Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2242 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-3967/ ARTF 050970 / ARTF 092073) IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 17 MILLION US$25 MILLION EQUIVALENT AND US$8.8 MILLION (ARTF GRANTS) TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN FOR A KABUL URBAN RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (KURP) February 28, 2013 Sustainable Development Department Urban and Water Unit Afghanistan Country Management Unit CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Afghani (Afs) US$ 1.00 = 52.34 Afs FISCAL YEAR: December 21-December 20 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFMIS Afghanistan FM Information System JRC Judicial Reform Commission (JRC) AKTC Agha Khan Trust for Culture KSP Kabul Solidarity Program ARDS Afghanistan Reconstruction and Dev Services KURP Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund LTTC Land Tenure Technical Committee AUWSS Afghanistan Urban Water Supply and Sanitation M&E Monitoring & Evaluation CBO Community Based Organization MoUDA Ministry of Urban Development Affairs CIDA Canadian International Development Agency MTR Mid Term Review CHMP Cultural Heritage Management Plan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization CR Conformance Report O&M Operation and Maintenance DCA Development Credit Agreement PD&C Planning, Design and Contracts Management DOS Department of Sanitation, KM PDO Project Development Objective EIA Environment Impact Assessment PIM Project Implementation Manual ERL Emergency Recovery Loan PMU Project Management Unit FM Financial Management PSC Program Steering Committee FMR Financial Monitoring Reports SDU Special Disbursement Unit GCS Gozar Community Sura TQM Turquoise Mountain Foundation GTZ German Technical Cooperation TA Technical Assistance ICRR Implementation Completion and Results Report TF Trust Fund IDA International Development Association TSS Transitional Support Strategy IP Implementation Progress TSU Technical Support Unit IRA Islamic Republic of Afghanistan UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees United States Agency for International IUFR Interim Unaudited Financial Report USAID Development Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Country Director: Robert J. Saum Sector Manager: Ming Zhang Project Team Leader: Deepali Tewari ICR Team Leader: Deepali Tewari ii Afghanistan Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................ 10 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 18 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 22 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 22 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 25 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 26 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 28 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 30 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 33 Annex 5&6. Beneficiary Survey Results and Stakeholder Workshop Report ............. 35 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICRR ...................................................................... 37 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 43 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 44 iii A. Basic Information Kabul Urban Country: Afghanistan Project Name: Reconstruction Project IDA-39670/ARTF Project ID: P083919 L/C/TF Number(s): 092073/ARTF 50970 ICR Date: 02/28/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: OF AFGHANISTAN Original Total XDR 17.10M Disbursed Amount: XDR 15.04 Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 17.10M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MoUDA) Co-financiers and Other External Partners: US$3.2m from the ARTF TF050970 was applied by MoF for Consultancy Expenditures in 2006. There was no other co-financing. B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 07/31/2003 Effectiveness: 08/05/2004 08/05/2004 Appraisal: 04/19/2004 Restructuring(s): 02/18/2010 Approval: 07/29/2004 Mid-term Review: 11/22/2007 Closing: IDA 03/31/2009 03/31/2011 1 ARTF 03/31/2009 04/30/2012 1 The delivery date for the ICR of the Credit was extended on May 12, 2011 from September 30, 2011 to June 30, 2012 by SARDE (approved by Paul Birmingham) to coincide with the closing date of the ARTF funded Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project (P111825, TF092073). Subsequently the closing date of the ARTF was extended to April 30, 2012, making due the ICRs for both on October 30, 2012. The ICR Team subsequently was unable to gain access to key documents in IRIS for the previous six months, because an internal audit identified that a number of IRIS documents had been mis-classified as "Official Use Only" or "Public" even though they contained confidential information. To remedy the problem, the Bank's "wbdosc support team" launched the Content Remediation Project which automatically reclassified selected IRIS documents to "Confidential" as they were transferred to WBDocs. This made many of the documents needed for the ICR unavailable. The remedy took longer than expected because of missing data in the incoming documents and other technical issues with the access groups. There was a long turn around time for each document that the ICR Team requested access to. iv C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 1 1 General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 40 68 Roads and highways 24 24 Sub-national government administration 35 7 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Land administration and management 13 Municipal governance and institution building 24 7 Other urban development 25 4 Pollution management and environmental health 13 Urban services and housing for the poor 25 89 v E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Praful C. Patel Country Director: Robert Saum Alastair J. Mckechnie Sector Manager: Ming Zhang Sonia Hammam 2 Project Team Leader: Deepali Tewari Richard Beardmore ICR Team Leader: Deepali Tewari ICR Primary Author: Deepali Tewari F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The original Project Development Objectives were to assist the Borrower in: (i) improving capacity of the Ministry of Urban Development and Kabul Municipality in urban management 3; and (ii) supporting the integration of selected neighborhoods into the urban fabric of Kabul Municipality through the reconstruction and rehabilitation of urban services and facilities 4. These objectives were to be achieved by carrying out reconstruction and rehabilitation of urban infrastructure in select neighborhoods (with an allocation of US$24.19m) and enhancing the managerial capacity of the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing and the Kabul Municipality (KM) (with an allocation of US$0.55m). Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The revised PDO was to upgrade urban infrastructure to improve the delivery of basic urban services in under-serviced communities in Kabul Municipality5. 2 Assumed Task Team Leadership five months before close of the Project. 3 With an allocation of 2.2% of the Credit proceeds. 4 With an allocation of 96.8% of the Credit proceeds. 5 This revised PDO was aligned with the budget allocation for results to be achieved, which was not the case at Appraisal. vi (a) PDO indicators (s) 6 Original Target Actual Value Values (from Formally Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Values Completion or documents) Target Years 7 Number of people in approximately 45 “gozars� who receive improved urban Indicator services. Value quantitative or 141,480 250,000 92,000 8 Qualitative) Date achieved July 2004 February 2010 April 30, 2012 The restructured Project achieved its target to upgrade 19 gozars with about Comments 92,000 people. Actual beneficiaries were 141,480 (2009 Project census surveys). Today this number is probably higher due to densification. 6 These indicators are extracted from the ISRs that drew on indicators from the Technical Annex (equivalent of a Project Appraisal Document) and monitored over the implementation of the Project. 7 The term “gozar� in Afghanistan refers to a city residential area with a defined boundary. A traditional gozar in Kabul could consist of anything from 100 houses to 1000 or more houses. Each gozar has a Wakil (representative) registered with the Municipality. Any one of the 22 districts of Kabul consists of many gozars. Targets established at Appraisal of KURP therefore, were based on averages of estimates, and would assume technical meaning by way of costs only once detailed surveys were completed – these took place only after the PMU was established and technical assistance was in place some years into implementation. 8 There are some discrepancies in Project documentation – this figure is 92,400 in some documents, and 92,000 elsewhere. vii (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Values (from Formally Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Values Completion or documents) Target Years Number of hectares of urban land, including both formal and informal Indicator 1 settlements, subject to infrastructure improvements. Value quantitative or 1000 ha 600 ha 618 ha Qualitative Date achieved November 2007 February 2010 April 30 2012 Indicator target achieved. Appraisal targets had to be revised by the time of the MTR because (i) site Comments surveys made apparent that average gozar size was 70% higher, (ii) construction costs escalated with delays due to both an increase in oil prices and a deteriorating security situation. Indicator 2 Final Financial accounts prepared yearly Value quantitative or 10% 100% Not Revised Not Revised Qualitative Date achieved February 2004 November 2007 November 2007 April 30, 2012 Indicator target achieved. Annual financial accounts (of the Municipality) are prepared. Comments Kabul Municipality’s revenues increased to 3 billion Afs from 700 million Afs between 2006 and 2012 (increase of 400%). Indicator 3 Physical development plan for Kabul Value 6 structure plans and quantitative or proposal for next 1 structure plan 1 structure plan Qualitative Project Date achieved November 2007 November 2007 April 2012 Indicator target achieved. Comments A Structure Plan for Kabul, completed in June 2009 became an input to JICA’S support for the master plan for New Kabul City. Indicator 4 No. of kms new roads, reconstructed roads; number of kms repaired drains Value quantitative or 160 km Dropped N/A Qualitative Date achieved November 2007 November 2007 April 2012 Component F of KURP which included construction of main roads, drainages and traffic management was cancelled during restructuring. However, Comments approximately 124.5 km of secondary and tertiary roads was constructed as part of upgrading. viii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 12/02/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 06/03/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.00 3 08/31/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.00 4 10/19/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.11 5 12/22/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 1.11 Moderately 6 02/23/2006 Unsatisfactory 1.11 Unsatisfactory Moderately 7 10/19/2006 Unsatisfactory 1.11 Unsatisfactory Moderately 8 12/28/2006 Unsatisfactory 1.11 Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 9 06/28/2007 1.37 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 10 12/20/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.67 11 06/30/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.65 12 12/23/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.97 13 05/29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.63 14 11/30/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.50 15 05/24/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.09 16 12/06/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 20.62 17 06/21/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 22.11 18 04/26/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9 23.20 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions Development Restructuring was undertaken to Credit improve the Project’s overall Yes S S 16.70 Agreement performance management and (March 2010) implementation, and to 9 At the time of the last ISR the new TTL who took over just before closing Project rated the DO rating satisfactory in light of the achievements despite a very difficult context. This was downgraded in light of the intense learning about the Project during the ICR process, marking a disconnect. ix ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions reallocate the proceeds of the IDA Credit 10. I. Disbursement Profile 10 The cumulative impact of multiple factors had impacted the Project’s performance, including MoF’s unwillingness to use technical assistance judiciously when needed for consultants to undertake design and project management, protracted negotiations to get agreement on appropriate technical standards different from national standards for infrastructure design, delays in concluding contracts and processing of invoices due to the highly centralized system of disbursements that exist in MoF, limited capacity in the contracting industry etc. (for details refer to paragraph # 25 in Section 2.2) x 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. The Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project (KURP) 11 was appraised soon after major changes in the political and military situation in Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 – a context of conflict, transition, and the emergency for reconstruction 12. The country’s infrastructure was devastated, and most Afghans had had little or no access to basic municipal services. The majority of State Institutions were ineffective, institutional and legal frameworks were unclear, including for municipalities 13 , and institutional capacities were severely limited. Urban population growth was estimated to be double the annual national population growth rate of 2.8 percent. Urban development challenges were particularly acute in Kabul, which had experienced a 15% increase in population between 1999 and 2002 due to migration of landless refugees and internally displaced people. Land and real estate transactions had gone unrecorded for decades, land markets were dysfunctional and informal settlements of improvised houses on public land outside the limits of the land use master plan prepared in 1978, had mushroomed all over Kabul. 2. A key challenge in urban areas for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA) newly created in December 2003, was the proliferation of informal settlements in Kabul that were home to almost 80 percent of the city’s population. Representing a fixed capital investment of US$2.5 billion14, not including the value of land, these settlements were home to about 2.4 million people living without access to basic municipal services. Although urban development and urban management was high on the Government’s agenda and included in the Government’s budget for National Priority Programs, there was no appropriate model for urban development that integrated informal settlements into the main fabric of the city. Investment needs in urban areas were estimated to be US$815.0 million over 2004-2010; donor commitments for it stood at US$40.0 million. 