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# IEG CASCR Review
Independent Evaluation Group

| 1. CAS Data | |
|---|---|
| **Country:** Mauritania | |
| **CAS Year:** FY03 | **CAS Period:** FY03-FY07 |
| **CASCR Review Period:** FY03-FY07 | **Date of this review:** |

## 2. Executive Summary


i. The FY03 CAS was approved in a climate of confidence that Mauritania had proven its worth as a reliable IDA client, ready to graduate to accelerated programmatic lending. In the event, a relaxation of fiscal discipline, a deterioration in the Government's commitment to structural reform, and mounting political instability prevented deployment of five fast-disbursing operations, with the result that the CAS's relevance as a lending strategy was nullified. AAA fared better, but here, too, the disruptions were extensive. Portfolio performance suffered during the first half of the implementation period, but experienced a strong recovery, in tandem with the client's macroeconomic performance, during the last two years. IEG's survey of completed project performance yielded above-average ratings by Sub-Saharan African standards, but this largely covered projects implemented during the 1990s, when Mauritania's development effort was at a peak (paras. 1-7).

ii. Of the four CAS objectives, achievement of the Growth Anchored in the Poor and Human Resource Pillars was rated *moderately satisfactory*, based on IDA-supported gains in social service access (offset by some deterioration in quality) and modest successes in agricultural development and nutritional education. Poverty continued to decline at a significant pace, carrying over a trend first observed in the 1990s, although the connection to CAS-supported interventions was unclear, due to gaps in understanding about the exact origins of this decline. However, the goals of the Private Sector Development Pillar were largely not achieved (*moderately unsatisfactory*), and progress toward the Institutional Development Pillar was *unsatisfactory*. In this latter instance, deteriorating governance led to successive reductions in Mauritania's IDA allocations (paras. 8-26).

iii. IDA was clearly blindsided by adverse client domestic policy developments. However, IDA could be faulted for delivering weak quality at entry, since the CAS lacked a results focus, did not provide adequate mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation, and made no provisions for the risk that the client's prior strong performance might not continue. Supervision was of high quality, particularly during 2006-07, when a series of restructuring steps rapidly upgraded portfolio performance under trying circumstances. In understanding the moderately unsatisfactory overall outcome, erosion of the client's fiscal discipline and commitment to reform were important explanatory factors. IDA's performance is rated *moderately satisfactory* (paras. 27-28).

iv. The CASCR was frank in its discussion of CAS relevance and provided strong findings and lessons. However, it also suffered from three shortcomings (para. 29): (a) it did not cover the significant developments which occurred during FY06-07, presumably because it assumed (erroneously) that these years fell outside of the CAS implementation period; (b) it rated IDA contributions to the pillars, but not the outcomes of the pillars themselves, which is a fundamental requirement; and (c) it noted that the CAS included performance indicators, but did not report on their progress or lack thereof.



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v. The major findings and lessons of the CASCR Review (para. 30) are:

- Further progress on governance, particularly in the area of fiscal transparency, will be indispensable to substantial IDA engagement.
- Past performance is no guarantee of future behavior. Prudent strategic risk analysis requires identifying alternative steps to be taken, in the event the client's support for CAS objectives falls seriously short of expectations.
- Making major hard-to-reverse reforms should be a prerequisite for determining the extent of Mauritania's eligibility for programmatic lending.
- IDA needs to develop an integrated strategy for assisting the GIRM to strengthen its administrative capacity, without which the barriers to meaningful structural reform might prove to be insuperable.

## 3. CASCR Summary

***Overview of CAS Relevance:***

1. The FY03 CAS was formulated in the wake of a decade of uneven, but generally improving macroeconomic performance and structural reform implementation in the trade and public enterprise sectors. Together with increased earnings from fishing and mining royalties and a quadrupling in the size of foreign direct investment flows, these measures supported above-norm growth averaging 4.5 percent annually, which, in turn, led to a ten percentage-point reduction in the poverty headcount. However, as noted in IEG's 2005 CAE, by 2000, fiscal performance had begun to weaken, although awareness of this development would not emerge for another four years because of successful Government efforts to conceal it. Significant off-budget spending drove the fiscal balance, excluding grants, from a surplus of 4 percent of GDP in 2002 to deficits of 37 and 23 percent in the succeeding two years, and a loss of eligibility for drawing upon the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). With significant adjustments in 2006 and the advent of oil revenues, the fiscal accounts have now swung back into a substantial surplus.

2. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM) was one of the earliest IDA clients to adopt a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) in 2001. The four objectives of that PRSP – (i) accelerating private sector-led growth, (ii) anchoring that growth in the economic environment of the poor, (iii) developing human resources and ensuring universal access to basic infrastructure and services, and (iv) promoting institutional development and governance – were adopted verbatim by the CAS. The GIRM's perceived reliability as a development partner -- based on its longstanding macroeconomic stability, two decades of political stability, superior governance performance in regional terms (top quintile among Sub-Saharan African countries), and flawless march toward HIPC Completion -- was considered sufficient to justify switching most lending from investment to programmatic operations to support accelerated structural reform.

3. In the event, immediately following approval of the CAS, its usefulness as a strategic document evaporated. Several developments were critical. First, the GIRM's interest in wide-ranging reform waned rapidly, possibly, as the CASCR contends, because achievement of the HIPC Completion Point in 2002 removed a major motivation for action. Secondly, what had been an authoritarian, but stable, regime was suddenly beset by political challenges, including two failed coup attempts in 2003 and 2004, followed by a successful one in 2005. In its effort to keep opponents off-balance, the pre-2005 Taya Administration replaced ministers and other high-ranking officials at a dizzying pace, rendering continuity in conducting the policy dialogue with donors impossible. Thirdly, there was the aforementioned loss of fiscal discipline, which also involved violation of fiduciary reporting standards, and its associated impact on implementation of the PRSP, a key program trigger. Under these circumstances, the CAS's intended reliance on programmatic instruments was rendered inoperable. Not long after the CAS had been approved, it was effectively discarded, replaced by opportunistic

responses to events on the ground. For example, of US$140 million in planned projects, only US$78 million materialized, supplemented by US$78 million in new, unprogrammed projects. Less than half the planned AAA, originally linked to the discontinued programmatic operations, was implemented. Beyond these shortcomings, the CAS suffered from design flaws common to CASs of that period, including a lack of results orientation. As the CASCR notes, objectives were defined in terms of desired countrywide goals as expressed in the GIRM's 2001 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), without having translated them into a set of achievable program-level outcomes. Achieving these country-level outcomes depended on factors beyond the CAS's ability to control, such as fluctuations in Mauritania's terms of trade. Moreover, the CAS did not present a clear set of measurable indicators. Nor did it provide a plan for strengthening the GIRM's weak monitoring and evaluation systems. Consequently, when the CASCR was prepared in 2005, it was unable to report exactly what development impact CAS-supported interventions in a wide range of fields had actually had. Finally, the CAS did not plan for the possibility that client performance might fall short of the high level assumed. In sum, as a strategic guide, the CAS proved ineffective, and its relevance *negligible*.

