1. Project Data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project ID</td>
<td>P115717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>South Sudan Gender Support &amp; Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Costs (US$M):</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loan/Credit (US$M):</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Board</td>
<td>Gender and Development</td>
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<td>Cofinancing (US$M):</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Board Approval Date:</td>
<td>08/26/2009</td>
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<td>Closing Date:</td>
<td>06/29/2011 12/31/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sector(s)</td>
<td>General agriculture fishing and forestry sector (70%); Micro- and SME finance (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme(s)</td>
<td>Gender (100% - P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared by: Vibecke Dixon
Reviewed by: Ridley Nelson
ICR Review Coordinator: Christopher David Nelson
Group: IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:

According to the Grant Agreement (article 2.01., p.4), the Project Objective is to “achieve immediate peace dividends for targeted women in Southern Sudan, through the provision of (a) improvements in access to the existing economic opportunities and (b) support to the Ministry of Gender to develop gender policies and strategies”.

The formulation of the Project Objective is identical on p.43 of the PAD (March 2009). On page 12 of the PAD, part (b) of the Project Objective is slightly rephrased, and reads as follows: (b) support to the Ministry of Gender, Social Work and Religious Affairs to develop and implement gender policies and strategies (our italics).

This review is based on the statement of the objective in the Grant Agreement.

Note: The Ministry of Gender is referred to as the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs (MGSWRA) in the Grant Agreement and the PAD, while referred to as the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) in the ICR. For ease of reference, this review will use the term Ministry of Gender (MoG) only.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Components:

There were three components and Component 3 consisted of three sub-components.

Component 1:
Economic empowerment of women (Appraisal Estimate US$4 million, Actual: no information). This component supported the empowerment of vulnerable women through the implementation of income-generating sub-projects in all ten states of Southern Sudan, mainly, but not exclusively, within the agriculture, fisheries and livestock sectors. This was implemented by local CBOs through 108 projects and covered activities such as: (i) training of women in agricultural best practices; (ii) access to inputs for productive farming; (iii) access and linkage to market opportunities; (iv) development of a strategy to link activities to micro-credit programs; (v) introduction of cash crops as a complement to subsistence farming; and (vi) training in micro/enterprise management. The type of activities supported by these interventions also covered tailoring, livestock, fishponds, trading, grinding machines, bricks, hotels, beekeeping and processing of oil.

Component 2:
Construction of a Building for the Ministry of Gender (Appraisal estimate US$3.1 million; Additional financing June 2012 US$546,975.-, i.e. total estimated US$3.646 million. Actual: No information). Purchase and installation of temporary prefab facilities and provision for the construction of an office building to relocate the offices of the Ministry of Gender.

Component 3:
Institutional Development of the Ministry of Gender (Appraisal Estimate US$2.9 million, Actual: No information) supported the strengthening of human and institutional capacity of the Ministry of Gender and relevant ministries to support the formulation of a strategy for addressing gender inequalities in Southern Sudan. There were three sub-components:

Subcomponent 3 (a): Studies. A Country Gender Assessment (CGA) was financed to compile, review and analyze existing and on-going work by various agencies on the economic, social, legal and cultural environment of women for policy recommendations.

Subcomponent 3 (b): Institutional Development of the MoG and State Ministries. This subcomponent included a capacity assessment and training program to address The Ministry’s and States’ needs to prepare them to monitor CBO’s sub-projects and to mainstream gender activities and implement direct interventions for gender equality and women’s empowerment in the future. This subcomponent also included setting up of the Project Coordination Unit including staffing.

Subcomponent 3 (c): Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting. The establishment of an M&E system within the MoG and the preparation of regular evaluation reports were supported under this subcomponent.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:

Project Cost:
The ICR is unclear about the actual project cost. In table A Basic Information (page unnumbered), the total disbursed amount is stated to be US$ 9.02 million.

