Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2480 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-37910 IDA-37911) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 150.6 MILLION US$ 210 MILLION EQUIVALENT TO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH FOR THE RURAL TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT February 27, 2013 Sustainable Development Department Bangladesh Country Management Unit South Asia Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective July 19, 2012) Currency Unit = Bangladeshi Taka 1.00 = US$ 0.01 US$ 1.00 = Tk. 81.77 FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AAEC Awareness, Advocacy and Educational NCB National Competitive Bidding Campaign ARI Accident Research Institute NPV Net Present Value BUET Bangladesh University of Engineering ORA Operational Risk Assessment and Technology CE Chief Engineer PIU Project Implementation Unit CRRSU Central Rural Road Safety Unit PPC Project Preparation Consultant CUL Compensation-Under-Law PPRP Public Procurement Reform Project DSM Design Supervision Management PRMR Procurement Risk Mitigation Report ECP Environmental Code of Practice PSC Project Steering Committee EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return RAP Resettlement Action Plan EMF/ Environmental Management RF Resettlement Framework EMP Framework/Plan FMR Financial Management Report RHD Roads and Highways Department GCM Growth Center Markets RJ River Jetty GoB Government of Bangladesh RP Resettlement Plan GRC Grievance Redress Committee RRMAIDP Rural Roads and Market Access Infrastructure Development Project ICB International Competitive Bidding RRS Rural Road Safety ICT Information and Communication RTIP Rural Transport Improvement Project Technologies IDA International Development Association RTS Rural Transport Safety IDSS Integrated Decision Support System SEME Socio-Economic Monitoring and Evaluation IPDP Indigenous Peoples Development Plan SCM Suggestions and Complaints Mechanism INT Department of Institutional Integrity SIA Social Impact Assessment LCS Labor Contracting Societies SIL Specific Investment Loan LGED Local Government Engineering SIMF Social Impact Management Framework Department LGI Local Government Institutions TSA Transport Safety Assessment LGRD Local Government, Rural Development UFMS Unified Financial Management System MIS Management Information System UR Union Roads MLGRD Ministry of Local Government, Rural UZR Upazila Roads &C Development and Cooperatives Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Country Director: Salman Zaheer Sector Manager: Karla Carvajal Gonzalez Project Team Leader: Reefat Sultana ICR Team Leader: Elena Y. Chesheva ii BANGLADESH RURAL TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT CONTENTS Contents B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... v  C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... v  D. Sector and Theme Codes .......................................................................................... vi  E. Bank Staff .................................................................................................................. vi  F. Results Framework Analysis ..................................................................................... vi  G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................................................... xi  H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................ xi  I. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................ xii  1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1  1.1 Context at Appraisal ............................................................................................. 1  1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) .................................................................................................................... 2  1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification.............................................................................................. 2  1.4 Main Beneficiaries ................................................................................................ 2  1.5 Original Components (as approved) ..................................................................... 2  1.6 Revised Components ............................................................................................ 4  1.7 Other significant changes ...................................................................................... 4  2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 4  2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ................................................. 4  2.2 Implementation ..................................................................................................... 6  2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization ...... 7  2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance ................................................................... 8  2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase .............................................................. 13  3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 14  3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ....................................... 14  3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives .............................................. 14  3.3 Efficiency ............................................................................................................ 16  3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ............................................................ 16  3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts .......................................... 16  3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops ... 17  4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 17  5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 18  5.1 Bank Performance ............................................................................................... 18  iii 5.2 Borrower Performance ........................................................................................ 19  6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 19  7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 20  Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 21  Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 22  Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 24  Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 27  Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 29  Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 31  Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 32  Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 42  Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 43  MAP .............................................................................................................................. 44  iv BANGLADESH RURAL TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT DATASHEET A. Basic Information Rural Transport Country: Bangladesh Project Name: Improvement Project Project ID: P071435 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-37910,IDA-37911 ICR Date: 02/27/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: OF BANGLADESH Original Total XDR 138.00M Disbursed Amount: XDR 149.64M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 150.60M Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: Local Government Engineering Department Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 05/15/2001 Effectiveness: 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 Appraisal: 04/07/2003 Restructuring(s): 12/21/2007 Approval: 06/19/2003 Mid-term Review: 12/15/2005 Closing: 06/30/2009 06/30/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory v Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Agro-industry, marketing, and trade 20 20 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 80 80 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Rural markets 20 20 Rural policies and institutions 40 20 Rural services and infrastructure 40 60 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Mieko Nishimizu Country Director: Salman Zaheer Frederick Thomas Temple Sector Manager: Karla Gonzalez Carvajal Guang Zhe Chen Project Team Leader: Reefat Sultana Fabio Galli ICR Team Leader: Elena Y. Chesheva ICR Primary Author: Elena Y. Chesheva F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) Provide rural communities with improved access to social services and economic opportunities, and to enhance the capacity of relevant government institutions to better manage rural transport infrastructure. vi Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) PDO was not revised (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : 25% reduction in average travel time and transport costs in project area . motorized motorized transport Value motorized transport travel transport travel travel time-33.5 km quantitative or time-12 km hr., cost -TK time-15 km hr., hr., cost -TK Qualitative) 2.25/km cost -TK 1.69/km 1.64/km Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments Indicator targets achieved. In addition to LGED annual data, the Socio-economic (incl. % Impact Assessment done in 2010 indicated more than 58 % reduction in travel achievement) time on sampled project roads. 20% increase of rural roads categorized in 'good' (IRI<4) condition in project Indicator 2 : area. Value quantitative or 3,800km 6,200 km 0km Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 If using PAD definition of road in good condition with roughness IRI<4, no Comments roads in project area comply, baseline should be 0 and actuals 0, however, if (incl. % using LGED definition of IRI<6, baseline is 3,800km and actual achieved achievement) 6800km, surpassing the target. 15% improvement in overall LGED operating efficiency (annual operating costs Indicator 3 : as % of total annual budget). Value quantitative or 13.7% 11.7% 4.9% Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) 30% increase in revenue mobilization by participating Local Government Indicator 4 : Institutions (LGIs). Value quantitative or Tk. 200,000 Tk. 260,000 Tk. 200,000 Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments (incl. % The end target could not be achieved due to unresolved GoB- level policy issues. achievement) Indicator 5 : Completion of all civil works sub-component. Value 0% 100% 100% vii quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 Comments All civil works procured under the project were completed by the closing date, (incl. % which was revised twice to accommodate additional flood-related works and to achievement) allow sufficient time for their completion 5% annual real increase in the maintenance funding for the LGED managed road Indicator 6 : network. Value quantitative or TK 2 Billion TK 3.2 Billion TK 6.25 Billion Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 Comments (incl. % Target value surpassed. achievement) Indicator 7 : 24,000 person years of employment created in project area. Value 24000 Person- 50275 Person- quantitative or 0 Person-Years Years created Years created Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 Comments (incl. % target surpassed achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : 1,100 km of UZRs and 500 km of URs are improved by end of project. Value 1,600 km 1,638 km (quantitative 0 km improved improved completed, or Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments (incl. % Target achieved achievement) 15,000 meters of missing bridges/culverts are constructed to expand continuously Indicator 2 : passable rural road network. Value 15,000 meters 15,956 meters (quantitative 0 meters constructed constructed completed. or Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments (incl. % Target achieved achievement) Indicator 3 : 1,500 km of UZRs and URs are maintained/rehabilitated. viii Value 1,500 km 2,120 km 0 km (quantitative maintained/ maintained/ maintained/rehabilitated or Qualitative) rehabilitated rehabilitated Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments (incl. % Target achieved and surpassed achievement) Improvement/construction of 150 rural markets and 45 river jetties within the Indicator 4 : project area. 150/45 rural 123/32 rural Value 0/0 rural markets/river markets/river markets/river (quantitative jetties jetties jetties or Qualitative) improved/constructed improved/construc improved/construct ted ed Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments (incl. % Target achieved 82% for GCMs and 71% for river jetties achievement) Implementation of LGED-wide Institutional Strengthening Action Plan (ISAP) Indicator 5 : and Increase in number of LGED local government staff, and community members trained in management and financing. Full and Value Implementation of ISAP satisfactory About 98% ISAP (quantitative not yet started. implementation of implemented or Qualitative) ISAP. Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments IS Action Plan substantially completed. 12, 859 people attended various trainings (incl. % under the project. achievement) Implementation of LGED assistance to LGIs to improve service delivery and Indicator 6 : governance. Finalized Local Value Satisfactory Government 95% LGIP (quantitative implementation of Improvement Plan Implemented or Qualitative) LGIP (LGIP) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/26/2012 Comments All of Basic Training activities completed, Intensive Strengthening activities (incl. % completed partially due to limited interest of LGI benefitting from another achievement) project. Total 20,324 people from Union Parishads trained, 276 grants provided. Social and environmental safeguards documents -RF/RAPs/IPDPs and Indicator 7 : EMF/EMPs/ECPs are implemented in a satisfactory manner. RF/RAPs/IPDPs and Value EMF/EMPs/ECPs (quantitative none Yes are implemented or Qualitative) in a satisfactory manner. Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 ix Comments (incl. % Satisfactorily implemented albeit with significant delays in land acquisition achievement) Living standards of >75% of Project Affected People (PAPs) not made worse off Indicator 8 : or improved. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved Comments This indicator was not monitored, however, the assessments of Land Acquisition (incl. % and Resettlement and SEME indicated there were no major negative impacts and achievement) many positive benefits Indicator 9 : UZR maintenance successfully achieved physical and financial targets. UZR maintenance Value successfully (quantitative none achieve physical yes or Qualitative) and financial targets. Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 Comments The indicator was not monitored, however, all targets were achieved (see IO (incl. % Indicator #3) achievement) Indicator 10 : Enhancement of ICT asserts, IT strategic Planning, GIS and MIS capabilities Enhanced ICT Value No ICT strategy and assets, IT strategic (quantitative Partially Action plan planning, GIS and or Qualitative) MIS capabilities Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 Comments After delays, the ICT/MIS strategy and action plan were developed by the end of (incl. % the project period, however its implementation will be carried under another achievement) project (RTIP-II) Development of Road Safety strategy and action plan jointly by LGED and LGI Indicator 11 : and implementation of the action plan. Value RS Action Plan (quantitative none Partially implemented or Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 Comments Three Road Safety Pilots successfully implemented after completion of Road (incl. % Safety Assessments, however development of Rural Road Safety Strategy has achievement) been deferred to RTIP-II Establish LGED framework for effective participation of affected LGIs within Indicator 12 : the project area. Establish LGED Value framework for (quantitative none Largely effective or Qualitative) participation Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 Comments The guideline for community participation were developed and training x (incl. % conducted as part of LGIP program (20,324 people from Union Parishads achievement) trained), however, more efforts are needed to institutionalize it and improve participation Improve LGED functions and resources for analyzing and monitoring of Indicator 13 : socioeconomic and environmental impact on development projects Value Methodology for (quantitative no SEME methodology Yes SEME developed or Qualitative) Date achieved 07/30/2003 07/30/2003 06/30/2012 Comments (incl. % Methodology for SEME was developed in 2006 and updated in 2010 achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 07/21/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 10/15/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 03/26/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.00 4 09/22/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.56 5 03/17/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 18.05 6 05/11/2005 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 20.87 7 11/10/2005 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 31.70 8 01/05/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 36.55 9 06/15/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 58.22 10 12/27/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 75.32 11 06/05/2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 86.83 12 12/17/2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 104.77 13 06/03/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 118.02 14 09/12/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 128.29 15 03/12/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 139.41 16 09/30/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 162.60 17 03/31/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 174.96 18 05/30/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 186.22 19 12/03/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 195.16 20 05/21/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 211.45 21 08/29/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 221.79 22 03/28/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 228.70 23 07/08/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 228.70 H. Restructuring (if any) xi ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions Additional Financing - scale up 12/21/2007 S MS 104.77 to finance flood rehabilitation works I. Disbursement Profile xii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal Country and Sector Context 1. Bangladesh, with a population of about 150 million and a land area of 147,570 square kilometers is amongst the most densely-populated countries in the world. The economy of Bangladesh grew steadily during last decade due to macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization, improved private sector investment climate and financial sector reform. Poverty reduction, however, remains a major challenge: at the time of project appraisal 35 percent of Bangladesh's population lived in poverty, and large issues of weak governance, urban congestion and under-investment in basic rural infrastructure persisted. Improved rural transport infrastructure was considered key for rural connectivity and poverty reduction, where most of the poorest populations (73%) lived. The improvement of rural infrastructure in general, and of rural transport infrastructure in particular, has been and still is an important element of the Government of Bangladesh's (GOB) long term strategy to reduce the incidence of rural poverty by improving the infrastructure endowment of the rural economy. Sector Issues 2. Despite the large investments made to develop the country's road network, its condition remained far from satisfactory. The riding quality, geometric standards and carrying capacity of part of the secondary and tertiary road networks were poor. By the time of project appraisal, only 13,000 km of Upazila Roads (UZRs) were of all-weather standard, and most of the URs remained unpaved, making large portions of secondary and tertiary road networks impassable during the rainy season. Inadequate road maintenance funding was a major issue in Bangladesh. Based on the findings of the 2001/2002 public expenditure review commissioned by International Development Association (IDA), there was an annual maintenance funding shortfall of about US$9.0 million for the secondary road network. This represented a gap of about 28 percent of the total maintenance funding requirements. Furthermore, on-the-ground effectiveness of expenditures for both routine and periodic road maintenance was weak. 3. Transport and trade are vital elements of the rural and national economy. Development of transport and trade facilities including inland waterways and rural markets would maximize the transport sector’s contribution to overall economic growth. A more integrated transport and trade approach improving rural roads, markets, and river jetty facilities would deliver significant impacts on agricultural growth and rural and non- rural incomes. 4. The road classification system in Bangladesh had in the past fostered duplication of responsibility between Roads and Highways Department (RHD) and Local Government Engineering department (LGED) in the management of the various parts of 1 the road network. GOB finalized new guidelines for a more systematic secondary and tertiary road network classification and responsibility framework. The full implementation of these new guidelines was critical for progress towards sustainable improvements in the management of the respective parts of the road network. The capacity of Local Government Institutions (LGIs) to fund and manage the development and maintenance of rural infrastructure was weak. Furthermore, local government and communities had limited involvement in planning and management processes of maintenance operations. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 5. Project Development Objective was to provide rural communities with improved access to social services and economic opportunities, and to enhance the capacity of relevant government institutions to better manage rural transport infrastructure. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 6. There was no formal revision of the PDO and key performance indicators. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 7. The project impact area covered 21 districts with 44,900 square km and a total population of 45 million, which constitutes about 35 percent of Bangladesh’s total population and over 40 percent of its rural population. The main benefits included: (i) improved mobility of rural population; (b) reduced operating costs for both motorized and non-motorized modes of transport; (c) lower freight and passenger transport costs; (d) improved access and quality of rural markets to support agricultural and off-farm activities; (e) steady flow of labor intensive maintenance contracts; (f) improved access to social services (like health clinics and schools); and (g) improved environment through provision of drainage structures and roadside tree plantation. 8. The direct beneficiaries of the project were the population living in project areas, including road users, villagers, agricultural producers, agribusiness operators and transport operators living or operating in project areas. The project-funded civil works generated significant employment opportunities on its own. Furthermore, some of the civil works funded under the project specifically targeted vulnerable groups such as destitute women by providing them with employment opportunities. The LGED staff also benefited because of capacity development and training. Also, the contracting community benefited from the training and capacity building activities under the project 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 9. The Rural Transport Improvement Project (RTIP) funded the following eight components: 2 Component 1 - US$110.50 million: Improvement of about 1,100 km of UZRs: This component aimed to improve rural access and connectivity to markets and production centers in the 21 project Districts by making key UZR passable all year around and by improving their riding quality and carrying capacity. Component 2 - US$23.50 million: Improvement of about 500 km of Union Roads (URs): This component aimed to improve rural access and connectivity in the 21 project Districts by making key URs passable all year round and by improving their riding quality. Component 3 - US$39.00 million: Periodic maintenance/rehabilitation of about 1,500 km of UZRs: This component aimed to reduce the periodic maintenance/rehabilitation backlog on the LGED-managed portion of the road network by funding the overlaying, resealing and minor rehabilitation of 1,500 km of key UZRs in the 21 project districts. Component 4 – US$30.50 million: Construction of about 15,000 m of culverts/bridges on URs: This component aimed to make approximately 5,000 km of URs passable year- around in the 21 