Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 95199-BF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION PROGRAM APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF EUR 35.8 MILLION (SDR 25.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO BURKINA FASO FOR A PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM June 12, 2015 Governance Global Practice Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization BURKINA FASO - FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate as of April 30, 2015) Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) US$1.00 = CFAF 600 US$1.00 = Euro 0.8935 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACG Anti-Corruption Guidelines ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution AfDB African Development Bank ALIAS On-line Pay and Civil Service Employment Administration System (Access en Ligne Information Administratif et Salarié) ARMP Procurement Regulatory Authority (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics) ASCE High Authority for State Oversight (Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle de l’Etat) BUNEE National Agency in charge of Environmental Assessments (Bureau National des Evaluations Environnementales) CAST Designated Special Treasury Account (Compte d’Affectation Spéciale ouvert au Trésor) CDP Congres pour la Démocratie et le Progrès CEB District Offices of MENA (Circonscription d’Education de Base) CF Financial Comptroller (Contrôleur Financier) CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment CGCT General Code for Local Government (Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales) CID Computerized Expenditure Circuit (Circuit Intégré de la Dépense) CIE Integrated Accounting System (Comptabilité Integré de l’Etat) CNMA National Public Administration Modernization Committee (Conseil National de Modernisation de l’Administration) CNSS National Social Security Fund (Caisse National de Securité Sociale) COGES School Management Committee (Comité de Gestion) CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Report CPIA Country Poverty and Institutional Assessment CPS Country Partnership Strategy DCMP Central Directorate for Public Procurement (Direction Centrale des Marchés Publics) DGB General Directorate for the Budget (Direction Générale du Budget) DGCF General Directorate for Financial Control (Direction Générale du Contrôle Financier) DGCMEF General Directorate for the Control of Public Tenders and Financial Engagements (Direction Générale du Contrôle Des Marchés et des Engagements Financiers) ii DGMP General Directorate for Procurement (Direction Générale des Marchés Publics) DGPEDD General Directorate of Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (Direction Général de la Protection Environnementale et du Développement Durable DGTCP General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounts (Direction Générale du Trésor et de la Comptabilité Publique) DIAN Individual Employee File System (Dossier Individuel des Achevé Numérisé) DLI Disbursement-Linked Indicator DMP Procurement Department (Direction des Marchés Publics) DP Development Partners DPENA Provincial Directorate of MENA (Directions Provinciales de l’Education Nationale et de l’Alphabétisation) DPO Development Policy Operation DRENA Regional Directorate of MENA (Directions Regionales de l’Education Nationale et de l’Alphabétisation) ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ESMS Environmental and Social Management System ESSA Environmental and Social Systems Assessment EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product GI Global Integrity HR Human Resources IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICT Information and Communication Technologies IDA International Development Association IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards IGE General State Inspectorate (Inspection Générale de l’Etat) IGF General Finance Inspectorate (Inspection Générale des Finances) INSD National Statistics Institute (Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie) MATDS Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (Ministère de l’Administration du Territoire, de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDGs Millennium Development Goals MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances) MENA Ministry of National Education and Literacy (Ministère de l’Education National et Alphabétisation) MERH Ministry of Environment and Water Resources (Ministère de l’Environnement et des Ressources Halieutiques) MFPTSS Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (Ministère de la Fonction Publique du Travail et de la Sécurité Social) MJPDHC Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Ministère de la Justice, de la Promotion des Droits Humains et Civiques) MOD Specialized Procurement Agency (Maître d’Ouvrage Delegué) MOE Ministry of Environment MoU Memorandum of Understanding MTEF Medium-Term Expenditure Framework ODA Official Development Assistance PAF Performance Assessment Framework PAP Priority Action Plan PAST Three-Year Public Financial Management Action Plan iii (Plan d’Actions Sectoriel Triennal) PDO Program Development Objective PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability PER Public Expenditure Review PFM Public Financial Management PNJ National Justice Policy (Politique Nationale de Justice) PPP Public-Private Partnerships PRGB Budget Management Reform Plan (Programme de Renforcement de la Gestion Budgétaire) PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSDMA Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of the Administration (Plan Stratégique Décennal de Modernisation de l’Administration) PSEF Sectoral Program of Education and Training (Programme Sectoriel de l’Education et de la Formation) PSG Public Sector Governance SADINA Employee Access to Employment Files System (Système D’Access Dossiers Individuel Numérisé des Agents) SAI Supreme Audit Institution SCADD Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable) SIGASPE Integrated Human Resource Management System (Système Intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale du Personnel de l'Etat) SIMP Integrated Information System for Procurement (Systeme Integré des Marchés Publics) SPMA Permanent Secrétariat for the Modernisation of the Administration (Secrétariat Permanent de la Modernisation de l’Administration) SRFP Strategy for Strengthening Public Finance (Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques) SSA Sub-Saharan Africa TA District Court (Tribunal d’arrondissement) TAdmin Administrative Tribunal TD Local Departmental Court (Tribunal Départemental) TGI Superior First Instance Court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) TI First Instance Court (Tribunal d’Instance) TOFE Government Financial Operations Table (Tableau des Opérations Financières de l’Etat) UNDP United Nations Development Program VAT Value Added Tax WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Senior Practice Director: Mario Marcel Cullell Country Manager: Mercy Miyang Tembon Practice Manager: Guenter Heidenhof Task Team Leader: Serdar Yilmaz iv BURKINA FASO PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM Table of Contents Page I. STRATEGIC CONTEXT .................................................................................................................. 1 A. Country Context ................................................................................................................................ 1 B. Sectoral and Institutional Context ..................................................................................................... 2 C. Relationship to CPS ........................................................................................................................ 13 II. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................... 15 A. Program Scope ................................................................................................................................ 15 B. Program Development Objective/s ................................................................................................. 21 C. Program Key Results and Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs) ............................................... 22 D. Key Capacity Building and Systems Strengthening Activities ....................................................... 23 III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................................................ 24 A. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements (See Annex 1)........................................................... 24 B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation........................................................................................................... 24 C. Disbursement Arrangements and Verification Protocols (See Annex 3) ............................................ 25 IV. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 26 A. Technical.......................................................................................................................................................26 B. Fiduciary .......................................................................................................................................................29 C. Environmental and Social Effects .............................................................................................................32 D. Integrated Risk Assessment Summary .....................................................................................................33 E. Program Action Plan ...................................................................................................................................34 ANNEXES: Annex 1: Detailed Program Description ..................................................................................................... 35 Annex 2: Program Results Framework and Monitoring ............................................................................. 48 Annex 3: Disbursement Linked Indicators, Disbursement Arrangements and Verification Protocols ....... 56 Annex 4: Summary of Technical Assessment ............................................................................................ 67 Annex 5: Fiduciary Systems Assessment ................................................................................................... 93 Annex 6: Summary of Environmental and Social Systems Assessment ................................................. 107 Annex 7: Integrated Risk Assessment ...................................................................................................... 111 v Annex 8: Program Action Plan ................................................................................................................. 113 Annex 9: Implementation Support Plan .................................................................................................... 117 Annex 10: Development Partner Support ................................................................................................. 118 FIGURES: Figure 1: Protest and riot activity in Burkina Faso, 1997 - 2014 .................................................................. 1 TABLES: Table 1: Regional Distribution of Civil Servants.......................................................................................... 5 Table 2: Program Financing (Euro Million) ............................................................................................... 21 Table 3: Program Key Results Indicators ................................................................................................... 22 Table 4: Disbursement-linked Indicators by Reform Path .......................................................................... 23 Table 5: Overall Benefits of the Program ................................................................................................... 28 BOXES: Box 1: The success of public financial management reforms in Burkina Faso. .......................................... 3 Box 2: The strength of collective action of educational workers .................................................................. 9 Box 3: Rationale for Program Selectivity ................................................................................................... 18 vi PAD DATA SHEET Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program PROGRAM APPRAISAL DOCUMENT Africa Governance Basic Information Date: June 18, 2015 Sectors: General public administration (100%) Country Manager/ Mercy Tembon/ Themes: Administrative and civil service reform (100%) Director: Ousmane Diagana Practice Manager/ Guenter Heidenhof/ Sr. Practice Director: Mario Marcel Cullell Program ID: P132216 Team Leader(s): Serdar Yilmaz Program Implementation Period: 4 years Start Date: July 9 2015 End Date: December 31, 2019 Expected Financing Effectiveness Date: November 9, 2016 Expected Financing Closing Date: December 31, 2019 Program Financing Data [ ] Loan [ ] Grant [ ] Other [X] Credit For Loans/Credits/Others (US$M): Total Program Cost : Euro 53,108,763 Total Bank Financing : Euro 35,800,000 Total Co-Financing : Euro 5,347,088 Financing Gap : Euro 11,961,675 Financing Source Amount BORROWER/RECIPIENT Euro 5,347,088 IBRD/IDA Euro 35,800,000 Total Euro 41,147,088 Borrower: Burkina Faso Responsible Agency: Ministère de la Fonction Publique du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale Contact: Jacques Sosthene Dingara Title: Secrétaire Permanent de la vii Modernization de l’Administration Telephone No.: 226 70 28 73 16 Email: dijaso@yahoo.fr Expected Disbursements (in Euro Million) Fiscal Year FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 Annual 3,800,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 2,000,000 Cumulative 3,800,000 13,800,000 23,800,000 33,800,000 35,800,000 Program Development Objective(s) To improve selected service standards in targeted regions of the ministries responsible for primary education, justice, labor and civil service Compliance Policy Does the program depart from the CAS in content or in other significant Yes [ ] No [X] respects? Does the program require any waivers of Bank policies applicable to Program- Yes [ ] No [X] for-Results operations? Have these been approved by Bank management? Yes [ ] No [ ] Is approval for any policy waiver sought from the Board? Yes [ ] No [X] Does the program meet the Regional criteria for readiness for implementation? Yes [X] No [ ] Overall Risk Rating: Moderate Legal Covenants: None Team Composition Bank Staff Name Title Specialization Unit Serdar Yilmaz Sr. Economist, TTL Public Sector GGODR Management Anders Jensen Senior Monitoring and Monitoring and GPSOS Evaluation Specialist Evaluation PforR Adama Ouedraogo Sr. Education Specialist Education GEDDR Begnadehi Claude Senior Operations Impact Evaluation AFMBF Bationo Specialist Gabriel Dedu Governance Specialist Public Sector GGODR Governance Pierre M. Lenaud Program Assistant Public Sector GGODR viii Governance Maimouna Mbow Fam Senior Financial Financial Management GGODR Management Specialist Mamata Tiendrebeogo Senior Procurement Procurement GGODR Specialist Fatou Fall Social Development Social Safeguards GSURR Specialist Abdoulaye Gadiere Environmental Specialist Environmental GENDR Safeguards Alain Hinkati Senior Financial Financial Management GGODR Management Specialist Ngor Sene Financial Management Financial Management GGODR Specialist Boubacar Diallo Procurement Specialist Procurement GGODR Suzanne Rayaisse Procurement Assistant Procurement GGODR Faly Diallo Financial Officer Loans Operations WFALA Maya Abi Karam Senior Council Legal LEGAM Non Bank Staff Name Title Office Phone City Bronwyn Grieve Consultant-- Dakar Governance/Public Sector Reform Celestin Bado Consultant—Public Ouagadougou Sector Reform ix Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program 1. The social uprising that recently led to the sudden end of the almost three decade rule of President Blaise Compaore and the dominant Congres pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) party marks a historic turning point for Burkina Faso. President Blaise Compaore held the presidency since 1987, leading the CDP through successive presidential and legislative electoral victories. Until recently, the country enjoyed relative political stability in contrast to the other countries in the region. However, from 2011, citizen dissatisfaction with the government escalated (see Figure 1). By 2014, the governing party’s attempt to extend the constitutional limitation on presidential tenure to allow President Compaore to stand for another term in 2015 was met with significant resistance from the population. Public protests across the country and the burning of the Parliament ultimately forced the President to step down. The government was dissolved, the Constitution suspended and a transitional government was installed, with the support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to assist the country in moving towards peaceful and democratic elections. Figure 1: Protest and riot activity in Burkina Faso, 1997 - 2014 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014 Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data source for Burkina Faso 1997 – 2014, http://www.acleddata.com 2. This profound political change took place in a national context of persistent poverty, weak human development outcomes and declining citizen trust in government. In the last two to three decades, sound macro-economic policies and steady investment have enabled Burkina Faso to sustain significant growth rates, maintain relative macro-economic stability and reduce poverty levels. The country has maintained higher than average growth rates relative to 1 the sub-region since 2000, the average growth rate per year has been 5.5 percent and annual growth rates in 2012 and 2013 reached 9 percent and 7 percent respectively. This provided opportunities for increased public expenditures on health, education and water and sanitation, as well as for more targeted social service provision.1 Burkina Faso has also received significant aid flows in the last decade, being a relatively good performer in terms of its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score.2 Yet a high population growth rate of 3.2 percent, a non- inclusive pattern of growth and the less than optimal performance of public administration have limited the impact of economic growth and stability on poverty reduction, anti-corruption and service delivery. Though poverty has declined from 51 percent in 2003 to 46.7 percent in 2010, Burkina Faso continues to be ranked among the poorest countries in the world. The country ranks third last in the United Nations Human Development Index3 and is unlikely to meet many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).4 The rise in unrest reflects, in part, a gradual decline in public trust and growing disillusionment in the government’s capacity to deliver and to be held accountable to its citizens. 3. As the country begins anew, the critical challenge for the Burkinabe government will be to restore public confidence by strengthening governance institutions as well as developing a modern and accountable administration that is capable of delivering quality services and tangible development outcomes. Despite the cautious optimism that prevails during the transitional period, political and social stability remains fragile. There is lingering discontent with existing social and economic conditions and the population has high expectations of change. There remains a risk that potentially negative developments could unfold in the post- election period. Against this background, there is a need to strengthen public sector governance institutions as well as increase efforts to meet the development objectives outlined in the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable - SCADD) approved in June 2011. 4. Government effectiveness in Burkina Faso is comparatively weak. The country scores poorly on a range of selected public sector and governance indicators (see Annex 1). In terms of the quality and professionalism of the public administration, Burkina Faso scores lower than other countries in the region (Ghana and Senegal) and lower than both the averages for Sub- Saharan African countries and low income countries according to the Global Integrity Indicators. The Doing Business and Enterprise Survey indicators also highlight public sector inefficiencies 1 The budget for pro-poor spending increased from 5.3 percent of GDP in 2006 to 7.6 percent in 2011 and is projected to reach 7.8 percent by 2015. 2 Burkina Faso’s CPIA score since 2010 has been 3.78, making it one of the best performers in West Africa. 3 In 2013, Burkina Faso’s score on the United Nations Human Development Index was 0.343, giving the country a low ranking of 183 out of 186 countries. 4 The under-five mortality and infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births in 2012 were 102 and 66 respectively, well above the MDG targets of 69 and 35. Illiteracy rates also remain high at 28.7 percent. The proportion of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities in 2012 was 17 percent, compared to the MDG 2015 target of 54 percent. 2 in the country, notably with respect to judicial performance. These inefficiencies are reflected in the low execution rates of public investment budgets in key sectors.5 5. Performance on public sector reform has been uneven. On the one hand, the country is regarded as being one of the top performers on public financial management reform in the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) region (see Box 1). In addition, the country has been particularly successful in creating progressive legal and institutional foundations. The first and second generation of public sector reforms in Burkina Faso established the legal and regulatory framework and introduced modern systems for an effective and efficient administration. But, none of these reforms have translated into improvements in the performance of public administration in delivering services. Poor development outcomes are partly to blame for the recent popular insurrection, as the population is frustrated with the quality and quantity of public services. A rise in the level and number of civil servant strikes in recent years also points to growing levels of frustration amongst civil servants with regard to their working conditions. Box 1: The success of public financial management reforms in Burkina Faso. Since the 1990’s, Burkina Faso has earned a reputation in the WAEMU as being at the pinnacle of progressive public financial management (PFM) reform. Across the region, Burkina serves as a model with respect to its budgetary and financial management and revenue mobilization systems. A joint analysis conducted in 2012 by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) identified the reasons behind the successful implementation of PFM reforms in Burkina Faso. Notwithstanding, rent-seeking in the administration was commonplace, within a system of entrenched clientelism and limited political contest. Despite capacity limitations, Burkina Faso made significant progress in introducing multi-year programmatic budgets. The report highlights three key factors that resulted in the successful implementation of these cross-cutting public sector reforms. First, a technical secretariat to manage the Ministry of Finance’s Strategy for Strengthening Public Finances (Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques - SRFP) played a critical role in effectively coordinating PFM reforms across the ministries. Well-equipped and staffed with talented and reformist civil servants, the Secretariat coordinated with development partners and accompanied sectoral ministries in the roll-out of the PFM reforms. Second, the reforms were introduced on a progressive basis, starting with the introduction of programmatic budgeting in a handful of ministries. This allowed energies to be focused on supporting the sectoral ministries and it also facilitated the capitalization of lessons learned for scaling up the exercise. Finally, generous donor support was a key factor. The combination of technical assistance provided to support the implementation of the SRFP and general budget support over an extended period created effective incentives for the achievement of results, whilst ensuring institutional capacity was in place for implementation. Source: Benoit Taiclet et al (2012) ‘Burkina Faso: An Implementation Strategy for the Harmonized WAEMU Public Finance’: WB, UNDP ÌMF. 6. Past attempts at public sector reform have done little to improve the performance of the public administration: a) Burkina Faso enacted the first generation of public sector reforms in the early 1990s. These reforms aimed at adapting the public sector to the changing economic environment – which involved a shift from a planned economy to a market-based economy. The reforms focused predominantly on technical improvements to the modus operandi of the central administration without necessarily addressing the highly centralized structure of the public administration system. 5 The execution rate of public investments in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were respectively: 59 percent, 26 percent and 32 percent. 3 b) The second generation of public sector reforms, which began in 1998, involved a focus on decentralization and civil service reforms. In 1998, the recommendations of the independent Commission Nationale de la Décentralisation informed a wave of legislation to advance decentralization reforms.6 The main objective of the new set of legislation was to devolve decision-making authority in order to improve allocative efficiency in service delivery. The General Code for Local Government (Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales - CGCT) adopted in 2004, envisaged a combination of decentralized and deconcentrated local government structures. 7 Despite advances over the years, the implementation of these reforms has been slow and uneven. c) Civil service reforms introduced during the second generation of reforms principally involved strengthening the legal and regulatory framework,8 including the enactment of legislation governing civil servant employment which set forth the general conditions for employment as a civil servant. The reform efforts also focused on establishing systems to manage human resources and payroll. These reforms have taken time to implement and many have yet to yield significant impact in terms of administrative efficiency or in terms of creating appropriate incentives to optimize civil servant performance. 7. The shortcomings of earlier reform efforts reflect a combination of political inertia, as well as strategic, institutional coordination and implementation failures. Public sector reform is, by nature, a traditionally complex reform area. Despite government commitment to public sector reform in the past and the existence of reform-minded senior level bureaucrats, there was limited political engagement and weak institutional leadership during the reform implementation process. Accordingly, insufficient resources were allocated to the reform processes and successes were measured on the basis of outputs (usually in the form of legal and regulatory texts) rather than improvements in the performance of the public administration. At the same time, the process of developing consensus upstream and engaging potential opponents to reform, including the union movement, was underestimated. Resistance to reform not only slowed the pace of implementation, but resulted in policy reversals and extensive government efforts downstream to negotiate with unions. Reform shortcomings also reflected institutional coordination issues. In Burkina Faso, diffuse coordination of the Public Sector Governance (PSG) reform agenda by three central ministries (Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Ministry of Civil Service) was compounded by the limited engagement of sectors in implementing the reforms. Sector ministries have incentives, driven by donor-financed projects, to focus on service delivery results rather than tackling institutional 6 The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 040/98/AN du 3 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) which defines basic principles for decentralization in Burkina Faso; (ii) Loi N°041/98/an du 06 août 1998 (JO N°38 1998) which establishes the distinction between administrative circumscriptions (village- department- province) and the decentralized entities (municipality and province); (iii) Loi n°042/98/AN du 06 août 1998 which describes governance structures (executive and legislative branches) of decentralized entities, local administrations, state agents in decentralized entities, consultative bodies at the local level; and (iv) Loi N° 43/98/AN du 6 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) which lays out the timetable for implementation of decentralization reform. 7 Deconcentrated units are the representatives of the central government and have supervision (tutelage) responsibility over decentralized units. 8 The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 10/98/AN du 21 avril 1998 which articulates state intervention modalities and allocation of powers between the state and other development actors; (ii) Loi N°013/98/an du 28 avril 1998 which establishes civil service; (iii) Décret N°2000-86/PRES/PM/MFPDI du 13 mars 2000 which establishes performance evaluation system for the civil service. 4 issues. The implementation of medium-term public sector reforms was, therefore, sidelined in favor of quick wins, e.g. school or clinic construction. Finally, as with all reform efforts in Burkina Faso, implementation challenges linked to limited resources and weak capacity played an important role. 8. As a result, the performance of the public administration in Burkina Faso is presently hampered by a series of shortcomings. First, the highly centralized nature of decision-making authority and the concentration of financial and human resources at the center limit the administration’s capacity to respond to the needs and expectations of citizens . The administrative system is built on a notion of ex ante controls rather than ex post performance monitoring. Decisions on budget and human resources are made by key ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (MFPTSS), and the role of other ministries is largely confined to carrying these out. As a result of the high level of concentration of decision-making power at the center, service delivery ministries have limited administrative authority to ensure effective implementation of public policies. At the same time, the central ministries, most notably the MFPTSS, lack sufficient capacity to provide strategic orientation to line ministries. Concentration of decision- making powers at the central level is accompanied by concentration of financial and human resources at the center. For example, more than 56 percent of civil servants reside in the central region where the capital city, Ouagadougou, is located (see Table 1). In the education and justice sectors, there are a disproportionately high proportion of front-line service delivery professionals (teachers and magistrates) working as administrators in each ministry. 9 The combined effect of the concentration of financial and human resources is the lack of availability of resources for front-line service delivery. Table 1: Regional Distribution of Civil Servants Region Number of Civil Servants Share Boucle du Mouhoun 4,588 4.91% Cascades 1,834 1.96% Centre 52,594 56.33% Centre-Est 3,720 3.98% Centre-Nord 4,823 5.17% Centre-Ouest 4,437 4.75% Centre-Sud 2,103 2.25% Est 3,337 3.57% Hauts-bassins 5,106 5.47% Nord 4,088 4.38% Plateau Central 1,716 1.84% Sahel 2,346 2.51% Sud-Ouest 2,668 2.86% Total 93,360 100% Source: European Union Report, 2010. 9 For example 30 percent of magistrates are assigned to administrative functions in the Ministry of Justice. 5 9. Second, the process of decentralization/de-concentration has yet to yield measurable improvements in public service delivery. While political decentralization has been consolidated in the last decade, with the last round of local government elections held in 2012, the central government, through its tutelle authorities, still retains large ex ante controls on most decisions taken by decentralized local governments. Local governments are constrained from carrying out their mandates by the limited (and often late) resources that are sent from the center and by the absence of qualified civil servants. The process of de-concentration was intended to: (i) accompany the new and poorly capacitated local governments in carrying out their mandates; and (ii) facilitate improved access by the population to services provided by the central government. Due to the slow and varied pace of de-concentration in the sectors, local governments do not receive adequate levels of support from regional offices of ministries and de- concentrated departments have not consistently succeeded in bringing public administration closer to local populations. 10. Finally, the civil service environment lacks appropriate incentives to motivate administrators and front-line public service providers to deliver results. Various attempts have been made by successive governments to improve human resource management and strengthen the institutional capacity of the public administration. However these efforts have not been particularly successful in attracting and motivating a capable and performance–driven body of civil servants or in optimizing the use of human resources for the efficient provision of services. Civil servant performance tends not to be results-oriented or focused on individual accountability and civil servants have become increasingly disgruntled by their working conditions. Critical factors that influence this civil service environment include: a) Weak civil service reform coordination and implementation capacity: From a strategic perspective, the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (MFPTSS) remains poorly equipped, both in terms of financial resources and in terms of expertise, to lead a coherent and results-oriented strategic direction for human resource management that is operationally relevant to the individual ministries. The devolution of responsibility for human resource management to the line ministries and the regional departments of the MFPTSS that started in 2005, paved the way for a more efficient and responsive management of the state’s human resources. However, these de-concentrated structures have limited capacity or authority to manage human resources effectively. b) Inadequate information systems: Concerted efforts have been made to streamline and strengthen civil service information systems in recent years through the introduction of the Integrated Human Resource Management System (Système Intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale du Personnel de l'Etat - SIGASPE), however the government has not completely shifted to a consolidated system for capturing all human resource processes.10 Accordingly, recruitment, career management and retirement processes are often delayed and neither the MFPTSS nor the line ministries possess easily accessible 10 There are two major systems integration issues: (i) the coverage of SIGASPE is limited within the administration as several ministries, as well as deconcentrated ministerial departments are not connected to the system; and (ii) its interface with other information systems, such as the Individual Employee File system ( Dossier Individuel des Achevé Numérisé - DIAN), the Employee Access to Employment Files system, ( Système D’Access Dossiers Individuel Numérisé des Agents - SADINA) and the On-line Pay and Civil Service Employment Administration system (Access en Ligne Information Administratif et Salarié - ALIAS) is not completed. 6 and up-to-date information on the civil service for planning, budgeting and monitoring of the wage bill. c) Limited effectiveness of HR and career management processes: Efforts to promote pay for performance are hampered by the lack of clearly defined job descriptions, career plans and poorly defined performance contracts. Furthermore, individual civil servants only have modest incentives for performance as there are very limited opportunities for in- service training and career advancement and there are few linkages between objective performance evaluation and promotions. d) Low institutional capacity: The weak capacity of mid to senior level managers within the civil service to strategically manage and monitor reform programs limits accountability for results. A lack of regular in-service training in planning, programming and monitoring and evaluation, as well as weaknesses in the systems and processes for developing, implementing and monitoring reform programs substantially contribute to this capacity deficit. e) Poor working conditions remain a particular concern at all levels of the civil service, particularly for front-line service delivery units. Deteriorated office spaces, restricted availability of basic office supplies, the uncontrolled, inefficient and limited use of information technology and the absence of reliable archiving facilities limit efficiency and impact upon morale. f) Political economy factors, including the prevalence of patronage within the administration, have had the effect of politicizing the civil service and creating entrenched rent-seeking interests. This has in turn minimized incentives for ensuring the effective implementation of civil service reforms, particularly amongst mid to senior level managers. 11. Shortcomings in public sector performance impact upon service delivery outcomes across the sectors and ultimately influence levels of trust in government. In Burkina Faso, cross-cutting efforts to modernize public administration and reform the civil service have often failed to make the nexus between public sector performance and improvements in service standards. Accordingly, the government’s laudable efforts to improve capacity, strengthen legal and regulatory frameworks and improve internal processes have seldom been accompanied by perceptible changes in the manner in which services are provided to citizens. In the current national context, establishing service standards in key sectors and creating the appropriate incentives and operating environment for civil servants to meet those standards, would help to strengthen the compact between the government and the Burkinabe population. The proposed Program aims to improve selected service standards in the labor, primary education and justice sectors. Each of these three ministries provides services that are strategically relevant to strengthening public trust in government and enhancing social cohesion.11 Situation in the Labor Sector: 12. The government’s regulation and protection of labor standards represents a strategically critical service for workers. During the period under President Sankara’s 11 For further details on the strategic relevance and rationale behind the selection of the three ministries, refer to Annex 4 and Section 2 of the Technical Assessment. 7 leadership in the 1970s, the rights of workers became a central element of national discourse. Three decades later, this concern for the protection of worker’s rights continues and is reflected in the influence of the trade union movement across public and private sectors. Labor problems in one sector often trigger solidarity strikes across public and private sectors. As an acknowledgement of the need to uphold labor standards for all workers, the government merged the ministries of civil service and labor together in 2011. 13. However, in both the formal and informal sectors, compliance with labor laws by employers is weak and registration of employees in the National Social Security Fund remains limited. In the formal private sector, only 42.5 percent of workers have a written contract of employment and 44.5 percent have a pay stub. 12 The situation is worse in the informal sector: only 7 percent of employees have a work contract and 3.8 percent a pay stub. In the formal private sector, 55.8 percent of high level executives do not have paid annual leave, 63.7 percent do not benefit from social security retirement contributions and only 13.7 percent benefit from healthcare coverage. As for employees and workers in formal private enterprises, 68.1 percent do not have paid annual leave and 79.5 percent do not benefit from social security retirement contributions. In order to provide social protection services (paid leave, social security, and retirement benefits) to workers in compliance with labor laws, there is a need to increase efforts to ensure that employers register them with the National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Securité Sociale- CNSS). 14. Labor inspections are strategically significant to the government’s efforts to enforce laws. Labor inspections create visibility with respect to the conditions to which workers are subjected at the enterprise level. They also offer a valuable opportunity for the sensitization of employers with respect to their obligations towards employees. At present both the coverage and frequency of labor inspections are limited, leaving a significant proportion of the formal and informal workforce, including those in high risk sectors (mining, construction) with little to no government surveillance over their employers. Situation in the Primary Education Sector: 15. Primary education represents a core service provided by the government in Burkina. Improving educational outcomes through the provision of accessible and quality education is vital to achieving the National Education and Training Sector Program (Programme Sectoriel de l’Education et de la Formation - PSEF) objective of strengthening human capital. The quality of service delivery in primary education also has a direct influence on citizen perceptions of the public administration and a spill-over effect on social cohesion. The closest contact that much of the population has with civil servants is through their interactions with primary school teachers. Teachers represent the most regionally disperse body of civil servants, providing front-line services at the village level. Teachers also make up over one third of all civil 12 Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie. BURKINA FASO - ENQUETE 1-2-3 2001-2003, PHASE 1 : ENQUETE EMPLOI, Dernière modification Nov 25, 2013 (National Institute of Statistics and Demography, Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie—INSD). 