LABOR MARKETS AND THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY IN AN OPEN DEVELOPING ECONOMY

by

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Table of contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction and summary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Model</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 The Production Side</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Preferences</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Choice of Technology - The Flexible Wage Case</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Welfare Comparison - Labor</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Welfare Comparison - Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 The Choice of Technology and Potential Conflicts</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Choice of Technology - The Minimum Wage Case</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Labor Markets and the Choice of Technology in an Open Developing Economy

ABSTRACT

This paper highlights economic factors determining the choice of technology and openness in an intertemporal context in the presence of institutional constraints in the labor market. It considers the case in which a "more aggressive" development strategy involves an investment in a modern technology. This technology raises the degree to which real wages and productivity depend on external factors while at the same time it also raises the expected value of real income. In the absence of such investment, production takes place in a traditional sector, using a technology that limits exposure to external shocks. The analysis evaluates the dependence of the choice of technology on the volatility of the shocks affecting the economy, the expected productivity gains, the investment cost associated with the modern technology, and the attitude towards risk. It starts with a benchmark case of a flexible wage/employment economy. The dependence of openness, investment, and real wages on the attitude towards risk is derived for such an economy. The paper then proceeds to analyze the implications of departures from the benchmark model. Specifically, it evaluates the effects of minimum wage policy on the choice of technology. It is demonstrated that institutional constraints in the labor market tend to discourage adoption of new technologies. The importance of this effect depends on the volatility of the underlying shocks. A rise in the volatility tends to be associated with a drop in the degree to which a given institutional structure constrains the move to the new sector. Thus, turbulent periods provide opportunities for structural shifts in favor of the new sector. The analysis assesses both the positive aspects of policies and the welfare costs associated with departures from fully flexible labor markets. It also discusses the interaction between institutional structure of the labor market and the use of protective measures that attempt to reduce exposure to external shocks.

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1. Introduction and summary

The remarkable difference in the growth pattern of Latin American and East Asian nations has been documented in several studies. Understanding this difference is an important task, because it should highlight key economic considerations that affect the design of growth policies. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the interplay of several factors that influence the choice of growth policies: attitudes towards risk; perceptions regarding the cost/benefit of exposure to international trade; and labor market policies.

The differential growth pattern is reflected in the fact that the average per capita GDP growth rate of East Asian nations was 4.9% during 1960-77, whereas it was 3.1% for the Latin American nations. During that period the export share of the GDP of East Asian nations rose from 22.8% to 40.2% whereas it was relatively stable for the Latin American nations, rising only from 13.8% to 14.9%. The differential growth patterns of Latin American and East Asian nations have persisted for a long enough period to suggest that they may reflect different attitudes regarding openness and the desirability of international trade. A rough comparison suggests that East Asian nations were applying outward-oriented policies, whereas most Latin American nations preferred inward-looking policies. The growth of East Asian nations has occurred during decades when outward policies have been particularly well suited to the global trend of growth and less restricted international trade.

An important policy question is why these different policies were chosen. One contributing factor may be a different evaluation of the costs/benefits of outward policies. The experience of Latin American nations in the decade 1930-1940 induced a frame of mind in which external trade was related to greater exposure to adverse external shocks, whereas inward policies were viewed as successful in reducing
vulnerability to foreign shocks. Inward policies were not perceived to be costly as long as external shocks were contractionary and internal shocks were negligible. Once that situation was reversed, and external shocks became expansionary and internal conditions less stable, the cost of inward policies became apparent. Yet the political system was not flexible enough to adjust its policies to the new economic trends, and policies that had been viewed as successful (or less costly) in the 1930's and 1940's penalized the growth of Latin American nations when applied in the 1960's and 1970's. The history of the East Asian nations is different. They were less exposed to the adverse shocks of the 1930's, and apparently they entered the 1950's with no historic bias against international trade. Actually, the experience of some of them in the 1930's and 1940's suggested international trade as a source of growth. In this sense they viewed outward policies more favorably, and their policies fitted 1960's and 1970's well.

