Report No. 6356-IND Indonesia Policies and Prospects for Non-Oil Exports Annex Il: Policies Influencing Non-Oil Export Performance December 31,1986 Country Programs Department East Asia and Pacific Regional Office FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7'''Q c0, '.'.D,'', - 4 TIMS An A e' 0* pV,, - t! edb j P t _ .es ., t e ; ¢ .,nt Y wt.otherwh 9- c. ...........r^- - - !V *'3........................ N'y,SSt° 0_'. y #teWbtlt ?o"P , ' o 2,', ... .. v . ^2' oA 4 ,i*.8¢< ', '4 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Before November 15, 1978 US$1.00 = Rp 415 Annual Averages 1979-85 1979 US$1.00 = Rp 623 1980 US$1.00 = Rp 627 1981 US$1.00 = Rp 632 1982 US$1.00 = Rp 661 1983 US$1.00 = Rp 909 - 1984 US$1.00 = Rp 1,026 1985 US$1.00 = Rp 1,111 December 30, 1986 US$1.00 = Rp 1,654 - FISCAL YEAR Government - April 1 to March 31 Bank Indonesia - April 1 to March 31 State Banks - January 1 to December 31 1/ On March 30, 1983 the Rupiah was devalued from US$1.00 = Rp 703 to US$1.00 = Rp 970. 2/ On September 12, 1986 the Rupiah was devalued from US$1.00 = Rp 1,134 to US$1.00 = Rp 1,644. 1On OFFnCIAL USE ONLY ANNEX II POLICIES INFLUENCING NON-OIL EXPORT PERFORMANCE Table of Contents Page No. A. External Barriers to Non-oil Exports ... .........o......,..,.... 1 The Extent of Barriers Facing Indonesia Exports................ 1 Nontariff s .......................... 3 NTB's Facing Individual Product Groups......................... 19 GT' a'gItvda rtc rus................... ........................ ............ 19* 000 Coffee, Tea and Spices...................... .......... ...... 20 Vegetables and Products Thereof............................... 21 Wood and Wood Productso ........e ..................... ......... 23 Textiles and Cltig.................................23 Administration of Textile Quotas in Indonesia .................. 0 26 B. Institutional Arrangements for Stimulating Non-oil Exports ..... 31 Duty Drawbacks and .......................... .............. ... 32 Financing Production.. ............ ...... ............... ..e. 40 Producing and Selliag the Goods............................ 48 Shipping the Goods to the Overseas Market...................... 53 References......e...... ... ....... ....... . .... ............ . ..... .o 59 Appendix 1 The Experiences of Korea and Taiwan in Providing Duty-Free Imported Inputs for Exporters........... 60 Appendix 2 Indonesia's New Inspection System for Traded Goods... 63 Appendix 3 Mexico's In-Bond Assembly Programor.e........m....... 67 Appendix 4 Key Changes Resulting from INPRES 4 on Ports and Sii p p i n g 70 This document has a restricted distibution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonrance of their offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. AM=UX 2 Page 1 POLICIES INFLUENCING NON-OIL EXPORT PERFORMANCE A. External Barriers to Non-oil Exports 1. In this section an attempt is made to identify barriers facing Indonesian products of actual and potential export interest and to discuss some of the problems associated with them. While the literature on the theoretical aspects of access to import markets is abundant, empirical studies are infrequent particularly those that deal with nontariff barriers. 2. Information contained here was drawn primarily from the UNCTAD Data Base on Trade Measures. Inquiries in Indonesia revealed little concern by exporters with Sarriers to export with the exception of those facing textile and plywood. in other product groups, I$onesian exports are too small or too stagnant to suffer from import controls.- However, as the experience of textile exports to the USA shows, once the imports af "sensitive" products reach sii7if icant level or display dynamic growth, restrictions are imposed.- Since the Indonesian comparative advantage ieems to be exactly in those products considered as sensitive (i.e. the labor intensive manurfacturers), trade restrictions in industrial countries should be of major concern when studying potential exports. 