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The World Bank

Report No: ICR2583

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-30790)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 39.6 MILLION
(US\$53.3 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

THE REPUBLIC OF COTE D'IVOIRE

FOR AN

EDUCATION AND TRAINING SUPPORT PROJECT

February 28, 2013

Education – West Africa
AFCF2
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective February 15, 2013)

Currency Unit = CFA Francs (CFAF)

FCFA 100 = US\$0.20

US\$1 = 492 CFAF

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BEP	Project Implementation Unit (<i>Bureau d'Execution des Projets</i>)
CAFOP	Teacher Training Institutes (<i>Centres d'Animation et Formation Pédagogique</i>)
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCICI	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Côte d'Ivoire (<i>Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie</i>)
CG	Consultative Group
CICSE	Inter-ministerial Committee for the Coordination of the Education Sector (<i>Comité Interministériel de Coordination du Secteur de l'Education</i>)
COGES	School Management Committee (<i>Comité de Gestion Scolaire</i>)
CPEF	Promotion Unit for the Education of Girls (<i>Cellule de Promotion de l'Education des Filles</i>)
DREN	Regional Directorate for National Education (<i>Direction Régionale de l'Education Nationale</i>)
DRENF	Regional Directorate for National Education and Basic Training (<i>Direction Régionale de l'Education Nationale et de la Formation de Base</i>)
EGRG	Economic Governance and Recovery Grant
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrollment Rate
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
ISDS	Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet
ISR	Implementation Status and Results report
KPI	Key Performance Indicators
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENFB	Ministry of National Education and Basic Training (<i>Ministère de l'Education Nationale et de la Formation de Base</i>)
MESRIT	Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Technological Innovation (<i>Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation Technologique</i>)
MESRS	Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (<i>Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique</i>)
METFP	Ministry of Vocational and Professional Training (<i>Ministère de l'Enseignement Technique et de la Formation Professionnelle</i>)

METFPA	Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational and Craft Training (<i>Ministère de l'Enseignement Technique, de la Formation Professionnelle et de l'Artisana</i>)
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NER	Net Enrollment Rate
NETDP	National Education and Training Development Plan
PASEC	Program for the analysis of education systems of the confederation of ministers of education (<i>Programme d'Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN</i>)
PASEF	Education and Training Support Project (<i>Project d'appui au Secteur Education/Formation</i>)
PCAP	Post-Conflict Assistance Project
SIGFIP	Integrated Public Finance Management System (<i>Système Intégré de Gestion des Finances Publiques</i>)
SPASS	Education Statistics System
WDR	World Development Report

<p>Vice President: Maktar Diop Country Director: Madani M. Tall Sector Manager: Peter N. Materu Project Team Leader: Hamoud Abdel Wedoud Kamil ICR Team Leader: Hamoud Abdel Wedoud Kamil</p>

REPUBLIC OF COTE D’IVOIRE
Education and Training Support Project

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A. Basic Information			
Country:	Côte d'Ivoire	Project Name:	Education and Training Support
Project ID:	P035655	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-30790
ICR Date:	2/28/2013	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	GOVERNMENT
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 39.60M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 39.28M
Revised Amount:	XDR 39.60M		
Environmental Category: B			
Implementing Agencies: Bureau d'Exécution des Projets (BEP)			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	11/01/1995	Effectiveness:	09/25/1998	09/25/1998
Appraisal:	01/27/1998	Restructuring(s):		08/12/2008 04/05/2010 08/16/2011
Approval:	05/29/1998	Mid-term Review:	09/25/2000	06/28/2002
		Closing:	12/31/2002	08/31/2012

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Satisfactory	Government:	Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	Satisfactory
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	Satisfactory
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Unsatisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	6	6
Primary education	39	39
Secondary education	38	38
Sub-national government administration	5	5
Tertiary education	12	12
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Decentralization	13	13
Education for all	25	25
Gender	25	25
Participation and civic engagement	13	13
Rural services and infrastructure	24	24

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Makhtar Diop	Jean-Louis Sarbib
Country Director:	Madani M. Tall	Shigeo Katsu
Sector Manager:	Peter N. Materu	Helena Ribe
Project Team Leader:	Hamoud Abdel Wedoud Kamil	Bettina Moll
ICR Team Leader:	Hamoud Abdel Wedoud Kamil	
ICR Primary Author:	Sandra Beemer, Franco Russo	

Project Development Objectives

The objectives of the Project as recorded in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) dated June 17, 1998 are to assist the Government in its efforts to: (i) strengthen its capacity to carry out a comprehensive basic education reform program; (ii) increase

access to, and improve completion rates in, primary education; and (iii) to improve the quality of instruction and learning outcomes for students in primary and lower secondary education.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The objectives of the Project are to assist the Borrower to resume the delivery of education services in primary schools, which implies: (i) providing quality school inputs to guarantee teaching and learning in classrooms, and (ii) improving access to education and retention of primary school children. (Date August 15, 2008; Type Level one)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Repetition Rate (% children repeating in the beginning of a school year)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	22%	14%		18.7%
Date achieved	SY 2007/08	SY 2011/12		SY 2011/12
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target missed but the overall trend is positive. The repetition rate for Grades 1-6 (CP1-CM2) includes large disparities with Grade 1 (CP1) at 13.9% and Grade 6 (CM2) at 30.8%. CM2 remains high because CM2 students cannot transition to lower secondary due to limited spaces. The repetition rate drops to 16.6% if CM2 data is excluded.			
Indicator 2 :	Primary Completion Rate			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	46%	50%		64.2%
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded.			
Indicator 3 :	Gross Enrollment Rate in Primary			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	74%	82%		83.6%
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded.			
Indicator 4 :	Gross Enrollment Rate in 1st Grade			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	71%	80%		76.4%
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012

Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target was missed by 3.6%. However, the trend is positive and the progress is substantial considering the post-conflict status and the fact that schools were closed during the 2010 conflict.
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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Construction of Lower Secondary Schools			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	8		9
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded. 9 colleges built and 1 rehabilitated. 8 were built in rural areas and chosen based on school mapping and to relieve transition pressure from CM2 to lower secondary or overcrowding (in the case of Bouaké).			
Indicator 2 :	Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions. (core indicator)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	300		300
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The target was met. A technical audit was carried out and found the structures to be of sound and good quality.			
Indicator 3 :	Textbooks purchased			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	6,326,215		6,791,971
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded. In addition, the project helped the government in reaching the HIPC target for textbooks per child.			
Indicator 4 :	Teachers trained pre-service to minimum qualifications and certification requirements. (core indicator)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	7,276		13,665
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target was exceeded by training a total of 9,768 primary school teachers and 3,897 lower secondary school teachers.			
Indicator 5 :	Teacher trained in-service			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	9,790		9,790

Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target was met. This indicator was introduced at the end of the project to meet Africa Region Core Indicator requirements. The breakdown of the total is: 2,400 teachers trained in the competency-based approach with 7,390 teachers receiving upgrading.			
Indicator 6 :	Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	48%-Primary 40%-Secondary		45%-Primary 41.9%-Secondary
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achievement of this target was mixed: the primary school target was missed while the lower secondary school target was exceeded.			
Indicator 7 :	Strategic and operational capacity of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research reinforced			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	Yes		Yes
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target was met. The ministry's capacity was reinforced by the project with training. In addition, it has developed a sector strategy that is now being used to guide higher education reform.			
Indicator 8 :	Strategic and operational capacity of the Ministry of National Education (MEN) reinforcement.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	Yes		Yes
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target was met. The MEN developed an education sector plan (ESP) that was endorsed by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). In addition, MEN purchased SPASS education statistics system that will be integrated into an education management information system (EMIS) during the GPE project.			
Indicator 9 :	Pre-service teacher training strengthened			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	4 pre-service institutions re-opened in the ex-rebel controlled zones.		All 14 CAFOPs were re-opened with 2 CAFOPs fully renovated
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded. In addition, all 14 institutions received pedagogical materials for staff and students.			
Indicator 10 :	Assessment of student achievement outcomes carried out in one grade of primary and secondary respectively.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	Testing carried out in one grade in primary and one grade in		Assessment of Student learning was carried out in Grades 2 and 5

		secondary.		(PASEC) and Grade 3 by MEN.
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target met. The assessments were conducted and baselines established for grades 2, 3 and 5. No lower secondary assessment was carried out. MEN will conduct another assessment School Year (SY) 2012/13 for grades 2, 3 and 5.			
Indicator 11 :	System for learning assessment at the primary level and utility of the learning assessment system (core indicator).			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	No	Yes (3.00)		Yes (3.00)
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target met.			
Indicator 12 :	Curriculum reform in primary completed and implemented. New curriculum introduced in pre-service teacher training institutions and existing teachers received in-service training.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	Curriculum reform in primary completed and implemented		Curriculum was developed for primary schools and implemented in the pre-service training program.
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target met. An in-depth analysis of the reform was carried out and areas of improvement were identified. The MEN is now working on making modifications based on the analysis.			
Indicator 13 :	Target for textbook-pupil ratio in primary school achieved			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	1:3 – Primary 1:5 – Secondary		1:3 – Primary 1:5 - Secondary
Date achieved	6/30/2008	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target met. In addition to meeting the project target the HIPC target of 3 textbooks per child was also met.			
Indicator 14 :	Direct Project Beneficiaries-% female (Core Indicator)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	N/A	2,400,000 44%		2,888,000 45%
Date achieved	6/30/2012	8/31/2012		8/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target was met. The beneficiaries include students, school administrators, teachers, communities that received new schools, and ministry education staff that participate in the capacity training.			
Indicator 15 :	Literacy services expanded in the central, northern and eastern parts (zones CNO)			
Value quantitative or	N/A	3,000 (of which 75% women)		3,000 (of which 75% women)

Qualitative)				
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target was met. 3,000 adults participated in short-term literacy training.			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	02/17/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.11
2	04/28/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.11
3	05/14/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.15
4	06/29/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.16
5	12/23/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.37
6	02/16/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.37
7	09/21/2000	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	2.74
8	12/15/2000	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	2.76
9	06/12/2001	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	2.76
10	12/18/2001	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	2.76
11	03/22/2002	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	2.72
12	06/26/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.87
13	10/17/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.87
14	04/21/2003	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	4.44
15	11/11/2003	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	4.59
16	05/27/2004	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	5.93
17	04/28/2005	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	5.93
18	12/23/2008	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	8.70
19	06/30/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	9.48
20	12/22/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	14.73
21	02/17/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	20.90
22	06/29/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	29.74
23	02/27/2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	41.01
24	12/04/2011	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	46.91
25	06/27/2012	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	51.79
26	08/26/2012	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	54.81


H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
08/12/2008	Y	U	U	5.07	Post-conflict portfolio restructuring; extension of closing date.
04/05/2010	N	MS	MS	21.78	Extension of the closing date; reallocation of credit proceeds.
08/16/2011	N	MU	MS	43.64	Extension of closing date.

If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below:

	Outcome Ratings
Against Original PDO/Targets	U
Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets	MS
Overall (weighted) rating	MS

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. **Country Context.** In early 1994, following the devaluation of the CFA Franc (CFAF), Côte d'Ivoire had successfully implemented a multiyear program of economic recovery and reform, aimed at achieving sustained economic growth and restoring financial viability with the assistance of the International Development Association (IDA), the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The result of the comprehensive adjustment strategy adopted in 1994 was that real gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 2.1 percent in 1994 to 7.1 percent in 1995 and 6.8 percent in 1996. The 12-month inflation rate fell from 32.2 percent in December 1994 to 3.5 percent December 1996. At the same time a comprehensive strategy to manage external and internal debt was put in place. All external payment arrears to official bilaterals and multilateral creditors and most domestic arrears were cleared by the end of 1996. The economic situation had a substantial impact on all the social indicators which fell below the norms for most countries with similar income levels.

2. In the late 1990s, Côte d'Ivoire underwent severe political and social crisis, culminating in a brief civil war which effectively divided the country in two. It was estimated in the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) "Conflict, Security and Development" that "civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty". During the period 2000-06, the annual real GDP declined 0.4 percent. This combined with the 1.7 percent average population growth, resulted in an annual per capita real GDP decline of 2.1 percent, aggravating already very high unemployment levels, especially among youth. Poverty increased from an official 38.2 percent just before the crisis in 2002 to 43.2 percent in 2006. Côte d'Ivoire was in debt distress. Another phenomenon during this time was the increase in global food prices, which led to unprecedented increases in the prices of rice, cooking oil, and other food items and to food shortages.

3. **Sector Context.** The Bank approved three education credits in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1970s. When the last education project closed in 1986 the Bank was absent from the sector¹ until 1991 when IDA supported an adjustment operation (Human Resource Development Program – HRDP, 1991-1996) covering all human resources sectors. In 1998, the first education sector specific project, since 1986, the Education Training and Support Project (PASEF) was approved by the Bank Board of Executive Directors. At this time, the population of Côte d'Ivoire was expected to grow from 14 million in 1997

¹ The implementation period of the third Bank--supported project coincided with the onset of a long and severe economic recession, which put a strain on resources for education. Through its dialogue, the Bank sought to find approaches to respond to these pressures. However, there was no consensus on the issues and IDA was absent from the education sector as a lender from 1986 to 1991 when IDA supported the HRDP project. (PAD, p. 7)

to 27 million by 2015. Approximately 36.8 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. Protein-calorie malnutrition was 20 percent in urban areas and 28 percent in rural areas. The adult literacy rate was estimated at 43 percent (higher among females at 32 percent). Children under the age of 15 accounted for 45 percent of the population and net enrollment rate (NER) at the primary school level was less than 51 percent (41 percent female). Access to education for children in poor households was 41 percent and 30 percent in the poorest. Quality of education was poor with 22.8 percent repetition in first grade and 42.5 percent in sixth grade and the primary school completion rate was less than 40 percent. The primary GER for boys was 80.9 percent and 61.4 percent for girls in 1996/97. There were high costs and poor accessibility for poor households and low efficiency within the public education system.

