 miles after crossing into Pakistan territory it enters the steep 300-mile long Indus Gorge between Skardu and a point some 30 miles downstream of Tarbela. After being joined by the Kabul River it enters the lower Indus Gorge which cuts through the soft sedimentary rocks of the Attock hills and the Salt Range between Attock and Kalabagh. At Kalabagh the river breaks out on to the vast, flat plains of the Punjab and the Sind which extend some 700 miles to the sea; here the river is very broad and runs in many shallow channels dug and redug in the silt which it deposits. Sites with potential for construction of a dam that would create large-scale storage on the main stem are few, and each has its own disadvantages. The available sites are discussed in Chapter VII. 4.19 The Tarbela site was selected for detailed studies and de- sign work in 1961 after consideration of a number of other sites over several years and thorough investigation of a 20-mile stretch of river around Tarbela. The dam which has now been designed would provide a reservoir with some 11 NAF gross storage capacity and up to 9.3 MAF live storage capacity. The cost of water from Tarbela Reservoir de- livered at the watercourse, calculated in a similar way to the figures presented in Table 9 would be about PRs 93, which means that it is ex- pensive compared to the other ways of making water available mentioned in the table. 4.20 There is a number of factors accounting for the costly nature of surface water storage in West Pakistan. Sites with potential for construction of dams backing up large storage tend to be very broad, valley topography is generally such that the dams have to be unusually VOLUME I FIGURE 2 MEAN MONTHLY DISCHARGE : INDUS, JHELUM AND CHENAB RIVERS* (AVERAGE MONTHLY DISCHARGE - MAF) 25 1 1 1 1 1 1 25 20 20 INDUS AT ATTOCK 15 15 10 10 CHENAB AT MARALA I 5 f... .. .*****.... .* **. I ..*....*.... ..** - w '"JHELUM AT M ANGLA ** .. 0 I I I O JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC MEAN YEAR * Based on the period 1922-1963. (2R)IBRO-3220  - 41 - high relative to the storage capacity created, and foundation conditions pose considerable difficulties. Both Mangla and Tarbela Dam Projects will be earth and rockfill structures and each consists of one main dam, two auxiliary dams and two spillways. Table 12 presents some of the main statistics regarding the two projects. Table 12 Principal Features -- Mangla and Tarbela Projects Mangla Tarbela Maximum Initial Live Storage (MAF) 5.3 9.3 Length of Reservoir (Miles) 40 48 Site Excavation (m1n. cu. yds.) 55 95 Earth and Rockfill (mln. cu. yds.) 122 178 Main Dam Earth and Rockfill (min. cu. yds.) 78 159 Maximum Height (feet) 380 485 Crest Length (feet) 11,000 9,000 Another major component of the Tarbela Project is an impervious earth blanket which will be continuous with the imperious core of the dam and extend upstream for about one mile covering the river bottom. 4.21 Apart from the size of the valleys where each of the two pro- jects are sited and the general scale of works required in each case, another major factor accounting for the high costs of surface water stor- age is the large amount of spillway capacity that has to be provided. Though for somewhat different reasons on each project, this represents a very significant item of total cost in both cases: about 20 percent of the main civil engineering contract in the case of Mangla (or $90 million) and only a slightly lower proportion for Tarbela (about $95 million). Table 13 gives some details of spillway capacity on each of the two projects, the floods against which they were designed and the maximum flood of record. 4.22 The table illustrates the fact that despite the higher de- - sign flood and higher recorded peak on the Jhelum at Mangla, neverthe- less spillway capacity required is somewhat less. As pointed out, the Jhelum River is consdrably more variable and unpredictable than the Indus, and it is Ai6Ne highly dependent on monsoon rain. The high de- sign flood at Mang-la -results from the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of heavy monsoon storms in the upstream catchments. High floods which should be relatively rare will be handled partly by the spillways but to an important extent by superstorage in the reservoir; between full supply level of 1202 feet and elevation 1228 there is about two MAF superstorage capacity at Mangla. - 42 - Table 13 Floods and Spillway Capacity, Mangla and Tarbela Mangla, Jhelum Tarbela, Indus Maximum Flood of Record (cfs) 1,100,000 875,000 a/ Date August, 1929 August, 1929 Design Flood (cfs) 2,600,000 2,127,000 Spillway Capacity b/, total (cfs) 1,130,000 1,L10,000 Main Spillway (cfs) 900,000 615,000 Auxiliary Spillway (cfs) 230,000 795,000 Reservoir Full Supply Level (feet SPD) 1,202 1,550 Height of Main Dam (feet SPD) l,234 1,565 a/ Indus at Attock, after confluence with Kabul; it will have been some- what less at Tarbela. b/ Discharge capacity at normal full supply level. At Tarbela the main component of the design flood is again the maximum probable monsoon storm, but substantial allowances had also to be made for late snowmelt runoff from the Himalayas and for the possibility of a natural dam break upstream. Natural dams have formed fairly frequently in the past on the Upper Indus and its tributaries, due to glacial movement or avalanches; the flood of August 1929 on the Indus occurred in connection with the breaking of a natural dam on the Shyok River. Despite these additional components, the design flood at Tarbela is con- siderably lower than that at Mangla. However, because of the high con- centration of Indus flows in a few summer months and the relative regu- larity of the river, the floods of an average year will approach much more closely the design flood. The spillways will be the main means of dealing with floods, rather than superstorage -- capacity for which is much more limited at Tarbela -- and it is estimated that even in the initial years of the project's life the spillways will carry some 40 percent of the river's annual discharge in the two or three flood months of the summer. 4.23 The other noteworthy factor accounting for the high cost of water stored on the Indus is the siltation that is expected to take place in the reservoir and consequent rather rapid depletion of live storage capacity. The average annual sediment load of the Indus at Tarbela is estimated at 440 million short tons and almost all of it is borne by the summer flood flows. The sediment load can reach 10 million tons a day. Little is known about its origin, but it appears that some of it is due to current glacial action and avalanches in the upper reaches of the river and its tributaries while some is due to landslides and river scouring in the vast piles of debris built up in the lower parts of the Upper Indus by past glacial movement and silt deposition. The Jhelum also has a sizable sediment load, although much 4 i3 - smaller (about 70 million short tons per year) than the Indus. However, the sediment load on the Jhelum appears to be the result of human acti- vities to a much greater extent than that on the Indus, and it has been estimated that about 30 percent of it could be eliminated by conservation measures and erosion control. Sediment on the Indus, being apparently much more the result of geological forces, may be harder to reduce. 4.24 Siltation is not an unfamiliar problem in West Pakistan, but it has never been dealt with on the scale that will be involved by a permanent dam across the Indus. It was a serious difficulty on the early barrages and canals. Soon after a permanent weir had been built across the Ravi in 1870 at the head of the Upper Bari Doab Canal, the first major modern canal, the canal intake became seriously silted up. Various attempts were made to solve the problem, and the design finally chosen is basically the one that has since been used: a divide groyne was built out in an upstream direction from the weir spanning the river, thereby creating a pond of relatively calm water in front of the intake to the canal, in which silt could settle. High flood flows would be allowed to pass the weir and with them they would carry silt deposited in the pond. Sluicing in this manner serves to keep the barrages reasonably free of silt. The barrages have virtually no storage capa- city and so flood flows have anyway to be passed through. The problem is obviously different with storage works, the purpose of which is to capture flood flows and hold them for later release. Warsak Dam on the Kabul River, completed in 1960, was not built for its storage but mainly to use run-of-river flows for power generation; however, the storage is useful -- and would be more so after completion of Mangla -- to make the power plant more flexible and enable its use to a larger extent for peaking, but the initial live storage of 23,000 acre-feet has already been greatly reduced and is expected soon to reach a residual minimum of about 10,000 acre-feet. One solution to the problem of siltation at a storage dam on the Indus would be to take advantage of the very large amount of surplus summer flows by building a dam with sluice gates, similar to a barrage, sluicing through the early flood flows and storing on the receding flood. But there are severe disadvan- tages to such a procedure -- in particular the fact that power capability is eliminated at the time of sluicing -- and it is also difficult to find sites on the Indus which are accessible, have the necessary surrounding topography for forming a reservoir, and are at the same time underlain by rock sufficiently hard to carry the stresses to which such a sluicing struc- ture would be subjected. 4.25 Thus planning to date has had to be carried out on the assumption that an average of about 70 million tons of sediment will be deposited in Mangla Reservoir each year and about 440 million tons in Tarbela Reservoir. Wb0 million tons is equivalent to about a quarter of a million acre-feet compacted volume, and, allowing for a portion of this to be deposited in the live storage area, it is projected that Tarbela Reservoir will be fully silted up, except for a residual 1 MAF of live storage volume, in about 50 years, whereas Mangla Reservoir, though of much smaller size, would only lose about 30 percent of its initial capacity over the same period. The heavy silt load of the water does of course have other implications besides those for the life of storage dams. It will cause problems of abrasion, for instance, of uncertain severity, on the spillways, tunnels and turbine blades, and this will require added maintenance attention. These factors, the designs adopted to minimize problems of abrasion and the limited life that is anticipated for stor- age projects on the main stem of the Indus do add to the cost of stored water. But they also mean that the cost of water stored on the Indus will, other things being equal, be somewhat less when a second dam is added either downstream of Tarbela and protected by Tarbela, at least for a number of years, or upstream of Tarbela and therefore protecting Tarbela; this is a part of the reason why the cost per acre-foot of stored water delivered at the watercourse is substantially less when a long-term program is considered as a whole than when Tarbela is con- sidered on its own. 4.26 For all its high cost, water added to rabi supplies by means of storage from the kharif flood season does have considerable advantages not shared by other means of making water available at that time. It should prove relatively easy to use effectively since it represents an addition to a customary source of water -- from canals -- of assured quality at a time of year when shortages are currently felt acutely. It also has great flexibility in use, in that it can be diverted via the complex canal distribution system wherever it is required. Mangla water, as pointed out, can be carried to practically any part of the Punjab and Tarbela water can be supplied to the western and southern Punjab and all the Sind; by substitution, the effects of Tarbela may be felt in the northern Punjab since it could replace downstream deliveries from Mangla and leave more of Mangla's water available for use upstream. The flexi- bility of stored water will be of considerable importance in connection with the tubewell program, since it can be taken to those areas in which the need, under the hydrological conditions of the year in question, is greatest. For instance, the areas where the groundwater requires con- tinuous mixing or is too saline to be used for agricultural purposes will require a steady supply of fresh surface water, and the contribution from Tarbela will be especially important to them. But areas of fresh ground- water that absorb some additional surface water in rabi (so that the need for canal remodeling is postponed) may be able to pump more water in poor hydrological years to ensure a continued supply to the areas with ground- water of lesser quality. The possibility of ready transfer of surface water among different areas is particularly important under such con- ditions. 4.27 Despite the clearly indicated demand for additional stored water there is one important factor which, under present circumstances, limits the areas in which it could wisely be used. As with canal remodel- ing for increasing kharif supplies, simple addition of stored water to rabi supplies of surface water, unaccompanied by other measures, could exacerbate the problem of waterlogging and high groundwater table -- and the related problem of salinization of the top soil. To specify quan- titatively the extent of this hazard or the area which has the canal capacity to receive additional surface supplies and a sufficiently low groundwater table to make it safe to deliver such supplies is extremely difficult. The waterlogging problem is very much a localized one affecting small parts of one canal command and large parts of another, and there are no clear criteria which can be universally applied to distinguish between areas which could and those which could not receive additional surface water without the groundwater table being brought too close to the surface. The following table gives a broad impression of the extent of canal-irrigated areas having groundwater table at different depths under present conditions. Table l4 Depth to Groundwater in Canal Commanded Areas (Million acres) Usable Groundwater Saline Groundwater (0-3,000 ppm) (above 3,000 ppm) Less than More than Less than More than 10 feet 10 feet 10 feet 10 feet Punjab 6.1 8.6 1.2 2.6 Sind 1.1 1.2 3.9 2.9 Total (excl. Peshawar) 7.2 9.8 5.1 5.5 The table suggests that there are about 15 million acres with groundwater table at more than 10 feet from the surface, but this does not mean that there is anything like this extent of area which can safely receive addi- tional surface supplies on a sustained basis without measures to improve drainage: some of these areas are already receiving rabi canal supplies up to canal capacity, 10 feet is already on the high side from the agricul- tural viewpoint considering the effect that summer floods may have, and the water table, though apparently stabilizing in the areas with highest existing level, is still rising in areas where the present levels are deeper. 4.28 The most that it seems possible to say on a general plane is that in almost all areas improved subsurface or surface drainage is needed before substantial additional quantities of surface water can safely be applied. The necessary drainage can be performed by tubewells, surface drainage channels or underground tile drains. There is very little ex- perience in Pakistan with building either of the latter two types of drains. Tubewells, in all areas of usable groundwater, have the great advantage that they can provide additional irrigation water at the same time as fulfilling the drainage function, and they can be run in a fashion which integrates their irrigation supplies with surface water supplies, as will be elaborated below. In areas underlain by saline groundwater, conditions vary considerably and each drainage technique - 46 - may be appropriate in different places. Tubewell drainage of saline water has the advantage that it can be easily controlled -- and this could become important, as irrigation diversions increase and river flows become confined to a few months in the year, in those areas where the river constitutes the only outlet into which drainage water can be discharged. In extensive areas of saline groundwater in Sind the aquifer is unsuitable for tubewell pumping, and there horizontal drains may be the best solution. These are estimated to cost about the same as tubewells per acre drained. In areas where the groundwater is saline, and where a crop such as rice that benefits from a fairly high ground- water table is grown, open surface drains may be most appropriate. These would be consistent with maintenance of the high groundwater table and they would leave the more saline deeper groundwater underground. 4.29 Extensive drainage work is thus an essential accompaniment of surface storage, as it is of canal enlargement. It will enable additional areas to benefit from the increased rabi supplies, but to the extent that it is performed by tubewells in certain usable groundwater areas it will also increase the proportions of the stored water that can be beneficially used. Between Tarbela and the farmers' watercourses a very large proportion of the stored water released -- about 40-45 per- cent -- will be lost to seepage from the river and, more especially, from the canals, and to evaporation. These losses were taken into account in calculating the figure of PRs 93 given for the cost of an acre-foot of stored water at the watercourse head; that figure corres- ponded to a cost of PRs 53 per acre-foot of water released from Tarbela Reservoir. However, seepage from the river and the canals constitutes additional recharge to the aquifer and to the extent that it occurs in usable groundwater areas covered by tubewell fields it can be recovered at relatively low cost and applied to the crops. 4.30 There is also another benefit of storage development which is extremely hard to quantify but can be of considerable importance. Storage capacity has been discussed so far as a means of converting ex- cess floods in the kharif season into useful irrigation supplies in rabi. But it was pointed out that irrigated agriculture depends not only on adequate total supplies over the course of a season but adequate sup-- plies in each month -- and particularly in some months. Even within a season, and especially in the rabi season, the presence of storage capa- city on the system can help to bring natural river flows more into line with the time pattern of crop-water requirements. This potential benefit depends on the careful integration of reservoir releases in each period from both natural inflow and from storage with downstream crop-water re- quirements and on the adequacy of knowledge regarding natural river flows to be expected in the latter part of the season. For the rabi season it is known as the intra-rabi regulation benefit. 4.31 Provision of additional water from storage in the form of useful recharge or of more timely water during the rabi season would help to lower the true unit cost of stored surface water, but the most crucial element of exaggeration in the PRs 93 cost figure is the omission of power benefits. It was shown in Chapter II that the demand for - 47 - electricity in West Pakistan has been growing very rapidly, and that a large portion of the increase in demand in recent years was due to the tubewell installations. The growing requirements of electric power have been met partly from various small new hydroelectric stations, more from gas-fired thermal stations. Since natural gas was first discovered in West Pakistan in sizable quantity in the early 1950's most of the major generating sets in the Province have been converted to use it and all the new large thermal stations rely primarily on gas. Of the 3.7 billion kwh generated in West Pakistan in 1965 some 50 percent was pro- duced from natural gas, 40 percent from Warsak and the other small hydro- electric stations and the remainder from petroleum fuels, most of them imported, and to a very minor extent from indigenous coal. The growth of demand for electricity may slacken somewhat from the 20 percent per annum rate experienced in recent years, as growth of the tubewell load begins to stabilize and once the backlog of past growth in demand is caught up, but the rate of growth in energy consumption will probably re- main in the order of 14 percent per annum up to about 1970, and it is unlikely to fall below 10 percent per annum within the foreseeable future. 4.32 Meeting these loads will involve very heavy investments in generation and transmission equipment and if Pakistan is to meet them from her own indigenous energy reserves there appear to be only two pos--- sible sources of importance -- natural gas and hydroelectric potential. West Pakistan is known to have some cpal reserves but they are generally of rather low quality -- more lignite than coal -- and rather inaccessible; there is one coal field, in the south of the Province, which might be- come useful for large-scale production of electricity but it could never meet more than a small portion of the total requirement. The natural gas reserves of the Province are considerably larger than the coal re- serves and much easier to develop. However, as was pointed out, soils in West Pakistan are seriously deficient in nitrogen, which can be pro- duced most easily in usable form from natural gas. In 1965 about 50 percent of the natural gas consumed in the Province was used for power generation and about 5 percent for nitrogenous fertilizer production; most of the current fertilizer supplies have to be imported. However a large new nitrogenous fertilizer plant is due to come into production in 1968 and several other plants are at more or less advanced stages of planning. Production of fertilizer from gas should grow to very signi- ficant proportions in coming years. Use of gas for power generation thus competes directly with conservation of the gas for production of fer- tilizer and other purposes for which gas is more suitable than alternative fuels available. The hydroelectric resource of West Pakistan is large -- larger than any other known energy resource -- but it is expensive to develop with present technology. It is primarily concentrated in the 300- mile long main Indus Gorge. Full hydroelectric development of the Gorge and of other minor sites on the Indus tributaries might ultimately be some 35 million kw, capable of producing annually an amount of energy equiva- lent to about one-fifth of the total known gas reserves in the Province. This would probably be a far greater amount of energy than West Pakistan could absorb annually even 50 years from now, but early development of a portion could make a very sizable contribution to meeting growth of the - 48 - power load. Perhaps some 15 percent of the ultimate hydroelectric potential mentioned will be developed before the end of the century; Tarbela, with 12 generating units installed, would represent about six perbent of that ultimate potential. 4.33 The hydroelectric facet of surface storage can thus make a major contribution to meeting the power load imposed by the tubewells, at the same time conserving much of the natural gas reserves for manu- facturing fertilizer to make up the nitrogen deficiency of the soil and to permit the reduction of fallow with its unfortunate tendency to promote salt-efflorescence. Estimates given in Chapter VII suggest that Tarbela's power benefits may be about one-quarter of total benefits; and estimates in Chapter VIII suggest that these power benefits may be even higher if adequate allowance is made for the saving in natural gas that the hydroelectric plant would make possible. Attribution of three- quarters of the cost of Tarbela Dam to its irrigation function would mean that the average cost of stored water delivered to the watercourse would be about PRs 70 per acre-foot rather than PRs 93. Some adjustment can also be made for the addition to useful recharge made by conveyance losses on water released from storage at Tarbela. Adjustments to the above figure, allowing for the time pattern of such recharge (small initially because only a few of the areas affected may have tubewell fields and tailing off in the last years of the century as Tarbela's live storage declines) and for the costs of pumping such recharge, suggest that this would reduce the average cost of stored water from Tarbela delivered at watercourse head either directly by canals or indirectly by pumping from the aquifer to about PRs 61 per acre-foot. Private Tubewells 4.34 So far private tubewell development has been largely confined to the Punjab and to areas underlain by fresh groundwater there. Out of the total number of private tubewells in existence in 1965 about 30,000 were believed to be in the canal-irrigated areas. Since tubewells in those areas are providing water supplementary to canal supplies they are believed to serve relatively large acreages -- on average about 100 acres each. This would mean that the private tubewells were providing supple- mentary irrigation supplies to about three million acres. 4.35 Private tubewells have in fact been much the most rapidly expanding source of increased irrigation supplies in recent years. Their contribution is estimated to have increased from about one NAF in 1960 to more than 5 MAF in 1965. The wells are cheap in terms of capital cost -- about PRs 7000-9000 ($1500-1900) each. Operating costs are quite high, and the wells are not very efficient, often being poorly designed for the aquifer conditions in which they are set, so that the effective economic cost per acre-foot works out about the same as an acre-foot pumped by a more expensive and more efficient public well. Private wells, however, have the great advantage that they lay no burden on pub- lic finances -- except for electrification, in the case of electrified wells -- and, in the case of the diesel wells, the foreign exchange - 49 - burden of the fuel. However, the diesel wells do make a substantial contribution to Government tax revenues. 4*36 It was pointed out in Chapter II that little success has been had in trying to explain why private tubewells have grown very rapidly in some areas, such as Bari and Rechna Doabs, and relatively little in other areas that would appear to have equally suitable aquifer conditions. As a result it is very difficult to make any well-founded prediction as to the likely future growth of private tubewells. There are about 14 million acres within the canal-irrigated area underlain by fresh ground- water, 12 million of them in the Punjab. All these areas are believed to have aquifers with good permeability characteristics. If three million acres have already been covered by private tubewells and another three million acres of fresh groundwater area have already been, or will soon be, covered by the public SCARP tubewells there clearly still remain large fresh groundwater areas open to private development. In projecting future development one might suppose that private tubewells would continue to grow most rapidly in those areas where they are already widespread and well-known; equally it could be argued that these are the very areas where the farmers who have the interest and the money have already in- stalled wells, so that development will tend to slow down there and pick up elsewhere. It does appear that in some areas most of the larger and wealthier farmers have already installed wells; however the growth of wells is still being sustained in those areas by smaller farmers, some- times clubbing together and building a well for joint use. 4.37 From the point of view of the total irrigation system, the role of the private tubewells appears to be as a rapid, but rather un- even and unpredictable, means of overcoming the constraints set by limited canal capacities and limited river flows. They are used intensively in certain months when crop-water needs are high relative to canal supply. And it is probable that they are also used more intensively in years when river flows and canal deliveries are low. It is noticeable how carefully the farmers use the water from private tubewells. In this sense the tubewells are automatically integrated with the rest of the irrigation system. There is also evidence that in some areas wells are now located sufficiently close together that they may have started to lower the water table and thus carry out some of the drainage needed before additional surface supplies can be brought in. However, the capabili- ties of the private tubewells in these directions under present circum- stances are clearly limited. Being located haphazardly and operated according to the needs of the individual farmers, they are unlikely to be able to provide uniform water table control over any large area. Since some farmers will continue without private tubewells and since canal water is provided at a price so much below the cost of water pumped by private tubewells, it will be hard if not impossible to cut off surface water supplies to an area where the aquifer has been privately developed even though other areas may have much greater need for the surface water temporarily. It is also doubtful whether private wells will be established in areas that require extensive reclamation. Private tubewells are also not very suitable for areas where close - So - control is needed to ensure that groundwater is mixed with fresh sur- face water in the right proportions before application to the crops. These technical problems are important in quite large areas; nevertheless there are also very large areas where they are more or less absent and where private groundwater development could probably continue to make a large and early contribution to increased irrigation water supply. Public Tubewells 4.38 Although it has been discussed for more than a decade, public tubewell development is still largely confined to a relatively small area -- about 1.5 million acres -- in the northern Punjab. A number of other SCARP projects -- in Rechna, Chaj and Thal Doabs in the Punjab and at Khairpur in northern Sind are under way. Though some of the wells were in fact sunk in the late 1940's and early 1950's the SCARP I project in Rechna Doab has been in operation as a unit only since 1961. The water table in the area has been lowered and a certain amount of land reclamation has been carried out. 4.39 The potential strengths of public tubewell development are its capability to provide large increases in irrigation supplies, its flexibility for handling technically difficult groundwater and aquifer conditions and the feasibility of fuller integration of public wells than of private wells in the overall operation of the irrigation system. Irrigation supplies could be substantially increased by public tubewell development in virtually all areas that have groundwater of usable quality. Applying their judgment to the information they were able to gather, IACA chose certain criteria regarding the quality of groundwater at a depth of 300 feet for distinguishing between areas with usable and unusable groundwater. Fresh groundwater was defined as water with less than 1,000 parts per million (ppm) Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) and IACA took the view that this could be applied directly to the crops provided it was made available in adequate quantity. Zones with ground- water of between 1,000 and 3,000 ppm TDS were defined as Mixing Zones, in which the groundwater would have to be mixed with fresh surface water before application to the land. Groundwater over 3,000 ppm TDS was considered unusable. These categories applied to the Punjab; somewhat stricter limits were selected for the Sind, partly because groundwater there is little known and may have a higher admixture of other noxious chemicals such as sodium at any given level of TDS and partly because surface water tends to gather some salt on its passage through the Punjab and thus to be somewhat more saline in the Sind than in the North, where it is generally in the order of 250 ppm. Mixing zones in the Sind were defined as those with groundwater between 1,000 ppm and 2,000 ppm TDS, and groundwater of more than 2,000 ppm TDS was categorized as unusable. Table 15 shows the extent of these areas by regions. - 51 - Table 15 Regional Groundwater Quality Zone Areas (Million acres of development CCA) Region Fresh Mixing Saline Total Vale of Peshawar 0.58 0.10 - 0.68 Thal Doab and Indus Right Bank 2.03 0.99 0.60 3.62 Chaj Doab 1.19 0.36 o.49 2.04 Rechna Doab 3.37 0.84 0.9 4.70 Bari Doab 3.95 1.34 0.5 5.83 Sutlej and Panjnad Left Bank 1.29 0.47 1.75 3.51 Lower Indus 1.81 0.45 6.72 8.98 Total 14.22 4.55 10.59 29.36 The table shows that some 19 million acres are underlain by groundwater of usable quality, nearly 17 million of them in the Punjab and Peshawar. 4.40 Since the groundwater aquifer is very deep in most areas -- estimated at over 1,000 feet -- it would be possible to sink deep wells and to "mine" the groundwater reservoir so that the water table would gradually fall. The Revelle Panel recommended groundwater mining for a 30-year period, over which the groundwater table would be lowered to about 100 feet below the surface. The alternative would be to pump out only "balanced recharge" or the amount of groundwater that annually seeps into the aquifer from rivers, canals, watercourses and fields. IACA studied these alternatives and found that pumping to balanced recharge at a groundwater table of about 15 feet would cost about PRs 16 per acre foot -- the same as private tubewell pumping; the higher initial capital cost of the large public well would be offset by higher utilization, better hydraulic efficiency, longer life and lower costs for electricity distribution lines. Groundwater mining would require the installation of deeper wells and also considerably more electric power for raising the water from a greater depth. On a comparable basis the cost of an acre-foot mined, with the groundwater table finally stabilized at 100 feet, would average PRs 64. Mining to lesser depths would cost less, because of the smaller quantities of electricity involved. However, besides being relatively expensive, mining of groundwater in West Pakistan would raise some technical prob- lems -- in particular the danger of migration of saline water into the freshwater aquifer, once its level was substantially lower than that of neighboring saline aquifers. 4.41 Without prolonged mining, however, the groundwater reservoir could be used, under public development, as a flexible "buffer" in integration with surface water supplies, particularly in areas underlain - 52 - by fresh groundwater. The public tubewell project would be designed in grid fashion in such a way as to give complete coverage of an area and to bring the groundwater reservoir under full control. Initially, be- cause of the need in most areas for drainage and lowering of the ground- water table, the aquifer would be "mined" but only down to a depth of about 15 feet. Thereafter, pumping would be concentrated in those months and seasons when canal capacity or river flows were inadequate to meet irrigation requirements. This would make it possible to maxi- mize the water supply assured to the farmers without necessitating any canal remodeling, as pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, and in most fresh groundwater areas to produce sufficient water to meet full crop-water requirements at cropping intensities of 150 percent, which was generally regarded as a reasonable planning target from an agricultural viewpoint. Many of the areas where this would be feasible would be non-perennial. But in some perennial areas, such as part of the perennial portion of Upper Chenab Canal Command, SCARP IV, it would be feasible and then it might be possible to release existing rabi canal supplies, replacing them with water pumped from the groundwater aquifer which would be fully replenished from seepage from the rivers and from kharif surface water supplies. In the case of SCARP IV it would be possible to release about 0.75 MAF of current rabi canal supplies. But beyond this integration between surface and groundwater over the course of a year, there would also be possibility of stretching the balanced recharge concept and pumping more than recharge in a low-flow year to ensure continued availability of full irrigation water supplies, making up the overdraft on the aquifer by pumping less than recharge in high-flow years. Thus the groundwater reservoir could be used as the buffer against hydrological uncertainty, eliminating the need for pro- vision of expensive reserve capacity at the surface storage reservoirs. 4.42 Mixing zones would not be so flexible in this manner and their development to a high cropping intensity would be somewhat more complicated, but since they generally represent portions of canal com- mands that are predominantly underlain by fresh groundwater they would be gradually brought under development along with the fresh groundwater areas. This has been the case with SCARP I. IACA's research led it to establish the following criteria for mixing groundwater with surface water: groundwater of between 1,000 and 2,000 ppm TDS would be mixed in a 1:1 ratio with fresh surface water, while two-and-a-half parts of sur- face water would be added to every one part of groundwater of 2,000-3,000 ppm TDS before application to the crops. It would be important to apply such mixed water ,o the crops in adequate quantities to ensure that salts would not collect at the surface. IACA also estimated that about five percent of the mixed water might have a hazardous alkali content, which if it were allowed to remain in the topsoil would cause soil conditions to deteriorate, reduce soil permeability and adversely affect plant growth. Although further research is required on the alkalinity problem the application of sufficient water should contribute to reducing its severity. The mixing of surface and groundwater would need to be con- tinuous, and hence supplies of surface water would be needed at all times before the groundwater could be used -- and they would generally be needed in larger amounts than current canals in the areas would be able to carry. It will be recalled that these zones of saline water were generally designated perennial at original development and hence given smaller canal capacity per unit of area than the non-perennial areas. Requiring larger canal capacities, they would also require larger sup- plies of canal water than they have had in the past. Hence their development would be particularly closely dependent on the availability of additional rabi supplies from surface storage. 4.43 Zones underlain by groundwater above 3,000 ppm TDS would be entirely dependent for additional irrigation supplies on surface water since their groundwater is not considered usable for irrigation at all. Table 15 shows that these areas are not very large in the Punjab, except on the left bank of the Sutlej and Panjnad, but they are extremely im- portant in the Sind. They would require tubewells or surface drainage- channels to provide drainage before they could absorb significant addi- tional quantities of surface water. Drainage from the Sutlej/Panjnad Left Bank might be into the neighboring Thar Desert, but in the Sind it would require very large channels running through the canal commands on each side of the Indus discharging into the lower reaches of the Indus or the sea. To provide additional quantities of surface water canal remodeling would be required in virtually all these areas. It is also in these saline groundwater areas that canal lining might prove justi- fied. At present almost none of the canals in West Pakistan are lined. Normally canal lining gives a high capacity for a given size of canal, by allowing increased velocity, but in West Pakistan this advantage is generally slight because of the extreme flatness of the land. The main benefit of canal lining would occur in the form of reduced seepage; but the cost of water saved in this way, according to calculations by IACA on a comparable basis with those cited in Table 9, would be PRs 110 per acre-foot. Only in the saline zones would the cost be less -- about PRs 65 per acre-foot, because there canal lining would reduce not only seepage losses but also the related drainage pumping. Lining could in fact only be carried out after the groundwater table had been lowered, because otherwise the lining would not stick, and in general it would be difficult to carry out except on new canals because otherwise it would involve complications due to interruption of canal supplies. Thus lining of canals would be complicated and relatively expensive but it might make a small contribution to additional supplies to the saline groundwater areas in later years. The main additional supplies of water to the saline zones will be from the river flows in kharif and from Tarbela and any water released by public tubewell development in fresh groundwater areas in rabi. 4.44 From a purely technical standpoint it is thus clear that sub- stantial increases can be made in irrigation water supply in the fresh groundwater zones by means of public tubewells without running into bottlenecks due to lack of development in other facets of water develop- ment, whereas increase of water supply in the mixing zones and saline zones is a much more complex matter, depending on interdependent enlarge- ment of canal capacity and increased supply of surface water in the rabi season, as well as provision of drainage. Simply with the installation of tubewells and the provision of electric power in sufficiently large quantities, the irrigation supplies in the fresh groundwater areas can be greatly expanded. 4.45 The difficulty is that the executive and administrative capa- city for the still complex task of designing tubewell projects, carry- ing them through from initial land acquisition to final electrification, and operating them efficiently is limited; and so too are the funds for these purposes. These problems of implementation capacity are discussed in greater detail in Chapter IX. Their consequence is that it is neces- sary to ration out the public effort very carefully, allocating it to areas where public development shows the greatest advantage over what could occur simply with continued private tubewell development -- rather than to those areas which might show the greatest benefit to public development per se. This will make it possible to bring additional water supplies to much wider areas than would be possible if all development depended on the public effort alone. It also means that the public develop- ment effort may be placed in areas involving greater difficulties and com- plexities than would be the case if it had to be confined to areas where development meant simply putting in tubewells to pump fresh groundwater. Moreover, these selections of areas with priority for public and for private groundwater development have to be made with a view to the pro- jects in other fields of water development, such as surface storage and drainage, that will ensue and with a view to the ultimate need for inte- grated operation of West Pakistan's water resources. -55 - CHAPTER V PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION 5.01 The preceding chapters have described past development in the use of water resources for irrigation and generation of electric power in West Pakistan and they have outlined the chief alternative means of future development to meet the needs of the Pakistan economy. This chapter dis- cusses the analyses that were undertaken in the course of the Study with a view to selecting among these alternatives those that would be appropriate for inclusion in the proposed programs for irrigation, agriculture and power. 5.02 The methodology of the Study, as formulated by the Bank Group and agreed with the Government of Pakistan, stressed the comprehensive nature of the task. Analysis was to start on a basinwide scale, within the framework of development planning in West Pakistan. The review of resources for power development would cover all aspects from water power to the energy of gas, oil and coal, as well as the potentials of nuclear power. A general comprehensive review would be made of the main factors governing agriculture, particularly irrigated crop production, including land, population, ground and suzface waters and crop yields. Specific attention would be paid to identifying the development potential of the various regions of the Indus Basin and the steps needed to realize that poten- tial. Specific project proposals for water and power development fully inte- grated into a comprehensive piogram were to be the end product of the Study. 5.03 Originally it was envisaged that selection of projects for irrigation development would be mainly a matter of reviewing the priority status and technical aspects of projects already formulated by the Pakistan authorities. In the course of the Study it became apparent that -- apart from Tarbela and the Sukh Beas Drainage Scheme -- there were virtually no projects prepared and formulated for which financial commit- ments had not already been obtained or were being negotiated and which were thus "ongoing" projects and, as such, outside the purview of the Study. As a result the scope of IACA's assignment had to be broadened to include in addition to review of existing project proposals the identification and tentative formulation of new projects. It was decided early in the Study that IACA would have to,assign about three-quarters of their strength to project work in order to make up for the lack of existing project proposals. 5.04 Because the consultants were instructed to concentrate their initial efforts on subjects and areas which were important for planning purposes but which were not being investigated intensively by others, the direction of their effort was influenced by work already underway. For example, the scope and magnitude of the work being done by the LIP consultants on the development of irrigation and agriculture in the Sind suggested that it would not be a fruitful use of manpower of the Bank Group consultants to undertake intensive field activities in this - 56 - area. Thus the proposals for irrigation development in the Sind in this report are largely based on a critical review by IACA and by the Bank Group of the program prepared by LIP. 5.05 It was clear that an important step in the preparation of a basin- wide program for irrigation development would be correct assessment of distinctions among areas and regions regarding the present state of agri- culture and the potential for future growth of productivity. Therefore several major efforts were undertaken to gather data about different regions, additional to information already available from Government sources or from other consultants. The main gap in existing knowledge concerned the current state of agriculture. LIP had begun to remedy this in the Sind with an intensive study of selected watercourses. For detailed study in the Punjab IACA chose 20 watercourses, each of about 300 acres, on the basis of ground reconnaissance and aerial photographs of sample areas which had been made by the Government of Pakistan's mapping organization at the request of the Bank Group. Field observers were established on each selected watercourse to record on a daily basis all agricultural activities over one full kharif season and two partial rabi seasons. The aerial photographs were also useful for comparison with those made a decade before, in 1953/54, under a Colombo Plan Survey in order to indicate changes in land use, with special reference to land which had gone out of cultivation, land which had been reclaimed, new land which had been developed, and changes in cropping intensity. 5.06 As a further means of increasing their knowledge about farmers and agriculture in general, the consultants organized questionnaire surveys in three selected zones. A special study, using a similar survey technique, was also made with a view to identifying the changes which had resulted from the first of WAPDA's Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP I). Besides these agricultural studies IACA also undertook detailed soil surveys as part of the watercourse studies, primarily to give information on the relationships between yields and soil. Permeability and infiltration rates were also covered. In addition, two somewhat less detailed soil surveys were carried out for a 240,000-acre area in the northern parts of Rechna and Chaj Doabs. Some direct experimentation was undertaken on the reclamation of saline and alkaline soils in these areas. 5.07 While the irrigation and agriculture studies required sizable data collection efforts, including the abovementioned surveys, to close important gaps in knowledge, the studies of dam sites and power required much less new field investigation. Major field work was in fact excluded under the terms of reference, as formulated by the Bank Group, to expedite execution of the Study. However some aerial photography was undertaken of areas on the Indus, including sites at Chasma and Kalabagh (for back- water studies), the confluences of the Soan and the Haro with the Indus (for studies of side valley storage), and the Skardu area. Considerable attention was given to backwater studies for a dam at Kalabagh and to the approximate location, length and size of conveyance channels that would be required for side valley storage on the Haro (Gariala) or on the Soan (Dhok Pathan). Rough preliminary designs were made for a number - 57- of sites, particularly Kalabagh. Independent studies of the engineering design of Tarbela were not made, but the progress of designs and the pro- gram for constructing the project were reviewed on a number of occasions with the designer, TAMS. Identification of Irrigation Projects 5.08 With the requisite basic data in hand the first step towards formulation of a basinwide program for irrigation development was analysis of alternative possible modes of development in different areas. For purposes of analysis the 42 principal canal commands in the Indus Basin in West Pakistan were subdivided according to the partitioning of commands that arises from the Indus Basin Works and following proposals made by the LIP consultants for the Sind. Further subdivision was made for technical reasons related to the design capacities of canals. These considerations resulted in the adoption of 61 units of analysis which became basic to the basinwide planning as well as to project formulation. Each unit of analysis was at various stages of the Study further subdivided and treated separately for four groundwater salinity zones -- fresh groundwater, two mixing zones of intermediate salinity and a saline (unusable groundwater) zone, 5.09 Irrigation water requirements, determined by three factors -- cropping pattern, crop water requirements and cropping intensity -- were projected for each of these 61 areas. Cropping patterns (proportions of each area devoted to each crop in kharif season and rabi season) were projected on the basis of a number of factors, such as present cropping patterns, the quality of climate and soils in each area, anticipated increases in crop yields, estimated future national requirements of food and fiber, the farmer's preference for growing certain crops when more water becomes available and the possibilities of concentrating production of certain crops in areas with an absolute advantage in their production. Observed trends in areas benefiting.from groundwater development suggest that increases in water supplies would tend first to be used mainly on cash crops. A general increase in fodder acreage is expected in order to feed the livestock required to meet growing demand for milk and meat. With regard to wheat acreage a substantial increase is projected by 1975, after which date the growth of yields due to widespread acceptance of Mexican wheat varieties and fertilizer would probably be sufficient to permit a gradual reduction in wheat acreage with a corresponding increase in land planted to cotton. The result of these various trends would be, in basinwide terms, a slight reduction in the kharif-rabi ratio between 1965 and 1975 followed by a gradual increase through the year 2000, as shown in Table 43 of Chapter VII below. 5.10 Monthly crop water requirements were estimated for each crop in the cropping pattern in each canal command. IACA assessed water requirements in terms of the full amount that they believed to be needed, under conditions obtaining in the different areas, to support modern agricultural techniques, including the use of technical inputs like fertilizer. This is the concept of 'full delta' and it represents rather more water for each acre of crop than the farmers are currently - 58 - receiving, as pointed out in Chapter III. 'Full delta' is defined as the summation of (a) the net consumptive use of water by crops after making allowance for effective rainfall, (b) an allowance for pre-planting, (c) an allowance for soil moisture retention, and (d) an allowance for seepage loss which also provides for leaching of salts. In computing the full delta water requirements at watercourse head the consultants have totaled items (a), (b) and (c) above, and adjusted this sum upward by assuming that item (d) involves a loss of 37 percent, including conveyance losses in the watercourses. 