3. The Bank’s Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) of March 2003, based on the Government’s reconstruction strategy, was to provide financial and non-financial assistance in areas where the Bank had a comparative advantage: (i) improving livelihoods; (ii) fiscal strategy, institutions, and management; (iii) governance and public administration; and (iv) enabling private sector development. Urban issues were to be addressed through analytic services, institutional capacity building, and pilot initiatives. 11 Initially called Emergency Urban Reconstruction Project, the word “emergency� was dropped after Appraisal to better reflect the Government’s desire for implementation of programs of a developmental nature. 12 The Project was delivered within seven months as an Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) as are all projects in Afghanistan. KURP predates the Bank’s current enhanced understanding and policies for development in post conflict and fragile countries. 13 The Municipal Act of 1927 had been abrogated during the Taliban regime with its own Law. This Law had been declared void through a Presidential decree of 2000, but no new Law had been passed. 14 Economic Sector Work, Kabul Policy Notes, World Bank, 2004-2005 – data interpreted from satellite imagery. 1 By way of analytic services, the Bank prepared six Urban Policy Notes for Kabul 15 . Institution capacity building and pilot initiatives were supported by this project, the Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project (KURP). The Project aimed to “introduce contemporary techniques of urban planning, initiate programs for community based upgrading of informal urban neighborhoods, urban land use planning, and initiate modernization of the urban land management system.� Delivered within seven months as an Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL), KURP predates the Bank’s current enhanced understanding and policies for development in post conflict and fragile countries. Rationale for Bank Involvement 4. Donor engagement 16 in the urban sector was small and no donor was supporting the delivery of a comprehensive integrated package of basic municipal services in infrastructure-deficient planned and unplanned settlements. The identification of this gap provided a niche where the Bank has a comparative advantage, given over four decades of support for urban upgrading and integrated urban development around the world and its ability to facilitate and sustain reform processes over an extended period of time with sizable investment. It “was “uniquely positioned to respond to opportunities and challenges by: (a) applying a systematic and long term approach to urban development; (b) using the leverage of its lending volume and advisory capability to induce and accelerate institutional and policy reforms and demonstrate sustainable approaches to address shelter and urban development issues; and (c) making use of its extensive international experience and converting the lessons learnt into best practices 17�. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 5. The PDO as stated in the Technical Annex (equivalent of a Project Appraisal Document) was “to provide improved delivery of basic urban services in vulnerable communities in Kabul Municipality through the upgrading of urban infrastructure and enhancing the managerial capacity of MUDH and Kabul Municipality�. The PDOs as stated in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA), were worded a little differently: “ to assist the Borrower in: (i) improving capacity of the Ministry of Urban Development and Kabul Municipality in urban management 18 ; and (ii) supporting the integration of selected neighborhoods into the urban fabric of Kabul Municipality through the reconstruction and rehabilitation of urban services and facilities 19. 15 Between September 2004 and January 2005 “Kabul Urban Land Crisis: A summary of issues and recommendations� (Series # 1); “Why and how should Kabul upgrade its informal settlements� (Series # 2); “Should Kabul grow by expanding to a new town or by building up its existing suburbs?� (Series # 3); “What are the sources of conflict in urban land tenure?� (Series # 4); “Will formal documents of title and the courts resolve all land disputes?� (Series # 5); “Conflict over property rights and resolution of disputes in Kabul: Conclusions� (Series # 6). 16 Donor engagement in the urban sector had been small but growing – European Union, GTZ, UNHCR, UN-HABITAT, Japan, MEDAIR, CARE, USAID, Italian Aid, CIDA. 17 Technical Annex, Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project, Report # T7629-AF, July 1, 2004. 18 US$ 0.26m (1.04%) of total IDA credit was allocated to achieve this result. 19 US$ 24.19m (96.8%) of IDA credit was allocated to achieve this result. 2 6. With almost 97% of the Credit proceeds allocated to area upgrading, the key PDO indicator was the number of people in approximately 45 gozars who receive improved urban services and enhanced security of land tenure (Target: 250,000 people). 7. Output indicators for the different Parts of the Credit as stated in the Technical Annex were: (i) Number of hectares of urban land, including both formal and informal settlements subject to infrastructure improvements (Target: 1000 hectares with allocation of US$24.19m from the Credit proceeds, i.e. 96.8% of the Credit proceeds) (ii) Quality of manuals of procedures, skills developed; number of plot holders given enhanced security of tenure (Target: 5000 plot holders, with allocation of US$0.26m from the Credit proceeds, i.e. with 1.04% of the Credit proceeds) (iii) Increases in own revenue as percent of base (Target: 100%); Months after FY end required to produce Annual audit reports (Target 6 months, with 0% allocation of Credit proceeds). (iv) Physical development plans; Project proposals (Target 6 plans; 1 Project proposal with 0% of Credit proceeds) (v) Number of km new roads, reconstructed roads; number of km repaired drains (Target: 160 kms with 0% allocation of the Credit proceeds) 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 8. The revised PDO for the Credit after first-order restructuring on March 25, 2010 was to upgrade urban infrastructure to improve the delivery of basic urban services in under-serviced communities in Kabul Municipality, making the PDO’s scope commensurate with the allocation of Credit proceeds (refer to paragraph # 21 for description of the changes). 9. The revised PDO Indicator in the DCA was: Number of people in approximately 16 gozars who receive improved urban services (Target: 92,000 people 20) 10. The cumulative impact of multiple factors led to significant delays in the start-up of the Project, and is discussed in detail in Section 2.2. Delays in implementation set in as the Ministry of Finance remained reluctant to use Credit proceeds for consultancy expenditures. With delays, construction costs in Afghanistan rose as international oil prices increased - almost all construction materials in Afghanistan are imported. Delays were exacerbated with deterioration in domestic security conditions. Financing was finally secured by the Bank for Consultancy expenditures in March 2006 21 from an 20 The target population was based on the interpretation of data from Ikonos satellite imagery of 2004 which had indicated that informal settlements had between 20 to 28 houses per hectare. Once the PMU and technical assistance to the PMU was in place, but before census surveys in each gozar were done, in target areas were done, KURP used an average of 25 houses per hectare with 6 people per household to establish targets achievable within the available Credit proceeds. 21 “Grant Agreement for the Feasibility Study Facility Project� (TAFSU) from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was made available in 2003 to the Government of Afghanistan to assist in; (a) 3 ARTF Grant managed by MoF, the PMU and technical assistance was put in place, a reassessment of targets achievable with the US$24.19m allocation for upgrading was done, and targets scaled back from 45 to 19 gozars. With 3 of the 19 gozars being located in the historic part of Kabul where unit prices would be higher, it became clear that the budget for upgrading was insufficient for the revised target of upgrading 19 gozars. Additional co-financing from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Funds (ARTF) was secured to address the shortfall for upgrading the 3 historic gozars, and in 2010 the Project was restructured in response to the Ministry of Finance’s (MoF) request “to improve the Project’s overall performance management and implementation�. 11. The ICR team finds inconsistencies in documentation particularly with respect to Project outcomes/outputs and targets in Bank’s internal documents: Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRRs), Aide Memoires, Legal Agreements and Project Restructuring papers. For example, the Implementation Status Report (ISR) Sequence # 8, December 28, 2006 set a target to upgrade 600 hectares with an estimated population of 92,400 in 19 gozars. However in the ISRR Sequence # 15 the target is to upgrade 600 hectares with an estimated population of 92,000. The DCA of the Project at restructuring (January 28, 2010) of the restructured Project recorded the reduced geographical scope for the upgrading area (from 1000 hectares to 600 hectares) and number of gozars from 45 to 16, but the target number of beneficiaries was not consistent with the ARTF Project Paper of 2008 which stated that the historic gozars were home to 40,000 people. The ARTF Grant Agreement however states that the targeted beneficiaries from the ARTF Grant in the 3 historic gozars were 11,059 – in which case the targeted beneficiaries from the IDA Credit alone would be 92,000 less 11,059, i.e. 80,991 people. These inconsistencies do not materially affect the achievement of targets after restructuring. 12. The Revised Intermediate Outcomes as stated in the DCA Attachment 3, were: (i) Number of hectares of urban land, to infrastructure improvements (Target: 600 hectares) (ii) Final account prepared yearly (iii) Physical development plan for Kabul. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. Direct beneficiaries from upgrading of 618 hectares of land at the time of Project completion stands at 142,215, which was the population, recorded at the time of census surveys done between 2006 and 2009. As discussed in Annexes 3, 5 and 6, communities in the neighboring gozars benefited from a cleaner environment due to reduced dust as roads were paved; greater security due to street lighting; better access as taxis and other developing capacity to define needs for developmental projects and programs, and to prepare projects and programs that are suitable for funding by development partners and commercial sources; and (b) commencing the process of developing local technical and professional consulting capacity. US$3.2 million from this TF050970 was made available for consultancy expenditures in 2006. 4 transport vehicles that now penetrate into areas that were inaccessible before; enhanced access to ancillary facilities like education centers for children / adults / women that have sprung up; more economic activity e.g. shops; and higher values of their property as a result of infrastructure improvements 22. Infrastructure improvements have increased real estate demand, and there has been neighborhood densification as residents have added rooms to rent. Women and children were the prime beneficiaries of investments in water supply, as was the Afghanistan Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Corporation (AUWSSC), whose revenues from Project areas increased by 36% from the target area, as the Project provided 5,121 new house or public tap connections. This revenue is likely to increase once the water production and distribution investments supported by KfW, originally scheduled for completion in 2006, are completed in the future, as 3,264 connections provided by KURP do not currently have water. 14. The Project also generated 855,000 man days of skilled and unskilled employment. In addition, engineers from small contracting firms benefited from training delivered by the PMU and their Technical Assistance (TA) consultants in areas like Project management, finance, materials testing, environment and social safeguards etc. Many of these small firms grew, some getting absorbed into bigger companies as a result of the capacity built under KURP, although this was not a specific indicator tracked during implementation 23. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) (KURP-IDA Cr. 3967, and ARTF Grant TF# 092073) 15. With 3 out of the 6 components of KURP to be financed by the Credit, KURP consisted of the following parts as described in the DCA 24 : Part A: Area Upgrading in Kabul Municipality (US$25.11: US$24.19 from the Credit, or 96.8% of the Credit proceeds and an expected US$0.92 from donors): Carrying out an area-upgrading program in areas under Kabul Municipality’s jurisdiction focusing on poor, infrastructure-deficient, planned and unplanned neighborhoods by providing improved water supply, sanitation, solid waste management, access roads, hill-side steps, drainage and street lighting services and facilities. Part B: Land Tenure Regularization (US$0.64: US$0.26 from the Credit or 1.04% of the Credit proceeds and US$0.38 expected financing from donors): Developing an appropriate capacity, appropriate methodologies, and procedures to regularize urban land-tenure in the Borrower’s territory, including: (i) the carrying out of pilot schemes to test methodologies and assess capacity in four identified communities; 22 Beneficiary Assessment done just prior to the closing of the Project. 23 Email from KURP PMU, September 26, 2012, confirmed during meeting on 22 October, 2012.. 24 It is unusual for a Bank Legal Agreement to include PDOs, component descriptions, and an agreement for results to be achieved from a Project on the basis of an expectation that donor resources (usually off budget in Afghanistan) would be secured. This was the case with KURP – the impacts are the following: while the IDA Credit was for US$25.0m, the overall Project costs appear to be US$52.0m; result indicators for which financing was not available were tracked throughout the Project life leading to poor performance ratings; and there is a lack of clarity for efficiency analysis in the ICR: US$25m or US$52m? 5 and (ii) capacity-building and training in the Afghan Cartography Office, the Kabul Makhzan 25, and other Project implementing agencies. Part C: Engineering and Management Support for the Borrower’s Urban Agencies (US$4.32m: US$0.55 from the Credit or 2.2% of the Credit proceeds and US$3.77 expected financing from donors): Provision of engineering and Project management support including: (i) technical assistance by the Technical Support Unit to support the Program Management Unit, the Project Support Team, and the planning and design consultants; (ii) goods for the Ministry of Urban Development, Kabul Municipality, and the Afghan Cartography Office; (iii) auditing, monitoring and evaluation services, and (iv) incremental operating expenses. This component was also designed to be co-financed with other donors. IDA financing for the component was US$ 0.55m. Part D: Overall Capacity Building for Kabul Municipality (US$0.3m: No financing from the Credit, all expected from donors: Assisting Kabul Municipality by: (i) strengthening its revenue generation, financial management, budgeting and planning (other than town planning); (ii) capacity building for various departments including: (A) the planning and finance department and related sub-departments, (B) the income department, (C) the properties department, and (D) the control office; and (iii) the development, design, and implementation of simple operating procedures to improve efficiency. There was no IDA financing for this component. Part E: Preparation of Structure Plans and a Future Urban Project (US$1.64: No financing from the Credit, all expected from donors): Assisting the Ministry of Urban Development, Kabul Municipality, and other Participating Municipalities in: (i) preparing physical development plans; and (ii) building planning capacity, and (iii) preparing feasibility study for a future urban Project focusing on city-wide urban services in Kabul Municipality and other Participating Municipalities. The total cost of the component was estimated to be US$ 1.64m. Part F: Improvements to Main Roads, Drainage, and Traffic Management in Kabul (US$20.0m with no financing from the Credit). A program involving construction and rehabilitation of major streets and drains in Kabul Municipality that will include: (i) construction of new roads; (ii) reconstruction, repair, and overlay of existing roads; and (iii) repair of primary drainage channels and secondary drainage systems; and (iv) traffic management improvements. This component was designed to be co-financed through donor support. Total cost estimate for this component was US$ 20m. 16. The components financed from the ARTF Grant 92073 were described as follows in the ARTF Grant Agreement: Part A: Area Upgrading in the Historic Old City of Kabul (US$3.6m): Carrying out an area-upgrading program in the Historic Old City of Kabul through the 25 The government agency which is the repository of land titles, deeds and other documents. 