

Project Name WEST BANK AND GAZA-GZ-Emergency Services Support II

Region Middle East and North Africa Region

Sector Health (30%); Secondary education (25%); Tertiary education (20%); Other social services (15%); Central government administration (10%)

Project ID P078136

Implementing Agency Ministries of Social Affairs (MOSA); Education (MOE, Higher Education merged with MOE); Health (MOH); Labor (MOL); Trade and Economy (MOTE); Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)

Environment Category C

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#### 1. Country and Sector Background

A complete collapse of the Palestinian economy has been averted by the massive financial assistance provided by donors as emergency budget support. But despite this important assistance, the PA is still experiencing an un-funded budget gap of around US\$20 million per month for the Ministries of health, education, social assistance and labor, which has been managed through a combination of accumulating arrears to suppliers, occasional loans from domestic banks, trimming operating budgets, and delaying payments for certain non-salary expenses like for example, special hardship cases under the Ministry of Social Affairs, and to the Gaza Pension Fund. Unemployment has soared since the beginning of the conflict. Data from PCBS shows that in Q3/2000, just before the start of the intifada, the unemployment rate was 10 percent. It is estimated that unemployment jumped to 20 percent by December 2000, and to 35 percent by December 2001. According to the Living Conditions Survey (PPLC), more than 80 percent of those unemployed had lost their jobs because of the conflict. 40 percent of those who lost their jobs were employees in the private sector, and 34 percent who had lost their jobs as self-employed. Almost 30 percent of those who lost their job qualified for special hardship cases, which means that many families have joined the ranks of the extreme poor as a result of the conflict. Families have used a variety of strategies to cope with a sharp decline in income. After 9 months of the intifada, at the time of the June 2001 survey, 60 percent of families reported their income was not enough to maintain previous levels of consumption. But very few expressed that they had reduced expenses. Many made up for lost income by drawing on their savings (24 percent), assistance from family and friends (15 percent), cultivating land (10 percent), or selling property (8 percent). Five months later, in November 2001, the number of families reporting income was not enough for their

needs had increased to 68 percent, and 17 percent were reducing their expenses, 15 percent were relying on assistance from family and friends, and only 13 percent were able to draw from their savings. In terms of sources of food, 82 percent of families rely on their own income for their food needs, while 11 percent rely on family and friends, and 7 percent rely on relief assistance. Of those relying on relief assistance for food, the majority were in Gaza. The surveys help illuminate the effectiveness of the relief programs in reaching the poor. Households identified as hardship cases receive 56 percent of all food assistance, and those below the poverty line receive another 26 percent. The balance, 18 percent of food assistance is received by households with reported incomes above the poverty line. While most food assistance is reaching families that are in real need, however, most poor families are not yet reached by food assistance programs. About 70 percent of families below the poverty line reported to rely on their own sources of income for food. And if one looks at the most destitute group of families, the hardship cases, only 34 percent among them rely mainly on food assistance. In sum, relief assistance seems well targeted, but is insufficient to reach most of the poor. Families not only have less income and a very fragile set of coping mechanisms, but also their consumption patterns are changing with potential negative effects on the long term well being of individuals, particularly children. As families reduce their expenditures, they cut first on "non-essential" items. As the conflict continues and intensifies, families are changing their consumption patterns, reducing consumption on items like meat (62 percent of families), dairy products (46 percent) and carbohydrates (39 percent). A closer look to families below the poverty line reveals that 79 percent reduced consumption of meat, 64 percent reduced consumption of dairy products, and 53 percent reduced consumption of carbohydrates. The three PPLC surveys conducted in February, June and November 2001, show that assistance was delivered to 43, 49 and 43 percent of the population respectively. UNRWA remained the main source of food assistance throughout the three polls, while religious organizations and Zakat committees came in second, and the PA came in a close third. Local charitable organizations and NGOs made up the rest. In terms of financial assistance, the PNA was the main source of assistance in February and June, but lost its leading position in November, when it was displaced by financial assistance provided by NGOs. In February, 75 percent of the families who received financial assistance, obtained cash from the PA, dropped to 58 percent in June and to zero in November. The drop in November reflects in part the increasing financial difficulty of the PA to deliver assistance. PCBS has conducted three surveys (March, May-June, and July-August) in year 2001, and one survey in 2002 (January-February). The median income of a family during 2001 was between 52 and 56 percent of the median income before the intifada. The number of families who reported losing more than half of their income came close to 57 percent at the beginning of 2002. The number of families receiving humanitarian aid between June-August 2001 increased from 48 to 53 percent (after a peak of 57 percent in June). In January-February 2002 it had increased again to 58 percent. Between one quarter and one third of families who indicated their need for humanitarian assistance did not receive any. Families' largest source of cash assistance in 2001 came from relatives (median value of assistance US\$366 in July-August), charity institutions (US\$24), Ministry of Social Affairs (US\$24) and UNRWA (US\$15). But in January-February 2002 cash assistance from relatives had collapsed to a median of only US\$28. The July-August 2001 survey also

