Local Level Institutions
Working Paper No. 4

GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN BOLIVIA

A STUDY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF TIAHUANACU, MIZQUE, VILLA SERRANO, AND CHARAGUA

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The World Bank
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GLOSSARY

APCOB Apoyo para el Campesinado del Oriente Boliviano
APG Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní
CEDEAGRO Centro de Desarrollo Agropecuario
CADIA Centro de Asesoramiento en Desarrollo Integral Agropecuario
COCAS Centro de Capacitación y Organización Agro Social
CIPCA Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado
CIAT Centro de Investigación Agropecuaria del Trópico
CEDEC Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo de Chuquisaca
CORELPAZ Cooperativa de Electricidad de La Paz
CORDEPAZ Corporación de Desarrollo de La Paz
ETASI Equipo técnico de asesoría interinstitucional
FIS Fondo de Inversión Social
FONDECO Fondo de Desarrollo Comunal
FSE Fondo Social de Emergencia
FDC Fondo de Desarrollo Campesino
IBTA Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria
INE Instituto Nacional de Estadística
IMCC Organización para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación Microregional
IRFA Instituto Radiofónico Fé y Alegría
LPP Ley de Participación Popular
ONG Organización no Gubernamental
PAMG Programa de Apoyo a la Mujer Guaraní
PDAR Plan de Desarrollo Alternativo Rural
PLAFORE Plan Forestal
PROSABAR Programa de Saneamiento Básico Rural
PDM Plan de Desarrollo Municipal
POA Plan Operativo Anual
SENDA Fundación Ser, Entorno, Desarrollo Autónomo
TECO GUARANI Taller de Educación y Comunicación Guaraní
SARTAWI Fundación Sartawi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study is the result of a research project commissioned by the World Bank to the firm of professional consultants, Sinergia, for the purpose of presenting an overview of Bolivia's grassroots organizations and local institutions at the municipal and community levels. On the basis of this overview, the study proposes to examine the mechanisms used by the organized population to channel its demands and also the strategies it employs to provide community services. The research in Bolivia is part of a comparative study on this subject that is also being carried out in Indonesia and Burkina Faso.

TRANSLATION

This text has been translated from the original Spanish by Ms. Marjory Urquidi. Selected annexes, translated by Ms. Urquidi and Ms. Mari Barboza, have been included in this report. Other annexes and additional documents may be obtained by contacting the World Bank (see inside cover).
INTRODUCTION

Objectives of the Study

Overall Objective

To establish the forms in which local institutions — both state and civil society — affect local development, especially the way in which these institutions help households and communities gain access to services and the market.

Specific Objectives

• To offer an inventory at three levels:
  1. Grassroots social organizations
  2. Local institutions (state and non-governmental) present in municipalities
  3. Existing services in the communities and municipalities under study

• To analyze the interaction established between grassroots organizations and local institutions for implementing delivery of services and access to services and resources.

• To identify local, state, and civil society institutions that can benefit from external support for local development programs.

• To identify the most adequate forms of support at three levels: types of counterparts, types of programs, and types of support/financing.

Survey Design

The survey was designed on the basis of information supplied by the National Institute of Statistics. For each municipality, we drew up lists of communities from which we made a statistical selection, using systematic sampling.

Selection of Communities

This was accomplished in the following way:

---

2 For selection of communities and those interviewed, our sampling frame was demographic data from the 1992 National Census of Population and Housing.
1. The capital of each municipality was selected to be the urban area required for the survey.

2. The number of rural communities in each municipality was divided by nine. The ratio was considered the systematic selection factor.

3. The first community to be included in the survey (apart from the municipal capital) was identified by means of simple random sampling.

Through this systematic selection, we made sure that, in each municipality survey, the municipal capital represented the "urban" area along with nine rural communities of varying population size — "large" communities and "small" communities — and that the statistical procedure was strictly observed.

In this way, the following communities were included in the study:
Table 1. Communities Included in the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Area</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Rural Area</strong></td>
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<td>Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>Mizque</td>
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<td>Kasachuta</td>
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<td>Huancollo</td>
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<td>Ñachoca</td>
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<td>Mizque Pampa</td>
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<td>Santa Rosa de Taraco</td>
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<td>Tin-Tin</td>
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<td>Chambi Taraco</td>
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<td>Yanarico</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Villa Serrano (Southern Valleys)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Charagua (Eastern Plains of the Chaco)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Villa Serrano</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Charagu</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuevo Mundo</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>Machipo</td>
<td>337</td>
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<td>Cañadillas</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>San Antonio</td>
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<td>Mendoza</td>
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<td>Isoporenda</td>
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<td>San Francisco</td>
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<td>Pampas Arias</td>
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<td>Lampasillos</td>
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<td>Masavi</td>
<td>419</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huerta Mayu</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>Taputa</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Selection of Housing Units

In selecting housing units, two procedures were used: one for the capital of each municipality (urban area), and the other for the remaining nine rural communities.

Selection of housing units in the urban area. A two-stage sampling was done in each municipal capital:

- Simple random sampling with no replacement of blocks, based on a map drawn up by the National Institute of Statistics.

- In each block selected, a systematic selection was made of the housing units that had been included in the sample. For this selection, the number of units in the block were counted. This number was divided by the number of interviews to be conducted in each block (usually four). The ratio was considered the systematic selection factor. The first housing unit to be included was selected by simple random sampling. Starting with this unit, the other three were selected on the basis of the systematic selection factor.

Selection of housing units in the rural area. In the rural area, two procedures were used:

First Procedure:

1. All the housing units in the community were counted. The number of units was divided by the number of interviews to be conducted (a total of 25). The ratio was considered the systematic selection factor.

2. The community's visible center was located. Simple random sampling was used to select the first housing unit to be included in the sample.

3. Starting with this housing unit, an open clockwise spiral path was followed; the sample included units chosen according to the systematic selection factor. 3

This path was followed until the sample included the housing units most distant from the community center. This procedure was applied to two communities of the Tiahuanacu municipality.

On recommendation of the World Bank, after using this method in the two Tiahuanacu communities, we changed the selection procedure for housing units in the remaining rural communities.

3 Contrary to what might be assumed, in most of the rural communities there is not a marked internal social stratification. Moreover, relatively more "prosperous" campesinos do not live in the community center, but close to the road. In light of these circumstances and Sinergia's earlier experiences, it can be stated that this type of selection in rural communities is sufficiently representative of the population.
Second Procedure:

1. All housing units in the community were counted. Then, starting from its visible center, the community was divided into four imaginary quadrants.

2. In each quadrant, the housing units were re-counted, and the number of questionnaire forms assigned was weighted by the proportional number of housing units in the quadrant.

3. In each quadrant, the total number of housing units was divided according to the assigned number of forms. The ratio was considered the systematic selection factor for this quadrant.

4. Then, the most northeastern housing unit within the quadrant was chosen as the point of departure. Starting with this unit, other units were chosen according to the systematic selection factor, spiraling inward toward the center of the quadrant in question.

In each unit, the head of household was interviewed. If no head of household was to be found in the selected unit, a replacement unit was selected, using the same procedures described above.

To summarize, it can be said that a multi-stage sampling was applied with systematic selection of communities and systematic selection of households.

**Research Techniques**

For this study, the following research techniques were used:
Table 2. Research Techniques Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Techniques</th>
<th>Executed By municipality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>At Household Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face to face interviews (surveys)</td>
<td>250 surveys, 25 per community in 10 communities</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>At Community Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups with male heads of household and female heads of household and/or wives</td>
<td>20 groups, 2 per community in 10 communities</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grout interviews with community leaders</td>
<td>10 interviews, 1 per community</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory/description of the community</td>
<td>10 forms, 1 per community</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>At Municipal Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interviews with authorities and key informants</td>
<td>Average of 8 interviews</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case studies of “successful” projects</td>
<td>2 projects</td>
<td>4⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The household-survey questionnaire form was provided by the World Bank together with sample size and quotas per community, so that the study's quantitative data would be comparable to the findings in the other two countries where the study is being conducted: Indonesia and Burkina Faso.

On the other hand, the instruments used to collect qualitative data were designed by the Sinergia team in accordance with the particular characteristics of Bolivia, but based on recommendations made by the World Bank research team.

Field Work

To carry out field work, initial contacts were made with grassroots institutions, authorities, and directors in the municipalities selected. These contacts were made through non-governmental organizations that had already worked for several years in the area.⁵

Field-Work Planning

Once the first contacts were established, we proceeded to plan our field work, beginning with a chronogram that later underwent significant changes, as will be explained later.

Two field-work teams were formed. One was to compile qualitative data through focus groups, group interviews, in-depth interviews, and documentary research. In the frame of quantitative research, the other team was to work exclusively with heads of household on completing the questionnaire forms.

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⁴ At the outset, eight case studies were planned, but only four could be carried out due to limited access to information.

⁵ For its ongoing work in the area of social research and evaluation of social projects, Sinergia keeps in regular contact with the NGOs. These organizations were kept informed of the study's objectives and they cooperated in every way to help us achieve our purpose.
Field-Work Problems

One of the most serious problems in our field work\textsuperscript{6} was the rainy season, which this year lasted too long. Because of this situation, roads to some communities were almost impassable, causing many problems for our teams.

Another difficulty was that our field work took place during harvest-time, which kept a number of campesinos\textsuperscript{7} occupied most of the day. Fortunately, thanks to earlier contacts made with both communal and supra-communal authorities, the latter encouraged campesinos to take a break from their harvesting in order to cooperate with the study.

A third difficulty lay in the seasonal and permanent emigration of heads of household in some communities. This made it more difficult to make contact with heads of household.

The fourth difficulty came from the dynamics of the municipal authorities. Following enactment of the Popular Participation Law, municipal authorities have had very heavy schedules. This was especially true in Charagua and Mizque.

A final obstacle was the length of the questionnaire form, which took about 1.15 to 1.30 hours to fill out. This meant that some male/female heads of household interrupted the interview before it could be completed, obliging us to find replacements.

Data Processing

Quantitative Data

Completed questionnaires were being processed in our offices at the same time field work was taking place, so that if any errors were found, they could be corrected by a re-interview or a new interview in the community.

On completion of the data processing, our team made a consistency check of the coding scheme as it referred to local institutions of Sections II and III of the questionnaire. Having made sure the coding scheme was valid, our team went on to code the 1,000 questionnaires and subsequently to transcribe them.

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\textsuperscript{6} Field work, which was conducted between March 3 and April 26, 1997.

\textsuperscript{7} Literally translated, “campesino” identifies one who is of the land or country. The term is generally used to refer to a subsistence farmer or cultivator who may be the owner, tenant, or salaried worker.
The data base was cleaned in close cooperation with the World Bank and according to the requirements of the institution's research team.

Sinergia opted for simple cross-tabulations in data processing because of the limited capacity of our installations to manage the data statistically.

**Qualitative Data**

*Non-comparative processing.* Qualitative data were processed in separate stages:

- First, a report was prepared for each community on the basis of the qualitative data collected from focus groups, group interviews with leaders, the community-description forms, and additional in-depth interviews.
- Second, reports were prepared for each municipality in order to process the qualitative data gathered from in-depth interviews with municipal authorities, leaders of grassroots supra-communal organizations, and NGO officers.
- Third, every successful project studied in each municipality was processed.

*Comparative processing.* For the comparative processing of qualitative data, two double-entry matrices were prepared, each one of which captured two levels of analysis: the municipal and the community.

**Final Considerations**

Following the recommendations of the World Bank research team, we were guided by Putnam's work on social capital (Putnam, 1993) for our methodology and interpretations of results. This work provided us with some of the conceptual bases supporting our report's analysis.

Our analysis is predominantly at the municipal level, on the assumption that this will furnish an adequate contextual framework to enable the World Bank team, with its detailed information on families and communities, to interpret and use the data as needed.

The report is divided into six chapters. After a general synthesis serving as an executive summary, the first chapter presents an overview of the historical and circumstantial context in which local institutions and grassroots organizations have evolved.

The second chapter examines — by municipality — services, institutions, and grassroots organizations. In the third and fourth chapters, we present our main conclusions on the most important organizational patterns. We also describe the mechanisms and strategies for institutional and self-managed relations that are used by the organized population and by local governments to solve problems of services and access to resources within the context of rural poverty.

The fifth and sixth chapters deal with the study's principal conclusions and its recommendations for achieving a stronger civil society.
In closing, we wish to express our gratitude to all the institutions and persons whose generous sharing of information enabled us to carry out this report. We would like to especially mention the collaboration of CEDEAGRO, CEDEC, COCAS, and CIPCA; all the campesino and sindicato Centrals that gave us entrance into their communities and believed in our work; and also the advice and contributions of officials of the Secretariat of Popular Participation and UDAPSO.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Socio-Economic Context

In Bolivia, poverty is accompanied by a profound inequity in the distribution of resources between rural and urban areas. This means that whereas poverty affects 52.6 percent of urban households, in rural areas 95.4 percent of households live in poverty. For this reason, rural-urban emigration has increased in recent decades. Since 1985, with the implementation of structural adjustment policies, this situation has worsened because the most vulnerable sectors of society have had to bear the cost of adjustment.

Meanwhile, policies have been adopted to mitigate the social consequences of the so-called structural adjustment. One of the most important of such measures is the 1994 Popular Participation Law that modifies local development conditions in Bolivia. This law has three main features:

- It reorders the political organization of Bolivia's provinces by designating each provincial "section" as the basic urban-rural planning zone for local development: this zone is called the "municipality".

- It redistributes resources to municipalities according to the number of inhabitants in each one. Previously, only 7.9 percent of the financial resources earmarked for municipalities went to rural areas; after enactment of the Law, this percentage rose to 61 percent.

- It establishes institutional channels enabling grassroots organizations to participate actively in determining and prioritizing their requirements, in presenting their demands to municipal government, and in monitoring actions taken by municipalities. In each rural community and urban district, it recognizes a grassroots organization — which can be an agrarian sindicato, an indigenous community, or a neighborhood committee — as the active channel of communication with municipal government.

The Popular Participation Law incorporates some of the social processes that have been evolving for decades in Bolivia and it proposes to change others:

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8 This study considers local development to be the dynamics between social and institutional actors in a given geographical region; such dynamics are oriented toward the generation and redistribution of social, economic, and cultural resources for the purpose of improving the quality of life of the population (Arocena, 1995).
• It preserves and reinforces the longtime organizational tradition of Bolivia's campesino and indigenous communities.\(^9\)

• This tradition, which dates from pre-Hispanic times, continued under the Republic and became clearly defined in the populist-national revolution of 1952. The government that emerged from this revolution gave impetus to campesino organizations in the highlands and valleys of Bolivia by way of an "Agrarian sindicato" in each community. In the lowlands of eastern Bolivia, indigenous communities have maintained their traditional forms of organization. These grassroots organizations encourage community work and are the channels through which demands are presented to governmental and non-governmental institutions.

• The Popular Participation Law seeks to modify the centralist character assumed by the state after the 1952 revolution. This centralism meant that resources were concentrated in cities and political decisions were made in La Paz; consequently, in rural areas there was no state presence and the provinces received few resources.

Description of the Municipalities Under Study

• Tiahuanacu: It is located in the Bolivian highland, at an altitude of 3870 meters above sea level. Cold and arid, it is inhabited by Aymara campesinos who engage in subsistence farming and dairy production.

• Mizque: It is located in Bolivia's central valleys (classified as mesothermic) at 2225 meters above sea level. Its climate is hot and subject to periods of drought. It is inhabited by Quechua campesinos who farm intensively on small parcels of land.

• Villa Serrano: It is located in the valleys of southern Bolivia at 2378 meters above sea level. Its varied climate is typical of the many different microclimates found in the mountainous Andean countryside. Its population, although originally Quechua, has been largely Hispanicized and they practice subsistence farming. Haciendas still exist in this part of the country.

• Charagua: It is located on the plains of eastern Bolivia in the region known as the "Chaco", at an altitude of 980 meters. Its climate is dry. Its Guarani indigenous population live side by side with hacienda owners engaged in raising livestock and the exploitation of forests.

In Tiahuanacu, Mizque, and Villa Serrano, rural communities are represented by agrarian sindicatos. In some communities, women and producers are also organized. In Charagua, rural communities are organized around the Regional Assembly of the Guarani People, which performs

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\(^9\) The term "campesino" is used here to designate the rural inhabitant primarily on the basis of his productive activity, which is linked to his land. On the other hand, the term "indigenous" is used to describe the rural inhabitant primarily on the basis of his cultural tradition, which is different from the more western and "criollo" cultural tradition.
functions similar to those of the agrarian sindicato. Rural organizations are grouped together in supra-communal organizations, which in Tiahuanacu, Mizque, and Villa Serrano are called Campesino Centrals; in Charagua they are known as the Regional Assemblies of the Guarani People.

In all four municipalities there are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that work in the areas of health, formal and informal education, in support for grassroots organizations, and in agricultural and livestock production. Charagua has the greatest number of NGOs.

All four municipalities have serious problems of access to basic services. There are, however, differences: Charagua has the broadest coverage in education and health; Mizque has the best systems of irrigation and potable water; Tiahuanacu has expanded primary education and community electrification; and Villa Serrano has developed irrigation systems.

Demands are channeled through grassroots organizations, which also monitor the actions of municipal governments and help maintain the infrastructure of education, health, and regional secondary roads. In most cases, they are not involved in maintaining electrical services and in providing access to small loans.

**Characteristics of Community Organizations**

In general, grassroots organizations play an important role in the municipalities under study:

- Eight of ten households participate in grassroots organizations.
- Grassroots organizations are very important in nine of ten cases.
- Seven of ten cases participate in the decisions of grassroots organizations.
- Seven of ten cases believe that grassroots organizations benefit the community and the family.
- In six of ten cases, respondents state that the organization was formed by the community

There are two kinds of grassroots organizations:

- Territorial organizations (campesino sindicatos and neighborhood committees) which specialize in demanding services that have a greater impact on the community than on the individual family. They are quite effective.

- Functional organizations (of women and of producers) whose membership is voluntary and whose impact is more on the family than on the community. They are less effective than the territorial organizations.

Municipalities having a strong organizational tradition that preserves many of the indigenous patterns of organization (Tiahuanacu and Mizque):
♦ Greater participation in the agrarian labor union

♦ Perception that membership is mandatory

♦ Attendance at meetings "fair" (3 to 6 times in the last 3 months)

Municipalities having a weaker organizational tradition that preserves fewer of the indigenous patterns of community organization (Villa Serrano and Charagua):

♦ Less participation in the Agrarian Sindicato (Villa Serrano) or the Regional Assembly of the Guarani People (Charagua)

♦ Perception that membership is voluntary

♦ Attendance at some family meetings "high" (more than 6 times in the last 3 months), and at other family meetings "low" (less than 3 times in the last 3 months)

Municipalities having grassroots organizations that more effectively channel social demands (Mizque and Charagua):

♦ Less participation of families in more than two organizations

♦ More participation in the decisions of grassroots organizations

Municipalities having grassroots organizations that are less effective channels for social demands (Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano):

♦ Greater participation of families in more than two grassroots organizations

♦ Less participation in the decisions of grassroots organizations

The strength of grassroots organizations is affected by the penetration of market forces in the following ways:

♦ In communities isolated from markets and with high levels of poverty, their subsistence living standard and the emigration of their inhabitants mean that their grassroots organizations are weak and unstable.

♦ In communities affected by the terciarization of their economic activity, there emerge groups of merchants and truckers who have no roots in the community; here, grassroots organizations are also weak and lacking authority.

♦ In communities that have higher levels of agricultural productivity and, therefore, higher living standards and access to educational and health services, grassroots organizations are stronger and more dynamic.
Social and Institutional Actors in Local Development

Regional leaderships that promote and direct supra-communal campesino organizations are very important in pressuring municipal governments to respond to the demands of civil society and in monitoring actions taken by such governments. They resolve conflicts between communities and they are able to mobilize the population in order to attain regional goals.

The effectiveness of regional leaderships depends chiefly on renovation of leaderships, on the educational level of new leaders, on their experience in negotiating with institutions, and on innovative organizational practices.

The regional leaderships of Mizque and Charagua are dynamic and effective in channeling demands. The regional leaderships of Tiahuanacu have shown initiative and the ability to mobilize support, although in this municipality there is not yet a cohesive "team" of leaders. In Villa Serrano, regional leadership is only beginning to be established.

It is not possible to understand the dynamics of local development without taking into account municipal government's effectiveness in processing and responding to social demands. After enactment of the Popular Participation Law, municipal government was able to increase municipal resources through external financing and to orient local development toward a specific purpose.

The effectiveness of municipal government depends on the formation of a regional elite to direct local development; the institutional stability of the municipality; the institutionalization of receiving, processing, and responding to social demands; the training of human resources; and institutional ability to increase resources made available to it by the Popular Participation Law.

In Mizque, municipal government is headed by an established campesino elite that has trained workers and incorporated technical procedures. In Charagua, municipal government is made up of ranchers and timber barons; but it is open to dialog with the Guarani indigenous population. In Villa Serrano, consolidation of municipal government is just beginning to emerge from a power struggle between various groups. In Tiahuanacu, municipal government is still weak and has no trained human resources.

This study has established that when non-governmental organizations are present to provide continuous guidance in social matters, they are a major factor in supporting and strengthening a regional grassroots leadership and in training human resources for municipal government. These non-governmental organizations promote relations between municipal government and civil society.

Non-governmental organizations providing continuous guidance in social matters are institutionally stable (in their financing and internal administration); they have working experience in the region; they have acquired a comprehensive understanding of local development; they coordinate their activities with other NGOs, as well as with municipal government and regional grassroots leadership; and they work hard to train human resources.
In Mizque, CEDEAGRO has played a major role in strengthening local development, as has CIPA in Charagua. In Villa Serrano, CEDEC and CARE attempt to overcome structural limitations on local development. In Tiahuanacu, there is no NGO to provide ongoing social guidance.

Local development in the four municipalities under discussion is influenced by several scenarios that are compared as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
<th>V. Serrano</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stable Regional Leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient and Accessible Municipal Government</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ongoing NGO Social Guidance</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potential for Local Development</td>
<td>Very Favorable</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>Fairly Favorable</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
</tr>
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CHAPTER 1

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN BOLIVIA

Introduction

This chapter will describe the context in which grassroots organizations and institutions interact in the dynamics of local development.

A Brief Description of the Demographic and Socio-Economic Situation in Bolivia

Bolivia is a landlocked country with a heterogeneous geography in terms of ecology, altitude, and climate. This means that there are immense difficulties of communication between the various regions that limit the extension of basic services to the widely dispersed settlements of the rural area. These physical features, together with an economic development that is characterized by regional and sectoral disparities, have produced a country in which development is inequitable and where there are high levels of poverty.

The heterogeneity of ecologies also implies a cultural heterogeneity that makes Bolivia a multi-ethnic and pluri-lingual country. The three most important indigenous groups of the population are the Aymara, who live in the highland (La Paz and part of Oruro); the Quechua, who inhabit the valleys (Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, and Potosí); and the Guarani, in the eastern lowlands. It is estimated that 70 percent of the Bolivian population is of indigenous origin (Yashar, 1997).

With a population of about 6,420,165 inhabitants, which increases at an annual rate of 2.11 percent\(^1\), Bolivia presents the following basic demographic characteristics:

- Whereas 42 percent of population is less than 15 years old, the number of those aged over 50 is in sharp decline.
- Early marriage and 5 to 6 children per female are the rule in rural areas
- Infant mortality rates reach 75 per 1,000 live births
- Life expectancy is 59 years

\(^{1}\) Source of this and following data is 1992 National Population and Housing Census.
Inequity and lack of opportunities in Bolivia are closely linked to gender and ethnic discrimination: households headed by females and/or persons speaking only an indigenous language are more likely to live below the poverty line (UDAPSO, 1995).\(^\text{11}\)

Poverty indicators show that there is a profound inequity between urban and rural areas. At the national level, urban poverty affects 52.6 percent of the population, whereas in rural areas, this percentage is 95.4 percent (Muller y Asociados, 1997). This is due to the deficient infrastructure, services, and resources existing in rural areas.\(^\text{12}\)

In Bolivia, rural women have little access to education; for every illiterate man, there are four illiterate women (INE, 1992).

Although the so-called structural adjustment that began in 1985 halted the country’s hyperinflation,\(^\text{13}\) it launched the liberalization of the economy and the work force. This factor, together with other structural changes in Bolivia’s development and the drought of 1982, accelerated the impoverishment of broad sectors of the population, which gave rise to deteriorating living conditions and rural emigration to the more populated cities. Therefore, we find that rural growth rates are close to negative in several regions.\(^\text{14}\) In a large part of the rural area, seasonal migration is more and more practiced as a way of supplementing family income. Household heads move according to the agricultural cycle, in order to sell their unskilled labor in cities.

The principal causes of the seasonal and permanent emigration of rural population to cities are (Morales, 1992; Castedo, Mansilla, 1993; and UNITAS, 1994):

- Declines in agricultural and livestock production
- Adverse climatic conditions
- Absence of irrigation infrastructure and appropriate technologies
- Increasingly smaller land parcels
- Marketing difficulties

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\(^{11}\) Poverty has been measured by the National Statistical Institute and by the Political Sciences Center, with data from the 1992 National Population and Housing Census, using for this purpose the methodology of unsatisfied basic needs such as access to basic services, health, and education.

\(^{12}\) For example, in rural areas, only 24 percent of households have potable water; only 17 percent have sewerage (Giussani, 1996).

\(^{13}\) By 1985, monthly inflation had soared to 128.8 percent (CEDLA, 1994). In the last four years, annual inflation has averaged 10 percent.

\(^{14}\) In 1950, about 73.8 percent of the Bolivian population lived in rural areas, while the remaining 26.2 percent lived in towns or cities; in 1992, some 42.5 percent live in rural areas, while 57.5 percent of Bolivians live in urban localities of more than 2,000 inhabitants.
• Absence of vigorous public policies to support the small farmer.

• Deficiencies in coverage and quality of formal education.

Rural-urban migration is not associated with urban development and industrialization.\textsuperscript{15} In Bolivia, the growth of some cities at the expense of a decline in rural areas and other depressed population centers has resulted from the poverty that drives people to seek better living conditions.\textsuperscript{16}

The expectations of rural-urban migrants — mainly better working conditions, education, and access to services — have no correlation with receiver zones in need of human resources. This situation suggests that in coming years there will be increased marginalization and poverty in the major cities of Bolivia.

Public Policies Aimed at Human Development

Together with the macro-economic policies known as “structural adjustment”, the cost of which has been borne by the poorest social sectors, there have been some state initiatives to remedy the conditions of poverty. These include:

• \textbf{Popular Participation (1994)} decentralizes the state by redistributing resources and responsibilities to municipal governments and it involves social organizations in the planning, execution, and monitoring of municipal performance.\textsuperscript{17} Further on, we shall fully develop this subject, because it directly affects local development processes.

• \textbf{Administrative Decentralization (1996)} is a measure that supplements Popular Participation and grants greater responsibilities to departmental governments.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Bolivian industry has been very weak. Poor production infrastructure and lack of production-support policies has adversely affected the country’s competitive position (Baudoin, 1997).

\textsuperscript{16} More than 30 percent of the population lives in Bolivia’s four major cities, called the “Axis Cities”: La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. At the same time, it is estimated that there are 12,000 rural communities with populations of less than 225 inhabitants (INE, 1992).

\textsuperscript{17} Territorial administration in Bolivia conforms to a unitary system under the central government, and nine regions called “departments” under the departmental government, which is headed by the prefect. Each department is in turn divided into smaller regions called “provinces” headed by a subprefect. Each province is divided into “province sections”; a province section is an urban-rural space generally united by the dynamics of an economy that ties together the section. In most of the rural area, province sections are made up of one or two “urbanized” towns that concentrate the commercial and administrative activity of the section and they also include several campesino communities that carry out most of the production activity. The Popular Participation Law constituted each province section as an urban-rural municipality. This is the space in which the present study analyzes the dynamics of local development.

Finally, each province section, now called a “municipality” by Popular Participation, is composed of smaller zones or regions, which are the “districts” of the municipality. The “district” generally coincides with what was called “canton” before the Popular Participation Law.

\textsuperscript{18} For a more detailed analysis of this and the measures that follow, see Giussani, 1996.
• **Capitalization (1996)** is a special mechanism for privatizing public enterprises that transfers 50 percent of their shares to foreign enterprises in order to promote investment in major public enterprises.

• **Pension Reform (1997)** substitutes individual capitalization for the former system of simple distribution.\(^\text{19}\)

• **Educational Reform (1994)** proposes to broaden access to the formal educational system by incorporating bilingual education and promoting community participation through school councils.

• **National Old Age Insurance and Maternal and Child Health Programs (1996)** are both designed to provide free medical care to the most vulnerable sectors of the population — the elderly and, during their childbearing period, women who are not wage-earners.\(^\text{20}\)

• **INRA Law (1996)** is a kind of continuation of the agrarian reform decreed in 1953. Its objective is a just redistribution of land: indigenous people have access to community lands and are also entitled to free adjudication in cases where unproductive latifundia are expropriated. Campesinos and settlers have titles to their land guaranteed. To ensure their legal ownership, entrepreneurs are required to pay taxes and invest in their lands.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Bolivia has consolidated democracy after a long period of dictatorships and military coups that were a constant between 1964 and 1982. Since 1982, democracy has continued without interruption. During fifteen years of democratic government, Bolivia has implemented important economic and institutional reforms, while enjoying a measure of fiscal and macro-economic stability.\(^\text{21}\) Nonetheless, these achievements have not yet been reflected in a more aggressive growth in GDP\(^\text{22}\) that would enable the country to satisfy its social demands.

**Grassroots Organizations and Local Development in Rural Bolivia Before Popular Participation**

To understand the relations that were established between grassroots organizations and local institutions after enactment of the Popular Participation Law in 1944, it is necessary first to understand the dynamics of these grassroots organizations and the actions taken in local

\(^{19}\) In a system of simple distribution, active workers finance, by mandatory contributions, the pensions of retired workers.

\(^{20}\) Female wage-earners and the elderly have been covered by medical insurance since 1930. Resources for Old Age Insurance come from the National Lottery and for the Mother-Child Insurance from the National Treasury.

\(^{21}\) The annual shortfall in tax revenue of the past decade has been reduced in recent years; currency issue is under control and tax collection has been increased.

\(^{22}\) In the last five years, GDP has grown at no more than 4 percent annually.
development that, before Popular Participation, bore the imprint of the national-populist revolution of 1952.\textsuperscript{23}

The three most important consequences of the 1952 revolution were:

- Redistribution of land by the Agrarian Reform of 1953.
- “Citizenship” for the campesino through a broader vote and expanded educational system.\textsuperscript{24}
- Official encouragement of campesino organizations, as a support base for the new state.

**Agrarian Reform**

Agrarian reform was enacted in August 1953 at a time of political instability. Both in the La Paz highland and the Cochabamba valleys, campesinos, organized into sindicatos, demanded the takeover of land even to the point that they defied government authority (Rivera, 1984). And where the campesino sindicato movement was strongest, there was more land redistribution (Calderon and Dandler, 1984).

It soon became clear that agrarian reform had resulted in the breaking up of land into small parcels. Of Bolivia’s 108 million hectares of territory, 72 million are not suitable for livestock or agriculture; 32 million are in the hands of 40,000 medium and large-size enterprises, and only 4 million hectares are owned by 550,000 families of small campesino landholders. In other words, 11 percent of the redistributed land is divided among 90 percent of landowners, and the remaining 89 percent belongs to 10 percent of landowners (UNITAS, 1995).

**Campesino Sindicatos**

In 1952, the state promoted organization of rural sindicatos as a mechanism for political control of campesino mobilization. The formal process of land expropriation could be initiated only through the sindicato (Pearse, 1984). The revolutionary state counted on campesino sindicatos to serve as its armed force and as an instrument for mobilizing the masses in its support.

Even though the word “sindicato” derives from the notorious urban organizations, the rural sindicato has features distinguishing it from the proletarian sindicato. “The sindicato assumed the principal campesino demands such as control and ownership of land parcels, but it also became basically an organization of local self-government that legitimized the campesino’s status as a citizen and participant in the political process” (Calderón, 1984:44).

\textsuperscript{23} For a more detailed description of grassroots organizations and local development before 1952, see Lavaud, 1984.
\textsuperscript{24} Before 1952 only males of criollo descent had the right to vote, and education was offered exclusively in urban areas (Lavaud, 1984).
The sindicato in each campesino community is directed by the secretary general, whose collaborators take care of sectoral matters: secretary of public relations; agriculture; education; justice; livestock raising; roads; sports; and others (Pearse, 1984). New sindicato directors are elected every year by direct vote of the community population.

At the supra-communal level, the campesino sindicato is structured as follows:

Elimination of the haciendas and the concomitant formation of campesino sindicatos took place in the highland and valleys where the population WAS primarily Aymara and Quechua. The eastern plains remained almost untouched by agrarian reform and campesino sindicatos. Here, land rapidly became concentrated in the hands of the military governors of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the GUARANI\(^{25}\) indigenous population began gradually to organize, culminating at the end of the 1980s in the formation of CIDOB (Indigenous Central of Eastern Bolivia), which grouped together the new indigenous organizations of the region. CIDOB is affiliated with the Confederation of Bolivian Campesino Workers.

\(^{25}\) Less integrated into the market and urban culture than the Aymara and Quechua.
Local Development and the Channeling of Demands Previous to Popular Participation

The state that emerged from the 1952 revolution centralized all development initiatives and also was the principal agent of income redistribution. This meant that there was a conspicuous absence of the state at the local level. In the 1970s, in response to this vacuum, hundreds of NGOs, together with social grassroots organizations, sought to act as a substitute for the state in providing services. Only in the 1980s did the state attempt to fulfill its commitment to respond at the regional and local level by setting up the Department of Development Corporations, the Social Emergency Fund — which later became the Social Investment Fund — and the Campesino Development Fund.

Because of the national government’s centralist character, local institutions were weakened by their inability to make political decisions, their limited access to resources, and by the lack of attention given to rural areas.

Popular Participation

The above-described conditions prevailed in Bolivia when the Popular Participation Law was enacted in 1994. The latter recognized 311 municipalities and not only assigned to them resources and new functions, but also gave grassroots organizations — whether neighborhood committees, indigenous communities, or campesino organizations — legal standing and shared responsibility for planning and monitoring local development.