4. In order to begin to deal with these issues, government adopted a goal of universal primary education by 2010. At the Consultative Group (CG) meeting in 1995, the CG set out its strategy to achieve this goal as well as to attain greater quality, access and efficiency. The CG document provided a conceptual framework for the development and implementation of sector-wide reforms, but still gave a strong sense of central top-down planning, with more emphasis on infrastructure than on teaching and learning. An education law based on an improved strategy was approved by the National Assembly in September 1995, followed by a draft National Policy Statement on Education and Training. There were two participatory planning seminars that brought together stakeholders including teacher unions, sector personnel and donors and from these seminars the National Education and Training Development Plan (NETDP) emerged. The NETDP also established proposals for donor support in other areas including literacy, vocational training and higher education. It was presented at a Donor Round Table in September 1997. The NETDP was characterized by three essential features: (i) coverage of all education sub-sectors; (ii) support to broader economic, social and personal development; and (iii) open and responsive management of the education system.

5. The 2001/02 socio-political instability also had an impact on enrollments. During this period gross enrollment rates (GER) dropped from 76 percent in 2001/02 to 53.3 percent in 2002/2003, which coincided with the onset of the political instability. Only in 2008/09 did GER reached 76.2 which was the pre-crisis level. Data collection was difficult during the political instability because the areas under the “Force Nouvelles” control were not accessible. In addition, Côte d’Ivoire had four assessments of student learning between 1995 and 2012, including two with the support of the Program for the Analysis of Education Systems (PASEC) in 1996 and 2009. The comparison between school performance in 1995/96 and 2008/09 shows that in grade 2, the average learning score declined by 16.1 points and in grade 5 by 17.1 points. This represents an average annual decline of approximately 1.3 and 1.4 respectively over the conflict period. Furthermore, this period was marked by destruction of classrooms, closing of some teacher training institutes (*Centres d’Animation et Formation Pédagogique – CAFOP*) as well as deterioration of CAFOP facilities, limited availability of textbooks, and teaching materials. The deterioration of the education system led to the decision to restructure the project with a focus on primary education.

6. **Project Context.** The PASEF project became effective on September 25, 1998, which was a politically volatile time for Côte d'Ivoire and had a lasting impact on overall implementation. An evaluation of the PASEF project requires a full understanding of the political context within which the project was implemented. In 1999, Côte d'Ivoire had begun to experience significant political turmoil, the government went into arrears and the project was suspended in 2000. In 2002 the arrears were cleared and project funds were available immediately. The political turmoil culminated in a civil conflict in 2002-2003 so that on September 19, 2002 the country was divided into two parts –with the “*Forces Nouvelles*” holding the north and west and the government in control in the southern and central regions. During this period, real GDP contracted by 6 percent and poverty increased from an official 38 percent before the crisis to 42 - 44 percent after the crisis.

7. In March 2004, tensions escalated again and resulted in an additional four years of civil conflict and a suspension of all World Bank activities. A breakthrough was achieved with the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords on March 4, 2007. The Bank's support to the peace process was a pre-arrears clearance grant, the Post-Conflict Assistance Project (PCAP, US\$120 million) approved by the Board on July 17, 2007 and the Economic Governance and Recovery Grant (EGRG, US\$308 million) approved by the Board on April 1, 2008. Clearance of arrears paved the way for the reactivation of Côte d'Ivoire's suspended portfolio that included the PASEF project. On July 29, 2008 the PASEF project was reactivated in the post-conflict setting. It only took 12 days after reactivation for the funds to be available to support the rebuilding of the education system in Côte d'Ivoire which was a major benefit of having the PASEF project in the portfolio.

8. Shortly after the October 2010 elections, the country entered another phase of civil conflict and in February 2011 project disbursements were suspended again until June 7, 2011 when the conflict ended and the government cleared their arrears again. Again, the funds were immediately available to support the education system and re-open schools.

9. **Côte d'Ivoire Donor Context.** Côte d'Ivoire has relatively few partners active in the education sector. The United Nations Children's fund (UNICEF), and some NGOs support primary education but most of the other major partners only support post-primary education and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET). The EC, the French Cooperation and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have been providing support to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and youth employment. The AFD is planning a TVET project; and the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), with EC and World Bank financing, has been implementing activities in labor intensive public works, youth employment and the reintegration of ex-combatants to address post-conflict emergency needs.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

10. The objectives of the Project as recorded in the DCA dated June 17, 1998 were to assist the Government in its efforts to: (i) strengthen its capacity to carry out a

comprehensive basic education reform program; (ii) increase access to, and improve completion rates in, primary education; and (iii) to improve the quality of instruction and learning outcomes for students in primary and lower secondary education. Progress would be evaluated on the basis of the following:

Indicator	Baseline (1997)	Target (2001-2002)
Gross enrollment rate increase	72%	79%
Proportion of female students increase	42%	45%
Average grade repetition decrease	23%	20%
Introduction of standardized testing of learning achievement	Not Available	Not Available
Increase in completion rates	Not Available	Not Available
Improvement success rate in national school leaving exam	Not Available	Not Available
Decline in time and cost required by student to complete each level of schooling	Not Available	Not Available

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

11. The level one restructuring of the project on August 15, 2008 led to revisions in the PDOs and key performance indicators (KPI). The new PDOs were to assist the Borrower to resume the delivery of education services in primary schools, which implied: (i) providing quality school inputs to guarantee teaching and learning in classrooms, and (ii) improving access to education and retention of primary school children. The new KPIs—along with their respective baseline values and expected outcome targets—were modified and became the following:

Indicator	Baseline 2008¹	Target 2010	Target 2012²
Gross enrollment rate in grade 1	71%	80%	80%
Gross enrollment rate in primary	74%	82%	82%
Primary Completion Rate	46%	50%	50%
Repetition Rate (% children repeating in the beginning of a school year)	22%	14%	14%

¹Baseline date represents data for the school year 2007/08.

²The August 2011 project restructuring to extend the closing date to August 31, 2012 did not change the project targets.

12. The primary reason for the restatement of the PDO was to align the objectives of the project with country's recovery needs and the Government's post-conflict priorities after years of conflict and the associated devastation. The new PDO and activities would also be aligned with the government's donor-endorsed Education Recovery Restoration Plan (ERRP) that was prepared in mid-2007 which focused almost entirely on supporting the restoration of basic education service delivery.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

13. The project beneficiaries of the 2008 re-structured project were a highly vulnerable group. A diagnosis of the project areas by the Ministry of State and Ministry of Planning and Development showed that there had been a decrease in the number of students because schools were closed or destroyed and there was pressure in safer areas because people were fleeing areas of conflict or tension. As a result, the project targeted approximately 2.4 million primary school-age children and 450,000 lower secondary students. The other beneficiaries were approximately: (i) 17,300 teachers that received pre-service and in-service training; (ii) 15,000 school staff, as well as parents and communities where new classrooms were constructed; (iii) 3,000 adults that received literacy training; and (iv) 3,000 staff at the Ministry of National Education (MEN), the Regional Directorate for National Education (DREN), the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESRS) and Ministry of Vocational and Professional Training (METFP). The approximate total of direct beneficiaries is 2.88 million, of which 43.9 percent were women.

1.5 Original Components

The original project design included the following five components:

14. **Project Component 1: Improving Learning at the Primary and Secondary Levels. (US\$26.5 million equivalent, of which US\$18 million IDA)** This component aimed to strengthen the role of the school in improving teaching and learning, both at the primary and secondary levels. It supported changes in the curriculum to increase the relevance of education and aimed to increase the availability of textbooks while shifting textbook publishing to the private sector. This component had five sub-components: (i) revision of curriculum content and implementation; (ii) school-based pre-service and in-service teacher training; (iii) applied research and pedagogical innovations; (iv) provision of textbooks in the targeted areas; and (v) a student learning evaluation system. Each sub-component was designed with particular attention to promoting girls' education.

15. **Project Component 2: Expanding Access to Primary Schools and Colleges (US\$36.7 million equivalent, of which US\$19.5 million IDA).** This component aimed to increase access to primary and secondary schools in underserved and unserved areas through a construction and renovation program accompanied by a sustainable school maintenance program. These activities were to focus on small schools with multigrade classrooms and schools with combined preschool and first grade classes (*classe préparatoire unique* - CM3 and CP1) instead of first and second grade classes (CP1 and CP2), to facilitate access in areas that were less populated or which had a low enrollment rate among girls and disadvantaged children. Small neighborhood secondary schools (*collèges de proximité* or *collèges de petite échelle*) were also to be constructed. The component aimed to renovate four teacher training institutes (CAFOPs) in the targeted areas. This component had two sub-components: (a) school construction and renovation; and (b) school maintenance.

16. **Project Component 3: Developing Institutional Capacity (US\$7.0 million equivalent, of which US\$6.1 million IDA).** This component supported the improvement and strengthening of the planning, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacities of MENFB at all levels, including strategic resource planning. Planning for girls' education and the health of school children. This component's five sub-components aimed to provide the necessary inputs for: (i) decentralization; (ii) strategic planning and management; (iii) improved resource management; (iv) creation of a girls' education promotion unit (*Cellule de Promotion de l'Education des Filles - CPEF*); and (v) school health and nutrition.

17. **Project Component 4: Enhancing Strategic Sector Planning and Sector Coordination (US\$9.6 million equivalent, of which US\$7.5 million IDA).** This component aimed to ensure better coordination of the education sector as a whole, by: (i) increasing relevance and external efficiency. It had three sub-components: (i) strategic planning and management of higher education; (ii) strategic planning and management of vocational and professional training; and (iii) sector coordination and dialogue.

18. **Component 5: Project Management (US\$2.3 million equivalent, of which US\$1.5 million IDA).** The Project Implementation Unit – PIU (*Bureau d'Exécution des Projets - BEP*) and regional branches. Project management of civil works was organized both through a central service based in Abidjan and its regional branches (*antennes régionales*) within the ten DRENFB.

1.6 Revised Components

19. During the July 29, 2008 restructuring the project components were also realigned to support the post-conflict priorities of the government by focusing on the restoration of basic education service delivery. The new components were articulated as follows:

20. **Component 1: Improving the quality of basic education (US\$27.7 million equivalent).** This component involved: (i) developing, printing, and distributing textbooks and teachers' manuals to achieve a ratio of three textbooks for students in grades 1 and 2, and five textbooks for each student in grades 3 to 6, and improving the existing textbook rental scheme in primary schools; (ii) finalizing the primary education's curriculum reform based on the competency-based approach and providing related training to teachers and other pedagogic supervisors in the school districts; (iii) strengthening the national student evaluation system, conducting student evaluations in one grade in primary and secondary education, and analyzing and distributing the results; (iv) rehabilitating and re-equipping teacher training centers (CAFOP), providing teaching and learning materials to student-teachers and training teacher-trainers in the competency-based approach; (v) supporting the National Literacy Support Fund (FNAA) to provide literacy training to 3,000 people (of which 75 percent would be women) in the zones under *Forces Nouvelles* control; and (vi) purchasing, through the World Food Programme (WFP), and delivering food to 400 primary schools in the regions of Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, Dimbokro, Daloa and Gagnoa from September 2008 to June 2009.

21. **Component 2: Supporting access to primary and lower secondary education (US\$16.2 million equivalent).** This component aimed to finance the construction and equipping of 300 primary classrooms and 8 lower secondary schools – these were to be largely new constructions. The number of teachers available was adequate (including volunteers who became *de facto* teachers during the 2004 crisis) and the Government’s education budget could support their salaries. Despite some localized issues, there were no salary arrears.

22. **Component 3: Developing institutional capacity (US\$17.8 million equivalent).** This component included support and capacity building for each of the three ministries of education², but with a larger focus both financially and technically on the MEN. First, the Project aimed to reinforce the strategic and operational capacity of the MEN through: (i) the setting up and staffing of a 4-person strategic executive unit located in the Minister’s Cabinet; (ii) the development and installation of an education and management information system (EMIS); (iii) the strengthening of human resources in charge of education statistics, human resource management, school mapping, elaboration of an education Country Status Report (CSR) and support for the Education For All- Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) endorsement process; and (iv) the re-equipping of central and decentralized MEN structures. Second, in both the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (METFP) and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESRS), support was provided for: (i) the development and installation of an EMIS; (ii) human capacity development – notably by means of technical assistance (TA) – in the areas of statistics, human resource management, Public Expenditure Review (PER/EPTS); (iii) studies and consultations for the elaboration of national strategies in the technical and vocational training sector and higher education; and (iv) a limited number of vehicles and equipment for planning divisions and a few decentralized structures in the METFP and MESRS.

23. **Component 4: Project management (US\$4.4 million equivalent).** This component financed the running costs of the project execution unit (BEP). The BEP was responsible for fiduciary management, civil works management, programming and monitoring of project activities, and production of execution and audit reports. Expenditures under this component included: (i) the purchase of new equipment; (ii) operating costs; (iii) consultant services; (iv) studies; and (v) training.

1.7 Other significant changes

24. On October 31, 2000 the Bank suspended disbursements for the project because the government was in arrears. By January 30, 2002 the government cleared the arrears and disbursements began shortly thereafter.

² The three Ministries of Education remained largely the same as under the original project but with slightly different names: (i) Ministry of National Education (*Ministère de l’Education Nationale – MEN*); (ii) Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (*Ministère de l’Enseignement Technique et de la Formation Professionnelle – METFP*); and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (*Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique – MESRS*).

25. December 23, 2002, IDA, at the request of the government, granted a six-month extension of the original project closing date from December 31, 2002 to June 30, 2003 due to the ongoing civil conflict.

