95570 SYSTEMSAPPROACHFORBETTEREDUCATIONRESULTS    SABER  WorkingPaperSeries   Number8July2014       WhatMattersMostfor  EngagingthePrivateSectorinEducation:   AFrameworkPaper                   TableofContents Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................... ....................3 AbouttheAuthors............................................................................................................................... ......................3 Abstract............................................................................................................................... ....................................... 5 Rationale............................................................................................................................... ..................................... 6 ............................................................................................................................... .............10 ConceptualFramework PolicyGoals............................................................................................................................... ...............................16 ‘Ž‹…›‰‘ƒŽͳǣ…‘—”ƒ‰‹‰‹‘˜ƒ–‹‘„›’”‘˜‹†‡”•....................................................................................... 16 ˜‹†‡…‡............................................................................................................................... ...........................17 †‹…ƒ–‘”•............................................................................................................................... .........................19 ‘Ž‹…›goalʹǣ ‘Ž†‹‰•…Š‘‘Ž•ƒ……‘—–ƒ„Ž‡...................................................................................................... 20 ˜‹†‡…‡............................................................................................................................... ...........................20 †‹…ƒ–‘”•............................................................................................................................... .........................22 ‘Ž‹…›‰‘ƒŽ͵ǣ’‘™‡”‹‰ƒŽŽ’ƒ”‡–•ǡ•–—†‡–•ǡƒ†…‘—‹–‹‡•.............................................................. 23 ˜‹†‡…‡............................................................................................................................... ...........................23 †‹…ƒ–‘”•............................................................................................................................... .........................25 ‘Ž‹…›‰‘ƒŽͶǣ”‘‘–‹‰†‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ•—’’Ž›................................................................................................... 25 ˜‹†‡…‡............................................................................................................................... ...........................26 †‹…ƒ–‘”•............................................................................................................................... .........................28 ............................................................................................... 29 ApplyingPolicyGoalstoFourTypesofEngagement SABERInstrumentandMethodology...................................................................................................................... 33 LimitationsandFutureWork............................................................................................................................... ....44 ............................................................................................................................... .................................45 Conclusion References............................................................................................................................... ................................47 Annex1:SABERͲEngagingthePrivateSectorRubrics............................................................................................. 54  2  Acknowledgements ThisframeworkpaperbenefitedfromthesupportoftheSABERͲEngagingthePrivateSectorcoreteamwhoseteam membersincludeHuseinAbdulͲHamid(SeniorEducationSpecialist,WorldBank),JohnAnderson(Economist,World Bank),RachelCooper(EducationConsultant,WorldBank),FahmaNur(EducationProgramAssistant,WorldBank), WennaPrice(EducationConsultant,WorldBank),andHugoWesley(EducationConsultant,WorldBank),inaddition totheauthors.TheteamalsowishestoacknowledgepreviousteammembersValentinMathieuFrancoisOlivryand AnnaͲMariaTammi.TheteamisgratefultoClaudiaCostin(SeniorDirector,EducationGlobalPractice,WorldBank), AmitDar(Director,EducationGlobalPractice,WorldBank),ElizabethKing(formerEducationDirector,WorldBank) for guidance and support. We would also like to thank our peer reviewers, April Harding (Lead Public Private Partnerships Specialist, World Bank) and Shobhana Sosale (Senior Operations Officer, World Bank). Valuable contributions to the paper and the program have been provided by Svava Lee Bjarnason (Principal Industry Specialist, International Finance Corporation), Angela Demas (Senior Education Specialist, World Bank), Juliana Guaqueta(AssociateIndustrySpecialist,InternationalFinanceCorporation),MohammedAliKhan(SeniorEducation Specialist,InternationalFinanceCorporation),HalseyRogers(LeadEconomist,WorldBank),MichelWelmond(Lead Education Specialist, World Bank), and Quentin Wodon (Education Adviser, World Bank). This paper and program wouldnotbepossiblewithoutourAdvisoryCouncil:CeciliaMariaVelez(FormerMinisterofEducation,Colombia, and Visiting Professor, Harvard University), Ruth Kagia (former Education Director and Country Director, World Bank),GeetaKingdon(Professor,InstituteofEducation,London),CarlBistany(President,SABISEducationSystems) and Miguel Luz (Former Education Undersecretary, Philippines, and President, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction). The team is grateful for the support of the Education Practice Managers and regional education staff.TheteamalsowishestoacknowledgethefinancialsupportandtechnicalcollaborationofferedbytheUnited Kingdom’sDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentthroughthePartnershipforEducationDevelopment.  Allremainingerrorsarethesoleresponsibilityoftheauthors. AbouttheAuthors DonaldBaumisanEducationConsultantintheEducationGlobalPracticeoftheWorldBankGroup.HeholdsaPhD fromtheUniversityofMinnesotainComparativeandInternationalEducation.HeworkswiththeSABERͲEngaging the Private Sector team and the Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund. He specializes in the economics of education, impact evaluation, and private approaches to education provision. His previous experience includes work for the Asian Development Bank, CARE International, the International Center for Research on Community Engagement, and the University of Minnesota. Mr. Baum’s publications include CrossͲnational impacts of publicͲprivate partnerships on equitable student achievement: A quasiͲexperimental assessment (2013) and Education service contractinginthePhilippines(2012). Laura Lewis is a Health and Education PPP Specialist at the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World BankGroup.Ms.LewisjoinedtheIFCfromtheEducationGlobalPracticeoftheWorldBank,wheresheworkedon theSABERͲEngagingthePrivateSectorteam,mappingtheroleofthenonͲstatesectorineducation,tobenchmark policyintent,implementation,anddialogueandtocatalogueprivateprovidersacrossSubͲSaharanAfricaandSouth Asia.LaurajoinedtheWorldBankGroupfromCfBTEducationTrustwhereshewasresponsibleforoverseeingthe education impact of their $200 million project portfolio. Prior to CfBT, she worked for McKinsey and Company in their Social Sector Practice. Ms. Lewis has provided strategic advice to multiple donors including ADB, DFAT and DFID as well as governments across the Middle East and North Africa and Asia Pacific. Her publications include Education Systems: Towards Leading Indicators Evidence from East Asia, World Bank (forthcoming); Engaging the PrivateSectorChapter7ofSABER:BenchmarkingEducationSystemsforResultsStrengtheningEducationQualityin 3  East Asia (2012); Impact Evaluation and Private Participation in Education (World Bank and CfBT, 2012); and A Framework for Engaging the Private Sector in Education (2011). She holds an MA in Economic Development and PolicyAnalysisfromtheUniversityofNottingham(U.K.). OniLuskͲStoverisanEducationSpecialistintheEducationGlobalPracticeoftheWorldBankGroup.Sheholdsan MA in International Comparative Education from Stanford University. She is the team leader for SABERͲEngaging the Private Sector and manages the Partnership for Education Development, a World BankͲUnited Kingdom Department for International Development partnership focusing on education resilience, school finance, teacher policies, workforce development and education markets for the poor. Ms. LuskͲStover is the World Bank representativetothegoverningcommitteeoftheUnitedNationsGirls'EducationInitiativeandisamemberofthe SABERͲEquity and Inclusion team, conducting research to address multiple sources of disadvantage in education. Previously she was a member on the World Bank Education Sector Strategy 2020: Learning for All team and facilitated the strategy consultation process in SubͲSaharan Africa and South Asia. She joined the World Bank in 2006andhassinceworkedonprojectsandresearchinitiativesinSubͲSaharanAfricaandSouthAsiainadditionto herworkintheKnowledgeandInnovationteamoftheEducationGlobalPractice. Harry Patrinos is the Education Practice Manager for East Asia and the Pacific in the Education Global Practice of the World Bank Group. He holds a DPhil from the University of Sussex (U.K.). He specializes in schoolͲbased management, impact evaluation and publicͲprivate partnerships. He managed the Benchmarking Education Systems for Results in East Asia, the role of nonͲstate provision in education, and equity and inclusion work programs. He also led the Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Development research program. In operations, he managed education programs in Mexico, Colombia and Argentina. His publications include Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Development (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Making Schools Work: New Evidence on Accountability Reforms (2011) and The Role and Impact of PublicͲPrivate Partnerships in Education (2009). Mr. Patrinos has many publications in academic and policy literature, with more than 60 journal articles. He has also worked in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and North America. He previously worked as an economist at the EconomicCouncilofCanada.HejoinedtheWorldBankin1992asanEconomistintheLatinAmericaRegion.Hehas sinceheldvariouspositionsinLatinAmericaandtheEducationGlobalPractice.   4  Abstract Thispaperprovidesanoverviewofwhatmattersmostforengagingtheprivatesectorinbasiceducation.Inmany countries,privateschoolseducateasubstantialandgrowingshareofthestudentpopulation.Thegoalofthispaper isnottoadvocateforprivateschooling,buttooutlinethemosteffectiveevidenceͲbasedpoliciesthatgovernments canusetoorientthesenonͲstateproviderstowardpromotinglearningforallchildrenandyouth.Thepapergrounds theprogram,theWorldBank’sSystemsApproachforBetterEducationResults–EngagingthePrivateSector(SABERͲ EPS),intheglobalevidencebaseanddiscussestheguidingprinciplesandtoolsforanalyzingcountrypolicychoices inlightofthisevidence. SABERͲEngaging the Private Sector (EPS) builds upon the framework for effective service delivery outlined in the WorldBank’sWorldDevelopmentReport2004,MakingServicesWorkforthePoor,aswellasintheWorldBank’s EducationSectorStrategy2020,LearningforAll.Aneducationsystemiscomposedofallthelearningopportunities thatareavailableinasociety—notonlythoseprovidedbygovernmentschools,butalsothoseofferedbyadiverse range of providers (government, communities, faithͲbased organizations, forͲprofit organizations, private institutions, nonͲgovernmental organizations) and funders (public and nonͲpublic). Because education is a human right and because it has social benefit beyond its private returns, governments must take responsibility for the outcomes of the entire education system, not only for the publicly provided services. SABERͲEPS is a guide for governmentsthatarecommittedtoimprovingservicedeliveryforallchildrenandyouthandhavedeterminedthat nonͲstateeducationprovidershavearoletoplayinachievingtheseefforts. Toassistcountriesinimprovingtheirpolicyframeworksforprivateeducation,SABERͲEPSanalyzesandbenchmarks four policy goals that, according to the global evidence, can strengthen provider accountability and promote learningforall.Thesepolicygoalsare:(1)encouraginginnovationbyproviders;(2)holdingschoolsaccountable;(3) empowering all parents, students, and communities; and (4) promoting diversity of supply. Each of these policy goalsisbenchmarkedacrossfourcommonmodelsofprivateservicedelivery:(a)independentprivateschools,(b) governmentͲfundedprivateschools,(c)privatelymanagedschools,and(d)voucherschools.Thepurposeisnotto encourage government uptake of any of these specific nonͲstate mechanisms, but simply to guide governments thatarecurrentlyutilizingthesenonͲstateprovisionapproachestowardseffectivepolicypractices.Forthisreason, initscountryͲlevelapplicationoftheframeworkandtools,SABERͲEPSassessesonlythemodesofprivatedelivery thatalreadyexistineachcountry.   5  Rationale Thestateisresponsibleforguaranteeingqualityeducationservicesforallchildren. The benefits of providing access to quality education services for a country’s citizens are widespread and wellͲ documented.Atanindividuallevel, education enhancespeople’s ability tosustainalivelihood,be betterparents, livehealthylives,makeinformeddecisions,andexercisetheirrights(WorldBank2011).Therightofeveryindividual to receive a quality education is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Nationally, education plays a critical role in creating responsible citizens, enhancing social cohesion, raising civic participation and environmental awareness, preparing skilled workers, promoting economic growth, and reducing poverty (World Bank 2011). These growth and development payoffs should give governments a strong rationale for providing equitable access to quality education for all childrenandyouth Throughout the world, governments are held responsible for ensuring the provision of quality basic education services. Public funding of education corrects the failure of the market to provide sufficient resources to education—animportantrole,asbasiceducationhasconsiderablesocialvaluebeyondthebenefittotheeducated individual.Publicfundingalsoexpandsaccesstothosewhocouldnototherwiseaffordaneducation(Commission on Growth and Development 2008). Thus, public education investment is necessary to protect both the rights of individualchildrenandyouthandtheinterestsofthenation. Despiteglobaleffortstoincreaseaccesstoeducation,57millionchildrenremainoutofschool. Concerted international effort, combined with effective education policies and sustained national investments in education,hasledtoconsiderablegrowthinaccesstoschoolingacrosstheglobe(WorldBank2011).Between1990 and 2011, the proportion of children in lowͲincome countries who completed primary school increased from 46 percent to 68 percent (World Bank 2013). During this same time period, the primary net enrollment rate in lowͲ incomecountriesincreasedfrom55percentto80percent(WorldBank2013).Globally,however,57millionchildren remainoutofschool;30millionofthosechildrenareinAfrica(UnitedNations2013). Learningremainsamajorchallenge. Despitethegrowthineducationalenrollmentaroundthedevelopingworld,manychildrenacquirelittleknowledge and few skills during their time in school. For example, in India roughly 47 percent of students in grade 5 were unable toreadagrade2text (Pratham 2010).AstudyinPerufoundthatonly halfofallstudentsingrade2could readatall(Crouch2006).OntheOECD’s2009ProgrammeforInternationalStudentAssessment(PISA),90percent of students in lowerͲmiddleͲincome developing countries and 73 percent of students in upperͲmiddleͲincome countriesfailedtoreachthethresholdofthemostbasicnumeracyskills(400points).InOECDcountries,bycontrast, only22percentofstudentsfailedtoreachthisthreshold.OfthesevenlowerͲmiddleͲincomenationstoparticipate in the 2011 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, all scored below the international mean in mathematics(Figure1).     6  Figure1.MathperformanceoflowerͲmiddleͲincomecountriesonTIMSS2011:standarddeviationsbelowinternational mean Yemen Ghana Honduras Indonesia Georgia Armenia Ukraine 0 Ͳ0.5 Ͳ1 Ͳ1.5 Ͳ2 Ͳ2.5  Source:Mullisetal.(2012) School access and quality are determined by student background characteristics, leading to inequitableeducationalopportunities. Inmanyplaces,schoolaccessandlearningarestilldrivenlargelybyfactorssuchashouseholdincome,geography, and gender. Rural girls, marginalized groups, students with disabilities, and students from poorer households are less likely to attend school (UNESCO 2013). For example, in Pakistan, students from the poorest 20 percent of families have, on average, 4 fewer years of schooling than students from the wealthiest 20 percent of families. In Malawi, students from the poorest 20 percent of families complete primary schooling at a rate of 42 percent, comparedto 98percentforthewealthieststudents. In Uganda,ruralstudents have,onaverage,2fewer yearsof schooling than their urban counterparts (World Bank 2013). Students from poorer households and students from rural communities are less likely to begin schooling and more likely to drop out. Overcoming these disparities will require targeted strategies. The highestͲperforming school systems in the world are able to provide high quality educationtoallstudents,regardlessoffamilybackground(OECD2010a). These challenges will not be solved by increasing resources alone; proper allocation of resourcesiscritical. Addressing the obstacles that keep governments from adequately providing education requires more than allocatingadditionalresourcestoeducation.Adequatefundingforeducationisimportant,butincreasedspending isnotstronglycorrelatedwithimprovementsincriticalschoolingoutcomessuchasstudentlearning.Forexample, the United States essentially doubled the amount it spent on education between 1970 and 2000 without any significant increase in student educational achievement (Hanushek 2006). Effective use of education resources hingesupontheincentivesandaccountabilitymechanismsthatexistbetweenthekeyactorsinthesystem(Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). Misallocation of resources for education is one problem common to many national funding strategies. Certain demographic groups, such as ethnic minorities and indigenous students, lowͲincome students, and girls, are disproportionately excluded from education opportunities, and these students therefore require a disproportionate share of resources and targeted policies to help them catch up to their classmates. Unfortunately, education funding in developing countries typically favors privileged social groups who are more likelytoobtainaccesstobasiceducationservicesevenwheneducationisostensiblyfree(UNESCO2013;Omwami andOmwami2010). 7  The private sector is playing an increasingly important role in expanding school enrollment forallstudents,includingtraditionallyunderservedchildrenandyouth. In recent years, the private sector in education–including a vibrant mix of forͲprofit, nonͲprofit and faithͲbased organizations–hasgrownsignificantlyaroundtheworld.Inthelasttwodecades,thepercentageofstudentsinlowͲ incomecountriesattendingprivateprimaryschoolsdoubled,from11to22percent(Figure2).Thisgrowthinprivate provisioniscloselyconnectedtotheboominaccessthathastakenplaceinlowͲincomenationsoverthepasttwo decades:primarynetenrollmentincreasedfrom55to80percentbetween1990and2010. Figure2.Privateenrollmentasapercentageoftotalprimaryenrollments,bycountryincomelevel LowͲincomecountries MiddleͲincomecountries HighͲincomecountries  Note:ForinformationontheWorldBankprocessofclassifyingeconomies,visitdata.worldbank.org/about/countryͲ classifications Source:WorldBank(2014)  ThegoalofSABERͲEPSisnottoadvancetheagendaoftheprivatesector,andtheanalyticalworkdoesnotsuggest that countries should transition from public to private service delivery. However, SABERͲEPS is premised on the evidence that, in many countries, private educators provide a significant contribution to education and that improved interaction between government and private schools is essential for increasing equity and quality. A census in Lagos State, Nigeria, found that 57 percent of all basic education students are educated in private institutions (Härmä 2011). In Pakistan and India, roughly 32 percent and 28 percent of basic education students attend private schools (World Bank 2013; Pratham 2012). While the share of private enrollments is not high in all countries,inmany,thenumberofstudentsinprivateschoolsissignificant.Inover70oftheworld’scountries,more than20percentofstudentsateithertheprimaryorsecondarylevelsattendprivateschools(WorldBank2013). Ascountries redouble theireffortstoachievelearningforallattheprimaryand,eventually,secondarylevels,the private sector will continue to provide a significant share of services. As such, it falls squarely within the public interest and responsibility of the state to ensure that all children–including those in both the public and private education sectors–are provided equitable access to quality education opportunities. Current research provides examples of many governments that have successfully improved education access and quality, by increasing oversightofandcooperationwithprivateeducationproviders(BarreraͲOsorioandRaju2011;FrenchandKingdon 2010;Patrinosetal.2009;BarreraͲOsorio2006).   