***Overview of CAS Implementation:***

4. Because of the aforesaid developments, major alterations in AAA and lending had to be made. Eight of ten planned base-case projects were dropped, including all adjustment lending. Five new investment projects were added. Lending was concentrated on rural, natural resource, and social sector development.

5. The on-going portfolio experienced a sharp deterioration in performance up to 2005, followed by an equally rapid recovery during 2006-07, spurred by extensive restructuring efforts IDA conducted with a transitional post-coup military regime and by strengthened portfolio tracking mechanisms. After rising from nil to 22 percent of the total from 2003 to 2005, the percentage of problem projects once again fell to zero in FY07. Similarly, after deteriorating from 25 to 18 percent, the disbursement ratio recently rebounded to 23 percent (FY08 CAS Annex Table B2). Early closures reduced the number of projects from 12 to ten over this period. Notwithstanding these difficulties in implementation, Mauritania's IDA assistance, already high by Sub-Saharan African standards, was further increased by US$26 million above the planned US$140 million (including US$88 million in unprogrammed projects) during the FY03-07 period (see Annex Table 1).

6. IEG evaluated ten projects during this period, rating them, on average, in line with Bankwide levels of portfolio performance, and well above the Sub-Saharan Africa averages for outcome, institutional development, and sustainability (see Annex Table 3). This above-norm performance acquires context when account is taken of the fact that these completed operations were implemented by and large during the "golden era" for Mauritanian development of 1992-2002, and not the more troubled era which succeeded it.

7. With respect to AAA (see Annex Table 2), of seventeen planned products, seven were delivered, of which three on time. The remainder were either postponed or dropped. In addition, ten unprogrammed studies were delivered. Given the fact that much of this AAA was intended to support a transition from investment to programmatic lending, and premised on a productive policy dialogue which has only recently re-appeared, its impact has been necessarily restricted. No QAG assessments were done relating to this period. According to the CASCR, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) papers and the FY04 Country Economic Memorandum positively shaped the emergence of better-defined social, rural, urban, and private sector development strategies in 2006-07.

***Overview of Achievement by Objective:***

**Accelerating Private Sector-Led Growth**

8. As noted in the CASCR, IDA focused its planned interventions on agriculture, fisheries, the financial sector, micro-finance, oil, and mining, complemented by pro-competitive actions in infrastructure. The IFC pledged to expand operations in the fisheries, industry, and banking sectors. In the event, many of the IDA initiatives were dropped, although projects in irrigated agriculture and mining proceeded with positive impact. All efforts to break the state monopolies in energy, water, and sanitation were unsuccessful. For example, a planned partial risk guarantee for privatization of the power company was never taken up, because the sale of the enterprise attracted little interest from buyers, who may have been put off by the small scale of Mauritania's internal market, the effects of years of mismanagement on assets and labor relations, and the GIRM's history of failing to approve adequate tariff adjustments. A replacement project, the Energy/Water/Sanitation Sector Reform TA, was narrower in scope, but nonetheless ineffective, according to the CASCR, producing little improvement in either the competitiveness or efficiency of services provided.

9. IDA's assistance in support of natural resources management was more productive. The cadastre established under the Mining Sector Capacity Building Project (PRISM) introduced more transparent, investor-friendly procedures, which, in turn, may have indirectly helped bring about a several-fold increase in mining sector activities. Of course, this latter trend was also connected to favorable trends in international ore and metal prices. An additional achievement, according to the CASCR, was that the GIRM became more receptive to technical assistance and transparent procedures in the oil sector, joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2006. The Second Integrated Development Project for Irrigated Agriculture (PDIAIM 2) supports agricultural export diversification, improved commercialization, and higher quality rice and produce. It follows a predecessor project closed in 2005, which IEG rated moderately satisfactory, mainly because, although meeting most of its major relevant objectives, the project had significant shortcomings on physical components, such as the rehabilitation and expansion of the irrigation system. In fisheries, IDA's advice on improved management of royalties largely fell on deaf ears until 2006, forcing a postponement of planned AAA. The CAS describes the current environmental situation as one of inadequate information, severe shortages of qualified manpower, and an uncontrolled exploitation of all natural resources which, in the case of the fisheries, has led to over-fishing in both an economic and a biological sense.

10. IEG's 2005 CAE concluded that deficiencies in administrative capacity were major impediments to private sector development, and this concern was also embodied in the CAS. Eight sectoral MTEFs consolidated in an overarching MTEF plan helped shape the terms of the 2004 Budget Law as it applied to the infrastructure, energy, urban, and rural sectors, according to the CASCR. Several Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grants supported capacity building in a variety of ministries, including Justice and Economic Affairs. However, because of a lack of adequate budgetary and financial controls, including functional spending aggregation for tracking purposes, their impact remains uncertain. IDF financing of a study on support to the accounting profession provided policy advice on financial management issues.

11. The Financial Sector Reform Operation, originally planned for FY03, was dropped for lack of GIRM interest, and replaced by a large AAA study and scattered financial components, such as the PDIAIM line of credit, from several other projects. Nonetheless, the characteristics of the financial sector – oligopolistic, riddled with self-lending, largely inaccessible by small and medium-scale entrepreneurs, and a major private sector bottleneck – appear to have been little altered by any of these efforts. Nearly two-thirds of IFC's new commitments were channeled into this sector, the remainder going to mining and tourism. The CASCR took the view that IFC's regional office in Senegal was too far removed to gain a comprehensive view of Mauritania's private sector needs and opportunities.

12. In broad terms, the CAS characterizes the current state of private sector development as one hampered by extensive administrative barriers, weak corporate and public governance, inadequate

access to financial services, difficulty in enforcing business contracts, excessive infrastructure costs, and an inadequate skill base. While overall growth was satisfactory at around five percent annually, most originated in the enclave natural resource sector, with the remaining non-resource private activities experiencing weak expansion. On the basis of this evidence, achievement of this objective is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

**Growth Anchored in the Economic Environment of the Poor**

12. Improvements in access by the poor to basic "non-social services", especially roads, water, sanitation, electricity and waste disposal services, were the main focus of IDA's interventions. IDA's key instruments were the PRSCs, which never materialized, and the Urban Development Program APL (PDU) approved in FY02, which has experienced disbursement lags in excess of sixty percent. More recently, the APL has experienced some improvement in performance, with the result that the PDU is now estimated to have aided some 55,000 urban slum dwellers with credits and infrastructural improvements.

13. The CASCR singles out the positive contributions of the Integrated Development Project for Irrigated Agriculture (PDIAIM) and the Rainfed Natural Resource Development Project (PDGRNP), particularly in expanding non-traditional exports. By the end of 2006, these had reached five percent of total exports. Moreover, the CAE-criticized lack of any integrated rural development strategy continued, due to the lack of effective transport, financial, and land-titling instruments.

