Report No. PID11472
Project Name             WEST BANK AND GAZA-GZ-Emergency Services
Support II
Region                   Middle East and North Africa Region
Sector                   Health (30%); Secondary education (25%);
Tertiary education (20%);
Other social services (15%); Central
government administration (10%)
Project ID               P078136
Implementing Agency
Ministries of Social Affairs (MOSA);
Education (MOE, Higher Education
merged with MOE); Health (MOH);
Labor (MOL);Trade and Economy (MOTE);
Planning and International Cooperation
(MOPIC)
Environment Category     C
Date PID Prepared        September 17, 2002
Auth Appr/Negs Date      October 12, 2002
Bank Approval Date       December 19, 2002
1. Country and Sector Background
A complete collapse of the Palestinian economy has been averted by the
massive financial assistance provided by donors as emergency budget
support. But despite this important assistance, the PA is still
experiencing an un-funded budget gap of around US$20 million per month for
the Ministries of health, education, social assistance and labor, which
has been managed through a combination of accumulating arrears to
suppliers, occasional loans from domestic banks, trimming operating
budgets, and delaying payments for certain non-salary expenses like for
example, special hardship cases under the Ministry of Social Affairs, and
to the Gaza Pension Fund. Unemployment has soared since the beginning of
the conflict. Data from PCBS shows that in Q3/2000, just before the start
of the intifada, the unemployment rate was 10 percent. It is estimated
that unemployment jumped to 20 percent by December 2000, and to 35 percent
by December 2001. According to the Living Conditions Survey (PPLC), more
than 80 percent of those unemployed had lost their jobs because of the
conflict. 40 percent of those who lost their jobs were employees in the
private sector, and 34 percent who had lost their jobs as self-employed.
Almost 30 percent of those who lost their job qualified for special
hardship cases, which means that many families have joined the ranks of
the extreme poor as a result of the conflict. Families have used a variety
of strategies to cope with a sharp decline in income . After 9 months of
the intifada, at the time of the June 2001 survey, 60 percent of families
reported their income was not enough to maintain previous levels of
consumption. But very few expressed that they had reduced expenses. Many
made up for lost income by drawing on their savings (24 percent),
assistance from family and friends (15 percent), cultivating land (10
percent), or selling property (8 percent). Five months later, in November
2001, the number of families reporting income was not enough for their



needs had increased to 68 percent, and 17 percent were reducing their
expenses, 15 percent were relying on assistance from family and friends,
and only 13 percent were able to draw from their savings.       In terms of
sources of food, 82 percent of families rely on their own income for their
food needs, while 11 percent rely on family and friends, and 7 percent
rely on relief assistance. Of those relying on relief assistance for
food, the majority were in Gaza. The surveys help illuminate the
effectiveness of the relief programs in reaching the poor. Households
identified as hardship cases receive 56 percent of all food assistance,
and those below the poverty line receive another 26 percent. The balance,
18 percent of food assistance is received by households with reported
incomes above the poverty line.       While most food assistance is reaching
families that are in real need,    however,   most poor families are not yet
reached by food assistance programs. About 70 percent of families below
the poverty line reported to rely on their own sources of income for food.
And if one looks at the most destitute group of families, the hardship
cases, only 34 percent among them rely mainly on food assistance. In sum,
relief assistance seems well targeted, but is insufficient to reach most
of the poor. Families not only have less income and a very fragile set of
coping mechanisms, but also their consumption patterns are changing with
potential negative effects on the long term well being of individuals,
particularly children. As families reduce their expenditures, they cut
first on "non-essential" items. As the conflict continues and
intensifies, families are changing their consumption patterns, reducing
consumption on items like meat (62 percent of families), dairy products
(46 percent) and carbohydrates (39 percent). A closer look to families
below the poverty line reveals that 79 percent reduced consumption of
meat, 64 percent reduced consumption of dairy products, and 53 percent
reduced consumption of carbohydrates. The three PPLC surveys conducted in
February, June and November 2001, show that assistance was delivered to
43, 49 and 43 percent of the population respectively. UNRWA remained the
main source of food assistance throughout the three polls, while religious
organizations and Zakat committees came in second, and the PA came in a
close third. Local charitable organizations and NGOs made up the rest.