3. The discussion is divided into three parts. In the tirst, the extent of tariff and nontariff barriers (NTBs) affecting current exports is estimated. In the second, NTBs facing individual product groups of export interest to Indonesia are discussed. In Part 3, the system for allocation of export licenses for textiles (i.e. the institution that it has been necessary for Indonesia to develop in order to administer trade restrictions imposed on it by industrial countries) is examined and its efficiency discussed. The Extent of Barriers .acing Indonesian Exports 4. Tariffs. Table 1 shows that, in the aggregate, the tariff rates on Indonesian exports to major industrial markets currently stand at relatively low levels. The average for total exports do not exceed 2.5X and is lower than the average facing world exports. Only agricultural exports to Japan and industrial exports to Australia appear to be subject to significant charges. While it may be tempting to dismiss the current importance of tariffs based on the data in Table 1, it should be recognized that these overall statistics may conceal very different tariff profiles which may exist on a sectoral basis and that for some specific goods tariffs can still constitute a very important trade barrier. In addition, particularly from the view point of a developing 1/ Dynamic growth of imports is currently one of the most "popular" reasons behind import restrictions) 2/ The number of Indonesian textile products subject to specific limits in the USA escaiated from 9 in 1983 to 18 in 1984 and 34 in 1985. ANNEX 2 Page 2 country, the tariff structure can be equally important as the tariff level; specifically, numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that raw materials imperted into industrial country markets typically face zero or very low import duties while tariffs increase as these goods experience further processing. It is held that the effects of such "escalating" tariff structures are to produce an important bias against exports of processed or fabricated goods. Table 1: AVERAGE POST-TOKYO ROUND TARIFFS FACING INDONESIA IN MAJOR INDUSTRIAL MARKETS /a Importers Products Australia EEC (9) Japan USA All 2.4 1.6 2.1 0.7 All excluding fuels 2.8 1.7 1.6 0.1 Agricultural 0.1 3.3 7.3 0.3 Industrial 9.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 Memo item: Total (World) Exports All n.a. 2.4 5.8 2e9 /a Weighted averages of the post-Tokyo Round MFN and preferential nominal tariff rates. To arrive at them, first, a tariff average for each tariff position was calculated using actual import values and the import duties facing them (i.e. MFN, GSP or special preferences); and secondt the arerage rates for tariff positions were aggregated to the product group level, using shares of tariff position in total imports of this product group. Source: UNCTAD Data Base on Trade Measures 5. As an illustration of the nature of the problem, Table 2 (adapted from UNCTAD, p. 44j examines the structure of nominal tariffs in ten industrial country markets before and after the Tokyo Round for selected ANNEX 2 Page 3 processing chains, many of which are of primary importance to Indonesia.31 Shown here are the average pre- and post-Tokyo Round tariffs applied to each stage of fabrication as well as two statistical indices which measure whether the degree of escalation increased or decreased due to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. For example in the case of coffee the rate facing primary products was reduced from 10.0% to 6.8% (i.e. by 32%) while the rate facing fabricated products (i.e. processed coffee) decreased from 13.3% to 9.4% (i.e. by 29.3%). Consequently, the overall level of tariff protection, as well as, the absolute difference between rates on primary and processed coffee, were reduced, but the relative (percentage) difference was in fact increased. 