14. The multi-donor *Aftouf-Es-Saheli Water Supply* credit was not delivered because of difficulties in reaching agreement on the project scope and individual donor contributions. Implementation of both the PDU and the Higher Education was plagued by delays caused by low capacity in the building sector, renegotiations of contracts due to price fluctuations and the poor quality of deliverables, according to the CASCR. AAA contributed high-quality eight high-quality sectoral MTEFs of uncertain impact because of GIRM ambivalence, while high-case CAS scenario ESWs on "*Private Participation in Infrastructure and Supply Chain*" FY04 and on "*Issues and Perspectives of the Housing Sector*" planned for FY04 had to be dropped.

15. A Transport Sector Operation, added as a piecemeal replacement for components no longer provided by the abandoned PRSCs, experienced major delays, and has now morphed into a greatly reduced technical assistance project scheduled for presentation no earlier than FY09. Hence, a key infrastructural deficiency, highlighted in the 2005 CAE, namely the importance of increasing IDA assistance to the rural road network, with its important knock-on benefits in reducing rural poverty, remained unaddressed.

16. Poverty declined significantly from 2000 to 2004, the latest period available. Nationally, the headcount declined from 51 to 47 percent, while in the hardest-hit area, the rural river basins, it declined even more dramatically, from 77 to 66 percent. The cause of these impressive declines is not yet clear. Principal candidates are the impact of the natural resource boom and improvements in delivery and access to social services. The evidence for neither is compelling. Growth in the three major resource sectors – fisheries, mining, and petroleum – has not, by all measures, generated much employment. And, while there is evidence that access to educational and health services has improved, the decline in their quality casts doubt on their anti-poverty effects, as does the relatively brief duration of this trend. Finally, the relation to CAS-supported services is likewise tenuous, as the following section describes. Overall, IEG concurs with the CASCR rating of this objective as *moderately satisfactory*.

**Developing Human Resources and Ensuring Universal Access to Basic Services**

17. Non-delivery of the PRSCs left the health sector bereft of IDA financing and hard-pressed to prepare a replacement health sector operation, according to the CASCR. A number of high-case AAA activities, including the Market Dynamics in the Health Sector ESW, and a Labor Market Study (FY04)

were never delivered. A Strategic Country Gender Assessment (FY03) was delivered four years behind schedule. The lending program shifted toward implementation of the Education Reform Sector Program APL, a legacy project approved in FY02, the Multi-Sectoral HIV/AIDS Control Project (MAP) approved in FY03, the Health Sector Investment Project (HSIP), and the Nutrition, Food Security, and Social Mobilization Project, the latter two being legacy projects from the 1990s which closed in FY05.

18. While significant gains were made in some social indicators, such as primary school (including female) enrollment rates, maternal healthcare access, and child vaccinations, other indicators deteriorated, such as school retention rates, and maternal and child mortality. The low quality of both educational and health services continues to be a reality, according to the CASCR. And, the fact that the impact of IDA interventions was generally not quantified, either through lack of benchmarking, follow-up monitoring, or simply the intangible nature of the expected results further muddles the diagnosis of program impact.

19. Fundamental weaknesses in project design and deficiencies in implementation arrangements, including monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, adversely affected the efficiency of the Nutrition, Food Security, and Social Mobilization Project LIL, and delayed completion by almost three years, according to the CASCR. The greatest impact of the Nutrition, Food Security, and Social Mobilization Project appears to have been its community component, which successfully spread popular awareness about young children's special dietary needs for preserving health, as evidenced by a beneficiary survey.

20. The MAP was developed at the Government's insistence, even though HIV prevalence in Mauritania is among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, at 0.6 percent of the population. Although made effective in January 2004, the project has been plagued by the slow release of counterpart funds and problems with procurement. Recently, MAP reporting uncovered a disturbing trend, namely that HIV prevalence among women aged 15 to 19 had begun to rise.

21. In the education sector, the Bank's operations and policy advice supported universal access to basic education, while seeking improvements in the quality of teaching and learning as well as systemic efficiency. Access to education increased to 95% in 2004-2005 from 43% in 1998. Meanwhile, primary education completion rates dropped to 44% in FY05 from 55% in 2001. Secondary school completion rates also declined. In addition, vocational training, very much needed to meet the country's professional needs, was not delivered, while tertiary education facilities were oversaturated with students, who were unable to find employment thereafter. Furthermore, bilingual reform in Mauritania required teacher certifications in both, French and Arabic, a requirement which IDA's program was not designed to address, thus hampering relevance to Mauritania's teacher training needs. The shortage of certified teachers has, in turn, adversely affected secondary school educational quality, according to the CASCR.

22. The *Higher Education Development Project* focuses mainly on improvements to the University of Nouakchott campus. Capacity constraints in the building sector harmed the development impact of this credit and delayed implementation, according to the CASCR. Overall, achievement of this objective is rated *moderately satisfactory.*

**Promoting Institutional Development and Governance**

23. This was identified as the core CAS objective, because shortfalls in ministerial skillsets as well as excessive dependence on Project Implementation Units (PIUs) for technical knowledge had stymied the emergence of sustainable public sector capacity. AAA focused on rural and urban sector MTEFs, annual reviews of the public investment program, and promoting good governance through a planned Country Financial Accountability Assessment (FY03), the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), the Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR) in FY05, analytical work on monitoring and evaluation, the fiduciary framework, poverty-reducing public expenditure, economic regulation, and procurement reform. WBI interventions included training seminars on the PRSP

process and public expenditure management. IDA's lending focused on the Institutional and Capacity Building Project for Natural Resource Management (FY05) and a supplemental credit for the Mining Sector Capacity Building Project for improving mineral resource management. The GDLN, Global Distance Learning Center Project, was prepared in response to a GIRM request for public sector capacity building. It established physical infrastructure for a Global Distance Learning Center with linkages to other centers and partnerships/networks with other donors. Mauritania also takes great advantage of the regional face-to-face activities conducted by WBI in neighboring Senegal. In FY05, the most popular programs were Public-private Partnerships in Infrastructure (86 participants), Education (81), and Health and Population (45).

24. There is persuasive evidence that, in recent years, the GIRM has re-oriented public spending from less developmentally-relevant activities (military spending, transfers) toward those more likely to upgrade the nation's human resource endowment, notably in health and education. Social and poverty-related spending increased from 8 percent of GDP in 2001 to 11.4 percent of GDP in 2003. It is by no means implausible that IDA's persistent message on this score, joined with that of other donors, has contributed importantly to this change of heart. Still, the subsequent relaxation of fiscal discipline (only redressed in 2006-07), combined with the absence of comprehensive accounting records covering the period 2003-05, raises doubts about the extent to which this trend has been sustained.