5.11 For most areas the maximum cropping intensity that uould be attainable, if all the water that was needed could be delivered, was assumed to be 150 percent. Theoretically it would be possible to reach a cropping intensity of 200 percent, or full use of all the CCA in an area in both rabi and kharif seasons. For a variety of reasons this theoretical ceiling does not appear to be a feasible target for development. The physical difficulty of growing certain crops -- such as cotton and wheat -- in succession is one reason. But overlap in growing seasons is not the only obstacle. Shortages of animal power or labor may make it impossible for some farmers to complete the harvesting and marketing of one crop in time to prepare the land for a succeeding one. Some portion of the CCA, moreover, should be considered reserved for livestock and not available for cropping. On some farms or some watercourses an intensity over 150 percent might be reached, but IACA concluded that the average intensity over areas as large as canal commands would not rise above this level. The only exception to this was in the Peshawar Vale canal commands where the :special combination of crops grown, in particular the importance of perennial crops, might permit an ultimate cropping intensity of about 175 percent. In a portion of the Ghulam Mohammed Barrage Command in the Sind not suitable for perennial cropping it was assumed that the maximum attainable intensity would be 130 percent. 5.12 The time required to reach these target intensity levels will vary among different canal commands depending partly on the availability of water but also on a number of other factors. Among these other factors IACA attributed importance to the starting intensity in each area and the extent of soil salinity. The starting intensity gave an indication of the change in agricultural practices which would have to take place, whereas the prevalence of soil salinity indicated the extent to which soil reclamation was needed. The following table gives the results of the consultants' studies in the form of the average time they believe would be required to reach the target level from different starting levels and under various salinity conditions, once water supplies were increased, - 59 - Table 16 IACA's Average Projection of Growth in Cropping Intensities in Terms of Time Required to Reach 150 Percent Starting Intensity Salinity Category a/ (Percent) I II III ---- (years) ---- 135 5 - - 120 6 10 110 7 10 100 8 11 15 90 9 11 15 80 10 12 16 70 11 13 16 60 12 l 17 a/ Salinity categories are defined as follows: I: 15 percent of CCA requires reclamation. II: 30 percent of CCA requires reclamation. III: 45 percent of CCA requires reclamation. No cropping intensity this high in the salinity category. 5.13 Canal command irrigation water requirements, as determined by crop water requirements, cropping patterns and cropping intensities feasible from the agricultural point of view, were employed in a computer simulation of canal command operation which served to show the extent to which the irrigation supplies required at the maximum attainable intensity could be provided by the various techniques of water development outlined in Chapter IV. The most important role of the simulation model was in the analysis of the potential for integrated use of groundwater and surface water because this required that certain feedback effects, such as that arising from the need to pump annual recharge, be taken into account. The information provided by this analysis was essential to the formulation and design of the public tubewell projects proposed. Formally, the simulation model uorked in such a way as to maximize the intensity level in each of the 61 canal commands in the reference years 1975, 1985 and 2000 subject to the following constraints: (1) The cropping intensity in the particular reference year is not to exceed that which is judged to represent the agriculturally feasible maximum discussed above. (2) The required surface water deliveries cannot exceed the delivery capacity of the existing canal system, (3) Groundwater use is not to exceed the annual recharge to the area's aquifer. (4) Groundwater use up to the extent of the usable part of annual recharge will always precede additional surface water use. - 60 - (5) Por groundwater between 1,000 and 3,000 ppm TDS, mixing ratios with surface water have to be observed, (6) In the fresh groundwater zones, the greater part of the pumping would be in rabi, to economize in the use of scarce surface water at that time and to overcome canal delivery constraints during seasonal overlaps in irrigation requirements. It should be noticed that the fourth constraint listed is based on the premise, discussed in Chapter IV, that in each canal command the least costly source of increased irrigation supplies, namely groundwater, will be fully developed before the next source of increased supplies - canal remodeling and/or supplies from storage -- is brought into play. 5.14 Beyond this basic analysis of potential public groundwater development, a number of additional variants were tested. The simulation model was used to show the maximum full delta cropping intensity that would be attainable if the only irrigation supplies available were historic surface water deliveries (i.e. generally the average of those over the period 1952-63), or if such -deliveries ]were supplemented-by. iI, supplies from private tubewells. An analysis was also made for the assumption that surface water deliveries and their monthly pattern would be limited not to their historic levels but simply by existing canal capacities. Another analysis was made simulating operation with inte- grated use of surface water and groundwater under the assumption that canal capacity would be increased to the extent needed to enable the 150 percent cropping intensity to be reached without mining the ground- water aquifer, 5.15 The case involving private tubewell development, as an alternative to integrated operation with public wells, was critical to the choice of areas for inclusion in the proposed public program because of the need, discussed at the end of Chapter IV, to allocate public tubewells to areas where they would show the greatest advantage over likely private develop- ment rather than the greatest absolute rate of return. The quantifica- tion of this likely private development was therefore very important. At the same time large-scale development of private tubewells is of such recent origin that it was difficult for IACA to find a reliable basis for projection of future growth. They considered the data available regarding the number of private tubewells estimated to exist in dif- ferent areas in 1963, 1964 and 1965; these years were considered most relevant because it was apparently only after 1962 that diesel wells became widely accepted. IACA developed a general trend of future private tubewell development on the basis of the relationship between achieved levels of private tubewell development and the change in their density as observed in these years. From this general trend a projection for each area was derived, related to the prevalence of large farms and of owner-occupied farms. These two factors were intended to serve as proxies for more general determinants such as farmers' enterprise and financial resources. IACA expected private tubewell development to be most rapid in Bari and Rechna Doabs and slowest in the relatively - 61 - backward areas of the Lower Indus and in Thal and Indus Right Bank. In all areas, however, the general pattern would be a slow initial development stimulated by the most enterprising farmers and supported by the Department of Agriculture, and then a more rapid development as farmers appreciate the profitability of private tubewells, leading to a declining rate of instal- lation as the constraints of farm size, land tenure and finance become more operative. The table below shows some samples of their projections of private tubewell growth in the absence of public development. Table 17 Selected Projections of Private Tubewell Growth (Numbers of wells) 1965 1970 1975 1985 Dipalpur above BS Link (Bari) 860 18h0 2470 3115 Rohri North (Sind) 100 300 800 1600 Panjnad-Abbasia (Sutlej Left Bank) 615 1990 3230 4570 Ideally the uncertainty which attaches to the projections of private tube- well growth should have found expression in the use of a range of private tubewell projections rather than one single projection per area; the complexities of the Study precluded this approach within the context of the basinwide determination of project priorities. However in the indi- vidual project reports by IACA and in the Bank Group's reviews attention was given to the sensitivity of the project's priority to alternative projections of private tubewell growth. 5.16 The most important output of the canal command simulation is a water budget reflecting a particular mode of irrigation development and indicating the maximum cropping intensity attainable with this type of development. It corresponds in effect to a hypothetical water development 'project'. The water budget would show, for instance, depending on the type of development to which it related, the amount of public tubewell capacity required per acre of CCA, the quantity of scarce rabi surface water required, the extent to which canal capacity had to be increased to permit attainment of 150 percent cropping intensity, and the amount of horizontal drainage capacity needed in the more saline zones to pre- serve a stable water table with increased surface water deliveries. To each of these items there corresponded a certain cost, so that the total cost of the hypothetical 'project' could be estimated. To each water budget there also corresponded a certain full delta cropping intensity, as pointed out, and this constituted one dimension of the benefits of the 'project'. 5.17 To derive a full picture of the benefits of agricultural development it was necessary to examine the likely growth of crop yields. IACA considered that key factors accounting for current low yields are unreliable and inadequate water supplies, waterlogging and salinity, limited use of fertilizers and pesticides, and the poor quality of seed. It was their belief that increased irrigation supplies would not only - 62 - have a direct effect on yields but would also act as a catalyst in the adoption of these non-water inputs. Projections of average crop yields were prepared showing a threefold increase over the period 1965 to 2000. In projecting the transition from the present to the ultimately attainable yields the consultants assumed that the farmers will first concentrate inputs and attention on cash crops and wheat. After reasonable levels have been reached for these crops then the improvements would be extended to other crops, particularly fodder and maize. The basic yield projec- tions derived for each canal command from a regional average with allowance for local differences in climate, soils, standard of farming, etc., applied to areas with full water supplies and adequate drainage; adjustments had to be made where water shortage was expected to continue or where there were serious problems of soil salinity and waterlogging. In areas which were waterlogged and suffered from soil salinity yields were assumed to be some h-55 percent below normal by 1975 in the- absence of water development and reclamation in the interim. For the case of water shortages IACA assumed that over the short term there is advantage to be gained by extending, through underirrigation, the area cropped, as long as traditional crop varieties are cultivated and no fertilizer is applied. To allow for the additional production that would be associated with this practice IACA added 10 percent to the output of minor crops that they estimated would occur if available water were con- centrated on the area it could cover at full delta supply. In the case of major crops IACA assumed that in areas where underwatering prevailed provision of additional water would give the same increase in consumption whether it was used to increase water deliveries per cropped acre to full delta or to expand acreage cultivated at less than full delta irrigation supply. Furthermore, it was assumed that if additional water were made available then yields would be increased almost instantaneously by the degree to which underwatering was corrected. For example, if the increase in irrigation supply were sufficient to raise the irrigation level from 80 percent of full delta to full delta, then yields would increase automatically some 25 percent. Figure 3, which shows the yield growth for four major crops in the Punjab, Sind and areas outside the Indus Basin that IACA anticipated would accompany the execution of their total proposed program for development of irrigation and agriculture is indicative of the specific yield increases which they projected. The very sharp rises show in the figire between 1965 and 1985 reflect in part their assumption that yields would increase markedly as soon as additional water is provided. 5.18 Yield projections derived in this manner were combined as appropriate with the cropping intensities derived from the canal command analyses to show the gross benefit streams of the different hypothetical water projects. An allowance was added for increased production of livestock products which IACA projected would occur with the increased amount of feed that would be available from additional fodder output and increased crop residues and with a gradual improvement in the productivity of the animals. Gross benefits were converted to net benefits by deduction of on-farm costs, including allowance for wages of hired labor. Very little is known about present levels and composition of on-farm costs, but some estimates were prepared for DERIVED AVERAGE YIELDS FOR REFERENCE YEARS (MAUNDS PER ACRE) WHEAT COTTON SUGAR CANE (GUR) RABI FODDER 36 36 180 1,800 34- 34- 32 32 160 1,600 30- - 30- 28 j2.2% 28 140 1,400 26- / - 26- PUNJAB 24 24 120 1,200 22- ° I- 22- ,"SIND 2% 2___ __________ 20 20 22 100 1,000 58 -I - 58 2- /6 29% PUNJAB 6 16 80 800 3 0%PUNJAB 2 3% 4- 1 5% 30% - / 14 - .0% --SIND 3 A% SIND 12 12 60 600 24% OUTSIDE AREAS /73 PUNJAB 40 SIND o ...••2 10 2-% -P 8.'-8 40 400 2% 1.1% ~2%/ 6 6- 58% OUTSIDE AREAS S20 23% 200 ...... 4% 10% 2 2- - 23% l0 0 0 t0 '- of 0 ILn 0 f 0 iL 0 tnl 0 Ifn 0 tfl 0 ifn 0 «) 0 k) I 0 0 I 0 Il 0 D 0 n 0 0 ou r- o- im< ( - r-E n M (R) IBRD - 3287 ud  - 63 - different levels of intensity and yields on the basis of detailed farm budgots built up by the consultants for different regions of the Indus Basin. 5.19 Having generated a number of alternative water budgets and related estimates of benefits which summarize the potential consequences of public and private investment in different areas, IACA went on to aggregate the projects and to test them within the context of the irrigation system as a whole. As pointed out, the canal command analyses were based on the premise that the least costly water source (groundwater) would be used to the maximum possible extent before the next source would be tapped. In this way the requirement for stored water, the more ex- pensive source, was determined as a residual rather than a foregiven quantum. Determination of storage requirements was one of the main pur- poses of a second computer model which IACA used, designed to simulate the operation of the entire irrigation system of the Indus Basin in West Pakistan. Canal command irrigation water requirements were accumulated up to the rim stations and to Mangla and Tarbela Reservoirs, with allow- ances for seepage and evaporation losses from the link canals and river reaches as well as for time lags between the release of water from a reservoir and its arrival at a major distribution point. Another im- portant purpose of this simulation model was to indicate link canal capacity requirements. As with the canal command studies, the analysis was carried out for a number of reference years up to the year 2000. It was generally conducted in terms of mean-year river flows. However, studies of aspects such as the monthly pattern of water releases required for irrigation purposes from Mangla and Tarbela Reservoirs were conducted in terms of various combinations of main stem and tributary low flows. Selection of Irrigation Projects 5.20 Out of these simulation studies there developed increasing sensitivity to the implications of alternative patterns of water use so that more refined choices could be made among the various alternative types of water development considered for each canal command. At the same time IACA also reached the conclusion that there were certain limits, set by implementation capacity (further discussed in Chapter IX below), to what could be expected to be achieved in water development by 1975. IACA defined these limits specifically as a maximum of 20,000 public tubewells completed in the period 1.965-75 and a maximum of one million acres in which canal remodeling could be carried out over the same period. Preliminary estimates of the increase in agricultural output attainable with a water investment program up to these limits and with expansion in the use of non-water inputs up to the limits of the absorptive capacity of the agricultural sector also suggested to IACA that growth in agriculture would fall short of the rates projected in Government planning documents. It appeared to them, moreover, that these specific scarcities -- limited absorptive capacity and limited implementation capacity -- would prove more restrictive on development than any global resource constraint such as availability of foreign ex- change or of development finance. Development should proceed at the maxi- mum pace possible within these specific constraints; therefore, in the - 64 - preparation of the development program, it was necessary to focus on the al- location of the scarce factors among areas with different development poten- tials in'such a.way as to maximize the return to these factors. 5.21 Selection of public tubewell and canal remodeling projects within these limits of implementation capacity was based on a number of technical and economic criteria. From the technical point of view areas which were underlain by usable groundwater but which also had water table within 10 feet of the surface were considered to be of high priority for public tubewell development. Among these areas the first place in the program should go to those underlain by fresh groundwater which could be applied directly to the crops; second place should go to those where the groundwater required mixing with surface water and where, as pointed out in Chapter IV, there would generally be need for canal remodeling as well as additional surface water deliveries in order to permit attain- ment of a high cropping intensity at full delta irrigation. The reliance on public tubewells to accomplish subsurface drainage in areas of high water table reflects IACA's considered judgment of the limited de- watering capability of private tubewells. Again from the purely technical point of view the areas which seemed most suitable for deferment of public projects in favor of continued private tubewell development were those underlain by usable, especially fresh, groundwater and with water table more than 10 feet from the surface. 5.22 On the basis of these technical criteria the more promising areas for public tubewell development and canal remodeling were identified. However, the implementation of public tubewell projects in all of the areas so selected would have required a public tubewell program during the Third and Fourth Plan periods beyond the specified limit of 20,000 wells. Therefore, a further analysis was made giving explicit recognition to the limitation upon the size of the public tubewell and canal remodeling pro- gram during the period up to 1975. This analysis focused its attention on the timing of public tubewell development in the various groundwater quality zones of the 61 canal commands. To simplify the calculations the alternatives were specified as public tubewell installation in the period up to 1974, in the period 1975-79, or in the period 1980-84, plus the possibility of canal remodeling. Canal remodeling would take place either parallel to public tubewell development or at a deferred date. Finally, rabi surface water was incorporated as an additional limiting input in the years 1972, 1973 and 1974. For other years the surface water used in conjunction with the various 'projects' was assigned an imputed cost which corresponds to the estimated scarcity value of rabi water in the system. This analysis, which in effect compared the various tentative 'projects' for each area which had come out of the canal command simulation, was designed to show how the limited numbers of public tubewells and amounts of canal remodeling considered feasible could be allocated among areas, taking account of the prospects for private tubewell development in each area, in such a way as to maximize the net present worth of output in irrigated agriculture in the Indus Basin. The outcome of this analysis was a list of priority areas for public tubewell development and canal remodeling in the three periods specified. - 65 - 5.23 Despite the complexity of the various analyses described, they oversimplified reality. Putting alternative 'projects' on a standardized basis for use in formal analysis of priorities over the whole Basin, for instance, rmant that many individual peculiarities of a project area had to be ignored -- the quality of the soil, specific drainage problems, variation in farm size and tenure, location of canals, etc. Thus more detailed investigation of priority areas identified had to be carried out. Even the scope of some projects had to be changed because, for practical purposes, they could not be smaller than the smallest con- trollable surface water distribution unit. This was usually a distrib- utary. In some cases this necessitated the inclusion of areas underlain by groundwater of lower quality or even zones of unusable groundwater; the need for canal remodeling in some of these areas in connection with groundwater development in turn affected the composition of the canal remodeling program. Detailed phasing and integration of all development activities for inclusion in the recommended program also had to be per- formed outside the formal analyses on the basis of the technical and economic criteria used and by considering,in addition, the state of project preparation as well as technical and operational interdependencies. The latter were of particular importance in the cases where the imple- mentation of one priority became a prerequisite for the execution of another priority activity, e.g. drainage before canal remodeling in areas with saline groundwater and high water table. 5.24 Thus, through a series of approximations the various possible means of irrigation development analyzed with the aid of the simulation models were reduced to a single program consistent with implementation capacities as determined and internally consistent in terms of availa- bility and usage of surface water and groundwater. Project priorities established on the basis of the formal analyses and adjusted as neces- sary in light of practical problems were integrated into a phased development program. Irrigation and drainage aspects of the program are discussed in Chapter VI below. Surface water storage aspects are discussed in Chapter VII, which shows the projection of storage capacity requirements that came out of the simulation analysis of total irrigation system operation described above. 5.25 The largest component of the proposed program for irrigation and drainage development up to 1975 is 13 public tubewell projects addi- tional to those which are presently underway. These projects differ in a number of ways from those which have been begun in the past as a direct result of the approach to project selection adopted in this Study. First, because the analysis was concerned with maximizing the contribu- tion to agricultural growth from both public and private tubewells, it indicated a need for public tubewell projects covering smaller areas so as to leave maximum scope for private enterprise development wherever it could occur. Second, because the net present worth approach to evaluation of benefits gives priority to areas where returns from investment can be expected sooner rather than later, the proposed projects imply greater emphasis in the early future on development of usable groundwater in areas where it can be applied immediately to increase crop production, and less emphasis on reclamation of saline - 66 - lands and water-table control in non-usable groundwater zones. Third, the proposed public tubewell projects have been selected and designed with a view to their integration into the overall irrigation/power system. Pumped water has so far been regarded largely as a supplement and not a substitute for canal supplies, with the result that total water supplies are now sometimes more than adequate in tubewell areas while elsewhere crops are suffering shortages. The canal command and irrigation system simulations, as pointed out, were intended to show results obtainable with integrated use of surface and groundwater. Slight additions were also made in the course of project design to the tubewell capacity which was shown by the canal command analyses to be required; the additions were partly to ensure the availability of sufficient pumping capacity in a project area for full irrigation requirements to be met from groundwater and surface water combined in any month in four years out of five of river flow conditions experienced; they were also partly intended to provide sufficient pumping capacity so that the wells could be shut off at the time of evening peak on the power system without reducing the amount of water that could be pumped below requirements. Sequential Analysis 5.26 Because of the problems and uncertainties created by variations in river flows a detailed reexamination of the proposed program was under- taken on the basis of a variety of different river flow conditions. The basic analyses had all been made in terms of reference years and generally on the assumption of mean-year river flows. However, special hand adjust- ments had been made to allow for other hydrological conditions, such as the addition to pumping capacity mentioned in the preceding paragraph for coping with temporary surface water shortages. In years of shortage groundwater pumping would be temporarily increased beyond the balanced recharge level, and the consequent overdraft on the aquifer would be replaced by reducing pumping and increasing surface supplies during periods of above-average surface water availability. This form of integration was one of the most important proposals implicit in the recommended program. In order to assess in detail the operational implications of using groundwater to compensate for surface flow variations through temporary pumping in excess of recharge, the then Chairman of WAPDA (Mr. Ghulam Ishaq) suggested that the development pro- gram proposed by the Bank's consultants be subjected to a behavior trial utilizing the sequential model of irrigation and power systems operations developed by WAPDA's general consultants, Harza Engineering. The Bank's coordinating consultant, Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, with the coopera- tion of Harza executed this additional study in which the operation of the water and power system during the period 1965 to 1985 was simulated under the assumption that IACA's program would be carried out as recommended. This behavior test demonstrated in detail how the irriga- tion system as a whole would meet the water requirements of each area unit under various sequences of river flow conditions over the course of 20 years. The test led to the conclusion that the proposed program and each component thereof is operationally feasible provided the existing pattern of water distribution is gradually changed so as to establish, step by step, the fully integrated system of groundwater and surface water use which the program envisages. - 67 - Project and Program Review 5.27 As the Study progressed the Bank Group subjected the emerging program for irrigation development and its project content to systematic and detailed review. In order to test the economic efficiency of the project priorities proposed by IACA in a basinwide context the Bank Group employed a linear programming model that focuses upon those overall resource constraints which, in the judgment of the Bank Group, would control strategically the complex phenomenon of development of irrigated agriculture. The linear programming analysis made use of IACA's projec- tions of output responses to water and other agricultural inputs and their judgment about the importance of implementation constraints in the field of public tubewell development and canal remodeling. However, use of the linear program provided an opportunity to give fuller attention to the various constraints on development and to variations in the specific values attributed to these constraints. About 500 water 'projects', based on the water budgets produced in the consultants' canal command simulation, were considered. The alternatives for each area -- public tubewells, private tubewells, canal remodeling, increased supply of regulated surface water in the rabi season by construction of further storage reservoirs and improvement in drainage by installation of drainage wells or tile drains -- were considered for execution in each of the two time periods 1965-75 and 1975-85 either singly or, where appropriate, in combination with one another. The special value of the linear program lay in its ability to take into account simultaneously a variety of constraints on development, their interaction, and the possibility that they may change over time. Specifically, five resource limitations were selected: foreign exchange, availability of surface water supply during rabi, construction and project-management capability in regard to implementation of public tubewell projects, the same limita- tion for canal remodeling projects, and the availability of budgetary resources to support groundwater development. The explicit consideration given to the availability of rabi surface water supplies meant that the linear programming analysis was also useful for study of the size and composition of the proposed surface water storage program. 5.28 While elaborate testing of the basinwide implications of the proposed water development program continued till the end of the Study, each of the priority projects proposed by IACA was also subjected to most detailed scrutiny. As noted before, the consultants devoted a very large part of their effort to selection and study of specific projects for early execution and since these projects were one of the most important outcomes of the Study, the Bank Group also devoted a major effort to appraising them. In its review of the economic justification of the projects the Bank Group made an attempt to quantify those aspects of the projected cost and benefit streams on which it diverged from the views of the consultants. On-the whole, . these adjustments tended to strengthen the case for private groundwater development. In contradistinction to the approach of IACA, the Bank Group has in its project reviews attached an economic value to the additional surface water use occasioned by a tubewell project and sub- tracted that from the gross benefits of the project. For purposes of - 68 - determining the rate of return on public tubewell investment the Bank Group has assumed that the rates of increase in the use of non-water inputs .would be similar whether or not-the public project were undertaken. The Bank Group also checked the proposed projects against the alternative of stimulated and accelerated private tubewell development wherever this was deemed tech- nically feasible. 5.29 One important matter of divergence between the Bank Group and IACA concerned future crop yields. In its review of the consultants' studies the Bank Group recognized the need for adequate water application to meet both crop consumptive use and to maintain the long-term productive capacity of the soil, but it considered that the full delta concept may have been too rigidly applied by IACA, particularly for the conditions likely to prevail during the early years of project development. As noted in discussion of the consultants' yield projections above, it was assumed by IACA that a sudden increase in water supplies up to full delta would be accompanied by a sudden increase in yields of the same magnitude. It was the view of the Bank Group that it might take considerable time to organize the higher level of non-water inputs required to match the increase in water. In practice the probable course of development would be a simultaneous increase in acreage as well as an improvement in delta and inputs. This implies for some time a larger cropped acreage at a lower level of production per cropped acre than assumed by IACA; overall production would be higher. Figure 4 is representative of the effect of the Bank Group's adjustments on the crop yield side. It shows the average yield increase for cotton projected by IACA for the twelve selected tubewell project areas and the Bank Group's modified projection for these same areas. The figure also shows projections based on the continuation of past per- formance on two large, well-managed commercial farms in the Punjab. Agricultural Development 5.30 IACA did not formulate any non-water development activities in the form of projects, but they did prepare a general program for agri- cultural improvement, closely interlinked with the proposed irrigation development program. Preparation of this program involved study of the technical feasibility of using different levels of farm inputs in areas with water supplies of varying adequacy, their cost and an assessment of the contribution that they would make to the growth of agricultural production. The chief inputs covered were improved seed varieties, fertilizer, insecticides, chemicals for land reclamation, various measures for improvement of animal husbandry and improvement in farming and irrigation techniques and equipment. The Formulation of the Power Development Program 5.31 Parallel to the formulation of the irrigation development pro- gram and closely interlinked with it, the Study was to prepare a compre- hensive plan for the development of the power sector. The assumption which was adopted for the second phase of the Study -- that Tarbela Reservoir would be campleted by 1975 -- was as important for the formu- lation of the power program as it was for the irrigation program. The COTTON YIELD PROJECTIONS (MAUNDS OF SEED COTTON PER ACRE) 35 I I 35 30 30 AVERAGE YIELD OVER LAST THREE YEARS FOR MAJOR PRODUCING COUNTRIES 25 MAUNDS OF SEED COTTON 25 PROJECTIONS BASED ON CONVILLEPUR FARM 20 ->-0 201 US S.R -20 IACA PROJECTS (2 PROJECTS) ..82 1 15.9 USA 1. 0 PROJECTIONS BASED #0je d ON KHANEWAL FARM oo .0 BAN 9 96 SUDAN 1 dop p BANK GROUP ASSUMPTIONS do.VEAG YIEL OVER L.PKS AST 5 5 *020I UIS.1- 0 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 5 5- (R)IBRD-3288 . "  - 69 - hydroelectric potential of Tarbela is so large relative to prospective power loads that a sensible action program for interim power development would need to anticipate the existence of Tarbela in 1975. The power characteristics of the Tarbela and the Mangla plants had to be determined for different assumptions as to flows, reservoir release patterns, number of generating units installed, etc. Special reservoir simulation studies were under- taken to indicate the implication for power of different modes of operation. Because the data on the irrigation program were subject to so much study and review, the power consultant had to make certain interim assumptions about tubewell pumping loads and reservoir operation and proceed on that basis to formulate a power program. Rather than use a fully integrated system analysis, the power consultant relied on judicious partial analyses related to his judgment of the overall character of the power system and the relative attractiveness of individual investments. Various alterna- tives were compared by hand. The long-term program for power was based on a set of detailed regional load forecasts. The load data and the related bulk supply program were prepared on a month-by-month basis for the full period, 1965-85. 5.32 In its review of the proposed power program the Bank Group's objectives were similar to those adopted in its review of agricultural and water proposals: to build up procedures which would enable it to broaden the range of alternatives and to test the economic efficiency of the consultants' proposals. In addition it was hoped to contribute to the process of developing techniques appropriate for updating over time the power program finally recommended. Using a computer, the Bank Group developed a simulation model of the electric power system of West Pakistan down to, but not including, the distribution stage. By providing a means for comparing the costs and operational characteristics of alternative proposals, this simulation technique played a central role in the formulation of the Bank Group's conclusions and recommendations; the power consultant's bulk supply proposals were checked with the aid of the simulation model, and some alterations were made on the basis of the Bank Group's analyses. Joint Planning for Power and Irrigation 5.33 There are many points of overlap and interdependence between the power and irrigation sectors in West Pakistan, as indicated in the pre- ceding chapters. Considerable effort was devoted throughout the Study to trying to ensure'consistency in the Study and in the programs which re- sulted from it. One difficult problem was in the matter of costs and prices. It was easy to specify the cost concepts which were to be used: all economic comparisons between alternative investments were made in terms of the economic costs of the alternatives -- i.e. costs excluding transfer payments such as import duties, sales taxes and interest during construction -- while financial calculations, designed to indicate the total costs of the selected projects and programs, were carried out in terms of financial prices including these transfer payments. As in using economic prices for comparison of alternatives, the Bank Group also tried to approximate opportunity costs, representing the value of factors in alternative uses, in the case of farm budget calculations by pricing hired labor at current rural wage rates but assuming family labor to be - 70 - available free. However, there were many uncertainties which had to be solved by judgment. In one sense, reasonable comparability among economic costs of engineering works could be ensured by using 1965 prices, on the assumption that increases in unit prices would affect all works compared in a similar way, but this was less reasonable for crop prices, the dif- ferential among which may well change over the years. 1965 farm prices were in fact taken for most crops, but where change seemed particularly likely -- in a downward direction for instance in the case of rice and in an upward direction in the case of meat -- special adjustments were made. Another problem, relating more particularly to the costs of engineering works, arose from the very varying amounts of knowledge and experience that exist regarding the different projects considered. Very large amounts of money have been spent, for instance, to firm up the costs of the Tarbela Project, and only a tiny fraction of that amount on most other surface storage projects. Or again, in the case of irrigation works, considerable experience has been accumulated regarding the costs of tubewells -- though there is still room for disagreement about them - whereas there is practically no experience of large-scale canal re- modeling. Difficulties of securing comparable costs were encountered all through the Study and they had to be handled by techniques such as taking price ranges, making contingency allowances of varying size and always coming back after making any comparison to reassessing its validity. 5.34 There were a number of technical interrelations between the agriculture and power sectors to be considered. Electricity for tube- well pumping will increasingly become an important part of the total power load and the projection of tubewell load growth was an imprtant aspect of the irrigation program; its monthly pattern was derived partly with a view to the seasonal variations that will occur in the capability of the power system and it was also adjusted to allow for interruption at the time of daily system peak so as to fit it better with the overall pattern of power demand and system capacity. Another technical overlap concerned the repercussions of the recommended tubewell program for the pace of rural residential electrification; it was possible to make some broad projections in this regard. 5.35 Cognizance was taken of the fact that the agriculture and power sectors would to some extent be competing with one another and with other sectors for the same scarce resources. It was hard to be very specific about this on the macroeconomic side because no official provincial breakdown of the Perspective Plan for Pakistan (1965-85) which had been prepared by the Pakistan Planning Commission was available. However, as regards foreign exchange, some allowance was made for macroeconomic constraints by making certain comparisons at both current official exchange rates and various alternatives, most often a scarcity rate twice the current rate (i.e. PRs 9.52 instead of PRs 4.76 to the U.S. dollar). As regards capital, the interest rate of eight percent used in all economic comparisons was chosen as an approximation to the real opportunity cost of capital, i.e. the marginal productivity of capital in uses outside the sectors under study. In the selection of an appropriate interest rate the Bank - 71 - Group was conscious both of the need to give due recognition to the relative scarcity of capital in the Pakistan economy and of the importance of not biasing the project selection process unduly against the longer-lived alternatives such as storage reservoirs and hydroelectric plant which were relatively expensive in capital cost and relatively cheap in operating cost. The eight percent rate ultimately chosen is somewhat above the prevailing rate of interest on Government bonds in Pakistan and somewhat below typical rates of return on private investment. Use of the eight percent interest rate meant automatic exclusion from the program of projects yielding less than eight percent rate of return. 5.36 Besides finance and foreign exchange the agriculture and power sectors will also compete for the use of water stored behind the Mangla and Tarbela Dams and, as pointed out in Chapter IV, for use of the Province's natural gas reserves. Once Mangla is completed, and even more when Tarbela is completed, there will be room for choice between drawing down the reservoirs fully and thus releasing all the water stared from the kharif season for irrigation use in rabi and, on the other hand, retaining some water in the reservoirs throughout the year and thus increasing the power capability of the hydroelectric plants in the season when power supplies will be most short. To the extent that the reservoirs are drawn down more fully there will be a greater requirement for thermal generation capability -- and this will be largely based on natural gas, especially up to 1980. But use of more natural gas for power generation means that less will be available for manufacture of fertilizer for the agricultural sector. 5.37 The most critical meeting point between agriculture and power in the Study was the analysis of the justification of Tarbela itself. Ks the final, comprehensive phase of the Study was coming to an end, the coordinating consultant readdressed himself to this question and broadly confirmed the conclusion reached in the first phase of the Study regarding the rate of return to be anticipated from the project. The Bank Group also reapprai- sed the Tarbela Dam in a number of studies, including a consideration of the project within the framework set by the agricultural projects recommended and an assessment, with the aid of the linear programming analysis of irrigation investment and the power system simulation model, of the loss that would be sustained if execution of the project were delayed ten years. All these studies concurred in indicating that Tarbela should be executed as scheduled. - 72 - VI. AGRICULTURAL INPROVEENTS AND IRRIGATION PROJECTS 6.01 This chapter discusses the program for the development of irrigation and agriculture presented in Volume II of the Bank Group's report. The program is based on the work of the Irrigation and Agri- cultural Consultants Association (IACA) but it also reflects the impact of views expressed by the Pakistan authorities during the course of the Study and of the Bank Group's own experience in Pakistan. The Bank Group has set forth projections of the higher levels of agricultural production that appear reasonable for the future. Throughout the next decades, but particularly for the period 1965-75, the Bank Group has been concerned with what is practically achievable within the constraints that are likely to be operative, rather than with the technical potential. It has been assumed that the development of irrigation and agriculture would receive the high priority in the allocation of resources, which its importance deserves, and that these would be efficiently and effectively deployed. Water development and agricultural development are essentially interdependent, and both receive the emphasis in the recommended program which the Bank Group considers appropriate under prevailing conditions. The level of agricultural production projected for 1975 would only be achieved as the result of a major effort of an emergency character and spectacular improvement in performance in all sectors. Its attainment, however, is designed to go far towards meeting West Pakistan's most pressing needs in food and exports of agriculturally based commodities. 6.02 The methods used in this part of the Study have been outlined in Chapter V. As noted in assessing the opportunities to stimulate agricultural development, the Bank Group studied data on a wide range of agricultural factors. These include crop yields, cropping patterns, cropping intensities, crop water requirements, the relationship between water and other agricultural inputs, land tenure, project organization and implementation, and the institutional base for agriculture in West Pakistan. It examined specific development projects, and reviewed the available information on water supplies from all sources, the require- ments for increasing supplies from any of these sources, and the limit inherent in a complex plan where changes in supplies from one source affect the use which can be made of other sources. The more important findings and conclusions derived frcm these studies as they relate to agricultural improvements and irrigation projects are discussed in this chapter. A brief summary is presented first of developments as they relate to agricultural improvements. 6.03 The Province of West Pakistan covers a land area of some 200 million acres, of which about 70 million acres are considered poten- tially suitable for agricultural production. However, less than 40 million acres are presently cultivated. The Indus Plains include nearly 70 percent of the cultivated acreage, supply about 80 percent of the foodstuffs produced and contain a large majority of the popu- lation of the Province. The irrigated plains also offer the greatest scope for further agricultural development. For these reasons, this - 73 - area has received primary emphasis throughout Volume II of the Bank Group's report. Crops 6.0 The predominant importance of the canal-irrigated areas is illustrated in Table 18 in terms of the acreage under various major crops and the contribution of these crops to the Gross Production Value (GPV) of agricultural output. Production of three of the important crops grown -- rice, cotton and sugarcane -- is virtually confined to the canal-irrigatediareas, and these account for nearly half the GPV of crops. Three-fourths of the GPV from wheat comes from these areas. Cotton is the most important cash crop and accounts for some l4 percent of the total cropped acreage in the irrigated areas; it is grown mainly in the southern Punjab, Bahawalpur and Northern Sind. Production of rice and sugarcane as cash crops is heavily concentrated in the irri- gated areas of the northern Punjab and Peshawar. Table 18 Cropped Acreage and GPV for Canal Irrigated and Other Areas (1965) (Millions) Canal Irrigated Remainder West Pakistan Area GPV Area GPV Area GPV in acres PRs In Acres PRs In Acres PRs Annual Food Crops Wheat 7.72 1,222.5 4.99 412.5 12.71 1,635.0 Millets 1.02 68.2 1.99 136.8 3.01 205.0 Maize 1.09 128.6 1.07 122.4 2.16 251.0 Others 3.08 412.9 3.12 288.1 6.20 701.0 Rice 3.52 589.0 - - 3.52 589.0 Perennial Crops 1.62 1,112.0 - - 1.62 1,112.0 Total Food Crops 18.05 3,533.2 11.17 959.8 29.22 4,493.0 Cotton 3.71 880.0 - - 3.71 880.0 Fodder 4.99 - 1.20 - 6.19 - Total Crops 26.75 4,413.2 12.37 959.8 39.12 5,373.0 Table18 also indicates that food crops account for about 75 percent of the total acreage currently cultivated, though somewhat less in the canal irri- gated areas. Wheat, the staple food in most areas, alone accounted for nearly one-third of total acreage cropped. - 714 - Livestock 6.05 No less than 15 percent of the 39 million cropped acres are used for the production of fodders of various kinds, four-fifths of this area falling within the canal-irrigated plains. This indicates the im- portance of animals in West Pakistan's rural economy. This 15 percent under fodder crops understates the actual area devoted to livestock be- cause crop residues provide about half the animal nutrient supply and large rainfed areas are also used primarily for grazing. Table 19 shows the estimated livestock population of West Pakistan in 1965. Table 19 Livestock Population of West Pakistan, 1965 (in million heads) Bullocks 7.4 Other work animals 2.4 Bovine cows 4.4 Bovine followers 3.5 Buffalo cows 5.4 Buffalo bulls and followers 3.1 Sheep 9.8 Goats 7.2 Total larger livestock 43.2 Poultry 10.0 A few of the larger farms in West Pakistan have begun to use tractors and other mechanized equipment, but the vast majority rely entirely on draught animals for cultivation, threshing and farm transport. Draught animals account for about one-quarter of the total animal population of 43.2 million head. While also producing meat most of the milk and meat in Pakistan ' come from the other 75 percent of the herd. Livestock products account for a very significant proportion -- estimated at some 35 percent -- of total agricultural output. Production of milk, meat, hides and skins, etc., is somewhat less heavily concentrated in the irrigated areas than production of field crops, since the non-irrigated areas provide extensive grazing land: farmers in the canal-commanded areas may be responsible for 70 percent of total output of livestock products though some of this occurs on the higher regions of the doabs not commanded by canals. Farms and Farmers 6.06 One of the reasons why animal power will continue for long to be important in West Pakistan is that there is a very large number of small farms. The 1960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture shows that 49 percent of the farms are under five acres. However, there is wide variation over the Province. The average farm holding is 10.1 acres (with arcultivated - 75 - area of 7.7 acres), but the range extends from an average of 5.5 acres in Peshawar Division to 35.9 acres in the largely unirrigated Kalat Division, west of the Indus. In general terms, farms are smaller in the more productive, irrigated areas of the Punjab and Peshawar Vale than elsewhere. 6.07 Despite the very large number of small farms, much of the farm area is in fact in relatively large farms. The 49 percent of farms under five acres account for only 10 percent of the culturable area, while 4O percent is in farms over 25 acres in size. 6.08 The pattern of land tenure also shows considerable variation over the Province. Owner-operated farms account for nearly half the acreage in the Punjab, but only about one-third in the Khairpur Division of the Sind. This reflects the fact that tenancy is more prevalent in the less developed parts of the Province, where large acreages are owned by absentee landowners. Land reform legislation has sought to deal with the problems posed by farms that are either excessively large or excessively small. The right to subdivide land below a mini- mum size designated as an "economic holding" has been limited, and the largest landowners (those with more than 500 acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land) have been required to divest themselves of land in excess of the legal limits. Both kinds of measures have had some success in achieving their objectives, and the strategic position of the larger landlords may have been partially weakened in the process. Efforts to consolidate land holdings which are fragmented have proceeded slowly. It is difficult to relate the recent increase in production directly to the effects of land reform programs., in part, because land reform has had so little measurable impact on the size distribution of land holdings. On the other hand, land reform may be a factor in chang- ing the attitudes of large landowners, and awakening a more active in- terest in improving the productivity of their lands through increased investments, including tubewels and mechanization of farm operations. Fertilizer 6.09 One indication of the responsiveness of farmers to new inputs has been the very rapid increase in use of fertilizer in recent years. During the First Plan Period (195h/55 - 1959/60), fertilizer use grew only some 5,000 nutrient tons. Thereafter, the rise was more spectacular, as shown in the following table. - 76 - Table 20 Fertilizer Use During the Second Plan Period (tons of nutrient) Nitrogen Phosphate Annual Year (N) (P2 Q5) Total Increase () 1959/60 19,300 100 19,400 0.8 1960/61 31,100 00 31,500 62.7 1961/62 37,200 500 37,700 19.7 1962/63 42,900 1,400 44,300 17.5 1963/64 62,400 1,100 63,500 43.3 1964/65 84,000 2,000 86,000 35.4 6.10 This increase in fertilizer use was supported by a Government subsidy. The drop in growth of offtake in 1961-63 coincided with a dec- rease in the rate of subsidy. After reinstatement of full subsidy, con- sumption again grew rapidly. Shortages in supply probably limited use in the final year of the Second Plan to the quantities shown, for there have been pervasive reports of sales of fertilizers at black market prices since 1964/65. Though still small in absolute terms and largely confined to areas of higher standard farming, fertilizer has probably made an important contribution to the growth in production of cash crops, on which applications tended to be concentrated. 