At risk of simplification, it is constructive to contrast the experience during the 1930's and 1940's of two countries whose growth performances diverged during the 1960's and 1970's -- Argentina and Korea. (The average per capita GDP growth rate of Argentina was 2.1% during 1960-77, whereas it was 6.7% for South Korea). While both maintained reasonable growth rates in the 1930's and 1940's, Argentina did so by means of inward growth policies, while Korea adopted an outward orientation (see Table - 1)\(^3\). It is noteworthy that as a practical matter the depression of the 1930's had no effect on the growth performance of Korea, whereas it affected Argentina to some degree. The Korean experience was characterized by increased trade with Japan whereas the Argentinian experience was characterized by "inward growth" which was viewed as the source of Argentina's relative success in shielding itself from the depression.

These observations suggest that the Latin American and East Asian nations entered the 1950's with divergent perceptions regarding the cost/benefit of inward growth, resulting in a different choice of growth strategies. The purpose of this paper
### TABLE 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Per Capita Commodity Product* (rates of growth per year) in Korea</th>
<th>Per Capita Goods production in Argentina (rates of growth per year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-1925</td>
<td>1925-1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1930</td>
<td>1930-1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Trade Ratio in Korea (Export+Imports)/2</th>
<th>Trade Ratio in Argentina (Export+Imports)/2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Product</td>
<td>GNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1925</td>
<td>1925-1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1930</td>
<td>1930-1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1935</td>
<td>1935-1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-1940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td></td>
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*Commodity Product is defined as the net output originating in agriculture, forestry, fishery, mining, and manufacturing (See Sang-Chul Suh (1978)).
is to provide a framework for the analytical assessment of the economic factors determining adoption of an inward growth strategy. This is done by modeling an outward policy as the choice to invest in a new technology that raises the dependence of productivity on foreign shocks, thereby reducing its dependence on domestic shocks. Our choice to model external dependence as a choice of technology is arbitrary in the sense that all the results can be derived for the case where external shocks manifest themselves as shocks to the terms of trade, and the choice is between growth in sectors with a different exposure to external shocks.

The analysis evaluates the dependence of the choice of technology on the volatility of the shocks affecting the economy, the expected productivity gains, the investment cost associated with the modern technology, and the attitude towards risk. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 applies it to a benchmark case of a flexible wage/employment economy. The dependence of openness, investment, and real wages on the attitude towards risk is derived for such an economy. The analysis demonstrates that for a significant degree of risk aversion, labor benefits from the new technology if the gain in expected productivity compensates for the greater volatility of foreign relative to domestic shocks. At the same time, capital owners will benefit from adoption of the new technology if the expected productivity gain and the volatility of foreign shocks outweigh their investment costs in the new technology. As a result, a rise in the volatility of foreign shocks tends to work in divergent directions for each group (i.e., labor and capital owners).

The analysis characterizes situations where the interests of the groups diverge. This will arise if the gain in expected income attributed to the new technology does not suffice to compensate risk averse workers for the greater exposure to foreign shocks attributed to the new technology, while at the same time the expected profits suffice to justify the investment from the perspective of the entrepreneurs. In these circumstances, the adoption of the new technology will be influenced by the relative strength of the two opposed factors. Protective policies can be introduced as a
mechanism designed to resolve the conflict by raising the expected income enough to compensate labor for the exposure to external risk. This will be the case where exposure to the new technology is accompanied by protective policies. While such policies can achieve their goal, they are dominated by alternative policies that deal directly with the "missing margin". The role of such policies is to compensate for the missing market for risk. This is done by facilitating the transfer of the income risk from labor to the entrepreneurs, thereby eliminating the conflict of interest regarding the new technology. This can be accomplished by labor market institutions such as contracts that guarantee a certain level of wages and employment. If such contracts are not credible, policies that will move the economy towards the desired risk redistribution will be beneficial. These policies will contribute to the elimination of the conflict between the factors of production, enhancing the chances of the adoption of the technology.