recorded changes in consumption patterns. Close to 40 percent of families reported having reduced food consumption, particularly meat (62 percent), fruits (62 percent) and dairy products (48 percent). The reduction in food consumption was larger in Gaza than in the West Bank. By January-February 2002, the proportion of households who had diminished their meat consumption was 76 percent, fruits 74 percent, and dairy products 58 percent.

## 2. Objectives

A. Background Closures of most West Bank and Gaza towns and cities under Palestinian Authority since the beginning of civil strife in West Bank and Gaza in September 2000, along with increased military presence and actions, have led to significant revenue and infrastructure losses and deterioration of service delivery for the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the municipalities. A fresh outbreak of violence beginning on March 29, 2002 has escalated the conflict to unprecedented levels of destruction and has crippled the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to deliver public services. The World Bank has estimated that, as of mid-March, the costs of replacing damaged infrastructure would total approximately US \$400 million, and that gross national income losses to date would amount to approximately US\$2.8 billion. It is estimated that more than 1300 people have been killed and more than 27,000 wounded since the latest military actions and incursions began. Several PA ministry buildings have been damaged or destroyed (including the Ministries of Education and Higher Education), along with records, office equipment, and communication facilities. Because of security restrictions and curfews, many people, including PA officials, are confined to their homes for all but a few hours a day. In the current context everyone in the West Bank and Gaza is vulnerable. Poverty is not chronic, but rather is a direct consequence of chronic and intensifying closures and incursions. World Bank estimates put poverty in the range of 50% in West Bank Gaza while the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics estimates that two thirds of Palestinians in WBG live below poverty line of US\$340 or 57.8 percent of all in West Bank and 84.6 percent of everyone in Gaza. Poverty alleviation therefore demands a response that goes to the root cause of the poverty experienced in the WBG due to the more recent and the prolonged closure and military operations. Due to a combination of economic crises at the government and household level, along with escalated violence and destruction, a humanitarian crisis is looming. Along with the "traditionally" vulnerable groups, such as female-headed households, the elderly, and people with disabilities, there has been a large increase in the number of people who, though not belonging to a vulnerable group, are at risk of malnutrition and health complications because of reduced household income, lack of mobility, and fallout from violence. Incidences of wartime injuries among the general population, such as trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, are on the rise. The severe increase in unemployment and people in need has also contributed to a sharp increase in the number of "new poor," heightening the need for larger and more effective aid and employment programs to a wider group of beneficiaries. Yet lack of funding, mobility restrictions and curfews for government workers and beneficiaries alike, constrain the possibility of instituting effective government aid programs. Closures not only disable the general population but also render immobile the institutions of the PA and the international agencies and therefore disables them in terms of implementation of programs and projects. Development gains made by the PA and the Palestinian people in partnership

