DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1415 89230 Sudan Social Safety Net Assessment Annika Kjellgren, Christina Jones-Pauly, Hadyiat El-Tayeb Alyn, Endashaw Tadesse and Andrea Vermehren Africa Social Safety Net and Social Protection Assessment Series May 2014 SUDAN Social Safety Net Assessment Annika Kjellgren, Christina Jones-Pauly, Hadyiat El-Tayeb Alyn, Endashaw Tadesse and Andrea Vermehren, May 2014 Africa Social Safety Net and Social Protection Assessment Series Until recently, most countries in Africa implemented safety nets and social protection programs only on an ad hoc basis. In the wake of the global economic, food and fuel price crises starting in 2008, however, policymakers in Africa began to increasingly view safety nets as core instruments for reducing poverty, addressing inequality, and helping poor and vulnerable households to manage risk more effectively. During FY2009-2013, to support governments in their quest to understand better how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety nets in their countries, the World Bank’s Africa Region undertook social safety net or social protection assessments in a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2014 assessments have been completed or are under preparation for over 25 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These assessments analyze the status of social protection programs and safety nets, their strengths and weaknesses and identify areas for improvement, all with the aim of helping governments and donors to strengthen African safety net systems and social protection programs to protect and promote poor and vulnerable people. They were all carried-out with the explicit aim of informing governments’ social protection policies and programs. With the results of analytical work like these assessments and other types of support, safety nets and social protection programs are rapidly changing across Africa. For a cross-country regional review, please see "Reducing Poverty and Investing in People: The New Role of Safety Nets in Africa," which pulls together the findings and lessons learned from these assessments and other recent studies of safety net programs in Africa. Abstract The Sudanese population has suffered from years of conflict, and deep-seated security issues have severely hampered Sudan’s long-term economic stability and social development. As a consequence, Sudan is struggling to meet its MDGs. Since the secession of South Sudan, Sudan has lost a considerable part of its oil production and fiscal revenues. At the same time, the Government recognizes social safety nets as important instruments for reducing poverty. This report provides an analysis of the state of social safety nets in Sudan which shows that Sudan’s existing safety net programs are limited in coverage, lack coordination, as well as monitoring and evaluation. The report suggests (i) reallocation of savings from the fuel subsidy reform to targeted pro-poor safety net programs; (ii) strengthening of the existing safety net through monitoring the outcomes, strong controls and social accountability, and a culture of evaluation, and (iii) development of a coherent National Social Protection Policy. JEL Classification: I32, I38, J32, H53 Key Words: social protection, systems, safety nets, social assistance, welfare, administration, public policy, public sector reform, developing countries ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AEO African Economic Outlook AfDB African Development Bank AU African Union (Addis) CBO Community-based Organization CBOS Central Bank of Sudan CBoSTAT Central Bureau of Statistics CDF Community Development Fund CETA Central, East, and Three Areas (Kassala, Blue and White Nile, North and South Kordofan, and Red Sea) CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CRDP Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CRMA Sudan Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis Project (UNDP) DFID Department for International Development (UK) ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office EFA Education For All EFC Errors, Fraud, and Corruption EMOP Emergency Operation Program EPP Estimations and Projections Package ESCWA UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia ESPA Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement ESSP Education Sector Strategic Plan EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FFA Food for Assets FFT Food for Training FMG/C Female Genital Mutilation and Cutting FS Fragile Situations GDP Gross Domestic Product GDWFA General Directorate of Women and Family Affairs (Ministry of Welfare and Social Security) GDF General Food Distribution GP General Practitioner GoS Government of Sudan (North) HAC Humanitarian Aid Commission (Sudan government) HC Humanitarian Coordinator (UN) HGSF Home-grown School Feeding HSS Health Systems Strengthening IDPs Internally Displaced Persons i IMF International Monetary Fund IOM International Organization for Migration (international intergovernmental organization) IPRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency LGA Local Government Agreement LICs Low-income Country MDGs Millennium Development Goals MDTF Multi-donor Trust Fund MF Micro Finance MFI Micro Finance Institution MIC Middle-income Country MIS Management Information System MoE Ministry of Education MoFNE Ministry of Finance and National Economy MoH Ministry of Health MoWSS Ministry of Welfare and Social Security MUAC Measuring Mid-upper Arm Circumference NAPO National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics NCCW National Council for Children’s Welfare NCPD National Council for Persons with Disabilities NGO Non-governmental Organization NHIF National Health Insurance Fund NPC National Population Council NPF National Pension Fund NRWEP National Rural Women Empowerment Project NSF National Social Fund NSPS National Social Protection Policy OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper SAM Severe Acute Malnutrition SCP Sudan Country Program SDG Sudanese Pound SHHS Sudan Household Health Survey SME Small and Medium Enterprise SNAP Sudan National Aids-control Program SP Social Protection SPS Social Protection System SSDB Savings and Social Development Bank SSN Social Safety Nets TRMA Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis Project (UNDP Khartoum) ii TSFP Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program TSSR Targeted Seasonal Supplementary Ration UN United Nations UNAMID United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur UNDP United Nations Development Program UNEP United Nations Environment Program UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme WV World Vision WVS World Vision Sudan iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS At the request of the Government of Sudan, the World Bank has undertaken an analysis of the state of social protection in Sudan including an inventory of the country’s social safety net. This Social Safety Net Assessment was carried out to support the government’s efforts to develop an effective social safety net as part of a comprehensive social protection system. The World Bank has conducted this assessment with support from Sudan’s Ministry of Finance and National Economy and the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security. The Bank would like to expresses its gratitude to the Government of Sudan for its cooperation in providing the information and data reviewed in this report. In particular, H.E. Amira Elfadil, former Minister of Welfare and Social Security (now under the guidance and support of H.E. Masha’ir Al-Dawlab, Minister of Welfare and Social Security), and Ms. Khadiga Abu-Gassin, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security, both provided critical policy guidance and substantive contributions that made the preparation of this paper possible. Dr. Jamal El Nile, former Director of the Poverty Reduction and Coordination Center at the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security, contributed invaluable insightful comments and documentation as well as optimistic support and counsel. Dr. Awad Abdelomoniem, current Director of the Poverty Reduction and Coordination Center, contributed perceptive comments on the final draft as well as active support for innovative implementation of programs. In addition, the diagnostic has benefitted from consultations with both national and international stakeholders. The Bank thanks all stakeholders in development agencies, donors, and civil society, including the UNDP, UNICEF, the WFP, the DFID, and ECHO for sharing their insights, information, and making other contributions. This report was prepared by Annika Kjellgren with assistance of Hadyiat El-Tayeb Alyn, Gender Specialist, and Dr. Christina Jones-Pauly, Consultant, with support and guidance of Endashaw Tadesse and Andrea Vermehren, World Bank Task Team Leaders. Valuable input and support was received from Isabel Soares, Senior Operations Officer, and Aimnn Hassan, Team Assistant. iv Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... VII I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 A. RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................. 1 B. THE ROLE AND KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS AND SOCIAL SAFETY NETS . 3 C. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY .............................................................................................. 5 D. THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT ............................................................................................ 6 II. MACROECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT, POVERTY, AND VULNERABILITY IN SUDAN............................................................................................................................. 7 A. MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT ................................................................................................. 7 B. DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT .................................................................................................... 10 C. POVERTY, MALNUTRITION LEVELS, LIVELIHOODS, AND SHOCKS .................................................. 13 III. THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ................................. 17 A. THE GOVERNMENT’S EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION ................... 17 B. THE GOVERNMENT’S EXISTING STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION ........................ 18 IV. AN INVENTORY OF SUDAN’S EXISTING SOCIAL SAFETY NETS ................................ 23 A. GOVERNMENT SOCIAL SAFETY NET INTERVENTIONS ................................................................. 24 B. NON-GOVERNMENT SOCIAL SAFETY NET INTERVENTIONS ......................................................... 40 V. FINANCIAL OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING SOCIAL SAFETY NET ...................................... 68 OPTION 1: REALLOCATING SAVINGS FROM THE FUEL SUBSIDY REFORM .............................................. 68 OPTION 2: INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF ZAKAT FUNDS BY STRENGTHENING EXISTING PROGRAMS ....... 71 OPTION 3: MOBILIZING DONOR FUNDING .................................................................................... 71 VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................... 73 List of Annexes Annex 1: Guidelines for a Social Protection System in Sudan ................................................ 82 Annex 2: Gender, Children, and Early Childhood Development Rates of Return .................. 96 Annex 3: Stakeholders Consulted ......................................................................................... 100 Annex 4: ZAKAT Fund Institutional Setup ............................................................................. 103 Annex 5: Existing Institutional Structure of THE Ministry of Welfare and Social Security ... 104 Annex 6: Existing Strategic Framework for Social Protection .............................................. 125 v List of Tables Table 1: State Ranking by Population Size, Poverty Percentages, Absolute Numbers, and Rural versus Urban Poverty .................................................................................... 13 Table 2: Policies and Strategies of Federal Ministries or Agencies Relevant to Social Protection and Social Safety Nets .......................................................................... 19 Table 3: Existing Databases or Forthcoming Initiatives to Establish Data .............................. 21 Table 4: Sudan’s Existing Social Safety Net Interventions, 2012 (by Cost and Beneficiaries) 23 Table 5: Sudanese Government’s Existing Social Safety Net Interventions, 2012 (by Cost and Beneficiaries) ................................................................................................... 25 Table 6: Zakat’s Total Financial Envelope and 61 Percentage Allocations to Poor and Very Poor Households, 2008-2012 ................................................................................. 30 Table 7: Zakat Fund Support to the Poor, 2012 ...................................................................... 32 Table 8: Non-governmental Social Safety Nets in Sudan (by Funding Source and Numbers of Beneficiaries) ...................................................................................................... 42 Table 9: Total Costs and Beneficiaries of the WFP’s Programs, 2012 -2013 ........................... 44 Table 10: WFP Beneficiaries and Costs by Activity and Region .............................................. 49 Table 11: The WFP’s Monitoring and Evaluation and Information Systems .......................... 52 Table 12: Financial Envelope of Main Stakeholders Involved in Nutrition Programming in Sudan ...................................................................................................................... 57 Table 13: Budget by Nutrition Category and by Partner, 2013 (US$) .................................... 57 Table 14: Sector Needs Analysis ............................................................................................. 58 Table 15: UNICEF Nutrition Program’s Actual Coverage Compared to Need (SAM), by State........................................................................................................................ 59 Table 16: Main Nutrition Partners .......................................................................................... 61 Table 17: World Vision’s Funding Envelope for its 2013 South Darfur Food Assistance Program .................................................................................................................. 62 Table 18: Beneficiaries of World Vision’s South Darfur Food Assistance Program, 2013 ...... 63 Table 19: Potential for Savings from Fuel Subsidies to be Reallocated to Social Safety Nets, 2013 .............................................................................................................. 69 Table 20: Scenarios for Reallocating the Fuel Subsidy Savings to the Existing Direct Cash Transfer (2012) ....................................................................................................... 70 Table 21: Scenarios for Reallocating the Fuel Subsidy Savings to Non-governmental Food Security and Nutrition Programs ............................................................................ 70 vi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of this report is to provide a preliminary analysis of the state of social protection in Sudan with a focus on providing an inventory of social safety net programming. The report is meant to serve as a basis for the government’s efforts to formulate an effective social protection system in Sudan. The report also suggests the options that are available to the government to support additional social safety nets for the poorest and neediest citizens. These options are: (i) reallocating savings from the fuel subsidy reform to the poor; (ii) increasing the efficiency and targeting of Zakat funds; and (iii) mobilizing donor funding. The main findings of the report are as follows: The Government of Sudan acknowledges the need for targeted social safety nets to address the country’s high levels of poverty and vulnerability. The coverage of existing programs is limited, and there are many evident overlaps between them. There is a need for improved targeting, a unified beneficiary registry, efficient payment systems, and more transparent governance mechanisms. In general, there is a lack of coordination among the various social safety nets implemented by different actors in the country, including the government, semi-autonomous agencies, and non-government actors. There is currently no comprehensive national social protection or welfare policy in place in Sudan, although the government has been working towards the goal of developing an integrated social policy. A number of formal social protection systems are in place, but they vii are contributory and they do not cover the poor and vulnerable in the informal economy, especially those in conflict-affected populations and communities. This report concludes that the existing social safety net system is in need of significant support if it is to be able to respond to the widespread poverty and vulnerability in Sudan. The following recommendations would improve social protection in Sudan:  Reallocate the savings from the fuel subsidy reform to social safety nets to fund targeted and effective pro-poor interventions.  Explore links between social safety net programs, the health/nutrition and education sectors, and conflict-related interventions to ensure optimal use of resources and institutional capacity to provide families with core services.  Review the existing institutional architecture for implementing social protection interventions.  Develop a coherent National Social Protection Policy (NSPS) that includes social safety nets.  Develop an effective system for monitoring the outcomes of social protection programs, strengthen controls and social accountability, and foster a culture of evaluation.  Enhance existing information technology (IT) for managing, monitoring, and implementing social protection programs, including management information systems, payment systems, and program monitoring and oversight. viii  Create an efficient document filing system for important documents and reports to facilitate future assessments and analysis as scattered documentation has been one key factor that has impeded the development of the sector. ix I. INTRODUCTION A. Rationale and Objectives 1. The Sudanese population has suffered from years of conflict, and deep-seated security issues have severely hampered Sudan’s long-term economic stability. Sudan has had alternating civilian and military governments and experienced a protracted North-South war that took a heavy toll on human life and economic resources. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 brought in an era of peace and economic prosperity as a result of the sale of oil. After the CPA, nationwide elections were held, the first in 10 years, but the secession of South Sudan in 2011 with no agreement on the flow of oil to the North has resulted in economic uncertainty and austerity in the Republic of the Sudan and threatens its security. 2. Sudan is struggling to meet its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Despite some achievements, progress towards achieving these goals has been uneven. Sud an’s most recent MDG progress report in 2010, which covered both South and North Sudan before the secession, identified armed conflict as one of the biggest impediments to progress because it was diverting substantial resources away from development. The report acknowledged that the marginalization of certain regions within Sudan has weakened or destroyed social protection for families and the disabled (Republic of Sudan, 2010, p.13). This has increased the need for assistance for the poor and vulnerable, especially women and children (UNICEF, and NCCW, 2011) in Darfur and in eastern Sudan, and the massive numbers of people displaced by war and armed conflict. 3. Sudan faces considerable challenges, including a very high poverty rate and difficult living conditions. The challenges facing Sudan are huge, including: (i) a poverty rate of 46.5 percent (CBoSTAT, 2010, p. 52); (ii) an estimated 2 million internally displaced 1 people and 4 million persons who largely depend on humanitarian aid for their survival; (iii) a large number of unemployed young people (aged 15-24) - 33 percent in general and 44.8 percent among young women), unemployment as of 2011 (Ministry of Labor, 2011),; and (iv) significant disparities in development and opportunities between Sudan’s regions, which is one of the main causes of the conflict in the country, and between rural and urban areas. 4. The secession of South Sudan has had a considerable negative impact on the Sudanese economy. Since the secession, Sudan has lost some three-quarters of its oil production, half of its fiscal revenues, and about two-thirds of its international payment capacity (IMF, 2012a). Adjusting to a permanent shock of such magnitude is a daunting challenge and requires a strong policy response at a time when international financial support is limited. 5. International aid to date has mostly been humanitarian in nature, but as Sudan is now transitioning into a post-conflict situation, donors are increasingly providing aid for recovery and development. In 2012, humanitarian funding coordinated by the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reached US$821 million (OCHA, 2012). 6. The Government of Sudan has recognized that social safety nets are an important instrument for reducing poverty by including them as a strategic area in its Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MoFNE, 2012). The government also participated in the meeting that set up the African Union Social Protection Framework (African Union 2008 and Taylor 2010). It asked its external partners, including the World Bank and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) for the necessary support to assess its ongoing social protection programming and to identify any existing gaps in its social safety net (SSN) programming. This report is the result of that support. It assesses the status of the social safety nets that are currently being implemented and financed in Sudan by federal line ministries, semi-autonomous agencies, and development partners. 2 B. The Role and Key Characteristics of Social Protection Programs and Social Safety Nets 7. There is a growing body of evidence showing that well-designed social protection programs can have a wide range of positive outcomes, including the long-term positive impact of lifting people out of poverty (World Bank, 2012b). Social protection can be seen as a basic human right as it directly combats poverty and food insecurity and contributes to economic growth and human development. 8. Social protection consists of social insurance, social assistance and labor market programs. Social insurance covers pensions (to ensure a minimum income in old age) and health insurance (to protect the well-being of households in the face of adverse events). Social assistance consists of the provision of targeted programs (to increase the access of vulnerable groups to basic services), and labor market programs promote employment, productivity, and micro-finance. These programs complement the delivery of basic health and education services, financial services, the provision of utilities and economic infrastructure, and other policies and programs aimed at reducing poverty and managing risk. Social Safety Nets as Part of a Social Protection System 9. Social safety nets (SSNs) are non-contributory transfer programs targeted to the poor and vulnerable. Safety nets aim to increase consumption of basic commodities and essential services by the poor and vulnerable, that is, individuals unable to meet their own basic needs or in danger of falling into poverty, either because of an external shock or because of socioeconomic circumstances such as age, illness, or disability. SSNs include such programs as cash transfers, public works, and in-kind support such as fee waivers for basic services and school feeding and nutrition programs. 3 10. Programs can be designed to address the needs of: (i) the chronically poor, as even in “good” times these households struggle to meet their minimum needs; (ii) those vulnerable to life-events/shocks such as economic crises and natural disasters that threaten their well-being; and (iii) particularly vulnerable groups or those in vulnerable circumstances (such as the disabled, orphans, and street children). 11. When SSN interventions are well-designed, they can be affordable even in low- income countries with tight budgets. They can increase the government’s ability to respond to shocks, reduce inequality, promote social stability, fight poverty, and promote growth. Key Components and Characteristics of Well-functioning SSN Programming 12. The following components are required for effective SSN programming:  Identify the needs a program aims to cover  An effective targeting mechanism  An effective delivery mechanism  An effective monitoring and evaluation system  A well-functioning complaints and redress mechanism  Digitized systems (including a management information system). 13. The performance of each SSN program should be measured against the following characteristics:  Sustainability (fiscal, political, and administrative).  Scalability (so systems can respond quickly to emergencies and growing needs).  Cost-efficiency. 4  Equity (gender and children ‒ see Annex 2).  Incentive compatibility (the program promotes work, savings, and participation in insurance).  Adequacy (in terms of the program’s coverage, benefit levels, and duration). 14. For more details of the strategic role played by SSNs in social protection and of the key components of SSN interventions, see Annex 1. C. Methodology of the Study 15. The structure of this report is designed to reflect Sudan’s specific SSN programming and its strategic and institutional setup. The World Bank team conducted the study in close collaboration with various ministries in Sudan as well as with the development partners and agencies engaged in social protection in Sudan. The study used data from the World Bank’s “Poverty Profile for the Northern States of Sudan” (World Bank, 2011a), UNICEF’s “The State of Sudanese Children” (UNICEF, 2011), the Central Bureau of Statistics “Poverty in Northern Sudan” (CBoStat, 2010), Sudan’s MDG Report (Republic of Sudan, 2010), and data and reports from various government agencies implementing social safety net activities. The team also referred to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy’s “Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper” (MoFNE, 2012). 16. This report has several limitations. Available information is limited in Sudan. The social protection sector involves a wide range of actors and activities for which the quality and quantity of reporting varies. Therefore, this report does not claim to cover all social protection and SSN programming in Sudan. Instead, it focuses on the main SSN interventions at the federal/national level and should be seen as a starting point for assessing and strengthening SSN programming in Sudan. Further data collection and 5 dialogue with stakeholders, especially at state and locality levels, will be needed to expand the findings of this assessment. D. The Structure of the Report 17. Chapter 1 introduces the rationale and objectives of this report and briefly describes the role of SSN interventions and key characteristics against which their performance can be measured. Chapter 2 discusses the macroeconomic context and the demographic context within which SNNs operate. Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the institutional and the strategic government framework for SSN interventions. Chapter 4 assesses the main government-funded SSN interventions and non-government-funded SSN interventions. Chapter 5 outlines options for raising additional resources to expand social safety net programming. Finally, Chapter 6 presents conclusions and recommendations for strengthening social protection programming in general and SSN interventions in particular. 6 II. MACROECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT, POVERTY, AND VULNERABILITY IN SUDAN A. Macroeconomic Context 18. Deep-seated security issues have for years represented serious challenges to Sudan’s economic prosperity and social cohesion. (IMF, 2012[a and b]). Sudan has had alternating civilian and military governments and was engaged in over 40 years of civil war with the South. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 to end the war, Sudan enjoyed a respite for six years.1 This era ended with the secession of South Sudan in 2011, which yielded new defense, security, boundary, and economic issues. With the South went the major oil reserves, and an era of harsh austerity began in North Sudan, which increased vulnerability and poverty 19. Between 1995 and 2008, per capita GDP almost doubled from US$780 to US$1,400 as Sudan started exporting significant amounts of oil. This was in sharp contrast to the low per capita GDP growth between 1975 and 1995 (between US$600 and US$800 in real terms) during which time Sudan was classified as a low-income country with an average income similar to that of Chad or Kenya. The economic expansion brought with it increased investment and improved macroeconomic management, including a sharp reduction in inflation from an average of 33 percent per year during the 1970s and 1980s to only 8 percent per year after 1999 (World Bank, 2012a). 20. However, the secession of South Sudan is having a significant negative impact on the Sudanese economy. Following the secession, Sudan lost some three-quarters of its oil production, half of its fiscal revenues, one-fifth of its natural resources (including forests), and about two-thirds of its international payment capacity. While Sudan’s economy is 1 The CPA was signed on January 9, 2005 by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). 7 relatively diversified and open, from 1999 onwards it had developed a dependency on the oil sector that increased its vulnerability to external and fiscal shocks. 21. Adjusting to a permanent shock of such magnitude is a daunting challenge and requires a strong policy response at a time when international financial support is limited. Therefore, in mid-2011, the government approved a comprehensive reform program for 2012-2014 to address the economic and social challenges posed by the secession and to halt and reverse the deterioration in the country’s economic and financial situation. The objectives of this Three-Year Emergency Program were to maintain fiscal and external sustainability, boost inclusive growth, and gradually reduce unemployment, and it included a sharp reduction in fuel subsidies. 