6. The two major points that emerge from Table 2 are that, in cases like fish, coffee, hard fibres and wood, the degree of escalation in tariffs actually increased due to disproportionately large tariff reductions for primary and intermediate stage items which were made in the Tokyo Round. In these instances it is clear that the changing structure of tariffs (i.e. the increased degree of escalation) will have a negative influence on Indonesia's (and other developing countries') efforts to expand exports of fabricated goods. Second, the table also indicates that the degree of escalation for many of the chains remains very high after the Tokyo Round. For example, the average post-Tokyo tariff for processed fruit (16.6) percent) is almost four-times that for fresh fruit (the primary stage product) while a similar degree of escalation is also evidenced in the wood processing chain (tariffs rise from 1.8-6.6% over the different stages). Similarly, in the case of leather, raw hides are subject to a zero average import duty in the ten industrial markets with the average for leather manufactures standing at more than eight percent. All in all, the evidence presented in Table 2 indicates that tariff escalation continues to be a problem for Indonesia (and other developing countries) and, in some cases, the magnitude of the problem has increased as a result of the Tokyo Round results. 7. Nontariff Barriers. Since the protective effect of tariffs is frequently seen by importing countries as inadequate, and since tariffs are in any case difficult to manipulate in a quick and efficient manner owing to legal constraints, governments often rely on various nontariff measures. 3/ The analysis in Table 2 follows the standard GATT approach of calculating the levels of tariffs at each processing stage and determining how these average tariffs behave over the chain. If tariffs are found to escalate with fabrication this is taken to indicate a bias against processed good exports from developing countries. However, a recent analysis shows that even when tariffs do not escalate over a processing chain there may still be an important bias against processed goods due to the relatively greater demand elasticities for these products. See Yeats. lhJ 2 SNMNM FAI:IG PE= CP E III 10 IT INSIAM IN NA(R INIDIAL MUNDW *AM /a /b ao= AMA MA NXX I2 FR PSR M M IL M Mr UK FIN JAP ' SE 0106 L L L L Q L 1904 VL UIL U. W U IL W, VL lL LL 2209 I. Q AL 2401 0301 L R R R R R I R R R QgL L 0302 L QqL L 0303 L S LR 0812 L L L L L L L L L L 12DI L L Q L L 0 AL 12D7 L Q L 2102 L IL IL SL U. U. IL IL IL IL S 2914 L AL 2923 L 2925 L AL 2927 L S 8 2942 L AL DA RA N= 1N FR ax a rJ' Er uK FIN JAP Wa a 300B L S L 420Q L UO L,1Q L 490Q L 4911 L 5OtW 1w2I Q L !5;!7 1Q ISk L S4 ~~M 1. 5 EOOt.1 Q,S L L IL .~~~~~~~~~~~~ I. , _ 6101 ' Q S S L IL 6102 Q Q,S S IL 6104 ?,L 0 L R 6402 S L Q 6403 1Q 8 S S S S S S S 6912 L 8 am L S L L 9212 L Table 2 AT AUA tN Pi MR W DTL 1TA 1i -Ul Pll JR IR SW 9703 L 0706 N. WI NL VL UL WI WI VL VLL L 1605 S L L 2205 L,R L,R LRLR ,R LR L,R L,R L,R L,R Q 2302 VL,L II,yL LYL LVL LYL LYL 4LL LVI LVI L Q 38Q in1 IQ ?Q in 10 IQ IQ 1t? 4.415 IID IQ IT) IQ) IQ 'IQ IQ) It) I 5505 L 0901 L Q AL 0602 S L L 1703 L fL YLL VL.L WLL 7LL AILL WLL VL,L VL,L L Q 2006 L L S,L L L L L L L L L 4405 Is 4413 S 6103 S S L AL 7302 S S S S S S S S S 8515 L Q Q L 8521 Q 8706 S 0603 IS is iS TS iS iS TS TS iS L L Q MTble 2 1006 ~ ~ .I V. V. . L V. .I -I. .L _I. 1006 flI n L lL lL sL S 2002 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 0 L 5a.Q 6202 Q L 8702 L Q Q Q Q 0701 L Q S Q Q L L L Q 0802 R R R R R R R R R L 1104 VIL I. VlfL VIL V V VL VIL L AL 1702 L L L L L L L L L L L AL 1704 L V V VIL VIL VI VL VIL 'vL VL 2107 L4VIL VL VL V VIL VI IL LVL VL 0 VL 0407 L L L 0508 L 0509 0 0512 L 1005 L L L L L L L L L VL IQ L 1108 L,L I,L L,JL L,lL LflIL LLL,VL L,vL L Q Q 1208 0 1302 Q L 1303 L S Q 1405 L L Tle 2 Pw8 XiI A Z - JR (U - DW rr 1s IX PIN X X U 1504 L 1604 L L S L L 2208 Q Q Q 2532 Q 2942 Q L 4014 Q 4102 Q 4103 0 4104 Q 9505 Q 9905 Q L 0a204 L L 0902 AL 1203 S AL 1507 4VL L,WL 4LW LVL L,VL LW4 LVL L,Y LYL L & 1801 AL 3401 AL 3707 AL 5509 AL 6106 A Tble 2 ATA MA X N M R (M1 We I Mr PET U FIN 4 PR S( 9028 L Eiplanatii a£of bSyd Nontariff Bsrriers L - licensing Q - quota AL - autamtic lUceming VL- vwab levy S - surAeUanoe T: - tariff quota A - refeec iwort price lv- Cmtis ATA - Aautria ALA - Australia B[X - BeIg 4cmbur I - Dw- PR -France GM - Germy, Fed. Pe. E - Geece IRL - Irland ITA - Italy NPE - Netherlamn 1K - United Kxgm FIN - Finland JAP -Japan wz - gwitzeriad /a Syul in norsa print indicate wmures actually inps on ipcts from Indorsia, bold sybols indicate mmures hch wmaul face Irdonesign product sbxdiA it be e3ported to a gLl country. /b easur tae under the PJtifibe Arraput (WA) are not inclued ANNEX 2 Page 10 8. Especially striking about the current array of nontariff measures is its wide variety: some studies suggest that over 200 different types of these measures exist. Here four groups of major NTBs are investigated. (a) Quantitative restrictions and "voluntary" export restraints: Prohibitions: embargoes on the importation of a product. A prohibition may be total, may admit exceptions or may operate only under certain conditions. Quotas: ceilings (specified in value or quantitative terms) imposed for a given period of time. Discretionary import authorizations: permission to import granted at the discretion of the competent authorities. Conditional import authorizations: permission to import granted subject to the importer undertaking comitments in areas other than importation, or to specified overall economic conditions. "Voluntary" export restraints (VERs): Agreements between an export- ing country and an importing country as to the maximum amount of exports to be effected within a given period of time.'' (b) Price controls Variable levies: variable charges serving to equalize the c.i.f. import price with a decreed price. Minimum price systems: the setting of a minimum import price by the importing country. Actual prices below the decreed minimum may trigger the imposition of additional duty or a price investigation. "Voluntary" export price restraints: agreement between the exporter and the importer on the minimum price to be observed by the exporter. 4/ While voluntary export restrictions are administered by exporting countries, their imposition is the result of successful protectionist requests in importing countries. ANNEX 2 Page 11 (c) Monitoring measures Anti-dumping and countervailing duties: duties levied on a product that is sold in the importing country at a lower price than in the exporting country (dumping), or to offset rebates or subsidies provided for the production or export of a good (countervailing). Although the GATT permits the use of these duties under certain circumstances, there is evidence that they are frequently applied in lieu of safeguards with both the intent and effect of protecting domestic industry, see Finger, Hall and Nelson. Price investigations: Formal investigations of charges by domestic producers about unfair trading practices of an exporting country. While an investigation is obviously necessary to determine the facts of dumping or subsidies, there is evidence that the inquiry process itself has a protective effect, independent of the eventual findings, see Finger. Also, in some cases, price investigations were a prelude to the negotiation of "voluntary" export restraints. Monitoring: formal close surveillance of imports of sensitive products, primarily by the means of automatic and liberal licensing. Surveillance may be the precursor to restriction - or may inhibit trade in its own rights. (d) Measures increasing the landed price of imports Tariff quotas: the application of two tariff rates, the higher rate coming into operg;ion when the quantity of imported goods exceeds a specified level.' Seasonal tariffs: different tariff rates are applied to the same (agricultural) product according to the time of year. 9. All these types of measures are binding nontariff barriers since they control or restrict either the price or the quantity of imports. In some cases the mechanism is direct -- e.g. for quotas, minimum price agreements, and "voluntary" export restraints -- while in others, it is more subtle. For example, price investigations and surveillance measures are necessary precursors to control and thus create uncertainty and encourage "self- restraint" among exporters irrespective of whether explicit protective action is subsequently taken. 5/ Indeed European Economic Community regualtions [e.g., Council regulation (EEC) 288/82] explicitly refer to surveillance for this purpose. (See the Official Journal of the European Communities, 1982.) 