Section 4 proceeds to analyze the implications of departures from the benchmark model. Specifically, it evaluates the effects of a minimum wage policy on the choice of technology. It is demonstrated that institutional constraints in the labor market tend to discourage the adoption of the new technology. The importance of this effect is determined by the volatility of the underlying shocks. A rise in volatility tends to be associated with a drop in the degree that a given institutional structure constrains the move to the new sector. Thus, turbulent periods provide opportunities for structural shifts in favor of the new sector. The analysis assesses both the positive aspects of the policies and the welfare costs associated with departures from fully flexible labor markets. It is shown that because the presence of minimum wages diminishes the chance of adopting the new technology, there is a greater potential role for labor market institutions. Section 5 closes the paper with concluding remarks.

Before turning to the more formal model, it is noteworthy that the problem of the choice of technology is more important for Developing countries than for
developed nations. In the presence of complete markets, the choice of technology tends to be independent of preferences, and standard separation theorems apply. This result does not hold for Developing countries, whose credit markets are not fully developed. For these countries the choice between technologies will be determined by preferences, and the interests of labor and capital owners may diverge. In these circumstances the adoption of protective policies and growth strategies will be influenced by the relative strength of sectors and of owners of inputs.

2. THE MODEL

In this section we outline a minimal model to describe the factors affecting the intertemporal choice of technology in the presence of incomplete information and risk-averse workers. This is done in a two-periods framework where in period one the economy has the option to invest in acquiring a new technology that will be used in period two. The new technology involves greater exposure to external shocks, and we assume that it involves an irreversible change in the process of production.

2.1. The Production Side

We consider an economy facing the choice between a traditional and a new technology. The traditional technology is given by:

\( X = \exp(S)L \quad : \quad S \sim N(0, V_S). \)

where output \( X \) is produced by labor input \( L \). The productivity of labor is subject to domestic shocks \( S \), distributed normally with mean zero and variance \( V_S \). For a given realization of \( S \) the wage is given by

\( w = \exp(S). \)
If investment I is undertaken in period one, the economy will produce in period two using the following process:

\[ x^2 = AM^A L^L \]

where M stands for an imported input, A is the efficiency coefficient, and \( x^2 \) stands for the output obtained using the new technology. We assume that installing the second technology involves an irreversible change in the capital stock, implying that following the investment the economy cannot apply the old production process. To capture the notion that openness can expose the economy to external shocks we assume that the external price of the imported input \( (P_m) \) is subject to shocks, denoted by \( \varepsilon \). Our choice to model external dependence in the form of imported input is arbitrary in the sense that all the results can be derived for the case where external shocks manifest themselves in shocks to the terms of trade and the choice of technology is also a choice between sectors with a different exposure to external shocks. The choice of the technology embodied in (1) and (3) is motivated by the presumption that the new technology involves higher capital intensity. For simplicity of exposition we take the extreme case where the traditional technology does not use capital.

Consider the case where the price of M is given by

\[ P_m = \exp (\varepsilon), \quad \varepsilon \approx N(0, \Sigma). \]

The use of labor and the imported input is at a level that minimizes the production costs, yielding the following first order conditions:
\[ (5) \quad \beta x^n = m \exp(e) \]

\[ (6) \quad \alpha x^n = Lw \]

Applying (3) and (5)-(6) we obtain that

\[ (7) \quad x^n = A[\beta w/(\alpha \exp(e))]^\beta L^{\alpha+\beta} \]

\[ (8) \quad w = \exp(p - \varepsilon')L^{(\alpha+\beta-1)/(1-\beta)} \]

where \( \varepsilon' = \varepsilon \beta/(1-\beta) \) and \( p = \ln[\alpha A^1/(1-\beta)(\beta)/(1-\beta)] \).

The introduction of the new technology implies that the productivity of labor is determined by a measure related to the efficiency of the new technology and the price of the imported input (\( p \) and \( \varepsilon' \) in (8)). The value of \( \varepsilon' \) corresponds to the drop in labor productivity due to the supply shock induced by the rise in the cost of the imported input. The value of \( p \) corresponds to the gain in productivity due to the adoption of the new technology.