22. In 2012 the IMF evaluated the medium-term outlook for Sudan as being slightly positive (IMF, 2012a) but a year later, despite the adoption of the reform package, the IMF re-evaluated Sudan’s medium-term outlook as unfavorable. It now predicts that non-oil real GDP growth will remain below potential at about 3 percent. Consumer price inflation is expected to decline gradually, although it will still remain in double digits, reflecting the continued monetization of the deficit as well as the depreciation of the Sudanese pound. However, this decline is under threat from several potential risks. In addition to the ongoing tensions along the border with South Sudan and the continuing conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei that will entail increased military spending and will involve the displacement of more people and livestock, wider regional unrest might adversely affect Sudan’s inflation rate, GDP growth, and commodity prices. As Sudan relies on import s of food, especially wheat, and of petroleum products, an increase in food and fuel prices could increase inflation further and, with it, the cost of the remaining subsidies. Given Sudan’s weak social protection programming, the impact on poverty could be significant. The government, on the other hand, regards the domestic political risk as low. While it recognizes that bold measures are needed to deal with the macroeconomic imbalances, it 8 cites protracted economic sanctions, delays in debt relief, and weak international support as the causes of the country’s difficulties (IMF, 2013a). 23. In September 2013 the government decided to abolish fuel subsidies, a move which was aimed at reducing the fiscal imbalance. This has resulted in increases in the prices of diesel, gasoline, and cooking gas of 65, 68, and 67 percent respectively, which has caused massive protests throughout the country. The abolition of fuel subsidies has also increased the prices of goods and services that use fuel in their production and distribution. The loss in real income is estimated to be about 4 percent overall, but a large part of this burden falls on the poor. The IMF has estimated that 1 million more people have been added to the current figure of 13.5 million poor people in Sudan (those with incomes of less than 114 SDG per person per month) (IMF, 2013b). 24. The IMF has estimated that the September subsidy reform will generate about 797 million SDG in budgetary savings. These savings present the government with a unique opportunity to expand social safety net interventions and develop a new strategic framework for social protection in Sudan. The IMF estimated that fully compensating the poor for the loss in real income associated with the reform would cost 59.3 million SDG, including an incremental administrative cost of 5 percent. One month after the September reform, the government doubled the social spending budget and reinstated the cash transfer program. Over 350,000 poor families are being targeted to receive 150 SDG per month, whereas in the previous year only 100,000 families were targeted with 100 SDG per month, only 89 percent of whom were reached (for various reasons such as difficulties identifying beneficiaries and getting the transfer delivered in remote locations).2 The salaries of civil servants are also expected to be raised. 2 World Bank mission team’s conversations on December 17, 2013 with personnel of the Savings and Development Bank, which handles the actual transfers. 9 B. Demographic Context 25. Sudan is a multicultural society and is undergoing rapid change.3 Located at the crossroads of North and East Africa and the Middle East, it has a number of ethnic and language groups, including the Fur, Nubians, Beja, Rashaida, Manassir, and Fallata. Climate changes have exacerbated conflict among the groups competing for the ever-scarcer resources needed for livelihoods and survival and have politicized the relationship between the periphery and the center in Khartoum. 26. The accuracy of demographic data has always been an issue in Sudan. The combination of a vast territory, a large nomadic population, civil conflict, and security concerns has made it difficult to count the population. Therefore, much effort was invested in the 2008 population census, the first post-war census carried out in Sudan, which estimated that the total population of northern Sudan, now the Republic of the Sudan, was about 31.8 million. 27. The majority of the population of Sudan is rural (World Bank, 2011a). Overall, two- thirds (64.4 percent) of the population of Sudan live in rural areas, with some states having higher or lower proportions of rural populations. For example, only 19.1 percent of the population of Khartoum state lives in rural areas, whereas 45 percent of the population in Red Sea state does. The rural fractions in the remaining states range from 67.8 percent in White Nile state to 823 percent in Northern state. 28. Like most African countries, Sudan is undergoing rapid urbanization. In 2008, 43 percent of the population was living in urban areas, up from 36 percent in 2000 and 27 percent in 1990.4 The strong rural-urban migration trend is driven in part by drought and 3 This section is drawn from UNICEF and NCCW (2011) World Bank (2012a). 4 According to World Development Indicators for 1990 and 2000 (data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world- development-indicators) 10 desertification as well as by insecurity in rural areas. A decline in the provision of basic health and education services outside of Khartoum is also playing a role (UNDP/CRMA, 2013 and UNDP/TRMA, 2009). 29. Nomads make up a large share of the population in Sudan (MoFNE, 2012). According to existing estimates, nomads account for 8.5 to 9.1 percent of the total population. However, the exact number remains unknown. Providing basic services, such as education and health care, and targeted interventions to this particular group is a challenge as they are perpetually on the move, they often attach little value to education, and old traditions require girls to marry young (UNICEF, 2009). 30. Half of Sudan’s population is made up of children, with approximately 15 million Sudanese being under the age of 18 (CBoSTAT, 2011) and approximately 1.33 million children being born each year and this number continues to rise.5 Of these, an estimated 76,000 will die in their first year, and 104,000 will die before their fifth birthday.6 In other words, one child in every 30 dies during the first 28 days of life, while more than one child in every 13 dies before his or her fifth birthday. The unequal distribution of health care professionals, the country’s limited capacity to deliver services, and low government investment are among the factors that have stymied progress in reducing child mortality. 31. North Darfur, South Darfur, and South Kordofan have the highest levels of poverty as a percentage of the total population at 69 percent, 61 percent, and 60 percent respectively. In absolute numbers, these states contain 25 percent of the total population but 33 percent of the population who are living below the poverty line (approximately 4.8 million). South Darfur and North Darfur are two of the five most populous states in Sudan. 5 This number is a projected denominator used in the Ministry of Health’s immunization (EPI) data. According to Census 2008, the number of births is much lower at 904,000. 6 Estimates for child mortality are calculated based on the 2010 Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS). 11 32. North Kordofan, Red Sea, Blue Nile, White Nile, and West Darfur are the five states with the next highest (and very similar) population shares living below the poverty line with 58 percent, 58 percent, 57 percent, 56 percent, and 56 percent respectively. Of these, North Kordofan is also the fourth most populous state, though three other states (all but Blue Nile) each have a population of between 1.3 million and 1.7 million. 33. The eight above-mentioned states contain 48 percent of the population of Sudan, but all have poverty levels above the national poverty line, representing 9 million (61 percent) of the total poor population. All other states have averages below the national average, with Khartoum having the lowest percentage of poverty at 26 percent. However, of the eight states with percentages above the 46.5 percent national average, only North Kordofan, North Darfur, and South Darfur have more than 1 million citizens living below the poverty line. 34. Poverty rates are substantially lower in urban areas than in rural areas. In cities, 26.5 percent of the population is below the poverty line compared with 57.6 percent of the rural population. South Darfur, Gezira, and North Kordofan are the most rural states in terms of absolute numbers (with over 2.3 million rural dwellers in each state). However, Northern State has the highest proportion of rural dwellers at 83 percent, followed by Gezira (81 percent), and West Darfur (82 percent). As a large proportion of Gezira’s rural population are engaged in productive agriculture, Gezira is one of the two main centers of economic activity in Sudan. This is in sharp contrast with the largest economic center, Khartoum State, which has a rural population of only 19 percent. Table 1 below summarizes these poverty statistics and rankings for all of the states. 12 Table 1: State Ranking by Population Size, Poverty Percentages, Absolute Numbers, and Rural versus Urban Poverty State Total No. of Poverty Total No. of Rankin Ranking (2): Ranking (3): % Rural Total No. of Total No. of Population Per Level % Popu-lation g (1): By % of By # of Popu- Rural Popu- Urban State a/ per Living By Population Population lation per lation per Population Stateb/ Under Total over under State State per State Poverty No. of Poverty Poverty Line Per Popu- Line Line State a/ * lation (Pop. Size per State) Northern 699,065 36% 251,663 15 10 15 83% 580,224 118,841 River Nile 1,120,441 32% 358,541 11 11 14 72% 806,718 313,723 Red Sea 1,396,110 58% 809,744 12 4 8 45% 628,250 767,861 Kassala 1,789,806 36% 644,330 6 10 11 72% 1,288,660 501,146 Gadarif 1,348,378 50% 674,190 9 7 10 72% 970,833 337,546 Khartoum 5,274.321 26% 1,371,323 1 12 4 19% 1,002,212 4,272,200 Gezira 3,575,280 38% 1,358,606 3 9 5 81% 2,895,977 679,303 White Nile 1,730,588 56% 969,129 7 6 6 68% 1,176,800 553,788 Sinnar 1,285,058 44% 565,426 10 8 12 80% 1,028,046 257,012 Blue Nile 832,112 57% 474,304 14 5 13 74% 615,763 216,349 North 2,920,992 58% 1,694,175 4 4 2 80% 2,336,794 584,198 Kordofan South 1,406,404 60% 843,842 8 3 7 77% 1,082,931 323,473 Kordofan North 2,113,626 69% 1,458,402 5 1 3 78% 1,648,628 464,998 Darfur West Darfur 1,308,225,728 56% 732,606 11 6 9 82% 1,072,745 235,481 South 4,093,,594 61% 2,497,092 2 2 1 74% 3,029,260 1,064,334 Darfur TOTAL 30,894000 47% 14,703,375 64% 19,895,737 10,998,264 Source: Table compiled by the author. a/ UNICEF/NCCW (2011). b/ World Bank (2011a). c/ Central Bureau of Statistics, www.cbs.gov.sd,.). The projected population figures were provided used as there are no projected poverty statistics to date. Notes: *Rounded % of poverty levels (World Bank, 2011a). Rankings are in order of: (1): highest percentage of rural population; (2) highest absolute number of rural population; (3) highest absolute number of households under the poverty line. C. Poverty, Malnutrition Levels, Livelihoods, and Shocks 35. Poverty disproportionately affects rural populations and is particularly deep in the areas most affected by conflict and drought. This is illustrated by the fact that the Darfur and Kordofan regions have the highest concentrations of poverty with 63 and 59 percent of the population living below the poverty line (close to 5 million and 2.6 million people respectively). 13 36. Poverty rates are slightly lower for the small number of households headed by women. Nearly one-third of Sudanese households are headed by women according to the 2006 Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS). Among these households, 44.2 percent are below the poverty line compared to 47 percent of households headed by married men. 37. Education levels in the Sudan are very low, and poverty rates are highly correlated with education (World Bank, 2012a). Forty-five percent of household heads have no formal education. Poverty rates are highest for people living in households whose head has no education. They are also high for those whose household heads have only some primary education and those whose highest level of completed education is khalwa (Quranic school). 38. Currently, only 57 percent of 6 to 16 year olds are attending school, and the school attendance rate gradually declines after peaking during early adolescence. 7 Only three out of four children of primary school age are receiving a formal education. Among the children who are of primary school age (6 to 13 years old), almost 2 million8 are out of school. This number increases to more than 3.3 million if children of secondary school age (14 to 16 years old) are included. At all ages, attendance rates are much higher in urban areas than in rural areas and are much higher for children from the wealthiest quintile than for those in the lower quintiles (World Bank, 2011a). Although the right to free primary education is guaranteed in the Interim National Constitution of 2005, in reality parents are bearing the costs. 7 The pre-education enrollment rate is 30.2 percent, the primary education enrollment rate is 66.1 percent, and the secondary school enrollment rate is 29.7 percent (Ministry of Education 2008/09 p.31). 8 According to the Ministry of Education’s Statistics for 2008-2009, 1,981,839 children between the ages of 6 and 13 are out of primary school and 1,336,006 children between the ages of 14 and 16 are out of secondary school. 14 39. The percentage of children who are underweight, stunted and wasting9 in Sudan is high in Sudan, but varies from state to state. Global underweight is 32.2 percent: The highest rate among the states is in Sinnar with 42.6 percent and the lowest in Khartoum state with 19.9 percent (SHHS 2010). The global rate for stunting is 35 percent in Sudan, 15.7 per cent severe stunting. Red Sea has the highest rate of global stunting with 54 percent and Khartoum again the lowest at 21.9 percent. The global rate for wasting in Sudan is 16.4 percent, severe wasting is 5.3 percent. Red Sea has the highest rate of global wasting with 28.5 per cent and Khartoum the lowest with 12.8 percent (SHHS 2010). 40. Households in Sudan are engaged in a variety of activities. Most of the poorest households ‒ those in the bottom 20 percent ‒ are engaged in agriculture (crop farming and animal husbandry). There is tremendous variation by region in the extent to which the economy is concentrated on agriculture and livestock. In the states in the northeastern corner of the country, only a minority of people live in households whose main livelihood is agriculture or livestock. In contrast, most people living in households in the remainder of the country report that agriculture or livestock is their main livelihood. 41. Eastern Sudan has the country’s largest population of refugees, mainly from Eritrea. Eastern Sudan has been relatively stable and peaceful following the peace agreement of 2006. Eastern Sudan, which consists of the states of Red Sea, Kassala, and El- Ghadaref with a total population of about 3.8 million, has eight camps for refugees, some of whom have had refugee status for over 40 years. It is estimated that there are about 120,000 refugees, mostly of Eritrean origin, in Eastern Sudan, with 60 percent of them having been born into refugee status in Sudan. About 60,500 of these refugees are in the 9 Definitions according to UNICEF: Underweight - Moderate and severe - below minus two standard deviations from median weight for age of reference population; severe - below minus three standard deviations from median weight for age of reference population. Stunting - Moderate and severe - below minus two standard deviations from median height for age of reference population. Wasting - Moderate and severe - below minus two standard deviations from median weight for height of reference population. 15 camps, 40,000 are integrated into urban areas, and 15,000 are in closed camps.10 The large and growing number of long-term refugees among the displaced population in Eastern Sudan threatens to destabilize this underdeveloped region (UNHCR, 2011, MoFNE, 2012, and UNDP/TRMA (2009). 42. Armed conflicts affect the security situation in the border states of South Kordofan (including Abyei) and Blue Nile. The historical social and economic links between the tribes plus the traditional seasonal pastoral migration on both sides of the border between Sudan and South Sudan endure. The humanitarian repercussions of the ongoing conflicts are reported to be severe and wide ranging, including family separations, lack of shelter and medical facilities, and interruptions to children’s schooling. 43. The arid states in the north, such as Northern State and North Darfur, suffer from frequent droughts, leading to displacement and conflict over limited resources. Meanwhile, Khartoum has better than average rates, whereas in its neighboring states, poverty and inequality exist in cities as well as in remote rural areas. The full extent of the economic and social disparities and slum dwellings within Khartoum is not known (Pavanello et al, 2012). 10 Closed camps mean that the refugees are totally segregated and cut off from intermingling with locals. 16 III. THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 44. In the context of the broad economic and social challenges facing Sudan’s poor population, this chapter provides a brief overview of the government’s existing institutional and strategic framework for social protection, the role played by SSN interventions in alleviating poverty, and efforts by the government and its development partners to address the country’s challenges. A. The Government’s Existing Institutional Framework for Social Protection 45. In Sudan, an institutional framework already exists to support social protection programming, but the system is complex and has many overlapping objectives and activities. As Table 2 below shows, social protection in Sudan involves a range of institutional stakeholders. In addition to the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MoWSS), this includes (but is not limited to): the Ministry of Health (nutrition and fee waivers for health); the Ministry of Education (school feeding); the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (the internally displaced – formerly under the Ministry of Interior)); the Central Bank of Sudan (micro-financing policy); the Ministry of Finance (general food subsidies and cash transfers); and the Ministries of Agriculture and Water and of Animal Resources. Additionally, each state has its own state offices of the MoSWW and the Ministry of Agriculture that coordinate programming with their counterparts within the federal line ministries. 46. The MoWSS is the main ministry in charge of social protection and is responsible for the protection, prevention, and promotion of the poor and vulnerable. It carries out this mandate through the following programming: (i) the Zakat Chamber, which manages resources raised through the compulsory charity tax, one of the five Pillars of Islam made in accordance with Islamic law and runs some complementary SSNs funded by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE); (ii) social insurance programs; (iii) micro- 17 finance/income-generating programs; (iv) social services and rural development projects; and (v) advocacy and social policy activities including those for vulnerable groups (such as the disabled, the elderly, and children). The MoWSS has eight directorates and ten semi- autonomous agencies to coordinate these activities and programs. 47. There is also an additional institutional framework for coordinating external support for the poor and vulnerable. The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), a government body, coordinates government’s departments, civil community organizations, UN agencies, and NGOs. HAC operates in parallel with the government’s own social protection and SSN programming. However, this coordination leaves much to be desired, which hampers the achievement of an integrated approach to SSN programming in the country. B. The Government’s Existing Strategic Framework for Social Protection 48. Currently, social protection programming is guided by a wide array of government policies, strategies, and action plans implemented by many different ministries, directorates, and semi-autonomous agencies, but there is no comprehensive and common vision guiding the sector as a whole. Also, there is a lack of strategic clarity on the contribution that social protection can and should make to the nation’s anti -poverty objectives. 49. Specifically, there is no policy on social safety nets. Table 2 presents the main policies, strategies, and programs in the area of social protection in Sudan. As is evident in the table, the strategic framework is scattered and multi-layered. The MoWSS has instituted a social protection committee for coordinating the various departments and semi- autonomous agencies placed under its purview. 18 Table 2: Policies and Strategies of Federal Ministries or Agencies Relevant to Social Protection and Social Safety Nets Ministry or Agency Relevance for Social Protection and Social Safety Nets Ministry of Welfare and Holds the main mandate for social policy and related activities and for welfare and Social Security – social security issues for eight directorates, including those for Social Programs, Directorates and Semi- Women and Family, and Poverty Reduction, and 10 semi-autonomous agencies, autonomous Agencies including the Zakat Fund, the National Council for Child Welfare, (NCCW), the National Council for Persons with Disabilities, the National Health Insurance Fund, the National Population Council, and the microfinance program under the National Rural Women’s Empowerment Program. The Center for Poverty Reduction and Coordination has the mandate to coordinate microfinance schemes and programs within the MoWSS and its agencies. As of November 2013, it is in charge of developing the Poverty Reduction Strategy. The National Health Insurance Fund has set a policy of increasing the number of people covered by fee waiver health insurance by 3 percent per year and is responsible for pensions (other than pensions for the police, military, and judiciary) and for providing microfinance to poor pensioners. It coordinates the microfinance programs of institutions affiliated with the MoWSS such as the Savings and Development Bank and the Family Bank. The MoWSS is also responsible for the following policies: the National Policy for the Welfare of the Elderly, the National Policy for Social Service Education (training for social workers), the National Policy for Supporting Orphans, the National Policy for Resolving the Problems of Homelessness, the National Policy for Street Children, and the forthcoming Comprehensive Integrated Social Program It was intermittently responsible for the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (IDPs), which was placed under the Ministry of Interior, then restored to the Ministry of Welfare. Responsible for leading the dialogue with external humanitarian donors to develop an exit strategy under the Paris Declaration. Ministry of Finance and In charge of financial resources for social protection and general subsidies. Until National Economy November of 2013, the MoFNE oversaw the policy formulation of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which includes social safety nets, and the commitment to a National Social Protection Policy under the Human Development pillar. Oversees the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for social service projects, including the Community Development Fund (CDF) and the African Development Bank projects. In charge of the forthcoming Development Aid Strategy for non-humanitarian aid. Ministry of Education Responsible for the school feeding program under the new National School Feeding Policy (2012-2016) in close collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) though the program will gradually transition to the government’s full control by 2016. Also responsible for promoting girls’ education and education for nomads. Ministry of Health Responsible for the draft National Nutrition Policy (2012-2106) and for implementing a nutrition program in close collaboration with the WFP though the program will gradually transition to the government’s full control over time. Also responsible for implementing the 2009 decree that granted free health insurance to pregnant and lactating mothers and children under 5 years of age. Beginning to pilot the latter policy. Central Bank of Sudan Responsible for setting micro-credit policies and for introducing financial mechanisms to promote income-generating activities to complement SSN programming for the poor. Its 2007 policy requests all banks to set aside 12 percent of their portfolios for microfinance if their profit margins so permit. Of this 12 percent, 30 percent is to go 19 to women and 70 percent to rural families. Ministry of Responsible for food security and livelihood programming, including early warning Agriculture/Ministry of systems and the monitoring of food security. The Secretariat for Food Security is Animal Resources responsible for the pending National Food Security Policy. There is no explicit policy on food subsidies. Ministry of Labor Responsible for labor market activities and programming, including for youth. The MoL is responsible only for the formal sector of employment, not the informal sector. It has begun a survey on the informal sector in coordination with the MoFNE and ILO. Ministry of Interior Was made responsible for the National Policy for IDPs through the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) (which was formerly under the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and before that under the MoWSS). The HAC Has been transferred again to the a/ Ministry of Welfare. Ministry of Petroleum While MoFNE sets the prices at which oil is sold and determines extent of subsidizing the price, the MoP is responsible for executing the sales at the specified prices and for sending the proceeds to the MoFNE, but it has no known subsidy policy or b/ strategy. Commission for Student In-kind grants support 30.8 percent of all public university students (80,000 Welfare (Office of the supported by the Zakat Chamber and 88,000 by the Student Welfare Fund). Targeted President) by means of information provided by each student about the economic status of themselves and their families and verified by a committee of social workers at each university. Of the grantees, 65 percent are women and 35 percent are male. Since 2012, soft loans are being offered to students by the Student Welfare Fund through the Savings and Social Development Bank (2,000 currently enrolled) with the bank’s administrative fees being paid for by the Student Welfare Fund. Source: Compiled by the author. A complete list of ministries can be found at: http://www.sudan.gov.sd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=65. Notes: a/ OCHA = United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Not all major stakeholders are coordinated under OCHA. Exceptions include the Qatar Foundation and the Islamic Development Bank. b/ For details, see the summary in Chapter 4 or refer to IMF (2012b). 50. In the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2012, the government committed itself to developing a National Social Protection Policy, but the various ongoing efforts towards this end are not fully aligned (MoFNE, 2012). There are multiple parallel policy dialogues going on within the MoWSS and in other agencies and ministries (see Table 2 above). 51. A key challenge in Sudan is a lack of data, and even when the data do exist, there is no coordinated system for making them available. Table 3 summarizes the initiatives taken by various government bodies regarding data collection, storage, and availability. Insufficient resources and the lack of a common vision seem to be the main constraints in this area. The lack of data to inform policy dialogue and program design, implementation, 20 and monitoring and evaluation severely hampers the relevance and effectiveness of SP programming. Table 3: Existing Databases or Forthcoming Initiatives to Establish Data MoWSS Directorates and Agencies Database (Existing or Forthcoming) Zakat Fund Poverty census (CBoSTAT 2011) with all data gender disaggregated. The state-level Zakat Funds are digitized. The plan is to digitalize the entire system down to village level eventually, but for now the necessary infrastructure is lacking. General Directorate for Women and Family Created a Gender Documentation Center, a database for Affirs collecting all research on gender. Needs further development to enable it to link up with existing documentation centers on women and gender. Information Directorate In preliminary discussions to expand its current information center to better serve the MoWSS beyond the current email server function and file archiving. National Health Insurance Fund Electronic database has been developed, needs to be enhanced. National Pension Fund Could be improved. National Council for Child Welfare Being developed with support from UNICEF; publishes the annual State of Sudan’s Children report with UNICEF. National Council for Disabled Persons Being developed in partnership with Zakat. Savings and Social Development Bank Member of a loan tracking system. Well-established database linked to payments systems. No M&E system for tracking the impact of loans on reducing poverty Other Central Bureau of Statistics (CBoSTAT) Has finalized a National Statistics Strategy with support from the UNDP. CBoSTAT is redesigning the questionnaire for the new SHHS, which serves as the basis of poverty surveys. The Census 2008 data have been collected on CD-ROM for distribution and contain analytical papers on social issues (such as those related to gender and the disabled). MoE An educational MIS is being developed for the school feeding program using WFP data. Ministry of Health (MoH) Holds data from the Sudan National AIDS Program (SNAP) Behavioral and Epidemiological Survey (BES) of 2002 and the Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS). The National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2012-2016 identifies the need for a more integrated and less fragmented health information system. Source: Compiled by the author Note: This should not be regarded as a complete or definitive list. 21 52. Additionally, development partners generate a wide range of data and assessments relevant to food security and nutrition for poor and vulnerable households using a broad range of methods and systems. Anyone trying to collect or coordinate data in Sudan or to monitor its quality faces multiple challenges. Links between data collected by the states and between data collected at the local level and data at the national level need to be strengthened. Also, little information is digitized even though there is a general consensus among stakeholders that digitizing data and reporting would have significant advantages, including cost savings. With this in mind, the World Food Programme (WFP) has invested time and resources to pilot the use of smart cards in a small refugee camp in Sudan (see next chapter), and other smaller efforts are being developed by other development agencies (see World Vision below). It may be possible to use smart cards for IDPs in Darfur but only after IDP the re-registration process is completed.11 53. If the efforts of all stakeholders, including both the government and non- governmental bodies, were aligned and coordinated, then SP programming could be improved and better monitored and evaluated. A common nationwide vision for social protection with integrated programming, a coordinated monitoring and evaluation mechanism, and digitized systems using innovative technologies adapted to the unique challenges that exist in Sudan would enable the government and stakeholders alike to maximize their resources and provide effective SP programming. 