8  The government must provide stewardship for the whole education system, which encompassesalllearningopportunitiesandprovidertypes. The traditional view of the education system, which views the government as the sole provider and funder of education services, is incomplete. An education system is composed of all the learning opportunities that are available in a society—not only those provided by government schools, but those offered by a diverse range of providers(government,community,faithͲbased,andforͲprofit)andfunders(publicandnonͲpublic)—andincludes allstakeholdersandbeneficiaries(teachers,administrators,employees,students,andtheirfamilies). Governments, therefore, are responsible for every student of schooling age within their borders and should be accountable for each student’s learning outcomes. This does not imply that the state need always be the direct provider and financier of all educational services. In many countries, governments have great success sharing the responsibilityofprovisionwithfaithͲbased,community,andforͲprofitorganizations,orevendirectlywithparents themselves (BarreraͲOsorio, Patrinos, and Wodon 2009). Box 1 provides a list of some of the major types of providersfoundaroundtheworld. Box1.Typesofeducationproviders Provider Example Governmentschool x Traditionalpublicschools FaithͲbasedschool x Islamic(madrasa)schoolsinBangladesh x FeyAlegríaschoolsinLatinAmerica NGOschool x BRACschoolsinBangladesh Communityschool x EDUCOschoolsinElSalvador Private,forͲprofitschool x BridgeacademiesinKenya x OmegaschoolsinGhana x BeaconhouseschoolsinSouth&EastAsia Formoredetailsontheeffectivenessofthesedifferenttypesofschools,pleaseseethefollowingsources:Asadullah,Chaudhury,& Dar(2009),Allcott&Ortega(2009),Hossain(2007),JimenezandSawada(2003),RanganandLee(2010),andStanfield(2012) This paper uses the terms ‘private’ and ‘nonͲstate’ interchangeably to refer to any school that is not operated, owned, and financed by the government. In some circles, the term ‘private’ is associated only with forͲprofit ventures. In both this paper and the World Bank’s work, the notion of a private provider moves beyond this forͲ profitconnotation.‘Private’denotesaserviceprovidedbyanynonͲstateentitywhichmayincludeanyofthenonͲ governmentproviderslistedinBox1above(forͲprofitandnonͲprofitorganizations,NGOs,faithͲbasedgroups,and community organizations). In a number of countries, forͲprofit schools constitute a minority of the private educationproviders.Forexample,70percentofprimaryschoolstudentsintheNetherlandsattendprivateschools, yetlessthanonepercentoftheseschoolsareforͲprofitorganizations(Hirsch2002).InZimbabwe,over85percent ofprimaryschoolstudentsattendnotͲforͲprofitnonͲgovernmentschools(GovernmentofZimbabwe2005).   9  In the large majority of cases, education systems include a combination of public and private providers, and the evidencedoesnotsuggestthatthereisanyuniquelyeffectivemixofthetwo.Instead,whatmattersmostiswhether governmentpoliciesgoverningthepublicandprivatesectorsenableeffectiveaccountabilityrelationships,establish relevantincentivesandpromotehighͲquality,equitableservicedelivery. SABERǦEPSwillimproveourunderstandingoftheprivatesector’sroleineducationandhelp governmentstoengagetheprivatesectormoreeffectivelytopromoteequitablelearningfor all. NonͲstateprovidersoffersubstantialcontributionstotheeducationeffortsofmanycountriesasdescribedabove. However,inmanycountries,theextentandactivityoftheprivatesectorineducationislargelyundocumentedand unknown.SABERͲEPSisworkingtohelpchangethat.SABERͲEPSassesseshowwellacountry’spoliciesareoriented toward ensuring that the services of nonͲstate providers promote learning for all. This paper outlines the most effectivepoliciesforgovernmentsthatchoosetoinvolvenonͲstateprovidersindeliveringbasiceducationservices. Ultimately,theresponsibilityfallsuponeverygovernmenttoensurethatthecountry’sobjectivesforschoolquality, equity,andaccessaremet,irrespectiveofserviceprovider. ConceptualFramework Effective service provision requires that providers be able to innovate and that they be held accountableforresults—intermsofaccess,quality,andequity. The World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report, Making Services Work for Poor People (World Bank 2003), outlinesananalyticalframeworkthatexplainsthecomponentsnecessarytoeffectivelydelivercriticalsocialservices suchashealthcareand education. The frameworkfocusesonthreegroupsofactors:(1) citizens,households,and communities; (2) central and local governments; and (3) state and nonͲstate service providers (schools), and the relationshipsandinteractionsthatshouldexistbetweenthemtocreateeffectivesystemsofservicedelivery(Figure 3). This framework suggests that to make services work for citizens, particularly the poor and marginalized, there mustexisteffectivechannelsofaccountabilitybetweencitizensandproviders,betweencitizensandpolicymakers, betweenpolicymakersandproviders,andthatthedifferenttypesofproviders—stateandnonͲstate—innovateto ensurethatthoseservicesmeettheneedsofallstudentsintheeducationsystem. In what the World Development Report (WDR) refers to as “the long route of accountability,” citizens are able to holdthestateaccountablebyusingtheirvoicethroughtheestablishedpoliticalprocess.Thestate,inturn,callsthe providers to account for their outputs/outcomes. As shown in Figure 3, this long route to accountability is a twoͲ stepprocess,requiringthestatetodemandhighqualityservicesonbehalfofitscitizens(throughchannelsofvoice andqualityassurance).Alternatively,theshortrouteofaccountabilityrequiresproviderstoanswerdirectlytotheir clients,thusincreasingtheclientpowerofcitizens.Whenaserviceiscompetitivelyprovidedandinformationonits quality is freely available, client power is strong, and this short route is sufficient to ensure satisfactory service delivery.  10  Figure3.Relationshipsofaccountabilityforsuccessfulservicedelivery  Source:AdaptedfromWorldBank2003  SABERǦEPS focuses on four policy goals that assess how effectively the government is engagingthenonǦstatesectorineducation,howeverthecountryhasdecidedtoengagethe nonǦstatesector. The framework, which is supported by findings from rigorous research and an analysis of the world’s topͲ performing and rapidly improving education systems, shows the importance of accountability relationships in establishingeffectivesystemsofservicedelivery(WorldBank2003;WorldBank2011;Bruns,Filmer,andPatrinos 2011; Patrinos et al. 2009). The most effective school systems in the world are those that are able to set appropriate incentives and strengthen accountability to deliver an education that gives young people the right jobͲmarketskillsandpreparesthemtoplayanactiveroleinsociety.  Theaimofthispaperisnottoadvocateaparticularapproachtodelivery,buttooutlinethemosteffectivepolicies for those governments seeking to strengthen service delivery by engaging with the private sector. SABERͲEPS assesses how well a country’s policies are oriented toward ensuring that the services of nonͲstate providers promotelearningforall. SABERͲEPSidentifiesfourpolicygoalsthat,accordingtoasurveyofevidencefromaroundtheworld,canstrengthen accountability mechanisms and improve education access and quality. The policy goals are: (1) encouraging innovationbyproviders;(2)holdingschoolsaccountable;(3)empoweringallparents,students,andcommunities; and (4) promoting diversity of supply (see Box 2). Each of these policy goals is benchmarked across four common models of private service delivery: (a) independent private schools, (b) governmentͲfunded private schools, (c) privatelymanagedschools,and(d)voucherschools.  11  Box2.Fourpolicygoalsarecrucialforensuringthattheprivatesectorpromoteslearningforall 1. Encouraging innovation by providers: Local 2. Holding schools accountable: If schools are decisionͲmaking and fiscal decentralization given autonomy over decisionͲmaking, they can improve school and student outcomes. must be held accountable for the outputs Most highͲachieving countries allow their theyproduce.Increasesinautonomyshould schools substantial autonomy over managing be accompanied by standards and resources, personnel, and educational interventions to increase access and content. Local school autonomy can improve improve quality. The state must hold all the power of the poor in determining how providers in the system accountable to the localschoolsoperate. samehighstandards. 3. Empowering all parents, students, and 4. Promotingdiversityofsupply:Byfacilitating communities: When parents and students market entry for a more diverse set of have access to information on the relative providers, governments can increase the qualityofschools,theyhavethepowertohold responsibility for results, as providers schools accountable and the voice with which subsequently become directly accountable to lobby governments for better quality tocitizensaswellastothestate. services.Forempowermenttoworkequitably, options for parents and students should not dependonwealthorstudentability.  Pursuing the four policy goals can help governments create effective service delivery mechanisms. The four policy goals allow the government to increase innovation and strengthen accountability between the critical actors in the education system (Figure 4). Empowering parents, students, and communities enhances the ability of parents to express their opinions and hold policymakers accountable for results. Additionally, when parents are empowered, their client power is increased, and they have greater direct influence over provider behaviors.Increasingschoolaccountabilitystrengthensthequalityandequityassurancemechanismsbetweenthe stateandproviders.Encouraginginnovationandpromotingdiversityofsupplyontheotherhand,allowproviders torespondtolocallybasedneeds.IncreasingschoolͲlevelautonomyovercriticaldecisionͲmakingwillimprovethe servicesprovidedtostudents.Allowingadiversesetofproviderstoenterthemarketwillincreaseclientpowerand enablecitizenstochoosefromawiderrangeofprovidermodels(seeFigure4).  12  Figure4.Fourpolicygoalsforimprovingrelationshipsofaccountability  Source:AdaptedfromWorldBank(2003) Thefirstthreeofthesepolicygoals–(1)encouraginginnovationbyproviders,(2)holdingschoolsaccountable,and (3) empowering all parents, students, and communities–are appropriate goals for any education system, whether or not the government is the primary service provider. The extent to which each is currently implemented varies widely,alongwiththequalityofservicedeliveryacrossnations.Insystemsofpredominantpublicprovision,when clientpowerisabsent,thestatemediatestherelationshipofaccountabilitybetweencitizensandproviders.When parents have no influence over school behavior directly, they must work through the political process to demand government regulatory action. In many education systems, this means that parents, students, and communities have a limited role in directly influencing what takes place in the schools. There are a number of ways by which governments can increase client power, and make schools more directly responsive to the needs of parents and students.Somegovernmenteducationprogramsallowparentstobemembersoflocalschoolcouncilsorparticipate in school inspections and planning processes. This enables parents and community members to influence change through schoolͲlevel decisionͲmaking and quality assurance procedures. Many of these approaches have been successfulinincreasingschoolaccountabilitytostakeholders(WorldBank2007). The fourth policy goal of promoting diversity of supply emphasizes strengthening client power by increasing the choiceoptionsthatparentsandstudentshaveamongeducationalproviders.Internationalevidencehasshownthat anincreaseinchoiceofschoolisaneffectiveapproachforincreasingclientpowerandimprovingresults.Promoting diversityofsupplycreatesvibrantcompetitionamongprivateprovidersthemselves.Governmentsmustalsoensure thatprivateprovisioninitselfdoesnotbecomeareplacementmonopoly.IntheNetherlands,thegovernmenthas incorporated a monopoly test as around 70 percent of student enrollments are private. An advisory committee reviews any mergers or local markets where monopoly power is questioned (Netherlands Merger Test 2011). As demonstrated in Figure 4, the existence of multiple providers from which citizens can choose their services strengthens the power of the clients, enabling them to hold their providers accountable for the processes and outputsoftheschool.Insuchascenario,whenaparentisunsatisfiedwithoneschool,shehasthepowertosend her child to another. This power can make both schools more directly responsive to the needs of the parent and 13  student.Byfacilitatingparticipationofamorediversesetofproviders,governmentscanincreasetheresponsibility forresults,asprovidersbecomedirectlyaccountabletocitizensfortheirresults. The emphasis put on each policy goal can vary between systems. For example, in Finland, the state is the predominant provider of education. The country has only 1.5 percent and 8.3 percent private enrollment at the primary and secondary levels and roughly 75 percent of secondary students attend schools as determined by geographiccatchmentareas(PõderandKerem2012).SchoolsandteachersinFinlandhavehighlevelsofautonomy over curriculum, assessment, and school management, and are held accountable for results by parents and communitieswhohavecloseinteractionwithschoolsandinfluenceoverprocesses(OECD2010b).Thismodelhas resulted in highͲquality services due to the accountability relationships between providers, policymakers, and clients.FinlandhasoneofthebestͲperformingschoolsystemsintheworld;ofthe65countriesassessedusingPISA 2009, Finland’s 15ͲyearͲold students were ranked 2nd, 3rd, and 6th in science, reading, and math achievement respectively. Finland achieves these strong results by fostering client power through parental involvement in the school and through more informal mechanisms of accountability rather than through inspections and high stakes studenttesting. In contrast, the Netherlands has an education system where over 70 percent of students are educated in private schools. Here, strong channels of client power are created through open school choice and a high degree of competition between schools; schools must produce desirable outcomes in order to retain their students. HighͲ performingschoolsreceiveaninfluxofstudentenrollments,whilelowͲperformingschoolssufferfromstudentflight (Koning and Van der Wiel 2010). This is accompanied by strong regulatory procedures such as school inspections and an emphasis on standardized tests. The Netherlands performs relatively well on international assessments, ranking11th,10th,and11thinscience,reading,andmathachievementoutof65countriesonthePISA2009.Finland and theNetherlandsdemonstrate the multiplewaysbywhichgovernments cansupporteffectiveservicedelivery by guaranteeing quality assurance, voice, and client power in the system to produce quality education results. Strong relationships of accountability can be developed between the key stakeholders by using either public or privateeducationservices. SABERǦEPSempowersgovernments,donors,andthepublicwithnewdataandinsightsforuse incraftingandimplementingeducationpoliciesthatengagetheprivatesector. TheSABERͲEPStoolallowscountriestosystematicallyevaluatehowwelltheirpolicyframeworksarealignedtoward achievingthesefourpolicygoals.SABERcollectsandanalysespolicydataoneducationsystemsaroundtheworld, usingglobalevidencetohighlightthepoliciesandinstitutionsthatmattermosttopromotelearningforallchildren and youth. This information is compiled in a comparative database where interested stakeholders can access detailed reports, background papers, and other resources that describe how different education systems engage with the private sector. The data and information generated by SABERͲEPS aims to support governments in engaging nonͲstate providers so that they can contribute to improving education results. The SABERͲEPS information is uploaded to the SABER website alongside the other SABER policy domains: www.worldbank.org/education/saberͲeps. Equipped with this information, governments can make better use of nonͲstateeducationinterventionstoimproveeducationqualityandaccessforallchildrenandyouth. TheSABERǦEPSframeworkisinformedbythecriticismsandfailuresofprivateeducationand includesmeasuresbywhichpolicycanbestprotecttheneedsofthevulnerable. Giventhesubstantialrolethattheprivatesectorplaysinmanyeducationsystems,itisnecessaryforgovernments toestablishpoliciesthatprotecttheinterestsandrightsofallchildren.However,whenconsideringprivatedelivery ofapublicgood,itiscriticaltoaddressandaccountforrisksandmarketfailuresthatmayinterferewiththepublic interest. Private involvement in education raises a number of legitimate concerns and any approach to private 14  engagement must account for these. The primary critiques surrounding private education provision include the following: (i) Private education exacerbates social inequities. Overall, the bulk of criticism levied against private education interventions addresses matters of social justice and inequality. This perspective does not claim that private education strategies are incapable of increasing school access or improving student performance,butthatthesestrategies,byandlarge,favorthemoreprivilegedsocialgroupsandperpetuate socialpowerrelations(Apple2001;Whittyetal.,1998;Ambler1994).AsnotedbyBonal(2004),“ratherthan being a strategy for fighting poverty, education seems to be a sphere in which the ravages of poverty are laid bare and made visible” (p. 658). Myriad empirical studies and essays substantiate the argument that private education services are often plagued by inequitable access (Waslander et al. 2010; Hsieh and Urquiola2006;SöderströmandUutsitalo,2010;Witteetal.,2008;Allen2007;FiskeandLadd2000).AwellͲ documented impediment to accessing private schools is poverty (Bangay and Latham 2012). For example, there is overwhelming demand for lowͲfee private schooling in India, but access to such schools is limited formanystudents(Härmä2009).AcrossPISA2000countries,increasedincomeinequalityisrelatedtolower participation in public schools (Croix and Doepke 2009). PISA 2009 shows that attendance in governmentͲ funded private schools is significantly associated with higher levels of student wealth (Baum 2013). GovernmentͲfundedprivateschoolsarealsomorelikelytobaseadmissionsonstudentwealthandprevious academicperformance.Iftheopportunitytoattendprivateschoolsisnotwidelyshared,expansionofthese serviceswillwidengapsbetweenadvantagedanddisadvantagedsocialgroups(Carnoy1998). (ii) Expansion of private education represents government abdication of its responsibility for education and continued World Bank support of freeͲmarket neoliberalism. Some scholars see increases in private educationasanattemptbythestatetoshiftresponsibilityforresultsandblameforeducationfailuresfrom itselftoprivateactors,schools,parents,andchildren(Apple2001).Inlinewiththisidea,somecriticsofthe World Bank’s approach to private education argue that the institution’s education policy is driven by a neoliberal ideological dogma (Klees 2012). Neoliberalism is founded on the idea that competitive free markets with minimal government intervention are the social institutions most capable of reaching the optimalsocialwelfareoutcomes(VlachouandChristou1999).Withinsuchaframework,thestatemaintains emphasis on liberalization, deregulation, privatization, market fundamentalism, and minimal intervention (Stiglitz,2003;Rose,2003).Inthecontextofeducation,thesingularpolicyobjectivethatfitsthisdescription is a pure education free market, that is, a universal voucher system with no government intervention (Friedman1997;Hoxby1996). (iii) The profit motive in education favors economic over academic interests. The concern that increasing private education provision will potentially turn the service into a commodity which is bought and traded rather than provided affordably to all is one of the primary concerns associated with private education (LewinandSayed2005;Gauri,2003).Asdiscussedabove,forͲprofitschoolsmakeuponlyaportionofwhat we consider to be ‘private’ education providers. The profit motive is absent from the operating models of many nonͲstate providers. With regard to private proprietors whose businesses depend upon making a profit,thereissomelegitimate concernthat interestsoffinancialviabilitydonotcoincidewithinterests of thepublicgood.Suchconcernsarealsocloselytiedtoworriesoffinancialcorruption. Whilethesecritiquesaretypicallycitedtoargueagainstexpansionofprivateeducation,theyalsodemonstratethe need for improved government policymaking for private education. For, as demonstrated by the current internationalcontextabove,theprivatesectorwillremainasubstantialcontributortolearningforalleffortsinthe future, and without proper oversight from government, these contributions will work less to serve the needs of thosemostinneed.ThispaperoutlinesanumberofprivateͲsectorͲfocusedpoliciesthatcanassistgovernmentsin this effort. The subsequent section outlines the SABERͲEPS policy goals. Within each of these goals are recommendedpoliciesthatwillassistgovernmentsincounteractingthekeyconcernsregardingprivateeducation. 15  This framework recommends that the state protect its public interests through strong state regulatory policies of accountability and quality assurance, which provide the government with ultimate control over educational outcomes. The framework offers protection for vulnerable groups by recommending targeted funding strategies (e.g. tax subsidies, scholarships, and cash transfers), limiting student fees in schools that receive public funding, and restrictingschooladmissionspracticesthatpromotecreamskimming.Anumberofdocumentedprivateeducation programshavebeensuccessfulinallowingpoorerfamiliestotakeadvantageofprivateeducationservices(Patrinos, 2002;Malik,2010;Uribeetal.2006;BarreraͲOsorio,2006). Rather than supporting a neoliberal approach of nonͲinterventionism, under the guidelines of the SABERͲEPS framework, the state assumes a strong role in ensuring accountability of both public and private providers. The occurring shift is not from state responsibility to market responsibility. Rather, the state shares responsibility for the delivery of education services and, in turn, strengthens its role in funding, enabling, regulating, and primarily ensuring that services are affordable, nonͲdiscriminatory, and accessible to all (LaRocque 2011). To consider the privatesectorasapossiblecontributortowardslearningforall,governmentsshoulddesignpoliciesandprograms thataddresstheserisksandpromoteinclusiveeducation. The conceptual framework discussed above naturally addresses the profit motive and potential corruption concerns.Withthecorrectpoliciesinplace–suggestedlaterinthispaper–allschoolproviders,whetherforͲprofitor notͲforͲprofit,becomeaccountabletoparentsandtothestate.Toaccomplishthis,recommendedpoliciesinclude (i) making information on the quality of services available to all families, with particular mind to vulnerable populations, and (ii) tying school admissions policies and quality outcomes to rewards and sanctions for schools. Theserelationshipsofaccountabilityenablethestateanditscitizenstodemandequitableandqualityservicesfrom allserviceproviders.Assuch,theprofitmotivebecomesinextricablylinkedtomotivesofqualityandaccessibility. To address issues of financial corruption, SABERͲEPS recommends policies requiring governmentͲfunded private schoolstoreportontheiruseofpublicmoney.Carefulconsiderationandimplementationofallofthesepoliciesby governments will lead to improved oversight of the private sector with outcomes that more equitably meet the needsofallstudents. PolicyGoals The SABERͲEPS four policy goals were identified through a review of rigorous research and an analysis of topͲ performing and rapidly improving education systems. This section outlines the international evidence for each of thepolicygoals.SABERͲEPSseekstoemphasizetheevidence,brokendownbykeyindicatorswithineachgoalthat willbeusedtoassessgovernmentengagementwiththecountry’snonͲstateproviders. Policygoal1:Encouraginginnovationbyproviders Local decisionͲmaking and fiscal decentralization can have positive effects on school and student outcomes. Most highͲachieving countries allow their schools substantial autonomy over managing resources,personnel,andeducationalcontent.Localschoolautonomycanimprovethepowerofthepoor indetermininghowschoolsoperate.  