Combined Project Information Documents / Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS)

Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 07-Jul-2016 | Report No: PIDISDSA20248
A. Basic Project Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Parent Project ID (if any)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>P157891</td>
<td>Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North Eastern Nigeria</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Estimated Appraisal Date</th>
<th>Estimated Board Date</th>
<th>Practice Area (Lead)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>18-Oct-2016</td>
<td>19-Jan-2017</td>
<td>Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lending Instrument</th>
<th>Borrower(s)</th>
<th>Implementing Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment Project Financing</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>State Governments of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The processing of this project is applying the policy requirements exceptions for situations of urgent need of assistance or capacity constraints that are outlined in OP 10.00, paragraph 12.

Yes

Financing (in USD Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financing Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Development Association (IDA)</td>
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</tbody>
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Total Project Cost 200.00

Environmental Assessment Category

B - Partial Assessment

Decision

Track II-The review did authorize the preparation to continue

Other Decision (as needed)

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B. Introduction and Context

Country Context

1. In spite of a fairly strong national economy, Nigeria suffers from severe subnational disparities, with the North East (NE) region lagging behind in a number of key indicators. Compared to the wealthier southern states that benefit from oil production, the NE is heavily dependent on agriculture, with roughly 80 percent of the population engaged in farming. Over the past two decades, the pace of development of the NE has been lower than the rest of the country with persistently lower education levels and limited access to healthcare and...
other basic services and infrastructure. Poverty incidence was higher in the NE than in any other region of the country, with poverty headcount ratio of over 50 percent according to 2012/13 General Household Survey (GHS) data (see Table 1 below), compared to the nation-wide average of 33 percent. While all other regions experienced steadily reducing poverty rates in the past decade, the NE region was the only region with increasing poverty rates.

Table 1: Poverty Incidence by Region in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South South</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Situation of Urgent Need of Assistance

2. Since 2009, the NE has been affected by the Boko Haram (BH) conflict and the resulting military operations, impacting the lives of over 15 million people. The ongoing conflict, takes place in a setting characterized by deep poverty, poor social and economic conditions, lack of infrastructure and basic services, poor governance, weak institutions and high income inequality. All these complex and long standing factors contributed to the emergence of the conflict, by stoking frustration and a sense of injustice among citizens. A number of incidents acted as triggers, finding in the above mentioned structural drivers a fertile ground for the emergence and rapid spread of violence. The BH conflict was characterized by extreme levels of violence and destruction. The fighting became particularly intense in 2014, leading to the loss of at least 20,000 lives and the displacement of 2.5 million people internally and across international borders. About 84% of the forcibly displaced people have remained within the three conflict-affected states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY), while 8% are scattered through Northern and Central Nigeria, and the remaining 8% are in neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

3. The BH conflict has triggered an acute humanitarian and forced displacement crisis, with devastating social and economic impacts on the population, further deepening poverty and fragility in the NE region. Across the six states of the NE – Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba, there has been estimated infrastructure damage of US$ 9.2 billion and accumulated output losses of US$ 8.3 billion. Such extensive damage exacerbated the existing deficit in socioeconomic development in the NE, further straining a vulnerable population already among the poorest in the country. Social cohesion was deeply eroded, with social interaction among various societal groups and ethnicities becoming increasingly challenging in an atmosphere characterized by mistrust, property and inter-personal disputes and retaliation. Conflict and insecurity have also affected regular economic activities, bringing the already weak local economies to a virtual standstill. In the most directly and heavily affected BAY states, hundreds of thousands of households are living without access to basic infrastructure and social services. The pressing conditions demand immediate and emergent

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1 World Bank calculations, based on Nigeria General Household Survey 2012-13
2 Lake Chad Regional Forced Displacement Assessment, 2016
3 Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) 2016 for North-East Nigeria
actions to be taken as a response to recover the damages and losses in the conflict-affected areas and to help the conflict-affected population restore their lives.

4. In July 2015, after a series of successful military efforts that lead to the recovery and stabilization of part of the territory once controlled by BH, the Government of Nigeria (GoN) requested support to the WB in the recovery efforts in the NE. In response to this request, the WB in partnership with the European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) conducted a Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) from January to April 2016, which identified and measured crisis recovery needs in the NE. The RPBA involved extensive data collection, considerable dialogue and stakeholder consultation, and the quantification of recovery and peace building needs across affected states. It estimated the total needs for recovery and peace building at US$ 6.7 billion across the three strategic areas of intervention – US$ 150.5 million for peace building, stability and social cohesion; US$ 6.0 billion for infrastructure and social services; and US$ 473.5 million for economic recovery. These needs are spread across the initial stabilization and early recovery phase (years 1-2), and the subsequent medium-term recovery (years 3-4) phase. The overall needs in BAY states by sector as per the RPBA are summarized in Annex 1.