Central Aspects of Popular Participation

Implementation of the Popular Participation Law has three important aspects:

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26 “In Bolivia, almost no one goes to negotiate with the prefect, everyone wants to negotiate with the President of the Republic. This is the consequence of a centralist structure at every level. Historically, it is a logic that began with the 1952 revolution, inasmuch as the state from its central position created political parties, sindicatos, and everything that exists in the country” (Blanes, 1996:166)

27 It is estimated that more than 500 non-governmental institutions operate in Bolivia with resources of about 150 to 200 million USD a year:

- NGOs concentrate their activities in rural areas.

In order of importance, NGO activities include: education; health and nutrition; training in production; technical advice and assistance; and micro-credit (Sandoval, 1993).

The impact of the NGOs is just beginning to be studied and discussed. There is no doubt, however, that they have played a major role as settings for innovative social intervention, such as their contributions to drafting the Popular Participation Law, to including the gender issue in the public agenda, and to educational reform and multi-lingual education.

28 Until 1987, municipal authorities were appointed by the state.

29 In 1986, a law to simplify tax collection was passed that redistributed fiscal resources: 75 percent went to the National Treasury; 10 percent to departmental development corporations; 5 percent to universities; and only 10 percent to municipalities, 90 percent of which were located in capital cities.


31 Of 311 municipalities, 248 were created after enactment of the Popular Participation Law.

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First, the state extended its control throughout the country beyond what even the 1952 state had accomplished. It established 311 municipalities, each being a section of the province and having rural and urban jurisdiction.

Second, it assigned resources\(^\text{32}\) and specific functions to municipal government, transferring to it duties previously discharged by the central government such as maintaining the infrastructure of education, health, small-scale irrigation, and local roads, and also promoting rural development.

In addition to resources from shared tax revenue, there are other funds available to municipalities — the “Counterpart Funds”, which are channeled mainly through the Social Investment Fund (FIS) and the Campesino Development Fund (FDC). The purpose of counterpart funds is to increase income by concentrating social investment on areas such as educational infrastructure and production investment that are given priority in national strategic policies. In order to apply these funds, the municipality has to meet technical planning requirements and also contribute about 30 percent of the total investment requested.

Third, the Popular Participation Law recognizes indigenous, campesino, and urban communities as channels of communication with municipal government. This recognition of national organizational tradition implies legal recognition of a variety of organizations according to the uses and customs of each community. These organizations range from those structured in the most modern way after establishment of the 1952 state — campesino sindicatos and, in populated centers, precinct organizations (neighborhood committees) — to the most traditional organizations (ayllus, capitanías, tentas, etc.). The Law respects the traditional and customary norms of each community in electing its officials and achieving community consensus.

In each campesino community a “legal personality” is granted to an organization known generically as a “Territorial Grassroots Organization”, which is given rights and obligations to propose, request, control, and supervise the execution of work projects and the provision of public services in accordance with community needs as regards education, health, sports, basic sanitation, small-scale irrigation, local roads, and urban and rural development; it can propose changes in or the ratification of educational and health authorities within its territory; and it has access to information on the resources allocated to Popular Participation (Popular Participation Law, Art. 12).

\(^{32}\) Municipal funds, which come from shared revenue (domestic and customs taxes) that is distributed among the municipalities on a per capita basis, went up from 10 to 20 percent with the Popular Participation Law. This means that resources tripled between 1993 and 1995; in 1993, 52,166,580 USD came from shared revenue; by 1995, the amount had gone up to 155,550,584 USD. Redistribution of this absolute increase has been weighted by the population of each municipality. Until 1993, 92 percent of municipal resources was concentrated in the capital cities and 7.9 percent was allocated to the rest of the country. At present, capital cities receive 39 percent and the rest of country the remaining 61 percent. As to the municipal share of revenue, the significant per capita increase from 9 USD in 1993 to 27 USD in 1996 attests to the new standard of fairness.
New Functions of the Three Government Levels and Grassroots Organizations

Within the new context of administrative decentralization, there is a clear definition of the functions and responsibilities of the central government (Ministries, Secretariats, Development Funds), the departmental government (Departmental Prefectures), the municipal government (Mayoralties), and grassroots organizations.

Central government. The function of the central government is to set forth guidelines for the country’s development policies and to recommend national, regional, and local plans based on national priorities. As may be observed, the central government’s role is normative and regulatory, while it is the prefectures and mayoralties that act as executors.

Departmental government. Departmental government assumes responsibility for planning, administering, and controlling resources allocated to education, health, social assistance, road construction, rural electrification, irrigation, and also for promoting production, tourism, and environmental conservation (Giussani, 1996).

Municipal government. This is the part of the state closest to the people. Unlike the departmental level, municipal governments are not chosen by the central government, but by the urban/rural population that lives in the municipality. They are responsible for looking after municipal development and maintaining social infrastructure; they also govern the mechanisms of popular participation in the planning and execution of development projects; and they monitor municipal actions.
The following chart illustrates the interaction of the three levels described above:

**Figure 2. Levels of Government Decision-Making, After the Popular Participation Law**

- **CENTRAL GOVERNMENT**
  - Sets national development policies

  - Ministries
  - Subsecretariats

- **DEPARTMENTAL GOVERNMENT**
  - Administers, controls, and supervises human resources in health and education, at the departmental level. Promotes the production of infrastructure of the region.

  - Prefect
  - Departmental Council

- **MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT**
  - Human and economic development of the municipality. Administration of the infrastructure of health, education, secondary roads, and small-scale irrigation.

  - Mayor
  - Municipal Council
  - Legislative Deliberates
  - Grassroots Organizations

  - Chief Administrative Officers
Participatory Planning and Popular Monitoring of Municipal Action

In the process of participatory planning, all the actors of Popular Participation interact in drawing up the Annual Operational Plan (PAO), which is the result of negotiations between organizations and municipal government (Pérez, Zilveti, 1997). Here is where grassroots organizations and public and private institutions such as OTBs, oversight committees, development funds, cooperation agencies, and the municipal government itself all meet together.

**OTBs (Territorial Grassroots Organizations).** OTB is the name given to any pre-existing organization that is recognized by the community: in some cases, this may be a sindicato or a neighborhood committee, both structured along modern lines; in other cases, this may be a traditional organization like the ayllu, the capitanía, or the amazónica.

The OTB speaks for the community and channels community demands to municipal government; it also monitors work projects carried out by municipal government.

At the community level, the OTB participates in the analysis that serves as a basis for prioritizing the demands to be channeled through municipal government.

**Oversight committee.** For the oversight committee in each municipality, the OTB directors choose one representative per canton. Thus, a link is established between the OTBs and municipal government in that oversight committees perform two basic tasks: on the one hand, they pressure municipal government to incorporate community demands into the Annual Operational Plan (PAO); on the other, they monitor municipal actions — for example, by taking precautions against an inequitable urban/rural distribution of resources and by supervising budget items and the execution of work projects.

**Municipal council.** The council is the highest decision-making authority in the municipality. In rural municipalities, the council is composed of five representatives of the political party receiving the greatest number of votes in the municipality, and the mayor himself is included. This is where the Annual Operational Plans and the (triennial) Municipal Development Plan are prepared. The role of the OTBs and the oversight committee is to “influence” and put pressure on the Council’s decisions (Pérez, Zilveti, 1997).

**Cooperation agencies.** Agency resources are channeled in two ways. When they involve multilateral cooperation (IDB, UNICEF, and others), resources in the form of credits or grants are channeled through development funds; whereas bilateral agencies (JICA, COTESU, DANIDA, GTZ, and others) can allocate their resources directly or through non-governmental agencies (Pérez, Silveti, 1997)

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33 Villa Serrano, for example, has six cantons; therefore it has six representatives on the oversight committee.
34 The central government disburses funds to the municipalities only after the oversight committee has given its approval.
35 Social Investment Fund, Campesino Development Fund, Regional Development Fund.
Gap Between Social Demands and Action Taken

Municipal Development Plans (PDM) reveal a clear equilibrium between demands related to production (support for production, road construction, water resources, and other production infrastructure) and those related to social investment (health, education, basic sanitation, culture, and housing).36

Nevertheless, when Municipal Development Plans are converted into Annual Operational Plans (PAO), the balance tips in favor of social projects.37

The foregoing shows that, three years after enactment of the Popular Participation Law, participatory planning and the response of municipal government to community demands still has many deficiencies.

Conclusions

1. Bolivia’s development has been characterized by a high degree of geographic, economic, and socio-cultural disarticulation, inequitable resource distribution, and low productivity. In the face of the inadequacies and limitations of the state, campesino and indigenous communities have amassed a tradition of self-directed organization that enables them to maintain their cultural identity. This tradition has made possible the accumulation of social capital capable of strengthening local development.

2. The 1952 revolution produced a centralist state together with very weak local governmental institutions incapable of responding to the demands and needs of communities. The Popular Participation Law of 1994 gave impetus to an aggressive process of decentralization by delegating resources and responsibilities to municipal governments and by incorporating the organizational tradition of urban neighborhoods, campesino communities, and indigenous peoples for planning and monitoring municipal action.

   It is according to these new rules set forth in the Popular Participation Law that local development in Bolivia must be considered, planned, and promoted. The municipalities established by this Law are the starting point from which grassroots organization have to develop the potentialities of the social capital that has been built up throughout its history.

3. All research on the possibilities of local development and the effect on it of social capital should bear in mind that the new scenario presented by the Popular Participation Law gathers together ancestral processes of community organization and

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36 At the national level, production projects represent 44.7 percent, and social projects the remaining 55.3 percent (Nicod, 1996; Giussani, 1996; Booth, 1997).
37 Some 63 percent of the projects are socially oriented and only 12 percent are related to agricultural production (Ibid.).
social action and incorporates them into innovative processes of planning and institutional action. Therefore, consideration of long-standing structural and historical factors has to be balanced against the new processes arising from this law and the new relationships between municipal government and grassroots organizations, and the presence of already established social and institutional actors against the emergence of new actors.

4. Inasmuch as the Popular Participation Law has been in effect for barely three years, there are many questions about its impact on local development.

♦ It is still not known if the recently created municipal governments, with their new functions, responsibilities, and resources, will be able to consolidate themselves so that they can respond to local demands. Still less is known about the influence of historical, cultural, and socio-economic factors on whether or not municipal governments are able to consolidate.

♦ It is difficult to foresee to what extent traditional grassroots organizations will adjust to the new dynamics of institutional negotiation and to their new roles in the planning and monitoring of municipal action. In this sense, we shall examine the dangers that may be presented by opposite but equally negative scenarios: on the one hand, the persistence of these organizations in their ancestral traditions and patterns of action followed by failure to adapt to the new scenario of local development; on the other, the uprooting of communities from their socio-cultural organizational traditions and the consequent formation of organizations lacking identity and without the capacity for social representation.

♦ Another question posed by Popular Participation is whether or not the resources redistributed to municipal government are sufficient to enable them to carry out their new responsibilities (managing the infrastructure of education, health, local roads, and irrigation, in addition to promoting the production potential of the area) and the growing demands of civil society.

♦ Finally, it is still not known whether the deficiencies already identified in the implementation of Popular Participation (ineffectiveness of most oversight committees and of the participatory planning process; ignorance about the Law; institutional weakness of various municipal governments and also their lack of trained human resources; difficulties of obtaining external financing, etc.) will be satisfactorily resolved by the municipalities and by the Bolivian government itself.

Nonetheless, since 1994 it has not been possible to think of local development outside the new scenario presented by the Popular Participation Law.
Figure 3. Map of Bolivia
CHAPTER 2

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY AREAS

Introduction

This study was carried out in the municipalities of Mizque, Charagua, Villa Serrano, and Tiahuanacu. The following section will present a general description of these municipalities, together with an inventory of their infrastructure, basic services, institutions, and grassroots organizations.

This information will make it possible to understand the dynamics and functions of grassroots organizations in local development (Chapter 3), and also the interaction between regional leadership, municipal government, and governmental organizations within the local setting (Chapter 4).

General Data

As may be seen in Table 3, the municipalities in question are highly rural and extremely poor. Apart from these similarities, they differ in important ways that are reflected in the socio-demographic data gathered from the heads of household that were interviewed for the study.

Table 3. General Data on the Four Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>V. Serrano</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altitude</td>
<td>3,870 masl</td>
<td>2,225 masl</td>
<td>2,378 masl</td>
<td>980 masl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>13,151</td>
<td>20,170</td>
<td>12,616</td>
<td>18,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of rural population</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population with basic needs unsatisfied</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>93.4%</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in extreme poverty</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>0.3444</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 The poverty data measure this index according to the following living-condition indicators: housing (quality of material); basic services (availability of potable water, sewerage, electricity); education (years of schooling, curriculum, literacy rate); and health-care services.

39 Meters above sea level.

40 Data from Population and Housing Census, 1992 (without projections).

41 Preliminary data: UDAPSO, 1997.
Table 4. Socio-Demographic Data on the Heads of Household Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>V. Serrano</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Number)</strong></td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 25</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 and over</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language Most Used</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tiahuanacu**

Tiahuanacu is situated on a highland plateau just one hour away from the city of La Paz. An asphalt road (La Paz-Guaqui) connects it with the Bolivian capital. Due to its altitude and geographical location, it is a cold, dry, arid region — conditions that are unfavorable to agricultural production. The majority of its approximately 13,500 inhabitants (Table 3) are Aymara campesinos engaged in small-scale farming (Table 4).

Tiahuanacu is a municipality in which the population is subject to strong expulsive forces not only because of its harsh climatic conditions but also, and chiefly, because of the proximity of La Paz. Seasonal and permanent emigration is reflected in the high percentage of household heads over 56 years of age (Table 4).

Made up of 41 communities, the municipality of Tiahuanacu has three clearly differentiated agro-ecological regions:

- The region adjacent to Lake Titicaca. Its agricultural potential is helped by irrigation from the lake and it produces mainly potato, broad bean, and barley. These communities have fishing as a secondary activity and their catch is consumed locally.

- The small Tiahuanacu basin is the region with lowest agricultural potential. Because the land is relatively dry and arid, there are limited possibilities for intensive farming. This region produces mainly potato and pasture for cattle. Raising livestock is also important in these communities.

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The plain lying south of the town of Tiahuanacu is naturally irrigated by water from the melting snows of a nearby mountain range. This is therefore the region most suited to intensive farming. In these communities, the production of potato, broad bean, and, to a lesser degree, barley is higher than in other regions. Most of the land is devoted to growing fodder, and families are mainly engaged in raising beef cattle; it is a dairy-producing area. Its proximity to the La Paz-Guaqui asphalt road helps it to market its products. It is the most prosperous region.

The agrarian reform and the consequent breaking up of haciendas, especially those around Lake Titicaca, gave rise to minifundia, a process that affected the entire municipality. The town of Tiahuanacu, abandoned by hacienda owners, was settled by mestizo campesinos and merchants who formed the nucleus of “residents” and later emigrated to La Paz.

In Tiahuanacu, the concept of “local” is diluted because of the proximity of La Paz. There is no clearly dominant social group and the leading townspeople have their interests firmly based in La Paz. Until the Popular Participation Law, the campesino leadership channeled its demands principally through La Paz.

Mizque

The municipality of Mizque is located in the Cochabamba department in the province of Mizque, 149 kms away from the department capital. It is classified as a mesothermic valley with an average altitude of 2,225 meters above sea level (Table 3).

As a mesothermic valley, its characteristics are: dry climate, scanty rainfall, prolonged periods of drought, and a mean temperature of between 16 and 18 degrees Celsius.

Because the climatic conditions made the valley of Mizque suitable for cultivating vineyards, it attracted Spanish settlers. The region, which gradually became celebrated for its productive and commercial dynamism, suffered greatly from the wars of independence and, later, from the agrarian reform.

According to the census of 1992, the first section of Mizque province, which is the municipality of Mizque, has a population of 20,176, with a very young age structure: 40 percent of the population is less than 15 years old.

As in most rural areas, there is substantial movement in the Mizque population after the April-May harvest. Most seasonal migration goes to Chapare where young men work as day laborers in the production and processing of coca leaf; a smaller proportion goes to the city of Cochabamba where mainly young women find employment as domestic servants. Some 12 percent of these emigrants do not return to his or her place of origin (CEDEAGRO, 1997).

The number of children per woman is 6.5, which is accompanied by a high infant mortality rate of about 116/1000.

Mizque’s area of 1,720 square Kms covers three different ecological zones: the mesothermic valleys, the heads of deep valleys, and the Altiplano or “Puna”.

32
• The mesothermic valleys and deep-valley heads are suitable for agriculture and they both produce potato, maize, onion, garlic, and peanuts; many types of fruits are also grown, among which grapes, custard apple, peaches, and guava are the most important.

• Highland crops include quinoa, broad bean, tarwi, oca, and amaranth, in addition to the preeminently traditional potato.

As may be observed, agriculture is the most important activity, followed by fishing and, to a lesser degree, forest exploitation. Products sold in regional marketplaces are chiefly potato, onion, peanuts, and fruit; these market-oriented crops are sold at prices that often do not cover production costs. It is estimated that, in this municipality, the average income of a campesino family is 570 USD a year (CEDEAGRO, 1997).

Agriculture is practiced on irrigated and unirrigated land. The latter developed at altitudes of 2,800 to 3,500 meters and in the higher valleys of 2,000 to 2,800 meters. Both practices use family labor, combined with a reciprocal system of collective cooperation, along with traditional methods. Overgrazing, which is gradually destroying ground cover, affects nearly 42 percent of land.

Rural properties average about 2.5 hectares in size. Legal ownership of land is principally male; women own only 16 percent of rural property.

Most land tenure has its origin in the adjudication of haciendas expropriated under the agrarian reform. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, land ownership has still not been legalized.

The municipality is surrounded by the Mizque and Caine River basins and by microbasins. It is calculated that these hydrological resources have the potential to irrigate 3,000 additional hectares. Now under permanent irrigation are about 3,370 hectares benefiting 2,305 families (CEDEAGRO, 1997). It should be pointed out that this water is derived not only from irrigation systems but also from irrigation ditches.

Water resources are managed collectively. Of the 53 communities benefiting from irrigation, 28 have magistrates who regulate water use; in 19 communities, this is the sindicato’s responsibility; and only 4 communities permit individual management.

Villa Serrano

The municipality of Villa Serrano is located in the northeastern part of the Chuquisaca department at an altitude that varies from 900 to 3,840 meters above sea level and it is 155 kms away from the city of Sucre. It lies in a mountainous region that, despite its limited area of

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43 Chuquisaca is divided into three ecological zones: high mountain ranges, medium mountain ranges, and the Chaco plain.
about 2,000 square kilometers, has a wide range of micro-climates and agro-ecological conditions.

This agro-ecological diversity is expressed in four geographical categories: Puna, deep-valley heads, closed valleys, and subtropics.

- Communities in the Puna grow potato, maize, wheat, and barley.
- In the lower land of the valley heads, the main crops are potato, wheat, peanuts, and chile pepper.
- The even warmer and more humid climate of closed valleys is suitable for the cultivation of chile pepper, sugar cane, maize, and citrus fruit.
- The hottest and most humid region is the subtropics.

The municipality is divided into four cantons: Pescado, Mendoza, Nuevo Mundo, and Urriolagoitia. The most densely populated cantons are Pescado and Urriolagoitia, which together contain about 60 percent of the population.

According to data of the 1992 National Population and Housing Census, the municipality has approximately 12,616 inhabitants (Table 3). The broad dispersion of the population, on the one hand, makes social service coverage difficult and, on the other, leads to emigration.

This migratory trend has caused a decline in population, especially in Nuevo Mundo and Pescado cantons. One of the most important migratory factors is the attraction exerted by the economic dynamism of the Santa Cruz department. In reality, the seasonal migration that is attracted by the rice, soy bean, and cotton harvests gradually becomes converted into permanent migration.

Although of Quechua origin, most of the campesino population of Villa Serrano is “Hispanicized” (Table 4) and, therefore, its Andean cultural traditions have been weakened.

Inasmuch as the 1953 agrarian reform did not have a significant impact on the haciendas of the southern valleys — including those of Villa Serrano — hacienda owners still control to some extent the mechanisms of local power. This power resides in the support they receive from the townspeople who still tend to practice socio-cultural discrimination against the campesinos.

Charagua

The municipality of Charagua is in the second section of the Cordillera province. Its capital is the town of Charagua, which is about an eight-hour trip from Santa Cruz to the south, in the Chaco region of the department.
After Camiri, Charagua is the most populated municipality of the Cordillera province. In 1992, Charagua had 18,536 inhabitants (Table 3). It is estimated that by 1997 its population had grown to more or less 22,000 people. This increase is due to a number of factors, including:

- Natural growth

- Migratory flows from the west, which are both urban (merchants who settle in the town) and rural (campesinos from Oruro and Potosí who come for the cotton harvest and remain)

- A decline in seasonal and/or permanent emigration to Santa Cruz, Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil

As is true of most of Bolivia’s eastern section, Charagua remained relatively isolated from the country’s economic, cultural, and political dynamics until the Chaco War of 1930. Beginning with this war, but especially during the military governments of the 1960s and 1970s, more and more latifundia were created by despoiling Guarani communities of their land for the benefit of the military and the Santa Cruz oligarchy.

Charagua is a livestock-raising region, where both the haciendas and Guarani communities let their cattle roam freely. The second most important activity is agriculture (maize, beans, and forage are grown in addition to crops like soy bean and cotton recently introduced by Mennonites). The third activity is forest exploitation, which is carried out on a minor scale by small enterprises.

In Charagua, there are three agro-ecological zones: the sub-Andean area, the foothills, and the Chaco plain.

- The sub-Andean area is made up of the spurs of the Andean mountain range, where the main vegetation is the Chaco “bosque bajo” (scrub forest). Average annual rainfall is from 600 to 700 cubic cms (CIPCA, 1986). Haciendas that practice free-range cattle raising predominate.

- The foothills have an average annual precipitation of 800 to 900 cubic cms (CIPCA, 1986) and they are suitable for agriculture. This area is itself divided into (a) North Charagua (with 22 communities), which is inhabited mainly by the more prosperous Guarani, owners of adequately sized plots of land; and (b) South Charagua (with 10 communities), which has serious problems because the small size of its land parcels limits production.

- The Chaco plain (with 16 communities) is the largest region of Charagua. Annual rainfall averages 3 cubic cms (CIPCA, 1986). Its sandy soil is not well suited to agriculture and extensive cattle-raising. This area, known as the Izozo, is organized according to the Guarani tradition of captains whose authority is hereditary. Here are the poorest communities of the municipality.
Although the Guarani make up 60 percent of the population, local power is in the hands of the criollo minority. Cattle ranchers and timber companies control power in the municipality through the Oversight and Civic Committees.

**Inventory of Grassroots Organizations**

*Community Organizations*

The structure of the four municipal organizations under study is more or less the same (Table 5): A fairly broad range of organizations in all rural communities (sindicatos in Mizque, Villa Serrano, and Tiahuanacu; APGs\(^44\) in Charagua), and neighborhood committees in urbanized towns. All the foregoing are recognized as territorial grassroots organizations (OTBs) under the Popular Participation Law.

**Table 5. Community Organizations, by Municipality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Irrigation-committee Associations (2,000 families enrolled)</td>
<td>28 Communal APGs</td>
<td>Agrarian Sindicatos</td>
<td>41 Agrarian Sindicatos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centers for Mothers</td>
<td>6 Communal Captaincies</td>
<td>Producer Associations</td>
<td>Producer Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Boards</td>
<td>Women’s Associations</td>
<td>School Boards</td>
<td>School Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Neighborhood Committees (only in the populated center of Mizque)</td>
<td>5 Neighborhood Committees (3 in Charagua and 2 in San Antonio)</td>
<td>3 Neighborhood Committees (in the town of Villa Serrano)</td>
<td>Neighborhood Committees (in the town of Tiahuanacu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centers for Mothers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Clubs for Mothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Sports League</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These organizations mobilize the community for collective work projects and they channel the community’s demands to the municipal government, the NGOs, and other agents of development.\(^45\)

In Charagua, there are two types of rural community organizations: the APGs, recently formed and more modern in structure; and the traditional communal captaincies in the Izozo region (Table 5).

There are sectoral organizations (health, education, sports, women’s), which are linked to the OTBs.

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\(^{44}\) Assembly of the Guarani People at the community level.

\(^{45}\) Such as the Catholic Church and international cooperation.
Of special importance in Tiahuanacu are 1) the local health promoters who are responsible for epidemiologic surveillance, stocking basic medicines, and maintaining contact with health services; and 2) the sports leagues that organize community football (soccer) games.

“Generational” organizations, especially for young people, do not exist. In rural areas, young unmarried men do not have a separate status, but are always seen as belonging to their parents’ families.

Supra-Community Organizations

While Mizque and Villa Serrano are characterized by unitary supra-communal campesino organizations (Centrals and Sub-Centrals), there is some duality in the supra-communal organizations of Charagua and Tiahuanacu (Table 6):

- Charagua maintains a duality of organizations that are more “modern” (APGs) and those that are more traditional (Captaincies).
- In Tiahuanacu, there are two competing Centrals — the “Taraco” and the “Tiahuanacu”, but the latter is more influential.

### Table 6. Supra-Communal Organizations, by Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural Organization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1 Campesino Central</td>
<td>• Assembly of the Guaraní People</td>
<td>• Sindicato Central</td>
<td>• Campesino Central of Tiahuanacu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 14 Sub-Centrals</td>
<td>• Zonal APG</td>
<td>• Sub-Central</td>
<td>• Campesino Central of Taraco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Women’s Central</td>
<td>• Captaincy General of the Izozo</td>
<td>• Producers of Seed Potato</td>
<td>• Dairy Farmers Sindicato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Production Organizations: Dairy Farmers; Bee Keepers</td>
<td>• Zonal Captaincy</td>
<td>• Producers of Wheat Seed</td>
<td>• Council of Amautas (Village Elders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civic Committee</td>
<td>• Civic Committee</td>
<td>• Civic Committee</td>
<td>• Residents Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Federation of Livestock Ranchers</td>
<td>• Federation of Timber Companies</td>
<td>• Provincial Football League</td>
<td>• Artisans Sindicato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Federation of Timber Companies</td>
<td>• Teachers Sindicato</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban-Rural Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oversight Committee</td>
<td>• Oversight Committee</td>
<td>• Oversight Committee</td>
<td>• Oversight Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provincial Development Council</td>
<td>• • Transport Cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Mizque, Charagua, and Villa Serrano, the Civic Committee (Table 4) is the organization associated with the traditional dominant sectors; since Popular Participation, it has almost ceased to function in these three municipalities. Before Popular Participation, Civic Committees pressured prefectures and the central government to channel resources in favor of the dominant groups in each region.

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46 Before Popular Participation, Civic Committees pressured prefectures and the central government to channel resources in favor of the dominant groups in each region.
is an organization of townspeople who emigrated to La Paz and who every year return to give a party and “show off” their social and economic progress.

The Oversight Committees created by the Popular Participation Law hardly function in the four municipalities. In Mizque, the Provincial Development Council incorporates the Municipal Government, the Non-Governmental Organizations as technical advisors, the Women’s Central, the Campesino Central, and the Civic Committee; it plays a major role in provincial planning. In Tiahuanacu, the Campesino Central has created a transport cooperative of campesinos in transition to transport activities.

**Inventory of Non-Governmental Organizations**

Except in Tiahuanacu, multi-sectoral NGOs are generally characterized by a comprehensive regional approach and ongoing participation. They can maintain their participation because they have stable and adequate financing for their institutional needs.

The specialized NGOs generally are concerned with programs to promote education — both formal and informal — health, leadership training, grassroots organizations, and campesino credit.

Charagua has the most NGOs (Table 7). As will be seen later, the Catholic Church is a key factor in understanding this group of NGOs. A number of them were created as a result of the Church’s recommendations and participation.

**Table 7. Non-Governmental Organizations, by Municipality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-Sectoral NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Altiplano Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialized NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doctors Without Borders</td>
<td>Guarani Marketing Association</td>
<td>PLAFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CADIA</td>
<td>TECO Guarani</td>
<td>IMCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IBTA</td>
<td>IRFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SENDA</td>
<td>CARITAS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APCOB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FONDECO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Comercilizadora Guarani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAMG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sartawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intervida</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COCAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Provision of Services

Education

Rural education is organized as a network.

- The most basic level is the sectional school that offers the first three grades of primary school under a single teacher.

- Several sectional schools are associated with a nuclear school in a “central” community that offers the complete basic cycle and also some secondary-school courses given by various teachers under a single director.

- Several nuclear schools are in turn associated with a secondary school offering a complete curriculum and usually located in the capital of the municipality.

Although Mizque has the least coverage as regards sectional schools, it seeks to correct this deficiency with rural boarding schools (Table 8). Of the four municipalities, Charagua has the most developed system of higher education, due largely to the influence and pressure exercised by livestock ranchers and lumber companies on the Central Government to equip the town of Charagua. There is no school in Villa Serrano that prepares campesino students for a “bachillerato” (preparatory/high school degree). Tiahuanacu, with its densely populated communities, has the broadest coverage of sectional schools.

Table 8. Educational Infrastructure, by Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 sectional schools for 150 communities</td>
<td>38 sectional schools for 48 communities (ratio: 1.2 to 1)</td>
<td>31 sectional schools for 45 communities (ratio: 1.3 to 1)</td>
<td>41 sectional schools for 40 communities (ratio: 1 to 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ratio: 4.5 to 1)</td>
<td>11 nuclear schools</td>
<td>4 nuclear schools</td>
<td>6 nuclear schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 rural schools</td>
<td>1 secondary school</td>
<td>1 technical-humanistic residential center for rural adults (CEITHAR)</td>
<td>1 technical university affiliated with the Catholic University of La Paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 student centers</td>
<td>1 Fe y Alegria school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 secondary school</td>
<td>1 normal school for rural teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 rural boarding schools</td>
<td>affiliate of the René Moreno University of Santa Cruz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 center for a high school (bachillerato)</td>
<td>technical training institute administered by Aracuarenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degree in pedagogy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rural boarding schools are educational complexes that, from Monday through Friday, house children from remote communities. These educational complexes are administered by NGOs or by the Church. To pay for their food and lodging expenses, the children are expected to carry out productive activities at the boarding school.

An average of 250 inhabitants. This population density is higher than in other municipalities. The criterion used by the Ministry of Education to assign teachers is the number of inhabitants in a given region; the higher the region’s population density, the more probability of its having educational centers.
Health

The rural health system has three levels:

- First level 1 is the “health station”, with a nurse in charge; it is intended for primary care of outpatients.
- First level 2 is the “health center”, staffed by a physician and two or three nurses; it is intended for primary care of inpatients.
- The second level is the “second-tier hospital” for limited regional coverage; it performs no surgery.

Charagua has the best health infrastructure, followed by Mizque and Villa Serrano (Table 9). Tiahuanacu has the most deficient coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 health stations</td>
<td>13 health centers</td>
<td>6 health stations</td>
<td>4 health stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 hospitals</td>
<td>3 hospitals</td>
<td>1 hospital</td>
<td>2 health center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potable Water

The Valley municipalities (Mizque and Villa Serrano) have better potable water coverage of rural areas. In second place is Charagua. Again, Tiahuanacu has the least coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65 water systems. 40 percent coverage in home installation</td>
<td>Coverage limited to only two urban populations: Charagua and San Antonio. Some North Charagua communities have communal water systems</td>
<td>13 of 45 communities have home installations. Nonetheless, because inhabitants of these communities are so widely dispersed, not all the population is covered</td>
<td>Almost non-existent. In the city, water is sporadically delivered by the mayor’s office.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Electricity

The relatively better coverage in Tiahuanacu is due largely to the work of the NGO International Altiplano Plan, which makes this service a priority in its strategy of social intervention. In the remaining municipalities, electrical service is almost exclusively limited to their capitals.

Table 11. Electrical Service Coverage, by Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coverage only of the capital and a few communities</td>
<td>Coverage only of the capital</td>
<td>13 of 45 communities have home installations. Nonetheless, because inhabitants of these communities are so widely dispersed, not all the population is covered</td>
<td>11 communities have electricity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Irrigation

Mizque is the municipality that has most developed its irrigation systems. This infrastructure reaches more than 2,000 families and at present a system is under construction that will cover 2,000 additional families. About 90 percent of the infrastructure was installed with resources of the NGO-CEDEAGRO.

These irrigation systems are administered by the Association of Irrigation Managers in coordination with the Agrarian Sindicatos

Charagua and Villa Serrano have limited systems and Tiahuanacu has none.

Table 12. Irrigation Systems, by Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substantial infrastructure in the valleys</td>
<td>Coverage limited to a few communities in North Charagua</td>
<td>There are micro-irrigation installations</td>
<td>Non-existent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Credit

In all municipalities, credit is channeled through specialized agencies (usually NGOs) and is directed to families rather than communities or work groups. Access to credit is individual rather than mediated by grassroots organizations.
Table 13. Credit Services, by Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A savings and loan cooperative</td>
<td>The NGO-FUNDECO channels a service adapted</td>
<td>There are no specialized institutions. There</td>
<td>Individual credit through the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and PRODEM are the institutions</td>
<td>to campesino needs</td>
<td>is a small revolving fund in kind: seed and</td>
<td>NGO Sartawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this service</td>
<td></td>
<td>input</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roads

In general, the most important “trunk” road infrastructure is taken care of by government departments, whereas construction and maintenance of secondary roads is the responsibility of the communities, which mobilize themselves to maintain the local roads that give them access to the trunk road.

Tiahuanacu is the municipality with the best system of roads connecting with the capital of the department. Thanks to the hard altiplano soil in this municipality, secondary roads are passable the year round.

Table 14. Road Infrastructure, by Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIZQUE</th>
<th>CHARAGUA</th>
<th>VILLA SERRANO</th>
<th>TIAHUANACU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A trunk road that connects the municipal</td>
<td>A trunk road that connects the capital with</td>
<td>A trunk road that connects Villa Serrano with</td>
<td>An asphalt road (La Paz-Guaqui)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital with Cochabamba (180 kms)</td>
<td>Santa Cruz to the north and with Camiri to the</td>
<td>Sucre and with Valle Grande in reasonably</td>
<td>connects the municipality with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>south. Until recently, this road was</td>
<td>good weather. Secondary roads are, in general,</td>
<td>La Paz. Secondary roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>impassable during the rainy season</td>
<td>accessible during the dry season</td>
<td>are maintained by communal work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and most of them are all-weather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>roads</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions

1. The four municipalities under study present diverse agro-ecological, ethno-cultural, demographic, and socio-economic conditions. Not only among themselves, but also within each one.