In terms of financial assistance, the PNA was the main source of
assistance in February and June, but lost its leading position in
November, when it was displaced by financial assistance provided by NGOs.
In February, 75 percent of the families who received financial assistance,
obtained cash from the PA, dropped to 58 percent in June and to zero in
November. The drop in November reflects in part the increasing financial
difficulty of the PA to deliver assistance. PCBS has conducted three
surveys (March, May-June, and July-August) in year 2001, and one survey in
2002 (January-February).The median income of a family during 2001 was
between 52 and 56 percent of the median income before the intifada. The
number of families who reported losing more than half of their income came
close to 57 percent at the beginning of 2002. The number of families
receiving humanitarian aid between June-August 2001 increased from 48 to
53 percent (after a peak of 57 percent in June). In January-February 2002
it had increased again to 58 percent. Between one quarter and one third of
families who indicated their need for humanitarian assistance did not
receive any.    Families' largest source of cash assistance in 2001 came
from relatives (median value of assistance US$366 in July-August), charity
institutions (US$24), Ministry of Social Affairs (US$24) and UNRWA
(US$15).   But in January-February 2002 cash assistance from relatives had
collapsed to a median of only US$28.     The July-August 2001 survey also
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recorded changes in consumption patterns. Close to 40 percent of families
reported having reduced food consumption, particularly meat (62 percent),
fruits (62 percent) and dairy products (48 percent). The reduction in
food consumption was larger in Gaza than in the West Bank. By
January-February 2002, the proportion of households who had diminished
their meat consumption was 76 percent, fruits 74 percent, and dairy
products 58 percent.
2. Objectives
A. Background     Closures  of most West Bank and Gaza towns and cities
under Palestinian Authority since the beginning of civil strife in West
Bank and Gaza in September 2000, along with increased military presence
and actions , have led to significant revenue and infrastructure losses
and deterioration of service delivery for the Palestinian Authority (PA)
and the municipalities. A fresh outbreak of violence beginning on March
29, 2002 has escalated the conflict to unprecedented levels of destruction
and has crippled the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to deliver
public services. The World Bank has estimated that, as of mid-March, the
costs of replacing damaged infrastructure would total approximately US
$400 million, and that gross national income losses to date would amount
to approximately US$2.8 billion. It is estimated that more than 1300
people have been killed and more than 27,000 wounded since the latest
military actions and incursions began. Several PA ministry buildings have
been damaged or destroyed (including the Ministries of Education and
Higher Education), along with records, office equipment, and communication
facilities. Because of security restrictions and curfews, many people,
including PA officials, are confined to their homes for all but a few
hours a day. In the current context everyone in the West Bank and Gaza is
vulnerable. Poverty is not chronic, but rather is a direct consequence of
chronic and intensifying closures and incursions. World Bank estimates put
poverty in the range of 50t in West Bank Gaza while the Palestinian Bureau
of Statistics estimates that two thirds of Palestinians in WBG live below
poverty line of US$340 or 57.8 percent of all in West Bank and 84.6
percent of everyone in Gaza. Poverty alleviation therefore demands a
response that goes to the root cause of the poverty experienced in the WBG
due to the more recent and the prolonged closure and military operations.