6.11 Even though water supplies are unreliable and below the optimum in many areas there would appear to be great scope for raising yields by increasing the use of fertilizer. Increased use of fertilizer will be the most important single factor in bringing about rapid agricultural growth in the near future. Various short-term projections of future fertilizer use have been made in the past and they tend to coincide at an absorp- tion target of about 370,000 nutrient tons by 1969/70 or a rate of growth of well above 30 percent per annum over the next several years. This would imply a further acceleration over the already impressive experience during the Second Plan period. While the actual performance during the first year of the Third Plan (1965/66) does not show a major increase over 1964/65 the recent steps taken by the Government of Iest Pakistan which aim to have some 250,000 nutrient tons available during the current fiscal year would tend to support such an optimistic assessment. How- ever, the problems of production and procurement as well as transpor- tation and actual distribution should not be discounted nor should the influence of price supports be underestimated in an environment where the mass of farmers are still preoccupied with subsistence farming. Con- sidering these difficulties, the major efforts being made to overcome them and the rate of growth of fertilizer usage achieved in the Second Plan, it would appear that the target for 1969/70 of about 350,000 nut- rient tons, equivalent to about 1.6 million tons of fertilizer (ammonium sulphate equivalent), although much above that implied by IACA, as illus- trated by Table 21 , is, nonetheless, reasonable for planning purposes. - 77 - Table 21 Projections of Fertilizer Consumption,by IACA and Bank Group ('000 tons of nutrient) 1964/65 1970 1975 1985 IACA: (TT-Nitrogen 90 120 217 573 (b) Phosphate - 55 103 335 Total 90 175 320 908 Rate of Increase (% p.a.) 104% 13% 11% Bank Group: (a) Nitrogen 90 250 470 620 (b) Phosphate - 100 230 330 Total 90 350 700 950 Rate of Increase (% p.a.) 30% 15% 5% The rate of growth of fertilizer off-take may slow down somewhat during the Fourth Plan period but it should be feasible to maintain an average growth of 15 percent per annum, implying consumption of 700,000 tons of nutrients by 1975. This would again be double the IACAestimate. While a high degree of uncertainty is necessary inherent in all these projects, it would be possible for the West Pakistan authorities to reach these targets provided appropriate arrangements are made for supplies and dis- tribution. After 1975, the growth in consumption would probably slow down. 6.12 Achievement of the Bank Group targets shown in Table 21 would mean reaching by the end of the Third Five Year Plan period somewhat be- yond the coverage and rates of application envisaged by IACA for 1975. The rates of application for each crop shown in the following table have been developed from rates presently recommended by the Department of Agriculture. The projections imply that about half of the fertilizer usage would be for the wheat crop and another quarter for cotton. The projections of area covered and application per acre shown below reveal that the target chosen is ambitious and that its attainment will require determined efforts by all concerned. - 78 - Table 22 IACA's Projection of Fertilizer Coverage by 1975 (in percent of crop acreage covered; applications in lbs of nutrients) Punjab Sind Outside Areas % of crop Application % of crop Application % of crop Application acreage in lbs per acreage in lbs per acreage in lbs per covered cov'd. acre covered cov'd. acre covered cov'd. acre Wheat - nitrogen 50 50 25 50 15 25 phosphatesa/ 50 30 25 25 - - Cotton - nitrogen 60 40 [0 [0 - - phosphates 30 30 20 20 - - Fine Rice - nitrogen 50 30 - - - - phosphates 30 30 - - - - Sugarcane - nitrogen 70 60 50 60 - - phosphates 30 30 15 20 - - Kharif fodder-nitrogen 20 60 20 60 5 10 Rabi fodder-phosphates 20 50 - - - - a/ P205 Improved Seeds 6.13 The use of improved seed material has considerable potential. Probably only in the case of cotton has there been any widespread supply of improved varieties to farmers, and the significance of this improvement is open to doubt since controls on seed selection and protection against adul- teration have not been very effective in all areas. Though it occurred too late to affect production during the Second Plan period, important pro- gress has now been made in developing superior strains of crops, par- ticularly wheat. Since 1959 West Pakistan, in collaboration with Mexican wheat breeding experts supported by the Ford Foundation, has embarked on an active wheat-improvement program. Several higher-yielding varieties have been developed and are in various stages of progress from the re- search stations to commercial multiplication. Presently, imported Mexi- can varieties (Penjamo and Lerma Rojo) are being multiplied while the locally produced Mexipak varieties are expected soon to reach the stage of distribution for commercial production. - 79 - 6.14 The technical yield potential of the newly introduced wheat varieties is given by the wheat-breeding experts as about 45 maunds per acre compared with a current wheat yield in the better farming areas of 13 maunds. Harvesting data for 5,000 acres in the first year of commercial multiplication (1965/66 rabi season) show yields ranging between 26 and 34 maunds under actual farming conditions. Maximum yields exceeded 80 maunds, but the level of yields on some of the ADC seed farms did not even approach those presently achieved with in- digenous varieties in the better farming areas of West Pakistan. A number of causes have been indicated: sub-optimum moisture conditions of the 'seed beds, excessive depth of sowing carried over from practices used with indigenous varieties, seed rates below those recommended for the new varieties, shortage of irrigation water and insufficient number of waterings, and deficient application of fertilizer. It is important to recognize that where there was failure not any one single factor was the cause but to some extent practically all major elements of efficient cultivation practices were lacking. The future success of the accelera- ted wheat-irprovement program is thus not only dependent on the avail- ability of adequate quantities of improved seeds but also on an overall improvement of crop husbandry practices. 6.15 The magnitude of total seed requirements for the major crops at the present time and as projected by IACA for the future is shown in Table 23. Table 23 Seed Requirements for Major Crops (Million maunds) 1965 1975 1985 2000 Wheat 8.90 16.00 18.80 17.80 Cotton 0.90 1.60 2.60 4.00 Rice 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.90 10.50 17.40 22.20 22.70 Actual distribution of improved seed by the Agricultural Department and the Agricultural Development Corporation in 1964/65 was 0.4 million maunds for wheat, 0.3 million maunds for cotton and 0.7 million maunds for rice. Thus improved seed covers only a small proportion of total requirements, except in the case of rice. Large quantities of improved seed will also be re- quired for coarse grains and fodder. 6.16 The projection made by IACA and adopted by the Bank Group is 50 percent coverage of the wheat acreage with improved varieties by 1975 and 100 percent coverage by 1985. Improved wheat seed material of 18.8 million maunds (700,000 tons) will therefore be required by 1985 and - 80 - about half this amount by 1975. Assuming that the seed is produced by the best farmers with an average yield of about 30 maunds per acre of seed material this would require that about 320,000 acres be devoted to improved seed production by 1975; in 1965/66 there were altogether under improved wheat varieties some 12,000 acres. Thus the task is substantial. The wheat breeding experts advising the Government of West Pakistan have predicted even more rapid progress is possible -- coverage of six million acres of irrigated land by 1969/70, implying a need for more than seven million maunds of improved seed material. At least 250,000 acres would be required to produce this quantity of seed. Use of these quantities of improved seed by 1969/70 would certainly be desirable, but it is doubtful whether it is achievable. The production, handling and distribution of such quantities of improved wheat seed would require a crash program for improved extension services, commercialization of multiplication and strict quality control over extensive areas, provision of adequate stor- age facilities to ensure retention of high germination rates, and an extensive and efficient distribution network. 6.17 As regards cotton IACA estimates that about 40 percent of the present acreage is planted with improved seed and that this could be raised to 100 percent by 1975. IACA found in their watercourse studies that typical potton plant populations were less than half the recommended 16,000 plants per acre. The low plant population appeared to be due partly to poor-quality seed and partly to low seed rates, emergence diffi- culties and post-emergency mortality. Thus, in conjunction with improving cotton seed quality IACA projects increasing seed rates and full plant populations; the seed requirements shown in Table 23 are calculated on'the basis of recommended seed rates and plant densities. 6.18 For coarse rice important progress has been made with the development of high yielding dwarf varieties at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines. These varieties are being tested at Dokri Rice Research Station in West Pakistan with apparently good results. The possibilities of large-scale introduction are under con- sideration by the Agricultural Department which plans for a coverage with improved varieties of about one million acres by 1970, roughly equivalent to the target adopted here for 1975. By 1985 IACA would expect improved rice varieties to be in common use. 6.19 Wheat, cotton and rice together with sugarcane are the main crops for which IACA projects an improvement in the quality of seed used. In the case of sugarcane the choice of sets material need improvement as does the planting rate. At present only about half the recommended number of sets is being planted, and most of these are two-node sets while IACA considers three-node sets desirable. Bybrid and synthetic maize varieties have potential for West Pakistan, but they require considerable organizational and scientific support for maintenance breeding as well as large-scale planting in contiguous areas. In general IACA believes that progress in the use of improved seed will occur mainly with wheat and the three main cash crops, as mentioned above, because these are the ones on which farmers will concentrate attention. Use of improved seed will probably increase much more rapidly in the irrigated areas than outside them. - 81 - 6.20 In its review of the IACA projections of the use of improved seed the Bank Group was very conscious of the fact that to measure pro- gress in terms of the amount of improved seed employed could be quite misleading. In the past much of the so-called improved seed has been little if any better than farmers' own stocks. If improved seed is interpreted as meaning seed of high genetic quality, produced and distri- buted under controlled conditions providing a high degree of assurance that it would be true to type, free from adultrants and of high germina- tion, then the Bank Group would feel that IACA's estimates are not unreasonable. The main point is that progress must be measured quali- tatively as well as quantitatively and much depends upon the institutions responsible for production, multiplication and supervision of the distri- bution of improved seed material. Plant Protection 6.21 In the past plant protection has been provided to farmers vir- tually free through the agricultural extension services, but the results have not been too satisfactory. It is estimated that at best some 12 percent of the cropped area has been receiving some form of plant pro- tection, which may or may not have been effective, while as much as 15 percent of the potential yield of crops has been lost each year to pests. There is a shortage of properly trained personnel to carry out this ser- vice, treatments often are neither timely nor of proper dosage, insecti- cides have not been available in adequate quantities at the critical time, and the selection of areas for treatment appears to have been not always based on an objective assessment of the most pressing needs. Some of the problems have been on the side of the farmers too. The elimina- tion of weeds serving as host plants for pests and destruction of crop residues immediately after harvesting is not practiced on a wide scale. Little attention is given to adjusting planting dates in accordance with pest-control needs. 6.22 IACA believes, and the Bank Group agrees, that plant protection measures are unlikely to improve much before the use of fertilizer and better husbandry have become more widespread and yields thus increased. Plant protection will then become recognized as increasingly important. But lack of knowledge on the part of the farmer and the extension service, the critical importance of applying the pesticide at the right time, the need that will arise for pesticides to be properly stored and transported in quantity and the problem of cost sharing between tenant and landlord will be serious constraints on the rate of progress. Therefore IACA has assumed a relatively small increase in the acreage sprayed by 1975, but more general use of chemical control in later years. Table 24 gives a rough assessment of the proportion of the acreage of different crops presently sprayed and IACA's projection of the increase in this propor- tion. - 82 - Table 24 IACA Projection of Plant Protection Coverage (Percent of acreage under crop) 1965 1975 1985 Rice Nurseries 20 45 65 Fine Rice 3 20 40 Coarse Rice 3 5 17.5 Cotton 5 20 40 Sugarcane 5 27.5 47.5 Fruit 25 25 45 Vegetables 10 15 35 Maize 3 7.5 27.5 Kharif fodder - 5 17.5 Oilseeds - 5 20 Wheat - - 10 Rabi fodder - - Gram - Kharif pulses - 10 Agricultural Implements and Mechanization 6.23 Existing farm implements are adapted to local conditions and mostly manufactured from local materials, but there is room for substan- tial improvement in them. Efforts are being made to develop improved hand tools and animal-drawn equipment at research centers and to promote their use with the aid of subsidies. However, in contrast to the rapid spread of private tubewells, the improvement in tools and simple equip- ment appears to be progressing rather slowly. Use of tractors and tractor-drawn equipment is expanding more rapidly but is still confined at present to a few larger farms; it is believed that in the whole of West Pakistan there are only about 6,000 tractors working on farms. 6.24 Mechanization will become more advantageous to farmers as cropping intensities increase. At high cropping intensities farming schedules will be tight and higher labor peaks arise, particularly in the overlap periods between seasons when some crops are still being har- vested and the land is beginning to be prepared for sowing of others. Mechanized cultivation, which is apparently not generally more expensive than bullock farming, has the additional advantages of setting free land devoted to fodder. It also enables timely land preparation which con- tributes to better crop performance. However, there are a number of fac- tors restraining the expansion of mechanization. The farm size problem and its associated financial implications have already been mentioned above. In addition, land fragmentation and the tenure and share-cropping system are likely to be a substantial barrier to rapid mechanization. The small size of individual fields enclosed by irrigation bunds would create physical problems for efficient use of machinery. Furthermore, - 83 - even on larger farms the rapid adoption of mechanized farming would de- pend greatly on the existence of satisfactory service facilities includ- ing adequate supply of spare parts and mechanics. Research is still needed to select the right types of equipment and to develop equipment better suited to local conditions. 6.25 For the purpose of projection IACA has developed a "rate of mechanization" based on a hypothetical percentage of farm area fully mechanized. This would not be the case in practice since mechanization is a progressive process. Initially, mechanization would be partial, concentrating on specific activities such as cultivation and land pre- paration. In its approach IACA has taken this into account and has equated this with full mechanization on a reduced area. The following table shows the coverage and rate of mechanization by farm size groups as projected by IACA for reference years. Table 25 IACA's Projected Rate of Mechanization (Percent of farm area covered) 1975 1985 2000 % of Total Percent Percent Percent Farm Size Farm Area Mechani- Mechani- Mechani- Group in Group zation zation zation Farms above 25 acres 40 20 50 85 Farms 5-25 50 4 10 30 Farms below 5 acres 10 5 10 Total Farm 100 10 25 50 Area To the above percentage coverage IACA has related complete mechanization units -- including a tractor with tilling and mowing equipment, seed drill and thresher, and a trailer and miscellaneous equipment -- costing about PRs 25,000 and capable of serving a cropped area of about 100 acres. The area assumed to be mechanized in Table 25 would require about 33,000, 83,000 and 165,000 such units for the respective reference years. Livestock Development 6.26 Despite the great importance of the livestock sector in total agricultural production in West Pakistan the keeping of animals is haphazard and it plays a subsidiary role in the mixed farming system of the Province. The major part of the livestock population consists of scrub animals with poor genetical qualities. Many of the animals are underfed and depleted. - 84 - Indiscriminate breeding is widely practiced. The rural population appears to be fairly well supplied with milk and milk products, but effective dis- tribution systems for making milk and milk products widely available in the towns are almost nonexistent. 6.27 The projections in Table 25 imply that animals will continue for a long time to be the main source of power on the farm. Even after a farmer has introduced some mechanical equipment -- usually for cultivation and threshing, at the early stages -- he still requires bullocks for operations such as cane crushing and transport, and so it is only when a fuller degree of mechanization has been reached that he can dispense with work animals. Apart from the continuing need for animals for work, more livestock will be required for meeting the demand for milk and meat, which is likely to grow rapidly as population and incomes grow. Moreover, as cropping intensities increase and work animals are called upon to do more work and as improved animal husbandry results in production of more milk and meat per animal, the intake of fodder per animal will be greater. 6.28 The size of the existing livestock herd in West Pakistan is uncertain, but IACA estimated the bench-mark data presented in Table 19' above and projected the growth of the herd. Draught animals are assumed to decline, in rough correspondence with the compensating growth of mechanization, from about 12 million now to about 6 million in 2000. Bullocks are the main component of the animal work force and will remain so. Table 26 illustrates the changes projected. The animal units (AU) used in the table are a common denominator equivalent in terms of total annual fodder consumption to one bullock. The table shows that the projected increase in the number of cattle and buffaloes raised for milk production more than offsets the decline in the number of working bullocks. Sheep and goats, important sources of meat in West Pakistan, also increase though somewhat less rapidly than cows and buffaloes. 6.29 The main producers of milk in West Pakistan at the present time are the 5.4 million buffalo cows, and, as the table shows, IACA projects continued growth of the number of such animals up to about 1985. However in later years the numbers of buffaloes would decline in accor- dance with IACA's recommendation to build up an improved herd of Zebu cows which would eventually become the main source of milk in the Province. The buffalo is at present a greatly superior producer of milk. However the heavy, late maturing buffalo requires more food intake for growth and maintenance than the less heavy and earlier maturing Zebu cow. Moreover the buffalo tends to be a seasonal breeder, resulting in long intercalving periods. There are promising dairy Zebu breeds in West Pakistan such as Sahiwal in Punjab and Red Sindi in Sind, and it is these which would be used as the base of the new milk herd. The very large expansion in the Zebu herd would be brought about by a massive program of artificial insemination of existing cows with semen from selected Sahiwal and Red Sindi bulls. IACA have drafted an outline of such a program, calling for a rapid expansion of the existing artificial insemination organi- zation under the Directorate of Livestock Farms. IACA believes that the program should be started in the near future since it may take 10 - 85 - years to achieve significant progress. Table 26 Composition of Projected Livestock Population 1965 1975 1985 2000 No. of Animal No. of Animal No. of Animal No. of Animal Stock Units Stock Units Stock Units Stock Units (in millions) - - - - - Work Animals Bullocks, adults 7.4 7.40 6.6 6.60 5.6 5.60 3.7 3.70 followers 1.8 1.40 2.3 1.77 2.0 1.54 1.4 1.08 Horses, camels etc.2.4 1.20 2.1 1.05 1.8 0.90 1.0 0.50 11.6 10.0 11.0 9.42 9.4 8.04 6.1 5.28 Milk/Meat Animals Bovines: Milk cow adults 4.4 3.32 3.8 3.11 3.0 2.52 2.0 1.78 Female followers 1.7 1.25 2.4 1.73 1.9 1.35 1.4 0.98 Milk Zebu & followers - - - - 0.7 0.58 7..6 6.76 Buffaloes: Bulls & followers 3.1 3.19 6.4 6.08 10.9 9.92 8.4 7.22 Cows 5.4 6.53 6.9 9.35 9.6 12.97 7.0 10.74 Browsing Animals: Sheep & Goats 17.0 2.77 20.1 3.16 24.7 3.82 27.2 4.15 Poultry Existing desi 10.0 0.13 10.0 0.13 10.0 0.11 10.0 0.10 Improved stock - - 2.4 0.06 7.1 0.24 20.3 0.'68 Total 17.9 23.62 31.51 32.41 Grand Total 27.19 33.04 39.55 37.69 6.30 The projections in Table 26 imply an increase of nearly 40 percent in the total number of animal units between 1965 and 2000. To feed this larger animal population and to supply it with a gradually increasing feed intake over time, IACA has provided for expansion in the acreage of fodder crops. IACA measures animal feed in terms of Total Digestible Nutrients (TDN), which includes fodder, crop residues, and grazing. Part of the increase in feed requirements would therefore be met by crop resi- dues from the increasing volume of crops raised for other purposes. An- ticipated improvements in pasture management and control would also help to supply some of the additional TDN consumed by the larger herds. - 86 - Nevertheless, the acreage under fodder in the canal-commanded areas would have to increase from scme 5.0 million acres now to 6.2 million acres in 1975 and 8.5 million acres by 2000. Total production offodder (including that from areas outside the canal commands) would then double between 1965 and 2000. The consumption of TDN per animal unit would increase from an average of about 1,035 kilos at present to about 1,400 kilos by the year 2000. In- cluded in this would be enough digestible protein to ensure a reasonably balanced diet for the livestock. Improved Farming, Physical Inputs and Water 6.31 The discussions above inevitably emphasized physical targets for increase in the quantities of agricultural inputs and in the live- stock herd. But mere increase in physical quantities by no means neces- sarily implies a commensurate increase in production of crops, milk and meat. Much depends on the quality of the inputs used, as pointed out for instance in the case of improved seed, and of the livestock herd developed; and much depends too on the quality of husbandry practices. Implicit in the Bank Group's projections of development is not only an increase in the physical quantities of inputs absorbed but also a steady improvement of quality -- seed more disease resistant and of higher germination rate, insecticides that are easier to apply and more effective, animals that produce more milk and meat per kilo of TDN consumed. Improvements in quality and effectiveness of use will depend partly on research -- and the Bank Group believes that much more attention should be given to this, especially to research with a prac- tical orientation, as discussed in Chapter IX -- and partly on develop- ment of facilities for production and distribution which are capable of bringing to millions of farmers inputs of improved quality. 6.32 If these larger quantities of better-quality inputs are to be used to maximum effect, improvement of farming practices is essential. Indeed the Bank Group believes that there is scope for large increases in production simply by way of improvement in farming practices, but these improvements will probably come about largely as accompaniments to increased absorption of agricultural inputs and increased use of water. However it may come, it is clear that the basic need is for a much im- proved and expanded.extension effort, capable of providing better advice and assistance to large numbers of farmers. Extension work will indeed be a very critical input, and the Bank Group discusses in Chapter IX below some of the measures that it believes are most urgently needed to improve the effectiveness of the extension service. 6.33 The Bank Group believes that adoption of more advanced and efficient farming techniques, including use of the modern physical aids to productivity, could lead to considerable increases in crop yields even with current water supplies, and it is for this reason that pride of place in this chapter has been given to discussion of the main measures required in this direction. In the past in West Pakistan, and - 87 - still to some extent today, there has been a tendency to overstate the importance of further public water development as a means to secure in- creased agricultural production and to understate the importance of im- proved farming employing more and better :'inputs. The evidence is that typical water applications may now be in the neighborhood-of 80 percent of the full delta irrigation level as defined in Chapter V. The Bank Group believes that this level of irrigation delta, even given the un- reliability of supplies at certain critical-times, is sufficient to sup- port much greater use of other yield-improving inputs than presently ob- tains. Efforts to help farmers get better value from the water they now have are less spectacular than major construction works but in the Bank Group's opinion such efforts can contribute more in the immediatefuture to a broad improvement in farmers' productivity; and the importance of the people responsible for such efforts should be recognized. 6.34 Notwithstanding this opinion the Bank Group recommends that a major effort be made to increase and improve water supplies to farmers. Uncertain irrigation supplies are a serious deterrent to investment and enterprise by farmers at present. Unless this situation is corrected it will inhibit growth in the use of farm inputs. Water, moreover, is an accustomed input, and once it is available in adequate and reliable quan- tity there appears to be greater interest in other new means of increas- ing production. There are thus both technical and psychological complemen- tarities between water and other inputs, as pointed out in Chapter III. Both additional irrigation water and increased use of other agricultural inputs will fill vital gaps in West Pakistan's current agricultural prac- tice. Since few improvement measures can be taken in isolation, and maxi- mum benefits are to be obtained only from a balanced combination of water and other inputs, it is important to avoid thinking of developmental inputs in mutually exclusive terms. Some measures may have to precede others, but there should be an integrated approach to development which calls upon all inputs to play their proper roles in reasonable balance at the approp- riate time. 6.35 Thus the Bank Group considers that the projections of increasing absorption of non-water inputs, though presented independently in the first part of this chapter, are intimately interdependent with the water program presented in this chapter. The program as a whole applies to the period up to the year 2000, but the Bank Group has been particularly concerned with the initial period 1965-75. This is a critical time in Pakistan's develop- ment effort, and being the near future it is also the time for which plans can be more specific. Irrigation Development -- Third Plan Period 6.36 There is an urgent need in West Pakistan for more reliable and greater supplies of irrigation water to enable farmers to extend their cropped acreage and increase their water applications per acre cultivated and to encourage them to absorb farm inputs in larger quantities. Because surface water cannot be increased quickly above existing levels there are only two important ways immediately feasible in which this need can be - 88 - even partially met within the Third Plan period -- public tubewells and private tubewells. 6.37 As regards public tubewells WAPDA has under way a number of pro- jects which add up to a construction program several times the size of what it has accomplished in the past; it is doubtful whether this program can in fact be fulfilled as scheduled and there is certainly very little scope for commencement of additional projects within the Third Plan period. There are four important ongoing public tubewell projects -- SCARP II in Chaj Doab, SCARP III in Thal Doab, SCARP IV in Upper Rechna Doab and the Khairpur groundwater development project. Some 955 wells had been com- pleted in SCARP II by the end of 1966 but none in any of the other areas. Completion of all four projects will require installation of a further 7,183 wells. Table 27 shows approximately WAPDA's schedule for completion of these wells. Table 27 Schedule of Implementation for the Ongoing Public Tubewell Projects (No. of wells completed) Project 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 Total SCARP II 420 630 418 307 100 - 1,875 SCARP III 240 570 495 165 - - 1,470 SCARP IV 110 500 780 790 75 345 3,270 Khairpur 80 200 288 - - - 568 Total 850 1,900 1,981 1,262 845 345 7,183 IACA have suggested deferment of 1,010 wells scheduled for SCARP IV because of extensive private tubewell development in the area which would be served by these wells. This would considerably reduce the peak levels of instal- lation shown for the years 1967/68 and 1968/69 in the above table. Never- theless, even with this adjustment, the program would still amount to about 5,850 wells in the last three and a half years of the Third Plan period or an average of about 1,670 wells per year. This target rate compares to an average performance between 1959 and 1966 of about 450 wells completed per year. The first year of the Third Plan period (1965/66) showed disappoint- ing progress: about 1,000 wells were drilled but only about 140 were elec- trified and brought into operation. Financial and contractual arrangements still have to be made for about half the wells included in the above table. To bring 5,850 new public wells into effective operation before the end of the Third Plan would require increased financial allocations to WAPDA, re- moval of the constraints on electrification, establishment of proper in- ventory system and procurement schedules for electrical distribution equip- ment and supplies, and early establishment of management cadres capable of putting tubewell fields into operation immediately upon completion. For these various reasons the Bank Group considers it doubtful whether the - 89 - ongoing program can be completed as scheduled unless it is given excep- tional priority and the status of an emergency operation. 6.38 The measures needed to step up the rate of implementation of tubewell projects -- particularly those measures listed in the preceding paragraph -- should be taken as a matter of urgency. If implemented immediately the Bank Group believes that completion of about 2,000 wells per annum should become feasible towards the end of the Third Plan. Therefore the program presented here foresees completion by the end of the Third Plan of some 894 wells in projects additional to those included in WAPDA's ongoing program. Table 28 shows the Bank Group/IACA Action Program for the remainder of the Third Plan, including the additional projects, a revised WAPDA schedule for installation of the SCARP IV wells and various other minor changes from the WAPDA schedule of Table 27. All projects with the exception of SCARP III, Wagah and Shorkot-Kamalia would continue into the Fourth Plan period. Table 28 Action Program for Public Groundwater Development During Third Plan (No. of wells installed) 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 SCARP II 420 590 615 580 SCARP III 270 520 465 215 SCARP IV 50 370 565 635 Khairpur 80 200 288 Wagah 95 Shorkot-Kamalia 100 326 Rohri North 140 Panjnad Abbasia 183 Total wells 820 1,680 2,128 2,079 Wagah is a small area (about 50,000 acres canal commanded) lying between the Bambanwala-Ravi-Bedian-Dipalpur Link, as remodeled under the Indus Basin Works, and the Indian border. It has in the past been served by the Upper Bari Doab Cpnal from the Ravi and so it will lose canal supplies when the Indus Treaty is fully implemented. Cpnal supplies in the BRBD Link are required for other areas and transfer of water from the Link in- to this area would anyway involve lift pumping and remodeling of the dis- tributaries. The area is underlain by fresh groundwater and IACA esti- mates that the recharge to the aquifer from surface run-off and seepage from the adjacent link canal would be sufficient for tubewells alone to provide full-delta supplies for a cropping intensity of 150 percent. 6.39 The remaining three projects included in Table 28 are new projects which have been the subject of preliminary feasibility reports by IACA which have in turn been reviewed by the Bank Group. Tables 29 and - 90 - 30 show some of the main technical characteristics of the areas in question and some details of the development proposed. The location of the projects is shown on Map 3 at the end of the chapter. Table 29 New Third Plan Project Areas -- Technical Characteristics Grounwater Quality and Depth (N CCA) CCA Water per Cropped Acre Less than 1000 ppm Above per./nonper. a/ (a.f. per acre) less than more than 1000 ('000 acres) Present Required 10 feet 10 feet ppmiV Shorkot-Kamalia 214/80 2.2 2.8 71% 5% 24% Panjnad-Abbasia 59/819 2.5 3.5 73% 9% 18% Rohri North 598/- 2.6 3.4 37% 38% 25% a/ Perennial/norperennial. b/ All groundwater of mixing quality, except for 13% of Shorkot-Kamalia area. Table 30 New Third Plan Projects -- Proposed Development No. of Rate of Present Worth of Increase Public Cropping Intensity Return to in Production (PRs mln) Wells Present Proposed Project With With Private Project Tubewells Shorkot-Kamalia 426 92% 149% 21% 159 95 Panjnad-Abbasia 1,623 95% 148% 22% 596 288 Rohri North 1,580 95% 145% 16% 329 162 These projects were scheduled early in the proposed program of development largely because they are in a more advanced stage of preparation than most other projects. Nevertheless they are also projects upon whose priority there was a strong degree of unanimity among the results of the various a,nalyses carried out by the Bank Group and its consultants described in Chapter V. 6.40 The Shorkot-Kamalia area lies at the southern tip of Rechna Doab and it includes areas of former river flood plain along the banks of both the Ravi and the Chenab. Part of the area has been irrigated since the 1890's by the Lower Chenab Canal, but much of it has only re- ceived perennial supplies in the last 30 years, chiefly under the small Haveli Project completed in 1939. WAPDA has prepared a public tubewell project, SCARP V, covering the whole of Lower Rechna Doab (some 1.5 - 91 - million acres with 2,300 wells and scheduled to start in fiscal year 1967/68), which would complete the public tubewell coverage of Rechna Doab started with SCARP I and continued with SCARP IV. However Rechna Doab is one of the areas where private tubewells have spread most rapid- ly (there were an estimated 10,500 private wells in the area by 1965) and where chances seem to be good for further rapid growth. To take advantage of this opportunity of easing the burden on the public sector IACA suggested confining public tubewell development initially to the Shorkot-Kamalia portion of SCARP V. In this sector rapid growth of pri- vate tubewells is less likely to occur, farming being less advanced there; moreover there are very serious problems of soil salinity -- some 25 percent of the CCA is affected -- and of waterlogging -- more than 25 percent of the CCA has a water-table depth of less than five feet -- and private wells are unlikely to be able to cope adequately with these problems for a long time to come. Climatically this area is well suited to cotton, but yields are low compared to other areas due to waterlogging and salinity; rice, the other important cash crop in the area, is more tolerant of waterlogging, but yields are again low because climatic con- ditions are unsuitable. Public tubewell development will help to deal with these pressing problems, will enable substantial immediate increases in irrigation supplies since three-quarters of the area is underlain by fresh groundwater and will also provide sufficient water-table control so that additional rabi surface water deliveries, when they become available from Tarbela, can be absorbed without threat of further waterlogging. The tubewells required would all be installed within the Third Plan period. 6.41 Additional rabi surface supplies will particularly be needed in that part of the project area -- about one-quarter -- which is not under- lain by fresh groundwater. To enable these additional quantities of sur- face water to be brought in, a small amount of canal remodeling will be required, and, though this is not scheduled in the program for execution until the early years of the Fourth Plan period it is discussed here be- cause it was included in the cost base for calculation of the rate of return on the whole project shown in Table 30 above. The area for which enlarged canal capacity is required is mainly in the Haveli Oanal Com- mand. IACA estimate that an increase in capacity of about 30 percent will be adequate for the distributaries supplying the 11,000 acres under- lain by groundwater of between 1,000 and 2,000 ppm TDS; the existing channels could be widened and deepened. But very much larger increases in canal capacity will be required in the 50,000 acres underlain by saline water or water that must be mixed with large quantities of surface water before application to the crops, and for these areas IACA recommends con- struction of entirely new channels paralleling the existing ones. The area underlain by water that is totally unusable for irrigation purposes is relatively small -- about 37,000 acres -- and IACA suggests that this would be an appropriate place for a pilot project in tile drainage. How- ever the costs of this work have not been included in the cost base of the project because it would be largely in the nature of an experiment designed to test the feasibility of this type of drainage in the Punjab. - 92 - 6.42 The Panjnad-Abbasia Project covers a much larger area than Shorkot-Kamalia and it would only be started within the Third Plan period, most of the tubewells not becoming operational before the early years of the Fourth Plan. The project area, which is adjacent to the confluence of the Indus with its Punjab tributaries, is one of the chief non-perennial areas originally developed as part of the Sutlej Valley Project. It typifies many of the advantages and disadvantages of that region. It has in the past suffered from severe water shortage because of unreliable river flows and a low priority for surface water allocations. Crop-water requirements are high relative to those elsewhere in the Punjab, because of the southern location of the project area, and Table 29 shows that current average irrigation supplies fall very seriously short of require- ments. The shortage and unreliability of water supplies is reflected in the cropping pattern which has an unusualli7ylarge component of drought- resistant coarse grains such as jowar and bajra. What water is available appears to be concentrated on the main crops -- cotton, for which the area is very well suited, and wheat -- and yields on these crops are com- parable with yields obtained in the perennial areas of the Punjab. More than 80 percent of the project area is underlain by fresh groundwater, but private tubewells have so far grown slowly; there were estimated to be about 600 installed by 1965 or an average of only one well for nearly 1,500 acres of CCA. A small part of the project area is designated peren- nial and rabi surface supplies to that area may become somewhat more regular as a result of the completion of Mangla Dam, but otherwise the shortage and variability of irrigation deliveries will not be substan- tially altered by the Indus Basin Works. Apparently because of its location at the confluence of the rivers Panjnad-Abbasia suffers from a high water table -- groundwater within 10 feet of the surface in more than 80 percent of the area == and severe waterlogging. The proportion of the land affected by soil salinity varies between about 20 percent and 60 percent in different parts of the project area. According to the Bank Group's calculations, public tubewells, supplemented by some additional rabi surface deliveries from Tarbela after the groundwater table has been brought under control by public wells, would enable full irrigation supplies to be provided for an intensity of 148 percent by 1985; private wells, on the other hand, as far as can be foreseen, would only be able to support an intensity of about 114 percent at that date. Hence, as indicated in Table 30, the increase in the net value of agricul- tural production with public wells is anticipated to be more than twice the increase attainable with private wells in present-worth terms. 6.43 To enable attainment of 150 percent cropping intensity over the whole of the project area canal remodeling would be required in about 100,000 acres underlain by groundwater of mixing quality. There are also extensive areas with saline groundwater and high water table adjacent to the project area where, IACA estimates, water supplies could be increased by canal remodeling sufficiently so as to support a cropping intensity at full delta irrigation of 150 percent intensity as compared(t to a present level of 82 percent. The economic analyses carried out by the Bank Group and its consultants suggested quite high priority for this work. However before additional surface water could be absorbed it would be necessary - 93 - to provide for drainage of these high water table areas. IACA believes that the most economical form of drainage for the area would be tubewells discharging into channels which would dispose of the water in the neighbor- ing Thar Desert. This scheme would need considerable investigation before it could be undertaken, but in conjunction with remodeled canals for the saline area and surface storage to provide the necessary rabi supplies it would enable large increases in irrigation supplies and agricultural out- put. Within a few years of commencement of public tubewell irrigation in the fresh groundwater zones in the area, it would also probably become important to provide drainage in the saline zones to prevent migration of saline water and consequent contamination of the fresh groundwater aquifer. Thus drainage and related canal remodeling for the saline zones in the Panjnad-Abbasia area are foreseen in the development program for the Fifth Plan (1975-80), and, as a start to them, canal remodeling for the mixing zone of Panjnad-Abbasia is proposed for the end of the Fourth Plan. Neither the costs nor the benefits of this work, however, are included in the Panjnad-Abbasia Tubewell Project presented. 6.44 Rohri North, the last area proposed for initiation of public tubewell development before the end of the Third Plan period, contrasts in many respects with the areas discussed above. It is one of the most promising areas of the Sind, located on the left bank of the Indus im- mediately south of the ongoing Khairpur tubewell project. The area is designated perennial and irrigation supplies, which are drawn from Sukkur Barrage, vary relatively little from year to year. Rohri Canal is in fact often run somewhat above its design capacity. However irrigation supplies are inadequate for the acreage now cropped; the canal was designed for a kharif cropping intensity of 27 percent, but the exist- ing kharif intensity is about 36 percent. The area includes some of the most extensive areas of fresh groundwater in the Sind. Nevertheless pri- vate tubewells are very few and farming is generally backward. It is estimated that about 60 percent of the farm area or nearly three-quarters of the farms are operated by share-cropping tenants. The landowners generally live away from their lands, and apparently take little interest in their farms. The main cash crops are cotton in summer and oilseeds in winter, but relatively small acreages are devoted to them. However crop yields are rather above the very low averages representative of the Sind and IACA believes that the average cropping intensity could be increased from its current level of about 95 percent with underwatering to about 145 percent with full watering by installation of a public tubewell scheme and some slight additional surface supplies at times when canal capacity is not a constraint. Tubewells alone could provide sufficient water, in combination with current canal deliveries, to reach 150 per- cent intensity in almost all the fresh groundwater areas, but the everage intensity would be held down by the mixing zones where intensities would be severely limited without canal remodeling and this, which would be ex- ceptionally complicated because of the scale of the Rohri Canal, IACA does not recommend until the Fifth Plan period. Surface salinity is not a wide- spread problem in this area so that additional water supplies could be used immediately to grow more crops rather than for land reclamation. Waterlogging is also not a serious problem in most parts, although 4O percent of the area has groundwater within 10 feet of the surface so that the water-table control provided by the public tubewells will be valuable. Despite the generally favorable technical conditions for private tubewell - 94 - development the prevailing situation in the project area is such that pri- vate wells are unlikely to spread rapidly. Nevertheless the Bank Group tested the proposed public project against an accelerated introduction of private tubewells (which were assumed to grow from about 100 in 1965 to about 2,200 in 1975). The public project appeared more attractive than the private project, producing twice as much in terms of present value of the increase in agricultural production. In practice, however, private tube- wells might develop rapidly in certain confined areas -- for instance the blocks where groundwater is fresh and well below the surface, which cover nearly 40 percent of the project area -- and the Bank Group thinks that serious attention should be given to the possibility of encouraging pri- vate development there and concentrating the public effort initially in the hydrologically more complicated parts of the project area. 6.65 The Bank Group believes that a public tubewell program including the initiation of the three projects mentioned above is at the outside limits of what can be accomplished during the Third Plan period. This em- phasizes the crucial need for continued rapid growth of private tubewells. The contribution from the public program alone will be inadequate to sup- port the growth of agricultural production that West Pakistan must have to achieve a high overall growth rate in provincial output. While the performance of the public tubewell program has in the past fallen very far short of expectations despite the high priority it was accorded, pri- vate tubewell development with little Government support achieved an im- pressive rate of progress. As discussed in Chapter II private tubewells added more irrigation supplies during the Second Plan period than the pub- lic efforts as a whole. In view of the relative performances in the past, the need to ration the deployment of public resources, the urgency of improving agricultural growth, and the desirability of fostering private initiative amongst farmers, any lack of emphasis on continued private de- velopment at least for the time being would appear inconsistent with the needs of the situation. 6.46 IACA's overall projection of the total number of private tube- wells that will be installed appears modest in the light of past ex- perience. Their figures, adjusted in the light of information recently available regarding the situation that existed in 1965, would suggest that the number of private tubewells in existence would increase from about 34,000 in 1965 to about $5,500 in 1970. In their projection they made allowance for the fact that public wells will gradually be replacing private wells and that announcement of a forthcoming public tubewell project for an area will tend to slow down the rate of installation of new private wells there. In absolute terms the IACA figures imply that the average annual increase would drop from more than 5,000 wells during the Second Plan period to slightly more than 4,000 wells in the Third Plan. Recent preliminary esti- mates indicate that the total number of private wells installed in the northern zone alone between 196$ and 1966 exceeded 8,400 of which about 7,900 were apparently new wells while the remainder were replacements. While there may be a gradual slowing down of private tubewell development, and there is some indication that areas where private development has already been most active may be approaching a "saturation point", it is reasonable to expect that further extension can be brought about by public stimulation and en- couragement, as envisaged in the Third Five Year Plan documents. Assuming that active support for private development is forthcoming and that any undue competition by public groundwater development is carefully avoided, the Bank Group sees no reason why an average annual rate of installation of about - 95 - 6,500 wells, achieved at the end of the Second Plan period, should not be maintained during the Third Plan period. This would bring the total number of private wells in operation to 66,500 by 1970. 6.47 The need for such development is emphasized by the following table, which shows the maximum contributions to irrigation supplies in 1969/70 that can be expected from the public tubewell program, as resched- uled, and from the number of private wells projected by IACA and compares them with the amounts of groundwater shown by the sequential analysis to be required to meet irrigation requirements in that year under mean-year hydrological conditions. Table 31 Groundwater Pumped During Third Five Year Plan Period if Action Program is Carrie'd Out 1965/66 1969/70 Canal Canal Commanded Outside Commanded Outside No. of Tubewells in Operation Area Area Area Area Public 2,900 - 9,600 - Private 29,000 5,000 46,500 9,000 Estimated Annual Pumpage in MAF Public 2.7 - 10.2 - Private 7.0 1.0 9.0 1.8 TOTAL 9.7 1.0 19.2 1.8 Private as percent of total 72% 100% 47% 100% Requirement as calculated in the Sequential Analysis 9.6 - 21.7 - It is anticipated that about 9,000 of the private wells projected by IACA for 1969/70 would be located outside the canal commands. The private - wells within the canal commanded areas should deliver about 9.0 MAF. The number of public wells shown in Table 31 is the maximum that could be-ex- pected to be installed by 1970 if the recommended program were fully adhered to. It would appear, therefore, that continued private groundwater develop- ment on about the scale presently experienced is imperative in the short run if the essential growth in agricultural production is to be achieved. The Bank Group would strongly suggest that the Pakistan authorities implement policies conducive to rapid private tubewell development as a matter of urgency. The improvement of existing institutional support, in particular credit facilities, technical advice, and counsel for cooperative ownership and utilization, should be given high priority (see further Chapter IX). Financial resources required for such support would be small compared to the savings to the public sector that would accrue from avoidance of an over-extended public tubewell program and from the ability that the Province --hould develop to meet its own food requirements and forego imports. - 96 - 6.48 There are two other major public projects in the water sector which are included in the Bank Group's program for commencement before the end of the Third Plan period. One is the Sukh Beas Drainage Scheme, for which IACA has prepared a project report on the basis of a proposal by the Government of Pakistan, and the other is the Left Bank Outfall Drain which has been proposed by LIP for the Sind but for which no project report is yet available. Both are large projects which will take many years to execute, especially the Left Bank Outfall, and it is important to start them early. 