2.2 Preferences

The economy is composed of risk averse workers and risk neutral entrepreneurs. The second-period utility of a representative worker is given by:

\[ (9) \quad H = -k \exp(-\theta U) \quad \text{where } U = (2-L)C \]

where \( C \) stands for the consumption and we normalize leisure endowment to 2. The attitude towards risk is measured by \( \theta \) -- a higher \( \theta \) implies a higher aversion to risk.
The problem facing the entrepreneur in period one is to determine if the switch to the new technology is desirable. Such a switch necessitates an investment in period one, and we assume the entrepreneur faces an opportunity cost of capital given by r. In the next sections we evaluate the conditions under which the entrepreneur will undertake the investment, and the conditions under which the adoption of the new technology will raise the expected utility of the workers.

3. The Choice of Technology - the Flexible Wage Case

We start by considering a benchmark case where the labor market is assumed to be flexible. Note that the employment level using both technologies is L=1. The consumption level of a worker using the old technology is \( C = \exp(s) \). Thus, the worker's expected utility using the old technology is (denoting by E the expectation operator)

\[
(10) \quad E(H) = -kE(\exp(-\theta C)) \quad ; \quad \text{where} \quad C = \exp(s).
\]

Applying (8) we obtain that the wage level with the new technology is \( \exp(p - \varepsilon') \), and the corresponding expected utility using the new technology is \( H^n \):

\[
(11) \quad E(H^n) = -kE(\exp(-\theta C^n)) \quad ; \quad \text{where} \quad C^n = \exp(p - \varepsilon')
\]

3.1 Welfare Comparison - Labor

We turn now to an evaluation of the welfare implications of the new technology. This is done by calculating the expected utility of a representative worker, obtained by applying a second-order Taylor approximation of \( H^n \) around \( \varepsilon' = 0 \) and of \( H^n \).
around $\delta = 0$. This procedure results in approximations whose accuracy is determined by the variances of $\varepsilon'$ and of $\delta$. Henceforth we assume these variances to be small enough to merit the applicability of the resultant approximations. Using (11) we get that

$$(12) \quad H^0 \approx -k \exp(-\theta \omega_\theta) [ 1 - \theta U'(\theta)\varepsilon' - .5 \theta U''(\theta) - (\theta U'(\theta))^2 ] (\varepsilon')^2$$

where $\omega_\theta$ is the real wage ($\theta$) obtained for $\varepsilon' = 0$ ($\omega_\theta = \exp(\rho)$). Applying the expectation operator to (12) we conclude that

$$(13) \quad E(H^0) \approx -k \exp(-\theta \omega_\theta) [ 1 - .5 \varepsilon' (\theta U'(\theta) - (\theta U'(\theta))^2 ]$$

Direct calculation reveals that

$$(14) \quad E(H^0) \approx -k \exp(-\theta \omega_\theta) [ 1 + .5 \varepsilon' \theta \omega_\theta (\theta \omega_\theta - 1) ]$$

Applying a second-order Taylor approximation of $H$ around $\delta = 0$ we obtain (following steps similar to (12)-(14))

$$(15) \quad E(H) \approx -k \exp(-\theta) [ 1 + .5 \varepsilon (\delta \theta - 1) ]$$

The new technology will be adopted if $E(H^0) > E(H)$. To gain further insight into the factors that determine the choice of technology we assume that the variances of $\varepsilon$ and $\delta$ are small, and that the value of $\omega_\theta$ is close to one. Subject to these assumptions, we can conclude that with flexible labor markets the adoption of the new technology is advantageous if
Equation 16 has a simple interpretation, in terms of "mean-variance" analysis. The left-hand term is a measure of the expected rise in income due to the adoption of the new technology. The right-hand side is a subjective measure of the rise in volatility that is associated with the adoption of the new technology, being equal to the spread of the variances of the foreign and domestic shocks weighted by a term related to the degree of risk aversion. The adoption of the new technology is expected to benefit labor if the gain in productivity outweighs the rise in the volatility of income by a factor of \( \frac{1}{2}(\theta - 1) - 1 \).