- Tiahuanacu is a freezing cold altiplano, with adverse conditions for intensive agriculture. Mizque is a mesothermic valley with a dry climate, little rainfall, and “hot” temperatures. Villa Serrano has the many different agro-ecological and climatic conditions typical of mountainous country, with an altiplano that is extremely cold, valley heads, closed valleys, and tropics. Charagua is part of the Chaco plain with a hot, dry climate and a severe shortage of water resources.
But this is not just a question of differences between municipalities, but also within each one there are microregions that in turn include microclimates that have an impact on productivity, product types, land management and production methods, and the introduction of campesino communities into the market.

- At the ethnic-cultural level, the inhabitants of Tiahuanacu and Mizque speak mainly their indigenous language; in Charagua, language is at an intermediate stage between indigenous and Spanish; and in Villa Serrano, almost only Spanish is spoken (Table 4). As will be seen in the next section, these linguistic differences are correlated with the different degrees of influence exercised by traditional patterns of organization on social capital.

- At the demographic level, there are three scenarios: 1) In Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano, seasonal and permanent emigration prevents the full consolidation of community organizations; 2) in Mizque, there is “intermediate migration” to the coca plantations of Chapare; and 3) in Charagua, emigration has been substantially reversed thanks to the increased productivity of Guarani communities, especially in North Charagua, which has made it possible for community organizations to become better consolidated and effective, as will be seen further on.

- At the socio-economic level, there are also three scenarios: in Tiahuanacu, socio-economic heterogeneity is less pronounced than in other municipalities, because the more prosperous social strata reside primarily in La Paz. In Mizque, this heterogeneity is somewhat more noticeable not only because of the difference between campesinos and townspeople, but also because within some communities, economic diversification and social differentiation have been brought about by expansion of tertiary activities — especially in transport and commerce. And finally, in Charagua and Villa Serrano, where the agrarian reform has had minimal impact and an elite group of hacienda owners still exist, society is sharply stratified.

As will be seen further on, such differences both between and within municipalities have a decisive influence on local development conditions, the performance of grassroots organizations, and the institutional consolidation of municipal governments.
2. The structure of grassroots organizations is quite similar in the four municipalities.

- Grassroots organizations in rural communities are more stable and consolidated than in the urban area (towns).

- Grassroots organizations in the rural area revolve around an organization that mobilizes the community and represents it to the outside (agrarian sindicatos in Tiahuanacu, Mizque, and Villa Serrano; local APGs and communal captaincies in Charagua). It may be stated that this is the organization that is at the core of organizational scaffolding: within the community, it is the link with groups having specific interests (education, health, women), and at the supra-community level, it is the starting point for a series of levels that more or less follow the administrative division of the territory (for sub-central cantons and regional APGs; for municipalities and sometimes for the Provincial Campesino Centrals; and at the national level, the CSUTCB). 49

- The interests of the traditionally dominant groups in the local setting (townspeople, merchants, transport services, and, in Charagua, livestock ranchers and timber companies) are linked together in the four municipalities through organizations like Civic Committees and, in Tiahuanacu, Residents Committees. It is, however, symptomatic that in recent years and especially since Popular Participation, these organizations have been weakened and no longer have any function. 50

It is probable that this situation will oblige traditionally dominant groups to seek new channels for their interests, this time within the framework of Popular Participation.

3. Non-governmental organizations have established a widely ranging presence: from a diverse and relatively broad presence in Charagua, to a few organizations in Tiahuanacu, with intermediate numbers in Mizque and Villa Serrano. Except for Tiahuanacu, in each municipality there are one or two NGOs with multi-sectoral strategies of social intervention that have taken the lead in terms of territorial coverage, number of projects, contact with grassroots organizations, and support for municipal management (in Mizque, CEDEAGRO; in Charagua, CIPCA; in Villa Serrano, CEDEC and CARE).

As will be seen further on, these non-governmental organizations play a key role in generating and strengthening conditions needed for local development.

49 Sindicato Confederation of Bolivian Campesino Workers.

50 This is partly due to the fact that Popular Participation does not grant legal status to organizations that represent the group interests of an association or a sector, but only to territorial grassroots organizations.
4. The delivery and infrastructure of services reflect the priorities and response capabilities of the state when faced with the demands of the towns and communities of these four municipalities. Education is the service that has been most developed in all four, especially higher education in Charagua and primary education in Tiahuanacu.

Health services are more developed in Charagua and Mizque than in the other two municipalities.

Apart from both services, the municipalities show major infrastructure differences, especially for production. Mizque is characterized by a somewhat better installation of water and irrigation systems; Charagua by its health and education coverage; Villa Serrano by its production infrastructure (rice silos); and Tiahuanacu by its primary-education coverage and community electrification.

5. In general, communities have access to these services by channeling their demands through sindicatos or APGs (Charagua) to the municipal government, an NGO, or a decentralized state agency, especially the Social Investment Fund.

To implement infrastructure construction, most communities furnish labor and some material (for schools, health centers, irrigation systems). In this way, investment costs are somewhat reduced.

In administering and maintaining services, community roles differ according to the service in question:

- In education, communities actively participate in maintaining infrastructure and supervising teachers through the School Board.

- In opening up and maintaining local roads, the community also plays a very important role. Its collective labor constitutes the main support for the investment.

- In Mizque, the Irrigation Manager Committees are essential to administration of irrigation systems.

- In other services, such as health, electricity, and potable water, grassroots organizations are not vital to administration.

- Access to credit is principally individual.

It is in this context that community and supra-community organizations perform the important function of channeling demands, mobilizing the community, and managing collective work projects. As will be seen in the next chapter, these functions, which are common to all the leading grassroots organizations (Sindicatos, APGs, and Neighborhood Committees) acquire different characteristics due to the influence of the concrete conditions in each municipality and, within each one, in its microregions.
Figure 4. Geographical Location of Municipalities Included in this Study
CHAPTER 3

THE ROLE OF GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS
IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

This chapter will present a description and analysis of the grassroots organizations in the municipalities under study that will explain how these organizations function and which ones are most important in terms of participation by household members — their attendance at meetings, sharing in decision-making, and access to basic services.

Participation in Grassroots Organizations

In the household surveys, respondents were asked about the participation of household members in community organizations. It should be pointed out that, in principle, the concept of “participation” was essentially ambiguous for those interviewed. Information gathered from focus groups revealed that some people understood “participation in grassroots organizations” to mean having a management responsibility. This restrictive idea of “participation” as acting in a directive capacity applies mainly to the agrarian sindicato which, as we shall see later, is the most important grassroots organization in campesino communities.

Another connotation of “participation” refers to participation in grassroots organizations with voluntary membership and frequent meetings; for example, once a week. Here, “to participate” means primarily to attend meetings and not solely to hold directive positions.

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51 Most of those interviewed in the focus groups assumed this meaning for “participation”, especially in the less Hispanicized municipalities (Mizque and Tiahuanacu).

52 As we shall see later on, a typology of grassroots organizations divides them into “obligatory” associations in which the fact of living in a community or neighborhood “obliges” the person to “participate” in the meetings and to take on directive posts in these organizations. There are usually pressure mechanisms such as monetary penalties or social censure if the person does not participate, which is the case of agrarian sindicatos in campesino communities and of neighborhood committees in municipal capitals. Other, more “voluntary”, associations give the person greater margin to decide whether or not to “participate”, and there is no monetary penalty or social censure for not doing so; these include producer organizations, NGO-connected groups, the Catholic Church, etc.
In light of the information obtained from focus groups, it may be assumed that in the course of the household survey, the respondents understood and used the concept “participation” in both its connotations: the restrictive meaning of performing directive functions, especially in reference to the agrarian sindicato and the neighborhood committee; and the broader meaning of meeting attendance, as applied mainly to grassroots organizations.

Having pointed out the ambiguity of the concept of “participation”, we go on to analyze Graph 1. According to this Figure, at least one member of most of the households included in the survey participates in some grassroots organization.

The highest percentage of household participation in grassroots organizations is found in Mizque and Tiahuanacu. In both municipalities, the agrarian sindicato has a long-standing organizational tradition.\(^{53}\)

Furthermore, the use of indigenous languages is higher among respondents in Mizque and Tiahuanacu than among those interviewed in Charagua and Villa Serrano (Table 4), suggesting that indigenous cultural patterns of organization are stronger in the former municipalities. This factor has an impact on household participation in grassroots organizations: the rotation system\(^{54}\) with fines and penalties imposed on those who do not take their turn as directors, and the mandatory change in directors every year ensure that there is broad participation of households in the agrarian sindicato.

In Charagua and Villa Serrano, however, the historical and cultural variables are different from those of Mizque and Tiahuanacu. In the first two municipalities, the organizational tradition of the agrarian sindicato (Villa Serrano) and of the APG-Local (Charagua) is more recent.

- In Charagua, APG Locals were organized only in the 1980s and they were not consolidated until 1987 with establishment of the National Assembly of the Guarani People (APG National), which represents the Guarani living

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\(^{53}\) Since around 1952.

\(^{54}\) An Andean organizational system that obliges heads of household who own land parcels in the community to assume directive posts at least once in the agrarian sindicato. Moreover, this system requires that there should be an annual change in sindicato directors, so that there is a rotation of other families in these posts (Pearse, 1984).
in the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Chuquisaca and which maintains contacts with Paraguayan and Argentine Guarani. A major obstacle standing in the way of earlier organization of Guarani communities was the expansion of latifundia and livestock ranches. Until the 1980s, hacienda and ranch owners were able to co-opt traditional Guarani directors so that they obtained cheap labor and at the same time prevented the formation of grassroots organizations strong enough to stand up to them.

- In the same way, Villa Serrano has little organizational tradition largely due the presence of haciendas that have survived the 1952 revolution.

Unlike the situation in Mizque and Tiahuanacu, in Charagua and Villa Serrano the majority of the population speak Spanish (Table 4). Therefore, Villa Serrano is less influenced by the Andean patterns of rotating directive posts, and Charagua by the traditional Guarani patterns of hereditary captaincies. Although the pattern they follow permits them to assemble for election of their leaders, at the same time it keeps the agrarian sindicato directive posts from being rotated among heads of household. Thus, the percentage of participation in grassroots organizations in Villa Serrano and Charagua is lower than in Mizque and Tiahuanacu (Graph 1).

As may be seen in Table 15, males who are aged 36 and over and have had no schooling are the ones who are most active in grassroots organizations. Non-participants are non-farmer females who are less than 36 years old and have not completed their primary or secondary studies.

These data indicate a communal system of organization that favors the participation of household heads who are mature males and, therefore, have made their mark within the community.

Table 15. Profiles of Household Heads, Participating and Non-Participating in Grassroots Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating 87.3%</th>
<th>Non-Participating 12.7%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>In Charagua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Mizque</td>
<td>In Villa Serrano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak primarily Quechua or Aymara</td>
<td>Speak primarily Guarani or Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have lived 8 or more years in the community</td>
<td>Have lived less than 8 years in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 36 and over</td>
<td>Aged under 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>Non-farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling or have</td>
<td>Have not completed primary or secondary schools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 In the municipality of Charagua, 60 percent of the population is Guarani (CIPCA, 1987). They form part of numerous cultures that inhabit the lowlands of northern, eastern, and southern Brazil. These “lowland” cultures, unlike the Andean culture, did not develop complicated systems of state and agricultural management.
Although there are women and youth organizations in some communities, they are not important, as we shall see further on. It would appear that these segments of the community (women and young people) have no special channels for direct community participation except through the mediation of mature male heads of household.

Graph 2 shows that households tend to participate in one or two grassroots organizations, especially in Charagua and Mizque.

As will be seen later, the concentration of household participation in one or two organizations is positively correlated with access to various services through such organizations.

- In Charagua, APG Locals as well as producer organizations linked to the work of NGOs — in particular, CIPCA\textsuperscript{56} — are efficient in obtaining access to various services. In Mizque, the Campesino Sindicato in each community, like the Campesino Central that incorporates all community sindicatos, has become the channel through which every service-oriented public and private project is obliged to pass.

- On the other hand, in Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano there is a slight trend toward household participation in three or more grassroots organizations at the same time (Graph 2). Our qualitative research has revealed that the campesino sindicatos in these municipalities are not sufficiently strong and effective in channeling resources; therefore, households must try to obtain services through other organizational channels.

In Tiahuanacu, work groups are connected with specific NGO projects (International Plan, Intervida), the dairy farmers cooperative, and the provincial transport cooperative. The campesino sindicato in Villa Serrano is so weak that households turn to organizations that are set up as a result of NGO projects (CEDEC, CARE).

\begin{quote}
“Here (in Tiahuanacu) the sindicatos are no good, no one pays attention to them. Sometimes, we go to other (grassroots) organizations...Institutions like the International Altiplano Plan only work with their own people”. (Campesino, Nachoca, Tiahuanacu).
\end{quote}

\textbf{Participation According to Type of Grassroots Organization}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
  & Charagua & Mizque & Tiahuanacu & Villa Serrano \\
\hline
1 to 2 organizations & 14\% & 14\% & 12\% & 10\% \\
3 or more organizations & 86\% & 86\% & 92\% & 90\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Households According to the Number of Organizations in which They Participate}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{56} Campesino Sector Research and Support Center. See next chapter for role of CIPCA in local development and empowerment of the Assembly of the Guarani People.
Campesino Sindicatos

As can be seen in Table 16, Campesino Sindicatos (the APG Locals in Charagua) rank high among the grassroots organizations in which respondents participated.

Table 16. Participation According to Type of Grassroots Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Type</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
<th>V. Serrano</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (Number)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-participation</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campesino Sindicatos</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and marketing</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups connected with NGOs</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood committees (total of 25 urban interviews)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious practices</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The system of rotating posts means that most household heads in Mizque and Tiahuanacu will be obliged at some time to take on management responsibilities. In the Hispanicized municipalities of Villa Serrano and Charagua, however, post rotation is not enforced, which permits directors to be re-elected, especially in Charagua, thereby limiting management experience to a few household heads.

Nonetheless, the Campesino Sindicato is the most important organizational entity in campesino communities for a number of reasons:

- It organizes community work, thereby reducing the cost of project execution.

- In some cases, it resolves internal conflicts in the community such as boundary lines and communal work quotas, in addition to access to pasture land, springs, and other communal resources, etc.

- It channels the demands of the community in general, not just of campesino producers, to the municipal government, regional government and/or non-governmental institutions in the area.

- In many cases, it endorses or rejects the implementation of community projects.

“The system of rotating posts means that most household heads in Mizque and Tiahuanacu will be obliged at some time to take on management responsibilities. In the Hispanicized municipalities of Villa Serrano and Charagua, however, post rotation is not enforced, which permits directors to be re-elected, especially in Charagua, thereby limiting management experience to a few household heads.”

Nonetheless, the Campesino Sindicato is the most important organizational entity in campesino communities for a number of reasons:

- It organizes community work, thereby reducing the cost of project execution.

- In some cases, it resolves internal conflicts in the community such as boundary lines and communal work quotas, in addition to access to pasture land, springs, and other communal resources, etc.

- It channels the demands of the community in general, not just of campesino producers, to the municipal government, regional government and/or non-governmental institutions in the area.

- In many cases, it endorses or rejects the implementation of community projects.
It monitors project implementation.

_Campesino sindicatos in Mizque._ This section will refer to only communal campesino sindicatos. The next chapter will analyze the dynamics of supra-communal sindicato organizations.

The Mizque sindicatos are stable and have centralized their role in authorizing and monitoring community development projects, whether state or non-state. This veto power does not so much depend on their relations with the community, but rather on their connection with a campesino power pyramid that has at its apex the Campesino Central that embraces all the sindicatos of the region.

The closer a community is to the municipal capital, the more its economic and social base becomes fragmented and, therefore, the sindicato is less able to mobilize the population. The farther a community is located from the municipal capital and from significant commercial activity, the more uniform its economic and social base and, therefore, the sindicato commands more authority in mobilizing the population.

_Campesino sindicatos in Tiahuanacu._ The campesino sindicatos in Tiahuanacu are relatively stable and consolidated. Although this is also true in Mizque, communal power and veto is less concentrated than in Tiahuanacu. In Tiahuanacu, communal sindicatos routinely organize communal work and, to a lesser extent, present communal demands to the municipality.

Rotation of posts means that direction of each sindicato changes from year to year. If, through this system, a campesino is elected who has some education and some knowledge of institutional patterns of negotiation, management is likely to be “effective”. If rotation results in the top post being held by a campesino with little or no education and without experience in institutional patterns of negotiation, then management “is not effective”.

_Campesino sindicatos in Villa Serrano._ In this municipality, most of the campesino sindicatos are weak. They are neither empowered to mobilize the community nor are they effective in channeling its demands.

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57 Communities of Tipa Tipa, Taboada, Takuma Baja, and Tin Tin.
58 Communities of Churu and Thago Thago Alto.
In this case, the lower percentage of households that “participate” in sindicatos is a sign of the weakness of these organizations.

**APG locals in Charagua** In the municipality of Charagua, new communal organizational patterns are being formed that differ from the traditional forms of Guarani organization.\(^59\)

This Guarani leadership first gave impetus to the formation of communal assemblies, with organizational patterns that were mostly “western” — assemblies, democratic elections, renewal of leadership, monitoring of the base, etc. — but accompanied by discourse that reclaimed indigenous identity. At the same time, it promoted the creation of the National Assembly of the Guarani People, which gave rise to local and regional APGs.

Thus, in some of the communities included in this study, the local APG has been structured along modern lines — a community president and departments for land-territory, education, health, and women’s organization\(^60\); other communities have a hybrid system that includes both “captain” and president\(^61\); and in others, there still exists the traditional Guarani organization based on the hereditary authority of the “captain”.\(^62\)

Communities that have introduced new organizational patterns have shown better adaptation to the new dynamics of Popular Participation and more ability to channel state and international-cooperation resources.

By permitting re-election of directors, local APGs promote specialized training in leadership; traditional structures are hereditary and not accessible.

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\(^{59}\) The traditional Guarani organization is characterized by the concentration of communal power in the hands of the “captain”, which is a hereditary title. This type of organization worked in favor of the region’s hacienda owners, allowing them to arrange for the transfer of cheap labor to the agro-industry of the department capital and to local livestock ranchers.

\(^{60}\) Communities of Machipo and San Antonio.

\(^{61}\) Communities of Machipo and San Antonio.

\(^{62}\) This type of organization predominates throughout the Charagua region called El Izozo, an extensive plain with scattered salt-water deposits, making farming difficult. The regional leader of El Izozo is “Capitán General” Bonifacio Barrientos, who has tried to incorporate into the traditional authority of the captaincy a modernized indigenous way of thinking.
Women’s Organization

There is a fairly high percentage of women’s organizations in municipalities where access to directive posts in campesino sindicatos is limited (Charagua and Villa Serrano, Table 14).

In Charagua, most of these organizations are promoted by the Support Program for Guarani Women created in 1992. It is an NGO that, under an agreement with CIPCA, is devoted to training women and promoting women’s organizations. Other women’s organizations are created more or less spontaneously around APG Locals. A third type of women’s organization, the least common, develops around production projects, mainly in agriculture.

In Villa Serrano, women have organized chiefly around specific NGO projects for non-formal adult education. Some of these organizations have been occasionally linked to family vegetable garden projects started by the NGO-CARE.

Women’s organizations in Charagua are a little more stable than those in Villa Serrano. Both in carrying out regular activities and participating in the election of new leaders, the norms and functions of these organizations have been more solidly consolidated. On the other hand, in Villa Serrano, women’s organizations often come about because of a specific project and they usually disappear after the project ends.

In Mizque and Tiahuanacu, the households of women’s organizations are not very active in grassroots organizations (Table 16). Women’s organizations in Mizque started out as clubs for mothers to receive donated food. In Tiahuanacu, there are almost no women’s organizations.

From the foregoing analysis, it may be concluded that most women’s organizations were not spontaneously formed by the community, but were structured by an external agent — generally an NGO. Broadly speaking, they formed as a result of specific projects, mainly projects for organizational training and non-formal education.63 Except in Charagua, these organizations are usually unstable; they function intermittently and stop functioning when the project in question has ended.

63 Most of the projects and programs in Bolivia are designed for general training and non-formal education (Sandoval, 1993). Although these projects have often been criticized because they are not concerned with production activities, which is presumably “the most important aspect of non-governmental cooperation”, women-oriented programs are actually doubly important. First, women find in these programs a vindication of their rights in a system that has discriminated against them in access to formal education; and they therefore demand more such programs. Second, within programs of this type, women have opportunities that are generally denied to them in the community and even in their homes: leadership, public expression, and solidarity with their peer group (Sinergia, 1994).
Regardless of the degree of stability of women’s organizations, or the percentage of women participating in them, such organizations are generally connected with campesino sindicatos. Their role in the community is secondary and subordinate to that of sindicatos.

*Producer Organizations*

Table 14 also shows that producer/marketing associations are important in the Charagua and Villa Serrano municipalities, where there is less sindicato participation. On the other hand, in Mizque and Tiahuanacu, where there is greater participation in sindicato leadership, producer/marketing associations are not very significant.

The negative correlation between participation in sindicatos and participation in Producer/Marketing Associations, may be partly explained by the leadership system of sindicatos. Because in Mizque and Tiahuanacu, directive posts are rotated and “mandatory”, human resources are largely co-opted by the sindicato. In Charagua, however, where directive posts in the AGP Locals are not rotated and have little power, there exist human resources not directly involved in the sindicato and therefore available for forming alternative groups that are voluntary and with special interests, such as the producer/marketing associations.

*Producer and marketing groups in Charagua.* Producer and marketing groups were established in Charagua at the request of the Campesino Sector Research and Support Center (CIPCA) and of the Tropical Agriculture Research Center. Both institutions

64 develop production projects with campesino groups, usually called “work groups”.

In particular, CIPCA has been developing since 1974 an extensive and long-term program to experiment with producing vegetable and animal species adapted to the Bolivian Chaco. Starting in the late 80s, it has disseminated the adapted species among Guarani communities. As a result of this dissemination program, work groups have been organized in a number of communities to improve agricultural productivity.

*Production and marketing groups in Villa Serrano.* As can be seen in Table 14, the percentage of participation in producer and marketing groups in Villa Serrano is less than in Charagua, but more than in Tiahuanacu and Mizque.

In the Villa Serrano municipality, groups of producers have organized in response to specific production projects launched by the NGOs — especially CEDEC and CARE. These producer groups work together with the NGOs to raise productivity and, by using quality control, to enter the market in better conditions so that their output can compete in the regional markets of Sucre and Santa Cruz.
Groups Connected with the NGOs

These groups are oriented toward education, health, technical training, and other projects. Nonetheless, the fact that interview respondents mentioned the NGO as a means of group identification demonstrates the NGO’s importance in establishing and linking up grassroots organizations.

Groups of this kind are important in Charagua, Tiahuanacu, and Villa Serrano. In Mizque, the policy of the major regional NGO (CEDEAGRO) is to tie together all projects through the sindicato, in order to avoid the creation of parallel organizations; this is why NGO-connected groups in this municipality are barely mentioned.

Neighborhood Committees

Neighborhood Committees only function in municipality capitals — urban centers that are structured like towns rather than campesino communities. In this case, neighborhood committees are organized in the town of Tiahuanacu, which is the capital of the Tiahuanacu municipality; in the town of Mizque, capital of the Mizque municipality; in the town of Charagua, capital of the Charagua municipality; and in the town of Villa Serrano, capital of the Villa Serrano municipality.

In these four municipalities, the role of the neighborhood committee is bound up with the historical relations between “residents” (townspeople) and “campesinos” (inhabitants of rural communities).

Tiahuanacu. In the town of Tiahuanacu, as in most Altiplano towns, there was a significant demographic change after the agrarian reform; the criollos abandoned several towns, which were than “occupied” by Aymara; in many cases, this Aymara population was in transition from agriculture to commerce.  

Therefore, Tiahuanacu town residents, having more or less the same cultural and ethnic roots as campesinos, continue their ancestral organizational patterns. This explains why in Table 14, 72 percent of those interviewed in the town of Tiahuanacu “participate” in the neighborhood committee.

In 1997, when the study was carried out, the leaders of the Tiahuanacu neighborhood committee were unusually active in channeling demands to the municipal government and the prefecture for potable water, street repair, and asphalting the two-kilometer road from town to international highway.

“Here, the leadership of the neighborhood committee is doing a good job. The committee is asking the Mayor’s office to asphalt the road that connects us with the La Paz-Guaqui highway. It’s chaired by a woman and she’s handling it very well”.

(Tiahuanacu businessman).

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64 CIPCA is a NGO and CIAT is a decentralized state agency dedicated to research on agricultural and livestock species adapted to the Bolivian tropics.

65 Calderón, Dandler, 1984.
**Villa Serrano and Mizque.** Both municipalities are in the Valleys, where relations between townspeople and campesinos are more explicitly antagonistic than in the Altiplano. Several Valley towns count among their residents ex-hacienda owners who in the 1952 revolution suffered the violent seizure of their latifundia. Therefore, in Mizque and especially in Villa Serrano there is open hostility between town and communities.

At the same time that this hostility motivates the town to organize, it also limits its organization. It is a motive for the townspeople to “defend” their interests “against” the campesinos. But in organizing themselves, the townspeople generally ignore the Neighborhood Committee. The town elite usually makes its contacts directly with the prefecture and other government agencies. Thus, it channels its demands directly to the central government rather than to the municipality.

In making this type of connection, the town’s power group has, for many years, by-passed neighborhood committees. Nevertheless, the Popular Participation Law, together with the sindicatos of campesinos and indigenous peoples, favors neighborhood committees as urban channels to the municipal government for demands and work-project supervision. Thanks to such support, this organization form, although still in its early stages, is gradually gaining strength in Villa Serrano and Mizque.

**Charagua.** In Charagua, relations between townspeople and campesinos are not so much antagonistic (as in Mizque and Villa Serrano), as they are dualistic in nature. The mixture of white and indigenous that took place both in the Tiahuanacu Altiplano and in the Valleys where Mizque and Villa Serrano are located and that produced the mestizaje characteristic of those townspeople, occurred to a far lesser degree in eastern Bolivia and, especially, in Charagua.

Furthermore, unlike the Valleys, Charagua townspeople still have economic power thanks to the haciendas, especially those raising livestock; and they have political power through their control of the municipal government, the prefecture, and other government agencies.

Inasmuch as Charagua townspeople themselves enjoy regional economic and political power, they can obtain a response to their demands without the need to use neighborhood committees as channels. Thus, there is still little participation in neighborhood committees in the town of Charagua.

**Characteristics of Grassroots Organizations**

Having analyzed the various grassroots organizations in the four municipalities under study, we shall now go on to describe some of their most important characteristics.

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66 Neighborhood committees have been important in large cities, especially in those altiplano cities where there are numerous Aymara and/or Quechua immigrants.

67 On the other hand, due to such factors as the Popular Participation Law, campesinos in Tiahuanacu, Mizque, and Villa Serrano are beginning to have some opportunities to exercise influence, particularly in the municipality (Tiahuanacu) and in the provincial council (Mizque).
Organizations Formally and Informally Organized

As seen in Graph 3, the respondents interviewed reported that in almost all cases, their participation was in “formally organized” grassroots organizations.

For most of the persons interviewed in the focus groups, the concept “formally organized” meant that the activities of the organization in question were carried out on a regular basis.

The regular nature of such activities is closely related to the regular nature of meetings held by the organization. If the organization has held regular meetings with its members over a fairly long period of time, focus-group respondents regard it as “formally organized”.

From the foregoing, it may be inferred that “formal” is not linked to explicitly stated norms — statutes and regulations — but rather to the existence of implicit norms that permit the grassroots organization to function on a regular basis.68

**Who Formed the Grassroots Organizations?**

In Graph 4, it is seen that — except in Charagua — more than 70 percent of those interviewed said that the organizations in which they or a family member participated were formed by the community. At the same time, Graph 4 shows that the role granted to the government in forming organizations is minimal.

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68 This does not mean that the formal aspects of an institution — statutes, regulations, and a legal personality — are not important, but that these aspects were not dealt with by those interviewed in the survey. Statutes, regulations, records and now, with the Popular Participation Law, a legal personality are all very important, especially to directors of campesino sindicatos, to guarantee the “legal existence of a grassroots organization”.

58
These data are somewhat surprising if it is considered that the majority of campesino sindicatos, which is the organization referred to in most of Graph 4 data, were formed at the instigation of the 1952 revolutionary government.

The responses recorded in Graph 4 indicate the extent to which those interviewed have assumed that the campesino sindicato is their very own community creation and that other organizations having relatively high participation — women’s organizations in Charagua and Villa Serrano; producer organizations in both municipalities; NGO-connected organizations in Charagua, Villa Serrano, and Tiahuanacu; and neighborhood committees in Tiahuanacu, Villa Serrano, and Mizque — are generally initiatives of civil society rather than of the state.

Graph 4 clearly shows the heterogeneity of NGOs in forming grassroots organizations. In Charagua, NGOs are prime external agents for the formation of grassroots organizations in 34 percent of the cases. As we shall see later on, unlike what occurred in the other municipalities, the APG Locals (the equivalent of the campesino sindicato) were organized in this municipality as the cause and immediate effect of the formation of the National Assembly of the Guarani People (APG National), which in turn was largely brought about thanks to the influence of the NGO-CIPCA. In addition, organizations of women, producers, and groups connected with specific work projects are associated with NGOs such as CIPCA, PAMG, TECO Guarani, and Aracuarenda (Table 7).

The foregoing explains why respondents in Charagua perceive the NGOs as playing a major role in grassroots organizations.

According to Graph 4, Villa Serrano is another municipality where respondents stress the importance of NGOs — especially, CEDEC and CARE — in the formation of grassroots organizations.

In municipalities where the agrarian sindicato has less participation (Table 16), where there is less tradition of sindicato organization, and where indigenous cultural patterns are less “deeply rooted” (Charagua and Villa Serrano), the role of NGOs is of primary importance in forming grassroots organizations.

On the other hand, in municipalities with a more profound organizational tradition (Mizque and Tiahuanacu) and with a stronger sindicato presence to channel demands to the central,
departmental, and municipal governments, the role of NGOs in forming grassroots organizations is minor.

*Forms of Becoming a Member of Grassroots Organizations*

Table 17 confirms what we have been saying about the campesino sindicato. In Mizque and Tiahuanacu, Andean forms of organization are important and are expressed above all in the post rotation that “obliges” household heads to assume management responsibilities. Therefore, in Mizque 73 percent of the cases state that “membership” in the sindicato is “obligatory”, and in Tiahuanacu this proportion is 70 percent (Table 17).

**Table 17. How Did You Become a Member of the Grassroots Organization?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Form of Becoming Member</th>
<th>Sindicato</th>
<th>Women’s Organization</th>
<th>Producer Organization</th>
<th>NGO-connected Groups</th>
<th>Neighborhood Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charagua</td>
<td>Obligatory</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizque</td>
<td>Obligatory</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Founder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>Obligatory</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa Serrano</td>
<td>Obligatory</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Charagua, however, taking on the duties of a director in the APG is more “voluntary”, according to 60 percent of the respondents. New APG directors are elected in the annual assemblies held in each community; the persons nominated may refuse the nomination after giving their reasons. Post rotation does not carry the obligatory force characteristic of Andean culture.

To the extent that in Villa Serrano the post-rotation system is weakened, the perception of those participating in the sindicato emphasize that membership is voluntary (41%), although the number perceiving it as obligatory (58%) is also significant.

“Membership” in the neighborhood committee follows nearly the same pattern as in the campesino sindicato. In the town of Tiahuanacu, where the population has a strong Aymara tradition and the neighborhood committee plays more or less the role played by the sindicato — to channel the town’s demands to the municipal government and to organize community work — most of the respondents consider membership in the neighborhood committee to be “obligatory”, as it is in the campesino sindicatos of this municipality. In Villa Serrano, the percentage of those who

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69 For each municipality, only those organizations are included that have a relatively high percentage of participation according to Table 14.

60
consider membership in the neighborhood committee voluntary is higher than those who replied “obligatory” for the sindicato.

Membership in other organizations — women’s, producer, and NGO-connected groups — is regarded as voluntary, especially in the municipality of Charagua.

There are, then, three organizational settings:

- Charagua, where voluntary membership in grassroots organizations predominates. There is a kind of modernizing system that permits the individual to decide whether or not to participate; and the selection of directors through communal assemblies points toward the formation of a fairly stable leadership base.

- Mizque and Tiahuanacu, where there is mandatory rotation of sindicato directors, together with a peripheral system of voluntary membership in other grassroots organizations.

- Villa Serrano, where a weakened rotation system has turned into a mixed system of post rotation together with voluntary membership in the sindicato and other grassroots organizations.

**Attendance at Meetings of Grassroots Organizations**

Graph 5 shows the extent of participation of respondents in meetings of the grassroots organizations to which they belong. On average, in 85 percent of the cases, the respondents go two or more times a month to meetings of their grassroots organizations.

This implies a substantial investment of time and energy in grassroots organizations. At the same time, it is an indicator of the importance of grassroots organizations in the daily life of the communities included in the study.

Graph 5 also shows that regular attendance in Mizque and Tiahuanacu is different from regular attendance in Charagua and Villa Serrano. In Mizque and Tiahuanacu where the sindicato is very important, we see the lowest percentages of “high” (7 or more times in the last three months) participation in meetings and at the same time we see...
the lowest percentages of “low” (1 or 2 times in the last three months) participation. Especially in Mizque, there is remarkably regular participation of between one and two times a month in the campesino sindicato meetings.

On the other hand, there is a significant percentage of “high” participation in grassroots organizations in Villa Serrano and especially in Charagua. This type of participation occurs mainly in women’s organizations and producer organizations. “Average” participation of from three to six times in the last three months predominates in the Villa Serrano sindicato and in the Charagua APG Local. At the same time, both these municipalities show the most significant levels of “low” participation — 19 percent for Charagua and 22 percent for Villa Serrano.

Again, these differences can be explained by the system of membership, participation and selection of leaders — more post rotation and “obligation” in Mizque and Tiahuanacu; more selection and “voluntary” acceptance in Charagua and Villa Serrano.

*Participation in the Decisions of Grassroots Organizations*

The campesino sindicatos in Villa Serrano would be the weakest inasmuch as not only is the level of those participating in them lower than that of Tiahuanacu and Mizque (Table 16), but there is also a slightly lower percentage of persons who state that they actively share in the sindicato decisions (Table 18).