25. Despite years of IDA and other donors in strengthening public sector financial management, as of now, the Treasury is only beginning to restore its capacity to prepare monthly Treasury balances, which are a pre-requisite for generating consolidated fiscal reports. Fiscal reporting is still not computerized, although progress has been made. Financial supervision remains weak, and, according to the CASCR, governance has actually deteriorated.

26. Although Mauritania started the implementation period with an above-average performance on governance, by the end of it, governance, as measured by CPIA indicators, had deteriorated sufficiently to reduce Mauritania's IDA allocations consecutively in FYs06-07, according to the CAS. Achievement of this objective is rated *unsatisfactory.*

Achievement of CAS Objectives

| **Objectives** | **CASCR Rating** | **IEG Rating** | **Explanation / Comments** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private Sector Growth | Moderately Satisfactory | Moderately Unsatisfactory | Persuading the Government to join the EITI was a big step, but needs to be tested by its willingness to actually implement the commitments it has signed on to. Efforts to privatize the power and water sectors failed, and meager progress was made in arresting alarming trends in environmental degradation. Growth remains narrowly based, with few employment or other benefits for the wider population. Little or no progress in redressing the critical shortcomings in the financial sector. |

| Objectives | CASCR Rating | IEG Rating | Explanation / Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| Growth Anchored in the Poor | Moderately Satisfactory | Moderately Satisfactory | |
| Human Resources and Social Service Access | Moderately Satisfactory | Moderately Satisfactory | |
| Institutional Development and Governance | Unsatisfactory | Unsatisfactory | |

***Comments on Bank Performance***

27. IDA was blindsided by Mauritania's political instability and deterioration of the client's commitment to promised reforms. There is no evidence that, in early 2002, when the CAS was being drafted, IDA would have had any way of knowing that fiscal performance was deteriorating, because the client assiduously hid this fact from outside knowledge. Based on what was known about Mauritania's generally favorable, with moderately high growth complemented by low inflation, a large-scale opening of trade, and some public enterprise restructuring. Consequently, this Review concludes that IDA could not reasonably have foreseen any of the warning signs that Mauritania's reliability as a development partner was about to undergo a sharp reversal, or that its subsequent actions were about to render large parts of the CAS irrelevant. Under trying circumstances, IDA managed to produce constructive MTEF policy notes, a CFAA, and a CEM, all of which made positive contributions to the debate over revamping Mauritania's key sectoral strategies, even as large parts of the lending program were being discarded and replaced with *ad hoc* products. In many respects, AAA was the most constructive component of the CAS's planned interventions. Supervision was also of generally good quality; IDA responded rapidly and appropriately to restructure the portfolio in 2006-07, once an energetic and cooperative interim counterpart government was in place. In this regard, though, the sharp decline observed in supervision resources, from US$93 thousand per project in FY07 to US$78 thousand in FY07 is cause for concern. Several, more serious shortcomings should also be noted. First, the CAS lacked any semblance of a results-oriented design, rendering subsequent evaluation of its impact more-than-ordinarily challenging. Secondly, as the CASCR notes, despite Mauritania's sound prior record, greater prudence in risk planning required development of contingency planning for a below-Base-Case scenario. The proposed transformation of lending from a project to a programmatic base would have been demanding on the client, even in the best of cases. Hence, a fallback plan identifying simple, executable investment projects and selective technical assistance would have provided particularly useful guidance on how IDA should proceed, once it became clear that the conditions for programmatic lending were unlikely to materialize. Thirdly, although the CAS was said to be participatory, the FY08-11 CAS has had to institute extensive new measures of consultation, after receiving donor complaints that coordination on the FY03-07 had not been satisfactory, consisting mainly of strong early contacts which, by and large, were not followed up, leaving some stakeholders with a sense their inputs were not being taken seriously. On these bases, IDA performance is rated *moderately satisfactory.*

| 4. Overall IEG Assessment | |
|---|---|
| **Outcome:** | *Moderately Unsatisfactory* |
| **Bank Performance:** | *Moderately Satisfactory* |

28. Because the institutional development and governance pillar was identified in the CAS as its core objective, its rating was accorded the greatest weight in determining the overall outcome. Although the relevance of the CAS was negligible as a strategic guide, the moderately satisfactory outcome for two of the four objectives was taken into account in rating the overall outcome moderately satisfactory Additional factors in explaining the slight upgrade from the unsatisfactory outcome judgment rendered in the 2005 CAE were marked differences in the time periods covered, and the upswing in program performance observed during the final two years of the FY03 CAS. Domestic political instability and the consequent diminished client commitment to structural reform were negative contributory factors. CAS quality at entry was deficient, but offset by appropriate IDA adaptations, including strong portfolio restructuring, accounting for the modestly higher rating of IDA performance. The impact of exogenous factors on CAS performance was favorable, supporting faster growth and blunting the effects of macroeconomic mismanagement.

## 5. Assessment of CAS Completion Report

29. The strengths of the CASCR are: (i) the frankness and thoroughness of its discussion of the setting for CAS development, and the reasons why it subsequently became largely irrelevant; and (ii) its strong lessons on the need for planning contingent alternatives to the PRSP process, for a well thought-out risk mitigation strategy, for improved donor coordination, and for a well-designed results matrix in the new CAS to ensure strong monitoring and evaluation. Its weaknesses are two-fold. First, having been finalized in February 2006, the CASCR was never updated, leaving out major new, and largely positive, developments transpiring in 2006-07 which might, conceivably have affected both its ratings judgments and identification of important lessons. Among the developments covered in the FY08-11 document, but not in the CASCR, were the major turnarounds in portfolio performance, the efforts of the interim government to create a macroeconomic climate more conducive to a resumption of programmatic lending, and myriad developments, both positive and negative, with respect to achievements under the individual pillars (objectives). The Region takes the view that, had issuance of the finalized CASCR been delayed until now, so as to account for recent developments, it could not have provided timely findings and lessons needed as an input for preparation of the FY08 CAS. Moreover, the new CAS filled in the gaps by providing a comprehensive update. Finally, the Region notes that the two-year delay in issuing a new CAS was necessitated by the long political transition, which only recently culminated in election of a new administration. On the whole, the Region's decision to issue the CASCR early enough so that it would be of practical utility makes sense, although, in a rapidly-evolving situation, such as that which Mauritania experienced, there is always a risk that the findings and lessons of the CASCR will be overtaken by events, thereby providing unreliable guidance to the new CAS. Of greater concern was the second shortcoming: rating IDA contributions to achievement of the various pillars, but not their outcomes. The reason adduced by the Region was that the lack of indicators and monitoring throughout CAS execution made it impossible to measure outcomes, but did not prevent making narrower judgments about the value of IDA contributions. There are several problems with this line of argument. CASCR guidelines require rating the CAS outcome. Secondly, other CASCR teams, faced with the same dilemma, have nonetheless made a best-efforts attempt to rate outcome, with the understanding that retrofitting the evaluability of a non- results-based CAS is an imperfect process. Finally, omitting any rating of outcomes on the grounds they were not tracked and measured risks giving rise, if inadvertently, to a perverse incentive to neglect adequate monitoring and evaluation in order to evade reporting on not-so-favorable results.