6 improvement of basic tertiary infrastructure and services, including water supply, sanitation, solid waste management, access roads, drainage and street lighting services and facilities, in response to community needs and demands. Part B: Engineering and Project Management Support (US$1.76m): Providing engineering and Project management support for: (i) the development of methodologies and construction standards appropriate for the preservation of the cultural heritage of the Historic Old City of Kabul; (ii) the design, planning, and supervision of interventions in accordance thereof for the upgrade of infrastructure in the Historic Old City of Kabul; and (iii) the carrying out of capacity-building and training activities for Project implementing agencies. Part C: Support to Cultural Heritage (US$0.24m): Strengthening the capacity of MoUDA’s Department for the Safeguarding of Afghanistan’s Urban Heritage in order to develop policies for the regulation and upgrade of urban areas of historical and cultural interest. This component also supported implementation of a social and environmental impact assessment to inform the area upgrading plan for the Historic Old City of Kabul. Project Costs: KURP-IDA Cr. 3967 and ARTF Grants (as approved) 17. The table below provides a composite overview of the entire Project before restructuring, the Credit as well as the two ARTF Grants, TF 050970 for US$ 3.2m for TA, and # TF 092073 for US$5.6m for upgrading 3 historic gozars. The total IDA support at the time of appraisal was envisaged to be US$ 25 million. The total cost with IDA Credit and anticipated donor funding at the time of appraisal was estimated to be US$ 52 million (although this was never realized, and the improvements to main roads and drains envisaged was packaged under another IDA supported Project, the Kabul Urban Roads Improvement Project). IDA Credit US$25.0m ARTF Funds for Historic ARTF gozars (US$5.6m) 50970 IDA Components Unrealized ARTF 92073 (US$3.2m) Donor Components from Financing TAFSU Part A: Area 24.19 0.92 Part A: Area 3.6 None Upgrading in 96.8% Upgrading in Kabul Municipality the Historic Part B: Land 0.26 0.38 Old City of Tenure 1.04% Kabul Regularization Part C: 0.55 3.77 Part B: 1.76** 3.2* Engineering and 2.2% Engineering Management and Project Support for the Management Borrower’s Urban Support Agencies 7 Part D: Overall None 0.3 Capacity Building for Kabul Municipality Part E: Preparation None 1.64 Part C: 0.24 None of Structure Plans Support to and a Future Urban Cultural Project Heritage Part F: None 20.00 Improvements to Main Roads, Drainage, and Traffic Management in Kabul Total 52.0 1.6 Revised Components 18. The table below provides a composite overview of the Project after reallocation of Credit proceeds for Consultancy services to supplement the MoF managed Technical Assistance and Feasibility Study (TAFS) Grant # 50970 that enabled the establishment of the PMU and its TA (2006), and Project restructuring (2010). The components financed through ARTF are stated above under paragraph 17. IDA financed Components ARTF 92073 financed ARTF 5097026 (US$ 25m) Components (TAFSU) (US$5.6m) Part A: Area 20.37 Part A: Area 3.6 None Upgrading in Upgrading in Kabul Municipality the Historic Old Part B: Land 0.03 City of Kabul Tenure Regularization Part C: 3.2 Part B: 1.76** 3.2* Engineering and Engineering and Management Project Support for the Management Borrower’s Urban Support Agencies Part D: Overall None Capacity Building 26 About US$ 0.3 m from TF 50970 was provided for Part D: capacity Building for Kabul Municipality 8 for Kabul Municipality Part E: Preparation 1.4 Part C: Support 0.24 None of Structure Plans to Cultural and a Future Urban Heritage Project Part F: None Improvements to Main Roads, Drainage, and Traffic Management in Kabul Total 25 5.6 3.2 Total Financing for KURP: US$33.8m 1.7 Other significant changes 19. Finance for Consultancy services: As stated in paragraph 10, Ministry of Finance’s reluctance to use Credit proceeds to finance consultancy services, US$3.2 million was made available from the Technical Assistance and Feasibility Studies Facility 27 (TAFS, TF 50970) funded through ARTF in December 2006 for co-financing of technical assistance for Project management as well as engineering preparation and supervision of works. Another US$5.6m was made available to finance the civil works in historic gozars through the ARTF TF 92073 for US$ 5.6 million to cover the short fall for civil works from the Credit. 20. Reallocation of Credit proceeds: A reallocation of funds amongst disbursement categories in April 2006 enabled the Credit to finance consultancy services 28, recruit staff for the Project Management Unit (PMU) to replace ministerial staff seconded to the Project, and make up for the lack of co-financing for the land tenure component at the time of Appraisal. Credit proceeds were reallocated from Component A (urban upgrading) to Component C (Engineering and Management Support) and Component E (Preparation of Structural Plans). • At the time of approval, co-financing not identified was intended to finance consultant services. No co-financing was identified, and a reallocation of funds amongst 27 TF050970 ARTF “Grant Agreement for the Feasibility Study Facility Project� was made available in 2003 to the Government of Afghanistan to assist in; (a) developing capacity to define needs for developmental projects and programs, and to prepare projects and programs that are suitable for funding by development partners and commercial sources; and (b) commencing the process of developing local technical and professional consulting capacity. It was not earmarked for any specific project but for the preparation of identifying and preparing projects and programs that would be suitable for donor support. US$3.2 million from this facility was provided to KURP. 28 There was also an increase in the cost of consulting services due to inflation and a decree from the Ministry of Finance on the tax liability of consultants. Memo to CD, April 26, 2006. 9 disbursement categories was done in April 2006 so that the Credit could finance consultancy services, including the PMU staff which were recruited replacing ministerial staff seconded to the project, as well as the land tenure component due to the absence of co-financing. 21. Amendments to the DCA and extensions in the closing date of the Credit: The DCA was amended twice, a level 2 restructuring the first time, and a level 1 restructuring the second time?: • For the first time on March 24, 2009 to (i) extend the closing date of the Project from March 31, 2009 to March 31, 2010; and (ii) provide for an increase in the Special Account Authorized Allocation. No changes were made to the PDO or the PDO indicators, and the amendment required no exception to Bank policies. • The second time on March 25, 2010 to (i) extend the closing date of the Project from March 31, 2010 to March 31, 2011; (ii) cancel components that were expected to be financed by other donors at Appraisal; (iii) reduce the allocation of funds for upgrading by 8%; and (iv) revise the PDO and output targets (paragraph 13). This revision was necessary, among other reasons, to comply with the Government’s request to include all planned and unplanned areas within the administrative boundary of a gozar for upgrading, so the average area covered by the project was higher than the average gozar size used for budgeting in 2004. 22. Extension of the closing date of the ARTF Grant: The closing date of the ARTF Grant TF#50970 was extended three times to enable completion of works in historic areas, largely because of the deteriorating security situation in Kabul since 2009 which caused unpredictable mobility restrictions in the city, affecting the movement of contractors that naturally led to delays in construction. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 23. The urban agenda and the program outlined by the Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MoUDA) to which KURP tried to respond, was extremely ambitious 29. Despite Project design supported by a qualified Bank team with required skills, the team failed to exercise judicious selectivity in the scope of the Project - the components chosen were neither straightforward nor simple, nor was there adequate time to prepare them, nor were there adequate resources. There were also multiple interlocutors for such components, increasing the number of entities that would be involved in the implementation of the Project and consequently the complexity. In fact, the municipal finance component was not managed by the KURP PMU but by the MoF. 29 MoUDA’s program had the following elements: (i) Planning and Management aimed to strengthen MoUDA’s capacity for planning and removing barriers to reconstruction; (ii) Housing to include serviced land for self-help housing / grants for reconstruction and upgrading, and land policy interventions to increase the supply of land; (iii) Infrastructure to increase provision of residential water supply, power, roads, sewage treatment in Kabul and solid waste management in Kabul and five cities, (iv) Government Building reconstruction especially in the provinces to complement the civil service reform program. 10 This complexity was further exacerbated by the inclusion of unfunded components that needed implementation and monitoring arrangements different from the rest of the Project making the Project unmanageable. There was no budget for contingencies and therefore little recourse when consultancy packages were awarded at twice the estimated budget. A lack of knowledge of the capacity of the local construction industry in 2003- 2004 when preparation took place, led to unrealistic time schedules for contract execution which ultimately made contract management even more challenging than is the case in a country where security conditions impact the market. Had the Project included only two components, Infrastructure and Project Management, it is conceivable that the Project’s implementation performance may have been both better and faster. 24. The focus of the Project was upgrading of under-serviced urban settlements. A number of key lessons on urban upgrading from international experience were incorporated in the component’s design 30 . The introduction of urban upgrading as a concept in any country is challenging, as such settlements are commonly perceived as “illegal�. The component challenged the mind sets of the Afghans who had returned to the country to assume influential positions in government – this leadership had not only a strong nostalgia for the green Kabul they had left behind 31, but were also motivated to see Kabul “develop� rapidly, i.e. in a planned manner, as unplanned development was not seen as development despite the enormous private investment in such areas. Upgrading requires significant advocacy and knowledge sharing which takes time, to bring about a change in mind-set from perceiving unplanned settlements as “illegal� and therefore worthy only of demolition and urban renewal. The policy notes on Kabul and Upgrading prepared by the Bank did win champions for the concept at the highest levels in the MoF and MoUDA, but there was little time to cultivate the champions needed in KM where the Project investments were made.. 2.2 Implementation 25. The cumulative impact of multiple factors caused the Project to perform poorly in its early years. These factors ranged from (i) the new leadership being slow to acknowledge challenges of implementation managed through government employees with little motivation or commitment; (ii) the MoF’s unwillingness to use Credit proceeds for technical assistance judiciously when needed although the Credit proceeds were intended to finance this 32 ; (iii) frequent personnel changes on the client side; (iv) inadequate experience and capacity for procurement in conformity with Bank requirements; (v) protracted negotiations to agree on appropriate technical standards and design norms with the engineers of KM and reaching agreement for delivering water connections for households without land tenure rights; (vi) delays in concluding 30 (i) The importance of “ownership� of investments by stakeholders who are responsible for operations and maintenance; (ii) Flexible design standards that reduce costs and minimize disruption so that upgrading can go to “scale�, and (iii) Ihe importance of beneficiary participation. 31 This had been identified as a risk at the concept stage, and a decision was taken to focus on Kabul alone, as opposed to additional cities, to minimize the risk. 32 During Negotiations, the financing of all Consultancy services, apart from US$100,000, was removed from IDA financing and was to be co-financed (Restructuring paper, February 2009). 