5. Simultaneously, the GoN demonstrated strong commitment to address the recovery and development challenges in the NE and requested financial support for its crisis recovery program. The WB response, totaling US$ 775 million includes (i) the development of this proposed US$200 million Multi-Sector Crisis Recovery Project (MCRP) for NE Nigeria, which serves as a node of convergence in supporting the overall recovery efforts in the NE; and (ii) a US$575 million Human Development (HD) Program including a coordinated set of additional financing (AF) and restructuring of HD projects. The program aims to address the needs of conflict-affected populations targeting short- and medium-term recovery, stabilization and peace building, through coordinated emergency transition and stabilization activities in the six NE states.

6. Now that significant portions of the territory formerly controlled by BH are under government control, it is of critical importance to support the GoN to immediately secure, consolidate and translate these gains into developmental progress. Given the limited window of opportunity created by improved security, combined with a high-level authorizing environment, and the critical need for immediate action on early recovery, this Project is being processed under paragraph 12 (Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance) of OP 10.00 (Investment Project Financing). The Project is thereby being prepared using condensed procedures including deferral of environmental and social requirements to the project implementation phase.
Sectoral and Institutional Context

Dynamics and Impacts of the Boko Haram Conflict and the Critical Need of Restoring Social Cohesion

7. **Besides the economic disparities, the lagging NE states suffer from deep governance and social issues that contribute to the BH conflict.** The state’s limited presence has given rise to an array of non-state institutions and actors—traditional, community, private, and sometimes criminal—grown to fill the governance void in areas such as security, service provision, and justice. A series of incidents – the most pivotal being the detention and death of the movement’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, while in custody in 2009 — were factors that caused the violent radicalization of BH members. These drivers combined with social and economic disparities and lack opportunities for the youth create conditions for the emergence and spread of the conflict.

8. **BH’s extremist ideology and its heavy reliance on tactics of indiscriminate terror, perpetrated against a wide array of targets have significantly impacted social relations, further dividing and polarizing an already fragmented society.** The group was identified as the single deadliest terrorist group in 2014\(^4\). The repeated but unpredictable incidences of violence have created widespread suspicion, mistrust, and apprehension, leading to fragmentation along religious, ethnic, and other cultural fault lines, and undermining the social contract between the Government and its citizens. Traditional institutions and community-level conflict management mechanisms (such as local government councils, local courts, and religious institutions) have been undermined by the conflict, leaving significant gaps in the capacity of these institutions to mediate and manage conflicts.

9. **The potential for increased tension between host communities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is also a concern, as the coping mechanisms and services in host communities are largely stretched by the massive influx of displaced population.** The majority (81%) of Nigerian IDPs currently live among host communities, while the remaining 19% live in camps or camp-like settings\(^5\), adding to the strain of already overstretched service delivery systems available in urban areas. Services and livelihoods previously available in their places of origin are also affected, limiting prospects of return.

10. **The conflict has had disproportionate impacts along gender lines, making of this a factor that should be taken into account when planning and implementing recovery efforts.** As in other armed conflicts, casualties in NE Nigeria are predominantly young men. This, together with the separation of families and the systematic migration of men towards larger and safer cities to be able to provide for their families back home, have translated into a significant increase of “unconventional” households, with women, elders and even youth and children as their main breadwinners. Women have also become targets of violence during the conflict, being victims of sexual and gender based violence and abduction, and have been disproportionately affected by forced displacement being overrepresented among the most vulnerable.

The Urgent Need to Rehabilitate Basic Service Delivery Infrastructure

11. **One of the furthest-reaching effects of the conflict is the vast scale of forced displacement that it has caused, overstretching the capacity of the host communities in terms of resources and service delivery.** Displacement has drastically affected the living conditions, poverty status and social cohesion of the affected population and communities. Individuals and families fled from conflict and lost all their productive assets, homes, and possessions. In the process of displacement, families and communities became separated, severing crucial social ties and safety nets, all of this translating into an increased level of vulnerability, particularly on

\(^4\) Institute of Economics and Peace, 2015

\(^5\) International Organization for Migration (IOM), July 2016
the part of unaccompanied children, women heads of household, and older people.