6.49 The purpose of the Sukh Beas Scheme is to permit reclamation of waterlogged lands and to prevent further waterlogging and flood damage caused by surface run-off in the upper and central parts of the Bari Doab. The main element of the project would be the canalization of the old bed of the Beas River, but a substantial part of the cost would be in the extension and remodeling of branch drains discharging into Sukh Beas. The course of the proposed 327-mile long drain runs from Kasur in Lahore District diagonally across Bari Doab to the Chenab River near Jalalpur Pirwala in Multan District. The catchment area is about 3.3 million acres bordering on the Dipalpur, Pakpattan and Mailsi canals on the east, and the Lower Bari Doab main canal on the west. The drain would have a discharge capacity of 462 cusecs at the head and 2,263 cusecs at the tail. Construction, including completion of field drains, is estimated to take nine years. IACA estimated the agricultural benefits of the project by comparing the flood damage which would occur with the provision of surface run-off drainage against the damage likely to occur without such provision. In this way IACA has established, on the basis of agricultural benefits alone, a rate of return of about 15 percent and a benefit/cost ratio of 1.8. The Bank Group considers the project to be of high priority. It would help protect crops from flood damage in one of the most productive areas of the Province and would support private as well as later public, tubewell development. To the extent that the reduction in prolonged flooding of large agricultural areas would reduce the recharge to the groundwater aquifer, the project would also contribute to the control of the water table in large parts of Bari Doab. 6.50 The Left Bank Outfall Drain, the first stage of a large drainage complex proposed by LIP for the Sind, would carry some surface run-off, particularly from areas south of Nawabshah (see Map 1 in Chapter I), but its main purpose would be to remove to the sea saline subsoil drainage water from the greater part of the Indus Left Bank south of Sukkur. It would have an overall length of 257 miles stretching from near Khairpur to the Rann of Kutch and would provide a maximum dis- charge of 15,000 cusecs. The cost has been estimated by the LIP consul- tants at PRs 610 million, exclusive of the branch and lateral drainage system. The massive scale of the works in this project, involving a construction period of some 16 years, necessitates an early start and because effluent disposal works would need to be available by the time drainage wells in saline groundwater areas come into operation, the Bank Group has concurred with the LIP consultants' proposals for construction to start in 1968. This would mean that a rapid program of studies and site investigations must now be undertaken. - 97 - Irrigation Development -- Fourth Plan Period 6.51 The principal objective of irrigation development in the Fourth Plan period, as during the Third Plan, must be to supply more water to the farmers in areas where it can be used to greatest immediate advantage and to deliver it to the land in a manner which is timely and suited to the crop calendar. Subsidiary to this objective, but not without importance, are two other considerations directly related to the'fact that Tarbela is due to be completed at the end of the Fourth Plan. First, the drainage capacity of the land, especially in those areas which already have a high water table, needs improvement before additional supplies of irrigation water can safely be accepted on a long-term basis. Second, irrigation developments should be consistent with gradual movement towards the kind of integrated use of all water resources, which was described in Chapter IV and which will become increasingly important in later years when water resources are more fully used. 6.52 In public tubewell development during the Fourth Plan period the first job will be to complete the projects started before 1970. The top of Table32 shows the four projects which, according to the recommended program, will be ongoing in 1970: SCARP II, SCARP IV, and two of the new projects discussed above in connection with the Third Plan -- Rohri North and Panjnad Abbasia. In these four projects alone there will be more than 4,800 wells to be completed during the Fourth Plan, on the present schedule, If these projects are assured of com- pletion on schedule, then consideration would be given to further projects. If, in addition, private-well performance in the various areas appears likely to be as projected here and WAPDA seems able to commit itself firmly to completion of an average of 2,200 wells a year, then the Bank Group believes that the remainder of the schedule presented in Table 32 is wcrthy of serious ccnsideration. Table 32 Action Program for Public Groundwater Development During Fourth Plan (Number of wells installed) 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 SCARP II 305 SCARP IV 600 600 450 Rohri North 360 360 360 360 Panjnad Abbasia 540 500 400 Dipalpur above BS Link 130 360 140 Shujaabad 165 360 200 Ravi Syphon Dipalpur Link 170 360 250 Fordwah Sadiqia 150 360 155 Rohri South 230 360 360 Bahawal Qaim 210 360 Begari Sind 180 360 Dipalpur below BS Link 90 360 Sukkur Right Bank 180 Initiation of New Projects 180 540 2,100 2,350 2,290 1,990 2,315 - 98 - However, the Bank Group believes that further experience with private develop- ment may well justify some rephasing of this program. If new projects are to be ready for commencement at the beginning of the Fourth Plan detailed project preparation, which would normally take about two years before the start of construction work and therefore three years before the first wells come on stream, will have to start in the near future. The Bank Group's analysis indicates that highest priority in the preparation of Fourth Plan projects should be accorded to Rohri South, Fordwah Sadiqia and Bahawal Qaim. Decision on the Bari Doab projects -- Dipalpur, Shujaabad and Ravi Syphon-Dipalpur -- should be made in the light of further experience with private development. The Sukkur Right Bank and Begari Sind projects, both in the Lower Indus, would appear appropriate for execution late in the Fourth Plan. These projects are shown on Map 3 at the end of the chapter. 6.53 Fordwah Sadiqia and Bahawal Qaim projects are contiguous with one another as well as with Panjnad Abbasia and constitute a narrow strip of land, not more than about 20 miles wide, extending some 200 miles along the left bank of the Sutlej River. They represent parts of four canal commands originally developed under the Sutlej Valley Project. IACA defined the project areas to include those portions of these canal commands which, largely because of their proximity to the river, are under- lain by usable groundwater. Like other parts of the Sutlej Valley Project these areas suffer from inadequate and unreliable canal deliveries. Conditions are quite suitable for private groundwater development but the installation of private wells has not attained a pace to compare with that in the neighboring Bari Doab. IACA estimated that in 1965 about 10 per- cent of the canal-irrigated area was receiving supplemental supplies from private tubewells. The standard of farming and average crop yields are also somewhat below those in Bari Doab. Though the area is very suitable for cotton, only about 7-8 percent of the canal-commanded acreage is devoted to cotton and average cotton yields are some 15-30 percent below the average attained in the main cotton growing areas of the Punjab. Drought-tolerant jowar and bajra are important kharif crops, especially in Bahawal Qaim. Coarse rice has become important in Fordwah Sadiqia because of the high water table -- within 10 feet of the surface over more than half the project area -- despite climatic conditions which are not very favorable. As a result of under-irrigation and high water tables there are areas of severe salinity; the problem is worse in Fordwah Sadiqia, where nearly 17 percent of the land is believed to be waterlogged waste and there are additional areas affected by soil salinity. Table 33 gives some details of the existing technical conditions and the proposed public tubewell development in the two areas. - 99 - Table 33 Proposed New Fourth Plan Project Areas -- Sutlej Left Bank Technical Characteristics Groundwater Quality & Depth Water per (7o CCA) CCA cropped acre Less than 1000 ppm Above Per./nonper.a/ (af/acre) Less than More than 1000 ('000 acres) Present Required 10 ft. 10 ft. ppm Fordwah-Sadiqia 61/298 2.0 3.0 32% 3h% 34% Bahawal Qaim 167/355 2.2 3.1 7% 57% 36% Proposed Development Present Worth of Increase in Production No. of Rate of (PRs mln.) Public Cropping Intensity Return to With With Private Wells Present Proposed Project Project Tubewells Fordwah-Sadiqia 665 81 145 30% 302 87 Bahawal Qaim 924 85 146 34% 431 117 a/ Perennial/nonperennial. 6.54 The contrast between the groundwater conditions in these two areas makes a difference to their development potential. Nearly two-thirds of each area are underlain by fresh groundwater, and the Bank Group believes that the number of private tubewells installed in each area might, in the absence of public development, increase some 300 percent by 1975 and 400 percent by 1985. In neither case would private tubewells be able to pump more than about half of annual recharge. Whereas this would make it imprudent to deliver any more surface water, when it becomes available from Tarbela, to Fordwah Sadiqia with its already high water table it would matter much less in the case of Bahawal Qaim where the water table is below 10 feet over more than 90 percent of the area. According to IACAts judgment, substantial quantities of Tarbela water could safely be delivered to Bahawal Qaim. In that case, with private tubewell development, Babawal Qaim might be raised to a full delta cropping intensity averaging 125 per- cent by 1985, but Fordwah Sadiqia could only be raised to about 96 percent by that time. Public tubewell development, on the other hand, would raise both areas to cropping intensities in the neighborhood of 145 percent average, but in Bahawal Qaim it would also leave available for use else- where most of the Tarbela water. The various economic analyses reflected these technical differences. All concurred in showing high priority for the Fordwah Sadiqia project. But the benefits of the Bahawal Qaim project were found to be sensitive to the assumptions made regarding the feasibil- ity of altering surface water allocations and regarding the value of surface water released from the project area. In the proposed program the project is scheduled for completion at a time when the overall avail- ability of surface water would be a less severe constraint; so that the - 100 - rate of return given in Table 33, which includes the benefits from the saving in surface water, is to some extent an overstatement. The Bank Group therefore concluded that Fordwah Sadiqia was a priority project for early execution and that while Bahawal Qaim was also fully worthy of inclusion in the program it should be scheduled one year later. 6.55 In the Lower Indus area the recommended program includes three tubewell projects for initiation during the Fourth Plan period -- one, Rohri South, of relatively high priority and proposed for commencement early in the Plan, and two, Begari Sind and Sukkur Right Bank, of somewhat lower priority and presently scheduled later in the period. The table below gives some details regarding these project areas and the development proposed. Table 34 Proposed New Fourth Plan Project Areas -- Lower Indus Technical Characteristics Groundwater Quality & Depth Water per (o CCA) CCA cropped acre Less than 1000 ppm Above Per./nonper.a/ (af/acre) Less than More than 1000 ('000 acres) Present Required 10 ft. 10 ft. ppm Rohri South 528/- 2.6 3.5 4% 72% 24% Begari Sind -/349 2.4 3.2 90% 10% - Sukkur Right Bank 232/41 3.1 3.2 58% 1% 4l% Proposed Development Present Worth of Increase in Production No. of Rate of (PRs mln.) Public Cropping Intensity Return to With With Private Wells Present Proposed Project Project Tubewells Rohri South 1,500 83 132 23% 342 118 Begari Sind 880 80 150 14% 180 41 Sukkur Right Bank 820 111 150 16% 178 52 Perennial/nonperennial. Less than 1,200 ppm in case of Begari Sind. The Rohri South project area, over 500,000 acres canal-commanded area, covers the lower half of the existing Rohri Canal Command on the left bank of the Indus and extends from the site of the proposed Sehwan Barrage to Hyderabad. It shares many of the same problems as Rohri North which was discussed above in connection with the Third Plan: very heavy dependence on share cropping, prevalence of absentee landlords, canal supplies that are fairly reliable since they come from Sukkur but very inadequate in total quantity, and almost complete lack of private tubewell development. Rohri South actually fares somewhat worse than Rohri North for canal supplies, partly as a natural consequence of being at the tail of the Rohri Canal and partly due - 101 - to problems of siltation and canal regime. The water shortage restrains the rabi intensity which is lower than that in the North and it causes water applications in kharif to be below the optimum. Crop water requirements in the area are relatively high because of its southerly location. Nevertheless the area has some advantages, Problems of waterlogging and salinity are minimal, being confined to barely two percent of the area. Three-quarters of the irrigated land is underlain by fresh groundwater and the remainder by water between 1,000 and 2,000 ppm that can be mixed with surface supplies. Rohri South has the reputation of being the best cotton area in the Sind and nearly a quarter of the land is sown to cotton each year; yields, at about 2.8 maunds of lint per acre, are not high but they compare favorably with other parts of the Sind. Oilseeds, mainly for export to East Pakistan, and wheat are the main rabi crops and yields on these crops too are relatively high. It is clear that the main irrigation need in this area is simply for increased supplies of water. Water supplies can be greatly increased merely by installing tubewells, but this is one of the areas where even in the fresh groundwater zones tubewells alone will not provide sufficient water for 150 percent intensity at full delta. Canal remodeling will be needed and is planned in connection with the Sehwan-Manchar Project in the 1980's. In the meantime the proposed public tubewell project could raise the project area to 132 percent intensity. Maximum effort should be made in the years before it starts (it could start in 1970) to get private enterprise to carry part of the burden by installing wells in the very extensive areas which are technically ideally suited for private well development. Should private development succeed, then the Bank Group would suggest to redesign and limit the public project to the areas less well suited for private development. 6.56 :Begari Sind and Sukkur Right Bank areas, both on the right bank of the Indus and adjoining one another at the city of Sukkur, contrast in many respects with Rohri South. From a technical point of view they belong to a slightly later stage of development: the main need in these areas is for drainage, though more reliable water supplies could also help, and in both areas there are very extensive areas which are heavily salt affected and will need a major reclamation effort. Both areas include the usable groundwater portions of the canal commands in this area. Most of Sukkur Right Bank is commanded from Sukkur, while Begari Sind area has only been transferred from reliance on inundation canals much more recently, with the completion of Gudu Barrage in 1962. Coarse rice is the most important single crop in both areas, especially in Sukkur Right Bank where it occupies about 95 percent of the acreage cultivated in kharif. The standard of rice husbandry is relatively good. Average rice yields are among the highest in the Province, but they do vary greatly among farms, mainly due to the un- certainty of water supply and shortage of labor at the critically important transplanting stage. In Begari Sind the shortage of water under inundation canal conditions for meeting the highly peaked requirements of rice was minimized in the past in some of the area by planting cotton which requires about the same total quantity of water but spread over a much longer period. Nevertheless cotton yields are very low, partly because of the predominantly high water table conditions. As the water table is lowered and better seed, better plant protection and more fertilizer come to be used, IACA has indicated that cotton will probably become a relatively more attractive crop and so they project a large increase in the acreage devoted to cotton - 102 - and a reduction in the acreage devoted to coarse rice. However, substantial increases in cropping intensity will only come about with reclamation -- some 35 percent of Sukkur Right Bank and 45 percent of Begari Sind are totally unused at present, mainly because of severe soil salinity and much of the land that is cultivated is affected by yield reducing salinity. Eventually it will be possible, without any canal remodeling, to make the nonperennial portions of the project areas perennial and to raise the annual cropping intensity to 150 percent, but the process will inevitably be slow and so the returns to these public tubewell projects are rather low compared to some others recommended. Private tubewells, on the other hand, appear incapable of providing adequate water-table control and the increase of production attainable with them would likely be only a fraction of what could be reached with public development. Water-table control is needed here more urgently than almost anywhere else, and whether or not this can begin to be provided during the Fourth Plan will depend greatly on the rate at which WAPDA can speed up its execution of tubewell projects and on the extent to which private enterprise can take over the development of easier areas for groundwater development. 6.57 There are four project areas in the Bari Doab which have been identified for possible development during the Fourth Plan period. They include some two million acres of canal-commanded area or about one-third of the total in the Doab, but they have been selected in such a way as to cover almost two-thirds of the area in the Doab having groundwater within 10 feet of the surface. The most northern of the project areas, Ravi Syphon Dipalpur Link Command, within the boundaries of which lies the city of Lahore, is one of the oldest areas of canal irrigation in the Province, having been supplied in the past mainly from the Upper Bari Doab Canal (called the Central Bari Doab Canal in Pakistan since Partition) with headworks at Madhopur on the Ravi; it is a perennial area. As the name of the area implies, the canal which commands it represents the last stretch of the Bombanwaba-Ravi-Bedian-Dipalpur Link and after 1970 it will draw all surface water supplies from the Chenab through this Link. Most of the remainder of the area identified for possible development in the Fourth Plan period is nonperennial and, apart from some 250,000 acres supplied from Sidhnai Barrage, it is almost entirely Sutlej Valley Project area on the right bank of the Sutlej, which after 1970 will also depend entirely on the links for surface water supplies. The table below gives some details of the four areas and of the public development projects studied. Table 35 Possible New Fourth Plan Project Areas -- Bari Doab Technical Characteristics Groundwater Quality & Depth Water per (% CCA) CCA cropped acre Less than 1000 ppm Above Per./nonper.a/ (af/acre) Less than More than 1000 ('000 acres) Present Required 10 ft. 10 ft. ppm Dipalpur above BS -/372 2.1 2.6 54% 38% 8% Shujaabad 33/346 2.4 3.2 65% 15% 20% RSD Link 595/- 1.5 2.3 10% 33% 57% Dipalpur below BS -/611 2.2 2.6 8% 51% 41% a/ Perennial/nonperennial. - 103 - Table 35 (continued) Possible New Fourth Plan Project Areas -- Bari Doab (continued) Present Worth Public Development of Increase in Production No. of Rate of (PRs mln.) Public Cropping Intensity Return to With With Private Wells Present Proposed Project Project Tubewells Dipalpur above BS 630 74 150 25% 150 150 Shujaabad 725 95 149 31% 259 178 RSD Link 780 113 150 25% 301 301 Dipalpur below BS 850 83 150 36% 192 192 Except in the Ravi Syphon Dipalpur Link Command, with its perennial canal supplies, existing cropping intensities are low compared with the Bari Doab average of 102 percent. Nevertheless in all these areas very substantial private tubewell development has taken place, so that by 1965 there was an average of one private well to about 400 or 500 acres and private wells together with Persian wheels are estimated to have been supplying between one-quarter and one-third of total water supplies -- and a much higher pro- portion of course in the rabi season. Between 20 and 25 percent of the land in each area is receiving supplemental supplies from private tubewells. One-half to two-thirds of the rabi cropped acreage is devoted to wheat. Fodder to support the large livestock population of the Doab is important in both seasons in all the project areas, but especially in Ravi Syphon Dipalpur Link and Shujaabad because of their proximity to the major cities of Lahore and Multan, respectively, where fodder is required for Tonga horses, etc. Rice, mainly of low quality, and cotton are the two other important kharif crops, but as waterlogging and salinity are removed, the different canal commands will probably distinguish themselves more clearly, those in the North increasing their cotton acreage and devoting more land to fine rice which is much more profitable than coarse rice but susceptible to soil salinity and those in the South concentrating to an even greater extent than they do now on cotton in kharif. 6.58 There is every prospect that private tubewells will continue to develop rapidly in the Bari Doab to support these increased cropping inten- sities and to provide water for the absorption of more fertilizer and other inputs. The Bank Group believes that, even in these somewhat more difficult areas which have been delineated as possible projects, private tubewells might spread, given proper stimulus, in the zones underlain by usable groundwater rapidly enough to reach an average density of one well for about every 120 acres by 1975. This would represent a considerably more rapid rate of development of private wells than envisaged by IACA. The Bank Group also believes that private tubewells at this density would be able to pump annual recharge in all the project areas except Shujaabad. And even in Shujaabad the private wells might be able to provide sufficient water table control to permit absorption, as in the other areas, of the same amount of additional surface water, mainly in rabi, as could be absorbed with public groundwater development. The result would be that average cropping intensities could be raised, entirely by private - 104 - groundwater exploitation, to about the same level as could be reached with public groundwater development, except in the case of Shujaabad where the smaller contribution to be anticipated from private groundwater development would limit the full delta cropping intensity to about 126 percent. Since yield growth vould not be expected to differ much with public or private groundwater development provided sufficient effort was made to support the growth of private tubewells with an expanded agricultural extension service, credit, and improved supply of fertilizer, better seed, etc., the increase in production should be of the same order of magnitude with private tubewell growth at this rapid rate as with a public tubewell project, as implied by Table 35. 6.59 The real prospects for this kind of private development will become clearer towards the end of the Third Plan. It will likely differ somewhat among canal commands, and even if the prospects turn out most favorable there will still remain a large amount of irrigation work to be undertaken by the public sector in the Bari Doab during the Fourth Plan. The main construction work on the Sukh Beas Drainage Scheme, introduced above in discussion of the Third Plan, will take place during the Fourth Plan. Attainment of a 150 percent cropping intensity in Ravi Syphon Dipal- pur Link Command, whether with public or with private tubewells, will depend on canal remodeling in some 330,000 acres underlain by groundwater which is either too saline to be used on the crops or requires mixing. Canal capacity is severely limited in this canal command, being one of the old perennial areas, and all analyses have agreed in giving especially high priority to canal remodeling in the mixing zones although the restraining effects of lack of canal capacity on growth of cropping intensity would be much less severe there than in the unusable groundwater zones. 6.60 There are also considerable variations among the technical characteristics of the different project areas and these will call for varying degrees of public assistance in the improvement of irrigation, whether or not the full public projects outlined are undertaken. The area which most of the technical and economic analyses showed to be least in need of a public tubewell scheme out of the four was Dipalpur below the Balloki-Suleimanke Link, Some 60 percent of the area is underlain by fresh groundwater and the remainder by usable groundwater. Canal capacity is already sufficient to provide enough water, in conjunction with tubewell supplies, to reach an effective average cropping intensity of 150 percent. Soil salinity is confined to very small areas. The water table is less than 10 feet from the surface in about 28 percent of the area, which is considerably less than in the other proposed projects. IACA recognized that it might be preferable to postpone public development of this project. However, they proposed that the portion of the project area with a high water table might be brought under public development earlier, and the Bank Group recognizes that early public development might be required in order to secure proper mixing in the 40 percent of the area underlain by groundwater between 1,000 and 3,000 ppm, which also contains most of the land with high water table. Dipalpur above the Balloki-Suleimanke Link is more seriously affected by high water table -- within 10 feet of the surface over some 55 percent of the area and perhaps as much as 70,000 acres effectively waterlogged -- but almost the entire area is underlain - 105 - by fresh groundwater which can be directly used. There the greater problem, solution to which will certainly require public assistance is reclamation of salt-affected land; a large portion of the project area is affected by salinity and while simple addition to water supplies will help to deal with this, about 125,000 acres will require major reclamation efforts if the projected cropping intensities are to be reached. In the Ravi Syphon Dipalpur Link, to the west, soil salinity is much less widespread but 45 percent of the area is underlain by groundwater of mixing quality and 12 percent by groundwater in excess of 3,000 ppm; the consequent need for canal remodeling was already referred to, and at a later stage, probably soon after 1975, drainage by shallow tubewells or by tile drains will be required. Shujaabad was the only one of the four areas which did not appear capable of reaching the same cropping intensity and increase in output with accelerated private development as with public groundwater development, but the differences were not very large. Being situated at the confluence of the Ravi and Chenab, the project area suffers severely from high water table -- within 10 feet of the surface over about three-quarters of the area and about 100,000 acres effectively waterlogged. In about 20 percent of the area groundwater would require mixing. Nevertheless private development has been rapid and there would appear to be considerable opportunities for its extension. Therefore the Bank Group concluded that while the prevalence of high water table and the extensive areas affected by salinity might be dealt with most effectively by a public project, with its more efficient drainage capability, nevertheless this,like the other areas selected in the Bari Doab, was an area which it might be prudent to omit from the public tubewell program if that program had to be cut back. 6.61 The public tubewell projects recommended above and the surrounding discussions of the projects and of private tubewell development in the same areas are the outcome of the basinwide survey and the various technical and economic analyses -- both basinwide and project specific -- described in Chapter V above. The basinwide economic analyses, using standardized data for each potential project area, did suggest that high priority for public groundwater development attached to certain areas not included in the final recommended program. There was a number of reasons for exclusion of these areas -- such as lack of data or doubt about the validity of the data used, uncertainty as to the feasibility of the development recommended by the economic analysis, and the fact that the economic analyses sometimes used areal units which were impractical to develop alone or were rather large so that they included some areas of relatively low priority along with others of very high priority. The various economic analyses agreed in giving high priority, for instance, to the small Peshawar Canal Commands -- largely due to the high-value crops which are widely grown there. Development in these areas was deferred in the recommended program until after 1975 because of lack of knowledge about aquifer conditions in the area and because what evidence is available suggests that well drilling is difficult there. The economic analyses also tended to show quite high priority for public tubewell development in the canal commands in the Thal and Indus Right Bank area -- Thal, D.G. Khan and D.I. Khan (Paharpur). For these areas, too, data are severely lacking and what data were available were of dubious quality. Moreover the canal systems in these areas are still under development and, as pointed out in Chapter II, natural conditions are not - 106 - very favorable to irrigated agriculture. Extensive land leveling is required in Thal before efficient use of surface water supplies will become possible, and the sandy soils have poor water-retention qualities. Infrastructure, such as communications and markets, are only now under development, and the areas are thinly populated. Some of the analyses suggested priority for much wider areas in Lower Rechna Doab and Loicer Bari Doab than have been included in the final program; large portions of these areas were excluded not because they have poor potential but precisely because they have such good potential that extensive groundwater exploitation will likely be undertaken by private enterprise. The small southerly portions of these areas where rapid private development seem less likely -- Shorkot-Kamalia in Rechna and Shujaabad in Bari Doab -- were tentatively included in the recommended program, but with reservations in the case of Shujaabad as discussed above. 6.62 The tubewell projects constitute the most critical part of the recommended public investment program for irrigation development during the Fourth Plan period and account for some 50 percent of the cost, but there are also developments proposed in canal remodeling and in drainage. The canal remodeling is primarily for the purpose of supplying the additional quantities of surface water required in several areas where mixing is required and partly to increase supplies in some saline areas contiguous with the project where tile drainage would be introduced simultaneously. Some of the projects proposed in these fields have been discussed earlier in connection with the tubewell projects: canal re- modeling in Panjnad Abbasia, Ravi Syphon-Dipalpur Link and Shorkot Kamalia and tile drainage in Shorkot Kamalia. The surface drainage schemes, Sukh Beas and Lower Indus Left Bank, on which considerable expenditures would be incurred in the Fourth Plan period, were also discussed earlier in connection with the Third Plan. Both of these projects are proposed for starting as soon as possible, say, 1968. There would also be a number of other minor canal and drainage works which are ongoing. None of the specific proposals in canal remodeling and tile drainage listed in the table below could be underway until about 1969 and therefore have been included for execution during the Fourth Plan period. Table 36 Specific Project Proposals -- Canal Remodeling & Tile Drainage Canal Remodeling (000 acres) Tile Drainage ('000 acres) Khairpur East & West 454 Shorkot Kamalia 40 Panjnad Abbasia 100 Lower Bari Doab 70 Ravi Syphon Dipalpur Link 330 Tando Bago 90 Lower Bari Doab 70 Khairpur East 120 Shorkot Kamalia (Haveli) 60 Kalri Baghar 30 1,014 350 - 107 - 6.63 Both canal remodeling and tile drainage are recommended for Khairpur as an extension of the ongoing public tubewell project there. The various economic analyses undertaken showed higher priority for canal remodeling elsewhere, but practical considerations recommend execution of this work. After the Khairpur Project was started it was found that much of the groundwater was less saline than had*been anticipated so that it could be used for irrigation provided it was mixed with surface water. IACA agreed with the LIP consultants that Khairpur, with a project team and facilities already in existence there, would be a good place for a first attempt at the difficult task of large-scale canal remodeling in the Sind. The program also includes tile drainage accompanying canal remodeling in a small area -- some 70,000 acres -- at the head reach of the Lower Bari Doab Canal. This project is intended primarily as a pilot project in tile drainage in the Punjab. The area proposed lies on the left bank of the Lower Bari Doab Canal and is a saline groundwater zone with shallow water table. The effluent would be disposed of into the Lower Bari Doab Canal. The other two areas listed for tile drainage are in two Ghulam Mohammed Barrage commands in the Sind and the projects pro- posed are essentially pilot projects in this type of drainage, which may later become very important in the extensive saline groundwater zones of the Sind. 6.64 The recommended program for the Fourth Plan period also includes a small allocation of PRs 75 million for flood protection works. IACA's analysis suggested that there was no justification for major works designed solely to provide protection from floods. Nevertheless they recognized the need for some works, especially as development proceeds and the damage that can be done by floods consequently becomes more severe. The specific projects undertaken will be guided by the work of the West Pakistan Flood Commission which is preparing a flood control plan for the Province. The Bank Group also foresees the possibility of continued rapid growth of private tubewells in several areas. The main new private tubewell invest- ments during the Fourth Plan are expected to occur in the portions of Bari and Rechna Doabs not included in the public program and in the Indus Right Bank and Lower Indus regions. Considerable replacement investment might also be required in areas already covered by private tubewells and not brought within the public program. In areas where public tubewell programs are carried out, private tubewells probably would not be replaced as they wear out. Therefore, according to the Bank Group estimates, the total number of private tubewells in existence in 1975 might on balance be no larger than the number existing in 1970. 6.65 The following table illustrates the change in the number of public and private wells and in their contribution to total water supply between 1970 and 1975, assuming implementation of all proposed public tubewell projects on schedule. - 108 - Table 37 Groundwater Pumping During Fourth Five Year Plan Period if Action Program is Carried Out 1969/70 197/75 Canal Canal Commanded Outside Commanded Outside Area Area Area Area No. of Tubewells in Operation Public 9,600 - 20,700 - Private 46,500 9,000 38,500 14,o0 Estimated Annual Pumpage in MAF Public 10.2 - 21.7 - Private 9.0 1.8 8.5 2.8 Total 19.2 1.7 30.2 2.8 Private as percent of Total 47% 100% 28% 100% Requirement as calculated in the Sequential Analysis 21.7 - 31.0 - The last line of the above table gives the amount of groundwater which the sequential analysis of the proposed program showed to be required to meet projected requirements, and it indicates that the proposed program can pro- vide sufficient water. Public and private wells together would be pumping an amount of groundwater close to what IACA projected as annual recharge in usable groundwater zones by 1975 -- 34 MAF. The more than 20,000 public tubewells in operation would cover nearly 12 million acres of canal com- manded area, or more than 4O percent of the total, and nearly 70 percent of the usable groundwater zones. The 38,500 private wells within the canal commands might cover at least another 3.5 million acres, so that more than 90 percent of the usable groundwater area would be receiving additional irrigation supplies from tubewells. Irrigation Development -- Fifth Plan Period 6.66 The completion of Tarbela in 1975/76, with its storage and regulation capabilities, following the extensive public and private tubewell developments proposed for the Third and Fourth Plan periods, would create a situation in which irrigation supplies could be matched to the water requirements of crops to a much greater extent than has been possible in the past or will be possible before 1975. Irrigation supplies should then become adequate to meet the needs of an increasing cropped acreage at full delta, including the conversion to full perennial cropping of nonperennial areas where canal capacities, recharge to the aquifer or groundwater quality are inadequate to permit this to be done by groundwater development alone. Public and private tubewells would by 1975 have begun to reduce the water table in extensive areas where sustained application of increased surface supplies would otherwise cause a danger of waterlogging. Tarbela water would also play an important part in raising cropping intensities in - 109 - the 12 designated tubewell project areas to the full 130-150 percent attain- able without canal remodeling. It would be particularly important in the zones with groundwater of mixing quality. According to IACA projections all the tubewelliproject areas, barring Sukkur Right Bank, would absorb Tarbela water though the amount absorbed initially in 1975/76, when additional drainage pumping was still required and intensities were still below the ultimate attainable, would be less than what would be required later. 6.67 Specific projects have not been studied for the period after 1975, but some general lines of priority activity, insofar as they can be foreseen, have been identified. First priority would attach to completion of the public tubewell projects initiated in the Fourth Plan period. In addition public tubewell development would be carried further, especially in some of the usable groundwater zones that were not considered to be of sufficiently high priority for inclusion in the program for the first ten years. In addition, installation of tubewells for drainage purposes in saline zones might start on a large scale. Canal remodeling would become a much more important part of irrigation development activity with the increased supplies in the critical overlap months that would be available both from Tarbela and as a result of substitution of groundwater for surface water in some of the tubewell project areas with fresh groundwater. Figure 6 illustrates the main lines of activity in different areas suggested for this later period. 6.68 According to the schedule of execution for the proposed public tubewell projects there would remain some 2,300 wells to be completed in the first two years of the Fifth Plan period. The table below shows the number of wells involved in each area. Table 38 Completion of Proposed Tubewell Projects in Fifth Plan Period (Number of wells completed) 1975/76 1976/77 Rohri South 360 190 Bahawal Qaim 354 Begari Sind 340 Dipalpur below BS Link 360 40 Sukkur Right Bank 360 280 1,774 510 With the final completion of these tubewells some 5.8 million acres of canal commanded area would have been brought under public tubewell development by the projects specifically identified in the course of the Study. Of the total 5.8 million acres, some 4.1 million acres would be in fresh groundwater zones, 1.5 million acres in zones underlain by -groundwater of mixing quality and 0.1 million acres in saline zones. In some 50 percent of the area covered by the projects groundwater would be pumped initially from a depth of less than 10 feet, indicating the - 1101- concentration of the projects in areas with usable groundwater and high water table. The total pumping -capacity installed in the projects would amount to about 37,000 cusecs, designed to extract about 12.6 MAF at full development; full agricultural development would generally be reached within about ten years of completion of well electrification but somewhat later in areas with very low initial cropping intensities or heavy reclamation needs. 6.69 Besides the 2,800 wells required to complete Fourth Plan projects, an additional 13,000 public wells might be installed during the Fifth Plan period according to the IACA projections. Some 4,000 of these would be in saline groundwater areas, particularly in the Rohri Canal Command and in the Thal and Indus Right Bank area. It is in this period also that drainage wells would be provided for the saline zones in the Panjnad Abbasia and Ravi Syphon Dipalpur Link areas that were discussed above for initial development of the usable groundwater zones in the Third and Fourth Plan periods. IACA proposed that about 9,000 wells in new projects in usable groundwater zones might also be introduced in the Fifth Plan period. These wells fall into two rather different categories. Some would be in areas such as Thal, D.G. Khan and D.I. Khan canal commands, where three-quarters of the area is underlain by usable groundwater but agricultural prospects are somewhat less bright than in the longer established farming areas and there is much infrastructure to be built in the meantime. Some of the Peshawar commands are also proposed for development in this period. But a large portion of the wells proposed for this period would be installed in the areas such as Lower Bari and Lower Rechna Doabs that had before been left for private development. On the IACA schedule there would by the end of the Fifth Plan in 1980 be only a few small areas with usable groundwater not developed by public wells -- notably Upper Swat, Warsak and parts of Pakpattan and Ghotki. This schedule reflects IACA's belief that public wells are generally more efficient than private wells, and that the complexities of integrating water supplies, water-table control, and drainage require public operation in the long term. The Bank Grouo believes theqe arguments are weighty but it also thinks-private wells might become sufficiently dense and well-org- anized in some areas to provide roasonable water-table control and some degree of integration with the overall irrigation system, so that proserv- ation.of private exploitation could be worthwhile. The Bank Group recommends that this question should be left open for resolution after more experience has been gained about the full capabilities of private ground- water development, and so it concludes that some of the proposed 9,000 public wells in new projects may not be required in the Fifth Plan period. 6.70 Enlargement of canals serving about two million acres is fore- seen for the Fifth Plan. Some of this would be in areas of saline ground- water but most would be in areas where the increased canal supplies could be used in conjunction with groundwater, Apart from the small amounts of canal remodeling proposed in connection with tubewell projects discussed above, IACA, in accordance with the economic analyses, attributes highest priority for major canal remodeling in the Punjab to Panjnad-Abbasia. Without canal enlargement large parts of the mixing zones in this area would be constrained to about 120 percent cropping intensity. Therefore continuation of canal remodeling in this area and extension of the work into the.adjacent saline zones would be an important part of the Fifth VOLUME I FIGURE 6 REVISED* IACA PROGRAM FOR IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT CANAL COMMAND THIRD PLAN FOURTH PLAN --------------------------------------1975-1980 1980-1985 1985- 2000 OR PROJECT" 6EV66 66/6767/68 68/69 69/70 70/7171/72 72/7373/7474/75 GROUNDWATER, CANAL ENLARGEMENT AND SUB-SURFACE DRAINAGE (') KABUL 8 SWAT UPPER SWAT LOWER SWAT, DOABA 8 SHOLGARA KABUL RIVER, JUl SHEIKH 8 INUNDATION WARSAK HIGH LEVEL L a R BANK II) INDUS THAL PAHARPUR MUZAFFARGARH D G KHAN m (III) INDUS, JHELUM 8 CHENAB (PUNJAB) RANGPUR mm_m HAVELI SIDHNAI PAKPATTAN BELOW S-M LINK MAILSI BELOW S-M LINK m BAHAWAL BELOW M-B LINK PANJNAD 8 ABBASIA (iv) INDUS, JHELUM 8 CHENAB (SIND) GHOTKI IN BEGARI SIND DESERT 8 PAT NORTH WEST RICE DADU KHAIRPUR WEST KHAIRPUR EAST ROHRI NORTH ROHRI SOUTH EASTERN NARA 8 NARA PUMPS m S KALRI BAGHAR, OCHITO IS 8 PUMPS m m PINYARI 8 FULELI LINED CHANNEL GAJA TANDO BAGO mmm mon IN (v) JHELUM UPPER JHELUM LOWER JHELUM (vi CHENAB 8 JHELUM LOWER CHENAB LOWER BARI DOAB DIPALPUR BELOW B-S LINK FORDWAH 8 EASTERN SADIQIA mm PAKPATTAN & MAILSI ABOVE S-M LINK QAIM 8 BAHAWAL ABOVE M-B LINK (viI) CHENAB M-R LINK UPPER CHENAB RAVI SYPHON-DIPALPUR LINK DIPALPUR ABOVE B-S LINK RESERVOIRS, BARRAGES, LINK CANALS AND DRAINAGE CHANNELS RESEVOIRS MANGLA TARBELA KALABAGH I I BARRAGES WITH STORAGE CHASMA SEHWAN-MANCHAR -CHOTIARI BARRAGES QADIRABAD RASUL MARALA LINK CANALS QADIRABAD-BALLOKI RASUL-QADIRABAD BALLOKI-SULEIMANKE Il CHASMA-JHELUM TAUNSA-PANJNAD SEHWAN-NARA FEEDER NEW PUNJAB LINK DRAINAGE CHANNELS SUKH BEAS PROJECT LOWER INDUS LEFT BANK OUTFALL LOWER INDUS RIGHT BANK OUTFALL- RESERVOIRS, BARRAGES, LINK CANALS AND DRAINAGE CHANNELS USABLE GROUNDWATER TUBEWELLS -mmm SALINE GROUNDWATER TUBEWELLS CANAL ENLARGEMENT mmmm TILE DRAINAGE *MINOR REVISIONS MAINLY IN 1965/75 PERIOD-SEE CHAPTER = "4CANAL COMMANDS ARE GROUPED BY RIVER SOURCES IBRD-3284  - ill - Plan period development. Another important area for canal remodeling in this period is some 500,000 acres in Sidhnai which iere not included in the Shujaabad Project proposed for the Fourth Plan; here canal remodeling would be undertaken simultaneously with the installation of irrigation tubewells. Another priority area, where the canals were also originally designed to provide perennial surface supplies, is Rohri South where, as pointed out in connection with the tubewell project proposed for the area for initiation in the Fourth Plan, groundwater development alone would enable attainment of a full delta cropping intensity of only about 130 percent. Irrigation Development -- Sixth Plan Period 6.71 With virtually all areas of usable groundwater covered by tubewells by 1980 and high cropping intensities already attained in many of these areas, attention would then swing increasingly towards areas underlain by ground- water too saline for irrigation use. Installation of drainage tubewells would continue at a rapid pace (5,000 wells in the Sixth Plan period), canals serving some three million acres would be enlarged, the Left Bank Outfall Drain which was proposed above for initiation in 1968 would be completed and work would commence on the other large-scale drainage project proposed by the LIP consultants -- the Right Bank Outfall Drain. In addi- tion, the Sehwan-Manchar Project (see Chapter VII) would be completed in the Sind and a new link canal would be built across the Punjab to provide suf- ficient water for remodeled canals in zones of saline and mixing quality groundwater in the eastern Punjab. 6.72 The canal remodeling in Rohri South and the installation of drainage wells and tile drains there during the Fifth Plan would come to fruition with the completion of the first stage of the Sehwan Barrage in 1980. This completion date is considerably later than that proposed by the LIP consultants because IACA found that substantial development could be achieved in the Rohri Command, given the availability of Tarbela water, simply by the installation of tubewells in the usable groundwater zones, as proposed for the Fourth Plan period. Moreover, canal remodeling in the saline zones of Rohri necessitates the installation of drainage tubewells, and the basinwide studies suggested that the capacity to install wells could first be used to greater advantage in usable groundwater zones, as proposed in the programs for the Third and Fourth Plans. By 1980,however, the necessary expansion of canal capacity would have been executed and, in conjunction with Sehwan Barrage, a new feeder from Sehwan to the Rohri Canal would have been built to bring water to the enlarged canal. By 1982 the storage potential of the Sehwan Barrage and the neighboring Lake Manchar would have been developed. During the Sixth Plan period drainage wells and tile drains would be installed in Nara further to the east and after 1985 the feeder would be extended from Rohri to Nara. 6.73 The other main developments in the Sind in the Sixth Plan period would be the major drains mentioned above, canal remodeling and either tubewell or tile drainage in the saline zones of the Sukkur Right Bank canal commands, and public tubewell development in Ghotki. The Lower Indus Left Bank Outfall Drain was discussed in connection with the Third Plan; the Right Bank Drain, which would be built between 1980 and 1990, would - 112 - serve the Gudu and Sukkur Right Bank areas and drain their effluent into the Indus downstream of Sehwan Barrage. The Ghotki area, something of an excep- tion in the Sind, was omitted from the program for- public development in earlier years because it is underlain by usable groundwater with a depth to water table in excess of 10 feet and it was felt that there were good prospects of private tubewell growth in the area. However, the water table appears to have been rising quickly mainly as the result of too much surface water and this position may need reexamination. 6.74 Development in the Punjab in the years following 1980 would be closely related to construction of the new trans-Punjab link which IACA recommends for initiation around 1980. Without such a new link the possi- bility of increased canal deliveries in the Punjab and hence the feasibility of development in the extensive saline and mixing zones in the eastern Punjab would be severely restricted. IACA proposed construction of a new canal with a capacity of about 1.5 NAF/month on an alignment across the Punjab running from the tail reach of the Chasma-Jhelum Link, crossing the Chenab in the vicinity of Chiniot, and leading ultimately into the Sutlej. Besides providing increased surface supplies for the eastern Punjab, such a link would add to the flexibility of the irrigation system by bringing much land that had previously been commanded only from the Jhelum/Chenab also under the command of the Indus. As the construction of this link proceeds so it will be possible to provide increased canal supplies further eastward. Because of the importance of this link, the Bank Group would stress the need for preparatory work, especially of possible alignments. 1ACA also recommends canal remodeling in the Sixth Plan period in saline and mixing zones in Chaj and Lower Bari Doabs. Remodeling in the Sutlej commands would come later as the link was extended there. Irrigation Development after 1985 6.75 Apart from the introduction of public tubewells in Warsak High Level canal commands development foreseen after 1985 takes the form enti- rely of canal remodeling and of drainage tubewells and tile drains for saline zones. Canals serving some 10 million acres would be remndeled between 1985 and 2000, bringing the total area which would be provided with enlarged canal capacity between now and 2000 to some 16 million acres. Apart from some important areas, such as Sidhnai and Rohri which have already been discussed, where enlarged canal capacity is required in addition to irrigation tubewells to provide sufficient water for a 150 percent cropping intensity, most of the areas proposed for canal remodeling have groundwater in excess of 1,000 ppm. The canal remodeling program pro- posed -- which would increase the aggregate canal withdrawal capacity by some 40 percent to about 19 MAF/month -- is the minimum believed necessary to achieve cropping intensities of about 150 percent in perennial areas and 95 percent in those few areas likely to remain nonperennial (or an average of 145 percent for the development CCA of 29.4 million acres). Remodeling on this scale coupled with surface storage sufficient to meet the higher of the two sets of requirements projected by IACA (see Chapter VII) would by the year 2000 result in the complete diversion of mean year river flows into the irrigation system. Any water that enters the sea in a year of mean inflow would be essentially derived from saline drainage - 113 - effluent discharged either through the river channels or through the Left Bank Outfall Drain. 