11 contracts and processing invoices due to the highly centralized system of financial management in Afghanistan where no Project funds are provided at the Project level, and all payments are made by the MoF severely affecting disbursements; (vii) delays due to limited capacity in the construction industry for cash flow management and adherence to technical specifications; and, (viii) timely and accurate submission of invoices with supporting documentation to the MoF. Project management and implementation arrangements were not in place at Project effectiveness, and much of the design work that is usually done for infrastructure Projects before Appraisal, did not start until some two years and five months into implementation, when TA and Project Management Unit staffing was in place 33 26. Agreement on use of Credit Proceeds for TA took time. Reluctance on the part of MoF to use the Credit proceeds for establishing a Project Management Unit (PMU) and procuring the TA created a two year delay – both these were imperative to initiate detailed design work so procurement of contractors for civil works could begin. In December 2006, US$3.2 million was made available from the ARTF TF # 50970 for co- financing of TA, along with a commitment by the Bank to seek financing for the PMU in MoUDA as required by the DCA. 27. Project Management and Implementation Arrangements: The Project’s design called for the PMU to be supported by firms that provided TA for Project management known as the Technical Support Unit (TSU), and firms known as the Planning Design and Contracts Management (PD&C) firms that were responsible for community mobilization, preparation of upgrading plans, detailed designs and supervision of works. All procurement in Afghanistan is managed by the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Service (ARDS) whose capacity limitations (which still exist) caused a two year delay in procuring TA for the PMU whose procurement was not completed till February 2006. Furthermore, it took the Bank time to persuade the MoF to allow KURP to establish its own procurement capacity with staff recruited at market salaries, and ultimately the Government made an exception for KURP. 28. Final selection of upgrading areas and a revision of key assumptions: The original target of 250,000 vulnerable 34 beneficiaries established in 2004 had to be revised once detailed studies were completed to finalize gozar selection. Meanwhile upgrading work had been undertaken in the historic parts of Kabul by other donors 35 and provided some guidance on higher upgrading costs in historic areas that was not available during 33 KURP Mid Term Review Report, November 2007. 34 A study to determine eligibility criteria was undertaken, based on vulnerability and service deficits, and a scoring system for the criteria and related indicators developed based on secondary data and district administrator interviews. A preliminary list of neighborhoods viable for upgrading were developed (approximately 90 neighborhoods) based on the scoring system and screened through the findings of a sample survey to more narrowly define the preliminary selection to approximately 60 which best meet vulnerability and service deficiency criteria. Service deficits were identified and prioritized through interviews with municipal, ministry, district and neighborhood representatives, in addition to the household survey. 35 The Agha Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC) and the Turquoise Mountain Foundation (TQM) had begun work in a neighborhood called Murad Khana. 12 preparation. It is important to note that the per hectare upgrading costs of works done by other donors was not, and is still , comparable to the costs of comprehensive upgrading under KURP, as donors have supported single sector interventions within a settlement, and not a full package of basic infrastructure and services. It became possible to determine trunk infrastructure needs and boundaries of selected gozars that led to the revision of key assumptions, e.g. the average size of a gozar assumed to be 20 hectares at Appraisal, turned out to be 70 percent higher, i.e. 34 hectares 36 as the area under the full administrative boundary of the gozar, planned and unplanned, was included for upgrading upon request from the Government 37 . Had the original target number of gozars been maintained, it would have resulted in an estimated US$50.0 million short fall in resources. Physical targets to be achieved therefore had to be revised, and the Project was restructured. In the absence of concrete results to show, seeking additional financing for a project that had hardly disbursed in three years, was not an option. 29. Impact of oil price increase and security issues on construction costs: Afghanistan’s construction industry was deeply impacted by the uncertainty accompanying the volatility in oil prices 38 ., as the industry is almost entirely import dependent. During 2007-2009 when the bulk of the works contracts were bid upon, the consumer price index had soared. Cost estimates had to be revised upwards from US$17,500 per hectare in 2004, to US$28,000 in 2006. By 2009, there had been a dramatic increase in suicide attacks and roadside bombings, discouraging bidders resulting in lower competition. Lower competition also resulted from the few qualified bidders who preferred not to participate in government sponsored procurement as opportunities became abundant with NATO sponsored construction, until KURP established a reputation of good governance in the industry. Finally, apart from the short construction season in Afghanistan because of the weather conditions 39, the last years of implementation saw a deterioration in security conditions which led to mobility restrictions on contractors, causing more implementation delays. 30. Mid Term Review: The Mid Term Review (MTR) took place in November 2007 when 60 percent of the Credit was committed, and 14 percent disbursed 40. The capacity of the PMU and its supervision consultants was severely stretched, with indications of this worsening in the subsequent years as the award of more upgrading packages were in the pipeline. The land tenure component 41 for which the Project had allocated just US$260,00 had just been initiated, although progress on this had naturally remained a significant challenge. Although the scope of Structure Planning component had been reduced from five to three cities due to budget constraints, it was not progressing well 36 An indicator of number of gozars had little technical meaning as a performance measure for results from upgrading, as upgrading costs are area sensitive, and not community, population, or density sensitive. 37 KURP Mid Term Review Report, November 2007. 38 US$34.66 per barrel in April 2004, US$49 in August 2004, US$56 per barrel in April 2005, US$72.75 in June 2006, and US$75.79 in July 2007. 39 IDA Supervision Mission Aide Memoire, January 2009. 40 Financial Management Input to the MTR Report. 41 Land tenure issues are extremely complex to address even when there is a project focused entirely on them, leave alone as an under-funded component of parent project that relies of unpredictable donor funds that are provided off-budget. 13 either. The ICR finds that the Project team did not make adequate recommendations for the remaining implementation period during the MTR, missing the opportunity to address Project design issues and the related implementation constraints that had affected the Project’s performance. 31. The issues identified at MTR were addressed much later, almost three years after the MTR when the first order restructuring took place in January 2010. At restructuring, the civil works component of the PDO to which approximately 97 per cent of credit was allocated was retained while capacity building part of the PDO to which about 1.04 per cent of funds were allocated was dropped. The capacity building components were designed to be co-financed through other sources and suffered with implementation bottlenecks when co-financing was not secured and were dropped 42, although they taxed the Project teams on both the client and Bank side. Despite all these issues, the main factors contributing to the overall successful results and achievement of the PDOs, was the relevance of urban upgrading, and the performance of the PMU. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 32. Design and Implementation: The Project was initially monitored using the Results Framework as set out in the Technical Annex of KURP, and, after restructuring, using the Results Framework as set out in the DCA which was specific and measurable and aligned with realistic budget allocations for components, based on estimates of area and density using satellite imagery43. M&E arrangements mandated the requirement of quarterly or more frequent supervision missions during implementation. The Project in its lifetime has been supported through 21 supervision missions. About 14 of these missions were fielded during 2005-2009. The Project’s M&E design included a Management Information System (MIS), that was used by the PMU to regularly monitor Project progress and performance, which was reported upon monthly, quarterly, bi- annually, and annually even after the TA to the PMU was completed in September 2010. The MIS system enabled instantaneous extraction of any information for any kind of analysis for regular or specific monitoring – it also provided a solid foundation for analysis for the ICR and for preparation of the forthcoming urban project for Kabul that is under preparation. Quarterly reports were provided to IDA. Implementation of M&E systems improved with the establishment of the PMU and the TSU. A household survey undertaken by the PMU’s social team as part of the preparation of community development plans, provided baseline data on beneficiaries in each gozar, and although there has been an increase in population since then, the PMU used this data to report on final beneficiaries who received improved urban services through KURP at the time of the ICR. 42 With US$300,000 allocated for this component from the Credit in a context of conflict, transition and emergency when state institutions had been rendered ineffective, the scope of this component (see paragraph 15 Part D) was unrealistic, although with the technical assistance provided to the Municipality through the ARTF Grant managed by MoF, the preparation of annual accounts was achieved. 43 Estimates based on satellite imagery need to be ground trothed through surveys – this was done by the PMU as detailed plans were prepared for upgrading gozars. 14 Utilization 33. The ICR team would like to highlight some inconsistencies in documentation of Project targets which merits attention. For example, the number of gozars and the beneficiaries have not been the same in different Project documents such as the restructuring paper of January 2010 and ARTF Grant Agreement. However, these inconsistencies did not materially affect the achievement of targets and should be judged as documentation errors. The performance of the PMU in supervision of civil works and contracts has been satisfactory. Moreover, the forthcoming Project which is under preparation will benefit from the capacity built within the PMU. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 34. Safeguards: The Project was rated as Category B and the Bank’s Operational Polices on Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), Physical Cultural Resources (OP 4.11) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) were triggered. The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) developed for the Project included a set of procedures and mechanisms for ensuring that environmental and social considerations were an integral part of the Project. The ESMF requirements were included in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM), and Environment and Social Impact Assessments (EIA/SIA) were undertaken for historic “gozars� for which Cultural Heritage Management Plans (CHMP) were developed. 35. Site specific ESMPs for all sub-Projects were part of the contract documents and assured contractors’ activities were in compliance with guidelines for health and safety, prevention or compensation of any loss of livelihood and environmental degradation. The PMU conducted safeguard trainings for PD&C consultants on supervision of ESMP, complaint handling, land acquisition and consultation with communities. Civil works were monitored through regular site visits to ensure that requirements of the Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) were adhered to and immediate remedial actions were undertaken when needed. A Community Consultation Manual developed by the PMU guided all community consultations which were an integral part of the Project. Participation by beneficiaries had a direct impact on the Project’s ability to manage social safeguards issues. No formal land acquisition was anticipated or funded under KURP and wherever the need for minor land requirements arose in connection with the upgrading of roads, water supply or other interventions, the community members resolved the issues through negotiations. As a result, some community members voluntarily relocated their latrines from the right of way, while in other instances larger or smaller community compensation for affected people were agreed upon, where the affected households were unable or unwilling to donate minor pieces of land for upgrading work. KURP maintained full documentation of these processes which are used as examples of Good Practice for social safeguard training in Afghanistan 44. The Project was consistently rated Highly Satisfactory for social safeguards. PMU enforced policies for contractors’ contracts ensuring that the latter could negotiate with Project Affected People to mitigate negative impacts. The Bank promptly addressed another 44 Forthcoming: Guidebook on Compensation under Afghanistan’s Land Expropriation Law. 15 trigger to safeguard policy, OP 4.11, when KM destroyed five houses in the historic site of Andrabi for establishing commercial property, warning that such action could also pose a reputational risk to the Project and KM and would adversely impact Project implementation. 36. KURP was not formally mandated to develop local-level, democratic and inclusive representative bodies, but it facilitated the establishment of elected community councils called gozar Cooperating Shuras (GCSs). These GCSs represent each selected gozar. The Project developed draft bye-laws for the GCSs, a Community Consultation Manual, and a Grievance Redress Mechanism. These manuals have become models for other Projects in the country, supported by the Bank and other donors. 37. Financial Management: The Project closed with a ‘Moderately Satisfactory’ FM rating and the ICR concurs with the rating. The Project operated under the steadily improving Public Financial Management reforms under implementation by the Government of Afghanistan with the World Bank/ARTF assistance. Proper records of grants received and disbursements through the designated account were maintained by the MoF’s Special Disbursement Unit (SDU) which eventually migrated from a manual to an automated Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS). The funds flow was timely, and proper records of eligible expenditures were maintained by the PMU. The internal controls were adequate. Regular IUFRs in the agreed format were submitted during the life of the Project. Annual audited financial statements were submitted regularly. The audit opinion of the Control and Audit Office of Afghanistan was unqualified (clean) and audit observations were promptly resolved. The FM capacity was strengthened during the course of the implementation. 