To gain further insight, we turn to Figure One in which line \( A_1A_2 \) plots combinations of \( (V(\varepsilon); \rho) \) that leave labor indifferent to both technologies. Whenever the degree of risk aversion exceeds a threshold \( (\theta > 1) \) a rise in the volatility of foreign shocks must be accompanied by a corresponding rise in the productivity gain of the new technology in order to keep labor indifferent between the two technologies. Notice that for low degrees of risk aversion \( A_1A_2 \) is downward-sloping. This corresponds to the case where volatility is a "virtue" [in terms of (14),(15) a rise in the volatility of productivity shocks raises expected welfare for \( \theta < 1 \)]. This result stems from the convexity of profits and the derived labor income with respect to the productivity shocks, which in turn implies that higher volatility raises expected income\(^7\). Henceforth we will assume that the degree of risk aversion is high enough to cause the adverse effect of higher volatility to dominate the beneficial effect of the rise in expected income (formally, that \( \theta > 1 \)), as is assumed in Figure One. The area above \( A_1A_2 \) defines the region where labor expects to benefit from the new technology. A rise in domestic volatility \( V(\delta) \) shifts
FIGURE 1
A1A2 downwards, increasing that area. This corresponds to the fact that higher domestic volatility makes investment in openness more attractive. A rise in the degree of risk aversion rotates A1A2 counter clockwise around point K, thereby reducing the advantage of the new technology if foreign exceeds domestic volatility.

3.2 Welfare Comparison - Entrepreneurs

The decision to undertake investment in the new technology is determined by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. The residual income corresponds to the capital share in costs. Applying (11) we find that the entrepreneur's income is

\[(17) \quad ((1-\alpha-\beta)/\alpha) \exp(\rho-e').\]

The entrepreneur will invest in the new technology if the expected income exceeds the cost of capital, or if

\[(18) \quad E\{((1-\alpha-\beta)/\alpha) \exp(\rho-e')\} > (1+r)\]

where r is the opportunity cost of capital. Applying a second-order Taylor approximation to (18) around \(e' = 0\) we obtain that the condition for undertaking the investment can be approximated by

\[(18') \quad \ln((1+r)I) < \rho + \ln((1-\alpha-\beta)/\alpha) + 0.5 V(e').\]

Line C1C2 (Figure One) plots combinations of \((V(e'), \rho)\) where the entrepreneur is
Indifferent regarding the new technology. The area above $C_1C_2$ defines the region where the entrepreneur expects to benefit from the new technology. It is noteworthy that $C_1C_2$ is downward sloping. This reflects the convexity of profits with respect to the productivity shocks, which in turn implies that higher volatility raises expected income.

3.3 The Choice of Technology and Potential Conflicts

We now combine the information summarized in curves $A_1A_2$ and $C_1C_2$ to assess the dependency of the choice of technology on preferences, volatility, and costs. We will identify circumstances where there is a conflict of interest between the inputs, and we will address the role of policies in these circumstances. Notice that whenever the expected productivity gain from the new technology is high enough (relative to volatility measures) there is no conflict of interest between labor and capital. This corresponds to points like $Z$. For relatively low productivity gain, potential for conflict exists. For example, if foreign volatility is high, capital owners will tend to benefit from the new technology, whereas labor will tend to lose (see point $S_3$). At that point the expected change in wages does not compensate for the rise in volatility of income attributable to the new technology. This conflict of interest can be resolved by protective policies which can be viewed as policies attempting to raise the returns to factors in the new industry. In terms of our example such a policy can raise $\rho$, thereby shifting point $S_3$ up, solving the conflict.