Due to a combination of economic crises at the government and household
level, along with escalated violence and destruction, a humanitarian
crisis is looming. Along with the "traditionally" vulnerable groups, such
as female-headed households, the elderly, and people with disabilities,
there has been a large increase in the number of people who, though not
belonging to a vulnerable group, are at risk of malnutrition and health
complications because of reduced household income, lack of mobility, and
fallout from violence. Incidences of wartime injuries among the general
population, such as trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, are on the
rise. The severe increase in unemployment and people in need has also
contributed to a sharp increase in the number of "new poor," heightening
the need for larger and more effective aid and employment programs to a
wider group of beneficiaries. Yet lack of funding, mobility restrictions
and curfews for government workers and beneficiaries alike, constrain the
possibility of instituting effective government aid programs.       Closures
not only disable the general population but also render immobile the
institutions of the PA and the international agencies and therefore
disables them in terms of implementation of programs and projects.
Development gains made by the PA and the Palestinian people in partnership
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with the international community have been put at risk for collapsing. The
ongoing conflict has resulted in a near collapse of the Palestinian
economy, soaring unemployment and a sharp increase in poverty. The median
family income has dropped by 40 percent compared to pre 2000 levels, to
which the Palestinian population has responded by resorting to coping
mechanisms such as reducing their consumption levels, using personal
savings, selling off assets, delaying payments and incurring debt. These
strategies, after 19 months of conflict, are nearly exhausted and
unsustainable. Many of the coping strategies are not only unsustainable
but carry long-term risks in terms of nutrition, education and depletion
of assets by families, particularly the poorest. Consumption of meat and
dairy products has dropped considerably in recent months compared to
pre-intifada levels, while families resort to selling their assets to
provide income for immediate consumption. Further shocks to the
Palestinian economy will find a population that has exhausted its capacity
to cope and will be largely dependent on humanitarian assistance with
unpredictable political consequences.      The recession in the Palestinian
economy has been induced by closures of the Palestinian territories, which
has drastically limited the number of Palestinian workers in Israel. In
addition, the flow of goods into and from the Palestinian territories has
been severely interrupted. Economic activity has also been severely
affected by restrictions to movement within the Palestinian territories.
In addition to the negative impact of border closures, Israel's
withholding of tax revenues accrued to the PA has resulted in a sharp drop
in government revenues, limiting the PA's ability to function. The level
of PA revenue before the intifada amounted to US$88 million per month,
but is has declined to less than US$20 million per month as per December
2001. Total gross revenues withheld by Israel by the end December 2001
amounted to a cumulative US$500 million. Real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) fell by 6-7 percent in 2001, following a dismal fourth quarter. In
2001, real GDP fell by an additional 12 percent. In per capita terms, GDP
fell by about 10-11 percent in year 2000, and by 16 percent in 2001.
Worker remittances fell by more than 40 percent compared to the low levels
of 2000. The number of poor (defined as those with a consumption of less
than US$2 per day) rose from 600,000 in September 2000 to between 1.2 and
1.5 million by the end of 2001, about xt of the population.      Non-salary
operating costs have been severely squeezed: traditional non-emergency
operating expenditures have declined from US$52 million per month in the
second quarter of 2000 (Q2/2000) to US$18 million per month in Q2/2001     A
complete disintegration of the economy and a humanitarian crisis in which
more than three million people are subjugated to military closures has
been averted by the massive financial assistance provided by donors as
emergency budget support and by coping mechanisms by the government, such
as accumulating arrears to suppliers, occasional loans from domestic
banks, trimming operating budgets, and delaying payments for certain
non-salary expenses. IDA has responded to other emergencies in the past
through programs such as the Second Emergency Rehabilitation Project in
1996, the Emergency Response Program in 2000, and the Emergency Services
Support Project (ESSP) of February 2002. In light of the new violence and
destruction since March 2002, the PA has additionally asked IDA to develop
a project that would help deliver emergency social, health, and education
services in the context of the present situation of intensified closures
and military incursions. The proposed Second Emergency Services Support
Project (ESSP II) would support this program by financing services to help
reach a greater number of the poorest and most vulnerable groups.       The
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proposed project would also support a series of conflict-related emergency
medical services, including trauma counseling and medical supplies, and
would seek to restore the functioning of health and education facilities
through provision of needed supplies. It would concentrate on delivery of
emergency services that may be delivered in under the current, extremely
limited, conditions, using already-existing government and non-government
organizations and facilities to house the services. Administration would
be decentralized to the maximum extent possible, and non-government
organizations (NGOs) would be contracted to deliver services should their
capacity and outreach exceed that of the ministries.B Project Development
ObjectivePrimary objective is to provide budgetary support to key social
sector ministries for their non salary recurrent costs to mitigate the
deterioration of basic social services and growth in poverty brought about
by ongoing closures and conflict in West Bank and Gaza and prevent further
irreversible loss of human capital; and the secondary objective is to
support the ministries particularly in the social sectors, including
education, health, and welfare, to continue business to the greatest
extent possible, and to respond to the newly-arisen emergency needs of the
population. The project has a strong development objective of keeping
those institutions responsible for development from collapsing through
support to their non recurrent costs budgets.