12. The Boko Haram conflict has inflicted huge damages and losses on the physical infrastructure in the NE states, and social services have been interrupted or deteriorated in many places. Three-quarters of the damages are in Borno (US$ 6.9 billion), followed by Yobe (US$ 1.2 billion) and Adamawa (US$ 828 million). The combined impact on the physical and social sectors has been so substantial that access to basic services has become a major issue for the residents of the conflict-affected areas. Damages and recovery needs are the highest among some of the following key public service delivery sectors:

   a. **Transport:** Roads and bridges have been damaged extensively by explosive devices and the unprecedented movement of military vehicles, seriously affecting the mobility of goods, services and people. Destroyed and damaged local roads have limited residents’ access to markets, schools, health facilities, and other community services.

   b. **Education:** The conflict has had a particularly high impact on the education and vocational systems, which were heavily targeted by BH. Schools were damaged and destroyed, teachers were threatened and in some cases killed, and schools were transformed into shelters for IDPs. Schools that are in operation across the three BAY States are overcrowded and are largely unable to meet the needs of the host population and IDPs.

   c. **Health:** Health facilities have also been systematically targeted, leading to damage and destruction of hospitals, health centers and non-permanent facilities. As a result, the already weak health infrastructure in these states has been further deteriorated. Even in communities where health facilities are functioning, lack of medicine and the cost of treatment are key factors preventing IDPs from accessing health services.

   d. **Water and Sanitation:** The conflict has seriously damaged water and sanitation infrastructure, and the increase in population due to the inflow of IDPs has placed an additional burden on already strained water and sanitation facilities. The provision of sufficient water points and sanitation facilities is a priority need in locations where an influx of IDPs has led to overcrowding and saturation of such facilities.

   e. **Public Buildings:** In the conflict affected areas, nearly 700 public buildings were destroyed or rendered dysfunctional including police stations, jails, post offices and other state and local administrative buildings which provided key municipal services to the residents. Recovering these services and rehabilitating these public buildings also therefore represents an urgent need and challenge for the affected states.

**Institutional Context**

13. The federal and state governments have formulated several initiatives and plans for recovery and development in the NE. Historically these have included the Presidential Initiative for the NE (PINE), and the North East States Transformation Strategy (NESTS), and more recently, these have galvanized in the form of The Buhari Plan for NE Interventions. The Buhari Plan is an amalgamation of a number of plans focused on the NE, including the RPBA, and the implementation oversight and accountability for this plan will be provided directly from the Office of the President through the Presidential Committee for the North East Initiative (PCNI).

14. The Buhari Plan and the RPBA provide the analytical underpinnings for developing and operationalizing an overall programmatic implementation framework of crisis recovery for the NE. The GoN, WB, and key development partners agreed that such an implementation framework would comprise the
following five elements: (i) policy development; (ii) prioritization and sequencing of recovery; (iii) institutional framework and implementation strategy; (iv) recovery financing strategy; and (v) program oversight and monitoring and evaluation. This approach will allow the prioritization of both the immediate and medium-term needs identified in the RPBA, which will pave the way for towards incrementally addressing the longstanding developmental deficits identified in the Buhari Plan, PINE and NESTs.

15. **At the Federal level, clarity is emerging on the key actors for the coordination and oversight of the Government’s NE recovery program.** As the PCNI was mandated by the Presidential Executive Order from President Buhari in September 2016, its role became clear as “to serve as the primary national strategy, coordination and advisory body in the Federation for the humanitarian transformational and developmental efforts in the NE to achieve the peace, stability, socio-economic rehabilitation, reconstruction and long-term sustainable development of the region.”[^6] It is worth noting that this mandate would be focused on coordination and oversight, and not implementation. According to the Presidential Executive Order, the PCNI shall have a tenure of three years, by which time a long-term regional development framework or entity is expected to be duly designed and formalized to drive the long-term development of the NE region.

16. **At the State level, multi-sector coordination forums are needed, or existing coordination mechanisms should be strengthened to manage recovery and stabilization programs.** Borno and Adamawa already have some mechanisms in place that can provide a starting basis for the evolution of such State-level coordinating bodies, including the establishment of a Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Borno and a State-level committee in Adamawa. Yobe is still in the process of setting up structures to perform these functions. These coordination bodies are likely to play a critical role in coordinating the WB and other development partner projects at the state level. State-level prioritized Strategic Plans of Actions for Recovery and Stabilization (SPARS) are being developed by the BAY States to objectively prioritize immediate needs and identify financing gaps. This will ensure a bottom-up and state-driven approach, to complement the central RPBA and Buhari Plan implementation framework.

**C. Proposed Development Objective(s)**

Development Objective(s) (From PAD)

The proposed Project Development Objective (PDO) is to “support the Government of Nigeria towards rehabilitating and improving critical service delivery infrastructure, improving the livelihood of conflict and displacement-affected communities, and strengthening social cohesion in the States of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.” The Project may also be able to provide immediate recovery support to the government in the event of a future eligible crisis or emergency through the Contingent Emergency Response Component.