with the international community have been put at risk for collapsing. The ongoing conflict has resulted in a near collapse of the Palestinian economy, soaring unemployment and a sharp increase in poverty. The median family income has dropped by 40 percent compared to pre 2000 levels, to which the Palestinian population has responded by resorting to coping mechanisms such as reducing their consumption levels, using personal savings, selling off assets, delaying payments and incurring debt. These strategies, after 19 months of conflict, are nearly exhausted and unsustainable. Many of the coping strategies are not only unsustainable but carry long-term risks in terms of nutrition, education and depletion of assets by families, particularly the poorest. Consumption of meat and dairy products has dropped considerably in recent months compared to pre-intifada levels, while families resort to selling their assets to provide income for immediate consumption. Further shocks to the Palestinian economy will find a population that has exhausted its capacity to cope and will be largely dependent on humanitarian assistance with unpredictable political consequences. The recession in the Palestinian economy has been induced by closures of the Palestinian territories, which has drastically limited the number of Palestinian workers in Israel. In addition, the flow of goods into and from the Palestinian territories has been severely interrupted. Economic activity has also been severely affected by restrictions to movement within the Palestinian territories. In addition to the negative impact of border closures, Israel's withholding of tax revenues accrued to the PA has resulted in a sharp drop in government revenues, limiting the PA's ability to function. The level of PA revenue before the intifada amounted to US\$88 million per month, but is has declined to less than US\$20 million per month as per December 2001. Total gross revenues withheld by Israel by the end December 2001 amounted to a cumulative US\$500 million. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 6-7 percent in 2001, following a dismal fourth quarter. In 2001, real GDP fell by an additional 12 percent. In per capita terms, GDP fell by about 10-11 percent in year 2000, and by 16 percent in 2001. Worker remittances fell by more than 40 percent compared to the low levels of 2000. The number of poor (defined as those with a consumption of less than US\$2 per day) rose from 600,000 in September 2000 to between 1.2 and 1.5 million by the end of 2001, about x% of the population. Non-salary operating costs have been severely squeezed: traditional non-emergency operating expenditures have declined from US\$52 million per month in the second quarter of 2000 (Q2/2000) to US\$18 million per month in Q2/2001. A complete disintegration of the economy and a humanitarian crisis in which more than three million people are subjugated to military closures has been averted by the massive financial assistance provided by donors as emergency budget support and by coping mechanisms by the government, such as accumulating arrears to suppliers, occasional loans from domestic banks, trimming operating budgets, and delaying payments for certain non-salary expenses. IDA has responded to other emergencies in the past through programs such as the Second Emergency Rehabilitation Project in 1996, the Emergency Response Program in 2000, and the Emergency Services Support Project (ESSP) of February 2002. In light of the new violence and destruction since March 2002, the PA has additionally asked IDA to develop a project that would help deliver emergency social, health, and education services in the context of the present situation of intensified closures and military incursions. The proposed Second Emergency Services Support Project (ESSP II) would support this program by financing services to help reach a greater number of the poorest and most vulnerable groups. The

proposed project would also support a series of conflict-related emergency medical services, including trauma counseling and medical supplies, and would seek to restore the functioning of health and education facilities through provision of needed supplies. It would concentrate on delivery of emergency services that may be delivered in under the current, extremely limited, conditions, using already-existing government and non-government organizations and facilities to house the services. Administration would be decentralized to the maximum extent possible, and non-government organizations (NGOs) would be contracted to deliver services should their capacity and outreach exceed that of the ministries. B Project Development Objective Primary objective is to provide budgetary support to key social sector ministries for their non salary recurrent costs to mitigate the deterioration of basic social services and growth in poverty brought about by ongoing closures and conflict in West Bank and Gaza and prevent further irreversible loss of human capital; and the secondary objective is to support the ministries particularly in the social sectors, including education, health, and welfare, to continue business to the greatest extent possible, and to respond to the newly-arisen emergency needs of the population. The project has a strong development objective of keeping those institutions responsible for development from collapsing through support to their non recurrent costs budgets.

### 3. Rationale for Bank's Involvement

IDA's long involvement in the Palestinian areas in education, health, urban and community development allows it to bring a wide range of technical expertise and practical know-how to this project. The World Bank's experience working with NGOs during the course of the first and second Palestinian NGO Projects will allow it to facilitate links between NGOs and ministries, and to better coordinate social services provision. In addition, the direct experiences of IDA with the Emergency Response Program approved in December 2000 and the first ESSP project provide useful insights on how to design appropriate emergency response programs in the Palestinian areas.