26. In June 2003, the Côte d'Ivoire country portfolio was restructured and, at that time, the project closing date was extended from June 30, 2003 to June 30, 2004.

27. On June 14, 2004 the government went into arrears again and the project disbursements were suspended on June 15, 2004. This suspension lasted until April 2, 2008 when four years of civil war ended and the government cleared their arrears thereby paving the way for reactivation of the Côte d'Ivoire suspended portfolio. On July 29, 2008, four projects in the Côte d'Ivoire portfolio were restructured as a part of the Bank's re-engagement, and the PASEF project was one of them. The restructuring retroactively extended the project closing date from June 30, 2004 to August 30, 2010. It also eliminated the borrower portion of the overall project costs but maintained the total credit amount of SDR39.6 million. During the four year suspension, the project benefitted from fluctuations in the SDR:US\$ exchange rate. In 1998 the SDR:US\$ equivalent value of the project was US\$53.3 million and by July 2008 it was US\$66.1 million. The restructuring modified the project activities to focus almost entirely on supporting the restoration of basic education service delivery and used the additional resources to support teacher training, literacy and respond to the country's food crisis. The restructuring: (i) restated the PDO as indicated above; (ii) simplified the project components by reducing the number of project activities and combining the original components 3 and 4; and (iii) added three new activities to help: (a) respond to the food crisis, its impact on school children and their education, (b) improve literacy; and (c) rehabilitate teacher training centers (CAFOP) that were in a state of disrepair after so many years of neglect due to the crisis. This restructuring also reduced the overall scope of classroom construction from 900 to 300 for new classrooms and 300 rehabilitated classrooms and reallocated project resources (see Table 1).

Table 1: 2008 Restructuring of Project Resources

Component	Initial Project (PAD): as % of total	Restructured Project: as % of total
Learning Improvements	32.0	41.9
Expanding Access	44.3	24.4
Institutional Strengthening (Combined 3 and 4)	20.1	26.9
Project Management	3.6	6.8

28. In 2009, the project was restructured to increase the procurement thresholds.

29. In March 2010, the project was restructured again to: (i) extend the project closing date from August 30, 2010 to August 30, 2011; and (ii) reallocate the Credit proceeds between disbursement categories.

30. On February 12, 2011, disbursements were suspended one more time because the government was in arrears. This suspension was lifted on June 7, 2011.

31. On August 16, 2011, the project was restructured for the final time. At this time, the project closing date was extended from August 30, 2011 to August 30, 2012. This extension was requested to complete ongoing activities so that the PDO could be achieved and critical activities completed such as the school feeding program and the purchase of additional desks that were financed by the project.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

32. **Project Preparation.** In 1997, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the Bank initially considered a sector-wide education operation that was to be supported by a Sector Investment Program (SIP) instrument. It was ultimately decided that this type of operation would not be appropriate because the strategies for technical and higher education were not sufficiently developed, and this would create unnecessary delays for implementation of reforms to basic education. The Bank preparation and appraisal teams consisted of technical experts that were appropriate for the development of the project. Project preparation was also spread over several months, which allowed for the development and continuation of a sector-wide dialogue with the government, all three education ministries (MENFB, METFPA and MESRIT) and the donor community. This was done in an effort to engender strong and sustained political leadership, championship and ownership, which the team felt were important for the success of the project. On the government side, the development the NETDP, meetings and workshops, were used to build consensus around the NETDP among donors, the rest of government and civil society in support of the NETDP education reforms. The project preparation process seems to have been thoughtful, collaborative, and technically sound and to the extent possible, based on lessons learned from previous operations.

33. **Original Project Design.** The original PASEF project design fit squarely into the NETDP, the HIPC agreement and the associated HIPC education sector targets, as well as the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). They shared the common objectives of supporting growth, rapid poverty reduction, and improved public sector managements and recognized the strong links between universal basic education, high economic growth and poverty reduction. The project design took into consideration comments by the peer reviewers which, in 1997, were responsible for providing the quality guidance on the project. The quality reviewers included two Bank education specialists as well as an outside reviewer who worked for the Institute of International Research on improving educational quality. The preparation team also incorporated lessons learned from past sector investment loans (SILs) and the adjustment program, such as: (i) the need for specific interventions in the education sector rather than relying on a programmatic approach through the Ministry of Finance; (ii) ensuring that sectoral policies were addressed in ways that were consistent with the broader macroeconomic environment; and (iii) ensuring that projects were responsive to national and regional economic

conditions and demand for skills. Initial discussions included adopting a “Sector Investment Program” approach. However, other sub-sector strategies were not sufficiently developed at the time of project preparation, which led to the project being developed as a SIL.

34. The project design included the appropriate activities to assist the government in reaching their goal of universal basic education (UBE) and improved quality through: (i) expanding access to schools in underserved and unserved areas; (ii) focusing on girl’s education; (iii) dealing with weak capacity to deliver education services with the inclusion of a sector capacity building component; and (iv) improving quality through teacher training, provision of textbooks and learning assessments. It also included a critical pre-investment component to move the sector-wide dialogue forward in the areas of vocational training and higher education. To support the implementation of all these activities, it was decided that: (i) there would be an oversight group that included representatives from all three education ministries; (ii) MENFB would coordinate all communication with the Bank, and (iii) the BEP would handle all of the financial management and procurement activities. This structure was appropriate to ensure continued ownerships by all three ministries, and the BEP had the capacity and experience to implement Bank procurement and financial management. Finally, the results framework for the project was derived from the NETDP and HIPC education targets which were appropriate.

35. **Restructuring Design.** In 2008, after four years of civil war and suspension of the Bank’s Côte d’Ivoire portfolio, the project was restructured as part of the Bank’s support for the country’s emergency recovery. The restructuring was again fully aligned within the three strategic objectives of the Bank’s Interim Strategy Note (ISN) which were to: (i) support stabilization after the crisis and assist government in addressing key conflict factors through implementation of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords; (ii) assist war-affected populations by way of community rehabilitation and support for the provision of basic social services; and (iii) assist economic recovery and reform by focusing on economic governance and fostering demand for accountability. As mentioned, the restructuring modified the project activities to focus almost entirely on supporting the restoration of basic education service delivery, reducing the scope of the overall project and used the available resources to support teacher training, literacy and respond to the country’s food crisis. The project’s institutional arrangements remained the same because they were judged to be valid and appropriate for implementation. Finally, the results framework was also redesigned to measure the simplified project structure with new baselines and targets to match the country reality after four years of civil war. Specifically, Component 1 included: (i) almost twice as many textbooks and teachers’ guides than originally programmed; (ii) a new school-feeding initiative, which had to be extended for an additional year due to the 2011 crisis; and (iii) a new literacy program to support those who missed the chance for an education due to the political and security situation prevalent at the time. Similarly, Component 2 added a particular emphasis on providing schools with 30,870 additional student desks to help replace the large numbers lost due to years of conflict. Lastly, Component 3 moved beyond its original focus of providing mostly technical assistance and small information technology

equipment to the three ministries: the conflict required the project to support both physical replacement of assets (computers, office furniture and vehicles) as well as capacity building. These new activities represented a marked shift in the project with the focus now on restoring the delivery of basic education services.

36. The restructuring was appropriate particularly in light of the post-conflict fragile state status of Côte d'Ivoire at the time of re-engagement. The project was important because it was able to provide needed resources for the sector immediately and quicker than an emergency operation because the funds were readily available upon clearing of the country's arrears. Providing resources quickly had a direct impact on bringing teachers, students and school administrators back into the education system.

2.2 Implementation

37. The PASEF project was in the Côte d'Ivoire country portfolio for 14 years. During this period, the project was formally suspended for a total of 5 years and 4 months. Implementation of the project was successful to a greater or lesser extent depending on the time period: phase one was the period September 1998 to April 2008 and phase two, the post-restructuring period, was August 2008 to August 2012. As previously mentioned, there were many exogenous factors that complicated implementation over the project period. Despite many implementation challenges, the project had many successes most of which were achieved following restructuring.

38. During phase I (9/1998-4/2008), the project disbursed only 10.4 percent of the total credit. During the first 16 months following Board approval, the project made good progress: (i) project effectiveness occurred three months after board approval; (ii) progress was being made toward recruiting the required TA for the revision of the curriculum, learning evaluation and teacher training reform; (iii) procurement and distribution of approximately 1.2 million primary school textbooks in the 61 targeted areas had taken place; (iv) teacher training institutions (ENSs) were moving quickly on pedagogical reform; (v) studies were launched for the new computerization scheme (EMIS) and job post evaluation; (vi) training on the new financial management system had been provided to staff at the regional level; (vii) a draft program for school health and HIV/AIDS had been endorsed by government; (viii) the Bank's no objections had been issued for the construction of 300 classrooms; and (ix) counterpart funds were being provided as agreed.

39. Implementation of Component 3: Sector Development and Coordination component was mixed: (i) capacity building activities in METFP and MESRS slowed due to replacement of the ministers and turnover of key staff associated with these changes; and (ii) the inter-ministerial committee (*Comité Interministeriel de Coordination du Secteur de l'Education - CICSEF*) that was to be the coordination mechanism was legally established but was functioning at a basic level, particularly after the August 1999 reshuffle of the government. Project management was hampered by the introduction of a highly complex and cumbersome Integrated Public Finance Management System (*Système Intégré de Gestion des Finances Publique - SIGFIP*), which required multiple

approval steps and delayed disbursements and therefore payments to contractors. Despite the 1999 *coup d'état* and slow disbursements, the PDO indicators were being measured and data were available to Bank supervision teams. Based on the initial implementation progress, the project was rated satisfactory during this time.

40. By September 2000, there were still delays in payments and disbursements as a result of SIGFIP. This whole process was being further aggravated by the late adoption of the 2000 budget that was caused by the 1999 *coup d'état*. Activities were moving forward albeit it with counterpart funding because the country went into arrears and project disbursements were suspended. At this time, the PDO rating and project management were downgraded to unsatisfactory. In January 2002 the arrears were cleared and in June 2002, the Bank conducted a mid-term review (MTR) of the project. Upon completion of the MTR, the DO was upgraded to satisfactory because the government had continued to implement project activities. In addition, data showed positive trends toward achievement of the DO with increases in GER, girl's participation rates and pass rates.

41. In September 2002, civil war broke out in Côte d'Ivoire and all Bank missions were stopped. The Bank and the government implementation team, continued to supervise the project through video conference meetings as well as reverse supervision missions. Based on these "supervision" findings, the project was rated unsatisfactory because many activities could not be implemented, especially in the North where the *Forces Nouvelles* were in control. After the signing of the Marcoussis Peace Agreement: (i) the Bank re-engaged, (ii) the closing date was extended to June 30, 2004; (iii) disbursements started to pick up; and (iv) the Bank and government began discussions on a proposed project restructuring to address the post-conflict nature of Côte d'Ivoire. At this time, there was a real benefit to having the PASEF project in the country portfolio because it meant that funds were immediately available to support the education sector. However, the 2004 restructuring never materialized because by June 2004, Côte d'Ivoire was in arrears again due to government instability and shortly thereafter, all Bank activities were suspended due to the civil war which lasted four years. The last ISR for this implementation period was archived in April 2005.

42. Phase two (8/2008-8/2012) was marked by Bank re-engagement in a post-crisis, fragile state environment for Côte d'Ivoire. Again, as mentioned, one of the most important benefits to having the PASEF project in the country portfolio was that funds were immediately available to support the education sector. During this period, the project disbursed 88.8 percent of the project funds. This was due, in large part, to the restructuring of the project, which simplified the PDO and reduced the activities to focus mainly on primary education. The simplified project structure with the focus on basic education was appropriate for the post-crisis situation due to the fact that the education sector had not functioned for five years and the need was for inputs to rebuild the system and capacity building to deliver education services. During this period, project implementation began slowly due to the fact that institutions need to be reestablished. However, once the BEP was re-engaged, project disbursements began to move.

43. In early 2009, the Bank placed the task team leader in Côte d'Ivoire to work closely with the government to solve project problems more effectively and efficiently. This had the intended effect as the Bank was able to quickly respond to implementation issues and guide the BEP in the day-to-day management of the project. By 2010, in a post-crisis fragile state situation, project disbursements had increased from 10.4 percent to 68.9 percent with a commitment rate of 95 percent. This could be seen by the fact that: (i) primary school classrooms were being constructed, (ii) textbooks were being purchased and delivered; (iii) teachers were being trained; (iv) schools were being re-equipped; (v) CAFOP were being rehabilitated and supplied with furniture; and (vi) institutional capacity was being strengthened through management training. This is an impressive achievement for a sector that needed to be rebuilt after 10 years of a combination of civil war and social unrest/insecurity. As mentioned earlier, the project experienced one more period of political instability. Shortly after the October 2010 elections, the country had another phase of civil conflict and in February 2011, project disbursements were suspended due to arrears until June 7, 2011, when the government cleared the arrears. Despite this civil conflict, project activities continued and by the project closing date, all activities were completed and the project had disbursed 99.2 percent of project funds.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

44. **Design.** As stated previously, the original set of indicators for the project were appropriate for the project design and reflected the project design practices of the time. The indicators were linked to the PDO and were adequate to measure achievement of the PDO. The intermediate indicators were also linked to the components and included details on the various units responsible for collecting the data. After the 2008 restructuring, the PDO indicators were focused and closely aligned with project objectives, the intermediate indicators linked to the project investments, and the data collection responsibilities clearly articulated (see datasheet for full list of indicators). The original project design and the restructured project design both sought to develop and install an Education Management Information System (EMIS) and the design for the EMIS activities proved to be appropriate for the project.