## 6. Findings and Lessons

30. The CASCR Review's principal findings and lessons include:

- Progress on governance, particularly in the area of fiscal transparency, will be indispensable. Now that the GIRM has accepted admission into the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a focus on issuance of implementing regulations, regular reporting on royalties and taxes, and effective enforcement is essential.
- Past performance is no guarantee of future behavior. Prudent strategic risk analysis requires identifying alternative steps to be taken, in the event the client's support for CAS objectives falls seriously short of expectations.
- Given the backtracking which occurred under the FY03 CAS, actions which make major reforms hard to reverse should be a priority in determining Mauritania's eligibility for programmatic lending.
- IDA needs to develop an integrated strategy for assisting the GIRM to strengthen its administrative capacity, without which the barriers to meaningful structural reform might prove to be insuperable.

**Annex Table 1: Actual vs. Planned Lending**

| | Proposed FY | Approval FY | Status | Proposed Amount (million US $) | Approved Amount (million US $) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Programmed Projects*** | | | | | |
| ***Base-Case Scenario*** | | | | | |
| Financial Sector Reform Project | 2003 | - | Dropped | 15.0 | - |
| PRSC I | 2003 | - | Dropped | 15.0 | - |
| Supplemental Credit for Mining Sector (Mining Sector TA SIL 2) | 2003 | 2004 | Slipped | 5.0 | 18.0 |
| Multi Sector HIV/AIDS Project | 2003 | 2004 | Slipped | 15.0 | 21.0 |
| Partial Risk Guarantee for SOMELEC Privatization | 2003 | - | Dropped | 10.0 | - |
| PRSC II | 2004 | - | Dropped | 15.0 | - |
| Water Supply Project | 2004 | - | Dropped | 20.0 | - |
| PRSC III | 2005 | - | Dropped | 15.0 | - |
| PGRNP II (Rainfed Natural Resource Management Project) | 2005 | - | Dropped | 10.0 | - |
| Natural Resource Mgmt Capacity Bldg Project | 2005 | - | Dropped | 5.0 | - |
| **Total FY03-07** | | | | **110.0** | **39.0** |
| ***High-Case Scenario **** | | | | | |
| Base-case | | | | 110.0 | 39.0 |
| PRSC II | 2004 | - | Dropped | + 5.0 * | |
| Water Supply Project | 2004 | - | Dropped | + 10.0 * | |
| PGRNP II (Rainfed Natural Resource Management Project) | 2004 | | Dropped | | |
| PRSC III | 2005 | - | Dropped | + 5.0 * | |
| PDIAIM II (Irrigated Agr Integr Dev APL 2) | 2005 | 2005 | Active | 10.0 | 39.0 |
| **Total FY03-07** | | | | **140.0** | **78.0** |
| ***Non programmed projects*** | | | | | |
| Com Based Rural Dev | | 2004 | Active | | 45.0 |
| Higher Education | | 2005 | Active | | 15.0 |
| Health and Nutrition Support | | 2006 | Active | | 10.0 |
| Pub Sec CB SIL | | 2007 | Active | | 13.0 |
| Petroleum Capacity Bldg. TAL (2nd Mining Sector Capacity Building Supplemental) | | 2007 | Active | | 5.0 |
| **Total FY03-07** | | | | | **88.0** |

*Source:* Mauritania CAS FY03 and WB Business Warehouse as of June 19, 2007.

* In addition to the proposed amount under base-case scenario

**Annex Table 2: Planned Non-lending Services and Actual Deliveries FY 2002 - 2007**

| | Proj ID | Proposed FY | Delivered to Client FY | Status | Estimated Cost (thousand US $) | Actual Cost (thousand US $) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Pre-CAS (Completed or Underway)** | | | | | | |
| MTEF Education * | | 2002 | - | Dropped | | |
| MTEF Health * | P075649 | 2002 | 2003 | Slipped | 73 | 0 |
| Fisheries Resource Management * | | 2002 | - | Dropped | | |
| The Education System in Mauritania * | | 2002 | - | Dropped | | |
| Rural Development Strategy * | | 2002 | - | Dropped | | |
| Agro-Business Strategy * | | 2002 | - | Dropped | | |
| Integrated F'work Trade Strategy * | P076707 | 2002 | 2002 | On Time | 40 | 4 |
| Dev't of New Technologies | | 2002 | - | Dropped | | |
| Mico-Finance Dev't Strategy * | | 2002 | - | Dropped | | |
| Livestock Dev't Strategy (Livestock Contribution to Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth) * | P077270 | 2002 | 2002 | On Time | 25 | 34 |
| Macro-Modeling | P075914 | 2002 | 2003 | Slipped | 70 | 19 |
| Financial Sector Development | | 2003 | - | Dropped | | |
| **Planned** | | | | | | |
| **CAS: Base-Case Scenario** | | | | | | |
| CEM | P075648 | 2003 | 2004 | Slipped | 105 ** | 294 |
| Economic Regulation | P078615 | 2003 | 2003 | On Time | 50 | 16 |
| CFAA | P076259 | 2003 | 2003 | On Time | 65 | 124 |
| Regulatory Framework Oil Sector | | 2003 | | Dropped | 30 | |
| PRSP Monitoring | P078616 | 2003 | 2003 | On Time | 61 | - |
| PRSP Monitoring | P083265 | 2004 | 2005 | Slipped | 30 | - |
| CPAR | | 2005 | - | Dropped | 80 | - |
| CAS | | 2005 | 2008 | Slipped | 50 | - |
| **CAS: High-Case Scenario** (Base-Case Plus) | | | | | | |
| Gender Assessment | P083479 | 2003 | 2007 | Slipped | 30 | 63 |
| Labor Market Study | | 2004 | - | Dropped | 50 | - |
| Private Participation in Infrastructure | | 2004 | - | Dropped | 50 | - |
| Issues & Perspectives in Housing | | 2004 | - | Dropped | 50 | - |
| Market Dynamics in Health Sector | | 2004 | - | Dropped | 50 | - |
| Consultative Group | | 2005 | - | Dropped | 170 | - |
| Agriculture Statistics | | 2005 | - | Dropped | 50 | - |
| Rural Business Devt Services | | 2005 | - | Dropped | 50 | - |
| Devt Prospects of Arabic Gum | | 2005 | - | Dropped | 50 | - |
| **Non-Planned** | | | | | | |
| PER | P083266 | | 2004 | | 118 | 137 |
| Rural Domestic Energy Note | P087300 | | 2004 | | 55 | 29 |
| Transport Sector Overview | P087318 | | 2005 | | 55 | 92 |
| Senegal River Basin WRM | P084858 | | 2005 | | 15 | 7 |
| AML/CFT Assessment | P093662 | | 2005 | | 100 | 106 |
| FSAP | P093089 | | 2006 | | 252 | 277 |
| CEM Update (Oil Issues) | P095700 | | 2006 | | 75 | 199 |
| PER Update | P095284 | | 2006 | | 70 | 149 |
| Education Country Status Report | P093511 | | 2006 | | 75 | 74 |
| PSIA of Mining Sector Reform | P085323 | | 2007 | | 210 | 61 |

*Source:* CAS FY03, WB Business Warehouse as of June 19, 2007, IRIS, Imagebank and Operations Portal.

