Lewis Through a Looking Glass: Public Sector Employment, Rent-Seeking, and Economic Growth

Alan Gelb, John B. Knight, and Richard H. Sabot

What Adam Smith wrote in 1776 is still broadly true: “Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes are by public, prodigality and misconduct.”
Governments in developing countries should and do provide valuable goods and services, but resources are wasted when public revenues support unproductive employees (at the expense of productive workers).

The accumulation, in little more than a decade, of even a small part of the total labor force in an unproductive sink can sap the economy of its dynamism, eliminating improvements in living standards for all but the few who obtain rent-yielding jobs.

Moreover, creating sheltered employment tends to be self-perpetuating. It creates and consolidates vested interests that seek to perpetuate the protected jobs. In the inverse of the Lewis model, the extent of surplus labor increases, rather than diminishes, over time.

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Alan Gelb, John B. Knight,
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1. **Introduction**

In his seminal article Lewis (1954) depicted the process of economic growth as one in which labor is transferred from a traditional sector, containing surplus labor and characterized by disguised unemployment, to a dynamic capitalist, or modern, sector in which the profit calculus prevails and labor is fully employed. Lewis made no distinction between the private and state roles in the modern sector; the organization and control of economic activity were irrelevant to his model.

That distinction is crucial to this paper, however. Public enterprises and bureaucracies commonly have motives other than profits; they may be subject to political pressures for employment provision or themselves have employment objectives. We argue that the labor transfer process outlined by Lewis can give rise to surplus labor -- in the sense that the marginal product of labor is less than the wage -- in the public part of the modern sector and that this may deprive the modern sector of its dynamism. Since Lewis wrote, empirical research has cast doubt on the existence of significant non-seasonal disguised unemployment in rural areas (Berry and Sabot, 1984, pp. 100-4). Instead of labor moving from a surplus labor sector, the transfer may thus be reversed, i.e. labor leaves a sector in which income equals marginal product for one in which the wage exceeds marginal product. In this paper we view Lewis through a looking glass.
The Lewis model has been criticized for its assumption of full employment in urban labor markets. Variants have been developed which incorporate open urban unemployment and disguised unemployment in a free-entry, flexible-wage part of the urban sector (Harris and Todaro, 1970, Fields, 1975, Sabot, 1979). The excess migration and urban unemployment that equilibrates rural and urban expected incomes when the modern sector wage exceeds the rural supply price of labor has attracted much attention in the literature, but it is not well established that the social costs of such static labor misallocation are quantitatively important. In this paper, we argue that a policy response to the excess demand for high wage jobs -- of which urban unemployment is a manifestation -- in the form of public sector employment creation can incur social costs that are potentially more important because they involve waste of investment resources that can grow cumulatively over time.

The rapidly expanding literature on rent-seeking behavior and directly unproductive activities (DUPs) in developing countries, initiated by Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982), is relevant to our interpretation of the policy response to unemployment. Rent-seeking in the labor market can take three forms: lobbying for rents (e.g. trade union pressures to raise wages); investing in rent search (e.g. voluntary unemployment while seeking rent-yielding jobs); and lobbying for the provision of rent-yielding opportunities (e.g. pressures for the creation of more high-wage employment). Our concern is with the third, less-thoroughly explored type.
Section 2 presents some disparate but relevant evidence on the nature and potential magnitude of surplus labor in the modern sector. Section 3 draws on public choice theory and the 'new political economy' to explain how the phenomenon might arise. Section 4 sets out a simple computable general equilibrium model designed to show that modern sector surplus labor can generate dynamic resource costs. We quantify these costs in Section 5: numerical simulations examine the response of economic growth to the accumulation of modern sector surplus labor and the sensitivity of this relationship to changes in behavioural and policy assumptions. Section 6 concludes.

2. Some Suggestive Evidence

There appears to be a structural difference between the industrialized market economies and the developing economies with regard to public sector employment. In the 23 developing countries for which data were available for a year near 1980 public sector employment averaged 44 per cent of total non-agricultural employment (Heller and Tait, 1983); extreme cases included Ghana (74 per cent), India (72 per cent), Tanzania (78 per cent) and Zambia (81 per cent).\(^1\) The equivalent figure for 14 industrialized countries was 24 per cent.

Heller and Tate (1983, pp. 15-16), using cross-sectional evidence, find that public sector employment declines, *ceteris*

\(^1\)The definition of 'non-agricultural' employment is not provided but it appears to include only employees reported in surveys of establishments.
paribus, as income per capita rises. By contrast, time-series evidence for industrialized countries suggests that they have experienced a gradual increase in the importance of public sector employment as their income per capita has risen (e.g. Martin, 1982, Musgrave and Musgrave, 1980, pp. 142-3). Its importance in the developing countries of today is, therefore, greater than would be predicted from this historical experience, apparently because of the more interventionist character of their governments.