In Annex 1 of the ICR, page 22, table (a) Project cost by component (in US$ million), reports on appraised and revised expected cost only and not on actual cost:
Component 1: Original Cost: US$4.0, Revised Cost: US$4.0;
Component 2: Original Cost US$3.1, Revised Cost US$3.6; and
Component 3: Original Cost US$2.9, Revised Cost US$2.9.

On page 10, para 46 of the ICR, it is stated that “of the allocated amount of US$10,546,795, total disbursement stood at US$8,999,899, or 85% at closing.... Out of the total US$3,860,408 for sub-grants released to beneficiaries (subcomponent 1), US$579,966, or 15% remains unaccounted for. The Bank issued a memo in April 2013 to MoG requesting documentation for the missing funds.”

There is no further information in the ICR regarding the actual cost of each sub-component or the total actual cost. Nor does the ICR explain the discrepancy in the reported Total Actual Cost (US$9.02 million as stated in table A versus US$8.99 million as stated in para 46 on page 10).

According to the TTL, all the funds (US$10.546 million) were disbursed, and the actual cost of each component equalled the planned cost, except from under component 1 where nearly US$600,000 were unaccounted for at project completion. At MTR, some of the CBOs proved not to be performing, and the project was given the permission to reallocate funds from the non-performing CBOs to the better performing CBOs, and it is the TTL’s impression that the funds were lost in that process. The TTL followed up by a) informing the INT, and b) by sending a letter to the Ministry of Finance and MoG through the Country Manager asking for either an
Financing:
The original approved grant from the South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was for US$10 million. It was later revised to US$10,546,795. The extra funds were also provided by the South Sudan MDTF (See Amendment No. 1 to Grant Agreement, August 3, 2012, para 1, page 1). There were no other external financing sources.

Recipient contribution:
There was no financial contribution from the Government of the Republic of South Sudan.

Dates:
There were two extensions of the Closing Date for a cumulative period of 18 months.

The first extension, a one-year extension of the Closing Date until June 2012 was approved in June 2011 to: (i) complete transfers of funds to CBOs and allow sufficient time for sub-project activities; and (ii) complete the procurement of materials and equipment and construction of the Ministry building.

The second restructuring was carried out in June 2012 to extend the project closing date another six months and to provide additional financing under Component 2 (construction of the building). The project closed on December 31st 2012, just over 18 months later than originally scheduled.

The six-month’s extension, from June 29, 2012 till December 21, 2012, brought the cumulative extension to 18 months.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:

High
The objectives are highly relevant to the Bank's strategy for South Sudan as outlined in the Fiscal Year 2013-2014 Interim Strategy Note. The project’s objectives are in line with three of the four development priorities outlined in the Note (pages i and 20): (i) build transparent and accountable national institutions to convert oil revenues into equitably shared development gains for men and women; (ii) build local institutions to establish the authority and capability of the state to deliver services, represent local constituencies and resolve local conflict; and (iii) create an enabling environment for the private sector to generate jobs and economic opportunities, including women and youth. It is stated in the Note that the strategy is informed by the World Bank's 2011 strategy for Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It. The Project Objectives are also well in line with the priorities stated in the regional strategy, where agribusiness, agricultural development and women's empowerment are included.

The objectives are also highly relevant to the South Sudan IDA 16 Priorities (as quoted in Box 3, page 23 of the ISN 2013-2014): "Gender: Based on a review of gender issues in South Sudan, all investment projects are being and will continue to be prepared with full consideration for the unique needs and constraints of male and female participants/beneficiaries with particular attention given to interventions that contribute to reducing severe gender disparities."

b. Relevance of Design:

Substantial
The relevance of design is rated Substantial.

The project design was largely coherent and logical in that the components complement each other and in that most of the identified outputs for each component link to the identified outcomes. The causal chain between funding and outcomes is clear, despite a vague statement of objectives.