45. **Implementation and Utilization of Monitoring and Evaluation.** During phase one of implementation, education data was being collected and reported on by the government albeit hampered at times by the unstable political situation. The statistics office of the MEN did provide Bank missions with data and information that allowed the teams to make judgments on progress toward achieving the PDO and the project's implementation progress. This information was regularly reported on by the Bank in aides-memoire and ISRs. The implementation of a full EMIS system that was envisioned in the original design was not realized during the first phase of implementation. Again, this was mainly due to the political and fiscal instability of the country, which made procurement of goods and services difficult.

46. After the 2008 restructuring, the M&E activities improved. The MEN began to focus on developing an integrated EMIS system. MEN purchased an education statistics

system (SPASS) as a transitional data software to allow them the ability to process data quickly while they worked on developing an integrated EMIS system. The regional education offices (*Direction Régionale de l'Enseignement Nationale - DRENS*) received IT equipment and training to facilitate the collection of data for SPASS. The SPASS became fully operational in 2010/11 and was used to produce statistics for the new yearbook 2011/12. The project was not able to develop a fully integrated EMIS system for the MESRS or METFP during the project life; however, the new Global Partnership for Education (GPE) project design supports the SPASS's integration into a full-fledged EMIS.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

47. **Safeguards.** The project was originally classified as a Category C based on the Bank's Operational Policy in 1997 and on the fact that no environmental risks were foreseen and construction would comply with national environmental laws. There was a social assessment during project preparation in 1998. During the 2008 project restructuring, the environmental category was changed to Category B because it included school construction and at that time an environmental assessment was done. A new Integrated Safeguard Data Sheet (ISDS) was prepared and disclosed in the InfoShop. An Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared, approved and disclosed in Côte d'Ivoire and the InfoShop in April 2008. There was a post-project environmental audit that showed that construction and rehabilitation activities were carried out in accordance with the ESMF and that the project was in compliance with all safeguards requirements.

48. **Fiduciary and Procurement Compliance.** As mentioned previously, the BEP was responsible for implementing the project under the MEN. The BEP fiduciary management capacity was satisfactory for the implementation of the original project and the restructured project according to OP/BP 10.02. At the time of restructuring, the financial management software was updated and project personnel were trained by Bank staff on new fiduciary requirements and procedures for Bank projects. By project closing, there were no outstanding FMRs and PASEF was fully compliant with the submission of the quarterly interim financial reports (IFRs). The Bank received the second-to-final project audit report for 2011, which was qualified due to fact that some of the supporting documentation related to the 2004 and 2005 counterpart funds was not included in the records. In response to the audit, the government hired a consultant to assist in providing clarification to the issues raised in the audit report. The MEN was able to provide the additional documentation that led to a revision in the audit report to unqualified status by project closing. The final 2012 audit report is in the process of being completed and is due by June 30, 2013.

49. Financial management (FM) capacity within the BEP was weak because there was a lack of training and support during the civil crisis. When the project restarted in 2008 the Bank had new procedures for FM that required retraining and upgrading of skills. This support was provided however, at one point in June 2012 FM was downgraded to unsatisfactory because of lingering capacity constraints. These constraints

were discussed with the Minister of National Education and it was agreed to hire two additional accountants for the project. The additional support helped improve the financial management performance and led to 99.2 percent of project funds being disbursed by project closing. Project procurement was conducted in accordance with Bank policies and procedures. However, towards the end of the project implementation period, the BEP displayed capacity issues related to solving issues of nonperforming contracts for the production and delivery of student desks. These issues led to procurement being downgraded to unsatisfactory in June 2012. By project closing, the PIU, with TA support, was able to cancel the nonperforming contracts, sign new contracts, and ensure that all the desks were delivered to schools before project closing.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

50. There are two emergency projects currently being implemented in Côte d'Ivoire that were designed to sustain the achievements and build on the successes of PASEF. The Emergency Basic Education Support Project (P119328), which is funded by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) with the Bank as the supervising entity, was approved and became effective on April 2, 2012. It supports: (i) access to basic education services through rehabilitation and replacement of primary classrooms, providing desks; and promoting access to lower secondary schools particularly for girls; (ii) improving the quality of teaching and learning through pre-service and in-service teacher training, learning assessment; pedagogical inputs and school health and nutrition; and (iii) strengthen institutional capacity through clarification of national, central and school levels, training of regional level education management staff and strengthening the roles and responsibilities of communities through school-based management committees. The Bank-supported Emergency Youth Employment and Skills Development Project (P122546), approved in September 15, 2011 and effective on December 27, 2011, provides support for improved access to temporary employment and skills development opportunities through skills training and literacy programs.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

51. **Relevance of Objectives.** The original project objectives were **highly relevant** to the country's sectoral needs when the project was developed. The project objectives fit into the Bank's CAS and the HIPC agreement's objectives of economic growth and poverty reduction through improved education services. Moreover, the government had adopted a goal of universal basic education (UBE) and the project objectives fit squarely into assisting the government in reaching their goal of UBE by 2010. While the original project objectives were relevant at the time of design, years of civil war created a country environment that warranted a more narrowly focused project objective as the country began to rebuild in a post-conflict fragile state environment. The revised project objectives were also **highly** relevant to supporting the restoration of basic education services, teacher training and literacy and continue to fit into the current CAS.

52. **Relevance of Design.** The original project design was appropriate for assisting the government in reaching their goal of UBE. Therefore, the relevance is judged to **substantial**. In addition, the relevance of the restructured design is judged to be **substantial**. This judgment is based on the fact that the: (i) PDO was linked directly to the post-conflict status of Côte d'Ivoire; (ii) PDO indicators were simplified and new baselines provided that reflected the country situation; and (iii) components were simplified to focus on basic education with project activities that directly address the sector needs and post-conflict realities.

53. **Relevance of Implementation.** The immediate availability of project funds after each Bank re-engagement led to the fast resumption of implementation and supports a higher relevance for overall project implementation. The relevance of phase one project implementation is judged to be **modest**. This is mainly based on the exogenous factors that impacted implementation such as: (i) civil war; (ii) country arrears; and (iii) introduction of the SIGFIP system that had a negative impact on project disbursements. It should be noted that despite the various exogenous factors, the PIU did continue to implement some project activities with counterpart funds and attempted to meet the supervision and reporting obligations when the country situation permitted such activities. Phase two project implementation relevance is judged to be **substantial**. Although there was a slow start to the implementation of phase two, the rating is based on the fact that: (i) all project activities were implemented; (ii) 99.2 percent of funds were disbursed; (iii) BEP monitored project safeguards; and (iv) MEN improved capacity to deliver education services as well as their ability to monitor and evaluation the education system with the use of SPASS.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

54. Prior to restructuring, data related to the original PDO indicators were being collected and used for measuring progress toward achievement of the project's objectives. However, progress toward achievement of the PDO was mixed, varying between satisfactory and unsatisfactory depending on the political situation, and the Bank and government's access to information to measure progress. Based on this, the achievement of the PDO prior to restructuring is rated **moderately unsatisfactory**.

55. After restructuring of the project, four new outcome indicators were introduced to measure progress toward achievement of the PDO. This section evaluates the outcomes against the results framework developed during the 2008 restructuring and other indicators of system performance. The overall rating for the project post-restructuring is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

56. **Improved access and retention** was to be measured by an increase in GER in primary schools, increase in gross enrollment rate in first grade and increase in the retention rate. The enrollment rate in primary schools increased from 74 percent in 2008 to 83.6 percent in 2011/12 exceeding the project target. The gross enrollment rate in first grade increased from 71 percent in 2008 to 76.4 percent, missing the target of 80 percent. Although the project missed the target by 3.6 percent, the trend is positive and it is a

substantial increase considering that the 2010 civil conflict closed schools and prevented children from attending. During the implementation period, repetition rates for Grades 1 – 5 fell from 22 percent in 2008 to 16.6 percent in 2011/12 missing the target of 14 percent. Again, while the target was missed by 2.6 percent, a decrease of 5.4 percent in a post-conflict environment is a substantial achievement.

57. The intermediate indicators used to measure improved access were: (i) additional primary school classrooms built or rehabilitated and (ii) construction of lower secondary schools. The project constructed 300 primary school classrooms, which met the project target. The project constructed 9 lower secondary schools (or *collèges*) surpassing the target of 8 and helped finance the rehabilitation of an additional lower secondary school. These lower secondary schools were mainly in rural and semi-rural areas which had been under “*Forces Nouvelles*” control. Their locations were chosen on the basis of school mapping data and responded to the urgent need for investment in lower secondary school places. There was also an independent technical audit of the construction to determine the quality of schools built. The audit concluded that the project built and equipped 300 primary schools and 9 colleges. The audit highlighted the difficult conditions of the country because of the various crises that the country experienced. The audit also determined that the quality of the construction was good. In addition, it showed that communities constructed the schools and that the activity was important for bring communities back together around a common purpose of improving education within their communities.

58. **Providing quality school inputs to guarantee teaching and learning in classrooms** was measured, at the PDO level, by increased primary school completion rates. During implementation of the restructured project, the primary completion rate increased from 46 percent in 2008 to 64.2 percent in 2011/12, surpassing the project target of 50 percent. This is a substantial achievement.

59. The following intermediate indicator results were recorded: (i) textbooks purchased, delivered and in use in the classroom based on an implementation audit conducted by the MEN were 6,791,971, exceeding the target of 6,326,215; (ii) pre-service teachers trained to minimum qualifications and certification requirements at the primary level were 9,768 and at the secondary level 3,897, far exceeding the target of 7,276; (iii) in-service primary and lower secondary school teachers trained were 9,790 meeting the target; and (iv) textbook-pupil ratio in primary school was achieved with a primary ratio of 1:3 in grades 1-3, and 1:5 in grades 4-6, which was also related to the HIPC target.

60. The project also conducted a validation exercise that confirmed the delivery of textbooks and did a review of the competency-based curriculum that was being taught in the teacher training institutions. The MEN used the findings of the assessment to make modifications to the curriculum to better align it with the needs of students.

61. With regard to the textbooks, school equipment and teacher training supported by PASEF, the 2009 Country Status Report (CSR) found that 58 - 67 percent of the

differences in results between students were related to what happens inside the school. The report also found that, all things being equal, the grade 6 primary exam success rate was higher for students who had reading and mathematics textbooks than the students in schools without such books. The report also found that having two or more students share a mathematics book³ significantly and negatively impacted their ability to learn. Analysis show that having a reading textbook per student could increase a student's success rate by 0.5 percentage points and 1.5 percentage points in the case of mathematics textbooks. In terms of furniture, a 2009 PASEC analysis showed that only 51.89 percent of students in grade 2 and 63.07 percent of students in the grade 5 shared a desk with only one other student. The model results showed a significant and negative relationship between the number of students per desk (if greater than or equal to three) and student learning, which means that making desks available in all schools would increase the success rate of final exam students.

62. Furthermore, the CSR found that the presence of a canteen, electricity and latrines had a positive impact on school results in national examinations, keeping all other things equal. Students in grade 2 located in well-equipped schools would benefit from a better learning environment, and were more likely to do better in school. The study further showed that the success rate during the final exam improved by 0.33 points if schools had canteens, 1.07 points if the school had electricity and 1.12 points if latrines were available.

63. The pre-service teacher training was strengthened by the re-opening of 14 CAFOPs, including the rehabilitation of two CAFOPs, and the provision of pedagogical materials for staff and students, which met the project target. The project also introduced a new primary school curriculum and teachers were trained in the new curriculum, meeting the project target. A learning assessment for grades 2, 3 and 5 was also carried out with support of the project, which established baselines and met the project target. The MEN will conduct another assessment in SY2012/13. The ICR datasheet and Annex 2 provide additional information on the project achievements.

3.3 Efficiency

64. Implementation efficiency related to keeping the project suspended and “on the books”, was high compared to closing it and then preparing an emergency project. This implementation efficiency is evident when looking at three comparisons. These comparisons are: (i) it took less than one month in the case of all three suspensions to re-engage and resume project implementation in support of education service delivery. This should be compared to the average preparation time of 14 months for an investment project in Africa (source: AFTOS Africa Dashboard January 2013). As indicated in the 2011 World Development Report “Conflict, Security and Development”, one of the four key principles required to avoid re-emergence of conflict is “early results to build citizen confidence and create momentum for longer term institutional transformation”. Therefore, the time-efficiency of extending this project several times is best practice,

³ In grade 5, nearly 22 percent of students shared a mathematics textbook, against 12.5 percent in grade 2.

since it enabled the Bank to quickly support the opening of schools across the country and, thus, show a benefit of peace; (ii) the supervision costs, during suspension in FY05-08, totaled US\$150,000, which should be compared to the average project preparation cost of an investment project in Africa of US\$611,000 (source: AFTOS Africa Dashboard January 2013); and (iii) the continuation of the project implied a continuation of project capacity (personnel, structures and procedures), which both led to higher resilience of education service delivery during the crises –as described above the BEP continued to support primary education delivery during the crisis—and to a fast resumption of service delivery and aid flows after conflict.

65. The efficiency gains from the project were impacted by the political instability that prevailed during the life of the project. Given the difficult environment the efficiency gains are judged to be **substantial** because the project was able to: (i) provide textbooks in a cost effective manner, (ii) construct and equip 300 classrooms at a reasonable cost given the political context, and (iii) successfully improve the capacity of MEN. The analysis shows that there is no significant gain to income for a primary school education. The low marginal benefit of obtaining a primary education, when compared to receiving no education, seems appropriate. This is due to the post-conflict nature of the country where there is an oversupply of primary school graduates and limited job opportunities due to the slow economic growth and the closing of enterprises during the conflict. It is estimated that the number of enterprises affected range from 30 to 50 percent according to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Côte d’Ivoire (CCICI). An estimated 70-80 percent of formal sector employees were also laid off in March 2011. However, the wage income premiums are none the less substantial for TVET and higher education graduates.