While a protective policy is capable of resolving the conflict, it will introduce new costs. If the purpose of the protective policy is to allow both labor and capital
to benefit from the new technology, alternative and more effective means are available. The potential for welfare-improving policies arises from the fact that our economy lacks a market for risk. Institutions or policies that would work directly on the "missing margin" would be superior to protective measures. In order to demonstrate this point let us apply Figure One. Suppose our economy is at point $S_1$.

The distance $S_1N'$ is a measure of the compensation needed to make labor indifferent between the traditional and the new technology (measured as a percentage of the wage, $w_0$). Similarly, $S_1N$ is a measure of the expected rent generated by the new technology (measured as percentage of the investment cost, $I(1+r)$). If the expected rent exceeds the needed compensation, a redistribution of income can resolve the conflict.

More effective means are measures that will redistribute both risk and income. For example, consider a credible contract offered by the entrepreneur to employ labor at the level observed in a competitive equilibrium ($L = 1$), paying a fixed real wage. In order to derive the wage contract note that distance $OA_1$ (Figure One) is equal to $(\theta-1)5V(\varepsilon)$. This is also a measure of the willingness of the worker to 'pay' in expected income to stabilize his real income earned with the traditional technology -- labor employed with the traditional technology is indifferent between the random income ($\text{exp}(\varepsilon)$) and a fixed real income (given by $1- (\theta-1)5V(\varepsilon)$). Thus, point $A_1$ defines the reservation wage $1- (\theta-1)5V(\varepsilon)$ that will make labor indifferent between the old technology and the new in the presence of the contract. Subject to this contract the expected rent increases by the distance $S_1S_0$.

The contract has the effect of shifting the exposure to income risk introduced by the new technology (as represented by $V_\varepsilon$) from labor to the entrepreneur. Notice
that a point below $A_1B$ (like $S_2$) represents a situation where the proposed contract calls for an income redistribution from the entrepreneurs to labor. The needed redistribution is measured by the distance $S_0S_2$ (in wage units). This is a feasible contract only if the initial rent in point $S_2$ exceeds the needed redistribution. Using that observation we can define a locus $C_3C_4$ of points where the rent equals the needed transfer. The proposed contract is feasible only above line $C_3C_4$. This contract will eliminate the conflict of interest for all the ‘risk-return’ combinations that are represented by points above $C_3C_4$ and below $A_1A_2$.

While the contract offers an efficient solution to the conflicts between the inputs, it may lack credibility because it implies that in ‘bad’ states of nature labor is paid above its marginal product. In the absence of a credible enforcement mechanism, the contract might not be feasible. In these circumstances, tax-cum-subsidy state-dependent policies that will move the economy towards the desired risk redistribution will be beneficial. These policies will contribute to the elimination of the conflict between the factors of production, enhancing the chances of adopting the technology.

Figure One is instructive in interpreting the dependency of the choice of technology on perceptions regarding the relative volatility of domestic to foreign shocks. Note that point $K$ is determined by the domestic volatility ($V_0$). Thus, a drop in domestic volatility shifts $A_1A_2$ upwards, reducing the desirability of the new technology. For a given degree of risk aversion and domestic volatility a point like $Z$ represents an equilibrium where there is no conflict between labor and capital, and the new technology is adopted. A country that perceives foreign shocks as more volatile will identify the same technology with a point like $Z'$. At that point there is a conflict of interest between the various factors of production, and the adoption
of the new technology will be determined by the relative efficiency of the labor market and domestic policies in enhancing beneficial risk redistribution.

4. The Choice of Technology -- the Minimum Wage Case

The purpose of this section is to illustrate the effects of minimum wage policy on the choice of technology. This is done by considering an example where a minimum wage regulation that does not affect the equilibrium with the traditional technology has consequences regarding the attractiveness of the new technology. This would be the case if the new technology involved exposure to a more volatile environment. In these circumstances the adoption of the new technology in the presence of the minimum wage will imply spells of unemployment in bad states of nature which reduce the desirability of the new technology. In order to overcome this effect, the technology should generate a compensatory gain in productivity. Unlike the finding with a flexible labor market, a higher volatility is shown to raise the relative attractiveness of the new technology for both factors of production. This finding results from the fact that, in the presence of a minimum wage, a mean preserving rise in volatility will increase the expected gain from the new technology because it will increase benefits in good states without affecting losses in bad states when the minimum wage dictates unemployment.