3. Rationale for Bank's Involvement
IDA's long involvement in the Palestinian areas in education, health,
urban and community development allows it to bring a wide range of
technical expertise and practical know-how to this project. The World
Bank's experience working with NGOs during the course of the first and
second Palestinian NGO Projects will allow it to facilitate links between
NGOs and ministries, and to better coordinate social services provision.
In addition, the direct experiences of IDA with the Emergency Response
Program approved in December 2000 and the first ESSP project provide
useful insights on how to design appropriate emergency response programs
in the Palestinian areas.
4. Description
The   proposed second ESSP would continue to provide budgetary support
for non salary recurrent costs for the same sectoral components as in the
first ESSP with the exception of the municipal services component, which
would be covered by a separate municipal funding project. For the
preparation of the first ESSP project the PA established an
Inter-Ministerial Committee to work with IDA and other donors to identify
the needs of the various social service delivery ministries and of
municipalities. These needs were grouped by sector and the components of
the initial ESSP reflected this grouping. The project would include two
components (1) financing of the non salary recurrent expenditures of the
ministries of health, education (and higher education to be merged with
MoE), labor and social affairs and (2) the management, planning and the
operating costs of the project implementation unit in the Ministry of
Finance and the budget units of implementing ministries (health,
education, labor and social assistance). Component 1: Non Salary Recurrent
Expenditures.Education Services. (US$24.356 million) In terms of
financing needs items (i) through (iv) are of high priority for the
Ministry of Education: (i)Recurrent Expenditures( US$4.82 million):     This
subcomponent would require retro active financing beginning July 1, 2002
which would finance: (a) rent payments of school buildings; (b)
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transportation including fuel, vehicles maintenance, licensing and
insurance; (c) water and electricity utilities for schools, directorates
and the Ministry headquarters; (d) communication including telephones and
mail (e)consumables such as cleaning materials and other perishable items
(f)maintenance of equipment and buildings (g)heating fuel and (h) and
other items.(ii) Textbooks Printing (US$7.60 million): this sub component
would finance only scientific and technical text book printing of 10
million copies of school textbooks and teachers guides for the year
2003. (iii)General Examinations (US$2.70million): this subcomponent would
finance stationary; printing of examinations. This is a requirement for
the current year of 2002-2003 and may require retroactive financing
through ESSPII if it is not covered in ESSP. (iv) Support for School
Activities (US$0.50 million): this subcomponent would require retroactive
financing beginning July 1, 2002 and would finance materials required
school activities such as sports, arts, science, home economics and other
summer school activities. (v) Copy printers for Secondary Schools(US$ 0.80
million). This subcomponent would require retroactive financing beginning
July 1, 2002 and would finance 200 copiers for secondary schools.(vi)
Supplies for Vocational and Commercial Education Schools (US$0.156
million): this subcomponent would require retroactive financing and would
finance essential tools and raw materials used on a daily basis in
training students in different vocational and commercial disciplines.