### 4. Description

The proposed second ESSP would continue to provide budgetary support for non salary recurrent costs for the same sectoral components as in the first ESSP with the exception of the municipal services component, which would be covered by a separate municipal funding project. For the preparation of the first ESSP project the PA established an Inter-Ministerial Committee to work with IDA and other donors to identify the needs of the various social service delivery ministries and of municipalities. These needs were grouped by sector and the components of the initial ESSP reflected this grouping. The project would include two components (1) financing of the non salary recurrent expenditures of the ministries of health, education (and higher education to be merged with MoE), labor and social affairs and (2) the management, planning and the operating costs of the project implementation unit in the Ministry of Finance and the budget units of implementing ministries (health, education, labor and social assistance). Component 1: Non Salary Recurrent Expenditures. Education Services. (US\$24.356 million) In terms of financing needs items (i) through (iv) are of high priority for the Ministry of Education: (i) Recurrent Expenditures (US\$4.82 million): This subcomponent would require retro active financing beginning July 1, 2002 which would finance: (a) rent payments of school buildings; (b)

transportation including fuel, vehicles maintenance, licensing and insurance; (c) water and electricity utilities for schools, directorates and the Ministry headquarters; (d) communication including telephones and mail (e) consumables such as cleaning materials and other perishable items (f) maintenance of equipment and buildings (g) heating fuel and (h) and other items. (ii) Textbooks Printing (US\$7.60 million): this sub component would finance only scientific and technical text book printing of 10 million copies of school textbooks and teachers guides for the year 2003. (iii) General Examinations (US\$2.70 million): this subcomponent would finance stationary; printing of examinations. This is a requirement for the current year of 2002-2003 and may require retroactive financing through ESSPII if it is not covered in ESSP. (iv) Support for School Activities (US\$0.50 million): this subcomponent would require retroactive financing beginning July 1, 2002 and would finance materials required school activities such as sports, arts, science, home economics and other summer school activities. (v) Copy printers for Secondary Schools (US\$ 0.80 million). This subcomponent would require retroactive financing beginning July 1, 2002 and would finance 200 copiers for secondary schools. (vi) Supplies for Vocational and Commercial Education Schools (US\$0.156 million): this subcomponent would require retroactive financing and would finance essential tools and raw materials used on a daily basis in training students in different vocational and commercial disciplines. (vii) Voucher System This subcomponent would finance support to Palestinian Higher Education institutions (US\$7.80 million) The voucher system to institutions is an effective tool that provides financial support to institutions of higher education while encouraging the enrolment of students in high priority fields. This tool is part of the Ministry's financing strategy and entails paying institutions on the basis of the number of students enrolled in high priority fields of study. The payment will cover the difference between the normative cost and the current tuition levels of programs identified as national priority areas. The estimated amount of financial support required under this scheme is equal to US\$ 7.8 million.

**Health Services** (US\$16.756): This component would be retroactively financed from July 1, 2002 and would cover six months of the non-salary recurrent budget of the health ministry and would include the following essential non-salary needs in Health services: (i) Essential drugs and medical consumables (US\$2.80 million): This sub-component will finance the procurement of essential drugs, vaccines, laboratory and blood bank materials and other medical consumables. (ii) Medical treatment abroad for critical cases (US\$4.70 million) : this subcomponent would finance the treatment of those patients who are in critical condition and their medical needs cannot be taken care of in West Bank and Gaza hospital facilities. (iii) Non -medical expenses (US\$9.256 million): This sub-component will finance non medical costs of operating and maintaining of health facilities including communication, fuel, water and electricity utilities, rent for health facilities, food, cleaning contracts, cleaning materials, transportation, linen, uniforms and stationary. It will also finance the repair or replacement of ambulances damaged during the conflict. (iv) Psycho-social trauma counseling (US\$X.0 million) : This sub-component will finance contracts with NGOs to provide community-based and school-based counseling services to promote psycho-social well-being for conflict-affected population, as well as coordination of such services. For example the Palestinian National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children; an umbrella for NGOs, are dealing with psycho-social issues and could be considered under a