To simplify exposition, let us consider the case where the traditional technology is non-stochastic \( V_\delta = 0 \), and where the distribution of the foreign shock \( \varepsilon' \) degenerates to:

\[
\begin{align*}
\varepsilon' &= h & \text{probability } 0.5 \\
&= -h & \text{probability } 0.5
\end{align*}
\]
Notice that \( V_b = h^2 \). In a flexible wage economy the interests of both factors are represented by a special case of Figure One, where \( V_b = 0 \) implies that points \( K \) and \( O \) coincide. This situation is drawn in Figure Two, where \( A_1 A_2 \) and \( C_1 C_2 \) have the same interpretation as in Figure one. Thus, in the absence of a minimum wage regulation labor will benefit from the new technology above \( A_1 A_2 \), whereas entrepreneurs will benefit above \( C_1 C_2 \).

Consider now the case where a minimum wage is set at a level dictated by the traditional sector, implying that wages cannot fall below \( w_m = 1 \). While this law does not affect the traditional sector, it implies that with the new technology unemployment can occur in bad states of nature. Let us recall that (8) implies that with the new technology the equilibrium wage is given in bad states of nature by \( \exp(\rho - h) \). Thus, whenever \( h \) exceeds \( \rho \), unemployment will occur in bad states of nature. This will be the case if the volatility of foreign shocks (measured by \( \sqrt{V_b} \)) exceeds the productivity gain (\( \rho \)). Henceforth we will assume that \( \rho < h \) and that in states of unemployment the utility of labor (\( U \)) is given by \( U_\theta \) (\( 0 \leq U_\theta < 1 \)), corresponding to the possibility of a non-market production.

Labor will benefit from the new technology if the following condition is met:

\[
(20) \quad 0.5 [ -k \exp(-\theta U_\theta) - k \exp(-\theta \exp(\rho + h))] > -k \exp(-\theta)
\]

The right hand side of (20) is the utility in the traditional sector, where \( U = 1 \). The left hand side is the expected utility with the new technology, being an average of the bad states where unemployment occurs (\( U = U_\theta \)) and the good states where
\[ U = \exp(p+h) \]. Equation (20) allows us an assessment of the potential role of volatility. Assuming that the conditions for a binding minimum wage in bad states hold (i.e. \( p < h \)), it can be shown that if \( \theta(1 - U_0) > \ln 2 \) then the new technology is undesirable for any \( V(e') \). This is because a high enough degree of risk aversion \( (\theta) \) and low enough non-market productivity \( (U_0) \) imply that with the new technology the drop in utility in bad states is too large to be compensated for in good states. If, however, \( \theta(1 - U_0) < \ln 2 \), then for large enough \( p+ h \) labor will benefit from the new technology.

Higher volatility enhances the relative attractiveness of the new technology because a rise in \( h \) has the effect of raising utility in good states, without a corresponding drop in bad states. The same result can be derived for a case of a continuous distribution of \( e' \). This result stems from the fact that the minimum wage truncates the distribution of the effective productivity of labor in bad states. In general, for truncated distributions a mean preserving spread of the underlying variable \( (e' \) in our case) puts greater weight on the tails, resulting in a higher expected value of the effective productivity. Curve \( G_1G_2 \) in Figure Two plots configurations of \( (V(e'); p) \) that leave labor indifferent between the two technologies. The area above \( G_1G_2 \) defines the region where labor expects to benefit from the new technology. The curve is downward sloping because a rise in volatility raises expected utility with the new technology, allowing a drop in the "reservation" value of productivity gain, \( p \). It can be shown that a drop in the degree of risk aversion shifts \( G_1G_2 \) downwards.