(vii) Voucher System This subcomponent would finance support to
Palestinian Higher Education    institutions (US$7.80 million)    The
voucher system to institutions is an effective tool that provides
financial support to institutions of higher education while encouraging
the enrolment of students in high priority    fields. This tool is part of
the Ministry's financing strategy and entails paying institutions on the
basis of the number of students enrolled in high priority fields of
study.  The payment will cover the difference     between the normative
cost and the current tuition levels of programs identified as national
priority areas.     The estimated amount of financial support required
under this scheme is equal to US$ 7.8 million.        Health Services
(US$16.756): This component would be retroactively financed from July 1,
2002 and would cover six months of the non-salary recurrent budget of the
health ministry and would include the following essential non-salary needs
in Health services:(i)Essential drugs and medical consumables (US$2.80
million): This sub-component will finance the procurement of essential
drugs, vaccines, laboratory and blood bank materials and other medical
consumables.(ii) Medical treatment abroad for critical cases (US$4.70
million) : this subcomponent would finance the treatment of those patients
who are in critical condition and their medical needs cannot be taken care
of in West Bank and Gaza hospital facilities.(iii)Non -medical expenses
(US$9.256 million): This sub-component will finance non medical costs of
operating and maintaining of health facilities including communication,
fuel, water and electricity utilities, rent for health facilities, food,
cleaning contracts, cleaning materials, transportation, linen, uniforms
and stationary. It will also finance the repair or replacement of
ambulances damaged during the conflict.(iv) Psycho-social trauma
counseling (US$X.0 million) : This sub-component will finance contracts
with NGOs to provide community-based and school-based counseling services
to promote psycho-social well-being for conflict-affected population, as
well as coordination of such services. For example the Palestinian
National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children; an umbrella for NGOs,
are dealing with psycho-social issues and could be considered under a
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subcontract with the MoH to implement this subcomponent, to ensure
successful implementation of these services. The NPA has already
provided its emergency plan of action to be considered which also includes
activities under (vi). (vi) Nutrition services (US$X.0 million: This
sub-component will finance nutritional monitoring, education and
supplements.   Social Assistance   (US$3.65 million)      Mechanisms to
assist the newly poor: These mechanisms would be temporary in nature to
allow families who have lost their income due to the closures and the
induced economic crisis, to partially replace their lost income. New
programs would target the vulnerable, both permanent and temporary, with
clear eligibility criteria and monitoring capabilities to determine the
level and duration of assistance. These new programs would consist of:
(i) social welfare centers to assist the handicapped, the elderly and
victims of domestic violence, (ii) programs for people with disabilities
to integrate them into society; (iii) school-based feeding programs in
poor geographical areas; and (iv) emergency workfare programs to provide
income opportunities for those who have lost their jobs during the
conflict (to be decided on the basis of the findings in July 2002, of an
ILO evaluation mission.) (ii) Social welfare shelters(US$0.05): This
sub-component will finance goods and services needed to operate welfare
shelters. It would include rent for two child protection centers for six
months (the permanent centers are under construction); construction of
three additional rooms for a center for the mentally disabled and a center
for abused women.. The shelters cater to various groups including
battered women, the elderly and infirm, and the handicapped. They are
either run directly by MOSA or by NGOs under contract from the
Ministry.(iii) Training and rehabilitation (US$ 1.50 million): This
sub-component will finance goods and services for (a) vocational centers
that provide school dropouts with labor market skills, and (b) centers
that provide rehabilitation and reintegration services to dysfunctional
youth; the elderly, and the disabled    A total of 14 such centers are run
directly by the MOSA or by NGOs under contract.(iv)Programs for people
with disabilities (US$0.10 million): This sub-component would finance
outreach programs to integrate children with disabilities into society and
to finance special enrichment programs for children with learning
disabilities. It would also finance wheelchairs, prostheses, and other
equipment needed by people with physical disabilities and, if possible,
home care and outreach services for homebound adults.Component 2 :
Project Management    (US$4.00 million)  This component will finance
project management and implementation. It would finance the implementation
costs for the second ESSP for the MoH, MoE, MoSa, MoL and MoF. The
component would finance, external audits, replacement of destroyed
equipment and supplies in the Ministries of Health, Education and Social
Assistance    (especially hard and software - ( Each Ministry's exact
requirement for replacing destroyed equipment will be specified at
appraisal).