11 The World Bank mission team’s conversations in December 2013 with WFP personnel in Khartoum. 22 IV. AN INVENTORY OF SUDAN’S EXISTING SOCIAL SAFETY NETS 54. This chapter reviews and assesses the social safety net interventions that were implemented in Sudan in 2012. The chapter first looks at the government’s SSN interventions and then examines the interventions being implemented by non-government bodies and assesses all of these programs against set performance criteria (see Chapter 1). According to the list of key SSN programs used in this report, 26 percent of SSN interventions are – broadly speaking – funded by the government (excluding universal subsidies). These represented approximately 0.5 percent of GDP in 2012. Table 4 presents a summary of the main categories of SSN interventions. Information about the subsidies will have to be revised in light of the abolition of fuel subsidies in 2013, although the government has retained subsidies in some fuel-related sectors such as companies transporting and distributing fuel to the major urban areas. Table 4 is intended to give an idea of the size of subsidies within the context of social programming. Table 4: Sudan’s Existing Social Safety Net Interventions, 2012 (by Cost and Beneficiaries) Financial Allocation Financial Allocation Beneficiaries (# Beneficiaries 2012 2012 of households) (total # of family a/ (SDG) (US$) members GDP 190.4 billion $51.5 billion* n/a n/a b/ Subsidies 10.0 billion $1.8 billion Universal Universal (5.2 % of GDP) Main Government- 927.8 million $162.8 million 4,681,977 26,687,269 funded SSNs (0.5% of GDP) Main Non-government- 2.6 billion $456.0 million 6,109,231 n/a c/ funded SSNs TOTAL excl. Subsidies 3.5 billion $618.8 million 10,791,208 26,687,269 (1.8% of GDP) % of Gov. Total 26.5% 26.5% 43% of n/a (excl. Subsidy) beneficiaries TOTAL incl. Subsidy 13.5 billion $2.4 billion n/a n/a (5.5% of GDP) Sources: Compilation by author. * IMF (2012a, p.10, 2012b, p. 32)), p. 30. Notes: The percentage of GDP may differ slightly due to rounding errors and the different GDP exchange rates used by the IMF and the author of this report. a/ Calculated as the total number of households multiplied by 5.7 (average family size). b/ Fuel subsidies only (IMF 2012). c/ Does not represent all SSN programming in Sudan. Rather it focuses on the main programs as in the section below, with a focus on federal-level activities and actors. 23 A. Government Social Safety Net Interventions 55. Governments often use price subsidies as a way to achieve social protection by reducing the cost of living. In some instances they prefer subsidies to income transfers, even though subsidies are more likely to produce economic distortions (Alderman, 2002). In Sudan in 2012, in terms of fiscal cost, general subsidies constituted the bulk of social programming, dwarfing the size of the Zakat Fund and other government programming. A recent IMF report (IMF, 2012[a]) estimated that the total fiscal cost of direct and tax subsidies, including the subsidy on crude sales for refineries, was SDG 10 billion (US$1.8 billion), or 5.2 percent of GDP after the June 2012 reform, down from SDG 11 billion (or 6.0 percent of GDP) before the reform. New figures will have to be calculated in light of the September 2013 reforms. However, these subsidies are not targeted programs, and analysts have found that they tend to favor higher-income households. In Sudan, the IMF’s country report of 2012 estimated that 50 percent of the fuel subsidies benefitted the richest 20 percent of households. Only 3 percent accrued to those in the bottom quintile, 9 percent to those in the 2nd quintile, 16 percent to those in the 3rd quintile, and 24 percent to those in the 4th quintile. The IMF recommended the gradual withdrawal of the fuel subsidies, but the government did not follow the advice and removed them in only two phases over two years (June 2012 and September 2013) instead of the expected three (IMF 2012a, pp. 5 and 13). 56. The Zakat Fund is currently the main provider of targeted SSN interventions with a specific mandate to target poor and vulnerable households. Zakat is a significant resource of pooled funds earmarked for the poor as it is one of the five Pillars of Islam. It is governed by the Zakat Fund Act and operates as a semi-autonomous agency affiliated with the MoWSS. Zakat resources fund about 87 percent of the government’s SSN interventions in Sudan (in terms of financial allocations and excluding the government’s allocation for subsidies, which is not targeted specifically to the poor). Table 5 presents a summary of the government’s main SSN interventions and the beneficiaries that they support. 24 Table 5: Sudanese Government’s Existing Social Safety Net Interventions, 2012 (by Cost and Beneficiaries) Financial Financial Beneficiaries (# Beneficiaries % of Total c/ Allocation Allocation of Households) (total # family Population a/ (SDG) (US$) members and 2012 2012 % of Total c/ Poor b/ b/ General 10 billion 1.8 billion Universal Universal Universal b/ Subsidies (5.2% of GDP) Not Targeted Not Targeted Not Targeted to Poor to Poor to Poor Households Households Households Zakat-funded 1. 2. 807.8 million 141.7 million 4,581,977 26,117,269 84 % and Transfers 182 % MoFNE-funded 120.0 million 21.1million 100,000 570,000 1.8% and Transfers 3.9% Health Insurance 933.8 million 653.7 million 399 million 2272 million <0.01% and by Zakat (year 2012) (year 2012) (year 2012) (year 2012) <0.01% 122.46 million 20.41 million 313,000 (year 1.87 million (year 2014) (year 2014) 2014) (year 2014) Health Insurance 95 million 16.6h million 378,000 2.1 million 2.7% and by MoFNE (year 2012) (year 2012) (year 2012) (year 2012) 5.9% 339.84 million 56.6 million 590,000 (year 3.36 million (year 2014) (year 2014) 2014) (year 2014) SSN-like Pensions 21,120,000 88,000 (excluding certain (year 2014) pensioners sectors like the (year 2014) police, security services, and judiciary which have their own pension funds) TOTAL excl. 927.8 million $162.8 million 4,834,117 27,554,467 89.2% and Subsidies 192% TOTAL incl. 10.9 billion $1.96 billion n/a n/a n/a Subsidies Sources: Compilation by author from various sources, including IMF (2012a) and Zakat Fund (2012) and information provided by the National Health Insurance Fund and the Center for Poverty Reduction and Coordination within the MoWSS. Notes: US$ estimates are based on a 5.7 exchange rate. Total Population = estimated at 30.9 million. Total Poor = estimated at 46.5 percent of the total population (14.4 million). a/ Calculated as the total number of households multiplied by 5.7 (average family size). b/ Fuel subsidy costs = the estimated fiscal cost of direct and tax subsidies, including the subsidy on crude sales. c/ Calculated as the estimated total number of family members covered (beneficiaries times average family size). 25 57. Outside the scope of Zakat programming, direct cash transfers are a recent phenomenon in Sudan, starting with a new government cash transfer program that was introduced in 2012. This program reflects the government’s efforts to strengthen SSN programming under the auspices of the MoWSS with commensurate resource allocations committed by the MoFNE for the period of 2012-2014. The program, which targets poor and vulnerable households as determined by the poverty census undertaken by Zakat in 2011 in collaboration with the Central Bureau of Statistics, is helping MoWSS staff to gain direct experience in executing an SSN program at the federal level. While the funding commitment for this new program was US$21.1 million in 2012 alone (15 percent of Zakat’s 2012 funding), the program has some shortcomings related to the inefficiency of the distribution mechanisms on the ground and the targeting procedures used. The transfer is distributed by the Savings and Development Bank or by Zakat committees in the villages if the Bank does not have sufficient branches in remote or insecure areas such as Darfur. The MoWSS through the Zakat Chamber selects the beneficiaries of the cash transfer program using the targeting procedures designed by Zakat to identify the extremely poor, very poor, and poor. However, the government recognizes that it will need external technical assistance to modernize the targeting and distribution processes in order to make the cash transfer program more equitable and transparent (MoWSS, 2012b) and to strengthen the coordinating and performance evaluation role of the Center for Poverty Reduction and Coordination in the MoSWW. 58. Apart from Zakat’s activities and the cash transfer program, government -funded SSN programs are implemented by a variety of different ministries with the result that there is no one institutional home that has the authority to coordinate all of the interventions. This means that there is considerable potential for overlaps of beneficiaries between pensions, health insurance, cash transfers, and Zakat transfers, which reinforces the need for a common targeting mechanism and a unified registry. The other key programs that have the potential to be significant in scope are the school feeding and nutrition 26 programs, but these are developed, funded, and managed by the WFP though they are due to be transferred to government control in the foreseeable future. 59. The government also continues to fund universal food subsidies, though the extent and costs of the subsidized foods are hard to estimate. These subsidies help to stabilize consumer prices but are very expensive and regressive (FAO, 2012). The government is now in the process of reviewing its general subsidies and its food subsidies with the assistance of the FAO (Ministry of Agriculture, 2011). 60. This chapter contains a detailed description and assessment of each of the four categories of the government’s SSN programming: (i) general subsidies; (ii) Zakat-funded direct transfers; (iii) cash transfers funded by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy; and (iv) the fee waiver for health insurance for poor families and lactating mothers and children under the age of 5 funded by the MoFNE, the WFP, and Zakat. General Subsidies 61. In Sudan, universal subsidies represent a significant portion of the government’s mechanism for redistributing wealth. Generally, subsidies help to stabilize consumer prices, but they are very expensive and regressive and several of them have been found to benefit richer segments of the population (IMF, 2012[b]). The government used to provide a range of different fuel subsidies, but these were abolished in September 2013 although there are still some subsidies on the transportation of fuel to urban areas. Food subsidies remain, but it is difficult to assess how well they are managed or to assess their distributional impact and cost because of a lack of data (FAO, 2012). 62. In 2012 the IMF assessed the government’s fuel subsidy reforms by reviewing the cost and welfare distribution of the subsidy, highlighting policy challenges, and making recommendations (IMF, 2012[b]). Subsidy reform is important not only because it has both a direct and an indirect impact on the cost of commodities such as energy and food but also 27 because it presents the government with an opportunity to reallocate the savings to targeted programs for poor and vulnerable segments of the population. The report came to two main conclusions:  The high fiscal cost of subsidies crowds out both high-priority public expenditures on and private investment in key social and physical infrastructure, including health, education, and access to safe water. This also limits the budget that is available for more effective social protection programming, such as targeted transfers to the poor.  Price subsidies are a passive approach to social protection programming and do not give the poor any incentive to rise out of poverty through their own efforts. Programs that make the receipt of transfers conditional on beneficiary households investing in the human capital of their family members (through education, training, and health care) have been found to be more effective in achieving a sustained decrease in poverty and in helping to break the inter-generational transmission of poverty. 63. Policy Challenges to Removing Subsidies. Although subsidies are generally fiscally costly, inefficient, and inequitable, removing them presents a number of policy challenges. Governments are often particularly concerned about the adverse impact that the abolition of subsidies can have on the poorest households and the potential for social unrest, while beneficiaries are often reluctant to give up such benefits. Policymakers are also concerned about the potential adverse impact of such a move on the competitiveness of energy- intensive industries (in the case of fuel subsidies), especially in sectors that must compete in domestic and foreign markets with international suppliers. Sudan’s high and rising inflation and unstable political conditions have long hampered the swift implementation of the necessary subsidy reform. However, international experience shows that most subsidy reforms occur without major civil unrest, especially if the increase in price is gradual and if well-targeted compensation programs are publicly announced (IMF, 2013a). 28 64. Addressing the Policy Challenges of Subsidies. Policymakers in Sudan must therefore address these challenges to ensure that subsidies can be successfully abolished and that the savings can be reallocated to SSNs to enable more targeted and effective pro- poor programming. This will require an effective public information campaign that clearly sets out the shortcomings of subsidies, the fiscal risks involved, the urgent need for reform, and the details of a reform strategy that addresses the various policy challenges. Specifically, the reform strategy should be: (i) gradual, to allow consumers to adjust their consumption and minimize any inflationary impact; (ii) sequenced, to minimize the impact of the price increases on poor households and to give the government time to strengthen the social protection system and introduce targeted SSN interventions for the poor and vulnerable population; and (iii) durable, to guard against the reintroduction of subsidies at a later date. ZAKAT-funded SSN Interventions - Direct In-kind and Cash Transfers 65. Overview. The Zakat Fund currently administers and implements the largest poverty-targeted program in Sudan. Zakat has an extensive institutional infrastructure that reaches all the way down to the village level. It is regulated under the Zakat Law, which is based on the five Pillars of Islam and reflected in the Sharia, and is regarded as a semi- autonomous agency under the MoWSS. Zakat contributions are compulsory. Revenue in kind and in cash is collected from all over the country, administered centrally, and then redistributed through state and local administrative structures of Zakat. 66. There are eight categories of need that warrant support through this mechanism, two of which target the “extremely poor” and the “poor.” Zakat has broadly four main kinds of support focused on poor and extremely poor households: (i) direct in-kind or cash transfers; (ii) fee waivers for basic services by paying households’ health insurance premiums or school or university fees; (iii) micro-credit; and (iv) the expansion of basic 29 services, for example, by building a health center, religious school, or water reservoir (hafir) for a community. 67. Zakat Program Objectives. The objectives of Zakat’s SSN programming is to ensure that the needy, especially the poorest of the poor, do not to fall into destitution and to increase equity by redistributing income from the better-off to the worse-off. 68. Sources of Funding. Zakat’s resources are generated by Zaka tax collection. Sudanese Muslims earning over 10,000 SDG (about US$3,575) per annum are obligated under the five Pillars of Islam to pay 2.5 percent of their annual income to the fund. Non-Muslims pay a social solidarity tax at an equivalent rate. The Zakat law of 1986/1990 permits the state to collect these taxes on wages and salaries and to deduct Zakat from incomes, securities, deposits, and collected debts. The law also dictates that 61 percent of the revenue collected should be transferred to the poor and needy. Zakat’s budget is independent of that of the MoFNE. According to Zakat sources, the annualized budget increased from 244 million SDG (US$43 million) in 2008 to 807.8 million SDG (US$141.7 million) in 2012, reaching US$200 million in 2013. According to the law, 492.8 million SDG (US$86.5 million) or 61 percent of Zakat’s 2012 funds (US$122 million in 2013) should be spent on interventions to assist the “poorest and the poor”. Table 6: Zakat’s Total Financial Envelope and 61 Percentage Allocations to Poor and Very Poor Households, 2008-2012 2008 2008 Of which Of which 2012 2012 Of which Of which SDG US$ 61% to 61% to SDG US$ 61% to 61% to (millions) (millions) poor poor (millions) (millions) poor poor (SDG (US$ mil) (SDG (US$ mil) mil) mil) Zakat 244 $43 149 $26 807.8 $141.7 492.8 $86.5 Resources Sources: Zakat Fund (2012) and Republic of Sudan (2010) 30 69. Institutional Setup of Zakat at the Federal Level. Zakat belongs to the International Zakat Organization, which is part of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Within Sudan, Zakat’s Supreme Council of Trustees serves as a board of directors and includes the Minister of MoWSS, the General Secretary, and 20 other members from the scholarly field as recommended by the Minister. The President appoints the General Secretary on the recommendation of the MoWSS and the Supreme Council. Each state has its own State Council of Trustees. The Federal High Council issues directives about expenditure allocations based on needs and priorities. In 2012, it issued 40 decisions, which included an expansion of the budget allocated to measures to mitigate inflationary pressures on poor households. New guidelines issued in 2013 contain revised technical criteria for revenue collection and expenditure. 70. Institutional Setup of Zakat at the State and Local Levels. Each state has its own Zakat Council of Trustees. These are responsible for creating and selecting members of the Zakat Community Committees at the local (grassroots) level. There are currently 19,378 such committees in Sudan. Membership is not decided by elections based on majority vote. Instead, members are selected based on certain criteria that require the representation of women, youths, and members who pay membership fees. In order to regulate the work of these committees, Zakat is beginning to computerize information about them and is drawing up new membership criteria. Community Committee members are not paid a salary but may receive incentive payments. 71. Zakat Oversight and Redress Mechanism. Zakat has its own audit department under its General Secretariat. Sudan’s Council of Ministers reviews the performance of the Zakat Fund each year through the Office of General Audits. There is also a Federal High Committee for Grievances consisting of 25 legal counsels. Each state has its own State Grievance Committee. It has been reported that these Grievance Committees deals primarily with claims such as organizations or individuals disputing the extent of their taxes. 31 72. Geographic and Beneficiary Coverage: The Zakat Fund covers the whole of the country and has an extensive structure that reaches down to the village level. In 2013 the Zakat Fund report stated that it supported 6 million people. Table 7: Zakat Fund Support to the Poor, 2012 Type of beneficiaries Number of Households Transferred amount (SDG Million) Poor people 3,111,996 399.3 Very poor 375,120 89.6 Poor people – health insurance subscriptions 383,577 109.9 Poor households Ramadan costs 578,188 104.8 University students 80,000 36.6 Orphans 53,096 26.9 Total 4,581,977 767.1 Source: Zakat Fund (2012). 73. Targeting Method. Beneficiaries are identified by local Zakat Fund branches using data from the poverty census of 2011 that was undertaken by the Zakat Fund in collaboration with the Central Bureau of Statistics. It identified 2.2 million poor and very poor families as qualifying for support. These data are contained in the Zakat Fund’s database and are disaggregated by gender, state, and locality. They also include information on the age and marital status of the household heads, the educational level of the heads of households, the health of the household head and members, the status of employment or unemployment of the household head and of all members over 15 years of age, household expenditure, the type of dwelling, and the tenure status of the head of the household. The poverty census is reported to be updated continuously. However, this database is not readily accessible to the local Zakat Committees where the targeting takes place. The local committees can’t access the digitized list of beneficiaries. 74. Type of Benefit and Delivery Mechanism. Zakat’s direct support program provides benefits in the form of cash, in-kind payments, and/or payments for certain services such as health insurance or to cover other health costs such as operations. In-kind benefits are the 32 most common. The cash and in-kind payments are delivered through Zakat’s institutional network, with the beneficiaries collecting their transfer from their local Zakat Committees. 75. Benefit Level and Frequency. While the level of the benefit varies, the frequency with which the benefit is paid is determined based on applications made by families or individuals or on the initiative of the Zakat Fund branches. No information on the level of the benefit and the regularity and frequency with which it is paid is currently reported, thus making it difficult to evaluate whether the program is providing adequate coverage to its recipients. 76. Redress Mechanism. As mentioned above, Zakat has a redress mechanism built into its institutional structure. However, no independent complaints mechanism exists at the community and/or village level. Beneficiaries and community members depend on the Zakat Community Committees and/or, in some cases, the village’s Popular Committees to deal with complaints. However, there is a potential conflict of interest inherent in the Zakat Committees’ dual roles, especially if any individuals are members of both the Zakat Community Committee and the Popular Committee. The members of these committees are not elected by majority vote, which means that the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable may not be heard. 77. Overall Assessment According to Specified Criteria. Overall, Zakat constitutes an important financial and institutional framework for providing SSN support to the poor and vulnerable population of Sudan. However, there is room for improvement in Zakat’s SSN programming, particularly in the areas of equity, adequacy, scalability, transparency and accountability, and cost-effectiveness. Specifically, the most immediate needs are for program identification cards, monitoring and evaluation systems, a digitized data system, a complaints and redress mechanism, a mechanism for verifying that payments have been delivered, and a mechanism for reviewing targeting. Also, benefit levels (both the type and adequacy of such benefits) should be reviewed by Zakat. 33 78. The potential of Zakat programming to address the needs of the poor is significant both in terms of its available resources and institutional reach. Zakat’s financial sources, being independent of the government budget, are not only very sustainable but have the potential to grow over time, which is a significant advantage over other sources of funding. However, the real impact of Zakat transfers needs to be monitored and evaluated. There is a need for systematic tracking of the frequency of direct cash or in-kind transfers (in terms of the predictability and timeliness of the payments) and for an established level of benefit, which are both key features of a good safety net program. 79. The gaps in Zakat programming include: (i) the absence of any system for identifying program beneficiaries and of any connection to a computerized and unified database to facilitate the tracing of funding and any overlaps in beneficiaries; (ii) the lack of any system for tracking payments to control for error, fraud, and corruption; (iii) the lack of an independent complaints and appeals mechanism to ensure the transparency and accountability of the program; and (iv) limitations in the existing M&E mechanism that is meant to monitor the implementation of the program and evaluate its impact. Direct Cash Transfer Program Funded by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy 80. Program Objective and Ministry in Charge. The objective of the program is to provide financial support to poor households. The Poverty Reduction and Coordination Center of the federal MoWSS administers the program, while the Savings and Social Development Bank (SSDB) is the program’s implementing agency and is in charge of delivering the cash transfer. The beneficiaries are those poor households identified by the Zakat poverty census. 81. Sources of Funding. The main source of funding for this program is the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE), and the funding is transferred to the MoWSS, which in turn transfers to the SSDB. The SSDB, under the supervision of the MoWSS, 34 distributes the funds. In areas where there are no branches of the SSDB, the Zakat structure is used to distribute the cash to beneficiaries. The government finances the program from the savings that it is generating by reducing government subsidies. 82. Geographic and Beneficiary Coverage. The program is designed to cover the whole country and targets poor households. It is a four-year program, which started in 2012 and will run until 2015. The target group for this program is the very poorest families in all states as identified by the Zakat database of poor people. In 2012, the program covered 100,000 households (570,000 individuals). The program was recently suspended for lack of funds but was restarted in October 2013. It is currently providing a benefit of 150 SDG to 350,000 households. As of January 2014, coverage will increase to 500,000 families. 83. Targeting Mechanism. The Zakat Fund Committees identify the actual households to benefit from the program using the program’s criteria. Although it seems like good practice for the Zakat programs and the MoFNE’s cash transfer program to use the same targeting criteria and the same committees to select their beneficiaries, it is possible that some of the same poor families are benefitting from both programs. The Zakat Fund and the MoFNE both recognize the need to rectify these overlaps. 84. Benefits Types and Delivery Mechanism. The benefit type is a cash transfer. The SSDB delivers the transfer to those recipients who live close to their branches, and if the branches are too far away, then the local Zakat Committee distributes the funds. The SSDB has 44 branches (two or three branches only in each state). Hence the Zakat and the SSDB share the distribution to families almost equally. As of November 2013, the SSDB was able to make payments to 53,629 families and relied on the Zakat Committees to deliver the transfer to 42,784 families. In Darfur, Zakat handles all of the distributions because of the 35 region’s insecurity.12 For the second round of distribution to an additional 62,928 families in October and November 2013, the SSBD transferred all funds to the Zakat to be distributed. 89. Benefit Level and Frequency. As of October 2013, the benefit level is 150 SDG a month per poor household regardless of size. 85. Monitoring and Evaluation: The Higher Committee for Social Protection chaired by the Minister of MoWSS receives reports from the states, the SSDB, and the Zakat Fund and makes visits to the field. For example, a member from the committee has accompanied members of the Poverty Reduction and Coordination Center to Gazeera and North Kordofan. When the MoWSS requested more detailed monitoring, a field survey was carried out by the Poverty Center of the MoWSS in 2012 in the eight states covered by this program ‒ Northern State in the northern region, Kassala and Gedarif in the eastern region, Sennar, Blue Nile, and White Nile in the central region, North Kordofan in the Kordofan region, South Darfur in Darfur, and finally Khartoum. The study sample covered 874 people, consisting of 715 beneficiaries plus 159 community members and officials administering the cash transfer fund. Of the beneficiaries, 62 percent said that they had found it difficult to reach the branch of the SSDB to receive the transfer. The majority of beneficiaries were not receiving support on a regular basis because of a number of factors that were not specified in detail, while 35.5 percent did not experience any difficulties. Only 2 percent did not respond. Of the officials who were surveyed, 61 percent confirmed that access was a problem. With regard to overlaps of benefits, nearly half of all of the surveyed beneficiaries (48 percent) received the following benefits from the Zakat Fund: health insurance in addition to in-kind or cash transfers (percentages not specified), education support (9 percent), support related to medicines and heath care (7 percent), micro-finance support (3 percent), and help to find a job (1.4 percent). Nearly half of all of the beneficiaries (48 percent) increased their purchasing power as a result of receiving the cash support, but only 33 percent reported that they were able to purchase processed goods (the term 12 World Bank mission December 2013, Savings and Development Bank print-out of Cash Transfer Payments for First Group of Beneficiary Households. 36 “processed” is not defined) with the addition cash (with 17 percent not responding). The funds were mainly spent on education, with 46.7 percent spending the extra cash on pocket money for school children, 26.3 on school uniforms, and 16.2 percent on school books. The data did not indicate levels of improved nutrition. When asked if the transfers were sufficient to enable the household to start a business or go into self-employment, the rate of non-responses was high at 77.6 percent, which seems to indicate that the additional cash did not support income generation either for the family as a whole or for any individual member of the family. The only sectors where it did help to generate more income were the agricultural sector (4.9 percent), poultry/livestock raising (6 percent), and petty trading (5.9 percent). When asked if the transfers were sufficient to enable the household to make any home improvements, only 18.9 percent of respondents reported using the transfers to maintain their home, followed by 9.5 percent who built a room or a hut. Only 5.7 percent were able to introduce drinking water. When the officials were asked to evaluate the cash transfer support, they found that the majority of beneficiaries (59.9 percent) held the project in high esteem and perceived it to be very important for family stability. Half of the beneficiary respondents (50.9 percent) found the impact on their households to be very good as opposed to excellent. 