8 servants in the country13 and have historically been amongst the most active and influential civil servants with regards to industrial action and strike activity (see Box 2 for further details). Box 2: The strength of collective action of educational workers Problems in the education sector in Burkina Faso have historically been at the core of broader civil unrest in the country. Events in the last decade serve to highlight this nexus. The strength and collective organization of trade unions in the education sector has resulted in a disproportionately high rate of collective action by teachers. Between 2007 and 2014, teacher strikes have accounted for over sixty percent of all industrial action by civil servants. Trade unions in the sector are closely united and strikes initiated in either the public or private sectors frequently develop into collective action across the sector. The disruptions to education services induced by this collective action have also led students and their parents to mobilize and voice their dissatisfaction. In 2010, for example, parents marched in solidarity with teachers over concerns regarding the quality of education. Civil unrest amongst students has triggered some of the most significant incidents of political unrest in the country in recent years and has prompted emergency social measures to be adopted by the government. The death of Justin Zongo while in police custody in 2011 and the ensuing closure of schools and protests by students marked the beginning of the political crisis in 2011. More recently, in 2013, student protests in Ouagadougou over the cost of living forced the government to allocate public resources to short term measures to increase student loans. 16. Notwithstanding significant improvements in access, 14 the quality of education represents a binding constraint to achieving educational development outcomes. The completion rate, though improving significantly from 41.7 percent in 2008 to 55 percent in 2012, remains low, with vast regional disparities (including a 33 percent difference in completion rates between urban and rural areas). Poor learning outcomes are also observed in the sector. In grade 6 for example, about 65 percent of students do not acquire the basic competencies specified in the curriculum.15 17. The instructional time provided to students in classrooms has a particular impact on the quality of education. Student instruction time has featured as a priority area of reform in Burkina since 2001. Under the current PSEF, a specific objective of Program 2 on improving the quality of education is increasing the hours of instruction in primary schools.16 In 2008, the then Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy (MEBA), commissioned a report 17 to assess actual instructional time and to identify the principal factors that limit teacher time on task. The report estimated that actual teacher time on task averaged 574 hours, representing a loss of 40 percent of time in the school calendar year. The report highlighted the linkages between instruction time, teacher management and broader civil service reform. It concluded that institutional factors 13 50,331 civil service agents were employed in the Ministry of National Education and Literacy (MENA) in 2012, representing 42 percent of the entire civil service: Annuaire Statistique, MFPTSS, 2012. 14 The Gross Enrollment Rate reached 79.6 percent in 2012, up from 72.4 percent in 2008. 15 Country Status Report 2012. 16 Activities identified in the PSEF to support this objective include (i) the reorganization of the school week; (ii) the timely recruitment and placement of teachers to start the school year; (iii) the timely distribution of school supplies; (iv) the implementation of a mechanism to monitor teacher time on task; (v) the implementation of incentives to reward schools that demonstrate high levels of teacher time on task. 17 Etude Relative au Volume Horaire effectif de l’Enseignement Primaire au Burkina Faso ”, CTB/I&D. January 7, 2008 9 related to the inefficient management of the school year and teachers accounted for almost half of the instructional time lost. 18. Government efforts to address teacher time on task have had limited success for the following reasons: a) Difficulties in measuring instruction time. The monitoring mechanism introduced in 2010 is not reliable. Reporting has not been undertaken in a detailed manner, there are no internal or external controls over reporting and the manual process is both cumbersome and susceptible to errors. These shortcomings are reflected in the 2011 report,18 in which the average actual instructional time in five pilot regions was reported at 930 hours, a figure that is well above the new national norm of 770 hours instruction time. b) Substantial delays in teacher recruitment: The process for teacher recruitment is regularly delayed and teachers are often not available in schools in time to start the school year in October. Registration for civil service examinations for teachers starts as early as April of each year and recruitment is now conducted on a regional basis. However, the sheer volume of applicants, the increased number of teacher recruits 19 and the cumbersome and manual processes for registering applicants, marking examinations and hiring and allocating recruits present ongoing challenges for the MFPTSS and the Ministry of National Education and Literacy (Ministère de l’Education National et Alphabétisation – MENA). c) Teacher management: Inefficient and bureaucratic human resource management processes result in teachers having to spend significant periods away from classrooms attending to their administrative matters related to career and salary. Although the progressive de-concentration of human resource management and payroll have limited the distances that teachers have to travel to resolve these issues, challenges remain. For example, continued reliance on manual processes for teacher transfers and the payment of indemnities require teachers to invest time and resources in preparing hard copy dossiers for submission to human resource departments and payroll. d) Control over absenteeism: Absenteeism is rarely taken into account for the evaluation of teacher performance or promotion purposes. In addition, sanctions related to absenteeism are poorly defined and seldom applied by school principals or controlled by technical inspectors. Though performance evaluation was re-introduced for teachers since 2011, it remains embryonic. Controllers in MENA lack appropriate resources to conduct field missions and, at the de-concentrated level, they seldom have adequate office or archiving space. Situation in the Justice Sector: 19. In Burkina Faso, the performance of the judicial branch of government has had a significant impact on citizen’s trust in government and on levels of social cohesion. The 18 Monitoring Report of the Implementation of the Dispositive for Measuring Instructional Time in Primary Education, MENA, 20-24 September 2011. 19 In recent years, the government has undertaken a concerted recruitment drive to address poor teacher to student ratios and to take into account the rate of demographic growth. In 2014 alone, 7,000 teachers were recruited. 10 judiciary provides both (i) a critical accountability check on executive action and public administration and (ii) a formal channel through which the grievances of citizens, including civil servants, can be addressed. The two most significant incidents of socio-political unrest in Burkina Faso over the last two decades were precipitated, in part, by public dissatisfaction with the state of the justice system. The alleged assassination of a journalist, Norbert Zongo, in 1998 and the death of a student, Justin Zongo, while in police custody in 2011 sparked widespread protests over the perceived culture of impunity, executive influence over the judiciary and the shortcomings in judicial process and the rule of law. These incidents prompted national dialogue on justice reform which further highlighted deep-seated frustrations with regard to the performance of the judiciary. 20. In particular, the weak performance of the administrative tribunals hampers the extent to which the public administration is held accountable to citizens downstream and limits the formal recourse that civil servants have against the State as an employer. In Burkina Faso, administrative cases are dealt with either by the Superior First Instance Courts (TGI) or the Administrative Tribunals (TAdmin), in the case of Ouagadougou and Bobo- Dioulasso. These courts are vested with responsibility for all matters concerning civil servant employment, land tenure, public procurement, taxation and local elections. 20 Improving the administrative justice system is therefore a principal downstream element of enhancing public sector performance and a necessary condition for protecting citizens’ rights vis a vis the State.21 21. The average time taken by administrative courts to issue judgments remains lengthy.22 In 2013, average case processing time was 1 year and 6 months, an increase of two months in comparison with the averages of 2011 and 2012. At the same time, demand in administrative jurisdictions has increased threefold in the last decade, with the highest case load concentrations in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. Improvements in case processing times in administrative jurisdictions are likely to have a significant impact upon individual litigants and upon broader civil service and public perceptions of the accountability of the public administration in Burkina. For example, the timely resolution of civil servant grievances would have significant effects on levels of civil servant motivation and accelerated resolution of land disputes could help to minimize the escalation of localized social tensions. 22. Furthermore, the poor performance of the local departmental (tribunal départemental - TD) and district courts (tribunal d’arrondissement - TA) in resolving local level conflicts affects social cohesion. The closet courts to rural populations are the local 20 The jurisdiction of the courts include : (i) contentious matters between civil servants and the State regarding their employment from recruitment to retirement, (ii) procurement- related matters including attribution, execution, interpretation and termination of contracts between private entities and the State, (iii) fiscal matters related to taxation disputes, (iv) electoral matters including irregularities in electoral lists, voting and vote counting procedures, and (v) all other administrative law matters. 21 The African Commission has determined that the right to a fair and public hearing is a general principle applicable to all legal proceedings, including administrative: see “Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa”, African Commission, DOC/OS 247, section A – General Principles Applicable to All Legal Proceedings, . 22 There is however no absolute time limit in international law for the completion of administrative judicial proceedings, and the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is dependent on the particular circumstances of the individual case.167 König v Germany, ECtHR, 28 June 1978, para 99. 11 departmental (TD) and district courts (TA). These courts are responsible for delivering civil registry documents to citizens and they also have limited jurisdiction over civil and commercial matters to the value of US$200 and over minor infringements (crop damage, animal wandering, and perimeter breaches). For civil and commercial disputes, local courts (TD/TA) are required to first attempt conciliation between the parties. If conciliation fails, the courts are required to proceed to a formal arbitration of the matter – at which point the case is legally termed ‘a contentious matter.’23 TA and TD rarely exercise their jurisdiction over contentious matters and local populations are forced to resort to informal and unenforceable means of conflict resolution. 24 23. The effective delivery of judicial services in Burkina is impeded by: a) Limited capacity for coordination and implementation of reforms. Poor systems and weak capacity for coordination within the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Ministère de la Justice, de la Promotion des Droits Humains et Civiques - MJPDHC) and between the MJPDHC and the judiciary, combined with weak monitoring processes, hamper efforts to improve the quality of judicial services. At the level of the individual jurisdictions, performance is hampered by poor working conditions, continued reliance on inefficient case management systems, limited access to laws and jurisprudence, and rent seeking behavior. b) Limited accountability for outcomes in the judiciary which is induced by weaknesses in the production of sector statistics, 25 ineffective performance evaluation and heavily politicized career advancement processes. c) Court coverage is insufficiently de-concentrated to ensure access to justice. While the construction of Superior First Instance Courts (Tribunal de Grande Instance – TGI) in the regions has advanced in recent years, these regional jurisdictions are often poorly equipped and lack adequate and quality human resources. At the local level, the local district and departmental courts are presided over by the prefect of the department who is, in principle, assisted by appointed assessors. Prefects and assessors are poorly trained in conciliation and arbitration and they are seldom paid their sitting allowance. 24. The government’s vision for the third generation of public sector reforms in Burkina Faso is focused on developing a modern performance-oriented public administration system. The Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of the Administration 2011 - 2020 (Plan Strategique Decennal de Modernisation de l’Administration - PSDMA) was approved in 2011. The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development. The strategic plan aims to provide a federating framework to improve public management across the 23 Article 53, la loi 028-2004 portant modification de la loi 010/93 ADP, portant organisation judiciaire au Burkina Faso. 24 While the local courts are in high demand for the processing of civil registry matters, they seldom exercise jurisdiction over civil and commercial disputes and rarely go beyond conciliation in such cases. According to information based on a quantitative background analysis of rural access to justice conducted in 2012, for civil and commercial disputes, local populations continue to resort predominantly to customary and informal avenues for the resolution of their disputes. 25 The Ministry of Justice does not collect statistics on case load or case processing for the local courts. 12 administration and create the necessary foundations upon which sector policies can be pursued more effectively. The PSDMA was developed following an extensive and inclusive process of national consultation. It was recently endorsed by the new transitional government through the adoption of the Second Action Plan to facilitate its implementation.26 25. Implementation of the PSDMA needs to be reinvigorated. The implementation of the PSDMA started with the first action plan covering the period 2011 to 2013. The budget allocation for the implementation of the first action plan was around US$37,800,000 (18,619,000,000 CFA) of which US$5,600,000 (2,800,000,000 CFA) came from the national budget. The implementation of the first action plan was fraught with many of the same challenges that earlier reform efforts had encountered. High level political commitment did not translate into adequate leadership. The National Public Administration Modernization Committee (le Conseil National de Modernization de l’Administration),27 which is charged with overseeing the coordination of the PSDMA, did not convene once in the three year period as envisioned in the strategy document. The Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Administration (le Secretariat Permanent de la Modernization de l’Administration - SPMA), which is charged with day to day coordination, remained underfunded and poorly equipped to lead reform efforts. The continued lack of results orientation and weak monitoring and evaluation framework made the task of monitoring progress or keeping line ministries engaged and accountable for results difficult. The new government has developed a Second Action Plan for the period of 2015 to 2018. The objective of the Second Action Plan is to strengthen public management for improved service standards within the administration. 26. The Program seeks to draw from the lessons learned from earlier public sector reform efforts to revive the implementation of the PSDMA in a new political era. It harnesses the renewed political and social commitment to reform that has been induced by the recent political changes. It seeks to address institutional coordination and implementation failures that have previously affected implementation of the PSDMA and earlier public sector reform efforts. In particular, it will focus on strengthening reform coordination and creating incentives for selected line ministries to engage in the cross-cutting reform process and achieve results. It will also use many of the levers that proved successful to public financial management reforms in Burkina Faso. 27. The PSDMA and the proposed Program are aligned with the second strategic theme of the 2013-2016 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). The CPS is based on three strategic themes: (i) accelerating inclusive and sustainable economic growth; (ii) enhancing governance for more efficient social service delivery; and (iii) reducing economic, social, and environmental vulnerabilities - and two cross-cutting themes: governance and gender equality. The Program 26 The Council of Ministers adopted the Second Action Plan on April 8, 2015. 27 The PSDMA is implemented under the guidance of the National Public Administration Modernization Committee which is chaired by the Prime Minister. The National Committee includes the ministers of MFTPSS, MEF, Communications and Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (MATDS) as vice-chairs. The day- to-day management of the modernization efforts under the leadership of the National Committee is trusted to a Permanent Secretariat. 13 features as a cornerstone operation in the second strategic theme and in the cross-cutting theme of governance. It aims at improving selected service standards in the education, justice and labor sectors. 28. The proposed Program is also aligned with World Bank’s corporate strategies. The Africa Strategy (2011) is built around two pillars: (a) competitiveness and employment and (b) vulnerability and resilience - and a foundation: governance and public sector management capacity. Poor governance has been identified as one of the main challenges underlying Africa's development. Building on lessons learnt, the Africa Strategy highlights the importance of investing in both demand and supply-side governance to enhance accountability. By strengthening institutions and improving public sector service-delivery and promoting third-party monitoring and verification of results, this Program will improve governance and enhance social accountability. The Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy 28 aims to build capable and accountable states. More specifically, it focuses on strengthening institutions and fostering transparency, participation and accountability. It also emphasizes the importance of developing robust results frameworks for governance improvements. Rationale for using the Program for Results (PforR) instrument 29. Both the government and the World Bank consider the PforR instrument to be the most appropriate for supporting the country’s program for the modernization of the administration. The PforR instrument was selected to enhance the impact of the Bank‘s financial and technical support and strengthen the overall results orientation of the government’s vision for the modernization of the public administration in Burkina Faso. In so doing it will facilitate:  Program ownership. The PSDMA is an ongoing national program with ownership at the highest levels of government. Its implementation in pilot ministries will also involve support for existing sectoral strategies that have been developed and are owned by the respective ministries. The PforR instrument will accordingly allow the government to implement its own national program.  Improvements in coordination of public sector reform efforts. The PforR supports improvements in the design of the PSDMA and in the use of the Program's systems. The Bank’s assessment of the quality of the Program, including the results framework, expenditure framework, and supporting systems, is satisfactory and the Program systems meet OP 9.00 requirements. Although the PforR operation will support specific interventions, the Bank’s contribution is anticipated to foster improvements in terms of effectiveness and efficiency in the overall program over the next 5-6 years (the implementation period for the PSDMA is 2011-2020). The ongoing policy dialogue with the government and the Bank Group’s proactive support during the preparation of the Program is already improving the quality of dialogue within the administration as well as the linkages with the PSDMA and sectoral reform strategies, and the use of the country’s 28 World Bank, Strengthening Governance, Tackling Corruption: The World Bank’s Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan, January 2012. 14 own systems. Several measures to strengthen these systems during implementation have been incorporated in the design of the Program’s results framework.  Improvements in national systems and procedures. Burkina Faso has made significant progress in PFM and procurement reforms. Through its Program Action Plan, the Program will continue to provide support to strengthen country systems related to financial and administrative controls, audits, and complaints handling. The Bank has assessed the Program’s fiduciary and environmental and social management systems and deemed them satisfactory.  Results orientation. The use of the PforR instrument will establish clear linkages between International Development Association (IDA) disbursements and the delivery of PSDMA results. In so doing, the PforR instrument reinforces the results orientation of the PSDMA. Each of the three results areas is linked to a set of simple and measurable intermediate indicators and protocols for monitoring and verification. This provides the necessary incentive for participating ministries to improve their capacity to plan, deliver and sustain public service delivery by implementing cross-cutting public sector reforms. The Program supports the gradual adoption of a results-based management in the public administration. The government recognizes the importance of focusing on results and wants to use this operation (as a demonstration effect), to support its ambition to develop and implement performance-based management throughout government as put forward in the PSDMA.  Coordination with other development partners. The use of the PforR instrument and its focus on results make it easier to coordinate between development partners and the government. The PforR provides a platform to reinforce the importance of an outcome orientation for public sector reforms. The government intends to approach other development partners to finance the implementation of PSDMA in other ministries using the same outcome orientation. 30. The PSDMA sets the short to longer term strategic orientations for the government to improve public sector performance in achieving the country’s ambitious development goals. The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development. The objective of the Second Action Plan of the PSDMA is specifically to strengthen public management for improved service standards within the administration. The Strategic Plan consists of five pillars: Pillar No 1: Improving the Efficiency and the Quality of Public Service Delivery: The overall objective of this pillar is to enhance public administration performance for sustainable development and streamline the decision-making processes, procedures and structures within the public administration. Pillar No 2: Upgrading and Improving Human Resource Capacity of the Public Administration: The purpose of the second pillar is to focus on the human resource 15 capacity framework and improve staff working conditions which are affected by outdated equipment and physical infrastructure. Pillar No 3: Promotion of Accessibility and Transparency in the Public Administration: The objective of the third pillar is to improve access to services and to establish the principle of accountability across the entire public administration. Pillar No 4: Promotion of E-governance: The fourth pillar seeks to improve the quality of public services through the use of ICT. Pillar 5: Promotion of Deconcentration and Decentralization: The fifth pillar envisages deconcentration to support an effective decentralization in favor of local development. 31. The PSDMA is a fully-developed and costed stand-alone government program. It incorporates cross-cutting public sector governance reforms that are applicable horizontally across the entire administration. Given its broad coverage across public administration, the PSDMA operates as the foundational government program upon which sectoral reform strategies are developed and implemented. Vertically, individual ministries each have longer term sector strategies that articulate the vision of the government with respect to the particular sector and that identify specific service delivery outcomes. The effective alignment and coordination of sector strategies around the PSDMA ensures consistency across the Burkinabe public administration, whilst simultaneously better connecting public sector performance and public service delivery. The PSDMA is connected with all of the sectoral strategies in Burkina Faso. For the purposes of the IDA-financed Program (defined below), the following sectoral strategies are relevant: The Strategy for Strengthened Capacity in the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (Strategie de Renforcement des Capacities du Ministere de la Fonction Publique, du Travail et de la Securite Sociale 2014-2025), was recently adopted as the long term strategic vision of the MFPTSS. The objective of the strategy is to improve the human, infrastructural, technological and material capacity of public administration to ensure decent working conditions for all workers, including civil servants, by 2025. The Sectoral Program of Education and Training (Programme Sectoriel de l’Education et de la Formation 2012-2021 - PSEF) articulates the government’s vision for the entire education sector and incorporates the sub-sector strategies for preschool, primary, primary non-formal, post-primary and vocational training. The objective of the PSEF is to achieve an efficient and inclusive education system by 2021 whereby all citizens have the educational opportunities to enable them to contribute to the socio-economic development of the country. The National Justice Sector Policy (Politique Nationale de Justice 2010-2019 - PNJ) reflects the government’s justice sector priorities. The main objectives of the PNJ are to (i) improve the performance of the justice sector by reinforcing its capacities, (ii) promote access to justice by reducing the obstacles faced by users, and (iii) reinforce and reaffirm the rights and liberties of citizens. The policy was revised in 2013 to enhance its alignment with the PSDMA. The PforR (“The Program”) 16 32. The Program is a results-based approach to supporting selected aspects of the government’s public sector modernization program in ministries responsible for civil service, labor, primary education and justice. Given the broad coverage of the PSDMA across all government ministries and across the national territory and given the finite resources available through the Program, a selective approach to supporting PSDMA implementation has been adopted. The Program is designed to support a subset of the PSDMA’s Second Action Plan (see Annexes 1 and 4). It will focus on implementation of this subset of government program reform activities in three ministries – MFPTSS, MENA and MJPDHC- and in selected regions. 33. Notwithstanding its more narrow scope, the Program will contribute to both the achievement of targeted results in each of the three ministries and systemic improvements to the quality of the public administration as a whole. The Program will provide incentives for the achievement of specific, measurable and strategically significant service standards in each of the selected ministries resulting from the targeted implementation of the PSDMA. In doing so, the Program will focus on strengthening the nexus between cross-cutting public sector management reform and tangible service delivery results in particular sectors. A detailed explanation of the results chain is provided in Annex 4. The Program will also support system- wide improvements by strengthening the institutional coordination of the PSDMA and the piloted implementation of cross-cutting PSG reforms. 34. The Program will cover discrete elements of the Government’s PSDMA expenditure program. The Program will promote the attainment of service standards in each of the selected ministries by focusing on three cross-cutting results areas: (i) improved human resource management capacity and performance; (ii) strengthened institutional capacity for policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation; and (iii) strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms. Each of these results areas corresponds to specific elements of the government’s PSDMA expenditure program. The scope of the PSDMA Second Action Plan expenditure program and the Program’s coverage of expenditures through the results areas are detailed in Annex 1 and in the Technical Assessment, which is summarized in Annex 4. 35. The three ministries targeted by the Program were selected on the basis of their strategic relevance and on the basis of the World Bank’s engagement and expertise in the sector. Each of the three ministries provides services that are strategically relevant to strengthening public trust in government and enhancing social cohesion. These ministries also face particularly challenging or acute public sector management weaknesses, which have a critical effect on the quality of service provision. The World Bank’s engagement and expertise in the selected ministries was also taken into account. Box 3 below provides a summary of the rationale for Program selectivity. Further details on the selection of ministries and regions for Program support is provided in Annex 4 and in the Technical Assessment. 17 Box 3: Rationale for Program Selectivity MFPTSS: Civil service: Enhancing the performance of public administration lies at the heart of improving government effectiveness and the delivery of public services. Civil service reform features as a critical element of public sector reform. The MFPTSS is responsible for the overall management of the civil service and for leading the public sector modernization agenda. The inclusion of the MFPTSS in the Program is therefore strategically pivotal for the effective implementation of the Program and the PSDMA. The World Bank has long been a leading development partner on civil service reform in Burkina Faso and is strategically well-placed to support the country in consolidating and improving upon its earlier reform efforts. The Program provides incentives for the government to take the necessary policy and operational changes to transition further towards a unique and integrated human resource management and payroll system that will yield efficiency gains in processing recruitments, promotions, transfers and retirement. Labor: The government’s regulation and protection of labor standards represents a strategically critical service for workers. Government efforts to monitor and safeguard labor conditions in the private sector are also a necessary complement to efforts to improve civil servant working conditions. The Directorate General of Labor (Direction Générale du Travail) in the MFPTSS is responsible for monitoring compliance with the labor laws and regulations including registration of workers with the CNSS and employers’ social security contributions. The Program’s support to improve labor inspections and increase the number of workers registered with the National Social Security Fund is an important step in providing them with social protection services (paid leave, social security, retirement) and increasing employers’ contributions to the Fund. There is no geographical selection for the implementation of activities in the MFPTSS. Human resource management improvements will be system-wide covering the whole administration. Likewise, labor sector inspections will be conducted in all regions. MENA Notwithstanding significant improvements in access, 29 the quality of education represents a binding constraint to achieving educational development outcomes in Burkina Faso. The instructional time provided to students in classrooms has a particular impact on the quality of education. Student instruction time has featured as a priority area of reform in Burkina since 2001. There are clear linkages between instruction time, teacher management and broader civil service reform. Institutional factors related to the inefficient management of the school year and teachers are estimated to account for almost half of the instructional time lost. The present Program provides appropriate incentives to strengthen coordination between the government’s public sector modernization and civil service reforms and the sectoral reforms envisaged in the education sector with respect to instruction time. In so doing, it will help to strategically address the institutional factors that limit instruction time. The World Bank has long been a leading development partner on primary education reform in Burkina Faso 30 and is strategically well- placed to continue support for the sector. The Program draws upon existing expertise and engagement in the sector 29 The Gross Enrollment Rate reached 79.6% in 2012, up from 72.4% in 2008. 30 P115264 Education for All Fast Track Initiative Project; P148062 Education Access and Quality Improvement Project 18 and seeks to complement earlier and ongoing vertical support to the sector. It also harnesses MENA’s relatively successful experience with results-based lending through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI) 31. The regions selected for improving teacher time on task were identified on the basis of learning outcomes, with priority given to the regions with the lowest level of learning outcomes. Justice: From a public sector modernization reform perspective two areas of judicial reform are particularly pertinent and realizable in the short time frame of the Program. First, improving the performance of the administrative tribunals is critical to ensuring that, downstream, the public administration is kept accountable to citizens. It also provides civil servants with a formal avenue for recourse against the State as an employer. Improving the administrative justice system is therefore a principal downstream element of enhancing public sector performance and a necessary condition for protecting citizens’ rights vis a vis the State.32 Second, improving the performance of local courts in resolving local level conflicts in a formal and objective manner is necessary to strengthening social cohesion and making core functions of the State relevant and visible to the predominantly poor and rural populations in Burkina Faso. While the World Bank has not extensively engaged in the justice sector to date, a recent background review of the justice sector in Burkina Faso, including a political economy analysis of reform implementation in the sector, has provided a strong rationale for strategic World Bank engagement. The Program will help the Ministry of Justice to reduce the delays involved in processing administrative law cases and to strengthen and scale up its pilot efforts to improve the performance of 50 local courts. The jurisdictions and regions selected for support were chosen on the basis of the high demand for judicial services registered. 36. The Program will be complemented by existing and planned sectoral support to the three ministries provided by other development partners. While the Program will not receive the direct support of other development partners, it has been designed to ensure complementarity with other development partner support to the selected ministries. Annex 10 provides detailed information on development partner support. It is anticipated that the Program will also stimulate additional donor financing for the implementation of the PSDMA. Program Activities 37. The Program provides financing for specific activities identified in the PSDMA Second Action Plan. The Program’s three results areas incorporate the following PSDMA activities (more detailed information on activities is included in Annex 1): 38. Results Area 1 – Improved Human Resource Capacity and Performance: Under the Program, the MFPTSS will lead efforts to modernize and harmonize human resource management processes and to strengthen the capacity of de-concentrated human resources (HR) departments in the relevant ministries. The MFPTSS will support: (i) the elaboration and application of sector specific HR tools (in-service training, needs projections and staff planning, career plans, sectoral motivation strategies, job profiles etc.); (ii) the improvement of HR information systems, including an expansion of the coverage of the SIGASPE internally within the three ministries, the up-dating and computerization of personnel files and an upgrading of the 31 Fast Track Initiative Grant for Basic Education - P115264 ; Fast Track Initiative Grant II for Basic Education - P119413 ; Fast Track Initiative Grant III for Basic Education - P127166 . 32 The African Commission has determined that the right to a fair and public hearing is a general principle applicable to all legal proceedings, including administrative: see “Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa”, African Commission, DOC/OS 47, section A – General Principles Applicable to All Legal Proceedings, . 19 SIGASPE functionality, including its interfacing with other information systems, such as the Individual Employee File system (Dossier Individuel des Achevé Numérisé - DIAN), the Employee Access to Employment Files system, (Système D’Access Dossiers Individuel Numérisé des Agents - SADINA) and the On-line Pay and Civil Service Employment Administration system (Access en Ligne Information Administratif et Salarié - ALIAS); (iii) the training of personnel in the human resource departments of each ministry and the further de- concentration of certain HR responsibilities; and (iv) the refinement and implementation of modern and merit-based civil servant performance management and promotion processes to further entrench a results-based focus in the public administration. 39. Results Area 2: Strengthened Institutional Capacity for Policy Planning, Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation: The Program will promote strengthened institutional capacity of the three selected ministries to develop, implement and monitor public policies. Emphasis will be placed upon: (i) strengthening the capacity of civil servant agents through in-service professional training (including managerial training in policy formulation, program budgeting, monitoring and evaluation), (ii) enhancing the systems and processes involved in policy planning, implementation and monitoring evaluation (including statistical systems, coordination and review mechanisms), (iii) improving the working environments of civil servants at the central and de-concentred levels; and (iv) further developing the use of information and communication technology (ICT) (e-Government) to improve the efficiency of information management and dissemination. 40. Results Area 3 – Strengthened Coordination Capacity for Public Sector Reforms: The activities will assist the Permanent Secrétariat for the Modernisation of the Administration (SPMA) in coordinating the implementation of the Program and the overall PSDMA. The activities make up a significant proportion of the Program Action Plan (see Annex 8 for details) and will seek to (i) improve the technical dimensions of the PSDMA and the formal rules and procedures governing the organization and management of the systems used to implement the Program; (ii) enhance the capacity and performance of the SPMA and sectoral focal points in each selected ministry; and (iii) address the fiduciary, social and environmental risks identified in the integrated risk assessment of the Program. The activities will also strengthen national ex ante control systems for fiduciary oversight with respect to the Program. The external audit institution, the Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes), will be supported to effect external controls over the Program in the later years of implementation. The High State Control Authority (Autorite Superieure de Controle d’Etat - ASCE) and the ministerial technical inspectorates will also be supported to strengthen the capacity for internal controls in the three ministries. Program Financing 41. Program expenditures are estimated to total Euro 41 million and the implementation period is anticipated to be four years from 2016 to 2019. Program expenditures will finance a subset of activities in the Second Action Plan of the PSDMA, including activities which have been drawn from the three sector strategies to populate the Second Action Plan and which are directly linked to the achievement of the DLIs and to the PDOs. The Program expenditure amount represents the full cost of direct modernization efforts in the selected three ministries, 20 excluding wages and salaries as well as recurrent operating expenditures. 