The highly particular and contextualized nature of education delivery necessitates decisionͲmaking at the school level.Inordertobeawareofandadapttochangingstudentneeds,schoolleadersrequireautonomyoverthemost criticalmanagerialdecisions.Schoolswithgreaterautonomycanuseittoimproveeducationqualityby(1)making selection decisions over education professionals; (2) adapting pay and conditions to reward highͲquality staff; (3) allocatingresourcesasdeemedappropriatebylocalschooldecisionͲmakingbodies;and(4)adjustingclassestofit 16  available school resources and student needs. NonͲstate schools receiving public funding often operate under differentautonomystructuresthantraditionalpublicschools.Bygrantingautonomytotheseschools,governments increase the potential for innovation. However, the effect of autonomy on student achievement is tied closely to the level of accountability for results. As such, by simultaneously enhancing policies of school autonomy and accountabilityfornonͲstateschools,governmentscanimprovethequalityofeducationservicedelivery. Evidence The methodologically rigorous studies assessing the impacts of local school autonomy on student learning outcomesgenerallyfindapositiverelationship(HanushekandWoessmann2010;Bruns,Filmer,andPatrinos2011). A number of studies find evidence that local autonomy for school leaders is associated with increased student achievement, as well as reduced student repetition and failure rates (King and Özler 2005; Jimenez and Sawada 2003;Gertler,Patrinos,andRubioͲCodina2012). In the case of communityͲmanaged schools, which are run by nonͲgovernment entities, increased levels of autonomy have been found to promote better use of teacher resources, higher rural coverage, increased student intake, and learning outcomes on par with traditional schools, even among poorer and more rural student populations(DiGropelloandMarshall2005).RigorousresearchonEDUCOcommunityschoolsinElSalvadorfinds positive impacts on rural access and student persistence (Jimenez and Sawada 2003). Parker’s (2005) impact evaluation of Nicaragua’s autonomous schools finds mixed results of the local autonomy effect on student math achievement. In Mexico’s AGE (Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar) school program, increased local decisionͲmaking decreased grade repetition and grade failure by 4 to 5 percent (Gertler, Patrinos, and RubioͲCodina 2012). This study found no impact of curricular or pedagogical choices on student achievement. Filmer and Eskeland (2002) findtheinteractionofschoolautonomyandparentalinvolvementinschoolsinArgentinatobepositivelyassociated with sixthͲ and seventhͲgrade math test scores; the effects are stronger among poorer schools and as strong for poorer children. Community management of schools in Nepal has been successful in reducing repetition and increasingschoolprogression,particularlyfordisadvantagedcastes(ChaudhuryandParajuli2009). Some streams of research have distinguished the types of school autonomy that seem to matter most for influencing student learning. King and Özler (2005) find that broad school autonomy in Nicaraguan public schools hasnoimpactonstudent achievement scores;however,schoolswithgreaterlevelsofautonomyspecificallyover teacher staffing, salaries, and incentives are more effective in positively impacting student performance. Higher levels of school autonomy over staffing were associated with improved student performance on the PISA 2003 (Woessmann et al. 2007), while school autonomy in delivering curriculum was positively related with student performanceonPISA2009(OECD2010c). Research evidence also supports giving schools autonomy over determination of class sizes and teacher qualifications.ClassͲsizepolicyregulationshavebeensupportedbymanygovernmentsseekingtoimprovestudent learning outcomes. The importance of school autonomy in determining class sizes has been debated in the literature. Perhaps the most consistent conclusion pertains to the cost of class size reductions, which finds the strategytobearelativelyexpensiveeducationintervention(Breweretal.1999;Yeh2009;NormoreandIlon2006). Regardingtheimpactofclasssizeonstudentlearning,thefindingsaremixed(Hoxby,2000;WoessmannandWest 2006; Angrist and Lavy 1999; Schanzenbach 2006; Jepsen and Rivkin 2009; Dobbie and Fryer 2011). Lazear (2001) findsthat therelationship between classsizeandstudentperformance dependsonthebehavior(ordiscipline)of thestudentsintheclass.ThelogicalimplicationisthattopͲdownclasssizerestrictionsarelimitedintheirstudent learning benefits, as student behavior cannot be adequately assessed and managed from a centralized policy standpoint. This,combinedwiththe highfinancialcostofsmallclassͲsizestrategiesand themixedeffectsofclass size on student achievement, leads to the conclusion that school autonomy over classͲsize decisionͲmaking is 17  perhaps a more important policy mechanism than systemͲwide classͲsize restrictions. A similar logical argument can be made for increasing school decisionͲmaking power with regard to teacher qualification standards. The substantialliteratureoneffectiveteachersgenerallydoesnotfindthatstandardmeasuresofteachercredentials– including years of experience (beyond the first few years of teaching), certification, and education–are associated with better student learning achievement (Goldhaber and Brewer 2000; Goldhaber and Anthony 2007; Hanushek 1997; Hedges et al. 1994; Dobbie and Fryer 2011). As such, it is preferable for schools to determine their own standardsforhiringteachersasopposedcentrallyimposedteacherqualificationstandards. Thereisalackofrigorousresearchintotheeffectsofautonomyoverschoolbudgetsonstudentachievement.For privateschoolsinparticular,greaterempiricalevidenceisneededtoseewhetherhigherlevelsofschoolautonomy overbudgetsimpactsstudentachievement.AstudythatusescrossͲcountrydatafromPISA2003findsthatprivately operated schools perform better when they are autonomous in formulating school budgets and making staffing decisions (Woessmann et al. 2009). MultiͲcountry research using crossͲsectional and panel data has found mixed resultsonthebenefitsofincreasinglevelsofbudgetautonomyforpublicschoolsandcombinedsamplesofpublic and private schools (Hanushek et al. 2013; OECD 2009; Fuchs and Woessmann 2007; Hanushek et al. 2010). Although there is little empirical evidence on the subject, conceptual reasoning offers some relevant guidance. When the state involves private parties in the delivery of educational services, it lessens its own role in direct provision,yethasthepotentialtoincreaseitsinfluenceinoversight,regulation,andqualityassurance(Patrinoset al.2009).Ifpolicystructuresareinplacetoholdprovidersaccountablefortheirresults,greaterlevelsofautonomy can be afforded to providers at lower risk than would apply to similarly autonomous public schools. Evidence supports the notion that, for private providers, higher levels of autonomy and accountability lead to improved student learning outcomes (Woessmann et al. 2007; Hanushek and Woessmann 2007). By raising school freedom over governance, budgeting, staffing, and other important decisions, schools can adapt processes and pursue strategicprioritiesthroughinnovationtoraisetheefficiencyandqualityofservices(LewisandPatrinos2011). The charter school model of private management in the United States has produced some successful student learningoutcomes,inpart,duetotheincreasedautonomygrantedtoschools.Charterschoolsarepubliclyfunded, but operate outside of the regulatory framework of traditional public schools. These schools are given increased levels of autonomy over their budgets, staffing, governance, and curriculum, among other things; in return, they aresubjecttoheightenedlevelsofaccountability.Althoughtheempiricalfindingsoftheimpactofcharterschools have been mixed on a macro level, a few highͲperforming models provide evidence of the potential impacts of increasedschoolautonomyoveroutcomes.InBoston,charterschoollotterywinnerswerefoundtoperformupto 0.4standarddeviationsbetterthancontrolgroupstudentsonEnglishandmathexams(Abdulkadirogluetal.2009). The Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) operates a network of 125 charter schools across the United States. An evaluation of 43 KIPP middle schools found an average estimated impact of 0.36 standard deviations in math (representing roughly 11 months of learning) (Tuttle et al. 2013). In addition, KIPP schools have had success increasing levels of student and parent satisfaction. Students attending the Promise Academy middle school in Harlem,NewYork,gain0.28and0.06standarddeviationsinmathandEnglishlearningeveryyearascomparedto analogous students in public schools. The implications of these results are substantial: black primary students attendingPromiseAcademyperformaswellastheirwhitecounterpartsinneighboringpublicschools(Dobbieand Fryer2011). However,notallcharterschoolsarefoundtobeeffective.Althoughrigorousresearchhasmoreoftenfoundpositive effects for charter schools (Betts and Tang 2008), some findings demonstrate nonͲsignificant and even negative effects of charter schools on student achievement. Evidence from North Carolina finds that students in charter schools experience smaller academic gains than they would have in traditional public schools (Bifulco and Ladd 2006).Arecentevaluationof36charterschoolsacross15statesintheUnitedStates,allofwhichutilizedrandom assignmentofstudents,foundnodifferencebetweencharterandpublicschoolsinimprovingmathorreadingtest scores,attendance,gradepromotion,orstudentconduct(Gleasonetal.2010). 18  The overall conclusion seems to be that, as in public schools, there is considerable heterogeneity in the quality of educationservicesprovidedamongstcharterschooloperators(CREDO2013;Furgesonetal.2012;Hanushek2007). Thereiscompellingevidencethatinsomelocations,grades,andsubjects,charterschoolssignificantlyoutperform traditional public schools, while in others, charter schools significantly underperform (Betts and Tang 2008). Perhaps more important than determining whether charter schools are “better or worse” than public schools is determiningwhycertaincharterschoolsseemtobeeffectiveandothersnot.Researchattemptingtobetterexplain thisheterogeneityhasshownthatinsomecasescharterschoolsproducepositiveresultsincombinationwithother schoolͲlevelpolicymeasuressuchasopenenrollment(Hanushek2007),dataͲdrivenassessment(DobbieandFryer 2011b),andschoolautonomyoverhumanresources(Abdulkadirogluetal.2011).However,theamountofresearch seeking to understanding the heterogeneity of performance across charter schools is still sparse. Future research canbeexpectedtoprovidegreaterunderstanding.Fornow,wecombinethebodiesofevidenceonautonomyfrom acrossallnonͲgovernmentschooltypes(includingcommunityandfaithͲbasednonͲprofitproviders,charterschools, independentschools,governmentͲfundedschoolsandvoucherschools)todevelopthecriticalindicatorsbywhich governmentscanbetterencourageinnovationbyproviders. Indicators As part of the effort towards targeting evidenceͲbased practice in education policymaking, the SABERͲEPS project not only identifies policy goals, but also identifies key indicators of whether the government is using policy levers that can help reach those goals. For example, the evidence cited above suggests that to encourage innovation by providers, governments should employ the policy levers listed in Table 1. In particular, innovation for effective provision requires that schools have autonomy over key decisions, such as human resources, resourcing at the classroomlevel,anddeliveryofthecurriculum. Table1.Policyindicators–Encouraginginnovationbyproviders PolicyGoal Indicators  x Teacherqualificationstandardsaresetattheschoollevel. Encouraginginnovation x Appointmentanddeploymentofteachersaredecidedattheschoollevel. byproviders x Teachersalarylevelsaresetattheschoollevel. x Dismissalsofteachersaredecidedattheschoollevel. x Howthecurriculumisdeliveredisdecidedattheschoollevel. x ClassͲsizedecisionsaremadeattheschoollevel. x Managementofoperatingbudgetsisconductedattheschoollevel. Granting autonomy to schools to support local decisionͲmaking is important for realizing the promise of private provision, but it alone will not ensure learning for all. Evidence suggests that the effect of autonomy on student achievement is tied closely to the level of accountability in the school system (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2009; Woessmannetal.2007;OECD2009).Thatis,forschoolautonomytohavethestrongestpositiveeffectonstudent performance, it must be accompanied by strong mechanisms of accountability. Local decisionͲmaking works best in contexts where schools are held accountable for their results (Hanushek et al. 2013). And in systems with low levelsofschoolaccountability,increasinglocalautonomymayactuallyhavenegativeimpactsonstudentoutcomes (Woessmann 2005). This underlines the need for government to balance its efforts between the four SABERͲEPS policygoalsandnottopursuetheminisolation.   19  Policygoal2:Holdingschoolsaccountable If schools are given autonomy over decisionͲmaking, they can be held accountable for the outputs they produce.Wheremoreprovidersexist,thestate can beassertiveinrequiringhigh performance.Increases in autonomy should be accompanied by standards and interventions to increase access and improve quality. The combination of increased levels of school autonomy and accountability has been found to positivelyimpactstudentperformance.  Research demonstrates that, for both public and private schools, the schoolͲlevel factor that contributes most significantly to student success is teacher quality—but in both sectors, schools find it challenging to ensure that students are taught well. During a year of schooling, students with a poor teacher typically master less than 50 percentofthecurriculum,whilestudentswithagoodteacheraverageoneyearofprogressionandthosewithgreat teachers can master the curriculum from 1.5 grade levels (Hanushek and Rivkin 2010). But while good teaching is essential,manysystemsdonothaveeffectivemechanismsinplacetoencourageit.Becauseitisdifficulttopredict teacher effectiveness at the time of hiring, schools need to have the autonomy to manage teachers effectively (Clotfelter et al. 2007; Hanushek 1997). In addition, high accountability standards for overall school performance arerequired toensurequalityoutputs.Raisingschoolaccountabilityrequiresstrengthening thequalityͲassurance mechanisms that are in place between the government and school providers. This entails setting standards for teacher and school academic outcomes. In cases where nonͲstate schools receive government funding, these resourcescanbetiedtoqualityassurancestandardstoensureaccountabilityforresults.Othereffectiveapproaches for raising accountability include school inspections and qualityͲassurance procedures, sanctions for underperformance,schoolmanagementandmonitoringofstudentoutcomes. Evidence In the United States, research across state, within states and within cities has shown that higher levels of accountabilityarepositivelyrelatedtohigherlevelsofstudentperformance.CrossͲstateresearchfromtheUnited Stateshasshownincreasedlevelsofschoolaccountability(asmeasuredbythepresenceofahighͲschoolexitexam; rewards for student achievement; and risk of principal transfer, loss of students, or reconstitution for underperformance) to be positively associated with student performance on the National Assessment of EducationalProgress(NAEP) (CarnoyandLoeb2002).Between1996and2000,stateswithhigherlevelsofschool accountabilityexperiencedconsiderablylargerscoregains,acrossallethnicgroups.Schoolswiththehighestlevels of accountability experienced test score gains over one standard deviation greater than the least accountable schools.Similarresultswerefoundby HanushekandRaymond(2005).Theyshowed that U.S.schoolswhichwere early adopters of accountability reforms and attached consequences to school performance such as monetary rewards and takeover threats, experienced more rapid gains in student achievement levels on the NAEP assessment. In Florida, sanction threats based on student performance had positive effects on elementary math scores (lasting through years 1 and 2 of secondary school) (Chiang 2009). Rockoff and Turner (2008) found that schools in New York City which received a low performance grade on a new accountability system significantly increasedstudentperformanceinbothEnglishandmathematics.  The charter school experience in the US shows the importance of pairing autonomy with accountability. As noted above,studentswhoattendedcharterschoolsinBostonafterwinningtheschoolͲentrylotteryperformed0.2and 0.4standarddeviationsbetterthancontrolgroupstudentsonEnglishandmathexams(Abdulkadirogluetal.2009). These schools operated under the traditional charter model of high autonomy/high accountability. By contrast, Bostonalsohad‘pilotschools’thatweregiventhesamelevelsofautonomyascharterschoolsbutwerenotsubject totherigorousaccountabilitystandardsappliedtocharters.StudentsintheselowͲaccountabilityschoolsperformed nobetterthanstudentsintraditionalpublicschools. 20  Research shows that standardized assessments are an effective accountability mechanism that increases student learning outcomes across multiple country contexts. Evidence from multiple international student assessments shows that students perform significantly, and in some cases substantially, better in education systems with externalexitexams.Theseresultsarefoundusingthe2000and2003PISAexam,the1995and1999TIMSSexams, andtheTIMSSͲrepeatexam(Woessmann2003;Bishop2006;Woessmann2001).Someresearchhasdemonstrated thatprivateschoolsinparticularbenefitfromexternalinspectionandperformancecomparisonswithotherschools (Woessmannetal.2007). Strong accountability systems consist of more than minimum standards; they also require mechanisms to continually improve school performance and supply transparent information to stakeholders. A review of quality assuranceandschoolmonitoringsystemsacrosseightAsianPacificcountriesfoundthatmostcountriesacrossthe region use minimum standards, although some go beyond this basic measure and effectively use accountability mechanisms to ensure continual improvement (Mok et al. 2003). The Office for Education Standards in Education (Ofsted)inEngland,theEducationReviewOfficeinNewZealand,andtheNationalInspectorateintheNetherlands haveallmovedtoariskͲbasedinspectionapproach,whichallowsschoolsperformingwellandcontinuallyimproving to face less frequent inspection, while schools performing below standard are inspected more frequently and rigorously(DutchInspectorateofEducation2013).Thisapproachreinforcestheaccountabilityrelationshipsattwo levels,providingautonomytohighperformersandtargetingaccountabilitytoschoolsingreatestneed.  An effective inspection process, including appropriate followͲup, can be an important means of school improvement. Inspection frameworks should outline strengths and weaknesses of schools and priorities for improvement.Improvementplanningcanfacilitatepositivechangeasaschoolstrivestodeliverbettereducational outcomesforallstudents.AneducationreforminBrazilthatrequiredschoolstodevelopaschoolplanhadpositive impactsonschoolmanagementpractices(Carnoyetal.2008).Schoolimprovementplanshavebeenanimportant piece of multiple successful education programs in developing countries (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). In particular, inclusion of parents in the development of school improvement plans can significantly increase their influence over school governance and student outcomes (see subsequent policy goal, ‘empowering all parents, students,andcommunities’,formoreevidenceonparentalinvolvement).Improvementplanstraditionallyoutline aschool’sgoals,itsstrategiestoachievethosegoals,andthepracticalactionablestepsneededtobetakenbyeach individualwithintheschool.(Schmoker&Marzano1999;Reeves2006;Collins2005).Changesattheschoollevel, however, will only occur when relationships in the school are also strengthened. School leaders must ensure that improvement plans are meaningful to all stakeholders and purposeful actions are taken throughout the school (Fullan2007).  For nonͲstate providers, when government funding (such as vouchers or subsidies to nonͲstate schools) is tied to accountabilitystandards,itcreatesanincentiveforschoolstoperformmoreefficiently(Patrinos2002).InBogotá, Colombia, for example, the government has been successful at increasing accountability for quality standards by allowingnonͲstateorganizationstomanagepublicschools.Thestatemandatescertainacademicrequirementsand holds schools accountable for poor performance, offering sanctions or even ending contracts for failure to reach determined standards (Patrinos 2002). The key here is the role of the state in ensuring quality by connecting performancestandardswithincentives.  AnotherexampleofaprogramthateffectivelylinksperformancestandardswithincentivesisthePunjabEducation Foundation’s Assisted Schools (FAS) program. The FAS program provides monthly perͲstudent cash subsidies and freetextbookstolowͲcostprivateschools.Theprogramgrewexponentiallyfrom8,573studentsand54schoolsin 2005toover1millionstudentsand3,000schoolsin2012.Participationintheprogramrequiresthatschoolsachieve aminimumstudentpassrateinasemiͲannualmultiͲsubjectexam–QualityAssuranceTest(QAT).AtleasttwoͲthirds oftestedstudentsmustscoreabove40percentontheQAT.Ifaschoolfailstoachievetheminimumpassrateon 21  two consecutive QATs, it is permanently disqualified for funding. A rigorous evaluation of the program found a positivecausalimpactofthethreatofprogramexpulsiononstudentlearning.Schoolsthreatenedwithlosingaccess tosubsidieswerenearlyalwayssuccessfulinraisingstudentscorestomeettheminimumpassrateonsubsequent exams—only 49 percent of schools in the study met the minimum pass rate in November 2007, but nearly 100 percentofthesesameschoolsmetitinMarch2008(BarreraͲOsorioandRaju2010).  