Moreover, time-series evidence for some developing countries indicates that public sector employment has been growing rapidly. Table 1 presents a sample of 14 developing countries for which comparable data on public sector employment are available for recent years a decade or more apart. In every case employment in the public sector grew more rapidly than wage employment in the private sector, and in some cases the latter declined. In a substantial number of developing countries the public sector has been the dominant source of employment expansion in recent years: the median share of the public sector in the increase in total employment in our sample was between 71 and 87 per cent.

Much of this, of course, may have been due to the growth in provision of valued goods and services, or to the nationalization of private enterprises. Nevertheless, the greater the size of the public sector the greater the scope for lobbying for more jobs. The

2 Most developing countries do not publish statistics on public and private sector employment.
motivation may be provided by economic rents. The mean government wage averaged 4.6 times national income per capita in the low-income countries of the Heller and Tait sample compared with 1.7 times in the high-income countries (p. 47). This may be due not only to a relative scarcity of human capital but also to wages set above the supply price of labor.

A World Bank report comments on the independent employment-creating function of public enterprises:

Overmanning at all levels is common since public undertakings are often viewed as employers of last resort; hiring decisions frequently result from the exercise of political patronage while dismissal procedures are cumbersome and ineffective.... These practices lead to frequent losses which are almost invariably financed from the national treasury or the banking system (World Bank, 1979, p. 65).

This theme has been echoed by other researchers. Take the Indian case. Bhagwati and Desai (1970, p. 163) argued that political involvement in Indian industrial public enterprises contributed to excessive hiring of unskilled labor, whereas the private sector was less vulnerable to political pressures. Chaudhuri (1978, p. 158) argued that public enterprises had become a drain on saving, partly because of their underutilization of both capital and labor. In 1980-83, public enterprises in India accounted for 13 per cent of GDP, 35 per cent of gross capital formation but only 2 per cent of gross national saving (United Nations, 1985, pp. 171-2). Jha (1980, p. 71) explained 'the reckless expansion of the bureaucracy' as the response of successive governments to 'pressure to create jobs at any cost which they have found extremely difficult to resist'. Bardhan
(1984) noted that the incremental capital-output ratio had risen more in the public sector industries than in the private sector (pp. 29-30). He attributed this, and low capacity utilization in the public sector, to the 'pervading atmosphere of the politics of patronage'. 'Overstaffing, feather bedding, fake payrolls' and other employment irregularities in public enterprises were condoned in the general atmosphere of 'parasitism on the state' (pp. 69-70).

It has been claimed that state manufacturing enterprises in Turkey, which accounted for 36 per cent of employment in manufacturing in 1979, seriously waste resources. This was said to be condoned by government because of vested interests (Walstedt, 1980, p. 201). Managers claimed that 'the politicians would not allow us to let go of surplus personnel' (p. 202) while others argued that the managers themselves were largely political appointees who carried out political objectives, e.g., 'to increase the workforce beyond the needs of production' (World Bank, 1981, p. 26). In 1976 labor input per unit of output was higher in the public than in the private sector in all eleven Turkish manufacturing sector activities in which the two sectors were comparable, and capital input per unit of output was higher in nine cases. For a weighted average of these activities, the ratio of public to private labor inputs per unit of output was 1.97 and that of capital inputs 1.66. These figures imply that surplus labor represented half of the total in public sector enterprises, and surplus capital 40 per cent (Krueger and Tuncer, 1982, derived from Table 5).
Hill (1982) obtained similar results for the weaving industry in Indonesia. Capital per unit of output in 1977 was 1.6 times higher in public than in private enterprises in the case of fully automatic looms and 5.4 times in the case of semi-automatic looms. For labor input per unit of output, the ratio was 1.25 (fully automatic looms) or 1.90 (semi-automatic looms) owing to the employment of more operative, administrative and clerical staff. Hill explained these findings in terms of inadequate managerial incentives and political interference (pp. 1020-22).

If results such as these obtain in the manufacturing sector, they are likely to apply a fortiori to the provision of government services unrestrained by market competition. The problem has been endemic in the public service as well as in the state corporations of Ghana. Public service employment grew by 68 per cent over the period 1960-65 and a commission of inquiry concluded that 'there is widespread underemployment in the public sector' (Mills-Odoi, 1967, p. 28). But vested interests had been formed, and its recommendation that public sector employment should be considerably reduced was not implemented (Mensah, 1969, p. 21). Later Killick (1978, ch. 9) argued that overmanning remained one of the major problems of state enterprises in Ghana; and between 1975 and 1982 public service employment grew by 15C per cent.

A number of other governments, including those of Egypt, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritius and Sri Lanka, have explicitly acted as 'employer of last resort', particularly for university graduates
(World Bank, 1983, p. 103). In Egypt public sector employment increased from less than 10 per cent of total employment in 1960 to 30 per cent (50 per cent of non-agricultural employment) in 1976 (Handoussa, 1983, table 1, Hansen and Radwan, 1982, p. 62). Overmanning was estimated at 40 per cent in 1976 (p. 207). Because graduates were a free good to public agencies -- funds were automatically provided -- the bureaucracy had an interest in expansion, even though the marginal product of labor may well have been negative.