project districts, and provided appropriate drainage structures on these roads. Component 5 – US$17.50 million: Improvement/construction of about 150 rural markets and 45 river jetties: This component, through the improving/constructing 150 Growth Center Markets (GCM) and 45 river jetties (RJ), aimed to help lower the cost of goods and commodities in the 21 project Districts by facilitating their trade. Most of the selected rural markets and river jetties for improvement/construction were linked to UZRs/URs to be improved or maintained under the project. Component 6 – US$14.00 million: Land acquisition, implementation of safeguards documents: This component was designed to assess and mitigate the social and environmental impacts of implementing the civil works components of the project and finance implementation of Resettlement Framework (RF), Environmental Management Framework (EMF), Resettlement Action Plans (RAPS), Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), Indigenous People Development Plans (IPDPs), and utility relocation. Component 7 - US$14.00 million: Design Supervision Management (DSM) consultant services, quality, financial and procurement audit services, and other consultant services: This component was designed to ensure the timely, quality, and cost effective construction, maintenance/rehabilitation of the civil works components under the project. Component 8 - US$6.00 million: Technical Assistance (TA), training, capacity building of LGED and LGIs, equipment and pre-investment studies: This component aimed to finance a wide variety of activities and investments including enhanced training programs for LGED staff, LGED implementation of improved new business processes and systems, local government capacity building initiatives and rural road transport safety. More specifically, this component aimed to assist LGED in funding the implementation of the Institutional Strengthening Action Plan (ISAP) and the corresponding planned TA services. The various ISAP targets were aimed at enhancing 3 the key elements of LGED's policy framework, planning and operational capabilities, as well as building LGI's capacities for infrastructure management and related revenue mobilization, thus driving the substantive reform process in the sector with an integrated approach. 1.6 Revised Components 10. There was no formal revision of the components of the project. A component on Flood Rehabilitation was added in 2008 following approval of the Additional Financing. While this component was treated separately in the Aide-Memoires, no formal changes in the system were made to add the component in the Project Portal. 1.7 Other significant changes 11. In 2007, Bangladesh suffered major flooding directly affecting over 13 million people in 46 districts, causing over 1,000 deaths, affected over 2 million acres of agricultural land, and damaged infrastructure, social and educational facilities and private assets. Responding to the Government’s request for assistance, the World Bank established a cross-sectoral Emergency 2007 Flood Restoration and Recovery Assistance. As part of this effort, restoring secondary and rural road network affected by the floods, including rehabilitation of Upazila roads, culverts and bridges, was implemented under RTIP as part of Additional Financing (AF) (IDA Credit of US$20 million and reallocated $7million from RTIP savings, which with GoB contribution made the total US$33.8 million). AF didn’t require a change to the RTIP project development objectives. The closing date of the project was extended by two years to June 30, 2011. The same implementing arrangements were used for the implementation of the Flood Component. 12. Another extension of the closing date till June 30, 2012 was approved to allow completion of flood rehabilitation contracts which experienced delays in implementation. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 13. The project was prepared following successful implementation of two previous Bank-funded projects – First and Second Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Projects (RRMIMP-I and RRMIMP –II) by LGED, and its design was in large part informed by lessons learned during the implementation and the analytical and technical assistance started under these projects. 14. The following lessons learned were incorporated during project preparation: (a) early and comprehensive preparation of engineering, social, environmental, participatory planning and institutional aspects to ensure quality at entry; (b) up front procurement actions to ensure high degree of implementation readiness (aiming for 20 percent of project works to be ready for award by credit effectiveness; (c) integrated improvement of UZRs, URs, markets and critical river jetties to maximize synergistic benefits; (d) construction of missing minor structures to improve connectivity, and (e) targeted capacity building initiatives to increase role of LGIs and communities. 4 15. To ensure readiness for implementation, the engineering of the first phase works and the bidding process were completed before the Board approval of the project (about one fourth of the total civil works contracts). The TORs for the major consultancies were prepared and discussed at appraisal. 16. The project team pushed for some early agreements during project preparation. Thus, re-classification of roads and re-definition of responsibilities between RHD, LGED and LGIs was made a condition for appraisal. The Planning Commission, LGED and RHD formed a committee to work on the issue, and the decision was made in March 2003, an important milestone for the project. 17. Maintenance needs were thoroughly analyzed during preparation and as a result the decision was made to increase allocation of project funds for periodic maintenance and rehabilitation, which doubled initially planned length of roads to be covered under the component. To further strengthen the commitment of the government, a covenant was agreed at negotiations which stipulated that the GoB should endeavor to increase by at least 5% in real terms starting from FY2004/2005 and for duration of the project funds needed to cover the estimated annual maintenance expenditures of the LGED managed portion of the network. 18. The design of the IS component was based on the recommendations of the Management Capacity Strengthening Study (MANCAPS) funded under earlier projects, and the Institutional Strengthening Action Plan was broken into short, medium and long- term set of reform actions and was endorsed by the appraisal. 19. The project team correctly identified many risks and designed the project in such a way as to minimize many of them. However, the risk related to delays with land acquisition and site readiness challenges, while correctly identified, proved very challenging for mitigation and the project suffered from such delays. The problems with procurement delays due to small contract packages in earlier projects, were suggested to be addressed by piloting four ICB contracts (estimated value of about 10 percent of total contracts value), however, this didn’t prove to be a feasible solution for rural roads due to their geographic spread and relatively short sections of the roads. 20. Participation of local communities in planning and prioritization of investments and their implementation was deemed very important, and a separate Local Government Improvement Program (LGIP) was designed as part of the IS component to improve administrative, financial and management expertise of Local Government Institutions (LGIs). Participatory selection of URs, markets and river jetties was incorporated in project design, though the work of the Upazila and District level councils. 21. Following the tested methodology of Socio-Economic Impact Evaluations under the RRMMIP-II, the comprehensive baseline surveys were undertaken over a period of 10 months during project preparation and early in the implementation, which allowed for collection of necessary data for end-of project evaluation. 5 22. Quality at Entry: No quality at entry assessment of the project was carried out. 2.2 Implementation 23. The project was implemented over a course of 9 years. This is largely due to the fact that the scope the project has been increased at the end of 2007 to implement additional flood rehabilitation works. All works and technical assistance activities were completed by the extended closing date of June 30, 2012. 24. During implementation, improvement of UZ roads took longer to complete than expected due to delays in land acquisition and poor contract management. The maintenance component, however, progressed satisfactorily since it did not involve any land acquisition. There was a severe price increase of construction materials (especially cement and reinforcement steel) in international markets during the period of 2007 to 2008 which resulted in a major setback in the construction of UZ roads (many contractors abandoned the site because of the high price of materials since price escalation was not included as part of their contract). 25. The Mid-Term Review of the project which took place in December 2005 identified the key issues related to delays in implementation, and after follow up discussions, the LGED moved to start cancelling the contracts for non-performance. In total 73 contracts had to be cancelled. Since the additional financing resulted in extended closing date, most of the cancelled contracts were rebid and completed satisfactorily. Although delayed, LGED’s prompt contractual decisions helped in the completion of about 70 contracts. 26. RTIP introduced four International Competitive Bidding (ICB) contract packages on a pilot basis which were awarded in 2008 and each packages composed of four to five roads. However, severe delays occurred during implementation mainly due to the large geographic spread of the roads. Two contracts were completed with a one year extension beyond the original contract period of thirty months. The other two contracts were cancelled and re-awarded as National Competitive Bidding (NCBs). 27. Supervision of the civil works was done jointly by LGED district and Upazila engineers and by two appointed Design and Supervision Management consulting (DSM) firms. However, it should be noted, that due to the limited capacity of the DSM in the districts, a lot of supervision efforts had to be done by LGED. 28. Quality control of the works was performed by the Quality Unit of the LGED. District field laboratories were used for materials and soil testing. In addition, several independent technical audits were commissioned, the last one in 2010 to review implementation of the ICB contracts. The technical inspection of a sample of project roads was also done during ICR preparation, which confirmed overall good quality of construction. 29. The main focus of the Institutional Strengthening Action Program (ISAP) of LGED was related to (a) strategic development, (b) organizational development, (c) 6 financial management and audit, (d) quality assurance and technical auditing, (e) maintenance and asset management(f) rural transport safety, and (g) environmental and social mitigation management. While implementation of ISAP was progressing satisfactorily, the World Bank and LGED initiated an Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) study in 2008 aiming to assess fiduciary and operational risks in LGED’s management of projects, assets and other resources, to evaluate the efficacy of external review of decision-making by LGED and the LGD, to identify options for future monitoring of operational risks in LGED and the LGD, and to prioritize options which are realistic and to effectively minimize the major operational risks identified. ISAP steering group was monitoring ISAP activities, several working groups were formed to focus on areas of organization and staffing, role and mission, training, rural transport safety. In the last 2 years of project implementation ISAP steering Committee was disassembled by the current Chief Engineer (CE), who formed instead the Inter-Unit Coordination Committee, chaired by the CE. 30. LGIP program included basic training for Union Parishads in preparation of investment schemes, conducting public consultations, records maintenance, and was first piloted in 5 districts, and after evaluation, rolled out to the rest of 21 districts. The second phase of Intensive Strengthening was done on need basis, as a hands-on training for Union Parishad management. It was planned to start it as pilot selecting one UP in a districts and then rolling out to other interested UPs. However, in 2008-2009 another project of the Bank (LGSP) started offering the training and grants, which unlike the LGIP didn't require matching contribution of 20 percent from the UP. Thus the interest of the UPs towards LGIP dried out. The UP elections at the end of 2010 diverted attention and interest of UP heads. Initially the resource mobilization study was planned under this component, however, it was dropped as it was understood it would be done under LGSP. 31. About US$4.5 million of project credit remained undisbursed after the refund of balances of DAs from all 21 districts and refund of ineligible expenses in December 20121. This balance resulted from a combination of factors (depreciation of Taka against dollar- rate of 69 taka per 1 dollar at the moment of contract signing to about 82 Taka per 1 dollar in 2012, the decision not to rebid cancelled contracts after 2010, and changes in the SDR/dollar). While there were discussions with LGED about using the money no decision was made in this regard and the opportunity to utilize remaining money was missed. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 32. Overall, the Results Framework for the project was designed to monitor achievement of the project objectives and cover all key areas of the project, and an appropriate set of outcome and intermediate indicators was identified. The outcome indicators included reduction in travel time and transport costs, increased percentage of 1 The refund took place with delays 6 months after project closure and by the time of ICR submission the systems did not have updated information on the undisbursed amounts (still showing undisbursed amount of US$0.9 million). 7 roads in good condition, percentage increase in maintenance funding, improved operating efficiency of LGED, increase in revenue mobilization and employment creation. To better assess the achievement of the first part of PDO the team should have considered a separate indicator on measuring improved access to social services and economic opportunities. While no indicator was formally entered, the socio-economic impact assessment done in 2010 did look at the access to the health and educational facilities as well as business opportunities and confirmed significant improvement in access compared to control areas. By the time of introduction of Core Transport Indicators the project was in the last stage of implementation and the decision was made not to add them to the results framework. 33. A number of deficiencies were identified by the ICR team: (i) the baselines for the indicators were not provided in the PAD and were only introduced during first Implementation Status Reports (ISR)2; (ii) the data for outcome indicator for revenue mobilization for LGIs proved difficult to collect; (iii) the indicator for flood rehabilitation component while listed in the Project Paper in Additional Financing was never formally added to the results agreement of the project and was not part of monitoring of results in the ISRs; (iv) the definition of the indicator on roads condition used the International Roughness Index (IRI) proved inconsistent between the PAD and what was monitored during the project. The PAD identified road in ‘good’ condition as a one with IRI below 4, however, the LGED used the definition of road condition as good with IRI<6. LGED definition is appropriate for these types of roads; however the PAD used the definition set too high making it impossible to achieve the target if interpreted by PAD definition. The project was monitoring the percentage of roads in good condition, but somehow this discrepancy in interpretation was never brought up. 34. The project should be commended for developing further the methodology for socio-economic monitoring and evaluation (SEME) piloted under previous RRMMIP project and commissioning collection of comprehensive baseline and end result data. The SEME was conducted in 2010 for a representative sample of investments and was able to demonstrate significant benefits of the project. This methodology was developed as part of the ISAP activities and introduced as a practice in LGED. 35. A number of independent evaluations were also commissioned for specific activities and areas of the project. This included independent evaluation of resettlement done in 2011, assessment of implementation of Local Government Improvement Program (LGIP) and ISAP implementation completed at the end of the project. Findings of these assessments have informed preparation of the Second Rural Transport Improvement project (RTIP-II). 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 2 The baselines for output indicators for infrastructure works were put as zero indicating that out of selected roads and markets none have been yet improved/constructed. 8 Procurement 36. Procurement of works, goods and consulting services was carried out in accordance with the Bank guidelines. PIU had previous experience with WB procurement rules which allowed processing of a very large amount of contracts. Project procurement included 2065 contracts for civil works ( 70 for UZRs, 200 for URs, 900 for UR structures, 150 for GCM, 45 for RJ, 100 for periodic maintenance and 600 for tree plantation and off-pavement maintenance). There were 4 ICB contracts for UZRs improvement, and the rest were procured under the NCB procedures, except for tree plantation and maintenance. Tree plantation was done by soliciting three quotations, off- pavement maintenance and tree- nursing were carried out through direct contracting procedures by Labor Contracting Societies (LCSs). To allow for a proper distribution of workload the project was designed to be implemented in three phases. Flood rehabilitation works were added in the second half of the project when many of the contracts were either completed or ongoing, thus, this didn’t create too much of a burden. 37. Initial procurement capacity was low. During 2004-2007 as many as around 30% contracts were awarded beyond the initial period of bid validity. There were instances of weaknesses in procurement management and reporting quality, apparent political influences in decisions, disinterest in investigating issues etc. These were overcome gradually and since 2008, about 90% contracts used to be awarded within initial period of bid validity. As the capacity grew rapidly, LGED tried to minimize delays in procurement; in flood component even bid evaluation was done in a quick process. In order to overcome bottlenecks and areas lacking understanding, LGED developed a core group of procurement experts whose opinion was sought during difficult procurement deliberations. The components related to improvement and rehabilitation works experienced severe delays with execution of some contracts and initially the LGED were slow with moving on the non-performing contracts, however, after intensive urging of the Bank, the LGED assumed a much more proactive role and started contract cancellations and rebidding. Piloting of ICB contracts under the project proved their unsuitability for rural roads works under the project. All ICB contracts experienced severe delays due to covering too many roads, tight pricing, rising price of construction materials and contractor's inability to mobilize multiple construction sites. Two ICBs had to be cancelled, divided into 4-6 lots, re-bid and awarded around 2009-2010 as NCBs. 38. During the initial project implementation period, the post review on procurement revealed some deficiencies and lapses by LGED. As a mitigation measure, after the Mid- Term Review LGED started submitting quarterly Procurement Risk Mitigation Report (PRMR) on an agreed format. Additionally, all RTIP engineers received procurement training by LGED or the Government’s Central Procurement Training Unit, which helped mitigate procurement risk. In October 2006, the Bank introduced this matrix of actions aimed at reducing procurement-related risks in RTIP. It was further developed by Government of Bangladesh under Public Procurement Reform Project (PPRP-II) and developed as a set of procurement performance-related indicators named PROMIS. This has elements regarding procurement performance on advertising, bidding, timeliness in 9 evaluation and award, complaint resolution, F&C prevalence etc. During the first three years of RTIP, there used to be frequent complaints by bidders. After implementing PRMF, where LGED agreed to have complaint boxes in every district offices, the occurrence of complaints diminished and Bank’s post-review also did not reveal any issues related to contractors’/bidders’ representations. 39. Independent procurement post-reviews were done annually between 2006 and 2012. The major deviations found, among others, were as follows: (a) bid evaluation not done properly; (b) documents accepted for evaluation had inherent faults (i.e. bid securities from unscheduled banks); (c) false/doctored experience certificates; (d) apparent political influence in procurement decisions; (e) many occasions where contracts were not completed on time; (f) collusion among bidders and inappropriate bidding practices by LGED officials. Over the course of the project, the issues identified in these reviews were eventually resolved, albeit with some delays. On the findings of F&C or inappropriate bidding practices, LGED debarred firms and took disciplinary actions against its officials in relevant cases. LGED during various stages of RTIP has debarred about 20 firms, which is the highest among government agencies in Bangladesh since such debarment started around June 2004. By the time of ICR submission one case identified in the last post-review was under review of the Department of Institutional Integrity (INT) of the World Bank. 40. LGED is one of the target agencies of the Government’s PPRP-II. As part of it, huge capacity building of LGED has taken place in last nine years, and currently 377 out of 624 procuring entities (about 60 percent) of LGED have at least one person with national three-week training on procurement. LGED is also a front-runner in procurement monitoring and electronic government procurement. Financial Management 41. Financial management was quite weak and experienced a number of challenges at different times during the project implementation. 42. One of the issues was related to delays in settlement of audit issues between LGED and Foreign Aided Project Audit Division and occasional inconsistencies in accounting data. To increase the capacity of LGED’s accounting system, an accounting firm with IT experience has been appointed to assess and customize the Unified Financial Management System (UFMS) capability and accounting hierarchy in the system to produce accurate and effective Financial Management Report (FMR). Submission of FMRs was often delayed and sometimes with inaccurate information, and project accounts of the RTIP have remained un-reconciled for a long time. These issues were attributed to RTIP’s heavily decentralized structure, which created difficulties in mobilizing adequate accounting resources across the field offices, transmitting financial information from field offices to headquarters, and consolidating financial information at headquarters. A financial expert appointed under a contract carried out reconciliation of project accounts at the PD’s office and 21 district locations for the financial years 2004- 2010. A subsequent review of the consultant’s report by the Bank’s task team along with 10 RTIP’s follow up action indicated that the issues identified in the PD’s office were largely resolved. The reconciliation work for the remaining two years (FYs 2011 and 2012) has been undergoing during ICR preparation and with significant delays was completed in December 2012. 43. While LGED submitted the annual audited financial statements for RTIP on a timely basis, it has shown some difficulties in resolving material pending issues identified by the World Bank in the audit reports. Although LGED’s responses to audit issues were previously slow, substantial progress was made to address these issues during appraisal of the RTIP-II. All audit objections on the RTIP financial statements until 30 June 2011, that were material to IDA have been satisfactorily resolved. LGED had developed a UFMS, which was implemented in a few LGED projects but was not found adequate for being used in RTIP. The system will be rolled out under the ongoing project. 