6.76 Thus the proposed canal remodeling program does not include pro- vision for the enlargement of canals supplying fresh groundwater zones that would be necessary if the underground storage potential of these zones were to be developed. This type of development, mentioned in Chapter IV as an alternative to surface storage, was investigated by IACA. They concluded that it might be adopted in the long term but they did not include it in the program. Since the fresh groundwater areas are mainly confined to the Punjab, development of underground storage of any scale would necessitate major link canal construction additional to that proposed above for the Fifth Plan. It would also entail some difficult hydraulic problems in operating the enlarged canal system because of the wide variations in canal flow that would be involved. The Growth of Irrigation Supplies 6.77 IACA projected the irrigation water requirements implied by its program for agricultural development rising from estimated mean-year water supplies in 1965 of 68 MAF at watercourse head to 94 MAF in 1975, 117 MAF in 1985, and 135 MAF in 2000. The program outlined in the preceding pages would meet this growth of requirements with increased supplies of surface water and groundwater in the proportions indicated in the table below. Table 39 Relative Use of Surface and Groundwater Measured at Watercourse Head Reference Surface Water Groundwater Total Year MAF Percentage MAF Percentage MAF 1965 58 85 10 15 68 1970 a/ 56 75 19 25 75 1975 63 68 31 32 94 1985 77 66 ho 34 117 2000 91 67 44 33 135 a/ Estimate for 1970 derived from sequential analysis with some adjustment for surpluses occurring during rabi period and effect of adopted pumping pattern (including pumping needed for lowering of water table in project areas) on surface water use. This tabulation shows that the proportional contribution from groundwater is expected to be more than doubled over the first ten years. Thereafter the ratio would remain fairly constant because under balanced recharge pumping,the permissible pumping would become proportional to the surface supplies. After 1975 up to full development the increment in canal sup- plies follows the pattern of demand created by canal enlargement and in- cludes the amounts that would be available from surface storage reservoirs (see Chapter VII). The contribution of private tubewells to the total - 114 - groundwater abstraction in the canal commanded areas is currently about 50 percent but, although rising in absolute terms from 5 to 8 MAF in the decade 1965-75, the percentage contribution would fall to about 25 percent in 1975 and lower in following years as public wells supersede private ones. Figure 5 compares projected growth of surface water usage with mean flows. 6.78 The following table illustrates that the distribution of water supplies between Peshawar, the Punjab and the Sind would remain fairly constant over time, with the Punjab areas taking a slightly increasing share in the early period. Table 40 Watercourse Deliveries to Main Sectors of Indus Basin (MAF/Year) Vale of Total Reference Peshawar Punjab Sind (rounded) Year MAF Percent MAF Percent NAF Percent MAF 1965 1,7 2.5 40 59.5 26 38 68 1975 1.9 2 61 65 31 33 94 1985 2.8 2.5 75 64 39 33.5 117 2000 2.8 2 85 63 47 35 135 Groundwater which in 1965 accounted for nearly 25 percent of irrigation supplies in the Punjab and a negligible quantity elsewhere would from about 1975 onward account for over 40 percent of total irrigation supplies in the Punjab but only some 12 percent in the Sind. Expected Results of Development 6.79 On the basis of the general strategy and programs discussed here- tofore, it is possible to construct estimates of agricultural production at different reference years between 1965 and 2000. Projections of this kind must be regarded as indicative at best, dealing as they do with a rural sector where subsistence farming is still an important element and where the bench-mark data are of varying degrees of accuracy. Estimates of future levels of agricultural production are particularly difficult for West Pakistan, with its large territory and its great variation in farm sizes, tenure arrangements, climatic conditions, and degrees of irrigation development. 6.80 In order to relate projected growth of agricultural production to the proposed Water Development Program, at least for the period of the Action Program, the production data for different regions were aggregated into four major types of area as follows: (i) Ongoing project areas -- CCA within the Indus Basin where groundwater development projects have received sanction under Government planning procedures and are already scheduled for implementation (5.5 million acres CCA). VOLUME I FIGURE 5 PROJECTED USAGE OF AVAILABLE SURFACE WATER IN THE INDUS RIVER BASIN OF WEST PAKISTAN (FLOWS, WITHDRAWALS - MAF) 4 0 1 I I I 1 1 1 1 4 0 - COMPOSITE HYDROGRAPH OF INDUS RIVER SYSTEM AFTER DIVERSION OF THE THREE EASTERN RIVERS BASED ON THE PERIOD 1922-1963 -- - PROJECTED WITHDRAWALS 2000 CONDITIONS 35 - PROJECTED WITHDRAWALS: 1985 CONDITIONS. 35 -*-* PROJECTED WITHDRAWALS 1975 CONDITIONS. 30 30 25 25 20 20 15 15I 15, % 1 15 5s \ I \ I 1 / . ...- **. 10 0 0 I ' I I I I 0 OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP MEAN YEAR (2R) IBRD-3223  - 115 - (ii) IACA project areas -- CCA within the Indus Basin covered by the groundwater projects recommended in the Action Program (5.8 million acres CCA). (iii) Deferred project areas -- CCA within the Indus Basin not scheduled for public groundwater development projects before 1975 (18.4 million acres CCA). (iv) Outside areas-- noncommanded areas. This includes non- commanded land interspersed with the CCA within the canal system (12.4 million acres). 6.81 The Bank Group's estimate of the agricultural production likely to result if the Action Program were implemented as scheduled, and if the longer term water resource development program were also carried out is summarized in Table 4l. The table shows the impact of the program on the growth of cropped acreage, yields and gross value of agricultural output in the different areas and in all areas combined. The bottom block of the table shows that the Gross Production Value (GPV) of agricultural produc- tion is projected to grow at an annual rate of 5.2 percent for all West Pakistan during the periods 1965-75 and 1975-85. Slower growth rates for the 15 years, 1985-2000, would reduce the annual rate for the entire period, 1965 to 2000, to 4.5 percent per annum. The upper portions of the table show that the average growth rate in total output for the 1965-75 period results from a combination of 1.6 percent per annum growth in cropped acreage (primarily concentrated in the canal commanded areas) and 3.5 percent per annum growth in yields. For the 1975-85 period, cropped acreage would grow 1.3 percent per annum and yields 3.9 percent. Total GPV for all West Pakistan is projected to grow nearly fivefold over the period 1965-2000, on a basis of cropped acreage that increases by slightly Iess than 50 percent. The relatively substantial increase in acreage during the earlier years reflects the immediate effect of an increase in water supply, whereas the large increase in productivity, measured by the increase in GPV per acre, particularly reflects the expanding use of agricultural inputs combined with more adequate watering of crops. 6.82 The development of water supplies indicated in Table 39 shows an increase of deliveries to the watercourse head amounting to 38 percent over the decade 1965-75, 25 percent during 1975-85, and 15 percent during 1985-2000. These figures reflect the concentration on public and private tubewells before 1975 and a continuation of groundwater development to 1985 at the same time that Tarbela water becomes available. Opportunities for such a rapid growth in water supplies would largely be exploited by 1985. It is therefore this period, 1965-85, when the impact of these developments would be most widely felt throughout the CCA and the highest rates of growth in output would take place. 6.83 The Bank Group considers it reasonable to expect that the earliest effects of water resource developmrent would occur in the ongoing project areas. Cropping intensities would rise as new supplies of irrigation water are spread over a larger cropped acreage than befcre. Growth in agricultural - 116 - TABLE 41 PROJECTION OF GROWTH OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION Average Growth Rate 1965 1975 1985 2000 (1965-2000) Acreage (in million acres) CCA Cropped Acreage On-going Project Areas 5.53 5.03 (h.1) 7.51 (1.0) 8.29 (0) 8.29 1.4% IACA Project Areas 5.76 5.27 (2.7) 6.89 (2.0) 8.40 (0) 8.42 1.4% Deferred Project Areas 18.35 18.05 (1.3) 20.39 (1.6) 23.85 (0.9) 27.53 1.2% Subtotal - Canal Area 297. 79 (2.1) M1.77 (1.5) 70.5 (0.6) M57M 1.3% Outside Areas - 12.37 (0.6) 13.5 (0.6) 13.76 (0.3) 1M43 0.4% Total - TO.72 (1.6) U7-.EW (1.3) 5.30 (0.5) 3M.T 1.0% Yield (in terms of Rupees of GPV per acre cropped) On-going Project Areas 261 (3.7) 375 (4.0) 551 (2.2) 760 3.1% IACA Project Areas 227 (2.8) 299 (4.6) 469 (3.3) 760 3.5% Deferred Project Areas 236 (3.4) 330 (3.5) 469 (3.3) 760 3.4% All Canal Area 239 (3.4) 331 (3.9) W__ (3.0) 70 3.4% Outside Areas 156 (3.3) 21 (3.5) 305 (3.2) 19f 3.4% All Areas 21 (3.5) 302 (3.9) Wo (3.0) ;9 3.4% Total Gross Production Value (Rs. billions) On-going Project Areas 1.30 (8.0) 2.82 (5.0) 4.57 (2.2) 6.30 4.6% IACA Project Areas 1.19 (5.6) 2.06 (6.7) 3.94 (3.3) 6.40 4.9% Deferred Project Areas 4.27 (4.7) 6.74 (5.2) 11.19 (4.2) 20.92 4.7% Subtotal - Canal Area 6.77 (5.5) 11.2 (5.4) 19.70 (3.6) 33.62 4.7% Outside Areas 1.93 (3.9) 7.71 (4.1) T1 (3.6) 7.15 3.8% GRAND TOTAL .70 (5.2) WJ.T7 (5.2) 23.90 (3.6) 55.77 4.5% a/ Figures in brackets represent average growth ratein the respective periods in percent per annum. - 117 - production, reflecting both acreage and yield increases, is estimated at eight percent per annum in these areas during 1965-75. 6.8 The construction of the IACA tubewell projects should be largely completed during the period 1965-75. The period of most rapid growth for these areas, however, is expected to come in the decade 1975-85 at a time when increased surface water supplies would also be available from Tarbela. Increases in both cropping intensity and yields would begin about midway between 1965 and 1975. Output would increase about 5.6 percent per annum in the 1965-75 decade and 6.7 percent during 1975-85. 6.85 The deferred project areas constitute the largest single category used in these projections and also contain the areas most dependent in the years before Tarbela is completed on private tubewell installations. The Bank Group has estimated that there were 15,600 private wells in these areas in 1965, and that each well commanded an area of 100 acres at a cropping intensity of 125 percent. This would be a CCA of 1.56 million acres and a cropped acreage of 1.95 million acres, Since the full CCA of the deferred project areas is 18.35 million acres, there would still be 16.79 million acres CCA not served by private tubewells. This remainder includes some of the best irrigated land in the Province and has at present approximately an average cropping intensity of 96 percent. 6.86 The Bank Groupestimates that "private wells in the deferred project areas would increase from 15,600 in 1965 to 37,500 in 1975, and by then would command a CCA of approximately 3.0 million acres and a cropped area of 4.2 million acres (140 percent intensity). The remaining CCA of 15.35 million acres (18.35 million acres less 3.0 million acres) could only increase in cropping intensity slightly to 105 percent by 1975, or a cropped acreage of 16.19 million acres, The contribution of private tube- wells would be replaced after 1975 by further public groundwater develop- ment and by additional surface water, and the deferred project areas could then achieve an average cropping intensity of 130 percent by 1985, rising to 150 percent during the period 1985-2000. On the basis of this develop- ment in the deferred project areas output would grow by 4.7 percent per annum up to 1975 and by 5.2 percent between 1975 and 1985. 6.87 A relatively small amount of water development is projected outside the CCA, although considerable private tubewell activity is ex- pected to take place in the outside areas, with the number of wells in- creasing from 5,000 in 1965 to 25,000 by 1985. This category is quite large (12.4 million acres) and the impact of this number of private tube- wells would not be very great in terms of increased cropped acreage. Moreover, these areas are, by definition, outside the canal commanded portions of the Basin and would not benefit from the increased water supplies resulting from Tarbela or the construction of other storage facilities and canal remodeling. Growth in agricultural production would be somewhat lower in these areas, increasing at a rate of around 4 percent per annum between 1965 and 1985. 6.88 The Bank Group projections in all areas show lower rates of growth after 1985 than before that date, but this is not an implication - 118 - that it considers a continuation of high rates of growth is impossible. It does mean that foreseeable growth after 1985, with techniques and inputs now known, would depend largely on improvements in yields alone, and these may be increasingly difficult to obtain once the levels pro- jected for 1985 have been reached. On the other hand, advances in agricultural technology during the intervening years could open vast opportunities for increased production which are not now contemplated. 6.89 The cropping patterns used for planning purposes and underlying these global projections of the increase in agricultural production were derived partly on the basis of forecasts of demand for agricultural products and also on the basis of a number of other factors, as discussed in Chapter V. The main focus was on what farmers might actually be expected to achieve. Some of the assumed shifts in cropping pattern were described above, for the sake of example, in reference to the project areas that were studied in detail. In general terms, over the next twenty to thirty years in the Basin as a whole, fine rice was expected to become more important than coarse rice, and the acreage in jowar/bajra, gram and rabi pulses was expected to decline. The acreage in oilseeds was projected to grow only slightly larger than that sown in 1965, while wheat acreage would rise during the first decade but would be constant and then declining in later years when considerably higher yields would be obtained. There would be substantial acreage increases (in addition to that in fine rice, mentioned above) in cotton, fodder and green manure; the increase for these three crops alone would be 11.1 million cropped acres. In broad terms the con- templated changes can be summed up as constituting a relative shift from grain production for domestic consumption toward export crops and livestock support. 6.90 Comparison of the percentage change in acreage and increases in physical production of important crops and livestock products is another indicator of the rclative emphasis given to the growth of different kinds of agricultural output. Among crops, cotton would have the largest per- centage increase in acreage and production. Wheat, which would have a high growth in acreage in the first decade and a decreasing acreage in the period 1985 to 2000, was expected to have the smallest percentage increase of physical production among the major crops. The rate of growth in wheat production is, in fact, only slightly greater than the projected rate of population growth. 6.91 The expected contributions from livestock production are sub- stantial. The size of the production herds has been placed at levels biologically consistent with estimates of available total digestible nutrients (TDN), which includes fodder production, crop residues, and an allowance for grazing. The quantities of TDN consumed per animal were assumed to increase over time because animal husbandry practice would be gradually improving. There would also be change in the kinds of cattle to be raised for milk and meat production. Buffaloes provide a major part of the milk production up to 1985, and the herd size increases up to that date, but it declines in the years after 1985 when there would be an increase in the number of dairy cattle from Zebu breeds such as the Sahiwal and Red Sindi. The herd increase projected depends on a very widespread VOLUME I MAP 3 STUDY OF THE WATER AND POWER RESOURCES KABUL OF WEST PAKISTAN COMPREHENSIVE REPORT PROGRAM 1965 TO 1975 PROJECT AREAS + s., .+ G H AN Project areas ++++ On-going tubewell program PESHAWAR Sukh Bea drainage scheme (zone of influence) QUETTA Boundary of canal commanded area Project boundary of proposed Krlbcg rE DA SCARP V PROJECT International boundary K4I M --- Jamu and Kashmir boundary AWALPINDI Approximate ceasefire line D I K 5) b,p SCARP 2 (1970/71) Jhel.m RSCARP 3 od0 (1969/70) H -4 0o ns 5 1JA BA 15 ...0 .. - D G Kh n sraa(1,970/71-1972/73) SUKKUR r'SHORKOT-KAMALIA1%rr9 RIHT BANK J.,.obgo Su, (968/69-1969/70) Bel 0 (1475-2976/77) BEGARI SIND 9 Ø .e . + .. .. -- i JL/ -9 /77o ,9y { rSCARP 1 TANCv (completed) Ira Ba!! ..PANJNAD ABBASIA DIPALPUR LINK 9AIPUR (196 70-1972/?3) OR ha a--(197 1/?2-1 973/74) (68/69) 19 A169 BAHAWAL QAIM F- (19 / -NORTH (1973/74-1975/76) HI ++'+9 ORDWAH SADIQIA DIPALPU ABOVE 6 KARACH I Nowobsh.h (1972/?3-1974/?5) * #B.S. LINK ROERI SOUT H DIPALPUR BELOW (1970/71-1972/?3) (1972/73-1976/7?) B.S. LINK + ++++(1973/74-1976/77) HYDE R ABAD Üa +a O 50 00 150 mi ES JULY 1967 IBRD-1945R  - 119 - and effective artificial insemination program, as mentioned above. The Bank Group has followed the conversion rates of its consultants in deriving estimates of milk and meat production at future reference years and applying these to estimates of herd buildup gives production estimates for livestock production which show an annual growth rate of five percent for the period 1965-2000. Although the Bank Group has used these estimates, it retains reservations about them on several counts. Basic data on iest Pakistan livestock, required as bench marks, are admittedly of uncertain quality, but they have been used in the absence of any alternative that appeared more reliable. The livestock projections make allowance for the biological constraints governing production and reproduction, but they also depend implicitly on improvements in herd management and selective breeding prac- tices. These latter may ultimately impose more critical constraints on livestock growth than the availability of TDN. The livestock estimates thus appear technically feasible, but they may be subject to downward adjustment in light of the importance of managerial factors. 6.92 Projections of demand for agricultural products are necessarily very uncertain -- as illustrated by wide differences between two separate estimates of the elasticity of domestic demand for agricultural products discussed in Chapter X. Thus it is important that there be sufficient flexibility in the programs for irrigation and agriculture to permit the changes in cropping patterns needed to meet changes in demand. Comparisons were made between projected production by crops and estimates of demand for each crop and, as would be expected, they did not show a balance for each commodity, further illustrating the need for flexibility. These comparisons are discussed in general terms in Chapter X, which considers the broader implications of the 5.2 percent per annum growth in GPV of agriculture and 4.5 percent per annum growth in value added in agriculture implied by the projections in this chapter. As regards specific crops, there would in general be a fair degree of flexibility within the proposed water program for shifts in acreage toward wheat -- such as might take place in response to the recent increase in price of wheat and in view of the availability of the new high-yielding varieties. For instance, rather large fodder acreages have been projected on the production side -- even larger than required to support the ambitious livestock program mentioned in the preceding paragraph -- and some of this acreage could be shifted to wheat. Oilseeds, gram and pulses are also, like fodder, crops which are grown in both seasons and the amount of acreage devoted to them rather than to wheat in rabi would in practice depend largely on the relative yields and prices obtaining for the crops in the future. Cotton acreage, on the other hand, could not normally be transferred to wheat, within the limits of projected water availabilities, because although it is true that, with present varieties, they overlap in time in the fields and compete for the same acreage, there would be no provision within the irrigation program to meet the water requirements of wheat in other rabi months; however, cotton acreage could be transferred to other kharif food crops such as coarse grains or oilseeds, though this would be less likely in view of the very important position that cotton holds among Pakistan's exports. Shifts in the opposite direction -- out of foodgrains into cotton -- would clearly be easier because of the readier availability of water in the kharif season. Thus it would appear that there is considerable scope within the irrigation program proposed for shifts at the margin to meet demands for agricultural products of differing composition. - 120 - VII. SURFACE WATER STORAGE Introduction 7.01 The chapter discusses the findings of the Study with regard to surface water storage needs and the manner in which they can best be met. The Bank Group's analyses and recommendations are based on the work of both IACA and Chas. T. Main International. The surface storage program proposed in this chapter has been drawn up within the overall framework of the irrigation program presented in Chapter VI above. 7.02 From the early 1970's, when the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 will be fully implemented, the flows of four main rivers will remain available to Pakistan -- the Indus, Kabul, Jhelum and Chenab. They have a combined average annual discharge of some 142 MAF. Table 42 Mean Year Discharges of Principal Rivers MAF % of Total Indus above Attock 66 47 Kabul above Attock 27 19 Total Indus at Attock 93 66 Jhelum at Mangla 23 16 Chenab at Marala 26 18 142 100 Nearly half of the average annual discharge is in the Indus itself and the remainder is divided roughly equally between the other three rivers. Small additional contributions will be made from several minor tributaries and in some years part of the surplus flood flows in the Ravi and Sutlej will be likely to pass downstream. These flows, being heavily dependent on the size of the monsoon, will fluctuate greatly from year to year. Current Storage'Development 7.03 Mangla Dam, with its initial live storage capacity of about five MAF, provides the first sizable amount of surface water storage capacity to be built in West Pakistan. Barrages and weirs have been built on the main rivers over the course of the last century, as described in Chapter II, but they have been able to store only insignificant amounts of water. The first dam to be built with storage capacity was Warsak, completed in 1960. The project was designed primarily for power purposes with a storage capa- city of only 23,500 acre feet which is rapidly being reduced by deposition of sediment; it is estimated that the reservoir will shortly reach a minimum - 121 - residual capacity of about 10,000 acre feet, useful for peaking purposes on the power units but insignificant from the agricultural point of view. 7.04 With the completion of Mangla Dam it will be possible to store a portion of the flood flows on the Jhelum in the summer of 1967. The reser- voir at Mangla is formed by the 11,000 foot long Mangla Dam, a smaller dam at Jari, and long dikes, all of zoned earth embankment type. The reservoir will have an initial gross storage capacity of 5.9 MAF and a live storage capacity of about 5.3 MAF at drawdown level of 1040 feet or 4.9 NAF at drawdown level 1075 feet. About 0.4 NAF of the live-storage is in the Jari Arm beyond the Mirpur Saddle, but a trench has been excavated through the Saddle to enable about 0.3 MAF of this water to be diverted into the main reservoir and released through the power plant. Five diversion tunnels of 30-feet diameter were constructed through a ridge at the left abutment in - order to divert water from the dam area during its construction. Four tun- nels have been lined with steel penstocks of 26-foot inside diameter for their full lengths and they will be the initial means of releasing water for irri- gation purposes and power generation. The fifth tunnel is plugged with a steel bulkhead, but steel linings can be installed and the tunnel plug re- moved if and when it is required for irrigation purposes or for power gen- eration. 7.05 Live storage of about 0.5 4AF on the Indus main stem will be added in 1971 at Chasma Barrage, some 35 miles downstream of Kalabagh; construction began in the middle of 1967. The main purpose of the barrage is to divert water from the Indus to the Jhelum River, as part of the Indus Basin Works, through the Chasma-Jhelum link canal. The barrage was originally designed with a headpond elevation of 640 feet, but it was found that by raising the barrage structure some six feet and extending bunds on either side, live storage of about 0.5 MAF could be provided (between elevations 642 and 649 feet) at relatively low cost of about $32 million. This storage capacity is expected to be permanent since sediment collecting above elevation 642 would be flushed out during subsequent flood seasons. Future Storage Developments 7.06 Although a large number of potential storage sites can be idenr- tified on the rivers of West Pakistan -- Chas. T. Main has identified up- wards of-100 of them -- the Province does not in fact present opportunities for cheap storage development, as far as is now known. Technological progress may change this situation and economic development with concomi- tant improvement of the transportation infrastructure will help significantly to reduce the costs of dam construction at some potentially good sites, such as in the Upper Indus. Apart from this problem of accessibility there are several other factors, discussed in Chapter IV, which account for the high cost of providing storage in West Pakistan: the difficulty of finding sites which combine the right topographic features for formation of a large reservoir with bedrock formations capable of carrying heavy structures; the high concentration of annual flows within a few months in the summer and the extreme year-to-year variability of some of the rivers resulting in the need for - 122 - provision of very large spillway capacity; the heavy silt loads of the major rivers and particularly of the Indus and the Kabul, meaning that, as far as can now be foreseen, storage capacity provided in a reservoir will be sharply reduced in a relatively short period. The result of these factors is that surface storage is a rather expensive means of making water available to the farmers in the months that they need it. 7.07 Planning of surface storage in an integrated irrigation system with two cropping seasons, as in West Pakistan, involves a careful con- sideration of the potential for irrigation development in each of the two seasons. Absorption of irrigation water in the kharif season of high natural flows is currently limited mainly by canal capacity and the shortage of water during the early planting period. But as canal enlargement and tubewell pumping proceed, more surface water will be able to be absorbed in that season, and less will be available for storage. Demand for surface water in the rabi season of low river flows is presently greatly in excess of supply, but tubewells will be able to meet a large part of this demand. In devising their program for the development of irrigation IACA carried out an integrated analysis, as discussed in Chapter V. In their analysis, future rabi watercourse requirements were met as far as possible from the groundwater available from the proposed tubewell fields plus natural river flows. IACA's studies indicated that groundwater pumping, when feasible, was generally a much cheaper way of meeting rabi irrigation requirements than provision of surface storage. But there was a limit to the speed with which tubewell development would proceed and, in some areas with somewhat more saline groundwater, surface water supplied from reservoirs would be essential to meet growing irrigation requirements. The demand for surface storage at any particular stage of development was thus esti- mated as the residual of total irrigation requirements, in each of the rabi months, that could not be met from groundwater and natural flows. Flows Available for Storage 7.08 The amount of surface water available for storage depends on river flows during kharif and on the amount of water required for immedi- ate delivery to the watercourses in that season. Kharif requirements of surface supplies for irrigation in turn depend mainly on the cropping patterns and intensities attained in different areas (with their different crop-water requirements), and the extent to which water can be supplied from tubewells in that season. IACA projected cropping patterns and in- tensities for kharif and rabi seasons taking into account the current situation in different areas, likely trends in demand for kharif and rabi crops and in yields of such crops, and the various alternative means avail- able for increasing water supplies to meet the water requirements of high- er intensity cropping. Table 43 shows the projected average intensities and kharif-rabi ratios for the development CCA (29.4 million acres), as defined by IACA. - 123 - Table 43 Projected Cropping Intensities and Kharif-Rabi Ratios Average Annual General Present Cropping Intensity (%) Kharif-Rabi Ratio 1965 97 1: 1.09 1975 112 1: 1.20 1985 125 1: 1.16 2000 145 1: 0.94 The amount of irrigation supplies to be provided from the groundwater aquifer was projected by IACA on the basis of the canal command studies described in Chapter V, which integrated groundwater and surface water supply over the months on the assumption that balanced recharge would be pumped in the course of a mean-flow year. Kharif pumping in usable groundwater zones was minimized, with a view to concentrating usage of recharge to the aquifer in the rabi months when river flows are low; but in some cases and in some months kharif pumping was needed to bal- ance recharge over the course of the year or because watercourse re- quirements exceeded canal capacity. 7.09 Tables h and 45 show IACA's projections of the amounts of sur- face water that would be available in 1985 and at the stage of "full development" in the reference year 2000 for surface storage on the Jhelum and on the Indus. The sharp decrease in the storable surplus after 1985 reflects the increase in the kharif-rabi ratio and the increase in kharif intensities from about 58 percent to 75 percent between 1985 and 2000 (see Table43) as a result of the large canal remodeling program envisaged for that period. Table h Mean Year Storable Surplus Based on IACA's Projected Program: Jhelum River at Mangla (MAF) 1985 Full Development Mean Flow Irrigation Storable Irrigation Storable Month At Mangla ' Reguirementsb/ Surplus Requirementsb Surplus May 3.6 0.8 2.8 2.1 1.5 June 3.7 0.7 3.0 1.8 1.9 July 3.8 0.6 3.2 1.1 2.7 Aug 3.0 0.8 2.2 1.6 1.4 Sept 1.6 1.0 0.6 2.0 Storage Release Total 15.7 3.9 11.8 8.6 7.5 a/ 1l-year period, 1922-63. b/ After full allowance is made for use of flows from the Chenab River. - 124 - Table 45 Mean Year Storable Surplus Based on IACA's Projected Program: Indus River at Tarbela (PJAF ) 1985 Full Development Mean Flow Irrigation Storable Irrigation Storable Month At Mangla2 Requirementsb/ Surplus Requirements- Surplus May 4.4 3.1 1.3 6.0 Storage Release June 10.2 5.0 5.2 9.4 0.8 July 16.8 1.5 15.3 5.7 11.1 Aug. 16.0 2.4 13.6 6.1 9.9 Sept. 6.8 4.5 2.3 6.6 0.2 Total 54.2 16.5 37.7 33.8 22.0 a/ Ll-year period, 1922-63. b/ After full allowance is made for use of flows from the Kabul River. 7.10 The situation in the projected year 2000 conditions when the plans made by IACA would reach full realization is shown in Table 46 and Figure 7. These show-IACA's estimates of the amounts of water that could be stored, under mean year flow conditions, with reservoirs of different sizes on the Indus and the Jhelum. The figures are derived from an analysis of the monthly discharge records of the two rivers over the impounding season for the 41-year period, 1922-63, and take account of the required mean irrigation releases implied in IACA's program during these months at the ultimate stage of development. The figures show that, when kharif irrigation requirements have reached the stage pro- jected by IACA after completion of their full program of canal remodel- ing, and on the assumption that kharif requirements will receive priority each year, it will be possible to fill a reservoir on the Jhelum only to the extent of two MAF in every year; whereas it will still be possible to fill reservoirs with total live storage capacities in excess of 15 MAF every year on the Indus. The efficiency of storage capacity, measured as a ratio of mean annual storage yield to storage capacity available, falls off rapidly on the Jhelum River at figures above six MAF, whereas it remains around 100 percent up to nearly 20 MAF on the Indus at Darband. VOLUME I FIGURE 7 AVERAGE ANNUAL YIELD AND EFFICIENCY OF STORAGE CAPACITY ON THE INDUS AND JHELUM RIVERS* 25 YIELD 20 I 5 INDUS AT DARBAND z IO z w 5M 0z JHELUM AT ANGLA 90 5: 80 r WITH INTERCONNECTION o 1,000WIHUINECNCTO 0 WITHOUT INTERCONNECTION a. 0 a- 900 - c- 0 02 0 40 5 0 08 I-- - 0 47 -~700 ~ 600 COS OFTHRMLTULHU..UETS PE ILLIRONNB.TU.) (- a. 400 4010 20 30 4 0 5 0 6 10 70 8 0 COST OF THERMAL FUEL (U.S. CENTS PER MILLION B.T.U.) (2R) IBRD -3310  - 169 - $206 million or about $80 million more than the present worth of the cost 1/ of the program including Tarbela. The Bank Group prepared a number of power programs excluding Tarbela for meeting projected Province-wide load growth and it compared them with programs including Tarbela under different assumptions regarding the price of thermal fuel and the value of foreign exchange. It found that the net power benefits of Tarbela were not very sensitive to changes in assumption regarding the value of foreign exchange, but as illustrated by Figure 10, they were very sensitive to changes in assumption regarding the price of thermal fuel -- ranging from about $40 million at a fuel price of 20 cents per million Btu to about $220 million at a fuel price of 70 cents, with calculations using the current foreign exchange rate. At current financial fuel prices the net benefits attributable to Tarbela were in the neighborhood of $110-120 million. The Scarcity Value of Thermal Fuel 8.27 Because of the sensitivity of the power benefits of Tarbela to different assumptions regarding the price of thermal fuel and because many other decisions concerning the scheduling of the introduction of the hydro units and transmission lines and the type of thermal equip- ment that should be installed depend intimately on the value attributed to the Province's fuel reserves the Bank Group devoted considerable attention to trying to determine the real economic value of thermal fuel in West Pakistan. This involved consideration of the Province's estimated reserves of natural gas, coal and oil and of the likely growth of demand for these fuels for purposes other than power generation, particularly for major alternative uses such as fertilizer production. Estimated indigenous reserves of oil are very small and known coal reserves are of relatively low thermal value and mostly located in places where exploitation would be costly, so that main attention was focused on the natural gas reserves. These are concentrated chiefly in the Upper Sind region, particularly in the Sui field (estimated reserves six trillion cubic feet) and in the Mari field (currently estimated reserves 1.8 trillion cubic feet), but there is also a number of other significant fields -- Sari Sing near Karachi, Khandkot and Mazarani in Upper Sind and Dhulian in the Potwar Plateau in the North. The reserves in these fields were considered together and compared against the projected growth of non-power uses of natural gas; it was found that if all the natural gas currently estimated to be available and not already committed were reserved for purposes other than power generation, then they would be exhausted about the year 2000. Therefore, to the extent that they were used in the interim for power generation the date when they would be exhausted would occur earlier. For the purposes of the analysis it was assumed that once exhausted, the fuel needs which 1/ Costs of the program including Tarbela excluded the costs of the main reservoir structures, because these costs were all considered on the irrigation side. - 170 - they had been meeting would have to be covered by imported liquid fuels. Consideration was given to the international price at which liquid fuel might be assumed to be available in the year 2000 and also to the heavy burden on foreign exchange available to West Pakistan at that time which would occur as a result of the need to import large quantities of fuel. The purpose of these studies was to reach a figure for the real burden on the Pakistan economy that would be involved by the need to import fuel supplies once gas reserves were exhausted and thereby to reach a reasonable basis for rationing out available gas reserves in the interim. The figure finally adopted for this purpose was $1.14 per million Btu of imported fuel delivered to the Upper Sind in the year when gas reserves were exhausted (i.e. around 2000). The sacrifice involved by using gas for power generation in any year instead of con- serving it for non-power uses could then be defined as the discounted present worth in that year of the burden that would be incurred by the need to import fuel in the year of exhaustion of gas reserves. Taking account of the amount of gas that would be required for power genera- tion in a program including Tarbela and applying this approach to current estimates of gas reserves, it was found, for instance, that the economic value of gas at well head would be approximately eight cents per million Btu in 1965, 11 cents in 1970, 18 cents in 1975, 28 cents in 1980 and 6 cents in 1985. If Tarbela were to be eliminated from the program or postponed to 1985, then the draft on the natural gas reserves for power generation would be substantially higher, the reserves would be depleted more rapidly and hence the economic value of thermal fuel would be higher in the later years of the Perspective Plan period. Other similar sets of calculations were made for the assump- tion of gas reserves larger than currently estimated. Figure 11 shows the results of these calculations under the different assumptions regarding the size of gas reserves and the timing of Tarbela. 8.28 The various components of the recommended power program -- the units at Mangla and Tarbela and the transmission lines, etc., and the proposed timing of their installation -- were considered and verified for validity within the fuel price framework set on the approach des- cribed in the previous paragraph. Major items in the program were also considered in terms of a set of fuel prices in different parts of the Province termed 'financial' and roughly corresponding to the fuel prices presently paid by the electric utilities. It was roughly estimated that the net power benefits of Tarbela, estimated at about $110-120 mil- lion on the basis of current financial fuel prices, would be at least $150 million if thermal fuel was attributed its real scarcity value. EHV Interconnection Between the Major Power Markets 8.29 Both Stone & Webster and WAPDA's consultants, Harza, have recommended that the major power markets of West Pakistan be linked by EHV transmission lines in the early 1970's; and both based their recommendations to a significant extent upon the assumption that sub- stantial reserves of natural gas were available at Mari with little use for purposes other than power generation. When it became known VOLUME I FIGURE II PROJECTION OF THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF NATURAL GAS AT WELL HEAD (U.S. CENTS PER MILLION B.T.U.) 160 -1m- 1my- 1rjm 1rr l sr-r r-vr 160 140 140 VALUES DEPEND ON 120 ASSUMED GAS RESERVES. 120 7,300 9,500 TRILLION B.T U. 100 100 80 80 POWER PROGRAM INCLUDING TARBELA 1975 INCLUDING TARBELA 1985 40 40 POWER PROGRAM INCLUDING TARBELA 1975 INCLUDING TARBELA 1985 20 20 1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 (2R) IBRD-3308  - 171 - that Mari gas reserves might in fact be only a fraction of what had been previously estimated, Stone & Webster expressed strong doubts as to whether EHV interconnection should still be introduced at the time they had recommended. 8.30 The Bank Group considered programs with and without inter- connection and with different amounts of thermal development in the Mari vicinity. It found, on the basis of calculations in terms of both current financial and projected economic prices for natural gas, that its analysis confirmed the doubts raised by Stone & Webster regarding the validity of EHV interconnection if thermal development in the Mari vicinity had to be limited to 400 mw, as had at one time been suggested. However, the approach to the price and use of natural gas reserves briefly described above suggested that, with reserves as currently best estimated, it would appear reasonable to use substantial amounts of Sui gas over coming years for firing the thermal plants which are a neces- sary complement to Mangla and Tarbela as sources of electric energy. Moreover, the site provisionally-selected by WAPDA's consultants for generation on the basis of Mari gas was at Gudu, close to the Indus River and almost equidistant from the Mari and Sui fields. The Bank Group, therefore, tested a power program including interconnection and 1,100 mw at Gudu and requiring in total over the 20-year period 1966-85 about.one trillion cubic feet of Sui quality gas (for generation in Karachi and the North as well as at Gudu). It found that such a program would have significant advantages over a program excluding interconnection. The difference between the two programs in terms of rate of absorption of hydro energy is illustrated by Figure 12. In quantitative terms, allowing for the saving in generating capacity reserves, the saving in thermal fuel requirements in the South resulting from the availability of hydro energy there, and the saving in pipeline capacity for gas transmission, all of which would occur with interconnection, the Bank Group found that the program including interconnection showed savings over the best program without inter- connection with a present worth of the order of $20-25 million when foreign exchange costs were valued at the current exchange rate and of about $10-15 million when foreign exchange was valued at a shadow rate of twice the official rate. 8.31 , These savings of a with-interconnection program would be offset to some extent by the costs of gas pipelines to carry fuel from Mari and Sui to the Gudu site; but there is a number of other advantages to interconnection which were not taken into account in the quantitative analysis. In the first place, if the Northern Grid has still to generate all its own power requirements in the pre-Tarbela years, it will probably be more costly than assumed in the quantitative calculations to supply sufficient thermal fuel since either additional gas pipeline capacity will have to be installed or expensive imported fuel oil will have to be used to meet peak fuel requirements. In the second place, the quantitative comparisons between the with and without-interconnection programs were made in terms of the same series of economic prices for - 172 - natural gas whereas a program excluding interconnection would in fact involve a heavier draft on natural gas reserves than one including it and so, on the approach to fuel pricing described in preceding paragraphs the fuel prices applicable to the without interconnection program should be somewhat higher. In the third place, the EHV transmission lines may be able to carry somewhat more hydro energy southward than has been assumed in the quantitative analysis, as illustrated by the hatched blocks in Figure 12. Finally, there are more general and intangible, but none the less important, advantages to interconnection such as the flexibility which it will add to the overall power system. The Timing of Interconnection 8.32 The main comparisons among programs made by the Bank Group were all based on the assumption that, if 380-ky interconnection were introduced, then a complete link from Lyallpur to Mari to Karachi would be available by 1971. In order to check this proposed timing, the Bank Group made several short-term comparisons between different schedulings for EHV interconnection. The conclusion drawn from these studies was that there were advantages to having the complete EHV line in 1971 or 1972 but that these advantages were particularly strong in the case of the link between Mari and Lyallpur. Therefore, in contrast to Stone & Webster, the Bank Group would attach higher priority to the Lyallpur-Mari line than to the Karachi-Mari line. Nevertheless the Karachi-Mari line should be completed by 1975 at the latest, for a large part of the benefit of the whole EHV system occurs in the form of thermal fuel savings in the South resulting from availability of hydro energy there, and these savings will become particularly important when the units begin to be installed at Tarbela. The main disadvantages that will result from postponement of the EHV link between Mari and Lyallpur beyond 1971/72 are that additional thermal capacity may then have to be installed in the Northern Grid area which would be relatively little used for a decade or more after completion of Tarbela Dam and that special difficulties would arise in meeting peak requirements of thermal fuel in the North in the early 1970's, as pointed out in the last paragraph. To the extent that loads in the North in the early 1970's follow more closely the contingency load forecast than the main load forecast, the case for early EHV interconnection between Mari and Lyallpur will be reinforced. Operation of Mangla and Tarbela Reservoirs 8.33 For purposes of power planning the Bank Group has used the final monthly release patterns developed by the irrigation and agriculture consultant on the basis of low winter flows in the rivers and with a view to meeting the needs of both power and irrigation to the extent that they are reconcilable. Irrigation requirements in fact dominate, but, by increasing the use of tubewells for meeting irrigation requirements in the early part of the rabi season, advantage can be taken of the greater THE ABSORPTION OF HYDRO-ENERGY BILLIONS OF KWH) 25 a25 o PROGRAM WITH SYSTEMWIDE z 380 KV INTERCONNECTION FROM 1971: An area this size represents half a billion KWH o MAXIMUM CAPABILITY OF of energy in o year, or fuel to the value of about c TRANSMISSION LINES $ 2 8 million at a fuel price of U. S cents 50 per -i w FIRM CAPABILITY OF 20 - -million B T U - - - TRANSMISSION LINES 20 W ( 15 < 0 1 5 5 4w o M A C T U A L z2 0 R J C C ( ww z00 03 < 7 PROGRAM WITHOUT INTERCONNECTION - 5 c w 00 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 '< -4----ACTUAL ;10MEPROJ ECTED0 (2R)IBRD-3314 3m  - 173 - availability of hydropower in this period when the heads on the turbines are higher, and more water can be retained in the reservoir until later in rabi, thereby increasing the capability of the hydro units and insuring against a deficiency in natural river flows for irrigation purposes in these months. Table 65 Tarbela and Mangla Release Patterns (% of live storage) (positive figures: releases; negative figures: storage) Mangla Tarbela October 23 0 November 15 8 December 10 11 January 10 21 February 24 26 March 18 19 April 0 10 May -24 5 June -36 -45 July -31 -55 August - 9 0 September 0 0 In practice, there will be deviations from these release patterns above, depending on the natural flows available in each year and the tubewell pumping capability available, etc., but small changes in the release patterns will have the effect only of transferring the availability of hydro energy from one month to another and possibly requiring compensating changes in the amount of thermal energy produced. 8.34 The most critical aspect of reservoir operation from the point of view of power planning will be the levels to which the Mangla and Tarbela Reservoirs are drawn down each spring because this will have a substantial effect on the capability of the hydroelectric stations in this period and it will consequently affect the amount of complementary thermal capacity required to meet loads. Sacrifice of 400,000 acre-feet of potential rabi irrigation supplies from Mangla, by raising the minimum drawdown level from 1040 feet to 1075 feet, results in raising the head on the Mangla turbines throughout the critical period by 35 feet and consequently increasing the firm capa- bility of 8 units by about 140 mw. At Tarbela the firm capability of 12 units can be increased by about 270 mw by sacrificing some 700,000 acre-feet of potential initial live storage capacity and keeping - 174 - the minimum reservoir level up to 1332 feet. Alteration of the drawdown levels on the reservoirs will also have some effect on the energy avail- able from the hydroelectric units, particularly in the season of minimum drawdown. It is estimated that maintenance of the higher drawdown level at Mangla would increase the total amount of energy available in the mean year by about 250 million kwh, while maintenance of the higher drawdown level at Tarbela would increase mean-year energy output by about 300 million kwh. 8.35 In practice of course the minimum drawdown level at Mangla or Tarbela is a continuous variable, but the Bank Group focused attention on the two discrete alternatives for each reservoir mentioned in the last paragraph in order to secure an indication of the relative order of priority that should be attached to the needs of agriculture and of power in long-term planning. Estimates of the power benefits which would arise from maintaining a higher rather than a lower drawdown level at each reservoir were derived from comparison, on the power system simulation model, of two alternative power programs. One was built on the assumption that the reservoir would be drawn down each year of the 20-year plan period to the lower level and the other on the assumption that it would be drawn down to the higher level. The program based on the assumption that the higher drawdown level would be maintained required installation of less thermal capacity. The difference in present-worth costs of the two programs, which was taken as indicating the net benefits to power of maintaining the higher drawdown level, resulted mainly from this reduced need for thermal capacity and, to a smaller extent, from fuel savings possible with the higher drawdown level. Estimates of the agricultural benefits of drawing down to the lower level rather than the higher level were derived from the Bank Group's linear programming analysis of investment in irrigation and agriculture (see Economic Annex, Part II) on the assumption that the resultant increase in the availability of irrigation water would be released gradually over the year in accordance with the release patterns assumed respectively for the two reservoirs. The linear programming analysis worked in terms of two ten-year periods, 1965-75 and 1975-85, and the program indicated the shadow prices or marginal values of small increments or decrements to the annual supply of irrigation water in these ten-year periods. 