Key Results

17. Achievement of the intended PDO will be monitored by the following indicators:

- Number of direct project beneficiaries (Number) (of which % are women)
- Percentage of beneficiaries satisfied with project activities towards increased social cohesion (Percentage)
- Number of beneficiaries with additional or improved access to basic services (Number)
- Increased government capacity for crisis recovery planning and implementation, as measured by capacity assessment surveys (Survey rating)

D. Project Description

18. To achieve the aforementioned development objectives, the proposed MCRP will take a programmatic approach to recovery and peace building as recommended in the RPBA. Under this approach, the MCRP is seen as a subset of a larger multi-sector and multi-partner solution to crisis recovery towards addressing the service delivery and social cohesion needs identified in the RPBA. Making use of the WB’s leadership and comparative advantage in this area, the MCRP is intended to serve as a central node of convergence for coordinating the related interventions from government, development partners and other Bank projects. This will help deliver mutually complementary multi-sector outcomes while following the key guiding principles and synchronized implementation modalities described below.

19. **Flexibility**: MCRP will allow flexibility in resource allocation across various project components and various geographic locations in the BAY states. Such flexibility is necessary to avoid risks of disruption and/or destruction of project investments due to security reasons, as BH may retain the ability to periodically stage attacks in some pocket areas; and to avoid overlaps and maximize complementarity with other projects, as there is still uncertainty on what other development partners will be funding over the next few years. However taking such a flexible approach also requires building flexibility in the project results framework and other related aspects.

20. Such flexibility is manifested in the project design in the following ways: (a) the PDO allows selection of interventions across multiple sectors and is not confined to specific sectors; (b) the infrastructure component retains flexibility to allocate resources across subcomponent progressively during implementation, based on specific yearly investment plans prepared by the states; and (c) about 20% of the project amount will remain unallocated and will be distributed across the three states based on their relative implementation performance at a later stage.

21. **Systematic and Progressive Prioritization**: Given the gaps between the overall needs identified by the RPBA and the available resources from both domestic and international sources, there will be a need for
systematic, criteria-based and progressive prioritization of needs across and within various sectors and the six affected states. Such an approach will increase the likelihood of a smoother transition from immediate to medium-term recovery as well as ensure the deepening, consolidation and sustainability of the intended project impact. The proposed prioritization process comprises three dimensions:

a. **Geographic prioritization**, based on a bottom-up consultative approach led by the states using multiple prioritization criteria and conflict sensitive programming;

b. **Sectoral and Sub-sectoral Prioritization**, based on the results of preliminary post RPBA prioritization exercises conducted together with these States and the relevant development partners; and

c. **Temporal Prioritization**, premised on a multi-phased engagement with GoN that entails providing a combination of support for both immediate and medium-term conflict recovery and resilience building.

22. **Conflict Sensitivity**: The prioritization process, along with overall project preparation and implementation, would be conducted adopting a bottom-up approach led by the states and informed by community consultations. Conflict sensitivity will be central to this project, ensuring proper identification and mitigation of conflict risks, supporting conflict resilience and addressing key drivers of conflict.

23. **Maximizing Complementarity and Avoiding Overlaps**: The programmatic-framework design approach adopted by the MCRP is to ensure complementarity and avoid duplications across the range of interventions proposed or undertaken by government institutions and development partners. A gap analysis has been developed, which summarizes how the project complements the WB AF projects and lists all the known and proposed interventions in the NE relevant to the project (see Annex 6). These have been, and will continue to be, taken into consideration to ensure that the MCRP builds synergies and complementarities with these projects. This is however not a one-time process and will require a rigorous institutional decision making process towards filling sectoral and geographic gaps where possible, and necessarily avoiding overlaps where necessary. Within the WB, coordination amongst project teams will ensure the respective projects in the NE are mutually supportive and use similar implementation, institutional and results management approaches. Institutional strengthening to the government will also be provided through the project to enhance its capacity to coordinate amongst relevant actors in the region and ensure ongoing activities are mutually supportive.

24. **Promoting Multi-Sector, Multi-Phased Recovery**: While focusing primarily on medium term multi-sector recovery and strengthening of social cohesion, the Project will also assist and smoothen the transition from humanitarian operations to early recovery. In this connection, the project will support the continuation and scaling up of provision of basic necessity kits and livelihoods assistance to forcibly displaced populations, using existing mechanisms and humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

25. **Concentration and Consolidation of Intended Project Impact**: Given that project resource allocation is only a fraction of the overall needs estimate of the RPBA, the project will only target the three most heavily and directly impacted BAY states, to concentrate and deepen project impact in fewer states rather than spreading it thin across the six affected states. Hence, the selection of the constituent project states, and subsequent project resource allocation across these states, is based largely on the principles of “impact proportionality” and “impact maximization”. The AfDB and IsDB infrastructure interventions are being spread across the six affected states, which also allows the WB project to place focus on the BAY states.