* Prepared and financed by the Government of Mauritania in partnership with the Bank and other donors.

** Estimated Cost is US$ 82,000 as per WB Business Warehouse.

**Annex Table 3: IEG Project Ratings for Mauritania, Exit FY03-07**

| Exit FY | Proj ID | Total Evaluated $M | IEG Outcome | IEG Sustainability | IEG ID Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | General Education V | 32.0 | SATISFACTORY | LIKELY | MODEST |
| | Mauri:RAINFED NAT RES MGT | 17.1 | SATISFACTORY | LIKELY | SUBSTANTIAL |
| | MR REGIONAL POWER | 10.6 | SATISFACTORY | LIKELY | SUBSTANTIAL |
| 2004 | | | | | |
| | MR -TELECOM & POSTAL REFORM | 9.4 | SATISFACTORY | LIKELY | SUBSTANTIAL |
| 2005 | MR Health Sect. Invest. Program | 23.5 | MODERATELY SATISFACTORY | LIKELY | SUBSTANTIAL |
| | MR-Iirrigated Agr Integr Dev APL (FY00) | 38.5 | MODERATELY SATISFACTORY | LIKELY | SUBSTANTIAL |
| | MR-Nutr Food Sec & Soc Mobil LIL (FY99) | 5.0 | UNSATISFACTORY | UNLIKELY | MODEST |
| | MR MINING SECT CAPACITY | 15.1 | MODERATELY SATISFACTORY | LIKELY | SUBSTANTIAL |
| | MR CULTURAL HERITAGE | 4.9 | SATISFACTORY | LIKELY | SUBSTANTIAL |
| 2006 | MR-Enrgy/Water/Sani Sec Reform-(PARSEAE) | 9.9 | UNSATISFACTORY | UNLIKELY | NEGLIGIBLE |

| Region | Total Evaluated ($M) | Total Evaluated (No) | Outcome % Sat (No) | Inst Dev Impact % Subst (No) | Sustainability % Likely (No) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mauritania | 166.1 | 10.0 | 80.0 | 70.0 | 80.0 |
| AFR | 10414.8 | 251.0 | 69.8 | 48.1 | 66.8 |
| Bank Wide | 72549.9 | 1086.0 | 79.0 | 54.7 | 79.3 |

*Source:* BW as of June 21, 2007.

Annex Table 4: Portfolio Status Indicators by Year

| Country | Fiscal year | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mauritania | # Proj | 10.0 | 12.0 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 10.0 |
| | Net Comm Amt | 230.2 | 303.4 | 270.4 | 270.5 | 288.5 |
| | # Proj At Risk | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| | % At Risk | 0.0 | 0.0 | 22.2 | 11.1 | 0.0 |
| | Comm At Risk | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.9 | 21.0 | 0.0 |
| | % Commit at Risk | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.4 | 7.8 | 0.0 |
| Algeria | # Proj | 13.0 | 11.0 | 9.0 | 7.0 | 3.0 |
| | Net Comm Amt | 560.8 | 473.9 | 337.0 | 83.5 | 45.1 |
| | # Proj At Risk | 1.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 |
| | % At Risk | 7.7 | 27.3 | 22.2 | 0.0 | 66.7 |
| | Comm At Risk | 81.9 | 48.9 | 112.2 | 0.0 | 26.7 |
| | % Commit at Risk | 14.6 | 10.3 | 33.3 | 0.0 | 59.2 |
| Mali | # Proj | 10.0 | 11.0 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 13.0 |
| | Net Comm Amt | 518.2 | 522.0 | 432.0 | 538.4 | 658.4 |
| | # Proj At Risk | 1.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 |
| | % At Risk | 10.0 | 27.3 | 40.0 | 16.7 | 0.0 |
| | Comm At Risk | 21.0 | 163.5 | 112.2 | 42.5 | 0.0 |
| | % Commit at Risk | 4.1 | 31.3 | 26.0 | 7.9 | 0.0 |
| Morocco | # Proj | 16.0 | 12.0 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 12.0 |
| | Net Comm Amt | 425.0 | 338.3 | 435.6 | 813.1 | 747.4 |
| | # Proj At Risk | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 |
| | % At Risk | 12.5 | 16.7 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 16.7 |
| | Comm At Risk | 98.6 | 14.6 | 42.2 | 0.0 | 53.2 |
| | % Commit at Risk | 23.2 | 4.3 | 9.7 | 0.0 | 7.1 |
| Senegal | # Proj | 18.0 | 14.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 17.0 |
| | Net Comm Amt | 777.0 | 686.8 | 632.2 | 631.4 | 731.7 |
| | # Proj At Risk | 2.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| | % At Risk | 11.1 | 21.4 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 11.8 |
| | Comm At Risk | 160.0 | 210.0 | 45.0 | 20.0 | 50.0 |
| | % Commit at Risk | 20.6 | 30.6 | 7.1 | 3.2 | 6.8 |
| Africa | # Proj | 343.0 | 334.0 | 334.0 | 351.0 | 373.0 |
| | Net Comm Amt | 15793.2 | 16387.7 | 16364.8 | 18310.4 | 21228.9 |
| | # Proj At Risk | 65.0 | 76.0 | 97.0 | 77.0 | 84.0 |
| | % At Risk | 19.0 | 22.8 | 29.0 | 21.9 | 22.5 |
| | Comm At Risk | 2937.3 | 3174.5 | 4300.9 | 3241.0 | 4055.1 |
| | % Commit at Risk | 18.6 | 19.4 | 26.3 | 17.7 | 19.1 |

*Source:* Business Warehouse as of June 21, 2007.

**Annex Table 5: IBRD/IDA Net Disbursement and Charges (in US$), FY 2003 -2007**

| Fiscal Year | Disb. Amt. | Repay Amt. | Net Amt. | Charges | Fees | Transfers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY03 | 39200253.37 | 6253511.38 | 32946741.99 | 4024753.64 | 0 | 28921988.35 |
| FY04 | 44318023.54 | 7278205.71 | 37039817.83 | 4699394 | 427248.47 | 31913175.36 |
| FY05 | 47608068.8 | 8228671.37 | 39379397.43 | 5024659.35 | 771933.54 | 33582804.54 |
| FY06 | 41430839.44 | 9840427.16 | 31590412.28 | 5018195.6 | 654721.72 | 25917494.96 |
| FY07 | 59839494.18 | 0 | 59839494.18 | 677664.92 | 386685.8 | 58775143.46 |
| Total | 232396679.3 | 31600815.62 | 200795863.7 | 19444667.51 | 2240589.53 | 179110606.7 |

*Source*: Business Warehouse as of June 21, 2007.