The main objective was “to achieve immediate peace dividends for women.” This objective is vague and not defined or elaborated upon in the documents. The TTL explained that the expression “immediate peace dividends” was commonly used in South Sudan at the time, The women who were consulted during the preparatory mission had stated that they wanted “peace dividends”, and by this they meant increased household
income. At the time, most of the “peace dividends” projects in Sudan concentrated on infrastructure and physical construction, according to the TTL. This project was designed primarily as a community development project, with the intention of supporting women to increase their income.

It was stated that the means by which the objective was to be achieved were through (a) improvement in access to economic opportunities for women and (b) support to the MoG to develop gender policies and strategies. This review regards (a) “improvement in access to economic opportunities for women” as a potential early intermediate outcome, while (b) “support to the Ministry of Gender to develop gender policies and strategies” is an input (“support to”). However, it does also include an expected output; the development of gender policies and strategies.

As discussed later under Quality at Entry the two year project period was unrealistic.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):

The project’s objective, “to achieve immediate peace dividends for targeted women in Southern Sudan, through the provision of (a) improvements in access to the existing economic opportunities and (b) support to the Ministry of Gender to develop gender policies and strategies” can be divided into two sub-objectives: (i) improvements in access to the existing economic opportunities; and (ii) support to the Ministry of Gender to develop gender policies and strategies. Support to the Ministry of Gender is an input rather than an outcome, while the development of gender policies and strategies is an output.

Although, as noted, “immediate peace dividends” was a vague objective, it is clear from discussion with the TTL that what was intended was increased household income for the targeted women (see also section 3 above): the project was designed primarily as a community development project, with the intention of supporting women to increase their income.

Due to the lack of baseline data and the delay in setting up the M&E system, targets for the indicators were only set during the MTR in June 2011.

In the table called (a) PDO Indicator(s) in the fact sheet at the beginning of the PAD, it is stated that the final number of women benefitting from the project was 7,134. This figure is based on information gathered from field visits, interviews with CBOs, focal persons and chairpersons of women’s organizations and monitoring reports, and is used as the basis for the efficacy assessment. The figures in the table are percentages of the total number of actual beneficiaries; and as such only provide information of the percentage of total women participants partaking in each activity. It does not provide any information on the extent to which the project reached its target, as it is unclear what the target was. It is unclear whether the numbers reported in the table are actual baseline figures at MTR, and actual figures at project ending, or whether the figures under “MTR” represent target figures for the end of the project. The ICR provides no information on how many women were in the target group; the ICR seems to equate the total number of actual participants with target numbers.

The key performance indicator for the PDO is stated as: “% of target women who perceive increase in income as a result of project interventions”.

There are some shortcomings with this key performance indicator:

- **Target women’s perception:** Surveys that assess beneficiaries’ perception do not necessarily provide a measurement of the actual outcome. Other factors might influence people’s perception than what is supposedly measured. Studies have shown that even when people’s perceptions are positive, it does not necessarily coincide with actual improvement. However, given the difficult circumstances under which this project was implemented and the lack of quantitative baseline data, a perception survey might be appropriate in that it at least offers information on how the beneficiaries perceived the project outcomes.

- **Increase in women’s income** is here measured as a goal in itself. The underlying assumption is that “women’s increased income” will lead to “women’s economic empowerment” (the stated goal of Component 1) and/or “immediate peace dividends” (the stated POD). The assumption that an increase in women’s income automatically will lead to women’s economic empowerment or other higher level results, however, is a weakness in the project’s theory of change. The crucial question of who controls the money (men or women) was not explicitly dealt with. This major assumption that women control their own income is not questioned or discussed in any of the project documents, nor in the ICR, and no measures have reportedly been taken in the project to ensure women’s control over own income. However, in the meeting with the TTL, it was pointed out that the women consulted (in the perception survey and during supervision missions) reported that they did perceive an increase in income, and that they were now able to feed their
children, send them to school and take them to the health clinics when necessary. This indicates that women funded by the project actually did control at least a significant share of their own income; this was also the impression of the TTL who did not find information that indicated otherwise. That the women were able to feed the children and provide clothes and healthcare for them indicates positive outcomes from the project, although it cannot be verified by more rigorous evaluation methods due to the security situation.