44. As detected in the course of financial management extended review of financial position of the cancelled contracts, the outstanding amounts of mobilization advances on three contracts became ineligible project expenditure. The mobilization advances would have been recovered in full on completion of the contracts through deductions from the contractors’ invoices over the contract periods. But as the contracts were cancelled half way through, the outstanding amounts that were paid out of the Credit, became ineligible and refundable to the Bank as the project did not get any value out of these. An amount equivalent to US$ 236,408.70 has been recovered from the contractors and refunded to the Bank in December 2012. Environmental Safeguards 45. The project has been classified as an Environment Category “A� due to uncertainty of degree of environmental impacts against all possible activities under the project and some subprojects that could have been located near ecologically sensitive areas. The policy on environment assessment (OP/BP 4.01) was triggered during project preparation. An Environmental Management Framework (EMF) was prepared on March 2003 in compliance with the requirements of Government of Bangladesh and the World Bank Safeguard Policy. The project activities included mainly improvement of the existing rural roads and as such the environment impacts were mainly site specific, temporary and not significant. Environmental issues identified in the project were mostly construction-related; these included air quality, noise pollution, water logging, surface water quality, drinking water quality, aquatic ecology, vegetation, top soil and borrow pit area management etc. 46. The environmental management of RTIP was carried out through the Project Environmental Unit with the support of the Environment Specialists of the DSM consultants and LGED field level offices. There were significant improvements in terms of the quality of environmental screening/assessment report and monitoring through the consultant. Environmental screening checklist was carried out for each subproject to identify the impacts on the environment. The environmental assessment was done for the subproject with moderate environmental impacts. EMP was prepared for 11 each subproject and was included as specific line-items in the BOQ of the bidding document. The project prepared the Environmental Code of Practice, which was also used as guidelines for the contractors. The billboard introduced by the project on pilot basis with environmental management plan with budget at the sub-project site created significant awareness at community level on environmental management. 47. Overall monitoring and quality control of environmental management required much attention from LGED. The ICR found weaknesses in the documentation of EMP progress reports and monitoring results as well as the establishment of Environmental Management Information System (EMIS), which made it difficult for actual data assessment. Social safeguards 48. Given the need for land acquisition and possible impacts on indigenous peoples, the project prepared a Resettlement Framework (RF) and an Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPDPF) which were consistent with the Bank’s OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement and OP 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples. The RF was prepared by using the GOB’s present land acquisition ordinance and the Bank’s OP.12. The framework for IPDPF was basically based on the Bank’s policy on indigenous peoples (IPs). The two frameworks provided the bases to prepare and implement Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) and Indigenous Peoples Development Plans (IPDPs). 49. The project was implemented in three phases with three separate RAPs. The design of the subprojects, which primarily consisted of improvement and expansion of the existing Upazila roads, made all efforts to minimize acquisitions and hence their adverse impacts. Still there were a large number of narrow strips to be acquired along the existing road alignments. As a result, the affected landowners were large in number with loss of relatively small amounts of land. The total amount of lands acquired was 427.91 acres (or 173.24 ha) which affected a total of 15,735 landowners or about a total of 14,304 households3. On average, the loss per landowner was 0.027 acre (or 0.011 ha). Resumption of LGED’s own and other public lands from unauthorized private uses also affected a total of 280 squatters, who mostly operated small businesses generally seen in the rural areas. Reportedly, the project caused no adverse impacts on indigenous peoples who are dispersed in small settlements in some of the project districts. LGED however built two school houses and provided water supply and sanitation facilities at two locations in the northern region of the country. 50. Compensation Payment for the affected lands and other assets was paid in two parts: (i) compensation-under-law (CUL) by the Deputy Commissioners (DCs – heads of district ‘acquiring body’), and (ii) the top-up, which made up for shortfall in the replacement/market prices of the affected properties and other stipulated entitlements to 3 The number of landowners and households do not match, because acquired lands are sometimes legally owned by more than one person of the same household. 12 both titleholders and others (mainly squatters) by LGED. The extremely time-consuming and cumbersome acquisition process caused persistent delays in CUL payment by DCs. By project end, the CUL payment amounted to about 92 percent of all affected landowners under the three project phases. On its part, LGED cleared top-up and other entitlements for 100 percent of the CUL recipients and squatters. 51. Lack of legal ownership records was singled out as the main reason for the vast majority of unpaid cases, followed by those where the land was acquired from co-sharers who could not show up together to make the CUL claims. In many cases the landowners were reluctant to claim compensation that were too small to commensurate the travel time and costs to go to the DC offices at the district headquarters. In many other cases affected landowners lived abroad and did never turn up to claim compensation from DCs. The compensation fund would remain with the DCs in deposit accounts and the affected persons could make the CUL claims whenever outstanding legal or other issues are resolved. 52. Low capacity in social safeguards contributed to the challenges. There appeared to be a lack of clear system of information flow from Upazila to district and to the Project Management Unit at the LGED headquarters. Most of the staff at district and Upazila levels knew little about the social safeguard compliance requirements or had an understanding of the mitigation policies, measures and application guidelines. The situation was further worsened by the fact that acquisition was carried out by involving, as the ordinance required, officials who belonged to different ministries and had no accountability whatsoever to the project authority. Valuation of acquired lands and other assets, which required participation of other GOB agencies like Public Works Department, Forestry, Fisheries, etc., had been a challenge and contributed to the delays. 53. An independent ex post review of the resettlement program was conducted and found LGED generally adhering to the RF, however, it raised questions about the practices in CUL determination by the acquisition officials and other participating GOB agencies, and whether the compensation paid to the squatters was enough compared to their losses. 54. Despite all the delays and challenges with this safeguard, the achievement of about 92% of payments to project affected people was one of the highest so far among other projects in Bangladesh. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 55. Although more than 1500 km of UZ roads were maintained under this project, this falls far short of the country wide requirement. LGED has already prepared and submitted a maintenance policy to the Ministerial Cabinet for approval which is expected shortly. Development of three-year rolling maintenance plans is included as a covenant under the RTIP-II. 56. Number of initiatives started under the project will be continued and further developed under the RTIP-II. This includes scaling up road safety pilot to be 13 implemented in all 26 districts, and support for institutional strengthening and implementation of recommendations of the ORA, focusing on improvements in the following areas: maintenance management (policy, planning and operations); planning, design and quality management; environmental and social (impact) management; performance management including monitoring and evaluation; IT-ICT-MIS Technology, facilities and capacity building; and training and human resource development capacity. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 57. The project objectives remain highly relevant to the development priorities of Bangladesh. The PDO “to provide rural communities with improved access to social services and economic opportunities, and to enhance the capacity of relevant government institutions to better manage rural transport infrastructure� remained relevant throughout the life of the project and is as relevant now as it was at the time of project appraisal. The project was in line with the Country Assistance strategies of the World Bank and reflected development priorities of the government. The importance and relevance of the objective is also reflected in the recently approved RTIP-II which aims to carry forward the achievements of the current project by further rural connectivity in 26 districts and strengthen institutional capacity for sustainable rural road maintenance and is fully aligned with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for FY11-14. 58. The project design comprising components for improvement and maintenance and rehabilitation of rural road infrastructure and institutional development rightly placed emphasis not only on the improvement of roads but also on their maintenance as well as capacity development activities to facilitate in efficient and effective management of the rural road network by the LGED, and was thus consistent with the overall objectives of improving access to markets and social services for the rural population. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 59. Achievement of the PDO was measured through the key outcome indicators of the project, which included: reduction in average travel time and cost, percentage increase of roads in good and fair condition, increase in maintenance funding, improvement of operating efficiency, increase in revenue mobilization and employment created. 60. Most of the project targets were achieved and surpassed. The final report of the third and final round of data collection for the Socio-Economic Monitoring and Evaluation (SEME) study calculated reduction in travel times at 58% for motorized vehicles during dry season and 65% during monsoon and for non-motorized vehicles 53% during dry season and 61% during monsoon, surpassing the target of 25 percent. Civil works contracts already executed have resulted in the creation of 50, 275 person- years of employment in the project area surpassing the end of project target of 24,000 person-years. It should be noted that project paid special attention to the employment of women through Labor Contracting Societies in off pavement maintenance work and tree 14 planting. Unfortunately, the target of roads in good condition cannot be considered formally achieved, if using the PAD definition of roads in good condition4. 61. All targets for intermediate indicators related to roads improvement, rehabilitation and maintenance were achieved and surpassed – more than 1630 km of UZ and UP roads were improved, 15,956 meters of bridges and culverts constructed to expand continuously passable network and 2120 km of UZ and UP roads rehabilitated and maintained. However, the target for construction of Growth Center Markets and River Jetties was reached only at 82 and 71 percent accordingly, reflecting challenges with raising co-financing by the communities. 