66. The efficiency analysis for acquisition of textbooks shows a high cost-efficiency compared to the original projected unit cost for textbooks and that costs are in line with those recently realized in projects in Burundi and Niger. Cost-efficiency of the construction of 300 new classrooms and nine lower secondary schools is low compared to the original projected unit costs. The projected cost estimates are based on the original project component from 1998, and the difference in projected and realized costs may thus be explained by the limited capacity to construct schools that prevailed after the conflict. An overall comparison with other projects suggests that the construction costs are in the high range, but without being excessively high. However, when limiting the cost comparison to projects undertaken in Côte d’Ivoire, cost-efficiency of the project shows to be relatively high. This indicates a general higher level of construction prices in Côte d’Ivoire, which may be due to the limited construction capacity prevailing from the conflict. Thus evaluated in this context, the project has provided an efficient use of funds with respect to construction.

67. The direct economic effect of the increased access to primary and lower secondary education is quantified based on expected income-gain for those graduating. Low income and limited dispersion in wages for the lower education levels reduce the direct economic benefit from the increase in primary and secondary education. In combination with high unit cost for students in primary and secondary education this leads to a negative value of return from investment, when benefits are solely measured by

the average wage-gain. However, there exist a series of other benefits from the expansion of basic education, as it increases the foundation of people suitable for higher education and provides important social benefits. These benefits are however difficult to quantify in monetary terms.

68. The establishment of a task force under MEN with donor support and PASEF financing has resulted in economic gains through support for development of ministerial strategies, which amongst others have attracted a Euro 9.28 million TVET project financed through the French Development Agency. The project’s overall reinforcement of the strategic and operational capacity of the ministries is particularly important in a post-conflict context, where the ability of a project to immediately intervene after a conflict can help restore confidence in the state and support economic recovery.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

69. An overall outcome rating of the project is **moderately satisfactory** and is reflected by the two contrasting periods of project implementation. Phase one shows that the project design was appropriate but implementation was slow and erratic. Furthermore, efficacy and efficiency were difficult to measure due to all the exogenous factors that impacted project implementation. The restructured project design, PDO and implementation were relevant, achievement of the PDO based on analysis of the PDO indicators is substantial, and efficiency of the project related to the restructured period is judged to be substantial. These judgments differ from the last two project ISRs because at the time the ISRs were submitted several key factors for rating the project MS were not clear. These were: (i) key indicator data was still being gathered and therefore, the data was only preliminary; (ii) technical assistance provided for financial management and procurement activities had just begun to improve the overall reporting situation; (iii) the project efficiency analysis that helps substantiate the overall rating was only done for the ICR; and (iv) final disbursement information was not yet available. When the ICR was written, the outstanding information was available and based on this, the overall project outcome is judged to be **moderately satisfactory**. Annexes 2 and 3 provide additional achievements related to the project’s outcomes and efficiency gains.

Original Project – Phase 1 (9/1998-4/2008) – 10.4 percent disbursement-net credit			
Project Relevance	Achievement of PDO (Efficacy)	Efficiency	Overall Rating
Substantial	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Modest	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Project Restructuring - Phase 2 (8/2008-8/2012) – 89.6 percent disbursement-net credit			
Project Relevance	Achievement of PDO (Efficacy)	Efficiency	Overall Rating
Substantial	Moderately Satisfactory	Substantial	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Project Ratings – 99.2 percent disbursement of net credit			
Project Relevance	Achievement of PDO (Efficacy)	Efficiency	Overall Rating
Substantial	Moderately Satisfactory	Substantial	Moderately Satisfactory ¹

¹Overall rating = (3)(.1040) +(4)(.8960) =3.896 (rounded up to 4 or MS)

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

Not Applicable

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

70. The restructured project helped finance the establishment of the “Task Force”, which is an inter-ministerial body and has been in charge of producing the following analytical pieces: (i) the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework; (ii) an overall sector policy, which provides a comprehensive vision for basic and higher education, the TVET sector, as well as the literacy and pre-school sub-sectors; and (iii) the letter of sectoral policy and the ten-year macro-financial framework that supports it. The Task Force, in collaboration with regional and local education authorities and NGOs, supported the UNICEF-led “Education Cluster⁴” in preparing a country-wide assessment of the situation of schools after the 2011 crisis to identify the most urgent needs. This assessment provided information for the preparation of the new GPE project. Finally, the Task Force helped prepare the 2011 Country Status Report, which provided the first in-depth analysis of the education sector in six years. The proven capacity of this inter-ministerial body also encouraged other donors to use it to help coordinate their investments in the education sector: currently, investments from Japan and Germany are being channeled through the Task Force. In addition, the *Agence Française de Développement – AFD* (French Development Agency) is using the Task Force to help coordinate its’ three interventions, which cover general education, higher education as well as TVET. The Task Force also prepared the GPE application in 2011, which led to the development of a US\$41.4 million basic education project, managed and implemented by the MEN through the Task Force. Finally, the Task Force plays an advisory role to all three education ministers, thereby strengthening their collaboration and coordination. PASEF has therefore directly contributed to strengthening the institutional capacity of the education sector and changed the way the three educational ministries operate.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

Not Applicable

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

Not Applicable

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Moderate

71. The risks identified during the original project preparation were mostly appropriate: two were rated high and three were moderate with an overall rating of moderate. During the 2008 restructuring, the original risks were still deemed appropriate but, at that time, the team placed greater emphasis on the limited capacity within the

⁴ The “Education Cluster” refers to the different development partners involved in the education sector in Côte d’Ivoire, and is led by UNICEF and includes the World Bank, French Development Agency, World Food Program and other international NGOs.

MEN given the post-conflict, fragile state status of the country. The identified risks related to the education sector were appropriate for both the pre- and post-restructuring periods as were the mitigation measures. As discussed previously, there were capacity constraints within the MEN that led to implementation challenges. However, the MEN, working with the Bank task team, was able to overcome the capacity issues especially at the BEP-level by contracting the appropriate TA to support them with project implementation. In addition, the strong capacity of the Task Force, with the intra-ministerial coordination responsibility, will continue to play a key role and will help mitigate the MEN risks of coordination, collaboration and capacity. The MEN and Task Force continue to receive training related to financial management and procurement for the two on-going Bank-supported projects, which is helping to improve MEN capacity in these areas. In retrospect, it would have been appropriate to indicate country risks associated with the project. However, this was not common practice within the Bank in 1998 when the project was being prepared.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: **Satisfactory**

72. During the original preparation of the project, the Bank team included the appropriate technical specialists to develop the project. The Bank team actively engaged the government in the preparation of the project through consultations and roundtable discussions on education and training. The preparation team also aligned the project with the CAS and HIPC report, and used them to identify key indicators and completion targets. The project preparation team ensured that the project focused on the education of girls by including explicit interventions in each component. It also aligned the operation with the government's "National Education and Training Development Plan - NETDP". The 2008 project restructuring was highly relevant to the post-conflict status of Côte d'Ivoire. The Bank and Government of Côte d'Ivoire refocused the project resources on basic education and simplified the project design to accommodate the capacity constraints that were exhibited within the MEN in the period following the conflict. The Bank also moved quickly to restructure the project so that the needed resources could be used by the MEN to restart the education system.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: **Satisfactory**

73. The project team was actively engaged in supporting the government in its' efforts to implement the project. An education economist and procurement-accredited operations staff were part of the Abidjan-based project team during phase 1 of project implementation, which facilitated the dialogue with the government. However, despite the efforts of the BEP and the Bank team, the volatile political situation impeded

implementation progress. The Bank team kept the dialogue open with the government and the BEP, even during the 2004 - 2008 suspension⁵, which in retrospect was important for the project's early accomplishments: the trust and level of engagement displayed by the Bank's team was repeatedly mentioned by the government as having played a major role in its willingness to proceed with the operation and dialogue with the Bank. Phase two--post-restructuring, the Bank's decision to base the TTL, financial management and procurement specialists in the field, proved instrumental in supporting the implementation of the restructured project and reaching 99.2 percent disbursements by project closure. Finally, the fact that Bank management allowed the project to stay active and remain engaged helped provide Côte d'Ivoire with much needed resources every time the country emerged from a conflict.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

74. Based on these findings, the ICR team rates the overall Bank performance as **Satisfactory**.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

75. Overall government performance has been uneven over the life of the project. The political turmoil and civil conflict had an ongoing negative impact on the project. The government fell into arrears four times and the civil conflict caused the overall Bank portfolio to be suspended for four years, all of which had a negative effect on project implementation and funding for the project activities. Prior to restructuring, the government was also reluctant to lift the monopoly on the production of primary school textbooks as well as to support schools in the North because they were not under central government control. These issues led to delays in implementing textbook production and classroom construction. The frequent turn-over of staff in key positions following changes in the government were a recurrent theme throughout the life of the project and, at times contributed to the slow implementation. However, the government remained accessible and open to dialogue even during the 2004 - 2008 suspension and, to the extent possible, continued to implement some project activities with counterpart funds, including the development and production of 22 textbook titles for grades 3-4. This showed, to the extent possible, a level of government commitment to the continued implementation of the project. Based on this, the phase one of implementation is rated **moderately unsatisfactory**.

76. Post-restructuring, the government showed considerable commitment to improving the project's performance. It agreed to implement a number of

⁵ The Bank team utilized the various options that were available to keep following project implementation such as reversed missions and meetings via videoconferencing.

recommendations proposed by the Bank, such as: (i) conducting post-conflict needs assessments; (ii) helping prepare a new Country Status Report; (iii) developing a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework; and (iv) conducting learning assessments for Grades 2, 3 and 5. These activities helped the government focus support where it was most critical and ensured the relevance of interventions, especially given the changes in the political and socio-economic landscape of the country. Furthermore, having carried out the previously-mentioned analytical pieces of work, the government was able to secure funds from the GPE and prepare a new Basic Education project that is currently being implemented. Based on this the post-restructuring rating is **satisfactory**.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

77. The BEP was the implementing unit both pre- and post-restructuring. The BEP was responsible for the early implementation progress and they continued to try and implement the project with counterpart funds even when the government went into arrears. In addition, the BEP was responsible for overseeing all of phase two implementation when the project disbursed 89.6 percent of the project funds. It should be noted, that the BEP exhibited capacity limitations, particularly related to Bank procurement and financial management activities. The BEP had difficulty: (i) processing procurement documents; (ii) cancelling non-performing contracts for civil works activities; (iii) ensuring the distribution textbooks; (iv) providing up-to-date financial status reports; and (v) preparing and submitting withdrawal applications. These issues led the Bank to downgrade procurement and financial management. Again, in a post-conflict environment, these capacity limitations are to be expected, and the Bank recognizing these issues, worked with the BEP and the MEN to identify appropriate technical assistance to provide the needed support and help resolve the problems which led to the successful completion of the project.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

78. The overall rating for Borrower performance is **Moderately Satisfactory**. This overall rating is based on the fact that the post-restructuring of the project period is judged to be moderately satisfactory with 89.6 percent of the project disbursed during phase two of project implementation.

6. Lessons Learned

79. **Lesson 1. Approved projects should not be closed due to suspensions.** The PASEF project played a key role in providing needed resources for the education sector each time Côte d'Ivoire emerged from civil unrest. Emergency projects are an option but take time to prepare unlike an existing project such as the PASEF, where money was immediately available each time the Bank re-engaged. This proved invaluable for getting teachers and children back in school quickly after each crisis.

80. **Lesson 2. Government ownership is essential for ensuring implementation quality and progress.** Government's decision to establish an inter-ministerial body to

help it implement not only the restructured project, but also provide a better oversight of activities and challenges in the sector as a whole. The government was committed to allow the task force help strengthen coordination and collaboration between ministries, the donor community and provided advice to MEN on the implementation of the PASEF project. This government ownership ensured the completion of all project activities.

81. **Lesson 3. Oversight bodies with the overall picture of system play an invaluable role in advising sub-sector ministries.** The task force established under the PASEF was responsible for: (i) helping prepare the 2011 Country Status Report, (ii) preparing the overall sector policy, (iii) ensuring coordination of donor activities, (iv) preparing the 2011 GPE application; and (v) advising all three education ministries. The task force will remain the oversight body for the education sector, which has proven instrumental in setting out the policy framework for the education sector.

82. **Lesson 4. Task team leaders based in post-conflict fragile state countries is essential for ensuring the implementation of Bank-supported projects.** The Bank place the task team leader in Côte d'Ivoire shortly after the 2008 restructuring. The presence of the TTL in country provide invaluable for daily support and monitoring of project implementation. Experience with other Bank-supported project in post-conflict countries has shown that have the TTL in-country is critical for ensuring timely project implementation.

83. **Lesson 5. Project implementation, in a post-conflict environment, may benefit from having a PIU outside the government structure.** The benefit of having the BEP as a semi-autonomous unit outside the MEN structure was important for maintaining continuity and staffing that were committed to the project. It was also important because: (i) the BEP remained operational because the key staff were not MEN staff thereby, subject to political staffing changes; (ii) project implementation continued, albeit limited, even during the 2004 - 2008 suspension; and (iii) BEP staff could be augmented by easily hiring consultants to provide support. Therefore, in a post-conflict fragile state situation, consideration should be given to establishing a semi-autonomous PIU with the plan of integrating future PIUs into the normal structure of the responsible ministry.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

See the Borrower portion of the ICR in Annex 7.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not Applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

Not Applicable

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent): 1998 - 2004

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component 1: Improving learning at the primary and secondary levels	18.0	2.50	13.9
Component 2: Expanding access to schools in underserved and unserved areas	19.5	0.90	4.6
Component 3: Developing MENFB's Institutional Capacity	6.1	0.25	4.1
Component 4: Enhancing strategic sector planning and sector coordination	7.5	0.40	5.3
Component 5: Project management	1.5	0.80	53.3
PPF reimbursement	0.7	0.70	100.0
Total Baseline Cost	53.3	5.55	
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.0
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.0
Total Project Costs	53.3	5.55	10.4
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	0.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Financing Required	53.3	5.55 ⁶	

⁶ Real disbursements on April 1, 2008 were SDR 4.12, which represented 10.4% of the total amount. Exchange rate differences applied in the restructuring paper explain the difference in the disbursed US\$ amount with the amount in this table.