- "as a result of project interventions": In order to be able to determine attribution, a counterfactual analysis would have been needed. Given the emergency nature of this project and the lack of data (both before and during operations), a counterfactual analysis has not been done. Thus it is not possible to establish whether the outputs and outcomes reported are attributable to the project intervention or whether the results are primarily due to other factors. In the absence of a baseline and more rigorous monitoring data, it becomes difficult to attribute all the project’s outcomes to the actual intervention. However, as pointed out by the TTL, the women themselves, both in the perception survey and during supervision missions, attributed their increased income to the project interventions. Some interventions were very clearly a direct result of the project, as for example the Blind Women’s CBO in Juba. Almost 100% of poultry for Juba was imported from Uganda, this CBO started poultry and egg production and were providing some of the hotels in Juba with poultry and eggs. Their business became self-sustaining by the end of the project and is still in operation.

Outcome:
The target was set at 20% (1,527 women) at the MTR (or the actual figure was 20% at the MTR) but reached 40% (2,854 women) of the target group who perceived an increase in income as a result of project interventions. This is a considerable achievement directly relevant to the project objective “to achieve immediate peace dividends for women”.

(i) Improvements in access to the existing economic opportunities

Outputs:
Indicator 1: 18% of target women received training in non-farm income generating activities (20% at MTR).
This indicator is listed under Intermediate Outcome Indicators in the ICR (unnumbered page), but is here treated as an output.

Indicator 2: 29% of target women received training in agricultural production activities (30% at MTR).
This indicator is listed under Intermediate Outcome Indicators in the ICR (unnumbered page), but is here treated as an output.

Outcomes:
Indicator 3: 29% of target women utilized at least one new agricultural production technology or practice due to project intervention (30% at MTR).

Indicator 4: 20% of target women perceived an increase in crop yields or harvest due to project interventions (10% at MTR).

Indicator 5: 40% of sub-projects are expected to continue post project closure activities (the total number of sub-projects is 108). Of the 108 CBOs who received funds to implement income-generating activities for women, 90 of them completed the projects. This is a substantial achievement considering the mobility, capacity and security challenges.

Efficacy rating: Substantial

(ii) Support to the Ministry of Gender to develop gender policies and strategies

Outputs:
Indicator 8: Interim prefabricated buildings, furniture and equipment installed; Yes.
Indicator 9: Construction of new Ministry building completed. No, only 31%
Indicator 10: Country Gender Assessment completed. Yes
Indicator 11: Completion of capacity building training program. Yes (no info of how many trained or who)
Indicator 12: Number of GoSS and state ministry staff received training 41 (target: 52)
Indicator 13: Number of CBO participants in project training 3,395 (target: ?)
Indicator 14: Number of monitoring reports submitted by sub-projects 10 and 8
Indicator 15: Number of supervision visits to approved project sites 83 of 108 only at closing
Outbreak of violence in some states prevented supervision visits
Indicator 16: Number of project staff onboard within 6 months of effectiveness 7 (target: 7)
Indicator 17: Number of sub-projects receiving full disbursement of grants 94 (of 108)
Indicator 18: Number of sub-projects complete by 2012 94

Outcomes:
No outcome indicators were developed for this sub-objective. The sub-objective itself is at input/output-level only.
However, according to the TTL, the capacity strengthening of the Ministry Staff was successful; they are now able to write proposals, manage projects.

No indicator was developed in the M&E framework with regard to the intended development of a gender policy and strategy. It is mentioned in the ICR text, however, (page 13, para 53 and page 14 para, 62), that the Country Gender Assessment was critical in enhancing the Gender Policy. Final approval of the 2008 Gender Policy by the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly had been delayed due to lack of evidence-based recommendations, but the CGA provided the basis for updating the existing Gender policy Framework draft into a National Gender Policy for approval by the Legislature.