**Table 18. Do You Very Actively Participate in the Decisions of Grassroots Organizations?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Charagua</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
<th>Villa Serrano</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sindicato</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Organizations</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer Organizations</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO-Connected Groups</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Committees</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, despite the fact that the percentage of participation in the APG Locals of Charagua is low as compared to the other three municipalities (Table 16), the percentage of participation in decision-making is one of the highest (Table 18). According to our qualitative data, APG Locals enjoy legitimacy within the communities because they are efficient in organizing collective work and in channeling demands.

Mizque is the only municipality in which there is a combination of high participation in the sindicato and high participation in decision-making.

Conversely, in Tiahuanacu, high participation in the sindicato (Table 16) contrasts with a relatively “low” participation in decision-making (Table 18). The majority of agrarian sindicatos in

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70 Included are only grassroots organizations that have a relatively high percentage of participation according to Table 14.
Tiahuanacu have adopted a routine that limits initiative in the aggregation and generation of demands.

Producer organizations in Charagua and the neighborhood committee in Tiahuanacu both report broad participation in decision-making; these types of organization are remarkably dynamic and efficient in getting results.

Homogeneity and Heterogeneity in Grassroots Organizations

As may be seen in Table 19, members of grassroots organizations are more less homogeneous as regards territory (belonging to the same community/neighborhood), socio-economic elements (occupation/farmers, social stratum and educational level), and gender.71

Table 19. Homogeneity and Heterogeneity in Grassroots Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grassroots Organizations in which you participate are from the same...</th>
<th>Charagua 100%</th>
<th>Mizque 100%</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu 100%</th>
<th>Villa Serrano 100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood-Community</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Level</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Members of the major grassroots organizations, particularly the campesino sindicatos, are not exclusively of the same family72, age73, or political party.74 Religious homogeneity does not mean that grassroots organizations choose their members on the basis of a given religious practice, but rather that most of the urban and rural population of Bolivia is Catholic.75

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71 Gender homogeneity is due to the fact that the household representative in the sindicato is the male head of household, owner of community land. In Tiahuanacu, during the season of heavy migration, it is not unusual to see women replace their husbands in the campesino sindicato. Thus, in Table 19, the percentage of gender homogeneity is less than 10 percent.

72 Tiahuanacu shows the highest percentage of family homogeneity in grassroots organizations, mainly because in these communities, as in other Altiplano communities, there is a good deal of intermarriage, so that in some communities there are four or, at most, five extended families (Albó, 1980). Grassroots organizations are not selective about family relationships; rather, they express the family composition of the community.

73 Generational organizations hardly exist in the municipalities studied.

74 Although political parties have traditionally tried to co-opt sindicato and campesino organizations in Bolivia, the latter have managed to maintain internally a relative plurality of political expression (Lavaud, 1984).

75 According to the 1992 National Population and Housing Census, 83 percent of families in Bolivia are Catholic (INE, 1992)
Factors such as territory, occupation, and “living conditions” have more significance in the structure of grassroots organizations than do concomitant factors like age, political ideology, and family ties.

Evaluation of Grassroots Organizations

Importance for the Household

Graph 6 clearly indicates the importance that respondents attach to grassroots organizations. On average, 98 percent of those interviewed consider the grassroots organization to be either very important or fairly important to their household.

This high regard for grassroots organizations is based on the functions they perform.

“"The sindicato (agrarian) is like the head of a community and if the head doesn’t work well, everything fails. It’s also like a father who works for everyone’s well-being. The sindicato solves problems between community members, boundary disputes. It’s like a squadron commander.” (Campesino, Chapas, Villa Serrano).

In the first place, grassroots organizations channel the demands of campesino families to the municipal government and other state and non-state entities — for example, the NGOs. To the extent that campesinos can not individually influence such entities to respond to their demands, they are obliged to turn to organizations that represent them outside the community.

In the second place, grassroots organizations organize collective work for common objectives: road building and maintenance, construction of schools and health stations.

In the third place, campesino sindicatos help to resolve conflicts within the community and with other communities (over boundary lines and natural resources).

Finally, grassroots organizations provide a setting in which campesinos can acquire self-confidence and organizational and directive skills.

Benefits Associated with Grassroots Organizations

Table 20 shows that respondents generally associate campesino sindicatos and neighborhood committees more with community/neighborhood benefits than with personal advantages; whereas
in the case of other organizations — women’s, producer, and NGO-connected groups — there is a tendency to give them more credit for personal than community benefits.

This perception is related to the functions of the various grassroots organizations. Both campesino sindicatos and neighborhood committees are concerned with obtaining services for the entire community — schools, health stations, potable water, road repair, etc. Other grassroots organizations, however, like women’s, producer, and NGO-connected groups, are aimed at improvements in education and income that directly affect the family.

Table 20. Benefits Associated with Grassroots Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Membership</th>
<th>Sindicato</th>
<th>Women’s Organization</th>
<th>Producer Organization</th>
<th>Organization formed by NGOs</th>
<th>Neighborhood Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Charagua</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Benefits</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Benefits</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligatory Participation</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Participation</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mizque</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Benefits</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Benefits</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligatory Participation</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Participation</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tiahuanacu</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Benefits</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Benefits</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligatory Participation</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Participation</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Villa Serrano</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Benefits</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Benefits</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligatory Participation</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Participation</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evaluation of Benefits Obtained Through Grassroots Organizations

Graph 7 lists the services that respondents say they obtained thanks to the grassroots organizations in which they participated.

It can be seen in Graph 7 that grassroots organizations, mainly campesino sindicatos (rural area) and neighborhood committees (towns) are helpful in obtaining access to such services as education, health, electricity, and water and sanitation. These mainly involve “public services” that affect the community as a whole.

On the other hand, services that are directly related to production/productivity and income generation do not carry the same weight. Except for the procedures required to consolidate land rights, none of the other services has grassroots organizations as its primary channel of access. Access to these services, chiefly credit and savings, is more individual than community.

The exception to the foregoing is Mizque, where communal irrigation systems are administered and water use is monitored by the campesino sindicato in most communities and the management committee in others.
Conclusions

1. In general, grassroots organizations have an important presence in the municipalities studied.
   - Eight of ten households participate in some grassroots organization.
   - Grassroots organizations are very important in nine of ten cases.
   - There is participation in the decision-making of grassroots organizations in seven of ten cases.
   - In seven of ten cases, the grassroots organization is believed to benefit the community and the family.
   - In six of ten cases, respondents state that the organization was formed by the community.

2. There are two types of grassroots organizations:
   - Territorial organizations (campesino sindicatos and neighborhood committees) specialized in demanding services that have their primary impact on the community and not just on the family; their effectiveness is relatively significant.
   - Functional organizations (women’s, producer), in which membership is voluntary, have more impact on the family than on the community. Their effectiveness is not as significant as in the case of territorial organizations.

3. Grassroots organizations at the community level are conditioned by, among other factors, their post-1952 organizational experience and by the degree to which their functioning is influenced by the persistence of indigenous cultural patterns. This conditioning can be observed in two contexts.
   - In Mizque and Tiahuanacu, the long-time campesino organizational tradition continued after the 1952 revolution and the dismantling of the hacienda system. For this reason, campesino sindicatos are very important in channeling demands and in organizing community work; and the way they function is conditioned by ancestral cultural patterns, principally mandatory rotation of directive posts.

   The major role of the campesino sindicato in these two municipalities means that there is not much participation in other grassroots organizations. Additionally, meeting attendance is higher than in Charagua and Villa Serrano.

   Respondents believe that the sindicato was formed by the community (although, historically, it was a creation of the revolutionary state that took power in 1952) and that membership in it is obligatory.
• Organizational tradition in Villa Serrano and Charagua is more recent. The continued hacienda presence limits formation of grassroots organizations, which in any event are less influenced by indigenous patterns.

Because of these factors, fewer families are members of grassroots organizations, and participation in directive posts in the campesino sindicato of Villa Serrano and the APG Local in Charagua is not as extensive as in Tiahuanacu and Mizque. Correspondingly, there is participation in a greater variety of grassroots organizations — women’s, producer, and NGO-connected groups — accompanied by a lower attendance record than that of Tiahuanacu and Tiahuanacu and Mizque.

Respondents believe that NGOs played a significant role in the formation of their grassroots organizations and that membership in these organizations is voluntary.

4. Together with the two historical-cultural settings described above, there are two other settings related to the effectiveness of grassroots organizations.

• Because they are more effective in channeling demands and obtaining economic resources, agrarian sindicatos in Mizque and APG Locals in Charagua enjoy legitimacy and the authority to mobilize the community. Respondents in these municipalities believe that they actively share in the decision-making of their grassroots organizations.

• In Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano, agrarian sindicatos are less capable in channeling demands and obtaining resources, and they are therefore less effective than those in Mizque and Charagua. At the same time, respondents in these municipalities are less likely than those in Charagua and Mizque to believe that they are active participants in decision-making.

The difference in the contexts of relative sindicato effectiveness is mainly explained by the formation of regional leadership, a subject that will be discussed in the next chapter. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out as a factor in differentiating between the contexts of community grassroots organizations.

5. If both of the contexts analyzed — historical-cultural and effectiveness — are taken into account, then there are four contexts in which grassroots organizations develop.
Table 21. Factors Influencing Performance of Grassroots Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sindicato Effectiveness in Channeling Demands</th>
<th>Organizational Tradition and Persistence of Indigenous Cultural Patterns of Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Mizque</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Mizque, (sindicato) grassroots organizations have a significant potential in local development due to their strong organizational and cultural tradition, together with their proven effectiveness.

Charagua is in second place because, although it does not have a long historical-cultural organizational tradition, its grassroots organizations have become very effective in channeling demands.

In third place is Tiahuanacu, where despite having kept its historical-cultural organizational tradition, the agrarian sindicato is currently having difficulties in channeling demands.

Finally, there is Villa Serrano, with deficiencies in both variables — historical-cultural tradition and effectiveness of grassroots organizations.

As will be seen in the next chapter, concomitant factors such as regional leadership, NGO activity, and the institutional effectiveness of municipal governments have a decisive impact and introduce significant variations in the municipal contexts described, according to the performance of community grassroots organizations.
CHAPTER 4

GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

So far, grassroots organizations have been analyzed as regards their most important characteristics, the relations they establish with community members, and the services that they help obtain for the community as a whole.

To understand fully the factors conditioning the effectiveness of grassroots organizations and the dynamics of local development in general, it is necessary also to study grassroots organizations as they relate to other actors that intervene decisively in local development: local government and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Regional Grassroots Leaders as Actors in Local Development

Functions of Regional Grassroots Leaders

In the four municipalities under study, the regional grassroots leadership, which emerges mainly from agrarian sindicatos and from local APGs in the case of Charagua, plays a major role in local development. The following figure diagrams the functions that are “ideally” performed by regional grassroots leadership:

Figure 5 is an “ideal diagram” of the functions of regional leadership, which does not represent empirical reality. As will be seen later on, each municipality’s leadership approaches this “ideal” to a greater or lesser degree.

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76 In the present study, regional grassroots leaderships refer to the directors of the supra-communal campesino organizations. In Tiahuanacu, Mizque, and Villa Serrano, these are the directors of the Campesino Centrals that group together the agrarian sindicatos of the municipality communities. In Charagua, they are the directors of the National Assembly of the Guarani People (ANPG) and the Zonal Assemblies of the Guarani People that combine the Local Assemblies of the Guarani People at the community level.
These regional grassroots leaderships constitute a kind of “inter-community political arm” that supports the actions of the territorial grassroots organizations (OTBs) recognized by Popular Participation\textsuperscript{77} in their dealings with the municipal government. Unlike community grassroots organizations, regional grassroots leaderships represent the totality of campesino communities and command the authority to mobilize most of them. For this reason, the political pressure they can exert on the municipal government is more effective than the pressure of individual community organizations acting alone.

This legitimacy of supra-community campesino organizations and their leadership is validated by their being recognized not only by the communities, but also by the municipal government. The latter has its task of receiving and responding to the demands of civil society simplified by the fact that it deals with a single regional interlocutor rather than any number of community interlocutors.

The authority concentrated in the hands of the regional grassroots leadership not only enables it to support all the communities in what they demand from the municipal government, but also and at the same time, to prioritize specific demands and pressure the municipal government for a favorable response; in some cases, the leadership itself originates demands.

\textsuperscript{77} Campesino sindicatos in Tiahuanacu, Mizque, and Villa Serrano; APG Locals in Charagua; and in towns, neighborhood committees. For OTBs, see Chapter 1 of this report.
Furthermore, regional leadership mediates not only between communities and municipal government, but also in intra-community disputes over boundary lines, springs, pastureland, etc.\textsuperscript{78}

Factors in the Formation and Performance of Regional Grassroots Leadership

Using Table 22 as a reference, we go on to analyze factors conditioning the formation and effectiveness of regional grassroots leadership.

Table 22. Factors in the Formation and Effectiveness of Regional Grassroots Leadership

| Historical Factors                      | Factors Associated with the Formation of Human Resources | Cultural Factors |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------
| Election of new generation of leaders   | Access to formal education                             | Introduction of innovative organizational practices |
|                                        | Skills in institutional negotiation                     |                 |

A new generation of regional leadership. The effectiveness of the regional leadership that emerged from Bolivia’s earlier stage (1952-1985) depended to a large extent on its bringing to the fore new leaders with new patterns of action and of relations with the state.

Although Bolivia’s urban and rural sindicato movement generally continued the patterns of action it had followed with the 1952 state (Laserna, 1997), what is significant here is that three of the four municipalities studied — Mizque, Charagua, and Tiahuanacu — show patterns of action corresponding to Table 23’s “After 1952”. These new patterns can be attributed to the new regional leaders that, in many cases, replaced the old grassroots directors.

Table 23. Regional Leadership of Grassroots Organizations: Patterns of Relations with the State, Before and After 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before 1952</th>
<th>After 1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation with the state</td>
<td>Negotiations with the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly political functions in terms of “national” demands</td>
<td>Political functions and channeling of “local” demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands generally directed to the national government</td>
<td>Demands generally directed to the municipal government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client relations with certain sectors connected with central state power</td>
<td>Decreased importance of client relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Access to formal education and mastery of institutional negotiation skills. Regional leaders who successfully obtain benefits for their regions are characterized by an above-average education\textsuperscript{79},

\textsuperscript{78} The major role played by regional campesino leaderships is nothing new in rural Bolivia. The 1952 revolution gave rise to a number of regional campesino mini-states that were able to mobilize their people, pressure the national state, and carry out “de facto” administration of justice (Revera, 1984).
which means that they are also better able than others to handle institutional negotiations. Mastery of such skills is also the result of their experience in relations with non-governmental organizations.

These factors — more education, mastery of institutional negotiation skills, and experience with NGOs — enable regional leaders to manage the institutional procedures of municipal governments in negotiating demands, presenting specific projects, and monitoring the administrative actions of municipal governments.

Introduction of new organizational cultural practices. As new leaders increasingly replace the old community representatives in dealing with municipal government, they incorporate cultural innovations into traditional patterns of election and leadership renewal that, among other things, permit:

- Communities to exercise more control over the actions of regional leadership, through the veto power of their assemblies.

- The substitution of elective assemblies for the systems of post rotation in the Altiplano (Tiahuanacu) and the Valleys (Mizque and Villa Serrano), and hereditary authority in East Chaco (Charagua), thereby making it possible to create a group of leaders specialized in the task of channeling demands and negotiating for resources with local government and other “external” agents.

Thanks to these cultural innovations in organizational practices, the dynamics of social capital can be adapted to the national context of the newly decentralized state and to the efficient use of instruments for action in local development as restructured by the Popular Participation Law.

Regional Leadership in Mizque

Until the early 80s, the Campesino Central of Mizque (supra-communal organization that groups together all the campesino sindicatos of Mizque province) was controlled by a leadership that had been molded by the practices of the agrarian sindicato movement of the 1952 state and that, at the same time, conformed to the military-campesino arrangement of the 1960s and 1970s (Dandler, 1983). This leadership, following a logic of confrontation with the state, mobilized communities for political objectives that were more national than regional.  

In was in this context that a new kind of leadership began to take shape, first in communities that had had contacts with the agricultural projects of the NGO-CEDEAGRO. This

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79 An outstanding example is Julián Quispe, law graduate of the University of San Andrés, who is Secretary General of the Campesino Central in Tiahuanacu and who, as we shall see later, has been “successful” in his 1996 and 1997 administrations.

80 In Mizque, mobilizations strictly followed the party line of the only national campesino sindicato (Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia), with generic slogans like “Down with neoliberalism” and “No, to IMF and World Bank demands”.

---
new leadership was consolidated as the Mizque Potato Producers Federation, an organization that received the institutional support of CEDEAGRO.

Thanks to its experience with local CEDEAGRO projects and its fundamental interest in promoting agricultural production, this leadership took politically less radical positions and was more concerned with local goals of regional development.

Gradually, the old leadership was replaced by the new generation of regional leaders that, by the end of the 1980s, had taken control of the Campesino Central of Mizque.

From this position and always with the help of CEDEAGRO, the new leaders began to channel demands related to local development needs, with special emphasis on installing irrigation infrastructure and raising the yields of potato and other vegetable crops. This process also served to channel international cooperation resources into such projects, resulting in higher productivity in areas of the province with greater agricultural potential.

The implementation of these projects made it obvious that planning at the provincial level was needed. Therefore, in 1990, regional leadership, together with CEDEAGRO, promoted the creation of the Provincial Development Council, a supra-communal entity that includes the Campesino Central, representatives of the eleven area sub-Centrals, the Campesino Women’s Central, the town-oriented Civic Council, the Mayor of Mizque, representatives of the Provincial Government (prefecture) and all the NGOs that work in the area.

A key background element of the Provincial Council was its use of “participatory planning” in the late 80s, under the auspices of CEDEAGRO and with the support of the Campesino Central. By means of this dynamic, communities identify and prioritize their needs. On the basis of such priorities, Annual Operational Plans are prepared that are used as tools in obtaining international cooperation resources and that are administered by the Mayor’s Office.

Because of its effectiveness and ability to channel demands and to generate projects, the regional leadership of Mizque has become a major factor in the channeling of resources and their subsequent transformation into services. The dynamism of Mizque’s regional leadership contrasts with the routine post rotation of community agrarian sindicatos that are mired in a process of continuous change.

The case of Mizque is an example of almost all the factors involved in the formation and performance of regional leadership that are listed in Table 22: replacement of old regional leaders, presence of new leaders with more education and more experience in institutional negotiation, together with innovations in forms of action, representation and total demands.
Regional Leadership in Charagua

Until the mid-80s, the communal and supra-communal organizations in the Cordillera Province, where the municipality of Charagua is located, were not very dynamic. Since the late 1970s, the only supra-communal organization of some significance has been the Captaincy General of El Izo, which is the eastern part of the Charagua municipality and of the Cordillera Province. This traditional organization is headed by Bonifacio Barrientos, formerly the indigenous leader of the Guarani, who has had broad national and international experience in representing the indigenous peoples of eastern Bolivia.

The socio-economic changes that have taken place since the mid-80s in the sub-Andean zone of North Charagua and the municipality of Gutiérrez, involve an increase in agricultural productivity and the partial reversal of campesino migration. A number of the Guarani who in the 70s emigrated to Santa Cruz, the dynamic capital of the department, have returned to their communities; many of them had access to formal education and institutional contacts during their stay in the capital.

This process has given rise to the formation of a modernizing leadership in North Charagua, a leadership that has begun to organize the communities of that region, while maintaining more or less symbolically the traditional and purely formal authority of the communal captains.

Together with this process, between 1986 and 1987 a broad and comprehensive “Diagnosis of the Cordillera Province” was prepared jointly by CIPCA and the Regional Corporation of Santa Cruz. This was an exceptional undertaking of inter-institutional coordination between the state and non-governmental organizations.

The study generated an unusual mobilization of grassroots organization that, thanks to the initiative of the modernizing leadership of North Charagua, culminated in the creation of the National Assembly of the Guarani People (ANGP), which grouped together the Guarani communities of the regions of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and, to a lesser extent, Chuquisaca.

The modernizing trend of the ANGP is seen in the lines of action programmed by the organization: production, education, health, infrastructure, and land-territory. These lines of action coincide with the work areas of the Development Plan that is emerging from the Provincial Diagnosis of 1986.

“Things began to change in Charagua in 1986, when CIPCA and the (Santa Cruz) Corporation produced a Diagnosis of the Cordillera Province. For me, the most important result was the formation of the National Assembly of the Guarani People. That was when the communities began to wake up...Before then, they were controlled by the hacienda owners”. (Functionary, ARACUAREND.LA).

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81 The sub-Andean zone has the humid soil of foothills, suitable for intensive livestock raising and large-scale cultivation of maize and soy bean; its productivity potential is the highest in the Province. Annual family income in some communities has increased from 300 to 1200 USD (CIPCA). In communities like El Espino and Kaipepe in North Charagua, emigration went down to almost zero in the 80s.
82 NGO that has been working in Charagua since 1972.
83 Decentralized agency of the central government.
Using the Diagnosis and the 1986-87 Development Plan as a starting point, several local institutions and the Assembly of the Guarani People obtained 10 million dollars from international cooperation for development and infrastructure projects, chiefly education and health. Furthermore, the ANPG received counterpart resources from the state for financing, through the Social Investment Fund (FIS)84, health and education projects.

The dynamics of regional leadership, connected in turn with the Assembly of the Guarani People, is evidence of the duality of organizational patterns in the region. Whereas the Assembly is run by a modernizing leadership, in the early 90s, the Captains General Council — an entity embodying the most traditional authority based on hereditary power and not subject to community supervision — was created within the Assembly of the Guarani People. Both types of organization and regional leadership periodically come into conflict over their claims to represent the Guarani people.85

The leadership of the Assembly of the Guarani People has also promoted the creation of Community Assemblies (APG Locals).

Without the emergence of a regional leadership connected to the National Assembly of the Guarani People, it would have been almost impossible for the communities, individually, to obtain the 10 million dollars needed to increase education and health coverage. As in Mizque, the regional leadership of North Charagua, having had access to formal education and experience in institutional negotiation, and enjoying the support of the NGOs (mainly CIPCA), can channel demands, obtain resources for local development, and introduce new cultural patterns of organization.

Rather than the replacement of old regional leaders that occurs in Mizque, in Charagua, old and new leaderships coexist and frequently dispute each other’s authority.

At this time, the National Assembly of the Guarani People is in the process of readapting itself to the new territorial dynamics favored by Popular Participation — dynamics that break up the regional-national space of the Guarani into a number of more local municipalities. In this process, the APG Locals connected with these municipalities are being viewed as more practical channels than the National Assembly for demands that are no longer directed to the national government, but to municipal government.

“At present, the National Assembly of the Guarani People is in a kind of crisis. Since Popular Participation, it hasn’t had anything to do, because people don’t use the Assembly anymore as a channel to central government; they go directly to the Mayor’s Office. Let’s see how it manages with the new rules (of Popular Participation)”. (Functionary of CIPCA).

84 State dependency.
85 Conflicts of this kind have spurred more traditional regional authorities (captains general) to propose the creation of an “Indigenous Municipality” based in the El Izozo region, which would be under the control of traditional authorities headed by Bonifacio Barrientos.
The leadership of the Tiahuanacu Campesino Central has for some years been “atypical” with respect to traditional Altiplano leaderships. Even though it shares with them certain patterns of action such as the tendency to confront the state and certain client relations with holders of local and national power, since early on it has been concerned with local development.

A few examples of the modernizing trend of the regional leadership in Tiahuanacu are:

- In the late 1970s, it asked the Catholic Church to create a Technical University affiliated with the Bolivian Catholic University to train local human resources so that, rather than emigrate, young people would remain to support local development.

- At the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s, it arranged for part of the income generated by the Tiahuanacu tourist complex to be allocated to the Campesino Central. This means that the Central has its own resources to carry out local development projects. \(^{86}\)

- In the mid-1980s, it sought to promote the production potential of the region by buying two tractors to be available to the community. Although this initiative was not continued over time, it shows the concerns of the Tiahuanacu regional leadership.

- In 1996, it created the Tiahuanacu Transport Cooperative to bring together campesinos who are entering transport activities.

These initiatives have legitimized the leadership associated with the Tiahuanacu Campesino Central to the extent that in 1996, it not only monitored municipal action, but also represented both the communities and the municipal capital townspeople. That same year, by means of an “open assembly”, \(^{87}\) it ran out of town a Mayor who had committed several corrupt acts.

In Tiahuanacu, there has been no replacement of the old regional leaders. Rather, the various initiatives described above have been carried out in a particularly efficient way.

In Tiahuanacu, unlike Mizque and Charagua, no group of new leaders have emerged with innovative patterns of organization; no “team” has been consolidated. For this reason, as occurs in the community agrarian sindicatos, its effectiveness depends largely on the personal qualities of the Secretary General whose turn it is. Election of regional directors is still subject to the post-rotation system, which works against the specialization of regional grassroots leaders.

Contrary to what usually happens in such situations, money has not provoked accusations of corruption against this leadership. An orderly management of this money in bank accounts has kept the municipal communities and their directors more or less satisfied with the administration of these funds.

Assembly of the Population, which makes administrative and political decisions.

---

\(^{86}\) Contrary to what usually happens in such situations, money has not provoked accusations of corruption against this leadership. An orderly management of this money in bank accounts has kept the municipal communities and their directors more or less satisfied with the administration of these funds.

\(^{87}\) Assembly of the Population, which makes administrative and political decisions.
The effectiveness of the present direction of the Campesino Central is basically due to the personal attributes of Julián Quispe, the young secretary general who, having studied at the University of San Andrés in La Paz, has acquired institutional negotiation skills together with a vision in which local development takes precedence over political mobilization for more general purposes.

Regional Leadership in Villa Serrano

In Villa Serrano, the organizational weakness of the Campesino Central reflects the organizational weakness of the campesino sindicatos overall. As was explained in the previous chapter, organizational tradition in Villa Serrano is recent and the strength of campesino sindicato organizations is quite limited.

Three factors stand in the way of the emergence of strong grassroots leaders:

- The relative absence of a strong ethnic tradition oriented to community organization, because most of the campesino population in Villa Serrano is Hispanicized (Table 4). Therefore, there is a lack of indigenous organizational patterns, channeling of demands, and grassroots-based monitoring, which hinders the emergence of regional leaders with clear patterns of conduct.

- The still important presence of the hacienda and of the hacendado elite who continue to control local power make it difficult to establish grassroots organizations with negotiating skills.

- The integration of “more prosperous” communities into the market in a way that encourages tertiarization of the community economy and, therefore, the emigration of wealthier families to the urban centers of Santa Cruz, Sucre, or Chapare.

Although the first two factors are common to both Villa Serrano and Charagua, the third factor establishes the difference between them. The integration of the “more prosperous communities” in Charagua (North) primarily promotes agricultural activity rather than tertiarization of the community economy; therefore, human resources with more leadership potential are interested in the local development of the region. On the other hand, the tertiarization of the economic activities of the more prosperous communities of Villa Serrano, together with a
significant seasonal migration, affects the values of community organization and uproots the most promising human resources from their land.\textsuperscript{88}

Nonetheless, the possibility for developing an effective regional grassroots leadership exists in the organizations of potato and wheat producers and of loggers supported by the NGOs CEDEC and CARE.

Comparison of Regional Leadership

Table 24 shows a sort of continuum that goes from the most (Mizque) to the least (Villa Serrano) developed potentials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
<th>Villa Serrano</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Replacement of old leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resources with more training and experience in institutional negotiations</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural innovations in regional-organization forms</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: Performance of regional leadership in local development</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Municipal Government in Local Development

As was pointed out in the previous sub-heading, supra-community grassroots organizations do not by themselves have the economic and institutional resources to offer the services required by the municipal communities. They can only augment and channel the demands of these communities to the municipal government; at the same time, they can put pressure on and monitor municipal actions in special cases — as in Mizque — and they can even participate in regional planning.

Nonetheless, without a state interlocutor like the municipal government, resource channeling and the execution of local development projects would be impossible. Therefore, the performance of municipal government and its ability to process and respond to demands is vital to understanding the dynamics of local development as a whole.

The performance of the municipal governments of the four municipalities under study will be analyzed from two levels: the structural level with reference to local power; and the other, more institutional, level with reference to human and financial resources and the management capability of the municipal governments.

\textsuperscript{88} This tertiarization is also observed in the other municipalities studied, except that in Villa Serrano, it is a major obstacle to the consolidation of regional leaderships.
An analysis of the effectiveness of municipal government starts with the assumption that such effectiveness is expressly based on local power connections. This implies the establishment of certain relations among the various actors that compete for control of local resources in order to orient local development toward specific interests and in a specific direction.  

In this study, it has been found that the stability and institutional effectiveness of municipal government depend on two structural factors: the replacement of earlier local power connections as dictated by the new conditions of local development and the consolidation of a given local power.  

New local power connections refer to the change of actors and/or relations among actors, so as to make this change more functional within the new Popular Participation scenario. In this case, it is necessary to identify local power relations before Popular Participation (or under the “1952 state”), on the one hand, and during Popular Participation, on the other. New local power connections are:

- “Total” (change in regional elites: Mizque)
- “Partial” (change in power relations but with the old elite: Charagua)

---

Figure 6. Structural Factors in the Performance of Municipal Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRUCTURAL LEVEL</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Local Power Connections</td>
<td>Ability to Respond to Demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation of Local power</td>
<td>Institutional Stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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89 Arocena, 1995.
• “Conflictive” (course to be followed by the new power connections has not yet been made clear, which gives rise to conflicts)

• “Uncertain” (changes have still not taken definite form)

The better the new power relations adapt to the requirements set forth by Popular Participation, the greater are the possibilities of institutional response by municipal government to community demands; the less successfully power relations function in terms of Popular Participation dynamics, the less likelihood of an institutional response by municipal government to community demands.

Consolidation of local power refers to the constitution of a regional elite able to control local resources and direct local development toward its interests “for the common good”. As shown below, greater consolidation of local power and, consequently, of a regional elite, translates into greater institutional stability of municipal government. At the same time, it will be observed that the less a regional elite is consolidated, the less institutional stability is enjoyed by municipal government.

Table 25 shows two structural processes and their corresponding institutional dimensions: a structural process “favorable” to local development in Mizque and Charagua; and a structural process “unfavorable” to local development in Villa Serrano and Tiahuanacu.

**Table 25. Connection Between Local Power and Institutional Performance, by Municipality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
<th>Villa Serrano</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Local Connections</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response of Municipal Government to Demands</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consolidation of Local Power</strong></td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stability of Municipal Government</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Favorable” structural processes. In Mizque, local power connections are undergoing a “radical” change. The 1952 revolution dislodged the old hacendado elite, and for a while its place was taken by a combination of merchants, truckers, and provincial administration headquartered in the town of Mizque. Rather than try to implement a comprehensive local development project, the new elite limited itself to the few resources that arrived from the central government before Popular Participation.

---

90 Several ex-hacendados joined this new elite.
Since the early 1980s, the new directorship of the campesino sindicato has been earning legitimacy and it has gradually gained power in centers such as the Provincial Development Council. After the advent of Popular Participation, it became a directive elite. It is not, however, totally consolidated (Table 25), due to the struggle for control between, on the one hand, the townspeople who want mechanisms to block municipal action connected with campesino power and, on the other, the emerging new campesino leaders connected with the more political movement of the coca-plantation workers in Chapare.  

This radical change in power connections and the relative consolidation of the local power of the campesino central in Mizque are reflected in the latter’s ability to channel campesino demands to the municipal government, together with a relative stability that, however, can be affected in the immediate future if the current campesino elite’s gains in power are lost to townspeople and to the campesino leaders connected with the Chapare political movement.

If in Mizque, there has been a change in regional elites, but at the expense of less consolidation of the current local power elites in the campesino central, in Charagua the contrary occurs: regional elites are more firmly consolidated, but they have not been radically changed (Table 25). That is to say, the regional elites that dominated before Popular Participation (livestock ranchers, timber companies, and light-skinned hacendados of the region) continue to hold local power under Popular Participation. Consolidation of their control has in turn ensured the institutional stability of municipal government.

In Charagua, what has changed is not the regional elite, as in Mizque, but the relations between this elite and campesino communities. Before the creation of the National Assembly of the Guarani People, the relationship between indigenous groups and the elite was one of servility, with the former almost totally subordinated to the latter. After formation of the Assembly, the relationship gradually turned into one in which the indigenous Guarani were better equipped to make their demands to the elite and to influence and monitor the institutional performance of the municipal government.

91 In this regard, reliable sources in Mizque told us they were concerned that the involvement of some of the leadership with the Chapare coca-plantation workers might brand the actions of the local sindicato organization as being “political” and national in nature, rather than focused on local development; this, in turn, would weaken the CEDEAGRO-connected leadership.

92 The present mayor and most members of the municipal council are engaged in livestock and lumber activities.

93 As in Mizque, in Charagua there have been no prolonged periods of institutional instability. Mayors elected since 1994, when Popular Participation was applied, have usually completed their term of office without mishap.
Although the institutional stability of municipal government in Mizque and Charagua is more or less the same, and although municipal government in both municipalities is similarly capable of taking action, at the structural level, the power centers that support this relative effectiveness are radically different. In Mizque, there is a campesino-oriented power center, whereas in Charagua, the power center is associated with the light-skinned overlords — livestock-rancher and timber-company owners of medium-sized and large haciendas — who are firmly in control of economic and political power.

Despite this radical difference at the structural level, the similarities at the institutional level provide both municipalities with relatively favorable opportunities to execute work projects and to obtain services.

“Unfavorable” structural processes. Still referring to Table 25, it can be seen that consolidation of a regional elite is very deficient in Villa Serrano and non-existent in Tiahuanacu. This situation causes the institutional instability of municipal actions taken in both municipalities. In fact, the Villa Serrano townspeople, in league with hacendado interests, forced the abrupt resignation of the former woman mayor, who attempted to respond to campesino demands.

In Villa Serrano, institutional instability is due to the fact that the 1952 revolution affected the political power of the hacendados, while allowing them to keep their properties. This elite has not been able to reconstitute its power, and there has been no other actor to replace it.

In the case of Tiahuanacu, there is almost no regional elite to use its connection to further its interests in local development and, therefore, there is even greater institutional instability in municipal government; this municipality has changed its mayor three times in less than a year, precipitately and without regard for institutional norms.

The 1952 revolution that ousted the hacendados from the region, thereby providing Tiahuanacu townspeople and campesino communities with a great deal of spatial mobility, also resulted in high rates of emigration to and trade with the near-by city of La Paz. This proximity of Tiahuanacu to the political center of Bolivia means that the dynamics of power are subsumed in the dynamics of La Paz. The elite in question is in La Paz and there is therefore no regional-local elite in Tiahuanacu.
Despite showing some dynamism, regional campesino leaders have not been able to consolidate a local power base.