38. Procurement: The Project closed with a ‘Moderately Satisfactory’ Procurement supervision rating in the last ISR and the ICR concurs with the rating. Procurement, managed by the PMU, was guided by IDA Guidelines which posed constraints to implementation. Until the TSU mobilized to support the PMU, there were delays as MoUDA staff did not have the necessary capacity for procurement. Delays then occurred due to constraints in the local contracting industry, and a large volume of bids were rejected in the early years as local contractors were unable to meet the qualifying criteria to bid on high value contracts. Failure to meet all of the qualification criteria as per IDA Guidelines also led to delays. The Kabul Procurement Team got agreement from the Bank’s Regional Procurement Advisor to reduce the normal qualification requirements for the contracting industry in Afghanistan. Large contracts were also split into lots where technically feasible to attract additional competition from bidders who could meet the requirements of post qualification. While these steps led to considerable progress in the procurement and award of contracts (the first works contracts were awarded only in 2008), contract implementation periods often could not be met, either due to a lack of realism as knowledge of the local contracting industry was limited, or because of security conditions. A majority of the contracts could not be completed during the period stipulated in the contracts, and there were many contract extensions. All these challenges notwithstanding, towards the latter part of the Project, PMU staffs were able to manage procurement under the Project without help from the international firm that was the TSU. 16 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 39. KURP investments covered (i) roads, drains and culverts (83% of the total expenditure); (ii) water supply investments (11.8% of the total expenditure); (iii) sanitation or latrines (1.8% of the total expenditure); (iv) waste collection points (0.2% of the total expenditure), and (v) street lights. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) arrangements for the infrastructure components is discussed below: (i) For 60 percent of the roads that were delivered in the unplanned areas, the communities signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Municipality’s district offices to assume responsibility for maintenance. For the remainder 40 percent of the roads built in the planned areas, the Municipality is responsible for maintenance. However, since for the first time quality assurance and quality control procedures equivalent to international standards were implemented 45, the technical quality of design and construction are excellent and for the next five to ten years no maintenance is foreseen apart from routine cleaning 46. (ii) For water, the communities signed a MOU with the water utility assuming responsibility for maintenance of the tertiary distribution pipe from the secondary distribution pipe along the street to the house. Responsibility for the primary and secondary distribution pipes rests with the water utility AUWSSC 47. As a result of the fragmentation of donor support that is delivered off budget, KfW has been unable to deliver on its water investments that were supposed to have been completed in 2006. 63% of the new water connections provided that do not currently have access to water, will get water when KfW supported investments are completed in 2013. However, recent data suggest that little progress (10%) was made with the distribution network construction which implicates unavailability of water supply to the households in 2013. (iii) O&M of the latrines are the responsibility of the individual households. (iv) Responsibility for bringing solid waste to the community collection points lies with the community, and the GCSs have employed sweepers for house to house 45 The ICR Team undertook a detailed analysis of the infrastructure provided by KURP (Note in files) with a view to analyzing design standards, construction specifications, and costs. Roads in unplanned areas were designed to functional standards to limit costs and are well below the national planning standard for tertiary roads which is 7m width. Costs of roads completed under the Project were found to be comparable to the costs of the roads executed under other projects in Kabul, for example under the JICA funded Kabul Solidarity Program. The ICR notes that through better urban design of the roads in unplanned areas more pedestrian friendly, and through the application of better streetscape principles, the costs of roads could be reduced by 20% (by leaving more land area for landscaping and street furniture rather than paving the entire right of way) and drains by 30% while contributing at the same time to improved street environment. 46 The proposed Kabul Municipal Development Program (P125597) has a strong focus on strengthening the planning, budgeting, and monitoring of Kabul Municipality’s finances, as well as asset management. 47 Institutional strengthening of AUWSSC is being supported by the Afghanistan Urban Water Sector Project (P087860). 17 collection. However secondary collection and transfer is the responsibility of the KM which will be unable to discharge its responsibility in the absence of a functioning city-wide solid waste management system that is adequately resourced through the taxes (the proposed next urban Project’s municipal finance component will support strengthening of the collection of this tax). (v) Responsibility for changing bulbs for street lights lies with the individual households as the street lighting provided in the gozars is not on top of utility poles, but fixed on the boundary walls of the houses. Ensuring uninterrupted power supply is the responsibility of the power utility and outside the scope of the Project. 40. Transition to the next urban Project for Kabul: Following the closure of KURP, two new urban engagements are planned. One of those 48 would focus on scaling up urban upgrading, and be implemented by KM and is to be supported by the multi-donor ARTF with a proposed US$100.00 million grant. Guidelines for safeguards, technical standards, methodologies for community organization, mobilization, and participation as well the roles of the beneficiary community in resolving safeguard issues developed under KURP, are being adopted for upgrading throughout the country and are an input into the development of a National Upgrading Policy by MoUDA. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 41. The Project objectives were and remain highly relevant for Afghan cities that have significant proportions of their populations in informal settlements. The PDO remains well aligned with the Bank’s continued focus on strengthening institutions and programs that can sustainably ensure equitable delivery of basic services. Given the scale of migration to Kabul and the unplanned nature of development occurring rapidly, KURP through investment of more than 95 per cent of credit in urban upgrading has demonstrated the viability of area wide upgrading of informal or unplanned settlements as an important tool to deliver basic services to a large and growing under-serviced population. It has established a cost effective methodology that integrates planned and unplanned areas of the city through the delivery of targeted trunk infrastructure, while at the same time strengthening the social capital of beneficiary communities by laying the groundwork for socially and gender inclusive community participation in decision making over public expenditure for service delivery that directly impacts the urban community. 48 The second IDA-supported proposed urban project is expected to invest in five secondary cities, with a view to piloting a future performance grant system for municipalities. 18 42. The inclusion of components not financed by the Credit, without confirmation of on-budget financing from donor commitments for the components, was a design feature that was highly avoidable as it stretched the supervision resources of the Bank and unduly taxed the PMU’s capacity. With project management costs typically between 3 to 10 percent of the total project budget in Bank-supported projects, with 97 percent allocated for upgrading there was not much left to finance other components. However, since IDA’s early engagement in Afghanistan, there is a much better understanding of the political economy of donor aid in Afghanistan today. The lack of an established PMU either during preparation or soon after effectiveness also created unnecessary challenges in an already difficult environment – this management capacity and technical assistance was essential but delayed till the Bank was able to mobilize additional resources for consultancy expenditures to comply with MoF’s desire to not divert funds from “works� to “consultancies�. 43. The Project’s implementation arrangements were relevant in view of the weak capacity as well as unwillingness on the part of KM to deliver investments in unplanned areas. Ultimately, MoUDA through a well-staffed PMU supported by qualified consultants implemented the Project and the Project started to fully take off as demonstrated by the increasing rate of disbursement and the achievement of the Project’s targets. The PMU continued to perform well even after the TA contracts were completed and its performance is testimony to the robust capacity building that took place amongst the local Afghan staff in the PMU. For scaling-up upgrading under the follow-on Project, it is these Afghan professionals that are to be absorbed by KM, making subsequent interventions in upgrading efficient. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 44. The Project is rated moderately satisfactory in terms of achieving the PDO, as 97% of the Credit proceeds were allocated for achieving results on the ground for beneficiaries with respect to the delivery of basic municipal services originally, and this figure rose to almost 98% by the time the project was restructured (see table under para 8). Though KURP achieved the revised Project targets satisfactorily but slow progress in the period before restructuring led to considerable reduction in targets as a result of price escalations. Uncertainties in securing co-financing delayed contracting of design & supervision consultants and resulted in cost escalations which necessitated revision of the PDO. By March 2009, the Project completed upgrading of only 179 hectares. In the post restructuring phase, the Project made remarkable progress and over-achieved the PDO (upgraded 618 hectares instead of 600 hectares). The institutional development impact of KURP has been well recognized as urban upgrading has gained universal acceptance amongst leaders and policy makers in Afghanistan as a viable urban development tool. With almost 97% of the Credit proceeds allocated for upgrading . 19 Achievement of PDO Target after Achieved value at restructuring completion Number of people in 16 gozars who 92,000 141,480 receive improved urban services Number of hectares of urban land, to 600 hectares 618 hectares infrastructure improvements Final account prepared yearly Annual Achieved Physical development plan for Kabul Completion Completed 45. Upgrading Component: The Project awarded 23 works contracts for area upgrading, and 9 contracts for trunk infrastructure to upgrade 19 “gozars� for a total cost of US$26.62m. Improved services were received by over 140,000 people, the number determined to be living in the upgrading areas through household census surveys that were conducted prior to preparing community upgrading plans. With all the contracts completed at the time of the ICR 49 , and with an increase in population over the last couple of years, it is safe to assume that the number of beneficiaries would be higher. 46. Final Account prepared yearly (i.e. preparation of financial accounts for Kabul Municipality: In March 2006, the baseline for the Municipality’s own revenue was 700 million AFN. This doubled to 1.5 billion AFN by March 2008. At Project closing, the ICR Mission found that KM’s revenue is close to 3 billion Afghanis, i.e. a 400 percent increase over baseline of 2006. The target of systematic preparation of annual accounts for the Municipality was achieved by 2008. However, this was a component not managed by the PMU but by MoF, and should not have been included in KURP – or if it had, should have been adequately budgeted for. 47. Physical development Plan for Kabul: The last development plans for Afghanistan’s cities were prepared in 1978. At restructuring, the scope of this component was scaled back to limit it to Kabul city alone. A Structure Plan for Kabul was completed in June 2009. It was the first time that multiple agencies came together with the consultants to pool data, and work jointly towards future growth scenarios. This plan was an input to the later master plan developed by JICA and the New Kabul Plan which is being developed for New Kabul City. 3.3 Efficiency 48. Feedback from Focus Group Discussions 50 (FGD) during the beneficiary assessment done by a private firm just prior to the closing of the Project, has been positive: beneficiaries reported cost savings from medical expenses, better health for children, higher monthly savings resulting from reduction in expenditure on clothes and shoes, time and cost savings from transportation and overall, better living conditions. Unavailability of data on household cost savings from transportation expenses, medical expenses, household monthly savings and time savings from traffic improvements 49 Some works were not completed by the closing of the project, but were completed by the time of the ICR, and payment of this amount was made by the Borrower from its own funds. 50 Consultant’s report of these discussions, including dates, times and places, are in the Project Files 20 reduced the scope for an economic analysis. Comparative cost efficiency analysis with respect to other donor investments was difficult as no donor has supported a comprehensive multi-sectoral intervention in any settlement alongside trunk infrastructure improvements to integrate informal areas with the main fabric of the city. Donor interventions have been focused on a single element, e.g. UNHABITAT in Kabul has supported improvements to a road within a community. USAID in Jalalabad has worked for the last eight years on tenure security. 49. The Project only realized US$ 33.8 million out of the “virtual� US$52 million estimated at the time of appraisal. Total expenditure under KURP amounts to US$ 31.6 million which reflects 93% expenditure efficiency. The Project could not implement the component “Improvements to Main Roads, Drainage, and Traffic Management in Kabul� due to non-availability of donor funds (but this was later taken up under another IDA- supported project). Costs for the works components under area upgrading escalated after significant implementation delays. The Project has spent approximately 27% of Project funds on PD&C consultants which exceeds the norm for design and supervision by about 7%. However, considering the physical and financial (price) contingencies which are prevalent in Afghanistan, this ICRR provides a satisfactory rating for the efficiency aspects of KURP despite time lost before the Project was restructured causing implementation to span almost eight years. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 50. The overall outcome is rated moderately satisfactory for the following reasons: (i) Project objective was relevant; and (ii) it achieved its stated development objective to upgrade urban infrastructure to improve the delivery of basic urban services for under- serviced communities in Kabul and met all physical targets; (iii) institutional development impact of upgrading has been significant; and (iv) performance for efficiency parameters is judged satisfactory. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts 51. KURP targeted under-serviced communities in Kabul, directly benefiting over 140,000 people living in informal settlements that were home predominantly to the poor and recent urban immigrants. No separate study was done regarding poverty impact, but the beneficiary assessment highlights not only substantial improvement of services, but also associated economic benefits in terms of reduction of transport costs, reduction of cost to clothing and shoes due to cleaner environment and reduction of expenditures to doctor’s fee and medicine, particularly related to children. Anecdotal evidence also point to the improved infrastructure provided by KURP having positive economic impacts that resulted in increased investments from small businesses, mainly in the informal settlement areas where the majority are poor. 52. Although KURP was not formally mandated to develop local-level, democratic and inclusive representative bodies, or target gender aspects specifically, in response to 21 the requirements of community participation in KURP, the Project facilitated the establishment of elected and gender-segregated community councils called gozar Cooperating Shura (GCSs) to represent the beneficiary community for liaising with the Project. Thus half the GCS members were women who played an overall very active role throughout the Project and were the Project’s strongest supporters. In several cases, community disputes related to KURP upgrading were resolved only upon the intervention and active mediation undertaken by the women. It also enabled the development of draft byelaws for the GCSs, a Community Consultation Manual and a Grievance Redress Mechanism. The WB and other donors are using these outputs as illustrations/models for other Projects in the country. 53. In keeping with the prevalent social norms, gender segregated representation increased women’s active engagement in community mobilization, and women were represented in their own separate GCS Shuras. Throughout the Project, special efforts were made to ensure female participation, and half the GCSs members were women, often the strongest community supporters of the Project. In several cases, community disputes related to upgrading were only resolved by the intervention and active mediation undertaken by the women of the gozar. The Project has thus effectively laid the groundwork for socially and gender inclusive community representation and the community’s active involvement in local-level decision making in the urban setting in Afghanistan. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 54. The risk to development outcome is rated moderate for the following reasons: (i) urban upgrading is fully endorsed as a critical urban development tool, and national Upgrading Guidelines developed by MoUDA are going through a final process of review; (ii) strengthening community participation for urban development remains an integral element of the upgrading investments in Kabul under the new proposed urban project; (iii) the trunk infrastructure investments supported by the Project remains capable of service delivery despite increased demand and usage; and (iv) institutional strengthening and financial sustainability are being concurrently supported by IDA for utilities in the water and roads sectors. However, the country context remains volatile and uncertain, with the withdrawal of international peace keeping troops in 2014. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance (relating to design, implementation and outcome issues) 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 22 55. The Project’s design failed to be selective and focused on upgrading, and included components that were not critical to the achievement of the PDOs and were ultimately dropped 51 . Institutional risks, country context risks, as well as risks posed by components to be financed by other donors, were not adequately anticipated and created significant challenges during implementation 56. There was no QAE assessment for KURP. The Project was prepared and approved within a short span of time, but project management capacity was not in place to manage preparation of bids for works. During preparation, activities involving significant amount of co-financing were included in the design without adequate risk mitigation measures that could counter the unavailability of donor funds. While “housing� which implied a broader policy agenda was dropped just before Appraisal based on the rationale that other donors were financing it, other components did not benefit from an extension of the same rationale. For example, the component on land tenure regularization created enormous complexity and high transaction costs for the Bank and the Client. Until components not fully funded from the Credit proceeds were dropped, task team supervision resources were diluted, in fact severely stretched. In January 2009, the Bank Team finally recommended cancellation of the land tenure regularization component. 57. Design shortcomings notwithstanding, the implementation of urban upgrading in Kabul have unequivocally and positively impacted the opposition at the local and national level to service improvements in informal and unplanned areas. Visible results of service delivery improvements have demonstrated the viability of urban upgrading as a relevant intervention in Afghanistan’s urban context for integration of underserved residential areas into the main fabric of the city. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 58. The Bank’s performance during supervision is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. There were 21 missions, which is higher than the Bank standard average of two missions per year. The Bank Task Team supervised the Project three times a year for the first five years with a high degree of commitment and dedication, but without consistent support from experienced Bank staff. The Team struggled to resolve implementation challenges posed by the lack of a dedicated PMU and TA, keeping Bank management informed. There were no changes in task management until the Project was restructured in 2010. Immediately thereafter there was a high degree of turnover of Task Team Leaders 51 At PCN stage, the project was even more complex. The Bank cleared inclusion of additional cities in the project, as well as technical studies for assessing the feasibility of housing grants and mechanisms for the provision of serviced land. 23 (TTLs), but there has been a resident TTL in Kabul soon after restructuring for the last two years, providing close implementation support to the client. Supervision performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory because the Bank was too slow to restructure the Project when the MTR made clear the need for restructuring - the DCA was amended two years after the MTR. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 59. The Project started performing after substantial delays. Implementation bottlenecks which are partly caused by design shortcomings were overtaken in later stages with better management of Project implementation and revision of targets. By the time of the ICR, the Project had surpassed the revised targets. However, despite the difficult country context and the Project team’s continuous engagement with the client, the challenges of finding experienced task managers to locate in Kabul, Bank performance is considered moderately unsatisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 60. Political instability and changes in leadership at the client end were another factor that led to implementation delays. Senior level leadership changes in MoF and MoUD in 2004 and 2006 respectively caused significant delays in securing co-financing 52. There were substantial delays in securing co-financing and procurement of TA. At the time of negotiations for KURP, the Government had ensured TAFSU support of $3.2 million with the understanding that the remainder funds from ARTF would be allocated once procurement contracts were initiated. Due to a difference in opinion between the MoF and MoUDA, it took unusually long for acceptance of contract proposals and authorization of payments to contractors which led to delays. During implementation, some contract invoices were not paid in a timely manner due to budget allotment issues that took time to resolve between MoUDA and MoF. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory 61. MoUDA supported implementation of Project activities through regular guidance and supervision. Significant progress was achieved by the PMU in overcoming the hurdles of procurement contracting and quality record keeping. The Project established strong relationships with the community members which resulted in ownership of the 52 World Bank Internal Note: The Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project: A Review of Implementation 24 Project by the beneficiaries. It is expected that future urban development projects will receive similar level of acceptance from the beneficiaries. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 62. The overall borrower performance is rated as moderately satisfactory considering the operational bottlenecks that significantly delayed procurement of consultants for implementation of different components under the Project. Delays in critically needed TA and Project management support created a delay of almost two years in the start-up activities under the Project. Once the TA was in place and a dedicated and well-staffed PMU established under MoUDA, the Project’s performance improved systematically over the subsequent years. The PMU continued its credibility with the beneficiary communities throughout the Project and helped in resolving conflicts that could have impeded progress. Performance of the PMU has been satisfactory in terms of contracts management and supervision of civil works. 6. Lessons Learned 63. Project design for post-conflict reconstruction should be kept simple and oriented towards the immediate and urgent reconstruction needs. While longer term objectives should be kept in mind and considered during Project preparation, components not on the critical path of achieving the PDOs should be excluded to avoid implementation risks that are created due to a lack of exercising selectivity during the design stage. A lack of selectivity often leads to the involvement of multiple agencies which makes coordination difficult even under normal circumstances and furthermore challenges the limited capacity of newly established Project units in implementing agencies. Project implementation experience in Afghanistan as well as in other fragile and conflict affected countries has demonstrated that activities co-financed by other donors does not necessarily yield the intended results and should not be included as part a Project, but remain complementary. If donor aid is delivered off-budget, the Borrower has little or no control on the content, sequencing, or quality of activities delivered by donors thereby affecting Project performance if included as part of the Project. 64. Urban upgrading in Afghanistan is a viable approach and community participation is critical. Upgrading was a new concept introduced by the KURP and ultimately gained broad acceptance. The Project succeeded in changing the mindset of perceiving unplanned settlements as "illegal" to recognizing their legitimacy and improving living conditions of people in such settlements. Community participation has proven crucial to make upgrading work, including highlighting the critical role of including women representatives and marginalized groups in the participation process. The policy of having at least half of the Gozar Cooperating Shuras members to be women was critical to its success. While technical and engineering consultants are needed to work with these community groups in developing the plans with technical details such as drawings, the community groups should make the key decisions regarding level of services, design of complaint handling mechanisms and agreement on O&M responsibilities, costs and financing. 25 65. Capacity constraints in both the public sector and the private sector in post- conflict environments are considerable. Bank support delivered as emergency operations within in a compressed time schedule usually will not allow time for effective capacity building activities to be delivered before Projects are effective. Capacity building activities can be delivered only after Projects become effective and resources are available. Considerably more allowances therefore needs to be made at the design stage for capacity building of public sector agencies in the technical, procurement, financial management and safeguard aspects of Bank Projects. Implementation periods also need to be assessed realistically. Private sector capacity, including in the construction industry is also limited in post-conflict environments and delivering capacity building activities for private sector firms also needs to be an integral part of the Project’s design. Bank’s criteria for procurement, (e.g. qualification criteria), should be defined in a way that is suitable to the condition of the local market. 66. Projects in post-conflict environments must either include higher contingency costs than is normal or set aside about 20% of the funds as unallocated funds, as post- conflict environments are uncertain and volatile. In a country like Afghanistan, where most construction materials are imported, implementation periods need to be realistic as supply chains of goods and construction materials are often disrupted for protracted periods of time. Costs in such environments tend to be higher and there is considerable price volatility. TA and implementation support costs are also likely to be much higher, because of lower competition. Supervision costs are also likely to be higher because unforeseen security related events can stall the work schedule of contractors, creating an additional challenge for contract management. 67. The presence of a field-based task-team leader (TTL) is of utmost importance in contexts such as Afghanistan. In conflict countries with significant capacity constraints, the presence of country-based TTL to provide intensive implementation support is crucial for timely achievement of Project results. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 68. This ICRR acknowledges the concern raised by the Borrower about inadequate due diligence during appraisal and reliance on co-financed activities which delayed implementation. The Project was designed as an emergency operation, allowing little time to complete the preparation necessary for infrastructure Projects. As the first urban Project in Afghanistan, implementation has provided significant lessons for future engagement in the sector. 26 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate (US$ Estimate (US$ Percentage of Components millions)# millions) Appraisal A. Area Upgrading in Kabul 25.11 23.97 /a 95.46 B. Land Tenure Regularization 0.64 0.03 /b 4.7 4.32 7.86 /c 182 C. Engineering & Management Support D. Overall Capacity for KM 0.30 0.3 /d 100 E. Structure Planning/ Future Project 1.63 1.64 /e 100 Preparation F. Main Roads, Drains & Traffic 20 0 0 Management Total Baseline Cost 52 33.8 65 Physical Contingencies 0 0 0 Price Contingencies 0 0 0 Total Project Costs 52 33.8 Total Financing Required 52 33.8 # Includes IDA and Co-financing estimates at appraisal. /a: contains US$ 20.37m IDA and US$ 3.6 m from ARTF 92073. b/: US$ 0.03 m received from IDA /c: Includes IDA US$ 3.2 m, ARTF TF 92073 US$ 1.76 and ARTF TF 50970 US$ 2.9 m. /d: Out of US$ 3.2 m from ATRF 50970, US$ 0.3 was provided for this component. /e: US$ 1.4m from IDA and from ARTF TF 92073, US$ 0.24 m was provided for support towards cultural heritage. (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Co- Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds financing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) IDA Grant 25 25 100 Co-financing (ARTF/others) 26.08 ARTF TF- 92073 0 5.6 ARTF TF- 50970 0 3.2 Communities 0.92 53 0 54 Total 52 33.8 65 53 KURP technical annex, pg. 10 54 Communities did not contribute in cash but kind, through consistent involvement with their time at all stages of the project cycle (see Section 3.5 and Annexes 5 and 6 for details). 