The relevance of two of the indicators, 6 and 7, is unclear. Indicator 6 “% of women joining associations”, and Indicator 7 “% of collective action among women in project sites” (here the actual achievement is measured to be 500%, due to an assumption that collective action was non-existent prior to the project, which is unlikely). There is no direct logical link between these indicators and the intended sub-objective of increased access to economic opportunities by women although there may be indirect links. This indicates a weakness in the M&E design.

The infrastructure element of the support to the ministry was not achieved.

Efficacy rating: Modest

5. Efficiency:

Negligible

Given the emergency nature of the operation and absence of data, no detailed economic analysis was conducted during preparation. The ICR does not contain any economic analysis or estimation of the Value for Money of the total grant nor of the different components. It is mentioned in the ICR (page 13, para 57-58 and Annex 3 page 28) that a Value for Money assessment was carried out for two of the activities (construction of the Ministry building and the purchase of 10 motorcycles) in October 2012. The assessment concluded that performance for the construction was partially achieved (construction was assessed at 31% at project closing), but fully achieved for the purchase of motorcycles. Annex 3 on page 28 provides a table summarizing the assessment, but does not provide sufficient information for a verification of the assessment. Furthermore, substantial parts of the project (other than the construction of the building and the purchase of the ten motorcycles) have not undergone any efficiency assessment. The ICR does not compare final costs at project closure with estimated costs at appraisal.

Experiences during implementation confirmed the accuracy of the high risk rating at appraisal: The project faced challenges specific to a fragile and post-conflict state. Security issues caused delays or failure in a number of sub-projects (23 out of 108) under Component 1, and lack of security forced the relocation of a number of sub-project activities. Pilfering of sub-project inputs was also a problem. These constraints affected the ability of the PCU to undertake monitoring and technical assistance visits. The lack of Banking infrastructure delayed fund transfers to grantees for sub-project activities. Most banks operated from Kenya and this delayed the remittance of funds. The remoteness and lack of access to some sub-project sites hindered the monitoring and reporting.

The two extensions indicate a degree of inefficiency, and were mainly due to the delay in the construction of the Ministry building. The failure to complete the construction (still not completed in 2014) involved a significant expenditure with no benefit stream. There were also delays in 23 of the 108 community projects. Furthermore, 15% of the project funds are still unaccounted for which suggests no benefits.

Efficiency is rated Negligible.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:
6. Outcome:

Relevance of objectives is rated high but relevance of design modest. The efficacy of the first sub-objective, "improvements in access to the existing economic opportunities", was substantially achieved, while efficacy of the second sub-objective was modestly achieved, mainly due to lack of approval of the gender policy and the non-completion of the construction of the Ministry building. Efficiency is negligible due to limited evidence and a delay in the construction of the ministry and therefore no benefit streams attributable to that substantial expenditure. The overall project outcome is assessed as moderately unsatisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The Risk to Development Outcome is rated High. The Republic of South Sudan is a fragile, post-conflict state where risks associated with uncertainties in the security environment and macroeconomic framework are high. The project development objectives rank high in the list of Government priorities, making the risk to changes in policy that would adversely affect the objectives low.

The risk that existing institutions within the Government will not build sufficient capacity is high. The numbers of staff trained under project activities are too few to impact sustainably the functioning of these institutions over time, and the risk of staff turnover is high.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:

The Quality at entry is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.

The project design was appropriate given the situation and development priorities of the Government of Southern Sudan at Appraisal. Response to the women’s dire economic situation was among GoSS’ key priorities. The absence of information to address gender concerns and the overall weak capacity in the country informed the institutional building component. Past donor and GoSS funded programs in the country informed the design of Component 1. GoSS had been providing resources, although small, for the economic empowerment of women to the 10 states from 2006 to 2008 for livelihood projects. Various donors also provided support targeting women and children. The design was furthermore based on workshops and reviews with a range of stakeholders.

The design provided arrangements to ensure fiduciary compliance during implementation. Assistance provided by international consultants ensured that the project’s financial and procurement systems were adequate. Assurances from the Ministry of Housing were relied on in moving forward with the construction component.