Thisfindinghighlightstheimportanceoftheaccountabilityrelationshipbetweenthefinancierandtheproviderof schoolservices.Whenthestatetiesqualityassurancestandardstoeducationfinancing,itcanimprovethequality of educational outcomes from private providers. The FAS program is capitalizing on this accountability by continually raising the minimum pass rate requirement. Additionally, by comparing schools that were just above and just below the initial FAS entrance requirements, rigorous research has shown that the program improved school facilities, lowered teacherͲstudent ratios, and increased student learning, (BarreraͲOsorio and Raju 2011). TheFASprogramhasalsoincreasedtestscoresinmathandscienceby0.4and0.5standarddeviations. Indicators On average, students perform better in schools with higher levels of accountability to the state. A strong accountability system requires that government, parents, and educational professionals work together to raise outcomes.FornonͲstateeducationproviders,particularlythosereceivingfinancialsupport fromthegovernment, there are strong incentives in place for schools to meet the explicit and implicit accountability standards set by governmentsandparents.Assuch,thestatecanbeassertiveinrequiringhighperformance.Increasesinautonomy shouldbeaccompaniedbystandardsandinterventionstoincreaseaccessandimprovequalityofschooling.Raising school accountability requires increasing the quality and equity assurances that are in place between the governmentandschoolproviders.Thisentailssettingstandardschoolacademicoutcomesandprovidingaccessfor allstudentsregardlessofbackgroundcharacteristics. The government must ensure that children learn in schools and that the education they receive is of high quality. SABERͲEPS assesses multiple policy indicators to determine how well a country holds its private schools accountable.AlistofthekeyindicatorsisprovidedinTable2. Table2.Policyindicators–Holdingschoolsaccountable PolicyGoal Indicators  x Governmentsetsstandardsregardingwhatstudentsneedtolearn,includingdeadlines Holdingschools formeetingthesestandards. accountable x Students are required to take standardized examinations; results are disaggregated by school,socioeconomicstatus,gender,etc. x Schools are required to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continued funding. x Government or an external agency performs inspection of schools as determined by schoolneed. x Schoolsproduceschoolimprovementplans. x Schoolperformanceleadstorewardsandescalatingsanctions.  Overall, the results are compelling and show the importance of school accountability in increasing the quality of education services. However, central governments are not the only monitors of school performance. The wider economics literature on the importance of information for general product quality suggests that information disclosure has a strong influence over the quality of service delivery (Figlio and Loeb 2011). Students and parents 22  mustusetheiragencytoinfluenceprovidersandlocalgovernmentstoimproveservicedelivery(Bruns,Filmerand Patrinos2011).Thispolicygoalisoutlinedinthesubsequentsection. Policygoal3:Empoweringallparents,students,andcommunities Whenparentsandstudentshaveaccesstoinformationonrelativeschoolquality,theyhavethepowerto holdschoolsaccountableandthevoicetolobbygovernmentsforbetterqualityservices.Forempowerment toworkequitably,optionsforparentsandstudentsshouldnotdependonwealthorstudentability.  Empowering all parents, students, and communities forms a foundational piece of providing quality learning opportunities for all students. Poor and marginalized children and youth disproportionately lack access to quality educationservices.Toovercomethisobstacle,governmentsneedtousevariousmechanismstoincreaseproviders’ accountability to all clients and to underͲserved groups in particular. First, ensuring that information on school performance is made available and letting families respond to that information through open enrollment policies canbeapowerfulmeansofequalizingopportunities(WorldBank2011).Second,providerscangrantparentsmore directinfluenceoverwhattakesplaceintheschool.Forexample,parentsandstudentscanbeinvolvedintheschool inspection and school improvement planning processes. Third, ensuring that all students are afforded the same opportunitiessometimesrequiresredistributiveaction.Thegovernmentcanremovebarrierstoschoolaccess,such as tuition fees, additional parental contributions, and consideration of student academic performance in admissions. Such targeted actions can open up the private sector to marginalized groups. These meansͲtested approachesarecriticalifthenonͲstate sectoristoreduceinequalityineducationalaccessratherthanexacerbate it. Evidence Central governments ought not to be the only monitors of school performance. Parents are often best placed to monitorthedaytodayactivitiesofaschoolinordertoensureitmeetstheneedsofallstudentsinthecommunity. Empowering parents through increased information and supporting their understanding of school operations can leadtogreatertransparencyandenablethemtoinfluenceschoolqualitythroughboththeshortandlongroutesof accountability. To exercise their voice and client power effectively, parents need detailed, current information on schoolquality.Interventionswhich giveaccesstoschoolperformanceinformationhavehad significantimpactsin both developed and developing countries. In Punjab, Pakistan, an education initiative to provide school achievement results to parents, communities, and teachers raised student performance up to 0.15 standard deviations in both state and nonͲstate schools. Additionally, the program reduced fees in highͲquality private schools by 21 percent (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2008). A recent program in three Indian states, Uttar Pradesh, MadhyaPradesh,andKarnataka,increasedcommunityknowledgeabouttherolesandresponsibilitiesoftheschool oversight committee. The program had positive and significant impacts on student learning in all three states (Pandey, Goyal and Sundararaman 2009). A public information campaign in Uganda was effective in not only increasing student performance (by 0.4 standard deviations), but also in decreasing system corruption and improvingtheratebywhichgovernmentfundsreachedschools(from20to80percent)(Björkman2007;Reinikka andSvensson2005).InNewZealand,informationwasgiventoparentsandzoningremoved.Thisledtoparentsand students from Maori and Pacific Island backgrounds making considerable use of school choice following the governmentintervention(LaRocque2004).  Public information interventions do not always benefit families equally. Researchers have found, in some cases, thatopenschoolchoicebenefitsmiddleͲandhighͲincomestudentsastheyaremoreadeptatgatheringandusing 23  theinformationavailabletothem.IflowerͲincomefamiliesfacehighercostsofgatheringandinterpretingstatistics onacademicachievement,theymaychooseschoolsbasedoneasierͲtoͲdeterminecharacteristicssuchasproximity, insteadofschoolquality.However,byimprovingtheinformationthatisavailableonrelativequalityandincreasing its dissemination, private school initiatives can reach traditionally marginalized students and equalize educational opportunities between social groups (Hastings and Weinstein 2008). Governments must consider how to ensure thatlowerincomeanddisadvantagedgroupsareabletousetheinformation.TheSABERͲEPSframeworksuggests implementationofpolicythatprovidesaccurateinformationonschoolstoparents.Inparticular,emphasisisplaced onestablishingprogramsthatactivelydisseminatetheinformationtohardͲtoͲreachgroups.Evidencesuggeststhat in a number of the wellͲestablished school choice environments in the United States–Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Washington DC–small information gaps between lower and higher income families have enabled school choice policies to benefit poor and wealthy families quite evenly (Teske, Fitzpatrick, and Kaplan 2006). Some countries haveusedinformationcenterstotargetlowerͲincomeordisadvantagedgroups.  Increasedparentalinfluenceintheschoolisanothertoolthatcanbeusedtoimproveeducationalperformanceof schools and students. Evidence from a number of education initiatives documents the value of high parental involvementinschooldecisionͲmakingandqualityassuranceprocesses(SkoufiasandShapiro2006;KingandOzler 2005). In El Salvador, enhanced parent involvement in community schools diminished student absences and improvedlanguageachievement(JimenezandSawada1999).InMexico,whenparentsweremoreinvolvedinthe schooling process and were able to voice their opinions on school matters, grade repetition and grade failure fell by 4 to 5 percent (Gertler, Patrinos, and RubioͲCodina 2008). Di Gropello and Marshall (2005) likewise attribute a largeportionofthesuccessofcommunityͲmanagedschoolstotheinclusionofparentsonschoolcouncilsthathad real decisionͲmaking authority. It should be noted that these positive findings often result from programs which combine increased parental involvement with high levels of school autonomy. In Argentina, Eskeland and Filmer (2002)findtheinteractionofschoolautonomyandparentalinvolvementto be positively associatedwithstudent math achievement. Parents can be included in the workings of the school in many ways. Some of the more successful approaches for increasing client power include providing opportunities for parents to participate in schoolplanning,qualityreviewprocesses,schoolcouncils,andcommittees.Itisessentialthatparentshaveactual influenceoverthepracticesofkeyactorsintheschool.  Governments may also need to use financing to empower disadvantaged groups. Even when school choice programs are open to all students, lowͲincome families can fail to benefit as a result of tuition shortcomings, transportation problems, and lack of school space (Peterson, Campbell, and West 2002). As many private schools relyonstudentfeestofinanceschooloperations,governmentfundingshouldbeaimedtowardsthosefamilieswho cannotaffordtheschooling.AgrowingbodyofinternationalresearchsuggeststhatdemandͲsideinterventionssuch asscholarshipsorvouchers,cashtransfers,andabolitionofschoolfeescanhelpgovernmentsaddresseducational disadvantages and improve the opportunities of the most vulnerable (Orazem and King 2007; Filmer and Schady 2008; Lewis and Lockheed 2007; UNESCO 2010; Patrinos 2002). In Pakistan, the Punjab Education Foundation’s Education Voucher Scheme (EVS) targets vouchers to female students and students in urban slums and districts with thelowestliteracyandenrollmentrates.InthePhilippines,the EducationalServiceContractingprogramhas significantly expanded the opportunities for students to access secondary education services (Baum 2012). In Uganda, recent experience with the Universal Post Primary Education and Training (UPPET) program has substantiallyimprovedschoolaccessopportunitiesbyprovidingschoolfeesforlowͲincomestudents(Brans2013). In Bogotá, Colombia, privately managed schools that target lowͲincome students have been successful in raising studenttestscoresanddecreasingdropoutrates(BarreraͲOsorio2006).AColombianprogramthatofferedschool vouchers to lowͲincome families had positive impacts on student achievement and school completion (Angrist et al.2002).InIndia,thegovernmenthastakenactiontochanneltherapidgrowthofthenation’sprivateeducation sectortowardsupportingsocialgoals.In2010,itpassedtheRighttoEducationAct,whichrequiresprivateschools to reserve at least 25 percent of their seats for poor students to be funded by the state (Pal and Kingdon 2013). 24  OthersuccessfulapproacheshaveincludedconditionalcashͲtransfersorfamilytaxsubsidies(Fiszbein,Schady,and Ferreira2009).IntheNetherlands,wherethereisanationalvoucherpolicy,schoolchoiceleveragedsubstantially, with over 70 percent of students enrolled in nonͲstate schools. Families from across the income spectrum take advantage of school choice options (Koning and Van der Wiel 2010). DemandͲside interventions should be accompaniedbyprogramstoensurethatparentsaregiveninformationtoenablethemtocompareschoolquality andmakeinformedchoices. Indicators SABERͲEPSidentifiesseveralpolicyleversthatassistthestateinempoweringallparents,students,andcommunities to exercise client power and demand highͲquality services. The state can make access more equitable by disseminatinginformationonschoolqualityandensuringthataccessisnotrestrictedthroughselectiveadmission practices. This requires information that is comparable across schools and provided openly to all parents. Any financial support to the private sector must be accompanied by strong government accountability and allow informed parents to actively participate in their children’s education. Combining these efforts with interventions that provide information to hardͲtoͲreach groups is a priority for education policy, particularly within nonͲstate education initiatives. Additionally, by involving parents and students in the school planning and quality assurance processes,schoolaccountabilityandclientpowercanbeincreased.Thestatealsohasaroletoplayinensuringthat parental choice is not restricted by financial contributions, particularly for those schools receiving government funding.AlistofthekeyindicatorsisprovidedinTable3.  Table3.Policyindicators–Empoweringallparents,students,andcommunities PolicyGoal Indicators  x Information on results of standardized tests and school inspections is made available Empoweringallparents, frommultiplesources. students,and x Parents and students are included in the inspection and improvement planning communities processes. x Admission processes for entry into publicly funded schools are not based on student background;instead,alotteryisusedincasesofoversubscription. x SchoolchoiceisnothinderedbyrequirementsforadditionalmonetaryornonͲmonetary contributionsfromparents. x Tax subsidies, scholarships, or cash transfers are available to lowͲincome and disadvantagedfamiliesattendingindependentprivateschools.  In order to meet growing education challenges, different kinds of schools are needed to teach new skills in new ways(LeadbeaterandWong2010).Theseinnovationsmaycomefromimprovementstoexistingschoolmodelsor from newly emerging models. To support more diverse approaches, governments must ensure that these models areabletoexpandandnewtypesofprovisioncanflourish.Therefore,morediverseprovisionwillempowerparents andstudentsbyincreasingthenumberofprovidersfromwhichtheycanchoose. Policygoal4:Promotingdiversityofsupply By facilitating market entry for a more diverse set of providers, governments can increase the responsibility forresults,asproviderssubsequentlybecomedirectlyaccountabletocitizensaswellastothestate.  25  Educationalchoicecanbeusedeffectivelytoraiseschoolqualityandincreaseaccess.Byopeningchoiceoptionsto a more diverse set of providers, governments can increase client power and make providers directly accountable tostudentsandparentsforresults.Althoughthepublicsectorwillalwaysremainanimportant(andinmostcases thepredominant)providerofeducationservices,educationalchoicecanbeusedaspartofapackageofreformsto benefit the public sector (World Bank 2003) This policy goal focuses on the mechanisms that raise school choice options by encouraging new and varied providers to enter the market. Increased levels of competition can have positive effects on students in both public and private schools. Greater private school competitiveness has been shown to raise the quality of public schools as measured by educational attainment, wages and high school graduation rates of public school students. In order to facilitate quality improvements through increased school competition and choice, governments can allow multiple types of providers to operate; promote clear, open, affordable,andunrestrictivecertificationstandards;andmakegovernmentfunding(andotherincentives)available tononͲstateschools. Evidence The ability to create an education system that promotes diversity of supply among all providers regardless of ownershiptypedependsontheregulatoryenvironment.Therefore,thegovernmenthasaroletosupporttherights ofparentswhilesimultaneouslyensuringthatprivatemonopoliesarenotencouraged.Inseveralothersectors,the role of a monopoly is limited by antitrust legislation in order to increase competition and consumer power. Monopolies often result in higher costs and lower quality due to the lack of competition in the marketplace. Regulatory measures to encourage supply and avoid monopolistic power should include allowing all types of providerstooperate,providingaccesstoinformationonregistrationprocesses,settingcertificationstandardsthat are limited to criteria that are linked either to educational outcomes or health and safety, and ensuring that regulatoryfeesdonotprohibitentry.Forindependentprivateschools,thisincludesallowingthemtosettheirown feelevelswhileholdingthemaccountableforhighqualityoutcomes.Itisalsoimportanttocreateanequalplaying field in instances where the government is providing funding to private providers. This funding may include startͲ up costs, access to government land or unused buildings, and operational funding. Schools should also be made aware of how much funding they can expect from the government in order to help them plan accordingly. Promoting diversity of supply can increase choice for parents as long as the government provides stewardship of themarket.  There are two primary streams of empirical research that assess the impacts of increased school choice. The first stream seeks to estimate the effect of nonͲstate schools in raising the performance of their own students. Summarizing the results of five different school choice studies in the United States, Hoxby (2003b) found that students in New York, Washington D.C., Milwaukee, Michigan, and Arizona, who were free to choose between providers, and funded with a voucher from the government, experienced positive achievement gains. In a 2011 study,ForstersummarizestheschoolchoiceresearchthathasbeenperformedintheUnitedStatesusingrandom assignmentmethods.Ofthese10studies,6findapositiveimpactofvouchersonallparticipatingstudentgroups, 3 find positive impacts on some student groups, and 1 finds no significant impact. Lefebvre and Merrigan (2009) examinedprivatelycontractedschoolsinQuebec,Canada,andfoundthattheeffectofchangingfromapublicgrade school to a private high school increases the percentile rank of a student’s math score by between 0.13 to 0.35 standarddeviations.AttendingagovernmentͲfundedCatholicschoolinArgentinaandChile hasbeensignificantly associatedwithdecreasedgraderepetition(McEwan2002).Thehighcompetitionbetweenvoucherschoolsinthe Netherlands was positively linked to increased academic achievement (Patrinos 2011; Himmler 2007). Bravo, Mukhopadhyay,andTodd(2010)foundthattheChilevoucherreformincreasedthedemandforprivateschooling andincreasedsecondaryschoolattainmentandgraduationratesacrossallincomelevels.However,Contrerasand colleagues(2007)foundthat,aftercontrollingforselfͲselection,therewasnodifferencebetweenpublicandprivate schools. 26   InIndonesia,privatemanagementwasfoundtobemoreefficientthanpublicmanagementinachievingacademic quality (James, King, and Suryadi 1996). Additionally, private secondary school graduates in Indonesia performed betterinthelabormarketthanpublicgraduates(BediandGarg2000).InarecentstudyofIndianprivateschooling expansion, private school growth was found to cause increases in student enrollment and literacy rates (Kingdon andPal2013).In theColombianchoiceexperience, voucherstargeted tolowͲincomestudentsraisedstudent test scores, increased completion rates, and decreased repetition rates (Angrist et al., 2002). These findings underline thepotentialofeducationalchoicestrategiesthattargetservicestosomeofthemoredisadvantagedsocialgroups. Experiences from around the world have demonstrated effective use of targeted interventions that allow underserved populations to access education services, in both public and private schools. This is a significant consideration, given that universal school choice plans providing coverage to all students are less likely to benefit thepoor(CarnoyandMcEwan2003).  Asecondstreamofempiricalresearchinvestigatestheeffectofprivateschoolcompetitionontheperformanceof neighboringpublicschools,arguingthatcompetitiveincentivesforceneighboringschoolstoprovidemoreefficient andeffectiveservices(Friedman1997;ChubbandMoe1990).AmetaͲanalyticalreviewbyLevinandBelfield(2003) finds evidence from more than 200 tests in 25 separate studies that competition has a beneficial effect on the academic outcomes of students in public schools. The authors find that a 1 standard deviation increase in private school enrollments raises public school efficiency by 0.2 standard deviations. Increased competition arising from theexistenceofprivateschoolsinSwedenledtoimprovementsinthestandardsofpublicschools(Sandströmand Bergström 2005). De la Croix and Doepke (2009) find that, across countries, increases in private education are associated with an improved quality of public education, as public spending is concentrated on fewer students. Nannestad(2004)analyzedwhetherprivateschoolsinDenmarkimprovedthequalityoflocalmunicipalschoolsand foundnoevidencethattheirexistenceincreasedcompetition.  TheresearchsuggeststhatchoiceͲdrivenincentivescanhavepositiveimpactsonschoolproductivity(Hoxby2003a). Indeed,Hoxby(2003a)estimatesthatifallschoolsintheUnitedStatesweresubjecttohighlevelsofstudentchoice, school productivity could increase by as much as 28 percent. These choice effects apply to all types of providers, including traditional public schools, privately managed schools, voucher programs, nonͲprofit and forͲprofit providers.Whenitcomestoeffectivedeliveryofpublicgoods,ownershipissuesaregiventoomuchweight;what matters instead are the accountability structures and incentives (Besley and Ghatak 2003). These incentives are developedthroughopencompetitionbetweenproviders.Thus,itstandstoreasonthatprovidingspaceformultiple educationprovidersandincreasingschoolchoiceoptionswouldbeapositivemechanismforimprovingthequality ofschoolservices.  Given the positive, if not overwhelming, evidence suggesting that increased choice can improve the performance of school providers—both public and private—there are several methods by which governments can facilitate growth in the educational marketplace. The indicators within this policy goal are those that encourage new and varied providers to enter the market. Key mechanisms to enable growth of provider supply include limiting the restrictionsandcostsofschoolregistration,certification,andoperation;makingprocessesforregistrationclearand open; and even providing incentives, such as access to government facilities and land for nonͲstate providers. Information on the procedures required to enter the market should be freely available; this will help avoid regulatory capture and ensure that regulation benefits consumers by allowing them greater choice (Stigler 1971). Strictcertificationguidelinesandhighregistrationcostscandiscourageprivateprovidersfromoperatinglegallyor, insomecases,operatingatall (Härmä2011).Clear,open,andaffordable certificationrequirementscontributeto aneducationalenvironmentsupportiveofinnovationandchoice.Additionally,allowingmultipletypesofproviders (e.g.,faithͲbased,community,forͲprofit)todelivereducationservicesraisesthepotentialforadiverse,innovative educationmarket. 