In Latin America, during the recent period of macroeconomic adjustment to external imbalance, consumption has declined relative to production, as expected, and private sector employment has fallen. However, public sector employment has been protected, indeed expanded, in some of these countries (Pfefferman, 1987). Brazil offers an interesting example of differences in public and private employment responses. With severe recession in 1983, output and employment in the private non-financial sectors contracted sharply while the banking system reaped seigniorage gains from accelerating inflation. With the start of the Cruzado Plan in 1986 inflation fell sharply. Over a three-month period about 150,000 employees -- some 20 per cent of the labor force -- were dismissed as the private banking sector retrenched. The public banks made no such response, although generally in a weaker financial state than the private banks.
3. **Towards a Theory of Government Employment Response**

The 'new political economy' approach to government policy views government not as a maximizer of social welfare but as provider of political favours to pressure groups (Becker, 1983) or an organizer of political support for staying in power (Bates, 1983, ch. 5). Within this approach, government interventions which generate rents and cause inefficiency are frequently capable of rational explanation. Private interests seek economic rents through their influence over public policy, and governments respond in order to satisfy favoured political supporters. To governments the creation of economic rents represents a relatively costless way of acquiring political resources.

Olson (1965, 1982) has argued that small groups are better able to organize for collective action than large groups on account of the 'free rider' problem, and therefore have disproportionate lobbying power. And small organizations are, similarly, more willing to incur the costs of pressing for measures which raise their members' income by redistributing income, even if aggregate income declines, than for measures which raise the income of society in general. According to Olson, rent-seeking lobbies are like 'wrestlers struggling over the contents of a china shop...' (1982, p. 44).

We neither wish nor need to reject entirely the view of government as an exogenous maximizer of social welfare. It is sufficient that this role be tempered by elements of rent-seeking behavior. Ill-functioning mixed economies with powerful
bureaucracies and little public accountability are fertile grounds for rent-seeking behaviour and patronage. The distribution of patronage depends on the social and political systems. Economic rents may be dispersed either narrowly to the few -- such as politicians and bureaucrats in a kleptocracy -- or more broadly by being passed down the line to favored groups -- such as party loyalists. In many developing countries the powerful are subject to endemic lobbying from members of client and kinship groups. Governments are particularly prone to such influences in Africa. Wherever rents derive from holding jobs, there is likely to be lobbying for jobs. Lobbying for extra public sector jobs takes various forms. It can take place at the individual level or through group lobbying. Governments may also respond to unemployment by creating public sector employment if they fear its consequences for political stability. Political pressures to distribute the benefits of a trade windfall may cause government to respond in part by expanding public sector employment (Auty and Gelb, 1986) but when the windfall ceases, lobbying by trade unions may maintain employment and ailing private sector firms are likely to be taken over by government. Freeman (1986, p. 76), in his survey of public sector unionism, concludes that its distinctiveness lies in '...union potential to

\footnote{Hyden (1983) has argued that there is a pervasive network of support among groups connected by blood, tribe, community, and other affinities. Such groups use political power to promote the interests of their members, one of the methods being tribalism and nepotism in hiring practices (p. 17). African bureaucracies and public enterprises have been politicized through such pressures.}
shift demand outward through the political process' rather than move employment along a demand curve.

The size of the surplus labor 'sink' in the public sector depends on the relative power of the employment lobby. We would expect the strength of demand for public sector employment to vary positively with the gap between the public sector wage and the supply price of labor. However, because pressures from other lobbies grow as the public sector wage bill mounts, government resistance to the employment lobby may also increase with the size of the wage gap.\footnote{Collier (1986) uses such a countervailing lobbying framework to examine the effects of exogenous shocks on public sector employment and wages.}

The introduction of a government response into a simple two-sector model is shown in Figure 1. Total labor supply is depicted on the horizontal axis, with rural employment being measured from the left hand origin 0 and urban employment from the right hand origin 0'. On the vertical axis are measured marginal products and wages. The marginal product curves of the rural sector and the urban modern sector (sectors 1 and 2 respectively) are \( m_{pl1} \) and \( m_{pl2} \). In competitive equilibrium a common wage rate \( (w_{10} = w_{20}) \) is established and employment in sectors 1 and 2 is respectively OA and O'A.

An exogenous raising of the modern sector wage to \( w_{21} \) -- we assume that the wage in the public and private components of the modern sector is the same -- creates a misallocation of labor, with rural employment expanding to OD and modern sector employment contracting to O'D; the wage gap becomes \( w_{21} - w_{11} \). The introduction
of a probabilistic migration relationship then creates urban unemployment in the model. Given the simplest probability function, equilibrium urban unemployment can be shown by means of the rectangular hyperbola $h_1 h_1$. Modern sector employment remains $O'D$, urban unemployment is $CD$, and rural employment contracts to $OC$, its corresponding marginal product being $w_{12}$.