Non Salary Expenditures:
Education Services
Health Services
Social Welfare Programs
Project Management:
Project Management
for MoL
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for MOPIC
for MOSA
5. Financing
Total ( US$m)
BORROWER/RECIPIENT $0.00
IBRD
IDA
SPECIAL FINANCING $20.00
Total Project Cost $80.00
6. Implementation
The project would have the same implementation arrangements as in place
for ESSP. Overall management of the ESSP has been handled by the MOF
through a coordination unit. A full-time project coordinator is in the
process of being recruited along with other full-time staff as needed;
the project coordinator will be IDA's first line of contact and will be
responsible for preparing and submitting progress reports. To expedite
implementation and avoid overburdening MOF, the coordination unit will be
supported by the services of a private accounting firm for the first year
of operation. The accounting firm will handle financial management, see to
the compliance with World Bank guidelines and disbursement procedures, and
ensure the highest degree of accountability and transparency. MOF would
recruit a financial auditor to audit all project activities and technical
experts would be recruited at the ministerial level to provide
non-financial monitoring of activities and deliverables. The physical
implementation of the project components will be the responsibility of the
line ministry concerned (ministries of health, education, higher
education, social affairs, finance, labor and planning). However,
considering the diversity and complexity of the tasks at hand and the
limited resources of each ministry in relation to the demand, civil works
will be sub-contracted to PECDAR while the delivery of trauma counseling
services, early childhood development programs, and services for people
with disabilities will be sub-contracted to NGOs. The Bank would provide
technical support to the ministries to ensure proper monitoring and
compliance with Bank procurement, financial management and reporting
procedures. The Inter-Ministerial Committee, consisting of representatives
of the line ministries and the Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation (MOPIC) will continue to provide overall monitoring for the
project. The Committee would provide monthly reports to donors on the
management of the budget, reporting on expenditures made against program
funds. PA-Donor CoordinationIt has been agreed that a committee of the MOF
and other social service delivery ministries should meet with
participating donors every three months to exchange information on the
budget and to coordinate existing efforts in support of PA operating
cost/service delivery programs.Program AdjustmentExperience from the first
Emergency Services Support Project suggests that programs designed to meet
vulnerable groups should be administered at the lowest possible level, to
avoid payment slowdowns and bureaucratic delays. Accordingly, the ESSP II
would be administered by local government agencies. In addition, as with
the ESSP 1, the ESSP II would support emergency needs in an evolving
situation and would likely need to be adjusted from time to time in
accordance with World Bank and other donor guidelines and according to
beneficiaries' changing needs. Any reallocation within and/or between
programs for each beneficiary should be allowed, and would be done in
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consultation with IDA. Any variations in the sub-programs shall be
validated through mutual agreement between the MOF and the technical
ministries with no objection from IDA.     Payment ProcessThe proposed
financial flow system is the same as in ESSP and will be subject to a
financial management review to be carried out by IDA's certified financial
management specialist Payments will be submitted in the following
process:MOF will open special accounts (SA) for each of the three line
ministries. After each SA is in place, MOF will assign the day-to-day
handling of the account and payments to each line ministry. Payments will
be made under signature of the line ministry's official and authorized by
the MOF. The MOF will countersign the replenishment applications as
rapidly as possible. The SAs will be with a commercial bank. It was also
discussed and agreed that MOF will open a SA for disbursements to be made
towards expenditures related to technical assistance, project management,
auditing, technical monitoring etc. The Trust Fund administrator shall
advance from the credit to each of the SAs the agreed ceiling for each
account (based on an average of four months of local expenditures expected
from that account) subject to a limit of 10 percent of the credit for the
sum of all SAs.Replenishment applications will be submitted regularly to
ensure that the SAs do not run out of resources, thus causing delays. It