27   To best catalyze the power of school choice and competition, there are a number of ways by which government policy can facilitate rather than restrict growth of the education marketplace. School systems can benefit from allowing unaided or independent private schools to operate, potentially creating positive gains in efficiency and productivity. Allowing for the growth of unaided private schools helps governments improve the redistributive potential of the system, because government can then more easily target investments to poorer students (Hoxby 2003; Kingdon 1996). Where schools do not receive government funding, the market should determine the price (tuitionfee),andallowdifferentiatedschoolmodelstomeetthedemandsofindividualcitizens.Restrictingtuition feesorimposingcapsreducesincentivestoenterthemarketand mayactasamechanismforrationing(Nechyba 2009).Instead,thegovernmentcouldimposesanctionsonindependentprivateschoolsfornonͲperformance(see sectiononholdingschoolsaccountable).Thegovernment’smainroleistoensurethatprovidersareincentivizedto enterthemarketwhileensuringthatboththeshortandlongroutesofaccountabilityareinplace.  Governmentscanalsoencouragenewproviderstoentertheeducationfieldbyprovidingfundingtoprivateschools. Public funding of private schools has been shown, in some contexts, to improve student achievement. One crossͲ country assessment using PISA 2003 found that students in publicly funded private schools performed one grade level higher than students in publicly funded public schools (Woessmann 2006). Government support of private schoolshasalsobeenshowntobeawiseinvestment,asprivateschoolsareoftenmoreefficientlyrunthanschools inthetraditionalpublicsystem(Jimenezetal.1991;CarnoyandMcEwan2003).Ananalysisof65studiescomparing privatevs.publicschoolsaroundtheworldfoundthatprivateschoolsweregreatlymoreefficientthantheirpublic counterparts.(Coulson2009).Fullfinancialsupportofprivateschoolsincreasestheincentivesforproviderstoenter themarket. Undersuch models,thegovernmentshouldsimultaneouslyensurethatschoolsareheldaccountable forthelearningoutcomesofalltheirstudentsandalsosupportequitybyprovidingadditionalfundingforstudents withspecialeducationalneedsorfromdisadvantagedbackgrounds.  Privately managed (but publicly funded) schools are a relatively new type of private sector engagement. Their growth in the United States and Canada has varied widely across states/provinces in accordance with the legal frameworks that either facilitate or restrict their participation in providing education services (Stoddard and Corcoran 2007; Center for Education Reform 2012). The ease of the authorization process is a predictor of the number of charter schools in a state. Thus, restrictions on authorization, such as limits on school or student numbers, are policies that governments can avoid if they wish to increase innovation and supplier diversity in the market(Waslanderetal.2010;CenterforEducationReform2012). Indicators This policy goal aims to increase the ability for a diverse set of providers to enter the market to deliver education services.Ifthegovernmentwishestoincreasethediversityofsupply,itshouldallowvarioustypesofprovidersto operate schools. Requirements and costs associated with school registration, certification, and operation should notbeprohibitive.Processesforregistrationshouldbeclearandopenlyavailable.WheregovernmentfundsnonͲ stateschools,marketentryandexpansioncanbeencouragedthroughequalfundingofpublicandprivateschools, targetedfundingtomeetspecificstudentneeds,andprovisionofschoolbudgetplansinadvanceofthestartofthe academicyear.AlistofthekeyindicatorsisprovidedinTable4.   28  Table4.Policyindicators–Promotingdiversityofsupply PolicyGoal Indicators  x Governmentallowsdifferenttypesofproviderstooperateaschool(seeBox1). Promotingdiversityof x Certificationstandardsdonotprohibitentryintothemarket. supply x Informationonrequirementstoenterthemarketisavailablefrommultiplesources. x Regulatoryfeesdonotprohibitentryintothemarket. x Publiclyfundednonstateschoolsandpublicschoolsreceiveequivalentstudentfunding; fundingisincreasedtomeetspecificstudentneeds. x Government provides incentives for market entry such as access to startͲup funding, publiclandandpublicbuildings. x Schoolsreceiveinformationontheamountofpublicfundingtheywillreceivesixmonths beforethestartofacademicyear. x Governmentplacesnolimitsonthenumber,studentenrollment,orlocationofprivately managed schools Government does not restrict tuition levels at private independent schools. An education system is made up of a diverse set of players: government, communities, faithͲbased organizations, forͲprofitorganizations,privateinstitutions,andnonͲgovernmentalorganizations,amongothers.Thegovernment must ensure that this increasingly diverse group of providers supports learning for all. This will not be achieved simplythroughtheproliferationofnewmodels:thegovernmentmustplayastrongstewardshiprole,ensuringthat autonomy and accountability are balanced and that parents are empowered to make informed choices. It is also imperative that the government work to strengthen these policy goals in the context of the broader education system,astheprivatesectorisonlyoneofmanyimportantpiecesofasuccessfuleducationsystem. ApplyingPolicyGoalstoFourTypesofEngagement SABERǦEPS outlines the characteristics of the four most common types of private sector engagementandappliesthepolicygoalstoeachindividualtype. Across the world, governments can improve educational outcomes through numerous strategies to support nonͲ stateeducationprovision.Theseapproachesarebestutilizedbysupportingthefourpolicygoalsdiscussedabove. SABERͲEPSfocusesonthefourmostcommonschoolmodels(Table5)thatutilizedifferentcombinationsofpublic and private funding, ownership, and operation to maximize available education resources and strengthen the relationshipsofaccountabilityforqualityresults. Table5.Financingandprovisionofeducationservices Provision     Private Public  Private Independentprivateschools Userfees Homeschooling Studentloans  Tutoring Finance Public GovernmentͲfundedprivateschools Publicschools Privatelymanagedschools Voucherschools Source:Patrinosetal.2009 29  ThedifferencesbetweenthesefourtypesofprivatesectorengagementaresummarizedinTable6by(1)whether the school is publicly funded, (2) whether ownership is public or private, and (3) whether there is an implicit or explicit contract in place between the provider and either students or the government. The first school type, independent privateschools,areowned,operated,andfundedcompletelyseparatefromgovernment. Theother three school types—governmentͲfunded private schools, privately managed schools, and voucher schools—are operatedbyprivateproviders,butfinanced,tosomedegree,bythegovernment. Table6.Summaryoftypesofschoolprovision Typeofschoolprovision Publiclyfunded Ownership Contracted Independentprivateschools No Private Family GovernmentͲfundedprivateschools Yes Private Government Privatelymanagedschools Yes Government Government Voucherschools Yes Privateand/or Family Government Source:Patrinosetal.2009  1. Independent private schools. An independent private or nonͲstate school is one that operates completely separate from any government contracts, ownership, or finance. Independent private schools are owned and operated by nonͲgovernment entities, either forͲprofit or nonͲprofit. They most often receive their funding from a combination of sources such as private donations and student fees and are typically autonomous in that they act free from many of the public education system regulations. Independent private schools–either registered, unregistered, or both–are found around the world in virtuallyeverycountry.  2.GovernmentͲfundedprivateschools.ThisapproachtononͲstateengagemententailspaymentsfromthe government to schools that are owned and operated by nonͲgovernment providers. Funding can come in theformofdirectpayments,bursaries,grants,subsidies,ortransferofschoolresourcessuchastextbooks or technological equipment. Ideally, funding is outlined through a contract or legal eligibility standards. In somecases,privateschoolseitherenterintoaformalcontractormemorandumofunderstandingwiththe government, or meet established eligibility criteria to receive funding. These criteria can include, but are not limited to, factors such as (1) the amount of tuition charged to students, (2) school and student achievement outcomes, (3) classͲsize restrictions, (4) curricular standards, and (5) forͲprofit or nonͲprofit statusoftheschool.Inothercases,therearenorequirementsforfunding.  InGhana,thegovernmentsuppliesprivateschoolswithtextbookstohelpbolstertheresourcesavailableto allGhanaianstudentsregardlessofsector.Schoolsdonotneedtomeetanyparticularcriteriaforeligibility. The government of Uganda subsidizes 430 private secondary schools serving roughly 56,000 students as a meanstoattainuniversalsecondaryeducation.TheMinistryofEducationchoosestheparticipatingschools 30  andsignsamemorandumofunderstandingwithindividualprivateschoolstoensurethattheycomplywith the policy’s implementation guidelines, which include limitations on class size, standards for adequate student performance, and head teacher certification (Patrinos et al. 2009). As part of the Philippines’ Education Service Contracting program, the government pays private schools a specified sum for every enrolled student (Baum 2012). However, this program is not offered to all schools. In order to be eligible, schoolsmustchargelowfees,servelowͲincomefamilies,andpassacertificationprocess.  3.Privatelymanagedschools.Privatelymanagedschoolsarefundedbythegovernment.Schoolsareowned by the government, but managed by private entities. These types of schools are often granted more autonomyoverschoolͲleveldecisionͲmakingthanpublicschools,butareheldaccountabletoperformance benchmarksorotheroutputmeasures,usuallythroughacharteroracontract.  SomeexamplesofprivatemanagementschoolsincludecharterschoolsintheUnitedStatesandacademies in England, which are publicly funded and owned but are free to operate outside some of the traditional boundaries of the public sector, such as standardized curriculum, collective bargaining agreements, and geographical zoning (Dobbie and Fryer 2011; OECD 2004). Private management is also used in some countries for the purposes of school turnaround. In these instances, government transfers control of lowͲ performingpublicschoolsovertoprivatemanagementorganizationswiththeaimofrevitalizingthequality ofeducationprovided.Privatemanagementorganizationscanbesmallentitiesthatgovernasingleschool orlargechains.TheycanalsobenonͲprofitorforͲprofitorganizations.ExamplesincludeFeyAlegríainLatin America (Allcott and Ortega 2009), concession schools in Bogotá, Colombia (BarreraͲOsorio 2006), KIPP charterschoolsintheUnitedStates(Tuttleetal.2013),andtheNationalRuralSupportPrograminPakistan (Rasmussenetal.2007).  4.Voucherschools.Voucherprogramstypicallyaimtoincreaseparent/studentschoolchoice.Withinthese school programs, students can choose between available public and/or private schools. The government pays schools based on the number of enrolled students. Vouchers can be universal, which means that funding follows each student to the school of her choice, or can be targeted to specific student groups. Colombia’s PACES program provides vouchers only to lowͲincome students (Angrist et al. 2002). In the Netherlands, where universal vouchers are used, over 70 percent of students are educated in nonͲstate schools(Wolf2008).  Countries are using different types of private sector engagement to support learning for all. Inanumberofcountries—includingHongKong,Ireland,Chile,Spain,andDenmark—asignificantshareofstudents areeducatedingovernmentͲfundedprivateschools(OECD2011b).Koreaoffersanexampleofhowthiscanwork: thegovernmentactivelyengagestheprivatesectorwhilesimultaneouslyimprovingqualificationsandprofessional developmentofteachers.Inthestate’s“levellingpolicyforsecondaryeducation,”elementaryschoolgraduatesare randomly assigned to either public or private middle schools in their district of residence. Private schools are required to meet government requirements and are not allowed to charge tuition fees. As a result, 95 percent of private school costs—including costs of teachers and operations—are paid by the government. This engagement beganaspartofthewidereducationreformunderwhichthegovernmentconductedshortͲtermtrainingofallhigh school teachers, downsized unqualified and courseͲconflicted teachers, and operated a transfer system among publicschoolteacherswithinschoolsanddistricts(WorldBank2011).Thisexampleshowsthepotentialdistinction betweenfinanceandprovisionofnonͲstateservices,offersacaseofstateͲtoͲschoolaccountability,andexemplifies theprivatesector’spotentialroleinprovidingtargetededucationservices. 31  To illustrate the multiple ways by which countries employ different approaches to nonͲstate provision, Figure 5 chartsthepredominantapproachtoprivatesector engagement alongwiththepercentageofprivateenrollments for the OECD and its partner countries. There is wide variation across countries in the order and magnitude of approaches for nonͲstate provision. The Netherlands, Chile, and Dubai are the economies with the largest shares of private sector engagement. Finland has a small share of nonͲstate provision in the form of voucher schools. In Ireland,the churchisheavilyinvolvedinprovidingeducationbut the Irish Government considerstheseschoolsto bepublicschoolsandthereforeIrelandappearstohavelimitedengagementwiththeprivatesector.  Figure5:Typesofprivateengagementandpercentageofprivateprimaryenrollment (Selectedcountries)  Note:PrivateenrollmentsincludeanyschoolownedormanagedbyanNGO,church,tradeunion,business,orothernonͲ governmentinstitution. Source:Privateenrollment–WorldBank(2014);EngagementtypeͲauthors’estimates. ThepurposeofSABERͲEPSisnottoencouragegovernmentuptakeofanyofthesespecificnonͲstatemechanisms, but simply to inform the policy choices of governments that have decided to use these nonͲstate provision approaches. Note that SABERͲEPS addresses the role of nonͲstate providers in primary and secondary education services. The private sector also has a major role in providing early childhood education and higher education services;expandingresearchintheseareasshouldbeamatterofpriority.(SABER’sEarlyChildhoodEducationand WorkforceDevelopmentdomainsexploretheengagementoftheprivatesectorinthoseareas.) 32  SABERInstrumentandMethodology The SABERǦEPS diagnostic tool benchmarks education policies against evidenceǦbased globalstandardsandbestpractice,drawingontheframeworkpresentedabove.  TheEngagingthePrivateSector(EPS)toolispartofSABER(SystemsApproachforBetterEducationResults).SABER helps countries systematically examine and strengthen the performance of their education systems to achieve learning for all. The World Bank is working with partners around the world to develop diagnostic tools that benchmarkeducationpoliciesaccordingtoevidenceͲbasedglobalstandardsandbestpractice.Byleveragingglobal knowledge,SABERfillsagapintheavailabilityofpolicydata,informationandknowledgeonwhatmattersmostto improvethequalityofeducation. The indicators listed in the previous policy goal sections are a starting point for identifying the key features of effectiveservicedeliverysystems.Indicatorsareidentifiedbasedonacombinationofcriteria,including: x empiricalresearchonthecharacteristicsofeffectiveprivateengagement x experienceofhighͲperformingsystems x theoryorgeneralconsensusamongexpertsregardingeffectiveservicedelivery x rationalconnectionsbetweenpolicyevidenceandindicatorapplication SABERǦEPSusesastandardizedprotocoltobenchmarkeachcountry’spolicyintentbased onthepoliciesandlawsthatgovernthenonǦstatesector.  Thedata collection processincludesareviewoflawsandpolicies currentlyinplacetoregulatetheapproachesto nonͲstate provision. The SABERͲEPS team has developed a series of instruments to collect data on each country’s policiesacrossthefourpolicygoalsandindicators.Asoutlinedabove,SABERͲEPSaddressesfourdifferenttypesof private sector engagement. The process implements a separate data collection instrument for each private engagement type in the country. If a country has multiple types of private sector engagement, each is assessed separately. For example, in Chile, there are separate data collection and benchmarking procedures carried out in referenceto(1)independentprivateschoolsand(2)voucherschools,asthosearethetwoprivatesectordelivery approachescurrentlypermittedwithinthecountry’spolicies.Ifallformsofprivateengagementarefoundwithina country,thenfourseparatequestionnairesarecompleted(althoughexistenceofallfourengagementtypesinone country is uncommon). It is expected that most countries currently provide legal grounds for one to two forms of privateengagementandthatindependentprivateschoolsarethemostprevalentmodel.Astandardizedprotocol with key questions is used to determine the types of engagement within each country and administer the appropriatequestionnaires(seeBox4). 33  Box4.Protocolfordeterminingtypesofengagementandadministeringquestionnaires Dopoliciesallowspaceforthe Yes CompleteQuestionnaireon legaloperationofindependent IndependentPrivateSchools privateschools? Dopoliciesallowforthestateto CompleteQuestionnaireon providefundingtononͲ Yes GovernmentͲFundedPrivate governmentschools? Schools Dopoliciesallowforpublic CompleteQuestionnaireon schoolstobemanagedbynonͲ Yes PrivatelyManagedSchools governmentoperators? Dopoliciesallowforpublic CompleteQuestionnaireon fundingtofollowthestudentto Yes VoucherSchools theschoolofherchoice?  Thequestionnaireforeachtypeofprivatesectorengagementaddressesallfourpolicygoals,butincludes slight nuances to adapt the goals to the unique characteristics of each school model. Answers to the questionnaires are accompanied by the actual policy documents against which responses are verified.A point of emphasis here is that these tools only assess the official and established policies that govern private education provision. Additional tools are required to determine how faithfully these policies are being implemented in practice (in a separate effort, the World Bank’s Education Markets for the Poor teamwillbecarryingoutschoolͲlevelanalysesinasubsetofcountries).Educationpoliciesregardingthe private sector can be found in a range of documents such as national and local constitutions, education actsandlaws,memorandaofunderstanding,officialeducationpolicydocuments,schoolregulationsand inspection manuals, and education reform documents, among others. The official documents vary for each country. Once the policies and laws have been collected, the data are analyzed and scored using individual rubrics for each corresponding questionnaire. These rubrics allow for country policies to be scoredoneachpolicyindicator(seeTable7foradescriptionofallpolicygoalsandindicators).   34  Table7.SABERͲEPSpolicygoalsandindicators PolicyGoal Indicators  x Teacherqualificationstandardsaresetattheschoollevel. Encouraging x Appointmentanddeploymentofteachersaredecidedattheschoollevel. innovationby x Teachersalarylevelsaresetattheschoollevel. providers x Dismissalsofteachersaredecidedattheschoollevel. x Methodofcurriculumdeliveryisdecidedattheschoollevel. x ClassͲsizedecisionsaremadeattheschoollevel. x Managementofoperatingbudgetsisconductedattheschoollevel.  x Government sets standards regarding what students need to learn, including Holdingschools deadlinesformeetingthesestandards. accountable x Students are required to take standardized examinations; results are disaggregatedbyschool,socioeconomicstatus,gender,etc. x Schools are required to report on the use of public funds as a condition for continuedfunding. x Government or an external agency performs inspection of schools as determinedbyschoolneed. x Schoolsproduceschoolimprovementplans. x Schoolperformanceleadstorewardsandescalatingsanctions.  x Information on results of standardized tests and school inspections is made Empoweringall availablefrommultiplesources. parents,students, x Parentsandstudentsareincludedintheinspectionandimprovementplanning andcommunities processes. x Admission processes for entry into publicly funded schools are not based on studentbackground;instead,alotteryisusedincasesofoversubscription. x SchoolchoiceisnothinderedbyrequirementsforadditionalmonetaryornonͲ monetarycontributionsfromparents. x Tax subsidies, scholarships, or cash transfers are available to lowͲincome and disadvantagedfamiliesattendingindependentprivateschools.  x Governmentallowsdifferenttypesofproviderstooperateaschool(seeBox1). Promoting x Certificationstandardsdonotprohibitentryintothemarket. diversityofsupply x Information on requirements to enter the market is available from multiple sources. x Regulatoryfeesdonotprohibitentryintothemarket. x Publiclyfundednonstateschoolsandpublicschoolsreceiveequivalentstudent funding;fundingisincreasedtomeetspecificstudentneeds. x Government provides incentives for market entry such as access to startͲup funding,publiclandandpublicbuildings. x Schools receive information on the amount of public funding they will receive sixmonthsbeforethestartofacademicyear. x Governmentplacesnolimitsonthenumber,studentenrollment,orlocationof privately managed schools; government does not restrict tuition levels at privateindependentschools.  35  The data for each of the four types of private sector engagement is analyzed to identify a country’slevelofdevelopmentonafourǦpointscale.  