33 However the complementarity of Program expenditures on sectoral activities in the government’s budget makes the potential impact of the Program on sectoral outcomes greater in value than the estimated amount of Program expenditures. For example, the Program activities to achieve the results in the primary education sector complement the activities of the MENA financed through the government budget. As such, the achievement of 770 annual hours of instruction in primary public schools in the selected three regions requires resources that are traditionally allocated to MENA’s budget, such as teacher salaries, operating expenditures of schools as well as expenditures on educational materials. It is impossible to delineate the expenditures of sectoral ministries (i.e. MENA, MJDHPC) according to geographical allocation and cost out a proportion that are only related to the achievement of the Program objectives. Because of these difficulties the government share of Program financing presented below represents only the direct budgetary allocation of the government for the implementation of the PSDMA. It doesn’t include sectoral ministries’ budgetary allocations for service delivery in the selected areas of the Program. Accordingly, the Program Financing depicted in Table 2 below underrepresents the government’s contribution to the Program as the indirect contribution of the government for the achievement of the program development objectives cannot be captured. Table 2: Program Financing (Euro Million) Source Amount % of Total Government 5,347,088 12.8 IBRD/IDA 35,800,000 87.2 Total Program Financing 41,147,088 100 42. The proposed operation would consist of a credit of EUR 35.8 million (US$40 million equivalent) for Burkina Faso, to be made available upon effectiveness and disbursed on the basis of a withdrawal application upon achievement of DLIs. The credits will be financed under Single Currency IDA credit terms, with a 38-year maturity including a 6-year grace period. The single currency amounts (EUR 35,800,000) will be converted to the final SDR amounts (SDR 25,800,000) for commitment authority and country allocation management purposes on the day of project approval. 43. The proposed program development objective is to improve selected service standards in targeted regions of the ministries responsible for primary education, justice, labor and civil service.34 33 The Program (and PSDMA) aim to support institutional strengthening of the targeted ministries. In that sense, they finance activities for public sector modernization, which are mainly non-wage and salary expenditure. The salaries of the civil servants are not part of the PSDMA or the Program. 34 The improvements are in the labor, education and justice sectors as well as human resource management in the civil service. The service standards selected are drawn from the sector strategy of each ministry. For the purposes of this Program, service standards refer to services provided by government ministries both internally within the administration and externally to citizens. 21 44. The results framework for the Program incorporates the three key results areas that are relevant to the achievement of each of the PDO level results. 35 Five indicators have been selected to measure progress towards the PDO. These indicators capture the service standard improvements in the three ministries in selected regions that are expected to be achieved through enhanced human resource management capacity, strengthened institutional capacity for policy formulation and implementation and strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms. The core indicator on direct program beneficiaries is also included in the program results framework. Table 3: Program Key Results Indicators Type Objective Indicator Share of transactions in the civil service completed within a certain PDO Level Improved management of entry and period: hiring and promotion within 28 calendar days Indicator 1 promotion of civil servants (disaggregated by: recruitment and promotion) PDO Level Improved effectiveness and efficiency Workers registered with the Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale Indicator 2 in private sector labor force inspections de Securite Sociale) PDO Level Improved management of teaching time Share of classes with at least 770 annual hours of instruction in Indicator 3 public primary schools in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions Share of judgments delivered in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dédougou and Bobo-Dioulasso regions with respect to: PDO Level Improved efficiency in the delivery of Indicator 4 judicial services  administrative law cases within 12 months  contentious matters36 by the 50 pilot local departmental and district courts in conformity with relevant procedures 45. The PDO service standard outcomes are each associated with a results chain or reform path which is clearly mapped through the Program’s results indicators. Disbursement-Linked Indicators (DLIs) are designed to provide incentives to each ministry for (i) either achieving progress along the reform paths that lead towards the attainment of the service standards that have been identified as PDO level results or (ii) actually achieving the PDO level results. The selection of specific DLIs reflects the assessment of critical challenges facing the public administration that are considered essential to the achievement of Program results through the reform paths. Moreover, they are important ingredients in the implementation of the PSDMA. The relationship between the PDO level results, their reform paths, the selected DLIs and intermediate indicators, the Program expenditures and the activities identified in the government’s Second Action Plan for the PSDMA is detailed in Annex 4 and Section 2 of the Technical Assessment. 35 Each results area consists of a set of intermediate indicators that are necessary and sequential steps to achieve the PDO outcomes as defined by the PDO indicators. The results framework and monitoring arrangements are provided in Annex 2. 36 Contentious matters are legally defined in Article 53 of loi 028-2004 portant modification de la loi 010/93 ADP, portant organisation judiciaire au Burkina Faso as the civil and commercial cases that are registered by a local court for which conciliation has failed and for which a hearing and an arbitrated decision of the local court are required. 22 Table 4: Disbursement-linked Indicators by Reform Path Reform path 1: human Reform path 2: Reform path 3: education Reform path 4: justice resources management labor DLI 1: Update of the DLI 4 : DLI 5: Improvement of the DLI 7: Establishment of a SIGASPE for better use by Number of monitoring mechanism for uniform case tracking system selected human resources private sector instruction time on task in in selected departmental and departments. employees public primary school in the district courts. registered with Sahel, Upper Basin and East the national regions. social security (Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale) DLI 2: Share of civil DLI 6: Share of public DLI 8: Share of judgments services transactions primary school classes with at issued by administrative involving hiring least 770 hours of instruction tribunals in a 12 month period (engagement/ intégration) time annually in the Sahel, (75% of which through a and/or promotion Upper Basin and East regions. written judgment) in the (reclassement) completed regions of Ouagadougou, within a 28 calendar-day Tenkodogo, Dedougou and period. Bobo-Dioulasso DLI 3: Share of new DLI 9: Share of judgments primary school teachers involving litigation matters appointed to the MENA by issued by selected August 31. departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient’s rules and procedures 46. The disbursement amounts associated with the DLIs, the definition of the DLIs, the verification protocols and the basis for the calculation of disbursements are provided in Annex 3, and will be further detailed in the program operational manual (POM). The amount assigned to each DLI reflects the mutually reinforcing relationships between improved human resource management capacity, institutional strengthening and strengthening the implementation of the PSDMA. 47. The Program envisages a more structured and systematic approach to developing the systems and capacity needed to enhance the performance of the public administration. Capacity building, for the purposes of the Program, is defined as a process by which the selected ministries will increase their ability to perform core functions and contribute to solving the development problems of the country in a sustainable manner. Due to the cross-cutting nature of the program design, the capacity building support envisaged by the Program will involve cross- cutting capacity development in a wide range of areas that are relevant to the administration generally. This will include training and coaching in human resource management, public policy making and implementation, program planning and budgeting, audit, ethics, fraud and corruption and monitoring and evaluation. It will also include efforts to strengthen various management 23 systems (human resources, IT, M&E systems). At the same time, capacity development will also be tailored to the needs of each ministry at the institutional and individual level to support the achievement of specific ministerial service standards. 48. The Permanent Secrétariat for the Modernisation of the Administration, as the designated coordinator of the PSDMA, will be the lead agency for the Program and act as the interlocutor with the Bank on behalf of the government. The SPMA will develop the Implementation Strategy for the PSDMA. The SPMA is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the activities that will produce the results targeted by the Program, in coordination with the Ministries of Education and Justice and other agencies (such as the Court of Accounts, the ASCE and the ministerial technical inspectorates). The SPMA is also directly responsible for activities identified under Results Area three of the Program. These responsibilities are detailed in Annex 1. 49. The World Bank will disburse funds based on the submission of consolidated, verified information on the performance of the DLIs. 50. The Results Framework (Annex 2) is the basis of the Program which will guide implementation and SPMA support to the participating ministries to assist them in achieving progress. It is made up of the PDO indicators and intermediate level indicators, some of which are DLIs. Each indicator has annual targets and a protocol for verification and assessment of progress. Monitoring of the indicators in the results framework will be conducted annually during the program implementation period for both DLIs and non-DLIs. This will ensure effective tracking of progress so that corrective measures can be taken to ensure the achievement of DLIs. 51. The Program will not use a dedicated/stand-alone M&E system. The M&E function will be assumed by the SPMA which has the overall coordination and responsibility for M&E for the PSDMA and the Program. The SPMA will coordinate with the ASCE as regards verification of DLIs.37 Currently the M&E capacity of the SPMA to monitor the implementation of the PSDMA is weak. To address these weaknesses, two M&E specialists will be hired to fill the capacity gap 37 The ASCE was selected as verification agency to verify Program results, which will be done in accordance with the verification protocol. This choice is based on ASCE’s role as a constitutional body with both the independence and the mandate to conduct audits of the ministries. ASCE comprises 21 internal auditors and has progressively introduced a risk-based approach, starting with the risk mapping of key ministries including civil service, justice and education which are part of this Program. ASCE is also adding value to the Program by improving internal control environment in the targeted ministries. ASCE will coordinate with ministerial inspectorates involved to ensure effective implementation of audit plans, compliance with audit methodology and risk-based approach, quality reviews of their audit reports and adequate follow-up of audit findings and recommendations. 24 and a review of the PSDMA results will be conducted as part of the PSDMA Second Action Plan expenditure program. 52. During implementation, the SPMA will provide continuous supervision of Program implementation and will closely support the participating ministries to meet their monitoring and reporting obligations under the Program. The World Bank will also provide implementation support to SPMA and the participating ministries on all aspects of implementation, monitoring, and reporting as outlined in the implementation support plan (Annex 9), including supporting the SPMA in the verification aspects of its mandate and its relationship with ASCE. 53. Once satisfied with the accuracy of the reporting, the SPMA will present annually by May 30, evidence of the DLI achievement (covering the period of January 1 to December 31 of the previous year)38 to the ASCE, which will verify the results by no later than June 30 each year in the form of the program results verification report. In order to validate the disbursement request submitted by the SPMA, the ASCE will verify all DLI target indicators through both a desk review and physical inspection of all sub-projects under the Program. These verified results will accompany any disbursement request to the World Bank by the MEF, which is expected to be submitted once a year (June of each year). Baseline and Verification 54. While baselines are drawn from existing data within the participating ministries and the SPMA, an assessment will be undertaken by the ASCE to validate the baseline information of all DLIs during the first year of the implementation. 55. Results will be verified according to the verification protocols which may include financial audit, procedural verification, and physical inspection that test the accuracy and quality of the results claimed. In accordance with good audit practice, physical verification will take place against a sampling framework and frequency. The level of calibration will be detailed in the verification protocol. On this basis, a program results verification report will be prepared to be shared with the SPMA and the World Bank. The program results verification report will be used to determine the amount of the eligible disbursement based on the results achieved. If the World Bank finds that the disbursement request meets the terms of the Financing Agreement, the corresponding funds will be disbursed to the MEF. Advances 56. The government has informed the World Bank that advances will be needed to provide the participating ministries with sufficient liquidity to begin sub-project implementation. Advances up to 25 percent of the total IDA credit can be made by the World Bank to the MEF. After consulting with the participating ministries, the SPMA and MEF will jointly determine how much of an advance will be requested, within the 25 percent limit. When the DLIs are achieved, the amount of the advance will be recovered. The advance amount recovered by the 38 For education DLIs (DLI 3.1) school year runs October 1 to June 30. 25 World Bank is then available for additional advances (“revolving advance”). The World Bank requires that the government refund any advances (or portion of advances) if the DLIs have not been met (or have been only partially met) by the closing date, promptly upon notice thereof by the World Bank. 57. The SPMA shall prepare Program consolidated financial statements annually. The Program report will include consolidated financial statements that will cover all Program activities, expenditures and sources of funds, in accordance with the applicable international public sector accounting standards (IPSAS). Each ministry will prepare the financial statements for the Program component implemented by the ministry and submit it to the SPMA for consolidation and audit. The Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), the Court of Accounts, will audit the consolidated Program financial statements. The Program Audit Report and audited consolidated Program financial statements shall be submitted to the World Bank within nine months after the end of the financial year. Assessment of Achievement Achievement of the DLIs will be assessed according to the data sources and methodologies outlined in the verification protocol at the date of assessment. The assessment will determine whether the target of the DLI has been achieved. For non-scalable DLIs, the achievement is assessed as ‘Achieved’ if the verification determines a ‘Yes’ and ‘Not Achieved’ if the verification determines a ‘No’. For scalable DLIs the achievement will be expressed in percentages and proportional disbursement will be made according to disbursement tables in the footnote of the Annex 3 Bank Disbursement Table. If the achievement of a scalable DLI is less than the previous year, no disbursement will be made in that year. Program Reconciliation 58. Although PforR operations do not link disbursements to individual expenditure transactions, the aggregate disbursements under such operations should not exceed the total expenditures by the Recipient under the Program over its implementation period. The World Bank will ensure that the amount of IDA financing disbursed does not exceed the total amount of expenditures under the Program, taking into account contributions from other financing sources (including any other IDA/IBRD credits/loans). If, by Program completion, IDA financing disbursed exceeds the total amount of Program expenditures, the Government is required to refund the difference to the World Bank with this amount subsequently being cancelled. 59. The assessment concludes that the proposed sub-projects are technically appropriate to achieve the global indicators of the Program. The summarized findings of the technical assessment are included in Annex 4. 26 60. The Government has demonstrated a clear commitment to reforming the public administration. As a reflection of its strategic importance, the steering of the PSDMA is anchored at the highest level of governmental authority, in the Prime Minister’s Office. 61. The PSDMA is strategically relevant. As in all countries, the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector in Burkina is pivotal to the success of development efforts. In Burkina, notwithstanding relatively high economic growth rates in the last decade and increasing investments in service delivery, inefficiencies in the public service and low levels of productivity have resulted in poor development outcomes and growing public dissatisfaction with the government. The PSDMA is at the heart of the government’s efforts to reform the public sector to achieve better service delivery. The premise of the PSDMA is that an efficient and effective public administration is a prerequisite for good public service delivery. The PSDMA aims to improve the administrative capacity of ministries to increase the development impact of their activities. Accordingly, the government’s effort to modernize the public administration system is firmly rooted in the country’s broader development strategy and constitutes a critical element of the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy’s focus on public sector governance. The PSDMA also represents a cornerstone for the successful implementation of the government’s sector strategies. 62. In terms of technical soundness, the PSDMA and the selected sectoral strategies have been appropriately designed to achieve their development objectives through mutually reinforcing reform initiatives. The PSDMA was developed following extensive consultations with stakeholders and support from development partners, including the World Bank and the UNDP. It is also based upon a series of background studies and surveys targeting beneficiaries of public services. The PSDMA recognizes that the most critical and difficult part of public sector reform relates to changes in behavior and organizational culture. It identifies organizational, operational and behavioral dysfunctionalities of the Burkinabe public administration system and establishes broad-based policy objectives and general results that are applicable across public sector institutions. The sectoral strategies for each of the three ministries selected are aligned with the PSDMA. The critical implementation challenge is to ensure that the PSDMA and sectoral strategies are coordinated in a results-focused manner. The Program seeks to support the government in tackling this challenge. 63. The Program is structured to provide the necessary vertical incentives to encourage the selected ministries to achieve measurable improvements in sectoral service standards through the implementation of cross-cutting PSDMA reforms. The Program will support the implementation of the government’s public sector modernization strategic plan in three ministries by leveraging new resources and apportioning responsibility to individual ministries through targeted results. Particular emphasis will be placed on strengthening the institutional capacity of the SPMA and participating ministries to coordinate reform efforts across ministries. 64. International experience. The interventions supported by the Program draw upon lessons learned from international experience and previous World Bank and donor projects, 27 including those developed in Burkina Faso.39 Longstanding engagement on public sector reform in Burkina Faso has provided the motivation for the Program. 65. Sustainability. In compliance with the WAEMU directives, the Government has introduced a global Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) as well as sectoral MTEFs in several pilot ministries, including those supported through the Program. The Program’s expenditure framework will be anchored in the national budget programming process. The Program will also rely upon country systems for complaints handling and internal and external controls. 66. M&E Capacity. Lack of baseline data on the PSDMA results and the weakness of the information management system represent major concerns for the implementation of the Program. The Program Action Plan (Annex 8) incorporates several activities to address these shortcomings. Program interventions will focus on building M&E systems in the SPMA and participating ministries. The Program will provide technical assistance to implementing ministries, to either support the use of existing monitoring systems or to develop new systems for monitoring Program results. Each ministry will provide dedicated staff and resources to ensure that the indicators are effectively monitored according to an agreed monitoring method and plan. Additionally, the SPMA will be responsible to ensure that each implementing ministry meets its monitoring requirements and makes adequate progress. 67. Economic analysis. The economic impact of the proposed Program is expected to be positive. The Program seeks to modernize the public administration, with the aim of improving the administration’s human resource management practices and service delivery standards in selected areas. While efficiency gains from improved services in human resource management can be estimated by using proxies, the improvements in service standards in the justice sector do not easily translate into monetary terms. Moreover, the transversal nature of reforms in policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation and the fact that these reforms are implemented alongside sectoral strategies make it difficult to attribute the expected outcomes to a single intervention. Despite these difficulties, and based on certain assumptions, the expected impact of the proposed interventions is positive. The analysis assumes an exchange rate of FCFA 500 per US dollar and a 5 percent discount rate. The overall benefit is valued to be an estimated US$56,091,515 to US$72,734,040. Table 5: Overall Benefits of the Program Reform Path 1/Cost savings from efficiency gains US$13,075,626 Reform Path 2/Increase in contributions to CNSS US$4,933,932 – 14,801,795 Reform Path 3/Increase in efficiency US$7,280,000 – 14,560,000 Reform Path 4/Savings from social spending US$30,296,619 Total US$56,091,515 – 72,734,040 39 An overview of the lessons learned is contained in Table 2 of the Technical Assessment summary in Annex 4. 28 68. An integrated fiduciary systems assessment has been undertaken that incorporates financial management, procurement and governance issues (with a focus on anti-corruption). The assessment concludes that there is reasonable assurance that Burkina’s financial management systems for the Program (planning, budgeting, accounting, internal controls, funds flow, financial reporting, and auditing arrangements) will ensure appropriate use of Program funds and will safeguard Program assets. The Government has requested to use a Dedicated Treasury Special Account (Compte d’Affectation Spéciale ouvert au Trésor— CAST)40 in order to achieve a smooth implementation of the Program. In addition, the assessment recommends appointment of a resident financial and public procurement controller to SPMA who is fully dedicated to the Program to ensure timely fiduciary controls. 69. Financial Management. The PFM systems and institutions have been assessed as sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the financing under the Program will be used for intended purposes, with due regard to the principles of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability. PFM systems in Burkina Faso have undergone positive changes, as evidenced by the high Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) and CPIA scores; however the low rate of capital budget execution and delays and duplication in the control of transactions represent ongoing weaknesses.41 The design of the Program relies on the existing financial management systems and institutions in Burkina Faso. Additional measures have been built into the Program design to mitigate the risks associated with cash rationing and slow budget execution. 70. The defined program expenditures are directly linked to reform activities. Therefore recurrent expenditures such as salaries and operating costs which would be incurred irrespective of reform efforts are not included in the Expenditure Framework. The Program will finance the implementation of a subset of activities within the PSDMA’s Second Action Plan in three ministries. The estimated financing needed for the Second Action Plan is Euro 53,108,763 (US$59,339,400)—(Table A.4.2), while total secured financing amounts to Euro 41,147,088 (US$45,974,400). The Program financing will be Euro 35,800,000, which is 87 percent of the total secured financing. The share of government financing is 13 percent of the total secured amount (Euro 5,347,088). The government has presented the Second Action Plan to other development partners to raise the additional funding required; there is no firm commitment from other development partners yet. 71. The MFPTSS is the main stakeholder responsible for coordinating the implementation of Program reforms with the sectoral line ministries. The SPMA is the lead implementation agency for the Program. The MEF is the primary government institution responsible for the elaboration and execution of the budget and as such has a central role to play in achieving the Program 40 The CAST is provided for under the Organic Finance Law and is already used by the Government for sectoral budget support provided by other donors. It has been chosen for this Program to facilitate the monitoring of Program resources and their related expenditures in the national budget and carrying forward unused but committed budgetary allocations, to avoid delays in the implementation of activities. 41 Boosting Budget Execution in WAEMU Countries, 2013. 29 results in terms of releasing funds and elaborating the standards and processes for program financial management. 72. The ASCE will assume the overall internal audit function of the Program and coordinate with ministerial inspectorates involved to ensure effective implementation of audit plans, compliance with audit methodology and risk-based approach, quality reviews of their audit reports and adequate follow-up of audit findings and recommendations. The program action plan includes support for capacity building and for the strengthening of the internal audit function. 73. The Program financial statements will be audited by the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), the Court of Accounts. If the SAI faces audit backlog and capacity constraints, a private external auditor will be hired under the supervision of the SAI. The audited Program financial statements will be sent to the Bank no later than 9 months after the end of the fiscal year. The capacity and performance of the Court of Accounts will be reassessed during the mid-term review of the Program. The Program Action Plan includes support for the restructuring and strengthening of the Court of Accounts. 74. Procurement. Procurement activities to be undertaken in the Program are modest and consist of: (a) small works of rehabilitation and new constructions; (b) IT and other equipment and (c) consultant services for some studies and development of training tools. 75. The procurement planning process is well managed in Burkina. As part of the annual budget preparation process, ministries draft a procurement plan which is joined to their budget. Once the budget is approved by the National Assembly, ministries finalize procurement plans and send them for publication to the General Directorate for the Control of Public Tenders and Financial Engagements (Direction Générale du Contrôle Des Marchés et des Engagements Financiers - DGCMEF). The assessment of the national procurement system conducted by the Bank in 2009 for the Piloting the Use of the Country System Report found the following aspects of the system to be particularly strong: (i) the start of the procurement process when sufficient budgetary allocations are made for the duration of the contract execution and (ii) the existence of a computerized expenditure circuit (Circuit Intégré de la Dépense - CID). 76. The following measures are recommended to strengthen the Program procurement environment: (a) nomination of experienced procurement specialists to the SPMA and (b) establishing deadlines to be respected in the procurement process and using them as indicators to evaluate performance. This last measure will help to identify the different bottlenecks and address them effectively during the lifetime of the Program. 77. Fraud and Corruption. The Bank has several large ongoing engagements in Burkina Faso and the country’s financial management systems are deemed to be satisfactory in mitigating fraud and corruption risks. An assessment of the legal and institutional framework for anti- corruption together with the effectiveness of country systems for tackling fraud and corruption was undertaken as part of the Program’s Technical Assessment – a summary of which is included in Annex 4. The assessment concluded that while levels of corruption remain high, the institutional and legal framework for tackling corruption is progressively improving and existing government commitment to addressing corruption is high. 30 78. The Borrower will implement the Program in accordance with the provisions of the Anti- Corruption Guidelines (ACG) applicable to PforR operations. The ASCE will be the government’s focal office for the purposes of ACG application. The modalities for implementing the ACG are detailed in Annex 5. 79. Complaints Handling and Grievance Redress. Citizens’ complaints and grievances pertaining to the Program will be coordinated and addressed by the Ombudsman, the Médiateur du Faso (the Ombudsman) and the ASCE, using the grievance redress systems and administrative structures of these institutions. Full details of the role of each institution are provided in the Program Technical Assessment. Through focal points established at the local level and regional delegations, the Mediateur will be responsible for (i) receiving & responding to, and resolving complaints pertaining to rules, procedures and unfair treatments under the Program; (ii) forwarding all complaints related to fraud and corruption to the ASCE in accordance with the terms defined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Grievance Redress Manual of the Program; and (iii) maintaining the register of complaints, preparing reports annually on grievance redress activities specifically for the project. Technical support will be provided to the Médiateur to support the implementation of key aspects of the Médiateur’s action plan to improve capacity of its regional offices and appoint focal points for communes. The ASCE’s role in the grievance redress process will consist of receiving complaints on fraud and corruption, not only from the Médiateur, but also directly from citizens through its normal processes and taking steps to investigate and take action in accordance with its operation manual, regulations and the terms of the MoU. 80. The existing country grievance redress systems have been assessed as functioning reasonably well (for a detailed assessment, refer to Annex 5). The Médiateur du Faso is a classical, single-purpose, complaint handling body, with relatively strong capacity at the center and weak decentralized units in the regions. The ASCE is legally mandated to investigate corruption cases and refer substantiated cases either to the prosecutor’s office for criminal acts or to the relevant Ministries and public institutions for administrative breeches. Though investigative capacity needs to be strengthened and sanctions need to be followed through, the ASCE is assessed as having demonstrated relatively strong ability to perform its legal mandates. 81. A memorandum of understating will be signed between the Mediateur and ASCE to promote collaboration between the two focal institutions in handling complaints and mismanagement of the Program funds. The MoU will provide institutional and operational guidelines for compliance with the Bank’s governance and anti-corruption requirements on respecting the Bank debarment list, transparent reporting and effective handling of grievances, including fraud and corruption allegations. 82. With the support of the Program, a communications strategy will be developed to promote awareness of citizens on the proposed Grievance Redress Mechanism and technical support will be provided to the Médiateur du Faso to improve capacity of its regional offices and appointment of focal points for communes. 31 83. In accordance with the requirements of OP 9:00, Program-for-Results Financing, a comprehensive technical assessment (Environmental and Social Systems Assessment – ESSA) was conducted to identify the strengths, weaknesses, and shortcomings of the Program‘s Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) with a view to assessing the adequacy of the ESMS for PforR financing and identifying key actions to improve the environmental and social management performance of the Program. A summary of the objectives, methodology and findings of the assessment is included in Annex 6. 84. The ESSA was conducted by the World Bank with the support and collaboration of the borrower and stakeholders. During the preparation of the ESSA two consultation workshops were organized in June and August 2014. The final ESSA was validated during the national validation workshop on April 7, 2015 and was disclosed in the Infoshop on April 29, 2015. The objectives of the ESSA are to : (i) verify that the potential environmental and social risks and impacts of the Program are subject to an adequate initial screening, (ii) ensure that environmental and social mitigation measures to avoid, minimize, offset, and/or compensate any adverse impacts and promote environmental and social sustainability will be applied to activities that will have potential environmental and social negative impacts; and (iii) identify suitable measures to strengthen the ESMS for inclusion in the program action plan. 85. To date, two key social risks have been assessed: a. Involuntary land acquisition: Some building construction and rehabilitation are planned under the Program. Though the government plans to mobilize and use only public land, the ESSA considers potential impacts in terms of loss of revenues, habitats and sources of revenues, in particular in rural areas where land titling is not systematic and customary laws are still practiced. b. Gender and inclusion: The Program is gender informed and there are no major gender and inclusion risks deriving directly from the implementation of the program activities. However, the ESSA considers a few potential indirect impacts due to inherent system weaknesses, including: (i) insufficient representation of female civil servants in particular in management positions in rural areas; (ii) limited access of beneficiaries to administrative services due to lack of adequate communication and transport material and staffing; and (iii) limited physical accessibility of buildings for handicapped persons. 86. The ESSA concludes that the Program ESMS is adequate for PforR financing and that the activities to be funded under the Program should, by their nature, characteristics and size, generate low-to-moderate social impact and generally bring beneficial and positive social impact. The national project screening system in place provides adequate mitigation measures in the case of minor infrastructure and rehabilitation activities. The ESSA further concludes that, subject to the adoption of the recommendations outlined below, the ESMS is appropriately equipped with the necessary tools and processes to identify, mitigate, and report on possible social impacts of Program activities. Accordingly, it finds that the risk of negative social impacts is addressed through the relevant ESMS provisions and operational procedures (subject to the incorporation of Bank recommendations). 32 87. The overall recommendation of the ESSA is that the ESMS needs to: a. reinforce coordination and harmonization between relevant administrative stakeholders in rural areas in terms of land administration and procedures, b. avoid and/or minimize resettlement of people, c. take into account informal occupants/squatters (this point is still under review), d. include monitoring and evaluation processes in case of resettlement, e. prepare a positive discrimination mechanism in teacher hiring to give priority to female teachers. 88. Specific recommendations include the need to: a. develop monitoring processes and tools (screening sheets, compensation mechanisms and other relevant documentation included in the ESSA), b. establish institutional mechanisms (focal person at central and local levels in charge of monitoring social related impacts and mitigation measures), c. for gender and inclusion, include accessibility structures (ramps) in planning and construction of buildings financed under the Program and raise gender awareness amongst civil servants for better service delivery. 89. The Bank has agreed with the Borrower on the above recommendations which have been built into the program action plan. The Bank team will work closely with the Borrower throughout the implementation support period to assist toward the effective implementation and completion of any agreed actions to improve and strengthen the ESMS. Based on the climate and disaster risk screening, there is no potential negative impact of the Program activities. 90. Communities and individuals who believe that they are adversely affected as a result of a Bank supported PforR operation, as defined by the applicable policy and procedures, may submit complaints to the existing program grievance redress mechanism or the WB’s Grievance Redress Service (GRS). The GRS ensures that complaints received are promptly reviewed in order to address pertinent concerns. Affected communities and individuals may submit their complaint to the WB’s independent Inspection Panel which determines whether harm occurred, or could occur, as a result of WB non-compliance with its policies and procedures. Complaints may be submitted at any time after concerns have been brought directly to the World Bank's attention, and Bank Management has been given an opportunity to respond. For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank’s corporate Grievance Redress Service (GRS), please visit http://www.worldbank.org/GRS. For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank Inspection Panel, please visit www.inspectionpanel.org. 1. Integrated Risk Assessment Summary Risk Rating Technical Moderate Fiduciary Moderate 33 Environmental and Social Moderate Disbursement Linked Indicator Moderate Other Overall Risk Moderate 2. Risk Rating Explanation 91. A detailed technical assessment of the Program, including a risk assessment was undertaken during the preparation of the Program (see Annex 4 for a summary). The overall implementation risk is considered moderate. The technical risk has been assessed as moderate because of weak coordination capacity of the SPMA and limited implementation capacity in the participating ministries. The proposed interventions are not technically complex, but the implementation of Program activities require strong coordination between ministries and their deconcentrated offices. Appropriate mitigation actions have been identified to minimize these risks and are described in Annex 7. The proposed institutional arrangements aim at facilitating such coordination and provide leadership to the overall reform effort through the third result area. The Bank will work closely with the government to monitor implementation and progress. 92. A number of assessments (technical, integrated fiduciary systems, environmental, and social) have been undertaken to assess the capacity of the Program’s implementing agencies and to identify gaps that may require action. The critical actions necessary for enhancing Program systems and mitigating risks have been included in the program action plan (Annex 8). 34 Annex 1: Detailed Program Description The Government’s Reform Program 1. Burkina Faso’s past attempts at public sector reforms have not led to significant improvements in public sector/governance and service delivery outcomes (see Table A.1.2). Over the years, public sector inefficiencies have resulted in poor social outcomes and low execution rates for sectoral budgets. In terms of the quality and professionalism of the public administration, Burkina Faso scores lower than other countries in the region (Ghana and Senegal) and lower than both the averages for Sub-Saharan African countries and low income countries according to the Global Integrity Indicators. At the same time, weaknesses in public sector management, particularly in the justice sector, have created an impediment to private sector investments. The Doing Business and Enterprise Survey indicators highlight public sector inefficiencies in the country, notably with respect to judicial performance. 2. The PSDMA represents the government’s vision for public sector modernization as a vehicle for achieving the country’s development goals. The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development. It aims to (i) bring the government closer to the people; (ii) share resources more equitably between the center and localities; (iii) establish a culture of results and accountability for results in the public administration; (iv) allocate resources for socio-economic development of the Burkinabe society according to national priorities; and (v) create favorable conditions for the participation of all stakeholders in decision making. 