8.36 The results of this analysis suggested that the marginal benefits to be derived from allocating a little more water to power (i.e. retaining it in the reservoir) or to agriculture (i.e releasing it) were quite close. The analysis tended to confirm the results of other studies in that it indicated a high marginal value for supplies of irrigation water in the decade 1965-75. The marginal value to irrigation of the last 400,000 acre-feet at Mangla in this decade appeared to be greater than the value of the higher drawdown level to power, thus suggesting in general that greater benefit would be derived from drawing down Mangla fully to 1040 until 1975. After Tarbela is completed in 1975 the marginal value of additional irrigation supplies will be considerably less, partly because of the sizable addition to rabi water supplies made by Tarbela itself and partly because of the substantial opportunities - 175 - that will then exist for increasing irrigation supplies by overpumping in the public tubewell fields. It appeared that, as far as could now be foreseen, an appropriate general presumption would be that Mangla might generally continue to be operated to the lower drawdown level in the decade 1975-85 but that Tarbela should probably be operated to 1332 feet, at least in that decade. Annual Operating Decisions and Hydrological Uncertainty 8.37 While these comparisons give an indication of the general order of priority attaching to the claims of irrigation and power on storage capacity they fail to show how much the priority of the claims of one sector over those of the other will fluctuate from year to year according to the specific circumstances obtaining in each year. Some aspects of these circumstances may be reasonably predictable -- the likely demands for irrigation water and for power and the availability of alternative supplies -- from tubewells in the case of irrigation water and from thermal equipment in the case of power. Even the predictable benefits of maintaining the higher rather than the lower drawdown level will fluctuate much from year to year because, for instance, the additions to power system capability that will represent the next steps in power system development in some years (e.g hydro units) will be much more expensive than the additions to power system capability (e.g gas turbines) in other years; maintenance of the higher drawdown level and consequent postponement of the next step in power system development will therefore bring much greater savings to the power sector in some years than in others. There are other aspects of the circumstances of any particular year which will be much less predictable -- e.g. the chance that flows may be high enough to maintain the higher drawdown level without detri- ment to the agricultural sector or the chance that serious outages of thermal equipment or transmission equipment may occur. In consideration of these uncertainties, attention also must be given to the losses that would be incurred by WAPDA and by the Pakistan economy should these uncertain factors turn out at their worst. It may be possible to weight these losses with certain probability factors (e.g. the probability that flows will not be sufficient to permit retention of the higher drawdown level without detriment to irrigation supplies). Some estimates of the losses that would be incurred by an unexpected requirement to draw down fully to 1040 feet at Mangla, for instance, instead of 1075 feet (see para 6.30 of Volume IV) suggest that they would not be very large. And it may be that in certain years the savings to be had from adding to capacity only the amount required assuming maintenance of the higher drawdown level would be sufficient to outweigh the losses that might occur (if it proved necessary to draw down fully) when these losses were weighted by an appropriate probability factor. Moreover, it may be possible to develop rate structures for large industrial loads with a built-in provision for occasional peak shaving and this could further reduce the losses that would arise from an unexpected shortage of capacity. Consideration of these various factors may thus permit planning for maintenance of a higher drawdown level in certain years than would otherwise appear prudent. - 176 - 8.38 This need to reconsider reserve requirements, rate structures and the new uncertainty factors bearing on the power system stems essentially from the fact that Mangla will be an entirely different type of-generating plant from any presently in existence on the power system of West Pakistan. If the Mangla Reservoir is drawn down each year to 1040 feet, the capability of each unit will fluctuate between about 45 mw in the period of minimum drawdown and about 130 mw at the time when the reservoir is full; even with a minimum drawdown level of 1075 feet the capability of each unit will still fluctuate between about 60 mw and 130 mw over the course of the year. Thus, provided that a release pattern of some similarity to that given in Table 8 is adhered to and that adequate capacity is installed on the system as a whole to meet loads in the period of minimum drawdown, then generating capacity reserves will be very ample or even excessive throughout most months of the year. The possibility of a power crisis of the proportions and duration experienced over the last nine months would then be remote. The same will be all the more true after the power units begin to be installed at Tarbela. Peaking at Manala and Tarbela 8.39 Another aspect of reservoir operation which will be important in certain months, especially in years of low river flow, is the extent to which the reservoirs can be used for pondage and their power units consequently used for peaking purposes. Peaking at Mangla and Tarbela will essentially involve storing some water over a day and then releasing a large quantity in a short space of time, as contrasted with maintaining an even discharge over the day. Tarbela is sufficiently far upstream of irrigation structures, and the Bong escape and Rasul Barrage provide sufficient re-regulation capacity at Mangla that there would appear to be no danger of sharp fluctuations in discharges causing scouring or other damage downstream. At Mangla it will probably be necessary to maintain a constant minimum discharge sufficient to meet the irrigation require- ments of the Upper Jhelum Canal but this will preempt only a portion of flows, so that remaining flows can still be used for peaking purposes if required. The Peaking Role of Thermal Plant 8.40 The heavy seasonal fluctuation in the capabilities of the units at Mangla and Tarbela will greatly affect the role which will be played by thermal equipment on the system. The type of service which the thermal units will be called upon to perform, if the system is run in the most economical way, will tend to be much more in the nature of peaking than it has been. This will apply especially to the thermal units in the Northern Grid as units are added at Mangla, but it will also apply to the Mari units and, when the South is linked by EHV transmission to the Northern Grid, it will also apply to many of the units there. These considerations have an important effect upon the type of thermal equip- ment that will be appropriate for installation and also on the means that should be adopted to meet the fuel requirements of the thermal plants. - 177 - 8.41 It was pointed out above in discussion of the timing of trans- mission line construction that one of the main reasons for pressing ahead with early EHV interconnection between Lyallpur and Mari was to avoid the need for installation of additional thermal equipment in the North which would scarcely be used for ten years or more as units were being introduced at Tarbela. Thermal capacity installed in the vicinity of Mari would be able to play a triple role -- helping to meet local loads and loads in the South as well as loads in the North during the short period in each year when hydro capacity was at a minimum. However, the load factor on thermal equipment installed in the Mariarea still appears likely to be relatively low. The Bank Group's simulation of the opera- tion of the power system indicates that thermal capability in the Upper Sind will, when required to meet Northern Grid loads, be brought into play in the critical months between base load (met by hydro) and peak load (met by local thermal generation). To a much greater extent -- in most months of most years -- it will supply power to help meet loads in the South but there, too, its contribution will generally be utilized between base load met by hydro energy from the North and nuclear energy, on the one hand, and peak load met by local thermal generation on the other. Partly with a view to the low load factor that would be experi- enced on thermal equipment in the Mari area, Stone & Webster recommended that the first 150 mw of thermal plant installed at Mari (ccming on line in 1569-71), should be gas turbines and that the next plant should be an extended rating steam turbine. The Bank Group's adjusted program includes about 400 mw of thermal capacity in the Upper Sind area during the period 1970-74 and studies suggested that all the equipment installed should be suitable for heavily fluctuating operation and a relatively large proportion of it should be in the form of gas turbines. Thermal Fuel Supply 8.42 The Bank Group also devoted considerable attention to the question of the best means of supply of thermal fuel in the different areas of the Province as the impact of Mangla and later of Tarbela is gradually spread throughout the power system by EHV interconnection. The conclusions of these studies may be briefly summarized. Consideration of the situation in the South over the next decade, taking into account the scarcity value of natural gas and of foreign exchange in this period, suggested that in general it would be more beneficial to expand the capacity of the gas pipeline from Sui sufficiently to meet peak require- ments of fuel for thermal generation in the South up to the time that EHV interconnection becomes available rather than to restrict expansion of the pipeline and meet peaks with fuel oil. This general conclusion might be altered under three sets of circumstances: (a) if the peak requirements were very sharp and expected to be very short-lived; (b) if it appeared that the Sari Sing field would be likely to prove an economic source of fuel supply for Karachi; or (c) if it appeared likely that Sari Sing could be deve2oped for gas storage purposes and the need for additional gas transmission capacity all the way from Sui could consequently be reduced. Under these circumstances it might prove economical to meet peak fuel requirements on a short-term basis with fuel oil. Once EHV interconnection between the North and the South - 178 - becomes available KESC's thermal fuel demands will have a much lower annual load factor than they do now. Moreover, the Bank Group's studies suggest that, if the recommended program is adopted and loads in the South are of the order projected here, then KESC's peak requirements for thermal fuel may not, within the Perspective Plan period rise substantially above the level reached immediately prior to interconnec- tion since hydro energy and Mari energy would continue to make sizable contributions to meeting the load in the South through the 1970's and nuclear power would become important in the early 1980's. Thus, following interconnection, the storage potential of Sari Sing might become particularly valuable, and even if it proves infeasible to develop Sari Sing for storage, it might become worthwhile at that time to meet KESC's peak requirements of thermal fuel,ith oil and to release to other consumers a portion of the pipeline capacity previously committed to supplying KESC with gas. 8.43 As regards the thermal plants in the North, the Bank Group's studies suggested that, if electrical interconnection is completed in 1971/72 and thermal development is concentrated in the Mari vicinity, then peak-day requirements of thermal fuel for meeting the main load forecast used in these studies would not increase above their 1966/67 level before about 1980. If loads turned out to be closer to the contingency load forecast, then peak-day fuel requirements might rise somewhat above their 1966/67 level -- perhaps to about 5 M-cf/day. However, the overall annual load factor on thermal plant in the North appeared likely to be quite low over the next 10-20 years -- not usually above about 30 percent on the main load forecast or 40 percent on the contingency load forecast even on the most economical plant (Lyallpur steam units). Moreover, the load would be heavily concen- trated in a few months of each year (in the spring), implying that any firm base load on the plants throughout the year would be small. These considerations suggest that thought should be given to the possibility of meeting peak fuel requirements in the North with imported fuel oil and releasing the gas pipeline capacity presently committed to WAPDA for serving other consumers rather than expanding the gas pipeline to Multan and Lyallpur to meet WAPDA's needs. Additions to the Power System during the Fourth Plan Period (1970-75) 8.44 Table 63above suggested that existing commitments of the elec- tric utilities for additional generation and transmission equipment would be sufficient to meet prospective loads up to 1970. The Bank Group proposes completion of a 380-ky link between the Northern Grid and Mari in 1971 and construction of Mangla units 4-8 between 1970 and 1974. It also proposes addition of 400 mw of capacity in the Mari area during the Fourth Plan period, about half of it in the form of gas turbines. Depending on a number of factors, particularly whether or not it is decided to commission the fifth tunnel at Mangla for irrigation purposes, it may prove economical to install units 9 and 10 at Mangla in this period in place of some of the gas turbines at Mari since the Mangla units would be able to operate on base load throughout most of the period of minimum reservoir level under mean-year flow conditions. - 179 - 8.45 The Bank Group's program is designed to meet the main load forecast adopted in this report. Provided that both Czech units at Mari can be installed by 1970 and that the 132-ky Mari-Lyallpur link is completed by that time and the 380-ky Mari-Lyallpur link completed by 1971, the program proposed by the Bank Group is also sufficient to meet the contingency load forecast for the Northern Grid through the year 1971 with ample reserve. By 1972 reserves would appear inadequate, unless the complete Lyallpur-Karachi 380-ky tie is in place by that time. Therefore, the Bank Group's program seems adequate for both load fore- casts until about 1972/73. The very large additions to capacity in the North which are being provided during 1967 should enable Northern Grid loads to be fully met again by the winter of 1967/68, and so actual sales will begin to provide a better indication of what the load in the North really is and of how it may grow. Load growth should be care- fully observed and the prospective loads of the early 1970's should be reassessed in 1969 in order to see whether they are likely to be closer to the main load forecast or to the contingency load forecast. If they are close to the latter, an additional 200 mw of capacity at Mari, over and above that proposed in the Bank Group's program, will need to be installed in 1973-75. 8.46 The chief factors affecting the development of the Karachi/ Hyderabad power system in the Fourth Plan period will be the date of interconnection with the North and the date when the Karachi nuclear plant becomes available as reliable capacity. Regarding the nuclear plant, the Bank Group has made the same assumption as Stone & Webster -- that 25 mw of its capability will become available as reliable capacity for KESC in 1971 and the remaining 100 mw in the following year. If 26 mw of gas turbines are added at Hyderabad in 1970 and the EHV trans- mission link with Mari is installed by 1971, then there would be suffi- cient firm capacity available in the South to meet the projected peak. Without the EHV link local capacity in the South may not be adequate to meet projected loads with full security of supply (i.e reserves adequate on the single-largest-unit-out criterion); so that it may be necessary to install gas turbines or to hasten completion of the the nuclear plant if it appears that the EHVlinkwill be delayed beyond 1971. The EHV link should anyway be completed by 1974/75. The Bank Group's tentative program includes a 125-mw Korangi unit No. 4 in 1975. This unit could be postponed longer, as Stone & Webster proposed, if more capability could be conveniently located in the Mari vicinity. 8.47 The Bank Group's program envisages completion of the first two units at Tarbela in time to meet the critical period in the power system in the spring of 1975. If it proves impossible to meet this schedule it may be necessary to install additional thermal capacity to cover the loads of that year. This would be unfortunate, since the additional thermal capacity would likely not be used very much in the following years as units were being introduced at Tarbela. Therefore, if a delay does appear likely in completion of the Tarbela units, 1975 may be one year when planning for maintenance of a higher drawdown level at Mangla and the careful screening of projected loads will be particularly relevant. - 180 - Utilization of Tarbela Potential and the EHV System 8.48 In the period 1975-80 three main sets of decisions can be identified: the scheduling of units at Tarbela, the steps that should be taken to expand the EHV transmission system, and the type and location of thermal capability to be provided to firm up the hydro- electric units and help stabilize the transmission system. How the capacity at the Tarbela units should be brought in will depend on details of the load growth that cannot be foreseen with sufficient accuracy at the present time to make a firm judgment. Various schedulings of the Tarbela units were tested on the power simulation model and these studies suggested that, with a drawdown level to 1332 feet the best schedule might be to bring in the first four units in 1975 and 1976 and to postpone the remaining eight for the introduction of two per year in 1978 and 1979 and the last four in 1980 when the capacity of the interconnected system to absorb additional supplies of energy will have grown. The inexpensive units at Warsak could be added in 1977-79 to provide useful peaking capability once the critical period has become May. The expansion of the 380-ky transmission system during 1975-80 would consist mainly in construction of lines from Tarbela to Lyallpur and the addition of further links between Lyallpur and Mari. These lines will not have sufficient capacity to carry the full potential output of Tarbela in the summer months; neither could the Northern Grid absorb the full potential of Tarbela in these months. Hence it would be necessary to increase considerably the transmission line capacity all the way to Karachi in order to find a use for the full output of Tarbela in the summer. This expense would not be justi- fied for such a short period. According to the main load forecasts underlying these studies there will be a need for an additional 400 mw of thermal capability in the system besides the 125-mw Korangi unit 4 at Karachi in the period 1975-80 even if all 12 units at Tarbela are installed. The additional thermal capacity will be required, firstly, to add capability that will operate at a low load factor to provide megawatts when the reservoirs are fully drawn down and, secondly, to provide capability at both ends of the EHV transmission line to help stabilize it. Thus in the period 1975-80 the Bank Group envisages the installation in the North of 12 units at Tarbela, two units at Warsak, 200 mw at Mari/Sui and 200 mw in Karachi. Kunhar and Raising Mangla for Power 8.49 The Bank Group gave attention to two possible hydroelectric developments that might be brought in within the Perspective Plan period after the completion of 12 units at Tarbela -- first, Kunhar and, second, raising Mangla for power programs -- and it was found that, as far as could be foreseen, neither would be attractive in the early part of the 1980's. One of the main considerations working against them was the fact that a sizable portion of the energy and capability which they would add would occur in the summer flood months when Tarbela would, at this time, still be producing more energy than could be absorbed. - 181 - Nuclear Generation 8.50 By about 1980 the Bank Group believes that, as far as can now be foreseen, there will be a strong case for extensive nuclear development in the South. Before 1980 nuclear plant does not look very attractive for a number of reasons. The most important of these is that, before that time, nuclear equipment, even in Karachi, would have a load factor of only about 50 percent as a result of hydro energy from the North and supplies from the small Atomic Energy Commission nuclear plant preempting base load in most months. Since most of the fuel cost on nuclear equipment occurs in the form of fixed charges on the cores, there is a heavy penalty to low load factor operation. After 1980 the load factor attainable on nuclear plant in the North (about 20-30 percent) would still appear to be too low to warrant installation of nuclear equipment there. But in the South loads should be adequate by the early 1980's to give a 400-mw nuclear unit a load factor of better than 80 percent; and by 1985 a second 400-mw nuclear unit could have a load factor, even after absorption of substantial quantities of hydro energy, of nearly 70 percent, accord- ing to the Bank Group's studies. Moreover, by the early 1980's loads on an interconnected system would be growing rapidly enough to absorb reasonably quickly nuclear units of 400 nw; present technological trends in nuclear development suggest that this is the minimum size at which substantial economies will be obtainable. By the early 1980's the technology and capability of the world nuclear industry and the industrial base in West Pakistan should also have developed far enough to make it possible to construct nuclear units of 400-mw size at reasonable cost in the Karachi area. In considering nuclear develop- ment it must be borne in mind that technology is developing extremely rapidly in this field and that even the optimistic views expressed in this paragraph may prove, within a few years, to have been short-sighted. Use of Indigenous Coal for Electricity Generation 8.51 There will be need to install additional thermal capacity in the late 1970's or early in the 1980's to firm up the capability of the Tarbela units in the season of minimum reservoir levels. The Bank Group believes that, as far as can now be foreseen, this will best be accomplished with additional gas-fired plant. However, there is a possibility that the situation regarding gas reserves might prove strin- gent enough at that time to make a mine-mouth plant at the Lakhra coal field appear attractive. A coal-fired plant would be considerably more expensive than a gas-fired plant in capital costs as well as operating and maintenance costs but if the price at which coal were available was sufficiently far below the scarcity price of gas at that time then generation on the basis of coal might be worthwhile. The Bank Group's analysis on assumptions favorable to coal suggests that coal would have to be available at a price per Btu about 20 percent below the price of gas to make coal attractive. In terms of economic prices this might be the case about 1980 if gas reserves turn out to be no larger than the lowest of current estimates of reserves. - 182 - System Development After 1980 8.52 The Bank Group foresees substantial thermal development in the vicinity of the Mari and Sui gas fields in the early 1980's despite the fact that it might not be possible to guarantee to gas-fired plants established at that time a lifetime supply of gas for high load factor operation. There is of course a possibity that more gas may be dis- covered over the intervening 15 years. If gas reserves appeared to be becoming short, it would be possible to keep the load factor on the Mari/Sui units down by developing further hydro plants or nuclear installations to meet base load. Even if gas reserves available for power use were completely exhausted the Gudu location would be quite suitable for generation on the basis of imported fuel oil to meet seasonal peaks in the North. Conversion of gas-fired plants to the use of oil is not expensive. Moreover, if imported fuel oil did have to be used to generate power to meet seasonal peaks in the Norths its use at Gudu instead of in the Northern Grid area itself would save a lengthy rail haul. The exact proportions-of plant that should be based on gas, imported oil or coal or able to use both oil and gas will of course depend on many unforeseeable factors. The tighter the gas situation the more attractive would it be, for instance, to use Lakhra coal for thermal generation for Karachi and the Sind intermediate between base load and peak load. Nevertheless, the concept of a heavy concentration of thermal development in the Mari/Sui area is one that seems well adapted to making the most economic use of known resources in West Pakistan, while it also has the advantage of providing a high degree of flexibility for meeting future contingencies. The Bank Group's Proposed Power Program 8.53 The bulk power supply program proposed by the Bank Group and set forth in detail in Volume IV and its annexes is summarized in the follow- ing tables 66 and 67. Table 66 Bank Group's Generation and Transmission Program, 1966-85 (Mw) Northern Grid Uper Sind Karachi-Hyderabad Total Hydro Thermal Thermal Thermal Generating Equipment Existing 1965 155 277 25 275 732 1966-69 135 202 25* 187 549 1970-74 225 - 400 151 776 1975-79 664 - 200 325 1189 1980-84 292 - 700 700 1692 1985 - - 400 400 - 183 - Table 66 (continued) 380-ky Transmission Equipment 1971 Mari-Lyallpur single circuit; Mari-Karachi single circuit 1974 Second Mari-Karachi circuit 1975 Tarbela-Lyallpur single circuit 1976 Second Mari-Lyallpur circuit 1978 Second Tarbela-Lyallpur circuit 1979 Third Mari-Lyallpur circuit 1980 Third Tarbela-Lyallpur circuit Distribution 8.54 The growth of the power system implied by the load forecasts adopted in this report will require a very substantial expansion of the distribution system. In order to serve the projected number of new domestic, commercial and industrial customers and to permit the proper functioning of the desired number of tubewells, Stone & Webster esti- mated that at least 20,000 miles of new distribution line would have to be constructed by WAPDA alone by 1970 and another 35,000 miles by 1975. Stone & Webster were doubtful whether WAPDA would be able to achieve these targets. They felt that the power wing of WAPDA had concentrated most of its efforts towards large projects involving power generation at the neglect of the electric distribution system. The distribution system had been made to bear an unreasonably high pro- portion of budget cuts, and insufficient efforts had been made to train technicians for distribution line work. Some of the figures recently made available by WAPDA suggest that achievement in terms of miles of line construction during the Second Plan period may have been somewhat better than implied by the figures available to Stone & Webster. However, the WAPDA figures are not wholly reassuring. The rate of connection of public tubewells appears to have declined from 1,000 in 1960/61 to 138 for the two years 1963/64 and 1964/65; and the rate of village electri- fication had also declined from the levels achieved during the earlier years of the 1960's. It would seem, therefore, that whatever the performance in the field of urban distribution, there remains a real difficulty in making rural connections, either under the village electrification program or under the tubewell program. Stone & Webster recommended that these two programs should be combined. With this the Bank Group agrees. They felt that this would make possible the attain- ment of higher rates of village electrification. Nevertheless, there is no question but that the electrification of customers in general and of tubewells in particular will make great demands on the resources of finance and trained manpower available to WAPDA and that it will not be easy to reach the targets set. Financial Requirements 8.55 Load growth has been curtailed in all the four major power systems of West Pakistan in recent years by shortages of capacity, particularly in the Northern Grid area and Lower Sind. Expansion of - 184 - Table 67 SUMMARY OF PROGRAM POWER GENERATING EQUIPMENT AND TRANSMISSION LINE INSTALLATION Generating Equipment Northern Grid Upper Sind Lower Sind and Karachi EHV KV Transmission Line 1966 Existing 467(Oct) Existing 50(Dec) Existing 280(Dec) 1967 Lyallpur-Steam 124 Hyderabad-Steam 15 Mangle 1', 2 90(Mar) Kotri GT 13 1968 Lahore GTs 52 Kotri OTs 26 1969 Mangle 3 45(Mar) Korangi "C" 125 1970 Mangle 45(Mar) Mari-Steam 100 Hyderabad GTs 26 Mangla 5, 6 90(Mar) 1971 Retire (15) Mari-Steam 100 Karachi-Nuclear 25 Lyallpur-Mari-Karachi (s/C) 1972 Karachi-Nuclear 10 1973 Mangla 7, 8 90(Mar) Retire (15) 1974 Mari GTs 200 Mari-Karachi (s/c) 1975 Tarbela 1, 2 180(Mar) Korangi 4 125 Tarbela-Lyallpur (s/c) 1976 Tarbela 3, 4 180(Mar) Lyallpur-Mari (s/c) 1977 Mari/Sui 5 200 1978 Critical changes to May Tarbela-Lyallpur (s/c) Tarbela 5, 6 146(May) Wareak 5, 6 80(May) 1979 Tarbela 7, 8 146(May) Korangi 5 200 Lyallpur-Mari 1980 Tarbela 9, 10 lW6(May) Tarbela-Iyallpur (s/c) Tarbela 11, 12 146(May) 1981 Korangi 6 300 - 1982 Mari/Sui 5a 200 Mari/Sui 5b 200 1983 Karachi-Nuclear 400 1984 Mari/Sui 6 300 1985 Karachi-Nuclear 400 - 185 - the distribution system has been insufficient to keep up with the growth of demand for new connections. Inadequate effort has been made on the maintenance side, both as regards generation and distribution. Thus backlogs have grown -- of deferred maintenance, of customers awaiting connection, and of additional generating capacity required. 8.56 It is partly for these reasons and partly because of the heavy cost of the EHV transmission system which the Bank Group believes WAPDA should commence during the current plan period that the Third Plan capital requirements of the power program proposed in this report represent a larger proportion of total plan investments than was spent on the power sector during the Second Plan. The capital requirements of the program proposed are also substantially above the Third Plan allocation so far made for the power sector. Estimated Third Plan capital requirements of the power program proposed by the Bank Group are PRs 3,017 million against an original Third Plan allocation of about PRs 2,178 million. The recent revision of the Third Plan has raised this allocation to about PRs 2,400 million which is still somewhat short of the Bank Group's proposal. 8.57 The following table compares actual capital expenditure on power with the total investment in each year of the Second Plan period and also indicates projected figures for each Five Year Plan period through 1985 on the basis of the Bank Group's proposals and some pre- liminary estimates that were made available by the Pakistan Planning Commission regarding total investment in West Pakistan over the Third and subsequent plan periods up to 1985. The table covers only public sector investment in power (i.e. excluding industrially owned). Table 68 Actual and Projected Investment in Power Compared to Total Investment (Public & Private) in West Pakistan, 1960-85 (PRs million) Investment Total Power as a in Power Investment % of Total Actual 1960/61 208 3,023 6.8 1961/62 273 3,528 7.7 1962/63 213 4.,410 4.8 1963/64 258 4,753 5.4 1964/65 242 5,260 4.6 Subtotal Second Plan 1,194 20,974 5.7 Projected Third Plan 2,849 27,250 10.5 Fourth Plan 3,68 38,200 9.1 Fifth Plan 3,676 53,200 6.9 Sixth Plan 4,031 68,000 5.9 The relatively heavy burden proposed for the Third and Fourth Plan periods - 186 - represents a measure of the catching up that needs to be achieved. Pro- jected expenditures on the power sector increase in absolute terms in later Plan periods but they decline as a proportion of total investment projected under the Perspective Plan to levels consistent with those recently achieved. Tariffs and Accounts 8.58 The large size of these capital requirements emphasizes the importance of keeping the level and structure of tariffs in West Pakistan under constant review. In 1965 the Harza Engineering Company, consultants to WAPDA, made a study of WAPDA's tariffs. Harza did not recommend any major changes in the tariff structure but proposed the elimination of certain anomalies and inequities in that structure. Their report focused more on the reduction of losses by improving the administration of the power system rather than on revising the tariffs in the immediate future. Harza pointed out that the very large amount of energy lost between generation and sales represented substantial losses in revenue. If the losses and unaccounted for could be reduced to about 15 percent of the total amount of energy sent out in 1963/64 the improvement in income would have been about 50 percent of the actual net earnings in that year. The Bank Group and also Stone & Webster are in agreement with the recom- mendations of Harza regarding the need for a major effort to reduce losses. One part of this effort would involve improvement of WAPDA's accounting and recording procedures so that management could be provided with a stream of up-to-date financial and statistical statements per- mitting analysis of operating results and trends and identification of where the responsibility for successes and failures lie. 8.59 WAPDA's rate of return on net fixed assets in operation, calcu- lated according to the World Bank's normal procedure, averaged 7.58 percent for the four years 1960/61 to 1963/64. For the latest year, 1964/65, for which financial information is available, WAPDA's rate of return declined to 5.83 percent. The large capital expenditure which will be required for system expansion and the recent decline in WAPDA's rate of return suggest that there is need for revision in the level and structure of WAPDA's tariffs. The agricultural tariff is a case in point. Harza pointed out in their report that bills under the agricul- tural tariff were 37 to 44 percent lower than bills which industrial consumers would pay for the same load and consumption. Harza recommended that sales to agricultural consumers under the present agricultural tariff should be available only to those who agree to discontinue the operation of their pumps during the critical load periods. This change of practice was not accepted by WAPDA. In effect, therefore, other consumers still bear the burden of the subsidy which is granted to agricultural pumping by these non-compensatory rates. Pumping require- ments are expected to increase substantially in the next decade. The Bank Group believes that it will be necessary for WAPDA to raise agri- cultural pumping rates, to raise rates to some or all non-agricultural customers or to ask that the subsidy be covered by allocations from the VOLUME I MAP 5 . U R C H l N A ) A m m u N NARAN A N D MALAKAND lir 15MWI 19 RA iDARGAI KABUL 0 TARBEL R4 SRINAGAR WARSAK 0 0PUE S H A W A R A M A B A D K A S H M i R GTO ATI RAWALPIND SMANG LA 2MWOKHARIAN KURRAM GARHI DAUD KHEL GUJRAT RSHAD I WAL" A SIALKO e/ 3MW 2MW CHASMA BARRAGE m' M. Y NADPUR GOMAL UJRANWAL INTE SRNAIOA IONDR I SAHDHA KAL 0AHKAKU CH'Í HMOK i NORT SHAIRA,' LAHORE L AL UR SOUTH LYALLPU KO TLAKHPAT RENALA k MONTGOMERY- 15MW $$MW QUTT 2lM N D l A / 96 COAL MINES MULA TUS BAHAWAL NAGAR BAHAWALPUR KALAT 0 r,0 BARRAGE $1TUDY OF THE WATER AND POWER RESOURCES s a «6« OF WEST PAKISTAN ,bl ,fidRAHIM YAR KHAN /COMPREHENSIVE REPORT JACOBABAD G / GH¥ MerARKI MAIN POWER STATIONS s. SIKARPUR .1..- AND I SUKK LARKANA PRINCIPAL TRANSMISSION LINES 6 vROHRI U KHAIRPUR EXUSTjNG CONST RU CTION PROPOSED THARUSHA GRID STATION OR TOWN 0 380 KV TRANSMISSION LINES ......... k DUO MRO 220 KV TRANSMISSION LINES - -... - ---.- k ?NAWBSHAM132 KV TRANSMISSION LINES k HYDROELECTRIC STATIONS Racy THERMAL STATIONS F NUCLEAR POWER STATION s-n S,.0 . m MIRPUR KHAS 6e, Fhod O 'HYDERABAD GAS FIELD KTRI 2 CA IL i5w KORANGI Oje . ~ DIGRI CA IL 125M 125W cr egh"0INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY KARACHI '- 1O HATTAl 252m DABEJI BADIN6 >, 0 5.0 100 150 200 s-."'MkLES JULY 1967 IBRD--1920RI 4 - 187 - Government. The Bank Group believes that WAPDA should aim for a rate of return calculated in the same manner as the figures above of not less than 8 percent. 8.60 KESC had a study of its tariffs made in 1964/65 by Gilbert Associates. Gilbert pointed out that KESC's present tariffs are extremely complex, hard to understand and difficult to use in calcu- lating bills. Some of the rates are based upon horsepower of demand and some upon kilcwattsof demand. Some of the rates run to five decimal places. Some rates are gross with a discount for prompt payment and others offer no discount. The fuel adjustment is a large portion of an industrial consumer's bill because the present base was established some years ago when fuel was cheaper. The changes proposed by the consultant would simplify all of the rates mentioned above and reduce the existing 11 rates to 7. There would be total elimination of free energy, kilowatts would be used instead of horse- power, several tariffs for residential and commercial consumers would be replaced by one tariff through one meter. The fuel adjustment would bring it into line with the present costs of fuel and there would be a uniform discount for prompt payment of all bills. On the whole, the new tariffs might yield about 5 percent more than the existing tariffs. 8.61 KESC's rate of return on average net fixed assets in opera- tion ranged between 10.6 and 13.4 percent over the years 1960 to 1964, but it declined to 10.2 percent in 1965. KESC declared cash dividends of 10 percent for a number of years except that in 1963 and 1964 stock dividends were declared and in 1965 a combination of 6 percent cash and a 4 percent stock dividend was declared. KESC's financial position has been sound in the past but the cost of doing business has recently risen, while the average revenue received per kilowatt-hour has declined. The generous tax exemptions which have been allowed to KESC for new facilities placed in service has been helpful but these exemp- tions may sometime in the future be withdrawn. The Bank Group believes that the Government should permit KESC to charge tariffs to maintain revenues sufficient to'provide the company with an annual rate of return of at least 8 percent on its average net fixed assets in operation so that it can continue to obtain from internal cash generation the local currency it will require for its expansion program. - 188 - IX. ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION Institutional Framework of Water and Power Development 9.01 The centerpiece of the institutional framework for public development of the water and power resources of West Pakistan is the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), established as a semi- autonomous Government agency in 1958. It was initially set up as a body which would be more flexible than the traditional Government departments and would have responsibility for the planning and execution of all major engineering works for development of the Province's water and power resources. However it was soon decided that it would be desirable to give WAPDA full responsibility for the operation of the power system in order to ensure close coordination between planning and construction of major power facilities and sale of energy to consumers, including the reclamation tubewells which were expected to become a very important part of the total power load. Consequently the Electricity Department of the Government of Viest Pakistan was transferred to WAPDA in 1959. Responsibility for operation of the irrigation system remained with the Irrigation Department. 9.02 WAPDA will bear responsibility for planning and execution of most of the major investment schemes recommended in this report -- in particular the Tarbela Dam, the public tubewell projects, and the main power generation and transmission projects. It is already responsible for execution of the major construction work under the Indus Basin Pro- ject. Since its inception, WAPDA has had dynamic leadership and has successfully performed a large amount of work. Not being restrained by normal departmental regulations, WAPDA has been able to attract and absorb funds needed for the implementation of large projects. All divisions of WAPDA have regularly enlisted expatriate and local consul- tants for the study, planning and supervision of projects. 9.03 Despite its leadership and the quality of much of its top staff, WAPDA has inevitably had growing pains, given the large volume of work it was called upon to perform, and it has not always been able to keep up with targets. This applies in particular to the execution of the public tubewell program. During the Second Plan period a total of about 2,100 public wells was installed; the largest achievement in any one year was in fact in 1960-61 when 1,000 wells were energized. In each of the fiscal years 1964/65 and 1965/66 less than 200 wells were placed in operation against a target in the WAPDA Master Plan of over 2,000 wells for 1966. The Third Plan target for additional sup- plies of groundwater to be provided by WAPDA projects is l MAF by 1970. The actual achievement during the Second Plan period was 2.5 MAF. Another example of the difficulties WAPDA has faced is in opera- tion of the power system. The power crisis of 1966/67 revealed de- ficiencies in the operation of the system and in plant maintenance, the consequences of which were aggravated by the delay in completion of the new Lyallpur plant. - 189 - 9.04 Some of the construction work involved in execution of the pro- gram recommended here and a great deal of the responsibility for success- ful operation of the irrigation schemes proposed will lie with two tra- ditional line departments of the West Pakistan Government -- the Irrigation Department and the Agriculture Department. Both of these bodies have responsibilities spanning the Province. The Irrigation Department operates some tubewells and undertakes some construction work for irrigation pur- poses outside the Indus Basin but its primary responsibility is the day- to-day operation of the entire surface water distribution system, in- cluding collection of irrigation revenue. As such, it has built up a cadre of engineers in its upper levels with great experience in water use and supply. Since canal remodeling work must be very closely in- tegrated with the operation of the canal system, in order to minimize interruption of supplies, IACA recommends that responsibility for most of this work should be borne by the Irrigation Department. 9.05 The Provincial Agriculture Department has extremely wide res- ponsibilities, covering virtually all aspects of agriculture (including animal husbandry) throughout West Pakistan; agriculture represents more than 40 percent of provincial income. The Agriculture Department will play a critical role in enabling the farmers to derive the results which are projected from the programs recommended here. Specifically its main contributions will be in research to identify new crop varieties, pes- ticides and other inputs and to discover the best practices for their application; in extension work to spread existing knowledge and the re- sults of further research work among the farmers; and in expansion and improvement of the livestock sector which is expected to play such an important role in future agricultural development in West Pakistan. The Department will not be able to fulfilLthese roles effectively unless a wholehearted effort is made to strengthen it. Primarily this will in- volve substantial improvement in the pay, conditions and facilities which it is able to offer to prospective employees so that it may obtain both better-quality personnel and more personnel than it now generally has. The Department has suffered seriously in the past from shortage of well- qualified staff. Careers in agriculture have not carried prestige, salaries have been low, opportunities for advancement limited, and work- ing conditions poor. Field Assistants are expected to cover 15,000 acres and the Agricultural Assistants supervising them 60,000 acres -- but neither have been provided with adequate transportation facilities to enable them to work effectively. Field assignments usually require living in areas where housing and school facilities for families are poor, but officers posted to extension services usually receive neither housing nor a housing allowance. Trained research staff are not pro- vided with adequate assistance or facilities, and they move to more remunerative administrative work which makes less than best use of their training. Sustained and rapid progress in agriculture will not take place without a vast improvement in two services as critical as research and extension. 9.06 Tio other agencies which will play a major role in the recom- mended tubewell project areas are the Agricultural Development - 190 - Corporation (ADC) and the Land and Water Development Board (LIDB). Both of these agencies, which combine responsibility for water and land develop- ment and for provision of other agricultural inputs in certain designated areas were established largely with a view to overcoming the rigidity and lack of coordination among the line departments. ADC, formed in 1961 as a result of a recommendation of the 1959/60 Food and Agriculture Com- mission, has been given responsibility for supply of certain inputs throughout the Province and specific responsibility for water supply, agricultural inputs and extension work in four areas that are being brought under surface-water irrigation -- Thal, Taunsa, Gudu and Ghulam Mohammed commands. It has dynamic leadership, which has helped to mobilize the divisions of the old line departments in the areas where ADC has worked, but it has lacked adequate numbers of experienced agricul- tural staff. The LWDB is an even newer body, established in 1964 at the suggestion of the Revelle Panel specifically to promote development in the SCARP areas. It has a high-level membership, being chaired by the Provincial Chief Secretary and having as members the secretaries of all Government departments concerned with agriculture; it meets only about once every two months. Its main activity until now has been in the SCARP I area, for which it appointed a Project Director in over- all command of developmental activities. The staff, who are seconded from the regular departments, carry out extension, reclamation, input supply and irrigation activities. The main differences from the situation elsewhere are that the extension coverage is somewhat more intensive and that all officers in the area concerned with agriculture and irrigation are responsible to the Project Director within an in- tegrated project program. 9.07 Most of the new inputs which have been provided to agricul- ture in recent years have been channeled via one or other of the agen- cies discussed above, but there is a gradual growth of private enter- prise activity in support of agriculture which could become very important in future years. This has developed in the context of a limited liberalization of the external relations of the economy and of a continuing improvement of the terms of trade of agriculture with other sectors of the economy, which has meant that farmers have had somewhat more earnings to reinvest in agriculture and somewhat more incentive to do so. Partly as a result of this and the improved availability of imported raw materials, private enterprise has played. a major role in drilling private tubewells and manufacturing and in- stalling pumps, casings and engines. Distribution of fertilizer was also handed over to private enterprise for a brief period in 1964 and 1965 and it was withdrawn not because it was unsuccessful but because, in a way, it was too successful: stocks were run down so fast that shortage and consequently a black market developed, so that the Govern- ment felt it could secure more equitable distribution, while the short- age lasted, through official channels. 9.08 It will be essential that as much use as possible is made of private enterprise because, as is natural in any country undertaking a rapid development effort, all Government departments suffer from a - 191 - severe shortage of qualified staff especially at the lower levels. With good Government officers being in short supply it is important that as many as possible of their responsibilities be transferred to market channels so that they may concentrate on overall supervision of market operations and on the work which generally cannot be handled by others -- such as education, and development and introduction of new inputs and new practices. A part of the difficulty in securing sufficient numbers of good-quality Government staff has been shortage of funds, and it may be that the effort to economize on current expenditures in order to maximize public savings and investment has been carried too far. There are signs that economizing on current expenditures may have become a false economy in some directions: in agricultural education and extension work, where it tends to lessen the ability of the farmer to respond to investments in water and other inputs; in maintenance of the irrigation system, where it leads to gradual deterioration and eventual need for much more extensive repairs than would have been necessary had maintenance been regular; and in investigations, such as groundwater quality studies and monitoring of project development, where it leads to lack of sufficient data for planning purposes and consequent mistakes which have later to be remedied, with much delay and added cost. Thus selected additions to Government current expen- diture, designed to strengthen the departments concerned with agricul- ture and irrigation development and to improve the quality of their staff, could have high returns. 9.09 With the variety of Government agencies concerned with agricul- tural development -- and there are other important bodies besides those mentioned above such as the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) which is playing an increasingly important role in provision of credit, and the Cooperative Development Board -- there inevitably arise problems of inter-agency coordination. As pointed out, the ADC and the LWDB were established specifically with a view to overcoming this problem, and they have been to a limited degree successful in the project areas where they have operated. Nevertheless the problem of coordination -- in planning, project construction and operation and implementation of Government policy -- remains serious. IACA reports that there have been occasions when two agencies have been planning independently of one another for the same area. Insufficient effort is made to ensure that plans made by one agency reflect the best judgment and experience available in other agencies; in particular until recently the Agricul- ture Department seems to have been drawn little into WAPDA and Irri- gation Department project planning. Differences of opinion are brought out only at later stages and reconciliation involves wasteful delays. Since WAPDA builds the main water development projects, the Irrigation Department distributes much of the water from them and the Agriculture Department is concerned with effective final use of the water, there is clearly need for close coordination in the common development effort and less concern with narrowly construed institutional interests. The ADC and the LMDB, being new, have had their own difficulties in estab- lishing effective working relationships with the existing administrative structure. The logical place for coordination of both planning and - 192 - policy implementation would seem to be the Lest Pakistan Planning and Development Department. Presently the Department has insufficient tech- nical and professional staff to perform an effective coordinating role. The problem is sufficiently important and the savings to be had from more effective deployment of human and financial resources are suffi- ciently large that early attention should be given to establishing mechanisms and obtaining the qualified staff needed for continuous coordination. "Implementation Capacity" 9.10 It is clear that shortages of effective organization and well- qualified personnel with initiative have been a serious brake on develop- ment in the past, as would be expected in any large and rapid development effort. Anxious to prepare a plan of action that would be feasible of execution, the Bank Group and its consultants essayed the difficult task of identifying approximately the rate of progress that might be achieved in each direction of activity, with a major effort. These are obviously matters of judgment and, as such, they leave plenty of room for disagree- ment. Nevertheless to disregard the facts that "implementation capacity" is scarce and that there are administrative and organizational limits to the pace at which activity can be expanded in any particular direction would be conducive to wishful thinking rather than to effective planning. 9.11 Many of the administrative limits to achievement adopted by the Bank Group and its consultants for planning purposes have been set at an extremely generous level; if judged solely in the light of past ex- perience they would simply be termed unrealistic; they assume a much more massive effort than has so far been made to promote agricultural develop- ment, an effort which can only be anticipated because of the Government's declared policy to eliminate dependence on food supplies from abroad and to make "high priority for agriculture" a reality rather than an inten- tion. Some impression has already been given of the extent of the change required in the amount of money, status and attention accorded to agricul- tural extension, education and research. It is difficult to express the required effort meaningfully in quantitative terms, because so much depends on the quality of the service and the inputs provided. Improved seed is a case in point. The target of the Second Plan was to cover 50 percent of the area under major crops with improved seed by 1964/65; actual achievement was, according to the Second Plan Evaluation, 11 percent or not greatly more than the area covered at the start of the Plan. The 1975 targets assumed in the Bank Group's projections are 40 percent of the rice acreage, virtually the entire cotton acreage and 50 percent of the wheat acreage; this would imply an increase over the 10-year period of more than 00 percent in the area planted with im- proved seed. More significant than the quantities projected is the Bank Group's assumption that the improved seed that gets into the hands of the farmer will be of high quality and high germination rate and will not be adulterated as it often is now. This will require a very sub- stantial expansion of seed multiplication farms under Government super- vision and much more effective quality control than has so far been maintained. - 193 - 9.12 It is not only in the agricultural field that the recommended program is administratively ambitious. It was pointed out above in pp. that WAPDA actually electrified in 1965/66 less than 10 percent of the number of wells envisaged in the Master Plan target for that year. Fulfilment of the Action Program will mean completing in almost each year of the Fourth Plan period as many public tubewells as were completed in the whole of the Second Plan period, or about ten times the recent annual achievement. Furthermore this large tubewell effort would take place at a time when a number of WAPDA's most competent engineers would still be burdened with the completion of the IBP works and with the construction of Tarbela. The recommended canal remodeling program -- about a million acres by 1975 -- would be no small job for the Irrigation Department either. 