86. The officials involved in implementing the program identified some important deficiencies in its implementation. First, 61 percent reported that there had been some delays in making the transfer payments. The reasons cited were long distances between the beneficiaries and the disbursal points, the bureaucratic procedures of the disbursing entity (the SSDB), and a lack of personal identity documents on the part of the targeted beneficiaries. According to these officials, only one-third of beneficiaries (36 percent) received the cash payments regularly and on time. Second, the officials reported that there had been some inappropriate targeting of beneficiaries, that is, there were more deserving poor families who met the Zakat criteria than those actually selected to benefit from the cash transfers. The large majority of officials (76 percent) complained about the targeting procedures. An even larger percentage (83 percent) opined that there were other families 37 more worthy of support. The assessment concluded that most officials were satisfied that the overall objectives of the program had been met, with 68.6 percent rating the program as excellent and 8.8 percent as good, while 16.7 percent did not respond. The findings have spurred future plans for a larger survey with more rigorous scientific methodology, but no timetable for this has yet been set. 87. The MoFNE does not have a list of all poor people whose consumption is under the poverty line of SDG 114 per person per month, the poverty line set by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Because the MoFNE did not have a list of the poor, the MoWSS requested the Zakat to undertake with the support of the Central Bureau of Statistics a Poverty Census. This constitutes the only list of poor individuals and households. It is used to target the cash transfer program. Eligibility depends on 10 criteria which include family composition, housing conditions, ownership of assets etc. There is no way of knowing whether and to what extent the program beneficiaries overlap with those receiving Zakat. As is the case with the Zakat programs, the transfers are not systematically tracked, which makes it difficult to undertake any assessment of the impact of the program over time or to carry out adequate monitoring and evaluation. MoFNE and Zakat-funded Fee Waiver for Health Insurance for Poor Families 88. Overview. The objective of National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) is to reach 100 percent of the population. In 1996, health care insurance contributions became compulsory for those in the formal sector (those in both government and private sector employment). The NHIF’s annual target is to increase coverage of the non-contributory population, otherwise known as the informal sector, by 3 percent per year. No targets are defined in terms of the source of contributions, in other words, what percentage should come from the Zakat Fund and what percentage from the MoFNE. 38 89. Funding Source. The NIHF relies on the MoFNE and the Zakat Fund to pay the health insurance premiums of the non-compulsory population. This constitutes “free” health service. 90. Coverage. In 2012 the Zakat Fund extended coverage to 2,140 families by paying for their health insurance. This support was specifically targeted to families with lactating and pregnant mothers. At the direction of the Office of the President, the MoFNE contributed the premiums for an additional 150,000 families. Coverage in the government sector is 100 percent, while coverage in the self-employment sector is not yet known, and the extent of coverage in the informal sector cannot be determined. The coverage of the poor can be determined by the number of premiums paid for by the Zakat Fund and the MoFNE. 91. Targeting. The criteria used for defining the poor are those used by the Zakat Fund with some slight changes. 92. Delivery Mechanism. The states all have branches of the NHIF, but each operates relatively autonomously. As a result, the states do not all offer the same kind, quality, or coverage of health care. The government is considering whether to encourage community- based health insurance coverage because, if several villages were to join together to collect premiums, this would lower the administrative costs of national health insurance. 39 B. Non-government Social Safety Net Interventions 93. International aid to Sudan to date has been mostly humanitarian in nature, but as the country is now transitioning into a post-conflict environment, humanitarian aid is expected to decrease. The 2012 UN and Partners Work Plan, coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), identified Sudan’s total funding requirement for 2012 as US$1.05 billion, but the actual amount of funding that Sudan received from donors was only $US556 million13 or 53 percent of the country’s total funding requirement. This was a sharp reduction in funding compared with the same date in 2011 when 56 percent of the required funding had been received. This drop represents a 22 percent decrease in real terms year-on-year. 94. The trend toward reduced external funding is a serious concern as it has not coincided with any significant decrease in humanitarian needs in Sudan. The main factors contributing to the reduction in funding include: (i) donor fatigue with the protracted crisis in Sudan as Darfur enters its 10th year of humanitarian operations; (ii) some difficulties in accessing the people most in need; (iii) some restrictions on the movement of aid agencies and donors within the country that make it difficult for them to carry out essential monitoring and evaluation; (iv) the government’s policy of channeling humanitarian aid mainly though national institutions and NGOs; and (v) recession or severely restrained economies in most donor nations (OCHA, 2013[b]). 95. However, now that Sudan is in a post-conflict context, international stakeholders are reevaluating their programs and moving toward more targeted and longer-term focused programming. While humanitarian needs in Sudan continue to be driven by a cycle of conflict, displacement, and vulnerability, the 2013 UN and Partners Work Plan continues the trend away from the blanket distribution of food and non-food items toward other 13 As of November 25, 2012. 40 sectors that have a greater focus on recovery and longer-term durable solutions. Also, the Transformative Agenda of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) includes efforts to improve needs assessments, strengthen monitoring and reporting, and ensure greater accountability to affected people and stakeholders. Therefore, the 2013 funding requirement is 8 percent lower than that of 2012, reflecting a rigorous project selection process and continuing efforts to ensure more focused activities and better targeting of the most vulnerable (OCHA, 2013[a). 96. Under the 2012 OCHA coordination mechanism, there are 74 projects being implemented by 57 partners in the food security and livelihoods (FSL) sector and 24 projects being implemented by 24 partners in the nutrition sector in Sudan. Mapping all their activities and accounting for all of the possible overlaps in both activities and beneficiaries remains a challenge. However, many of the partners face similar challenges on the ground, including limited capacity, a lack of access to information and geographical areas, and the high costs involved in delivering supplies. 97. In addition to the main UN agencies, there are about 70 international NGOs (INGOs) operating in Sudan, in part as implementing partners of the activities funded by OCHA. They are members of an international NGO Forum that aims to facilitate dialogue and coordinate international NGO activity in the country. Also, a wide range of national NGOs is also active in social protection within Sudan. It is a complex and difficult process to identify these NGO activities as there is no systematic reporting on their scope and reach. 98. The main partners in the FSL and nutrition sectors collaborate with a wide array of INGOs, NGOs, government departments, and other partners in delivering their activities. To avoid any double counting of funding and beneficiaries, they are not listed individually in Table 8 below. Instead, the specific SSN programming for which information is readily available is reviewed in this section. 41 99. Also, several significant actors that are implementing SSN interventions in Sudan, such as the Qatar Fund and the Islamic Bank, are not coordinated under OCHA. Therefore, their activities are not considered in this report. 100. Because of the wide range of stakeholder activities related to SSNs, this report has focused on the main external stakeholders that provide direct assistance in the areas of food security and nutrition. Specifically, of the 13 sectors supported under the OCHA funding envelope, this consists of the food security and livelihoods (FSL) sector with the WFP and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) as the main partners and the nutrition sector with UNICEF as the main partner. Table 8 presents a summary of the financial envelope for the FSL and nutrition sectors, listing the contributions of each of the main stakeholders and the number of beneficiaries that these external stakeholders support. Table 8: Non-governmental Social Safety Nets in Sudan (by Funding Source and Numbers of Beneficiaries) Financial Financial Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Allocation (SDG) Allocation (US$) (# of households) (total # of family a/ members b/ TOTAL Food Security 2.32 billion $407.4 million Est. 3,6 million n/a & Livelihood Sector -of which WFP 2.05 billion $359.6million 3,637,000 n/a c/ -of which FAO 164.7 million $28.9 million n/a TOTAL Nutrition 277.0 million $48.6 million 2,472,231 n/a Sector -of which UNICEF 102.6 million $18.million TOTAL 2.6 billion $456.0 million 6,109,231 n/a Source: Compiled by the author. Notes: a/ Calculated as the total number of households multiplied 5.7 (average family size). b/ The number of people estimated to require food aid in 2013 according to the 2013 OCHA Work Plan. c/ FAO funding is based on the 2013 OCHA Work Plan. It includes both food security and livelihood activities. 42 101. As assessing the specific activities of all of these stakeholders is beyond the scope of this paper, this section highlights specific programs for which sufficient information is readily available. Annex 3 provides a list of the stakeholders and partners who were consulted during the preparation of this report. 102. Finally, it should be noted that humanitarian aid is usually targeted to specific regions and therefore does not reflect the overall national need or any programming in any other regions or at the state level. Therefore, the information in Table 8 above is not representative of total national funding or total national need. In part, the government support at the federal level is captured in this section. Assessing (and agreeing on) national needs remains one of the main challenges facing stakeholders in Sudan. WFP-funded Food Security Interventions 103. Background. The WFP’s emergency operation for Sudan, Food Assistance to Vulnerable Populations Affected by Conflict and Natural Disasters, responds to the continuing complex humanitarian and food security situation that is characterized by localized conflicts, protracted displacement, and a deteriorating economy. Unresolved issues in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have exacerbated economic instability and border conflicts and have led to ongoing internal and external displacement that has negatively impacted the livelihoods of millions of people in the affected areas. As one of the largest humanitarian aid interventions, primarily in Darfur, the WFP operation is not sufficient in itself but rather provides a framework within which others can operate (WFP, 2010). 104. Coordination. The humanitarian work and longer-term programs of UN agencies and NGOs in Sudan are coordinated through the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), for which a sector approach has been in place since 2009. The WFP works closely with the HCT and its sector groups to implement its operation. The WFP is co-leading the HCT’s Food Security 43 and Livelihoods sector with the FAO and will lead the newly established Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications sector. The WFP is a key member of other sector groups, including Nutrition and Health, Education, Early Recovery, and Returns, Resettlement, and Reintegration. 105. Program Objective. The overall objectives of this operation are to save lives, reduce seasonal food insecurity, stabilize the prevalence of acute malnutrition, help to restore the livelihoods of vulnerable and conflict-affected populations, and stabilize school enrollment in line with the WFP’s strategic objectives. The operation also aims to work towards the achievement of the MDGs. 106. Financial Envelope. The WFP provides by far the largest amount of resources to the FSL sector under the humanitarian aid envelope in Sudan. Between the Emergency Operation Plans of 2012 and 2013, there has been a downward trend in funding from US$402.2 million to US$359.6 million, of which food distribution represented US$138.1 million and US$122.1 million respectively. The number of beneficiaries went down from 4.2 million to 3.6 million, but this was also a reflection of efforts to improve targeting and eliminate any overlapping beneficiaries. Table 9: Total Costs and Beneficiaries of the WFP’s Programs, 2012-2013 2012 2013 WFP Costs: -Food US$138.1 million US$122.1 million -Cash Vouchers US$26.8 million US$27.2 million TOTAL Cost US$164.9 million US$149.3 million a/ Number of Beneficiaries 4,213,000 3,637,000 Source: WFP Emergency Operation Plans 2009-2013. Note: a/ Adjusted to avoid double-counting. 107. Handover Strategy. In its longer-term strategy in Sudan, the WFP aims to increase the government’s capacity for food assistance management, with plans to expand the 44 training and technical support provided to the government by its external partners. The WFP intends to continue to transition from general food distribution (GFD) to more targeted early recovery activities, such as the Food for Assets (FFA) program and school feeding in Darfur. 108. Specific Targeted Programs. The WFP is transitioning part of its GFD to these targeted interventions: (i) the Food for Assets (FFA) program; (ii) the School Feeding program; (iii) the Targeted Seasonal Supplemental Ration (TSSR); (iv) the Integrated Blanket Supplementary Feeding Program (IBSFP); and (v) the Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program (TSFP).  Food for Assets (US$21.7 million): This program targets beneficiaries who are being transferred from GFD. It provides them with food (or, where feasible and cost-effective, with vouchers) in return for their labor on projects that will build their assets or capacity. These projects aim to increase beneficiaries’ potential to generate income (by improve literacy, train beneficiaries in the production of handicrafts) or their food production (by helping them to access agriculture/livestock extension services). In 2012, the program assisted 1.4 million beneficiaries.  School Feeding (US$12.4 million): The school feeding program provides one meal per day in the school setting to school-aged children in highly food-insecure areas (such as the CETA region14) or in communities with a large concentration of IDPs (such as Darfur). The WFP is also planning to provide the same service to displaced and vulnerable children in the conflict-affected South Kordofan and Blue Nile states once it has been granted access by the central government. The WFP’s support helps to reduce hunger and stabilize the enrollment rates of primary school children throughout the school year. By piloting a home-grown school feeding project in 2013, the WFP will initiate the 14 CETA stands for Central, East, and Three Areas consisting of Kassala, Blue and White Nile, North and South Kordofan, and Red Sea. 45 gradual hand-over of all school feeding activities in CETA areas to the government. In 2012, the program assisted 1.0 million beneficiaries.  Targeted Seasonal Supplemental Ration (TSSR) (US$3.3 million): This program targets children aged between 6 and 59 months old in households receiving GFD in Darfur by providing them with a seasonal (May to September) nutritious food supplement to address the high nutritional needs of children. The supplement consists of Super Cereal with sugar, vegetable oil, and dried skim milk. This activity is gradually being phased out as the WFP is launching a more comprehensive nutrition approach (see below). In 2012, the program assisted 0.24 million beneficiaries.  Integrated Blanket Supplementary Feeding Program (IBSFP) (US$3.3 million): This program targets pregnant and lactating women and children aged between 6 and 36 months old throughout the year by providing specialized foods (Super Cereal with sugar and vegetable oil) to meet the nutritional needs of the target group. The program was originally piloted in 2012 as a multi-sectoral initiative to significantly reduce acute malnutrition in the CETA region. Based on the findings of the pilot, the WFP scaled up its support and initiated the Integrated Blanket Supplementary Feeding Program (IBSFP) in Darfur and in CETA (Kassala and the Red Sea states). The provision of food rations is complemented by training for recipients to help them to improve their feeding practices and to encourage greater dietary diversity, better water and sanitation practices, and increased use of health care. As the IBSFP is scaled up, the TSSR will be phased out (see above). In 2012, the program assisted 0.16 million beneficiaries.  Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program (TSFP) (US$ 3.6 million): This program targets children aged between 6 and 59 old months who have moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and malnourished pregnant and lactating women by providing them with supplementary food. Age-appropriate nutritious food (Super Cereal Plus, 46 which has recently been approved by the government and will be imported until it is available locally) is distributed to recipients for 90 days on average. In 2012, the program assisted 0.24 million beneficiaries. 109. General Food Support. While the WFP’s programming is becoming more targeted, a large number of poor and vulnerable people still depend on its general food support (direct in-kind food transfers or vouchers). While this support is not targeted, it serves a significant portion of the population that would otherwise be left without any support and/or access to SSN interventions. These general programs are:  General Food Distribution (half and full rations) (US$103.2 million): This program targets IDPs and vulnerable residents of Darfur who have other sources of food (with a half ration) and newly arrived refugees and IDPs or residents recently affected by conflicts who rely entirely on WFP assistance and have no other sources of food (with a full ration). The WFP uses regular monitoring and food security assessments to establish whether or not the recipients have other sources of food. The content of the ration varies depending on the target group and is adjusted based on the same assessments. Assistance is provided in either in kind (as food) or as vouchers. Registered IDPs and refugees receive assistance throughout the year while vulnerable and food-insecure residents in Darfur benefit from the WFP’s support for five months during the lean season (May to September). The WFP provides full GFD rations to recently displaced people and vulnerable people in South Kordofan and Blue Nile until they can access other sources of food or income. In Kassala, newly arrived refugees receive a full GFD ration for three months while being registered and are then transferred to a half ration. In Darfur and border areas, some returnees receive a full ration for three months as part of a return package. In 2012, the program assisted 2.4 million beneficiaries (with both half and full rations), of whom 1.4 million were IDPs. 47  Voucher Delivery Mechanism (VDM) (US$27.2 million): This program provides IDPs in camps with monthly (or in some locations bi-monthly) voucher transfers. The WFP’s partners (NGOs, CBOs, and the line ministries of the state governments) provide these vouchers under the supervision of the WFP. Each paper voucher is printed with a serial number and the WFP hologram and is color-coded to reduce the risk of forgery and fraud. Beneficiaries have a limited time (until the end of each month) to redeem the voucher at participating stores and traders. Vouchers are redeemable for 10 to 15 locally available food items with a minimum of three mandatory commodities to ensure dietary diversity. In 2012, the program assisted 726,500 beneficiaries. 110. Beneficiary Target Group, Number of Beneficiaries, and Geographic Coverage. The WFP’s target groups vary between programs depending on their objectives (see individual programs above). Table 10 below shows the number of beneficiaries by activity and region and the accompanying total costs for each beneficiary group. 48 Table 10: WFP Beneficiaries and Costs by Activity and Region CETA DARFUR TOTAL TOTAL COST a/ Activity Voucher Food Total Voucher Food Total Voucher Food Total Cash US$ Food Total US$ US$ GFD 15,000 195,000 210,000 526,500 1,677,000 2,203,500 541,500 1,872,000 2,413,500 19.2 84.0 103.2 FFA/FFT 98,000 229,500 327,500 87,000 969,000 1,056,000 185,000 1,198,500 1,383,500 6.1 15.6 21.7 School 463,000 463,000 564,500 564,500 1,027,500 1,027,500 12.4 12.4 Feeding TSSR 243,500 243,500 243,500 243,500 3.3 3.3 IBSFP 20,500 20,500 135,000 135,000 155,500 155,500 3.3 3.3 TSFP 59,000 59,000 181,500 181,500 240,500 240,500 3.6 3.6 TOTAL 113,000 967,000 1,080,000 613,500 3,770,500 4,384,000 726,500 4,737,500 5,464,000 27.2 122.1 149.3 Adj. 917,500 2,719,500 3,637,000 b/ Total Source: WFP (2013 a). Notes: a/ Food cost was estimated by multiplying mt with estimated mt value (2013 cost of US$122.1 million divided by total mt 269,932). b/ The total has been adjusted to avoid double-counting of beneficiaries assisted through more than one intervention 49 111. Targeting Method. A rapid food security assessment is done first in each state and then in each locality to identify the poorest localities within each state. Then GFD beneficiaries are involved in the selection of beneficiaries through food management committees, with women being well-represented. The members of the communities targeted by the FFA program identify the most food-insecure households based on criteria agreed between the WFP and its partners and then select appropriate activities for them to build their assets. It is unclear whether these include public works within the camps. The WFP and its partners conduct regular information campaigns to ensure that beneficiaries and community leaders are aware of the objectives, eligibility criteria, and entitlements of the WFP’s programs. There may be conflict of interest issues involved in having the beneficiaries sit on the selection committee. 112. Identification Cards. Currently, the WFP programs use temporary non-electronic ration cards or vouchers. Starting in 2013, the WFP will pilot the use of smart cards that store biometric information (fingerprints) that identifies the beneficiaries and their families as well as their ration entitlements. The smart cards, which will initially be piloted for GFD, will eventually replace temporary ration cards, and the biometric verification will ensure that the rations are provided only to legitimate beneficiaries. These smart cards will form the basis for the WFP’s transition from paper vouchers to electronic vouchers (e -vouchers). The software is expected to be ready for field-testing in early 2013 when the smart cards will replace paper vouchers for some IDPs in North Darfur. The smart card is expected to significantly facilitate and increase the accuracy of beneficiary verification and tracking and will thus result in significant program savings by removing any duplication of beneficiaries. For example, removing duplicate beneficiaries in one camp alone has the potential to save the program US$250,000 per month in food costs (preliminary estimations). Therefore, while the upfront cost of the smart card pilot is high per beneficiary, it is expected to yield significant economies of scale and returns on investment. 50 113. Benefit Levels. Local food habits and past experience have been taken into consideration in the design of the WFP rations. The main staples in Sudan are sorghum and millet. In pastoral areas, more meat and milk are consumed, with fruits and vegetables being a relatively minor part of the diet. The ration’s size and composition can be adjusted during the year based on findings from the WFP’s Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS) and other food assessments. 114. Implementation Arrangements  Partners and Capacity: In Darfur, the WFP collaborates with major INGOs and is expanding its partnership with CBOs. In the CETA region, the WFP mainly works with government ministries, national NGOs, and CBOs. The WFP’s long-term partnerships with INGOs and its regular coordination meetings have helped to ensure that these collaborations are effective. In areas where partners are not available or lack capacity, the WFP implements its activities directly. INGOs also provide technical support and assistance to build the capacity of national NGOs and CBOs.  Procurement: The WFP may resume making limited local purchases when and if local prices become competitive (as they were in 2011-2012). The prospect of a good harvest (as in 2013) may also make it possible to increase local and regional procurement. The WFP also foresees starting local production of its Super Cereal Plus (for use in the TSFP).  Logistics: The Port of Sudan is the main port through which the food is imported. The food is then moved by road or rail to the WFP’s main logistics hubs in Khartoum and El Obeid (intermediate or central warehouses) prior to being dispatched to the WFP’s extended delivery points (EDPs) in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states. Tertiary transport (usually transport by road) then takes the food to the final delivery points. 51 115. Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism. The WFP does not have a digitized system for monitoring and evaluation (M&E). However, it regularly monitors its programs through its Food Security Monitoring System and prepares standard project reports every quarter. It also undertakes program assessments and complements its Food Security Monitoring System data with additional information and surveys, such as nutrition surveys. The opportunity exists to use the smart card system in monitoring and evaluation in future. The WFP is implementing food security monitoring and assessments in partnership with the state-level Ministries of Agriculture in the five Darfur states, North Kordofan, Red Sea, and Kassala and also with the state-level Ministry of Health in North Darfur. The WFP also carries out market and trader assessments (to verify that local markets are accessible to beneficiaries and can ensure an adequate supply of food to meet increased demand). It also conducted a grain market assessment in South Darfur in December 2012 in collaboration with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in preparation for piloting vouchers in the Nyala market. Also, as part of its risk management strategy, the WFP works continuously to strengthen its partnerships at the federal and state levels for tracking food security and monitoring prices. It maintains a Risk Register and continues to monitor status of population migration. The WFP conducts risk management on a daily basis and has a new emergency preparedness and response packagel Table 11 lists the WFP’s M&E and information systems. Table 11: The WFP’s Monitoring and Evaluation and Information Systems External Stakeholder Systems WFP Rapid Food Security Assessments (by geographic area and as needed). Food Security Management System (FSMS). Post-distribution Monitoring System. Complementary info collected as needed, including Nutrition Surveys. Regular reporting: Standard Project Reports (SPRs). Pending: Piloting of smart cards for biometric identification and verification of beneficiary data. Source: Compiled by the author from conversations with WFP Country Office Khartoum. This should not be considered a complete list. 52 116. A 2010 assessment by the WFP of its Emergency Operation Plan (EMOP) yielded some interesting findings about the challenges facing the WFP that could provide important lessons to other programs when it comes to program design (WFP, 2010). The first key finding was that the leaders of communities (sheikhs) of affected populations strongly opposed any targeting at the household level for a range of reasons: (i) they recognized the fragility of many households’ current livelihoods; (ii) they feared that providing aid to some and not to others would threaten social cohesion; and (iii) they confused the entitlement to food with the status of being conflict-affected. A second finding was that the WFP’s Darfur Food Security Monitoring System set up in 2009 was providing excellent data on food security and was an improvement on previous surveying methods. Third, the assessment found that the WFP was constrained by the limited number and capacity of its partners in Darfur. This was specifically true for its targeted interventions as they normally require more management capacity and serve fewer beneficiaries than GFD. Finally, the report found that the WFP had increased its investment in monitoring, including the acquisition of new operating system software to integrate all information to make monitoring more effective and easier. FAO’s Food Security Interventions 117. For the purposes of its 2013 allocations from the UN’s Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) in 2013,15 the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 14 percent of the Sudanese population (4.3 million) lives in crisis or emergency food situations. The main reasons for this are poor harvests in 2011, 100 percent increases in the prices of food and agricultural products, higher fuel prices, the devaluation of the Sudanese currency, and the outbreak of Black Quarter cattle disease in Blue Nile and Sennar. The total 15 The United Nations Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) is a pooled funding mechanism established in 2005 for humanitarian activities in Sudan. Under the overall authority of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), the Sudan CHF gives the HC the ability to target funds to meet the most critical humanitarian needs, to encourage early donor contributions, and to enable a rapid response to unforeseen events. 53 number of beneficiaries of the FAO’s food interventions in 2013 is predicted to have been 2.22 million, which represents slightly less than 50 percent of the 4.3 million people living in crisis. These include conflict-affected families, pastoralists whose animal routes have been blocked, and new IDPs. The geographical spread of these beneficiaries encompasses Darfur (with a focus on North Darfur), South Kordofan (including Abyei), Blue Nile, Kassala, Red Sea, Gedarif, Sennar, White Nile, and North Kordofan (FAO, 2013). 