**Annex Table 6: External Assistance to Mauritania, Total Net ODA Disbursement, 2003-2005 (in US$ million, 2005)**

| Donors | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.21 |
| Belgium | 1.63 | 0.64 | 4.15 | 6.42 |
| Canada | 2.67 | 2.35 | 3.37 | 8.39 |
| Finland | 0.12 | 0.72 | 0.03 | 0.87 |
| France | 51.85 | 29.75 | 47.53 | 129.13 |
| Germany | 11.53 | 11.36 | 12.48 | 35.37 |
| Greece | 0.14 | .. | 0.01 | 0.15 |
| Ireland | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.21 | 0.47 |
| Italy | 2.55 | 2.47 | 1.92 | 6.94 |
| Japan | 24.55 | 10.75 | 14.72 | 50.02 |
| Korea | 0.12 | 0.69 | 0.12 | 0.93 |
| Luxembourg | .. | 0.1 | .. | 0.1 |
| Netherlands | 0.63 | 0.76 | 0.6 | 1.99 |
| Norway | 1.03 | 0.84 | 0.83 | 2.7 |
| Spain | 20.79 | 11.98 | 15.74 | 48.51 |
| Sweden | 1.16 | 0.41 | 0.59 | 2.16 |
| Switzerland | 0.92 | 0.45 | 0.48 | 1.85 |
| United Kingdom | 1.9 | 0.52 | .. | 2.42 |
| United States | 29.37 | 11.34 | 21.5 | 62.21 |
| Other Bilateral Donors | 0.56 | 0.27 | 0.1 | 0.93 |
| AfDF | 14.7 | 7.85 | 3.65 | 26.2 |
| Arab Agencies | 5 | 5.94 | 0.73 | 11.67 |
| Arab Countries | -3.73 | .. | .. | -3.73 |
| DAC Countries,Total | 151.09 | 84.63 | 124.54 | 360.26 |
| DAC EU Members,Total | 92.55 | 58.9 | 83.29 | 234.74 |
| EC | 54.36 | 48.95 | 14.8 | 118.11 |
| G7,Total | 124.42 | 68.54 | 101.52 | 294.48 |
| GEF | 0 | .. | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| IDA | 46.39 | 42.47 | 43.52 | 132.38 |
| IFAD | -0.18 | 0.75 | 0.78 | 1.35 |
| Multilateral ,Total | 118.16 | 98.54 | 65.61 | 282.31 |
| Non-DAC Bilateral Donors,Total | -3.05 | 0.96 | 0.22 | -1.87 |
| SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF) | -19.78 | -18.19 | -14.26 | -52.23 |
| UNDP | 2.33 | 2.22 | 2.82 | 7.37 |
| UNFPA | 1.59 | 2.06 | 2.21 | 5.86 |
| UNHCR | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.56 | 1.26 |
| UNICEF | 1.35 | 1.35 | 1.78 | 4.48 |
| UNTA | 2.51 | 2.06 | 1.94 | 6.51 |
| WFP | 9.58 | 1.71 | 6.4 | 17.69 |
| ALL Donors,Total | 266.2 | 184.13 | 190.37 | 640.7 |

*Source:* OECD Dac 2a as of June 21, 2007.

**Annex Table 7: Economic and Social Indicators, 2000 - 2005**

| Series Name | Mauritania | | | | | | Mauritania | Algeria | Mali | Morocco | Senegal | Sub-Saharan Africa |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | Average 2000 - 2005 | | | | | |
| **Growth and Inflation** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP growth (annual %) | 1.9 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 4.2 |
| GDP per capita growth (annual %) | -1.1 | -0.1 | -1.9 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 0.6 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
| GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) | 1910.0 | 1880.0 | 2150.0 | 2110.0 | 2210.0 | 2310.0 | 2095.0 | 5831.7 | 876.7 | 4035.0 | 1553.3 | 1696.3 |
| GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) | 460.0 | 410.0 | 440.0 | 450.0 | 510.0 | 580.0 | 475.0 | 2003.3 | 273.3 | 1391.7 | 516.7 | 549.9 |
| Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) | 3.3 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 5.2 | 10.4 | 12.1 | 6.6 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.4 | |
| **Composition of GDP (%)** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) | 27.6 | 27.0 | 25.8 | 27.5 | 25.6 | 23.7 | 26.2 | 9.7 | 37.7 | 15.4 | 18.2 | 17.8 |
| Industry, value added (% of GDP) | 29.7 | 26.4 | 27.3 | 23.6 | 28.1 | 29.3 | 27.4 | 56.3 | 24.4 | 30.6 | 19.7 | 31.1 |
| Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) | 42.6 | 46.6 | 46.9 | 48.9 | 46.3 | 47.0 | 46.4 | 34.0 | 38.0 | 54.1 | 62.1 | 51.0 |
| Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) | 19.4 | 22.0 | 21.1 | 25.9 | 46.4 | 44.5 | 29.9 | 23.3 | 23.7 | 23.9 | 19.5 | 17.8 |
| **External Accounts** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) | 46.2 | 33.8 | 33.3 | 27.7 | 30.6 | 35.6 | 34.5 | 39.7 | 28.3 | 33.4 | 29.1 | 32.2 |
| Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) | 74.2 | 52.7 | 56.2 | 58.6 | 80.0 | 95.0 | 69.5 | 23.6 | 40.2 | 38.5 | 41.1 | 32.5 |
| External debt (% of GNI) | 217.8 | 207.8 | 175.9 | 173.7 | 143.3 | 119.1 | 165.8 | 32.9 | 82.7 | 45.7 | 65.7 | 53.0 |
| Total debt service (% of GNI) | 7.6 | 6.8 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 8.0 | 4.2 | 3.7 |
| **Social Indicators** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Health** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Life expectancy at birth, total (years) | 51.7 | .. | 52.5 | .. | .. | 53.7 | 52.6 | 71.0 | 48.0 | 69.6 | 55.7 | 46.2 |
| Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months) | 40.0 | 61.0 | 83.0 | 76.0 | 70.0 | 71.0 | 66.8 | 88.0 | 64.2 | 95.2 | 68.0 | 57.2 |
| Improved sanitation facilities (% of pop w/ access) | .. | .. | .. | .. | 34.0 | .. | 34.0 | 92.0 | 46.0 | 73.0 | 57.0 | 37.0 |
| Improved water source (% of pop w/ access) | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53.0 | .. | 53.0 | 85.0 | 50.0 | 81.0 | 76.0 | 56.2 |
| Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) | 79.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 78.0 | 78.5 | 35.5 | 122.0 | 40.5 | 63.5 | 98.4 |