62. The major RTIP capacity building targets for the LGED and for the involved local government institutions have been either fully or partially met. The main RTIP mechanisms in this context, the Institutional Strengthening Action Plan (ISAP) and the Local Government Improvement Program (LGIP) have been substantially completed. There were some substantial achievements in supporting institutional strengthening of LGED. Institutional reforms at LGED transformed it into the agency with vision and strategy and a focus on continued modernization. Maintenance policy developed under the project and adopted by LGED is a significant milestone 5 . Environmental strengthening facilitated by the project led to mainstreaming environmental management into regular operations of LGED. The LGIP program provided training to more than 20,000 people from local government institutions thus building their capacity in budgeting, planning and project management, enabling them to better participate with LGED in prioritization of investments. Wider GOB issues and policy changes have hampered the LGIP aim of assisting LG revenue mobilization and the total LGI revenue mobilization remains static at Tk 200K, against the original target of Tk 260K. The allocation of Tk 6.25 billion in the FY 2011-12 GOB budget for LGED road network maintenance continues to exceed target of Tk 3.2 Billion. The target of 11.65 percent in the agreed 'overall LGED operating efficiency' index has again been exceeded, now being calculated at 4.9 percent. 63. However, a number of challenges remain and would require consistent effort in the short-to-medium term. Introduction of Unified Financial Management System in LGED was not fully achieved as initially intended in large extent due to limited commitment of LGED management to this area; internal audit strengthening initiative didn’t result in establishment of the Audit Cell. While during project life there were a number of confirmations by LGED of establishment of a separate Road Safety Cell, currently its functions are embedded with the Maintenance Unit and the dedicate Road Safety specialist has been appointed only after project closure following prodding by 4 The PAD used definition of the road in good condition having roughness index (IRI) less than 4, while the LGED used the definition of IRI less than 6. Using the LGED definition the target of 6,200 km of roads in good condition in the project area by the end of the project was surpassed. 5 expected to be approved by the Cabinet shortly 15 RTIP-II. Development of ICT strategy and action plan experienced significant delays and was only completed by the end of the project period and its implementation will have to be supported by the ongoing project. 3.3 Efficiency 64. An economic analysis has been carried out at appraisal for three of the eight components described in the PAD: (i) improvement of about 1,000 kms of UZ Roads; (ii) first year periodic maintenance/rehabilitation of about 1,500 km UZ roads; (iii) improvement/construction of about 150 rural markets. These components represent about 72 percent of the total estimated project cost. Their Economic Rate of Return (ERR) at appraisal was 20.5 percent for the UZ improvement component; 52 percent for the Phase I UZ road maintenance/rehabilitation component; and 28.9 percent for the rural market improvement component. 65. The ex-post economic analysis focuses on the improvement of UZ roads and improvement of rural markets, considering actual investment costs. According to information provided by LGED at ICR stage, (i) the actual economic investment cost of the 72 UZ road links that were improved was on average 11% higher than planned and the actual investment cost for the 116 markets that were improved was on average 21 percent lower than estimated at appraisal. The ex-post ERR is 19.2 percent for the UZ improvement component and 35.2 percent for the rural market improvement program. The ex-post economic evaluation also shows that the periodic maintenance/rehabilitation component has a positive Net Present Value (NPV); thus all project components yield a satisfactory economic return considering the actual investment costs. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 66. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. The project remained very relevant to the development priorities of Bangladesh and achieved significant results in improving rural road infrastructure in 21 districts of Bangladesh and providing better connectivity. However, some of the project targets could not be fully reached, and despite very good record of implementation of key steps of institutional reform of LGED, a number of areas of institutional strengthening proved to be challenging for implementation. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 67. The SEME conducted under the project indicated improved access to social services in project areas compared to control areas. In Project villages the number of healthcare service recipients per month went up by 32%, with a 35% growth in the number of female recipients. On the contrary, in control villages the number of service recipients per month decreased by 20%, with a 3% increase in the number of female recipients. The number of new account holders in regular Bank branches rose by twice as much in RTIP project villages as in control villages, the sign of increased savings and access to a more modern economy. The studies confirm that households became 16 wealthier in project areas and saw a general improvement of their livelihood. The average monthly income rose by 73.6% in project areas and by 14.8% in control areas, while average monthly expenditure increased by 55.8% in project areas and by 33.9% in control areas. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 68. The project’s impact on institutional development has been mainly in areas of: (i) definition of LGED role, core functions and resources for strategic planning; (ii) network ownership and management; (iii) assistance to LGIs to improve services delivery and governance; (iv) LGED organizational structure, staffing profile and skills mix; (v) governance and performance accountability; (vi) enhancement of ICT assets, IT strategic planning, GIS and MIS capabilities; (vii) Human Resources development and training to support LGED functions and priorities; (viii) road network maintenance, and (ix) Environmental Management. See Annex 2 for details. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 69. Development of Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) for the entire LGED in 2007-2009 was not initially envisioned in the PAD, however realization of the need to address critical risks related to LGED operations and improve governance and accountability led to the agreement to conduct the extensive and comprehensive ORA exercise under the ISAP implementation. This was an LGED-driven process with extensive consultations and discussions, with establishment of a high-level committee which endorsed ORA recommendations and the Management Improvement Plan (MIP). 70. Road Safety assessments and three pilots implemented under the project led to greater road safety awareness among LGED and it was agreed to scale up this initiative to 26 districts under the new project. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 71. The SEME conducted under the project confirmed positive impacts of the project on improved access to social services and economic opportunities. See Annex 5. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 72. The risk to development outcome of this operation is rated as Moderate. The main sustainability risk relates to a lack of maintenance finance and its efficient use. The commitment of GoB to increase maintenance funding was in part demonstrated by increased amounts allocated during project life and will be further supported by approval of the National Rural Roads Maintenance Policy and preparation of three-year rolling maintenance plans. 73. The quality of completed works was considered acceptable; however, the big challenge for sustaining roads in good condition represents the increase of traffic on rehabilitated roads, particular of the overloaded trucks. Overloading is recognized as one 17 of the major maintenance and safety challenges for Bangladesh road network. The National Road Safety Council is working on the proposed legislation to address overloading. Under the ongoing RTIP-II it is planned to procure weigh bridges and further support development of maintenance capacity of LGED. A number of institutional strengthening initiatives started under the project will be further developed under implementation of RTIP-II which became effective in November 2012. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 74. Preparation of the project was thorough and built heavily on the analytical and TA work done under the previous WB-funded projects - (RRMIMP-I and RRMIMP –II). Some important steps were agreed during project preparation including the decision on re-classification of roads and re-definition of responsibilities between RHD, LGED and LGIs as a condition for appraisal and including legal covenant on increased annual maintenance funding. The project was designed well to include key elements needed for achieving PDO and piloting new concepts and approaches. The Bank team spent considerable time discussing maintenance needs and moved to increase funding for the maintenance-related component. The team was adequately composed with good mix of technical skills. However, a number of weaknesses in the results framework were overlooked, including errors in indicator definition and missing baselines. The team was probably too optimistic in estimating the implementation period for such a complex project. Thus, the overall Bank performance in ensuring Quality at Entry is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 75. This has been a difficult project for Bank staff to supervise and monitor effectively just because of the sheer volume of sub-projects. Considerable efforts were made to diligently monitor implementation of the contracts. When significant delays in contract implementation became widely spread in 2005, the team spent considerable time to address contract management issues and followed-up with LGED on proactive actions. This eventually led to improvements in contract management and project implementation picked up. The project had three Task Team Leaders during project implementation and benefitted greatly from Dhaka-based co-TTL who remained the same from project preparation through most of supervision, and remained engaged till project closure. Initially no local environment specialist had been involved in the task team of the project. Later, in 2007, the Environment Specialist joined Dhaka Office and participated in mission on regular basis. The frequency of full supervision missions was twice a year and these were supplemented by interim missions. Bank mission documents were clear in admitting issues and problems early on and were well prepared. 76. While the bulk of supervision efforts were done with high quality, the team missed to address issues related to the indicators and their monitoring. The restructuring at the time of Additional Financing should have been used to revise the results framework. 18 (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 77. The project was well prepared and executed with significant supervision efforts by the Bank team, however, some shortcomings during project preparation and implementation should have been addressed, particularly relating to monitoring results. The task team actively addressed client requests in a timely manner and adapted accordingly as major issues emerged. Proactive engagement with the LGED on contract management enabled implementation to improve and pick up. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory 78. The government had a strong commitment to the project and facilitated its timely completion. The provisions of the legal covenant on increased maintenance funding were complied with and there were no issues with counterpart funding. The government supported the important steps of the institutional strengthening of LGED by approving re- classification of roads, codes of practices and new organizational structure of LGED. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 79. LGED is one of the best performing agencies in Bangladesh and had considerable experience with implementation of donor funded projects, including two Bank-funded projects. The PMU’s capacity to implement the project improved over the life of the project and contributed towards completion of the project with huge volume of contracts and activities. There were 3 Project Directors for the Project and about 47 positions involved in project implementation including staff in the districts. Three staff in LGED HQ were engaged under the previous Bank-funded project (FM, social and environmental specialist-the latter became Deputy PD during RTIP) which developed institutional memory of PMU and ensured consistency with earlier initiatives. Overall the LGED performed well in implementation of this large project and managed to achieve intended results. However, the project suffered from procurement irregularities identified in post- reviews, delayed contract management issues and weak financial management. Thus, the implementing agency performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 80. Given that Government performance on the project is rated as Satisfactory and Implementing Agency performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory, overall Borrower performance on the project is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 81. The lessons learned during implementation of RTIP include:  Land Acquisition and Resettlement aspects. The implementation of road works was often delayed due to the resolution of the LA&R actions but the road sections which did not involve any LA&R actions, were implemented as planned. The land acquisition should therefore be minimized to the extent possible; all actions 19 including compensation to the affected persons should be completed prior to awarding civil work contracts (with relevant legal covenants).  Price Escalation Provision. RTIP civil works contracts did not include the price escalation clause (construction period was less than 18 months). However, construction material prices did rise during the implementation period. Many contractors were forced to abandon the works and about 70 contracts were cancelled and then re-awarded. The civil work contracts should include such a provision.  Procurement of ICB vis-a-vis NCB Contracts. Four ICB contracts were awarded on a pilot basis each with four to five non-contiguous roads. Large geographic distribution of roads caused implementation delays and quality control issues. Two of the four contracts were cancelled and re-awarded. ICB method might not be appropriate for small scale rural roads with small sections and wide geographical spread.  Inclusion of EMP in Bill of Quantities (BoQ). The contractors quoted lower price for the items of environmental management plan (EMP) in BOQs, mainly due to their lack of awareness and experience. As a result the contractor was unwilling to perform this obligation. To ensure contractors do not renege on their contractual obligations, the executing agency should put reasonable fixed amount against this BOQ item.  Importance of time sequencing of procurement. On many occasions LGED awarded civil works contracts at the beginning of rainy season or late in the dry season, resulting in non-activity of contractors for half of the year and delays in contract implementation. All contracts which were awarded in this pattern took one year extra for completion. This did not impact maintenance contracts but only improvement works. On the other hand contracts awarded by the end of rainy season had two full dry seasons to be completed.  Timely implementation of Institutional Strengthening Component. The procurement of key TA and consultancy services should be completed by project launch to avoid lengthy deferrals in implementation with gradually reduced counterparts concern and drive.  Mainstreaming initiatives. Where piloting of important new concepts, processes and approaches is planned, there should be a provision for rapid transition from pilot to mainstreaming within the term of the same project rather than plan an up-take of the post-pilot activity in the new project with risk of loss of momentum. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies Borrower’s assessment of the project and contribution to the ICR is included in Annex 7. (b) Cofinanciers N/A (c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A 20 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Appraisal Appraisal Actual/Lat Percentage Estimate Estimate es of Components (USD (BDT Estimate Appraisal millions) millions) (BDT Millions) 1 3 4 6 7 1. Improvement of UZRs 110.50 6,353.75 8,638.09 35.95 2. Improvement of URs 23.50 1,351.25 2,085.78 54.36 3. Periodic maintenance/rehabilitation of UZRs 39.00 2,242.50 3,425.22 52.74 4. Construction of minor bridges/culverts on URs 30.50 1,753.75 2,640.35 50.55 5. Improvement/Construction of rural markets and river jetties 17.50 1,006.25 330.92 (67.11) 6. Implementation of RF, EMF, RAPs, EMPs and IPDPs for civil works 14.00 805.00 125.08 (84.46) components 7. Provision of DSM services, quality, financial and procurement audit services 14.00 805.00 984.37 22.28 and other consultant services 8. Provision of TA, training, capacity building for LGED and LGIs, equipment 6.00 345.00 317.30 (8.03) and pre-investment studies Total Baseline Cost 255 14,662.50 18,547.12 Physical Contingencies - - - - Price Contingencies - - - - Total Project Costs 255.00 14,662.50 18,547.12 - Front-end fee IBRD - - 0 Total Financing Required 255.00 14,662.50 18,547.12 26.5 21 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component Achievement/Remarks Improvement of about 1,100 1630 km of Upazila and Union roads improved km of UZRs and 500 km of URs Periodic maintenance/ 2120 km of Upazila roads maintained and rehabilitated rehabilitation of about 1,500 km of UZRs Construction of about 15,000 15,956 meters of bridges and culvers were constructed and m of culverts/bridges on URs appropriate drainage structures on these roads were provided, making approximately 5,000 km of URs passable year-around in the 21 project districts. Improvement/ construction 123 GCMs and 32 River Jetties (Ghats) were constructed. of about 150 rural markets Improvements of the GCMs included construction of covered and 45 river jetties sheds for sale of perishable goods, slaughter slabs, sales platform, internal roads and walkways within the market area and connecting roads with the Upazila or Union road, drains, toilets, water wells and an office for market administration. Maintenance of GCMs represents a challenge. More training of Market Management Committees and of the potential leasers should have been envisioned under the project, as well as development of guidelines for maintenance of GCM. Land acquisition, Most of the component was implemented with GoB funding, implementation of RF, EMF, which was used for LA and R&R. Some of the costs related to RAPS, EMPs, IPDPs, utility RAP and EMP implementation were covered from the credit. relocation (total cost of component including contingencies): DSM consultant services, 2 Design and Supervision Management consulting companies quality, financial and prepared and supervised all civil works under the project. procurement audit services, The component also funded financial and procurement audits. To and other consultant services improve quality assurance a workshop was conducted in 2007 and (total cost of component was accompanied by training done under the IS component. including contingencies): Technical audits of the quality of works were conducted for a sample of completed sub-projects. A separate technical audit of ICB contracts was conducted in 2010. During the ICR preparation a visual inspection was completed to ensure overall quality of construction, and included inspection of selected UZRs and UNR roads, bridges and culverts, GCM and river jetties. The inspection confirmed overall satisfactory quality of construction. TA, training, capacity The implementation of Institutional Strengthening Component building of LGED and LGIs, achieved a number of important results: equipment and pre-  GOB Rules of Business for LGED were issued in 2003 investment studies (total cost that confirmed the mandate and responsibilities; of component including  In May 2003 GOB gazetted the revised road classification contingencies) criteria  LGIP program included basic training for Union Parishads - 20,324 people were trained. Intensive Strengthening 22 program was done on need basis, as a hands-on training for Union Parishad management. 276 grants were provided for improving UP infrastructure.  Dedicated EM cell established. The ‘Environmental Assessment Guidelines for LGED Projects’ were prepared to provide the framework EIA for planning, implementation and subsequent operation of different sector projects undertaken by LGED. The Project prepared the Environmental Code of Practice and Environmental Supervision Manual which was adopted by the LGED for its projects.  Rural Transport Safety Component (RTSC) implemented covering three roads. It included combination of Transport Safety Assessment (TSA), engineering improvements, Awareness, Advocacy and Awareness Campaign (AAEC) and Capacity Building. A 5-day road safety training program for LGED engineers and local staff was conducted together with half-day training on road safety as part of a basic training to 20,000 Local Government representatives.  New LGED structure and staffing proposals GOB- endorsed and introduced in July 2012  Preparation of LGED Annual Reports (from 2005)  Socio-Economic Monitoring & Evaluation (SEME) Framework and Operational M&E Methodology finalized / in place (2006 – updated in 2010  LGED pilot of HQ-to-field WAN/ICT use (2008-2010)  New LGED Medium-Term IT-ICT-MIS Strategy & Action Plan developed (2012)  LGED-specific Training strategy, policy and guidelines (2003), Training Needs Assessment, Formulation of new LGED Policy on Training evaluation / impact assessment. Overall 12, 859 people attended various trainings under the project.  Operational Risk Assessment for LGED done.  Comprehensive new LGED Maintenance Policy adopted by LGED in 2012 and is pending Cabinet approval Flood Rehabilitation Works 732 km of roads and 1.518 meters of bridges damaged in the flood were rehabilitated 23 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis An economic analysis has been carried out at appraisal for three of the eight components described in the PAD: 1. Improvement of about 1,000 kms of UZ Roads: 2. First year periodic maintenance/rehabilitation of about 1,500 km UZ roads. 3. Improvement/construction of about 150 rural markets These components represent about 72 percent of the total estimated project cost. Their Economic Rate of Return (ERR) at appraisal was (a) 20.5 percent for the UZR improvement component; (b) 52 percent for the Phase I UZR road maintenance/rehabilitation component; and (c) 28.9 percent for the rural market improvement component. The combined NPV for the project at appraisal was estimated at USS 124.6 million (Tk. 7.10 billion). Improvement of about 1,000 kms of UZ roads: These roads were selected through a techno-economic prioritization study. The benefits were estimated using: (a) the savings in VOC; (b) change in modal mix; and (c) increased traffic due to improved access as well as natural traffic growth. The ERR for the selected 144 road links ranged from a low of 13.8 percent to a high of 46 percent. The ERR for most of the roads ranged between 18-22 percent. The overall ERR for this component was estimated to be 20.5 percent and the NPV, discounted at 12 percent, USS45.10 million. During the life of the project, 72 of the roads identified at appraisal for the economic analysis were dropped since they were not feasible and some of them failed to deposit the local contribution timely. The revised EIRR for the remaining 72 links calculated at appraisal stage is 21.2%. According to information provided by LGED at ICR stage, the actual economic investment cost of the 72 road links was on average 11% higher than planned. However, it is important to mention that the variance within cost is significant, ranging from -92% to +303%. The huge variance is due to the fact that the construction costs had varied significantly due to the introduction of variations to the original specifications such as the construction of culvers and in some cases bridges in geographical sensitivity areas including wetlands and low-lying areas. Switching value analysis at appraisal stage has shown that the project cost has to increase up to 50 percent for the NPV to drop to zero. This implies that with an average cost increase of 11 percent, it is expected that the NPV at ICR stage of the implementation of the UZR improvement component has remained positive. The average daily traffic of 72 roads that were improved under the project is 1,275 vehicles per day and the average actual improvement cost per km is US$ 65,450 per km. An ex-post economic evaluation was done considering the actual improvement costs; replicating first the appraisal ERR of the improvement