(b) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent): 2008 - 2012

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component 1: Improving the quality of basic education	27.7	25.7	92.8
Component 2: Supporting access to primary and lower secondary education	16.2	15.9	98.1
Component 3: Developing institutional capacity	17.8	14.9	83.7
Component 4: Project management	4.4	3.9	88.6
Total Baseline Cost	66.1	60.4	91.4
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	66.1	60.4	91.4
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Financing Required	66.1	60.4	91.4 ⁷

(c) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Co-financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		23.10	0.00 ⁸	0.00
International Development Association (IDA)		53.30	60.40	113
LOCAL: BENEFICIARIES		6.40	0.00	0.00

⁷ The project actually disbursed 99.2 percent of its original funds. The difference is due to exchange rate fluctuations between SDR and US\$.

⁸ The restructuring of the project eliminated the need for counterpart funding and each category was financed at 100 percent.

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1: Improving Learning at the Primary and Secondary Levels

84. **Original component activities:** This component aimed at strengthening the role of the school in improving teaching and learning, both at the primary and secondary levels. It was to support changes in the curriculum to increase the relevance of education. It also aimed at increasing the availability of textbooks and shifting textbook publishing to the private sector. The original component included five sub-components: (i) revision of curriculum content and implementation; (ii) school-based pre-service and in-service teacher training; (iii) applied research and pedagogical innovations; (iv) provision of textbooks in the targeted areas; and (v) a student learning evaluation system. Each sub-component was designed with particular attention to girls' education.

85. **Impact on girls:** (i) a process was to be put in place to systematically review both program content and coverage in order to eliminate gender stereotypes and gender imbalance; (ii) pre-service and in-service training were to be revised to raise awareness among teachers of issues affecting girls' participation in schooling; (iii) longitudinal studies were to be undertaken in some *écoles* and *collèges témoins* on girls' participation in the classroom; (iv) in the targeted areas, access to textbooks was to be equal for boys and girls; and (v) results of the student evaluations would be disaggregated in such a way as to better understand different learning patterns between boys and girls.

86. **Progress between 1998 and 2004.** The project made significant progress in terms of introducing revisions to the curriculum through the development of a competency-based curriculum. By 2004, the project had undertaken the envisaged study tour to Senegal, trained 240 school inspectors and teacher trainers in the new competency-based teaching approach and developed curricula for Grades 1 – 10. The project also prepared a preliminary “minimum exit profile” for students graduating from elementary and lower secondary schools (Grades 6 and 10 respectively). No significant progress was made in terms of **school-based pre- and in-service teacher training**: the project had prepared draft legal texts that would bring about pre- and in-service teacher training reforms. However, it is unclear whether the government succeeded in lowering the training period at CAFOPs from three to two years prior to the 2004 suspension⁹. Draft terms of reference had been prepared in 2000 to help identify the real number of hours that teachers actually taught in classrooms; however, no follow-up action took place. In terms of **applied research and pedagogical innovation**, study tours to Guinea and Senegal by a consultant led to the development of a draft operations manual for the planned *Ecoles témoins*, followed by training of regional coordinators and an analysis/evaluation of existing model schools (*étude diagnostique des écoles témoins*). Information and sensitization campaigns about these schools were carried out and technological equipment and connectivity were provided. However, the project was not able to clarify

⁹ Currently, the CAFOP training period is two years.

and define the roles and responsibilities of the institutional structure. The project was able to provide approximately 1.16 million **textbooks** by January 2000, covering 62 *sous-préfectures*, although certain schools did not receive the full set of textbooks needed. During that period, the government instituted the FCFA 250 rental fee for textbooks and financed the development and production of grades 3 and 4 between 2004 and 2008. **Market liberalization** efforts made little progress. In January 2000, government had missed the opportunity to cancel monopoly contracts with the two publishers “CEDA” and “NEI”. The government’s agreement to cancel the contracts at the end of their term would have opened the printing of the “*Etat et Développement*” collection for competitive bidding. Despite the Bank’s insistence on the importance, this issue was only partially resolved in 2002 (the contracts were cancelled but CEDA and NEI only released a portion of the copyrights). The **Student learning evaluation** sub-component was able to finance study tours, help identify members of the student evaluation committee for both the primary and secondary levels, and procure technological equipment.

87. **Post-restructuring.** The restructured project eliminated many of the original activities, including the particular focus on girls. This was done because of the need to focus entirely on rehabilitating the education system which was destroyed during the civil conflict. The component continued to support the overall objectives but adjusted the sub-component descriptions as follows: (i) developing, printing, and distributing textbooks and teachers’ manuals to achieve a ratio of three textbooks per student in grades 1-3 and five in grades 4-6, and improving the existing textbook rental scheme in primary schools; (ii) finalizing the primary education’s curriculum reform; and (iii) strengthening the national student evaluation system based on the new competency-based approach and providing related training to teachers and other pedagogical supervision. However, the restructured project also put a particular focus on the post-conflict needs of the country and as such, included three new activities: (i) rehabilitating and re-equipping teacher training centers (CAFOP) and training teacher-trainers in the competency-based approach, including the provision of teaching and learning materials; (ii) supporting the National Literacy Support Fund (FNAA) for 3,000 people (75 percent women) in the zones under *Forces Nouvelles* control; and (iii) purchasing, and delivering food to 400 primary schools through the World Food Program.

88. Indicators used to measure progress were: (i) pre-service teacher training strengthened; (ii) literacy services expanded in the zones CNO¹⁰; (iii) textbooks purchased; (iv) target of textbook-pupil ratio in primary achieved; (v) curriculum reform in primary completed and implemented; (vi) pre-service teachers trained to minimum qualifications and certification requirements; (vii) in-service teachers trained; and (viii) assessment of student achievement outcomes carried out.

89. **Progress between 2008 and 2012.** Most activities under this component were completed. The project supported pre-service teacher training by equipping the existing 14 CAFOPs with teaching and learning equipment needed to resume operations, thereby

¹⁰ CNO refers to the *Forces Nouvelles*-controlled areas

meeting the target. The project also financed the rehabilitation of 2¹¹ CAFOPs, thereby meeting the target established during the 2011 restructuring. The project supported literacy training for 120 organizers from three NGOs, benefitting 3,000 adults (of which 75 percent women) and providing them with the learning kits, thereby meeting the project target. To facilitate supervision activities, eight motorcycles were purchased and provided to supervisors at the local level. Textbook acquisition surpassed the target of 6,326,215, with the purchase of 6,791,971 primary textbooks. In addition, the government financed textbooks with its own resources during the 2004-2008 suspension period, increasing the total number of textbooks acquired to approximately 9.9 million over the life of the project. The combined number of textbooks led to a student: textbook ratio of 1:3 in Grades 1-3 and 1:5 in Grades 4-6 meeting the project target. This textbook ratio also met the HIPC target. The government finalized its curriculum reform, having introduced the “competency-based” approach and trained a total of 2,400 teachers and teacher-trainers in its application. In-service teacher training supported the upgrading of approximately 7,390¹² teachers. The number of pre-service teachers trained at the primary level increased by 9,768 between 2008/09 – 2011/12, exceeding the end target of 7,276. At the secondary level, the government trained 3,897 additional teachers since the start of the 2008/09 academic year, with an additional 3,070 enrolled in 2012.

90. The government also implemented the PASEC¹³ assessment for Grades 2 and 5 as well as a Grade 3 assessment. These assessments were important for establishing the baseline for the next round of assessments scheduled for the 2012/13 school year. The project was not able to support the secondary school assessment as originally envisioned. This was in large part due to the 2011 crisis that caused delays in the development of the assessment. After the 2011 crisis, the government used the resources allocated for the assessment to conduct a technical audit of the CAFOPs. The audit was designed to assess the competency-based curriculum that the CAFOPs were using for training teachers because the teachers were not showing the desired qualifications upon completion of their training programs. The findings from the audit were used extensively in the design of the teacher training components of the new GPE-supported project, which is now begin implemented. The government also established a new department (*Service de Veille et de Suivi des Programmes*), under the direct supervision of the ministry cabinet to ensure a better coordination of student assessment administration and supervision.

91. Lastly, the project, provided food supplies to 400 canteens between 2008/09 and 2009/10 to all the regions identified in 2008, plus one additional region (Bouaflé). The decision was made during the 2011 restructuring to reallocate project resources, originally allocated for rehabilitation of two CAFOPs, to the canteens because the World Food Program’s storage facilities had been pillaged. The project helped to re-stock the storage facilities in an effort to avoid a food crisis.

¹¹ The restructured project intended to rehabilitate 4 CAFOP. However, following the 2011 crisis, it was decided to use funds for 2 CAFOP to finance the most pressing post-crisis needs such as additional student desks and canteen supplies.

¹² The indicator tracking in-service teacher training was not part of the restructured results framework but was added to retro-fit the project in compliance with Africa Core Indicator.

¹³ PASEC (*Programme d’Analyse des Système Educatifs de la CONFEMEN*) refers to a program to analyze the education systems of the confederation of ministers of education.

92. These are substantial achievements considering the post-conflict status of the country and the total years of political turmoil.

Component 2: Expanding Access to Primary Schools and Collèges

93. The original component activities included: (i) school construction and renovation; and (ii) infrastructure maintenance/support to improve the *patrimoine scolaire*. Indicators used to measure progress towards these components included: (i) construction of primary classrooms; (ii) construction of eight lower secondary schools; (iii) 30 percent of classrooms constructed should be below standard construction unit costs (low-cost construction); and (iv) increased private sector and community involvement in school maintenance.

94. **Impact on girls:** *Collèges de petite échelle* are one partial solution to the financial and social problems faced by students, including security concerns for girls.


95. **Progress between 1998 and 2004.** The project's initial target was the construction and equipment of 900 classrooms, rehabilitation and equipment of 300 classrooms and construction of eight small lower secondary schools. Although contracts had been issued for the construction for the first 300 classrooms and eight colleges, little progress was made during this period. This was mainly due to procurement delays, capacity constraints of the selected construction companies and continued civil strife. Consequently, no activities related to infrastructure were financed.

96. **Post-restructuring.** The restructured component eliminated most of the original project activities but retained the construction of primary classrooms and lower secondary schools. However, the scope of the construction was reduced to constructing and equipping 300 primary classrooms and 8 lower secondary schools. This was done in recognition of the post-conflict status of Côte d'Ivoire and the limited capacity to construct schools.

97. Intermediate indicators used to track progress were: (i) number of additional classrooms built; (ii) construction of lower secondary schools; and (iii) percentage of girls to boys in primary and secondary education.

98. The project constructed and equipped 300 classrooms by project closing thereby meeting the project target. The project surpassed the number of lower secondary schools to be constructed (9 instead of 8) and helped finance the rehabilitation of an additional lower secondary school. The restructured project focused on constructing lower secondary schools mainly in rural and semi-rural areas which had been under "*Forces Nouvelles*" control. Their locations were chosen on the basis of school mapping data and responded to the urgent need for investment in lower secondary school places. These schools helped: (i) relieve the transition pressure from CM2 to lower secondary; (ii) provided a safe environment for girls in the case of the school in Man; and (iii) eased overcrowding of the existing Bouaké lower secondary school. The project chose to build slightly smaller schools to help maximize catchment areas within a limited budget.

Figure 1: Location of lower secondary schools.



Source: Government school mapping.

Note: Project supported are represented by the round dots.

99. The project also exceeded the number of student desks to be procured, acquiring 30,870 compared to the original target of 25,000¹⁴. In addition to student desks, the project equipped 93 schools with teacher’s desks and chairs, as well as bookcases. Although the percentage of girls to boys in primary school missed the target of 48 percent by 3 points, the 40 percent target in secondary school was met.

100. The project provided support for strengthening school management at the local level by training 26 of local School Management Committee (*COGES*) coordinators in 2010 and 40 *COGES* members by 2011. The PASEF financed a technical audit of 3,000 *COGES* to help identify reasons for their persistent inefficient functioning. The audit provided a good analysis of the institutional and financial management weaknesses within the *COGES*s. These lessons were used to develop *COGES* activities as part of the new GPE project.

¹⁴ The increase in student desks was decided during the 2011 restructuring to respond to the shortage of student desks following the crisis as many desks were used as fire wood. The total number of student desks acquired over the life of the project, including those for the 300 new classrooms reached 38,351.

Component 3: Developing Institutional Capacity and Component 4: Sector coordination and strategic planning

101. Original components 3 and 4 were combined as part of the 2008 restructuring.

102. Component 3 – Developing Institutional Capacity: This component was to support the improvement and the strengthening of the planning, monitoring and evaluation capacities of the Ministry of National Education (MEN) at all levels, including strategic resource planning for girls' education and the health of school children. To this end, five sub-components were to provide the necessary inputs for: (a) decentralization; (b) strategic planning and management; (c) improved resource management; (d) the creation of a girls' education promotion unit (CPEF); and (e) school health and nutrition.

103. Indicators selected to monitor progress were: (i) hiring decisions made at the local level; (ii) training program for financial personnel at *prefecture*/inspectorate level; (iii) school record systems piloted; (iv) basic training for all DRENs completed; and (v) analytical framework and gender strategy developed and utilized.