3. The PSDMA focuses on strengthening public sector management and creating a modern operating environment for improved public service delivery. Details of the logical framework are presented in the Technical Assessment document of the Program. The strategic plan consists of five pillars: Pillar No 1: Improving the Efficiency and the Quality of Public Service Delivery: The objective of this pillar is to enhance public administration performance for sustainable development and streamline the decision-making processes, procedures and structures within the public administration. The pillar strives to (i) improve the performance and productivity of the administration; (ii) improve the satisfaction of public service users; (iii) streamline public administration structures and procedures; and (iv) introduce new approaches, methods and procedures to the public administration. Pillar No 2: Upgrading and Improving Human Resource Capacity of Public Administration: The purpose of the second pillar is to focus on human resource capacity framework and improve staff working conditions which are affected by outdated equipment and physical infrastructure. This pillar focuses on two issues: (i) improving operational and human resources capacities and (ii) strengthening the administration’s capacity for human resource policy development. Pillar No 3: Promotion of Accessibility and Transparency in the Public Administration: The objective of the third pillar is to improve access to services and to establish the principle of accountability across the entire public administration. It aims to develop mechanisms for civil servants to be more effective and to be at the service of 35 clients/citizens. The pillar targets improving accessibility and transparency of the public administration. Pillar No 4: Promotion of E-governance: The fourth pillar seeks to improve the quality of public services through the use of ICT. It aims to increase the ICT capacities of the administration by promoting the use of ICT tools and online services. Pillar 5: Promotion of Deconcentration and Decentralization: The fifth pillar envisages the deconcentration of the central ministries for an effective decentralization in favor of local development. It aims to address local governance capacity and inadequate delegation of power from the center to deconcentrated units. The strategy plans to promote deconcentration and decentralization by strengthening the capacities of decentralized services to enable them to be able to effectively support the implementation of the decentralization process. 4. The effective alignment and coordination of sector strategies around the PSDMA is critical to ensuring consistency across the Burkinabe public administration and to bridging the gap between public sector reform and public service delivery in order to improve service standards. The PSDMA is a unifying framework that identifies cross-cutting reforms that are applicable horizontally across the entire administration. It provides the foundations for the development and implementation of sectoral reform strategies in Burkina Faso, including the following sector strategies which are specifically relevant to the Program:  Civil Service and Labor Sectors: The Strategy for Strengthened Capacity in the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (Stratégie de Renforcement des Capacités du Ministère de la Fonction Publique, du Travail et de la Securité Sociale (MFPTSS) 2014- 2025), was recently adopted as the long term strategic vision of the MFPTSS. The objective of the strategy is to improve the human, infrastructural, technological and material capacity of the public administration to ensure decent working conditions for all workers, including civil servants, by 2025.  Justice Sector: The National Justice Sector Policy (Politique Nationale de Justice 2010- 2019) reflects the government’s justice sector priorities. The main objectives of the PNJ are to (i) improve the performance of the justice sector by reinforcing its capacities, (ii) promote access to justice by reducing the obstacles faced by users, and (iii) reinforce and reaffirm the rights and liberties of citizens. The policy was revised in 2013 to enhance its alignment with the PSDMA.  Education sector: The Sectoral Program of Education and Training (Programme Sectoriel de l’Education et de la Formation 2012-2021--PSEF) articulates the government’s vision for the entire education sector and incorporates the sub-sector strategies for preschool, primary, primary non-formal, post-primary and vocational training. The objective of the PSEF is to achieve an efficient and inclusive education system by 2021 whereby all citizens have the educational opportunities to enable them to contribute to the socio economic development of the country. It is based on the following basic principles: (i) free basic education; (ii) increasing the linkages between formal and informal education; (iii) skills development; (iv) improving the relevance of skills development; (v) development of national languages and their inclusion in the new 36 curricula; (vi) improving the legal framework of education and training system; (vii) optimum mobilization of domestic and external resources; and good governance. 5. The implementation of the PSDMA is guided by action plans. The PSDMA started with the First Action Plan covering the period of 2011 to 2013. Inadequacies in the prioritization of activities and the linkages between sector strategies and the PSDMA, together with limited resources, including development partner support, slowed the pace of implementation over this period. A Second Action Plan has recently been developed and approved by the Transitional Government to guide the implementation of the PSDMA over the next four years covering the period of 2015 to 2018. The objective of the Second Action Plan is to strengthen public management to improve service standards within the administration. Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program 6. The Public Sector Modernization Program (Program for Results) is a results-based approach to supporting the implementation of the PSDMA’s Second Action Plan in three ministries. The Program is designed to support the government with the implementation of the PSDMA and to improve coordination between the PSDMA’s national public sector modernization objectives and sectoral reform efforts in the Ministries of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (MFPTSS), National Education and Literacy (MENA) and Justice (MJPDHC). The program expenditure framework is designed to finance a subset of activities in the Second Action Plan to achieve service standard improvements along reform paths in each of these sectors. 7. The proposed Program Development Objective is to improve selected service standards in the selected regions of the ministries responsible for civil service, labor, primary education and justice.42 The Program will provide incentives for the achievement of specific, measurable and strategically significant service standards in each of the selected ministries resulting from the targeted implementation of the PSDMA. In doing so, the Program will focus on strengthening the nexus between cross-cutting public sector management reform and tangible service delivery results in particular sectors. It will contribute to both the achievement of targeted results in each of the three ministries and systemic improvements to the quality of the public administration as a whole. The Program will promote the attainment of service standards in each of the selected ministries by focusing on three cross-cutting results areas: (i) improved human resource management capacity and performance; (ii) strengthened institutional capacity for policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation; and (iii) strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms. 8. The Program will cover discrete elements of the Government’s PSDMA expenditure program. Table A.1.1 below presents the pillars of the PSDMA and the sub-programs (and examples of activities) envisaged in the Second Action Plan and their linkages with the results areas (and examples of activities) covered by the Program. The full scope of the PSDMA Second 42 The improvements are in labor, education and justice sectors as well as human resource management in civil service. The service standards selected are drawn from the sector strategy of each ministry. For the purposes of this program, service standards refer to services provided by government ministries both internally within the administration and externally to citizens. 37 Action Plan expenditure program and the Program’s coverage of expenditures through the results areas are further detailed in the Technical Assessment of the Program. The Program’s three results areas incorporate the following PSDMA activities (further details of Program activities are included in Table A.1.1 below): 9. Results Area 1 – Improved Human Resource Capacity and Performance: Under results area one, the Program will support the MFPTSS in leading efforts to modernize and harmonize human resource management processes and to strengthen the capacity of the de-concentrated HR departments in the relevant ministries. This results area will support three kinds of activities: 1. It will support capacity development of personnel in the human resource departments of each ministry. It will also assist the selected ministries in elaborating human resource management tools to better motivate and build the capacity of personnel. The tools will include in-service training needs projections and plans, career plans, sectoral motivation strategies, job profiles etc. 2. The Program will support efforts to consolidate and improve the existing, functional HR information systems. It will facilitate an expansion of the coverage of the civil service information system (SIGASPE) internally within the three ministries, the up-dating and computerization of personnel files and an upgrading of the SIGASPE functionality, including its interfacing with other information systems, such as the Individual Employee File system (Dossier Individuel des Achevé Numérisé, DIAN), the Employee Access to Employment Files system, (Système D’Access Dossiers Individuel Numérisé des Agents, SADINA) and the On-line Pay and Civil Service Employment Administration system (Access en Ligne Information Administratif et Salarié, ALIAS). 3. It will support the refinement and improved application of performance evaluation processes in the three ministries, as a foundation for the shift to modern and merit-based civil servant performance management and promotion processes to further entrench a results-based focus in the public administration. These activities are expected to improve the efficiency of human resource management in the selected ministries and create the necessary conditions and incentives for civil servants to perform better. 10. Results Area 2: Strengthened Institutional Capacity for Policy Planning, Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation: The Program will promote improvements in the institutional capacity of the three selected ministries to develop, implement and monitor public policies. This results area will have three principal points of focus: 1. First it will support the ongoing in-service professional training of mid to senior level bureaucrats to strengthen their managerial and technical capacities with respect to policy formulation, program budgeting and monitoring and evaluation. 2. Second, the Program will support the government in strengthening the systems and processes used by ministries in policy planning, implementation and monitoring evaluation. In particular, it will focus on activities that are relevant to the attainment of 38 the service standard results identified for each ministry.43 Accordingly, it will facilitate improvements in statistical systems, communication and sectoral mechanisms for coordination, reporting and review. 3. Third, the Program will focus on expenditures to improve the working environments of civil servants at the central and de-concentrated levels. This will include rehabilitation of administrative and court facilities and provision of office, communication and transportation equipment. 11. Results Area 3 – Strengthened Coordination Capacity for Public Sector Reforms: The institutional coordination failures and successes of earlier public sector reform efforts in Burkina Faso served as a valuable lesson for the design of the third results area. Limitations in the design of the technical aspects of the PSDMA, capacity constraints in the SPMA to effectively coordinate the PSDMA program,44 as well as insufficiencies in the steering function the National Public Administration Modernization Committee impacted upon the implementation of the First Action Plan of the PSDMA. The Third Results Area supports the government’s expenditure program and Program Action Plan (PAP) activities to assist the Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Public Administration (Secrétariat Permanent de la Modernisation de l’Administration—SPMA) in coordinating the implementation of the Program and the overall PSDMA. Activities will cover the following: 1. Improve the technical dimensions of the PSDMA as well as the formal rules and procedures governing the organization and management of the systems for the implementation of the Program. 2. Strengthen particular functions (monitoring and evaluation, reporting, information management) of (i) the SPMA (ii) the focal points established in each of the selected ministries and (iii) the National Public Administration Modernization Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office. These activities will also help the Government address the fiduciary, social and environmental risks identified in the integrated risk assessment of the Program. The majority of these activities are also included in the Program Action Plan (PAP). 3. Enhance national internal and external control systems to strengthen fiduciary oversight with respect to the Program. The external audit institution--Cour des Comptes—will be supported to effect external controls over the Program. The High State Control Authority (Autorite Superieure de Controle d’Etat—ASCE) and the ministerial technical inspectorates will also be supported to strengthen the capacity for internal controls in the three ministries. The Mediateur du Faso will be supported in strengthening the existing country systems for complaints handling. Implementation Arrangements 12. The Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Administration ( le Secretariat Permanent de la Modernization de l’Administration--SPMA) will be responsible for the day-to- 43 For example, with respect to labor inspections, the Program will support the MFPTSS to improve the system for risk-based targeting of enterprises for inspection. 44 As identified in decree no 2011-1138/MFPTSS/CAB/SP-MA 39 day management of program activities, facilitating coordination across ministries, monitoring results and generating performance and financial reports on Program implementation. The SPMA as the designated coordinator of the PSDMA,45 will be the lead agency for the Program and act as the interlocutor with the Bank on behalf of the Government. The SPMA is also directly responsible for activities identified under results area three of the Program. 13. The Program will have three implementing agencies—the ministries of Civil Service (MFPTSS), Education (MENA) and Justice (MJPDHC). These ministries will work with their deconcentrated structures to implement the Program activities in the regions. The Program implementing agencies will be directly responsible for the technical quality of implementation and for fiduciary management. Other agencies (such as the external audit institution —Cour des Comptes, the High State Control Authority—Autorite Superieure de Controle d’Etat—ASCE, and the ministerial technical inspectorates) will play complementary roles in accordance with their current functions. Coordination Arrangements 14. The overall oversight responsibility of the Program is with the National Public Administration Modernization Committee. However, the SPMA will be spearheading the program implementation and ensuring the achievement of the results. It will ensure that the Program is implemented according to the program operations manual. A program coordination committee will be established under the leadership of the SPMA and with the participation of DGESSs of the three ministries. The program coordination committee will ensure strong coordination of issues on planning, allocations, flow of funds and approval of results. There will be a technical sub-committee in each of the three ministries to coordinate the implementation of program activities in their ministries. 45 The SPMA will also develop the Implementation Strategy for the PSDMA. 40 Table A.1.1: Scope of Government and Program Expenditures Scope of PSDMA Second Action Plan and examples of activities Scope of Program and examples of activities Sub-Program 1 Promoting Greater Performance in the Public Results Areas 1 and 2 Administration Adaptation of personal evaluation and grading system for the public Adaptation of personal evaluation and grading system for the administration: public administration: - Computerization of evaluation process; training; MFPTSS controls over - Computerization of evaluation process in selected ministries ministerial evaluations - Training on performance evaluation in selected ministries - MFPTSS controls over selected ministerial evaluations - Analysis of performance of evaluation of magistrates, revision of evaluation criteria and training Rational utilization of human resources: Organize timely recruitment of teachers: - Global and ministerial human resource audits; review civil service recruitment - Establish and monitor deadlines for recruitment processes and timeframes; initial civil servant training; procedural changes to milestones, establish dedicated interministerial team, enhance efficiency of recruit transfers to Ministries acquisition of supplies and equipment, verification of teacher placement in classrooms and availability of pedagogical material Define and apply staffing norms (number of magistrates per Pillar 1 court) to selected jurisdictions IMPROVING THE Extend coverage of biometric enrollment of civil servants: EFFICIENCY AND - Acquire information system license, develop operating THE QUALITY OF guide, purchase of equipment for controls (vehicles etc). PUBLIC SERVICE Elaboration and implementation of total quality control in the public DELIVERY administration - Elaboration of service quality charters - Sectoral reviews of adherence to charters Enforcing service hours and regulations dealing with absenteeism - Develop and implement teacher time on task monitoring - Conduct global study on service hours and apply recommendations mechanism in selected regions Sub-Program 2: Streamlining Decision-making Processes, Results Areas 1 and 2 Procedures and Structures in the Public Administration Improve institutional and legal frameworks governing the Administration Feasibility study for adopting an Administrative Appeals Court – - Support ministries with the elaboration of new laws and decrees on Ministry of Justice organizational structures and processes Elaboration of public administration manuals : Elaboration of public administration manuals : - Develop guide for elaborating manuals, elaborate procedural manuals; - Develop guide for elaborating manuals, elaborate procedural sensitization and training manuals in selected ministries; sensitization on procedural manuals adopted in selected ministries 41 Implementation of an administrative organizational system with well-defined structures and competences - review of existing ministerial organigrams and development of standardized departmental organigrams Strategic Planning, Budgeting and Programming: Strategic Planning, Budgeting and Programming: - Elaboration and revision of sectoral strategies, action plans, budget programs, - Elaboration and revision of sectoral strategies, action plans, training budget programs, training in selected ministries Sub-Program 1 Civil Servant Working Conditions Results Areas 1 and 2 Measures to improve performance motivations for civil servants: Evaluation of the workforce morale and motivations: - analysis of existing civil service performance motivations / incentives; - motivation strategies and monitoring of implementation in elaboration of legislative and regulatory provisions for civil servant motivation; selected ministries elaboration of ministerial motivation strategies and implementation; monitoring of implementation Measures to improve working environments: Measures to improve working environments: - Construction and rehabilitation of priority ministerial buildings; acquisition of - Physical audit of working environments in selected ministries materials and equipment - Rehabilitation of selected administrative buildings and acquisition of materials for selected central departments of selected ministries Sub-Program 2: Improving Human Resources Management Results Areas A and 2 Pillar 2 Improvements to career management processes: Improvements to career management processes: RECOGNIZING AND - Review existing system for career management of civil servants, update and - Update career profiles of civil servants in selected ministries IMPROVING computerize individual career profiles of all civil servants (DRH DGFP), (interministerial team to report on irregularities in SIGASPE); HUMAN RESOURCE improve DGFP archiving facilities computerize civil servant career documentation (DRH DGFP) for CAPACITY IN selected ministries (DIN), improve DGFP archiving facilities Distribution of equipment and software to deconcentrated ministerial units for Acquisition of equipment and materials for DRH in selected PUBLIC human resource management: ministries ADMINISTRATION - Define a minimum package of equipment for DRH; acquisition of materials and equipment Development of modern human resource management tools: Development of modern human resource management tools: - Guides for developing HR tools; HR programming tool, elaboration of career - Guides for developing HR tools, HR programming tool plans, training plans, job profiles - Career plans, training plans and job profiles for selected ministries Coordination of HR managers: - Organization of coordination meetings on processing of civil - Organization of regular coordination meetings and annual conference for servant promotion, transfer and retirement files in the selected ministerial HR department managers ministries - Organization of dedicated sessions on processing of teacher recruitment files Capacity building for human resource managers on modern HR management Capacity building for human resource managers on modern HR techniques management techniques: - Training on results-based management, SIGASPE; performance contracts and - Training on results-based management, SIGASPE; performance 42 evaluation processes contracts and evaluation processes Sub-Program 3: Strengthen the capacity of public administration in Results Areas 1 and 2 development policy design and monitoring Capacity building for civil servants responsible for conceptualization and Capacity building for civil servants responsible for implementation of development policies: conceptualization and implementation of development policies: - Top management training, targeted training (on certified scholarship basis) for - Top management training, targeted training (on certified ministerial departmental managers, study tours scholarship basis) for ministerial departmental managers, study tours in selected ministries Improve coordination between training institutions: Support for regular coordination between MFPTSS and training - Create information sharing network; regularize coordination meetings institutions between institutions; regularize coordination meetings between MFPTSS and training institutions Sub-Program 4 : Promoting Expertise in Public Administration Not covered Sub-Program 1: Improving Hospitability and Accessibility in the Not covered Public Administration - Identification of accessibility norms and introduction of building security measures, information desks, guidelines for service provision etc. Sub-Program 2: Improving Transparency in the Public Results Areas 1, 2 and 3 Administration Implementation of training and sensitization program for public servants on service delivery Introduction of attendance controls: Pilot attendance controls in selected ministries: Pillar 3 PROMOTION - Develop system for controlling civil servant attendance and interconnect it with - Develop system for controlling civil servant attendance and OF ACCESSIBILITY SIGASPE; acquire equipment, training and sensitization interconnect it with SIGASPE, acquire equipment; training and AND sensitization TRANSPARENCY IN Biometric ID cards for civil servants: Biometric ID cards for civil servants: THE PUBLIC - Acquire equipment for production of cards, biometric enrollment campaigns for - Acquire equipment for production of cards; biometric ADMINISTRATION new recruits, distribution of ID cards enrollment campaigns for new recruits, distribution of ID cards Improve communications between Administration and service users: - Develop interfacing fora for the Administration and users; support ministerial communication strategy elaboration and implementation Preparation and dissemination of ministerial reports for strategic planning, Preparation and dissemination of ministerial reports for strategic management and evaluation: planning, management and evaluation in selected ministries: - Annual publication of ministerial statistics; report on administrative delays in - Annual publication of ministerial statistics; sectoral strategy processing civil servant dossiers; report on compliance with WAEMU program monitoring and evaluation reports and annual action plan budgeting directives; sectoral strategy monitoring and evaluation reports and implementation reports: annual action plan implementation reports, organization of strategic monitoring - Review of court registries to enhance data collection on case reviews in ministries / sectors, methodological guide and training on evaluating management public policy implementation - Review of statistical databases in selected ministries 43 Publication of - Organization of strategic monitoring reviews in selected ministries - Annual report on administrative delays in processing civil servant dossiers Improve internal ministerial controls Improve internal ministerial controls: - Maintain risk-based auditing cartography, develop and implement risk - Maintain risk-based auditing cartography, develop and mitigation plans in ministries, annual performance audits and controls, training implement risk mitigation plans in ministries, annual performance of inspectors audits and controls, training of inspectors Sub-Program 1: Strengthening of the Institutional and Security Results Areas 1 and 2 Framework for E-Governance Reinforcement of IT coordination between departments: - Introduce coordination fora Securitization of information and data exchanges: Securitization of information and data exchanges: - Develop a certification strategy and acquire equipment for data exchanges; - Develop a certification strategy and acquire equipment for data Establish a national agency for information system security; Introduce a policy exchanges; establish a national agency for information system on information system; Acquire servers; Introduce back-up and safeguard security; introduce a policy on information system; acquire measures, Introduce electronic authentication processes for administrative servers; introduce back-up and safeguard measures, introduce dossiers electronic authentication processes for administrative dossiers Sub-Program 2: Strengthening of the Communication Results Areas 1 and 2 Infrastructure and the Administration’s Information Systems Extension of intranet network (RESINA) to all administration Extension of intranet network (RESINA) to parts of the - cabling and interconnection of administrative buildings, sensitization; administration maintenance - cabling and interconnection of administrative buildings, Pillar 4 PROMOTION sensitization; maintenance OF E-GOVERNANCE Introduce computerized processes for improving internal coordination Introduce computerized processes for improving internal communication in ministries coordination communication in selected ministries - Elaborate IT strategies for each ministry; create a datacentre and back-up; - Implementation IT strategy in the MJPHDC introduce electronic application for managing ministerial mail and information - Create a Datacentre and back-up exchanges - Pilot electronic application for managing ministerial mail and information exchanges in selected ministries Acquire information system equipment and licenses: Acquire information system equipment and licenses: - Licenses for biometric data management and SIGASPE, maintenance - Licenses for Biometric data management and SIGASPE, agreements and anti-viral software; computer equipment (scanners, printers, hard Maintenance agreements and anti-viral software; Computer drives, computers, regulators etc.) for all ministries equipment (scanners, printers, hard drives, computers, regulators etc.) for selected ministries Sub-Program 3 Improving Administrative Procedures and Results Areas 1 and 2 Development of Online Services Development of custom-made applications and integration of IT systems Development of custom-made applications and integration of IT - Review SIGASPE functionality, introduce new modules in SIGASPE and systems interfacing with DIAN and ALIAS - Review SIGASPE functionality 44 - Introduce an integrated information system for management of Burkinabe - Introduce new modules in SIGASPE and interfacing with DIAN Orders and ALIAS - Develop an on-line ‘annuaire’ of civil servants - Introduce computerized case management system for selected administrative courts - Introduce computerized case management system for selected local courts Implementation of a unified and consolidated on-line portal of the Burkinabe Implementation of a unified and consolidated on-line portal of the administration: Burkinabe administration: - Develop a Guichet Virtuel de l'Administration Publique (GVAP), sensitization, - Develop a Guichet Virtuel de l'Administration Publique training of users, acquisition of equipment, controls, inclusion of existing e- (GVAP), sensitization, training of users, acquisition of services and civil servant on-line applications in portal, introduction of personal equipment, controls identification numbers for portal users, publication of ministerial statistics in portal Enhance user and citizen IT skills and improve access to E-Governance: Enhance user and citizen IT skills and improve access to E- - Sensitization and training on IT applications and GVAP, guide in different governance languages - Sensitization and training on IT applications and GVAP, guide - Establish community access points (computer centres) in different languages - Develop online training modules, train cyber-café managers - Establish community access points (computer centers) - Implement ‘one civil servant one computer’ policy - Implement ‘one civil servant one computer’ policy in selected ministries Pillar 5 Sub-Program 1 Strengthening the Operational Capacities of Results Area 2 DECONCENTRATION Deconcentrated Structures AND DECENTRALIZATION Providing resources to deconcentrated offices: Providing resources to deconcentrated offices of the selected - Acquisition of materials, IT, communication and office equipment, construction ministries in selected regions: and rehabilitation of deconcentrated office buildings; develop human resource - Construction and rehabilitation of deconcentrated office redeployment and motivation strategies in selected ministries; training of buildings, acquisition of materials, IT, communication and office deconcentrated civil servants equipment for: Superior First Instance Courts and selected local courts (TD/TA) in pilot jurisdictions; and structures of MENA (DRFP, DRT, CEB, DPENA and DRENA) in the selected regions - Training of selected DRT offices in technical controls and report-writing - Training of selected CEB, DPENA and DRENA on use of monitoring system for teacher instruction time - Training of local court presidents and assesseurs in arbitration and conciliation. Sub-Program 2 Promotion of Advice/ Support /Assistance Provided Results Areas 1 and 2 to Local Governments - Training of local government officials and de-concentrated agents; - Support to MATDS in the development of local civil service Operationalization of local civil service IMPLEMENTATION Sub-Program 1: Strengthen the Steering Function of the PSDMA Results Area 3 45 OF THE STRATEGY steering organs - Update legal texts; acquire equipment and materials for SPMA (vehicles, office Acquire equipment and materials for SPMA (vehicles, office supplies, IT, communication); recruitment of safeguard, accounting and supplies, IT, communication); recruitment of safeguard, procurement specialists, training and study tours of SPMA staff accounting and procurement specialists, training and study tours of SPMA staff Sub-Program 2: Enhance Coordination of PSDMA Implementation Results Area 3 - Support for steering committee meetings, semester reviews, monitoring - Support for steering committee meetings, semester reviews, missions; elaboration of PSDMA action plans and reviews, PSDMA monitoring missions; elaboration of PSDMA action plans and communications strategy reviews, PSDMA communications strategy Monitoring and evaluation software - Elaboration of project manual 46 Table A.1.2: Selected Governance Indicators Sub- Burkina Low Ghana Senegal Saharan Faso income Africa Source Year Overall Governance (Quality of) IV. Public 2008/ Administration & GI 48 55 57 57 58 11 Professionalism (0=lowest, 100=highest) 3. Rule of law (1=lowest, BTI 2012 10=highest) 4.0 7.5 5.3 4.7 4.0 POLITY Executive constraints 2010 3 6 5 4 4 IV (1=lowest, 7=highest) Judicial and Legal System III-3. Conflicts of Interest 2008/ Safeguards & Checks and GI 35 53 67 48 53 11 Balances: Judicial Branch (0=lowest, 100=highest) 3.2 Independent Judiciary BTI 2012 4 8 6 5 4 (1=lowest, 10=highest) (Prevalence of) F. Rule of FH-FIW 2011 7 12 10 6 5 Law (0=lowest, 16=highest) Court impediment (% of ES 2011 firms identifying courts as a 25.7 1.7 3.8 14.7 14.4 major constraint) (Efficiency of) Enforcing DB 2011 contracts (rank) (1=highest, 108 45 145 117 118 183=lowest) Governance and the Private Sector (Ease of) Starting a business DB 2011 (rank) (1=highest, 116 104 93 123 116 183=lowest) (Ease of) Registering DB 2011 Property (rank) (1=highest, 111 36 171 120 118 183=lowest) % Senior Management time ES 2011 22.2 3.2 2.9 7.5 7.9 to deal with regulations Time to clear imports from ES 2011 16m.4 6.8 8.8 13.5 13.5 customs (de facto days) GI: Global Integrity; BTI: Bertelsmann Transformation Index; POLITY IV: Political Regime Characteristics; FH- FIW: Freedom House -Freedom in the World; ES: Enterprise Surveys; DB: Doing Business 47 Annex 2: Program Results Framework and Monitoring BURKINA FASO: PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM (P132216) Project Development Objective (PDO): To improve selected service standards in targeted regions of the ministries responsible for primary education, justice, labor and civil service PDO Level Indicators* UoM Baseline Y146 Y247 Y348 Y449 Frequency Data source and methodology Respon Description DLI Cor e sibility PDO Indicator 1: Share of % Recruitment : 20 30 40 50 Annual Onboarding records or data entry forms (le MFPTS DLI#1.1 or years civil services transactions 4.38 bordereau de saisie) of the DGC of the S/ Y2, Y3 and Y4 involving hiring MFPTSS for the civil servants to be hired SPMA The indicator (engagement/ intégration) Promotion: 20 30 40 50 and promoted concerns all civil and/or promotion 4.6 service hiring and (reclassement) completed Appointment letter (arrête d’intégration), promotion within a 28 calendar-day hiring decision (décision d’engagement), transactions period. and reclassification letter (arrête de irrespective of (disaggregated by: reclassement) signed by the Secretary- staff category, recruitment, General of the MFPTSS number of agents promotion) and duty station Calculation by: in a calendar year (1) Generate the list of hiring (1 January – 31 (integration/’engagement) and promotion December) (reclassement) decisions in a year (through Recruitment SIGASPE) includes hiring of new graduates (2) Generate the list of hiring (‘integration’) (integration/’engagement) and promotion and more (reclassement) decisions completed within experienced 28 days in a year (through SIGASPE) professionals (‘engagement’) Calculate the proportion by 2/1 as procedure is the same. Verification agency: ASCE Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year. PDO Indicator 2: Number Num 298 000 324 000 360 380 000 400 Annual Annual statistics book of the CNSS MFPTS DLI#2 for years of private sector employees ber 000 000 S/ Y2, Y3 and Y4 registered with the Validated data from CNSS on workers SPMA Assessment date is national social security registered (before publication of the May the year after 46 1 January 2016 – 31 December 2016 47 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2017 48 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018 49 1 January 2019 – 31 December 2019 48 (Caisse Nationale de yearbook) the reporting year. Securité Sociale - CNSS) Methodology: Count of number of workers registered Verification agency: ASCE PDO Indicator 3: Share of % 0 20 50 60 80 Annual List of all classes in three regions MFPTS DLI#3.1 for years public primary school established by MENA records of primary S/ Y2, Y3 and Y4 classes with at least 770 schools and number of class based on SPMA Assessment date hours of instruction time school report cards at the beginning of the is September of annually in the Sahel, academic year the reporting Upper Basin and East year. regions. Reports by DPRENA and DGEB and consolidated by SPMA ASCE with MENA verifies validity of the DPRENA and DGEB reports and based on review of results from sample-based survey in public primary schools establishes the share of classes Verification agency: ASCE PDO Indicator 4: Share of Annual DLI#4.1: Administrative law cases: Date MFPTS DLI#4.1 and judgments of lodgment as registered on the receipt S/SPM DL#4.2 for years Y2, Y3 and Y4  issued by document (recipissé) issued by the A Assessment date is administrative tribunals in % 29 35 40 50 60 tribunal containing a unique identification May the year after a 12 month period (75% of number of the case which is provided to the reporting year. which through a written claimants and a copy of which is retained Pilot local judgment) in the regions of in the registry of the relevant departmental and Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, administrative tribunal. district courts: 50 Dedougou and Bobo- Calculation by: number of administrative selected courts Dioulasso court cases that have been resolved within identified in the Technical  involving 12 months administrative court cases and Assessment litigation matters issued by 3 out of 4 with written judgment by total selected departmental and % 0 40 50 60 70 number of administrative court cases district courts, in a manner lodged in the respective calendar year x consistent with the 100 Recipient’s rules and procedures DLI#4.2: Contentious matters: Registry entries of civil and commercial matters lodged in the local court by a claimant Records of hearings of civil and commercial matters lodged in the court 49 that are resolved by conciliation (date of the process-verbal) and those for which an arbitrated written judgment has been handed down Calculation by : total number of cases that are resolved by conciliation (date of the process-verbal) and those for which an arbitrated written judgment has been handed down by total number of cases for which written judgments are registered as having been handed down in a given calendar year x 100 Verification agency: ASCE Intermediate results Results Area 1: Improved human resource capacity and performance IR Indicator 1.1: Update Yes / No Yes Annual Review of technical inspection unit of the MFPTS DLI#1 for year Y1 of the SIGASPE for better No MFPTSS verifying the functionality of the S/ Assessment will be use by selected human updated and newly developed modules SPMA conducted as soon as the update is resources departments. (report) concluded. Technical inspection report after installation of new modules in SIGASPE Review of technical inspection report IR Indicator 1.2: Share of % 0 25 50 60 75 Annual Onboarding records or data entry forms MFPTS DLI#1.2 for Y2 and new primary school (le bordereau de saisie) of the DGC of the S/ Y4 teachers appointed to the MFPTSS for the teachers to be hired SPMA MENA by August 31 Appointment letter (arrête d’intégration) and/or hiring decision (décision d’engagement) signed by the Secretary- General of the MFPTSS Division of the total number of teachers whose appointment letter (arrête d’intégration) and/or hiring decision (décision d’engagement) signed by the Secretary-General of the MFPTSS by August 31 by the total number teachers to be hired in that year Verification agency: ASCE 50 IR Indicator 1.3: Share of % 0 20 60 80 100 Annual Technical inspection report of the MFPTS Defined criteria: DRFP offices satisfying technical inspection unit of the MFPTSS S/ Office working defined criteria on all DRFP offices including staff skills, SPMA conditions logistics, IT and office facilities and equipment (including asset register) IR Indicator 1.4: Share of % 0 20 50 60 75 Annual Sample-based surveys of SIGASPE MFPTS Baseline civil servants in selected records and checked through on-the- S/ ministries with an updated ground and face-to-face verification SPMA employment record in SIGASPE List of total number of civil servants in the selected ministries in SIGASPE IR Indicator 1.5: Share of % 0 20 50 75 100 Annual Sample-based survey based on SIGASPE MFPTS Baseline civil servants in the civil records and checked through on-the- S/ service with on-line access ground and direct observation SPMA to administrative and personnel HR information IR Indicator 1.6: Share of % 0 20 50 60 70 Annual Data from MFPTSS; sample-based survey MFPTS Baseline civil servants in the selected based on SIGASPE records S/ ministries with Individual SPMA Employee File system (Dossier Individuel Normalise --DIN) updated and available on-line IR Indicator 1.7: Share of % 0 20 40 60 70 Annual Ratio between the number of agents MFPTS Baseline civil servants in the three with job description, performance contract S/ selected ministries with job and annual performance evaluation SPMA description, performance contracts and annual performance evaluation. IR Indicator 1.8: Share of % 12 20 40 50 60 Annual Retirement letters MFPTS Indicator transactions in the civil S/ establishes a service carried out within a Transcript from the General Service SPMA service standard certain period: retirement History Transcript (Relevé General de for retirement, i.e. completed two (60 calendar Service – RGS) at least two days) months before the months before retirement date Calculation by: division of total number retirement date of retirement completed within 60 days by records in the HR total number of retirements in a year. management system, i.e. SIGASPE, are updated including the personal employment 51 record needed to determine monthly pension. Since SIGASPE is interconnected to the Ministry of Finance payment system, this will ensure timely payment of pensions to new retirees. Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year. Results Area 2: Strengthened institutional capacity for policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation IR Indicator 2.1: % 0 20 50 75 100 Annual Technical inspection report of the MFPTS Defined criteria: Share of DRT satisfying technical inspection unit of the MFPTSS S/ Office working defined criteria in the Centre, on all DRT offices including staff skills, SPMA conditions Centre-West, Cascades and logistics, IT and office facilities and Upper Basin regions equipment (including asset register) IR Indicator 2.2: Yes/ No Yes Annual Reports by DGESS/MENA and MFPTS DLI#3 for year Y1 Improvement of the No DPRENA consolidated by SPMA on the S/ monitoring mechanism for new system SPMA Assessment will be conducted as soon instruction time on task in as the mechanism is public primary school in Sample-based survey in public primary established. the Sahel, Upper Basin and schools by ASCE East regions ASCE verifies with MENA functionality of the system based on review of results from sample-based survey in public primary schools Verification agency: ASCE IR Indicator 2.3: Share of % CEB 60 % 70 80 85 90 Annual Technical inspection report of all District MFPTS CEB, DPENA and DRENA DPENA 83 % 85 90 95 100 (Circonscriptions d’Education de Base – S/ satisfying defined criteria in DRENA 67 % 75 90 95 100 CEB), Provincial (Directions Provinciales SPMA the regions Sahel, Upper de l’Education Nationale et de Basin and East l’Alphabétisation - DPENA), and Regional Offices (Directions Régionales de l’Education Nationale et de l’Alphabétisation - DRENA) including 52 staff skills, logistics, IT and office facilities and equipment (including asset register) IR Indicator 2.4: % 0 25 50 75 80 Annual Custom-made report in SIGASPE on new MFPTS Share of new teachers primary school teachers on post in S/ assigned to schools in the communities on or before 25 September SPMA Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions on or before 25 List of new teachers made available to September MENA on or before 31/08 (DLI 1.3) New teachers with appointed letters from CCEB before September 25 divided by total number of newly hired teachers Audit trail of SIGASPE IR Indicator 2.5: % 25 50 60 75 80 Annual Circuit supervisors reports (deposited at MFPTS Baseline Share of public primary CEB) S/ schools having at least two List of number of primary schools in the SPMA visits per academic year by three regions based on information circuit supervisor (CCEB) in DGESS the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions IR Indicator 2.6 : % 0 0 30 75 80 Annual Existing manual registries maintained in MFPTS Assessment date Share of written judgments jurisdictions with all cases registered and S/ is May the year handed down in the pilot for which written judgments are registered SPMA after the reporting jurisdictions in in a given year (including dates and year. Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, unique identification numbers) Definition of Dédougou and Bobo- automated Dioulasso regions for which Custom report generated by automated procedure: all the case management system of all written judgments handed steps after receipt process is automated (TGI : down for cases in which all of the case of documents are TAdmin) management steps have been automated in dematerialized; that system including dates and unique documents can be identification numbers followed and reports generated from the system IR Indicator 2.7: % 0 20 75 80 100 Annual Technical inspection report of the MFPTS Defined criteria: Share of pilot jurisdictions in technical inspection unit of the MJPDHC S/ Office working Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, of all pilot jurisdictions including staff SPMA conditions Dédougou and Bobo- skills, logistics, IT and office facilities and Dioulasso regions that equipment (including asset register) satisfy 80 percent of the defined criteria 53 (TGI/Tadmin) IR Indicator 2.8: % 0 40 70 80 100 Annual List of most frequently used laws and MFPTS Share of 115 most frequently jurisprudence identified on the basis of an S/ used laws and jurisprudence inclusive survey of administrative court SPMA publicly accessible online users (judges, clerks, prosecutors, lawyers, claimants) from Ministry of Justice and Official Gazette website Direct observation on Ministry of Justice website IR Indicator 2.9: % 0 20 75 80 100 Annual Technical inspection report of the MFPTS Defined criteria: Share of 50 pilot local technical inspection unit of the MJPDHC S/ Office working departmental (TD) and of all pilot courts including staff skills, SPMA conditions district courts (TA) in in the logistics, IT and office facilities and Pilot local Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, equipment (including asset register) departmental and Dédougou and Bobo- district courts: 50 Dioulasso regions that selected courts satisfy 80 percent of the identified in the defined criteria Technical Assessment IR Indicator 2.10: Share of % 0 50 100 100 100 Annual Report of training providers MFPTS Pilot local 50 pilot local departmental S/ departmental and (TD) and district courts (TA) List of all presidents and assessors in the SPMA district courts: 50 selected courts in in the Ouagadougou, three regions. identified in the Tenkodogo, Dédougou and Technical Bobo-Dioulasso regions that Ration between the number of the 50 Assessment have the presidents, selected TD/TA who received a training secretaries and assessors on a given topic and the total number of trained members IR Indicator 2.11 : Yes/ No Yes Annual Reports by DGESS/MJPDHC MFPTS DLI for Y1 Establishment of a uniform No consolidated by SPMA on the new system S/ case tracking system in SPMA Assessment will selected departmental and Sample-based survey in pilot jurisdictions be conducted as district courts by ASCE soon as the ASCE verifies with MJPDH functionality mechanism is of the system based on review of the established. uniform registers used in the pilot jurisdictions. Verification agency: ASCE IR Indicator 2.12: Share of % 40 40 50 50 50 Annual Appointment letters and calculation of MFPTS female teachers hired each female share S/ year SPMA 54 Results Area 3: Strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms IR Indicator 3.1: Rate of % 0 15 35 55 70 Annual Review of the progress report submitted MFPTS execution of the PSDMA to the CNMA S/SPM Second Action Plan. A IR Indicator 3.2: Publication Yes/ No Yes One-time Ministry of Finance website MFPTS of annual performance No S/SPM reports in conformity with A WAEMU Directive 7 IR Indicator 3.3: % 0 40 60 75 Annual Review of ASCE reports MFPTS Rate of execution of the risk- S/SPM based audit of the ASCE in A MENA, MFPTSS and MJPDHC. IR Indicator 3.4: % 20 60 70 75 80 Annual Review of ASCE reports MFPTS Rate of execution of the S/SPM internal ministerial technical A inspectorates’ recommendations in the MENA, MFPTSS and MJPDHC IR Indicator 3.5: Grievances % 0 5 20 30 50 Annual Review of ASCE and Ombudsman reports MFPTS responded by the S/SPM Ombudsman in compliance A with the Operational Manual of the Program IR Indicator 3.6: Direct Num 138 000 140 000 160 170 000 180 Annual Activity and project records MFPTS project beneficiaries (of ber (32) (33) 000 (35) 000 S which female) (%) (34) (36) 55 Annex 3: Disbursement Linked Indicators, Disbursement Arrangements and Verification Protocols Total As % of Indicative timeline for DLI achievement-planned Financing Total DLI disbursements Allocated to Financing Baseline Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 DLI (Euro ) Amount (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) DLI 1: Update of the SIGASPE for better use by selected 2,698,800 % 7.5 No 2,698,800 human resources departments. DLI 2: Share of civil services transactions involving 7,148,000 % 20 5 1,648,000 2,750,000 2,750,000 hiring (engagement/ intégration) and/or promotion (reclassement) completed within a 28 calendar-day period (disaggregated by recruitment, promotion) DLI 3: Share of new primary school teachers appointed 4,467,500 % 12.5 0 2,767,500 1,700,000 to the MENA by August 31 DLI 4 : Number of private sector employees registered 2,680,000 % 7.5 298,000 894,000 893,000 893,000 with the national social security (Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale) DLI 5: Improvement of the monitoring mechanism for 3,598,400 % 7.5 No 3,598,400 instruction time on task in public primary school in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions. DLI 6: Share of public primary school classes with at 5,361,000 % 15 N/A 1,961,000 1,700,000 1,700,000 least 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions. DLI 7: Establishment of a uniform case tracking system 2,698,800 % 7.5 No 2,698,800 in selected departmental and district courts. DLI 8: Share of judgments issued by administrative 4,467,500 % 12.5 29 1,700,000 1,700,000 1,067,500 tribunals in a 12 month period (75% of which through a written judgment) in the regions of Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso DLI 9: Share of judgments involving litigation matters 2,680,000 % 7.5 N/A 1,786,000 894,000 issued by selected departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient’s rules and procedures Total Financing Allocated: 35,800,000 100 8,996,000 8,970,500 8,829,000 9,004,500 56 Annex 3A: DLI Verification Protocol Indicators Definition/description Scalability Draft Protocol to Evaluate Compliance of the DLI Remarks (include timing of (Yes/No) and Data/Result Verification DLIs and amount attached, PPF, date of assessment, Data source Procedure annual data collection) 1 Update of the SIGASPE for Improved automated HR No Technical inspection report Review of technical DLI for year Y1 better use by selected human processes after installation of new inspection unit of the resources departments. DLI measures improved HR modules in SIGASPE MFPTSS verifying the functionality of the Assessment will be conducted management in the civil service as soon as the update is through improved functionality updated and newly developed modules concluded. of the SIGASPE based on a demand analysis of users (report) Conditions to be met for Verification agency: ‘Yes’: 80% of the modules for ASCE demanded by DGFP and AGRE installed and 80% of the existing modules for DGFP upgraded 2 Share of civil services Improved HR service Yes Onboarding records or data Calculation by: DLI for years Y2, Y3 & Y4 transactions involving hiring standards in the civil service entry forms (le bordereau (1) Generate the list of (engagement/ intégration) de saisie) of the DGC of the hiring and/or promotion MFPTSS for the civil The indicators concern all DLI establishes a service (integration/’engagement) civil service transactions (reclassement) completed servants to be hired and and promotion within a 28 calendar-day standard for processing promoted irrespective of staff category recruitments and promotions in (reclassement) decisions and duty station in a calendar period. in a year (through the civil service from date of year (1 January – 31 completion of the selection Appointment letter (arrête SIGASPE) December) process for recruitment and d’intégration), hiring promotions to update in the HR decision (décision (2) Generate the list of management system, i.e. d’engagement), and Hiring includes hiring of new hiring graduates (‘integration’) and SIGASPE, that is reclassification letter (integration/’engagement) interconnected to the Ministry (arrête de reclassement) more experienced and promotion professionals (‘engagement’) of Finance payroll signed by the Secretary- (reclassement) decisions General of the MFPTSS as procedure is the same. completed within 28 days in a year (through SIGASPE) Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year. Calculate the proportion 57 by 2/1 Verification agency: ASCE 3 Share of new primary school Improved efficiency in HR Yes Onboarding records or data Division of the total DLI for years Y2 and Y4 teachers appointed to the management in primary entry forms (le bordereau number of teachers whose MENA by August 31. education de saisie) of the DGC of the appointment letter (arrête MFPTSS for the teachers to Assessment date is October d’intégration) and/or after the education year be hired hiring decision (décision DLI measures improved management of process d’engagement) signed by between hiring of new teachers Appointment letter (arrête the Secretary-General of by the MFPTSS and their d’intégration) and/or hiring the MFPTSS by August allocation to MENA decision (décision 31 by the total number d’engagement) signed by teachers to be hired in the Secretary-General of the that year MFPTSS Verification agency: ASCE 4 Number of private sector Increased coverage of social Yes Annual statistics book of Count of number of DLI for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 employees registered with the protection services for the the CNSS private sector workers national social security labor force registered Assessment date is May the Validated data from CNSS year after the reporting year. DLI establishes a service on workers registered Verification agency: standard for labor force (before publication of the ASCE inspections as CNSS yearbook) registration of workers is proxy for coverage and effectiveness of these. 5 Improvement of the Improved monitoring of No Reports by DGESS/MENA ASCE together with the DLI for year Y1 monitoring mechanism for annual hours of instruction and DPRENA consolidated technical inspection unit instruction time on task in delivered in primary by SPMA on the new of the MENA verifies the public primary school in the education system functionality of the Sahel, Upper Basin and East system based on review Assessment will be conducted regions. of results from sample- as soon as the mechanism is DLI captures revision and Sample-based survey in based survey in public established. introduction of a new and public primary schools by primary schools improved monitoring system ASCE for teacher time on task. Verification agency: 58 ASCE 6 Share of public primary school Improved service standards Yes (%) List of all classes in three ASCE together with the DLI for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 classes with at least 770 hours in primary education regions established by technical inspection unit of instruction time annually in MENA records of primary of the MENA verifies the the Sahel, Upper Basin and schools and number of class validity of the DPRENA East regions. DLI establishes a service based on school report and DGEB reports and Assessment date is September standard in primary education cards at the beginning of the based of review of results of the reporting year. with respect to hours of academic year from sample-based survey instruction (by teacher or in public primary schools substitute) Reports by DPRENA and DGEB and consolidated by Verification agency: SPMA ASCE 7 Establishment of a uniform Improved monitoring of case No Reports from new system Review of new system, its DLI for year Y1 case tracking system in management functionality and reports selected departmental and generated to whether it district courts. Reports from meets defined standards Need to revise registries to DLI captures revision and DGESS/MJPDHC (registration, data ensure appropriate introduction of a new and consolidated by SPMA collection and data information is registered. improved monitoring system capture, report generation for case management. and case documentation) Assessment will be conducted as soon as the mechanism is Verification agency: established. ASCE 8 Share of judgments issued by Improved service standards Yes Date of lodgment as Calculation by: division DLI for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 administrative tribunals in a 12 and effectiveness in justice registered on the receipt of count of administrative month period (75% of which sector document (recipissé) issued court cases that have been through a written judgment) in by the tribunal containing a resolved within 12 Assessment date is May the the regions of Ouagadougou, unique identification months administrative year after the reporting year. Tenkodogo, Dedougou and DLI establishes a service number of the case which is court cases (numerator) Bobo-Dioulasso standard for time between the provided to claimants and a by count of total number lodgment of a legal case in an The indicator does not take copy of which is retained in of administrative court administrative jurisdiction and into account cases that have the registry of the relevant cases lodged (irrespective the delivery of a written been lodged before project administrative tribunal. of when complaint was judgment regarding that case start. lodged as long as this by the administrative tribunal happened after project Date that written judgment effectiveness) is submitted by the judge or (denominator) in the judges in the administrative 59 tribunal to the court clerk respective calendar year for submission to the x 100 claimant – as registered in the judgment registry of the relevant administrative The target figures set tribunal (Cahier de include at least 75 percent Reception des Decisions) of written judgments are issued by the court. For example, for the target year of 2018, of the 50 percent target figure at least 75 percent of the cases must be written judgments handed in. In the case of administrative tribunals, the baseline figure is judgment rendered not written judgment issued by the court. Verification agency: ASCE 9 Share of judgments involving Improved service standards Yes Registry entries of civil and Calculation by : total DLI for years Y3 & Y4 litigation matters issued by and effectiveness in justice commercial matters lodged number of cases for selected departmental and sector in the local court by a which no conciliation is district courts, in a manner claimant achieved by total number Assessment date is May the consistent with the Recipient’s of cases for which written year after the reporting year. rules and procedures judgments are registered DLI measures the improved Registry entries of civil and as having been handed 50 pilot local courts in 4 regions: The indicator does not take engagement of the local courts commercial matters lodged down in a given calendar I. Région du Center in the court that are into account cases that have in formally arbitrating local year Ouagadougou : (1) resolved by conciliation been lodged before project Arrondissement 9 ; (2) complaints over which the start. courts have jurisdiction (date of the process-verbal) Arrondissement 11 ; (3) TD de and those for which an Verification agency: Komsilga ; (4) TD de Pabré ; (5) TD de Saaba ; (6) TD de Tanghin arbitrated written judgment ASCE Dassouri ; (7) TD de Koubri ; (8) has been handed down TD de Komki-Ipala II. Hauts-Bassins Bobo-Dioulasso : (9) 60 Arrondissement 6 ; (10) Arrondissement 3 ; (11) TD de Karangasso-sambla ; (12) TD de Faramana ; (13) TD de Péni ; (14) TD de Toussiana Houndé : (15) TD de Houndé ; (16) TD de Koumbia ; (17) TD de Béréba Orodara : (18) TD de Orodara ; (19) TD de Banzon KoloKo : (20) TD de Kourignon ; (21) TD de Samorogouan ; (22) TD de N’Dorola ; (23) TD de KoloKo III. Centre-Est Tenkodogo : (24) TD de Bagré ; (25) TD de Bané ; (26) TD de Bittou ; (27) TD de Niaogho Koupéla : (28) TD de Koupéla ; (29) TD de Baskouré ; (30) TD de Yargo Ouargaye : (31) TD de Ouargaye ; (32) TD de Yondé Yargetanga : (33) TD de Yargatenga IV. Boucle du mouhoun Dedougou : (34) TD de Bondokuy ; (35) TD de Ouarkoye ; (36) TD de Safané ; (37) TD de Tchériba Boromo : (38) TD de Boromo ; (39) TD de Bagassi ; (40) TD de PA ; (41) TD de Poura Tougan : (42) TD de Lanfiéra ; (43) TD de Tougan Nouna : (44) TD de Nouna ; (45) TD de Madouba ; (46) TD de Bonborokuy Solenzo : (47) TD de Kouka ; (48) TD de Solenzo TOMA : (49) TD de Toma ; (50) TD Gassan 61 Annex 3B: Bank Disbursement Table # DLI Bank Of which Financing Deadline for Minimum Maximum Determination of financing available for DLI DLI value to DLI value(s) Financing Amount to allocated Achievement be achieved to expected to be be disbursed against to the DLI Prior Advances trigger achieved for achieved and verified results disbursements Bank DLI value(s) (in Euro ) of Bank disbursements Financing purposes 2,698,800 0% 100% December Achieved/Not N/A Achieved/Not Achieved 1 Update of the SIGASPE for 2016 Achieved better use by selected human resources departments. Share of civil services 7,148,000 0% 100% Closing date 11 50 Linear 2 transactions involving Per percentage point hiring (engagement/ increase is 178,700 (see intégration) and/or disbursement table promotion (reclassement) completed within a 28 below) calendar-day period. Share of new primary 4,467,500 0% 100% Closing date 26 75 Linear 3 school teachers appointed to Per percentage point the MENA by August 31. increase is 89,350 (see disbursement table below) Number of private sector 2,680,00 298 000 100% Closing date 324 000 400 000 Linear 4 employees registered with Per percentage point the national social security increase is 134,000 (see disbursement table below) Improvement of the 3,598,400 0% 100% December Achieved/Not N/A Achieved/Not Achieved 5 monitoring mechanism for 2016 Achieved instruction time on task in public primary school in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions. 62 Share of public primary 5,361,000 0% 100% Closing date 21 80 Linear 6 school classes with at least Per percentage point 770 hours of instruction increase is 89,350 (se time annually in the Sahel, disbursement table Upper Basin and East regions. below) Establishment of a uniform 2,698,800 0% 100% December Achieved/Not N/A Achieved/Not Achieved 7 case tracking system in 2016 Achieved selected departmental and district courts. Share of judgments issued 4,467,500 0% 100 % Closing date 36 60 Linear 8 by administrative tribunals Per percentage point in a 12 month period (75% increase is 178,700 of which through a written (see disbursement table judgment) in the regions of Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, below) Dedougou and Bobo- Dioulasso Share of judgments 2,680,000 0% 100 % Closing date 41 70 Linear 9 involving litigation matters Per percentage point issued by selected increase is 89,350 (see departmental and district disbursement table courts, in a manner consistent with the below) Recipient’s rules and procedures  Achievement of the DLIs will be assessed according to methodology in the verification protocol at the date of assessment. The assessment will determine whether the target of the DLI has been achieved. For non-scalable DLIs, the achievement is assessed in a binary manner: the amount in the Disbursement Table will be disbursed if the verification determines that a DLI is achieved. If a non-scalable DLI is assessed as “Not Achieved” in the second assessment, the disbursement amount will be cancelled. For scalable DLIs the achievement will be expressed in percentages. The disbursement amount in the first year for a scalable DLI is proportional to the percentage achievement on condition that the minimum target has been achieved. For the following years, the disbursement amount will be determined by subtracting the disbursement amount of preceding year from the disbursement amount corresponding to the percentage achievement. For example, for DLI2, if the initial year disbursement amount is eight hundred ninety three 63 thousand five hundred euros (15 percentage), if the achievement in the following year is 24 percent only 1,608,300 will be disbursed (2,501,800 - 893,500) will be disbursed. Disbursement Table for DLI 2: Share of civil services transactions involving hiring (engagement/ intégration) and/or promotion (reclassement) completed within a 28 calendar-day period. Percentage Disbursement Percentage Disbursement amount Percentage Disbursement Percentage Disbursement amount 11 amount 178,700 21 1,965,700 31 amount 3,752,700 41 5,539,700 12 357,400 22 2,144,400 32 3,931,400 42 5,718,400 13 536,100 23 2,323,100 33 4,110,100 43 5,897,100 14 714,800 24 2,501,800 34 4,288,800 44 6,075,800 15 893,500 25 2,680,500 35 4,467,500 45 6,254,500 16 1,072,200 26 2,859,200 36 4,646,200 46 6,433,200 17 1,250,900 27 3,037,900 37 4,824,900 47 6,611,900 18 1,429,600 28 3,216,600 38 5,003,600 48 6,790,600 19 1,608,300 29 3,395,300 39 5,182,300 49 6,969,300 20 1,787,000 30 3,574,000 40 5,361,000 50 7,148,000 Disbursement Table for DLI 3: Share of new primary school teachers appointed to the MENA by August 31 Percenta Disbursement Percentage Disbursement Percentage Disbursement Percentage Disbursement Percentage Disbursement ge 26 amount 89,350 36 amount 982,850 46 amount 1,876,350 56 amount 2,769,850 66 amount 3,663,350 27 178,700 37 1,072,200 47 1,965,700 57 2,859,200 67 3,752,700 28 268,050 38 1,161,550 48 2,055,050 58 2,948,550 68 3,842,050 29 357,400 39 1,250,900 49 2,144,400 59 3,037,900 69 3,931,400 30 446,750 40 1,340,250 50 2,233,750 60 3,127,250 70 4,020,750 31 536,100 41 1,429,600 51 2,323,100 61 3,216,600 71 4,110,100 32 625,450 42 1,518,950 52 2,412,450 62 3,305,950 72 4,199,450 33 714,800 43 1,608,300 53 2,501,800 63 3,395,300 73 4,288,800 34 804,150 44 1,697,650 54 2,591,150 64 3,484,650 74 4,378,150 35 893,500 45 1,787,000 55 2,680,500 65 3,574,000 75 4,467,500 Disbursement Table for DLI 4 : Number of private sector employees registered with the national social security Number Disbursement amount Number Disbursement amount 324,000 134,000 364,000 1,474,000 328,000 268,000 368,000 1,608,000 332,000 402,000 372,000 1,742,000 336,000 536,000 376,000 1,876,000 340,000 670,000 380,000 2,010,000 344,000 804,000 384,000 2,144,000 348,000 938,000 388,000 2,278,000 64 352,000 1,072,000 392,000 2,412,000 356,000 1,206,000 396,000 2,546,000 360,000 1,340,000 400,000 2,680,000 Disbursement Table for DLI 6: Share of public primary school classes with at least 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions. Percentage Disbursement amount Percentage Disbursement amount Percentage Disbursement amount 21 89,350 41 1,876,350 61 3,663,350 22 178,700 42 1,965,700 62 3,752,700 23 268,050 43 2,055,050 63 3,842,050 24 357,400 44 2,144,400 64 3,931,400 25 446,750 45 2,233,750 65 4,020,750 26 536,100 46 2,323,100 66 4,110,100 27 625,450 47 2,412,450 67 4,199,450 28 714,800 48 2,501,800 68 4,288,800 29 804,150 49 2,591,150 69 4,378,150 30 893,500 50 2,680,500 70 4,467,500 31 982,850 51 2,769,850 71 4,556,850 32 1,072,200 52 2,859,200 72 4,646,200 33 1,161,550 53 2,948,550 73 4,735,550 34 1,250,900 54 3,037,900 74 4,824,900 35 1,340,250 55 3,127,250 75 4,914,250 36 1,429,600 56 3,216,600 76 5,003,600 37 1,518,950 57 3,305,950 77 5,092,950 38 1,608,300 58 3,395,300 78 5,182,300 39 1,697,650 59 3,484,650 79 5,271,650 40 1,787,000 60 3,574,000 80 5,361,000 65 Disbursement Table for DLI 9 : Share of judgments involving litigation matters issued by selected departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient’s rules and procedures Percentage Disbursement amount Percentage Disbursement amount 41 89,350 56 1,429,600 42 178,700 57 1,518,950 Disbursement Table for DLI 8 : Share of judgments issued 43 58 (75% of which through a written1,608,300 by administrative tribunals in a 12 month period 268,050 judgment) in the 44 regions of Ouagadougou, 357,400 Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso 59 1,697,650 45 Percentage 446,750 Disbursement amount Percentage 60 1,787,000 Disbursement amount 3646 536,100 178,700 48 61 2,323,1001,876,350 37 47 625,450 357,400 49 62 2,501,8001,965,700 38 48 714,800 536,100 50 63 2,680,5002,055,050 3949 804,150 714,800 51 64 2,859,2002,144,400 4050 893,500 893,500 52 65 3,037,9002,233,750 41 51 982,850 1,072,200 53 66 3,216,6002,323,100 4252 1,072,200 1,250,900 54 67 3,395,3002,412,450 4353 1,161,550 1,429,600 55 68 3,574,0002,501,800 44 54 1,250,900 1,608,300 56 69 3,752,7002,591,150 4555 1,340,250 1,787,000 57 70 3,931,4002,680,500 46 1,965,700 58 4,110,100 47 2,144,400 59 4,288,800 60 4,467,500 66 Annex 4: Summary of Technical Assessment Burkina Faso Public Administration Modernization Program Strategic Relevance of the Program 1. Strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector in Burkina is pivotal to the country’s future stability and development outcomes. Notwithstanding relatively high economic growth rates in the last decade and increasing investments in service delivery, inefficiencies in the public service and low levels of productivity have resulted in poor development outcomes and significant public dissatisfaction with previous governments. Buoyed by recent events, the Burkinabe population has high expectations of a new government. The new government will need to deliver on development commitments in order to regain citizen trust and rebuild social cohesion. Public sector performance is, more than ever, under the spotlight. The sudden rupture of the political settlement which had endured for almost three decades affords unique opportunities for public sector reform. While the political economy constraints that impacted earlier public sector reform efforts, including pervasive clientelism, are unlikely to disappear entirely, their influence is expected to be significantly diminished in the current context. 2. Burkina Faso initiated the first generation of public sector governance reforms in the late 1980s. These reforms aimed at adapting the public sector to the changing economic environment – which involved a shift from a planned economy to a market based economy. The reforms focused predominantly on technical improvements to the modus operandi of the central administration without necessarily addressing the structural problems arising from the highly centralized structure of the public administration system. The reforms laid the foundations for an organized civil service. In 1986, the General Statute of Public Employees establishing the legal classification of civil service was adopted. In 1988, a civil service reform effort defined the wage scale for civil servants. In 1991, as part of the public sector reform, efforts the Ministry of Civil Service and Modernization of the Administration was established. 3. The second generation of public sector reforms began in 1998 with the adoption of a series of reform packages to improve public sector governance, including the Master Plan for Institutional Development of the Public Administration 1998-2000 and the National Plan for Good Governance 1998-2003. A series of legislation was introduced to clarify state functions, the division of competencies between central and local governments as well as NGOs and the private sector. At the institutional level, the second generation of reforms gave rise to the establishment of several structures to strengthen the framework for good governance and accountable administration. These included the Economic and Social Council (Le Conseil Economique et Social) 50 ; the Ombudsman (Le Médiateur du Faso) 51 ; the Higher Council of 50 The Council has been, since then, restructured to provide a broader representation of the Burkinabe society, including NGOs. 51 The Mediator is an independent authority dealing with disagreements between private citizens, agencies, and the state institutions. The mediator is appointed by the President for a five-year term. The decisions of the Mediator are irrevocable and independent of directives of any other authority. The mediator has the power to instruct the public agencies to settle disputes amicably, revise their decision or make proposals for the improvement of the situation. The Mediator has the power to propose amendments to existing legislations. 67 Information (Le Conseil Superieur de la Communication); the National Committee of Ethics (Le Comité National d’Ethique); the Independent National Electoral Commission (La Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante); the High Authority of Coordination of Fight against Corruption (La Haute Autorité de Coordination de la Lutte Contre la Corruption); the General Inspectorate of the State (L’Inspection Générale d’Etat); Ministerial Inspection Units (Des Inspections Ministérielles). Constitutional amendments were also introduced to clarify the hierarchy of the court system.52 4. The second generation of public sector reforms also focused on decentralization, civil service reform and public financial management. In 1998, the independent Commission Nationale de la Décentralisation’s recommendations informed a wave of legislation to advance decentralization reforms. 53 The main objective of the new set of legislation was to devolve decision-making authority in order to improve allocative efficiency in service delivery. The General Code for Local Government (Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales--CGCT) adopted in 2004, envisaged a combination of decentralized and deconcentrated local government structures.54 Civil service reforms introduced during the second generation of reforms principally involved strengthening the legal and regulatory framework, 55 including the enactment of legislation governing civil servant employment which set forth the general conditions for employment as a civil servant. The reform efforts established systems to manage human resources and payroll. Burkina also embarked on an ambitious public financial management (PFM) reform agenda, the results of which earned the country the reputation of being a leading PFM reformer in the WAEMU zone. 5. The country’s track record on public sector reform has been mixed. In addition to the exemplary efforts made in reforming public financial management processes, the main achievement of first and second generation public sector reforms was the establishment of legal, regulatory and administrative foundations for efficient and effective public sector management (decentralization, de-concentration, introduction of performance evaluation). However the effective implementation of the system that was intended to function from this framework has been comparatively weak. In particular: 52 The Supreme Court of Appeal is the high jurisdiction of the judiciary system, the Council of State is the high jurisdiction for administrative matters and the Audit Court is the high jurisdiction for financial audit (external audit). 53 The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 040/98/AN du 3 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) portant orientation de la décentralisation au Burkina Faso which defines basic principles for decentralization in Burkina Faso; (ii) Loi N°041/98/an du 06 août 1998 (JO N°38 1998) portant organisation de l'administration du territoire au Burkina Faso which establishes the distinction between administrative circumscriptions (village- department- province) and the decentralized entities (municipality and province); (iii) Loi n°042/98/AN du 06 août 1998, portant organisation et fonctionnement des collectivités locales which describes governance structures (executive and legislative branches) of decentralized entities, local administrations, state agents in decentralized entities, consultative bodies at the local level; and (iv) Loi N° 43/98/AN du 6 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) portant programmation de la mise en œuvre de la décentralisation which lays out the timetable for implementation of decentralization reform. 54 Deconcentrated units are the representatives of the central government and have supervision (tutelage) responsibility over decentralized units. 55 The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 10/98/AN du 21 avril 1998 portant modalités d’intervention de l’Etat et repartition de compétences entre l’Etat et les autres acteurs du développement; (ii) Loi N°013/98/an du 28 avril 1998 portant régime juridique applicable aux emplois et aux agents de la Fonction Publique; (iii) (iii) Decret N°2000-86/PRES/PM/MFPDI du 13 mars 2000 portant fixation de la date d’entrée en vigueur du systeme d’évaluation des fonctionnaires et des agents contractuels de la Fonction Publique. 68  decision-making authority remains highly centralized and financial and human resources are concentrated at the center.  the process of decentralization / de-concentration has yet to yield measurable improvements in the administration of public service delivery. The civil service environment lacks appropriate incentives to motivate administrators and front-line public service providers to deliver results. 6. A combination of political inertia, strategic, institutional coordination and implementation failures characterize earlier reform failures. Despite government commitment to public sector reform in the past and the existence of reform-minded senior level bureaucrats, there was limited political engagement and weak institutional leadership during the reform implementation process. Accordingly, insufficient resources were allocated to the reform processes and successes were measured on the basis of outputs (usually in the form of legal and regulatory texts) rather than improvements in the performance of the public administration. At the same time, the process of developing consensus upstream and engaging potential opponents to reform, including the union movement, was underestimated. Resistance to reform not only slowed the pace of implementation, but it resulted in policy reversals and extensive government efforts downstream to negotiate with unions. Reform shortcomings also reflected institutional coordination issues. Diffuse coordination of the PSG reform agenda by three central ministries (Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Decentralization and Ministry of Civil Service) was compounded by the limited engagement of sectors in implementing the reforms. The donor- driven incentives of sectors was to produce visible service delivery results and the implementation of medium-term public sector reforms were therefore sidelined in favor of quick win vertical interventions (e.g. school construction). Finally, as with all reform efforts in Burkina Faso, implementation challenges linked to limited resources and weak capacity played an important role. 7. The government’s vision for the third generation of public sector reforms in Burkina Faso is focused on developing a modern performance-oriented public administration system. The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development. The strategic plan aims to provide a federating framework to improve public management across the administration and create the necessary foundations upon which sector policies can be pursued more effectively. The PSDMA was developed following an extensive and inclusive process of national consultation. It was recently endorsed by the new Transitional Government through the adoption of the Second Action Plan to facilitate its implementation. 8. The Program is designed to revive the implementation of the PSDMA in a new political era. Implementation of the PSDMA to date has been fraught with difficulties. The budget allocation for the implementation of the first action plan covering the period of 2011 to 2013 was insufficient (around US$37,800,000 (18,619,000,000 CFA) of which US$5,600,000 (2,800,000,000 CFA) came from the national budget). The National Public Administration Modernization Committee (le Conseil National de Modernization de l’Administration), which is charged with overseeing the coordination of the PSDMA, did not convene once in the three year period as envisioned in the strategy document. The SPMA, which is charged with day to day 69 coordination, remained underfunded and poorly equipped to lead reform efforts. And the continued lack of results orientation and weak monitoring and evaluation framework made the task of monitoring progress or keeping line ministries engaged and accountable for results difficult. The new government has developed a Second Action Plan for the period of 2015 to 2018. Its objective is to strengthen public management to improve service standards in the administration. The Program will support a subset of activities within the Second Action Plan of the PSDMA. It seeks to address the institutional coordination and implementation failures that have previously affected implementation of the PSDMA and earlier public sector reform efforts. In particular, it will focus on strengthening reform coordination and creating pecuniary incentives for selected line ministries to engage in the cross-cutting reform process and achieve results. It will also use many of the levers that proved successful to public financial management reforms in Burkina Faso. 9. There is a strong strategic case for a World Bank Program to support the government in their efforts to modernize the public sector at this time. The Program harnesses the renewed political and social commitment to reform that has been induced by the recent change in political settlement. The Program will help the selected ministries to achieve their sectoral objectives by strengthening human resource management and institutional capacities. It will complement sector ministries’ efforts for achieving better service delivery outcomes by focusing on their institutional strengthening. Therefore the Program will directly contribute to the government’s effort in modernizing its administrative systems to improve the quality and quantity of public services. 10. Based on the findings of a Technical Assessment undertaken for the preparation of the Program, the overall technical risk rating is moderate. Technical Soundness of the Program 11. The technical design of the Program draws heavily from the Bank’s extensive experience with public sector reform in Burkina and from international experience. 