Now introduce a government response to unemployment. As the wage gap and thus unemployment increases, pressure from the employment lobby is assumed to increase relative to pressures from competing lobbies, so that the public sector employment response is positive. Given unemployment $CD$, government responds by creating employment in an unproductive 'sink' (sector 3), which in turn generates more migration and unemployment, and so on, until a new static equilibrium is reached. The new urban sector demand curve is the sum of the labor demands of sectors 2 and 3.

In the new equilibrium, sector 2 employment is $O'D$, sector 3 employment is $BD$, urban unemployment is $EB$, and labor in sector 1 is residually determined as $OE$. The marginal products of labor in the sectors 1, 2 and 3 are respectively $w_{13}$, $w_{23}$, and 0. The loss of

5The probability of modern sector employment for a worker in the urban sector equals the ratio of modern sector employment to urban labour force.


7For diagrammatic purposes the wage intervention is defined in terms of $w_{21} - w_{20}$, the difference between the modern sector wage and the competitive outcome. The diagram would be more complicated if the wage intervention were defined in terms of the sectoral wage gap $w_{21} - w_{11}$ as is done in the model to be computed below.
output due to government response and consequent allocative inefficiency is shown by the area under $mpl_1$ between $E$ and $C$. Quantitative results corresponding to this case -- which also take account of the impact on productive investment of the taxation of sector 1 or 2 to finance the sink -- and to the previous two cases are presented in Section 5.

4. A CGE Model with Government Employment Response

The model is kept as simple as possible; it comprises three sectors: rural (sector 1), urban (sector 2), and non-productive government (sector 3). The productive government sector is included in sector 2. The supply functions in the productive sectors are Cobb-Douglas:

$$y_i = A_i K_i^{\alpha_i} L_i^{1-\alpha_i}$$  \hspace{1cm} (i = 1, 2) \hspace{1cm} (1,2)

where $y$ is production, $A$ a parameter, $K$ and $L$ capital and labor, and $\alpha$ factor shares. Wages in the productive sector are set neo-classically by post-tax marginal products:

$$w_i = p_i(1-t_i)(1-\alpha_i)(y_i/L_i).$$ \hspace{1cm} (3,4)

There may, however, be a wage gap, a constant urban/rural ratio:

$$w_2 = (1 + \delta)w_1.$$ \hspace{1cm} (5)

The labor force is made up of employment in the three sectors plus unemployment:

$$L = L_1 + L_2 + L_3 + U.$$ \hspace{1cm} (6)

Unemployment is an urban phenomenon; expressed as a proportion of the urban labor force, its rate is therefore:

$$u = U/(L_2 + L_3 + U).$$ \hspace{1cm} (7)
The wage gap is assumed to induce excess migration and urban unemployment, as in the Harris-Todaro model. If the probability of urban employment depends on the ratio of urban sector employment to urban labor force, (7) can be expressed as \( u = (w_2 - w_1)/w_2 \) (e.g. Fields, 1975, pp. 167-8). However, as this generates implausibly high rates of unemployment for plausible values of the wage gap, a migration 'damp factor' \( (m > 1) \) representing, for instance, risk-aversion, psychic costs of migration, or lack of information on the part of rural dwellers, is introduced:

\[
\frac{(w_2 - w_1)}{mw_2}.
\]

Government attempts to absorb some of the unemployed in the unproductive sector, employing them at a wage equal to that in the urban productive sector:

\[
L_3 = gU.
\]  

Government is assumed to respond to urban unemployment, rather than directly to the political pressures generated by the wage gap, but the unemployment rate is itself a function of the gap. If government responds to pressures from rural workers as well as from the unemployed, its response parameter, \( g > 0 \), may take a high value.

Public workers cannot be seen to be idle. In order to create the impression of jobs, the government may also provide workers in sector 3 with capital \( (K_3) \), although the sector is assumed to produce nothing of value. Examples would be the establishment of public enterprises producing zero value added at world prices, or the construction of office buildings for workers in the sink. The
capital intensity of sector 3 is some fraction, $q \geq 0$, of that of sector 2.

$$K_3 = qL_3 (K_2/L_2).$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

The returns to capital in the other sectors are given by:

$$K_i r_i = p_i (1-t_i)y_i - w_i L_i. \hspace{1cm} (i = 1,2)$$  \hspace{1cm} (11, 12)

To finance sector 3 the government levies taxes on total outputs of sectors 1 and 2 at tax rates $t_1$ and $t_2$. The government budget is balanced:

$$
\sum_{1,2} t_i y_i = w_2 L_3 + [qp_1 + (1-q)p_2]I_3.
$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