All activities, except from the building construction, were completed. The project extensions secured were primarily to complete the construction activity.

However, there were serious shortcomings. The time to construction and the cost for the ministry building was under-estimated at appraisal. Although the Final Project Proposal had recognized the difficult operating
environment, it under-estimated the extent of the risks to implementation. The implementation horizon of two years for the project was highly unrealistic for achieving, in difficult country circumstances, an objective of income gains for women on any scale built on enhanced institutional capacity.

**Quality-at-Entry Rating:** Moderately Unsatisfactory

**b. Quality of supervision:**

The Quality of supervision is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

The Bank’s supervision of the project was conducted regularly with one to two missions per year. They were undertaken by the Team Leader supported by a country-based task team. The team provided hands-on support to the PCU during project implementation. It also provided significant support to the project on all components with particular attention to Component 1 and the procurement of studies and contractors for the building construction. Aide-Memoires from Bank supervision highlighted key accomplishment and called the attention of the Ministry and Bank management to key issues and follow-up actions by both Client and the Bank. Among these issues were the challenges in undertaking monitoring and reporting of sub-project grants; delays in the procurement of CGA studies, and delays in procurement and supervision by the building contractor.

The Bank team played a particularly critical role during the MTR by reviewing and revising the Results Framework, together with the Government, and putting in place corrective actions to support the reporting of CBOs.

The Bank was proactive in addressing implementation issues, including those in procurement. The resources that were allocated at the start proved to be insufficient and additional funds were allocated and more time provided.

However, more effort could have been devoted to improving M&E in the early stages of implementation. M&E data for the development objectives was only available after the MTR.

**Quality of Supervision Rating:** Moderately Satisfactory

**Overall Bank Performance Rating:** Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. **Assessment of Borrower Performance:**

a. **Government Performance:**

Government performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

The Government showed ownership at the project preparation stage. The Government’s commitment to the project is a reflection of its commitment to the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and its priorities, one of which is to address the dismal status of women through policy action and directed programs for economic empowerment. The PCU was established and staffed. The Ministry of Gender was tasked to implement the project and other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Housing, provided support.

The Government established a PFMU in the Ministry of Finance to handle the financial aspects of the project, including the filing of withdrawal applications, reimbursements and financial reporting. According to the ICR (page 18, para 78), the PFMU performed this function well. Other line Ministries (Agricultural, Animal Resources) provided technical support to CBOs to maximize their production and income generating potential. States also provided support through the Ministries of Social Development, whose staff acted as focal persons for the project. States’ involvement was however limited to the focal persons.

The Ministry of Housing played a key role in the construction component. Delays in the approval of design
and bid documents however became the major cause for the non-completion of the building.

**Government Performance Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

### b. Implementing Agency Performance:

Implementing Agency Performance is rated **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

The Ministry of Gender (through the PCU) implemented the project. It appointed counterpart staff to the project and named two of its Directors-General to lead the implementation and closely collaborate with the Bank in the implementation of the project.

According to the ICR (page 18, para 80), there was an overdependence on external consultants. While a number of staff were assigned to work with counterpart specialists in a twinning arrangement, this did not take place and the transfer of knowledge, particularly on Financial Management, procurement and training was negligible.

Monitoring of sub-projects and management of contracts were challenging from the start. Information was generated through interviews, phone calls and monitoring visits (key staff did not travel to project sites due to the security situation). After closing, with financial reports still pending and consultancies terminated, collection of information and submission of key reports slowed down even more.

The limited role played by the States and the failure to provide oversight to the construction component and meet reporting requirements for the sub-projects diminished the good performance by the Ministry of Finance in managing the financial aspect of the project. The failure of the Ministry of Gender to provide competent and responsive staff and counterpart officials necessitated a replacement at project mid-term. While a good number of CBOs performed adequately, a number of them still have to comply with reporting requirements, especially for the funds received.

As noted, there were some missing funds not yet accounted for.