As discussed previously, each policy goal consists of a set of key policy indicators. For each indicator, the country willbebenchmarkedintooneoffourlevelsofdevelopment:Latent,Emerging,Established,orAdvanced:  •Latentisthelowestperformancelevel,representinglimitedprivatesectorengagement •Emergingrepresentssomegoodpractice,withroomforimprovement •Establishedrepresentstheacceptableminimumstandardforengagement •Advancedrepresentstheidealorcurrentbestpracticeforprivatesectorengagement Thecountryteamorconsultantfirstcollectsinformationabouttheprivatesectorpoliciesinthecountry.Using therubrics,alevelofdevelopmentandscoreisassignedtotheindicatorswithineachpolicygoal: x Latent=1point x Emerging=2points x Established=3points x Advanced=4points Thescoreforeachpolicygoalisthencomputedbyaggregatingthescoresforeachofitsconstituentindicators. Forexample,ahypotheticalcountryreceivesthefollowingindicatorscoresforoneofitspolicygoals:IndicatorA= 2points;IndicatorB=3points;IndicatorC=4points;IndicatorD=4points.Thehypotheticalcountry’soverall scoreforthispolicygoalwouldbe:(3+4+2+3+4+4)/6=3.33.Theoverallscoreisconvertedintoafinal developmentlevelforthepolicygoal,basedonthefollowingscale: x Latent: 1.00–1.50 x Emerging: 1.51–2.50 x Established: 2.51–3.50 x Advanced: 3.51–4.00    36  Table8.Example:IndependentPrivateSchoolRubricͲEncouraginginnovationbyproviders DevelopmentLevels  Latent Emerging Established Advanced Teacher Centralgovernment Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolsetsits own Standards setsminimum governmentsets governmentsets teacherstandards standardsforteachers. minimumstandardsfor minimumstandardsfor withoutfinalreview teacherswithfinal teacherswithoutfinal fromcentral reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral authorities. authorities. authorities. Centralgovernment Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschool(school hasthelegalauthority governmenthasthe governmenthaslegal principal,school toappointanddeploy legalauthorityto authoritytoappoint council,parent Teacher teachers. appointanddeploy anddeployteachers associationetc.)has appointment teachers. withoutreviewby thelegalauthorityto anddeployment Appointmentsare centralauthorities. appointteachers subjecttofinalreview withoutreviewby bycentralauthorities. centralauthorities. Centralgovernment Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthe hasthelegalauthority governmenthasthe governmenthasthe legalauthorityto todetermineteacher legalauthorityto legalauthorityto determineteacher Teachersalaries salarylevels. determineteacher determineteacher salarylevelswithout salarylevelswithfinal salarylevelswithout reviewbycentral reviewbycentral reviewbycentral authorities. authorities. authorities. Centralgovernment Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthe hasthelegalauthority governmenthasthe governmenthasthe legalauthorityto Teacher todismissteachers. legalauthorityto legalauthorityto dismissteachers dismissal dismissteacherswith dismissteachers withoutreviewby finalreviewbycentral withoutreviewby centralauthorities. authorities. centralauthorities. Curriculum Centralgovernment Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschooldecides decideshowthe governmentdecides governmentdecides howthecurriculumis curriculumisdelivered. howthecurriculumis howthecurriculumis deliveredwithout deliveredwithfinal deliveredwithoutfinal reviewfromcentralor reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral regionalauthorities. authorities. authorities. Classroom Centralgovernment Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschooldecides resourcing decideshowresources governmentdecides governmentdecides howresourcesare areallocatedtothe howresourcesare howresourcesare allocatedtoclassrooms classroom. allocatedtoclassrooms allocatedtoclassrooms withoutreviewfrom withfinalreviewfrom withoutfinalreview centralorregional centralauthorities. fromcentral authorities. authorities.     37  Applying the SABER instrument and comparing countries can help governments make evidenceǦbasedpolicydecisions.  Through this process, countries will gain a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of their private sectorpolicies,inreferencetoeachpolicygoalandengagementtype.SABERͲEPSproducescountryreportswhich summarize the results of this benchmarking process and discuss the policy implications in connection with the country’sparticulareducationalcontext.TheSABERreportwillalsoincludepolicysuggestionstoguidecountriesin further developing nonͲstate provision or to act as a basis for inͲcountry conversation, which considers the policy optionsinlightofthenuancesofthelocalcontext.TheSABERtoolistobeusednotasprescriptivepolicybutrather asanassessmentofthecountrypoliciesbasedonthebestcurrentevidenceoneffectivepractices.Thisinformation is compiled in a comparative database where interested stakeholders can access detailed reports, background papers,andotherresourcesdescribinghowdifferenteducationsystemsengagewiththeprivatesector.  SABERͲEPS has already been applied in a number of countries around the world, including highͲ middleͲ and lowͲ income countries. Below, three country examples, the Netherlands, Chile and Thailand, are provided to demonstrate the application of the tools. These countries face distinct educational circumstances and exemplify widevariationinresourcesandinfrastructure.Allthreeusevouchersystemstodeliverbasiceducationservicesto aportionoftheirstudentpopulations;however,theeffectivenessoftheseinterventionsdiffersbycountry.These variationsprovideademonstrationoftheapplicationoftheSABERͲEPStoolsandpointoutsomeoftheimportant characteristicsofhighperformance.Adiscussionofthedifferencesandtheimplicationforpolicymakersisincluded afterthethreeexamples. Example1.Highincomecountry:VoucherschoolsintheNetherlands In the Netherlands, private schools account for approximately 70 percent of all enrollments. The Netherlands has oneofthelongestͲestablishednationalschoolchoicesystemsintheworld.Thecountryleveragestheprivatesector considerablymorethanotherOECDeconomiesbyusingavouchersystemtoprovidegovernmentfundingtoprivate schools.AlthoughallschoolsintheNetherlandsaregovernmentfunded,mostareadministeredbyprivateschool boards. It is evident that the Netherlands has a wellͲdeveloped policy environment for engaging the private sector in education(seeTable9).Thecountry’spoliciesencouraginginnovationbyprovidersforvoucherschoolsreceivean Advanced score; schools are not restricted to teaching the core curriculum and have the ability to tailor the curriculumtomeettheneedsofthespecificstudentstheyteach.Therearenorestrictionsonclasssize.Schoolsare also able to select teachers and set wage and salary increases. The country is also Advanced in regard to school accountability.SchoolsarerequiredtotakepartinstandardizedexamsandtheNationalInspectorateinspectsthe schools based on need. In empowering all parents, students, and communities, the Netherlands is Advanced. Parents in the Netherlands are able to compare quality of education in schools from a variety of sources. InformationhasbeenpubliclyavailablefromtheNationalInspectoratesince1998.Parentalchoiceisnotrestricted byvoluntarycontributions.Intermsofpromotingdiversityofsupply,voucherschoolsintheNetherlandsreceivea score of Advanced. The policy entitles private schools to the same equivalent funding as public schools. The government also increases funding to meet specific student needs. However, government funding is restricted to nonͲprofitproviders.  38  Table9.VoucherSchools:TheNetherlands Development PolicyGoal Description level Encouraginginnovation Schoolshavefreedomovercurriculaandareallowedautonomyto  byproviders managetheirhumanresources.Privateschoolsalsohavefullfiscal Advanced autonomyovertheirbudgets. €€€€ Holdingschools Minimumstandardsforstudentsareset.Thequalityassurance  accountable regimeisbasedonschoolneed,withinspectionscarriedoutbyan Advanced independentinspectorate. €€€€ Empoweringallparents, Choiceisnotrestrictedbyvoluntarycontributions;contributionsby  students,and parentsarenotallocatedtoindividualstudents.Parentshaveaccess communities toinformationtodecidebetweenschoolsonthebasisofquality. Advanced €€€€ Promotingdiversityof Equalfundingforpublicandprivateschoolsactivelyincreases  supply competition.Additionalfundingisavailableforstudentswithspecial educationalneeds.Schoolsareawareoffundingmorethanthree Advanced monthsinadvanceofthestartoftheacademicyear.Competitionis restrictedtononͲprofitorganizationsonly. €€€€ Source:WorldBank(2012a)  AccordingtotheSABERͲEPSbenchmarkingstandards,theNetherlandsexemplifiesinternationalbestpracticewith respecttoengagingtheprivatesector.Asdiscussedpreviouslyinthispaper,strongdevelopmentacrossallfourof these policy goals contribute to an education system capable of achieving learning for all. As a result, the Netherlands performs well in international student assessments, providing evidence that the framework works in creatingpositiveeducationaloutcomes. Example2.MiddleǦIncomeCountry:VoucherSchoolsinChile Chile,liketheNetherlands,alsousesavouchersystemtodelivereducationalservicestoalargenumberofstudents; privateschoolenrollmentrepresents55percentofallenrollments.Withinthissystem,governmentfundingfollows students to the public or private school of their choice. Some private schools choose not to participate in the program which means that they receive no government funding. Chile thus has both voucher schools and independentprivateschools,althoughonlytheresultsofthevoucherschoolpoliciesarereportedhere(seeTable 10). Chile’s laws call for an education system guided by several principles of apparent equal weight: universal access, quality, equity, autonomy, diversity, accountability, participation, flexibility, transparency, social inclusion and sustainability. Some of these principles are reflected in the funding formula used by the central government to allocatefundstothemunicipalitiesinthecaseofpublicschools,andtoprivateentitiesinthecaseofprivateschools. 39   Voucherschoolpoliciesin Chileare considered Establishedin termsofencouraging providerinnovation. Howthe curriculum is taught is up to the individual school. There are no restrictions on class size; however, no central funding is given after class sizes rise above 45 students. The government sets the minimum teacher salary but schoolscanchoosetosetwagesandsalaryincreasesabovethislevel.Chile’svoucherschoolpoliciesareAdvanced in terms of holding schools accountable. The government sets what students should know and by when and also sets minimum content areas. Mandatory examinations take place during 4th, 8th and 10th grade. A new Quality AssuranceAgencywillevaluateallschoolsandinspectlowperformingonesasmeasured bystandardizedtestsor iftheagencyreceivesarequestfromparents.SchoolsthatremainlowͲachievingafterfouryearswillbeclosed. Chile’svoucherschoolpoliciesareEmergingonthe‘empoweringparents,students,andcommunities’goal.Parents in Chile are able to compare quality of education in schools from a variety of sources and the Ministry also sends outletterstoparentsinformingthemoftheperformanceofschoolsintheirarea.Informationonstandardizedtests is available at the 4th, 8th and 10th grade levels. Parental choice is restricted by compulsory contributions in some schools, which prohibits certain students from fully exercising school choice. Similar monthly fees may also be collected by public secondary schools. However, the Chilean Government requires that 15 percent of all students are exempt from these monthly fees and schools are required to give scholarships. Secondary schools are also allowedtoselectstudents whichmeansthatschools donotprovideequalopportunities toallstudents.Selection is not permitted at the primary level by the General Law of Education (2009). Voucher schools are currently Establishedintermsofpromotingproviderdiversity.Voucherschoolsandtheirpublicschoolcounterpartsreceive equivalent per student funding. Additional funding is provided for disadvantaged students. However, the central government may provide additional resources to public schools for infrastructure and the local municipalities can give additional funds to public schools; therefore, public schools can receive higher funding than private voucher schools.Alltypesofownershipareallowedandschoolsareawareoffundingbeforethestartoftheacademicyear.   40  Table10.VoucherSchools:Chile Development PolicyGoal Description level Encouraginginnovationby Howthecurriculumistaughtisuptotheindividualschool.Thereis  providers norestrictiononclasssizebutnofundingisgiventoschoolsifclass Established sizerisesabove45.TheGovernmentsetstheminimumteacher €€€{ salarybutschoolscanchoosetosetwages/salaryincreasesabove thislevel. Holdingschools TheGovernmentsetswhatstudentsshouldknowandbywhenand  accountable alsosetsminimumcontentareas.Chileimposesminimumstandards, Advanced inspectsschoolsbasedonneed(thefrequencyofinspectionis €€€€ determinedbythecategorygiveninlastinspectionoristriggeredby aparentalcompliant).Schoolsmustalsoreporttothegovernment ontheiruseofpublicfinances. Empoweringallparents, Parentshaveaccesstoperformancedatatoallowthemtomake  students,andcommunities informeddecisionswhenchoosingbetweenschools;however,the Emerging choiceislimitedduetocompulsoryfinancialcontributions. €€{{ Secondaryschoolsarehowever,abletoselectstudentsbasedon academicperformance,whichmeansschoolsdonotactively competeforallstudents. Promotingdiversityof Privatevoucherschoolsreceivetheequivalentbaselinefundingas  supply theirpublicschoolcounterparts;howevertheMunicipalitycangive additionalfundingtopublicschools.Additionalfundingisprovided Established fordisadvantagedstudents. €€€{ Source:WorldBank(2012b)  According to the SABERͲEPS benchmarking standards, Chile demonstrates international best practice in terms of accountability and is working towards international best practice in the areas of encouraging innovation and promoting diversity of supply. However, the policies towards empowering all parents could be strengthened by removing selection at the secondary level and compulsory parental contributions. This would then help Chile to achievegreaterequityandmoreeffectivelyengagetheprivatesector. Example3.MiddleǦIncomeCountry:VoucherSchoolsinThailand TheprivatesectorplaysanimportantroleineducationinThailand,representing18percentoftotalenrollmentsat the primary school level and 17 percent of enrollments at the secondary level. Thailand, like many East Asian countries,hasindependentprivateschoolsthatreceivenofundingfromthegovernment.Thailand’sgovernment, however, also extensively funds private schools through a voucher system. Thailand’s policies towards voucher schoolsarediscussedhereforillustrativepurposes. Thailand is Emerging in terms of encouraging innovation by providers. Schools are restricted to teaching the core curriculum and have limited ability to tailor the curriculum to meet the needs of the specific students they teach. Theyarealsosubjecttorestrictionsonclasssize.ThailandisconsideredEstablishedinholdingschoolsaccountable. Schools are required to take part in OͲNET exams and the national inspectorate inspects the schools every five 41  years.ThepolicyisnotadvancedasThailandusesastandardterminspectionratherthanbasinginspectionsonthe gradeof the schoolat the lastinspection.Policiestowardsempowering parents,studentsand thecommunityare Emerging. The government provides information to parents on school performance; however, private voucher schoolsrequireallparentstocontributeadditionalfundingtotheschoolinorderfortheirchildtoattend.Schools arealsoabletoselectstudents.Intermsofpromotingdiversityofsupply,ThailandisEmerging.Currentpolicydoes not entitle private schools to the same equivalent funding as public schools. Voucher schools do not receive governmentfundinginatimelymanner,whichmakesplanningverydifficult. Table11.VoucherSchools:Thailand Development PolicyGoal Description level Encouraginginnovationby Thegovernmentsetsminimumstandardsforteachers.Schoolsare  providers allowedtoselectandrecruitteachersaswellasdecideontheirpay Emerging andconditions.However,schoolsarerestrictedbycurriculumand €€{{ resourcingofteacherstoclassrooms. Holdingschools SchoolsaresupervisedannuallybytheEducationServiceAreaand  accountable inspectedeveryfiveyearsbythenationalinspectorate.Studentsat Established bothprimaryandsecondarylevelarerequiredtotakeamandatory €€€{ exam.Schoolsarealsorequiredtoreporttothegovernmentasa conditionforthecontinuationoffunding. Empoweringallparents, Parentsareabletocompareschoolsintermsofqualitybuttheir  students,andcommunities choiceisrestrictedbycompulsorycontributions.Schoolsarealso Emerging allowedtosetadmissioncriteriatoselectstudents. €€{{ Promotingdiversityof Schoolsreceivelowerfundingthantheirpublicschoolcounterparts.  supply FundingfromtheGovernmentisnottimely,whichmakesplanning difficult.Theownershiptypeisalsorestricted Emerging €€{{ Source:WorldBank(2012c) Thailand has made substantial progress in improving education access and in outlining the need to improve education quality and student learning. The establishment of ONESQA and national ONET examinations has improved accountability. Voucher schools demonstrate Thailand’s commitment to using the private sector to increase educational outcomes. However, voucher schools are restricted as they receive less funding from the government when compared to their public school equivalents. They also require additional contributions from parentswhichmakesthemanoptiononlyformoreaffluentparents. Thebenchmarkingresultsreflectthequalityofprivatesectorengagement;researchevidence corroboratestheresultsforeachcountry. UsingthecountryexamplesoftheNetherlands,Chile,andThailand,theSABERͲEPSbenchmarkingprocesshasbeen outlined.Researchevidenceoneachcountry’sprivateeducationinitiativessupporttheconclusionsreachedonthe policygoals.  42  Chile meets the minimum standard (Established) on two of the policy goals (encouraging innovation by providers and promoting diversity of supply). In terms of holding schools accountable for results, Chile’s policies represent currentbestpracticeforprivatesectorengagement(Advanced).Thereissomeresearchevidencetosupportthese findings, suggesting positive student outcomes from the Chile voucher system. Bravo, Mukhopadhyay, and Todd (2010)foundthattheChilevoucherreformincreasedsecondaryschoolattainmentandgraduationratesacrossall incomelevels.Theevidenceintermsofschoolquality,however,isnotclearͲcut(HsiehandUrquiola2006;Carnoy and McEwan 2003). Contreras and colleagues (2007) found that, after controlling for selfͲselection, there was no differencebetweenpublicandprivateschoolstudentperformance.CleareristheimpactofChile’scurrentpolicies on parent and student empowerment (scored as Emerging according to SABERͲEPS). Due to the current private sector policies, one of the most significant difficulties that the Chile voucher system faces is providing equitable accesstoschoolservices.Thisissupportedbyalargebodyofempiricalliterature,whichfindsacademicsortingand socioeconomic segregation to be a hindrance to accessing the highest quality schools for many of Chile’s poorer studentpopulations(Elacqua2012;MizalaandTorche2012;CarnoyandMcEwan2003;HsiehandUrquiola2006). Unless Chile chooses to open access to voucher schools through regulations on school selection procedures and targetedfundingmechanisms,thesystemwillcontinuetoreinforcesocioeconomicstratification.  TheeducationsystemintheNetherlandsisfocusedoneffectivelyengagingtheprivatesectoracrossallfourpolicy goals. The nation, whose policies represent current best practice, has been successful at developing strong accountabilitymechanisms,facilitatingservicedeliveryinnovationandempoweringparentsthroughstatefunding andequitableaccess.Evidencesuggeststhatthisnationalvouchermodelhasimprovedstudentlearningoutcomes (Patrinos2011;Himmler2007)andsocialequity(KoningandVanderWiel2010). Thus,theSABERͲEPSbenchmarkingprocessdisplaysthepotentialbenefitsofeffectivelyengagingtheprivatesector acrossthesefourpolicygoals.   43  LimitationsandFutureWork The SABERͲEngaging the Private Sector framework builds on the evidence available to date. As mentioned throughoutthepaper,thereareseverallimitationsthatneedtobetakenintoaccountwhenusingthisframework. As new evidence emerges on what matters most for engaging the private sector, the framework will evolve to addresstheselimitations. Morerigorousevidenceisneeded. Thenumberofrigorousimpactevaluationsontheroleoftheprivatesectorhasbeensteadilyincreasingoverrecent years.Donors,foundationsandgovernmentsareinvestinginmorerigorousresearch.Theseinvestmentshaveled toseveralnewinitiativesaimedatexpandingtheglobalknowledgebaseonwhatworks.TheWorldBank’sStrategic Impact Evaluation Fund (SIEF) focuses, in part, on the impact of lowͲcost private schools. University research centers, such as the Education Innovation Lab or the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, which specialize in rigorousimpactevaluations,arealsoinvestigatingthenonͲstatesector’simpactinimprovingeducationoutcomes in various settings. This growing body of evidence will help fill knowledge gaps and provide evidence on how to designprivatesectorengagementpoliciesthatcanimprovelearningforall. SABERǦEPS benchmarks current policies; in the future, the initiative will also assess policy implementationanddialoguebetweenthegovernmentandkeyprivatesectoractors. TheSABERͲEPSframeworkfocusesonpolicyintentandfillsagapinourunderstandingofcurrentpolicies.However, policiesinpracticemaydifferquitesubstantiallyfrompoliciesasoriginallydesigned,duetothepoliticaleconomy ofthereformprocessandinstitutionalconstraints,amongotherreasons.Inthefuture,SABERͲEPSwillexplorethe role of both policy implementation and dialogue in supporting the policy goals. This will provide a more comprehensivepictureandensurethatevidenceͲbasedpoliciesareimplementedeffectively. ThenumberofcountriesparticipatinginSABERǦEPSneedstoexpandtoallowresearchersto determinethelinkbetweenEPSpolicygoalsandeducationaloutcomes. Currently,regionalstudiesonprivatesectorengagementinSubͲSaharanAfricaandSouthAsiaarebeingconducted. This expanded data set of countries or jurisdictions will allow more thorough analysis, through which EPS policy goalsandsubͲindicatorsarelinkedtostudentoutcomes.Itwillalsoallowresearcherstoanalyze thecombination ofsubͲindicatorswhichmattermostforeffectiveengagement. SABERǦEPS is one piece in a systems approach explaining successful education practices; linkagesandinterdependenciesbetweenthedifferentSABERdomainswillbeexplored. Theframeworkdoesnotcurrentlyaddresshowpoliciesforengagingtheprivatesectorinteractwithotherpolicies inaneducationsystem.SABERͲEPSispartofSABER,alargerinitiativethatcollectsinformationonseveraldomains of an education system, including student assessment, school finance, education management and information systems, equity and inclusion, school autonomy and accountability, teachers, early childhood education, tertiary education, workforce development, information and communication technologies, and school health and feeding initiatives. As information on the policies in other domains becomes available, SABERͲEPS expects to analyze the interactionsbetweenthepolicyfortheprivatesectorandotherdomains/subͲsystems.  