6/ Note that tariff quotas may also provide for preferences if the lower rate is set below the applied MFN rate. ANNEX 2 Page 12 10. Table 3 presents estimates of the extent of the above listed NTBa on Indonesian exports of non-oil products in 17 major industrial markets, and compares them with similar estimates for exports of developing countries. Information on NTBs is for 1983 and that on trade for 1981.7/ The statistical indicators employed to measure the extent of NIsa are the coverage and frequency ratios. For any importer, i, and type of ITB, let Nqx = 1 if there is a nontariff barrier on (tariff-line) imports of q from exporter x, and let Nqx - 0 otherwise, For sets of commodities, Q, and exporters, X, both indices take the form: 1 a Wqx qqx 1 geg xcx Z £ Wqx qeq xex The import coverage ratio defines Wqx as the value of i's actual imports of q from x. The frequency ratio defines Wqx as the presence or absence of a flow of q from x to i: thus Wqx - I if (tariff-line) imports of q from x are nonzero and Wqx 0 otherwise. 11. Note that the purpose of the coverage and frequency ratios is to measure the extent to which imports are covered by NTBs and not the degree to which they are restricted. Thus, it is a more elementary concept than a tariff average. An appropriate parallel is the ratio of dutiable to total (dutiable plus duty free) imports. A tariff rate is, by its very nature, a measure of the "intensity" of restriction, whereas nontariff measures, unfortunately, provide us with no such "natural" indication of intensity: all we have is a "Yes or No" indicator -- strictly qualitative information on whether or not governmental considerations influence trade. 12. Both indices have strength and weaknesses. The coverage ratio is possibly more natural in that the extent of NTIs is represented by the size of the particular trade flow it affects. Its drawback is that it understates the restrictiveness of barriers because the tighter an ITB the lower is the relevent import. The frequency ratio avoids some of the downward bias. The extent of ITB is measured by the number of trade flows that are subject to them so that every barrier or every observed trade flow receives equal weight. On the other hand, however, the frequency ratio ignores the perfectly natural differences in the sizes of different trade flows, and it is also sensitive to the tendency of trade classifications to be more fragmented the more monitored and restricted is a category of imports. 13. Returning to Table 3 we note that over 15SZ of the value of Indonesian exports to (major) industrial markets are subject to nontariff barriers. Comparison with the coverage ratio for all developing countries (22.5X) seems to indicate that while significantly impeded by NTBs, Indonesian exports suffer less from these barriers than exports of other developing nations. That observation however, is contradicted by the frequency ratio 7/ More recent data on NTBs facing all developing countries were not available for this tabulation. However, Chapter 2 provides up-to-date information on NTBs facing Indonesian exports. ANNEX 2 Page 13 which points to Indonesian products as a more frequent subject of NTBa than the products of other developing countries. Table 3: THE EXTENT OF NOVTARIFF BARRIERS FACING IMPORTS OFlE5 1UL PRODUCTS FROM INDONESIA AND ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY SELECTED MAJOR INDUSTRIAL MARKETS Value of Imports NTB Coverage ITB Frequency (1981,US$ mill.) Ratio Ratio Importer Indonesia LDCs Indonesia LDC8 Indonesia LDCs United Kingdom 177 1,1854 20.9 27.4 31.1 19.8 Netherlands 185 5t851 24.0 32.3 29.2 21.1 Italy 206 9,128 2.5 16.2 28.6 15.0 Ireland 3 357 39.8 19.9 40.9 22.1 Cermany 260 l7,80O 11.5 23.9 26.3 18.5 Greece 6 739 0.4 12.9 9.4 17.1 France 150 10,606 32.8 28.6 36.1 30.0 Denmark 36 1,140 47.8 35.8 41.0 24.6 Belgium-Lux 66 5,606 45.5 45.1 29.2 19.9 TOTAL EEC 1,089 639089 19.7 26.9 29.9 20.9 USA 908 559384 4.2 18.9 21.5 10.3 Switzerland 33 2,111 37.0 34.5 33.6 24.7 Norway 7 917 0.6 18.2 6.5 18.6 Japan l1437 24,358 15.7 17.5 14.4 11.3 Finland 2 812 16.3 26.9 14.3 21.0 Austria 13 1050 34.6 19e2 2.5 6.3 Australia 80 2t904 11.9 27.9 25.6 1Y.5 All Above 3,569 150,625 14.1 22.5 25.3 18.5 Source: World Bank estimates. ANNEX 2 Page 14 14. Does this contradiction suggest that Indonesian exports are particularly adversely affected by NTBs since only small values manage to overcome numerous obstacles? This in fact is the case of exports to some