104. Component 4 - Sector Coordination and strategic planning: This component aimed at ensuring better coordination of the education sector as a whole, by increasing relevance and external efficiency. It included three sub-components: (a) strategic planning and management of higher education; (b) strategic planning and management of vocational and professional training; and (c) sector coordination and dialogue.

105. Indicators selected to monitor progress were: (i) the share of primary budget expenditures to be allocated for the education sector to increase; (ii) an amount equivalent to at least US\$1,500,000 to be earmarked for the purchase of textbooks and pedagogical guides for primary school education; (iii) development plans for each university prepared; (iv) professional training program piloted; (v) development plans (public/private sectors) prepared for selected training institutions; (vi) IEC designed and implemented agenda; and (vii) agenda for private sector reform agreed.

106. **Progress between 1998 and 2004.** Little progress was made related to developing institutional capacity and sector coordination after the project effectiveness in 1998. However, during this period, the project: (i) hired 1,371 teachers (*instituteurs adjoints*), (ii) helped complete the Country Status Report, (iii) installed an information system at the University of Cocody, and (iv) produced school statistics for the 1998/99 – 2000/01 academic years. The project also supported the start of a dialogue about HIV/AIDS within schools. However, the other activities within these two components were not carried out. This was due to the fact that: (i) a new financial system was introduced that was cumbersome in its approval process; (ii) the country went into arrears several times which slowed implementation; (iii) the country was experiencing armed unrest making coordination and collaboration between government entities and regions very difficult and (iv) the central government would not support schooling in regions not under its control.

107. **Post-restructuring. Component 3: Developing institutional capacity (combined component).** Again, this component eliminated most activities of the original components 3 and 4. However, there was a need to support and build capacity for each of the three Ministries of Education, but with a larger focus both financially and technically on the MEN. This restructured component was to reinforce the strategic and operational capacity of the Ministry through: (i) setting up and staffing of a four person strategic executive unit (the “Task Force”), located in the minister’s cabinet; (ii) development and installation of an education and management information system; (iii) strengthening of human resources in charge of education statistics, human resource management, school mapping, elaboration of an education Country Status Report and support for the Education For All-Fast Track Initiative endorsement process; and (iv) re-equipping of central and decentralized (MEN structures. Second, in both the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (METFP), and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESRS), support was to be provided for: (i) the development and installation of an Education and Management Information System - EMIS; (ii) human capacity development in the areas of statistics, human resource management PER/EPTS; (iii) studies and consultations for the elaboration of national strategies in the technical and vocational training sector and higher education; and (iv) small provision of vehicles and equipment for planning divisions and a few decentralized structures in both education ministries.

108. Indicators to measure the restructured component included: (i) strategic and operational capacity of the MEN reinforced; (ii) strategic and operational capacity of the MESRS reinforced; (iii) strategic and operational capacity of the METFP reinforced; and (iv) system for learning assessment at the primary level.

109. The project supported the three ministries (both at the central as well as deconcentrated levels) through the procurement of critical office equipment and 212 vehicles needed to resume operations, especially following the 2011 crisis. Based on the evidence listed below, the ICR team judges that the project did reinforce the strategic and operational capacity of all three ministries and has therefore met the targets. Significant milestones achieved include:

- **MEN:** In 2009, the Ministry established a task force¹⁵ under its cabinet, which developed the new Education Sector Strategy and successfully prepared the country application for the new GPE operation. The project, through the Task Force, also supported the completion of the 2011 Country Status Reports, re-printing the statistical yearbooks for the 2005/06 - 2008/09 academic years, and collecting and analyzing the 2010/2011 school data. Furthermore, the project provided technical assistance for the Task Force to develop the medium-term expenditure framework for basic education, TVET and higher education. This framework provides information on the three years of expenditures for each sub-sector. In addition, the activity related to the *carte scolaire* (school mapping) was

¹⁵ The task force included a coordinator, an M&E specialist, an education policy specialist and an economist.

also completed, which included training both at the central and deconcentrated levels, and will be fully integrated within the MEN. Although a fully-fledged EMIS was not developed, the MEN has established an education statistics production system called *SPASS – Système de Production Annuelle des Statistiques Scolaires*. This system, which will be integrated into the EMIS system being developed as part of the new GPE project, became operational in 2010/11, and has been used by the MEN to produce education statistics and final project reports. The regional education offices (DRENs) also received IT equipment and training to facilitate the collection of data for the *SPASS*.

- **MESRS and METFP:** The project supported the two ministries to develop their strategies as a part of the overall national education strategy as well as the re-printing of MESRS' 2006/07 statistical yearbooks. The project also financed management training for key staff within the ministries and the procurement of vehicles and equipment for the planning divisions and some DRENs to facilitate supervision of project activities. Within the METFP, seven studies were carried out to support the METFP strategy of which the project financed two: (i) public private partnerships (PPPs); and (ii) development of internship programs and the dissemination seminars related to the studies. These studies, along with the other studies, are being used by the METFP to develop internship programs and establish PPPs through the new Euro 9.28 million AFD-financed project. Furthermore, the project supported METFP re-print is 2008 and 2009 data collection questionnaire, trained staff and helped METFP's regional offices in data collection. The project also financed a diagnostic study of the higher education system. The results have been used to further the Bank's dialog with government on higher education reform. However, the project was not able to develop a fully integrated EMIS system for the MESRS or METFP due to the fact that the 2011 crisis made meaningful data collection not feasible. However, MESRS and METFP do have systems in place to collect data and which are used to produce statistical reports.

110. **Component 4: Project Management and Coordination.** This component was to support the project implementation unit (*BEP*) and its regional branches: Project management of civil works would be organized both through a central service based in Abidjan and its *antennes regionales* (regional branches) within the ten regional directorates. Costs have been based on work estimates to fulfill the Government's annual construction program of approximately 1,000 classrooms.

111. **Progress between 1998 and 2004.** Overall, the BEP was viewed as providing adequate support to help implement the project and audits were unqualified for almost every year with the exception of the 1999 audit. The office had been strengthened with additional fiduciary staff, equipment and clarified roles, responsibilities and internal procedures. However, the government's financial management system (SIGFIP) was repeatedly cited as being the main reason for not only affecting overall project implementation progress but also good functioning of the BEP.

112. **Post-restructuring. Component 4: Project management (original component).** This component aimed at financing operating costs of the BEP. The project execution unit was responsible for fiduciary management, civil works management, programming and monitoring of project activities, and production of execution and audit reports. Expenditures under this component included: (i) the purchase of new equipment; (ii) operating costs; (iii) consultant services; (iv) studies; and (v) training.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

113. Project implementation has been deeply affected by the political volatility in Côte d'Ivoire, and the resulting project restructurings have caused project components to change over the lifetime of the project. This economic and financial analysis will evaluate project outcomes based on the final project design, which consists of four components: (i) Improving learning at the primary and secondary school level, (ii) expanding access to primary and lower secondary education, (iii) developing institutional capacity, and (iv) project management and coordination.

Cost-efficiency

114. Cost-efficiency is assessed for part of component 1 and component 2 for which there exist comparable cost data from similar projects.

115. As part of the activities under component 1, the project provided 6,791,971 primary school textbooks and thereby surpassed the target of 6,326,215 books. The total cost of the textbooks amounted to US\$8,921,168 (FCFA 4,308,924,359), which corresponds to a unit price of US\$1.3 (FCFA 634). Cost-efficiency on acquisition of textbooks is high compared to the original projected unit cost for textbooks, which was US\$2.4 (FCFA 1,166 – measured in 2012-prices).¹⁶ Compared to other similar projects, the actual unit cost is much in line with the ones recently realized in projects in Burundi and Niger, where textbooks were acquired for between US\$1.1 and 1.4 per book.¹⁷

116. Under component 2, the project constructed and equipped 300 classrooms meeting the target of the restructured project. The average overall cost of providing a new classroom was US\$25,339 (FCFA 12,238,600) including construction, supervision, and furniture. Excluding supervision and furniture, the unit price of classroom construction is US\$21,118 (FCFA 10,200,000), which exceeds the original projected cost by 42 percent.¹⁸ The cost estimate is based on the original project component from 1998, which means that it does not reflect the economic situation emerging from the political conflict. The capacity to construct schools was limited after the conflict, which resulted in the scope of the construction being reduced as part of the 2008 project restructuring, and which may explain the difference in projected and realized costs.

117. It is difficult to systematically compare efficiency across construction projects as constructions vary in standards, quality, and common premises included. But even for projects undertaken in the same country using the same design and technology, unit cost varies widely due to e.g. procurement and management methods. A study on construction of classrooms in Senegal shows costs ranging from US\$6,700 to US\$48,000 for

¹⁶ The original projected unit cost for textbook was US\$1.4 (FCFA 814) measured in 1998-prices.

¹⁷ ICR (TF-94742), Niger Basic Education Support Project, 2012: US\$1.1 for elementary textbooks and US\$1.4 for 6th grade textbooks. ICR (IDA-H2730), Burundi Education Sector Reconstruction Project, 2012: Unit price of US\$1.2 for primary education textbooks.

¹⁸ The original projected unit cost for a classroom was US\$8,475 (FCFA 5 million) measured in 1998-prices. This corresponds to US\$14,822 (FCFA 7.2 million) measured in 2012-prices.

government and donor-funded projects carried out between 2000 and 2004, which all uses a similar architectural design and technology.¹⁹

118. An overall comparison of construction costs across countries and over time suggest that the project construction costs are in the high end compared to other projects, but without being excessively high.²⁰ This holds true when comparing prices with more recent education projects supported by the World Bank. In a recent education for all fast-track initiative in Benin the average unit costs for construction of classrooms ranged from US\$12,931 to US\$20,000.²¹ In an education sector reconstruction project in Burundi the average unit price for construction of classrooms was US\$24,434.²² However, when limiting the cost comparison to projects undertaken in Côte d’Ivoire, cost-efficiency of the project shows to be relatively high, cf. Table 1. This indicates a general higher level of construction prices in Côte d’Ivoire, which may be due to the limited construction capacity prevailing from the conflict. Thus evaluated in this context, the project has provided an efficient use of funds with respect to construction.

Table 1 Unit cost of construction for classrooms in Côte d’Ivoire

Project	Unit cost US\$
PASEF (World Bank)	21,118
PDEB/BID (Islamic Development Bank)	23,333
KFW (German Corporation)	21,222
Japanese donation	41,408
PPU (Ivoirian finance budget)	21,387
Infrastructure project in rural areas (Coffee Cocoa Board)	21,325

119. In addition to the 300 primary school classrooms, the project constructed 9 lower secondary schools surpassing the target of 8 new schools. The overall unit cost of construction, supervision, furniture, office equipment, and other material for science, medical, and sport facilities amounts to US\$1.6 million (FCFA 778 million), whereas the unit price including only construction is US\$1.2 million (FCFA 595 million). As for the classrooms, the construction cost exceeds the projected cost by almost 40 percent, which may largely be explained by the situation prevailing from the conflict.

Economic evaluation

120. Component 1 focuses on increasing quality of learning by developing new curriculum, providing textbooks, and strengthening training teachers. These benefits are

¹⁹ Serge Theunynck, School Construction Strategies for Universal Primary Education in Africa - Should Communities Be Empowered to Build Their Schools? World Bank, 2009.

²⁰ Serge Theunynck, School Construction Strategies for Universal Primary Education in Africa - Should Communities Be Empowered to Build Their Schools? World Bank, 2009.

²¹ ICR (TF-91947): Benin Education For All-Fast Track Initiative Program, 2012: The unit cost of US\$12,931 (2012-prices) includes costs of furniture and used CDD-approach. The unit cost of US\$20,000 is excluding costs of furniture and using CMA approach.

²² ICR (IDA-H2730), Burundi Education Sector Reconstruction Project, 2012. Cost of construction, but including studies of the soil, materials, catchment area, etc. The original cost in 2007-prices is US\$22,088.

all difficult to quantify and are expected to prevail only gradually. The higher quality of education is expected to improve skills of the graduates and thereby increase their productivity and future income. Furthermore, an increase in quality of education can positively affect retention rates and thereby increase efficiency of the education system. Although both completion and repetition rates have improved over the project period, there remains room for improvement of the internal efficiency of the Côte d'Ivoire education system. Today 71 out of 100 children entering primary school reaches the last grade, whereas 63 out of 100 entering lower secondary education reaches the final grade.²³

121. The direct benefit from construction of new classrooms and lower secondary schools are easier to quantify, as these investments clearly link to the benefit of allowing more students to access and complete primary and lower secondary education. Today, the education system in Côte d'Ivoire is characterized by a lack of capacity while the school population is growing. The primary GER increased from 71.7 percent in 1998/1999 to 83.6 percent in 2011/2012, whereas the GER for lower secondary education is relatively low at 36.7 percent.²⁴ The increased capacity is thus expected to lead to a corresponding increase in access and thereby to raise the overall education level. The 300 additional classrooms are expected to increase capacity by 13,800 students, and the nine lower secondary schools are expected to increase capacity with almost 5,000 students.²⁵

122. The direct economic effect of the increased access to primary and lower secondary education can be quantified based on expected wage benefit for those graduating. As in many low-income countries, the level of education and training influences the size of income significantly. In Côte d'Ivoire the differences in wages are particular high going from primary to lower secondary education and from TVET to higher education, cf. Table 2.

Table 2 Income levels dependent on education level (2012-prices)

	Monthly income (FCFA)	Monthly income (US\$)	Pct increase from add. edu. level
No education	51,518	107	
Primary	52,259	108	1.4
Lower Secondary	67,726	140	29.6
Upper Secondary	86,873	180	28.3
TVET	103,921	215	19.6
Higher education	198,904	412	91.4

Source: *Le Système Éducatif de la Côte d'Ivoire, 2011*.