26. **The project bridges the gap between humanitarian and development activities.** It takes a gradual, phased and two-pronged approach, that includes: (i) a surge of high-impact, early recovery interventions in the period of stabilization for rebuilding lives and livelihoods while humanitarian operations continue in tandem
and; (ii) a gradual transition towards medium term recovery and resilience building through investments in social cohesion, productive, capital and social infrastructure. The key elements of the proposed approach are to: (i) respond to the immediate needs of forcibly displaced populations and host communities to address the humanitarian crisis; (ii) rapidly rebuild the social fabric and the social contract between the Government and its citizens, and; (iii) sustainably restore and improve service delivery and economic livelihoods across all critical sectors.

27. **Component 1: Strengthening Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion**

   **Social Cohesion** describes the nature and quality of relationships across people and groups in society, including the state (The World Bank, 2013). In the context of the MCRP, strengthening social cohesion implies supporting the creation of convergence mechanisms and platforms across groups in society that allow them to peacefully manage collective action as well as improving their immediate living conditions.

   **Transitional Support towards stabilization and self-reliance** by: (a) increasing and improving the access to basic necessity kits\(^8\); and (b) restoring immediate access to productive assets by providing agricultural inputs\(^9\) and livestock for farming families and trading commodities for non-farmers;

   **Increase community resilience and cohesion** by: (a) setting-up local peace-groups that bring together local authorities (government, traditional and religious) and representatives of different segments of the population; (b) financing social cohesion initiatives that address key drivers of the conflict and acute needs emerging from the conflict, such as social integration of out-of-school children and youth at risk, provision of life and soft skills for collective action, cultural, sport and social activities that promote common identities and inter-group interaction, as well as various violence-prevention and de-stigmatization campaigns., and (c) provision of community-based psychosocial support;

   **Citizen-government relationship building for recovery** by strengthening government capacity to consult stakeholders at local government and ward levels, and support them in planning for recovery and peace building.

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\(^7\) Social Cohesion describes the nature and quality of relationships across people and groups in society, including the state (The World Bank, 2013). In the context of the MCRP, strengthening social cohesion implies supporting the creation of convergence mechanisms and platforms across groups in society that allow them to peacefully manage collective action as well as improving their immediate living conditions.

\(^8\) This could include but not necessarily be limited to items necessary for the restoration of households including kitchen sets, mosquito nets, plastic mats, blankets, hygiene kits and other necessities.

\(^9\) Inputs to be provided could include but not necessarily be limited to seeds of local staple crops (i.e. maize, sorghum, beans or cowpea), fertilizers (i.e. NPK and urea) and manual tools. Pesticides are excluded from support packages.
Component 2 – Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Service Delivery Restoration and Improvement – US$ 150 million: This component will include the rehabilitation of critical physical infrastructure and the sustainable restoration of service delivery. Interventions under this component will be spread across the following sectors:

i. Transport: Rehabilitation and improvement of critical state and local transport infrastructure, including reconstruction and repair of damaged bridges and state and local roads.

ii. Restoration of municipal services including the reconstruction and repair of water supply facilities, latrines and other sanitation infrastructure, and solid waste management infrastructure and service delivery.

iii. Education: Reconstruction and repair of damaged school infrastructure such as classrooms, offices, fences, playground, latrines, labs, and other associated service delivery interventions.

iv. Health: Reconstruction or rehabilitation of health center buildings, and other associated service delivery interventions in respect of staff, furniture and supplies.

v. Public buildings: Rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged local government buildings particularly those seen as critical for restoring service delivery functionality across multiple sectors.

Component 3 – Technical Assistance (TA) and Program Management Support – US$ 20 million: This component would include TA for institutional capacity building and TA at the federal and state level for the (i) the development of implementation and performance management frameworks for programmatic recovery; (ii) immediate- and medium-term implementation capacity building; (iii) program management costs, including the engagement of a project management firm project monitoring and evaluation, contract management, financial management and procurement, and safeguards monitoring and management; and (iv) setting up citizen engagement and third party monitoring mechanisms.