Investment in sector 3 depends on the depreciation rate ($d$):

$$I_{3,t} = K_{3,t+1} - (1-d) K_{3,t}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

Total demand is the sum of factor payments after tax in the productive sectors plus government expenditure. Value of demand $D$ equals value of supply, and markets clear:

$$D = \sum_{1,2} K_i r_i + \sum_{1,2} w_i L_i + L_3 w_2 + [qp_1 + (1-q)p_2]I_3.$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

$$D = \sum_{1,2} p_i y_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

$$D_1 = y_1.$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

Demand is Cobb-Douglas, so that real demands $D_i$ are:

$$D_1 = qD/p_1$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

$$D_2 = (1-q)D/p_2.$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

In the conventional CGE model prices clear markets and inputs determine outputs. Here output in sector 3 is independent of inputs.
and tax rates adjust endogenously to satisfy the government budget constraint and clear markets by reconciling absorption with output.

The model is updated via labor force growth, technical change and capital accumulation:

\[ L_{t+1} = L_t (1 + g) \]  
(20)

\[ A_j, t+1 = A_j, t \ (1+tj) \]  
(21)

\[ K_2, t+1 = K_2, t \ (1-d) + I_2, t \]  
(22)

It is assumed, in keeping with the Lewis model, that productive capital accumulation occurs only in sector 2 and not in sector 1.

With a balanced budget, total income equals total output. Saving and investment can therefore be shown as:

\[ S = s_0 (y_1 + y_2) = I_2 + I_3. \]  
(23)

Hence:

\[ I_2 = s_0 (y_1 + y_2) - I_3. \]  
(24)

Productive investment is diminished to the extent that non-productive investment occurs. However, \( I_2 \) might depart from this value in either direction:

\[ I_2 = s_0 (y_1 + y_2) - I_3 + wF = s_0(y_1 + y_2) \]  
(25)

\[ I_2 = s_0 (y_1 + y_2) - I_3 - wC = s_0(y_1 + y_2) - I_3 - w_2L_3. \]  
(26)

\( wF (= I_3) \) is additional forced saving: a Soviet-type government can raise taxes without affecting productive investment, i.e., squeeze private consumption to maintain productive investment as a proportion of output. \( wC (= w_2L_3) \) is the additional consumption required to maintain private consumption at its previous level in the face of taxation yielding no consumption benefits. In this case, productive investment is reduced by the full extent of taxation, equal to non-
productive expenditure. The same result would be obtained if the effect of the government budget was to transfer income from profit-recipients, with a marginal propensity to save of unity, to workers, with a marginal propensity of zero.

If people save only out of their income in excess of subsistence \( (\pi = w_{10} = w_{20}) \), we have equations (23')...(26') respectively, e.g.

\[
S = s_1 (y_1 + y_2 - \pi L). \tag{23'}
\]

Table 2 sets out plausible parameter values to be assumed in the model, and initial conditions in the base period. The Generalized Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) was used to set up and solve the model.

5. Simulation Results

We present results for six different cases. The first, 'misallocation', involves a wage gap \( (\delta = 1.5) \) and the associated sectoral misallocation but no urban unemployment \( (m = 10,000) \) and no government employment response \( (g = 0, q = 0) \). In the second, 'Harris-Todaro', the wage gap is assumed to generate urban unemployment \( (m = 3) \). In the third and fourth, 'government response', government responds to urban unemployment by creating government employment \( (g > 0) \). The fifth and sixth cases, 'full government response', have government respond both by employing workers in the sink \( (g > 0) \) and providing them with capital \( (q > 0) \). The government response and full government response cases distinguish between 'weak
pressures' for employment \((g = 0.5, q = 0.5)\) and 'strong pressures' \((g = 0.9, q = 1.0)\).

The behavior of the economy over 13 'annual' periods is simulated in these six cases.\(^8\) Tables 3 and 4 show the behavior of relevant variables in or between the base period (period 0) and the final period (period 13).

The misallocation case, corresponding in Figure 1 to wages \(w_{11}\) and \(w_{21}\) and employment \(OD\) and \(O'D\) in sectors 1 and 2 respectively, is taken to be the base run. It is chosen in preference to the competitive labor market case \((w_{10} = w_{20})\) because the object is to contrast the effects (stressed in the literature) of introducing Harris-Todaro unemployment into a distorted labor market with the effect of in addition introducing a government response function; to include the static and dynamic costs of labor misallocation without unemployment would blur the comparison. Given a net saving rate of 0.17, capital accumulates at 3.7 per cent. Since labor grows at 2.0 per cent there is capital deepening. This, together with technical progress at a rate of one per cent in the rural and two per cent in the urban sector, generates growth in output of 4.6 per cent and in

\[^8\] Since the parameter values for the assumed rates of change from one period to another correspond to typical annual rates of change in developing countries, results in the form of rates of change per period can be regarded as 'annual' rates of change.
output per worker of 2.5 per cent. The base run captures a number of the characteristics of a relatively successful developing economy.⁹