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component A: Area Upgrading 69. As part of KURP, 19 gozars within KM’s jurisdiction were selected for area upgrading to improve basic tertiary and trunk infrastructure, e.g. access, water supply & sanitation, drainage, solid waste management and street lighting. A pilot gozar included four upgrading contracts, for which procurement was completed by 2008. 70. The detail Surveying, Planning, engineering design and construction supervision for the upgrading works was carried out through the PD&C. All upgrading works were implemented by local contractors procured through the World Bank procurement procedures for National Competitive Bidding (NCB). 71. Planning and design work was undertaken in two pilot gozars over a six month period from April–September, 2006 by interim consultants engaged directly by the PMU. Engineering drawings and BoQ’s were prepared and packaged into three contracts which were tendered in November 2006. However, no responsive bids were received during the first round which resulted in re-advertisement for the first three packages in early February, 2007. Successful rebidding was a key achievement for KURP, as a number of improvements were made and responsive bids were received for all three packages thereafter. The improvements started with some adjustments to the bidding documents which included bid security declaration, relaxations to the post qualification criteria as per the new World Bank standard NCB works document for Afghanistan and improvement to the EMP, specifications and Qa/Qc Manual which formed part of the bid document. 72. The MoUDA with assistance from the PMU and the TSU, appointed two PD&C consultants, namely Cooperation for Reconstruction of Afghanistan (CRA) for package one, and Arkane Foncier for package two. The PD&Cs were expected to have community consultation, engineering design, construction supervision and contract management skills. Shortly after signing the contracts, both consultants mobilized & started work in late December, 2006. Both consultants had 24 months contracts that were scheduled to be completed by December 2008. But the PD&C contract for package 2 with Gross Allain (Arkane Foncier) was cancelled on 1st July 2009, due to nonperformance. Subsequently, the PMU hired individual consultants directly to oversee the supervision of civil works package. The PD&C contract package with CRA, which was scheduled to expire on December 2008, was extended up to June 2010 to allow completion of the supervision and reporting activities. Total disbursements under Component A (not including consultancy cost of design and supervision of works) are in the table below. Components Description Unit QTY Total Spent (US$) Total for Access Road m 126731.00 11,375,295.10 Total for Drainage m 153569.78 4,817,196.65 Total for Water Supply Network m 104989.64 2,402,019.21 Total for Sanitation Latrine 7627.00 395,130.36 28 Total for Solid Waste Management Col. 41.00 46,449.67 Point Total for Street lightening House 8941.00 344,379.71 Total Trunk Drainage m 11613.71 1,191,648.70 Total local Septic Tank each 1.00 25,250.84 Total Boring of Deep Well Well 2.00 154,181.94 Total 20,751,552.19 Component B: Land Tenure Regularization Component: 73. A Land Tenure Technical Committee (LTTC) comprised of representatives from stakeholders from various agencies was expected to be convened by appointing international consultants who would provide leadership. However, the component was dropped at restructuring due to slow progress. Component C, D & E (Capacity Building Components): 74. In spite of the implementation impediments on account of procurement and FM difficulties, technical and managerial skills of PMU staff improved with extensive training imparted by the TSU in different fields such as finance, procurement, short and long term AutoCAD, GIS, etc. Given the scale and diversity of planned and unplanned neighborhoods in 6 districts of KM that have been upgraded under KURP, considerable technical knowledge on infrastructure costs has been generated. This is being synthesized by the KURP PMU to be published as a guide for Kabul and other cities in Afghanistan. 29 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 75. Analysis for economic rate of return was not undertaken at the time of Appraisal, as, without a PMU in place, baseline data on expected benefits from upgrading investments was not available. Data was only collected during implementation between 2006 and 2009, gozar by gozar, for developing community upgrading plans but lacked the kind of data that would normally be collected for computing economic benefits. However, international experience highlights that the range of the EIRRs found in other urban upgrading projects around the world are high. Some of the lowest rates may be as low as 4%, while some of the highest EIRRs may be as high as 94.1% (see table below). This ICRR was not able to conduct a robust economic analysis 55, but with over 96% of the Credit proceeds allocated for upgrading, EIRR can be safely assumed to be reasonable to justify the investment (see paragraph below). Range of EIRR based on International Comparisons Projects ERR Lahore – Pakistan Serviced sites 4% Lahore – Pakistan walled city upgrading 15% Algeria – social housing 11.6 % Yemen – Sana’a Urban Dev – Serviced sites & upgrading 16 % Yemen 2nd Urban Dev. - upgrading and serviced plots 36% Mauritania’s Urban Dev. project upgrading (different sites) 43%, 13%, 34%, 30% Venezuela’s Caracas slum upgrading (based on changes in 42.35% housing unit prices) Venezuela’s Caracas slum upgrading (according to changes 94.11% in housing values per m2) 76. The Project’s investments were targeted to settlements most vulnerable and deficient in basic municipal services. Vulnerability was measured as the ratio of income earners vs. dependents and years of living in Kabul. The primary criterion for lack of services was measured by the lack of access to; (i) piped water supply, (ii) in-house well, (iii) public well and (iv) tanker. Sanitation deficiencies were measured by (i) the absence of in-house facilities, (ii) disposal of night soil, (iii) improvements in latrines. While the benefits of delivering this basic package of urban services would be high in keeping with the benefits well documented from international experience, they could not be quantified in terms of improvements in health, incidence of disease, lost work or school days, 55 The Bank’s Investment Lending Reforms approved by the Board on October 25, 2012, includes an updated approach to economic analysis of IL operations that continues to provide the needed rigor of this mandatory requirement while allowing the use of a methodology appropriate for the specific operation, taking into account country and sectoral considerations. 30 reduced travel time and transport costs, increase in real estate values upon provision of public goods etc. 56. 77. The stakeholder assessment conducted by the PMU estimated the number of direct beneficiaries to be more than 248,000 (an increase over the142,215 beneficiaries recorded during the census surveys between 2007-2009), and the total number of indirect beneficiaries between 0.7-1 million, both because of the benefits reported during focus group discussions in the neighboring gozars and improvements to trunk infrastructure. The Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with beneficiaries identified several positive impacts, some of which are listed below: • Easier access to clinics, school or hospitals. • Savings accruing from reduction in expenditure on clothes and shoes due to less dirty roads. • Access to facilities such as markets has become easier. • Transport costs have reduced and time savings accrued to daily wage earner and other professionals. This is because people can walk to places where they previously had to take a taxi because of difficult terrain, and also taxis presently charge less to come to the upgraded areas now that roads are paved. • Healthier environment due to regular removal of waste. • Ability of residents to socialize together has increased and it has become easier to hold community events such as weddings. • Children do not fall sick often. • Income opportunities for small shopkeepers have increased. Expenditure Efficiency: 78. The ICR Team found several internal documents that alluded to high unit costs for upgrading and project management. An analysis and detailed review of technical standards for roads and drains (84% of infrastructure investments under KURP), engineering estimates and final costs, was undertaken, both for this ICR and to get a better understanding of engineering estimates and final costs to enable planning for the future. This analysis shows that the costs of the roads (predominantly secondary and tertiary roads, footpaths, and hillside steps) completed under the KURP are comparable to the costs of the roads executed under other projects. For instance, the cost of the roads executed under the JICA funded Kabul Solidarity Program (KPS) which is in the nascent stage, are estimated at $16 per sqm which is in line with KURP’s average costs. 79. The ICR Team also sought to better understand project management costs: The total anticipated Project cost at the time of appraisal was US$ 52 million including approximately US$ 22 57 million to be provided by bi-lateral donors that was ultimately 56 International experience with urban upgrading shows that every US$1 invested by the public sector in slums, leverages US$7 of private investment indicating that one of the main benefits arising from slum upgrading is from enhanced private sector economic activity due to improved physical environment 57 KURP Project paper page 3 31 not provided. Only US$ 30.6 million was made available from IDA and ARTF TF 92073. If funds provided from TAFS (ARTF TF 50970), i.e. US$ 3.2 million are included (although the execution of these funds was not done by KURP), then the available funds increase to US$ 33.8 million. The expenditure efficiency of the Project by funding source is given in table 3 (a) below. Table 3(a): Funding Source Available (US$ m) Expenditure (US$ m) Expenditure Efficiency IDA 25 23.2 93% ARTF TF 92073 5.6 5.3 95% ARTF TF 50970 3.2 3.1 97% Total 33.8 31.6 93% Source: KURP PMU 80. Total expenditure on PD&C consultants is estimated to be approximately US$ 9.04 million or 27% of the total expenditures on works. This is higher than the norm of 18% to 20% of actual civil works being allocated for design and supervision of works, as it includes the cost of community mobilization and organization. One of the major contracts for a PD&C consultant firm was funded through the ARTF TF Grant # 50970. The cost of the PMU (not including the costs of the international consulting firms that provided technical assistance) was US$0.6 million, approximately 2% of total Project expenses. This is low when compared to project management costs under other Bank supported projects which typically range from 3% to 7%, often as high as 10% for projects that are very transaction intensive, for example social fund projects. In contexts such as Afghanistan, security related threats create a premium that leads to higher than normal consulting contract costs. Higher costs for PD&C consultants and other construction consultants can be justified with respect to the contingencies associated with implementing Project activities in Afghanistan. A lot of uncertainty in Afghanistan exists due to cost of material as the construction industry is highly import dependent, and security conditions exacerbate the uncertainty and cause disruptions to deliveries and schedules – these cumulatively contribute to higher costs, about 30% higher than costs in the region. Under KURP, the cost of urban upgrading (Component A) increased by 60% in 2006 at the start of civil works and in 2009 including due the unknown technical factors at the time of Appraisal, with additional increases by more than 14 percent. For financial contingencies associated with inflation and other macroeconomic imbalances, suitable measures relevant to post-conflict environments should be incorporated in the Project design. 32 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ (b) Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Urban Richard M. Beardmore Senior Urban Specialist EASUR - Development Christophe E. Bosch Sector Leader AFTUW Operations Mohammad Q. Haidari Senior Operations Officer SASDT Operations Santhanam Krishnan Consultant SARPS Procurement Financial Irene Julitta Ponniah Financial Management Special SARFM Management Urban M. Vitor Serra Consultant LCSUW Development Jayashree Srinivasan Research Assistant FGIDB Supervision/ICR Deepali Tewari Lead Urban Specialist SASDU TTL Susanne Holste Lead Social development Specialist EASID TTL Raja Rehan Arshad Lead Operations Officer GFDRR TTL Rosanna Nitti Senior Urban Specialist SASDU TTL Soraya Goga Senior Urban Specialist MNSSD TTL Financial Manoj Agrawal Consultant SARFM Management Water Anna Cestari Water Resources Spec. ECSS6 Resources Specialist Social Abdul Mohammad Durani Consultant SASDS Safeguards Nagaraju Duthaluri Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement Deepal Fernando Senior Procurement Specialist ECSO2 Procurement Human Celine Ferre Consultant ECSHD Development Water and Karine Fourmond Water & Sanitation Specialist SASDU Sanitation Specialist Water and Soma Ghosh Moulik Sr. Water & Sanitation Spec. TWIWA Sanitation Specialist Mohammad Qahir Haidari Senior Operations Officer SASDT Transport Program Mariam Haidary Program Assistant SASHD Assistant Urban Abdul Wali Ibrahimi Operations Officer SASDU Development Asila Wardak Jamal Consultant SASDI 33 Urban Mihaly Kopanyi Consultant WBIUR Economist Dhirendra Kumar E T Consultant SARPS Procurement Financial Nargis Mohammad Yousaf Financial Management Analyst SARFM Management Financial Asha Narayan Financial Management Specialist SARFM Management Social Mohammad Yasin Noori Social Development Specialist SASDS Safeguards Sr. Financial Management Financial Kenneth O. Okpara SARFM Specialist Management Asta Olesen Senior Social Development Spec SASDS Gender Urban Srinivasa Rao Podipireddy Sr. Water & Sanitation Spec. SASDU Development Robin Michael Rajack Sr. Land Administration Specialist LCSAR Urban Planning Mohammad Arif Rasuli Senior Environmental Specialist SASDI Environment Sanitary Shyamal Sarkar Sr. Sanitary Engineer SASDU Engineer Kaushik Sarkar Consultant SASDU Economist Urban Elda Solloso Junior Professional Associate SASDU Development Michelle Lisa Chen Program Assistant SASDO Jayashree Srinivasan Research Assistant FGIDB Rahimullah Wardak Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement f (a) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks (including travel and consultant costs) Lending FY04 43 346.65 FY05 5 54.92 Supervision/ICR FY05 24 127.79 FY06 25 144.13 FY07 58 182.82 FY08 52 144.33 FY09 32 95.38 FY10 0 0 FY11 0 0.45 FY12 19 88.5 FY13 Total: 179 599.07 34 Annex 5 & 6. Beneficiary Survey Results & Stakeholder Workshop Report 80. While a baseline survey for each gozar was undertaken during preparation of the Community Upgrading plans, no survey was done at completion. However, a beneficiary assessment was done in February-March 2012 just prior to the closing of the Project. . KURP has resulted in a much higher level of satisfaction than other donor Projects in Afghanistan. Major benefits expressed by targeted communities are 58 : (1) Increased mobility and access to clinics, schools, hospitals, markets etc. (2) Improved social integration and reduced cost of transportation. Transportation has become cheaper either because people can walk to places they previously had to take taxis to, or because the taxis charge less to come to the area now that roads are paved. (3) Reduced expenditure on clothes and shoes that do not have to be washed frequently and replaced as the environment is less dusty. (4) Saved time by women on washing of clothes and cleaning, and (5) Improvement in children’s health. Social Issues and Results of Beneficiary Assessment 81. KURP conducted broad consultation with Project beneficiaries and stakeholders and involved them in development of Community Upgrading Plan (CUP) and Project implementation arrangements. Participation of beneficiaries in KURP, particularly in planning, budgeting, and monitoring was made mandatory to ensure community voices be heard and their opinion included in the Project planning. 