markets. For example, as it will be documented in detail in Chapter 2, textile and clothing exports to the USA are kept by the means of NTBs at a very low level. On the other hand, hcwever, very often Indonesia exports only very small quantities of particular products which are covered by NTBs in importing countries, but which due to their marginal size are not affected by these restrictions. For example in exports to Japan, values of 136 products (i.e. of 37% of all non-oil products) do not exceed US$10,000. While 13 of these products fall into tariff lines which are subject to NTBs their size is too small to trigger restriction&. However, as was already noted once these products display a sharp increase or it reaches an "undesirable" level they would most probably be regulated. 15. Thus the conclusion to be drawn from Table 3 is that the structure of Indonesian exports is such that a relatively large proportion of products fall into categories subject to nontariff barriers. While the current effects of NTBs on export value cannot be unambiguously evaluated, the above finding indicates that the growth of a large part of Indonesian exports is not only dependent on market conditions but also on the decisions of importinig countries' governments as to the desirable levels of imports from Intdonesia. 16. Tables 4-6 provide more detailed estimates - by large product categories -- of the extent of NTBs. As is revealed by Table 4, with the exception of a few markets, Indonesian agricultural products face very high nontariff obstacles. Only in the US, Australia, (which however maintains very stringent health and sanitary requirements equivalent, in many cases to a prohibition), and some smaller markets, the extent of NTBs is small. In other countries -- including Japan, i.e. the largest market for Indonesian products -- NTBa cover from 117 to as much as 67% (Japan) of agricultural exports. 17. Indonesia is a signatory of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), an umbrella type agreement between exporters and importers which regulates international trade in textiles and clothing. Based on provisions of the MFA Indonesia has concluded four bilateral agreements - with the USA, EEC, Canada and Sweden -- involving quantitative limits to its exports, and one agreement -- with Norway - providing for the monitoring (the so-called "double checking"). An agreement with Finland is currently being negotiated. 18. In addition, Indonesian exports are subject to unilateral measures in countries which did not sign or do not apply the MFA. Thus, in Switzerland textile imports require (automatically issued) licenses; in Japan quota limits imports of silk; Finland monitors imports of all textiles of the type exported by Indonesia and Australia operates a system of tariff quotas which provides for relatively low duties for specified (yearly) amounts of textiles and clothing and very high, penalty, duties for imports in excess of these limits. 19. Table 5 shows that as the result of the above restrictions, the coverage and frequency NTB indices for textiles and clothing are particularly Tml 4 NON-TARIFF AMIER OF INUSTRIAL CORIES APPLTED(*) TO IWORT FE INDONESIA I. ACULtMTE (CCCN 0101-2402; TSA 10001-1934) 1g981 vUE oF 5 5 PFRON IVESIA N1B OF PMUT (TARIF POSTO) RM IIIIIA TOTAL PERCENT OF IIMPORTS COVERED BY NTIS TOTAL PERCENT OF PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO NTIS IMPORTER (US 8.000.000) OR + VER PRtCE CONTR. MONITORtIG ALL(i) (NUMBER) QR + VER PRICE CONTR. MOtNTORING ALL(t) UNTD.KINGDOM 52 8.9 7.9 0.0 9.t 58 5.1 8.6 0.0 10.3 NETHERLANDS 137 22.2 13.5 0.0 27.0 ItO 15.4 14.5 0.0 26.3 ITALY 75 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 35 0.0 11.4 0.0 14.2 tRELAND 2 20.9 0.0 0.0 26.9 8 12.5 0.0 0.0 12.5 GREECE 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 GERMANY 127 2.0 8.0 0.0 10.9 8t 4.9 4.9 0.0 9.8 fRANCE 67 0.4 41.7 0.1 41.9 43 2.3 6.9 4.8 11.6 DENMARK 32 45.3 0.0 0.0 45.3 31 3.2 0.0 0.0 3.2 BELGIUM+LUX 51 20.9 48.8 0.0 51.6 45 tt.t 8.8 0.0 15.5 EEC (TOTAL) 548 tt.7 t8.1 0.0 23.2 427 7.4 8.4 0.4 14.5 U.S.A. 257 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 88 t.