56 The World Bank has been engaged in public sector reform efforts through successive waves of public sector reform, through both investment operations (the Public Institutional Development Project 1992 – 2000 (PID) and the Administrative Capacity Building Project 2005 - 2011 (PRCA)) and through development policy lending. The implementation completion reports of the Public Institutional Development and Administrative Capacity Building Projects as well as a number of sector specific reports prepared by the Bank57 and other donors are the body of knowledge that have informed the technical elements of the Program. 12. The lessons learned from these experiences and the guiding principles of the Program design are discussed in the table below: 56 Mark Schacter. 2000. “Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries: Issues, Lessons and Future Directions” Institute on Governance: Ottawa, Canada; Zoe Scott. 2011. “Evaluation of Public Sector Governance Reforms 2001 - 2011: Literature Review” Oxford Policy Management. 57 World Bank. 2013. “A Review of the Justice Sector in Burkina Faso”; EuroPlus Consulting and Management. 2010. “Rapport Diagnostic: Elaboration du document de plan strategique decennal de modernization de l’Etat.” Europlus. 2010. “Elaboration of a Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of Administration.” 70 Table A.4.1: Lessons Learned from PRCA and Other Donor Projects Area Lessons Learned Action Taken Program Risk— The source of change is often PSDMA suffers from similar pathologies of the What is driving ambiguous. In many cases, the driving past, i.e. donor pressure and complex design. the change and force is donor pressure and the design However, the Program synchronizes sectoral how complex is of change process is complex. A shift reform actions with the national reform the change in the institutional culture is often objectives of the PSDMA. This synchronization program? difficult to engineer and the complexity establishes the ownership of reform at the of change program doesn’t help the sectoral level and doesn’t necessarily add another internalization of change by layer of complexity. The recent political changes stakeholders. have had an influence on managerial configurations within the administration and this has also created internal drivers for change that did not previously exist. Knowledge An organization needs to engage its One of the most challenging and demanding Base—Do the stakeholders, in order to implement aspects of PSDMA has been communications. impacted changes effectively. To do that, There has been very little communication with stakeholders have stakeholders need to understand the the key stakeholders of change. Recognizing the the skills or reasons why the change is happening fact that successful change relies heavily on how information for and its benefits. They also need to have the participants in the change view it, the the change to an opportunity to express their views Program preparation process involved all of the succeed? and contribute their own ideas about stakeholders in the identification of program how it might be implemented. objectives, program activities as well as intermediate and disbursement linked indicators. Institutional Civil servants and public sector The organizational culture of the Burkinabe Framework—Is institutions find it difficult to get used administration is not necessarily conducive to the organizational to change. The impact of change. The Program design has the following culture conducive organizational culture on change is elements to address cultural barriers in front of to change? profound. Organization culture can be change: defined as what a group learns over  Clearly communicating the vision for change; time as it solves its problems of  Outlining the benefits and impacts of change; survival in an external environment  Ensuring that participating ministries’ and its problems of internal integration. leadership communicate with the Not anchoring the change into the deconcentrated structures; organizational culture, norms, and shared values could diminish the  Providing opportunities to participate in chances for success. managing the change;  Monitoring and measuring the impact of actions. Resources—Is Public sector organizations that embark Although adopted in 2011, the implementation of funding, staff time on a transformation understandably PSDMA was very slow due to limited resources. and infrastructure have high hopes. Fixing broken The Program will provide the necessary impetus in place to drive processes, eliminating activities that for the implementation of the PSDMA. More and sustain don’t add value, creating more importantly, it will support the national effort to change? fulfilling jobs, and delegating more coordinate the change process through power to the front line all hold out the strengthening the SPMA. However, these promise of a better way of service interventions do not guarantee the sustainability delivery. Yet these initiatives do not of the change process. 71 always translate into sustainable improvements. Management Successful reforms typically are those With increasing citizen pressure on the Risk—How that have the strong support of government to perform accountably, the committed is the leadership and that are well understood transitional government is under pressure to leadership and by the key stakeholders. Increased prioritize public sector reform. The confirmed how effective are stakeholder engagement in commitment of the Transitional Government to modes of development and reform interventions the PSDMA is reflected in its adoption of the communications? enables people to acquire the new Second Action Plan. An important missing item knowledge that will shape their in the picture is the weak monitoring and attitudes and prompt them to adopt the evaluation capacity of the SPMA and the lack of positive behaviors. There is growing reporting lines to the National Public evidence that effective communication Administration Modernization Committee. The is critical to generating broad support Program will address this weakness and support for reforms. the SPMA to develop effective communications tools to communicate better with the key stakeholders. Technical Assessment of the Results Areas 13. The three results areas of the Program represent priority reform areas that are strategically relevant to the successful modernization of the public administration in Burkina Faso and technically sound: Results Area 1 – Improved Human Resource Capacity and Performance Strategic Relevance 14. Human Resources Management (HRM) encompasses the philosophy, strategic approach, principles, policies, procedures and practices related to the management of an organization’s employees; more importantly it is directly linked to their satisfaction and performance. In Burkina Faso, public sector inefficiencies, including HRM, are reflected in poor development outcomes. These inefficiencies present severe constraints to the Burkinabe government in developing their economy, utilizing and managing national resources effectively, promoting the social welfare of citizens, and delivering services. To counter and meet these challenges, the government is forced to rethink the organization and management of its human resources. The PSDMA strategically places HRM at the center of its efforts to modernize the public administration and results area one supports this priority reform area. Technical Soundness 15. Civil service reforms are critical to improving the capacity and performance of the public administration. Historically, civil service reforms have been difficult to implement in many countries. They have often fallen prey to the countervailing incentives for the personalization and politicization of public office. Furthermore, staffing and remuneration is a central source of patronage.58 58 Bukenya ànd Yanguas (2013) ‘Building state capacity for inclusive development. The politics of public sector reform’ Working Paper No. 25, http://www.effective-states.org/publications. 72 16. Civil service reforms in Burkina Faso have resulted in progressive improvements to human resource management, yet further efforts are required for these reforms to have an impact on civil servant performance. During the second generation of public sector reforms, in the early 2000s, efforts were made to develop more efficient systems for managing civil servants and contract workers:  From 2005, certain human resource functions were delegated from the MFPTSS to the line ministries, through the creation of Human Resource Departments, and regional offices of the MFPTSS were established as an interface between civil servants situated outside of Ouagadougou and the administration. The devolution of responsibility for human resource management to the line ministries and the regional departments of the MFPTSS paved the way for a more efficient and responsive management of the state’s human resources. However, these de-concentrated structures have limited capacity or authority to manage human resources effectively.  The country also became one of the pioneers in francophone West Africa for the introduction of an integrated computerized system for human resource management (Système Intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale du Personnel de l'Etat— SIGASPE). In addition to this, the Government experimented with various software applications to electronically store and collate information on civil servants and make the information more accessible to civil servants. In comparison with the region, Burkina’s electronic systems are well advanced and the administration has been called upon by other countries to provide technical assistance in this regard. Notwithstanding these innovations, the government has not completely shifted to a consolidated system for capturing all human resource processes. Accordingly, recruitment, career management and retirement processes are often delayed and neither the MFPTSS nor the line ministries possess easily accessible and up-to-date information on the civil service for planning, budgeting and monitoring of the wage bill.  Efforts to introduce performance evaluation and merit-based promotion were slow-paced, but have started to gain traction. While performance evaluation has become routine across the ministries, the quality of the evaluation process is hampered by the absence of clearly defined job descriptions, annual performance contracts, effective controls on performance evaluation and training of personnel and management on the evaluation process. Transitioning from performance evaluation to real merit-based promotion will likely take time. As a next step, efforts need to be made to strengthen the evaluation process and cultivate trust in the process. 17. Under results area one, the Program seeks to target the technical shortcomings of earlier reform efforts. Activities are directed at modernizing and harmonizing human resource management processes and strengthening the capacity of the de-concentrated HR departments in the relevant ministries. Results Area 2: Strengthened Institutional Capacity for Policy Planning, Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation Strategic Relevance 73 18. The design and delivery of public programs involve production of goods and services, or transfers of resources to individuals, organizations or other levels of government. Governments also use regulation – in areas such as workplace standards, consumer protection, the environment, foreign investment, transportation safety – as a tool for achieving policy goals. Effective institutional capacity lies at the heart of these core government functions. The government’s ability to react to changing economic, technological and social phenomena–and to shape these very same phenomena–requires ‘institutional capacity’ in the form of (i) modern and appropriate systems, (ii) adapted working environments; and (iii) strong management capacity and an appropriate skills mix of staff. The Program will promote improvements in the institutional capacity of the three selected ministries to develop, implement and monitor public policies. Technical Soundness 19. The delivery of basic public services by the government is underscored by the capacity of the administration to effectively plan, implement and monitor its policies. Public sector reform failures have often been linked to failure to take political dynamics into account, weak diagnostics and no overarching framework, lack of theory of change, imported models, lack of ownership and short term approaches. 59 In Burkina Faso, the government has been relatively effective in analyzing development challenges and identifying development priorities and solutions. However, the mid to senior level civil bureaucrats that are responsible for implementation are often poorly equipped to undertake the task. The design of this results area takes these past failures into account. The results area supports the government in creating an administrative environment that is conducive to the effective design, implementation and monitoring of government-owned policies. In so doing, it avoids the tendency of donors to push for first-best technical solutions with little genuine support from the local bureaucratic and political leadership for the proposed reforms. Results Area 3 – Strengthened Coordination Capacity for Public Sector Reforms Strategic Relevance 20. The achievement of the country’s development objectives, as outlined in the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) requires a highly performing public sector, which is capable of delivering public goods and services and facilitating economic development by supporting public and private initiatives as well as providing social cohesion. As earlier public sector reform efforts in Burkina Faso have demonstrated (notably with respect to public financial management reforms), the cross-cutting nature of public sector reforms requires strong centralized coordination and clearly defined lines of reporting and responsibility. Results area three of the Program will accordingly focus on supporting the Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Public Administration (SPMA) in coordinating the implementation of the overall PSDMA. Technical soundness 59 Zoe Scott. 2011. “Evaluation of Public Sector Governance Reforms 2001 -2011: Literature Review” Oxford Policy Management. 74 21. The institutional coordination failures and successes of earlier public sector reform efforts in Burkina Faso (outlined earlier) served as a valuable lesson for the design of the third results area. Limitations in the design of the technical aspects of the PSDMA, capacity constraints in the SPMA to effectively coordinate the PSDMA program, 60 as well as insufficiencies in the steering function the National Public Administration Modernization Committee impacted upon the implementation of the First Action Plan of the PSDMA. The third results area supports PSDMA expenditure program and Program Action Plan (PAP) activities to address these insufficiencies. Technical Assessment of Selected Sectoral Reform Paths 22. Given the cross-cutting nature of the results areas and their influence on specific sectoral service standards results, a technical assessment of the specific reform paths for each sectoral service standard result is summarized below. This assessment provides the strategic rationale for the selection of specific service standards in the three Ministries. It also incorporates a technical assessment of the sector-specific interventions and the pertinence of the cross-cutting interventions to the achievement of the service standard results. The assessment sets out the DLIs selected for each reform path and examples of the interventions (program and government- funded) that are envisaged to support the achievement of the DLIs. Reform Path 1: Human Resource Management 23. Strategic Relevance: Enhancing the performance of the public administration lies at the heart of improving government effectiveness and the delivery of public services. Civil service reform features as a critical element of public sector reform. The MFPTSS is responsible for the overall management of the civil service and for leading the public sector modernization agenda. The inclusion of the MFPTSS in the Project is therefore strategically pivotal the effective implementation of the Program and the PSDMA. The MFPTSS has recently adopted a long term strategy to improve the human, infrastructural, technological and material capacity of the public administration. The World Bank has long been a leading development partner on civil service reform in Burkina Faso, as outlined above, and is strategically well-placed to support the country in consolidating and improving upon its earlier reform efforts. 24. Strategic Relevance to the PDO Level Indicator: The MFPTSS is responsible for managing the careers of civil servants from recruitment through to retirement. The processes for recruiting, promoting, transferring and arranging the retirement of civil servants have an impact on (i) wage bill management; (ii) the efficient allocation of human resources across sectors and regions; and (iii) the motivation and performance of individual civil servants in contributing to the delivery for basic services. The complete transition from a highly centralized, manual system to a deconcentrated automated system for human resource management has yet to take place in Burkina. The SIGASPE, though more advanced and functional than other countries in the region, does not provide a comprehensive repository of up-dated information. The Program provides incentives for the government to take the necessary policy and operational changes to transition further towards a unique and integrated human resource management and payroll 60 As identified in decree no 2011-1138/MFPTSS/CAB/SP-MA 75 system that is managed at the deconcentrated level. The PDO level indicator measures the efficiency gains in processing recruitments, promotions, transfers and retirement that will emanate from the application of such a system. 25. Technical Soundness: The Program activities related to this reform path (which are encompassed by results areas one and two), have been designed using existing analysis on the use of integrated human resource and payroll systems, as well as the experience gained through the initial installation of the system and the deconcentration of human resource management responsibilities under the Administrative Capacity Building Project. The Program will support both cross-cutting and vertical interventions to address many of the institutional and organizational factors that have prevented more efficient human resource management through consolidated ICT systems and enhanced deconcentration. 26. Figure A.4.1 presents the results chain for Result Area 1 in terms of sequencing of DLIs, program action plan activities, intermediate results and legal covenants. Activities undertaken in the input stage will contribute to outcomes and intermediate outcomes, all which will help the Program achieve DLI targets. For example, in the results chain analysis for Results Area 1, timely hiring of teachers in a teaching year, which is an activity of human resource management reforms, will help the Program achieve better results in the results area 3 for education. In order to demonstrate that relationship, the DLI 4, which an outcome for the education sector reform path, is represented by a dotted-line box. 76 Figure A.4.1: Results Chain for Results Area 1 – Human Resource Management Reform Path Input Technical audit of Share of civil SIGASPE Update of the servants in selected SIGASPE for better ministries with use by selected online access to Technical human resources departments. administrative and assistance for the personnel HR Share of civil services refinement of the information transactions system and its involving hiring interconnections Share of civil (engagement/ Share of DRFP servants in selected intégration) and/or offices satisfying promotion ministries with an (reclassement) Training of staff defined criteria updated completed within a employment 28 calendar-day record in SIGASPE period. Review of HR Proportion of civil business processes servants in three and tools selected ministries conducted with job description, Share of new performance Intensive training primary school contracts and course designed teachers appointed annual and effected for to MENA by 31 performance Share of public ministerial human August evaluation primary school resource classes with at least departments (DRH) 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions = DLI = PAP = RF = PPF 77 Reform Path 2: Labor 27. Strategic relevance of the sector: The government’s regulation and protection of labor standards represents a strategically critical service for workers, particularly in a country with strong socialist leanings. Government efforts to monitor and safeguard labor conditions in the private sector are also a necessary complement to efforts to improve civil servant working conditions. The Directorate General of Labor (Direction Générale du Travail) in the MFPTSS is responsible for monitoring compliance with the labor laws and regulations including registration of workers with the CNSS and employers’ social security contributions. Compliance with the laws and with inspectors' orders and suggestions varies widely. Although there has been a steady increase in the number of workers registered with the CNSS between 2005 and 2018; the total number is still very low (see table 4). It stands at 298,648 workers at the end of 2013. In 2012, employer contributions to the CNSS amounted to around 110 million dollars (54,926,220,798 CFA). 28. Relevance of the PDO level indicators: The number of workers registered with the national Social Security Fund is an important step in providing them with social protection services (paid leave, social security, retirement) and increasing employers’ contributions to the Fund. 29. Technical Soundness: Labor inspections are strategically significant to the Government’s regulation and protection of labor standards. These inspections create visibility with respect to the conditions to which workers are subjected at the enterprise level. They also offer a valuable opportunity for the sensitization of employers with respect to their obligations towards employees. At present both the coverage and frequency of labor inspections are limited, leaving a significant proportion of the formal workforce, including those in high risk sectors (mining, construction) with little to no government surveillance of their employers. The Program will target the performance of the MFPTSS in improving the coverage, frequency and effectiveness of labor inspections. 78 Figure A.4.2: Results Chain for Results Area 2 – Labor Reform Path Input Share of DRT satisfying the Risk-based defined criteria Increase in the labor Number of in the Centre, contributions inspection private sector Centre-West, of employers program Cascades and employees into the CNSS established Upper Basin registered with regions the national Increase in the social security percentage of (Caisse Nationale workers who Standardized de Securite benefit from norms for Sociale) social security regional Share of labor enterprises inspectorates that received at established least two labor inspections in the Centre, Centre-West, Cascades and Upper Basin regions = DLI = PAP = RF 79 Reform Path 3: Education 30. Strategic relevance of the sector: Primary education represents a core service provided by the Government in Burkina Faso and a priority development area. Despite remarkable progress,61 Burkina Faso still faces great challenges for providing quality primary education. The World Bank has long been a leading development partner on primary education reform in Burkina Faso62 and is strategically well-placed to continue support for the sector. The Program draws upon existing expertise and engagement in the sector and seeks to complement earlier and ongoing vertical support to the sector. It also harnesses MENA’s relatively successful experience with results-based lending through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI)63. 31. Relevance of the PDO level indicator: Notwithstanding significant improvements in 64 access, the quality of education represents a binding constraint to achieving educational development outcomes in Burkina Faso. The instructional time provided to students in classrooms has a particular impact on the quality of education. Student instruction time has featured as a priority area of reform in Burkina since 2001. There are clear linkages between instruction time, teacher management and broader civil service reform. Institutional factors related to the inefficient management of the school year and teachers are estimated to account for almost half of the instructional time lost. The present Program provides appropriate incentives to strengthen coordination between the Government’s public sector modernization and civil service reforms and the sectoral reforms envisaged in the education sector with respect to instruction time. In so doing, it will help to strategically address the institutional factors that limit instruction time. 32. Technical soundness: From a technical perspective, the Program’s proposed interventions will directly address inadequacies in the monitoring of instruction time. The Program will also support both cross-cutting and vertical interventions to address many of the institutional and organizational factors that continue to affect instruction time (e.g. late recruitment of teachers, inefficient human resource management processes, and controls over absenteeism). 61 The Ten-Year Plan for the Development of Basic Education (2001-2010) has greatly improved primary school outcomes. Between 2001-2010, the Gross Intake Rate (GIR) rose from 47.4 to 85.8 percent, the Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) from 45.9 to 74.8 percent, the Primary Completion Rate (TAP) from 27.4 to 45.9 percent and the success rate of Certificate of Primary Education (CEP) from 62.3 to 65.9 percent. 62 P115264 Education for All Fast Track Initiative Project; P148062 Education Access and Quality Improvement Project 63 Fast Track Initiative Grant for Basic Education - P115264; Fast Track Initiative Grant II for Basic Education - P119413; Fast Track Initiative Grant III for Basic Education - P127166 . 64 The Gross Enrollment Rate reached 79.6% in 2012, up from 72.4% in 2008. 80 Figure A.4.3: Results Chain for Results Area 3 – Education Reform Path Input Monitoring and Share of CEB, DPEN Share of public evaluation and DRENA primary schools in system for satisfying the the selected teacher time on defined criteria in regions that have at task reviewed the regions Sahel, least two visits per and re-designed Upper Basin and academic year by a East circuit supervisor Introduction of an electronic registration and marking system Improvement of for teacher entry the monitoring Share of public examinations mechanism for primary school instruction time on classes with at least task in public 770 hours of primary school in instruction time the Sahel, Upper annually in the Basin and East Sahel, Upper Basin regions. and East regions. Standardized norms for regional and provincial ministerial departments identified Share of new teachers made Share of new available to primary school communities in the teachers appointed regions Sahel, to MENA by 31 Upper Basin and Training and August East on or before sensitization 25 September in a program for year monitoring teacher time on task designed and disseminated = DLI = PAP = RF = PPF 81 Reform Path 4: Justice Sector 33. Strategic Relevance of the sector: In Burkina Faso, the performance of the judicial branch of government has had a significant impact on citizen’s trust in government and on levels of social cohesion. The judiciary provides both (i) a critical accountability check on executive action and public administration and (ii) a formal channel through which the grievances of citizens, including civil servants, can be addressed. Drawing on the lessons of past reform attempts, the MOJ recognized that there was a pressing need to tackle deeper institutional issues related to (i) the incentives of judges to perform; and (ii) to the Ministry’s capacity to implement reform. The World Bank has traditionally had limited engagement in the justice sector in Burkina, yet there is increasing recognition as to the sector’s pertinence and influence on the broader World Bank development program for the country. 34. Relevance of the PDO level indicators: From a public sector modernization reform perspective two areas of judicial reform are particularly pertinent and realizable in the short time frame of the Program: A. Improving the Performance of Administrative Tribunals: First, improving the performance of the administrative tribunals is critical to ensuring that, downstream, the public administration is kept accountable to citizens. It also provides civil servants with a formal avenue for recourse against the State as an employer. Improving the administrative justice system is therefore a principal downstream element of enhancing public sector performance and a necessary condition for protecting citizens’ rights vis a vis the State.65 The average time taken by administrative courts to issue judgments remains lengthy. 66 In 2013, average case processing time was 1 year and 6 months, an increase of two months in comparison with the averages of 2011 and 2012. Improvements in case processing times in administrative jurisdictions are likely to have a significant impact upon individual litigants and upon broader civil service and public perceptions of the accountability of the public administration in Burkina. B. Improving the performance of local departmental and district courts: Second, improving the performance of local courts in resolving local level conflicts in a formal and objective manner is necessary to strengthening social cohesion and making core functions of the State relevant and visible to the predominantly poor and rural populations in Burkina Faso. While the local courts are in high demand for the processing of civil registry matters, they seldom exercise jurisdiction over civil and commercial matters that require arbitration. 67 Drawing upon analysis conducted by UNICEF in 201168 the Ministry of Justice introduced a Local Court Reinvigoration Strategy in 2012 to strengthen the role of the local courts in resolving local 65 The African Commission has determined that the right to a fair and public hearing is a general principle applicable to all legal proceedings, including administrative: see “Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa”, African Commission, DOC/OS 47, section A – General Principles Applicable to All Legal Proceedings, . 66 There is however no absolute time limit in international law for the completion of administrative judicial proceedings, and the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is dependent on the particular circumstances of the individual case.167 König v Germany, ECtHR, 28 June 1978, para 99. 67 The Ministry of Justice does not collect statistics on case load or case processing for the local courts. However, in 2013, not a single case was referred from the local courts to a First Instance Tribunal (of a total of 486 cases). 68 UNICEF (2011) « Access to Justice in Burkina Faso » 82 conflicts. The Program will help the Ministry of Justice to strengthen and scale up its pilot efforts to improve the performance of 50 local courts (see Table 11 in the Technical Assessment for the 50 selected local courts). 35. Technical Soundness: The Program draws upon a series of technical assessments of the justice sector conducted since 2008.69 These assessments highlight that the limited capacity of the Ministry of Justice to strategically plan, coordinate and manage human and financial resources represents a critical constraint in the sector. In addition, the productivity of the administrative and local courts is affected by a combination of organizational shortcomings, capacity limitations and skewed incentive structures. The Program will support both cross- cutting and vertical interventions to address some of the critical institutional capacity and organizational factors that affect the performance of the administrative tribunals and the local courts. 69 e.g. Justice Sector Review (2013), World Bank ; Minnegheer, Jacques and Smets Smets (December 2008) « Évaluation du Programme d’appui au renforcement du processus démocratique, al bonne gourvernance, l’état de droit (PADEG) et Identification des lignes directrices de l’appui au Secteur de la justice dans le cadre du 10e FED, Rapport final » : European Union ; Ouagadougou, Loada, Augustin (2012) « Background Paper on the Political Economy of the Justice Sector in Burkina Faso»: World Bank ; Kagan, Claudine (2007) « Rapport de Mission Justice 1 : Diagnostic des statistiques judicaires et proposition d’un programme d’amélioration, » : European Union ; Ouagadougou. ; Kister, Janine (February 2012) « Mission de Suivi-Accompagnement de la Mise en Place du Bureau d’ Execution des Peines au Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso» : European Union ; Ouagadougou ; Caux, Olivier, Raynal, Jean-Jacques, Taberne, Jose Maria (March 2011) « Mission d’Identification et de Formulation d’Un Programme d’Appui à la Politique Nationale de la Justice » : European Union; Ouagadougou ; Centre Pour la Gouvernance Democratique au Burkina Faso (September 2011) “Rapport sur la Justice et l’Etat de Droit au Burkina Faso”. 83 Figure A.4.4: Results Chain for Results Area 4 – Justice Reform Path 36. Input Technical assistance Share of to review on-line jurisdictions in accessibility to laws Ouagadougou, and jurisprudence Tenkodogo, Dédougou and Bobo-Dioulasso regions that satisfy the defined criteria Review of administrative law court registers and  Share of identification of judgments issued by automated registry Share of most Share of written administrative tribunals in a frequently used judgments handed 12 month period (75% of laws and down in the pilot which through a written jurisprudence jurisdictions in judgment) in the regions of publicly accessible Ouagadougou, Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, online Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo- Dédougou and Dioulasso Standardized norms Bobo-Dioulasso  Share of for regional regions for which judgments involving jurisdictions the case litigation matters issued by identified management selected departmental and process is district courts, in a manner automated consistent with the Share of local Recipient’s rules and courts in selected procedures regions that satisfy the defined criteria Local court registers standardized Share of local courts in selected regions that have the presidents and Training modules for assessors trained local court personnel designed and disseminated Establishment of a uniform case Data collection tracking system in system in 50 pilot selected local courts departmental and reviewed district courts. = PAP = RF = PPF = DLI 84 Program’s Expenditure Framework 36. The Public Sector Modernization Program will finance the implementation of a subset of activities in the PSDMA’s Second Action Plan in three ministries. The estimated financing need for the Second Action Plan is Euro 53,108,763 (US$59,339,400)—(Table A. 4.2) as total secured financing from the Program (Euro 35,800,000) and the Government (Euro 5,347,088) amount to Euro 41,147,088 (US$45,974,400). The Program financing represents 87 percent of the total secured financing and the share of government financing is 13 percent of the total secured amount. The Program expenditure amount represents the full cost of direct modernization efforts in the selected three ministries, excluding wage and salary as well as recurrent operating expenditures. However the complementarity of the Program expenditures on sectoral activities in the government’s budget makes the potential impact of the Program on the sectoral outcomes greater in value than the estimated amount of Program expenditures. For example, the Program activities to achieve the results in the primary education sector complement the activities of the MENA financed through the government budget. As such, the achievement of 770 annual hours of instruction in primary public schools in the selected three regions requires resources that are traditionally allocated to the Ministry of National Education and Literacy’s budget such as teacher salaries, operating expenditures of schools as well as expenditures on educational materials. It is impossible to delineate the expenditures of sectoral ministries (i.e. MENA, MJDHPC) according to the geographical allocation and cost out a proportion that are only related to the achievement of the Program objectives. Because of these difficulties the government share of Program financing presented below represent only direct budgetary allocation of the government for the implementation of the PSDMA. It doesn’t include sectoral ministries’ budgetary allocations for service delivery in the selected areas of the Program. In that sense, the Program Financing table (Table 2) underrepresents the government’s contribution to the Program as the indirect contribution of the government for the achievement of the program development objectives cannot be captured. 37. The government is presenting the Second Action Plan to other development partners to raise funds, but there is no firm commitment from other development partners yet. The Program activities are drawn from three sector strategies to populate the Second Action Plan and directly linked to the achievement of the DLIs and to the PDO. 38. The Second Action Plan consists of a series of sub-programs, each aligned with a pillar of the PSDMA. The sub-programs incorporate the following types of activities: (i) studies and technical assistance to analyze insufficiencies in existing administrative systems and processes, (ii) the elaboration of manuals, guides and other administrative tools to support human resource management, civil service administration and to establish service standards, (iii) the purchase of office equipment and supplies to strengthen the administrative capacity of the MFPTSS, the HR and planning departments of the ministries and regional departments (including those regions not covered by the Program), (iv) the extension of ICT, including the computerization of both internal and external administrative services in the ministries (e.g. applications for performance monitoring), and (vi) in-service training. 39. Table A.4.2 summarizes the allocation of funds across pillars of the PSDMA, as provided for under the Second Action Plan of the PSDMA. While the systems to be developed under the 85 Second Plan (i.e. performance evaluation system), can be applicable in all ministries, the Program will focus on their implementation in three ministries: MFPTSS, MENA and MJPDHC. The distribution of the Program financing across different pillars of the PSDMA is as follows: The first pillar of the PSDMA, which aims is to enhance public administration performance for sustainable development and streamline the decision-making processes, procedures and structures within the public administration, will receive 9 percent of the total Program funding Euro 3,201,219 (US$3,586,560). The activities of the first pillar include: studies to analyze efficacy of the public administration, elaboration of a productivity strategy within the administration, development of performance evaluation system, development of modern HR management tools, designing training programs for senior managers on HR management, review of HR business processes and preparation of reports for the Council of Ministers. 40. The amount of financing for second pillar activities, which focus on improvements in human resource capacity and staff working conditions, will be Euro 6,541,286 (US$7,328,680), around 18 percent of the total Program funding. The activities of the second pillar include: evaluation reports for the improvements in working conditions within the administration, studies the level of administrative resources (materials, infrastructure, logistics), procurement of material (computer, printer, furniture etc.) based on the analysis of deficiencies, analyses of deficiencies in the HR management units and diagnostic reports on career management within the administration. 41. Nearly 13 percent of total Program funding will go to the activities under the third pillar of the PSDMA, which aims to improve transparency with the administration Euro 4,798,913 (US$5,376,572). The activities of the pillar include: studies to identify actions to improve hospitality and accessibility of public administration, elaboration of users’ guide for public services, studies for the development of service standards within the administration, development of citizen charters, studies for streamlining administrative processes, and development of training programs for civil servants on citizen charters. 42. The activities under the fourth pillar of the PSDMA, which aim to improve efficiency, transparency and more accessibility of the administration through ICT technology, will receive 16 percent of the total Program funding Euro 5,778,629 (US$6,474,220). The activities under the fourth pillar include: reviewing the organizational chart of ministries, establishment of IT teams within the ministries, training of IT staff in the ministries, development of on-line systems for e- government, and elaboration of legal texts for electronic approvals and payments. 43. The cost of the activities under the fifth pillar of the PSDMA, a pillar targeting deconcentration of the administration, is Euro 12,092,098 (US$13,547,660), around 34 percent of the total Program funding. The activities include: elaboration of ministerial deconcentration plans, identification of material and human resource needs of the deconcentrated structures, rehabilitation of buildings in regions, and construction of new buildings in regions. 44. Finally, the Program will finance the implementation of the PSDMA for Euro 3,388,430 (US$3,796,308), 9 percent of the total Program funding. 