Component 4 – Contingency Emergency Response Component (CERC) – US$ 0 million: This contingent emergency response component is included under the project in accordance with OP/BP 10.00, paragraphs 12 and 13, for situations of urgent need of assistance, as a project-specific CERC. This will allow for rapid reallocation of project funds in the event natural or manmade crisis in the future, during the implementation of the project, to address eligible emergency needs under the conditions established in its operations manual. This component will have no funding allocation initially, and will draw resources from the unallocated expenditure category in the case of activation. If an Immediate Response Mechanism is established, this Component will serve as an IRM CERC to allow the reallocation of uncommitted funds from the project portfolio to the IRM designated account to address emergency response and recovery costs, if approved by the WB.
IMPLEMENTATION

31. **The proposed Project will build on existing institutional structures, and establish new bodies only where needed, with specific and time-bound mandates.** Given the unprecedented nature of this conflict, new bodies for the recovery of the NE have been established at federal and state level, including the PCNI and the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Borno State. Yet, some of these institutions will evolve with time, and possibly new and more permanent ones will emerge, including the possible creation of the North East Development Commission (NEDC). The project is hence proposing to strengthen existing institutions such as PCNI to perform roles such as coordination at federal and state level, while at the same time strengthen MCRP implementation capacity. To this end, the GoN will develop and maintain a detailed Project Implementation Manual (PIM) to further elaborate the roles and responsibilities of the project’s implementation apparatus as well as lay out detailed technical and operational decision making processes.

32. **The MCRP activities will align with the overall recovery and stabilization Strategic Action Plan for the NE, coordinated by a Federal level apex committee.** This will likely be initially convened by the PCNI and anchored within the Vice President’s office. The committee includes representatives from the Vice President’s Office, PCNI, the Secretary to the Government, the FMoF, the FMBNP, and the BAY State Governors. This committee is also envisioned to provide oversight of recovery program activities in the NE, as well as central policy guidance and standard-setting as required on a periodic basis to ensure effective coordination and
harmonization of recovery and peace building initiatives in the NE, supported by government as well as development partners.

33. **The Project will support the setting up and/or strengthening of the following institutional coordination and implementation mechanisms:**
   a. **Overall Coordination:** At the federal level, the PCNI will be supported for strengthening coordination between federal government entities, development partners as well as with state governments.
   b. **Interstate coordination:** An interstate coordination committee would be established to ensure regular dialogue between the States to ensure effective policy coordination and alignment of implementation arrangements. States would be represented by a focal point nominated by the governor who has multi-sectoral responsibility and the ability to convene relevant state sectoral ministries. The state offices of PCNI could perform the secretariat functions of this committee, facilitating its materialization without creating any new institutional mechanisms.
   c. **Intrastate coordination through State steering committees:** At the state level, the project will support the coordination and collective decision making among line ministries, departments and agencies involved in the recovery and peace building process through the set-up of a recovery and peace building steering committee. The State steering committees will coordinate and oversee the implementation of recovery and peace building efforts at the State level, ensuring synergies across initiatives supported by different development partners.

34. **State-level Project Coordination Units (PCUs):** The PCU will focus on quality and process oversight, financial management, procurement, reporting, contract management, monitoring and evaluation and ensuring social and environmental safeguards compliance. For Component 1, the PCU will also be in charge of implementation functions given its cross-sectoral and cross-cutting nature. For Components 2 and 3, the implementation functions and responsibilities will be assigned to the relevant State line departments, where capacity exists. Therefore, in addition to coordination upwards to ensure the project responds to the evolving recovery needs of the State, the PCU will also coordinate across different sectoral line agencies to implement the multi-sectoral project activities. To develop economies of scale and a coherent state-led crisis recovery program, the PCU will also ensure MCRP coordination with related infrastructure projects supported by IsDB and AfDB.

35. **Sector-specific activities will build on existing institutional capacity and structures of the Ministries/Departments/Agencies (MDAs).** For Component 1, project implementation will be carried out by the State PCUs, taking into account the inter-sectoral nature of the component, and that functions such as return and reintegration of forcibly displaced population or social cohesion fall beyond the mandate of a single Ministry. In this case, while activity implementation will be outsourced to specialized service providers (as few as possible to ensure consistency), the State PCUs will be responsible for carrying out technical functions of site identification, development of bidding documents, as well as technical assurance and other necessary oversight. For Component 2, project implementation will be carried out by the relevant sectoral/technical MDAs in each State. The project will finance the operating costs of the respective project teams in these MDAs in order to ensure that existing capacity and organizational structures are used and enhanced where necessary. The staff working on the project will report to respective line agency hierarchy on a day to day basis for technical implementation, and report back to the PCU on a regular basis on overall for project implementation progress.

36. **State PCUs will be reinforced by a Project Management Consultancy (PMC) that will provide timely**
and quality support in technical, fiduciary and safeguards areas and supported by local partners for synergy of cooperation. The PMC will provide implementation support to the PCU on a phased basis. This will include intensive support in the first year in order to build the capacity of the PCU and then gradually phase out over the lifetime of the project. The PMC shall be expected to provide the PCU with intensive “on the job” training during the first phase of the project. The PMC will ensure that the management of all aspects of MCRP implementation, including fiduciary, safeguards and technical, is done in accordance with guidelines of the WB and within procedures of the State Governments. In addition, the project will link with local partners such as universities and civil society organizations, to fully mobilize available resources to improve the implementation capacity of the PCUs and to synergize cooperation from all partners under this project as a whole.

## SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safeguard Policies</th>
<th>Triggered?</th>
<th>Explanation (Optional)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4.01</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The proposed project activities includes the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure which could result in adverse environmental and social impacts thereby triggering OP/BP 4.01. However, considering the limited scale and magnitude of rehabilitation and improvement works as well as the confinement of activities to existing footprints, the proposed operation is classified as category ‘B’. At this point in time, the locations of the activities that will be financed by the project is not known in sufficient details. Site specific safeguards instruments such as ESIAs, stand-alone ESMPs, RAPs and Audits (when necessary) will be prepared, consulted upon and disclosed by the proponents prior to the commencement of civil works, and the relevant measures including E&amp;S clauses clearly incorporated in contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Habitats OP/BP 4.04</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This policy is triggered because of activities of reconstruction and rehabilitation of social and physical infrastructure might be located in or around areas recognized for biodiversity richness. No large scale conversion of biodiversity rich sites is envisaged. Mitigation measures will be part of the environmental assessment process of this project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forests OP/BP 4.36</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The project will not impact forests or forest products as defined by OP/BP 4.36.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pest Management OP 4.09</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>This project will not finance the procurement and/or use of pesticides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4.11</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This policy was triggered because PCR could be impacted at one or more sites. These may include religious sites such as mosques, churches and shrines,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and potential chance finds from civil works related excavation. In the event that a known/above ground cultural heritage is to be rehabilitated or lost, a physical cultural heritage management plan and/or compensation plan will be prepared and implemented by the project proponent. Also, the GON will prepare Chance Find Procedures for Contractors to guide them in the proper management of physical cultural properties in case they are found.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4.10</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>There are no Indigenous Peoples in the project area.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4.12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The need for involuntary resettlement or land acquisition in specific subproject areas will only be known during project implementation, when site-specific plans are available. Therefore, subprojects will be screened for applicability of the resettlement policy and in case any activity or subproject involves land acquisition, a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) or Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plan (ARAP) will be prepared in compliance with the Bank policy and Nigerian laws prior to actual implementation of the activity or subproject. Several issues will increase the complexity of land acquisition. For example, the lack of reliable land record systems, and the inability of people losing land to either document ownership or be physically present to make their claims for eligibility. Such situations can increase due to the situation of forced displacement in the North East as well as the weakened local authorities who can mediate in land ownership conflicts Site-specific Resettlement Plans will, therefore, include procedures for identifying eligible project-affected people, calculating and delivering compensation, and mechanisms for land dispute grievance redress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety of Dams OP/BP 4.37</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The implementation of the project will not entail the construction of new dam neither will any of the project activities rely on the performance of an existing dam or a dam under construction (DUC) that draw directly from a reservoir controlled by an existing dam or a DUC; diversion dams or hydraulic structures downstream from an existing dam or a DUC where failure of the upstream dam could cause extensive damage to or failure of the new Bank-funded structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7.50</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>This project will not involve extraction of water from any international waterways (any river, canal, lake or similar body of water that forms a boundary between</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The reconstruction and rehabilitation of affected basic social and physical infrastructure, may entail in cases, the construction of new infrastructure as to improve existing living conditions in BAY states and improve conditions before the conflict. As such, the project could involve land acquisition, and based on these conditions, the Bank policy on Involuntary Resettlement OP 4.12 is triggered. Although the involuntary resettlement and livelihood restoration are expected to be issues of moderate complexity, the involuntarily resettlement policy is triggered due to foreseen low to medium civil work activities (construction and rehabilitation of schools, health centers, water infrastructure, public buildings and community centers) as well as processes of retaking structures and buildings used as temporary camps for affected displaced people. The land acquired for this purpose may lead to loss of assets, sources of income or means of livelihoods for some households of conflict affected people.

Project activities that would trigger environmental impacts include rehabilitation and construction works of schools, hospitals, water intake and sanitation structures, public buildings and community structures. Construction related negative environmental impacts would include clearance of trees, noise nuisance, soil erosion, dust emissions, debris, solid and liquid wastes and pollution of surface and ground water resources among others. It is also important to recognize the practice of HIV/AIDS prevention and sensitization on non-tolerance of inappropriate contacts with underage girls in communities to help ensure a healthy migrant labor force of contractors and communities for civil works during construction periods.