## Annex Table 8: Millennium Development Goals

| Millennium Development Goals | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger** | | | | |
| Income share held by lowest 20% | .. | 6.3 | 6.2 | .. |
| Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5) | 47.6 | 23.0 | 32.0 | .. |
| Poverty gap at $1 a day (PPP) (%) | .. | 9.1 | 7.6 | .. |
| Poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day (PPP) (% of population) | .. | 28.6 | 25.9 | .. |
| Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) | .. | 50.0 | 46.3 | .. |
| Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) | 15 | 11 | .. | 10 |
| **Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education** | | | | |
| Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24) | 46 | .. | .. | 61 |
| Persistence to grade 5, total (% of cohort) | 75 | .. | 60 | 53 |
| Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) | 29 | 35 | 52 | 45 |
| School enrollment, primary (% net) | 35 | .. | 63 | 72 |
| **Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women** | | | | |
| Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%) | .. | 1 | 4 | 4 |
| Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) | 65 | .. | 87 | 96 |
| Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24) | 65 | .. | .. | 82 |
| Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment) | 37.0 | .. | .. | .. |
| **Goal 4: Reduce child mortality** | | | | |
| Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months) | 38 | 67 | 62 | 61 |
| Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) | 85 | 81 | 79 | 78 |
| Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) | 133 | 127 | 125 | 125 |
| **Goal 5: Improve maternal health** | | | | |
| Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) | 40 | .. | 57 | .. |
| Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) | .. | .. | 1,000 | .. |
| **Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases** | | | | |
| Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49) | .. | .. | 8 | .. |
| Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) | 233 | 253 | 274 | 298 |
| Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24) | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 |
| Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) | .. | .. | .. | 0.7 |
| Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%) | .. | .. | .. | 28 |
| **Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability** | | | | |
| $CO_2$ emissions (metric tons per capita) | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Forest area (% of land area) | 0 | .. | 0 | 0 |
| GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2000 PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) | 31 | .. | .. | 34 |
| Improved water source (% of population with access) | 38 | .. | .. | 53 |
| Nationally protected areas (% of total land area) | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 |

## Annex Table 8: Millennium Development Goals (continued)

| Millennium Development Goals | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development** | | | | |
| Aid per capita (current US$) | 116 | 100 | 80 | 62 |
| Debt service (PPG and IMF only, % of exports of G&S, excl. workers' remittances) | 28.8 | 22.1 | 16.2 | 6.7 |
| Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) | 3 | 4 | 13 | 256 |
| Internet users (per 1,000 people) | 0 | *0* | 2 | 7 |
| Personal computers (per 1,000 people) | .. | *6* | 9 | *14* |
| Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income) | 29.8 | 22.9 | 27.7 | .. |
| Unemployment, youth female (% of female labor force ages 15-24) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Unemployment, youth male (% of male labor force ages 15-24) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Other** | | | | |
| Fertility rate, total (births per woman) | 6.1 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.6 |
| GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) | 540 | 610 | 460 | 580 |
| GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions) | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.8 |
| Gross capital formation (% of GDP) | 20.0 | 20.4 | 19.4 | 44.5 |
| Life expectancy at birth, total (years) | 49 | 50 | 52 | 54 |
| Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) | 35 | .. | .. | *51* |
| Population, total (millions) | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 3.1 |
| Trade (% of GDP) | 106.4 | 82.0 | 120.5 | 130.6 |

*Source:* World Development Indicators database, April 2007.

**Annex Table 9: Additional Economic Indicators, 2000 - 2007**

| Series Name | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Revised | | | Preliminary | Projected | |
| | | | (percentage change; unless otherwise indicated) | | | | | |
| **External Sector** | | | | | | | | |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (percentage change in US dollars) | -0.9 | 0.2 | -6.6 | -4.1 | 38.1 | 42.2 | 137.4 | 9.5 |
| *of which:* non-oil | -0.9 | 0.2 | -6.6 | -4.1 | 38.1 | 42.2 | 24.9 | 29.5 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (percentage change in US dollars) | 17.9 | 2.4 | -7.3 | 25.7 | 70.3 | 54.7 | -12.5 | 2.6 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (percentage change in US dollars) 1/ | 17.0 | -7.0 | -7.6 | 22.1 | 33.7 | 24.4 | 25.2 | 3.3 |
| Current account balance (in percent of GDP) | -9.0 | -11.7 | 3.0 | -13.6 | -34.6 | -46.9 | -3.1 | -2.3 |
| Current account balance (in percent of GDP) 1/ | -8.2 | -6.7 | 7.6 | -7.1 | -11.9 | -7.1 | -8.9 | -8.1 |
| **Official Reserves** | | | | | | | | |
| Gross official reserves (end of period, in millions of US dollars) 2/ | 49.0 | 40.0 | 74.0 | 32.0 | 39.0 | 70.0 | 174.0 | 228.0 |
| In months of following year's imports of goods and services 3/ | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 2.3 | 2.9 |
| **Money and Credit** | | | | | | | | |
| Money and quasi-money | 19.6 | 34.3 | 23.8 | 25.5 | 13.5 | 14.6 | 15.8 | 17.3 |
| Currency in circulation | 16.7 | 17.6 | 17.7 | 47.5 | -3.4 | 14.8 | 15.8 | 17.3 |
| | | | | | (in percent of non-oil GDP) | | | |
| **Consolidated Government Operations** | | | | | | | | |
| Revenue and grants | 24.7 | 24.7 | 34.8 | 35.4 | 32.9 | 26.4 | 39.7 | 30.8 |
| Revenue and grants (excluding oil) | 24.7 | 24.7 | 34.8 | 35.4 | 32.9 | 26.4 | 28.4 | 25.0 |
| Idem, excluding grants | 21.8 | 20.7 | 30.4 | 30.7 | 29.7 | 24.4 | 26.2 | 23.1 |
| Grants | 2.9 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 3.2 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.9 |
| Oil revenue (including oil signature bonuses) | | | | | | | 11.3 | 5.7 |
| Expenditure and net lending | 30.7 | 35.0 | 37.6 | 47.2 | 37.7 | 33.5 | 37.5 | 33.2 |
| Overall balance including grants | -6.0 | -10.3 | -2.9 | -11.8 | -4.8 | -7.0 | 2.2 | -2.4 |
| Overall balance excluding grants | -8.9 | -14.3 | -7.2 | -16.5 | -8.0 | -9.1 | 0.0 | -4.3 |
| Overall non-oil balance excluding grants | -8.9 | -14.3 | -7.2 | -16.4 | -8.0 | -9.1 | -11.3 | -10.1 |
| Overall non-oil balance including grants | -6.0 | -10.3 | -2.9 | -11.8 | -4.8 | -7.0 | -9.1 | -8.2 |

Source: IMF Country Reports (06/271 and 07/43).

1/ Excluding oil exploration/production and other mining (copper, gold) - related activities.

2/ Excluding oil account.

3/ Excluding imports financed in FDI and aid.