**Implementing Agency Performance Rating**: Moderately Unsatisfactory

**Overall Borrower Performance Rating**: Moderately Unsatisfactory

### 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

#### a. M&E Design:

M&E was given appropriate consideration in the design in that it figured in one of three subcomponents under Component 3, and an M&E system was as such planned to be built into the project design. Appropriate M&E staff were recruited (albeit late) and were responsible for the development and implementation of the M&E system.

The design of the M&E system and the self-reporting baseline questionnaires had a very slow start, partly due to lack of adequately skilled staff in the beginning, and the M&E system, based on the Results Framework, was finally established in the second year of the project. Implementing CBOs were required to include detailed benchmarks and provide information on baselines, against which project progress would be measured.

The results framework was revised during the project Mid-Term Review to take into account new knowledge of development problems and local conditions. A beneficiary survey, complemented by information received from project monitoring staff and MDTF Monitoring Agents generated significant data to revise the indicators in the results framework.

The indicators chosen by the team in the original Final Project Proposal are mostly in line with the development objectives, but most of them focus on outputs rather than outcomes.

The project design did not factor in the extent to which data requirements and collection would be a challenge.
No baseline data were available for most of the indicators.

b. M&E Implementation:

From its inception, the M&E system was inadequate and the PCU lacked adequately skilled staff in the beginning. Information on sub-project grantees for a baseline was not available until the MTR.

Data verification for Component 1 was very challenging. Data collected from different sources suffered from discrepancies making it difficult to determine the actual impact of the sub-projects. To compensate for the lack of data, verification of information was done using in-depth interviews with Focal Persons, chairpersons and beneficiaries. Site verification visits supplemented these interviews. Data collected remains incomplete and actual figures for each of the indicators for Component 1 cannot be determined. Financial monitoring of CBOs was especially problematic due to their lack of skills in preparing reports and sub-project site inaccessibility. However, the ICR reports that the information collected appeared to be a good representation of the achievements (page 9 para 39).

c. M&E Utilization:

The M&E system became the basis for the project performance report, allowing the PCU to review sub-project status and take corrective measures. The reports generated became the basis for providing additional support to performing CBOs. The M&E System was still being utilized by the Ministry at the time of the ICR but in a limited way after project completion. The data gathering and performance measuring have largely been left to one-two ministry staff who already have a heavy workload and other responsibilities.

Reason for M&E Quality Rating:

The project operated under very challenging conditions in a post-conflict environment with substantial security issues coupled with low human and institutional capacity. Under these circumstances, the project staff showed professionalism and flexibility in applying alternative, adequate techniques (like the perception survey) when information gathering and reporting proved difficult. Given the emergency nature of the operation and the relative short period of the intervention, the project focused more on outputs than on outcomes.

M&E Quality Rating: Substantial

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards:

According to the Final Project Proposal, the operation was classified as Category “B” under the Bank’s OP4.01 Environmental Assessment Sub-projects were very small and did not trigger any safeguard policies. The overall project did not trigger any social safeguard policies. Project grantees were already engaged in productive activities and any expansion covered donated government lands. For the building construction, unoccupied land was procured by the Ministry of Gender and legal requirements and consultations were undertaken prior to design.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:

Financial Management

Out of the allocated amount of US$10,546,795, total disbursement stood at US$8.9 million (85%) at closing. The first tranche for 95 of the 108 beneficiaries and the second tranche for 47 have been accounted for. Out of the total of US$3,860,408 for sub-grants released to beneficiaries, US$579,966 (15%) remains to be accounted for. The Bank issued a memo in April 2013 to the MoG requesting documentation for the missing funds.