is recommended that applications be submitted monthly or even bimonthly as
the pace of expenditures is expected to be rapid.The amount replenished to
each SA will be equal to the amount of eligible expenditures from the
account supported by proper documentation.Expenditures from the SA would
be according to the proposed program and Bank's rules and regulations.MOF
shall co-sign the Withdrawal Application (WA) from each line ministry and
prior to presentation to the Bank for disbursement. The verification will
be done by MOF on an ex-post basis. After approving the WA (as rapidly as
possible in accordance with Bank guidelines), the Bank will transfer the
relevant amount to replenish the SA. The standard ten working days limit
will be subject to full documentation being submitted to IDA.The payment
cycle agreed above shall be reviewed. If there are bottlenecks in
payments, the process will be streamlined by mutual agreement between IDA
and the MOF three months after project implementation.
7. Sustainability
This is an emergency response project and its objective is to mitigate the
consequences of the ongoing conflict. The project will maintain basic
services and provide short term support until the economic situation
improves and revenues rise to a level where the PA can finance these
services from its own resources.
8. Lessons learned from past operations in the country/sector
The experience of the first ESSP project shows that centralization of
service administration and delivery can result in implementation delays.
In fact, the structure established for the present ESSP project, with
accounts opened in the main ministries, has made it difficult for local
institutions to disburse rapidly. Day-to-day activities of the proposed
ESSP II would be decentralized to the maximum extent possible. Central
ministries would be authorized to make advance transfers to their local
offices, against which funds could be disbursed quickly. In addition,
simplified Bank procurement procedures will be used to facilitate the flow
of funding. Border closures and internal closure of Palestinian towns will
undoubtedly contribute to longer-than-normal implementation periods being
required for the proposed services. This extra time will be built into
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project design. In addition, monitoring of services will be more
cumbersome than in other projects, and alternative monitoring
arrangements, such as periodic phone calls with less frequent visits, are
being considered.The emergency situation has prompted a rethinking of the
way services may be delivered. Since most beneficiaries and service
providers are extremely limited in their day-to-day movements, services
will be structured to take advantage where possible of telephone and other
communication facilities. For example, in addition to trauma counseling
services provided within health clinics and schools, the proposed project
will also finance telephone services that may be accessed by homebound
clients. Similarly, early childhood development activities will be
operated out of private homes. Another key lesson learned is the
importance of maintaining close coordination with other donors and
developing approaches to which other donors can contribute additional
funding. In this emergency project, there is room for other donors to
finance the same type of activities. The project is designed to allow
other donors to contribute and possibly use the same project
implementation structure.
9. Environment Aspects (including any public consultation)
Issues        The project will support on-going services which
have suffered as a result of the conflict. This support will include the
rehabilitation and reconstruction of educational and health facilities
damaged during the conflict. Key stakeholders include MOE, MOSA, MOH,
students and their families, teachers and, for health facilities, the
population at large. Because schools and clinics provide much needed
social services to the population, there is very strong stakeholder
ownership. In addition, rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged
buildings carries an important symbolic message about the will of the
Palestinians to go on with their lives and will help them regain a sense
of normalcy.
10. Contact Point:
Task Manager
David J. Steel
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington D.C. 20433
Telephone: 202-458-1938
11. For information on other project related documents contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-5454
Fax:        (202) 522-1500
Web: http:// www.worldbank.org/infoshop
Note: This is information on an evolving project. Certain components may
not be necessarily included in the final project.
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This PID was processed by the InfoShop during the week ending
September 20, 2002.
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