9.13 The recommended power program will also impose a very heavy burden on the administrative and managerial resources of Tpest Pakistan, but it is essential if growth in the agricultural and other sectors of the economy is not to be constrained by shortages of power as it was by the 1966/67 power crisis. During the Second Plan WAPDA more than doubled its number of customers and built about 15,000 miles of distri- bution line; the heavy concentration on new large-scale power projects and on connecting new customers led to some neglect of maintenance. During the current plan and the Fourth Plan this backlog in maintenance has had to be made up and, at the same time, according to the Bank Group's estimates, about 60,000 miles of new distribution line will be required. The recommended program also envisages a very substantial investment over the next decade in 380-ky EHV transmission, a field new to West Pakistan, and an approximate trebling of the utilities' installed generating capacity between 1965 and 1975. WAPDA takes the view that the load growth may be even higher than projected by the Bank Group. Whichever magnitude turns out to be right, it is clear that planning and construction will have to be enormously expanded and greatly improved if West Pakistan is to build a power system commensurate with its needs. Project Planning and Construction 9.14 As far as the planning and implementation of the proposed water and power projects are concerned, the main foreseeable bottle- necks are shortage of engineers and procedures that are still too loose to ensure the smooth flow of needed construction materials and completion of each stage of project execution according to schedule. The shortage of engineers can to some extent be remedied by continued use of foreign contractors and consultants, but there can be no adequate replacement for sufficient numbers of Pakistani engineers experienced in local conditions. Engineering education has expanded rapidly in recent years-, but still the output of graduate engineers during the Third Plan will be only about 3,800 against a requirement, according to the Third Plan document, of an additional 7,000 engineers between 1965 and 1970. By 1975 IACA estimate that 1,000 more engineers than are presently employed on the public tubewell program will be - 194 - required for project planning and construction alone. In addition, supervision and operation of completed tubewell projects will by that time require about 300 more engineers than presently engaged in it, and the Bank Group believes that special attention should be devoted to finding enough high-caliber staff with administrative as well as engineering ability for the critically important task of managing the tubewell projects once in operation. There is a limit to the rate at which formal education facilities in engineering can be expanded, without sacrificing quality, because of the shortage of good teachers. More on-the-job training is required for recent graduates. Greater use could also probably be made of opportunities for on-the-job train- ing to upgrade promising young men who may lack full formal training in engineering; such men could be used in supervisory positions where technical training is less important than good general experience in construction, operation or maintenance. More advantage could probably be taken of consultants for on-the-job training purposes. 9.15 It will be impossible to execute the large tubewell program proposed unless procedures for investigation, design, land acquisition, contracting, supplying components, and designing and building the electricity distribution system, are greatly tightened and, as much as possible, routinized. The public tubewell projects proposed here are of considerably smaller size than those considered hitherto; they average about half a million acres each. IACA recommended the smaller size for public projects mainly to leave as large an area as possible for private development in those areas where private tubewell growth shows promise. This would reduce the burden on the public authorities. The smaller scale of the projects would also make their construction and operation considerably more manageable. Construction stages would be shorter and the projects should come into operation more rapidly. Delays will be minimized by good initial investigations of the physical conditions -- groundwater, topography, electrification problems, etc. -- in the area to be covered, by better scheduling of procurement and by the improved coordination both within departments (e.g. between WAPDA Power and Water Wings) and between departments that was already called for. With one SCARP project completed and four underway, enough experience should have been gained that potential bottlenecks can be foreseen and the requisite steps taken at each stage of the progress of a project to see that they do not recur. 9.16 The Bank Group believes that difficulties in project execution will generally be better overcome by adjusting the existing organizational structure and strengthening weaker parts rather than by establishing further new organizations. This applies in particular to the tubewell projects and to work in the power field. One suggestion that has been put forward is that some of the responsibilities of WAPDA's Power Wing be transferred to a new organization; the Bank Group is not convinced that this would be a prudent move at the present time. The Power Wing has done a reasonably good job under rather difficult circumstances and through trial and error has gained much valuable experience. Establishment of a new organization would not - 195 - ease the basic problem of shortage of qualified and experienced people; indeed it would more likely only exacerbate this problem since the new organization would have to have its own separate management hierarchy and more people in both the new and the old organizations would have to devote time to ensuring proper coordination between them. New organiza- tions, such as municipal power distribution agencies, would also likely encounter even more difficulties than WAPDA does in securing adequate financing for distribution work because they would lack the financial strength of WAPDA. The Bank Group believes that reassignment of res- ponsibilities in different organizations at this time would rather tend to delay than to expedite work on the expansion of the distribution and transmission systems needed for the tubewell program and to connect the large numbers of new customers anticipated. It would be more prudent to concentrate on strengthening the Power Ting. Management and Operation of System and Projects 9.17 Efficient operation of the evolving water system and of the various projects proposed, especially the tubewell projects, may soon prove to be a more serious problem than actual construction. An ex- perienced body of engineers exists in the Irrigation Department for operating the surface water distribution system, and WAPDA is develop- ing ability for the efficient day-to-day running of the power generation and transmission system, but there are a lot of new problems coming, many of them problems of reconciling different interests, and thus re- quiring more coordination. Another aspect of day-to-day operation which needs closer attention on both the power and the water sides is main- tenance. 9.18 Over the coming two decades, and especially in the next few years, the irrigation system of West Pakistan, having remained basically a system for diversion of natural river flows with the aid of barrages for a century, will be going through a critical transitional phase. Established rights to surface water and the procedures that have been used for allocation of the flows available each year will no longer be appropriate means of deriving the greatest possible benefit from the water supplies that will be available. It will be necessary to con- tinue to allocate water each year largely on the basis of predetermined requirements rather than on a demand basis because of the rigidities of the system. But these requirements will need to be reviewed annually in the light of interim system development. Most of the Mangla storage will be required to replace the rabi flows of the eastern rivers but the intra-seasonal regulation capacity of the dam will make it possible to fit flows better to crop needs than has been possible in the past. Com- pletion of the link canals from the Indus will add to the flexibility of bulk water allocations between areas, but new diversions will be re- quired to enable them to provide enough water to replace Sutlej and Ravi flows. The irrigation supplies that become available from the groundwater aquifer with the gradual spread of tubewell fields will need to be taken into account in calculating surface-water requirements; and in some cases, first probably in SCARP IV, groundwater will be able - 196 - to substitute for some of the current surface supplies, thus releasing them for use elsewhere. Tarbela will further alter the nature of the system,adding substantially to total rabi water availability and pro- viding more capacity for fitting water supplies to crop needs. Thus the water system will be evolving rapidly and major new policy decisions will be required. 9.19 The Bank Group believes that a Provincial Irrigation Authority should be constituted at the highest level to give adequate recognition to the broad range of administrative, legal, sociological and technical considerations that should be brought to bear in formulation of these evolving policies. This body would be responsible for basic decisions on barrage allocations, reservoir release patterns and drawdown levels and other major policy issues such as the use of tubewell fields in re- lation to surface water deliveries, and it would be concerned with both power and irrigation aspects of these matters. The Authority would ensure that all Government agencies concerned with irrigation cooperate in the formation of new policies and water allocations, but it would not itself be expected to undertake the detailed analyses of water dis- tribution. The Bank Group believes that for this purpose there should be set up a semi-independent study group or working party staffed by, say, the Irrigation and Power Department, WAPDA, Agriculture Department and the Planning and Development Department. The study group would need to be well staffed with technical officers competent to carry out the detailed calculations and analyses required and fully conversant with the practical problems of irrigated farming and of operating the irrigation system. 9.20 Representation of the Power Ing in the derivation of policies for operation of the works, such as Mangla Reservoir and the tubewell fields, which have implications for power as well as irri- gation, will be important but improvement is also vitally needed in operations of the Power Wing less directly related to water resources. The chief dispatcherstof the power systems must be clothed with suffi- cient authority to direct the flow of electricity from generating stations to load centers as required and to order the start up or closing down of generating stations to meet fluctuating demands. After the power systems in the North and the South are interconnected by EHV transmission lines a central dispatching station will be needed. The Power Wing's billing, collecting and accounting procedures need improvement. The present accounting system does not provide management with sufficiently detailed and up-to-date statistics to analyze operating results and trends and to know where responsibility for successes and failures lies. Losses on the WAPDA systems are presently unduly high, about 20 percent of the total energy sent out from the generating stations; even a small reduction could lead to substantial increase in net income, but a sizable reduction should be possible with improvement of the distribution system, better meter reading and billing procedures, and more efficient operation of a denser transmission and distribution network. - 197 - 9.21 As the complexity of the irrigation and power systems in- creases the need for effective and carefully programmed maintenance will become increasingly important. Maintenance has been somewhat neglected in the past, partly due to shortages of personnel and partly due to lack of adequate financial provisions, and this neglect has led to some serious deterioration of works, sometimes with disastrous con- sequences as in the case of the Multan power plant. Deterioration of the distribution network on the WAPDA power system has led to a situation where accidents occur too often, and it also accounts in part for the large distribution losses on the system. It is urgent that WAPDA take the necessary steps to provide and train more man- power for work in this field and to allocate sufficient funds for renovation of the distribution network. More attention is needed for canal maintenance. IACA found many of the canals to be in such a state that further deterioration could result in the need for extensive and costly repairs. Better maintenance of the canals will become increasingly important because the changes that are being made in the overall system may cause some additional damage (e.g. scouring because the water will have deposited most of its silt load in the reservoirs) and because reliable operation of the canals will be critical in a tightly integrated system. Canal maintenance will have to be carefully scheduled and fitted in with the program for tubewell maintenance to ensure the availability of irrigation supplies from one source or other in accordance with crop requirements. 9.22 Once construction of each of the public tubewell projects is completed the critical task will be to operate the new water-supply system efficiently and to ensure the availability of the complementary agricultural inputs that will enable the farmers to get the best re- sults from the added water. The Bank Group attaches such importance to the latter task that it has diverged somewhat from IACA's proposals regarding project management. Concerned about the need for efficient management on the water side, IACA felt that integration of surface and groundwater supplies required that both be under a single unified control; they recommended that the Irrigation Department take over responsibility for operation of the tubewell fields. The Bank Group felt that the Irrigation Department had too many responsibilities elsewhere to be able to give the tubewell fields sufficient attention. It was also dubious whether private enterprise would be able to come into a project area in sufficient force initially to promote and provide inputs that had been relatively little used before. An inte- grated project management, fully responsible for all aspects of pro- ject operation, seemed to be required, somewhat along the lines of the existing concept of ADC and LWDB. Emphasis should therefore be placed on strengthening and improving these relatively new organiza- tions. They would provide a Project Director, with full responsibility for the overall success of the project, and with a staff of engineers, extension workers etc., seconded from the line departments but fully responsible to the Project Director. This approach will help to en- sure that sufficient emphasis is given to improved farm practices and to use of more material inputs as well as to water. An important task - 198 - of the project management should be, as IACA pointed out, monitoring project development starting with the pre-project condition: lack of sufficient data on agriculture in West Pakistan is an obstacle to effec- tive project planning and the execution of a project provides a very good opportunity to help remedy this deficiency. The integrated pro- ject management should in no sense discourage the development of pri- vate enterprise for supplying inputs and the activities of the regular line departments in the area; it should in fact withdraw once the pro- ject is well underway and major changes have been accomplished, in favor of an organization more representative of the local farmers. 9.23 There is one other aspect of water development policy which has received considerable emphasis throughout this report and which has important institutional implications: the potential contribution to be made by the private sector. The Bank Group sees public and private tubewells as essentially complementary, since neither alone can meet the urgent need for greater amounts of irrigation water. Public tubewell projects should be planned for areas where a public program has a clear advantage over private development and where private investment is not likely to be very significant. The Bank Group feels that when the de- tailed feasibility studies are made for the public projects recommended in this report special attention should be given to the question whether some parts or possibly all of a proposed project area might not wisely be left to private initiative in order to free public funds for activity elsewhere. It is very important to draw up a public program of manage- able size because scheduling an area for public development will dis- courage some of the private development that would otherwise have taken place there and, if the public project then gets seriously delayed, an important and avoidable loss of production will have been sustained. Besides providing this degree of security for investors in private tube- wells, the Government should take other measures to stimulate private water development. Many of the private tubewells presently installed have technical deficiencies which could have been avoided. Technical advice should be readily available to farmers and landowners on procure- ment and construction matters, types of equipment available, water quality, irrigation requirements and water management. Such advice would cover not only tubewells but also other water works such as small dams and watercourse alignment; increasingly, advice and assistance may be required to help organize cooperative use of facilities. Credit may also become more important as the further spread of private tubewells comes to depend more on the smaller farmers and more attention should be given to the possibility of stimulating private development in this way, for instance by a more aggressive credit policy on the part of the Agricultural Development Bank and sustained increases in its lending re- sources. The extension service should help farmers who are enterprising enough to install their own irrigation works to make the best use of them. The Bank Group strongly advocates measures of this sort, i.e. direct help in the form of technical advice and services that will not otherwise be provided. - 199 - Promotion of Farm Inputs 9.24 Very great stress has been laid in this report on the contri- bution to the increase of agricultural production that must come from the adoption of improved farm practices and greater use of agricultural inputs other than water. For the project areas the line departments will have to provide the personnel for promoting improved farming and the Project Directors will have overall responsibility for performance. However, even if the whole public tubewell program can be completed by 1975, Project Directors will be responsible for only about 10 million acres. Promotion of new inputs in the remaining three quarters of the farm area, both irrigated and unirrigated, in the Province will be the responsibility of the Agriculture Department staff, the ADC, and private enterprise. It is one of the most important conclusions of this report that such areas can profitably absorb large quantities of new inputs and adopt improved practices even before additional water is provided. Moreover a sizable portion of this area should see rapid development of private tubewells for increasing water supplies. It is the magnitude of this responsibility which underlines the need for the vast improvement in the Agriculture Department called for earlier. Even for the project areas it is largely the Agriculture Department that will be the source of extension staff and it will be responsible for the re- search work necessary to test and develop the new inputs and to evolve the cultural practices which will produce the best results from the inputs. 9.25 As with water development, the public sector should dispose its resources in such a way as to give maximum encouragement and oppor- tunity for the growth of private enterprise in supplying and promoting agricultural inputs; public resources should be allocated in such a way as to maximize the reburn on the combined public and private in- vestment of effort and finance in promoting better agriculture. As in water development, again, however, there will be many areas of activity where private enterprise will not come in rapidly and the Government must take a strong lead. There are essentially four as- pects to the work involved in achieving widespread adoption of an input and, because promotion of better agriculture must be a continuing process, they must all be carried on simultaneously. The first stage is research and testing of new inputs, and this must remain very largely a Government responsibility in West Pakistan. The second aspect is ensuring the widespread physical availability of supplies -- and this is where private enterprise should be able to make the largest contribution. The third part of the effort must be provision of incentives to the far- mer to adopt the new inputs, both in the form of an overall price struc- ture for agricultural goods which is conducive to investment of farmers' effort and savings in agriculture and in the form of subsidies for specific inputs and provision of credit for purchase of such inputs. The fourth aspect to the job of promoting new inputs is extension work to show the farmer what is available and how to use it; this may be the most important part of the work and though private enterprise again can help to some extent the main task will remain with the Government. - 200 - 9.26 Progress in agriculture will depend heavily on applied re- search and extension; this is especially the case for new crop varieties and effective plant protection. Research is vitally needed to develop new and improved varieties, more efficient plant protection methods and better understanding of soil, crop, water and fertilizer relationships, but, as presently set up, the research service is not capable of making the needed contributions. It suffers from the lack of qualified per- sonnel and supporting facilities noted earlier for the Agriculture Depart- ment as a whole. It tends to be overly academic and isolated from the farmers whose day-to-day problems need to be solved. Building an efficient and contributing research branch will not be a simple task and it will take more than the addition of a few more staff members or some new equipment. The critical needs for improvement of the research ser- vice are generous financial support, patience and understanding of the uncertainties which are a necessary part of research, the infusion of a spirit of service to the agricultural community, dedicated leadership and a conscious orientation towards the problems facing West Pakistan's agriculture today. 9.27 As instanced above in the case of new varieties, the Bank Group has set rather ambitious targets for the spread of new inputs; official targets, for example for fertilizer and improved seed, are even more ambitious. It is clear that a massive expansion of the dis- tribution network will be needed. At present the ADC and the coopera- tives bear the main responsibility for fertilizer distribution, but this input is probably one which could be most effectively handled by private enterprise, provided that fertilizer is made available in adequate quantities. Shortages have occurred because of the heavy de- pendence on imports, but large amounts of foreign exchange are now be- ing allocated. One commercial enterprise plans to distribute fer- tilizer from its plant now under construction through its own sales organization; other large domestic fertilizer plants now being planned may do the same. Production and distribution of improved seed is a field in which Government supervision will have to play a much bigger role; past efforts to promote improved seeds have suffered severely from adulteration by growers and distributors. Planned multiplication on an expanded network of registered growers supplied with nucleus stock under close Government supervision will be necessary to maintain the quality of the seed; if quality is not maintained and the ger- mination rate falls this can have very serious effects on the readi- ness of the farmers to use the new varieties. Private suppliers, under Government supervision, may gradually be able to take over from the Government departments a major part of the burden. Adoption of plant protection measures will not become widespread until the rela- tively large increases in yields that are attainable with fertilizer and better seed have been achieved and until research has developed simpler and more certain techniques. Effective plant protection depends so much on application at the right time that the farmer must bear a large part of the responsibility. At present the extension service carries almost the entire responsibility for plant protection, and, according to IACA, it is not very effective. Responsibility for - 201 - provision of plant protection materials should gradually be transferred to the greatest extent possible to private enterprise to give the exten- sion service more time for other activities. Farm mechanization and the spread of improved hand tools and animal-drawn equipment are other fields where private enterprise, with Government supervision, could play a bigger role than it does now. The Government will have to take steps to ensure that dealers are able to stock adequate spare parts and are prepared to offer continuing and dependable servicing facilities: some control may also be necessary on the variety of equipment made available. But the rapid growth of domestic production and servicing facilities for private tubewells suggests that private enterprise could handle the distribution and servicing of farm machinery effectively. 9.28 The most important financial measure that must be taken by the Government for promotion of new inputs, as for promotion of improved agriculture in general, is maintenance of a strong price framework for agricultural commodities which gives proper rewards to the farmers. A gradual improvement in the effective prices for agricultural products played a significant part in stimulating greater interest in agricul- ture during the Second Plan. There would still appear to be some room for further improvement in the price paid to the farmer for selec- ted farm products. The Government did recently raise the official support price of wheat to PRs 17 per maund which appears to be some- what above the international market price for wheat at the current exchange rate but is substantially below the international price at a shadow rate which possibly might be considered more relevant (say approximately double the official rate). Apart from a favorable price structure for farm products, there will probably continue to be a need for specific subsidies to encourage the use of particular inputs, in- deed it may well be that most help could now be given to agriculture by concentrating on such selective price adjustments for inputs and by spending more Government money on services to agriculture rather than by further raising the general price level for agricultural output. Current subsidies on fertilizer, plant protection and improved farm machinery do appear to play an important promotional role and they will need to be retained until such time as the value .of these irputs is so widely recognized among the farmers that they are prepared to buy adequate quantities at unsubsidized prices. It is therefore important that all subsidies be reviewed from time to time to see if the stage has been reached at which they could be dispensed with. One subsidy to the farmers which the Bank Group believes to be of dubious validity at the present time is that on electricity used for pumping purposes. This subsidy appears to have played little role in promoting tubewells; the more important factor encouraging installation of private wells has been the sheer availability of electricity. Since lack of finance is one of the major factors limiting the expansion of the electricity- distribution system and since the Power Wing's rate of return on capital invested is already below what the Bank Group would consider a reason- able level, serious consideration should be given to raising the price charged the farmer for electricity. The Bank Group would also urge thorough consideration of the possibility of raising water charges as - 202 - a means to alleviate the budgetary stringency which is such a serious problem in the execution of development programs. Water is an accustomed input, the critical importance of which is already widely understood by the farmers, so that increased water charges should have no disincentive effect. Indeed higher charges for water, more commensurate than those presently levied with the heavy costs involved in building and operating the irrigation system, could help to improve the utilization of water just as the much higher costs of private tubewell water have apparently led to more careful and productive use of water obtained from that source. 9.29 The credit system in general, and especially that for inputs like fertilizer and seed, is very inadequate and it may become a serious block to progress, unless special measures are taken to improve it. Credit on reasonable terms, generally from the Agricultural Development Bank and from the commercial banks, is available only to the larger farmers. The majority of credit made available comes from merchants, zamindars, etc., sometimes at high interest rates, and most of it is spent not on farm inputs but to meet social and subsistence needs; this heavy demand for credit for non-agricultural purposes tends to raise the price of credit in general. Measures are needed to improve the avail- ability of credit and the operation of the cooperative system which will be one important channel of credit, but such measures cannot have a rapid effect. Main reliance for credit will have to continue to be placed on non-institutional sources. 9.30 Perhaps the most critical aspect of the effort to promote im- proved agriculture and greater use of material inputs is education of, and advice for, the farmers. This is the task primarily of the extension service, and the service is at present entirely inadequate to meet the need, both in terms of numbers of officers and the quality of many of them. General problems of recruitment were referred to previously. The lack of facilities, such as transport, further limits the effectiveness of the available officers. Many farmers would apparently welcome new ideas and advice, but seldom have an opportunity of meeting an exten- sion worker. Much time of the extension service is devoted to adminis- trative chores and to rather ineffective plant protection work. The low status of the extension personnel, and the Field Assistant in particular, makes it difficult for them to contact and work with the more influential farmers in a community. With weak research support, and having only a small base of practical training and experience, the advice which many extension workers are in a position to offer is often of little real value to farmers. Yet it is this extension service which must carry the main responsibility for showing farmers how to use fer- tilizer to best advantage under specific conditions and for demonstrat- ing to them the best cultural practices that go along with new seed varieties. It is the extension service which must also have the capa- bility of advising the most progressive farmers, who are moving on to use insecticides and farm machinery. It is critical that large invest- ment in provision of improved water supplies in an area be rapidly followed by a concentrated extension effort to enable the farmers to make best use of the added supplies. The Bank Group and IACA have also - 203 - projected rather rapid development of the livestock sector in face of the increasing demand for meat and milk, and this is a field where tech- nical advice and assistance are extremely badly needed; animal hus- bandry will have to be closely coordinated with crop production in diversified farms and so it is the agricultural extension service which must develop the capability of providing advice about livestock manage- ment and improved feeding practices. 9.31 Despite the need for substantial expansion of the extension service, the Bank Group feels that the problem of quality is so serious that it may be more strategic in the short run to concentrate on re- cruitment of better personnel and improvement of training rather than to become too preoccupied with meeting given quantitative personnel targets. In fact, present plans for expansion should enable the agricultural universities to turn out enough graduates to meet both the requirements of the Government services (an increase of about 1,600 between 1965 and 1975) and also those of the other departments such as Irrigation, WAPDA and the Education Department. It should also not be difficult to carry out the physical expansion of training colleges for Field Assistants -- an additional six colleges coming into operation during the Fourth Plan period -- that would be necessary to meet the target recommended by IACA of approximately doubling the number of Field Assistants from 3,000 in 1965 to 6,000 in 1975. But whether this full expansion could be carried out simultaneously with a major effort to improve the quality of en- trants into agricultural service and of the instruction afforded them is open to question; and the Bank Group would put emphasis on the quality aspect. It welcomes the recent increase in the length of the course for Field Assistants from one year to two, including six months of supervised field work. There should be continuing efforts to make the training more meaningful in the practical terms required for effective work with the farmers. - 204 - X. PROPOSED PROGRAMS AND PAKISTAN'S PLANS 10.01 Over the years, and especially during the Second Plan period, Pakistan's Five Year Development Plans have come to play an increasingly important part in the total development effort of the country. The Plans are concerned with setting the overall financial and economic framework of the development effort, establishing specific financial and physical targets, allocating Government development expenditures and proposing policies which will promote economic growth. The First Five Year Plan covered the period 1955-60, but the results were disappointing. The Second Five Year Plan, covering the period 1960-65, was given much greater emphasis by the Government, and many of the policies recommended by the Planning Commission in the Plan document and generally endorsed by the National Economic Council were subsequently officially adopted as part of the national development effort. 10.02 In the course of preparing the Third Five Year Plan the Planning Commission felt the need for a framework which could give explicit recog- nition to objectives and major structural changes which could not be expec- ted to be achieved in as short a span as five years. Many of the decisions which were taken for the short term would have a critical effect in con- fining or expanding the scope forchoices at a later date and the realiza- tion developed that to see the full implications of current recommendations it was necessary to have a longer-term view. Considerable effort was there- fore devoted to formulation of a long-term or Perspective Plan built around the major objectives of the country. It was envisaged that the skeleton framework outlined in the Perspective Plan as a means of attain- ing those objectives would gradually be filled out by various Master Plans that would go into greater detail on the development potential of the dif- ferent sectors of the economy. 10.03 The objectives of the Perspective Plan (which covers the period 1965-85) are mainly national objectives, covering both East and West wings of the country.For purposes of its projections the Bank Group attempted to in- terpret the main objectives of the Plan as they would apply to West Pakis- tan: (i) doubling of per capita income between 1965 and 1985; (ii) parity in per capita incomes between East and West Pakistan by 1985; (iii) full employment at earliest achievable date; (iv) more equitable income distribution, especially raising the lowest 25 percent of the population; (v) universal eight-year education by 1985; (vi) elimination of net capital inflows on public account by 1985. At the time the Indus Special Study was underway the Planning-Commissi6n-was working on a quantitative regional breakdown of the Perspective Plan, _.t - 205 - no definite framework for West Pakistan was available. Nevertheless helpful guidance was provided by the Planning Commission and during several phases of the Study, especially at the outset, the Perspective Plan was drawn upon in connection with aspects such as projections of population and demand. Agriculture and the Development Plans 100.0 One of the chief targets of both the Perspective Plan and the Third Five Year Plan is to achieve an average annual growth rate in agriculture in the neighborhood of 5-5.5 percent. This was an am- bitious target.in the light of past experience -- of less than 2.5 percent average annual growth in agricultural production between 1950 and 1965. However the successes achieved in agriculture during the Second Plan period -- when production grew at more than twice the rate of the previous decade, as noted in Chapter III -- suggested that it would be feasible if sufficient incentive were given to the farmers and they were provided more water, fertilizer, insecticides, etc. Con- sideration of the long-term experience of relatively stable agricul- tural exports and growing imports of agricultural goods, discussed in Chapter III, also suggested that it would be essential to achieve a much higher growth rate in agriculture than had been attained in the past if growth of the provincial economy as a whole were not to be re- strained. Planning Commission Studies showed that an agricultural growth rate of some 4.5 - 5.0 percent per annum was essential to support the 6.0 - 6.5 percent growth rate in Gross Provincial Product required to meet the target of doubling per capita income between 1965 and 1985. 10.05 Developments since the Third Plan and Perspective Plan were formulated have added to the emphasis that is being placed on growth of agriculture in West Pakistan. TW,hen the Third Plan was revised late in 1966 top priority was given to agriculture. The document announcing the Plan revisions stated "The importance of this sector is already recognized in the Third Plan but the need for attaining self-sufficiency in food in the shortest possible time has been sharpened by the growing uncertainty and more difficult terms of PL-[80 supplies." Food self- sufficiency had been a somewhat longer term target in the original Third Plan. Now the Government of West Pakistan has developed and adopted a major program designed to eliminate dependence on imported wheat by the end of the Third Plan. The key element in the program is higher yielding wheat varieties introduced from Mexico. Ambitious targets have been set for use of Mexican wheat seed, as discussed in Chapter VI, and absorption targets for fertilizer have been greatly increased. High priority is being given to measures to increase irri- gation supplies, particularly from public and private tubewells. 10.06 The Action Program proposed in this report for development of irrigation and agriculture was drawn up largely before wheat self- sufficiency had been adopted as an immediate objective of West Pakistan and primarily on the basis of what the Bank Group and its consultants considered practically achievable and consistent with available resources. - 206 - Production was projected on the basis of detailed analysis of areas studied rather than against particular demand targets. Moreover, while prices of commodities were for analytical purposes for the most part held constant so that the focus could remain on the technical aspects of development proposals, this also precluded shifts in production in res- ponse to changing market incentives. 10.07 Although the program was thus purposefully evolved somewhat in isolation from demand considerations, some check was finally made against possible future demand to determine whether the Program might meet West Pakistan's requirements. Supply and demand did not show a balance for each commodity. Demand was estimated on the basis of expen- diture elasticities for different commodities over time, population , assumed rising to about 66 million in 1975 and 87 million in 1985, and a growth rate in Gross Provincial Product of about 4.3 percent per annum. The major shortfalls occurred in foodgrains, but there were surpluses in some other crops. However the Bank Group concluded from its agricultural studies that the production and acreage which it had projected could sup- port a higher overall growth rate than 4.3 percent -- a conclusion strengthened by the analysis discussed in the next paragraph -- and that the surpluses and deficits projected for different crops could be over- come by appropriate adjustments to the cropping patterns. Acreage in crops which appeared to be in surplus could, in many cases, be used for production of deficit crops within the same season and at about the same level of crop-water requirements; in general there seemed to be sufficient flexibility built into the projected development of the irri- gation system to cope with the apparent deviations between supply and demand for different crops. However Government price and marketing policies would have to be fashioned in ways which would encourage the necessary shifts in cropping patterns. 10.08 The Bank Group also undertook another more global analysis in the form of a macro-economic projection for West Pakistan from 1962/63 to 197[/75 on the basis of a model very similar to that used by the Planning Commission in preparing the Third Five Year Plan. The model is of the linear inter-sectoral type and relates macro-economic magnitudes such as the overall growth rate or the savings rate to a sectoral growth pattern, which balances the supply and demand relationships between sectors. The model also has a built-in mechanism for adjusting the surplus or deficit on the current account of the balance of payments to equal the difference between projected savings and investment; the adjustment mechanism is im- port substitution. Thus the model shows the value of import substitutes which must be produced domestically in the year projected if the assumed savings level is to be attained. 1962/63 was adopted as the base year for the projections because that is the only year for which an input-output table for West Pakistan is available. In attempting a 12-year projection the Bank Group had inevitably to use much judgment and make many assump- tions, but it believes that the results derived can shed useful light on some of the broader implications for economic growth in West Pakistan of the programs proposed for development of agriculture, irrigation and power. - 207 - 10.09 The Bank Group's projection suggests that the agricultural growth rate of 4.5 percent per annum projected in this report (see Chapter VI) would be consistent with a growth rate in Gross Provincial Product of about 5.7 percent per annum and, with that overall growth rate, it would be sufficient to provide for self-sufficiency in the major agricultural products. This estimate is based on the assumption that the marginal savings rate of about 24 percent between 1965 and 1975 which is implied by the Perspective Plan will be attained. 10.10 The point is illustrated by Figure 1. All the nimbers shown in this figure represent changes between the base year 1962/63 and the pro- jected year 1974/75, rather than absolute quantities. All the underlying projections were made on the assumption that Gross Production Value of agriculture would grow at an averge rate of about 5.2 percent per annum and that value added in agriculture would grow at 4.5 percent per annum. The vertical axis in Figure 1 represents the marginal savings rate be- tween 1962/63 and 1974/75; it is also the dividing line between the right- hand portion of the horizontal axis which measures the agricultural sur- plus in 1974/75, or the quantity of agricultural production in excess of domestic requirements and therefore available for export in that year, and the left-hand portion of the horizontal axis which measures the agricul- tural deficit in that year. Agricultural deficits or surpluses refer here to deficits or surpluses in meeting the increase of domestic require- ments between the base year and 1974/75. The sharply sloping lines in the center of the figure indicate that combination of agricultural surplus/ deficit and marginal savings rate which would be consistent with a partic- ular growth rate in Gross Provincial Product between 1964/65 and 1974/75. The more gently sloping lines indicate the corresponding amount of import substitution that would have to be achieved over the ten-year period in order to bring the Foreign Exchange Gap into balance with the Savings Investment Gap in 1974/75. Thus Figure 1 shows that with a marginal savings rate of about 24 percent and an overall growth rate of 5.7 per- cent per annum, an agricultural surplus of about PRs 250 million could be achieved, sufficient to offset the PRs 250 million of wheat imports in the base year. Not shown on the figure is the fact that there would be an accompanying improvement in the balance of payments on current account of the order of PRs 600 million, resulting from the facts that the amount of investment required to support a 5.7 percent growth rate in 1974/75 is less than the quantity of domestic savings achieved in that year with a 24 percent marginal savings rate in the interim and that, in the logic of the model, the Foreign Exchange Gap is equated with the Savings Investment Gap. 10.11 While this would mean that self-sufficiency in wheat was attained, it would fall seriously short of the Perspective Plan in other respects -- an overall growth rate of only 5.7 percent b.etween 1965 and 1975 against a Plan target of over six percent and an improvement in the balance of payments only half the size of that implied by the Plan. How- ever the choice of growth patterns is not restricted to this single one. - 208 - Higher rates of growth in Gross Provincial Product would be possible but they would require some continuing or even increasing imports of agricul- tural products and larger amounts of import substitution. Two alternative cases, both marked on Figure 1 with circles, have been studied as examples. They represent cases of six percent per annum overall growth rate, with 21 percent and 28 percent marginal savings rates respectively. At the lower savings rate needed imports of agricultural commodities are large, greater import substitution is required than in the case with 5.7 percent overall growth rate and the improvement in the balance of payments is small, less than PRs 100 million. At the higher savings rate a much larger amount of import substitution would be required, but there would also be a slight surplus on the current account balance of payments by 1975. The higher import-substitution requirements mean higher growth is required in the sectors where import substitution is assumed to occur -- manufacturing of consumer goods, intermediate goods and capital goods -- but the requisite growth rates do not appear unreasonable by comparison with those attained in the past or those projected in the Perspective Plan for these sectors. 10.12 It is possible that a six percent growth rate in Gross Provin- cial Product would be compatible with food self-sufficiency, a substantial improvement in the balance of payments and a relatively small amount of import substitution. This was found to be the case when the analysis was carried out on the assumption that the elasticity of demand for agricul- tural products is as it was assumed by the Planning Commission in prepara- tion of the Third Five Year Plan. The Bank Group carried out its main analyses, the results of which are shown by the lines in Figure 1, on the assumption that the expenditure elasticity of demand for directly consumed agricultural products is in the neighborhood of 0.85, including an elas- ticity of demand for food grains of 0.55. These elasticities are in line with the estimates made by IACA on the basis of careful analysis of de- mand for different crops; they are also consistent with those used in some Planning Commission documents. However a substantially lower elasticity of demand for directly consumed agricultural products -- 0.67 -- was used in the preparation of the Third Five Year Plan; it was derived on the basis of estimated historical experience in Pakistan during the Second Plan period. The Bank Group tested the effects of assuming this lower demand elasticity. It found that it had the effect of reducing the agricultural deficit or increasing the agricultural surplus projected using the Bank Group's coefficients by some PRs 700 million. In terms of Figure 1 it was sufficient to shift the line representing six percent growth rate in Gross Provincial Product over into the right-hand half of the figure, indi- cating even at a 21 percent marginal savings rate a reduction in agricul- tural imports between 1962/63 and 1974/75 of over PRs 100 million (see point marked with a cross in Figure 1) and at higher marginal savings rates potential increases in agricultural exports. 10.13 Thus the Bank Group's analysis suggests no necessary incompati- bility between a 4.5 percent growth rate in agriculture and a 6.0 percent growth rate in Gross Provincial Product. Indeed, using demand elastici- ties adopted by the Planning Commission, it would be possible to achieve food self-sufficiency with a 6.0 percent growth rate and also a balance VOLUME I FIGURE 13 WEST PAKISTAN: ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS WITH 41/2% PER ANNUM GROWTH IN AGRICULTURE - MARGINAL SAVINGS RATE GPP GROWTH RATE -- 6.1% 6.0% 59% 5.8% 5.7% 5 6% 555% -30 -25 24% MARGINAL SAVINGS LEVEL -20 4)1~ f I15 -1,500 -1,000 -500 0 +500 +1,000 +1,500 AGRICULTURAL DEFICIT AGRICULTURAL SURPLUS MILLIONS OF RUPEES *NOTE: Figures in italics indicate import substitution in millions of rupees IBRD -3497  - 209 - of payments improvement nearly two-thirds of that projected in the Perspective Plan, provided that the planned marginal savings rate of 24 percent is achieved. However the Bank Group has preferred to stay on the conservative side by making more ample allowance for growth of domestic demand for agricultural products. If demand for agricultural products grows at this higher rate, then, according to the Bank Group's analysis, it will not be possible to reach both self-sufficiency in agricultural products and a 6 percent overall growth rate. Since substantial imports of capital goods will be needed it would also be difficult under these circumstances to achieve the improvement in the balance of payments projected in the Perspective Plan. The extent of improvement possible would depend on the marginal savings rate achieved and the growth of import-substituting industry. Thus the Bank Group's analysis reconfirms the Planning Commission's conclusion that achievement of a high rate of growth in agriculture is very important to attainmen of Pakistan's objectives. Sectoral Growth Rates 10.14 As regards growth in sectors other than agriculture the Bank Group's projections doall imply some significant differences from the Perspective Plan. Two are especially noteworthy. Considerably more rapid growth in the transport industry is projected by the Bank Group than by the Perspective Plan -- about seven percent per annum as against less than six percent. This result further confirms the great stress that the Bank Group would place on expansion of the transport network -- both arterial links and farm-to- market roads -- as a critical element in attainment of a high agricultural growth rate and a high overall growth rate. The Government appearsto be aware of this need. In recognition of the importance of rural farm-to-market roads it was stipulated that one half of the funds earmarked for the Rural Works Program in 1964/65 had to be spent on local road construction. Plans are underway for substantial expansion of the capacity of the railway and of Karachi Port. However execution has not always comeup to expectations: less than half the funds allocated for Rural Works in 1964/65, for instance, were actually spent on roads, and there have been very serious delays in procuring the additional locomotives required by the Pakistan Western Railway. The Government's plan for wheat self-sufficiency identified transport as a major potential bottleneck in getting the requisite amounts of fertilizer to the farmer and wheat to the towns. All the studies of the Bank Group reemphasize the need for more rapid expansion of transport facilities than achieved in the past. 10.15 The second noteworthy difference between the Perspective Plan and the Bank Group's tentative projections.for West Pakistan concerns growth of consumer goods manufacturing. The Plan projects a growth rate in the neighborhood of three percent. Bank Group projections imply the need for growth at a rate in the neighborhood of at least six percent. Studies suggest that one aspect of the improvement in the relative price situation facing farmers, which -was such a crucial factor in inducing the agricul- tural successes of the Second Plan, was increasing availability of domestic manufactured goods at slightly declining prices through the late 1950's and early 1960's. Maintenance of a price structure which provides proper incentives and rewards to the farmers has been stressed as a critical need - 210 - at several points in this Volume, and it would seem that an important element in the pattern of incentives would be the availability of manu- factured consumer goods, at reasonable prices relative to farm product prices, on which farmers can spend their increasing incomes. The growth rate in consumer goods manufacturing implied by the Bank Group's projec- tions is slightly in excess of projected growth in total consumption in the economy. 