118. The support provided by the FAO is entirely in kind, mostly in the form of tools, ploughs, seeds, technical assistance, vaccines, and drugs for livestock. The total costs of this support in 2103 are estimated to have been US$3,233,813. The FAO is introducing pilots to wean beneficiaries away from fully subsidized handouts and to introduce partially subsidized support. The project requires strong governance structures and procedures. The aim of the Animal Feed Program in North Darfur is to sell a set percentage of the feed to beneficiary farmers at a subsidized price but to keep another set percentage to be given free to the poorest of the poor who cannot afford to pay. Initially, the FAO subcontracted with COOPI, an Italian INGO, to deliver the feed free of charge directly to North Darfur communities, but this is now being done by a women’s CBO. Each bag of feed will be sold at a subsidized price of 20 SDG, which compares to the market price of 25 SDG. Eighty-five percent of the feed must be sold, while 15 percent is reserved for the very poor who cannot pay even the subsidized price. The proceeds from these sales are put into a revolving fund run by the village development committee16 to be used to buy new stocks. The Animal Feed Program runs only during the dry season when small livestock (sheep and goats) have little pasture and when morbidity rates higher, Women are the main beneficiaries as they herd the smaller livestock. Around 10,000 households with an estimated 50,000 livestock have benefitted from the program so far in all five Darfur states. As the project only began in 2012, no evaluations have yet been conducted. It is a good illustration of an effort to make 16 Villages may each create a village development committee, which may or may not be recognized by the Local Government Authority under the Village Development Committee Act. 54 it easier for the community or the government to take over a program given that the current levels of humanitarian in-kind transfers from the FAO are not sustainable. 119. There are several minimum requirements that a village development committee must meet to establish a revolving fund under the FAO’s oversight . First, it must develop a financial plan (including, for example, the real price of animal feed per unit at the village level and scenarios of how long the fund can last depending on different levels of subsidies and losses). Second, it must work with the community to develop an operating framework for the revolving fund that specifies who is authorized to buy animal feed (if subsidized), how to prevent fraud, criteria for selecting the holders of the mandatory positions on the community management committee, and the remit and conditions of work of the committee. It should also establish a community management committee consisting of six mandatory positions held by nine people (including at least four women). These positions will be the Chairperson responsible for guiding the committee and accountability to community, a Warden of funds responsible for the cash box and bank account, two record keepers of funds responsible for the books, a Warden of feed responsible for feed and storage, two record keepers of feed responsible for in- and out-movements of feed stocks, and two Wardens of entitlement, responsible for controlling access to animal feed. The members of the community management committee are trained by FAO in simple and effective management practices including: (i) how to organize the committee’s work; (ii) how to be accountable to the community and to report on activities and results; (iii) how to keep the funds from being stolen; (iv) how to keep the books and financial records; (v) what to do if the contents of the cash box do not correspond with the record of funds; (vi) how to maintain the quality of the feed (for example, by ensuring appropriate storage conditions); (vii) what to do if the contents of the feed store do not correspond with the feed records; (viii) what to do if the cash box and records of funds do not correspond with the contents of the feed store and records of the feed; (ix) how to ensure steady supplies of feed (by negotiating with the suppliers and organizing transport); and (x) how to determine the 55 selling price of the feed at the village level. The village development committee should also ensure that beneficiaries are trained in the optimal use of the animal feed. UNICEF’s Nutrition Program 120. Overview. UNICEF is the lead partner, together with the government, for nutritional interventions in Sudan. UNICEF is primarily focused on reducing the high levels of severe acute malnutrition (SAM as measured by mid-upper arm circumference or MUAC) among children in 11 states in Sudan. During 2013 it aimed to expand to all areas with a prevalence of SAM higher than 3 percent. Currently, UNICEF supports 500 feeding centers within the targeted states, and this number is continuously expanding. UNICEF nutrition and surveillance officers run the feeding centers, and data from these centers are collected by the Ministries of Health at the state level where they are compiled for submission to the federal level where they are used to produce national SAM treatment reports. 121. Overall Financial Envelope. According to the 2013 OCHA Work Plan, UNICEF’s 2013 financial program requirement for Sudan is US$18 million. This is complemented by government-supported nutritional programming in those states that do not currently receive any UNICEF support. UNICEF has estimated that the total cost per child of supplying them with the supplementary food is US$100, but when supplies and operating costs are added in, the total per child cost is about US$200, making the current programming (while necessary) highly costly. Table 12 shows the financial resources that are available from UNICEF and the government for nutrition in Sudan. 56 Table 12: Financial Envelope of Main Stakeholders Involved in Nutrition Programming in Sudan Funding 2013 2013 % of Total Number of Beneficiaries Source (Planned and Actual) (Planned and Actual) 2013 US$ million SDG million UNICEF US$24 million SDG 102.6 million 82.68% 2,668,832 of whom (planned) (planned) (actual 122,919 children were US$ 17.19 million SDG 98.98 million costs) treated for SAM. (actual) (actual) Government US $ 3.6 million SDG 20.5 million 17.39% 749.071 children aged 5- (MoH) (actual) – spent (actual 59 months screened; mainly on centres, costs) 122,919 treated (costs training shared with UNICEF and WFP. Others TOTAL UD$27.6 million SDG119.48 million 100% Source: Compiled by the author with input from UNICEF Sudan and using 2012 and 2013 OCHA Work Plans (OCHA, 2012 and 2013a). 122. Budget by Nutritional Category and Partner. Nutrition interventions in Sudan are categorized into children with MAM (Moderate Acute Malnutrition), children with SAM (Severe Acute Malnutrition), pregnant and lactating women, and children under the age of 5 in conflict-affected states. Table 13 below shows the funding for each category provided by each partner. Table 13: Budget by Nutrition Category and by Partner, 2013 (US$) Children with MAM Children with SAM Pregnant & Children under 5 PARTNERS Lactating in conflict- TOTAL BY BY Women affected states PARTNER: CATEGORY UNICEF n/a $26,114,000 n/a n/a 17 million List of any UNICEF keeps no other data on its partners partners not received. TOTAL Info for totals not Info for Info for totals not Info for totals not received received totals not received received Source: Compiled by author with input from UNICEF Sudan and the 2012 and 2013 OCHA Work Plans (OCHA, 2012 and 2013a). 17 For SAM children in conflict areas and for preventing malnutrition. 57 123. Program Objective. The objective of UNICEF’s nutrition program in Sudan is to prevent children from dying. Currently, there is no major program in place that tries to address the underlying issues of malnutrition, though such a program is badly needed for the long-term development agenda of the country. 124. Beneficiary Target Group. Table 14 shows a breakdown of the people in need and those targeted under the 2013 OCHA Work Plan for Nutrition broken down by category. As can be seen, the work plan for the targeted states reaches only about 55 percent of those in need. Specifically, it reaches 12 percent of children with MAM, 20 percent of children with SAM, 35 percent of pregnant and lactating women, and 100 percent of children under the age of 5 in conflict-affected states. Table 14: Sector Needs Analysis People in Need Targeted Beneficiaries % of Need (in OCHA targeted states only) covered Category Female Male TOTAL Female Male TOTAL Children with 1,166,445 1,166,445 2,332,890 94,680 94,680 189,360 8% MAM Children with 378,549 378,549 757,098 50,000 50,000 100,000 13% SAM Pregnant & 487,698 -- 487,698 171,889 -- 171,889 35% Lactating Women Children <5 in 965,797 965,797 1,931,593 965,797 965,797 1,931,593 100% conflict affected states TOTAL 2,491,224 2,003,526 4,494,750 1,322,060 1,150,171 2,472,231 55% Source: 2013 OCHA Work Plan (OCHA, 2013a). 125. The Number of UNICEF Beneficiaries and Geographic Coverage. Currently, UNICEF operates only in 11 states. Table 15 presents the program’s total coverage across all states and the total need for nutritional support as identified by UNICEF and its implementing partners. 58 Table 15: UNICEF Nutrition Program’s Actual Coverage Compared to Need (SAM), by State State Number of SAM Number of Children in % of SAM coverage over Beneficiaries of UNICEF Need of SAM treatment total need Programming in 2012 (in targeted areas) (in targeted areas) Northern n/a 12,039 0 River Nile n/a 22,131 0 Red Sea 12,405 40,295 30.8 Kassala 5,823 43,359 13.4 Gadarif 5,980 54,872 10.9 Khartoum 6,269 89,644 7 Gezira n/a 76,475 0 Wite Nile 975 59,814 1.6 Sinnar n/a 58,672 0 Blue Nile 4,413 16,698 26.4 North Kordofan 9,073 76,121 11.9 South Kordofan 8,119 40,051 20.3 North Darfur 16,511 66,733 24.7 West Darfur 12,880 58,000 22.2 South Darfur 19,561 42,194 46.3 TOTAL 102,009 757,098 13.5 Source: Compiled by author with input from UNICEF Sudan. 126. Targeting. UNICEF supports SMART18 nutrition surveys carried out at the locality level (sub-state) in order to monitor the prevalence of malnutrition. In 2012, 52 such surveys were undertaken, the majority (41) in the Darfur region. In addition UNICEF supports mass community-based screening using MUAC in order to increase and maximize the program’s coverage. UNICEF supports training for community leaders, women, youth leaders, and NGOs in how to carry out MUAC screening. 127. Identification. Currently, child beneficiaries of the program are identified by UNICEF and partners at the central level. When a child is admitted to the SAM treatment program, he or she is entered into the program database. The tracking of individual children is only possible at the central level. However, there is currently no system in place to follow children after they have been discharged from the program to assess the long-term impact 18 Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions: http://www.smartmethodology.org/ 59 of their treatment. Data on the total numbers of children treated and program performance indicators are maintained at the state and federal levels by the Ministry of Health with support from UNICEF. 128. Benefit Levels. The benefit consists of a weekly supply of the ready-to-use therapeutic food called Plumpy Nut, which includes 500 calories per pack, with each child receiving three packs for each day of the week. The benefit is provided for a total of six to eight weeks. It is estimated that about 14 percent of recipients fail to turn up to collect the packaged food throughout the entire recommended period. While this is lower than the international minimum standard19 for default rates, it is still a high proportion. Sometimes the benefits are delivered in tandem with other benefits such as vaccinations. 129. Delivery Mechanism. A Sudanese manufacturer (Samil Co.) has recently started local production of Plumpy Nut. However, since there is only one manufacturer in Sudan that meets the standard requirements and its capacity is limited, the remaining supply is imported from abroad. Currently, Samil Co. supplies UNICEF, and UNICEF then delivers the cartons either alone or with the help of its partners to the 500 centers located throughout the targeted regions. As with the WFP, the delivery of supplies is complicated and varies depending on the capacity of the actual implementers. 19 Sphere Project (2011). 60 Table 16: Main Nutrition Partners SITE / AREA ORGANIZATIONS North Darfur UNICEF, WFP , RI, KPHF, GOAL, Sudan Aids Network South Darfur UNICEF, WFP, Johanniter Intl, NCA, Sudan AIDS Network, WVI, ARC, Merlin, CIS, IMC East Darfur UNICEF, WFP, Tearfund, Merlin West Darfur UNICEF, WFP, Tearfund, WR, Concern, CosV, KPHF, Save the Children Sweden, Sudan AIDS Network, IMC, HelpAge International Central Darfur UNICEF, WFP, NCA, Tearfund, Sudan AIDS Network, IMC South Kordafan UNICEF, WFP, Almanar, Concern, Sibro, CIS, KPHF, Save the Children Sweden, Sudan AIDS Network, Blue Nile UNICEF, WFP, WHO, WVI, Sudan AIDS Network, North Kordafan UNICEF, WHO, Sudan AIDS Network, Kassala UNICEF, WFP, Sudanese Red Crescent, Sudan AIDS Network, GOAL, Talaweit Red Sea UNICEF, WFP, WHO, Sudan AIDS Network Gadaref UNICEF, WHO, Sudan AIDS Network White Nile UNICEF, WHO, Sudan AIDS Network Sennar UNICEF, WHO, Sudan AIDS Network Khartoum UNICEF, WFP, WHO, Almanar, Sudan AIDS Network, WVI Source: Compiled by the author with input from UNICEF Sudan. World Vision’s Interventions 130. Background. World Vision (WV) is an international NGO, which has been working in Sudan since 1983 but started working in South Darfur in 2004 in partnership with the WFP. Its South Darfur program has been the largest in the region, accounting for an estimated 70 percent of WV’s overall investment (World Vision Sudan, 2012). The organization’s core interventions in Sudan are in the areas of food security (including support to agriculture as well as food aid), health and nutrition, water and sanitation, and child care and gender development. WV’s current Emergency Operation Plan (EMOP) for January to December 2013 is therefore aligned with the WFP’s 2013 EMOP (World Vision Sudan, 2013[a]). The interventions described in this sub-section are in large part delivered as part of the WFP’s programming and were described in detail in a previous sub-section. 61 131. Funding Envelope. The WFP provides 83 percent of the total cash EMOP budget required to ensure the proper implementation of the project while WV International funds the remaining 17 percent. In total, counting both food and cash, the WFP provided WV with 91 percent of its 2013 funds. Table 17: World Vision’s Funding Envelope for its 2013 South Darfur Food Assistance Program Funds SDG in millions US$ in millions WFP Cash $1.068 3. WV International Cash $1.292 4. Total Cash Budget $2.360 5. Food Value (WFP) $11.649 6. Total Project Budget $14,009 Source World Vision Sudan (2013). 132. WV’s 2013 Program. WV’s 2013 program covers the IDP camps in Nyala and Kass as well as mixed communities in the North Corridor. It aimed to provide GFD to about 236,603 IDPs in Nyala camp and 77,576 IDPs in Kass camp. The Nyala IDPs were also due to receive milling vouchers. Other than GFD and the milling vouchers, WV’s 2013 interventions consisted of Food for Education, which targets 73,052 school children in Nyala/North Corridor and Kass; the Blanket Supplementary Feeding Program, which covers 32,448 under-5 children in Kalma, Alsallam, Manawashe, and Mershing; Food for Recovery, which reaches 935 households (4,675 beneficiaries) in Duma and Adwa and supports the construction of schools (1,880 beneficiaries); and the Food Voucher program, for which the beneficiary targets are still being discussed between WV and the WFP. All of these beneficiaries are captured in the beneficiary numbers in the WFP’s EMOP report. 62 Table 18: Beneficiaries of World Vision’s South Darfur Food Assistance Program, 2013 World Vision Program Beneficiaries Geographic Area General Food Distribution 236,603 and 77,576 IDPs Nyala and Kass camps respectively. Food for Asset 13,200 targeted households; 935 Aburojo Village, Duma Village, number of participants Adwa Village, Jurof Village Food for Education 73,052 children Nyala/North Corridor and Kass Million Vouchers 236,603 IDPs Mosey B, Sakely, Alsalaam, Derege, Otash, Kalma camps in Nyala and Kass Blanket Supplementary Feeding 32,448 under-5 children Kalma, Alsalaam, Manawashe, and Program (BSFP) Mershing Food Voucher 55,178 Otash camp TOTAL: 488,057 South Darfur Region Source: World Vision Sudan (2013) Note: The GFD beneficiary figures are based on new caseload figures collected in 2012 during a successful verification exercise conducted jointly by the WFP, World Vision (WV), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). 133. General Food Distribution. WV started the general distribution of food commodities to the conflict-affected people of South Darfur in August 2004. In 2009 the agency began scaling down these GFD activities by gradually reducing ration levels and replacing the GFD program in the north corridor with seasonal food distribution from June to October. GFD rations have now been scaled down to 50 percent (and sometimes to as low as 32 percent). Also, a Food Voucher Program was started in Otash in April 2013 and is expected to be expanded to other camps beginning in July 2013. Providing beneficiaries with vouchers gives them the opportunity to choose the type of foods they wish to purchase from a list provided by WV. The Food Voucher Program will be assessed before it is expanded or replaces the distribution of food rations. A total of 332,888 IDPs have benefitted from WV’s GFD so far. 134. Food for Assets Project. The proposed Food for Assets Project focuses on peace- building activities in the communities of Duma, Adwa, Jurof, and Abu Rojo, which were all previously provided with GFD support. The objective of the project is to promote recovery and peaceful co-existence through the sustainable development of shared rangeland 63 resources and improved agricultural activity. The number of beneficiaries is anticipated to be 13,200. 135. Food for Education. Food for Education (FFE) serves as a social safety net for poor families and aims to increase the number of children enrolling in and attending school. Following the gradual reduction in ration levels and the scaling down of the GFD program, household food consumption was reduced, thus increasing the need for a safety net program such as FFE. In South Darfur, FFE is part of a safety net program that aims to provide emergency feeding to school children as a way of attracting them to attend school. The latest EMOP evaluation report confirmed that there is a need to continue attracting more children to enroll in and attend classes. The report also reported increases in both enrollment rates and attendance rates as a result of FFE. The average increase in enrollment over a period of six months was 3 percent, while the head teachers reported a 98 to 100 percent attendance rate. The program has also supported the upgrading of an increasing number of schools with greater involvement by parent-teacher associations (PTAs). 136. Blanket Supplementary Feeding Program (BSFP). This program (described in detail under the WFP above) provides nutritional supplements to children between 6 and 59 months old regardless of their nutritional status between April and August to minimize the risk of malnutrition and mortality caused by food shortages. The WFP’s Food Security Monitoring System showed that approximately 12 percent of children in the IDP camps were severely or moderately malnourished in October 2012 compared with only 6 percent in February 2012. It found that the proportion of severely malnourished children in the camps increased from zero to 3 percent between May 2011 and February 2012. Also, the proportion of moderately malnourished children increased from 4 to 9 percent during the same period. 137. Food Vouchers. Food vouchers are one of the new WFP initiatives to support the IDP populations in the camps around Nyala. WV is cooperating with the WFP in introducing the 64 Food Voucher Program, which is in line with WV’s global strategy of moving away from “food aid” to “food assistance” (as was discussed above with regard to the WFP’s voucher program). The program is based on food voucher initiatives in North Sudan and other parts of the country. According to the various studies of those initiatives, beneficiaries reported that they preferred food vouchers to in-kind food distribution rations because they are logistically easier and because the recipients can choose to buy local items and items not available in typical WFP food baskets, thus increasing the diversity of their diet. Also, beneficiaries in areas with high logistical costs reported a 15 percent cost savings over in- kind food delivery. So far the program has benefitted 55,178 recipients in Otash camp. Feasibility assessments for the provision of vouchers in crisis states (WFP, 2013b and Seep, Network 2007) have make a number of recommendations that are relevant for the voucher program in the future, including: (i) further pilots should be conducted; (ii) these pilots should be monitored very closely by monitoring staff capable of designing and implementing contingency plans in response to any risks that might emerge; (iii) lessons from the pilots should be taken into account in other locations; (iv) money will need to be injected into the local economy to help these markets to develop and eventually meet the increased demand created by vouchers, but the WFP needs to keep emergency food stock on hand in case of market failures; and (v) regional and federal financial institutions may be able to provide some of the credit or microfinance required for the anticipated volume of trade transactions in Darfur markets. 138. Milling Vouchers. WV began distributing milling vouchers to GFD beneficiaries in camps in May 2009. The objective of the program was to subsidize the high costs incurred by these households in taking their cereals to be milled by machines. This can be a considerable expense for these households. Payment for milling was usually made in cash, though bartering was sometimes used as a last resort. A WV Sudan study in 2012 (World Vision, 2012, Stories Alsalaam) and the World Vision Project Proposal for 2013 (citing an ECHO Evaluation report of 2011, para. 5.3) point out that the milling voucher program had helped beneficiaries to save money that they were then able to use to cover other 65 household expenses. After the introduction of the vouchers, the selling of GFD ration by recipient households decreased from 61 percent to 28 percent and bartering for milling declined from 63 to 3 percent. The households interviewed for the WV study reported that they consumed 93 percent of the GFD rations received directly by them following the introduction of the milling vouchers. Also, the received rations lasted for 20 days instead of the 17 days that had been the case at the time of the baseline survey. The study found that 89 percent of households saved more than 10 SDG per month and that these savings enabled them to buy fresh foods and firewood and to cover education-related expenses. Also, all (100 percent) of the surveyed households, millers, and focus group respondents reported that the milling voucher project had impacted their lives in a positive and meaningful way. In 2013, the WV proposed milling vouchers for 236,603 IDPs in six camps (World Vision 2013, para. 5.3). . 139. WV’s Identification Card. WV Sudan has been working on introducing an electronic identification card as a way to make the tracking and monitoring of program beneficiaries more effective. The Last Mile Mobile Solution (LMMS) was due to be piloted in 2013. This is a parallel effort to the smart card initiative being introduced and piloted by WV’s partner, the WFP (see above). These two valuable programs are piloting different innovative solutions that could be a key step in the development of a unified registry of beneficiaries linked to a digitized monitoring and evaluation system. 140. Design, Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation (DAME). WV International has a well-established M&E framework, but the challenging environment in Sudan has required it to make adjustments to the system. The M&E framework in Sudan consists of activity monitoring, process monitoring, context monitoring, and impact monitoring and involves a range of food program monitoring tools. M&E is part of a broader so-called Quality Assurance Framework that includes community accounting and reporting; commodity management; design, accountability, monitoring, and evaluation; compliance audits; and learning and capacity. It also includes a redress mechanism called the Community Help 66 Desk. A help desk is a committee of responsible community members who are available during food distributions to receive and respond to community issues, comments, suggestions, and feedback. The aim is to allow beneficiaries and other community members to provide their feedback and make suggestions in a non-threatening way. This feedback is intended to help WV to resolve issues and run more effective programs, to protect WV against any false accusations, and to prevent unfairness and/or corruption. WV has clear and well-established guidelines for its Community Help Desk as part of its broader M&E system. A recent evaluation study highlighted the challenges faced by the Help Desk and the views of community members in situations where there were not enough millers to mill the community’s cereals.20 141. Delivery Mechanism and Implementation Arrangements. WV is an implementing partner of the WFP. It provides further funding for activities other than those that it implements on behalf of the WFP in South Darfur. 20 Jean (2013) 67 V. FINANCIAL OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING SOCIAL SAFETY NET 142. The Government of Sudan has several policy options for tackling poverty (as well as different ways to finance those policies), but difficult compromises and trade-offs will be necessary as the extent of need far exceeds the amount of available resources. Therefore, the government must carefully consider a wide range of programs and policies across multiple sectoral areas and determine their likely effects on the country’s long-term economic growth. 143. This chapter presents three options that are available to the government (either singly or in combination) to support additional social safety nets for the poorest and neediest citizens. These options are: (i) reallocating savings from the fuel subsidy reform; (ii) increasing the efficiency of Zakat funds by strengthening existing programs; and (iii) mobilizing donor funding. Option 1: Reallocating Savings from the Fuel Subsidy Reform 144. Costly and untargeted general fuel subsidies (estimated to have cost 10 billion SDG or US$1.8 billion in 2012) are now being reformed, which presents the government with an opportunity to reallocate the savings to well-targeted social safety nets. The fuel subsidies were part of the government’s review of all general subsidies, several of which have been found to favor the rich. 145. The fuel subsidy reform alone is expected to generate savings of more than 0.6 percent of GDP or an estimated 1.3 billion SDG or US$228 million equivalent (IMF, 2012[a]). Currently, the total cost of the entire fuel subsidy is estimated to be 5.2 percent of GDP. If only a fraction (say 5 percent, 10 percent, or 15 percent) of the 0.6 percent of GDP were to be reallocated to well-targeted SSN interventions, these resources could be used not only to expand existing coverage but also to improve current systems to yield efficiency 68 gains. Table 19 presents three scenarios based on the 2012 cost savings as estimated by the IMF. Table 19: Potential for Savings from Fuel Subsidies to be Reallocated to Social Safety Nets, 2013 Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3: Reallocation of 5% Reallocation of Reallocation of Fuel Subsidy Fuel Subsidy of Savings 10% of Savings 15% of Savings Savings (in SDG) Savings (in US$) (in US$) (in US$) (in US$) 1,300,000,000 228,070,175 $11,403,509 $22,807,018 $34,210,526 Source: Author’s estimates based on data from IMF (2012b) Note: Savings of 0.6 percent of total GDP from fuel subsidy reform as estimated by the IMF 146. Such reallocations would be sufficient to support new and/or existing programming (in part or in full). For example, a 10 percent reallocation of the fuel subsidy savings would have been enough to provide the first 100,000 beneficiaries of the cash transfer program with a transfer of 100 SDG per month. To maintain the 2014 target, however, with a higher amount of 150 SDG per household, the reallocation to this program would need to reach 41.5 percent. Also, a 7.8 percent reallocation of the fuel subsidy savings to nutrition programming could support the entire UNICEF program, which in 2012 was estimated to cost US$18 million. Similarly, a 19 percent reallocation of the fuel subsidy savings to the WFP’s targeted programming (as is currently being discussed) would cover all of its existing beneficiaries. Table 20 presents options for reallocating the savings to the existing direct cash transfer program, and Table 21 shows how the savings could be used to aid the transition of certain non-government programs (currently being implemented by the WFP and UNICEF) into the government’s control. 69 Table 20: Scenarios for Reallocating the Fuel Subsidy Savings to the Existing Direct Cash Transfer (2012) A 10% fuel subsidy reallocation of $22.8 million would support: It would cover the cost of the 2012 Cash Transfer Program estimated to cost $21.1 million (120 million SDG). A 23% fuel subsidy reallocation of $52.6 million could support: This equals the cost of the targeted 2013 Cash Transfer Program estimated to cost $52.6 million (300 million SDG) for 250,000 households if the transfer amount were kept at 100 SDG/month. A 41.5% fuel subsidy reallocation of $94.7 million could support: About 450,000 households if the transfer amount were kept at 100 SDG per month. This equals the cost of the targeted 2014 Cash Transfer Program estimated to cost $94.7 million (540 million SDG). Note: Scenarios compiled by authors for illustration purposes. Amount of estimated fuel savings varies by year. This table uses the IMF’s estimates of 2012 savings. Table 21: Scenarios for Reallocating the Fuel Subsidy Savings to Non-governmental Food Security and Nutrition Programs Program Current Program Cost Current % of Fuel Subsidy Savings that could cover 100% of existing program cost UNICEF’s Nutrition Program $18 million 7.8 percent of the $228.1 million fuel subsidy savings in 2012 could cover the cost of this program WFP’s Food-for-Assets Program $21.7 million 9.2 percent of the $228.1 million fuel subsidy savings in 2012 could cover the cost of this program WFP’s School Feeding Program $12.4 million 5.4 percent of the $228.1 million fuel subsidy savings in 2012 could cover the cost of this program WFP’s targeted TSSR, IBSFP, and $10.2 million 4.5 percent of the $228.1 million fuel subsidy TSFP Programs savings in 2012 could cover the cost of this program All of the WFP’s targeted programs $44.3 million 19.5 percent of the $228.1 million fuel subsidy (FFA, SF, TSSR, IBSFP, and TSFP) savings in 2012 could cover the cost of this program Note: Scenarios compiled by the author for illustrative purposes. The amount of estimated fuel savings varies by year. This table uses the IMF’s estimates of 2012 savings. These examples do not imply that the existing programs are the right interventions for the government to adopt. However, similar programs that address these needs could be adopted to provide longer-term support to poor and vulnerable households that face food insecurity, malnutrition, and unreliable livelihoods. 