45. Program funding will be included in the annual budget, following the regular budget cycle, under the budget line for the Public Administration Modernization Program. All payments 86 of the Program will be made through the centralized Treasury system. All funding (regardless of the source) will flow through distinct budget line items. The Program funding will be used for only non-wage/salary related expenditures including non-wage related operating expenses and capital investments (small public works projects). The salaries of the civil servants are not part of the PSDMA nor the Program. The Program expenditures are narrowly drawn, excluding wage and salary expenditures. The Program expenditures are direct expenditures of the reform efforts whereas recurrent wage and salary expenditures would be incurred irrespective of reform efforts. They are financing activities clearly linked to the achievement of the DLIs and to the PDO. 46. Burkina Faso has a well-developed budget classification to track government expenditures under the Program. The Program budget for participating ministries will be incorporated in the PSDMA budget—under Title 5 Section 17 (MFPTSS)—of the annual budget which has provisions for both recurrent and capital budgets. 47. The Program will supplement PSDMA budget but will focus on implementation in the selected ministries. The total Program funds of Euro 35.8 million (US$40 million) will be used only for financing of activities identified clearly within the PSDMA Second Action Plan to achieve the intended results. 48. Financial sustainability of the Program is not a major concern. The implementation of the PSDMA started with the first action plan covering the period of 2011 to 2013 for which an inadequate budget allocation of around US$37,800,000 (18,619,000,000 CFA) was applied, of which US$5,600,000 (2,800,000,000 CFA) came from the national budget. In order to ensure an adequate level of financial resources for reform coordination and the implementation of the PSDMA, the Program has a dedicated results area for coordination (Result Area 3) and Program resources will finance activities for reform coordination and monitoring and evaluation of outcomes. 49. Although the fiscal space in Burkina is likely to be tight over the next few years, a dedicated treasury special account (Compte d’Affectation Spéciale ouvert au Trésor, CAST) will be opened to avoid cash rationing and streamline payment process of the Program. It will enable linking program resources to spending by using the national public financial management system. It will facilitate the: i) monitoring of resources and their related expenditures in the national budget; ii) carrying forward unused but committed budgetary allocations, which is an exception to the principle of the annual budgetary system; iii) managing of transactions directly through CID, and iv) having separate reporting on implementation, as well as an independent audit, since the transactions on the CAST can be extracted from the CID and the IT application for accounting (Integrated Accounting System, Comptabilité Integré de l’Etat – CIE). 50. An initial advance will be made to the Government once the Program becomes effective. 87 Table A.4.2: Program Expenditure Framework (in Euro) Financing 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total World Burkina Others Bank PILLAR No 1: IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY AND THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY 995,597 1,873,519 1,777,123 732,827 5,379,066 223,140 3,201,220 1,954,706 Program 1: Promoting Greater Performance in the Public Administration 288,333 934,546 975,604 338,316 2,536,798 17,851 1,742,420 776,527 Program 2: Streamlining Decision-making Processes, Procedures and Structures in the Public Administration 707,265 938,973 801,519 394,512 2,842,268 205,289 1,458,800 1,178,179 PILLAR No 2: RECOGNIZING AND IMPROVING HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 3,387,105 2,495,259 2,275,689 1,528,616 9,686,668 1,644,096 6,541,287 1,501,286 Program 1: Improving Staff Working Conditions 1,330,985 377,553 288,297 168,694 2,165,529 103,537 1,945,959 116,033 Program 2: Improving Human Resources Management 1,297,443 1,381,344 1,247,460 668,188 4,594,435 772,957 3,424,289 397,189 Program 3: Strengthen the capacity of public administration in development policy design and monitoring 758,676 660,494 660,494 660,494 2,740,159 767,602 1,171,039 801,519 Program 4: Promoting Public Expertise 75,868 79,438 31,240 186,545 186,545 PILLAR No 3: PROMOTION OF ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 2,798,308 2,349,939 2,277,642 1,501,472 8,927,360 427,001 4,798,913 3,701,446 Program 1: Improving Hospitability and Accessibility in the Public Administration 657,103 709,050 662,637 618,009 2,646,797 118,175 2,528,622 Program 2: Improving Transparency in the Public Administration 2,141,205 1,640,889 1,615,005 883,463 6,280,563 308,826 4,798,913 1,172,824 PILLAR No 4: PROMOTION OF E-GOVERNANCE 4,100,867 3,404,617 2,882,558 1,899,136 12,287,177 2,065,384 5,778,630 4,443,164 Program 1: Strengthening of the Institutional and Security Framework 94,611 299,900 182,082 17,851 758,676 556,957 148,165 53,554 88 Financing 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total World Burkina Others Bank Program 2: Strengthening of the Communication Infrastructure and the Administration Information Systems 893,810 632,147 654,371 323,589 2,503,916 17,851 2,432,512 53,554 Program 3: Dematerialization of Administrative Procedures and Development of Online Services 3,112,446 2,472,570 2,046,105 1,393,465 9,024,585 1,490,575 3,197,953 431,999 PILLAR No 5: PROMOTION OF DECONCENTRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION 3,925,532 6,288,299 1,953,975 904,324 13,072,130 740,825 12,092,099 239,206 Program 1: Strengthening the Operational Capacities of Deconcentrated Structures 3,634,558 5,799,177 1,687,992 638,341 11,760,067 133,884 11,547,638 78,545 Program 2: Promotion of the Advice/ Support /Assistance Provides to Local Governments 290,975 489,123 265,983 265,983 1,312,063 606,941 544,462 160,661 Implementation of the Strategy 1,415,957 880,421 773,589 541,605 3,611,573 133,884 3,388,433 89,256 TOTAL 16,683,366 17,392,052 11,932,572 7,100,783 2,963,975 5,347,088 35,800,000 11,961,675 89 Program’s Results Framework and Monitoring & Evaluation 51. The Program Development Objective (PDO) is to improve selected service standards in selected ministries. The key outcomes to be achieved are the following:  Improved human resource management processes;  Improved institutional capacity for public policy making and implementation;  Improved capacity for public sector reform implementation. 52. These results have been selected based on their strategic importance in their respective areas. The Program will be monitored and evaluated through the use of number of M&E tools throughout implementation including regular reports from the Ministries of Civil Service, Education and Justice as well as SPMA to ASCE, Cour des Comptes audits, value for money audits and the midterm review. 53. Internal administrative data collection capacity is relatively strong however additional efforts are needed to strengthen coordination and enhance the administration’s capacity to analyze and use data in policy formulation and implementation. The Program Action Plan will support strengthened M&E capacity. Governance Structure of the Program and Institutional and Coordination Arrangements 54. Adequate arrangements have been put in place for Program implementation. Details of the institutional and coordination arrangements for Program implementation can be found in Annex 1. Fraud and Corruption 55. Existing anti-corruption measures and policies will be strengthened to avoid the negative impact of fraud and corruption in the achievement of program results. Detailed discussions of fraud and corruption within country context and mitigation measures are included in the Integrated Fiduciary Assessment (Annex 5). Complaint Handling and Grievance Redress Capacity 56. Technical support will be provided to the Ombudsman to strengthen the grievance redress capacity of its regional offices and focal points. The objective is to ensure effective grievance redress and coordination with ASCE in handling fraud and corruption related complaints within the Program. The Program Operations Manual will have a Grievance Redress Section, as part of the capacity support to the Ombudsman. Further details of the grievance redress mechanisms proposed for the Program are outlines in Annex 5. Economic Justification of the Program 57. The World Bank’s Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-2020 ‘Better Results from Public Sector Institutions” provides a strong rationale for supporting public management improvements (2012). As the document states, the size and economic significance of the public sector make it a major contributor to growth and social welfare. The quality of services provided 90 by the government, and the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the public sector machinery are key areas that need improvement. The proposed reform areas provide a clear economic rationale for the intervention. 58. Economic evaluation of similar public sector reform programs elsewhere indicates that the economic benefits are wide-ranging and mutually strengthening. Emerging operational evidence of similar projects suggests that there are potential efficiency gains that can be derived from implementing public sector reforms supported by this program. Implementation of the program is likely to result in a reduction of transaction costs associated with the delivery of public services due to (a) improved human resource management capacity of government; (b) improved institutional capacity of selected sector ministries to design and implement public policies; (c) improved administrative capacity at the regional level resulting in improved responsiveness of service delivery agents to citizens’ concerns, needs and requests; and (d) improved accountability linkages between decision makers and citizens, resulting in better living conditions and reduced social conflicts.70 59. Although the expected economic impact of the proposed Program is difficult to quantify, it is expected to be positive. In the absence of hard evidence on economic rates of return and economic costs and benefits of institutional strengthening, cost effectiveness of these types of interventions elsewhere suggest that the benefits of the Program will outweigh the costs. In terms of a cost-benefit analysis, the Program seeks to modernize the public administration, leading to better management of civil servants and improved managerial efficiencies. The program resources will finance the implementation of activities within the PSDMA as well as sectoral plans with the aim of improving the human resource management practices and service delivery standards in selected areas. 60. While efficiency gains from improved services in human resource management can be estimated by using proxies, the improvements in service standards in the justice sector do not easily translate into monetary terms. Moreover, the transversal nature of reforms in policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation and the fact that these reforms are implemented alongside sectoral strategies make it difficult to attribute the expected outcomes to a single intervention. 61. Despite these difficulties, and based on certain assumptions, the expected impact of the proposed interventions is positive. The analysis assumes an exchange rate of FCFA 500 per US dollar and a 5 percent discount rate. The overall benefit is valued to be an estimated US$56,091,515 to US$72,734,040. Evaluation of the Technical Risks 62. Based on the findings of assessments undertaken for the preparation of the Program, the overall technical risk rating is moderate. 70 About the history of social conflicts in Burkina Faso see Harsch E. 2009. Urban Protest in Burkina Faso. African Affairs 108 (431): 263-288 and Hagberg S. 2007. Traditional Chieftaincy, Party Politics and Political Violence in Burkina Faso. In State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Buur, L. Kyed, H. M. (eds). Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire; 131-154. 91 63. The need for strong coordination between different ministries and their deconcentrated structures poses the biggest technical risk to the success of the Program. The Program mitigates this risk by setting up coordination committees (see discussions under Coordination Arrangements), strengthening the capacity of the SPMA and providing vertical incentives to encourage sectoral alignment with PSDMA objectives. 64. The weak monitoring and evaluation capacity of the SPMA and participating ministries also poses a technical risk. The Program Action Plan addresses the M&E risk by developing a robust capacity building plan. 65. With regards to fraud and corruption risks, the mitigation measures are taken at different levels. First, the ASCE will provide semi-annual internal audit reports, in cooperation with technical inspection units of the participating ministries. In terms of the external audit function, a private external auditor will audit the Program accounts initially while the capacity of the Cour des Comptes will be strengthened to assume the function following the mid-term review of the Program. 92 Annex 5: Fiduciary Systems Assessment 1. A Fiduciary Systems Assessment (FSA) of the Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program was carried out in accordance with OP/BP 9.0. An assessment of the financial management and procurement systems and capacities of the MFPTSS (the ministry in charge of the budget preparation and execution of the defined program expenditures), as well as the MEF, was carried out. The conclusion of the FSA is that the Program Fiduciary Systems have the capabilities to provide reasonable assurance that the funds under the Program will be used for the intended purposes. 2. The Program will finance a subset of the Government’s Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of the Administration (PSDMA) over a period of four years (2016 – 2019). The Program intends to support the operationalization of the PSDMA Second Action Plan in selected ministries. The Program aims to improve human resource management capacity of the Burkinabe administration and improve the operational efficiency of the selected ministries. The Program will promote the attainment of service standards in each of the selected ministries by focusing on three cross-cutting Results Areas: (i) improved human resource management capacity and performance; (ii) strengthened institutional capacity for policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation; and (iii) strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms. 3. The Program will rely predominantly on the existing financial management and procurement systems and institutions in Burkina Faso. Recent progress in the development of the country’s PFM systems and institutions has been assessed as sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the financing under the Program will be used for intended purposes, with due regard to the principles of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability. However, ongoing weaknesses in the existing systems were identified in the ‘Boosting Budget Execution in WAEMU Countries’ report (including the risk of budget regulation and delays and duplication of controls) require that a series of measures need to be adopted. Accordingly the FSA recommends a series of activities which have been incorporated into the Program Action Plan to strengthen fiduciary aspects of Program implementation. 4. The overall fiduciary risk for the Program has been assessed as moderate. The risk will be mitigated by (i) the utilization of a Dedicated Treasury Special Account (CAST)71, (ii) the appointment of a full time resident financial and public procurement controller, and (iii) the nomination of an experienced procurement specialist to the SPMA. 5. The Program will be implemented in accordance with the provisions of the Anti- Corruption (ACG) applicable to PforR operations. Further details are provided below. Institutional Arrangements for Program Implementation 6. The four most critical stakeholders involved in implementing the Program are the MFPTSS, MEF, MENA and MJPDHC. In the context of the Program, the MFPTSS is the 71 CAST is part of the government's existing procedures chosen for this program to facilitate the monitoring of Program resources and their related expenditures in the national budget and carrying forward unused but committed budgetary allocations, to avoid delays in the implementation of activities. 93 primary beneficiary that will be responsible for using the funds available through the Program in coordination with MENA and MJPDHC to support the implementation of a modern performance-oriented public administration system and the achievement of the results targeted by the Program. The SPMA is the lead agency for the Program and is also directly responsible for implementing activities contributing to targeted results. The Education and Justice ministries are not responsible for budget execution under the Program. The overall execution of the Program is centralized within the MFPTSS as the defined Program expenditures are directly linked to reform activities therefore the recurrent expenditures such as salaries and operating costs which would be incurred irrespective of reform efforts are not included the Expenditure Framework. 7. As the primary government institution responsible for elaboration and execution of the Program budget, the MEF has a central role to play in achieving the Program results in terms of release of funds and elaborating the standards and processes for program financial management. 8. The Program will be subject to the oversight of existing public sector oversight institutions in Burkina Faso. These include the Supreme Audit Institutions - the Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes), the High State Control Authority (ASCE) and the ministerial technical inspectorates. The ASCE will be also responsible for conducting the annual performance audits and annual verification of results, which will consist of financial and technical audits and the verification of achievements measured by each of the DLIs in accordance with the verification protocol. The ASCE was selected as a result of its status as a constitutional body with both the independence and the mandate to conduct audits of the ministries. The ASCE will report the results of the verification audits to the MEF and the Bank. Program Financial Management Systems 9. Financial management of the Program will be carried out using Burkina Faso’s existing PFM systems and processes. The Program will be located within the country’s budgetary framework and will rely on the existing systems for implementation. Planning and Budgeting 10. The 2013 and 2010 PEFA assessments documented obvious progress made with respect to the comprehensiveness and transparency of the budget, policy-based budgeting and internal controls, as well as the compliance of the budget preparation, approval and amendment procedures with good practices. According to the calendar set out in the Budget Act, at the end of May each year, the MEF issues Economic and Fiscal Policy Guidelines. All key indicators provided by the guidelines (including the limits of allocations set by the government) are then translated into instructions for drafting the state budget. A series of meetings with the MEF specifically targeted at programs means that they tend to be well integrated in the regular budget preparation process. When receiving budget instructions, program managers prepare their proposals of financial plans, within which they autonomously decide on the allocation of funds to programs and activities within the allocated limits. All approved programs have to produce their respective budgets for integration into the national Budget and the government’s budget management application before Parliamentary approval. By the end of the year the Parliament adopts the annual budget. One key constraint is the in-year regulation of the budget allocation 94 that can create unavailability of resources to spending units due to budget rationing or mid-term revision of the Budget. In addition, the lack of multi-year budgeting does not allow carrying forward unutilized budget allocation of programs. 11. Program funds will be entirely reflected in the central government budget under the budget line for the Public Administration Modernization Program. Payments and Flow of Funds 12. The PFM system in Burkina is based on the principle of the separation between those who order payments (ordonnateurs) and those who make the payments and record it in the accounting systems (public accountants). 13. Burkina Faso has selected the Euro as the currency for this operation. The GoB has analyzed the positive and negative of such choice and has concluded that the selection of Euro as the currency of choice is in their best interest reducing the country foreign exchange risk and aligning project financing currency (Euro) with its choice of disbursement currency and the repayment currency (Euro). Furthermore Burkina Faso local currency (FCFA) and international reserves are pegged to the Euro. All payments of the Program will be made through the centralized Treasury system. The government has requested to use a Dedicated Treasury Special Account (CAST) to avoid cash rationing and streamline the payment process of the Program. The CAST will enable resources to be directly linked to spending, in contrast to the general budget where resources cannot be allocated to specific expenditure. The creation of CASTs is provided for in the Public Finance Organic Law. The Parliament is responsible for approving the establishment of CASTs and their expenditure ceilings. CASTs use the existing public financial management system and are subject the same national fiduciary compliance requirements as other accounts. However, they facilitate: i) the monitoring of resources and their related expenditures in the national budget; ii) the carrying forward of unused but committed budgetary allocations, which is an exception to the principle of the annual budgetary system; iii) the management of transactions directly through the Integrated Financial Management System for budget monitoring (CID), and iv) separate reporting on implementation, as well as an independent audit, since the transactions on the CAST can be extracted from the CID and the IT application for accounting (CIE). The MEF is familiar with CASTs which are used for sectoral budget support by other development partners. 95 Flowchart of fund flows in CAST World Bank / National Budget of BF Upon satisfactory achievement of Program Account at the Central Bank - DLIs BCEAO Ministry of Economy and Finance CAST at Public Treasury Directorate of Budget /Public Accountant (Agent Comptable Central du Trésor) Payments of all Program transactions are part of Suppliers the national systems Accounting and Financial Reporting 14. The government’s budget management application is called the Integrated Financial Management System for Budget Monitoring (Circuit Intégré de la Dépense - CID) and it is fully interfaced with the accounting application (Comptabilité Integré de l’Etat – CIE), which is used to produce annual financial statements. Both systems have been applied to all ministries at the central level, as well as to the regions. CID is an application that integrates a number of sub- systems including budgeting and internal controls. It is currently utilized to process the entire expenditure chain and has contributed to improving transparency, minimizing processing lead times and enhancing effectiveness. The Government’s other principle IT applications – the Integrated Information System for Procurement (Systeme Integré des Marchés Publics -SIMP) and the Integrated Information System for Human Resource Management (SIGASPE) for civil servants’ payroll management – are also operational. 15. The government has adopted accounting standards approved by the WAEMU PFM directives since 2004. Though Burkina has not fully complied with the accrual accounting basis, it has applied double-entry accounting and records expenditures when these are incurred. 96 16. Budget execution reports: Since the implementation of the budget mid-term review, budget execution is reported on a bi-annual basis. This is complemented by bi monthly budget execution reports from line ministries to the Budget Directorate. These reports serve to identify how best to address issues encountered during budget execution and they include an update of the implementation of the procurement plan. 17. Annual financial statements and accounting reports: The annual financial statements prepared consist of a trial balance, a balance sheet, a P&L account, and a cash flow statement as well as annexes. These are complemented by the “comptes de gestion” produced by public accountants and sent systematically to the Court of Account. These end-of year-accounts provide the annual balance of all accounts used by the Treasury for collecting resources and incurring expenditures. As per the revised WAEMU PFM directives, government financial statements, annual accounts and supporting documents are made available to the Court of Accounts by 30 June of the following fiscal year. 18. The SPMA will be responsible for the compilation of Program financial statements and interim financial reports. Budget execution reports will be directly generated from CID, and transactions involving the Program’s CAST will be extracted from the CID and the CIE. Controls and Audits 19. Burkina’s control framework comprises several layers: 20. Internal control procedures: The Public Finance Organic Law regulations and the IT applications (CID, CIE, SIGASPE, SIMP) are built upon sound principles of internal controls and segregation of duties. Checks and balances are incorporated at all stages of the budget cycle, from the requisition of funds to the spending, accounting and reporting phases and through different access and user rights within the IT applications. Any budgetary expenditure processed through CID requires the intervention and authorization of three distinct staff members: a budgetary execution officer, who will commit funds and verify the amount to be paid, a financial control officer, responsible for ensuring that all regulations have been complied with and documented, and an accountant officer, in charge of payment. To avoid duplication of similar controls and delay in processing the transactions, the MEF has issued a decree to clarify roles and attributions of different stakeholders, merge the public procurement controls and the financial control within the same unit and de-concentrate the verification units to the line ministries. However, these concrete measures have not yet impacted positively the processing lead time which is still very long. Program managers have reported delays and cancelations often due to excessive formalism of control procedures. 21. Internal audit: Ministerial inspections, such as General Finance Inspectorate (IGF), are responsible for applying audit systems and procedures, assessing risks, identifying the root causes of irregularities or inefficiencies and making recommendations for improvement in the management of the public administration. Notwithstanding the progress made, there is a need to enhance the audit methodology used by the ministerial inspections and ensure the effective implementation of the annual audit plans. Following the creation of the ASCE in late 2007, which merged the former General Inspection of State and the Anti-Corruption Commission, the country is progressively emerging as a good practice model for internal oversight within 97 Francophone Africa. The ASCE comprises 21 internal auditors and has progressively introduced a risk-based approach, starting with the risk mapping of key ministries including civil service, justice and education which are part of this Program. A three year audit plan for each of these ministries has also been elaborated for the period 2014-2016. The ASCE is also adding value in the internal control environment by addressing cross-cutting issues that have been hindering the effectiveness of the internal audit system, concentrating on the investigation of corruption cases and the identification of individual responsibilities when funds are misappropriated. 22. It has been agreed that capacity building support to ASCE will be provided under the Program to enable it to assume the internal audit function of the Program. The ASCE will coordinate with ministerial inspectorates involved to ensure effective implementation of audit plans, compliance with audit methodology and risk-based approach, quality reviews of their audit reports and adequate follow-up of audit findings and recommendations. 23. External audits: Set up in 2002, the Court of Accounts has 17 magistrates and three chambers, which are respectively in charge of the control over the State operations, decentralized entities and public enterprises. The Court of Accounts has been a member of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) since 2007 and needs to adapt its articles of agreement in line with the ethics and auditing standards. Despite backlogs in the delivery of judgments and delay in the revision of its organic law to create more attractive terms and conditions of work for Court staff, significant improvements have been achieved by the Court. These are evidenced by the regular publication of the annual report and the implementation of the action plan developed following the peer review performed by the Moroccan supreme audit institution and the recent organizational and financial audit of the institution. The program action plan includes support for the ongoing restructuring and strengthening of the Court of Accounts. The Bank will rely on a private external auditor to audit the Program’s annual financial statements for the first two years of Program implementation to allow the Court of Accounts to clean up its backlog and strengthen its capacity. The audited Program financial statements will be sent to the Bank no later than 9 months after the end of the fiscal year. The capacity of the Court of Accounts will be reassessed by mid-term with the aim of transferring responsibility for the auditing of the Program’s financial statements to the Court of Accounts in accordance with the country practices. Disbursement arrangements from the Bank 24. Disbursements of the IDA credit will be made at the request of the borrower upon achievement of Disbursement-Linked Indicators (DLIs). Loan proceeds will be disbursed in Euro into a dedicated program account held at the Central Bank and then transferred to the Dedicated Treasury Special Account of the Program within the Treasury system. Disbursement requests will be submitted to the Bank using the Bank’s standard disbursement forms through the e- disbursement functionality in the Bank’s Client Connection system. An initial advance equivalent to 25% of the amount of the Financing will be made available upon project effectiveness in order to allow the borrower to achieve the results for one or several DLIs. This initial advance will be recovered against each DLI as per the instructions in the Disbursement Letter. 98 Program Procurement Systems Procurement profile of the Program 25. Procurements to be undertaken in the Program are relatively modest and comprise of: (a) small works of rehabilitation and minor constructions; (b) IT and other equipment; and (c) consultant services for some studies and development of training tools. Procurement planning 26. The Procurement planning process is well managed in Burkina. During the preparation of the annual budget, all ministries are invited to draft a procurement plan which is joined to the budget package and submitted to the approval of the National Assembly. Once the budget is approved, ministries are invited to adjust and finalize procurement plans and send for publication to the General Directorate for the Control of Public Tenders and Financial Engagements (Direction Générale du Contrôle Des Marchés et des Engagements Financiers - DGCMEF). The assessment of the national procurement system conducted by the Bank in 2009 for the ‘Piloting the Use of the Country System’ initiative found that proper budget implementation linked to procurement planning was made possible (i) because sufficient budgetary allocations for the duration of the contract execution were made at the start of procurement process; and (ii) through the existence of a computerized expenditure circuit (CID). But the ‘Boosting Budget Execution in WAEMU Countries’ study in 2013 revealed that one of the main weakness of procurement planning is the poor implementation of procurement plans which is due mostly to the lack of anticipation in the preparation of bidding documents. It also highlighted that the midterm review of the annual budgets by the MEF results in a cutting of budget allocation and the cancellation of procurement activities on the annual plans. 27. The use of a Dedicated Treasury Special Account – CAST will mitigate the risks of loss of unused funds. Procurement process and procedures 28. Following the transposition of WAEMU procurement directives, a Procurement Code was adopted in 2008, after review by IDA based on international practices. The Code of 2008, which was revised in 2013, promotes and establishes open competition, unrestrictive access to bidding broader publicity in advertising, minimum standards for standard bidding documents, including clearly specified evaluation criteria and measures to ensure the confidentiality of bids. In addition, new standard bidding documents were adopted in July 2009 to adhere to the provisions of the new procurement code. While the procurement framework is relatively robust, implementation and enforcement remain weak. The Boosting Budget Execution study report showed that there are a lot of delays in the procurement process as it takes more than 6 months to conduct a process from advertisement to contract award. The main reasons are: (i) the poor quality of bidding documents, (ii) redundant controls, and (iii) the low threshold of procurement methods and delegation of approval. The government is preparing to increase procurement, prior review and contract approval thresholds based on a proposal of the WAEMU. 99 29. Procurement under the Program will follow government procedures. The institutional arrangements of the Program reduce the risk of delays in procurement. To further mitigate the risk, the following measures need to be taken: (a) staff the SPMA with an experienced procurement specialist and (b) agree on deadlines to be respected by the SPMA in the procurement process and use these as indicators to evaluate their performance in procurement. This last measure will help to identify the different bottlenecks and address them efficiently during the Program life. Controls and integrity 30. All contracts estimated to be above US$10,000 for works, goods, non-consultant services and consultant services are submitted to the prior review of the General Procurement Directorate (Direction Génerale des Marchés Publics - DGMP). Initially, this prior review was centralized in the MEF, but in 2010, the Bank’ budget support operation proposed triggers on the decentralization of this function in some key ministries. The DGMP initiated a gradual process of decentralization of its review functions to the Ministries and Regions. Another improvement was introduced in 2013 with the merging of the DGMP and General Directorate of Financial Controls (Direction General du Contrôle Financier - DGCF) to create a new direction, the DGCMEF which combines procurement prior review and financial control. Today, a representative of the DGCMEF, a financial comptroller (Contrôleur Financier - CF) is assigned to each ministry and is responsible for conducting prior review of contracts under thresholds. An initial review of the impact of these changes noted some improvements but there are still challenges including: (i) the operationalization of the new function of CF through the implementation of the new Manual of Procedures and (ii) the training of DGCMEF agents. 31. Ideally, procurement audits are conducted by the Court of Accounts, but because of a lack of resources and capacity, the Court of Accounts does not systematically conduct procurement audits. The Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) also has difficulty in conducting annual procurement audits. The last procurement audit covered the period of 2010 to 2013; but the final report is not available yet. 32. For the Program, the FSA recommends to contract out the procurement audit to a private external auditor by the SPMA to avoid backlog in the national audit system. Procurement capacity 33. The MFPTSS, MJPDHC and MENA are the three beneficiary agencies. The assessment found that all the three ministries have an operational Procurement Department (Direction des Marchés Publics - DMP). All the DMPs are staffed with civil servants who have developed procurement capacity through practice and have an acceptable level of experience in procurement for goods and small consultant services contracts. However their experience and understanding of procedures for works is very limited. In addition, staff turnover in the DMPs is high. This can result in processing delays and poor results in procurement. 34. To mitigate these risks and reduce the work load of the DMPs, it is proposed to organize procurement training each year based on the finding of procurement audits for all procurement staff in central units as well as at the decentralized level. 100 35. The SPMA will coordinate the entire program and supervise its implementation in the three ministries. To play this role of coordination and supervision, it is recommended to staff the SPMA with an experienced general procurement specialist who has excellent communication skills to supervise and coordinate all work within the government and with the Bank. This person needs to be an experienced IT procurement person who can handle complex procurements and navigate the electronic civil service information system and its linkages with other government IT systems. Procurement staff in the SPMA will: (i) assist the DMPs in ministries to properly carry out procurement activities, (ii) consolidate and monitor the implementation of procurement plans, (iii) follow up on the use of procurement performance tools and indicators, (iv) organize procurement trainings, and (v) follow up on the implementation of recommendations from procurement audits. Contract administration 36. The ‘Boosting Budget Execution in WAEMU Countries’ report noted that, most of the time, the contract amounts are underestimated by bidders because of the weak capacity of bidders to correctly estimate contract values in order to be awarded the contract. The main consequences of this are (i) failing in contract execution, (ii) poor quality of deliverables, and (iii) no respect for contract deadlines. The SPMA experience in contract administration consists of putting in place committees to follow up contract execution and ensure that deliverables are acceptable. It is essential for the procurement staff that will join the SPMA to have a minimum experience of contract management or to be trained in this. Complaints handling mechanism 37. For Public Procurement, complaints are managed by the Public Procurement Regulatory Body (ARMP) which was established in 2008. Within the ARMP, an independent non-judicial appeals body with a tri-partite arrangement (public/private/civil society), the CRD, is specifically responsible for managing complaints. The decree no 2009-849/PRE/PM/MEF of December 24, 2009 on the attributions, organization and functioning of the ARMP, was modified on June 27, 2014. However additional recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the ARMP were tabled at the 2nd Public Procurement Forum held in September 2014. Fraud and Corruption Risks and Mitigation 38. The political will and engagement of the government towards good governance and the fight against corruption is exemplified by their adoption of the UN Convention on Anti- Corruption in December 2005 and the African Union Convention of Prevention and Combating Corruption in August 2006. It is also highlighted by the government’s recent efforts to strengthen the institutional arrangements for tackling fraud and corruption, including (i) the creation within the ARMP of the CRD for the handling of complaints; (ii) the introduction in the new Procurement Code with specific provisions regarding fraud and sanctions; (iii) the creation in 2007 under the authority of the Prime Minister of the ASCE, to coordinate the fight against corruption and to conduct internal audits of State Institutions; (iv) the establishment of a public “hotline” to collect complaints at the ASCE level. Public perception of corruption in the public sector is however still relatively high. The country ranks 85 out of 175 economies on the Transparency International’s 2014 Index. 101 39. Despite the lack of a comprehensive law on right to information, the recently adopted anti-corruption law and supportive legislative frameworks provide assurances for fighting fraud and corruption in Burkina Faso. A National Anti-Corruption strategy exists and has received endorsement from both government and civil society organizations. Articles 154 to 160 of the Penal Code criminalize corruption, embezzlement, abuse of office and conflict of interest in the public sector. Sanctions for corruption range from fines and/or imprisonment to the removal of civic rights. Active and passive bribery offenders can be fined twice the value of bribes promised, received or demanded.72 40. While limited capacity, particularly investigation skills, represents the key challenge facing the ASCE, the anti-corruption organization has demonstrated relatively strong ability to perform its legal mandates. The ASCE is currently concentrating on the investigation of corruption cases, focusing on the identification or individual responsibilities when funds are misappropriated. A major achievement of the progress made by ASCE is the elaboration of indicators to follow up the impact of anti-corruption actions and the adoption of a statistical reporting system on pending and closed corruption cases. 41. Despite this progress, the report of an anti-corruption NGO, REN LAC (Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption), on corruption perception in 2013 documented increasing of corruption levels, due to : (a) the lack of evidence that administrative sanctions are enforced in a systematic manner (an important number of corruption cases transmitted for judgment are still pending after several months and years) and (b) the government’s reluctance to include certain provisions to the new draft anti-corruption law proposed by the civil society. The REN LAC 2013 report ranked procurement as the 4th most corrupt area of practice after customs, transportation and justice. 