The already described processes notwithstanding, it should be noted that in both municipalities (Villa Serrano and Tiahuanacu), the mayors are of campesino background. Especially in Villa Serrano, this shows that the new dynamics of Popular Participation are opening up opportunities for campesinos to occupy positions of power — opportunities that, for many years, were closed to them because of socio-cultural discrimination and the absence of adequate institutional channels.

**Institutional Processes of Municipal Management**

Having analyzed the structural processes of local power connections that condition the institutional evolution of municipal government, we shall go on to analyze this evolution based on the following indicators: stability of municipal management; processes of diagnosis and planning; institutionalization of the processes of demand; monitoring of municipal management; channeling and use of financial resources; and skills of human resources.

**Stability of municipal management.** As stated earlier, municipal management in Charagua and Mizque is stable and continuous. There have been no prolonged or chronic problems. On the other hand, the interruption of municipal management in Villa Serrano and Tiahuanacu due to conflict with power groups, or more dramatically, with a mayor’s resignation or expulsion, was a constant in the early years of Popular Participation.

**Processes of diagnosis and participatory planning.** The possibility of carrying out municipal diagnosis and participatory planning is linked to two factors: 1) the presence of skilled human resources in municipal government; and the logistic support of external agents, chiefly the NGOs that work in the municipality.

Of the four municipalities studied, three municipal governments carried out systematic diagnosis: Mizque, Charagua, and Villa Serrano. Of these three, two had already completed broad-scaled provincial diagnosis: Mizque (1989) and Charagua (1986); these diagnosis were conducted with the technical-logistic assistance of CEDEAGRO (Mizque) and CIPCA (Charagua). Villa Serrano’s municipal diagnosis was prepared by CEDEC, and a community-by-community diagnosis was elaborated by CARE.

Clearly, the presence and influence of NGOs oriented toward sustainable social intervention is a major factor in making it possible for municipal government to prepare diagnoses and participatory plans.

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“The old authorities were hacendados and their families. Now they reject the new campesino power...because I represent the campesinos” (Mayor of Villa Serrano).

94 The present mayor of Mizque has held his post for seven years.

95 It should be mentioned that Mizque and Charagua are pioneers in preparing local diagnoses and participatory plans, long before these mechanisms were mandated by the 1994 Popular Participation Law.
In Tiahuanacu, the absence of trained human resources in municipal government and the absence of NGOs oriented toward sustainable social intervention — long term and coordinated with the municipality — prevented the carrying out of a municipal diagnosis.

*Institutional processes of receiving demands.* There is a continuum from more to less institutionalization in the processes of receiving and responding to demands:

- Charagua shows the most institutionalization in the receiving of demands, stemming from the communal assemblies in which needs are identified and prioritized. The directors of these communities meet together in zonal assemblies under the umbrella of the APG zonals of North Charagua, South Charagua, and the Izozo. In these assemblies, the needs of each community are presented in order of priority; they are then submitted to a second process of prioritization, this time by zone.

Finally, the directors of the APG zonals present these needs to the municipal council for inclusion in the Annual Operational Plan after yet a third prioritization. Although the demand-receiving process sometimes departs from this system, it is the process that is generally in effect and regularly followed in the municipality.

In the channeling of demands, there are almost no mechanisms that permit communal organizations to have direct access to municipal government.  

- In Mizque, two demand-receiving processes co-exist. One, which is formal and institutionalized, permits supra-communal grassroots organizations to participate in planning through the provincial council. The municipal government presents to the council its strategic and operative plans, which the council approves, modifies, or rejects. At the same time, the council approves or denies budgetary allocations to the various items and projects. Together with this institutionalized and formal process, there is another, more informal and personalized, process of channeling demands. It is based on the personal relations of friendship and ritual kinship that communal directors have established with the mayor.

- In Tiahuanacu, there are almost no institutionalized processes of channeling demands; rather, there exists ample opportunity for direct and personal contact with the mayor. The processing of these demands follows varying patterns that are not clearly defined.

- In Villa Serrano, institutional processes are very weak. Access to municipal government depends on personal and/or client relations and on ability to put pressure on the municipal executive.

96 This is apparently a product of the greater socio-cultural duality in Charagua, in which there is a dominant light-skinned world on the one hand and an indigenous Guarani world on the other, with very little interaction between the two.
Monitoring of municipal management.

- In Mizque, management-monitoring is the responsibility of the Campesino Central and the Provincial Development Council.

- In Charagua, the mayor prepares the management report, which he delivers to the zonal assemblies directed by the APG Zonals. Such circumstances do not favor detailed and technical monitoring of municipal management.

- In Tiahuanacu, the Campesino Central conducts a monitoring process on a fairly regular basis; but this exercise is neither systematic nor is it institutionalized. Instead, it depends on the personal initiative of the Secretary General.

- In Villa Serrano, monitoring of municipal management falls to the town’s power groups through mechanisms that are not institutionalized.

The Popular Participation Law establishes monitoring mechanisms by way of the Oversight Committees; nonetheless, it differentiates between these committees and the supra-communal grassroots organizations that actually conduct the monitoring of municipal management. In so doing, the Law created a structure parallel to traditional organizations. This would appear to be one of the reasons for the weakness and ineffectiveness of a number of Bolivia’s Oversight Committees, including those in the four municipalities of our study.

Use of financial resources. Table 26 shows the ability of municipal governments to obtain financial resources over and above the shared tax revenue allocated to them by the state under the Popular Participation Law.

Table 26. 1995 Budget, by Source of Financing
(in thousands of Bolivians)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Financing</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
<th>Villa Serrano</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular Participation</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Resources</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1457</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Political Science Unit (UDAPSO)

Again, it is the Mizque management that is most efficient in collecting its own resources, to the extent that these latter represent 49 percent of the 1995 budget.

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97 See Chapter 1.
98 For financing sources and the way in which Popular Participation resources are distributed, see Chapter 1.
99 As of this date, the exchange rate is 4.80 Bs. for 1 US dollar.
100 Tax revenue from real estate, automobiles, and economic entities formally established in the zone.
In second place is the Charagua municipal government, which has managed to compensate for its weakness in collecting its own resources by channeling resources that come primarily from international cooperation. This situation, however, indicates a significant dependence on “irregular resources”, which amount to 57 percent of the 1995 budget.

Villa Serrano is in third place, with barely 3 percent of its budget covered by international cooperation resources.

And, finally, Tiahuanacu, which has not been able to obtain any resources in addition to what it receives from Popular Participation. This is evidence of its institutional weakness and lack of contacts with other sources, not to mention the fact that when our study was conducted, Tiahuanacu still had no budget planned for the next municipal-government administration.

Training of human resources. Training of municipal-government human resources is directly related to the level of support provided by the NGOs that work in the municipality.

- In Mizque, three of the functionaries in municipal government, one of whom is the present mayor, were trained in CEDEAGRO. Furthermore, CEDEAGRO personnel provide technical support for such tasks as project preparation and evaluation. CEDEAGRO has even become the technical advisor for “inward” and “outward” operations of the municipal government, and it expands the institutional relations of the mayor’s office with the government, prefecture, special funds, and occasionally with international cooperation.

- In Charagua, CIPCA personnel are assisting in the preparation of the Municipal Development Plan, and it has created a special support program for municipal management.

- In Villa Serrano, some of the CEDEC and CARE personnel assist in municipal management.

- In Tiahuanacu, there is no ongoing support by NGO personnel in the area. The institutional and strategic weakness of these NGOs explains Tiahuanacu’s problems in training human resources for municipal government.

“What we need are more resources...The Mayor doesn’t have enough. We used to think it was a lot of money...but when you look at our needs, the resources don’t amount to much”. (Council Member, Villa Serrano).

“We need training and skills...It’s not possible, without a single professional. Professionals don’t want to work here; they study and go off to the city.” (Mayor of Tiahuanacu).

Municipal management in Mizque has really been up-graded. Our accounting is computerized. To attend to public demands, we’ve created new agencies — drinking water, electricity, garbage collection, urban improvement, water, a legal office for women. I believe that this is the way Mizque has prepared people to undertake local development with a view to provincial development” (Mayor of Mizque).
Comparative Indicators of Municipal Management

As can be seen in Table 27, municipal management more or less follows, on the one hand, the dynamics of the emergence and formation of regional grassroots leaders and, on the other, the structural processes of the consolidation and re-composition of local power. These dynamics, which are relatively favorable in Mizque and Charagua, are less favorable in Villa Serrano and Tiahuanacu.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management Indicators</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
<th>Villa Serrano</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosis and Planning</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalized Processes for Receiving Demands</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of Management</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channeling and Use of Financial Resources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of Human Resources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is not a question of coincidences or of the positive correlation of independent variables; rather, it is an inter-relationship of factors that mutually reinforce or limit each other. This inter-relationship can be thoroughly appreciated when another variable is introduced into the dynamics of local development: the presence of non-governmental organizations.

Local Development and Non-Governmental Organizations

Ideal” Functions of NGO’s in Local Development

Another key institutional actor in the local development processes analyzed in our study are the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that work in the municipalities. As has been noted in the preceding section, NGOs are essential in the training of grassroots leaders and human resources for municipal government, as shown in the “idealized” diagram that follows:

Figure 7 shows the “ideal” functions performed by an NGO in local development. Although the NGO plays an important role at either extreme of the relationship system — communities at the micro level and the national state at the macro level — its presence is vital at the intermediate levels of the system: municipal government and regional grassroots leaders.
Factors in the Intervention of NGOs in Local Development

We have identified five key factors that shape the form of NGO intervention in local development: two of these factors are situational; two refer to patterns of action; and the fifth is a mixture of the situational and patterns of action.
Table 28. Key Factors That Shape NGO Intervention in Local Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Factors</th>
<th>Factors Referring to Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Institutional stability vision</td>
<td>• Comprehensive and long-term of social intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• work experience in the area</td>
<td>• Inter-institutional coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Training of human resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greater the institutional stability and work experience in the area, the greater the possibility of a social intervention that promotes positive interaction between municipal government and regional leadership. Institutional stability, in financial terms and in internal management, makes it possible to create the minimal conditions for sustainable social intervention.\(^{101}\)

Work experience in the area not only provides a certain institutional “know-how” adapted to the needs of the social actors, but it also enables the NGO to start learning the specific socio-cultural characteristics of the area in which its work must be carried out; at the same time, it will learn the communication and interaction codes used by the social actors of the area.

These situational factors are necessary but not sufficient for sustainable social intervention; they must be supplemented by certain patterns of institutional action, especially a comprehensive and long-range vision of institutional intervention, ongoing institutional coordination with municipal government and regional leadership, and, finally, a systematic effort to train human resources, which also depends on situational factors such as financial and institutional resources (Table 28).

The following paragraphs will describe the role played by some NGOs in the local development of the municipalities under study. They are not the only organizations that play this role; however, because of their importance, they are useful examples.

**CEDEAGRO and Local Development in Mizque**

Since 1982, CEDEAGRO has been developing in Mizque programs of agricultural extension, agricultural credit, construction of education and production infrastructure, and technical support for the municipality.

\(^{101}\) In other research, Sinergia has found that NGOs subject to unstable financing and changing rules of internal management spend more of their time on institutional survival than on the logistics of sustainable social intervention.
CEDEAGRO’s vision of local development is not confined to the municipality; rather, it extends to the entire province and to a broader agro-ecological region in the central valleys.\textsuperscript{102}

CEDEAGRO has initiated several undertakings that have had a national impact, among which are:

- The formation of the Provincial Council of Mizque, which, since 1990, has developed processes of participatory planning that came to serve as a model for the Popular Participation Law of 1994.

- The elaboration of educational infrastructure, adapted to the ecological and socio-cultural conditions of the rural area, that has been used as a model for the 1996 Education Reform Law.

- CEDEAGRO has been one of the first NGOs to experiment with bilingual primary education, which was also adopted by the Education Reform.

Through its production-oriented projects, CEDEAGRO has maintained contact with the new leadership emerging from campesino communities.

Nonetheless, CEDEAGRO is most closely linked to municipal government, to the extent that, in terms of the mayor’s day-to-day management, it is sometimes difficult to draw a clear line between the NGO and the municipal government. In the first place, the highest executive level of this NGO regularly attends municipal council meetings; in the second place, the current mayor and two of the council members are CEDEAGRO functionaries; in the third place, the CEDEAGRO directorship takes specific action to obtain resources and even to carry out urban work projects for the mayor’s office.

\textsuperscript{102} CEDEAGRO favors the idea of an “association of municipalities” that would make it possible to plan and promote local development at the “macroregional” level. “With an association of municipalities, the thirteen member municipalities could put more pressure on the prefecture (departmental government) and be more forceful in making demands for services. For example, we were barely able to squeeze out of the prefecture a rural electrification budget; if we had tried to negotiate this alone, they wouldn’t have paid any attention to us. As an association, we would have a population and resource base, we would have the right to make demands. This would broaden our development prospects”. (Functionary of CEDEAGRO) [Trans: I have changed simple present to conditional tense, because I gather from text that the “Municipality Association” is/was still in the proposal stage.]
Although the fact that the NGO is closely linked to and occasionally superimposed on municipal government has been criticized by international cooperation agents as excessive and even coercive for the institutional development of municipal government, what is certain is that it has made possible not only the training of human resources for the municipality, but also the transfer of human resources, technology, and NGO patterns of institutional action to the municipal government.103

*CIPCA and Local Development in Charagua*

Unlike Mizque, where CEDEAGRO has established its primary link with municipal government, CIPCA’s chief connection is with the Guarani communities and their regional and national leaderships. Starting with this connection, it has developed a relationship of support and inter-institutional coordination with municipal government.104

CIPCA has worked in Charagua since 1972 with research projects, agricultural extension and credit programs, organizational assistance, non-formal education; and, after enactment of the Popular Participation Law, it developed a support program for municipal management.

CIPCA has been a veritable seed-bed of specialized NGOs. In 1992, it produced the Community Development Fund for agricultural credit and the Land Office for legalization of communal land titles, which — like the Guarani Marketing Association that seeks to ensure favorable market-access conditions for the community — is becoming independent of CIPCA.

Furthermore, as a result of the 1987 Campesino Development Plan and encouraged by CIPCA, there have been established Teco Guarani, which promotes bilingual education; the Institute of Campesino Documentation and Support; and ARACUAREnda, which is in charge of forming technical resources.

These NGOs, together with the health programs of the Cuevo Vicar’s Office, have also grown out of the vision of the Jesuit Order, without which it is impossible to understand the work

103 Still pending is a study on the influence and gender of the personnel involved in this social intervention and on the multi-dimensional and all-embracing form that it has acquired in the case of CEDEAGRO, in contrast with the lineal and institutionalized patterns of the processes supervised by male agents of cooperation.

104 Despite the apparent difference between the two kinds of connection, there are significant similarities if it is borne in mind that the local power center in Mizque and, therefore, the structural base of this municipality’s government are essentially campesino.
and orientation of CIPCA. For some years now, thanks to its connection with Jesuit authority, CIPCA has been evolving into a NGO “confessional”.

The most decisive CIPCA intervention in the local development not only of Charagua but of all the Cordillera province, has probably been its proposal to carry out a systematic diagnosis in cooperation with the Santa Cruz Regional Development Corporation. This diagnosis not only made it possible to prepare an ambitious provincial development plan but it also gave rise to a group of NGOs linked to the plan and, even more important, a regional leadership connected with the National Assembly of the Guarani People.

CIPCA also helped raise the agricultural productivity of a number of communities, especially in North Charagua.

Finally, CIPCA is collaborating in formulating Charagua’s Municipal Development Plan and in training its human resources.

**CEDEC and CARE in Villa Serrano’s Local Development**

In Villa Serrano, the CEDEC and CARE NGOs are concerned with developing a sustainable social intervention. Theirs is a comprehensive vision of institutional activities integrated into the municipality’s local development, and they are involved in supporting municipal government institutions and in forming regional leaders.

Both NGOs have developed production-oriented projects aimed at increasing potato and wheat output and improving the exploitation and renewal of forest resources. They have also developed projects to promote formal and non-formal education for community leaders who, even if in a rudimentary and uncertain way, may serve as the basis for future regional grassroots leaderships.

Furthermore, CEDEC and CARE support municipal management not only with personnel to carry out specific tasks for the municipal government but also with communications infrastructure.\(^{105}\)

The social intervention of both NGOs has to cope with a somewhat adverse situation in which the capability of grassroots organizations and municipal government to channel demands and get action has not been fully developed. Nevertheless, this intervention, which offsets some of the structural deficiencies, has the potential of generating a positive dynamic, as in Mizque and Charagua.

\(^{105}\) The municipal government uses CEDEC and CARE telephone services to communicate with the capital of the department (Sucre) and with other entities in Bolivia.
Local Development in Tiahuanacu

Despite the fact that a NGO has worked in Tiahuanacu since 1985 and has acquired institutional stability and the necessary experience in the area, it has not developed a long-term vision of local development and still less has it practiced inter-institutional coordination with municipal government and/or regional grassroots leaders. The other NGOs have neither sufficient institutional stability nor the necessary experience to make significant contributions to local development.

Tiahuanacu is a municipal setting in which the absence of NGOs with sustainable social intervention limits the formation of human resources at the grassroots-organization and municipal-government levels. This is why the Municipal Diagnosis that is so essential to any local development process has not been elaborated.

Factors in NGO Social Intervention, by Municipality

Table 29 shows three contexts related to NGO support of local development.

- The favorable context of social intervention in the process of becoming sustainable (Mizque and Charagua).

- The favorable context, with certain structural limitations, in which NGOs are hampered by the weakness of regional leadership and the institutional deficiencies of municipal government (Mizque).

- The unfavorable context, with NGOs that have neither a comprehensive vision of local development nor sufficient institutional stability (Tiahuanacu).

Table 29. Factors in NGO Social Intervention, by Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational factors</th>
<th>Cedeagro</th>
<th>Cipca</th>
<th>Ceded/Care</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional stability</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional-action factors</td>
<td>Local development vision</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional coordination</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained human resources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

1. It is not possible to understand the dynamics of local development without taking into account the relations and interaction among at least the three principal actors at the local level — regional grassroots leadership, municipal government, and NGOs — as may be observed in the following figure:

**Figure 8. Actors and Dynamics in “Ideal” Local Development**

As regards the dynamics represented in Figure 8, it is clear that local development cannot be understood solely through the patterns presented by social capital and grassroots organizations. It is also necessary to understand the patterns of accumulated institutional capital in local government and non-governmental organizations.

Moreover, Figure 8 indicates that the potentialities or limitations of the actors in local development are involved in a continuous feedback process, which becomes a positive or negative synergy according to the predominant characteristics of the actors.

2. The above diagram, translated into the concrete circumstances of the four municipalities studied, yields the following:
### Table 30. Actors in Local Development, by Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mizque</th>
<th>Charagua</th>
<th>Villa Serrano</th>
<th>Tiahuanacu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated regional leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient local government, receptive to demands</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>-/+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability-oriented NGOs</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local development potential</td>
<td>Very Favorable</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>Somewhat Favorable</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 30, the dynamics of interaction among the three actors in local development are positive in Mizque and Charagua, whereas they are less so in Villa Serrano, and severely limited in Tiahuanacu.

3. All institutional action in support of local development should take into account both the strength of grassroots organizations and the dynamism of regional leadership. Also, it is necessary to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional actors involved in local development.

4. When local development is just beginning, it is understandable that regional grassroots leadership and, above all, local government have to face new challenges without sufficient human, financial, and management resources. Nevertheless, it is also predictable that after local government has acquired sufficient institutional resources, NGOs should take an increasingly secondary role.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Inasmuch as every chapter of this report has ended with a section on “conclusions”, the following paragraphs will be a synthesis of the most important conclusions of the study. These conclusions may be considered as guidelines for medium and long-term policies for supporting local development in Bolivia.

1. “Local development” is a relatively recent concept in Bolivia. From its 1952 revolution, Bolivia emerged with a centralized state that was predominant until the 1980s. Therefore, the policies, especially at the national level, that social and institutional actors sought from the state only incidentally promoted local development. This accounts for the heavily “political” and “maximalist” character of confrontational social movements.

Largely due to the structural changes that occurred in Bolivia in the mid-1980s, the idea of local development based on actions taken by civil society and the state slowly began to gain ground.

At present, because both social and institutional actors are still in the process of redirecting their social actions toward local development, they have not yet clearly defined what represents a “local” dimension.

• Regional elites see local development in terms of departments under the authority of the dominant urban sectors.

• For several years, some NGOs have envisioned development in terms of the province rather than the municipality (section of the province), which they believe would require very costly institutional policies.

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106 In Bolivia, the term “maximalist” has been used to describe demands presented to the state by civil society — demands that, above all, seek a change in the structural relations between, on the one hand, the exercise of power, and on the other, the creation, modification, and maintaining of national development orientation.

107 On behalf of civil society, regional elites have been presenting demands for departmental development since the 1970s (especially in Santa Cruz), and some NGOs have begun to prepare analyses and provincial development plans. The cases of CIPCA and CEDEAGRO that we have presented in this report are examples. The state increasingly promotes both the autonomy of municipal governments and administrative decentralization.
And finally, some grassroots organizations that have special macroregional or sectoral interests find themselves under tremendous pressure to accept the concept of local development, at the risk of gradually losing the central role they played in social movements until the 1980s.

Any policy designed to promote local development should take into account that the perspectives of the above-described social and institutional actors reflect the transitional character of plans for collective action. This implies, on the one hand, that totally defined and established plans of action should not be expected from them and, on the other, that support should be given to those actors that have shown more concern for the needs of local development.

2. Since implementation of the Popular Participation Law in 1994, local development cannot be thought of without taking into account the new framework and rules that the Law sets forth. Unlike other experiences of “municipal decentralization” in Latin America, the Bolivian case institutionalizes the channeling of demands, the mobilizing of collective work, and the monitoring of institutional procedures, all functions that for many years were performed by Bolivia’s grassroots organizations.

By drawing up a balance sheet of the application of this Law in the four municipalities under study, we can identify some of its strengths, opportunities, weaknesses, and threats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• It gives grassroots organizations an institutional interlocutor (municipal government) that is to some degree capable of responding to their demands: it brings the state closer to civil society.</td>
<td>• The longtime organizational tradition of civil society can be exploited and strengthened by advancing local development processes that are adapted to the concrete needs of each municipality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It provides grassroots organizations with concrete institutional channels for presenting community demands and for monitoring municipal performance.</td>
<td>• Local development processes can be related to socio-cultural identities, so that they neither end up isolated from market forces nor do they turn into the kind of development that brings about loss of identity and the consequent loss of local roots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It enables communities to identify their local resources, needs, and priorities so that they can work collectively toward clearly defined communal goals.</td>
<td>• In terms of local development, it is possible to take advantage of not only accumulated social capital but also the institutional experience of such actors as NGOs, the Catholic Church, and international cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It opens up the possibility of establishing a minimum consensus between communities and municipal government concerning basic goals for local development.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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108 Such as the National Assembly of the Guarani People, which represents Guarani from several departments.

109 Such as the Labor Union Confederation of Bolivian Campesino Workers, which focuses on the campesino rather than on the region, or the Central Office of Bolivian Workers, which focuses on wage-earners.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The processes of participatory planning are not yet consolidated. Community demands are not always translated into concrete projects.</td>
<td>• The absence of a consolidated local power structure in municipalities like Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano can generate chronic institutional instability in municipal government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It is difficult for grassroots organizations, through their oversight committees, to monitor municipal actions.</td>
<td>• The difficulties of operation for oversight committees in the municipalities under study can degenerate into a process of corruption and sinecures in municipal management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Redistributed resources are not correlated with either local needs or municipal government’s broader responsibilities. This weakens the financial and institutional capability of municipal government.</td>
<td>• Traditional local elites may redirect local development toward their special interests, thereby consolidating traditional socio-cultural discrimination against campesinos, the indigenous population and, above all, women, unless the authority of grassroots organizations, especially regional grassroots leadership, to raise questions and exercise oversight is reinforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The absolute lack of institutional experience at the municipal level, especially in rural areas, means that municipal government faces serious limitations and problems of management; these deficiencies are closely related to the lack of trained human resources at the local level.</td>
<td>• Unless the process of seasonal and/or permanent emigration is reversed in some municipalities, it will be difficult to achieve the consolidation and reinforcement of social capital and of grassroots organizations as actors in local development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The absence of a consolidated local power structure in municipalities like Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano can generate chronic institutional instability in municipal government.</td>
<td>• Unless alternative financing sources are found, there may be a steady decline in per capita financial resources redistributed under the Popular Participation Law, thereby making it less and less possible for municipal governments to respond to popular demands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the foregoing, it is apparent that, if sustainable local development is to be achieved, support policies for local development cannot disregard the new dynamics involved in the Popular Participation Law. In operational terms, this means that local development requires a thorough analysis not only of the needs, together with the ecological, social, and institutional resources of a given region, but also of the concrete and detailed situation of the implementation of the Popular Participation Law in that region.

3. As the present study has made clear, grassroots organizations are indispensable to local development for two reasons: the role they have played for years in channeling demands and mobilizing collective work; and the dynamics that have developed from the Popular Participation Law in recognizing and institutionalizing that role.

In each campesino community and provincial town district, there is a grassroots organization that brings together community representatives such as campesino sindicatos, local APGs (Assemblies of the Guarani People), and neighborhood committees. In some
cases, there are more specialized groups such as producers, women, sports and religious associations, and groups working with NGOs, that are connected to these grassroots organizations.

This organizational structure is repeated at the supra-communal level. Campesino centers at the level of municipalities, federations at the level of departments, and the Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Labor Union Confederation of Bolivian Campesino Workers) at the national level — they all bring together representatives of campesino and indigenous communities.

The above groups can assist in establishing support policies for local development since they facilitate interaction with civil society. At the same time, they can be an obstacle if members of these organizations at the local level have not accepted the new guidelines for local development within the framework of the Popular Participation Law.

4. An adequate local development strategy should consider the following factors influencing the performance of grassroots organizations: market linkage; strength of traditions and cultural identity in establishing rules for community organization; experience in organizing grassroots organizations; and power relationships at the local level.

a) Market Linkage

By taking into account this factor, three scenarios are possible, of which two are considered “unfavorable” and one “favorable” to the performance of local grassroots organizations.

- In the first scenario, communities are relatively marginal to the market, have very limited production, and suffer from extreme situations that threaten the community’s survival. Such extreme situations may be due to distance from main roads and, therefore, from commercial traffic; to agro-ecological limitations on productivity; or to a sudden economic recession in the microregion as a whole. This situation gives rise to seasonal or permanent emigration of families, chiefly of heads of household, leaving almost no possibility of organizational stability and effectiveness. Either the population is unstable or there are no human resources to sustain grassroots organizations.

- In the second scenario, communities are linked to the market through a profound process of terciarization of their economies, with the predomination of commercial activities, transport and other services, together with proximity to urban centers. This terciarization destroys the possibility of a representative agrarian sindicato capable of mobilizing the community (special interest groups emerge that have no community ties) and it uproots families from their land and, therefore, from the community.

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110 This is the case of the communities of the Izozo region in Charagua, of some communities living in the small central valley of Tiahuanacu, and of the communities of the Mizque and Villa Serrano highlands.
111 This is the case of communities located near the towns of Mizque and Villa Serrano.
• The third scenario is the one most favorable to the consolidation of grassroots organizations. It involves an increase in community productivity leading to improved services, especially in the areas of health and education, as well as road and, in Mizque, irrigation infrastructure. In this situation, the economic stability of families, together with better access to services, especially education, and the low rate of emigration among heads of household, make it possible for local leadership to emerge that is trained to take action, channel demands, and mobilize the community.

b) Cultural Identity

A “strong” cultural identity makes it possible to consolidate grassroots organizations that are patterned on norms socially accepted by the community and also to mobilize the community on the basis of that identity. At the same time, when grassroots leaderships do not demonstrate the ability to adapt these cultural norms to the new dynamics of local development, traditional organizational practices run the risk of not developing in a creative way.

c) Historical Tradition of Organization

A long historical tradition of organization makes it possible for community grassroots organizations to accumulate social capital that equips them to adequately carry out their functions. Nevertheless, when this organizational tradition does not develop creatively, as in the case of cultural identity, it runs the risk of stagnating and impeding the effectiveness of organizations in the new contexts.

d) Local Power Relationships

In situations in which local power relationships have not changed since the 1952 revolution or earlier, and in which the traditional elites (generally, hacienda owners) maintain their hegemony, the possibilities of consolidating grassroots organizations are limited.

Policies supporting local development that take into account social capital as a factor in development should carry out a detailed analysis of the performance of grassroots organizations, giving priority to those that represent the community and are generally recognized by the Popular Participation Law as channels of communication with municipal administration.

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112 This is the case of the communities of North Charagua in Charagua, of the lower valley of Mizque, of the upper valley of Villa Serrano, and of communities located near the Tiahuanacu mountain range.

113 This is the case of the hacienda owners of Villa Serrano. Charagua appears to be an exceptional case where, in spite of the consolidated power of the area’s hacienda owners and timber barons, the Guarani communities have succeeded in strengthening their grassroots organizations, mainly on the basis of strong indigenous dialogue, the training of grassroots leaders, and the support of outside institutional agencies such as the Catholic Church and some NGOs (CIPCA, TECO Guarani, Aracuerena, etc.).

114 OTBs or Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (Grassroots Territorial Organizations)
Although quantitative data is important to an understanding of the consolidation and effectiveness of these organizations (number of meetings, number of organizations per community, number of members, etc.), it is still more important to understand how organizational dynamics are structured by the communities’ market linkage, cultural identity, organizational experience, and local power relationships.

5. Whereas grassroots organizations of campesino and indigenous communities are very important in channeling demands and in organizing collective work, the grassroots organizations of urban districts in towns that serve as municipal capitals are relatively weak. They do not function on a regular basis, they are minimally effective in channeling demands, and their ability to mobilize the community is still in question.

Therefore, support strategies for local development should always consider two contexts: the rural context, in which grassroots organizations have an important role; and the town context, in which grassroots organizations continue to be weak.

This implies that a strategy that takes into account social capital as a factor in local development should have different components for the town, on the one hand, and the campesino communities, on the other.

6. If grassroots organizations at the community level are important to local development, supra-communal organizations are equally so, especially because of the training they provide to regional grassroots leadership.

As has been seen in the present study, regional grassroots leadership can exert more pressure on municipal government than can community organizations. Their presence facilitates communication between municipal government and communities. Municipal government and regional leadership are the two actors — one institutional and the other social — with more or less the same regional dimension and scope.

The importance of regional grassroots leaders explains, to some extent, the differences between Tiahuanacu and Mizque. Even though community organizations in both municipalities are equally consolidated, the Mizque leadership has proved to be more effective and to command more authority in local development than the Tiahuanacu leadership. In Charagua, its regional leadership, which is linked to the Assembly of the Guarani People, is chiefly responsible for the subsequent organization of several communities.

In this context, support strategies for local development should consider the need to strengthen supra-communal organizations and their regional leadership in order to become more effective in presenting demands and monitoring municipal actions. This can be done

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115 The exception is the Neighborhood Committee of Tiahuanacu, which has been more dynamic and effective than those of Mizque, Charagua, and Villa Serrano.
directly or through institutional actors like NGOs, which — as we have already observed — play a very important role in promoting these regional grassroots leaders.

7. Although social capital with all its potential is required for sustainable local development, just as essential and of the same concern is the effectiveness of institutional capital, in particular, the performance of municipal government.

Municipal government should respond to the demands of grassroots organizations; additionally, it should orient local development by means of a strategy that is more or less consistent for the entire municipality so as not to make the mistake of undertaking isolated and unrelated projects.

Unlike grassroots organizations, which have an accumulated historical experience, municipal government — without the experience needed and with a minimum of institutional capital — has to cope with the challenges presented by the Popular Participation Law.

Earlier experiences of local “administration” based on magistrates (corregidores) and subprefects (subprefectos) cannot serve as models for institutional capital in light of their widespread system of patronage, nepotism, and sinecures and the almost total absence of any local development project.

In this sense, municipal government suffers from many institutional deficiencies, especially in three areas:

- Trained human resources
- Institutionalized processes for participatory planning
- Institutional capability for increasing its own resources and for obtaining financial and technological resources outside the municipality.

It should be added that when, as in the cases of Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano, there is no constituted social actor to exercise local power and, at the same time, there is direct interference by political parties that are battling for control of municipal government, municipalities may sink into occasional or chronic institutional instability with no local-development initiative possible.

A support strategy for local development should have an efficient and long-term program to strengthen municipality institutions by means of a thorough and detailed analysis of the institutional weaknesses and mistakes that have to be overcome.

8. Given the institutional weaknesses of municipalities and the need to strengthen community grassroots leaderships, a specific kind of social intervention by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has proven to be especially effective and helpful in reinforcing both grassroots leadership and municipal government.
This social intervention is distinguished by the institutional stability of the NGO in question and by a comprehensive and local vision of development. Some NGOs have been developing these features since the late 1970s. Their experience and accumulation of social — not state — capital constitute a comparative advantage, even against the recent experience of local administration by the state. Before the state took up the need for local development, several NGOs were already involved in this task and were carrying out analyses and multisectoral plans with provincial and/or microregional scope.

The institutional capital accumulated by various NGOs represents a resource that cannot be ignored in local development processes. Especially when it is considered that, because of their having been so recently created, several municipalities do not have even the minimum institutional experience required to undertake this development.

Furthermore, our study has shown that NGOs whose social intervention is ongoing, localized, and multisectoral within the framework of a consistent strategy of local development, promote the consolidation of regional grassroots leadership capable of channeling demands. They also help municipal government train human resources, formulate institutional procedures, and incidentally, to obtain external resources.

It must be emphasized that not every NGO can be an adequate channel; only those that have institutional stability, experience working in the municipality, and a vision of and commitment to local development in multisectoral terms.
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</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autor/Autora</th>
<th>Año</th>
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<th>Referencia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 1

PROFILES OF THE COMMUNITIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

Available in Spanish only. To obtain a copy, see inside front cover for contact information.
INTRODUCTION

In order to process the data we created a matrix to compare qualitative results by community type. This matrix allowed us to make comparisons between the communities of each municipality.

Community “types” were defined according to the strength or weakness of their grassroots organizations, especially those that were formed as counterparts to Popular Participation.