44  Conclusion Countries around the world are trying to leverage the private sector to achieve learning for all. An education system includes the full range of learning opportunities available in a country, whether they are provided by the public or private sector (including faith based, nonprofit, and forͲprofit organizations). As the government’smainresponsibilityisstewardshipofthesystem,itisaccountableforthelearningoutcomesofeach andeverystudent.Thisdoesnotrequirethestatetoalwaysbethedirectproviderandfinancierofalleducational services; in many countries, governments are leveraging the nonͲstate sector. SABERͲEPS provides an evidenceͲ based framework to evaluate the effectiveness of current government policies for engaging the private sector. SABERͲEPSoffersindividualtoolstoguidegovernmentstowardseffectiveengagementwithfourmodelsofprivate provision: private independent schools, governmentͲfunded private schools, privately managed schools, and vouchers. The four SABERǦEPS policy goals outline how the government can effectively engage the privatesectortosupportlearning. The four policy goals support education system innovation across a diverse set of learning environments, while ensuring that education provision meets student needs and responds to societal demands. First, empowering parents, students, and communities enhances the ability of citizens to express their voice and increase client power, thus holding policymakers and school providers accountable for results. Second, holding schools accountable strengthens the quality assurance mechanisms between the state and providers. Third, encouraging innovationbyprovidersincreasesschoolͲlevelautonomyovercriticaldecisionͲmaking,allowingproviderstoadapt andimprovetheservicesprovidedtostudents.Fourth,promotingdiversityofsupplyensuresthatdifferenttypes of providers can enter the market and clients are able to choose from a diverse set of learning environments. Ensuring that these policy goals are met can strengthen the education system’s accountability mechanisms and supportimprovededucationoutcomes. While all systems have a mechanism for ensuring each of the four policy goals, the relative importanceofeachmaydifferdependingonthecountrycontext. Both Finland and the Netherlands perform well on international assessments of student performance and ensure equitywithintheirsystems.However,theemphasiseachcountryplacesonthefourpolicygoalsdiffers.InFinland, the emphasis is on (i) encouraging innovation by providers (this is achieved through high levels of autonomy over curriculum, classroom based assessment, and school management) and (ii) empowering parents to positively influence school quality through close interactions with schools. In contrast, the Netherlands places a strong emphasis on (i) holding schools accountable through standardized tests and riskͲbased school inspections, (ii) promotingdiversityofsupplythroughequalfundingofpublicandprivateschools,and(iii)empoweringparentsby providing information on school quality to ensure parents make informed choices. These examples show the multiplepathsbywhichcountriescanfacilitatehighlearningoutcomes.Engagementwiththeprivatesectorisone means by which governments can meet the needs of the country context. Where the private sector contributes towardsbasiceducationprovision,thefourpolicygoalsareusedtoguideeffectivepolicymaking. TheSABERǦEPSframeworkwillcontinuetoevolveastheevidencebasegrows. The SABERͲEPS framework has evolved since its inception and is expected to evolve further as new evidence emerges on what matters most for effective private sector engagement. Growing evidence from rigorous impact evaluationsandincreasingcountryparticipationinSABERͲEPSwillallowforabetterassessmentoftherelationship 45  between policy design and learning outcomes. This will lead to the refinement of the SABERͲEPS indicators. 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WorldBank.2012a.SABERNetherlandsCountryReport.Washington,DC. WorldBank.2012b.SABERChileCountryReport.Washington,DC. WorldBank.2012c.SABERThailandCountryReport.Washington,DC. WorldBank.2013.EdStats:www.worldbank.org/education/edstats Yeh,S.2009.“Classsizereductionorrapidformativeassessment?AcomparisonofcostͲeffectiveness.”Educational ResearchReview,4(1):7Ͳ15. 53  Annex1:SABERͲEngagingthePrivateSectorRubrics PrivateIndependentSchools PolicyGoal Indicator Latent Emerging Established Advanced Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhaslegal legalauthoritytoset governmenthaslegal governmenthaslegal authoritytosetitsown Teacher minimumstandardsfor authoritytosetminimum authoritytosetminimum teacherstandards standards teachers. standardsforteacherswith standardsforteacherswithout withoutfinalreviewfrom finalreviewfromcentral finalreviewfromcentral centralauthorities. authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschool(school thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthelegal governmenthaslegal principal,schoolcouncil, Teacher appointanddeploy authoritytoappointand authoritytoappointand parentassociationetc.) appointment teachers. deployteachers. deployteacherswithout hasthelegalauthorityto and Appointmentsaresubject reviewbycentralauthorities. appointteacherswithout deployment tofinalreviewbycentral reviewbycentral authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal Encouraging thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthelegal governmenthasthelegal authoritytodetermine innovation Teacher determineteacher authoritytodetermine authoritytodetermine teachersalarylevels byproviders salary salarylevels. teachersalarylevelswith teachersalarylevelswithout withoutreviewbycentral finalreviewbycentral reviewbycentralauthorities. authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthelegal governmenthasthelegal authoritytodismiss Teacher dismissteachers. authoritytodismiss authoritytodismissteachers teacherswithoutreview dismissal teacherswithfinalreview withoutreviewbycentral bycentralauthorities. bycentralauthorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthelegal governmenthasthelegal authorityoverhowthe Curriculum howthecurriculumis authorityoverhowthe authorityoverhowthe curriculumisdelivered delivery delivered. curriculumisdeliveredwith curriculumisdelivered withoutfinalreviewfrom finalreviewfromcentral withoutfinalreviewfrom centralauthorities. authorities. centralauthorities. 54  Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthelegal governmenthasthelegal authorityoverhow howresourcesare authorityoverhow authorityoverhowresources resourcesareallocatedto Classroom allocatedtothe resourcesareallocatedto areallocatedtoclassrooms classroomswithoutfinal resourcing classroom(classsize). classroomswithfinal withoutfinalreviewfrom reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral centralauthorities(classsize). authorities(classsize). authorities(classsize). Governmentdoesnot Governmentdoesset Governmentdoesset Governmentdoesset setstandardsonwhat standardsforwhat standardsforwhatstudents standardsforwhat Student studentsneedtolearn. studentsneedtolearn,but needtolearnandalso studentsneedtolearn, Standards thereisnoindicationofby indicatesEITHERbywhenOR bywhen,andhowwell. whenorhowwell. howwelltheyneedtobe learned. Studentsdonottake Standardizedexamsare Standardizedexamsare Standardizedexamsare standardizedexams. administered,butnot administeredannually. administeredannually, annually. andresultsare Student disaggregatedbyschool, Assessment socioeconomic background,genderand othertypesof disadvantage. Governmentdoesnot Governmentrequires Governmentrequiresschools Governmentrequires requireschoolsto schoolstoundergoan toundergoastandardterm schoolstoundergoan Holding undergoaninspection. inspectionbutnotermis inspection. inspection,andfrequency schools Inspection specified. ofinspectiondependson accountable resultsofprevious inspection. Notapplicableifthe Inspectionreportsinclude Inspectionreportsinclude Inspectionreportsinclude governmentdoesnot strengthsandweaknesses strengthsandweaknessesof strengthsand requireschoolstotake oftheschool. theschoolandspecific weaknessesoftheschool, Improvement partininspections. prioritiesforimprovement. specificprioritiesfor planning improvementandschools arerequiredtosubmita schoolimprovementplan followingtheinspection. Sanctionsarenot Sanctionsincludeadditional Sanctionsincludeadditional Sanctionsinclude administeredbasedon monitoring/warningsand monitoringandfinesare additionalmonitoring, theresultsofschool areadministeredbasedon administeredbasedonthe finesand,asafinal Sanctions inspectionsor theresultsofschool resultsofschoolinspectionsor measure,schoolclosures performanceon inspectionsorperformance performanceonstandardized basedontheresultsof standardizedexams. onstandardizedexams. exams. schoolinspectionsor 55  performanceon standardizedexams. Noinformationis Adhocinformationis Regularinformationis Regularinformationis providedtoparentson providedtoparentson providedtoparentson providedtoparentson theresultsof standardizedexamresults standardizedexamresultsor disaggregated(byschool, standardizedexamsor orinspectionreports. inspectionreports. socioeconomic inspectionreports.  background,gender, othertypesof disadvantage,etc.) Information standardizedexam resultsandinspection reportsfromavarietyof sources.Policyoutlines Empowering informationinterventions allparents, totargeted studentsand disadvantagedgroups. communities  Notapplicableifthe Neitherstudentsnor Studentsorparentsare Studentandparentsare governmentdoesnot parentsaresurveyedas interviewedaspartofthe interviewedaspartofthe Voice requireschoolstotake partofaninspection inspectionprocess. inspectionprocess. partininspections. process.  Thegovernmentdoes Thegovernmentprovides Thegovernmentprovidestax Thegovernment notprovidetaxsubsidies taxsubsidiesforfamilies subsidiesandcashtransfers providestargetedcash Financial orcashtransfersfor attendingprivateschools. whichcanbeusedbyfamilies transferswhichcanbe support familiesattending attendingprivateschools. usedbydisadvantaged privateschools. familiesattendingprivate schools. Governmentsets Governmentdoesnotset Schoolssetfees,butare Schoolssetfeeswithout standardizedtuition standardizedtuitionfees subjecttoreviewfrom anyreviewfrom Promoting fees. butimposescap(overall government. government. diversityof Tuitionfees amountor%increaseson supply tuitionsfees).  56  Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallowstwo Thegovernmentallows three Thegovernmentallows oneofthefollowing ofthefollowingtypesto ofthefollowingtypesto allofthefollowingtypes typestooperatea operateaschool: operateaschool: tooperateaschool: school: Community Community Community Ownership Community Notforprofit Notforprofit Notforprofit Notforprofit Faithbased Faithbased Faithbased Faithbased Forprofit Forprofit Forprofit Forprofit Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards,that Certificationstandards,that Certificationstandards, thatarenotlinkedto arenotlinkedtoeducation arenotlinkedtoeducation thatarenotlinkedto educationoutcomes, outcomes,restrictentry outcomes,restrictentry educationoutcomes,do restrictentryincluding includingtwoofthethree includingoneofthethree notrestrictentry allofthefollowing:1. followingcriteria:1.land followingcriteria:1.land land(undulating, (undulating,distancefrom (undulating,distancefrom Certification distancefrompublic publicvenuesetc.)or2. publicvenuesetc.)or2. Standards venuesetc.)or2. facilities(separatescience facilities(separatescience facilities(separate labs,weathervanesetc.)or labs,weathervanesetc.)or3. sciencelabs,weather 3.assets(ownershipofland assets(ownershipoflandor vanesetc.)or3.assets orbuildings). buildings). (ownershipoflandor buildings). Registration/certification Registration/certification Registration/certification Registration/certification Marketentry guidelinesarenot guidelinesarenotmade guidelinesaremadepublicbut guidelinesaremade information officiallyoutlined. publicandareonly fromasinglesource. publicandfrommultiple availableonrequest. sources. Schoolsareableto Schoolsareabletooperate Schoolsareabletooperate Schoolsareableto Regulatory operatewhilepaying4+ whilepaying2Ͳ3typesof whilepaying1typeoffee. operatewithoutpaying fees typesoffees. fees. fees.    57   GovernmentǦfundedPrivateSchools PolicyGoal Indicator Latent Emerging Established Advanced Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhaslegal legalauthoritytoset governmenthaslegal governmenthaslegal authoritytosetitsown minimumstandardsfor authoritytoset authoritytoset teacherstandards Teacherstandards teachers. minimumstandardsfor minimumstandardsfor withoutfinalreview teacherswithfinal teacherswithoutfinal fromcentralauthorities. reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschool(school thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthaslegal principal,schoolcouncil, appointanddeploy legalauthorityto authoritytoappointand parentassociationetc.) Teacherappointmentand teachers. appointanddeploy deployteacherswithout hasthelegalauthorityto deployment teachers.Appointments reviewbycentral appointteachers aresubjecttofinal authorities. withoutreviewby reviewbycentral centralauthorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal Encouraging thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authoritytodetermine innovation determineteacher legalauthorityto legalauthorityto teachersalarylevels byproviders Teachersalary salarylevels. determineteacher determineteacher withoutreviewby salarylevelswithfinal salarylevelswithout centralauthorities. reviewbycentral reviewbycentral authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authoritytodismiss dismissteachers. legalauthoritytodismiss legalauthoritytodismiss teacherswithoutreview Teacherdismissal teacherswithfinal teacherswithoutreview bycentralauthorities. reviewbycentral bycentralauthorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverhowthe howthecurriculumis legalauthorityoverhow legalauthorityoverhow curriculumisdelivered Curriculumdelivery delivered. thecurriculumis thecurriculumis withoutfinalreview deliveredwithfinal deliveredwithoutfinal fromcentralauthorities. reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral authorities. authorities. 58  Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverhow howresourcesare legalauthorityoverhow legalauthorityoverhow resourcesareallocated Classroomresourcing allocatedtothe resourcesareallocated resourcesareallocated toclassroomswithout classroom(classsize). toclassroomswithfinal toclassroomswithout finalreviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral finalreviewfromcentral authorities(classsize). authorities(classsize). authorities(classsize). Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverthe themanagementof legalauthorityoverthe legalauthorityoverthe managementofschool Budgetautonomy schooloperating managementofschool managementofschool operatingbudgets budgets. operatingbudgetswith operatingbudgets withoutfinalreview finalreviewfromcentral withoutfinalreview fromcentralauthorities. authorities. fromcentralauthorities. Governmentdoesnot Governmentdoesset Governmentdoesset Governmentdoesset setstandardsonwhat standardsforwhat standardsforwhat standardsforwhat studentsneedtolearn. studentsneedtolearn, studentsneedtolearn studentsneedtolearn, Studentstandards butthereisno andalsoindicates bywhen,andhowwell. indicationofbywhenor EITHERbywhenORhow howwell. welltheyneedtobe learned. Studentsdonottake Standardizedexamsare Standardizedexamsare Standardizedexamsare standardizedexams. administeredinselect administeredinselect administeredinselect grades,butnotannually. gradesannually. gradesannually,and resultsare Studentassessment disaggregatedbyschool, Holding socioeconomic schools background,genderand accountable othertypesof disadvantage. Governmentdoesnot Governmentrequires Governmentrequires Governmentrequires requireschoolstoreport schoolstoreportonthe schoolstoreportonthe schoolstoreportonthe ontheuseofpublic useofpublicfundsasa useofpublicfundsasa useofpublicfundsasa fundsasaconditionfor conditionforthe conditionforthe conditionforthe thecontinuationof continuationoffunding continuationoffunding continuationoffunding Financialreporting funding. butonanadhocbasisor duringastandardterm. duringastandardterm withnostandardterm. withgreatermonitoring ofschoolsthathave failedtoadhereinthe past. 59  Governmentdoesnot Governmentrequires Governmentrequires Governmentrequires requireschoolsto schoolstoundergoan schoolstoundergoa schoolstoundergoan undergoaninspection. inspectionbutonanad standardterm inspection,and Inspection hocbasisorwithno inspection. frequencyofinspection standardterm. dependsonresultsof previousinspection. Notapplicableifthe Inspectionreports Inspectionreports Inspectionreports governmentdoesnot includestrengthsand includestrengthsand includestrengthsand requireschoolstotake weaknessesofthe weaknessesofthe weaknessesofthe partininspections. school. schoolandspecific school,specificpriorities Improvementplanning prioritiesfor forimprovementand improvement. schoolsarerequiredto submitaschool improvementplan followingtheinspection. Sanctionsarenot Sanctionsinclude Sanctionsinclude Sanctionsinclude administeredbasedon additionalmonitoring/ additionalmonitoring additionalmonitoring, theresultsofschool warningsandare andfinesare finesandasafinal inspectionsor administeredbasedon administeredbasedon measureschoolclosures performanceon theresultsofschool theresultsofschool basedontheresultsof Sanctionsandrewards standardizedexams. inspectionsor inspectionsor schoolinspectionsor performanceon performanceon performanceon standardizedexams. standardizedexams. standardizedexams. Rewardsmayalsobe Rewardsarealsoused. used. Noinformationis Adhocinformationis Regularinformationis Regularinformationis providedtoparentson providedtoparentson providedtoparentson providedtoparentson theresultsof standardizedexam standardizedexam disaggregated(by standardizedexamsor resultsorinspection resultsorinspection school,socioeconomic inspectionreports. reports. reports. background,gender,  othertypesof Empowering disadvantage,etc.) allparents, standardizedexam Information studentsand resultsandinspection communities reportsfromavarietyof sources.Policyoutlines information interventionsto targeteddisadvantaged groups.  60  Notapplicableifthe Neitherstudentsnor Studentsorparentsare Studentandparentsare governmentdoesnot parentsareinterviewed interviewedaspartof interviewedaspartof Voice requireschoolstotake aspartofaninspection theinspectionprocess. theinspectionprocess. partininspections. process. Schoolsareallowedto Schoolsareallowedto Schoolsarenot allowed Schoolsarenotallowed selectstudentsbasedon selectstudentsbasedon toselectstudentsbut toselectstudentsand Selection bothacademic academicperformance schoolsarenotrequired arerequiredtoconduct performanceand orgeography. tousealotteryif alotteryifschoolisover geography. oversubscribed. subscribed. Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceisnot restrictedbycompulsory restrictedbyvoluntary restrictedbyvoluntary restrictedbyanytypeof monetaryparent monetaryparent nonͲmonetaryparent parentalcontributions. Contributions contributionswhichif contributionsi.e. contributionsi.e.inkind notpaidprohibitsthe contributionstoaschool labororgoods. childfromattendingthe fund. school. Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallows oneofthefollowing twoofthefollowing threeofthefollowing allofthefollowingtypes typestooperatea typestooperatea typestooperatea tooperateaschool: school: school: school: Community Ownership Community Community Community Notforprofit Notforprofit Notforprofit Notforprofit Faithbased Faithbased Faithbased Faithbased Forprofit Forprofit Forprofit Forprofit Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards, thatarenotlinkedto thatarenotlinkedto thatarenotlinkedto thatarenotlinkedto educationoutcomes, educationoutcomes, educationoutcomes, educationoutcomes,do Promoting restrictentryincluding restrictentryincluding restrictentryincluding notrestrictentry. diversityof allofthefollowing:1. twoofthethree oneofthethree supply land(undulating, followingcriteria:1.land followingcriteria:1.land Certificationstandards distancefrompublic (undulating,distance (undulating,distance venuesetc.)or2. frompublicvenuesetc.) frompublicvenuesetc.) facilities(separate or2.facilities(separate or2.facilities(separate sciencelabs,weather sciencelabs,weather sciencelabs,weather vanesetc.)or3.assets vanesetc.)or3.assets vanesetc.)or3.Assets (ownershipoflandor (ownershipoflandor (ownershipoflandor buildings). buildings). buildings). Registration/certification Registration/certification Registration/certification Registration/certification guidelinesarenot guidelinesarenotmade guidelinesaremade guidelinesaremade MarketEntryInformation officiallyoutlined. publicandonlyavailable publicbutfromasingle publicandfrommultiple onrequest. source. sources. 61  Schoolsareableto Schoolsareableto Schoolsareableto Schoolsareableto Regulatoryfees operatewhilepaying4+ operatewhilepaying2Ͳ3 operatewhilepaying1 operatewithoutpaying typesoffees. typesoffees. typeoffee. fees. Academicoperating Academicoperating Allbudgetsacademic Allbudgetsacademic budgetsarenot budgetsareequivalent andadditionalbudgets andadditional(facilities equivalenttoperͲ toperͲstudentamounts andtransport)are (facilitiesandtransport) studentamountsin inpublicschools. areequivalenttoper equivalenttoper Funding publicschools. studentamountsin studentamountsin publicschools.Schools publicschool.School donotreceivetargeted receivestargeted fundingtomeetspecificfundingtomeetspecific studentneeds. studentneeds. NoIncentives Schoolsaresupported Schoolsaresupported Schoolsaresupported byoneofthefollowing: bytwoofthefollowing:bythreeofthe 1.startͲupfunding 1.startͲupfunding following:1.startͲup similartopublicschools similartopublicschools fundingsimilartopublic 2.accesstogovernment 2.accesstogovernment schools2.accessto Incentives landorunused landorunused governmentlandor governmentfacilitiesor governmentfacilitiesorunusedgovernment 3.exemptfromlocal 3.exemptfromlocal facilitiesor3.exempt taxes(propertytaxes) taxes(propertytaxes) fromlocaltaxes similartopublicschools. (propertytaxes)similar similartopublicschools. topublicschools. Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovided informationonthe informationonthe informationonthe informationonthe allocationstobe allocationstobe allocationstobe allocationstobe Planning transferredtothemless transferredtothem transferredtothem transferredtothem than1monthbeforethe between1and3months between4and6months morethan6months startoftheacademic beforethestartofthe beforethestartofthe beforethestartofthe year. academicyear. academicyear. academicyear.       