subcontract with the MoH to implement this subcomponent, to ensure successful implementation of these services. The NPA has already provided its emergency plan of action to be considered which also includes activities under (vi). (vi) Nutrition services (US\$X.0 million: This sub-component will finance nutritional monitoring, education and supplements. Social Assistance (US\$3.65 million) Mechanisms to assist the newly poor: These mechanisms would be temporary in nature to allow families who have lost their income due to the closures and the induced economic crisis, to partially replace their lost income. New programs would target the vulnerable, both permanent and temporary, with clear eligibility criteria and monitoring capabilities to determine the level and duration of assistance. These new programs would consist of: (i) social welfare centers to assist the handicapped, the elderly and victims of domestic violence, (ii) programs for people with disabilities to integrate them into society; (iii) school-based feeding programs in poor geographical areas; and (iv) emergency workfare programs to provide income opportunities for those who have lost their jobs during the conflict (to be decided on the basis of the findings in July 2002, of an ILO evaluation mission.) (ii) Social welfare shelters(US\$0.05): This sub-component will finance goods and services needed to operate welfare shelters. It would include rent for two child protection centers for six months (the permanent centers are under construction); construction of three additional rooms for a center for the mentally disabled and a center for abused women.. The shelters cater to various groups including battered women, the elderly and infirm, and the handicapped. They are either run directly by MOSA or by NGOs under contract from the Ministry.(iii) Training and rehabilitation (US\$ 1.50 million): This sub-component will finance goods and services for (a) vocational centers that provide school dropouts with labor market skills, and (b) centers that provide rehabilitation and reintegration services to dysfunctional youth; the elderly, and the disabled A total of 14 such centers are run directly by the MOSA or by NGOs under contract.(iv)Programs for people with disabilities (US\$0.10 million): This sub-component would finance outreach programs to integrate children with disabilities into society and to finance special enrichment programs for children with learning disabilities. It would also finance wheelchairs, prostheses, and other equipment needed by people with physical disabilities and, if possible, home care and outreach services for homebound adults.Component 2 : Project Management (US\$4.00 million) This component will finance project management and implementation. It would finance the implementation costs for the second ESSP for the MoH, MoE, MoSa, MoL and MoF. The component would finance, external audits, replacement of destroyed equipment and supplies in the Ministries of Health, Education and Social Assistance (especially hard and software - ( Each Ministry's exact requirement for replacing destroyed equipment will be specified at appraisal).

Non Salary Expenditures:  
Education Services

Health Services

Social Welfare Programs  
Project Management:  
Project Management  
for MoL

for MOPIC  
for MOSA

## 5. Financing

Total ( US\$m)  
BORROWER/RECIPIENT \$0.00  
IBRD  
IDA  
SPECIAL FINANCING \$20.00  
Total Project Cost \$80.00

## 6. Implementation

The project would have the same implementation arrangements as in place for ESSP. Overall management of the ESSP has been handled by the MOF through a coordination unit. A full-time project coordinator is in the process of being recruited along with other full-time staff as needed; the project coordinator will be IDA's first line of contact and will be responsible for preparing and submitting progress reports. To expedite implementation and avoid overburdening MOF, the coordination unit will be supported by the services of a private accounting firm for the first year of operation. The accounting firm will handle financial management, see to the compliance with World Bank guidelines and disbursement procedures, and ensure the highest degree of accountability and transparency. MOF would recruit a financial auditor to audit all project activities and technical experts would be recruited at the ministerial level to provide non-financial monitoring of activities and deliverables. The physical implementation of the project components will be the responsibility of the line ministry concerned (ministries of health, education, higher education, social affairs, finance, labor and planning). However, considering the diversity and complexity of the tasks at hand and the limited resources of each ministry in relation to the demand, civil works will be sub-contracted to PECDAR while the delivery of trauma counseling services, early childhood development programs, and services for people with disabilities will be sub-contracted to NGOs. The Bank would provide technical support to the ministries to ensure proper monitoring and compliance with Bank procurement, financial management and reporting procedures. The Inter-Ministerial Committee, consisting of representatives of the line ministries and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) will continue to provide overall monitoring for the project. The Committee would provide monthly reports to donors on the management of the budget, reporting on expenditures made against program funds. PA-Donor Coordination It has been agreed that a committee of the MOF and other social service delivery ministries should meet with participating donors every three months to exchange information on the budget and to coordinate existing efforts in support of PA operating cost/service delivery programs. Program Adjustment Experience from the first Emergency Services Support Project suggests that programs designed to meet vulnerable groups should be administered at the lowest possible level, to avoid payment slowdowns and bureaucratic delays. Accordingly, the ESSP II would be administered by local government agencies. In addition, as with the ESSP 1, the ESSP II would support emergency needs in an evolving situation and would likely need to be adjusted from time to time in accordance with World Bank and other donor guidelines and according to beneficiaries' changing needs. Any reallocation within and/or between programs for each beneficiary should be allowed, and would be done in