147. Regardless of the exact amount of the savings that is reallocated to SSNs, the amount of the reallocation would have a significant impact. Given the widespread food insecurity and malnutrition in Sudan and the decreasing humanitarian aid envelope, these savings provide an opportunity to increase government support for well-targeted programs 70 in the area of food security and nutrition. If well-designed, these programs would compliment other programs and other ongoing activities designed to increase livelihoods. Option 2: Increasing the Efficiency of Zakat Funds by Strengthening Existing Programs 148. Zakat resources, which are earmarked for the poor and vulnerable (to the tune of 492.8 million SDG or US$86.5 million in 2012), have a huge potential to help the poorest and most vulnerable in Sudan. However, this report has found that the existing programs that target the poor and vulnerable have several shortcomings, including the lack of any way to identify beneficiaries; no links to a computerized and unified database to enable the tracking of beneficiaries and payments to control for error, fraud, and corruption; no complaints and appeals mechanism to ensure the transparency and accountability of the program; and weaknesses in the M&E mechanism for monitoring the implementation and evaluating the impact of the program. While the cost of these existing inefficiencies is hard to estimate and the government will need to make further assessments in partnership with Zakat, the 2012 Zakat funding of US$86.5 million (492.8 million SDG) or 61 percent of total Zakat revenue (US$200 million in 2013) has the potential to cover 410,630 families or 2,340,600 individuals (or 16 percent of all of the poor people in the country) with a transfer of 100 SDG per household per month for 12 months. Option 3: Mobilizing Donor Funding 149. Several of the government’s existing international partners have expressed interest in providing specific and targeted financial and/or technical support to pilot or expand SSNs and to support the government’s efforts towards developing an integrated social protection policy. Donor partners could provide valuable support to the government in improving the existing SSNs and introducing new interventions. Therefore, a unique opportunity exists for the government to establish new strategic areas of development and mechanisms for implementation. Reaching such a goal will be feasible if the government 71 and its external partners can coalesce around a social protection strategy with clear targeting, payment, and M&E mechanisms that will address the needs of Sudan’s poor and vulnerable population. 72 VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 150. The analysis presented in this report leads to the conclusion that the existing SSN system is largely inadequate to respond to the widespread poverty and vulnerability in Sudan. The extent of need outstrips the availability of resources. The coverage of existing programs is limited and there are many evident overlaps between them, which is not efficient. The system also lacks proper targeting, a unified beneficiary registry, a regular and reliable payment schedule, complaint mechanisms, and transparency. In general, there is a lack of coordination among the various social safety nets implemented by the government, semi-autonomous agencies, and non-government actors in the country. 151. Generally, Sudan’s subsidies help to stabilize consumer prices but are very expensive and regressive and are not targeted exclusively to the poor. Therefore, reforming these subsidies and reallocating the savings to SSNs would make it possible to introduce more targeted and more effective pro-poor interventions. The Government of Sudan acknowledges the need for targeted social safety nets to address the high level of poverty and vulnerability in the country. Therefore, the government’s recent reduction in fuel subsidies in parallel with the strengthening of social safety nets is a significant reform. 152. A large proportion of SSN interventions in conflict-affected areas is currently financed by UN agencies. Given this heavy dependency on donor funding, it is essential for the government to develop a mechanism to coordinate donor support within the context of a national strategy. Without proper coordination, the proliferation of donor investments and different stakeholders on the ground can result in duplication of efforts and overlap of beneficiaries. 153. There is currently no comprehensive coordination or M&E of social protection interventions in place in Sudan nor a focus on decentralizing resources for social protection. At the national level policymakers need to formulate a comprehensive 73 coordination policy. Within that framework, the states should also formulate coordination mechanisms appropriate to their own circumstances (for example, the conflict areas of the Darfur Region and the Eastern Region have their own recovery and basic services programs). The coordination efforts at both national and state levels ought to focus on decentralized and community-driven social protection mechanisms to enhance ownership of social protection by local communities. National-level policymakers should also focus on building a comprehensive database of all sources of social protection data in Sudan. Key Recommendations for Improving Social Protection in Sudan As a result of the foregoing analysis, this report recommends the following actions to improve the provision of social protection in Sudan:  Review the existing institutional architecture to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of social protection interventions and develop control and accountability mechanisms for these interventions. Conduct institutional assessments of all potential implementing agencies and develop an appropriate governance framework for the social protection sector, including social accountability mechanisms, fiduciary controls, and systems for the implementation of future social protection programs.  Develop a coherent National Social Protection Policy that includes social safety nets and that is linked to national poverty reduction objectives. Establish a clear process for reviewing and integrating the existing policies into the common and comprehensive National Social Protection Policy to provide overarching guidance on social protection programming. Explore ways to leverage regional and international knowledge and experience in building a comprehensive social protection system. 74  Strengthen links between social safety nets and health/nutrition as well as the education sector and conflict-related interventions to ensure optimal use of resources and institutional capacity to provide families with core services and support. Explore the potential for turning existing humanitarian and conflict-related interventions into developmental interventions. Learn lessons from community-based programs (for example, the INGO CARE has experience in implementing community- based health insurance schemes).  Expand existing social insurance mechanisms (such as the National Health Insurance Fund) to cover the poor. The National Health Insurance Fund is already expanding its services to poor families based on Zakat’s targeting lists. However, funds are needed to expand these services further, particularly to conflict-affected areas of the country.  Update and enhance information technology (IT) for managing, monitoring, and implementing social protection interventions, including management information systems, payment systems, program monitoring, and oversight. Two major stakeholders are piloting innovative digitized solutions to facilitate the tracking of beneficiaries, with the potential to create a digitized and unified registry of beneficiaries. These are: (i) the WFP’s pilot of a biometric system that uses a smart card to identify beneficiaries of its voucher program and (ii) World Vision’s pilot of the so-called Last Mile Mobile Solution (LMMS). 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Available from Poverty Reduction and Coordination Center, Ministry of Welfare and Social Security or from the Higher Institute for Zakat Sciences, Khartoum. 81 Annex 1: Guidelines for a Social Protection System in Sudan As emphasized in the World Bank’s Africa Social Protection Strategy (World Bank, 2012b), social protection is a powerful way to fight poverty and promote growth .21 A growing body of evidence from African countries shows that social protection directly reduces chronic poverty and vulnerability by enabling poor households to meet their basic consumption needs, protect their assets, and achieve better health, nutrition, and education outcomes. These programs also build households’ productive assets and expand their income-earning opportunities by building their labor market skills and enabling them to engage in higher-risk, higher-return activities. Social protection contributes to local economic development by improving the functioning of the labor market, stimulating local markets through cash transfers, and creating community infrastructure. It also helps to foster broad economic growth by boosting aggregate demand and facilitating difficult economic reforms. Social protection reduces inequality and promotes social stability. Social protection has been used by governments to strengthen the social contract, which can promote social stability during periods of crises and difficult economic reforms. African countries that are emerging from conflict situations have used social protection to foster peace and to rebuild their social capital. This is because, for example, labor-intensive public works programs in fragile and violent settings can quickly help to stabilize a high-risk situation. Evidence is emerging that social protection can contribute significantly to reducing inequality by redistributing income to poor households and supporting their participation in productive activities. 21 This annex draws on existing works as noted. This is solely a compilation of information by the author to assist the reader. Please refer to the references for the full list of documentation. 82 Safety nets are a critical part of a government’s capacity to respond to shocks. The triple crises of 2008 and the 2011 drought in East Africa have demonstrated the vital role that safety nets can play in mitigating the impact of shocks on poor and vulnerable households. Across Africa, countries with well-established safety nets were able to scale up these initiatives swiftly to provide assistance to a large number of vulnerable households. African governments need to put in place the prerequisite infrastructure for scaling up their safety net programs seamlessly, such as robust early warning systems and contingency plans, and to ensure that these programs are coordinated with a well-functioning humanitarian response system. Countries can realize significant benefits by creating an integrated social protection system. Taking a systems approach to social protection will reduce inefficiencies and ensure more equitable delivery of benefits from safety nets, pensions, insurance, labor programs, and targeted service delivery. This approach is founded on a policy framework that articulates the government’s vision for social protection to guide the choice of instruments, financing mechanisms, and institutional arrangements for social protection. Within this framework, existing programs can be harmonized and expanded in a way that reduces fragmentation and duplication, while also promoting links between programs to capitalize on any synergies between different types of social protection programs. Adopting basic administrative tools can help programs to take advantage of economies of scale and increase administrative efficiency. Social protection is affordable for low-income countries despite their tight budgets. While overall spending on social protection in Africa remains low by international standards, experience suggests that social protection programs can achieve national coverage at the cost of only 1 to 2 percent of GDP. While this is only a portion of the financing required to operate a social protection system, it draws attention to what countries can achieve in the short term. Indeed, one way in which existing social protection spending can be made significantly more efficient would be by reducing current budget allocations for inefficient 83 subsidies and ad hoc emergency food aid and reallocating them to longer-term social safety nets. At the same time, social security systems should be reformed in ways that would ensure their fiscal sustainability while at the same time expanding their coverage. The costs of not protecting poor families are very high, are borne disproportionately by women and children, and undermine the productivity of future generations. A comprehensive social protection system (SPS) has many components. It consists of social safety nets (so-called social assistance); social insurance (such as pensions and health insurance); and passive and active labor market programs (labor regulations, education and training, credit, and employment services). In low-income countries or fragile environments, social safety nets (SSNs) are often the main vehicle used to address the urgent needs of poor and vulnerable segments of the populations. As a country develops and its formal sector expands, other complementary mechanisms, such as social insurance, begin to play an increasingly important role within the system. This annex aims to inform the social protection policy dialogue by providing those stakeholders who will help to develop social protection policy, many of whom have had little previous exposure to social protection or targeted SSNs, with an understanding of social protection systems, definitions, options, and links to other social services . The annex is structured as follows. It starts by outlining a theory of social protection systems and goes on to discuss the affordability of social protection in Africa. In the third section, it places SSNs within the broader social protection strategic framework, and then lists the various categories of SSN that can be implemented to assist poor and vulnerable households as well as some common and relevant social protection interventions that are not SSNs (as defined in this report). 84 I. Consolidated Theory of Social Protection Systems A “system” implies that all social protection programs are designed to achi eve interrelated outcomes and policy objectives within a strategic framework and have well- coordinated institutional arrangements (World Bank, 2012d, p. 24). A social protection system enables governments to respond more effectively and efficiently to chronic poverty and promote inclusive growth. It can also strengthen a country’s crisis response capacity. This approach capitalizes on the fact that reducing fragmentation and promoting harmonization can enhance both the performance of individual programs and the overall resilience, equity, and opportunity functions of social protection. African countries can realize significant benefits by creating integrated social protection systems. A social protection system is part of a larger system that includes a range of policies and programs to address poverty and vulnerability, including policies that promote economic growth and investments in human capital. The social protection system can complement these other programs by providing the poor and vulnerable with minimum income support and by ensuring that they have effective access to basic services and employment opportunities. 85 Annex Figure 1.1: Interaction between the Different Social Sectors and Social Safety Nets Source: World Bank (2012d) The three interrelated components of the social protection system are:  Social safety nets/social assistance programs, such as a cash or in-kind transfers to alleviate poverty (see further definition below)  Social insurance programs, such as mandatory (contributory) social insurance programs (pensions, unemployment benefits, and health insurance) to reduce the likelihood or impact of negative events such as old age or illness  Passive and active labor market programs (labor regulations, education and training, and credit and employment services) to create opportunities to pursue productive livelihoods. 86 The main objective of a comprehensive social protection system is to reduce vulnerability and poverty by helping poor citizens to:  Manage risk and respond to shocks.  Build their productive assets and increase their access to basic services.  Engage in productive income-earning opportunities. In general, social protection programs tend to perform better if they are part of a well- functioning, integrated, and coordinated social protection system designed to meet the needs of (i) the chronically poor; (ii) households vulnerable to events or shocks; and/or (iii) individuals dealing with special disadvantages (such as the disabled, the elderly, or street children). A comprehensive social protection system should aim to reduce poverty, manage individual risks, and promote equitable and sustainable growth through (World Bank, 2012b):  Protection – guaranteeing a minimum level of well-being and protecting against loss.  Prevention – reducing the likelihood of falling into poverty.  Promotion – creating opportunities to pursue productive livelihoods. To be effective, social protection systems should have the following features (World Bank 2012b, p xv):  Inclusion: Identify the coverage gaps and ensure the inclusion of the most vulnerable in the social protection system and eliminate any overlaps and redundancies. 87  Equity: Ensure that fiscal resources are equitably distributed and will achieve horizontal equity in the ratio of contributions to benefits across similar levels of income.  Sustainability: Ensure fiscal sustainability under different demographic scenarios and rules.  Incentive compatibility: Develop program rules that create incentives for workers (individually and/or at the community level) to work, save, and participate in insurance (to avoid adverse selection and perverse incentives to work and/or save less and to seek informal work) and to participate in human capital enhancement programs. Also develop incentives for social protection insurers and service providers to enroll all workers in the system to avoid risk selection and improve the monitoring of beneficiaries.  Results: Establish clear goals and well-articulated programs for reaching those goals with effective monitoring and evaluation systems to evaluate whether they are achieving their goals. A well-integrated social protection system should be part of a country’s broader poverty reduction strategy (World Bank, 2011b, p. 4). It contributes to the poverty reduction objectives of ensuring people’s access to food security, health, education, human rights, voice, security, dignity, and decent work. Within a social protection system, SSN interventions interact with and work alongside of social insurance, health, education, financial services, the provision of utilities and roads, and other policies and programs aimed at reducing poverty and managing risk. 88 In reality, many countries’ social protection and poverty reduction strategies and programs operate with little or no coordination. This leads to high transaction costs, duplication of implementation mechanisms, high targeting errors, and few or no monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (World Bank, 2012d, p. 24). The extent of the potential benefits from integrating social protection interventions depends on various factors, including the country’s level of economic and institutiona l development, capacity, and political commitment. As a country’s per capita income rises, the number of opportunities to create sustainable programs increases. II. The Affordability of Social Protection in Africa A reasonable level of social protection coverage is achievable in Africa, even where fiscal constraints are tight. While overall spending on social protection in Africa remains low by international standards, a number of large-scale social protection programs are currently achieving impressive coverage. The Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program covers 10 percent of the population at a cost of around 1.2 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2012e, p. 25). The Rwanda mutuelle des santé covers 91 percent of the population, and government and donor contributions to the scheme are equivalent to 1.2 percent of Rwanda’s GDP. These and other examples from across the continent suggest that the cost of national social protection programs ranges between 1.2 and 6 percent of GDP. Further analysis of international experience suggests that high rates of coverage of the poor can be achieved for between 1 to 2 percent of GDP if benefits are kept modest. There are several possible and mutually compatible scenarios for funding social protection systems in Africa: 89  Increase the efficiency of existing social protection expenditure: Social protection spending should be focused on efficient and effective programs that have been evaluated, proven to be effective, and then scaled up. This can include reallocating savings from abolishing subsidies to safety nets, transforming emergency food aid systems into a long-term safety net, and reforming current pension schemes. Consolidating fragmented programs into a system can yield further efficiency gains.  Explore innovations in social protection funding: Innovative concepts are being used to increase funding to social protection programs. For instance, risk management through macro/micro-insurance provides resources rapidly to governments, thus enabling them to scale up established safety nets in response to crises.  Increase the amount of domestic resources allocated to social protection: Recent economic growth and debt relief has created some fiscal space in Africa, although all areas of public services have significant deficits and compete fiercely for internal resources. Recasting social protection as a productive investment that can further sectoral goals can help to convince policymakers to invest domestic resources in social protection programs. As countries develop risk pooling mechanisms such as social insurance, governments can gradually shift away from focusing on social assistance financed through the general budget and more towards social insurance financed through private contributions.  Seek external assistance: External assistance can play a critical role in building basic social protection systems in some countries. However, development partners need to ensure that their support is consistent with the national social protection strategy and that they commit to providing long-term and predictable levels of funding. 90 II. The Role of Social Safety Nets in the Broader Social Protection Framework This report defines SSN programs as non-contributory transfer programs targeted in some manner to the poor and vulnerable who are living in poverty and unable to meet their own basic needs or who are in danger of falling into poverty, either because of an external shock or their socioeconomic circumstances such as their age, illness, disability, or discrimination. As part of the broader social protection system, SSNs seek to provide protection and prevention to poor and vulnerable households. SSNs are often the dominant social protection approach in most low-income countries and those in fragile situations, while social insurance (contributory programs) and employment assistance programs usually become more prominent on the policy agenda as a country’s capacity increases. These poor and vulnerable individuals and households can fall into one or a combination of the following groups: (i) the chronically poor, defined as people who lack enough assets to earn sufficient income, even in good years; (ii) the transient poor, defined as people who earn sufficient income in good years but fall into poverty, at least temporarily, as a result of idiosyncratic or covariate shocks ranging from an illness in the household to the loss of a job to drought or a macroeconomic crisis; (iii) vulnerable groups, commonly including, but not limited to, the disabled, the elderly, orphans, the displaced, refugees, and asylum seekers; and (iv) people who have lost benefits as a result of reforms. SSNs aim to increase and stabilize the consumption of these groups as well as encouraging their use of basic social services, not necessarily by increasing their resources per se but instead by lowering the cost of food and other basic commodities and essential services. At the core of the debate about SSNs is the question of their predictability and sustainability (World Bank, 2011c, p. 4). In the past, SSNs were perceived as simple relief transfers that helped poor people to alleviate the negative effects of shocks. Today, it is increasingly recognized that SSNs ought to be integrated into predictable, institutionalized 91 social protection systems capable of responding to vulnerability to risks and embedded in a rights-based approach. SSNs, if properly implemented, have the potential not only to protect households and prevent them from falling into poverty due to unpredictable shocks but also to significantly promote the livelihoods of poor people. Therefore an increasing number of development actors argue that SSNs should be predictable. This means that they should be paid or distributed regularly or in a predictable manner (for example, whenever climatic conditions impede agricultural production), rather than just as an ad hoc reaction to a crisis. As pre-emptive initiatives, these predictable SSNs can then help poor households to become self-reliant and help them to break out of the poverty trap. SSNs would then become sustainable interventions in the fight against poverty rather than being mere hand-outs that may increase the dependency of their recipients. III. Various Categories of Social Safety Net Programs The most common types of SSN programs can be classified as follows:  Programs that provide unconditional transfers in cash or in kind : o Cash transfers (such as child benefit, family allowances, and social pensions) and near-cash transfers (such as food stamps and commodity vouchers). o In-kind food transfers (such as school feeding and take-home rations) and other in-kind transfers (such as school supplies). o General subsidies meant to benefit poor/vulnerable households, often for food, energy, housing, or utilities. 92  Programs that protect and enhance human capital and access to basic services: o Conditional transfers (such as providing transfers in cash or in kind to poor or vulnerable households in return for their compliance with specific conditions related to their use of education and/or health care services) o Fee waivers for health and education to ensure access to essential public services (such as fee waivers for health care services or scholarships).  Programs that provide an income: o Public works in which the poor or vulnerable work in return for cash and/or food. A national safety net usually consists of several different programs (providing either long- term predictable transfers or short-term emergency transfers) that ideally complement each other as well as complementing other public or social policies. A well-integrated social protection system is more than a collection of well-designed and well-implemented programs. Rather, it can yield better outcomes and greater efficiencies than the sum of the individual programs (World Bank, 2011c, p. 3). IV. Common and Relevant Social Protection Interventions that are not Considered Social Safety Nets Contributory programs, or so-called social insurance programs, are one of the three main components of any social protection system and complement social safety nets. Social insurance (contributory programs) and employment assistance programs usually become more prominent on the policy agenda as a country’s capacity increases. However, in the case in Sudan, the social insurance program is the largest element of the country’s existing 93 social protection programming. It currently covers those in the formal sector (mostly civil servants) so is not necessarily targeting the poor and vulnerable in society. An assessment of Sudan’s social insurance program currently being financed by the African Development Bank is expected to shed further light in its effectiveness and its contribution to Sudan’s social protection programming (MoFNE, 2013). Income-generating activities and other livelihood programs fall outside the scope of the above definition of SSNs. Such programs are important instruments that focus on the promotion of poor households to increase their chances of raising their productivity and their incomes. Micro-finance and income-generating activities are key components of Sudan’s current strategic poverty reduction strategy, but they fall outside the scope of this report. Policies and programs intended to increase access to basic services for the entire population also fall outside the scope of the present report since they are not targeted specifically to vulnerable and poor households. Therefore, the free education for all policy in Sudan is not covered in this report. Transfer programs targeted to communities and associations (to build social assets in vulnerable communities) also fall outside the scope of this report since they are not targeted to poor and vulnerable individual or households directly. Thus, programs such as the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) programs in Sudan are not considered here. An assessment of the impact of the MDTF’s has been conducted which shed light on its effectiveness and on the contributions that it made to broader social protection programming. Universal food subsidies (price subsidies) can be considered as SSNs if they are introduced with the intention of increasing the consumption of vulnerable households by lowering the price of the basic commodities that these households consume. General subsidies can 94 be pro-poor (when poor households spend a higher average share of their expenditures on the particular subsidized commodity than the rich), pro-rich (when rich households spend a higher average share of their expenditures on the particular subsidized commodity than the poor), or distributionally neutral (when there is no significant different in average spending on the commodity in question). In the context of Sudan, this includes shops that sell goods at subsidized prices, particularly food staples like sugar, cooking oil, and flour. 95 Annex 2: Gender, Children, and Early Childhood Development Rates of Return Dos and Donts of Female-Sensitive Social Protection Programming Policymakers should ensure that SSN interventions do not reinforce gender disparities and biases in society even when they do not explicitly target women. Annex Box 2.1 below outlines some clear dos and don’ts. Annex Box 2.1: Dos and Don’ts of Female-Sensitive Social Protection There are some clear principles that should guide thinking about social protection policy from a gender perspective. The exact policy details will vary depending on circumstances, objectives, and country context. However, the key overall policy objective should be to help poor and vulnerable women, whether they are explicitly targeted or not. Policymakers should:  Not assume a unitary model of the household and be mindful that who receives the transfer matters: in most circumstances transfers should be delivered to women.  Not be limited to heads of households, men, or the unemployed.  