62   PrivatelyManagedSchools PolicyGoal Indicator Latent Emerging Established Advanced Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhaslegalauthorityto legalauthoritytoset governmenthaslegal governmenthaslegal setitsownteacherstandards minimumstandardsfor authoritytoset authoritytoset withoutfinalreviewfromcentral Teacher teachers. minimumstandardsfor minimumstandardsfor authorities. standards teacherswithfinal teacherswithoutfinal reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschool(schoolprincipal, thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthaslegal schoolcouncil,parent Teacher appointanddeploy legalauthorityto authoritytoappointand associationetc.)hasthelegal appointment teachers. appointanddeploy deployteacherswithout authoritytoappointteachers and teachers.Appointments reviewbycentral withoutreviewbycentral deployment aresubjecttofinal authorities. authorities. reviewbycentral authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal Encouraging thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authoritytodetermineteacher innovation determineteacher legalauthorityto legalauthorityto salarylevelswithoutreviewby byproviders Teachersalary salarylevels. determineteacher determineteacher centralauthorities. salarylevelswithfinal salarylevelswithout reviewbycentral reviewbycentral authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authoritytodismissteachers Teacher dismissteachers. legalauthoritytodismiss legalauthoritytodismiss withoutreviewbycentral dismissal teacherswithfinal teacherswithoutreview authorities. reviewbycentral bycentralauthorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverhowthe howthecurriculumis legalauthorityoverhow legalauthorityoverhow curriculumisdeliveredwithout Curriculum delivered. thecurriculumis thecurriculumis finalreviewfromcentral delivery deliveredwithfinal deliveredwithoutfinal authorities. reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral authorities. authorities. 63  Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschool hasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverhowresourcesare howresourcesare legalauthorityoverhow legalauthorityoverhow allocatedtoclassroomswithout Classroom allocatedtothe resourcesareallocated resourcesareallocated finalreviewfromcentral resourcing classroom(classsize). toclassroomswithfinal toclassroomswithout authorities(classsize). reviewfromcentral finalreviewfromcentral authorities(classsize). authorities(classsize). Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverthemanagement themanagementof legalauthorityoverthe legalauthorityoverthe ofschooloperatingbudgets Budget schooloperating managementofschool managementofschool withoutfinalreviewfromcentral autonomy budgets. operatingbudgetswith operatingbudgets authorities. finalreviewfromcentral withoutfinalreview authorities. fromcentralauthorities. Governmentdoesnot Governmentdoesset Governmentdoesset Governmentdoessetstandards setstandardsonwhat standardsforwhat standardsforwhat forwhatstudentsneedtolearn, studentsneedtolearn. studentsneedtolearn, studentsneedtolearn bywhen,andhowwell. Student butthereisno andalsoindicates standards indicationofbywhenor EITHERbywhenORhow howwell. welltheyneedtobe learned. Studentsdonottake Standardizedexamsare Standardizedexamsare Standardizedexamsare standardizedexams. administeredinselect administeredinselect administeredinselectgrades grades,butnotannually. gradesannually. annually,andresultsare Holding Student disaggregatedbyschool, schools assessment  socioeconomicbackground, accountable genderandothertypesof disadvantage. Governmentdoesnot Governmentrequires Governmentrequires Governmentrequiresschoolsto requireschoolstoreport schoolstoreportonthe schoolstoreportonthe reportontheuseofpublicfunds ontheuseofpublic useofpublicfundsasa useofpublicfundsasa asaconditionforthe Financial fundsasaconditionfor conditionforthe conditionforthe continuationoffundingduringa reporting thecontinuationof continuationoffunding continuationoffunding standardtermwithgreater funding. butonanadhocbasisor duringastandardterm. monitoringofschoolsthathave withnostandardterm. failedtoadhereinthepast. 64  Governmentdoesnot Governmentrequires Governmentrequires Governmentrequiresschoolsto requireschoolsto schoolstoundergoan schoolstoundergoa undergoaninspectionand undergoaninspection. inspectionbutonanad standardterm frequencyofinspectionis Inspection hocbasisorwithno inspection. dependentonresultsofprevious standardterm. inspection. Notapplicableifthe Inspectionreports Inspectionreports Inspectionreportsinclude governmentdoesnot includestrengthsand includestrengthsand strengthsandweaknessesofthe requireschoolstotake weaknessesofthe weaknessesofthe school,specificprioritiesfor Improvement partininspections. school. schoolandspecific improvementandschoolsare planning prioritiesfor requiredtosubmitaschool improvement. improvementplanfollowingthe inspection. Sanctionsarenot Sanctionsinclude Sanctionsinclude Sanctionsincludeadditional administeredbasedon additionalmonitoring/ additionalmonitoring monitoring,finesandasafinal theresultsofschool warningsandare andfinesare measureschoolclosuresbased inspectionsor administeredbasedon administeredbasedon ontheresultsofschool performanceon theresultsofschool theresultsofschool inspectionsorperformanceon Sanctionsand standardizedexams. inspectionsor inspectionsor standardizedexams.Rewardsare rewards performanceon performanceon alsoused. standardizedexams. standardizedexams. Rewardsmayalsobe used. Noinformationis Adhocinformationis Regularinformationis Regularinformationis provided providedtoparentson providedtoparentson providedtoparentson toparentsondisaggregated(by theresultsof standardizedexam standardizedexam school,socioeconomic standardizedexamsor resultsorinspection resultsorinspection background,gender,othertypes Empowering inspectionreports. reports. reports. ofdisadvantage,etc.) allparents,  standardizedexamresultsand Information studentsand inspectionreportsfromavariety communities ofsources.Policyoutlines informationinterventionsto targeteddisadvantagedgroups.  65  Notapplicableifthe Neitherstudentsnor Studentsorparentsare Studentand parentsare governmentdoesnot parentsareinterviewed interviewedaspartof interviewedaspartofthe Voice requireschoolstotake aspartofaninspection theinspectionprocess. inspectionprocess. partininspections. process. Schoolsareallowedto Schoolsareallowedto Schoolsarenot allowed Schoolsarenotallowedtoselect selectstudentsbasedon selectstudentsbasedon toselectstudentsbut studentsandarerequiredto Selection bothacademic academicperformance schoolsarenotrequired conductalotteryifschoolis performanceand orgeography. tousealotteryif oversubscribed. geography. oversubscribed. Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceisnotrestricted restrictedbycompulsory restrictedbyvoluntary restrictedbyvoluntary byanytypeofparental monetaryparent monetaryparent nonͲmonetaryparent contributions. Contributions contributionswhichif contributionsi.e. contributionsi.e.inkind notpaidprohibitsthe contributionstoaschool labororgoods. childfromattendingthe fund. school. Coverageofchartersis Coverageofchartersis Coverageofchartersis NoRestriction.Chartersarenot restrictedbythreeof restrictedbytwoofthe restrictedbyoneofthe restrictedbystudentnumbers, thefollowing:student following:student following:student schoolnumbers,orlocation andschoolnumbersand numbers,school numbers,school (certaincitiesordistricts). Coverage location(certaincitiesor numbers,location numbers,location districts).Onlynewor (certaincitiesor (certaincitiesor onlyexistingschoolsare districts).Norestrictions districts). abletobecomecharters. duetonew/existing schoolstatus. Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallowsallofthe oneofthefollowing twoofthefollowing threeofthefollowing followingtypestooperatea Promoting typestooperatea typestooperatea typestooperatea school: diversityof school: school: school: Community Ownership supply Community Community Community Notforprofit Notforprofit Notforprofit Notforprofit Faithbased Faithbased Faithbased Faithbased Forprofit Forprofit Forprofit Forprofit Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards,thatare thatarenotlinkedto thatarenotlinkedto thatarenotlinkedto notlinkedtoeducation educationoutcomes, educationoutcomes, educationoutcomes, outcomes,donotrestrictentry. Certification restrictentryincluding restrictentryincluding restrictentryincluding standards allofthefollowing:1. twoofthethree oneofthethree land(undulating, followingcriteria:1.land followingcriteria:1.land distancefrompublic (undulating,distance (undulating,distance venuesetc.)or2. frompublicvenuesetc.) frompublicvenuesetc.) 66  facilities(separate or2. facilities(separate or2.facilities(separate sciencelabs,weather sciencelabs,weather sciencelabs,weather vanesetc.)or3.assets vanesetc.)or3.assets vanesetc.)or3.assets (ownershipoflandor (ownershipoflandor (ownershipoflandor buildings). buildings). buildings). Registration/certification Registration/certification Registration/certification Registration/certification Marketentry guidelinesarenot guidelinesarenotmade guidelinesaremade guidelinesaremadepublicand information officiallyoutlined. publicandonlyavailable publicbutfromasingle frommultiplesources. onrequest. source. Schoolsareableto Schoolsareableto Schoolsareableto Schoolsareabletooperate Regulatory operatewhilepaying4+ operatewhilepaying2Ͳ3 operatewhilepaying1 withoutpayingfees. fees typesoffees. typesoffees. typeoffee. Academicoperating Academicoperating Allbudgetsacademic Allbudgetsacademicand budgetsarenot budgetsareequivalent andadditionalbudgets additional(facilitiesand equivalenttoperͲ toperͲstudentamounts (facilitiesandtransport) transport)areequivalenttoper studentamountsin inpublicschools areequivalenttoper studentamountsinpublic Funding publicschools. studentamountsin school.Schoolreceivestargeted publicschools.Schools fundingtomeetspecificstudent donotreceivetargeted needs. fundingtomeetspecific studentneeds. NoIncentives Schoolsaresupported Schoolsaresupported Schoolsaresupportedbythree byoneofthefollowing: bytwoofthefollowing: ofthefollowing:1.startͲup 1.startͲupfunding 1.startͲupfunding fundingsimilartopublicschools similartopublicschools similartopublicschools 2.accesstogovernmentlandor 2.accesstogovernment 2.accesstogovernment unusedgovernmentfacilitiesor Incentives landorunused landorunused 3.exemptfromlocaltaxes governmentfacilitiesor governmentfacilitiesor (propertytaxes)similartopublic 3.exemptfromlocal 3.exemptfromlocal schools. taxes(propertytaxes) taxes(propertytaxes) similartopublicschools. similartopublicschools. Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovidedinformation informationonthe informationonthe informationonthe ontheallocationstobe allocationstobe allocationstobe allocationstobe transferredtothemmorethan6 Planning transferredtothemless transferredtothem transferredtothem monthsbeforethestartofthe than1monthbeforethe between1and3months between4and6months academicyear. startoftheacademic beforethestartofthe beforethestartofthe year. academicyear. academicyear.   67   VoucherSchools PolicyGoal Indicator Latent Emerging Established Advanced Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhaslegal legalauthoritytoset governmenthaslegal governmenthaslegal authoritytosetitsown minimumstandardsfor authoritytoset authoritytoset teacherstandards Teacher teachers. minimumstandardsfor minimumstandardsfor withoutfinalreview standards teacherswithfinal teacherswithoutfinal fromcentralauthorities. reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschool(school thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthaslegal principal,schoolcouncil, appointanddeploy legalauthorityto authoritytoappointand parentassociationetc.) Teacher teachers. appointanddeploy deployteacherswithout hasthelegalauthorityto appointmentand teachers.Appointments reviewbycentral appointteachers deployment aresubjecttofinal authorities. withoutreviewby reviewbycentral centralauthorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authoritytodetermine Encouraginginnovationby determineteacher legalauthorityto legalauthorityto teachersalarylevels providers Teachersalary salarylevels. determineteacher determineteacher withoutreviewby salarylevelswithfinal salarylevelswithout centralauthorities. reviewbycentral reviewbycentral authorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityto governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authoritytodismiss dismissteachers. legalauthoritytodismiss legalauthoritytodismiss teacherswithoutreview Teacherdismissal teacherswithfinal teacherswithoutreview bycentralauthorities. reviewbycentral bycentralauthorities. authorities. Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverhowthe howthecurriculumis legalauthorityoverhow legalauthorityoverhow curriculumisdelivered Curriculum delivered. thecurriculumis thecurriculumis withoutfinalreview delivery deliveredwithfinal deliveredwithoutfinal fromcentralauthorities. reviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral authorities. authorities. 68  Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverhow howresourcesare legalauthorityoverhow legalauthorityoverhow resourcesareallocated Classroom allocatedtothe resourcesareallocated resourcesareallocated toclassroomswithout resourcing classroom(classsize) toclassroomswithfinal toclassroomswithout finalreviewfromcentral reviewfromcentral finalreviewfromcentral authorities(classsize) authorities(classsize) authorities(classsize) Centralgovernmenthas Regionalormunicipal Regionalormunicipal Theschoolhasthelegal thelegalauthorityover governmenthasthe governmenthasthe authorityoverthe themanagementof legalauthorityoverthe legalauthorityoverthe managementofschool Budget schooloperating managementofschool managementofschool operatingbudgets autonomy budgets. operatingbudgetswith operatingbudgets withoutfinalreview finalreviewfromcentral withoutfinalreview fromcentralauthorities. authorities. fromcentralauthorities. Governmentdoesnot Governmentdoesset Governmentdoesset Governmentdoesset setstandardsonwhat standardsforwhat standardsforwhat standardsforwhat studentsneedtolearn. studentsneedtolearn, studentsneedtolearn studentsneedtolearn, Student butthereisno andalsoindicates bywhen,andhowwell. standards indicationofbywhenor EITHERbywhenORhow howwell. welltheyneedtobe learned. Studentsdonottake Standardizedtestsare Standardizedtestsare Standardizedtestsare standardizedtests. administeredinselect administeredinselect administeredinselect grades,butnotannually. gradesannually. gradesannually,and resultsare Student disaggregatedbyschool, assessment Holdingschools socioeconomic accountable background,genderand othertypesof disadvantage. Governmentdoesnot Governmentrequires Governmentrequires Governmentrequires requireschoolstoreport schoolstoreportonthe schoolstoreportonthe schoolstoreportonthe ontheuseofpublic useofpublicfundsasa useofpublicfundsasa useofpublicfundsasa fundsasaconditionfor conditionforthe conditionforthe conditionforthe Financial thecontinuationof continuationoffunding continuationoffunding continuationoffunding reporting funding. butonanadhocbasisor duringastandardterm. duringastandardterm withnostandardterm. withgreatermonitoring ofschoolsthathave failedtoadhereinthe past. 69  Governmentdoesnot Governmentrequires Governmentrequires Governmentrequires requireschoolsto schoolstoundergoan schoolstoundergoa schoolstoundergoan undergoaninspection. inspectionbutonanad standardterm inspection,and Inspection hocbasisorwithno inspection. frequencyofinspection standardterm. dependsonresultsof previousinspection. Notapplicableifthe Inspectionreports Inspectionreports Inspectionreports governmentdoesnot includestrengthsand includestrengthsand includestrengthsand requireschoolstotake weaknessesofthe weaknessesofthe weaknessesofthe partininspections. school. schoolandspecific school.Specificpriorities Improvement prioritiesfor forimprovementand planning improvement. schoolsarerequiredto submitaschool improvementplan followingtheinspection. Sanctionsarenot Sanctionsinclude Sanctionsinclude Sanctionsinclude administeredbasedon additionalmonitoring/ additionalmonitoring additionalmonitoring, theresultsofschool warningsandare andfinesare finesandasafinal inspectionsor administeredbasedon administeredbasedon measureschoolclosures Sanctionsand performanceon theresultsofschool theresultsofschool basedontheresultsof rewards standardizedexams. inspectionsor inspectionsor schoolinspectionsor performanceon performanceon performanceon standardizedexams. standardizedexams. standardizedexams. Rewardsmayalsobe Rewardsarealsoused. used. Noinformationis Adhocinformationis Regularinformationis Regularinformationis providedtoparentson providedtoparentson providedtoparentson providedtoparentson theresultsof standardizedexam standardizedexam disaggregated(by standardizedexamsor resultsorinspection resultsorinspection school,socioeconomic inspectionreports reports. reports. background,gender,  othertypesof disadvantage,etc.) Empoweringallparents, standardizedexam Information studentsandcommunities resultsandinspection reportsfromavarietyof sources.Policyoutlines information interventionsto targeteddisadvantaged groups. 70  Notapplicableifthe Neitherstudentsnor Studentsorparentsare Studentand parentsare governmentdoesnot parentsareinterviewed interviewedaspartof interviewedaspartof Voice requireschoolstotake aspartofaninspection theinspectionprocess. theinspectionprocess. partininspections. process. Schoolsareallowedto Schoolsareallowedto Schoolsarenot allowed Schoolsarenotallowed selectstudentsbasedon selectstudentsbasedon toselectstudentsbut toselectstudentsand Selection bothacademic academicperformance schoolsarenotrequired arerequiredtoconduct performanceand orgeography. tousealotteryif alotteryifschoolis geography. oversubscribed. oversubscribed. Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceis Parentalchoiceisnot restrictedbycompulsory restrictedbyvoluntary restrictedbyvoluntary restrictedbyanytypeof monetaryparent monetaryparent nonͲmonetaryparent parentalcontributions. Contributions contributionswhichif contributionsi.e. contributionsi.e.inkind notpaidprohibitsthe contributionstoaschool labororgoods. childfromattendingthe fund. school. Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallows Thegovernmentallows oneofthefollowing twoofthefollowing threeofthefollowing allofthefollowingtypes typestooperatea typestooperatea typestooperatea tooperateaschool: school: school: school: Community Ownership Community Community Community Notforprofit Notforprofit Notforprofit Notforprofit Faithbased Faithbased Faithbased Faithbased Forprofit Forprofit Forprofit Forprofit Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards, Certificationstandards, thatarenotlinkedto thatarenotlinkedto thatarenotlinkedto thatarenotlinkedto educationoutcomes, educationoutcomes, educationoutcomes, educationoutcomes,do restrictentryincluding restrictentryincluding restrictentryincluding notrestrictentry. Promotingdiversityof allofthefollowing:1. twoofthethree oneofthethree supply land(undulating, followingcriteria:1.land followingcriteria:1.land Certification distancefrompublic (undulating,distance (undulating,distance standards venuesetc.)or2. frompublicvenuesetc.) frompublicvenuesetc.) facilities(separate or2.facilities(separate or2.facilities(separate sciencelabs,weather sciencelabs,weather sciencelabs,weather vanesetc.)or3.assets vanesetc.)or3.assets vanesetc.)or3.assets (ownershipoflandor (ownershipoflandor (ownershipoflandor buildings). buildings). buildings). Registration/certification Registration/certification Registration/certification Registration/certification Marketentry guidelinesarenot guidelinesarenotmade guidelinesaremade guidelinesaremade information officiallyoutlined. publicandonlyavailable publicbutfromasingle publicandfrommultiple onrequest. source. sources. 71  Schoolsareableto Schoolsareableto Schoolsareableto Schoolsareableto Regulatoryfees operatewhilepaying4+ operatewhilepaying2Ͳ3 operatewhilepaying1operatewithoutpaying typesoffees. typesoffees. typeoffee. fees. Academicoperating Academicoperating Allbudgetsacademic Allbudgetsacademic budgetsarenot budgetsareequivalent andadditionalbudgetsandadditional(facilities equivalenttoperͲ toperͲstudentamounts andtransport)are (facilitiesandtransport) studentamountsin inpublicschools. areequivalenttoper equivalenttoper Funding publicschools. studentamountsin studentamountsin publicschool.School publicschools.Schools receivestargeted donotreceivetargeted fundingtomeetspecific fundingtomeetspecific studentneeds. studentneeds. NoIncentives Schoolsaresupported Schoolsaresupported Schoolsare supported byoneofthefollowing: bythreeofthe bytwoofthefollowing: 1.startͲupfunding 1.startͲupfunding following:1.startͲup similartopublicschools similartopublicschools fundingsimilartopublic 2.accesstogovernment 2.accesstogovernment schools2.accessto Incentives landorunused landorunused governmentlandor governmentfacilitiesor governmentfacilitiesor unusedgovernment 3.exemptfromlocal 3.exemptfromlocal facilitiesor3.exempt taxes(propertytaxes) fromlocaltaxes taxes.(propertytaxes) similartopublicschools. (propertytaxes)similar similartopublicschools. topublicschools. Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovided Schoolsareprovided informationonthe informationonthe informationonthe informationonthe allocationstobe allocationstobe allocationstobe allocationstobe Planning transferredtothemless transferredtothem transferredtothem transferredtothem than1monthbeforethe between1and3months between4and6months morethan6months startoftheacademic beforethestartofthe beforethestartofthe beforethestartofthe year. academicyear. academicyear. academicyear. 72       worldbank.org/education/saber  TheSystemsApproachforBetterEducationResults(SABER)initiativecollectsdata on the policies and institutions of education systems around the world and benchmarks them against practices associated with student learning. SABER aims to give all parties with a stake in educational results—from students, administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers, business people and political leaders—an accessible, detailed, objective snapshot of how well the policiesoftheircountry’seducationsystemareorientedtowarddeliveringlearning forallchildrenandyouth. ThisframeworkpaperfocusesspecificallyintheareaofEngagingthePrivate Sector. Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedhereinarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyreflectthe viewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBankGroupanditsaffiliatedorganizations, orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectoroftheWorldBankGrouporthegovernmentstheyrepresent. The World Bank Group does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations,andotherinformationshownonanymapinthisworkdonotimplyandjudgmentonthepartoftheWorld BankGroupconcerningthelegalstatusofanyterritoryortheendorsementoracceptanceofsuchboundaries. 73