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 SWITZERLAND 20 0.2 0.0 58.0 58.2 30 16.6 3.3 20.0 40.0 NORWAY 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Is 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 JAPAN 331 87.2 0.0 0.0 67.3 98 39.8 0.0 0.0 40.8 FINLAND I 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 AUSTRIA 8 57.g 0.0 0.0 87.5 33 3.0 3.0 0.0 6.0 AUSTRALIA 39 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 34 17.8 0.0 0.0 17.8 ALL ABOVE 1,206 24.1 7.2 0.9 30.4 722 11.8 5.2 1.1 17.0 () S TIN AS OF 30 JM 1984 (1) INCLUDES ALSO TRmIFF TYPE AS (I.E TARIFF QWUOAS AMD SEASUL TARFS). Source: World Bank and UNCTAD. TABLE 5: Textiles (cccu O001-G02; TSA 3t-ua90o00) 1981 VALUE OF ZIPORS FROM INDOIESIA ROUNDER OF PRtlUC (TARIFF POSMONS) FRM RIOESIA TOTAL PERCENT OF IMPORTS COVERED BY WTIS TOTAL PEROENT OF PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO NTIS IPORTER (US 6.000,000) QR + VER PRICE CORTR. MONITORING ALL(t) (NtuMER) OR + VER PRICE COWTR. NONITORING ALL(I) UNTO.RIN"DON 6 99.2 0.0 71.4 99.9 7? 40.5 0.0 64.9 97.4 NETHERLANDS 6 98.6 0.0 S1.3 98.6 76 90.7 0.0 ft.8 90.7 ITALY 4 96.6 0.0 0.0 98.7 el 79.0 0.0 0.0 60.2 IRELAND 0 97.1 0.0 92.4 97.t 7 85.7 0.0 71.4 e5.7 GREECE 0 5.2 0.0 0.0 5.2 5 00.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 OERMANY 14 08.3 0.0 0.0 98.3 102 83.3 0.0 0.0 63.3 FRANCE 7 99.9 0.0 81.6 99.9 57 98.4 0.0 24.5 96.4 DEoNARI 2 09.6 0.0 0.0 99.8 48 88.4 0.0 0.0 8S.4 BELGIUM+LUX t 99.3 0.0 58.7 99.3 30 93.3 0.0 t6.6 93.3 EEC (TOTAL) 40 97.5 0.0 25.0 97.S 483 85.7 0.0 17.t 86.8 U.S.A. 38 99.7 0.0 0.0 99.7 72 B8.8 0.0 0.0 88.8 SWITZERLAND 0 0.0 0.0 78.5 76.5 31 0.0 0.0 61.2 61.2 NORWAY 0 86.9 0.0 0.0 86.9 4 75.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 JAPAN 4 60.1 0.0 0.0 60.1 eS 4.8 0.0 0.0 4.6 FINLAND 0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 4 0.0 0.0 t00.0 100.0 AUSTRIA 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 t8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 AUSTRALIA IS 0.B 0.0 0.1 40.0 78 S.1 0.0 1.2 34.6 ALL ABOfE 97 82.4 0.0 14.4 88.8 7s5 64.6 0.0 14.1 72.5 (1) NCULUS ALSO TARIFF TPE EASS (M.E TARIF TMAS SEASON TARIFFS). Source: World Bank and UNCTAD. ( * * n CCC/TS * * *) TABLE 6: Other Manufactures 1901 YAMI W ISOF RTS MM I EIA NE O PRODUIS (TARIF P06ITION) FRUN INDONESIA TOTAL PERCENT OF IPPORTS COVERED SY NTBS TOTAL PERCENt or PRODUCTS SU80ECT TO NTSS IMPORTER (US 3.000.000) OR + VER PRICE CONTR. MNNITORING AtL(I) (NUMBER) QR * VER PRICE CONTTR. MONITORINO ALL(I) UNTO.KINGOON It? 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.3 I" 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 NETHERLANDS 42 0.0 0.0 0.0 t.B t54 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 ITALY t2t 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 14t 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.8 IRELAND I 0.0 0.0 0.0 59.0 I 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.8 cR1501 3 0.S 0.0 0.0 0.5 32 3.f 0.0 0.0 3.1 EiRMANY t04 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 176 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 FRANCE 76 4.6 0.0 11.8 18.6 102 6.8 0.0 4.0 ta.t OENAttR1 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.7 20 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 *ELGtUM#LUX 14 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 S5 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 SEO (TOTAL) 486 0.8 0.0 1.8 9.6 S22 0.9 0.0 0.7 3.6 U.S.A. 613 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 t98 3.5 0.0 1.5 4.5 SWITZERLAND 12 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 44 0.8 0.0 4.5 11.3 NORWAY 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 JAPAN 938 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 194 4.6 0.0 0.0 4.6 FINLAND t 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 I 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 AUSTRIA S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 AUSTRALIA 26 4.7 0.0 0.0 11.5 101 21.7 0.0 0.0 24.7 ALL ABOVE 2,084 0.2 0.0 0.4 2.4 1,423 3.4 0.0 0.7 6.4 (1) INCLUfh ALSO TARF TYPE I_ASI (I.E TArF 1DAS AM SABSAL TMIF). Source: World Bank and UNCTAD. FIGURE 1 The Utilization of the MFA Specific Quotas in the USA (1984) -8 E 984 (avg. u O8.2"} ~~c.I ES }as etd3 UdmTaNU.z 90 - > :