Look for feasible mechanisms for targeting the poor as individuals rather than categories without incurring undue costs in reaching them.  Not be biased against women – do not exacerbate inequalities.  Try to compensate for any pre-existing biases against women.  Consider the form of transfer. Women often prefer to receive a share of wages or transfers in-kind since cash can more easily be exploited by male household members, and conditionalities can often be desirable for the same reason.  Take account of transaction costs as women may face higher time constraints and be less mobile than men.  Not forget about the many social constraints faced by women.  Provide childcare.  Do not forget that responses to policies may differ by gender: for example, foregone income and incentive effects may differ.  Remember that programs can have unintended consequences. Transfers affect labor supply but differently by gender and they can cause households to allocate work within households to children.  Do not assume that equality under the law is enough. Affirmative action may be needed from both an efficiency perspective (externalities, such as benefits accruing to children when women are targeted) and an equity perspective (women are often poorer or more vulnerable than men). Source: van der Walle (2010) 96 Principles of Child-sensitive Social Protection Programming Policymakers should also consider issues related to mothers and children when designing SSN programs. For example, they should ensure that public works are designed so that they do not unfairly exclude women with children. Also, specific principles should be considered when designing, implementing, and evaluating child-sensitive social protection programs (see Annex Box 2.2 below). Annex Box 2.2: Principles of Child-Sensitive Social Protection The following principles should be considered in the design, implementation, and evaluation of child-sensitive social protection programs:  Avoid adverse any effects on children and reduce or mitigate any social and economic risks that directly affect children’s lives.  Intervene as early as possible where children are at risk in order to prevent irreversible impairment or harm.  Consider age- and gender-specific risks and vulnerabilities throughout the lifecycle.  Mitigate the effects of shocks, exclusion, and poverty on families, recognizing that families raising children need support so that they can have access to equal opportunities.  Make special provision to reach children who are particularly vulnerable and excluded, including children without parental care and those who are marginalized within their families or communities due to their gender, disability, ethnicity, HIV/AIDS, or other factors.  Consider the mechanisms and intra-household dynamics that may affect how children are reached and pay particular attention to the balance of power between men and women within the household and in the broader community.  Include the voices and opinions of children, their caregivers, and youths in the design of social protection systems and programs. Source: DFID UK (2009) High Rates of Return to Human Capital Investments in the Young The Government of Sudan ought to consider prioritizing investments that contribute to the human capital development of children and young people. Almost half of the population (approximately 15 million people) is poor and of these, about 15 million are under the age of 18. Furthermore, there is abundant evidence that a lack of proper nutrition in the early stages of life severely hampers a child’s ability to develop to its fullest capacity, with irreversible consequences for its future development as a productive and capable 97 member of society. Therefore, it is highly recommended that SSNs be designed to avoid the long-term social and economic consequences of not supporting human development in the early stages of life. As Annex Figure 2.1 below shows, the rate of return to human capital diminishes as a child ages. 98 Annex Figure 2.1: Rates of Return to Human Capital Investment Source: Carneiro and Heickman (2003) Note: Assumes equal investment in all age groups 99 Annex 3: Stakeholders Consulted Government Stakeholders Consulted 1. Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MoWSS): General Directorates:  International Cooperation  Planning  Poverty Reduction and Coordination Center  Women & Family Affairs  Social Program  Information Semi-Autonomous Agencies:  National Health Insurance Fund  Zakat Fund  Higher Institute for Zakat Sciences  Social Insurance Fund  Pension Fund (General Fund not covering, for example, police or judiciary funds)  Population Council  National Council of Child Welfare (NCCW)  Savings and Social Development Bank  National Disability Council 2. Federal Ministry of Health’s School Health Program 3. Ministry of General Education’s School Feeding Program 100 Girls Directorate Planning Directorate 4. Ministry of Finance and National Economy 5. Central Bureau of Statistics 6. Other:  Sudan General Women’s Union  Sudan Micro-Finance Facility Non-governmental Organizations Consulted 1. Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) 2. African Development Bank 3. CARE International Switzerland (Sudan) 4. UK Department for International Development (DFID) 5. ECHO – EU’s Humanitarian Aid 6. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) – Center for Gender and Social Development 7. European Union Development Program 8. Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) 9. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Foundation) (FES) 10. INGO Forum 11. International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD) 12. Sub-Sahara Center 13. Sudan Red Crescent 14. Together For Sudan 15. UNDP 101 16. UNICEF 17. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 18. USAID 19. World Food Programme 20. World Vision Sudan 21. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Khartoum 102 Annex 4: ZAKAT Fund Institutional Setup Government’s Council of Ministers Ministry of Welfare & Social Security ZAKAT CHAMBER Semi-Autonomous Agency of MoWSS Federal Supreme Council of Trustees Federal High Council Federal General Secretary [High Committee for Grievance; Policy and Planning; Procurement; Audit; IT] STATE Council of Trustees STATE Council of Trustees [incl. Council for Grievances HISBA] [incl. Council for Grievances HISBA] Locality Locality Locality Locality Selected Zakat Selected Zakat Selected Zakat Selected Zakat Community Committee Community Committee Community Committee Community Committee Villages Villages Villages Villages Source: Compiled by the author. 103 Annex 5: Existing Institutional Structure of THE Ministry of Welfare and Social Security This annex gives an overview of the activities and programs of the directorates of the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MoWSS), which is the main line ministry in charge of the social programming and protection system in Sudan . Specifically, the official mandate of the MoWSS is to: (i) launch policies, plans and programs and organize activities related to pensions, social insurance, health insurance, Zakat, and the sponsorship of “Takaful”22 on the national level; (ii) study the impacts of the implementation of the strategic projects and the national policy in the social field; (iii) supervise poverty combating programs and programs associated with sponsorship “Takaful” and social development in coordination with the States; (iv) launch general policies in the field of women, family, and female activities; (v) launch plans and programs in the field of social welfare related to maternity and childhood on the national level; (vi) participate with the States to launch the population policies and family planning; (vii) drafting national laws projects that organize women, family and children affairs, maternity protection, childhood and strengthening the role of women; (viii) supervise national organizations, corporations and unions in the field of women and children (MoWSS, 2012c). The MoWSS consists of eight directorates, each headed by Director Generals, reporting directly to the Under-Secretary, and 10 semi-autonomous agencies (including the Zakat Fund) all established by decree and directly under the Minister’s supervision. These directorates and semi-autonomous agencies serve a wide range of mandates related to social issues, underpinned by a wide range of scattered policies, strategies, and programs. There appear to be significant overlaps among the various mandates and program activities, which are coordinated via an array of coordinating mechanisms. Annex Figure 5.1 shows the 22 The word “takaful” comes from the Arabic root word Kafala, meaning "guarantee." Takaful is therefore the practice whereby individuals in the community jointly guarantee themselves against loss or damage (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (n.d). Takaful also means social volunteerism and has morphed into Islamic insurance (Atia, 2010, p. 9 and Salvatore et al, 2005, p. 86). 104 entire organizational structure of the MoWSS and summarizes the individual mandates of each of these directorates and semi-autonomous agencies. 105 Annex Figure 5.1: The Existing Institutional Social Policy Framework within the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security Source: Compiled by author with input from MoWSS representatives, 2012. The Directorates of the MoWSS This section outlines the range of different responsibilities and activities of each of the eight directorates of the MoWSS. 106 Social Program Directorate This directorate’s mandate includes organization, coordination, and capacity- and awareness-building to support “all vulnerable groups” and to educate social workers at both the federal and the state levels. It is responsible for the majority of MoWSS’s policies, a total of seven different policies with approximately one staff member per policy (total of 10 staff). It has two sub-units: (i) Social Protection and (ii) Social Security, which covers the elderly and orphans. The activities of the two sub-units are listed in Annex Box 5.1. Annex Box 5.1: Main Activities of the Social Program Directorate’s Sub-units The activities of the Social Protection and Social Security Sub-units include the training of social workers, including capacity-building at the state level and the training of trainers-of-trainers (ToT) of social workers. The Social Program Directorate is the only unit in the government that trains social workers. Currently, there are about 300 social workers in Khartoum and about 30 social workers in each state. There are not enough social workers to meet need/demand and not all states have the resources to complete the training needed to increase their numbers. The Directorate is currently developing a curriculum for social protection ToTs in partnership with the National Council for Children Welfare (NCCW) and other relevant stakeholders, which will contribute to curriculum development. The curriculum will focus on how to educate a homeless child; caring for street children; emergency housing for children; foster care; childcare, etc. The Directorate is currently seeking international technical assistance. UNICEF may cover some ToT training and printing costs but funding is limited. Other activities include: awareness building and capacity building in collaboration with civil society, police, security forces; enforcing policies and coordinating various planning efforts; coordinating among all governmental bodies/agencies related to social protection; and developing partnerships with NGOs. Source: Compiled by the author with input from MoWSS representatives, 2012 With seven different policies guiding this directorate, it aims to develop a comprehensive strategy for all its social programs. A committee, chaired by the Minister of MoWSS, has been formed to review a proposal for formulating this integrated social program. The directorate has put forward a road map to the Under-Secretary that proposes a four-phase process: (i) a historical overview of federal, state, and international social policies and programs; (ii) an assessment of current policies and programs; (iii) the development of some proposed policy interventions; and (iv) the development of program activities and 107 manuals, including setting social protection concepts in the Sudanese context, defining clear responsibilities for the different actors, developing a curriculum for policy formulation, developing an M&E mechanism, and develop manuals to specify objectives, beneficiaries, costs, and outcome indicators. The Social Programs Directorate is a member of a wide range of various forums and committees including: the Sudan National Aids Program (SNAP) Forum; the Forum of Homeless People; the National Committee for Eradiation of Drugs; the National Committee on Social Security;23the National Committee for the Security of Vulnerable Groups;24 the National Committee for the Elderly;25and the National Conference for Social Security.26 Women and Family Directorate The Directorate’s mandate is to set policy related to women and family issues, to mainstream gender issues in all sectors, to review and propose legal reform related to family and women’s issues, to build capacity at the federal and state levels, and to coordinate women-focused NGOs. Its sub-units are: (i) Projects; (ii) Family Affairs; (iii) NGOs; and (iv) States Affairs and Liaison. It also oversees two centers for women, namely the 23 The National Committee on Social Security was established in 1998 to build the capacity of relevant committees at the state level to enhance the contributions of the elderly and their role in society. Members include the Social Security Fund, the Pension Fund, Zakat, the Ministry of Education, NGOs and other stakeholders. 24 The National Committee for the Security of Vulnerable Groups was set up to encourage society to take responsibility for social issues and vulnerable groups and to mobilize social support for vulnerable groups. It is chaired by the Minister of the MoWSS, and a technical Committee has been established to identify and award actors in this area. 25 The National Committee for the Elderly was set up to ensure the provision of free health check-ups for elderly. Members include the Ministry of Health and the Social Security Fund. The Zakat bodies at the community level identify those to be covered in each state. 26 The National Conference for Social Security recently made 16 recommendations, one of which recommended the development of a National Food Bank to be introduced in all states, which is still at the proposal stage. The National Food Bank would be a pilot, and the WFP is a possible partner in its implementation. 108 Women’s Center for Peace and Development and the Women’s Center for Human Rights. The activities of all sub-units under this directorate are listed in Annex Box 5.2. Annex Box 5.2: Main Activities of the Women and Family Directorate 1. The Projects Sub-Unit’s activities include: the management, oversight, and monitoring of the following programs: the National Rural Women’s Empowerment Program (2012-2016) in cooperation with the Under- Secretary’s office (80 million SDG from the Central Bank of Sudan); UNFPA projects on reducing maternal mortality and researching the link between poverty and maternal mortality; an evaluation of states’ laws criminalizing FGM; Y-Peer (a youth program ); anti-FGM awareness campaigns; M&E units in the states for monitoring each program; gender mainstreaming in line ministries and in the states. 2. The Family Affairs Sub-Unit’s activities include: legal research and studies related to family protection; legal reviews and recommendations in line with international law; and reviews of the institutional framework and mechanism for implementing laws/legal arrangements. Currently, it has reviewed over 75 different laws classified at three levels: (i) directly family-related legal issues; (ii) family-relevant legal issues (such as labor laws for domestic workers); and (iii) other indirectly related legal issues (such as criminal law). The sub-unit is active in building awareness of family issues, using media coverage and other venues for dissemination of family issues and concerns. It prepares reports on family issues for the Arab League and works closely with International Arab University on research in the area. 3. The NGO Coordination Sub-Unit’s activities include: working with national NGOs that focus on women’s issues to build their capacity, facilitate their coordination, and supervise their work. Currently has a network of 159 women NGOs. Supported creation and registration of a national network of women-focused NGOs equivalent to the network of international NGOs. Developed a curriculum for training women-focused NGOs with financial support from the French Embassy. Also works toward the eradication of AIDS by participating in the ‘Women’s Alliance with Regard to AIDS” Committee, by encouraging women-focused NGOs to engage in the Sudanese National AIDS Plan (SNAP), and by disseminating information on the maternal mortality rate to women NGOs. 4. The States Affairs and Liaison Sub-Unit’s activities include: working with women’s units in each state on the dialogue on women’s issues as specified in the National Women’s Empowerment Policy of 2007, developing state-level policy in close coordination with the federal MoWSS, providing institutional support, training, capacity-building, and funding to the states on women’s issues, and receiving statistical reports about the poor and disabled from each state at a quarterly forum with states’ gender contact staff. 5. The Women’s Center for Peace and Development’s activities include: administering the Productive Families and Prize for most productive women; providing peace-building and cultural training in the states; and preparing for UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women in peace negotiations (funded by UN Women). 6. The Women’s Center for Human Rights’ activities include working for legal reform of the 26 laws that discriminate against women, women’s electoral participation (training and analysis funded by UN Women), and reform of women’s prisons. Source: Compiled by author with input from MoWSS representatives, 2012. The General Directorate for Women and Family Affairs is guided by the National Women’s Empowerment Policy (NWEP) (2007) and the Family Strategy (2008). The NWEP includes seven strategic pillars: (i) Women and Poverty; (ii) Women and Peace; (iii) Women and 109 Economy (Micro-Finance); (iv) Women and Decision-making; (v) Women and Education; (vi) Women and Health; and (vii) Women and the Environment. It is this policy that underpins the Directorate’s National Rural Women’s Empowerment Project. However, although the Family Strategy was approved in 2008, it has not begun to be implemented because of a lack of resources. A majority of the activities under this directorate, besides its main project, relate to legal issues and advocacy to improve the rights of women and families and to coordinate relevant NGO networks. This directorate serves an important function, which is cross-sectoral in nature. The General Directorate for Women and Family Affairs is in charge of the National Rural Women’s Empowerment Program (2012-2016). The program aims to reduce poverty and empower women economically, socially, and politically through: small income-generating schemes funded by micro-credits and soft loans (grants); training and capacity building; technical and institutional support for women directorates at the state level; access to credit facilitation services that link beneficiaries with micro-finance institutions; and the creation of local lending and financing cooperatives/groups for women and entrepreneurs. The program is being implemented in two phases, with first phase having been completed in 2012. It targets 200 women (or groups of women) per state and has a monitoring and evaluation framework in place to follow the progress and future outcomes of the program. Other projects under the General Directorate for Women and Family Affairs include: (i) UNFPA’s focus on social and cultural determinants in maternal health determinants, including overseeing and developing interventions to decrease the maternal mortality rate in collaboration with the MoH; (ii) the UNFPA project (closed) focusing on female empowerment and gender mainstreaming; and (iii) UN Women’s technical support on legal reform pertaining to laws discriminatory against women (closed); formulation of a national plan for implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on peace and women; restructuring of the General Directorate for Women and Family Affairs; establishment of a 110 National Research and Documentation Center for Women and Gender and Peace Building to collect gender-disaggregated data to allow for better analysis. Poverty Reduction and Coordination Center This Center’s mandate includes the organization, coordination and monitoring of the work of all government and non-governmental bodies in the area of poverty reduction. It has five sub-units: (i) Programs and Policy; (ii) Micro-finance; (iii) Small Enterprises (new); (iv) Information; and (v) Cooperation. The activities of these sub-units are listed in Annex Box 5.3. Annex Box 5.3: Main Activities of the Poverty Reduction and Coordination Center 1. The Programs and Policy Sub-unit’s activities include: the Social Support Program for Poor Families, an SSN started in 2011 that provides packages for poor families, including the Direct Cash Transfer Program. The unit has held discussions with the UNDP about piloting a conditional cash transfer program. It has negotiated technical assistance from the World Bank on poverty mapping, targeting, M&E as well as capacity building assistance from the African Development Bank. a/ 2. The Micro-finance Sub-Unit’s activities include: conducting a policy dialogue with the Central Bank, which handles micro-finance policy, particularly concerning target groups, micro-finance institutions (MFIs), and banks’ ability to lend; increasing the accessibility of financial services; and providing support for training and procedures. The Coordination Council for Micro-Finance is a new council under the MoWSS Under-Secretary. Partners represented on the Council include: the Savings and Social Development Bank, the National Rural Women’s Empowerment Project, the Foundation for Pensioners, and Zakat. The MoWSS is a member of the Higher Council of Micro-Finance, which is led by the First Vice-President, with representatives from various ministries, 3. The Small Enterprise Sub-unit is a new initiative currently without a guiding strategy. It is looking to partner with the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Industry, trade unions, and other relevant stakeholders with the aim of strengthening the capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). Its goal is to hold a workshop to begin formulating an SME strategy. 4. The Information Sub-unit’s activities: These include: maintaining and filing all relevant resources and research papers related to poverty-fighting programs and research. 5. The Cooperation Sub-unit’s activities. These include: coordinating and supporting state MoWSS offices and their staff and collaborating with and supporting NGOs, civil society, and the private sector in poverty- fighting initiatives. Source: Compiled by the author with input from MoWSS representatives, 2012. Note: The Central Bank’s Micro-finance Department leads the planning and oversight of micro-finance policy and implementation. The first policy covered 2007-2011, and a revised strategy for 2012-2016 has been developed. 111 One of the main activities of this Center has drafted of the National Report for Efforts on Poverty Reduction that is presented to the Council of Minister chaired by the President.27 The directorate is in charge of collecting all information relevant to poverty and poverty fighting initiatives in all of the line ministries. It leads a technical committee comprised of representatives of all government bodies at the federal level. It also leads the policy dialogue with Ministry of Finance on the Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) ‒ approved in 2012 ‒ was formulated under the leadership of the MoF, with input from MoWSS Poverty Fighting Directorate and serves as the guiding policy of the work of the Directorate as well as of many other agencies of the government. A full-fledged PRSP is forthcoming. Also, poverty fighting objectives are imbedded in activities and programs that are outside the direct control of the Poverty Fighting Directorate. These include micro-loans to rural women operated by the Women and Family Directorate and micro-lending by Zakat, the Savings and Social Development Bank (SSDB), and the Family Bank). These activities outside the Poverty Fighting Directorate are guided by the national objective to fight poverty through income-generating projects. However, in reality, these policies seem not to be fully aligned, many activities overlap, and no aggregated data exist on the programs’ actual number of beneficiaries, their impact, or their complementary functions. Policy and Planning Directorate This directorate’s mandate includes the coordination of policy, planning, and research of all of the MoWSS’s directorates and the monitoring of the implementation each directorate’s five-year strategic plans. Its sub-units are: (i) Policy; (ii) Planning; and (iii) Research and Studies. In total the directorate employs nine staff, most of whom work in the planning unit. 27 The last such report was presented in 2009. The final 2010-2011 report was finalized but not yet released. 112 International Cooperation Directorate This directorate coordinates and manages the relationships with regional and international stakeholders.28 Its eight-person staff works in two sub-units: (i) Regional Cooperation and (ii) International Cooperation. The directorate’s activities include formulating and maintaining bilateral agreements with states in the field of social welfare and development; strengthening relationships between the MoWSS and other authorities related to international cooperation; overseeing the use of technical assistance to improve the use of resources and to ensure that it is used to further social and indigenous priorities; and promoting and strengthening global partnerships and participating in global forums. Information Directorate This directorate connects the mail and file management system for all directorates within the MoWSS, collects all information from various directorates to disseminate and archive, and manages and maintains the MoWSS internet site.29 The MoWSS is connected with the Ministry of Science and Communication’s National Independent Network, to which the states are also connected. However, there is no direct linkage between the MoWSS and the state network. There is a proposal by the MoWSS to develop an integrated and more sophisticated MIS to facilitate data analysis. However, with a staff of only five, the directorate’s current resources do not allow for more than email and file management, which is still mostly paper-based. 28 This directorate expanded when the Ministry of International Cooperation was abolished in 2012. 29 www.welfare.gov.sd 113 The Strategic Center for Rehabilitation and the Social Center for Development and Culture These two centers have broad mandates covering a broad array of responsibilities, including studying social issues, assessing implementation impact of programs, establishing databases, coordinating state social affairs, supervising and implementing training, and rehabilitating and supporting social policies. The Semi-Autonomous Agencies of the MoWSS This section outlines the range of different responsibilities and activities of each of the semi- autonomous agencies overseen by the MoWSS. The ZAKAT Fund The Zakat Fund currently administers and implements the largest programs targeting the poor in Sudan. A Presidential Decree institutionalized the Zakat Fund as a semi-autonomous agency under the MoWSS. Its guiding principles are based on Islamic law. Its financial envelope is largely independent of that of the government, and its resources are generated by taxes collected according to Islamic practices.30 According to Islamic law, there are eight categories that warrant the support through this mechanism, two of which target the “poor” and the “extremely poor.” Zakat has four kinds of support focused on the poor and extremely poor households: (i) direct in-kind transfers; (ii) fee waivers for basic services, for example, in the form of paying health insurance premiums or school fees; (iii) micro-finance; and (iv) the expansion of basic services, such as the construction of a health center or a school. 30 Sudanese Muslims earning more than 10,000 SDG (about US$3,575) per annum are obligated by Islamic law to pay 2.5 Percent of their annual income to the fund. Contributions include other voluntary contributions by devoted Muslims and other Zakat taxes may apply. 114 For further information about Zakat, see the main report. National Pension Fund The National Pension Fund (NPF) had its beginnings in the early 20th century with the ratification of the Government Pension Law (1904) which secured a pension income for retired government officials.31 That law was the followed by the Civil Service Pensions Law (1962), the Public Service Pensions Law (1975), and the Public Service Pensions Law 1992,32 all of which gradually expanded benefits and coverage. In 2012, the Government paid the premiums for 183,333 pensioners under the NPF, which had a budget of 957 million SDG (US$167.9 million), of which 207 million SDG (US$36.6 million) was a temporary transfer from the MoFNE to provide an additional 200SDG per month33 (about US$35 per month) to its poor pensioners. About 1 percent of the NPF funds are spent on scholarships for the dependents of the pensioners and on health care coverage and other support for pensioners in need. Some retired workers from other branches of the public sector are covered by their own pension schemes such as the police, the military, and the judiciary. National Social Fund The National Social Fund (NSF) was established in 1974 to ensure pension coverage of those workers in the formal sector who were not covered by the NPF.34 The original decree was later amended several times (in 1978, 1990, and 2004) to expand coverage to include, for example, old age, early retirement, disability (in other words, accident insurance), and death (in other words, survivors and dependence coverage). An amendment also stipulated the legal retirement age (early retirement from 50 years old and compulsory retirement at 60 years old). The NSF covers all employers who employ one or more workers. There are 35 31 Information from National Pension Fund representatives, Khartoum, September 2012 32 http://www.welfare.gov.sd/En/more/Pensions_Fund.pdf 33 Increased from the original amount of 100 SDG per month (approximately US$17 per month) 34 National Social Fund representatives, Khartoum, September 2012 115 offices throughout Sudan. The NSF’s total budget in 2012 was 419 million SDG (US$73.5 million) receiving premiums for 307,000 members (67 percent based in Khartoum). There are 12,600 companies listed under the NSF, of which 71 percent are Khartoum-based. National Health Insurance Fund The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) funds the provision of free medical services to its members at health centers and hospitals and subsidizes the price of medicines at 25 percent of their value.35 The national social health fund existing by law since 1995 is presently governed by 1996, by National Health Insurance Law of 2003 and provides for compulsory social health insurance for public and private sector employees. The NHIF’s insurance services are available in all of the states. Its coverage rose from 12.7 percent of the population in 2005 to 30 percent in 2009. However, this was a lot lower than the target set by the Twenty-Five Year Strategic Plan 2003-2027, which was to provide comprehensive health coverage to the whole population by 2027.36 Coverage is compulsory for public sector employees but not for private sector companies with fewer than 10 employees. Additionally, following the 2003 amendment, private sector companies with 10 or more employees can opt out of the NHIF by paying an exemption fee. One of the main challenges for the NHIF is how to extend its services to the informal sector. Under the federal system, the states are autonomous but the NHIF has a national center to which all states are accountable (with the exception of the State of Khartoum). The NHIF maintains a health map to assist in its services and keeps a database with its members’ data and coverage. The NHIF does not cover the military or the police.37 Of the estimated 28 million of NHIF’s target group (or approximately 80 percent of total population), it is 35 National Health Insurance Fund representatives, Khartoum, September 2012 36 In the team’s conversation with NHIF representatives, they mentioned the year 2031 as the deadline for reaching full universal coverage. 