The Harris-Todaro case corresponds to wages \( w_{12} \) and \( w_{22} \), employment OC, O'D and unemployment CD in Figure 1. Urban unemployment is 20 per cent of the urban labor force and, since the wage gap and migration damp factor are fixed, it remains there over the 13 years. Although rural employment and output fall, total output is only 2 per cent lower in period 0 in the Harris-Todaro case than in the misallocation case: the static effect of urban unemployment is small. Moreover, any dynamic effect is negligible: output per worker still grows at 2.5 per cent. The attention paid in the literature to migration-induced unemployment is out of proportion to the trifling social cost of such unemployment suggested by our simulations.

The case of government response can be depicted in Figure 1 as wages \( w_{13} \) and \( w_{23} \) and employment OE and O'D in sectors 1 and 2 respectively, employment BD in the sink and unemployment EB. The effects are qualitatively the same whether we consider 'strong' or 'weak' employment pressures, but they differ quantitatively.

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⁹The assumption that capital accumulation takes place only in sector 2 is in the spirit of the Lewis model and draws support from empirical evidence for a number of developing countries: it is commonly claimed that capital intensity is higher in the urban modern sector than in the rural sector, and that there is a net transfer of saving from the latter to the former (for instance, Meier and Johnston, 1984). Indeed, the capital stock of the rural sector might be interpreted as land. Rental rates on capital diverge in the model owing to the rapid growth of capital in sector 2: increasing land rents per acre are normal with economic growth. Employment growth occurs at the same rate (2.0 per cent) in both sectors.
former response function is not implausibly large; although government creates almost one sink job for every person unemployed, sink employment expressed as a proportion of the number of rent-seekers ($U + L_1$) is, by period 13, only 5.4 per cent when the pressures are strong, compared with 2.6 per cent when the pressures are weak. As a proportion of the urban labor force sink employment is 18 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.

Expenditure on sink employment crowds out productive investment. $K_2$ grows at 7.2 per cent in the misallocation case, and 7.1 percent in the Harris-Todaro case. When there are pressures for job creation, the rate of growth of $K_2$ drops to 6.3 per cent if they are weak and to 5.6 per cent if they are strong. The static effect on output (a fall of 3.4 per cent in period 0 when pressures are strong) is itself greater than in the Harris-Todaro case. More important, however, is the dynamic effect, retarding the growth of output each year by 0.5 per cent when the pressures are weak and by 0.9 per cent if they are strong.¹⁰

In the final case the diversion of capital into the sink has no effect on sink employment or urban unemployment but productive investment suffers further. In period 13 the sink accounts for 4.0 per cent of the total capital stock in the weak pressures case and

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¹⁰ The Harris-Todaro case would produce dynamic effects analogous to the government response case (without investment response) if government provided an open-ended compensation scheme for the unemployed. In most developing countries government unemployment compensation schemes, if they exist at all, are weak and confined to those already in modern sector employment.
for 13.2 per cent in the strong pressures case; and for 12.8 and 42.9 per cent respectively of the increment to the total capital stock over the 13 periods.

The further loss of saving for productive investment reduces the annual rate of increase in $K_2$ to only 5.8 and 3.8 per cent respectively. Output per worker grows at only 1.6 per cent in the case of full government response with weak pressures and at 0.5 per cent with strong pressures. On this last scenario improvement in living standards is thus very largely eliminated. Moreover, the attempt to reduce unemployment is futile: the number of unemployed workers is substantially higher than in the Harris-Todaro case.

Various sensitivity analyses were conducted; these generally confirmed that the results are robust. In particular, alternative saving assumptions were explored. One sensitivity exercise is to replace saving equation (26) with its alternative formulation, (26'). Instead of assuming that income is saved at the rate $s_0 = 0.25$, we assume that income above a subsistence level (the initial competitive wage) is saved at $s_1 = 0.50$. The annual growth of output per worker remains effectively the same (2.6 per cent) in the base run, but the effect of introducing government response is greater. In the case

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11The choice of tax rates $t_1$ and $t_2$ affects the relative production and employment of sectors 1 and 2, but the basic result is little different.
of full government response with strong pressures the fall is to 0.2 per cent instead of to 0.5 per cent per annum.\textsuperscript{12}

Introducing the intermediate saving equation (24), we find that the annual growth of output per worker becomes 1.0 per cent in the case of full government response with strong pressures. Thus the reduction in growth (1.5 per cent) remains significant, being three-quarters of the reduction in the case of (26). But the assumption that saving occurs only out of income in excess of subsistence again increases the sensitivity of the growth rate to the presence of a sink: on saving assumption (24') as with (26), annual growth of output per worker is reduced from 2.5 per cent to 0.5 per cent when full government response with strong pressures is assumed.\textsuperscript{13}

Only in the Soviet-type case -- equation (25) -- is economic growth little affected by the government response. Here the annual growth of output per worker falls from 2.5 only to 2.0 per cent. The main effect is a reduction in the level of consumption in all periods. For instance, in the final period consumption in the case of full government response with strong pressures is 15 per cent below its level in the misallocation case. The Soviet-type

\textsuperscript{12}Both in this case and in the cases reported below, the static and dynamic effects of the sink are combined; in no case does the static effect account for more than 0.3 percentage points of the fall in growth of output per worker.