consultation with IDA. Any variations in the sub-programs shall be validated through mutual agreement between the MOF and the technical ministries with no objection from IDA. Payment Process The proposed financial flow system is the same as in ESSP and will be subject to a financial management review to be carried out by IDA's certified financial management specialist. Payments will be submitted in the following process: MOF will open special accounts (SA) for each of the three line ministries. After each SA is in place, MOF will assign the day-to-day handling of the account and payments to each line ministry. Payments will be made under signature of the line ministry's official and authorized by the MOF. The MOF will countersign the replenishment applications as rapidly as possible. The SAs will be with a commercial bank. It was also discussed and agreed that MOF will open a SA for disbursements to be made towards expenditures related to technical assistance, project management, auditing, technical monitoring etc. The Trust Fund administrator shall advance from the credit to each of the SAs the agreed ceiling for each account (based on an average of four months of local expenditures expected from that account) subject to a limit of 10 percent of the credit for the sum of all SAs. Replenishment applications will be submitted regularly to ensure that the SAs do not run out of resources, thus causing delays. It is recommended that applications be submitted monthly or even bimonthly as the pace of expenditures is expected to be rapid. The amount replenished to each SA will be equal to the amount of eligible expenditures from the account supported by proper documentation. Expenditures from the SA would be according to the proposed program and Bank's rules and regulations. MOF shall co-sign the Withdrawal Application (WA) from each line ministry and prior to presentation to the Bank for disbursement. The verification will be done by MOF on an ex-post basis. After approving the WA (as rapidly as possible in accordance with Bank guidelines), the Bank will transfer the relevant amount to replenish the SA. The standard ten working days limit will be subject to full documentation being submitted to IDA. The payment cycle agreed above shall be reviewed. If there are bottlenecks in payments, the process will be streamlined by mutual agreement between IDA and the MOF three months after project implementation.

#### 7. Sustainability

This is an emergency response project and its objective is to mitigate the consequences of the ongoing conflict. The project will maintain basic services and provide short term support until the economic situation improves and revenues rise to a level where the PA can finance these services from its own resources.

#### 8. Lessons learned from past operations in the country/sector

The experience of the first ESSP project shows that centralization of service administration and delivery can result in implementation delays. In fact, the structure established for the present ESSP project, with accounts opened in the main ministries, has made it difficult for local institutions to disburse rapidly. Day-to-day activities of the proposed ESSP II would be decentralized to the maximum extent possible. Central ministries would be authorized to make advance transfers to their local offices, against which funds could be disbursed quickly. In addition, simplified Bank procurement procedures will be used to facilitate the flow of funding. Border closures and internal closure of Palestinian towns will undoubtedly contribute to longer-than-normal implementation periods being required for the proposed services. This extra time will be built into

project design. In addition, monitoring of services will be more cumbersome than in other projects, and alternative monitoring arrangements, such as periodic phone calls with less frequent visits, are being considered. The emergency situation has prompted a rethinking of the way services may be delivered. Since most beneficiaries and service providers are extremely limited in their day-to-day movements, services will be structured to take advantage where possible of telephone and other communication facilities. For example, in addition to trauma counseling services provided within health clinics and schools, the proposed project will also finance telephone services that may be accessed by homebound clients. Similarly, early childhood development activities will be operated out of private homes. Another key lesson learned is the importance of maintaining close coordination with other donors and developing approaches to which other donors can contribute additional funding. In this emergency project, there is room for other donors to finance the same type of activities. The project is designed to allow other donors to contribute and possibly use the same project implementation structure.

9. Environment Aspects (including any public consultation)

Issues : The project will support on-going services which have suffered as a result of the conflict. This support will include the rehabilitation and reconstruction of educational and health facilities damaged during the conflict. Key stakeholders include MOE, MOSA, MOH, students and their families, teachers and, for health facilities, the population at large. Because schools and clinics provide much needed social services to the population, there is very strong stakeholder ownership. In addition, rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged buildings carries an important symbolic message about the will of the Palestinians to go on with their lives and will help them regain a sense of normalcy.

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Note: This is information on an evolving project. Certain components may not be necessarily included in the final project.

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