37 The military has its own health insurance system with its own policy, contributions, and facilities. It is estimated to cover about 1.8 million people. 116 estimated that about 9 million or 25 percent are covered by the NHIF.38/39 When this is combined with the military pension plan (1.8 million people covered) and private insurance (0.7 million people covered), about 11.5 million people in Sudan are estimated to have some type of health insurance, about 33 percent of total population. It is further estimated that about 90 percent of formal workers in the public sector and 20 percent of those in the private sector is covered. National Council for Children’s Welfare The National Council for Children’s Welfare (NCCW) develops and executes policy in line with the international conventions to which Sudan is a signatory that promote the welfare and protection of children. The NCCW was established by Presidential Decree in 1991 to set policies, plans, and programs according to national and international policy; to monitor the implementation of the international and regional child conventions ratified by Sudan; to coordinate government institutions, including the police and military, on issues of child welfare; to establish an information system for child welfare; to represent Sudan at international and regional conferences on issues related to children’s welfare; to mobilize international and national financial assistance to support programs for children; and to advocate for increased awareness of children’s issues. Specifically, the NCCW is guided by: the Child Act (2010), the National Document for Child Welfare (2006-2015), and the National Strategy for the Abolition of Female Gender Mutilation (FMG/C) (2008-2018). The FMG/C strategy is being implemented through the 38 As the electronic database was being introduced, the NHIF found that some data related to the number of beneficiaries appeared to be inflated. One family member’s insurance covers the entire family under the same health insurance plan, but in the past, to estimate the total number of beneficiaries, including all family members, an average family size of 6.6 was applied to the total number of registered beneficiaries, which may have led to some inconsistencies. Generally, the NHIF chooses to rely on the data that are now in the electronic system as opposed to older data as the more recent data are more accurate. However, this means that the numbers may be under-counted until all beneficiaries, including family members, are included in the electronic database. 39 Khartoum State maintains its own health insurance system and the NHIF cannot verify the accuracy of the data. However, it is working to increase collaboration with Khartoum State and minimize any overlap of services. 117 National Program for the Abolition of FMG/C. Partners include government institutions, religious leaders, local and national figures, members of parliament, academia and research institutions, local community networks, civil society, and political parties. The main external partners are UNFPA, the DFID, UNICEF, and SIDA. The General Secretariat is the administrative and executive body of the Council. The President of Sudan chairs the NCCW, and the state governors are members of the Council. Each state has their own Council for Children’s Welfare, chaired by the state governor. The NCCW General Secretariat has the following core functions:  Preparing and developing national programs, plans, and policies and following up on their implementation.  Coordinating the activities and planning of government and non-government actors operating in the field of children’s welfare.  Helping to promote affordable services for children.  Attending conferences and forums related to children’s welfare.  Celebrating national, regional, and international occasions pertaining to children and childhood.  Issuing periodic reports concerning the implementation of national and regional conventions pertaining to children’s welfare. National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD) Established in 2010 by Presidential Decree, the National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD) develops and executes policy across cross-cutting areas and programs in line with the international Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to which Sudan is a 118 signatory. Considering its inter-sectoral nature, it was changed from a directorate to a council. Therefore, the NCPD is a new council within the MoWSS structure.40 The NCPD serves as the national coordination mechanism to ensure compliance with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The Convention is intended as a human rights instrument and defines a range of categorizations of people with disabilities. Additionally, Sudan’s Persons with Disabilities Act (2009)41 defines the definitions, types, and causes of disabilities with the aim of promoting the advancement of people with disabilities in various categories and based on their needs.42 The NCPD’s Five-Year Strategic Plan (2012-2016)43 aims to guide Sudan in implementing the CRPD and the Persons with Disabilities Act (2009) and in ensuring that 50 percent of the NCPD’s members are disabled 40 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol was adopted in December 2006 and became effective in May 2008. There were 82 signatories to the Convention, the highest number of signatories in history to a UN Convention. The CRDP clarifies and qualifies how all categories of rights apply to people with disabilities and identifies areas where adaptations have to be made for people with disabilities to effectively exercise their rights and areas where their rights have been violated, and where protection of rights must be reinforced. It is the first comprehensive human rights treaty of the 21st century and is the first human rights convention to be open for signature by regional integration organizations. http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150. 41 www.ncpd.gov.sd 42 This is done by: taking advantage of modern technology in training and rehabilitation programs for people with disabilities and their carers; conducting studies and research in the field of disability and using the results as input into the development of plans and programs; taking advantage of regional and international experience; strengthening the role of the family and society and adopting rehabilitation projects that involve family and community-based services to achieve results; integrating people with disabilities into the community and encouraging them to claim their political, social, and cultural rights; providing education, rehabilitative services, and health care to people with disabilities and their careers; ensuring equal opportunities in employment and adapting the working environment for people with disabilities; making positive changes in the built environment to make it more accessible to people with disabilities; creating empowerment programs for families and careers of people with disabilities; focusing on local, regional, and international cooperation in the field of disabilities to promote plans and programs of action; and harnessing modern technology to support various programs for people with disabilities. 43 The Five-Year Strategic Plan (2012-2016) lays out a detailed strategy for: (i) providing information and statistics on disability in Sudan as an input to appropriate policies and programs for the enforcement of the rights of disabled people as stipulated in the International Conventions; (ii) protecting and promoting the rights of disabled people in all policies and programs; (iii) ensuring the full and effective participation of disabled people in their communities; (iv) realizing equal opportunities for disabled people in society; (v) taking appropriate measures to eliminate negative discrimination on the basis of disability by people, official institutions, organizations, private sector companies, and communities; and (iv) promoting respect for the disabled, including for children and women, and developing the Ministry’s capacity to promote their rights and support their needs (MoWSS, n/d). 119 (see below). In 2011 CBoSTAT published a CD-ROM that analyzes the percentage of disabled people in Sudan. The NCPD is currently reconsidering the methodology for determining the numbers of disabled. The NCPD consists of a 33-member Council on which 50 percent of the members represent government institutions44 and 50 percent of members are people with disabilities. The Council meets every quarter and submits a performance report. As part of the NCPD’s capacity-building, it is working to establish councils at the state level. Additionally, there are 14 working groups within the NCPD that include representatives from a wide range of stakeholders, such as the media and the private sector. Specific activities of these working groups include mobilizing resources for the collection of reliable data on disabled people in Sudan, coordinating sectors and agencies on cross-cutting issues related to disability; raising awareness of issues related to disability and building the capacity of disabled people to contribute to their communities and society; monitoring and overseeing the implementation of and progress on relevant policies, treaties, and programs; and building capacity at the federal and state levels. National Population Council The National Population Council (NPC) originated from the International Population Conference of 1973. The Presidential Decree of 1995 established the NPC’s mandate to coordinate all population issues related to migration, fertility, and mortality; formulate population policy; analyze population data; and develop cross-sectoral policy recommendations. Although it is within the MoWSS, its mandate extends beyond social policy and includes the coordination and policy formulation of all population issues across 44 Of whom, 10 members are Under-Secretaries of various line ministries, and the remaining members are from specialized institutions. 120 multiple sectors. 45 It is a user of population statistics but does not produce any data. It has a mandate to implement policies but it does not implement programs. Rather, the NPC works to ensure that each line ministry integrates population policy into its sectoral policies. It also coordinates with the planning units of each line ministry to ensure that population issues are part of their programs and strategic plans, monitors policy implementation, and identifies any gaps between stated policy objectives and implementation. The first National Population Policy (2002) served as a policy guide for line ministries. The policy evolved through a collaborative process of over 600 representatives from a wide range of stakeholders. A revised policy is pending the endorsement of the Cabinet, primarily focused on improving the well-being of the population as opposed to controlling its size. It therefore focuses on issues related to mortality (infant mortality and maternal mortality), particularly on eight areas of policy (each involving two to three technical papers), and on Sudan’s commitment toward the Millennium Development Goals. Savings and Social Development Bank The Savings and Social Development Bank (SSDB) is owned by the MoFNE and the Central Bank and is subject to Central Bank regulations.46 It was originally established in 1974 as a rural bank in the Gazeera province, but, following the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen,47 a Presidential Decree transformed the SSDB into a national 45 Established by Presidential Decree in 1995, the NPC originates from the International Population Conference of 1973, which later evolved into the Research Department of the Higher Education Council, a small unit within the Ministry of Higher Education to promote the establishment of independent population councils. The coordination committee for the NPC has representatives from the Higher Technical Committee (the members of which are all Under-Secretaries from line ministries), the National Committee (which is chaired by the President and co-chaired by the Minister of MoWSS), the Technical Working groups (whose members are all from the planning units in the line ministries), regular NGO fora, and 15 state Population Councils (with the two new states still pending). 46 http://198.20.244.191/~ssdbank/sudasiteen/ 47 At the World Summit for Social Development, held in March 1995 in Copenhagen, participating governments reached a new consensus on the need to put people at the center of development. The Social Summit was the largest gathering ever of world leaders at that time. It pledged to conquer poverty, achieve 121 bank with a mission to support low-income families and to promote savings. It channels its resources to serve comprehensive economic and social development. It provides finance to private sector organizations that support the poor, artisans, productive families, professionals, women’s and social organizations, students, and groups supported by Zakat funds. It undertakes investment research in these sectors. The Central Bank’s National Micro-Finance Policy guides the SSDB’s micro-finance operations, which constitute 60 percent of its portfolio, the other 40 percent being for the commercial sector. The SSDB has 44 branch offices in 15 of the 17 states, with two new branch offices planned in the two newly formed states of West and Central Darfur. All of its branches provide micro-finance services. Under the supervision of the MoWSS, the Bank is managed by a Board of Trustees, with a Board of Directors with nine members including the General Manager of the SSDB, with six specialized departments, one of which is micro-finance. The SSDB serves the government’s stated goal to fight poverty; it coordinates the efforts of relevant agencies and institutions that focus on sustainable development; it helps to build administrative and financial management capacity in targeted sectors; it supports community participation in the planning, execution, and management of projects; it promotes women’s roles in the economy by providing training and financing; and it promotes commercial and social investments to promote equitable economic growth. 48 State Institutions Each state has its own constitution while the Local Government Act (LGA) provides the legal framework for the local governments (MoFNE, 2012). The federal and state constitutions as well as the LGA stress the principle of autonomy of the different levels of government and the goal of full employment, and foster social integration. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/text- version/index.html 48 http://www.welfare.gov.sd/En/bank.htm 122 the need for mutual respect for this autonomy.49 There are some key challenges to achieving an effective decentralization of power in Sudan including the lack of technical and institutional capacity at all levels, the inadequacy of financial resources at the state and local government levels to enable them to meet their constitutionally assigned responsibilities, the lack of real autonomy and participation of the population at the local government level, and the decision of the central government to decrease the amount of funds allocated to the states (UNDP, 2013). Local governments in Sudan are responsible for collecting local taxes and the delivery of key social services such as education and health. Also, through the Popular Committees, they play a critical role in security, development, and dispute resolution in each locality. However, local governments have very limited autonomy, and they need greater participation by their citizens to be effective in carrying out their mandates.50 Most interactions on social policy between the federal government and the state governments are between the representative of the relevant federal directorate and the assigned staff member at the state level. As there is no clear policy on social protection at the federal level and as there are only limited resources available to undertake social protection activities, the states are left to manage their own social protection programming and implementation. Currently, there is almost no state-level social protection or SSN programming except by the local offices of Zakat and the redistribution of in-kind assets such as livestock and harvested crops. The lack of the data needed to make informed decisions about social protection is a challenge, and what little information does exist at the local level is not necessarily reported to the federal level as there is no coordinated and 49 A High Council on Governance, headed by the President and consisting of selected federal ministers, the 15 (now 18) state governors and three experts nominated by the President, monitors progress in decentralization and resolves issues arising between states. 50 The Governor of the state appoints the political head of the locality ‒ the commissioner ‒ and the state government appoints and pays the staff of the locality from the locality’s share of revenue. The members of the local governments’ legislative councils are also paid by the state in the same manner. The decisions made by these legislatures, including the budgets, have to be approved by the state legislature (MoFNE, 2012). 123 comprehensive mechanism within which these data can be collected, monitored, consolidated, and evaluated. 124 Annex 6: Existing Strategic Framework for Social Protection Currently, there is a wide array of government policies, strategies, and action plans to guide social protection programming. This wide range of policies, strategies, and programs across multiple ministries, directorates and semi-autonomous agencies creates a scattered strategic policy framework for a broadly defined social protection sector. Annex Table 6.1 below presents a summary of the main policies, strategies and programs providing the existing strategic framework for social protection programming in Sudan. 125 Annex Table 6.1: Summary of Relevant Policies & Strategies by Ministry for Broadly Defined Social Protection Programming Relevant Ministry, Institution and/or Agency Relevant Policy, Strategy, Program, or Plan MoWSS – Social Program Directorate National Policy for Welfare of Elderly National Policy for Social Service Education (training for social workers) National Policy for Supporting Orphans National Policy for Eradication of AIDS National Policy for Resolving Problems with Homelessness National Policy for Eradication of Drugs National Policy for Street Children Comprehensive Social Program Policy (forthcoming) MoWSS – Policy and Planning Directorate Integrated Social Policy (forthcoming) MoWSS – Poverty Reduction and Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (2012) - includes a Coordination Center and Ministry of Finance commitment to SSNs under the Human Development Pillar & National Economy and a commitment to a National Social Protection Strategy National Poverty Reduction Strategy (forthcoming) MoWSS – Family and Women Directorate National Women Empowerment Policy (2007) National Family Strategy (2008) MoWSS – International Cooperation Various bilateral and regional agreements related to the Directorate ministry; no policies per se. MoWSS – Zakat Chamber Islamic Law MoWSS – National Center for Children’s Convention of the Rights of the Child Welfare National Document for Child Welfare (2006-2015) Child Act (2010) National Strategy for Abolition of Female Gender Mutilation (FMG/C) (2008-2018) a/ MoWSS – National Center for Disability UN Convention for Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP) Persons with Disabilities Act (2009) Five-Year Strategic Plan (2012-2016) MoWSS – National Population Council National Population Policy (2002) Revised National Population Policy (forthcoming) Ministry of Education Revised National School-feeding Policy (2012-2106) in close collaboration with the WFP (pending) Education for All Ministry of Health National Nutrition Policy (2008) Revised National Nutrition Policy (pending - status unconfirmed) MoWSS – National Health Insurance Fund Presidential Decrees (1995, 2001, 2003, and forthcoming) MoWSS – National Pension Fund Public Service Pension Law (1994 and 2004) MoWSS – National Social Fund Presidential Decrees (1974, 1978, 1990, and 2004) Sudanese Expatriates Social Insurance Act (1997) Central Bank of Sudan Central Bank of Sudan Micro-finance Policy (MoWSS – Family Bank) (MoWSS – Savings and Social Development Bank) Central Bureau of Statistics National Statistics Policy Ministry of Interior National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (2009) (formerly under Humanitarian Affairs) 126 Ministry of Finance/Ministry of Petroleum Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Development Aid Strategy (forthcoming) Ministry of Petroleum Energy Subsidies – no known policy Humanitarian Aid Commission United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) (2012-2016) Source: Compiled by the author Note: a/ The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol was adopted in December 2006; opened for signature on 30 March 2007. There were 82 signatories to the Convention, the highest number of signatories in history to a UN Convention (http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150). In the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP), the government committed itself to the formulation of a National Social Protection Policy. Efforts to develop an integrated policy have been ongoing within MoWSS since 2007 with support from the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and others, but these efforts have not yet been consolidated into a coherent policy vision. 127 Social Protection & Labor Discussion Paper Series Titles 2012-2014 No. Title 1416 Madagascar Three Years into the Crisis: An Assessment of Vulnerability and Social Policies and Prospects for the Future by Philippe Auffret, May 2012 1415 Sudan Social Safety Net Assessment by Annika Kjellgren, Christina Jones-Pauly, Hadyiat El-Tayeb Alyn, Endashaw Tadesse and Andrea Vermehren, May 2014 1414 Tanzania Poverty, Growth, and Public Transfers: Options for a National Productive Safety Net Program by W. James Smith, September 2011 1413 Zambia: Using Social Safety Nets to Accelerate Poverty Reduction and Share Prosperity by Cornelia Tesliuc and W. James Smith, March 2013 1412 Mali Social Safety Nets by Cécile Cherrier, Carlo del Ninno and Setareh Razmara, January 2011 1411 Swaziland: Using Public Transfers to Reduce Extreme Poverty by Lorraine Blank, Emma Mistiaen and Jeanine Braithwaite, November 2012 1410 Togo: Towards a National Social Protection Policy and Strategy by Julie van Domelen, June 2012 1409 Lesotho: A Safety Net to End Extreme Poverty by W. James Smith, Emma Mistiaen, Melis Guven and Morabo Morojele, June 2013 1408 Mozambique Social Protection Assessment: Review of Social Assistance Programs and Social Protection Expenditures by Jose Silveiro Marques, October 2012 1407 Liberia: A Diagnostic of Social Protection by Andrea Borgarello, Laura Figazzolo and Emily Weedon, December 2011 1406 Sierra Leone Social Protection Assessment by José Silvério Marques, John Van Dyck, Suleiman Namara, Rita Costa and Sybil Bailor, June 2013 1405 Botswana Social Protection by Cornelia Tesliuc, José Silvério Marques, Lillian Mookodi, Jeanine Braithwaite, Siddarth Sharma and Dolly Ntseane, December 2013 1404 Cameroon Social Safety Nets by Carlo del Ninno and Kaleb Tamiru, June 2012 1403 Burkina Faso Social Safety Nets by Cécile Cherrier, Carlo del Ninno and Setareh Razmara, January 2011 1402 Social Insurance Reform in Jordan: Awareness and Perceptions of Employment Opportunities for Women by Stefanie Brodmann, Irene Jillson and Nahla Hassan, June 2014 1401 Social Assistance and Labor Market Programs in Latin America: Methodology and Key Findings from the Social Protection Database by Paula Cerutti, Anna Fruttero, Margaret Grosh, Silvana Kostenbaum, Maria Laura Oliveri, Claudia Rodriguez-Alas, Victoria Strokova, June 2014 1308 Youth Employment: A Human Development Agenda for the Next Decade by David Robalino, David Margolis, Friederike Rother, David Newhouse and Mattias Lundberg, June 2013 1307 Eligibility Thresholds for Minimum Living Guarantee Programs: International Practices and Implications for China by Nithin Umapathi, Dewen Wang and Philip O’Keefe, November 2013 1306 Tailoring Social Protection to Small Island Developing States: Lessons Learned from the Caribbean by Asha Williams, Timothy Cheston, Aline Coudouela and Ludovic Subran, August 2013 1305 Improving Payment Mechanisms in Cash-Based Safety Net Programs by Carlo del Ninno, Kalanidhi Subbarao, Annika Kjellgren and Rodrigo Quintana, August 2013 1304 The Nuts and Bolts of Designing and Implementing Training Programs in Developing Countries by Maddalena Honorati and Thomas P. McArdle, June 2013 1303 Designing and Implementing Unemployment Benefit Systems in Middle and Low Income Countries: Key Choices between Insurance and Savings Accounts by David A. Robalino and Michael Weber, May 2013 1302 Entrepreneurship Programs in Developing Countries: A Meta Regression Analysis by Yoonyoung Cho and Maddalena Honorati, April 2013 1301 Skilled Labor Flows: Lessons from the European Union by Martin Kahanec, February 2013 1220 Evaluating the Efficacy of Mass Media and Social Marketing Campaigns in Changing Consumer Financial Behavior by Florentina Mulaj and William Jack, November 2012 1219 Do Social Benefits Respond to Crises? Evidence from Europe & Central Asia During the Global Crisis by Aylin Isik-Dikmelik, November 2012 1218 Building Results Frameworks for Safety Nets Projects by Gloria M. Rubio, October 2012 1217 Pension Coverage in Latin America: Trends and Determinants by Rafael Rofman and Maria Laura Oliveri, June 2012 1216 Cash for Work in Sierra Leone: A Case Study on the Design and Implementation of a Safety Net in Response to a Crisis by Colin Andrews, Mirey Ovadiya, Christophe Ribes Ros and Quentin Wodon, November 2012 1215 Public Employment Services, and Activation Policies by Arvo Kuddo, May 2012 1214 Private Pension Systems: Cross-Country Investment Performance by Alberto R. Musalem and Ricardo Pasquini, May 2012 1213 Global Pension Systems and Their Reform: Worldwide Drivers, Trends, and Challenges by Robert Holzmann, May 2012 1212 Towards Smarter Worker Protection Systems: Improving Labor Regulations and Social Insurance Systems while Creating (Good) Jobs by David A. Robalino, Michael Weber, Arvo Kuddo, Friederike Rother, Aleksandra Posarac and Kwabena Otoo 1211 International Patterns of Pension Provision II: A Worldwide Overview of Facts and Figures by Montserrat Pallares-Miralles, Carolina Romero and Edward Whitehouse, June 2012 1210 Climate-Responsive Social Protection by Anne T. Kuriakose, Rasmus Heltberg, William Wiseman, Cecilia Costella, Rachel Cipryk and Sabine Cornelius, March 2012 1209 Social Protection in Low Income Countries and Fragile Situations: Challenges and Future Directions by Colin Andrews, Maitreyi Das, John Elder, Mirey Ovadiya and Giuseppe Zampaglione, March 2012 1208 World Bank Support for Pensions and Social Security by Mark Dorfman and Robert Palacios, March 2012 1207 Labor Markets in Middle and Low Income Countries: Trends and Implications for Social Protection and Labor Policies by Yoonyoung Cho, David Margolis, David Newhouse and David Robalino, March 2012 1206 Rules, Roles and Controls: Governance in Social Protection with an Application to Social Assistance by Lucy Bassett, Sara Giannozzi, Lucian Pop and Dena Ringold, March 2012 1205 Crisis Response in Social Protection by Federica Marzo and Hideki Mori, March 2012 1204 Improving Access to Jobs and Earnings Opportunities: The Role of Activation and Graduation Policies in Developing Countries by Rita Almeida, Juliana Arbelaez, Maddalena Honorati, Arvo Kuddo, Tanja Lohmann, Mirey Ovadiya, Lucian Pop, Maria Laura Sanchez Puerta and Michael Weber, March 2012 1203 Productive Role of Safety Nets by Harold Alderman and Ruslan Yemtsov, March 2012 1202 Building Social Protection and Labor Systems: Concepts and Operational Implications by David A. Robalino, Laura Rawlings and Ian Walker, March 2012 1201 MicroDeterminants of Informal Employment in the Middle East and North Africa Region by Diego F. Angel-Urdinola and Kimie Tanabe, January 2012 To view Social Protection & Labor Discussion papers published prior to 2012, please visit www.worldbank.org/spl Abstract The Sudanese population has suffered from years of conflict, and deep-seated security issues have severely hampered Sudan’s long-term economic stability and social development. As a consequence, Sudan is struggling to meet its MDGs. Since the secession of South Sudan, Sudan has lost a considerable part of its oil production and fiscal revenues. At the same time, the Government recognizes social safety nets as important instruments for reducing poverty. This report provides an analysis of the state of social safety nets in Sudan which shows that Sudan’s existing safety net programs are limited in coverage, lack coordination, as well as monitoring and evaluation. The report suggests (i) reallocation of savings from the fuel subsidy reform to targeted pro-poor safety net programs; (ii) strengthening of the existing safety net through monitoring the outcomes, strong controls and social accountability, and a culture of evaluation, and (iii) development of a coherent National Social Protection Policy. About this series... Social Protection & Labor Discussion Papers are published to communicate the results of The World Bank’s work to the development community with the least possible delay. The typescript manuscript of this paper therefore has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formally edited texts. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. For more information, please contact the Social Protection Advisory Service, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Room MSN G8-803, Washington, D.C. 20433 USA. Telephone: (202) 458-5267, Fax: (202) 614-0471, E-mail: socialprotection@worldbank.org or visit the Social Protection website at www.worldbank.org/sp. Printed on recycled paper