82. KURP facilitated the establishment of elected community councils called gozar Cooperating Shura (GCSs)� in order to represent each gozar for KURP activities. Although KURP, unlike the National Solidarity Program for the rural areas, was not formally mandated to develop local-level, democratic and inclusive representative bodies, an abbreviated methodology to this effect was in fact developed in response to the requirements of community participation in KURP. Once KURP gozars were selected, each gozar was divided into clusters of 20-50 households, and each cluster selected a representative to send to the Gozar Cooperative Shura (GCS). The methods for selecting GCS members were locally sensitive, either using secret ballot voting for a choice of candidates, or election through consensus at a community meeting, by show of hands. The GCS were partly inspired by the rural CDCs and partly by UNHABITAT’s efforts in urban areas. KURP developed draft bye-laws for the GCS, as well as a Grievance Redressal Mechanism and a comprehensive Community Consultation Manual, ensuring community participation a vital role in all aspect of all aspects of the Project. Donors are using both the Grievance Redress Mechanism and the Community Consultation Manual as illustrations/models for other Projects in the country. 83. An important aspect of KURP’s participatory approach was its success in involving women. In view of the prevalent social norms it was found that gender 58 Source: Stakeholder Assessment of Kabul Reconstruction Project (2012). Zar Consultancy Services Company. 35 segregated representation increased women’s active engagement, and women were represented in their own separate GCS Shuras. Throughout the Project, special efforts were made to ensure female participation during the entire KURP process and according to the finding of CUP reports half of the GCSs members are female. Women played an overall very active role in KURP and were among its strongest community supporters. In several cases, community disputes related to KURP upgrading were only resolved by the intervention and active mediation undertaken by the women of the gozar. KURP thus effectively laid the groundwork for community representation and active participation in local-level decision making in the urban setting in Afghanistan 84. KURP’s success in community participation had a direct impact on its ability to manage social safeguards issues. No formal land acquisition was anticipated or funded under KURP and where ever minor land requirements appeared in connection with the upgrading of roads, water supply or other interventions, the community members resolved the issues through negotiations. As a result, some community members were convinced to relocate their latrines from the right of way, while in other instances larger or smaller community compensation for affected people were agreed upon, where the affected households were unable or unwilling to donate minor pieces of land for upgrading work. KURP maintained full documentation of these processes and the efforts are reflected in the Highly Satisfactory social safeguards rating – and the use of KURP case materials as examples of Good Practices in-country safeguards training modules. 85. In 2008, KURP conducted baseline a knowledge, attitudes and practice (KAP) survey on hygiene and sanitation in four selected gozars. A total of 240 household surveys (120 male and 120 female respondents) and 32 FGDs were undertaken in the selected gozars, which were chosen to represent the varied characteristics of: location, geography, ethnicity and socio-economic status across Kabul. The findings of the survey was shared with other agencies in the sector and used to inform KURP training module on health and hygiene. KURP also conducted FGDs and household surveys with men and women to include their views in the EIA/SIA developed for the old city gozars. 36 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR 86. The Project is considered successful. The target communities participated in Project implementation and benefitted from significant improvement in their health, economic position, and general living standards. The Project also generated awareness in non-target communities. The beneficiaries gained higher levels of skills in managing their own works communally, and the Project had a positive impact on women’s empowerment and provided them with active roles in the community. Project design and processes were successful with a few exceptions. Moreover, the receipt of some applications and requests for the Project to be implemented in different areas of the city shows the respect and admiration that city residents have for the Project’s achievements. It is worth mentioning that all the lessons learned while implementing KURP should be considered essential for the design of the future Project. Lessons Learnt under KURP: 87. An important distinction of community participation must be made. Participatory approach to empower communities to implement the Project is different from the participatory approach that aims at community empowerment to achieve sustainability. 88. Systematic community upgrading also requires a systematic approach to Project design and implementation arrangements. Without understanding the socio-economic classification of targeted population within each gozar or across gozars, cost effective and affordable solutions cannot be designed for community participation. 89. Piloting within a pilot Project not only offers an opportunity for building trust with communities, but also is an opportunity to improve procedures and Project implementation modalities. 90. Coordination among agencies should begin at the Project preparation stage with consensus on Project design principles and their enforcement during the implementation stage. Memorandum of Understanding could be signed for smooth operational coordination. 91. In an environment of political instability, reliance on counterpart funds for Project implementation adds a significant risk to Project implementation. 92. Project preparation should focus on building improved in-house capacities in procurement and financial management for sustained future engagements with the Bank. 93. The Bank’s management must oversee that the turnover of Task Team Leaders throughout the implementation period does not disrupt continuity of the Bank’s support to the Client. 37 Contracting Under KURP: 94. Bids for all (post review & prior review) packages were tendered and evaluated in accordance with the World Bank procedures. A couple of contracts were terminated while all other contracts are completed as shown in the following table. Table 6(a): SN Contract Construction Contractor Duration Completion Within Time Package No. 1 KURP/1-1 UNI Kapisa Kohnade Construction 538 days July, 2008 Company 2 KURP/ 1-1 TSI Jaihoon Amu Construction 535 days Nov, 2008 Company 3 KURP/2-1 UNI Afghan Maskan Construction 527 days Aug, 2008 Company 4 KURP 1-1 USF Ashqari Construction Company 424 days Dec, 2008 5 KURP/ 4-1 UNI Shear Poor Construction 675 days plus 280 Feb, 2010 Company working days 6 KURP/ 9-2 UNI Ziarat Gul Construction 150 working days Sep, 2009 Company 7 KURP/ 2-1 TSI New Sahak Construction 361 days Aug, 2008 Company 8 KURP/9-1 UNI AB Managers Construction 695 days plus 180 Nov, 2010 Company working days 9 KURP/ 2-1 USF Arghawan Construction 419 days Completed Company Sep-08 10 KURP/ 5-1 UNI Jaihoon Amu Construction 702 days Aug, 2009 Company 11 KURP/6-1 UNI Country Development 667 days Jun, 2009 Construction Company 12 KURP 4-1 TSI Bonyad Sahar Construction 478 days Sep, 2009 Company 13 KURP 8-1 UNI Emran Naween Construction 724 days Dec, 2009 Company 14 KURP 12-1 UNI Edress Obid Construction 566 days Feb, 2009 Company 15 KURP/ 14-1/1 Hekmatullah Nasir 365 working days Mar, 2010 UNI Construction Company 16 KURP/ 14-1/2 Road & Roof Construction 365 working days Mar, 2010 UNI Company 17 KURP/19-1/1 Bakhtar Peroz Construction 365 working days Feb, 2010 UNI Company 18 KURP/13-1/2 Walizada Construction 565 days plus 120 Jun, 2010 UNI company working days 19 KURP/13-1/3 Walizada Construction 584 days plus 180 Jul, 2010 UNI company working days 20 KURP/3- 1/1 (W) Asia Sahak Construction 410 working dasy Oct, 2010 UN Company plus 139 days 21 KURP 3- 1/2 (E) Hamkar Construction Company 420 working days Nov, 2010 38 UNI 22 KURP/10-1 UNI Sifat Construction Company 365 working days Mar, 2011 23 KURP/ 11-1 UNI Shah Maqsud Gulzar 602 CD plus180 Oct, 2010 Construction Company working days 24 KURP 16-1 UNI Rashid Sultani Construction 796 WD plus 90 CD Dec, 2010 Company 25 KURP 3-1/1 TSI Nikzad Brothers Construction 200 working days Mar, 2011 Company 26 KURP 15-1 UNI Hekmatullah Nasir 456 working days May, 2011 Construction Company 27 KURP 6-1/1 TSI Wadan Afghanistan 260 working days Terminated and KURP 6-1/1- Construction company 2 TSI 28 KURP 18-1 UNI Hassib Faisal Construction 305 working days Completed Company 29 KURP 17-1 UNI Asif Khan Construction 290 working days Dec, 2011 Company plus 60 days 30 KURP 20-1 UNI Shear Poor Construction 200 days Jun, 2011 Company 31 KURP 13-1/1 Excellent Planning & 210 days Dec, 2011 UNI Construction Company 32 KURP 6-1/1-2 Excellent Planning & 45 days plus 55 Terminated on 30 April TSI Construction Company working days due to the KURP closure 33 KURP 7-1 UNI Zurmat Construction Company Terminated due to fundamental breach of the contract 34 KURP 10-1 UNI Zurmat Construction Company Terminated due to fundamental breach of the contract 39 Table 6(b): KURP gozars: Total Upgradeable Area and Population – Source: Community Upgrading Plans (CUPs) Population Number of houses Gozar Name (Persons) Total gozar Area / Upgradeable Area in District No Hectare Lot-1 Lot-2 Lot-3 Total Lot-1 Lot-2 Lot-3 Total Lot -1 Lot-2 Lot-3 Total 1 Darwazay lahory 8.6 5.64 8.10 22.34 197 314 40 551 1895 3010 385 5290 1 Bagh-e-Bala/Dahan Nal 23.06 0.0 0.0 23.06 392 0.0 0.0 392 5600 0 0 5600 2 Karta-e-Parwan 30.55 0.0 0.0 30.55 295 0.0 0.0 295 4200 0 0 4200 3 Behind Baharistan 25.96 0.0 0.0 25.96 354 0.0 0.0 354 5060 0 0 5060 4 Karta-e-Aryana 20 0.0 0.0 20 262 0.0 0.0 262 3668 0 0 3668 5 2 Deh Afghanan 21.12 0.0 0.0 21.12 433 0.0 0.0 433 5796 0 0 5796 6 Deh Ghawchak Deh afghanan 8.61 0.0 0.0 8.61 280 0.0 0.0 280 3920 0 0 3920 7 Andrabi 6.82 0.0 0.0 6.82 136 0.0 0.0 136 1904 0 0 1904 8 Murad Khani TMF 4.89 0.0 0.0 6.82 53 0.0 0.0 53 735 0 0 735 9 Karta-e-Mamorin 44 0.0 0.0 44 483 0.0 0.0 483 6300 0 0 6300 10 3 Karta-e-Sakhi 23 0.0 0.0 23 501 0.0 0.0 501 7000 0 0 7000 11 Dewan Bigi 26.7 28.8 0.0 55.5 568 672 0 1240 6202 7330 0 13532 12 5 Niaz Big 23.9 0.0 0.0 23.88 533 0.0 0.0 533 5226 0 0 5226 13 Sayed Noor Mohammad shah mina 35.0 0.0 0.0 35 989 0.0 0.0 989 9890 0 0 9890 14 Shah Shahed Camps 19.3 0.0 0.0 19.3 227 0.0 0.0 227 2270 0 0 2270 15 Jaded Abad of Masjid Itifaq 61.1 0.0 0.0 61.14 1150 0.0 0.0 1150 1150 0 0 13962 16 8 Masjidi Itifaq, district 8 17 14 21.5 20.6 56.02 308.9 413.5 569 1291 3341 4472 6149 13962 Karta-e-Now 18 20.7 12.71 51.41 584.1 493.3 329 1406 6668 5632 3752 16052 18 Qismat-e-B Rahman Mina 25.4 28.2 0.0 53.6 350.0 425.0 775 4078 4951 0 9029 19 Masjidi Itifaq of district 13 13 54.25 0.0 0.0 54.25 868 0.0 0.0 868 868 0 0 8819 20 Note: figures in italics not included 642.38 12,219 142,215 Grand Total 40 Table 6(c): Cancelled Contracts under KURP after Restructuring No Contract name Size Population Remarks (hectare) 1 Darwaza-e lahory (lot 2) 5.6 3010 Darwaza-e Lahori lots 2& 3 will be covered by UN-Habitat. Based on the information by the PMU, UN-Habitat has already 2 Darwazay lahory (lot 3) 8.1 385 conducted survey of these two lots. 3 Karta-e-Parwan 30.6 4200 Only 13.9% completed. Please see detail information in a table for Karta-e Parwan gozar. 4 Karta-e-Now (lot 2) 20.7 5742 These two lots will be included in the next phase (KURP II) 5 Karta-e-Now (lot 3) 12.7 4678 6 Construction of trunk These trunk drains were cancelled. Kabul drain (Karta-e Mamorin) Municipality is expected to undertake the operation in order to convey wastewater from the sites covered by KURP targeted gozars and beneficiaries. Total 77.7 18015 Negative outcome of KURP; 77.7 hectares not upgraded and 18,015 persons not served 41 Table 6(d): KURP Total Output of Infrastructure Service Delivery Bagh-e- Karta- Darwazay Murad Bala/Dahan Behind e- Deh Deh Kart-e- Karte Lahory Khani Nal Baharistan Aryana Afghanan Ghawchak Andrabi Mamorin Sakhi Upgrading Package Unit Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Access Road m 3,417 0 3,483 4,931 3,705 4,835 2,413 1,903 6,761 4,475 Drain/Culvert m 3,943 1210 5,368 6,881 3,440 5,436 2,200 1,790 10,389 5,014 Water Supply (new conn..) No. 197 74 59 68 59 63 35 78 119 95 Sanitation (Latrines) No. 187 0 300 210 145 467 45 /1 78 238 298 Solid Waste Management No. 3 0 1 1 3 1 1 4 4 (Collection Points) Street Lighting (Houses No. 197 0 315 360 275 475 297 123 221 296 covered) Table 6(d) (continued) Jaded Syed Noor Shah Abad Qismat-e-B Masjidi Dewan Niaz Mohamma Shahed Masjid Masjidi Kart-e- Rahman Itefaq Bigi Bigi d Shah Camps Itifaq Itifaq Now Mina District 13 Upgrading Package Unit Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Access Road m 17259 6,391 10,840 6,398 11320 14121 4,655 9000 8,600 Drain/Culvert m 16955 8,593 15,958 2,995 13477 17850 7,992 14246 8,456 Water Supply (new Conn.) No. 1227 533 569 90 190 973 196 277 878 Sanitation (Latrines) No. 1182 515 695 207 0 918 512 790 843 Solid Waste Management No. 4 2 5 2 0 3 2 3 2 (Collection Points) Street Lighting (Houses No. 1201 558 987 225 0 1254 512 790 868 covered) 42 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A 43 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents (i) Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project -gozar identification report by Annette Beitting – 25 November 2004 (ii) World Bank, April 2004, Preliminary Engineering Design for Typical Settlements to be upgraded (iii) Mid-term Review, KURP, 2007 (iv) Development Credit Agreement (DCA), KURP (vi) Project Restructuring Paper, KURP (vii) Internal Note: The Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project: A Review of Implementation (viii) Input to ICR: Review of Infrastructure Costs (internal document) 44