10.16 It was in this matter of the growth rate of consumer goods manufacturing that the Bank Group diverged most seriously from the Pers- pective Plan when it was checking the power load forecast for industry used in the report. As noted in Chapter VIII the Bank Group assumed that the overall industrial growth rate actually achieved might be somewhat above that implied by the Perspective Plan. On that basis it concluded that the projection of industrial load included in the Main Load Forecast used for the power studies seemed reasonable for 1970 and might be a little on the high side by 1975. The macro-economic projections now made with the aid of the Planning Commission's model suggest that the growth assumed for consumer goods manufacturing in the power studies may have been a little on the low side while that for other types of manufacturing was likely somewhat too high. The effect of these dif- ferent industrial growth rates on the power load forecast has not been checked by the Bank Group in detail because it does not consider the precise sectoral growth rates arising from its macro-economic projection sufficiently reliable. Nevertheless it would appear, in general terms, that the aggregate growth of the industrial sector broadly defined (large-scale manufacturing, small-scale manufacturing, mining and utilities) might, according to the macro-economic projections, lie somewhere between the eight percent per annum projected by the Perspective Plan and the ten percent per annum assumed in the power studies. This would in turn imply that the Main Load Forecast remains a reasonable projection, erring on the optimistic side and thus including some contingency for unanticipated developments. Investment Requirements of Proposed Programs 10.17 The macro-economic model projections made by the Bank Group, analyzing the development patterns implied by different combinations of growth rates in gross provincial product and marginal savings rates with a 4.5 percent growth rate in agriculture, cannot do more than show alter- native possible paths of development which are internally consistent; it gives no indication as to whi6h pattern would produce the largest results for the least expenditure of scarce resources. It is important to hear this in mind in considering the financial requirements of the proposed:programs for development of agriculture, irrigation and power. In the past it-has sometimes been 'thdiight that one of the advantages of- giving a large role to agriculture in the development plans was that this sector could provide large increases in output and large increases in employmEnt for relatively low inputs of capital investment; in other words it had a low capital-output ratio. The Bank Group found that the capital-output ratio in agriculture implied by its projections was considerably higher than might be expected on the basis of past experience. For instance the ratio between total investment in irrigation and agriculture over the Second Plan period (excluding the Indus - 211 - Basin Works) and the increase in agricultural output over that period has been estimated by the Planning Commission at about 1.9. The Bank Group found that the comparable ratios implied by its program and assuming a rate of growth in agriculture of 4.5 percent would be about 2.7 for the Third Plan and 3.8 for the Fourth Plan period. These are considerably higher than the ratios implicit in the Perspective Plan. Taken at face value, they might appear to imply that less scarce investment capital should be allocated to agriculture and a lesser role should be given to agriculture in the future than hitherto planned. Another growth path involving less emphasis on agriculture and relying to a greater extent on industrial import substitution might be envisaged. 10.18 However the Bank Group believes that such a conclusion would be erroneous and that it is essential to give to agriculture the high priority role that it is attributed in the Perspective Plan, and to allocate the funds needed to support the most rapid development that agriculture can sustain. The explicit objectives of the Pakistan Govenment with regard to food self-sufficiency and agricultural growth were referred to pre- viously. In addition, it is the Bank Group's view that agricultural growth can play a major role in reducing the foreign exchange shortage which has severely hampered Pakistan's development efforts. Irrigated agriculture, partly because it involves slow gestation projects with long-term benefits, necessarily tends to be relatively capital intensive, and so the need to allocate relatively large quantities of capital to agriculture in !est Pakistan should not be unexpected. The heavy effect of irrigation works on the capital-output ratio is illustrated most dramatically by the fact that the ratio for the Fourth Plan, quoted above as 3.8, would be 2.9 if the Fourth Plan expenditures on Tarbela are left out of account on the grounds that the dam will not begin to yield bene- fits until the very end of the Plan period. Even 2.9 is a moderately high ratio. But here it is worth recalling the essential role these irrigation projects have in the development of a modern agriculture, as well as the relatively high rates of return which were shown in Chapter VI to be typi- cal of the proposed irrigation projects -- rates between about 12 and 25 percent. A recent survey of a wide range of major industries in West Pakistan showed that the average rate of return on total capital invested was about 14 percent per annum, although some industries had higher returns. The figures are not really directly comparable but they are indicative of the fact that t,he proposed surface water development and the public tube- well project's appear to be very paying propositions. In this connection, moreover, i 'must be borne in mind that the capital-output ratios and rates of return on the proposed irrigation projects are calculated chiefly in terms of actual financial prices of 1962/63 and average farm prices over the period 1960-65 respectively. There is strong evidence to suggest that the price structure in 1est Pakistan has been and still is less favorable to agriculture than in many other countries, despite improvements during the Second Plan period. Thus if the capital-output ratios and rates of return on different types of project were calculated in terms of inter- national prices for investments and for products, the rates of return on the irrigation projects would certainly appear even more favorable than shown above relative to projects in other sectors; and the capital-output ratios in irrigation and agriculture would appear lower. - 212 - 10.19 The heavy capital costs of development in the sectors with which this report is concerned reflect themselves in the need for some- what greater total investment over the period up to 1975 than projected by the Perspective Plan and for allocation of a larger proportion of total investment to these sectors than has been customary in the past, according to the Bank Group's studies. Tables 69 and 70 illustrate these points. Table 69 shows the Bank Group's estimates of public and private investment required in irrigation, agriculture and power over the Third and Fourth Plan periods. It compares them with total investment in these periods as implied by the Perspective Plan, shown at the bottom of the table, and with estimates of investment during the Second Plan period based on in- formation provided by the Planning Commission. Table 69 Investment in Agriculture, Irrigation and Power, 1960-75 (PRs Millions a/) Second Plan Third Plan b/ Fourth Plan b/ (est. actual) (projected) (projected) Private - Agriculture 1,500 (7.1) 2,330 (8.5) 4,120 (11.0) and Irrigation Public - Agriculture 625 (3.0) 1,640 (6.0) 3,200 ( 8.6) Irrigation 1,658 (7.9) 2,461 (9.0) 2,836 ( 7.6) Surface Stor- - 1,916 (7.0) 2,195 ('5.9) age Power 1,194 (5.7) 2,849 (10.5) 3,468 ( 9.3) Total 4,977 (23.7) 11,196 (41.0) 15,819 (42.4) Indus Basin IWbrks 2,910 (13.9) 3,500 (16.7) - Total Plan Investment 20,973 27,250 37,300 a/ Current prices for the Second Plan period and 1964/65 prices for Third and Fourth Plans. b/ Investment in agriculture, irrigation and power as projected by the Bank Group. The figures in brackets represent percentages of Total Plan Investment in each five year Plan period. The table suggests that execution of the pro- grams proposed will require devotion of a markedly hi:gher proportion of total investment to the sectors concerned than has been the case in the past. The increases would occur in all sectors, but they would be particularly substantial in public investment in agriculture and electric power; surface storage works, mainly Tarbela, would represent about 6.5 percent of total -213 - investment over the Third and Fourth Plan periods, and part of this in- vestment would be attributable to the irrigation sector, part to power. Table 70 shows estimates of total investment requirements over the Third and Fourth Plan periods derived from the Bank Group's macro-economic pro- jection to 1975. The lower portion of the table reproduces the investment costs of the proposed programs from Table 69 and shows these as a percen- tage of the projected figures for total investment. Table 70 Model Projection of Investment Required for Six Percent Growth in GPP (PRs millions, 1964/65 prices) Third Plan Fourth Plan Total Investment 31,175 43,o5o Proposed Programs 11,196 15,819 Proposed as % of Total 36% 36.7% These estimates suggest that investment in agriculture, irrigation and power would represent a lower proportion of total investment than implied by Table 69; nevertheless there would still be a substantial increase between the Second and subsequent Plan periods in the proportion of total investment required for these sectors. Public Sector Financial Requirements 10.20 Public sector development expenditures on agriculture, water and power during the First and Second Plans represented some 50 percent of total public development expenditures in those periods. In absolute terms expenditures on the three sectors more than doubled between the First and Second Plan. The Third Plan, as recently revised, allocates between sec- tors total public development expenditures about 80 percent above those achieved in the Second Plan. The allocation to agriculture is twice what was actually spent in the Second Plan period. Power has been allocated 15 percent of the total, as in the Second Plan, but the share of the total allowed for water development has been reduced from about 21 per- cent achieved in the Second Plan to 15 percent for the Third Plan. Al- locations for water, power and agriculture together represent about 43 percent of total revised Third Plan public sector expenditures, or some- what less than in previous Plans. 10.21 Table 71 shows the total public sector financial requirements of the programs proposed in this report for development of water, power and agriculture during the Third and Fourth Plan periods. The financial requirements, as estimated by the Bank Group, include interest during construction at six percent on all investment projects except Tarbela Dam, a substantial part of which is financed out of the sums remaining in the Indus Basin Fund. Table 72 summarizes these costs by sectors and compares them with revised Third Plan allocations. - 214 - Table 71 Financial Requirements of Proposed Public Sector Programs by Plan Periods' (PRa. millions) Third Plan Period Fourth Plan Period AGRICULTURE Fertilizer Subsidies 500 Fertilizer Subsidies 700 Plant Protection Subsidies 300 Plant Protection Subsidies 500 Extension and Research 180 Extension and Research -26o Mechanization 211 Mechanization, Forestry, Others, etc. 2 835 Soil Conservation 105 t29 Animal Husbandry 112 Capital Liability for Credit 350 Colonization 117 7,Z7 Forestry and Fisheries 304 Others 364 2,196 Capital Liability for Credit 178 2, 371i IRRIGATION & DRAINAGE Ongoing Public Tubewell Projects 873 Ongoing Public Tubewell Projects 118 New Public Tubewell Projects 286 New Public Tubewell Projects 975 Canal Remodeling & Other Irrigation 600 Initial Work on Further Wells 315 Surface Drainage 373 Canal Remodeling & Other Irrigation 402 Tile Drainage 39 Surface Drainage 527 Investigations 191 Tile Drainage 18h Flood Protection 74 Investigations 240 Miscellaneous 25L Flood Protection 75 2,M 2,5 36 SURFACE WATER STORAGE Raised Chasma 85 Raised Chasma 31 Tarbela 1,793 Tarbela 2,065 Investigations 38 Sehwan-Manchar 22 1,916 Investigations 77 2,195 ELECTRIC POWER Generating Units Completed or Under Construction 356 Proposed New Generating Units 1,017 Proposed New Units 697 Transmission Lines 525 Transmission Lines 590 Distribution Lines & Connections, etc. 1,890 Distribution Lines & Connections, etc. 1,180 General 36 General 26 3,,"- a/ Including taxes and duties and interest during construction at 6 percent per annum except on Tarbela. - 215 - Table 72 Comparison Between Public Sector Costs of Proposed Programs and Third Plan Allocations (PRs Millions) Third Plan, Revised Proposed Programs Agriculture 1,816 2,734 Electric Power 2,176 2,849 Irrigation and Drainage 2,211 2,461 Surface Storage (excl. Tarbela) ) 123 Subtotal . 6,203 7,807 Tarbela Dam - 1,793 9,600 The combined costs of the proposed programs, excluding the costs of Tarbela for which no financial provision was made in the Third Plan documents, would represent about 5h percent of total public development expenditures as now projected. Allocations for expansion of transport facilities, which as pointed out above, the Bank Group believes to be essential to support the projected development of agriculture, would be additional. 10.22 Table 72 shows that the largest difference between expenditure proposed and Plan allocations occurs in the electric power sector, despite the fact that the revised Plan increased the allocation to power by some PRs 250 million. The Bank Group's estimate for the costs of electric power facilities does include about PRs 115 million for Mangla units 1, 2 and 3, which may not be covered under the Plan allocation, but even with deduction of this amount the difference between the figures clearly remains large. The reasons why the Bank Group believes that larger allocations are required for power were discussed at the end of Chapter VIII. 10.23 The shortfall between planned and proposed expenditures on agriculture is also large. The Bank Group's figure corresponds closely to that in the original Third Plan document, which was reduced in the re- vision of the Plan largely by lowering allocations for fertilizer sub- sidies, plant protection, mechanization and extension services. In the revision of the Plan the crop production targets were not reduced, and targets for fertilizei absorption and production of foodgrains were in- creased, as mentionad before. The Bank Group understands that the re- vised allocation would make available no more than PRs 400 million for fertilizer subsidies, compared with an original Third Plan figure of PRs 678 million. -The adequacy of this reduced allocation for supporting the higher -consu mption targets now projected will have to be kept under close surveillance.>ghe Bank Grpap considers that the allocations for the extension services. -are of suffigiently high priority to warrant their maintenance at the original leve'ik - 216 - 10.2 No official estimates are available for Fourth Plan public sector development expenditures, but it was clear from Tables 69 and 70 that the public sector investment requirements for irrigation, agricul- ture and power are unlikely to represent a lesser burden percentagewise than in the Third Plan; in absolute terms they will be substantially greater. Quite apart from the funds required for construction of the proposed projects, increasing expenditures will be required for operat- ing and maintaining completed projects if maximum benefits are to be derived from them. It was pointed out in Chapter IX that some critically important services, like education and extension work and maintenance of the irrigation system and the power distribution system, have some- times been made to bear the brunt of budget cuts. The services depend primarily on budgetary Rupee resources and relatively little on foreign exchange. With the major economic progress that is being achieved in West Pakistan requirements for current operational expenditures inevit- ably increase rapidly. An instance of this is provided by IACA who projected an increase in the current expenditure of the departments res- ponsible for the irrigation and agriculture development program at a rate above 13 percent per annum, as illustrated in the following table. Table 73 Current Expenditures for Agriculture and Irrigation Development Program (PRs Millions) 1965 1970 1975 Agriculture Department 36 77 231 Land and Water Development Board 10 28 60 Irrigation Department Es- tablishment 36 54 81 Irrigation System Main- tenance 138 244 386 220 403 758 The Third Five Year Plan document projects an increase in current Govern- ment expenditure of about seven percent per annum. This may be on the low side if full benefit is to be derived from the human and material capital resources which Pakistan has already built up. 10.25 To meet the capital costs and the increasing current costs of the programs proposed large additions to revenues will be required. It was suggested in Chapter VIII that WAPDA Power Wing should aim for a rate of return (net of depreciation allowances) of eight percent on plant in service and that in particular this might involve increasing the tariffs on electricity sold to farmers; such an increase would still leave water pumped by electric wells substantially cheaper than water pumped by diesel - 217 - wells, but it would reduce the existing large disparity. The Bank Group believes that there is more general scope for charging the farmer more for water and that this may be the best way to increase Government revenues from agriculture. At present the agricultural sector, despite its size, makes an extremely small contribution to Government revenues. The Bank Group has estimated that tax revenues from farmers net of Government subsidies to them fell from about three percent of value added in agriculture at the beginning of the Second Plan period to about 1.5 percent -- or PRs 175 million -- at the end of the Plan period. Nevertheless the case for in- creasing taxation on agriculture is much more complex than this bald statement would imply, primarily because of the way in which the price structure has been somewhat biased against agriculture, as pointed out earlier in discussion of the capital-output ratio. The Bank Group be- lieves that there is a case for increasing taxation on agriculture, which would be the chief immediate beneficiary of the large works proposed, but that the measures chosen should be very carefully selected to fit in with a coordinated structure of financial incentives which makes it profitable for farmers to engage in activities that enhance economic growth and non- profitable to engage in activities that absorb resources without contri- buting substantially to growth. The Bank Group considers irrigation water a suitable vehicle for raising revenue from the farmer just because, un- like fertilizer or insecticide, its value is already very widely appreciated. Evidence from the private tubewell surveys also suggest that higher charges for irrigation water could lead to better and more careful usage. The Second Plan pointed out that "a large subsidy has been implicit in the provision of water" for irrigation: water rates were increased, but they still seem to be very low by comparison with the costs of making water available and even lower by comparison with the benefit that can be de- rived from water. There would appear to be considerable scope for raising water charges over time, and the Bank Group considers that this source of revenue could make a sizable contribution to the financial effort re- quired to meet the costs of the development program. 10.26 Nevertheless there may be shortfalls in the availability of finance for executing the programs proposed and it is necessary to be prepared for such an eventuality. Throughout the report the Bank Group has tried to emphasize the relative priority which it attaches to dif- ferent components of the programs. With financing for Tarbela Dam assured and its high priority established it should be carried through to com- pletion according to schedule; the only other major surface storage work for the first decade, Chasma Barrage, is already underway. On the irri- gation side Chapter VI discussed in some detail the relative priority of the various public tubewell projects, emphasizing the unanimity of view among analyses regarding the priority position of the three projects scheduled for commencement in the Third Plan and suggesting that the four projects proposed for Bari Doab -- or at least parts of them -- might be deferred in favor of continued reliance on private tubewell development in these areas. In general, it would be important to examine each of the 12 proposed tubewell project areas in detail before the public project started to see if there was not scope for reducing the scale of the pro- ject by relying more on private enterprise. There may be some scope, too, - 218 - for cutting back on the canal remodeling program: the proposed program includes remodeling of canals serving some 330,000 acres in Khairpur East during the Fourth Plan, but it would be possible to phase this out more into the Fifth Plan, following the LIP program; it would also probably be possible to postpone temporarily the canal remodeling proposed for 330,000 acres in Ravi Syphon-Dipalpur Link without involving more than a small amount of un derwatering or some minor adjustments in cropping patterns. The area where the Bank Group believes that any proposed cuts should be scrutinized most carefully and avoided if at all possible is the program for agricultural development, including expansion of extension and re- search and promotion of new farm inputs; a maximum effort here is essen- tial both for immediate production increases and to prepare the way for deriving maximum benefit from Tarbela. 10.27 On the power side, too, there is some scope for cutbacks, apart from the obvious but undesirable alternative of reducing the rate at which new customers are connected. The proposed program includes about PRs 90 million of expenditure in the Third Plan period on the first Karachi-Mari 380-ky transmission line. This could be postponed into the Fourth Plan period, as pointed out in Chapter VIII. As pointed out there also, the Bank Group has been concerned to prepare a power program which could pro- vide a considerably more reliable and adequate power supply service than has been available in the past, because it believes that this is needed; the Bank Group has tried to allow for a level of generating reserves consistent with this principle and it has included transmission-line capacity (for instance in the form of the second Karachi-Mari line in the Fourth Plan period) that is also appropriate for attaining a high degree of reliability in power supply. Reduction of planned generating and transmission reserves would be possible, but it would be at the cost of quality of service. However, in the Northern Grid, the sacrifice in quality of service would be less than what it has been in the past be- cause of the existence of the Mangla hydroelectric station. Private Investment 10.28 A great deal of stress has been placed throughout this report on the role to be played by private enterprise; any reductions in the scale of the public program that became necessary would further enhance the role to be played by private enterprise in achieving the projected growth of the economy -- particularly in the agricultural sector. Very little information is available regarding past private investment in irrigation and agriculture, but what there is suggests that it may have been running around PRs 300 million per annum or about 3- percent of value added in agriculture, and the figure given in Table 69 was based on this assumption. Private investment in irrigation and agriculture was projected in that table to increase rapidly, rising from some seven percent of total investment during the Second Plan to eleven percent of the figure implied by the Perspective Plan for total investment in the Fourth Plan period. The amounts included in these investment estimates to cover private tubewells are based on the IACA projection of private tubewell growth. Since it may be possible to reach a higher rate of - 219 - achievement in private tubewell installations and since in the long term it should be possible to reach a rate of private investment in agriculture of around 10 percent the Bank Group believes that the figures in Table 69 should be taken as minimum targets. 10.29 The Bank Group has developed some rough estimates, on the basis of available data, suggesting that savings from direct agricultural in- comes may have been in the order of ?Rs 700 million in 1963/64. Besides the PRs 300 million given above as estimated private investment in irri- gation and agriculture, about PRs 100 million would appear to have been invested annually in recent years in farm dwellings. These figures suggest that substantial transfers of savings out of agriculture -- perhaps of the order of PRs 300 million per year -- have been taking place and they also suggest that, if appropriate incentive policies are adopted, farmers should be quite capable of reinvesting in agriculture much larger amounts than they do currently. 10.30 To mobilize rural private resources to the maximum possible ex- tent for investment in agriculture and irrigation the Bank Group believes that three specific steps are essential -- in addition to the fundamental general need for a sound financial framework for farming, which was dis- cussed in Chapter IX. First, measures are needed to help channel avail- able savings from savers to investors and to expand the availability of credit for farmers to use along with their own savings for investment; the Agricultural Development Bank should play an increasingly important role in this, with a growing number of branches, and it should be enabled to follow a more expansionist credit policy. Second, increased Government attention to the provision of services, such as extension and rural work- shops and mechanics, and more ample financial allocations to current ex- penditures to support them, as called for above, will play a particularly important role in mobilizing private resources. Various suggestions for technical assistance to private tubewells, for instance, were made in Chapter IX, and implementation of these will require Government expendi- tures. 10.31 The third and possibly the most important policy required to obtain a maximum contribution from private initiative is provision of sufficient foreign exchange to ensure the availability of imported inputs and materials needed in agriculture. The liberalization of imports dur- ing the Second Plan period played an important role in promoting private tubewells. Most of the pumps and engines for the private wells are manu- factured in Pakistan, but the gradual freeing of imports of the basic commodities such as pig iron and steel meant that the small shops which produce the equipment could procure the necessary materials. The sheer availability of tubewell equipment meant that there existed opportunities for investment which would not otherwise have been there. The existence of these opportunities in turn encouraged farmers to save sufficient to take advantage of them. Thus provision of foreign exchange had a double effect, promoting both investment and saving. The Bank Group believes that the agriculture sector represents a high priority area for foreign exchange allocations. The linear programming analysis of investment in - 220 - irrigation was used to study the impact on the composition of the in- vestment program of different assumptions regarding the amount of foreign exchange available for covering the direct import component of capital and current expenditures on irrigation development. The analysis suggested that the value, in terms of increased agricultural production, of the foreign exchange required for the proposed development program would at the margin approximate the scarcity value of foreign exchange ih West Pakistan, as estimated by the Bank Group (about PRs 9.52 = US $1.00). This suggested that the size and composition of the proposed program were appropriate to the foreign exchange situation existing in Pakistan, and that it was worthwhile to allocate to irrigation development the amounts of foreign exchange required to execute the program. 10.32 Estimates of total foreign exchange requirements for agriculture, irrigation and power in the years to 1975 are inevitably rathe'r rough, because of uncertainty about the extent to which import-substitution will take the form of production of equipment and inputs for the specific projects and programs proposed. However the estimates that the Bank Group was able to build up, which are discussed in detail in the relevant volumes of the report, combine to show the foreign exchange requirements of the private sector in agriculture increasing much more rapidly than those of any of the other categories studied. Table 74 summarizes the estimates. Table 74 Foreign Exchange Requirements for Agriculture, Irrigation and Power Development, 1965-75 (PRs millions, 1964/65 prices) Third Plan Fourth Plan Private - Agriculture and Irrigation 340 1,050 Public - Agriculture 340 400 Irrigation 850 870 Surface Storage 960 1,280 Power 1,530 1,630 Total 4,020 5,230 The projected private sector requirements do include Rs. 450 million for fertilizer imports in the Fourth Plan period, and it is possible that domestic production of fertilizer might expand rapidly enough to reduce this need. However the remainder is allocate.d ta,cover import requirements for farm-mechanization, plant protection, and private tubewells and, just as the Bank Group believes that the private sector could outpace the projections of private investment shown in this report, if given proper incentives, so it believes that more foreign exchange may be required to support this investment. In connection with allocations of - 221 - foreign exchange to the agricultural sector it is well to bear in mind the very important contribution that the sector makes to export earnings. A large increase in export earnings was one of the main successes of the Second Plan. Visible exports increased from about Rs. 760 million in 1959/60 to about Rs. 1,140 in 1964/65. Exports of agricultural commodities, in raw form, made a more than proportionate contribution to this increase, rising from Rs. 320 million in 1959/60 to Rs. 620 million in 1964/65; cotton and rice were the main contributors. Over the Plan as a whole, agricultural commodities in raw form accounted for some 63 percent of vis- ible exports and cotton manufactures, made from domestic cotton, for another 16 percent. The analysis discussed at the beginning of the chapter suggested that West Pakistan may need to import increasing amounts of agricultural commodities if provincial income grows at 6 percent or more; nevertheless this would not exclude simultaneous increases in exports of those commodities in which the Province has comparative international advantage,and the Bank Group believes that West Pakistan may be able to increase its share of the world markets in cotton and rice. The Growth of Agricultural Employment 10.33 One of the main objectives adopted in Pakistan's Perspective Plan is attainment of full employment at the earliest possible date and at the least an unemployment rate no higher than five percent in West Pakistan by 1975. The current level of unemployment is believed to be about 16 percent. Labor force data are very sparse in West Pakistan and estimates of employment and employment trends are based on rather shaky foundations. The Planning Commission has estimated that agricultural work available in 1965 was equivalent to about 7.6 million man-years. This estimate was based on the-assumption that about 395 man-hours are required per cropped acre per year. The Bank Group studied this matter in light of the data gathered by its consultants and reached the con- clusion that 395 man-hours per cropped acre was on the high side. A figure of about 300 hours seemed more appropriate. 10.34 On the basis of assumptions developed from Planning Commission documents and from the work of IACA the Bank Group prepared estimates of the amount of employment that might be available in agriculture if produc- tion grows at the rates projected in this report. The starting point of the projection is 6.6 million man-years, representing the Planning Com- mission's figure for employment in the livestock sector together with a figure for employment on crops based on the assumption that about 300 man-hours are required per cropped acre. Allowance is made for increasing mechanization of agriculture at the rates estimated in Chapter VI. Table 75 shows the projected growth in agriculture and the employment estimates derived therefrom. - 222 - Table 75 Estimate of Employment in Agriculture, 1965-85 1965 1975 1985 Crops Cropped Acres (millions) W0.72 47.84 54.30 GPV of crops per acre (PRs) 133 184 260 Employment (mln. man-years) 4.7 5.8 6.9 Livestock Gross Production Value (PRs m1n.) 3.3 5.6 9.8 Employment (mln. man-years) 1.9 2.7 3.9 Total Agricultural Employment 6.6 8.5 10.8 Total Labor Force 16.2 21.2 28.1 Agriculture as % of Total 4o.7% 40.1% 38.6% The estimates of the total labor force given at the bottom of the table are based on the assumption that the labor force was in 1965 and will re- main about 31.6 percent of total population. This is the Planning Com- mission's figure. The population is assumed to be 67 million in 1975 and 89 million in 1985. The table suggests that agricultural employment may increase by about two-thirds between 1965 and 1985, equivalent to an annual rate of growth of 2.5 percent. The proportion of the labor force employed in agriculture would remain little changed. However it should be borne in mind that these are provincial average figures and there may be con- siderable variations in the growth of agricultural employment in different parts of the Province. - 223 - GLOSSARY OF TERMS Active flood plain: A strip of land beside a river or stream which is flooded at least once during most years, and is capable of reworking, subject to frequent deposition. Aquifer: A water bearing stratum of permeable rock, sand or gravel. Area ... assessed: An area irrigated on which water rates are levied. Rates vary according to the cropping period. ... cultivated: Land which has been under annual or perennial crop within the previous eighteen months. ... irrigated: That part of the farmlands within an irrigation system on which water is applied during a cropping season. Canal commanded ...: The area which it is possible to irrigate by flow from a given outlet on a canal, whether the whole area is actually irrigated or not. Culturable ... (CA): The sum of the cultivated area plus the cul- turable wasteland. Culturable commanded That portion of the culturable area which is ... (CCA): commanded by canal irrigation. Cropped ...: The sum of areas under kharif and rabi crops plus twice the area under perennial crops. Gross ... (GA): The total area within extreme limits set by a project, system or canal. Gross commanded That portion of the gross area which is com- ... (GCA): manded by canal irrigation. GCA includes villages, canals, roads, and some desert waste- land as well as CCA. Perennial ...: An area which has been designated to receive allocations of canal water throughout the year. Authorized full supply The maximum discharge (usually the design capa- (AFS): city in cusecs) authorized for an irrigation channel. - 224 - Balanced recharge: A term used in reference to groundwater pumping, meaning that the amount of water pumped out of the aquifer over a period is equal to the amount which seeps in. Barani: An Urdu term describing rainfed agriculture. Barrage: A gated diversion structure across a river. This structure is a part of the headworks of an irrigation canal. Base load: That part of the total power load at the base of the load curve which is continuous, as distin- guished from that which fluctuates as the total system load changes from hour to hour or seasonal- ly. Bund: A large artificial embankment which retains water, or protects agricultural lands from river floods. The term is also applied to small earth ridges separating two fields or sections of fields. Canal capacity Size of a canal, expressed as the volume of water (irrigation): that it can carry at any specified point. Canal commanded area: See under Area. Capability The maximum demonstrated continuous dependable (maximum): output of a generator under routine operating conditions, expressed in kilowatts or megawatts. Critical water-year: The year when the sum of flows from October through May of the Chenab, Indus and Jhelum Rivers measured at Marala, Attock and Mangla was minimum between 1922/23 and 1962/63. The critical water year was 1:954/55. Cropping intensity: The cropped area expressed as a percentage of the CCA. Cropping pattern: The sequence in which crops are grown in any given area during a single year and the propor- tion of'cropland devoted to each crop during the year. Dead storage capacity: That portion of the reservoir capacity which is not used for operational purposes. Dead storage means the corresponding volume of water. Dead storage level: The level of water in a reservoir below which the reservoir does not operate. - 225 - Delta: Tract of alluvium formed at the mouth of a river. Delta (irrigation): The depth of water applied to cropland. Demand The amount of electric power required (or de- (electrical): livered) at a given moment at any specified point or points in a system, usually expressed in kilowatts or megawatts. Often used in the report synonymously with maximum demand. Design intensity: The cropping intensity for which the irrigation system in an area is designed to provide adequate water supplies. Discharge factor: The outlet capacity from distributary and minor canals to watercourses expressed as cusecs per 1,000 acres of CCA, also known as water allow- ance. Dispatching load: The process of assigning generating plants to various positions on a load curve in order to indicate the amount of energy to be generated by each plant in a certain period. Distributary A canal of medium size, smaller than a branch (irrigation): canal and larger than a minor canal. Distribution system That portion of an electric system used to de- (electric): liver electric energy from points on the trans- mission or bulk supply system to the consumers. District: Small territorial unit in Test Pakistan for pur- poses of civil administration (about 50 in the Province). Diversity: That quality or characteristic by which in- dividual maximum demands occur at different times. There is hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, and annual diversity. Division: Large territorial unit for purposes of civil ad- ministration (12 in Province). Doab: An Urdu term referring to the land between any two adjacent rivers in the Punjab. Drawdown: In tubewells: the difference between the static water level in a well and the stabilized water level attained after continuous pumping at a con- stant rate of discharge. - 226 - In reservoirs: the extent to which the water level of a reservoir is lowered when releases for irrigation and/or power exceed the inflow. Electric system loss: Total electric energy loss in the electric sys- tem. It consists of transmission, transformation, and distribution losses, and unaccounted-for energy losses between sources of supply and points of delivery. Evapo-transpiration: The amount of the water consumed in a given area during a specified time by transpiration from vegetation and evaporation from the soil. Extra high voltage Term applied to voltage levels of transmission (EHV): lines which are higher than the voltage levels commonly used. Often used in the report as synonymous with either 380 kv or 500 kv. Firm power: Power intended to have assured availability to the customer to meet all or any agreed-upon por- tion of his load requirements. Full delta: The level of irrigation supplies at which crop yields reach the maximum attainable in the light of all the other circumstances of the agricultural regime. In the case of West Pakistan full delta supplies were in addition defined to include an allowance for the control of soil salinity. Headworks: The works constructed at the off-take of a main canal. It includes the weir or barrage on the river as well as the control structure across the head of the canal. Horizontal drainage: Tile, pipe or open channel land drainage or a combination of these. Hydrological year: Year beginning towards the end of kharif, running from October 1 to September 30. Impounding: Filling a reservoir with water. Installed capacity: The total of the capacities as shown by the name- plates of apparatus such as generating units, tur- bines, synchronous condensers, transformers or other equipment in a station or system. Interconnection: A transmission tie permitting a flow of energy be- tween the facilities of two electric systems. - 227- Interruptible load: Electric power load which may be curtailed at the supplier's discretion, or in accordance with a contractual agreement. Inundation canal: Canal which is dependent upon the surface level of water in a river for its supplies and is there- fore generally filled only at times of flood flow. Kharif: An Urdu term for the summer growing season, which includes the six months beginning April 15 and ending October 15. Kharif-Rabi ratio: Ratio of the areas cropped in the two growing seasons. Leaching: Washing down into the earth of salts in the top soil. Leaching requirement: The amount of water entering the soil that must pass through the root zone in order to prevent soil salinity from exceeding a specified value. It is used primarily under steady state or long- time average conditions. Live storage capacity: The reservoir capacity excluding dead storage capacity. Load: The amount of electric power required or de- livered at a specific point, usually expressed in kilowatts or megawatts. (Also often loosely used all inclusively to designate demand and energy such as in Load Forecast.) Load curve: A curve indicating the amounts of energy re- quired at different instantaneous loads over the course of a period. Load factor: The ratio in percent between the average load over a specified period and the maximum or peak load occurring during the period. Lost and Unaccounted For The calculated difference between energy sent (electric energy): out from generating stations and the sum of energy sales and energy accounted for but not sold. Main canal: A main irrigation supply canal off-taking from a river. Maximum demand: The greatest of all simultaneous demands on an installation or source of power supply within a specified time. - 228 - Mean water-year: Average monthly or ten-day river flows over the 41-year period 1922/23 through 1962/63. Mean-year flow: See Mean water-year. Median flow: The values of flows such that half the recor- ded flows are above and half are below in amount. Mining: Extraction of groundwater beyond balanced re- charge. Nameplate rating: The full-load continuous capability of a generator and its prime mover, in terms of megawatts, under specified conditions, as designated by the manufac- turer. Non-firm power: Power supplied (or purchased) under an arrange- ment which does not have the continuous avail- ability guarantee feature of firm power. Non-perennial canal: Canal designated to receive water supplies for a part of the year only, usually April 16 to Oc- tober 15 (i.e. kharif) and fed from a permanent barrage spanning the source river. Control of river flow is the chief feature differentiating non-perennial and inundation canals. Off-peak energy: Energy supplied during periods of relatively low system demands. On-peak energy: Electric energy supplied during periods of rela- tively high system demands. Overload capability: The maximum load that a machine or device can carry for a specified period of time under speci- fied conditions when operating beyond its normal rating but within safe limits predetermined. Overpumping See Mining (of groundwater). Peak demand: Demand at the instant of greatest load in a period. Peaking capability: The maximum output, specified in kilowatts or mega- watts, that a generator or system can sustain for short periods of time. Peak load: The maximum load in a stated period of time. Peak-load station: A generating station which is normally operated only to provide capacity during peak-load periods. -229 - Perennial canal: Canal designated to receive water supplies all the year round and fed from a permanent barrage spanning the source river. Persian wheel: A mechanism powered by bullocks or camels used for lifting water from wells, canals, or streams. Perspective Plan: An outline of a plan for the economic development of Pakistan over the period 1965-85, prepared by the Pakistan Planning Commission. Province: West Pakistan. Rabi: An Urdu term for the winter growing season which includes the six months from October 15 to April 15. Rated capacity: See Nameplate rating. Reactive power: Power that does no work, measured in voltamperes reactive. (Vars or Kvar). Recharge (groundwater): The process whereby water, at or near the ground surface, percolates downwards into the store of groundwater thus replenishing water which was re- moved. Regulated streamflow: The controlled rate of flow at a given point resulting from reservoir operation. Re-regulating dam: A dam or barrier built in a stream below a main dam to provide supplemental storage in order to smooth water releases from the main dam. Reserve (electrical): The difference between generating capability and load on the generators at a specified time, generally loosely used in this report as the dif- ference between peak capability and peak load. Reservoir capacity: The gross volume of water which can be stored in the reservoir. Rim stations: Stations established on main rivers, near where they enter the Indus plains, at which the flow is gauged. Riverain area: The active flood plain lands along main rivers. Salinity: A saline condition in soils or water which is detrimental to plant growth. Scouring: Removal of silt or other material by flow of water. -230 - Sediment: Matter carried by rivers which settles at the bottom of the reservoir. Siltation: The deposition of silt or sediment on the bot- tom and sides of a reservoir. Sluicing: Passing water through low level outlets or sluices at a dam or barrage, generally in an attempt to remove some of the sediment deposited. Spillway: Structure for discharging superfluous water flows at a reservoir or on a river. Storage capacity The gross volume of a reservoir available to store (reservoir): water. Sub-surface drainage: Water table control by either horizontal or ver- tical drainage facilities. Superstorage capacity: Storage capacity available in a reservoir be- tween normal maximum water elevation (FSL) and maximum elevation to which water can safely be raised for short periods. Surface drainage: Removal of surface effluent water by use of open channels. Tailwater level: Level of water at foot of structure in a river, such as dam or barrage. Tehsil: Administrative subdivision of a district com- prised of several Union Councils. Tile drains: Sub-surface horizontal drains lined with tiles. Transpiration: The process by which plants draw water into their roots for either building plant tissue or passing through the leaves into the atmosphere. Tubewell: A drilled well, cased and screened, usually gravel packed. Turbine (hydraulic): An enclosed rotary type of prime mover in which mechanical energy is produced by the force of water directed against blades fastened to a ver- tical or horizontal shaft. Turbine (steam or gas): An enclosed rotary type of prime mover in which heat energy in steam or gas is converted into mechanical energy by the force of a high velocity flow of steam or gases directed against successive rows of radial blades fastened to a central shaft. - 231 - Under watering: The application of insufficient water to sus- tain the maximum yields which would be attain- able in the light of all the other circumstances of the agricultural regime. Union Council: The smallest political subdivision composed of several villages. Value added: Output at factor cost, net of purchased inputs. Vertical drainage: Drainage by tubewell pumping. Watercourse: Farmers' channel, carrying water from a Govern- ment canal to the fields. Also used in reference to the area irrigated from such a channel. Waterlogging: State of the land with groundwater lying at or near the surface. The use of the term indicates that groundwater is so high that crop growth is precluded or crop yields lessened by it for at least part of the year. Water table: The height in the ground to which the earth is saturated with water. Water year: See Hydrological year. Weir: A structure across a river designed to pond water and thus raise its level for purposes of diversion into irrigation canals. Names ADB: Agricultural Development Bank. ADC: Agricultural Development Corporation. Agriculture Consultant: International Land Development Consultants N.V., and Hunting Technical Services Ltd. Bank Group: A group of staff members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development assigned to assist Dr. Lieftinck in the execution of the Indus Special Study. Binnie: Binnie & Partners, Consultant to WAPDA. Coode: Coode & Partners, Consultant to WAPDA. CSP: Civil Service of Pakistan. -232 - CTM: Chas. T. Main International, Inc., Dam Sites Consultant to the Study. Dam Sites Consultant: Chas. T. Main International, Inc. Gibb: Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, Irrigation Con- sultant and coordinator of consultants to the Study. GOP: Government of Pakistan. Harza: Harza Engineering Company, International, general engineering Consultant to WAPDA. HTS: Hunting Technical Services Limited, Agricul- tural Consultant to the Study. IACA: Irrigation and Agriculture Consultants Association. IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (World Bank). IGC: Indus Gas Company, which distributes Sui gas in the Sind (Sukkur, Hyderabad, etc.). ILACO: International Land Development Consultants N.V., Agricultural Consultant to the Study. Irrigation Consultant: Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners. KESC: Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd. KGC: Karachi Gas Company, which distributes Sui gas in the Karachi area. LIP: Lower Indus Project: regional study carried out by Hunting Technical Services Limited and Sir Murdoch Macdonald & Partners. LWDB: Land and Water Development Board. MESCO: The Multan Electric Supply Company, Ltd. NEMA: National Electrical Manufacturers Association. PMS: Power Market Survey Organization. Power Consultant: Stone & Webster Overseas Consultants, Inc., Power Consultant to the Study. REFCC: The Rawalpindi Electric Power Company, Ltd. - 233 - SCARP: Salinity Control and Reclamation Project. SGTC: Sui Gas Transmission Company, responsible for transmitting gas from Sui to the South. SNG?L: Sui Northern Gas Pipelines, Ltd., responsible for transmitting Sui gas to the North and dis- tributing it and the gas from Dhulian field there. S & W: Stone & Webster Gverseas Consultants, Inc. TAMS: Tippets-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton International Corporation, Consultants to WAPDA on Tarbela Dam. T & K: Tipton and Kalmbach, Inc., Consultant to WAPDA. WAPDA: Water and Power Development Authority of Test Pakistan. WASID: Water and Soils Investigation Division (of WAPDA). Units of Weights, Measures, Currency, etc. Acre-foot (AF): A measure of volume of water, corresponding to 43,560 cubic feet, the volumetric equivalent of one acre covered to a depth of one foot. Ampere: Unit of measurement of the intensity of elec- tric current, being that produced by one volt acting through a resistance of one ohm. Animal Unit (AU): Livestock expressed in terms of units deter- mined by their respective feed requirements compared with the requirements of a standard bullock. The standard bullock is taken to equal one animal unit. Bale (cotton): 1 bale = 392 pounds. Btu: British thermal unit, the standard unit for measuring quantity of heat energy such as heat content of fuel. 1 Btu = 0.29307 watt-hours. cfs: Cubic feet per second. cfs/month: 1 cfs/month = 59.65 AF (30-day month) or 61.43 AF (31-day month). - 234 - Cusec (cfs): One cubic foot per second, used to describe the rate of flow of water. Cusec-hour: At one cubic foot per second, the volume of water for one hour would be 3,600 cubic feet or 0.086 acre-foot. cy: Cubic yard. Fps: Feet per second. FSL: Full supply level. GPV: Gross production value (output x prices). Horsepower (HP): Unit of mechanical power equivalent to 550 foot-pounds of work per second; 33,000 foot- pounds per minute. 1 horsepower-hour = 0.7457 kwh. Kilovars: 1,000 reactive volt-amperes. Kilovolt (kv): 1,000 volts. Kilovolt-ampere (kva): 1,000 volt-amperes. Kilowatt (kw): 1,000 watts. Kilowatt-hour (kwh): Unit of electrical work; work done by one kilowatt of power in one hour. 1 kwh = 1,000 watt-hours. Mac: Million acres. MAF: Million acre-feet. MAF/month: 1 MAF/month = 16,850 cfs. Maund: A Pakistani unit of weight equal to 82.28 lbs. Mcf: Thousand cubic feet (gas measurement). Megawatt (mw): Unit of electric power equivalent to 1,000 kilowatts. Megawatt-hour (mwh): Unit of electrical work; work done by 1,000 kilowatts of power in one hour. 1MMcf: Million cubic feet (gas measurement). NPV: Net production value (GPV less input costs). - 235 - Ohm: Unit of electrical resistance. Paisa: One hundredth of a Rupee. Pcf: Pounds per cubic foot. Ppm: Parts per million. PRs: Pakistani Rupees (see Rs). Rs: Pakistani Rupees. Official rate is Rs 4.76 = US$1 or 1 Rupee = $0.21. SPD: Standard Pakistan Datum (based on mean sea level at Karachi). TDN: Total digestible nutrients which are the sum of all digestible organic nutrients, viz. protein crude fiber, nitrogen-free extract and fat. TDN represents the approximate heat energy value of a feed. Ton (long): 2,240 pounds. Trillion: 1012. volt: Unit of electromotive force (or electric pressure analogous to water pressure) being that which when coupled to a conductor with a resistance of one ohm will produce a current of one ampere. Watt: Rate of energy transfer equivalent to one ampere flowing under the pressure of one volt at unity power factor. Watt-hour: Work done in an hour at the steady rate of one watt.