Based on this assessment, the World Bank Safeguards Policies Triggered by MCRP: Environmental Assessment OP 4.01; Natural Habitats OP/BP 4.04; Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4.11 and Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4.12 are the only World Bank safeguards policies triggered for the proposed project. In terms of Environmental Assessment (EA) the MCRP is categorized B as no cumulative, unprecedented and large scale deleterious adverse impacts are envisaged to result from the activities that will be financed under this project.

2. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities in the project area:
Activities being planned under this project will have limited social and environmental impacts. In principle, MCRP does not envision to fund large-scale new infrastructure development projects (e.g. dams or power stations), but rather small to medium size rural infrastructural rehabilitation and reconstruction works in localized sites across the BAY areas. Much of the Project will focus on medium size rehabilitation and re-construction projects of schools, health centers, public buildings, water sources, roads and bridges. The anticipated scale of potential adverse environmental or social impacts on human populations are site-specific, few if any of them are irreversible and in most cases, mitigation measures could be designed to address the impacts.

3. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse impacts.

The MCRP, in view of the fact that it is responding to an emergency situation, will not in principle fund large-scale new infrastructure development projects that could potentially have long-term and irreversible impacts. Instead, the proposed project focuses on small to medium size rehabilitation and re-construction projects that can be easily managed at the community level. A flexible and programmatic approach is being taken and will adapt to the evolving context and environment on the ground.

4. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues. Provide an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described.

Specifically, the project will be processed through OP/BP 10.00 paragraph 12 that authorizes the deferral of the preparation of social and environmental assessment documents till implementation. Site specific safeguard instruments (ESIs, ESMPs, Audits—when needed- and RAPs) will be prepared as soon as the exact locations and scope of sub-project activities will be prepared, consulted upon and publicly disclosed. The Project, including the ESAP have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities for the implementation of measures related to safeguard policies. In addition, costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project cost tables.

5. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people.

Environmental Safeguards preparation, review and approval procedure to be followed under this project shall be consistent with the requirements from the Federal Ministry of Environment of Nigeria as specified in the Environmental Assessment Act (Decree No. 86 of 1992, hereinafter the EIA Act), the World Bank’s OP 4.01. Compliance with this procedure will constitute part of the evaluation methodology for proposed subprojects prior to approval for MCRP support. The steps in the process are project screening, environmental studies and document preparation, EIA review and approval, and oversight of implementation. Stakeholder consultation is an integral part of the preparation process, and public disclosure and comment are necessary prior to the decision to accept or reject a proposed subproject on the basis of environmental and social information.

The procedure for consultations on subprojects should conform to OP 4.01 and the EIA Act. OP 4.01 requires consultation with stakeholders. For MCRP, safeguards work on subprojects entails an initial consultation of affected populations and interested NGOs as well as relevant agencies of federal, state and local governments, to inform them about the proposed activity and solicit recommendations, questions and concerns to be addressed in environmental and social assessment. Once drafts of safeguards documents are completed, they must be disclosed. Both Nigeria and the Bank require public disclosure of EIAs, EMPs, and RAPs. The Bank’s requirements are the most detailed and, to comply with them, safeguards documents for MCRP subprojects will be disclosed, at public locations in the area affected by the project as well as in appropriate State and Federal agencies, and at the InfoShop at Bank Headquarters in Washington. Following a time period adequate for the review of those documents, which for MCRP is defined as 30 calendar days for Category B. It is a policy of the Bank that consultations and disclosure should be in form and language accessible to the
stakeholders, and that consultation should continue throughout project implementation. This consultation that has started during project preparation will be continued during implementation. In addition, the MCRP has a robust Grievance Redress Mechanism (DRM) that will project beneficiaries to log in complaints and receive swift and fair resolution in real time.

B. Disclosure Requirements (N.B. The sections below appear only if corresponding safeguard policy is triggered)

Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other

The review of this Safeguards has been Deferred.

Comments
N/A

Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process

The review of this Safeguards has been Deferred.

Comments
N/A

C. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting) (N.B. The sections below appear only if corresponding safeguard policy is triggered)

OP/BP/GP 4.01 - Environment Assessment

Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
NA

OP/BP 4.04 - Natural Habitats

Would the project result in any significant conversion or degradation of critical natural habitats?
No

If the project would result in significant conversion or degradation of other (non-critical) natural habitats, does the project include mitigation measures acceptable to the Bank?
NA

OP/BP 4.11 - Physical Cultural Resources

Does the EA include adequate measures related to cultural property?
NA

Does the credit/loan incorporate mechanisms to mitigate the potential adverse impacts on cultural property?
NA

OP/BP 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement

...
Has a resettlement plan/abbreviated plan/policy framework/process framework (as appropriate) been prepared?
No
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Practice Manager review the plan?
NA

The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's Infoshop?
NA
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs?
NA

All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project cost?
Yes
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal documents?
Yes

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