Significant attention was paid to the fiduciary framework at the design stage, and financial management and
institutional systems were assessed as weak. The overall Financial Management risk was rated as high, but according to the ICR (page 19 para 44) it is moderate in reality because of the mitigating measures that were put in place. These included: (i) monitoring the actual expenditures by a Monitoring Agent; (ii) assigning the responsibility over accounting systems to the Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) established for the MDTF-SS; and (iii) selecting and External Audit Agent (EAA) to provide independent assessment of financial statements. All Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) and the audit report for the Financial Years 2010 and 2011 were prepared and submitted on time. Mitigating measures were implemented and contributed to the moderately satisfactory rating of the Financial Management aspect of the project.

**Procurement**

The overall procurement risk was rated high at appraisal. An international Procurement Specialist was hired to assist the PCU build the capacity of the Ministry by pairing up with its procurement staff. The Procurement Specialist was responsible for the procurement of works, goods and services. There were significant delays in the procurement process of goods and services, especially in undertaking the CGA and in the construction of the Ministry building. At project closing, the construction of the building was only 31% complete with an estimated shortage of funds of US$4.2 million to complete the building.

At the MTR in May 2011, concerns were raised on the slow progress in the submission of financial accountability reports by grantees and delays experienced in three major activities, namely the preparation of the CGA, the construction of the building for the Ministry of Gender and supervision of construction. Delays in procurement for the three packages were caused by capacity constraints in managing procurement activities and in the preparation and approval of bidding documents. Measures were taken to solve these challenges, and the CGA was completed before project closing in December 2012.

c. **Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):**

The ICR (page 15 para 66) mentions some potential positive unintended effects by some of the sub-projects, such as revenues from renting out stalls used for assistance grants and a tailoring project secured a supply contract from a local school. However, such effects should be regarded more as intended and expected rather than positive unintended effects.

In the meeting with the TTL, two positive unintended effects were mentioned:

- The CBOs were strengthened through the project, both by receiving relevant training and also from gaining experience in managing projects. Many of the CBOs had no previous experience in working with donors, and the project contributed to a strengthened civil society at the local level through these women’s CBOs. Most of the CBOs are still operating in South Sudan, and some of the activities are still ongoing. The CBOs’ capacities were strengthened in such a way that several other WB operations (and other donor projects) now work through those same CBOs.

- The Country Gender Assessment led not only to the completion and approval of the Gender Policy by the Council of Ministers (yet to be endorsed by the parliament due to the recent civil war), but it also led to the formulation of a Social Protection Policy.

d. **Other:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. Ratings:</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>IEG Review</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreement / Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome:</strong></td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk to Development Outcome:</strong></td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>There are high risks associated with the security situation and the weak institutional capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bank Performance:</strong></td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>Quality at Entry suffered from an unrealistically short two year project period, far too short for a community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Borrower Performance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of ICR</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of ICR</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
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</table>

**NOTES:**
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

### 13. Lessons:

The following lessons, emphasizing those that would be applicable in other post-conflict environments, are taken from the ICR with some adaptation of language:

1. In post-conflict settings with extremely weak institutional capacity, continuing post-conflict insecurity and serious accessibility challenges due to the lack of infrastructure, projects should start at small-scale and be gradually scaled-up; experience suggests that nation-wide coverage at project start-up is over-ambitious. Small-scale and a focused set of activities should be prioritized to draw lessons for future expansion of coverage and scope.

2. In a post-conflict setting it is especially important to have realistic timetables for physical construction components.

3. It takes time to build capacity; capacity cannot be built within one two-year project - in any setting, but especially not in a new country where government and donor support is starting with a low level of capacity and with a need for capacity to be cross-sectoral.

### 14. Assessment Recommended?  
- Yes  - No

### 15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is clearly written and consistent with Bank guidelines. It presents good analysis of almost all dimensions required to evaluate the project. However, there are some shortcomings:

- There is no information of the total actual cost or the actual cost per component. A description and explanation of the discrepancies in the ICR between the reported planned and actual costs would have been useful.

- A fuller explanation of who the target group would be, how targets were set and what the targets were, would have been useful.

- A complete list of acronyms would also have been useful; the ICR uses several acronyms that are not spelled out or listed in the list of acronyms.

**Quality of ICR Rating**: Satisfactory