\textsuperscript{13}A more sophisticated version of (24'), allowing saving propensities out of subsistence income and additional income of 0.15 and 0.30 respectively and keeping the real subsistence level of expenditure constant as the relative prices of products 1 and 2 vary, produces a corresponding fall in annual growth of output per worker from 2.2 to 0.5 per cent.
assumption is implausible for most developing countries, however, implying as it does that governments have the power to increase taxation simply by squeezing consumption.

6. Conclusions

Our modification of Lewis' model takes its cue from another great development economist writing 178 years before him:

Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes are by public prodigality and misconduct. The whole, or almost the whole public revenue, is in most countries employed in maintaining unproductive hands..... Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the produce of the other men's labor. When multiplied, therefore, to an unnecessary number, they may in a particular year consume so great a share of this produce, as not to leave a sufficiency for maintaining the productive laborers, who should reproduce it next year. The next year's produce, therefore, will be less than that of the foregoing, and if the same disorder should continue, that of the third year will be still less than that of the second.....(Smith, 1776, pp. 342).14

Our concern is not as broad as that of Smith (1776) and Bacon and Eltis (1976), for whom the non-marketed sector as a whole was unproductive. Governments in developing countries should, and do, also provide valuable goods and services which generate a derived demand for factors of production. But wasteful diversion of resources into the public sector, over and above the derived demand for resources, can result from rent-seeking and rent-creating behaviour.

There is an important difference between the Smithian approach and the now-conventional welfare theoretic approach to development.

14Quoted in Bacon and Eltis (1978, p. v.)
The latter views government as imperfect but well-meaning and educable, as definitely part of the solution rather than as part of the problem. Both approaches are simplistic; however, this paper constitutes another nibble at the edges of the prevailing paradigm and a building block for the more sophisticated theory of policy-making in developing countries that should come to replace it.

We have shown that the accumulation, in little more than a decade, of even a small proportion of the labor force in an unproductive 'sink' can sap the economy of its dynamism, eliminating improvements in living standards for all but the few who obtain rent-yielding jobs. The dynamic cost of public sector surplus labor appears to be much more important than the static social cost normally attributed to urban unemployment in the context of probabilistic migration models. Fiscal resources are needed to support the sink and its investment claims, thereby diverting resources from productive investment. Moreover, creating sheltered employment encourages further rent-seeking, migration and unemployment. The experiments conducted to examine the sensitivity of the model to its various assumptions suggest that the main conclusion is robust.

Instead of postulating a non-productive sector we could have modelled government employment response as an expansion of modern sector employment beyond the level at which the marginal product equals the wage. Instead of having zero productivity, the additional employees would then be used as productively as possible in the modern
sector. The model would be analytically equivalent to one conventionally justifying an employment subsidy, but would differ from it in the motivation for the policy intervention\textsuperscript{15}. However, this assumption is inconsistent with surplus labor being confined to the public sector. Nor is it plausible that excess labor is allocated among public enterprises according to the elasticity of the marginal product of labor with respect to employment. Our zero marginal product assumption does not necessarily define the other extreme. It can represent an average of positive and negative marginal products in the sink, or it may incorporate negative externalities, for instance, morale effects on other public sector employees. The urge to find tasks for sink employees can also induce rent-creating regulation of the private sector.

The phenomenon of public sector surplus labor has been most obvious under populist, highly interventionist leaders. It may be more insidious in a milder form, however, because its effects, which may take several years to become visible, are less attributable; it is less likely, therefore, to be corrected. But recognition of the i?1-effects of surplus labor may not be sufficient to reverse policies. Hysteresis applies: the government's response itself creates or consolidates vested interests which seek to perpetuate i*. Economists search for explanations of why some developing countries have succeeded in growing rapidly while some others, equally well

\textsuperscript{15} More generally, the technical relationships analysed in this paper stem from the literature on shadow pricing, of which Sen (1960) is a pioneering and Anand and Joshi (1979) a recent example.
-endowed and with similar rates of saving, have failed. One strong
focus has been on foreign trade regimes; the Lewis model, when
viewed through a looking glass, is suggestive of another explanation
for failure.
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Auty, Richard and Gelb, Alan (1986). "Oil windfalls in a small parliamentary democracy: their impact on Trinidad and Tobago", *World Development*, 14, 9, 1161-75.


equation: interrelations among development, employment, and food consumption", Journal of Economic Literature, 22, June, 531-74.