42. The following actions are identified to strengthen the system and improve its efficiency: a system of processing complaints through the existing country systems managed by the Ombudsman and ASCE (see further below) will be relied upon and improved and support to strengthen the effective monitoring of all corruption complaints by the ASCE. 43. The Program will be also implemented in accordance with the provisions of the Anti- Corruption Guidelines (ACG) applicable to PforR operations. The modalities for implementing the ACG will include the following: a. The ASCE will be the government’s focal office for the purposes of ACG application. b. The government will undertake investigations, criminal and administrative, under the Program, of all material and credible allegations of fraud and corruption, and keep the Bank abreast of their progress and findings and make public the conclusions. c. The government will provide the Bank with reports annually or more frequently as warranted, reporting allegations of fraud and corruption under the Program received and registered, as well as related investigations and, as needed the actions taken. Reciprocally, if the Bank finds evidence of corrupt practices, the Bank will, to the extent 72 Finding The Right Balance - Scaling Up Complaints Handling Mechanism in the Burkina Faso Portfolio – A Blueprint. The report was authored by a World Bank team lead by Rima Al-Azar, Senior Operations Officer with the help of Souleymane Sere, Consultant, and Monique Ouffoue, Intern. 102 consistent with Bank policy, refer the case to the government for investigation under the relevant criminal and civil laws. d. If the Bank decides to conduct an administrative review into allegations or other indications of fraud and corruption in connection with the Program, conducted alone, together or parallel with the government investigation, the government will cooperate fully with representatives of the Bank and take all appropriate measures to ensure the full cooperation of relevant persons and entities subject to the government jurisdiction in such investigations, including, in each case, allowing the Bank to meet with relevant persons and to inspect all of their relevant accounts, records and other documents and have them audited by or on behalf of the Bank. If the Bank finds evidence of corrupt practices, the Bank will refer the case to the government for investigation under the relevant criminal and civil laws. The Bank may, however, debar private individuals and firms on its own. e. The Bank’s right to investigate or conduct review does not extend to criminal investigations, which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the government. f. The government will ensure that any person or entity debarred or suspended by the Bank is not awarded a contract under or otherwise allowed to participate in the Program during the period of such debarment or suspension. The SPMA will be responsible for the enforcement of the World Bank’s debarment list. g. The bidding documents will serve as the bidders’ source of information regarding the applicability of the ACG to the program. Compliance will be verified through the Program’s annual audits. Complaints Handling and Grievance Redress 44. Citizens’ complaints and grievances pertaining to the Program will be coordinated and addressed by the Médiateur due Faso (the Ombudsman) and ASCE by using the grievance redress systems and administrative structures of these institutions. The existing country grievance redress systems have been assessed as follows: a. The governance of grievance redress by the Médiateur du Faso supports a redress service which, to a large extent, meets the principles of good complaint handling. The country’s Ombudsman (Médiateur du Faso) created by decree in 1994, handles complaints from people who believe they have suffered injustice from maladministration by government and public institutions. Functionally, the Médiateur du Faso is a classical, single- purpose 73 , complaint handling body, with relatively strong capacity at the center and weak decentralized units at the regions 74 . In its strategic plan for 2013-2016, the Médiateur du Faso proposed to strengthen the capacity of its regional offices and appoint focal points at commune level. b. The Médiateur offices receive complaints directly through writing, walk-in, phone call or through online submission. The ombudsman can independently initiate an investigation based on information reported in the media or upon request by the government. The institution has developed a grievance database and operational manual. It generates annual activity reports that provide data on the number and type of complaints; whether 73 The Ombudsman’s mandate in some countries includes handling of fraud and corruption allegations, in addition to handling complaints pertaining to administrative justice. 74 Burkina Faso is unitary state. The country is divided into 13 administrative regions and 45 provinces 103 they were justified and successfully mediated, the geographical origin and are even disaggregated by gender. Between 1994 and 2010, the institution investigated 3,698 complaints related to conflicts between Burkinabe and non-Burkinabe nationals living in Burkina Faso and complaints involving government services. Approximately 3,500 cases, including 936 in 2009, were resolved. In 2013 the office registered 737 complaints, of which 82 percent were resolved. The Médiateur enjoys favorable public perceptions of its independence and impartiality and is generally perceived as a neutral and confidential moderator75 c. The ASCE receives complaints from several sources – walk-in, writing, or calling its hotline. The ASCE also investigates corruption cases published in the media. Between 2007 and 2013, ASCE received a total of 509 complaints of kinds. In 2013, for instance, 15 cases were referred to the courts for persecution. The ASCE also conducts its own investigations and controls government departments and agencies using a risk-based audit approach. Based on a variety of findings from its investigations, ASCE made 799 recommendations in 2013 of which 565 (representing 71%) were implemented by other government institutions. Technical support would be provided to ASCE under the Program to improve its operational capacity 45. The complaints handling in the Program will address the full spectrum of grievances that may arise through the implementation of the Program, including fraud and corruption: a. The Médiateur du Faso and ASCE would function as the focal institutions to receive and address citizens’ feedback or complaints on the Program implementation. Full details of the role of each institution are provided in the Program Technical Assessment. Through Focal Points established at the local level and regional delegations, the Mediateur will be responsible for (i) receiving & responding to, and resolving complaints pertaining to rules, procedures and unfair treatments under the Program; (ii) forwarding all complaints related to fraud and corruption to the ASCE in accordance with the terms defined in the MoU and Grievance Redress Section of the program operations manual; and (iii) maintaining the register of complaints, preparing reports annually on grievance redress activities specifically for the project. Technical support will be provided to the Médiateur to support the implementation of key aspects of the Médiateur’s action plan to improve capacity of its regional offices and appoint focal points for communes. The ASCE’s role in the grievance redress process will consist of receiving complaints on fraud and corruption, not only from the Médiateur, but also directly from citizens through its normal processes and taking steps to investigate and take action in accordance with its operation manual, regulations and the terms of the MoU. b. A memorandum of understating will be established (MoU) between the Mediateur and ASCE to promote collaboration between the two institutions in handling complaints that relate to incidence of corruption and mismanagement of the Program funds. The MoU will provide institutional and operational guidelines for compliance with the Bank’s ACG requirements on respecting the Bank debarment list, transparent reporting and effective handling of grievances, including fraud and corruption allegations. 75 The Ombudsman is perceived to provide opportunity for informal discussion of problems and complaints outside formal channels. It listens, discusses, answers questions, provides information, and identifies options and strategies for resolving a conflict situation. 104 c. A communications strategy will be developed to promote awareness of citizens on the proposed GRM processes, including methods of submitting complaints and expectations. The SPMA would facilitate the development of the communications strategy in coordination with ASCE and the Ombudsman. Program Fiduciary Risk Assessment 46. The PFM systems in the country are generally solid by international standards as reflected in the 2013 and 2010 PEFA assessments. Obvious progress has been made on the comprehensiveness and transparency of the budget, policy-based budgeting and internal controls, as well as the compliance of the budget preparation, approval and amendment procedures with good practices. Other PFM diagnostics such as the country systems review for project financial management conducted in 2009 have confirmed the adequacy of the systems. 47. The PFM system is however undermined by delays in the authorization of payments resulting from bottlenecks in the expenditures chain and duplication of controls through the processing of transactions. In addition, in-year regulation of the budget and cash rationing are major weaknesses of the systems. 48. The creation of a Dedicated Treasury Special Account – CAST, which has been envisaged for this Program could efficiently mitigate the risk of cash rationing and streamline payment process of the Program. 49. The four traditional steps (commitment, verification, approval for payment and payment) and ex post controls of financial and procurement controllers provide some level of fiduciary comfort but at the same time, create duplication and delays in processing transactions or failure to implement planned activities in a timely manner. An appointment of a resident financial and procurement controller fully dedicated to this Program and the adoption of a risk based approach as per the new WAEMU directives would contribute in mitigating the crucial issue of delay in the budget execution and processing of transactions. 50. It is assessed that the Program’s PFM arrangements relying on existing country wide systems are acceptable in terms of procedures and results provided that the above-mentioned mitigation measures are adopted. The country PFM system gives reasonable assurance that the Program fiduciary risks would be maintained at a moderate level and could be mitigated through the implementation of appropriate mitigation measures. 105 Recommended Fiduciary Actions Included in the Program Action Plan (see Annex 8) Program Action Responsibility Schedule Verification 1 Prepare and include in the annual Finance Law Directorate of Starting from Unaudited financial the annual plan and budget of the program and Budget the first year of report of the first quarter open a Dedicated Treasury Special Account – Permanent the Program CAST Secretariat of the PSDMA 2 Annually prepare a consolidated procurement Permanent Starting from Consolidated plan accordingly to the budget allocated Secretariat of the the first year of procurement plan PSDMA the Program 3 Appoint a resident financial and public Ministry of Starting from Annual performance procurement controller fully dedicated to the Economy and the first year of assessment and program Program to speed up processing of transactions Finances the Program reports and payments 4 Appoint an experienced general procurement Permanent Completed Annual performance specialist Secretariat of the assessment and program PSDMA reports 7 Effective internal audit function established for ASCE Starting from Internal audit reports the program in collaboration with ASCE; Ministerial the first year of strengthening the ministerial inspection units of inspections of the Program Public Service, Education and Justice to carry Public Service, out ex-post reviews of the Program each Education and semester and oversight the implementation of Justice the three- year audit plans of the ministries involved 8 Increase prior review, procurement methods Ministry of In the first year Decree of the Ministry of and contract approval thresholds Economy and Finance Finances 10 Procurement capacity building program and Permanent Starting from Training reports conduct annual training to address weaknesses Secretariat of the the first year of the identified weaknesses during audits PSDMA the Program 11 Definition of procurement deadlines and Permanent Annual performance measure the performance of the DMPs (an Secretariat of the assessment and program sample will be provided and discuss during PSDMA reports appraisal) 12 F & C cases reported on a semi-annual basis by ASCE / SP - PMA An MOU the ASCE signed between ASSCE, the Ombudsman and SPMA 106 Annex 6: Summary of Environmental and Social Systems Assessment 1. This annex summarizes the Program‘s Environmental and Social Systems Assessment (ESSA), which was carried out following the PforR interim Guidance Note on Environmental and Social Systems Assessment. This annex presents: (i) the process, (ii) the environmental and social risks assessed to date, and (iii) initial conclusions. 2. The ESSA was conducted by the World Bank with the support and collaboration of the borrower and stakeholders. During the preparation of the ESSA two consultation workshops were organized in June and August 2014. The final ESSA was validated during the national validation workshop on April 7, 2015 and was disclosed in the Infoshop on April 29, 2015. A. The ESSA process 3. In accordance with the requirements of OP 9:00, Program-for-Results Financing, a comprehensive assessment was conducted to identify the strengths, weaknesses, and shortcomings of the Program‘s Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) with a view to assessing the adequacy of the ESMS for PforR financing and identifying key actions to improve the environmental and social management performance of the Program. 4. The ESSA, conducted by the World Bank with the support and collaboration of the borrower and stakeholders, had the following objectives: a) Verifying that the potential environmental and social risks and impacts of the Program are subject to an adequate initial screening, b) Ensuring that environmental and social mitigation measures to avoid, minimize, offset, and/or compensate any adverse impacts and promote environmental and social sustainability will be applied to activities that will have potentially environmental and social negative impacts; and c) Identifying suitable measures to strengthen the ESMS. These measures, which are to be implemented by the Borrower will be agreed upon between the Borrower and the World Bank. The proposed measures shall be part of the Program Action Plan. 5. The ESSA is based on: a. A desk review of relevant documents including: the Environmental Regulatory Framework, applicable laws and regulations governing the justice, education and public administration sectors, land laws and reforms and literature on the structure of the public administration, on gender and on social norms; b. Participatory assessments involving various stakeholders such as city councils, municipality representatives, unions, NGOs and the Program’s institutional stakeholders (line ministries), staff of units in charge of environment and staff of the land management and decentralization ministry, MATDS; c. Field visits (Tenkodogo) and interviews with local stakeholders; d. An extensive consultation on the first ESSA draft through electronic dissemination to all stakeholders and separate meetings organized with stakeholders. 107 B. Environmental and social risks assessed to date 6. Environmental aspects: Potentially adverse impacts associated with Program activities are expected to be minor, site-specific and manageable at an acceptable level. The following risks have been identified: 1. There is a risk that activities might be implemented without an assessment of their environmental impact in order to speed up investments. To mitigate this risk, awareness campaigns need to be organized on the importance of conducting a systematic environmental impact assessment based on the screening mechanism contained in the ESSA for all activities and relevant safeguard measures taken before any implementation. 2. The capacity of environmental teams established in the selected ministries, which will be in charge of environmental impact management of the Program is weak. The staff in charge of these environmental cells are not environmental specialists. In addition, many of them do not have their own budget to allow them to build up their capacity or to organize field missions. From an organizational perspective, the environmental cell report to the Directorate General of Environment Protection and Sustainable Development (Direction General de la Protection Environnementale et du Developpement Durable - DGPEDD) and accordingly do not benefit from the National Agency in charge of Environmental Assessments (Bureau National des Evaluations Environnementales - BUNEE) training and capacity development initiatives. Furthermore, there is a risk of staff turn-over in the cells. To strengthen the capacity of the environmental cells, it is recommended that the Program facilitate training for the staff in the environmental cells of the ministries implicated by the Program and promote the reinforcement of professional relations with BUNEE to provide support and guidance. It is also recommended that the Program support field missions of the environmental cells. Finally, it is recommended that the Program provide work materials and other support to the environmental cell staff to interest them in the Program’s activities. 7. Social Aspects: The main risks noted are as follows: 1) Involuntary land acquisition: Some building construction and rehabilitation are planned. Though the government plans to mobilize and use only public land, the ESSA considers potential impacts in terms of loss of revenues, habitats and sources of revenues in particular in rural areas where land titling is not systematic and customary laws are still practiced. Should involuntary land acquisition occur, the current national laws include processes similar or in line overall with OP 4.12 related procedures. However, it is recommended that the government: a) reinforce coordination and harmonization between relevant administrative stakeholders in rural areas, b) minimize resettlement of people, c) take into account informal occupants/squatters, d) ensure monitoring and evaluation in case of resettlement. Based on the assessment of potential risks, the ESSA makes proposals in terms of monitoring processes and tools (screening sheets, compensation mechanisms, relevant documentation) and institutional mechanisms (focal person at central and local levels in charge of monitoring social related impacts and mitigation measures). 108 2) Gender and inclusion: There are no major gender and inclusion risks deriving directly from the implementation of the program activities. Nevertheless, the ESSA considers a few potential indirect impacts due to inherent system weaknesses such as: (i) insufficient representation of female civil servants in particular in management positions in rural areas, (ii) limited access of beneficiaries to administrative services due to lack of adequate communication and transport material and staffing, (iii) limited physical accessibility of buildings for handicapped persons. These existing weaknesses may impact on the quality of services rendered by the line ministries involved in the program. To address potentially negative impact on gender and inclusion, the ESSA recommends the inclusion of accessibility structures (ramps) in planning and construction of buildings financed under the Program and an awareness-raising program on gender awareness for civil servants to improve service delivery. 3) Grievance redress: The potential risks pertaining to grievance redress are twofold: (i) the likelihood that investigation of corruption allegations may take a long time to complete and the possibility of the ASCE not following up to ensure that sanctions are implemented; (ii) weak capacity of the regional offices of the Ombudsman to address some grievances. These weaknesses may affect the effectiveness the handling of complaints and corruption cases in the Program. To mitigate these risks, an MOU will be established between the Ombudsman and ASCE to promote collaboration between the two institutions in handling fraud and corruption allegations and ensuring government compliance with the Bank’s Governance and Anti-corruption guidelines on Program-for Results operations. C. ESSA conclusions 8. The ESSA concludes that:  The Program ESMS is adequate for PforR financing,  The activities to be funded under the Program should, by their nature, characteristics, and size, generate, low-to-moderate environmental and social impacts and generally bring beneficial and positive environmental and social impacts,  The ESMS is equipped with tools and processes to identify, mitigate, and report on possible environmental and social impacts of activities upon inclusion of Bank recommendations,  The risk of environmental and social impacts is addressed through relevant ESMS provisions and operational procedures upon inclusion of Bank recommendations,  The subproject screening system in place provides an effective mitigation process in the case of large infrastructure activities that would have significant and/or negative OP 4.01 and OP 4.12 related impacts.  The Program does not entail any real risk related to cultural appropriateness but, on the other hand, entails positive effects on service delivery.  Measures identified thus far to strengthen the Program ESMS include:  Use of screening forms, identification and definition of appropriate mitigation measures, 109  Strengthening the institutional arrangements to better include environmental and social aspects in the overall management of the Program which would include (i) capacity building of relevant staff on social and environmental aspects and (ii) designation of staff in charge of monitoring, documenting and reporting on environmental and social related aspects at central and decentralized levels including within the SPMA. 9. The Bank has agreed with the Borrower on these above measures which have been built into the Program Action Plan. The Bank team will work closely with the Borrower throughout the implementation support period to assist toward the effective implementation and completion of any agreed actions to improve and strengthen the Environmental and Social Management System. 110 Annex 7: Integrated Risk Assessment ORAF: Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program PDO: Improved selected service standards in selected ministries.76 1. PROGRAM RISKS 2.1 Technical Risk Rating: Moderate Description: Poor coordination by the Permanent Risk Management: The overall oversight responsibility of the Program is with the National Secretariat of the Modernization Plan or weak technical Public Administration Modernization Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister. The Program implementation capacity in the pilot ministries could has allocated resources for the functioning of the oversight mechanism. In addition, the Program have an impact upon the pace of achieving results. envisages building stakeholder capacity for implementation through the Program Action Plan and setting up a strong communication strategy to support the implementation of the Program across the various ministries. Moreover, the Results Area 3 activities include enhancing the understanding of counterparts on the PforR instrument possibly through south-south exchanges. The team will closely monitor the implementation of activities, particularly at entry, to ensure all stakeholders are committed to the Program. Stage: Due Date : Not yet Resp: Task Team Status: Not yet due Implementation due 2.2 Fiduciary Risk Rating: Moderate Description: Insufficient up-front national budget Risk Management: Work on consolidated PFM reforms will continue. A dedicated special allocations could affect the pace or extent to which the treasury account will be established to ensure the flow of Program funds. In addition, a resident DLIs are achieved. Delays in procurement might delay financial and public procurement controller that is fully dedicated to the Program will be activity completion. appointed to speed up processing of transactions and payments. Stage: Due Date : Not yet Resp: Task Team Status: Not yet due Implementation due 2.3 Environmental and Social Risk Rating: Moderate Description: The Program could experience minor social Risk Management: The PSDMA was developed on the basis of an inclusive dialogue with all risk due to resistance from labor unions (civil servants) stakeholders. Extensive consultations with social actors were also undertaken during Program with respect to the administration’s modernization preparation. Improved communication and the consolidation of positive motivation strategies in 76 The improvements are in labor, education and justice sectors as well as human resource management in civil service. The service standards selected are drawn from the sector strategy of each ministry. For the purposes of this program, service standards refer to services provided by government ministries both internally within the administration and externally to citizens. 111 scheme. the three selected ministries will minimize the risk. Stage: Due Date : Not yet Resp: Task Team Status: Not yet due Implementation due 2.4 Disbursement linked indicator risks Rating: Moderate Description: Implementation difficulties in certain Risk Management: Inclusive preparation of Program activities has ensured that there is ministries could have an impact upon overall commitment and ownership of the DLIs at both the central and deconcentrated levels (regional disbursements, which would in turn penalize the offices of the three ministries participated in preparations). DLIs are allocated equitably across performing ministries. ministries and across the implementation period of the Program. This will help to ensure that performing ministries are appropriately and regularly rewarded for achieving results. The inclusion of scalable DLIs provides additional encouragement to ministries to sustain or accelerate reform momentum. Stage: Due Date : Not yet Resp: Task Team Status: Not yet due Implementation due 2.5 Other Risks (Optional) Rating: Moderate Description: Monitoring and evaluation capacity is Risk Management: The Program Action Plan ensures extensive capacity development in limited. monitoring and evaluation and will strengthen the results-orientation of the government’s PSDMA reform program. Clearly defined verification protocols and the inclusion of external verification mechanisms will complement the capacity development support. Close supervision and guidance will be provided by the Bank team throughout implementation. Stage: Due Date : Not yet Resp: Task team Status: Not yet due Implementation due 3. OVERALL RISK RATING: The overall risk is MODERATE. 112 Annex 8: Program Action Plan Action Description Due Date Responsible Completion Link to DLI Covenant Party Description Results Area 1 : Improved Human Resource Capacity and Performance Diagnostic of SIGASPE Effectiveness MFPTSS Validated report by a DLI 1.1 functionality national workshop with stakeholders Technical assistance for CY1 MFPTSS Upgraded SIGASPE DLIs 1 and SIGASPE system for has been approved by 1.1 new modules, upgrading Minister of MFPTSS. old modules, training of users Introduction of an MFPTSS, DLIs 1.2 and electronic registration MENA 3 and marking system ‘e- concours’ for teacher entry examinations Review of HR business CY1 MFPTSS Report validated and DLI 1 processes and tools approved by Minister of MFPTSS DRH training course CY2 Training modules designed validated and approved by Minister of MFPTSS Results Area 2 Strengthened Institutional Capacity for Policy Planning, Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation Minimum standards for CY1 MFPTSS, Ministerial protocols regional ministerial MENA, signed and departments / MJPDHC, disseminated jurisdictions identified MOU signed Implementation of a CY1,2,3 MFPTSS Programme validated DLI 2 risk-based labor and disseminated to inspection program regional directorates by established MFPTSS Monitoring and Effectiveness MENA Report validated and DLI 3.1 evaluation system for approved by MENA teacher time on task reviewed Training and CY1 MENA Report including DLI 3.1 sensitization program training attendance for monitoring teacher records is submitted time on task designed and disseminated Technical assistance to CY1 MJPDHC Report validated and review on-line approved by MJPDHC accessibility to laws and 113 jurisprudence Review of CY2 MJPDHC Report validated and DLI 4.1 administrative law court approved by MJPDHC registers and identification of automated registry criteria Local court registers CY1 MJPDHC Decree issued by DLI 4 standardized MJPDHC Training modules for CY1, CY2, MJPDHC Report including DLI 4 local court personnel CY, 3 training attendance designed and records is submitted disseminated Results Area 3 - Strengthened Coordination Capacity for Public Sector Reforms Decree issued to include Effectiveness PM, SPMA Decree issued by Prime MJPDHC and MENA in Minister the National Public Administration Modernization Steering Committee Strengthening of the Effectiveness PM, SPMA Decree issued by Prime capacity of the SPMA Minister Establishment of a Effectiveness PM, SPMA Circular issued by Program MFPTSS Implementation Committee chaired by the SPMA and DGESS’s of the MFPTSS, MENA and MJPDHC Program Operational Effectiveness SPMA Circular issued by Manual developed and MFPTSS disseminated Action plans for risk- CY2 ASCE, Circular issued to based auditing MFPTSS, participating ministries established in each of MJPDHC, by the ASCE the participating MENA ministries and training of ministerial staff conducted Annual verification of CY1, 2, 3, 4 ASCE Reported issued by Program results ASCE conducted Annual audits are CY1, 2, 3, 4 Cour des Annual audit report of completed by Comptes the Program September 30 Semi - annual reporting CY1, 2, 3, 4 SPMA in Report issued by on implementation and coordination SPMA monitoring of with safeguards related MFPTSS, impacts (screening MENA and 114 sheets, compensation MJPDHC mechanisms and payments and other relevant documentation included in the ESSA) and semi report on procurement deadlines and indicators (Percentage of contracts approved in the validity deadlines, percentage of contracts executed in the contractual time, number of days of contract payment) Annual plan and budget Starting from Directorate Verified by unaudited of the Program prepared the first year of Budget financial report of the and included in the of the SPMA first quarter annual Finance Law Program and a Dedicated Treasury Special Account – CAST – opened An annual consolidated CY1, 2, 3, 4 SPMA procurement plan is prepared accordingly to the budget allocated Resident financial and Starting from MEF Annual performance public procurement the first year assessment and controller fully of the program reports dedicated to the Program Program Experienced general Effectiveness SPMA Appointment letter procurement specialist (note d’affectation) appointed Effective internal audit CY1, 2, 3, 4 ASCE Internal audit reports function established for Ministerial the program inspections ASCE in collaboration of Public with ministerial Service, inspections of Public Education Service, Education and and Justice Justice will carry out ex- post reviews of the Program each semester and oversee the implementation of the three- year audit plans of the ministries involved Procurement thresholds First year MEF MEF Decree increased 115 F & C cases reported on Periodic ASCE / Report a semi-annual basis by (every June SPMA the ASCE and December) PSMA Capacity First year SPMA Training building program materials designed developed Definition of First year SPMA Annual procurement deadlines performance and measurement of the assessment performance of actors in reports the procurement chain Installation of an First year SPMA information monitoring and evaluation information system 116 Annex 9: Implementation Support Plan 1. The Program will require considerable focused support from the World Bank team particularly during the early stages. The main challenge will be to strengthen the capacity of implementation agencies to plan for program activities and coordinate implementation with the different line ministries and their regional offices. It will be particularly important to support SPMA in the rolling out the Program, including the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system. Implementation support will focus on implementation of the Program Action Plan 2. Key to effective implementation support will be sustained engagement on the ground. The first implementation mission will take place as soon as possible after effectiveness to provide direct feedback on the quality of Program plans and review progress made against the Program Action Plan. The first mission is therefore expected to include staff predominantly from the M&E and fiduciary teams. 3. From a fiduciary perspective, the implementation support will focus on reviewing the Program quarterly financial reports, annual financial statements and audit reports as well as the Program reports such as the results verification reports prior to disbursement. The task team will coordinate the results reporting for the DLIs with the disbursement of the IDA credit funds. Table A.9.1: Main Focus of Implementation Support Time Focus Skills Need Resources First 12 months Support to implementing Technical skills in main Team of 3-4 specialists agencies to finalize Program areas and ability Program plans and begin to work with clients implementation, including ensuring adequate resource and M&E capacity 12-48 months Quarterly discussions with Technical skills in main Team of 3-4 specialists implementation agencies Program areas and ability to review progress and to work with clients plans for next cycle Other Independent verification of Technical skills on M&E Team of 3-4 specialists results 117 Annex 10: Development Partner Support 1. Extensive and ongoing coordination has been established with other development partners working on public sector governance reforms, including the UNDP and the European Union (EU). In addition to close bi-lateral relations with active partners in public sector governance, the program team participate in the donor working groups on Public Sector Management, Justice and Human Rights and Education as platforms to coordinate with development partners. While there are few development partners supporting the implementation of the PDSMA, there are multiple donors engaged in the justice (EU, French, Danish and Japanese) and education (EU, UNICEF, UNDP, French) sectors. Close collaboration with these partners during project preparation will ensure that the various interventions are complementary and appropriately harmonised. 2. Details of the existing and planned engagement of development partners in supporting the implementation of the PSDMA, PSEF and PNJ are discussed below. Primary Education 3. The proposed Program has been designed utilizing a sector wide approach that would complement the efforts of the government and development partners in the primary education sector. Consistent with this approach, the Program aims to address institutional weaknesses in the MENA not currently being addressed by the government, the Bank or other DP. Table A.10.1 below presents the operations of other development partners in the primary education sector. As presented in the table, other development partners are currently engaged in different aspects of primary education system. Table A.10.1. Donor Partners’ Support to the Primary/Basic Education Sector Total Budget Donors Period Type of Intervention (000 FCFA) Pooled Fund Participating Donors: French Development Agency Development of access to formal basic education; Canada improving the quality of formal basic education; 101,600,000 Denmark development of non-formal education; control of (US$203.2 2013-2015 the formal basic education and non-formal million) Netherlands education; effective and efficient management of Switzerland PDSEB. UNICEF GPE Addressing food insecurity by improving students’ health and nutritional status, with a specific focus on rural food insecurity (serving a 7,655,813 School Canteens Project MEBA / 2011-2015 meal each day for students in the program, (US$15.4 Cathwel contributes to lower dropout rates; improve the million) rate of enrollment, attendance and success in school). Project Schools Annex and 9,445,901 Centers Non-formal Basic 1995-2015 Increasing: (i): the number of girls and boys (US$19 million) Education (ES / CEBNF) and receiving quality basic education and (ii) the 118 Total Budget Donors Period Type of Intervention (000 FCFA) UNICEF number of girls and boys with disabilities receiving quality basic education. Building the capacity of community structures to promote educational innovations. Public primary school classrooms Construction of primary school infrastructure, 7,373,498 Construction and equipment 2012-2014 accommodation for teachers, classrooms and (US$15 million) Project (Phase 5). Japan toilets in primary schools. Project to Support Continuing Improvement of students learning in mathematics Education of Teachers in Science and sciences in all public schools in Burkina Faso, 1,831,463 and Mathematics at Primary 2012-2015 including the training of teachers and academic (US$3.5 million) School Phase II (Burkina Faso supervisors. SMASE-II) JICA Construction and equipping of an ENEP (Ecole Normale des Enseignants du Primaire) in Tenkodogo; construction and equipping of school complexes; acquisition of vehicles; acquisition of 6,290,000 Development Project of Basic office equipment (computer, photocopiers and 2011-2015 (US$12.6 Education, Phase IV - IDB fixtures); training of coaches, teachers and executives of MENA in emerging themes; million) acquisition of school kits, sewing and grinding machines; awareness campaigns to lead to the promotion of girls’ education. Project to support basic education and literacy by the PV-LFP-LED Improving the quality of basic formal education and basic non-formal education in rural areas 2,967,798 (A Lamp for Africa) lighting. 2011-2014 Taiwan, China through the provision of lighting for classrooms (US$6 million) through the acquisition of lighting kits. WFP Country Program Improving enrollment, attendance and success of 6,594,607 2011/2015 students, especially those in rural areas with high 2011-2015 (US$13.2 food insecurity rates by setting up local canteens in the Sahel region. million) Justice 4. While the World Bank has not extensively engaged in the justice sector to date, a recent background review of the justice sector in Burkina Faso, including a political economy analysis of reform implementation in the sector, has provided a strong rationale for strategic engagement. In addition to the sector’s pivotal influence with respect to the country’s stability and with respect to the population’s confidence in the administration in general, the externalities of a performing justice sector in other areas of development are significant. Table A.10.2 below presents the operations of other development partners in the justice sector. As presented in the table, other development partners are currently engaged in different aspects of justice system, namely, the France in criminal justice, the Denmark in human rights. 119 Table A.10.2. Donor Partners’ Support to the Justice Sector Projects/Programs Objectives/Components Development Partner National Justice The objectives of the program are to support justice sector Partner : European Union Policy Support to have a credible justice, effective and accessible to all. It Amount : 10 100 000 EUR Program seeks the following outcomes: (6,6 billion FCFA) • Outcome 1: the structural framework of justice is Duration : 84 months: Programme d’appui improved Effectiveness date : October, à la politique • Outcome 2: the public service of justice is optimized 2014 nationale de justice • Result 3: Implementation of the instruments of the NPC Closure : 2022 (PA-PNJ) are reinforced Support for the AMIJ is part of the National Justice Policy; it is built Partner : French development Modernization of the around the following components: Agency Justice • improving access to justice Amount : 485 000 EUR (317 • restoration of the criminal courts performance and million FCFA) Appui à la support criminal treatment of terrorism and transnational Start date : 2013 modernisation de threats Closure : 2016 l’institution • reform and modernization of the prison system to reduce judiciaire (AMIJ) overcrowding Project The objective of the project is to strengthen the protection Partner : DANIDA "Establishment of of the rights and the freedoms in Burkina Faso and the Amount : 39 028 815 DKK Human Rights and credibility of justice. (3 439 268 000 FCFA) Credibility of Justice The expected outcomes of the with Denmark" justice component are: Duration : 5 years - The legislative framework is enhanced inclusive and Start Date : January 2016 Projet « Instauration participatory manner according to the recommendations Closure : December 2020 des Droits humains of the UPR on the rights of women and non-negotiable et Crédibilité de la rights Justice avec le - Ethics is better respected in the administration of justice Danemark » and the stakeholders of the judiciary. Project to support The project aims to strengthen national capacity for good Partner : Japon the consolidation of governance promotion based on the strengthening of the Amount : 350 millions FCFA the rule of law and rule of law. Start Date : 2013 access to justice for Specific objective 1: strengthening access to legal and Closure : 2015 the poor in Burkina judicial information of populations to improve the Faso led by UNDP psychological populations' access to justice. Specific Objective 2: effective implementation of legal Projet d’appui à la assistance to improve financial access of the poor to consolidation de justice. l’Etat de droit et Specific Objective 3: strengthening human, technical, l’accès à la justice material and logistical poor to justice. pour les pauvres au Burkina Faso piloté par le PNUD 120 121