To define if a community has strong organizations, more or less strong or weak, we took into account the following indicators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Organizations</th>
<th>More or Less Strong Organizations</th>
<th>Weak Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy and power of convocation within the community</td>
<td>Positive or very positive results in the three indicators according to the qualitative information.</td>
<td>Positive or very positive results in at least two of the indicators according to the qualitative information.</td>
<td>Positive results in one, or none of the indicators according to the qualitative information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to channel demands and to negotiate with external agents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to question and oversee the work of the municipal government and hold it accountable.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We used these criteria to identify communities with strong, more or less strong, or with weak organizations for each municipality.
The matrix takes into account the following indicators:

1. INVENTORY OF GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

1.1 Grassroots Organizations

- Which community organization is Popular Participation’s counterpart
- Regularity of activities and functioning.
- Another type of community organizations and activity

1.2 Local Institutions

- Name of the NGOs that work in the community, length of time of their programs and projects.
- Regularity in their activities.
- Other local institutions in the community, length of time they have been working in the communities and activities.

2. ROLE IN THE PROVISION OF SERVICES

2.1 Education

- How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance).
- Role of the grassroots organizations.
- Role of local institutions.
- Role of the state.
- General evaluation of services.

2.2 Health

- How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance)
- Role of the grassroots organizations
- Role of local institutions
- Role of the state
- General evaluation of services

2.3 Potable Water

- How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance)
- Role of the grassroots organizations
- Role of local institutions
- Role of the state
- General evaluation of services

2.4 Electricity

- How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance)
- Role of the grassroots organizations
- Role of local institutions
- Role of the state
• General evaluation of services

2.5 Irrigation
• How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance)
• Role of the grassroots organizations
• Role of local institutions
• Role of the state
• General evaluation of services

2.6 Credit
• How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance)
• Role of the grassroots organizations
• Role of local institutions
• Role of the state
• General evaluation of services

2.7 Roads
• How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance)
• Role of the grassroots organizations
• Role of local institutions
• Role of the state
• General evaluation of services

2.5 Transportation
• How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance)
• Role of the grassroots organizations
• Role of local institutions
• Role of the state
• General evaluation of services

2.9 Other Services
• How to satisfy this need in the community (financing and maintenance)
• Role of the grassroots organizations
• Role of local institutions
• Role of the state
• General evaluation of services

3. INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

3.1 Relationships between Grassroots Organizations and Local Institutions
• Description of relationships
• Types of relationships
• Evaluation and projection of those relationships
3.2 Grassroots Organizations and the Population (community members)
Relationships
• Grassroots Organizations relationships to community members (ability to convoke, participation, legitimacy).
• Relationships of NGOs with the population (ability to convoke, participation, legitimacy)
• Relationships with other local institutions with the population. (Ability to convoke, participation, legitimacy).

3.3 Relationships of Grassroots Organizations and the State
• Relationships between Grassroots Organizations and the Municipality (type of relationship, results).
• Relationships between Grassroots Organizations and other government institutions (type of relationship, results).

4. FACTORS THAT STRENGTHEN/WEAKEN GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS

4.1 Historical
• Experience with the Agrarian Reform
• Tradition to interpellate the state (of holding the state accountable)
• Organizational experience
• Traditional presence of local institutions in the community (especially NGOs in the Municipality)

4.2 Economic Productivity
• Productive potential
• Market links
• Poverty indicators
• Internal stratification: local elites and power groups.

4.3 Ethnic and Cultural
• Homogeneity/diversification ethnic, cultural and religious
• Relationships with modernizing values and practices
• Training of ideological elites (characteristics)

5. GENERAL EVALUATION
• Strengths/weakness of grassroots organizations
• Role in local development and service provision
• Factors that explain strengths/weakness
## MUNICIPALITY: TIAHUNACU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Huakullani; Huank’ollo; Tiahunacu</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Pekeri, Taraco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chambi Grande; Ñachoca; K’asa Achuta; Santa Rosa; Chambi Taraco; Yanarico</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### I. INVENTORY OF GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

#### 1.1. Grassroots organizations

**Grassroots organizations counterpart of Popular Participation:**
- Agrarian Union 1953 -- highest communal authority: organizes, manages, litigates internal problems, lobbies for and channels institutional support. Irregular service.

**Other grassroots organizations:**
- School Board 1953 - oversees the strict compliance of the school plan and lobbies for institutional support.
- Area President 1993- organizes, mobilizes and litigates internal community problems.
- Fishermen Association 1987: concerned with interests of the fishermen, seeks markets for commercialization, lobbies for institutional support. Irregular service.

**Huakullani, Huank’ollo**
- Grassroots organizations counterpart of Popular Participation:
  - Agrarian Union. Irregular service.

**Other grassroots organizations:**
- School Board
- Area President and Neighborhood Committee, which represents neighborhood interests, but only exists in Huakullani.
- Parents’ Association, oversees compliance of the school schedule. Irregular service.

**Tiahunacu**
- Grassroots organizations counterpart of PP:
  - School Board

**Other grassroots organizations:**
- Civic Committee of Tiahunacu Residents in La Paz 1992 –represents interests of the town and lobbies for institutional support in La Paz.

**Grassroots organizations counterpart of Popular Participation:**
- Agrarian Union. Irregular service.

**Other grassroots organizations:**
- School Board
- Fishermen Association 1987: concerned with fishermen’s interests, seeks markets for commercialization, lobbies for institutional support. Irregular service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities with strong grassroots organizations:</th>
<th>Communities with more or less strong grassroots organizations:</th>
<th>Communities with weak grassroots organizations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chambi Grande; Nachoca; K’asa Achuta; Santa Rosa; Chambi Taraco; Yanarico</td>
<td>Huakullani; Huank’ollo; Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>Pekeri, Taraco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.2. Local Institutions : NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chambi Grande, K’asa Achuta</strong> has plans to install electricity. Intervida (since 1996) provides school infrastructure and supplies.</td>
<td>Plan International is not working in Huacullani. Intervida</td>
<td>Plan International does not support these communities because they lost the trust of the communities. Communities do not want to work with institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tiahuanacu</strong></td>
<td>Plan International 1980- school infrastructure, services basic. Intervida 1995-infrastructure; Cocos 1993-training and technical assistance to rural communities. They do not work in Tiahuanacu; Sartawi 1993-individual credits, mainly for the rural sector of the municipality. Regular service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3. Other Local Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catholic Church 1987- Only in Chambi Grande training, technical assistance</th>
<th>Catholic University 1989 -Training agronomist technicians.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 2. SERVICE PROVISION

#### 2.1. Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community schools are funded by the Government, built by the community, and enlarged by Plan International. The School Board oversees teachers and the government pays the salaries. Regular service.</th>
<th>Huakullani, Huankollo</th>
<th>The government built a school and Plan International later enlarged and repaired it. The School Board oversees education and coordinates the maintenance of the infrastructure. Service is regular.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Huakullani</strong></td>
<td>The government funded the schools, at the union’s request. The School Board oversees the work of the teachers. Poor infrastructure.</td>
<td><strong>Tiahuanacu</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tiahuanacu</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Chambi Grande
- Ñachoca
- K’asa Achuta
- Santa Rosa
- Chambi Taraco
- Yanarico

### Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Huakullani
- Huank’ollo
- Tiahunacu

### Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:
- Pekeri
- Taraco

#### 2.2. Health

**Nachoca**
Health center built by Suma Mank’añani (NGO) in coordination with the Agrarian Union. This health center stopped working due to lack of funds for the nurse’s salary.

**Chambi Grande, K’asa Achuta, Santa Rosa, Chambi Taraco, Yanarico**
Do not have health services in the community. They must go to La Paz for health services.

**Huank’ollo**
They have a hospital of traditional medicine created in 1968- funded by the Inter-American Foundation, built by the community and currently maintained by “popular health representative”. The government does not participate providing this service. Does not have adequate infrastructure, does not work in actuality.

**Huakullani**
Does not have this service

**Tiahunacu**
Has a health center funded by the state, built by the community. The Health Ministry manages it, the personnel includes a general practice doctor, a dentist and a nurse. It Regular service., even though it does not have the necessary materials.

**Do not have health services**

#### 2.3. Potable Water

**Chambi Grande**
Piped water non-potable to homes. Project channeled by the union and financed by Plan International in 1995

**Ñachoca, K’asa Achuta, Santa Rosa, Chambi Taraco, Yanarico**
Does not have this service. They store water in wells and irrigation ditches.

**Huakullani, Huankollo**
Does not have this service

**Tiahunacu**
Piped water to homes. The system was built by the Municipality and managed by a cooperative called CORELPAZ and financed by town residents. Grassroot organizations did not play an active role to obtain this service. Regular service.

**Do not have this service. They store water in wells. Provision is through irrigation ditches.**
### Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Chambi Grande
- Nachoca
- K‘asa Achuta
- Santa Rosa
- Chambi Taraco
- Yanarico

### Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Huakullani
- Huank’ollo
- Tiahuanacu

### Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:
- Pekeri
- Taraco

#### 2.4. Electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chambi Grande</td>
<td>Does not have electricity. The Union is trying to get funding from Plan International for the installation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huakullani, Huankollo</td>
<td>Does not have this service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>Electricity to homes was installed, maintained and managed by CORELPAZ. Town residents financed it. Grassroots organizations did not play an active role to obtain this service. Service is regular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perekeri, Taraco</td>
<td>Electricity to homes was installed, and financed through an agreement with a neighboring community maintained and managed by CORELPAZ. The Agrarian Union lobbied to obtain this service and negotiated the agreement. Service is irregular.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.5. Irrigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huakullani, Huankollo</td>
<td>Does not have systematic service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>Does not have systematic service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.6. Credit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Families have access to credit from Sartawi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.7. Roads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huakullani, Huankollo</td>
<td>Dirt road built by the large landowners before the 1952 revolution. The regional Transportation Union, Ingavi repairs them sporadically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>Ingavi serves the community twice a week and Tiahuanacu, the transportation cooperative provides daily service, every hour. Service is regular and good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perekeri, Taraco</td>
<td>Neighborhood roads are built and maintained by the communities. During the rainy season roads cannot be traveled.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.8. Transportation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huakullani, Huankollo</td>
<td>Ingavi serves these communities twice a week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>Tiahuanaco Transport Cooperative has hourly service every day, and Ingavi serves these communities twice a week. Service is regular and good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perekeri, Taraco</td>
<td>Ingavi provides service twice a week. Service is regular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:</td>
<td>Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Chambi Grande; Nachoca; K’asa Achuta; Santa Rosa; Chambi Taraco; Yanarico</td>
<td>Huakuullani; Huank’ollo; Tiahunacu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.9. Other Services

Santa Rosa of Taraco has a radio station that airs messages between communities and families. It has regular service.

Tiahunacu
The community has two public telephones, one under through the telephone cooperative of La Paz and another through the National Telecommunications Company. Tiahunacu and Huakullani have radio stations that air community and family messages. They operate irregularly.

3. INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

3.1. Between Grassroots Organizations and Local Institutions

Infrequent relationships between the union and NGOs (especially Plan International). Once, the Union approves a project, coordination is scarce.

Almost non-existent. Sporadic contacts between the Agrarian Union and NGOs.

Conflictive relationships due to lack of compliance of NGOs.

3.2. Relationships with the Population

* Community accepts the union’s decisions and participates in projects.
* Relationship between NGOs and the population only with families that participate in projects.

Huaullani, Huankollo
* The Union has support of the population. Massive participation by heads of households in meetings.
* NGOs do not coordinate their activities with the entire population, only with the Union.

Tiahunacu
* Neighborhood Committees have a limited power of convocation. Only a few heads of households participate in meetings.
* NGOs do not carry out activities with the urban population of Tiahunacu.

* Agrarian Union members do not have the power to organize these communities. During meetings only a few heads of households assist, younger members do not feel identified with the union.
* NGOs do not maintain relationships with the population.
### Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Chambi Grande; Nahoca; K’asa Achuta; Santa Rosa; Chambi Taraco; Yanarico

### Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Huakullani; Huank’ollo; Tiahuanacu

### Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:
- Pekeri, Taraco

#### 3.3. Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with the Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Relationship with Municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chambi Grande</td>
<td>Depends on the dynamism of the Secretary General of the Union. The</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more dynamic the Secretary, the more personal contact with the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor (Chambi Grande, Nahoca, Chambi Taraco). The less dynamic the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>secretary, the less contact with the Mayor (Yanarico, Santa Rosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Taraco).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huakullani, Huank’ollo</td>
<td>Almost non-existent. The general secretaries do not take initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiahuanacu</td>
<td>Coordination of activities between neighborhood committees and the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>municipality. Close relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-existent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.4. Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with Other Government Institutions

- Non-existent
- Non-existent
- Non-existent

#### 4. Factors That Strengthen/Weaken Grassroots Organizations

##### 4.1. Historical

**Huakullani, Huank’ollo**
- **Experience with the Agrarian Reform**: as a product of the reform, traditional grassroots organizations are substituted by less traditional ones such as the Agrarian Union.
- **Tradition of holding the state accountable**: Before the Agrarian Reform of 1952, a strong tradition to hold the state accountable existed in these communities, even though currently, this is reoriented toward the Municipality.
- **Organizational experience**: Since pre-Columbian times, through the Republic and now in a democracy (especially the Agrarian Union).
- **Presence of local Institutions in the community**: limited presence of local entities, especially NGOs.

**Tiahuanacu**
- **Tradition of holding the state accountable**: Do not have a tradition of holding the state accountable, but due to the political reorientation of the country currently, they are questioning the Municipality.
- **Organizational Experience**: They have a 60-year old organizational tradition (the case of the neighborhood association).

**Experience with the Agrarian Reform**: Product of the agrarian reform, grassroots organizations are reorienting their functions.
- **Tradition of holding the state accountable**: the Agrarian Union became the interlocutor and legitimate intermediary of the needs and demands of the population to the State.
- **Organizational experience**: Since pre-Columbian times, through the republic and now in a democracy (especially the Agrarian Union).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Pekeri, Taraco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2. Economic Productivity

**Nachoca; Santa Rosa of Taraco**
- **Productive potential:** Cattle-raising, agricultural and fishing communities with greater capacity to generate productive surpluses for sale.
- **Market links:** greater links, specially La Paz, El Alto and Tiahuanacu (do not have their own fair).
- **Poverty indicators:** they do not have many basic services or housing, but they generate a production surplus. They fall within moderate poverty.
- **Internal stratification:** Grouped around a power elite of subcentral Agraria Taraco.

**Chambi Grande; K’asa Achuta; Chambi Taraco**
- **Productive potential:** Cattle-raising and agricultural communities.
- **Market links:** minor links with area markets (do not have their own fair).
- **Poverty indicators:** do not have many basic services nor housing.
- **Internal stratification:** There is not an important internal stratification.

**Huakullani, Huankollo**
- **Productive potential:** Communities based in cattle raising, and agricultural subsistence production.
- **Market links:** Maintain links with Tiahuanacu and La Paz markets. Huakullani has an important fair.
- **Poverty indicators:** Communities do not have social services and the housing is precarious.
- **Internal stratification:** There is not marked internal stratification.

**Tiahuanacu**
- **Productive potential:** Town of merchants, teachers, artisans and farmers.
- **Market links:** the same town has a local fair, although its population maintains links with the market of La Paz.
- **Poverty indicators:** Communities do not have social services and the housing is precarious. Extreme poverty and chronic migration.

### 4.3. Ethnic and Cultural

**Nachoca; Santa Rosa of Taraco**
- **Aymara cultural homogeneity.** Diversity of religious practices (important evangelical presence).
- **Familiarity with western organizational and negotiating procedures.**

**Huakullani, Huankollo**
- **Aymara population, little religious diversity.**
- **Mixed mestizo** (Spanish and indigenous) and aymara population and great religious diversity. (Evangelical presence).
- **Familiarity with western organizational procedures.**

**Tiahuanacu**
- **Aymara population. Religious diversity.**
### 5. GENERAL EVALUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chambi Grande; Ñachoca; K’asa Achuta; Santa Rosa; Chambi Taraco; Yanarico</td>
<td>Huakullani; Huank’ollo; Tiahunacu</td>
<td>Pekeri, Taraco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strength related to the training of historical and traditional organizations that inspire respect, obedience and loyalty inside the community; but weak externally because they are channels with limited capacity and experience of institutional negotiation. Ulobbies for and channels the demands of the population, but participates little in the identification and prioritization of needs.

Grassroots organizations have little power to mobilize community work. They can channel demands to the Municipality, but have little power to oversee and control. Farmers and townspeople question their efficiency.

Grassroots organizations have irregular funding. High migration of the younger families impedes the training stable community leadership.
## Municipalities: Mizque

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations</th>
<th>Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations</th>
<th>Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mizque Pampa, Tabacal, Molinero</td>
<td>Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque</td>
<td>Tipa Tipa, Taboada, Tukma Baja, Tin Tin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### I. Inventory of Grassroots Organizations and Local Institutions

**1.1. Grassroots Organizations**

- **Grassroots organizations counterpart Popular Participation:** Agrarian Union, responsible for addressing community demands. Activities include bimonthly meetings to discuss community issues.
- **Other grassroots organizations:** Mother’s Clubs: organized women. Lasted while food was given away (6 months to a year) and then disappeared.

**Churo, Thago Thago**

- Grassroots organizations counterpart of Popular Participation.
- Agrarian Union, responsible for addressing community demands. Monthly meetings to discuss community issues.
- Other grassroots organizations: Mother’s Clubs that meet occasionally.
- Irrigation association: their activities are permanent, they control the turns of community members to irrigate their land, and solve problems related to water use.

**Mizque**

- Grassroots organizations counterpart of the PP.
- Neighborhood association, with little power of convocation.
- Civic committee: lobbies the government to get benefits to the region.
- Teacher’s Union
- Transportation Union

- Grassroots organizations counterpart to P.P: Agrarian Union: responsible for addressing community demands. Monthly meetings to discuss community issues.
- Mother’s Clubs: lasted only while food was given away and then disappeared.
- Irrigation association: their activities are permanent, they control the turns of community members to irrigate their land, and solve problems related to water use.
- School Board: deals with schools and student issues.
- Irregular service.
### COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Mizque Pampa
- Tabacal
- Molinero

### COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Churo
- Thago Thago Alto
- Mizque

### COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Tipa Tipa
- Taboada
- Tukma Baja
- Tin Tin

### 1.2. Local Institutions : NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doctors Without Borders</th>
<th>Cedeagro</th>
<th>Doctors Without Borders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 years working in this community. They built a small hospital and health center with primary health programs. Regular service.</td>
<td>3-6 months working in the communities. Potable water projects, agricultural credit and training in crops improvement. Cedeagro (NGO) irrigation projects including ditches water canalization and reinforcing ditches. Asterc: Training and credit projects.</td>
<td>built a health center with primary health programs. Regular service. Cedeagro: Built a school, boarding school, courts and training to improve crops and provide agricultural credit. Pedeaire (NGO) irrigation projects including ditches water canalization and reinforcing ditches Proimpa: training and credit projects. They work regularly. World Vision: primary health projects, training to improve crops and agricultural credit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senda</th>
<th>Doctors Without Borders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>does not work with the entire community, only with a few community members. They have some reforestation programs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3. Other Local Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radio Esperanza (Catholic church) training and crop improvement.</th>
<th>ELFEC (electric company): electricity</th>
<th>ELFEC: has worked in the area for 3 years.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 2. SERVICE PROVISION

#### 2.1. Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mizque Pampa, Molinero</th>
<th>Churo, Thago Thago, Alto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools funded by the FIS and built by Cedeagro. The community maintains the infrastructure. The union’s role is to organize the community in collective works to help the building the schools and for maintenance. The state provides teacher’s salaries. Service works well.</td>
<td>Do not have this service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tabacal</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does not have this service.</td>
<td>The school was funded y the FIS and built by Cedeagro. Grassroots organizations did not request this service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2.2. Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Mizque Pampa, Tabacal, Molinero</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Tipa Tipa, Taboada, Tukma Baja, Tin Tin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mizque Pampa</strong>, <strong>Molinero</strong>&lt;br&gt;Health Center funded by Doctors Without Borders (NGO). The community takes care of maintenance of the infrastructure. The state does not intervene. Irregular service.</td>
<td><strong>Churo, Thago Thago Alto</strong>&lt;br&gt;Do not have this service</td>
<td><strong>Tipa Tipa, Tin Tin</strong>&lt;br&gt;Health Center funded by Doctors Without Borders and World Vision. The community takes care of maintenance of the infrastructure. The state does not intervene. It functions well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tabacal</strong>&lt;br&gt;Does not have this service</td>
<td><strong>Mizque</strong>&lt;br&gt;Hospital built by Doctors Without Borders. The Municipality manages it and the Prefect pays the salaries.</td>
<td><strong>Taboada, Tukma Baja</strong>&lt;br&gt;Do not have this service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.3. Potable water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Mizque Pampa, Tabacal, Molinero</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Tipa Tipa, Taboada, Tukma Baja, Tin Tin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mizque Pampa, Molinero</strong>&lt;br&gt;Service financed by Cedeagro (NGO). The community takes care of the maintenance through the Water Committee, linked to the union. The state does not intervene. Service not working well, due to bad installation.</td>
<td><strong>Churo, Thago Thago Alto</strong>&lt;br&gt;Service financed by Cedeagro (NGO). The community takes care of the maintenance through the Water Committee, linked to the union. The state does not intervene. This service is not working well, due to a bad installation.</td>
<td><strong>Taboada, Tukma Baja, Tin Tin</strong>&lt;br&gt;Service financed by Cedeagro (NGO). The community takes care of the maintenance through the Water Committee, linked to the union. The state does not intervene. Service does not work well, due to bad installation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tabacal</strong>&lt;br&gt;Does not have this service</td>
<td><strong>Mizque</strong>&lt;br&gt;Potable water system built by the Prefect and administered by a water cooperative. Service is regular and good.</td>
<td><strong>Tipa Tipa</strong>&lt;br&gt;Does not have this service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.4. Electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Mizque Pampa, Tabacal, Molinero</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Tipa Tipa, Taboada, Tukma Baja, Tin Tin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do not have this service. They use lamp burners and candles.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Thago Thago Alto, Mizque</strong>&lt;br&gt;System built and maintained by ELFEC. Grassroots organizations do not intervene. Service is regular and good.</td>
<td><strong>Tipa Tipa, Tin Tin</strong>&lt;br&gt;Each community member pays his or her own installation and consumption. ELFEC provides this service. The union requests the service. The service is good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thago Thago Alto</strong>&lt;br&gt;Does not have this service.</td>
<td><strong>Churo</strong>&lt;br&gt;Does not have this service.</td>
<td><strong>Taboada, Tukma Baja</strong>&lt;br&gt;Do not have this service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</strong></td>
<td><strong>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molinero</td>
<td>Churo, Thago Thago Alto</td>
<td>Communities’ Development helped with irrigation systems. Cedeagro took advantage of rivers in the area. This service works well. The union has the role of organizing the community to contribute with labor. Institutions provide funds and technical assistance in the installation of this service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System built by the Peasant Development Fund and managed by the Irrigation Committee, linked to the union. It is somewhat deficient due to the scarcity of water.</td>
<td>System funded by Cedeagro, built by the community. The Irrigation Committee linked to the union manages it. Service is regular.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizque Pampa, Tabacal</td>
<td>Mizque</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not have this service.</td>
<td>System built and maintained by Pedaire. Community members did not build it, and they do not manage it either. Service is regular.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.5. Irrigation

- **Molinero**
  - System built by the Peasant Development Fund and managed by the Irrigation Committee, linked to the union. It is somewhat deficient due to the scarcity of water.
- **Mizque Pampa, Tabacal**
  - Do not have this service.

### 2.6. Credit

- **Cedeagro** offers credit. The union has the role of gathering the community member to learn about the advantages of credit. The state does not intervene. This service does not work well, because community members are unwilling to take out credit since they have one crop per year and are very poor.
- **Churo, Mizque**
  - Cedeagro offers credit. Access to credit is personal and it is not mediated by grassroots organizations. It is regular service.
- **Thago Thago Alto**
  - Do not have this service.
- **Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque**
  - Communities’ Development helped with irrigation systems. Cedeagro took advantage of rivers in the area. This service works well. The union has the role of organizing the community to contribute with labor. Institutions provide funds and technical assistance in the installation of this service.
- **Cedeagro, Proimpa and Astec (all NGOs)** offer credit to aid community members. The union has the role of gathering the community member to teach them about the advantages of credit. Government does not intervene. This service works well, because community members have three crops a year and need credit.

### 2.7. Roads

- Communities built and maintain the roads through communal work. The role of the union is to organize the community to keep up the roads. Institutions did not intervene. Recently, the state improved this service though their Neighborhood Roads Program. This service only works well during the dry season.
- Communities built roads and and maintain them through organizations established by the Agricultural Union. The state does not intervene. This service is not usable during the rainy season.
- **Cordeco, Community Development and Neighborhood Roads** improved the roads. The role of the union is to organize the community to keep up the roads. Institutions fund paving the roads with stone, and the state improves the service. This service only works well during the dry season.

### 2.8. Transportation

- Do not have a regular transportation system. Community members go to the regional fairs by foot.
- **Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque**
  - Do not have a regular transportation system. Community members walk to the main road.
- **The community** provides the service. Some community members have their own transportation, which other members can rent to get their products to the market. The majority has bicycles and motorcycles. **Tin Tin** has a Transportation Union provides service to Mizque.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
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<td>Tipa Tipa, Taboada, Tukma Baja, Tin Tin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.9. Other Services

- **Mizque**
  - Sewage built by the Prefecture.
  - The national telephone company ENTEL provides telephone services.

3. INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

3.1. Between Grassroots Organizations and Local Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Churo, Thago Thago Alto</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close coordination between the Union and the NGOs that work in the communities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service does not exist.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationship of coordination and mutual collaboration. This relationship has allowed local leaders to acquire the necessary experience in institutional negotiation and the NGOs to have a closer contact with the communities.

Churo, Thago Thago Alto

- Close coordination between the Union and the NGOs that work in the communities.
- Service does not exist.

Relationships plagued by mistrust and sometimes conflict. Community leaders assume a fiscalizing role over NGO projects and interventions.

3.2. Relationships with the Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Churo, Thago Thago Alto</th>
<th>Mizque</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Organizations: have almost total legitimacy in the community, but some community members, especially the younger ones do not recognize the Union as the highest authority. The entire community does not participate in the activities programmed by the Union.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Organizations: have some legitimacy and power to convoke. There is not enough organizational experience in the town. NGOs are appreciated in the community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grassroots organizations: partial legitimacy in the community. Agrarian Union members do not have enough power of convocation. There is a lot of internal stratification, so the union can not represent all the social segments. Relationships between NGOs and the population are of mutual respect.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Mizque Pampa, Tabacal, Molinero</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.3. Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with the Municipality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are not direct because the Community Union is more closely linked to the Central Peasant Organization of the Municipality and expresses urgent demands through them.</td>
<td>There is not a direct relationship. It is mediated though the Central Peasant Organization.</td>
<td>They are not direct because the Community Union is more closely linked to the Central Peasant Organization of the Municipality and expresses urgent demands through them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.4. Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with Other State Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with the Social Investment Fund.</td>
<td>No Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with state institutions.</td>
<td>No Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with state institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. FACTORS THAT STRENGTHEN/WEAKEN GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.1. Historical</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Agrarian Reform: key point, marking the beginning of Peasant Unions with absolute power and legitimacy. Communities have many organizational traditions since pre-Columbian times.</em></td>
<td>Churo, Thago Thago Alto The organizational tradition is important, but unions have not completely adapted to the new conditions posed by Popular Participation.</td>
<td>Communities historically assisted by state institutions and NGOs. They have not developed a strong organizational tradition to channel demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities with strong grassroots organizations:</td>
<td>Communities with more or less strong grassroots organizations:</td>
<td>Communities with weak grassroots organizations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizque Pampa, Tabacal, Molinero</td>
<td>Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque</td>
<td>Tipa Tipa, Taboada, Tukma Baja, Tin Tin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.2. Economic Productivity**

- They only have one crop a year, and few market links. Very poor communities without strong social stratification.
- Diversification in economic activities impedes the consolidation of grassroots organizations.
- Nearness to the market contributed to the diversification of the economic base, which has weakened the Union’s power of convocation and representation.

**4.3. Ethnicity and Culture**

- Homogeneous ethnic, cultural and religious makeup. Cultural traditions outline organizational rules and the interpellation of the municipality and other local institutions.
- Churo, Thago Thago Alto
  - Strong Quechua tradition and religious homogeneity allow the formation of a collective identity as the base for grassroots organizations.
- Mizque
  - Frequent contact of the population with the urban center of Cochabamba has made them learn Spanish.
- Cultural and religious homogeneity weakened by socioeconomic fragmentation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:</th>
<th>Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:</th>
<th>Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Mizque Pampa, Tabacal, Molinero</td>
<td>Churo, Thago Thago Alto, Mizque</td>
<td>Tipa Tipa, Taboada, Tukma Baja, Tin Tin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. General Evaluation

Grassroots organizations are strong, with power to convocate and absolute legitimacy in the community. The role of the grassroots organizations and NGOs is fundamental for local development and service provision. Factors that explain this strength are the need to surmount adverse economic limitations (only one productive cycle per year). Economic, cultural and religious homogeneity provides a symbolic common foundation for the legitimacy of the union and the negotiating experience of the leaders.

Grassroots organizations have experience in institutional relations, but inside the communities legitimacy is not total, due to the lack of institutional channels that allow participation of younger community members seeking their own representation. Despite this, in Mizque, grassroots organizations are very important to channel demand and for the organization of collective works. In Mizque, grassroots organizations do not play a central role in local development, but in the last few years they have sought to increase their presence in the dynamics of Popular Participation.

Grassroots organizations are weak. They do not have power to convocate the communities and only have partial legitimacy. The role of grassroots organizations and NGOs helps local development and service provision. The factors that explain this weakness are the economic conditions, proximity to Mizque, an urban center and access to its services, which does not foster motivation to develop the communities. Growing urbanization in these communities affects the legitimacy of the Agrarian Union.
## MUNICIPALITY: VILLA SERRANO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada</td>
<td>Mendoza, Zamora</td>
<td>Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### I. INVENTORY OF GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

#### 1.1. Grassroots organizations

**Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada**

- **Popular Participation Counterpart:** Agrarian Union.
- **Regular activities:** Meetings 2 or 3 times a month, according to the needs of the community.
- **Other community organizations and activities:** Civic Committee (except in La Quebrada) interlocutor before the Municipality; First Aid School Committee, with the assistance of students and teachers (Nuevo Mundo has fundraising raffles). The Water Committee oversees the quality of potable water and coordinates cleanings. Mothers’ clubs activities involve weaving, family planning, and family garden instruction.

**Mendoza**

- **Popular Participation Counterpart:** Agrarian Union.
- **Regularity of activities:** Meetings 2 to 3 times a month according to the needs of the community.
- **Other community organizations and activities:**
  - **Water Cooperative:** The Water Cooperative distributes and collects this service. The Association of Potato Producers, created by the community. The Civic Committee, which functions as an extension of the union.
  - **Auxiliary School Board:** oversees faculty and student assistance. Mothers’ Clubs, created by CARE instruct women in family gardening, weaving and cooking.

**Zamora**

- **Popular Participation Counterpart:** Neighborhood Committees (3 committees).
- **Regular activities:** Meetings when necessary.

**Huerta Mayu**

- **Popular Participation Counterpart:** Agrarian Union.
- **Regularity of activities:** Meetings 2 to 3 times a month according to the needs of the community.
- **Other community organizations and activities:**
  - **Water Cooperative:** The Water Cooperative manages and receives a small annual fee for the service. The Family Store is responsible for the supply of basic products comprising the family basket. Auxiliary School Board oversees faculty and student assistance. Mothers’ Clubs, created by CARE instruct women in family gardening, weaving and cooking.

**Lampasillos; Cañadillas; P. Arias; Chapas**

- **Popular Participation Counterpart:** Agrarian Union.
- **Regularity of activities:** Meetings 2 to 3 times a month according to the needs of the community.
- **Other community organizations and activities:**
  - **Water Cooperative:** The Water Cooperative manages and receives a small annual fee for the service. The Family Store is responsible for the supply of basic products comprising the family basket. Auxiliary School Board oversees faculty and student assistance. Mothers’ Clubs, created by CARE instruct women in family gardening, weaving and cooking.

**Villa Serrano**

- **Popular Participation Counterpart:** Neighborhood Committees (3 committees).
- **Regular activities:** Meetings when necessary.
### Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- **Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada**

### Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- **Mendoza, Zamora**

### Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:
- **Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas**

#### 1.2. Local Institutions: NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuevo Mundo</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Huerta Mayu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARE has promoted family gardens, reproductive health training, silos, soil improvement, live barriers and irrigation since 1995 (2 years). CEDEC literacy training of adult women since 1996 (1 year).</td>
<td>CEDEC seed credit, erosion control, and recently, literacy training of adult women since 1990 (7 years). CARE has worked building silos and providing veterinary technical assistance since 1994 (3 years). PLAFOR soil erosion control and reforestation since 1987 (10 years). CARITAS provides credit for commercial seed since 1995 (2 years). IMCC trains health promoters since 1994 and donated first-aid kits and medicine.</td>
<td>CARE builds silos and chicken coops, provides seeds and fences since 1994. CEDEC does literacy training of adult women since 1996 (7 people participate). PLAFOR works on reforestation since 1996 (only 2 people participate).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Quebrada</td>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDEC agroforestry, literacy training, credit in wheat seeds since 1994 (3 years). CARE reinforcing health promoters’ training since 1996 (1 year). PLAFOR reforestation since 1996 (1 year). IMCC training health promoters since 1990 (7 years).</td>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>CARE builds silos and chicken coops, does reforestation, family gardens and provides health support since 1994 (3 years). CEDEC implemented a greenhouse, does erosion control and literacy training of adult women since 1990 (7 years). PLAFOR soil erosion control since 1995 (2 years). IMCC trains health promoters since 1988 (9 years).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mendoza</td>
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<td>Mendoza</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mendoza</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada

### Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Mendoza, Zamora

### Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:
- Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.3. Other Local Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Parish built a boarding school and prepares breakfast for the school. IMCC (cooperation agency) since 1988 (9 years) health promoter training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. SERVICE PROVISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nuevo Mundo**
- 2 schools, one built by the community and the other, which is an educational complex, was built with resources from PP (FIS resources, carried out by a private company, Hidroservise and the community). The community maintains the school and the Union made the request. Service is good; the new school is large and has a court.