### Table 1 -- Selected Developing Countries: Growth of Wage Employment in the Public and Private Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Public (per cent per annum)</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage share of public sector in increase of total wage employment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1973-83</td>
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<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1966-76</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1960-78</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1960-80</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1963-61</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>1963-82</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1970-84</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1971-83</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>-3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1963-83</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>1970-84</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1967-82</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1966-80</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
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<td>Unweighted mean</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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**Sources:**

Brazil: *Brazilian Economic Studies*, No. 5, *Rais 83*; (urban wage employment).


Egypt: Hansen and Redwan (1982), Table 15; (establishments of 10 or more employees only).


India: *Statistical Abstract of India*, 1982; (private establishments of 10 or more employees only).


Panama: Echevarria (1985), from official statistical sources.

Peru: *Compendio Estadistico del Sector Publico no-financiero, 1968-84*, Anuario Estadistico del Sector Trabajo, 1981 (wage employment was extrapolated backwards by two years).


Trinidad and Tobago: *Annual Statistical Digest, 1971/2, Quarterly Economic Report, July-Dec. 1984*.

Venezuela: *Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informatica*, various years (in Echevarria, 1985).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Values (invariant)</th>
<th>Parameter Values (base period)(^1)</th>
<th>Experimental Parameter Values</th>
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<tr>
<td>Factor shares (\alpha_1 = 0.5, \alpha_2 = 0.5)</td>
<td>Labour supply (L = 75)</td>
<td>Wage gap (\delta = 0, 1.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depreciation rate (d = 0.08)</td>
<td>Capital stock (K_1 = 333, K_2 = 167, K_3 = 0)</td>
<td>Migration damp factor (m = 0, 3, 10,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price of sector 2 output (numeraire) (P_2 = 1)</td>
<td>Employment (L_1 = 50, L_2 = 25)</td>
<td>Government response parameter (g = 0, 0.5, 0.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical progress rate (\tau_1 = 0.01, \tau_2, = 0.02)</td>
<td>Output (Y_1 = 100, Y_2 = 50)</td>
<td>Government capital damp factor (q = 0, 0.5, 1.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor force growth rate (\lambda = 0.02)</td>
<td>Wage (w_1 = 1.0, w_2 = 1.0)</td>
<td>Saving rates (s_0 = 0, 0.25)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Price of sector 1 output (P_1 = 1)</td>
<td>(s_1 = 0.5, 0)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rental on capital (r_1 = 0.15, r_2 = 0.15)</td>
<td>Tax rates (t_1 = 0, t_1 &gt; 0)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) These initial values relate to the first period, when \(\delta = 0\), whereas the calibration of the model required that changes be introduced only in the third period. This third period is referred to in the text and subsequent tables as the base period, period 0.
Table 3 -- Simulation Results: Employment, Unemployment, Labor Force, Capital and Rental Rates, Base and Final Periods

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<tr>
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<td>Rural sector employment ($L_1$)</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>80.8</td>
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<td>Urban sector employment ($L_2$)</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sink employment ($L_3$)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (U)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor force ($L = L_1 + L_2 + L_3 + U$)</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>100.9</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>100.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban labor force ($U = L_1 + L_2$)</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rent-seekers ($U + L_1$)</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unemployment as percentage of:
- Labor force
- Urban labor force

Employment in sink as percentage of:
- Labor force
- Urban labor force
- Unemployment
- Rent-seekers

Capital stock:
- Rural sector ($K_1$)
- Urban sector ($K_2$)
- Sink ($K_3$)
- Total

Capital stock in sink as percentage of:
- Total capital stock
- Increment to total capital stock

Rental rates on capital as percentage:
- Rural sector
- Urban modern sector

Notes:
1. The GAMS algorithm was run for 16 periods but model calibration required that the various effects be introduced in the third period, referred to as period 0.
2. "Weak pressures" are defined as $g = 0.5$ in the case of "Government response" and $g = 0.5, q = 0.5$ in the case of "Full government response". "Strong pressures" are defined as $g = 0.9$ in the case of "Government response" and $q = 0.9, q = 1.0$ in the case of "Full government response".
3. The productive investment equation corresponds to equation (26) with $s_0 = 0.25$. The taxation equation corresponds to (13) with $t_1 > 0, t_2 > 0$, i.e. taxes are levied on both rural and urban production at the same percentage rate ($t_1 = t_2$).
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<tr>
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<td>Output</td>
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<td>Period 0</td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>123.2</td>
<td>121.4</td>
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<td>Period 13 (period 0 = 100)</td>
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<td>177.4</td>
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<td>Static percentage change (in period 0)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-3.4</td>
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<td>Average percentage increase per period:</td>
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<td>Output per worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Static percentage change (in period 0)</td>
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<td>Static plus dynamic effects</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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Figure 1.
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