The entrepreneur will benefit from the new technology if the expected income exceeds the cost of capital, or if
As in the flexible labor market case, volatility enhances the relative attractiveness of the new technology from the entrepreneur's point of view. Curve $F_1F_2$ in Figure 2 plots configurations of combinations of $(V(\epsilon); \rho)$ that leave the entrepreneur indifferent with respect to the new technology. The area above $F_1F_2$ defines the region where entrepreneurs expect to benefit from the new technology.

A comparison between the flexible wage case (curves $A_1A_2$ and $C_1C_2$) and the minimum wage case (curves $G_1G_2$ and $F_1F_2$) reveals that while higher volatility of foreign shocks enhances the possibility of conflicts between inputs with flexible wages, it works in the opposite direction with minimum wages. Note that because the presence of minimum wages diminishes the chance of adopting the new technology, there is a greater potential role for labor market institutions of the type elaborated in section 3.3. For example, a point like $S'$ (Figure 2) corresponds to an economy that adopts the new technology in a flexible wage equilibrium, but adopts the traditional technology in the presence of the minimum wage. Notice that a contract that will fix wages and employment at $w=1$ and $L=1$ will preempt the effect of the minimum wage, enabling the attainment of an efficient equilibrium. If such contracts are not credible, a minimum wage policy will generate a greater demand for protection. The role of protective measures is to overcome the potential adverse consequences of the minimum wage on the employment level associated with the new technology in bad states. While such policies can achieve their goal, they are dominated by alternative policies that deal directly with market imperfections.
5. Concluding Remarks

This paper describes an economy where a greater openness can result in a conflict of interest between labor and capital. A way to resolve the conflict is to accompany the exposure to greater openness with protective policies. While protective measures can achieve that goal for a given sector, they impose new welfare costs. Thus, protective policies are dominated by more direct means that will redistribute risk in an efficient manner, shifting the labor income risk to entrepreneurs, allowing a drop in the expected wage needed to interest labor in the new technology and raising thereby the expected income of entrepreneurs. This accomplishes a resolution of the conflict without imposing the welfare cost associated with protective policies.

The results of this study suggest that greater attention should be given to the interaction between institutional aspects of the labor market and the choice of growth policies. Such an interaction is of special relevance for LDCs because their lack of fully developed domestic credit markets puts a greater burden on labor market institutions as a means of risk redistribution.
Footnotes

1. For a recent study see Sachs (1985). For studies of growth and development see, for example, Krueger (1978), Bhagwati (1978) and Balassa (1982).


5. For a study of labor contracts as a means of risk redistribution see Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974).

6. The key assumption is that inputs differ in their attitude towards risk and their excess to the capital market. For exposition purposes we consider a special case where entrepreneurs are risk neutral. The discussion can be extended for the case where both labor and entrepreneurs are risk averse, and where inputs differ in their effective mobility across activities. This difference plays a key role, because potential mobility acts like an insurance that allows greater diversification across states.

7. For a more general discussion of the welfare effects of volatility see Newbery and Stiglitz (1981).

8. In terms of our example these policies are in the form of implicit subsidies applied to the new technology, like using a more favorable exchange rate for the imported inputs. It can be shown that if the exchange rate favors imports of M at a
rate of $s_m$, then $d \rho/d s_m = \beta/(1-\beta)$; where $s_m$ defines the percentage spread between the exchange rate applied for the final good $X$ and the imported input $M$. If the new technology is modeled as an investment in a new sector, then protective policies can be in the form of a tariff that raises the price of $X^\Pi$ relative to other activities.

9. It can be shown that $C_3C_4$ is parallel to $C_1C_2$, and is defined by the condition that $0.5V_\varepsilon + \rho = \ln[\alpha(1-0.5(\theta-1)V_\delta + (1+r)1)]$.

10. Formally, curve $G_1G_2$ is defined by $[V_\varepsilon, \rho]$ that satisfy

$$0.5[ -k \exp(-\theta U_\theta) -k \exp(-\theta \exp(\rho+ h))] = -k \exp(-\theta) \text{ and } \rho < h \ (h = \sqrt{V_\varepsilon})$$.
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