**La Quebrada**
- One school built by CEDEC and the Municipality with resources from the FIS. The community is in charge of maintenance. The union made the request. Service is good, however it is only up to 5th grade.

**Mendoza**
- One school and another is being built by and the Espinoza Company with funding from the FIS. The community and the Municipality are in charge of maintenance. The union requested the funds. Surrounding communities use this service.

**Zamora**
- One school built with FIS resources through the CEDEC, the community also helped to transport materials and is responsible for maintenance. The union requested this service. There are 2 teachers for 1st through 5th grade.

**Huerta Mayu, P. Arias.**
- Does not have a school Lampasillos; Cañadillas; Chapas
- One school funded by the FIS and built by CEDEC. Maintenance is the responsibility of the Union. Service is regular, and classes are through 2nd grade.

**Villa Serrano**
- One existing school and another is being built by CEITHAR with funding from the FIS, the Mayor’s office and the Parish. Also, there is a teacher’s institute paid by the Municipality and the population. Neighborhood committees did not request this service.
| COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: |
| Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada |
| COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: |
| Mendoza, Zamora |
| COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS: |
| Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas |

2.2. Health

**Nuevo Mundo**
Health center funded by the Inter-American Development Bank maintained by the Municipality and the community. The union requested this service. Service is regular. The center is not equipped, and they need a physician, since they only have a nurse.

**La Quebrada**
Does not have this service.

**Mendoza**
One health center built by CREILE and funded by the Health and Strengthening Program of the Health Ministry. The Union requested this service. They need doctors.

**Zamora**
Does not have this service.

**Huerta Mayu; Lampasillos; P. Arias**
Do not have a school.

**Cañadillas; Chapas**
CEDEC’s doctor and Health Department employees visit these communities once a month to weigh the children and provide food security support.

**Villa Serrano**
One hospital built and maintained by the Municipality. Neighborhood committees did not request it. The service works well, users pay a fee per visit, but some are not satisfied because of the lack of specialist doctors.

2.3. Potable water

**Nuevo Mundo**
Piped water to homes, the community got it through the Union and with the help of CARE and the ex-Cordech. The community takes care of maintenance and pays a fee. They have a Water Committee. This service works well thanks to the Water Committee, but there are difficulties with the purification, and also the fact that houses are disperse makes it difficult for water to reach all the areas.

**La Quebrada**
3 public wells in the school area. The Water Cooperative provides maintenance and members pay for the service. The Union requested the service. The service is regular, but does not reach all areas of the community.

**Mendoza**
Piped water to homes. The Union requested the potable water and got it through CARE. The Water Cooperative and the community provide maintenance. Service is not good in the rainy season.

**Zamora**
There are public wells around the school, but other areas have no water. This service was obtained through Public Health, part of the Health Ministry. The Union requested this service. The Water Cooperative organizes members to carry out clean-ups in places where the water is taken.
The service is deficient when it rains, because the water becomes clouded.

**Huerta Mayu, P. Arias**
Do not have this service.

**Lampasillos; Cañadillas; Chapas**
Public wells around the school in Lampasillos through PROSABAR, and Cañadillas with CARITAS and with PROSABAR. Maintenance through the Water Cooperative. Community members pay an annual fee. The unions requested the service.

Service is deficient, the water is cloudy and does not reach all the areas of the community.
The population obtained piped water to the homes through the municipality. The Water Cooperative is responsible for maintenance.

Service is bad in the rainy season. The population has not mobilized to improve the service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:</th>
<th>Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:</th>
<th>Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada</td>
<td>Mendoza, Zamora</td>
<td>Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4. Electricity

**Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada**
They use candles and lamp burners. The Union is requesting electricity to the municipality.

**Mendoza**
They use candles and lamp burners. They used to have electricity from a generator the community purchased, but it was expensive and they decided to stop the service. There is a solar panel in CEDEC’s office.

**Zamora**
They use candles and lamp burners. There is a solar panel in the school.

**Lampasillos; Chapas**
A solar panel was donated by CEDEC. The parents of the students give a fee to purchase the battery for the panel.

**Huerta Mayu; Cañadillas; P. Arias**
They use candles and lamp burners.

**Villa Serrano**
Electricity for homes is provided by CESA (Sucre’s electric company). The Municipality requested this service. Service is deficient, suffering from frequent cuts and low power.

2.5. Irrigation

**Nuevo Mundo and La Quebrada**
Wells, irrigation ditches and rain. Families that work with CARE’s project use it for their family gardens.

**Mendoza, Zamora**
Wells, irrigation ditches and rain.

Wells, irrigation ditches and rain.

2.6. Credit

**Nuevo Mundo**
Does not have this service.

**La Quebrada**
Credit (seeds) provided by CEDEC

**Mendoza, Zamora**
Does not have this service.

**Lampasillos; Chapas**
Credit (seeds) through CEDEC

**Huerta Mayu; Cañadillas; P. Arias**
Does not have this service.

**Villa Serrano**
Does not have this service.
### COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada

### COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Mendoza, Zamora

### COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas

#### 2.7. Roads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Mundo</td>
<td>Road construction is the responsibility of the ex-Development Corporation of Chuquisaca. The community and the Municipality are in charge of maintenance (there are problems because the municipality does not want to take responsibility for maintenance). The union requested this service. Roads are bad in the rainy season, almost impassable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Quebrada</td>
<td>The community is responsible for maintenance of roads. Roads work well if it does not rain too much.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza, Zamora</td>
<td>The municipality built the road with help from the communities. Communities provide maintenance to the roads. The union organizes communal work. The road is regular, in the rainy season it is passable, but there are holes and platforms cave in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huerta Mayu; Chapas</td>
<td>The municipality built the road. The community and sometimes the municipality are responsible for maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampasillos; P. Arias</td>
<td>Community members began working on the road and the municipality finished it. The community is responsible for maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cañadillas</td>
<td>The Municipality began making the road. The community and the municipality are responsible for maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa Serrano</td>
<td>Roads funded by the municipality. The service works well.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.8. Transportation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Mundo</td>
<td>Occasional transportation through merchants. No regular service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza, Zamora</td>
<td>Occasional transportation through merchants. No regular service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huerta Mayu; Lampasillos; Cañadillas; P. Arias; Chapas</td>
<td>Occasional transport through merchants. There is no regular service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa Serrano</td>
<td>Through fleets that leave for Sucre a day and a half apart. Good service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada

### COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Mendoza, Zamora

### COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
- Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas

#### 2.9. Other Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuevo Mundo</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Cañadillas; P. Arias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sewage: only community members in the main nucleus of Nuevo Mundo benefit from this service donated by CARE and ex-CORDECH. Community members contributed to build sidewalks surrounding the town’s main square.</td>
<td>CEDEC built 4 solar tents. DITER short wave radio operation that community members use to communicate with other aficionados. Community members provide maintenance. ENTEL has 3 telephone booths that are out of service. No one knows who set them up, because no one requested them.</td>
<td>9 Solar tents implemented by CEDEC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

##### 3.1. Between Grassroots Organizations and Local Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuevo Mundo</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Huerta Mayu; P. Arias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no coordination.</td>
<td>There is coordination, yet it is somewhat weak due to a certain mistrust of the population with the work of some NGOs.</td>
<td>There is no coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>La Quebrada</strong></td>
<td><strong>Zamora</strong></td>
<td><strong>Lampasillos; Cañadillas; Chapas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good relationships based on cooperation and coordination.</td>
<td>Positive coordination.</td>
<td>There is coordination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

##### 3.2. Relationships with the Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuevo Mundo</th>
<th>Mendoza; Zamora</th>
<th>Huerta Mayu; P. Arias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Grassroots organizations: Excellent relationships due to the power of convocation the union has community members, which assures massive participation in meetings. * NGOs: variable relationships, depending on the degree of compliance of the NGO. It they do not carry out their promises they lose credibility and the community does not participate. Communities participate actively in NGO projects, if it they are attractive to them.</td>
<td>* Grassroots organizations: Good relationships, especially the union because it is responsible for making the requests to the municipality and solves internal community problems. People participate in the meetings. * NGOs: Goods as long as they implement projects and provide support for the community.</td>
<td>* Grassroots organizations: the relationship between the Union and the population is not good because leaders have no power of convocation. * NGOs: Recently began working here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lampasillos; Cañadillas; Chapas</strong></td>
<td><strong>Villa Serrano</strong></td>
<td><strong>Villa Serrano</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is coordination.</td>
<td>There is no coordination due to political and partisan conflicts.</td>
<td>There is coordination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Grassroots organizations: good relationship. The union represents the community and the population participates in the meetings the union calls. * NGOs: Good because NGOs have been working for a long time in these areas. * Grassroots organizations: relationships are not good due to the open affiliation to a specific political party.
### 3.3. Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with the Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations: Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada</th>
<th>Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations: Mendoza, Zamora</th>
<th>Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations: Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| They are not good because there are too many needs and the municipality does not provide solutions. | The relationships between the unions of these two communities and the municipality are not good. The Municipality did not carry out promised works. | Huerta Mayu; Lampasillos; Cañadillas; P. Arias; Chapas  
They do not have a good relationship with the municipality because it does not attend to communities’ requests, especially road improvement.  
**Villa Serrano**  
They are not good due to political conflict. |

### 3.4. Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with Other State Institutions

| Communities with Health Ministry (programs it carries out) are good because they are working in water storage and thus benefiting the population. | Do not have a relationship. | Lampasillos; Cañadillas; P. Arias; Chapas  
In Lampasillos and Cañadillas the relationship with PROSABAR depends on the Health Ministry.  
They are seeking new water sources.  
**V. Serrano; Huerta Mayu**  
Do not have direct relations. |

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### 4. FACTORS THAT STRENGTHEN/WEAKEN GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS

#### 4.1. Historical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Experience with the Agrarian Reform:</th>
<th>Tradition of interpellation:</th>
<th>Organizational experience:</th>
<th>Presence of local institutions in the community:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Mundo</td>
<td>Land ownership is shifting toward small plots, and many owners do not have land titles.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Through the union.</td>
<td>Since 1995 the NGOs, and ex-Cordech.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Quebrada</td>
<td>Land is being divided into small plots, and many of the owners do not have land titles.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Through the union and other grassroots organizations.</td>
<td>NGOs work in the area since 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huerta Mayu; Lampasillos; Cañadillas; P. Arias; Chapas</td>
<td>Land is divided into small plots.</td>
<td>Through the Union.</td>
<td>Through the Union</td>
<td>NGOs work in Thola Pampas since 1996, in Lampasillos since 1992, and in Cañadillas since 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa Serrano</td>
<td>Experience with the Agrarian Reform: land divided in small plots and most owners have titles. This was not a “hacienda” (large state).</td>
<td>Through the Municipality.</td>
<td>Through their grassroots organizations.</td>
<td>Presence of local institutions in the community: the Church and a cooperation agency (1987). NGOs only have their office.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.2. Economic Productivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Economic Productivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada</td>
<td>* Productive potential: Agriculture and pecuary production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Links with markets: Once a year in the Serrano Fair. Transportation owners and intermediaries purchase their products.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Poverty indicators: Illiteracy (especially due to lack of use of skill), health services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza, Zamora</td>
<td>* Productive potential: Agriculture and pecuary production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Links with markets: Twice a year in the Serrano and Mendoza fairs. Transportation owners and intermediaries purchase their products.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Poverty indicators: Illiteracy (especially due to lack of use of skill), health services and lack of electricity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas</td>
<td>* Productive potential: Agriculture and pecuary production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Links with markets: Once a year in the Serrano Fair. Transportation owners and intermediaries purchase their products.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Poverty indicators: Illiteracy (especially due to lack of use of skill), health services, and lack of electricity, bad quality housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa Serrano</td>
<td>* Productive potential: Services and agriculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Links with markets: Markets in Sucre and other departments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3. Ethnicity and Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Ethnicity and Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada</td>
<td>* Ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity/diversity: population with Spanish and Catholic influences (few evangelicals).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Modernizing values and practices: frequent seasonal migration has introduced urban behavioral rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza, Zamora</td>
<td>* Ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity/diversity: population with Spanish and Catholic influences (few evangelicals).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Modernizing values and practices: frequent seasonal migration (20%) shows contact that influences their lifestyles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, P. Arias</td>
<td>* Ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity/diversity: population with Spanish influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Modernizing values and practices: seasonal migration (10%) does not affect the development of the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa Serrano</td>
<td>* Ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity/diversity: population with Spanish and Catholic influences (few evangelicals).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Modernizing values and practices: frequent seasonal and permanent migration and the road to Sucre have introduced urban behavioral rules.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. GENERAL EVALUATION

COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
Nuevo Mundo, La Quebrada

COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
Mendoza, Zamora

COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:
Huerta Mayu, Lampasillos, Cañadillas, Villa Serrano, Pampas Arias, Chapas

* Strength/weakness of grassroots organizations:
grassroots organizations are strong because the union gathers the community, and is the interlocutor of the community before the municipality and the institutions that work in the area.

* Role in local development and service provision:
decentralization and popular participation are helping the provision of services. However, we still can not see the impacts on the social level. Even though schools are being built, they only have grades 1<sup>st</sup> - 3<sup>rd</sup> due to a lack of teachers and funds.

Local Institutions, especially NGOs have been able to aid local development, however analyzing each community we see this is not the case in all communities.

* Factors that explain the strength of social capital include: dynamism of union leaders, support and participation of the community, roads even if bad during the rainy season, they still help communities sell their production to intermediaries or others, and a low percentage of seasonal and permanent migration for these communities.

* Strength/weakness of grassroots organizations:
grassroots organizations are strong because the union has power of convocation, and because other organizations coordinate work through the union.

* Role in local development and service provision:
NGOs have contributed to community development and not only in the provision of services. The FIS by providing resources for schools has had an impact in local development (Zamora up to 5<sup>th</sup> grade).

* Factors that explain strength/weakness:
precarious living conditions impede the consolidation of social capital.

* Strength/weakness of grassroots organizations:
grassroots organizations are weak in these communities (especially Thola Pampa) because the union does not have much power of convocation. In Serrano, grassroots organizations are weak because they do not have the backing of the population. Participation of the population is reduced; partisan conflicts are debilitating credibility.

* Role in local development and service provision:
Thola Pampa evidenced the lack of services, they only have a road and NGOs are just beginning to work in this area. In Serrano, the municipality is responsible for providing services, but now it works with the church in some projects.

* Factors that explain this weakness:
the passive attitude of the unions channeling demands, lack of capacity to come up with proposals to solve concrete problems.
### MUNICIPALITY: CHARAGUA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:</th>
<th>Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:</th>
<th>Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Lorenzo, Taputá, Masavi, Akae</td>
<td>Charagua, Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe</td>
<td>San Antonio, Isoporenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### I. Inventory of Grassroots Organizations and Local Institutions

**1.1. Grassroots Organizations**

- **Kaipepe**
  - *Popular Participation’s counterparts:* the Captain of the community is the highest authority of the community. He organizes, mobilizes, represents the community, lobbies for institutional support, also makes recommendations and suggestions.
  - Other Grassroots Organizations:
    - Municipal Assembly of Guaraní People (APG) is present in the other three. Their goals are to mobilize, organize, and represent the community, and to lobby for institutional support.
    - Commissions articulated from the APG, in charge of production, infrastructure, health, education, land and communal territory (PISETT). Working groups 1980—communal work cooperative 15 to 30 people in agriculture and cattle, benefiting from credits and technical assistance.
    - Women’s Organization 1990—training, organizing, and providing technical assistance.
    - Religious youth group 1994—only in San Lorenzo, Masavi—Water Committee, health—only in Masavi—Oversees, manages, maintains both services in perfect conditions.
    - Nuclear School Board—only in Masavi—1953 oversees compliance with the school plan.
    - The great majority of these organizations work regularly.

- **Charagua**
  - *Popular Participation’s Counterparts:* 3 neighborhood committees representing the neighborhood. They lobby for municipal support. Irregular service.
  - Other Grassroots Organizations:
    - Civic Committee of Charagua 1991—represents regional interests before the Central Government.
    - Female Civic Committee 1993.
    - Charaguan Resident Committee 1993—Lobbies for institutional support, speeds up legal procedures in the town of Charagua.
    - Mothers’ Clubs 1991—Training, technical assistance, alternative education, and communal works. Most of these organizations work regularly.

- **San Antonio**
  - *Popular Participation’s Counterparts:* Local APG provides regular service.
  - *Other grassroots organizations:* Women’s Organization trains, organizes, and provided technical assistance. School Board oversees compliance with school calendar, lobbies for institutional support. They work regularly.

- **Isoporenda**
  - *Popular Participation’s counterparts:* the Captain is the highest authority of the community.
  - *Other grassroots organizations:* School Board, Women’s Organization. They function irregularly.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations: San Lorenzo, Taputá, Masavi, Akae</th>
<th>Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations: Charagua, Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe</th>
<th>Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations: San Antonio, Isoporenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.2. Local Institutions: NGOs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPCA 1980 (Technical assistance, credit, agricultural inputs); Fondecu 1990 (Credit); Care-Bolivia basic services); Caritas (Food by work); Teco Guaraní (Literacy training), PAMG 1990 (Training women)</td>
<td>CIPCA 1977; Fondecu 1990 (Credit); Caritas (Food by work); Care Bolivia 1984-90 –only Machipo and Kaipepe-(basic services). PAMG – only Machipo and Kaipepe.</td>
<td>San Antonio CIPCA 1983, Caritas 1987, Teco Guaraní 1983 school infrastructure. These NGOs stopped activities in the communities. Isoporenda Aco 1987 (building materials, technical advise for women).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.3. Other Local Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Investment Fund: state entity (basic services, sanitary and school infrastructure).</td>
<td>Catholic Church 1992 -only supports San Francisco- (Parish);</td>
<td>Social Investment Fund, school infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. SERVICE PROVISION

#### 2.1. Education

- **Machipo; San Francisco; Kaipepe**
  - Built schools with funds from Popular Participation and the community contributed with labor.
  - The infrastructure is small for the needs of these communities.
  - **Charagua**
    - Two public schools built by the government. A private school. Rural Technical Teachers’ University, Technical Training Center for Guaranís. Grassroots organizations did not intervene channeling the demand.
- **San Antonio**
  - School built by the State, grassroots organizations did not make the request nor built it. It Irregular service.
- **Isoporenda**
  - Does not have this service.

#### 2.2. Health

- **San Lorenzo; Taputá**
  - Health center 1993 funded and built by the FIS and the community. The community supports a Popular Health Promoter and provides maintenance to the health center.
- **Masavi; Akae**
  - Do not have this service.
- **Machipo; San Francisco; Kaipepe**
  - Do not have this service.
- **Charagua**
  - Hospital 1985 funded and built by the Regional Health Organization of Santa Cruz and CORDECRUZ. It is managed and maintained by the Vicar of Cuevo (Catholic Church). The hospital is relatively well equipped and provides good and regular service.
- **San Antonio**
  - Health center 1993 funded and built by the FIS at the request of the local APG. Service is not regular.
- **Isoporenda**
  - Does not have this service.
### Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- San Lorenzo, Taputá, Masavi, Akae

### Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:
- Charagua, Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe

### Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:
- San Antonio, Isoporenda

#### 2.3. Potable Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>San Lorenzo</th>
<th>Charagua; Kaipepe</th>
<th>San Antonio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piped water to homes and collective water sources 1987-90. In San Lorenzo, the system was funded and built by FIS and CORDECRUZ, and in the three remaining communities by Care-Bolivia and CORDECRUZ. The Water Committee of the local APG manages the system. Service is irregular and deficient.</td>
<td>Piped water service to the homes (in Charagua funded and built by CORDECRUZ and remodeled by the FIS. It is managed and maintained by Cooperative Charagua. In Kaipepe, Care-Bolivia provides maintenance and the Mayor manages the service. Service is regular and good in Charagua, but deficient in Kaipepe (frequent cuts).</td>
<td>Service of non-potable water to homes, funded and built by CORDECRUZ in 1982. It is managed and maintained by a water and electricity cooperative. Service is irregular not efficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Machipo, San Francisco. Do not have this service. They use streams, wells and irrigation ditches.</td>
<td>Isoporenda Does not have this service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.4. Electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>San Lorenzo</th>
<th>Machipo; San Francisco, Kaipepe</th>
<th>San Antonio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity system to homes funded by the FIS and remodeled with funds from Popular Participation. It is maintained and managed by the community’s water committee. Service is regular, reaching 50% of the population. Masavi; Taputá; Akae Do not have this service. They use candles, and lamps.</td>
<td>Do not have this service Charagua Electricity. Network built by CORDECRUZ and managed by a water and electricity cooperative. Regular service reaching 70% of the population.</td>
<td>Electricity since 1973. Network funded and built by CORDECRUZ and maintained by a water and electricity cooperative. Service is irregular with frequent interruptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Isoporenda Does not have this service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.5. Irrigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>San Lorenzo</th>
<th>Machipo; San Francisco, Kaipepe</th>
<th>San Antonio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not have irrigation systems. Families channel underground water and use streams.</td>
<td>Do not have this service.</td>
<td>Do not have this service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.6. Credit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>San Lorenzo</th>
<th>Machipo; San Francisco, Kaipepe</th>
<th>San Antonio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Families have access to FONDECO credits.</td>
<td>Families have access to FONDECO credits.</td>
<td>Families have access to FONDECO credits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</strong></td>
<td><strong>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</strong></td>
<td><strong>COMMUNITIES WITH WEAK GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Lorenzo, Taputá, Masavi, Akae</td>
<td>Charagua, Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe</td>
<td>San Antonio, Isoporenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.7. Roads

| Main road built by CORDECRUZ. The Prefecture of Santa Cruz has plans to pave the road. It is usable almost the entire year, except when rains are strong. Community roads connecting communities with the main road are built and maintained by the community (Taputá) o with Popular Participation funds (San Lorenzo, Akae). The APG channeled the demand and coordinates maintenance works. The road is not passable in the rainy season. | Main road built by CORDECRUZ and maintained by the Prefecture. | San Antonio Main road built by CORDECRUZ. Isoporenda Dirt road built by the Prefecture. It is not passable in the rainy season. The community does not participate in its maintenance. |
| San Antonio Main road built by CORDECRUZ. Isoporenda Dirt road built by the Prefecture. It is not passable in the rainy season. The community does not participate in its maintenance. |

### 2.8. Transportation

| Irregular service. They are trying to use the fleets from Santa Cruz. | Charagua Public service to Santa Cruz provided by three transportation companies. Regular trips three times a week. Private taxi service connects Charagua with nearby communities. | San Antonio State train services this community. Isoporenda Does not have this service. Transportation is irregular with logging and cargo trucks. |
| San Antonio State train services this community. Isoporenda Does not have this service. Transportation is irregular with logging and cargo trucks. |

### 2.9. Other Services

| Charagua has a telephone connection provided by the National Telecommunications Company. | Charagua has a telephone connection provided by the National Telecommunications Company. | Charagua has a telephone connection provided by the National Telecommunications Company. |
| Charagua has a telephone connection provided by the National Telecommunications Company. |

### 3. INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

#### 3.1. Between Grassroots Organizations and Local Institutions

<p>| Close coordination and collaboration relationships Especially in San Lorenzo, Masavi and Kaipepe. | Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe Coordination and collaboration relations, even though they are not always regular. Charagua No relationships. | No relationships. |
| Close coordination and collaboration relationships Especially in San Lorenzo, Masavi and Kaipepe. | Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe Coordination and collaboration relations, even though they are not always regular. Charagua No relationships. | No relationships. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities with strong grassroots organizations: San Lorenzo, Taputá, Masavi, Akae</th>
<th>Communities with more or less strong grassroots organizations: Charagua, Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe</th>
<th>Communities with weak grassroots organizations: San Antonio, Isoporenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.2. Relationships with the Population</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.3. Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with the Municipality</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.4. Relationships of Grassroots Organizations with Other State Institutions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Grassroots organizations have legitimacy and power of convocation. * Despite some conflicts in Masavi and Taputá, NGOs maintain a close relationship with the working groups based on productive projects.</td>
<td>Indirect relationship through the Northern Charagua APG.</td>
<td>Relationship of coordination and canalization of demands with the FIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe</td>
<td>There is no relationship</td>
<td>Does not exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Organizations have legitimacy, even though there are some struggles to control them. * NGOs only coordinate their activities with grassroots organizations and not with the population.</td>
<td>San Antonio.</td>
<td>Do not have this service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charagua</td>
<td>San Antonio.</td>
<td><strong>4. FACTORS THAT STRENGTHEN/WEAKEN GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Grassroots organizations do not have power to convoke the population. Partisan struggles to control them. * NGOs maintain relationships with some women’s groups.</td>
<td>* Grassroots organizations have little power to convoke. * NGOs do not have a relationship with the population.</td>
<td><strong>4.1. Historical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isoporenda</td>
<td>Isoporenda</td>
<td>San Antonio has developed more as a service station for the train than as a Guarani town or community. Does not have experience in community organizing or holding the state accountable. Limited presence of NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Great legitimacy and power of convocation of the Captain of the community. * NGOs maintain a relationship with the population mediated by the Captain.</td>
<td><strong>Ample organizational tradition under the community Captain, a hereditary title, not subject to fiscalization. Despite NGO presence in the area, this community has not developed an important organizational experience.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. FACTORS THAT STRENGTHEN/WEAKEN GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.1. Historical</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These communities developed a dynamic leadership during the seventies, with and intermediate education level and experience holding the state accountable. The presence of NGOs, particularly of CIPCA since the seventies, has contributed to develop leaders and in the formation of local APGs.</td>
<td>The presence of large landowners near these communities and in the town of Charagua has inhibited the formation of community and grassroots leaders. NGOs have worked relatively less in these communities.</td>
<td>San Antonio has developed more as a service station for the train than as a Guarani town or community. Does not have experience in community organizing or holding the state accountable. Limited presence of NGOs. <strong>Ample organizational tradition under the community Captain, a hereditary title, not subject to fiscalization. Despite NGO presence in the area, this community has not developed an important organizational experience.</strong></td>
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<td>Communities with Strong Grassroots Organizations:</td>
<td>Communities with More or Less Strong Grassroots Organizations:</td>
<td>Communities with Weak Grassroots Organizations:</td>
</tr>
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<td>San Lorenzo, Taputá, Masavi, Akae</td>
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<td>San Antonio, Isoporenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2. Economic Productivity

These communities are located at the foot of the Andes, an agro-ecological area which favors agricultural and cattle raising activities. Productivity increased during the eighties and market links between Charagua and Santa Cruz have allowed improved living standards and access to services.

**Machipo, Kaipepe**
- They are located near the Chaqueña Plains, where aridness and dryness of the land make it unsuitable for agriculture and cattle raising. Living conditions are more precarious than for communities near the mountains. Market links are difficult because neighborhood roads deteriorate in the rainy season.

**San Francisco**
- Communal land has been divided into small plots, making productive activities difficult. Contact with the Charagua market is fluid and living conditions are better than in Machipo and Kaipepe.

**Charagua**
- The diversity of economic activities and internal stratification has weakened grassroots organizations. There is no tradition of holding the state accountable. Before Popular Participation, power groups controlled the mechanisms of access to resources for the development of the town.

**San Antonio**
- Diversification of a productive activities around services linked to the train station, as well as agricultural and pecuary activities. Agricultural and pecuary production is limited, thus peasant families are the poorest, while families engaged in commercial and service activities have better incomes.

**Isoporenda**
- Agro-ecological conditions are adverse for agricultural and pecuary production. Located in the Chaco region, the soil is dry, salty and not apt for agriculture. Their link with the Charagua market is hampered by road and transportation deficiencies. No important internal stratification is apparent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
<th>COMMUNITIES WITH MORE OR LESS STRONG GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS:</th>
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<tr>
<td>San Lorenzo, Taputá, Masavi, Akae</td>
<td>Charagua, Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe</td>
<td>San Antonio, Isoporenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3. Ethnicity and Culture

| Population is predominantly Guaraní with some religious diversity (presence of evangelical groups). Pro-indigenous discourse supported by Western organizational practices. | Machipo, San Francisco, Kaipepe Cultural (Guaraní, Caucasian and highland migrants) as well religious heterogeneity. Despite this, the discourse of vindication of a Guaraní identity persists. Organizational heterogeneity. Superposition of traditional and modern organizational practices. Charagua Population is predominantly white, with some Quechua merchants. Religious homogeneity, mainly Catholic with only a few evangelicals. Organizational forms are predominantly Western, but they lack a unifying discourse as in the case of the peasant communities. | San Antonio Cultural and religious heterogeneity. As in Charagua, grassroots organizations have not developed a discourse of ethnic identity. Isoporenda Cultural and religious homogeneity. Traditional patterns of organization linked the Captain of the community are very important. A strong discourse of indigenous identity, yet it contrasts with the APG which has traditional practices. |

### 5. GENERAL EVALUATION

| Strong organizations due to the degree of support of their population for organizational initiatives, as well as for the experience and youth of grassroots leaders. Local APGs have channeled demands to the Central Government and then to Municipalities. They have made contacts with NGOs and the church, thus allowing an increase in investment sources for communities. | As leader’s succeed meeting community demands, they earn support of their population, thus organizations are strong. However, grassroots leaders have demonstrated less initiative to establish parallel institutional relationships to demands posed before the Municipality. This is because they have less experience negotiating and lower education levels than leaders of the first group. Charagua Organizations are still weak. They do not have organizational experience, a tradition of holding the Municipality accountable, or a discourse of ethnic identity. Urban elites control local power, and they do not need to organize to access resources and services. | San Antonio Grassroots organizations are relatively weak because they do not have enough power of convocation. Also, growing diversification of economic activities prevents the formation of strong collective and mobilizing identities. No organization can claim to represent and channel demands of the different socio-economics groups. Isoporenda Inside the community, grassroots organizations are strong because they are based in traditional organizational practices with strong ethnic discourse. However, outside the communities these organizations are weak because they do not have institutional negotiating experience. Traditional practices do not allow the renovation of leadership, thus perpetuating certain patterns of community organization. |
ANNEX 3

PROFILES OF THE MUNICIPALITIES IN THE STUDY

Available in Spanish only. To obtain a copy, see inside front cover for contact information.
CASE STUDIES OF SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS

SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS: MIZQUE
IRRIGATION PROJECT IN CHUCHONGANI,
EXECUTED BY CEDEAGRO

Formation of Program

The relationship between the CEDEAGRO (Agricultural Development Center) institution and the Chuchongani community began in the early 1980s, when valley producers, prohibited from organizing as a sindicato and faced with the high cost of chemical fertilizers, joined together in an association of potato producers.

With the help of volunteer technical experts, who would subsequently set up the CEDEAGRO, the Potato Producers Association successfully negotiated to import fertilizers directly.

This positive experience encouraged many directors to turn to the volunteer experts when, later on, the region suffered serious difficulties because of the drought that had begun in 1982. Many communities asked for construction of irrigation canals; CEDEAGRO functionaries responded to five of them, including Chuchongani.

It should be noted that the experience of the Potato Producers Association would determine the direction taken by CEDEAGRO's subsequent actions. In the first place, it did away with the preconception that impoverished campesinos were incapable of saving; in the second place, it meant that intervention no longer presumed that only institutions and professionals had the knowledge and skills to solve problems. This direction was fundamental because it started a mutually beneficial process in which the community and institution learned from each other and which led to campesino initiative and an increasingly subordinate role for the NGO.

Construction of irrigation canals was initiated with the financial support of OXFAM-America, OXFAM-Canada, and the Bolivian Association of Belgium.

Program Objectives and Methodology

The project's objective was to construct the irrigation infrastructure needed for agricultural production. Later, with construction completed, new challenges were to emerge.
In 1984, starting out with an investment of about 12,000 USD, reconstruction of an irrigation canal was undertaken in Chuchongani. It was, in fact, a reconstruction because the Cochabamba Development Corporation had already financed and executed installations for the community that never functioned due to the fact that the irrigation ditch was badly located.

Reconstruction work ended in six months, with its objectives apparently accomplished. After installation of the infrastructure, however, the problems began; community members had no experience in water use.

Therefore, what seemed to be the end of the project was actually the start of a long relationship between CEDEAGRO, by now institutionalized, and the Chuchongani community. Once the irrigation canal had been built, institutional perspective changed and the two parties involved realized that they had to go on to agricultural planning, in combination with appropriate water use and a strong organizational framework.

This was to require a long period of collective experimentation and research, in order to justify what families would have to spend on irrigation. Community leaders collaborated by trying out changes in the times for planting, irrigating, and harvesting.

Results and Impact

After a year of observation and experimentation, the results were consulted with water-use magistrates who worked out an agreement with the community on amount of water flow, number of participants, and cost of water, as well as changes in harvest times for potato and other vegetable crops.

In this way, the participating ninety families, together with three magistrates to regulate water use, one in each sector of the community, established a far-reaching experience in self-management: standards were set for the use of water resources to irrigate 200 hectares of arable land; a savings process was started based on a revolving fund financed by a 4,000 USD subsidy; and this achievement in resolving irrigation needs was a decisive factor in encouraging not only further demands, but also self-management initiatives for local development.

Present Situation of the Project

As we have just stated, the success of the project rested as much on its multiplier effect as on the fact that it was duly executed. In this sense, it can be said that the project was the starting point for other initiatives, at first shared between institution and community, and later with more community leadership and less institutional participation.

The success of the irrigation-project results convinced the Chuchongani community of the benefits of collective action. They have now set up cooperative mechanisms for obtaining agricultural input, although production and marketing continue to be family managed. Collective needs for basic services have been nearly met: the community has home installation of potable
water and is in the process of acquiring electricity, for which it has saved 20,000 USD in counterpart funds.

And, finally, the project has cut back on seasonal migration.

**Why the Project Succeeded**

1. The initiative came from the community.
2. The target population actively participated in planning and shared in defining the most important aspects of using the project’s benefits: course of canal; number of hours, schedule, and amount of water flow; administration and cost of water; management of water basin; and formation of leaders.
3. Mechanisms for proper water use were defined by the community itself after a long period of joint observation and experimentation by the executing institution and the target population.
4. In its execution of the project, the institution was sufficiently flexible to make possible agreement on how to respond to the problems that arose after installation of irrigation infrastructure.
5. Encouraged by this collective achievement, the community undertook other local development projects such as basic services and silo construction.
6. Financing agencies made a positive contribution with technical recommendations—for example, to associate irrigation with water-basin management and reforestation as a way of conserving water resources.
7. From the outset, the executing institution and the community established clear-cut rules on the rights and obligations of both parties.

**PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL,**
**EXECUTED BY THE MAYOR'S OFFICE OF MIZQUE**

The Provincial Development Council is a project that is being executed under the auspices of the municipality, with the technical support of CEDEAGRO and with financing by the Belgium agency SOS FAIM. It is an extremely interesting experience in setting up an entity that represents the various interests of the provincial, although mainly municipal, population and that is capable of defining and coordinating development strategy policies.

**Formation of the Program**

From 1986 to 1989, two Mizque communities were in serious conflict over ownership of sources of irrigation water. Neither the sindicatos of the two communities, nor the Sub-Central Office, nor the Campesino Central could settle the dispute. This sparked the idea of an entity—the Provincial Development Council—that, over and above the Campesino Central, would be empowered to do so.
The head sindicato organization, the Campesino Central, could not dissuade the parties from taking legal action, with all this would imply--time and resources wasted, and the conflict prolonged indefinitely, even to the point of violence.

With these risks in mind, the Campesino Central called together all the institutions in Mizque to consider creating an association of the most representative organizations and institutions in the area.

Two factors figured in this initiative: on the one hand, the work already performed jointly by CEDEAGRO and the Campesino Central; and on the other, the absence of a municipal government capable of taking such action.

*Work Performed Jointly by CEDEAGRO and the Campesino Central*

CEDAGRO has been responsible for the training of sindicato leaders and, above all, played a major role in building up the Campesino Central. Until about 1984, the sindicatos and, especially, the Campesino Central of Mizque province were still under the influence of the "military-campesino pact". This influence was concentrated in a few leaders whose claim to legitimacy depended on their ties to the Cochabamba prefecture, thanks to which they acted on behalf of the campesinos.

CEDEAGRO began its work in 1986 with a proposal that young leaders should be trained in collective workshops where discussions would be held on campesino problems and provincial development. In all likelihood, not only the formation of a new leadership but also the transition to democracy were what determined a change in the old leadership.

The new directors of the Campesino Central, in consultation with CEDEAGRO, pinpointed the most serious defects in the previous Central management: its ignorance about provincial matters; its lack of information on the needs of the region's campesino population; and its failure to establish contacts within the communities. All of this produced campesino directors whose interests were individual rather than collective.

Between 1985 and 1987, the Campesino Central began a survey of the communities that made up the province. Its objective was to gather diagnostic data on the population, existing infrastructure, and campesino demands. Every Central director visited each community on foot, carrying simple forms to be filled out on the basis of the following questions: how many are we; what do we have; what do we do; what do we want; and what is our culture.

This process was innovative and creative. For the first time, campesinos had contact in their own communities with their directors. And now aware of the magnitude of its constituency, as regards both geography and population, the Campesino Central began to realize the importance of its work.

Having verified the potentialities and limitations of the region and its impoverished campesino population, the variety of ecological zones, and the extent of cultural diversity, the
Campesino Central faced the challenge of expanding its activities, which until then had been solely political, into the area of local development.

Up to this time, CEDEAGRO was the only institution present in the region. It should be recalled that the Municipality had existed as a mere figurehead; its functions were limited to keeping the town center clean and supervising sanitary conditions in the central market.

CEDEAGRO and the Campesino Central substantially modified their vision. In light of the diagnosis data, probably the first participatory diagnosis in Bolivia, the institution and the campesino head-office now had to cope with a more complex reality, one that could not be changed by such specific projects as seed improvement and irrigation infrastructure construction that, although necessary, were not sufficient. The challenge was to undertake provincial development through local power.

In 1990, a CEDEAGRO functionary native to Mizque, backed by the Campesino Central, presented his candidacy for the office of Mayor. He ran on a development program based on the participatory diagnosis and featuring "chauvinist" slogans designed to awaken the population to its regional identity and its commitment to the municipality.

After winning the election, the new mayor had to deal with his office's lack of funds. To resolve this problem, it was decided that the mayor's office, CEDEAGRO, and the community should combine their work and resources. Thus, began a kind of incestuous relationship between NGO and municipal government that, although certainly open to criticism, offered undeniable advantages for undertaking local development.

**Municipality Weaknesses**

Until enactment of the Popular Participation Law, the tiny budget of rural municipalities permitted them to pay the salaries of just two functionaries: the mayor and someone responsible for keeping the town center and the central market clean.

**Project Objectives**

The objective of the project is to strengthen the Provincial Development Council so that it can fulfill its role of defining development policies and strategies by incorporating the demands of the most important sectors and organizations: campesino, women's center, neighborhood committee, and municipal government.

The link between the people and the mayor's office is the Development Council and it is here, not in the mayor's office, where the overall aspects of development policies are examined, including discussion and approval of the municipal development program and annual operative plan, together with consideration and evaluation of proposals by non-governmental institutions. The Development Council is the NGO's interlocutor as regards project and budgetary matters.
Project Results

The initial objective of the Development Council, as we have mentioned, was to settle disputes in cases where the Campesino Central did not have the authority to do so. This initial objective kept being modified until it became secondary to functions having to do with development policy guidelines.

From 1990 to date, the Development Council has endorsed and committed itself to all projects connected with municipal development. In this way, all sectors of the province can democratically participate in the decision-making process through their representatives.

The Council operates out of the mayor's office; the logistical problems of getting its representatives to rural communities where they can check and consult with local population have been solved thanks to SOS FAIM. This agency has has made it possible for the Council to move from place to place by providing funds for the purchase of three mobile units, office equipment, communication facilities, and food stocks.

Once the financing period has ended, the mayor's office and the communities will be expected to cover the maintenance costs of the Development Council.

SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS: VILLA SERRANO

NUTRITION PROJECT, EXECUTED BY CEDEC

Translator's Note: In the following section, the original Spanish refers only to "desnutrición", which is "undernourishment". From the context, it is clear that not only undernourishment but malnourishment ("malnutrición") is involved. Although the project population may not be getting enough to eat, it is not starving; in terms of nutrition, however, its diet is clearly inadequate.

Formation of Program

The 1989 survey conducted by CEDEC (Study Center on Chuquisaca Development) in the Belisario Boeto province, revealed that the population's inadequate diet had resulted in widespread mal/under-nourishment, including stunted growth and mental retardation. The survey information made clear the need for programs designed to alleviate and combat infant mal/under-nourishment.

The project that was undertaken initially proposed a change in diet. After three years, however, it was decided that there were too many problems involved in trying to change dietary habits. In the first place, the mistake was made of insisting on consumption of chicken and eggs—products that traditionally were marketed. In the second place, solar tents were built that, although encouraging vegetable consumption, unduly burdened women with additional work; moreover, the difficulties of obtaining agrofilm meant that there was a tendency to abandon solar tents once the nylon cover had to be replaced.
In its second stage, the objectives of the project were shifted from changing dietary habits to ensuring proper nutrition.

**Project Objectives**

The fundamental objective of the next stage of the project was to ensure proper nutrition in a comprehensive way by creating alternatives to donated food and by raising the yield of market-oriented crops, thereby increasing income and improving the quality of alternative consumption.

Within this adjusted project, income generation was essential because only with increased income could campesino families purchase nutritional products other than what they produced in their parcel and, in addition, have resources for solar-tent maintenance.


Work has been carried out basically at the family level. Institution and population are connected through the sindicato, which is the entity that promotes, mobilizes, and evaluates the project within the community. It also suggests suitable families to take part in project activities.

Not all families in a community can participate in this project--only those that have water and land--which means leaving out the poorest families. On the assumption that production is more a family than a community matter, the institution also opted for a type of family production.

**Project Results**

CEDEC and the participating communities constructed an important network of infrastructure for family production: silos, solar tents, henhouses, and open-air vegetable gardens. All of these were combined with training in nutrition and hygiene and with raising female self-esteem. In this way, food production has been promoted both for family consumption and for the market; crops have been diversified with the introduction of new vegetables and Andean varieties such as the quinoa, broad bean, and tarwi; and women have learned new skills.
In terms of infrastructure and services, the project has contributed the following:

- family solar tents
- vegetable plots, with gardening tools
- henhouses, with 40 under construction
- poultry distributed
- silos constructed
- families whose daily diet is being monitored
- children, 14 years and younger, whose physical measurements are under continuous supervision.

Project results can be considered from two standpoints—changes in nutrition indices, and community initiatives in resource use.

The program succeeded in reducing mal/under-nourishment from severe to moderate, a result confirmed by the ongoing measurement of children's physical development.

Furthermore, project results have brought about a change in eating habits thanks to increased production and consumption of fruit and vegetables containing vitamins, proteins and calories.

Encouragement of poultry raising has led to consumption of more animal protein and also brought in additional income.

Construction of production infrastructure like family silos has reduced post-harvest losses by 10 to 40 percent.

It is predicted that this project, which is directly addressed to families, will not only to be viable but will continue to benefit the families involved. It is also expected that families will acquire the habit of eating vegetables and fruit so that, on the one hand, they will diversify their output and, on the other, will produce a surplus of vegetables and fruit that will provide them with more income and enable them to replace greenhouse material as needed.

**SEED POTATO PRODUCTION PROJECT, EXECUTED BY CEDEC**

**Formation of Program**

Given the fact that Villa Serrano communities enjoyed the advantage of nematode-free soil, CEDEC (Center for Chuquisaca Studies and Development), in conjunction with the Campesino Central Office and a few sindicatos, began planning a project for improved seed potato that could become an important source of income and also supply improved seed to the regional market.

**Project Objectives**
An interesting project was proposed for increasing the added value of potato output, to be financed by PROCADE (Alternative Program for Campesino Development) and self-managed by PROPASE (Association of Seed Potato Producers).

Although the project began with endorsement by the Campesino Central Office and agrarian sindicatos, it was directly aimed at individual campesinos, who later became part of an Association of Producers.

Producers participating in the project were carefully selected by the sindicato directorship on the basis of their land being pest-free, which was then confirmed by laboratory analysis.

Since the start of the project six years ago, there have been a number of adjustments to meet new challenges. One of the major adjustments was to include women in the training program. Initially, no account was taken of women's role in production and their skills in managing and selecting seed. Unfortunately, the production aspects of women's work have still not been translated into political empowerment, nor have women been made an integral part of PROPASE.

**Project Results**

In six years, the project has been extended to cover an ever larger population and its results can be positively measured by the substantial increase in the annual income of campesino men and women beneficiaries. Furthermore, infrastructure has been constructed that has reduced loss of stored seed potato. Nevertheless, the project's self-management objective has not yet been fully realized.

Work was carried out in eight communities--Mendoza, Cañadillas, Blanca Flor, Socavón, Kewiñas, Santa Rosa, Sipotendi, and Lampasillos--with an average of 58 beneficiary families, although this number has varied from year to year according to campesino interest; for example, from 1996 to 1997 there were 24 families; from 1997 to 1998 there were 54; and currently there are 78 families participating.

The growing number of those interested in joining the project is due its favorable effect on income, which went up 600 to 1,000 USD a year. Given that, at the national level, average annual campesino income is 200 USD, this implies a substantial positive impact.

As regards production infrastructure, four central silos have been built, each with a capacity of 1,000 qq, and 24 family silos. Thanks to better storage facilities, there has been an enormous increase in the tuber's sprout-producing capacity.

For all that, PROPASE is still not sufficiently organized to take over its own management in marketing, administrative decisions, silo supervision, and input supply; these responsibilities are handled by CEDEC.
The only function transferred to PROPASE so far has been seed selection. The challenge now faced by CEDEC and PROPASE is to consolidate transfer of project management by 1998. As for the member families of PROPASE, they have conscientiously managed production methods and seed selection in their land parcels.

Factors contributing to the project's success were the following:

- Active participation of the community in response to rapidly confirmed positive results
- Endorsement by the sindicato
- Use of simple technology
- Good soil conditions
- Immediate improvement in family income
- Market access opportunities
- Ongoing contact between institution and population, and dissemination of information, especially about income generation

An important element was the learning process that took place during the project's execution. At the outset, neither the institution nor the Producers Association had any experience in marketing and, furthermore, no clearly defined bases existed for cost calculation.

Because of lack of experience in data collection and marketing, there were errors in cost calculation, meaning not only that the Association suffered financial losses and required higher institutional subsidies, but that producers lost confidence in the mechanism of individual payment.

**Weaknesses of the Project**

The Producers Association is still a dependent and fragile organization. Marketing control and silo supervision are responsibilities that have not yet been transferred. It should also be mentioned that because the Producers Association has had no experience in obtaining commercial credit, CEDEC has been performing this service on a small scale and has provided input.

Since its members change at the start of every agricultural year, there is a lot of movement within the Association. The benefits gained by member families during a production cycle attract the interest of others and have resulted in a steady increase in membership. On the one hand, this favors the Association because it means that production of seed potato keeps up with growing demand; on the other, it has prevented the emergence of a stable directorship capable of taking over administrative and commercial responsibilities.
ANNEX 5

SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION IN BOLIVIA

DESIGN OF THE BOLIVIA STUDY

Background

The importance of “Social Capital” in the processes of decentralization and local development are increasingly recognized.

Social Capital is understood as the universe of community organizations, their networks and their modes of action in relation to the State. The foremost argument is that strong social capital has a positive influence in the processes of decentralization and local government. The World Bank is considering, therefore, policies directed at strengthening social capital in its decentralization and local development programs. This requires having empirical and comparative information on social capital and its presence in local development.

Objectives

General objective. To carry out a diagnostic study on the incidence of social capital in the local development of four municipalities of Bolivia.

Specific Objectives

1. Develop an inventory of the grassroots organizations and institutions present in each community and municipality.

2. Determine the specific role of these organizations and institutions in the provision of services. Identify which are the most important organizations/institutions.

3. Describe the relationship of the grassroots organizations:
   - with each other
   - with the families/individuals
   - with the Non-Governmental Institutions (church, international donors, media)
   - with local private enterprises
   - with local state entities

4. Establish the contextual factors that influence the greater or lesser incidence of these grassroots organizations in local development (provision of services):
• Historic
• Economic
• Ethnic-cultural-religious

5. Identify the role of social capital (network of grassroots organizations and local institutions) in the achievement of “successful” local development projects.

6. Specify how the World Bank and other donors can work with this social capital in order to implement “successful” development projects.

Objectives and research techniques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Municipalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survey to Heads of Household</td>
<td>Group Interviews to Key Informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory of Grassroots Organizations and Institutions</td>
<td>250 hhs per municipality, Total = 1000</td>
<td>1 group interview per community, i.e. 10 per municipality Total = 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Social Capital in the Provision of Services</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationship Between Social Capital and Other Local Entities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contextual Factors that Influence the Formation of Social Capital</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Role of Social Capital in Successful Projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>How to Work with Social Capital in Successful Projects</td>
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</table>

10 Communities per Municipality. 4 Municipalities
Defining the variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE 1: Inventory of Grassroots Organizations and Local Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1 Type of Grassroots Organizations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Community Organizations in General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Youth and Old Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social Volunteering</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Productive</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Community Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Natural Resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Credit related</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Supracommunual</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Recreational</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Education Related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health Related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Others</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1.2 Local Institutions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Cooperation Local Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local Media</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Others</td>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLE 2: The Role of Social Capital in the Provision of Services</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2 Services</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clean Water Consumption</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Land and Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Irrigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2 Role</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization of the Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fiscalization</td>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLE 3. Relations of the Grassroots Organizations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.1 Between Them</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Type of Relationship (cooperation/antagonism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Pursued Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Results Obtained</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.2 With Families and Individuals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Importance Assigned by the Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Degree of Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participation and Access to Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Socio-economic Situation and Participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VARIABLE 3. cont.

| 3.3 With Other Non-gov’tl Institutions | • With NGOs  
| | • Church  
| | • International Cooperation  
| | • Local Media  
| 3.4 With the Local Private Enterprise | • Type of Relationship (cooperation/antagonism)  
| | • Pursued Goals  
| | • Results Obtained  
| 3.5 With the State | • With the School  
| | • With the Health Service  
| | • With the Municipality  
| | • With the Prefecture  
| | • With the Central Government Funds  

### VARIABLE 4: Contextual Factors that Influence Social Capital

| 4.1 Historic | • Organizing Experience of the Grassroots Organizations  
| | • Type of Grassroots Organizations (traditional or not)  
| | • Experience in the Agrarian Reform  
| | • Type of State Presence  
| | • Tradition on Appeal/Lobbying Experience with the State  
| | • Tradition of NGO Presence in the Zone  
| 4.2 Economic | • Productive Potential of the Zone  
| | • Relationship with the Local, Regional and National Market  
| | • Poverty Indicators  
| | • Degree of Internal Stratification  
| 4.3 Ethnic-cultural | • Internal Ethnic Diversity  
| | • Local Demands in Accordance with Cultural Values  
| | • Receptivity to Occidental Values  
| | • Cultural Norms in Relating with the State  
| | • Religious Diversity and its Relationship to Grassroots Orgs  

### VARIABLE 5: Role of Social Capital in Successful Projects

| 5.1 Successful Projects | • Types of Projects  
| | • Satisfied Needs  
| | • Planning, Implementation and Evaluation Processes  
| | • Role of the State in these Projects  
| | • Role of the NGOs in these Projects  
| 5.2 Grassroots Organizations in These Projects | • Role of the Grassroots Org in these Projects  
| | • Differentiated Role of Leaders and their Base in these Projects  
| | • Forms and Degree of Participation of the Grassroots Org  
| | • Legitimacy of these Organizations in the Community  
| | • The Grassroots Org and Distribution of Project Benefits  
| | • The Grassroots Organizations and the Project’s Transference  

### VARIABLE 6: How to Work with Social Capital in Successful Projects

| 6.1 Relationship of the GROs with the State and NGOs | • Types of Relationships with the State in Successful Projects  
| | • Types of Relationships with the NGOs in Successful Projects  
| 6.2 Forms of | • Forms of Financing of Successful Projects  

Financing

Role of the Grassroots Organizations in this Financing

Target population

Four predominantly rural municipalities were selected, where a relatively advanced application of the Popular Participation Law has been identified, with similar socio-economic and population conditions, and belonging to different geographic regions.

- The advanced application of the Popular Participation Law is based on general criteria presented by State employees.
- The similar socio-economic conditions will be measured following these indicators:
  - Incidence of poverty
  - Number of inhabitants
  - Urban-rural population ratio
- One municipality in the highlands, two in the valleys and one in the tropics, will be selected.

The municipalities selected are:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tiwanacu</td>
<td>Altiplano</td>
<td>13,151</td>
<td>1,631,217 Bs.</td>
<td>97.8 %</td>
<td>87 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa Serrano</td>
<td>Valle</td>
<td>12,617</td>
<td>1,564,981 Bs.</td>
<td>93.8 %</td>
<td>93 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gutierrez</td>
<td>Llano</td>
<td>9,833</td>
<td>1,219,661 Bs.</td>
<td>96.9 %</td>
<td>75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizque</td>
<td>Valle</td>
<td>20,170</td>
<td>2,502,581 Bs.</td>
<td>98 %</td>
<td>96 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The poverty rates are at the province level

The municipality of Mizque will be studied as a particular case, which differs from the other three in terms of population and incidence of poverty, in order to identify the characteristics of social capital in more precarious socio-economic situations.

In each municipality, the 10 communities will be selected according to a simple probability sampling.
**SAMPLING AND FIELD WORK**

Sample selection

*Sample Framework*

The demographic information of the National and Housing Census of 1992, of the National Institute of Statistics (INE) was used in the selection of communities and interviewees.

*Selection of Communities*

From the INE information, lists of communities for each municipality were prepared, starting with the most numerous in inhabitants and ending with the least.

Once the lists were ready, a statistical selection was made using a systematic method. The following steps were taken:

1. The capital of each municipality was selected in order to include an urban setting in the sample.

2. The number of rural communities in each municipality was divided by nine. The quotient was considered as the factor of systematic selection.

3. The first community to be included in the sample (in addition to the capital) was identified through a method of simple random sampling.

This procedure of systematic selection ensured the presence of municipal capital as an example of an “urban” setting. There were also nine rural communities - including both large and small populations. At the same time, the rigorousness of the statistical approach was also ensured.

*Selection of Households*

Two procedures were followed for the selection of the households: one for the municipal capitals (urban area); and the other for the nine rural communities.

*Selection of households in the urban area.* In the capital of each municipality the two-step sampling method was used in the following way:

1. Simple random selection without replacement of “manzanos”, based in the cartographic map elaborated by INE.

2. In each “manzano” selected, a systematic selection of the households was made to include them in the sample. For this, the number of houses in each “manzano” were counted. This number was then divided by the number of interviews to be
made in each “manzano” (generally four). The quotient was considered as the factor of systematic selection. The first household to be included was selected on a simple random basis. From this first household, the other three were selected through the systematic selection factor.

Selection of households in the rural area. In the rural area, two procedures were followed:

1. First Procedure
   a) All the households of the community were counted. The number of households was divided by the number of interviews to be made (25 in total). The quotient was considered as the factor of systematic selection.

   b) The visible center of the community was identified. The first household to be included was selected on a simple random basis.

   c) From this household a route in open spiral was followed in clockwork fashion, selecting the households for the sample according to the factor of systematic selection. This route was followed including in the sample the households that were farthest away from the center of the community.

This procedure was applied to two communities of the Tiahuanacu municipality. After its application, the procedure of selection of the households was changed for the remaining rural communities.

2. Second Procedure

   a) All the households of the community were counted. The community was then divided into four imaginary quadrants, based on the visible center of the community.

   b) All the houses in each quadrant were counted again and were assigned the number of questionnaires according to the proportional weight of the number of households in the quadrant.

---

1 Contrary to what might be expected, in the majority of rural communities in the country, no marked internal social stratification is observed. The relatively “wealthier” campesinos do not live near the center of the community, but close to the road (which is usually on the outskirts or cuts across the community). For these reasons, and Sinergia’s past experience, one can be sure that this type of selection in rural communities guarantees an adequate representation of the population. (“Campesino” is translated as one who is of the land or country. The term is generally used to refer to a subsistence farmer or cultivator who may be the owner, tenant, or salaried worker.)
c) In each quadrant the total number of households was divided according to the number of questionnaires assigned. The quotient was considered as the systematic selection factor for that quadrant.

d) The starting point was chosen taking into account the household that was located at the northern most point in the quadrant. From this household, the rest of the households were selected according to the factor of systematic selection, following an outside-in spiral route, towards the center of the respective quadrant.

The head of household was interviewed in each household. If the head of household was not found in the selected house, a replacement household was sought, following the same procedures explained above.

In sum, one can say that a multi-step random sampling method was applied, with systematic selection of communities and households.

**Field work**

*Initial Contacts with Municipalities*

In order to carry out the field work, initial contacts with institutions, authorities and leaders of the selected municipalities were made through NGOs with many years of work in those zones.

Due to Sinergia’s permanent activity in the areas of social research and evaluation of social projects, these NGOs have regular contacts with our institution. Thus, they were aware of the study’s objectives and provided all their support for its realization.

Initial contacts were made with the municipal authorities and leaders of grassroots organizations through these NGOs. Explaining the scope and objectives of the study to them in writing as well as through personal interviews helped enlist their support.

*Planning of the Field Work*

Once the initial contacts were made, planning of the field work began by establishing an initial timetable. This timetable was later modified, as will be detailed later.

Two field work teams were formed: one, dedicated entirely to the qualitative data collecting work from focal groups, group interviews, in-depth interviews, and documented research. The other team was entirely dedicated to the application of the questionnaire for heads of households, in the framework of the quantitative data collection.

*The qualitative research team.* Sinergia selected a team of six professionals, all specialists in qualitative studies, from the pool of social scientists involved in the institution’s research
work. This team was trained in the objectives of the study and the use of the instruments, in a six-day workshop.

The team was coordinated by Lic. Beatriz Ascarrunz and Lic. Julio Córdova.

The quantitative research team. In the same manner, Sinergia chose four teams of interviewers (one per municipality), all persons with an average of five years experience in this type of work. Ten interviewers were selected for each municipality.

Each team was trained, during three days, on the objectives of the study and the application of the questionnaire to heads of households. Guided practice sessions in application of the instrument were carried out in order to correct errors.

This team was coordinated by Lic. Carola Capra, Architect Reynaldo Rojas, Engineer José Luis Ballivian, Mr. Marcelo Bustamante and Mr. José Antonio Valda.

Field Work

The field work took place from March 3rd to April 26th, 1997. The data gathering phase took place simultaneously in two municipalities, beginning with Tiahuanacu (La Paz) and Mizque (Cochabamba). In a second phase the study was made in Villa Serrano (Chuquisaca) and Charagua (Santa Cruz).

For the data gathering in each community selected, simultaneous work between the qualitative and quantitative teams was coordinated. The application of the questionnaire, the focal group interviews and the group interviews took place simultaneously after obtaining the consent of the community leaders. A letter signed by Sinergia with the support of the Municipal authorities was presented to the community leaders, for their consent.

The supervision of the qualitative and quantitative field work was carried out by the coordinators of the respective teams.

Fieldwork Problems

- One of the more serious problems faced in the field work was due to the rainy season that, this year, lasted much longer (until the end of April). This caused the inaccessibility of the roads to the communities and therefore, many problems for the field work teams. This was the major reason for the delay in the field work phase.

- Another difficulty was due to the agricultural season, during which the field work took place. This occurred during the end part of the harvest. Many farmers were busy in these tasks during major parts of the day. This difficulty was overcome thanks to the previous contacts with the communal authorities who encouraged the farmers to cooperate with the study, stopping their harvesting work when necessary.
A third difficulty was faced due to the temporal and permanent migratory processes of the heads of households in many communities. This made contact with the heads of household much more difficult.

- A fourth difficulty arose from the dynamic of the Municipal authorities. Since the dictation of the Law of Popular Participation, the Municipal authorities face a heavy agenda of activities because they have now become the center of channeling of community demands, and the managers of 25% of the national tax revenues for use in local projects. In addition, the new dynamic of the Popular Participation implies the presence of numerous research, consultant and fiscal control teams visiting the municipal authorities from the capital cities of the nation. This made appointments for interviews with the municipal authorities very difficult. Nevertheless, these took place thanks to the effective mediating work of NGOs working in the regions.

- Another difficulty was due to the extent of the questionnaire. Applying the questionnaire lasted between 1.15 to 1.30 hours. This caused many heads of household to interrupt the interview before it ended, which meant that the interview had to be replaced by a new one.

- A final obstacle arose in the difficulty of many interviewees, especially women, to express their ideas in Spanish. These individuals expressed themselves better in their native languages (Aymara and Quechua). This was especially so in Tiahuanacu (La Paz) and Mizque (Cochabamba). This meant that the interviewer or focal group leader had to translate the questions to the native language, taking care to maintain the original meaning as faithfully as possible. Anticipating that this could happen, the teams included bi-lingual interviewers (persons with a fluent command of Spanish and Aymara or Quechua).

**INFORMATION PROCESSING**

*Quantitative Information*

The desk critique of the completed questionnaires was done parallel to the field work, so as to correct errors by way of a re-interview or a new one in the community.

Six persons worked in the desk critique, trained for a period of three days on the study’s objectives, the correct filling of the questionnaires and the existing correlation between different questions. This team worked under the lead of Architect Reynolds Rajas and Engineer Hug Arrival.

In this manner, the questionnaires were critiqued as soon as the field work was completed.
After the desk critique took place, the same team revised the consistency of the whole of the codes for the local institutions in sections II and III of the questionnaire. Once this consistency was confirmed, the team proceeded to codify the 1,000 questionnaires.

At the same time, the functioning of the (data entry program) was tried and five transcribers in charge of filling the data base were trained for three days on the characteristics of the questionnaire and the data base.

Once the critique and the codification were completed, the phase of transcribing was started. The work of the transcribers is under the lead of Engineer Hugo Arévalo.

Qualitative Information

Non-comparative systematization. The qualitative information was processed in the following steps:

1. First, a report was prepared per community, based on the qualitative information gathered by way of the focal groups, the group interviews with community leaders, the community descriptive guide and some in-depth additional interviews. (This comprises more or less four hundred pages; approximately 10 pages for each of the 40 communities included in the study.)

2. Second, reports were prepared for each municipality, to systematize the qualitative information from the in-depth interviews with municipal authorities, supracommunal grassroots organizations’ leaders, and employees of NGOs.

3. Specific reports are also prepared on each of the eight successful projects studied in each municipality.

4. In the same manner, the answers of the community leaders systematized in order to translate them in numeric formalization.

This process was handled by the same researchers that gathered the qualitative information in the municipalities.

Comparative systematization. For the compared systematization of the qualitative information, two double-entry each matrixes were prepared, considering two levels of analysis: the municipal level and the community level.

1. Municipal Matrix of Comparison of Results

The comparison of results will be made through the matrix, identifying “the behavior” of social capital according to the five general variables of the study:

1. Inventory of grassroots organizations and local institutions.
The role of social capital in the provision of services.

2. The relationships within the social capital, of social capital and the population, and of social capital and the institutions of the State, on a local level (municipality), as well as regional (Prefecture) and national (Central Government and Development Funds).

3. Factors related to context: historic, economic and cultural, that strengthen or weaken social capital in each municipality, and their role in the provision of services (local development).

4. The role of social capital in the implementation of successful projects.

In this comparison matrix at the municipal level, social capital is understood as the combined efforts of grassroots organizations and civil society’s local institutions (NGOs, Churches, international cooperation).

This matrix will take special care in identifying the influence of the State in the structuring of social capital. A typology will be constructed for this purpose, based on the following criteria:

- The degree of state presence in the municipality: What is the composition and reaction of social capital to a greater or lesser presence of the State in the local sphere?
- The type of state-municipal administration.
- The degree of legitimacy of the state/municipal administration among the leaders of grassroots organizations and local institutions.

2. Comparison of Results Community Matrix

In the community matrix, the unit of analysis will be the community, not the municipality. For this, as can be seen in the matrix mentioned, the communities in each municipality will be classified according to the degree of strength of the grassroots organizations in each community: high, medium, and low.

In order to classify the communities by degree of strength of their grassroots organizations, the following criteria will be used:

- The regularity of operation of the grassroots organizations. Are we dealing with organizations that work without interruptions? (high regularity), or are they organizations that show interruptions in their operations? (low regularity).
• Intensity of action. Are they organizations that have intensive activities? (high intensity), or do not have intensive activities? (low intensity).

• Legitimacy. Are they organizations that are seen as legitimate by the population, as seen by their results, or their cultural and symbolic significance? (high legitimacy), or are they organizations with little or no legitimacy or summoning power? (low legitimacy).

Those communities in which the majority of the grassroots organizations fulfill the three criteria in a satisfactory manner: high regularity, high intensity of action, and high legitimacy, will be classified as communities with high organizational strength. Those communities in which the majority of the grassroots organizations only fulfill two of the criteria, will be classified as communities with medium organizational strength. Finally, those communities in which the majority of the grassroots organizations only fulfill one of the criteria, or do not fulfill either of the three criteria, will be classified as having low organizational strength.

Once the communities have been classified according to these criteria, all of the communities can then be analyzed following the variables of the matrix.

**EVALUATION**

A general appraisal of the work shows us that the design of the investigation, the preparation of the instruments, as well as the planning of the field work, have been relatively adequate to the reality in which Bolivia finds itself, at this moment.

This adequacy has allowed the gathering of information relevant to the object of study: the role of social capital in local development.

What has specially allowed the required gathering of information has been the pertinent spatial delimitation of the study: the municipality. In effect, upon the approval of the Law of Popular Participation in 1994, it is no longer possible to understand local development in the rural provinces, outside the new reality of social interaction comprised by the 311 urban-rural municipalities of Bolivia. Popular Participation and its sphere of application: the municipality.

In Sinergia’s field work experience, it has been observed that this new reality (the municipality with resources and responsibilities) has modified the mode of interaction of the diverse social actors, in local development.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out some elements that could be improved in future studies:
• The present study has selected Municipalities which, based on some organizational and municipal management indicators, the experts considered were relatively “successful” in the application of the Law of Popular Participation. This is to say that, there is information on social capital in places where this social capital is playing an important role in local development. But there is no information on those municipalities where the application of the Law presents problems, and where social capital is still weak. Future studies must contemplate this type of municipality for more comparative richness.

• The study was designed to study “effective projects” of social intervention. Nevertheless, the field work showed that a study of “effective programs” affords more and better information on the role of social capital at the municipal level. A study of programs in general, rather than of particular projects, allows an identification of certain tendencies that are, otherwise, not perceived.

• The design made special emphasis on the in-depth interviews, particularly with municipal authorities. Nevertheless, the field work showed that the richer information was obtained from interviewees who may not be formally considered authorities, but who have a broad knowledge of the dynamics of local development. In the future, this type of key informants and “local experts” should be treated with greater emphasis in the design of the studies.

• The design gave scant importance to in-depth interviews with key community informants. Rather, the group interview of community leaders was privileged. It would have been more useful if, in place of these group interviews, the leaders would have been interviewed separately and individually, in order to get a better grasp of their opinions and views.

• Section II of the questionnaire for heads of households (Inventory of Local Institutions where at least one member of the household participates) was found to be unnecessarily long. This section was designed in a way that it was up to the interviewer to classify the type of local institution as he/she made the interview. This made the interview process very complex and long. The classification could have been made later, using the codes for different types of local institutions, to save time and improve the quality of the rest of the information.

• Whereas, the questionnaire gave an unnecessary extra length to the inventory of local institutions, it gave insufficient space to the trust in local institutions in section III. There is only one question in this section on this topic, passing directly to identify the manner by which these institutions are supporting in the provision of basic services. The field work showed, through the qualitative work, that the degree of legitimacy of local institutions is very important to determine, on the one hand, their strength and, on the other, their role in local development. This essential aspect has been almost omitted completely in the quantitative study.
• Section IV on socio-economic indicators, does not seem to be in accordance with the objectives of the study: identify the role of social capital in the provision of services to households. From its length and detail with which this section dealt, it looked as another study to obtain a socio-economic and stratification diagnosis. Although it is possible to correlate the level of participation in local institutions and the degree of community stratification, we believe that such a broad number of socio-economic indicators make the correlation more difficult, rather than facilitating it.

• The qualitative instruments directed at the communities (Focal Group Guidelines and Guidelines for Group Interviews), do not stress the topic of motivations for participation, or not, in certain local institutions. It is advisable that this topic be analyzed with more detail because of its importance to the study.

On the format for the data base, we have two observations:

• Having the data base structured in eight different files made the process of transcribing more difficult by slowing it down. At the same time, this separation of the different sections of the questionnaire, did not allow the elaboration of electronic control mechanisms between questions and from one section of the questionnaire to another.

• The need to open new codes after the critique of all the questionnaires, delayed the transcription of the data, because small adjustments to the data entry had to be made.