Note: Income levels have been changed from 2002-prices to 2012 prices based on inflation rate.

²³ *Project d'appui au Secteur Éducation/Formation (PASEF), Présentation du Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique (MENET)*, December 2012, p. 26.

²⁴ *Project d'appui au Secteur Éducation/Formation (PASEF), Présentation du Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique (MENET)*, December 2012.

²⁵ Despite efforts to reduce the number of students per classroom to obtain an average of 40 students per classroom, the average classroom today accommodates 46 students: *Project d'appui au Secteur Éducation/Formation (PASEF), Présentation du Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique (MENET)*, December 2012, p. 18.

123. Conversely there is a very limited expected wage-gain from completing primary education compared to the average income for people without education. At the same time unit cost for students in primary and secondary education are high in Côte d'Ivoire compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries.²⁶ The yearly unit cost of a student in primary school is US\$211 (FCFA 101,877) and the unit cost for lower secondary students US\$413 (FCFA 199,654).²⁷ These facts lead to a negative value of return from investment, when benefits are solely measured by the average wage-gain of those who complete primary school compared to people without education, and likewise for lower secondary educated comparing expected income to those with primary education.

124. Côte d'Ivoire has experienced very low economic growth of less than 1 percent annually on average during the period of project implementation. The low income and limited dispersion in wages for the lower education levels reduce the direct economic benefit from the increase in primary and secondary education. Simple calculations show that if the monthly wage of primary and secondary graduates increase by US\$20 the direct wage-benefit is sufficient to offset recurrent costs as well as costs from the investment.²⁸

125. For basic education, the assessment of direct economic benefit for the students graduating does not include all the benefits prevailing from a general higher level education in the country. The expansion of basic education increases the foundation of people suitable for higher education and provides important social benefits. The social effects may include dimensions such as mortality, health, population growth, and civic life (more educated individuals are better able to participate in an organized community life and to make informed policy choices). These benefits are however difficult to quantify in monetary terms.

126. In addition to the 300 classroom and 9 lower secondary schools constructed by the project, the project financed rehabilitation of an additional lower secondary school. Rehabilitation of the facilities is expected to raise quality of learning as well as lowering maintenance cost, while the effect on access might be limited.

127. The focus of the restructured component 3 is to support and build capacity for each of the three ministries of education with a larger focus on the Ministry of National Education (MEN). Especially the establishment of a task force under MEN has resulted in economic gains through support for development of ministerial strategies for the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (METFP) and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESRS). The strategy prepared for METFP was able to attract a Euro 9.28 million TVET project financed through the French Development Agency. Furthermore, the task force worked out medium-term expenditure frameworks for basic education, TVET and higher education, provided support for

²⁶ *Le Système Éducatif de la Côte d'Ivoire*, 2011, p. 79.

²⁷ The unit cost is based on staff costs, non-wage current expenditure (excluding grants to private institutions) and the number of students by level of education. *Project d'appui au Secteur Éducation/Formation (PASEF), Présentation du Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique (MENET)*, December 2012, p. 12.

²⁸ The wage increase corresponds to an 18.3% and a 14.2% wage increase for primary and lower secondary graduates respectively.

development of a sector country status report, and served as an important link between the ministries of education. Finally, the task force was central for restarting the project after the conflict.

128. In addition to supporting the task force, the component provided critical office equipment and vehicles needed to resume operations in the three ministries following the conflict. The overall reinforcement of the strategic and operational capacity of the ministries is particularly important in a post-conflict context. The ability of a project to immediately intervene after a conflict can help restore confidence in the state and support economic recovery providing jobs through procurement.

Financial analysis

129. The total public spending on education accounted for 19.6 percent of total public expenditure in Côte d’Ivoire in 2012 corresponding to 5.3 percent of GDP, cf. Table 3.

Table 3 Total public expenditure on education

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
% of GDP	4.5	4.6	4.9	4.6	5.3
% of total government expenditure	20.2	19.8	19.2	16.4	19.6

Source: *Project d’appui au Secteur Education/Formation (PASEF), Présentation du Ministère de l’Education Nationale et de l’Enseignement Technique (MENET), December 2012.*

130. In 2012, 41.5 percent of public expenditure on education went to pre-school and primary education, 29.1 percent to lower and upper secondary education, 6.6 percent to TVET, and 22.7 percent to higher education.²⁹

131. Total project spending was US\$66 million, of which US\$5.5 million was spent during the first implementation period from 1998 to 2004 and the resulting from 2008 to 2012. The resulting fiscal impact from the project has been limited accounting for between 0.1 percent and 1.3 percent of the total public expenditure on education over the project period, cf. Table 4.

²⁹ *Project d’appui au Secteur Education/Formation (PASEF), Présentation du Ministère de l’Education Nationale et de l’Enseignement Technique (MENET), December 2012, p. 10.*

Table 4 Fiscal Impact

Project cost	Avg.	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1998-2004						
- Pct. of total public spending on education	0.1	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.2	0.9
- Pct. of recurrent public spending on education	0.1	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.0

Source: *Project d'appui au Secteur Education/Formation (PASEF), Présentation du Ministère de l'Education Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique (MENET)*, December 2012. Project spending according to Annex 1 based on equal annual spending within each project implementation period.

132. The primary fiscal impact after project implementation stems from the higher cost of the expanded primary and lower secondary education, i.e. the recurrent costs associated with the additional number of students accommodated as well as maintenance costs of the schools. A rough estimate of recurrent costs related to maintenance and replacement of equipment in the schools amount to US\$1.3 million (FCFA 612 million), corresponding to replacement of all furniture and equipment over ten years as well as a yearly construction maintenance cost corresponding to 5 percent of the original construction cost. Unit costs covering education of the additional students amount to just below US\$1 million yearly (FCFA 482 million), resulting in total recurrent costs of around 2.3 million (FCFA 1,094 million) a year. This corresponds to approximately 0.2 percent of the overall recurrent spending on education. The fiscal impact directly attributable to the project only relates to costs of the program as far as they are additional to the recurrent expenditure that would have been made without the project. Therefore the future costs of e.g. teacher training and regular updates of curricula are not accounted for as recurrent costs resulting from the project, as these types of spending in general are part of government spending and therefore considered as “regular expenditures”.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Bettina Mill	Education Specialist	AFTH3	TTL
Roger Key	Principal Economist	AFTH3	Economic Analysis
Robert Prouty	Cluster Leader	AFTH2	Quality Reviewer
Rachidi Radji	Economist	AFTH3	Economic Analysis
Catherine Laurent	Economist	AFTH3	Economic Analysis
Irene Xenakis	Sr. Implementation Specialist	AFTH3	Implementation
Daniele Jaekel	Operational Analyst	AFTH3	Project Costing
Asha Ayong	Procurement Specialist	AFTH3	Procurement
Ross Pfile	Project Assistance	AFTH3	Administrative
Nicole Hamon	Language Staff Assistant	AFTH3	Administrative
T. Mpoy-Kamulayi	Sr. Legal Counsel	LEGAF	Lawyer
Renee Desclaux	Disbursement Officer	LOAAF	Disbursement
Makha Ndao	Sr. Education Specialist		Education
Guy Massicotte	Higher Education Specialist- Consultant		Higher Education
Jacques Waechter	Architect, Consultant		Civil Works
Philippe Theunissen	Architect, Consultant		Civil Works
Jeffrey Fine	Economist, Consultant		
Jean-Claude Hameidat	Management, Consultant		
Arvil van Adams	Acting Sector Management	AFTH3	Quality Reviewer
Jane Schubert	Consultant		Quality Reviewer
Supervision/ICR			
Hamoud Abdel Wedoud Kamil	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTEW	TTL
Maurice Adoni	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPW	Procurement
Cherif Diallo	Sr Implementation Spec.	AFTEW	Implementation
Bella Lelouma Diallo	Sr Financial Management Specialist	AFTMW	FM
Saidou Diop	Sr Financial Management Specialist	AFTMW	FM
Zainab Mambo-Cisse	Program Assistant	AFCF2	Implementation
Africa Eshogba Olojoba	Senior Environmental Specialist	AFTN1	Safeguards
Cornelia Jesse	Operation Officer	AFTEW	Implementation
Sandra Beemer	Sr. Operation Officer, Consultant	AFTEW	ICRR
Franco Russo	Operations Officer	EASHE	ICRR
Eva Hansen	Economist, ICR Consultant	AFTEW	Economic Analysis

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY95	6.0	25.97
FY96	48.8	209.77
FY97	87.5	376.44
FY98	85.7	368.50
Total:	228.0	980.68
Supervision/ICR		
FY99	36.07	155.12
FY00	30.68	95.30
FY01	27.95	89.86
FY02	22.40	123.34
FY03	27.27	92.92
FY04	41.25	151.36
FY05	11.70	34.61
FY06	7.39	40.63
FY07	2.63	21.57
FY08	14.33	53.13
FY09	33.42	137.25
FY10	41.66	218.45
FY11	27.63	139.82
FY12	25.47	126.06
FY13	9.24	85.96
Total:	359.09	1,565.38

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Not Applicable

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Not Applicable

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

English translation of PASEF Government ICR Exec Summary

133. The overall effectiveness of PASEF was very partial because many actions have been dropped for procedural reasons, limited skills of the actors, and conceptualization of the various components at the start. The project objectives were revised downward, especially with regard to the construction and rehabilitation of classes (original target, 900 classes to build and rehabilitate; revised target 300 classrooms). Several important activities such as the study on the implementation of GIS software, or the acquisition of an education management information system could not be performed.

The overall efficiency is very critical. The implementation of the project has revealed several shortcomings in terms of initial project design: (i) non-functioning of the Inter-ministerial Committee for Coordination Sector Education / Training (CICSEF), (ii) absence of a detailed results framework tracking individual activities and associated results indicators by implementation period; and (iii) individual components being implemented in isolation without much coordination of project activities. In addition, the joint support structures involved in the implementation of the project at times faced bottlenecks. Indeed having two structures involved in following up on physical infrastructure contracts has not always facilitated the efficient implementation of project activities. On the other hand, poor organization and low technical capacity of some selected companies have considerably delayed project activities. The organizational set-up of PASEF also had certain shortcomings, which led to a less rigorous monitoring of activities. Furthermore, there existed certain weaknesses in the administrative management, personnel tracking, and recording and classification of accounting records unorganized.

134. The 2008 project restructuring, however, helped the government achieve the new objectives. For instance, the target for construction of additional classrooms and colleges was achieved, overall education indicators slightly improved, and the availability of textbooks also increased. Less progress were noted in terms of pupil / teacher ratio which rose from 39 in 1998/1999 to 46 in 2011/2012, which falls short of the national standard of 40 students per teacher.

However, PASEF did contribute in part to the development of education by increasing enrollment at all levels of the national education sub-sector, and secondly to improve access and gross enrollment at all levels of the sub-sector. Furthermore, the free textbook policy helped relieve the financial burden for parents wanting to send their children to school. However, more efforts need to be made as 2 out of 10 school-aged children do not attend school.

135. The economic and financial evaluation of PASEF is made based on the base cost of the project, the withdrawal applications and in particular information obtained from the Bank's "ClientConnection" website. The PASEF was initially very slow to disburse, with the first reports at the end of 2008 showing a very low disbursement rate and activities only really taking off in 2009. Although the restructured project did not include counterpart funding, the Ivoirian counterpart was able to support project activities by injecting 3,648 billion FCFA.

The PASEF also experienced some difficulties in its financial and technical management. The main areas needing particular attention are: (i) the number of project staff and partners who did not have the same understanding of project management; (ii) improve programming and technical monitoring activities; and (iii) the absence of a real budget planning mechanism and an efficient financial monitoring system. These difficulties should be taken as lessons learnt when allocating future resources and matching them to proposed activities.

Conclusion

136. The PASEF legacy can be understood as having re-established a truly Ivorian education system, provided sufficient equipment and vehicles, quality classrooms and equipment, improve sector quality (the development of competency-based programs, additional textbooks and teaching guides in the series "School and Nation", provision to school canteens, carrying out of a literacy program with active involvement of the target population, and an evaluation framework). A particular focus should be the maintenance and monitoring of the acquisitions and the progress made under the project.

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Aide-memoirs 1997 – 2012.

Côte d'Ivoire: Devaluation's Benefits, World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, 1998.

Côte d'Ivoire - Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), World Bank, 2012.

Country Assistance Strategy, World Bank, 1997.

Emergency Basic Education Support Project, Emergency Project Paper, Global Partnership for Education Fund Grant/World Bank, 2012.

Final Document for the Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), World Bank, 1998.

Implementation Completion and Results report ICR No. ICR2558, Niger Basic Education Support Project, World Bank, 2013.

Implementation Completion and Results report No: ICR1943, Benin Education For All-Fast Track Initiative Program, World Bank, 2012.

Implementation Completion and Results report No: ICR2429, Burundi Education Sector Reconstruction Project, World Bank, 2012.

Le Système Éducatif de la Côte d'Ivoire, World Bank, 2011.

Portfolio Restructuring in a Post-Crisis Environment in Côte d'Ivoire, Project Paper, World Bank, 2008.

Project d'Appui au Secteur Éducation/Formation (PASEF), Présentation du Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Enseignement Technique (MENET).

Project Paper for a proposed restructuring, World Bank, 2010 & 2011.


School Construction Strategies for Universal Primary Education in Africa - Should Communities Be Empowered to Build Their Schools? Serge Theunynck, World Bank, 2009.

World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, World Bank, 2011.



CÔTE D'IVOIRE

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- ⊙ REGION CAPITALS
- ⊙ NATIONAL CAPITAL
- RIVERS
- MAIN ROADS
- RAILROADS
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- - - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES



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