works program and then increasing the appraisal improvement costs by 11 percent. The ex-post economic ERR is 24 19.2 percent, which indicates that this project component is economically justified even with the 11 percent improvement cost increase. Improvement/construction of about 150 rural markets (Growth Centre Markets, GCM): The selection of rural markets was made using an integrated approach to rural development with most markets located at the end of the improved UZRs or URs. The economic benefit of improved markets has been estimated on the basis of: (a) reduction in spoilage of perishable goods (defined as the loss in value of goods over time of the day due to deterioration of goods in the market); and (b) increased market turnover. Of a total of 187 markets, 151 of them had an ERR above 12 percent and were selected for improvement. The ERR for this component was estimated to be about 28.9 percent assuming a 2.5 percent spoilage rate and it ranged from a low of 16 percent to a high of 78 percent. The NPV, discounted at 12 percent, was US$12.6 million. The typical ERR for 15 small market centers was 21.3 percent, for medium 43 market centers 23.5 percent, and for the remaining 92 large market centers 32.7 percent. During the life of the project, 35 of the selected markets were dropped (some of them were dropped as they were not feasible and some of them failed to deposit local contribution timely). The average revised ERR for the remaining 116 markets at appraisal stage is 28.6 percent (compared to 28.9 percent for the 151 markets). According to information provided by LGED at ICR stage, the actual investment cost for the 116 markets was on average 21 percent lower than estimated at appraisal. This is mainly due to reduction of the scope of work due to shortage of land. The average reduction in spoilage estimated at ICR stage was 3 percent therefore higher than estimated at appraisal (2.5 percent). Since benefits were higher and cost lower for the implementation of the market improvement component, it is expected that the NPV has remained positive. Considering the lower implementation costs, the ex-post ERR is estimated to be 35.2 percent. In the case of improvement/construction of about 45 river jetties/ghats, no economic analysis was presented in the PAD, however some analysis was carried out immediately after appraisal to facilitate the selection of the ghats to be improved under the project. A cost effectiveness criteria (US$ invested per Ghat User), was used to prioritized them. Unfortunately, information for only about 23 out of the 45 improved ghats was available at ICR stage. The actual cost at ICR stage was 14% higher than the estimated at Appraisal stage. However, since on average, the number of ghat users was 26% higher than forecasted, the amount invested per ghat users was, on average, 14% lower that at appraisal indicating that the implementation of the component was cost-effective. Periodic maintenance/rehabilitation of about 1,500 km UZ roads: The NPV/Cost ratio was used to prioritize the first year maintenance/rehabilitation program after collecting data on 1,200 km of UZRs roads. The benefits have been estimated from reduced VOC for different vehicle types. The ERR for the 57 roads selected in the first year phase ranged from 13 percent to 111 percent with an average of about 52 percent. The NPV for the first year program was estimated at US$66.68 million and the life time 25 economic cost of US$13.24 million. The NPV for this component is extrapolated to US230.0 million using the same ratio of NPV to cost as for the first year program. With respect to the improvement of about 500 kms of UR roads, no economic analysis was carried out at appraisal stage. The selection of URs was agreed to be done during project implementation through a consultative process with the users and communities on the rural roads to be improved. Unfortunately, since information is not available at Appraisal Stage, no comparison can be carried out at ICR stage. 26 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Fabio Galli Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR TTL J. Channe Highway Engineer A. Bansal Transport Planner K.M. Maqsoodul Mannan Consultant SARPS Reidar Kvam Manager CESPQ Mohammad Sayeed Consultant SASSP Ishtiaque Ahmed Transport Specialist SASDT Supervision/ICR Burhanuddin Ahmed Sr Financial Management Specialist SARFM Teen Kari Barua Consultant, Social SASHN Aminur Rahman Chowdhury Consultant SARFM Shakil Ahmed Ferdausi Senior Environmental Specialist SASDI Jean-Noel Guillossou Program Manager AFTTR TTL David C. Hanrahan Consultant SASDI Shamsul M. Hoque Temporary SASFP Md. Tafazzal Hossain Program Assistant SASDO Consultant, Institutional Ernst-August Huning SASDT Strengthening Marghoob Bin Hussein Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS Zafrul Islam Lead Procurement Specialist SARPS Gaurav D. Joshi Environmental Specialist SASDI Syed Muhammad Latif Consultant SASDI Tapas Paul Senior Environmental Specialist SASDI Mohi Uz Zaman Quazi Consultant SASDA Co-TTL Reefat Sultana Infrastructure Specialist SASDT TTL Ismat Sultana Program Assistant SACBD Suraiya Zannath Sr Financial Management Specialist SARFM Fernanda Ruiz Nunez Economist SASDT Elena Y. Chesheva Operations Officer SASDT ICR TTL Debbie Wei Mullin Junior Professional Associate SASDT (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY01 19.17 FY02 83.77 FY03 242.14 27 FY04 0.28 Total: 345.36 Supervision/ICR FY01 0.00 FY02 0.00 FY03 0.00 FY04 95.81 FY05 98.50 FY06 117.84 FY07 69.42 FY08 118.35 FY09 90.82 FY10 153.94 FY11 139.98 FY12 42.22 FY13 49.00 Total: 975.88 28 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results The Key Findings of the Socio-Economic Monitoring and Evaluation Report of RTIP6:7  The average number of passengers using motorized vehicles rose by around 500% in RTIP project areas, 40% more than on control roads. On the contrary, the increase in the use of non-motorized vehicles for passenger travel during hat (market) days on RTIP control roads was almost 100% more than on project roads. This difference can be explained by the fact that road improvement favors the use of motorized vehicles, thereby reducing the number of people traveling by non- motorized modes.  After project completion, passenger fares were found to be 8 % lower on RTIP Project roads during hat days and 38% lower on RTIP Project roads during non- hat days. On the contrary, passenger fares have increased on RTIP control roads. However, the decrease in passenger fares is less than the decrease in vehicle operating costs reflecting less than perfect market conditions with a limited transport supply compared to the huge unsatisfied demand at least during the period of the studies  The daily volume of goods carried on project roads increased by around twice as much as the volume of goods carried on the control roads by motorized vehicles and non-motorized vehicles on hat days and non-hat days. However, contrary to what was seen on RRMIMP Project roads, freight fares increased by 24% on hat days and by 182 % on non-hat days in project areas. In RTIP control areas this increase was a much higher 1300%. Owing that Bangladesh experienced a significant price hike during the RTIP inter-survey period, such figures could rather vindicate the idea that road improvement contributed to minimizing the effect of price hike in project areas  As a direct consequence of traffic improvement, agricultural and non-agricultural productions appear to have been stimulated in project villages. In RTIP Project villages it was observed a 195% increase in average yield per hectare.  The growth in the number of enterprises per road was higher in projects villages than in control villages, thus confirming the positive impact of the projects on the global economic growth of targeted villages.  Rehabilitation and improvement of growth center markets seem to have stimulated the trade activities in all project areas, since at the end of the inter- survey period there were 265 new permanent shops during hat days in RTIP’s GCM. In RTIP control areas, the number of permanent shops increased by 134%. 6 “Socio-Economic Monitoring and Evaluation Report of RTIP (Final)�, June 2010 7 for RTIP, the study was conducted in three Phases (2003-04, 2006, 2008-09). The sample consisted of 22 UZRs, 8 GCM and 4 Ghats. For both surveys data were collected during the rainy season and during the dry season 29 In all the project areas overall turnover of shops increased dramatically in comparison to the control areas.  Better income and enhanced transport conditions improved access to social services. In RTIP Project villages the number of healthcare service recipients per month went up by 32%, with a 35% growth in the number of female recipients. On the contrary, in control villages the number of service recipients per month decreased by 20%, with a 3% increase in the number of female recipients. As for education, the total student enrollment increased by around 12.2% in RTIP project villages, whereas it decreased by 60% in RTIP Control villages.  Finally, the number of new account holders in regular Bank branches rose by twice as much in RTIP project villages as in control villages, the sign of increased savings and access to a more modern economy.  The studies confirm that households became wealthier in project areas and saw a general improvement of their livelihood. The average monthly income rose by 73.6% in project areas and by 14.8% in control areas, while average monthly expenditure increased by 55.8% in project areas and by 33.9% in control areas. 30 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) N/A 31 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Project Assessment by the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) The government of Bangladesh received financial assistance from the World Bank for the implementation of the Rural Transport Improvement Project (RTIP) amounting to US$ 190.00 million. The Project was implemented over a period of 108 months from July 2003 to June 2012. Details of the loan/credit are as follows. Date bilateral agreement was signed with IDA: June 30, 2003 Amount of IDA credit : 138.00 million SDR Supplementary agreement with IDA for flood damage repair: US$ 20.00 million 2.0 Objectives of the Project The project development objectives are to: (i) remove physical bottlenecks, improve quality and enhance sustainability of rural transport and market services; and (ii) improve local institutional capacity for effective rural infrastructure investment and efficient rural infrastructure management, including maintenance. To meet the above development objectives, the project will produce the following main outputs: (i) Improvement of about 1638 km of priority Upazila and Union Roads including critical bridges and cross drainage facilities; (ii) Maintenance of approximately 2,123.64 km of UZRs and URs with appurtenant structures; (iii) Improvement of about 123 growth center markets and 32 river jetties; and (iv) Construction of 15,956 meters bridges/culverts on Union Roads (v) Increased role of local government and communities in management and financing of local transport and trade facilities. 3.0 Scope of the Project The main components of the project were: 1. Improvement and upgrading of 1638 km of UZRs and URs in the 21 districts of the project area to full all-weather bitumen surfaced standard. 2. The planning and implementation of a coordinated system of maintenance of the 2,123.64 km of road network in the project area, comprising UZRs and URs. 3. Construction of 15,956 linear meters drainage structures (culverts and small bridges) on existing union/village roads. 4. Planning, improvement and maintenance of the market infrastructure (internal roads and footpaths, drainage, sales platforms and sheds, latrines and potable water supply) in 123 Growth Centre Markets (GCM) in the project area 5. Planning rehabilitation/improvement and maintenance of 32 priority rural "ghats" in the project area to improve landing, loading and unloading, and other facilities for operation of country boats. 32 6. Institutional and human resource development to strengthen the management and technical capacity of LGED including the provision of training and implementation of Institutional Strengthening Action Plan (ISAP). Conducting Quality Assurance Audit at a periodic interval for sample sub-projects. 7. Implementation of Local Government Improvement Plan (LGIP) to address the internal weakness of the Union Parishad (The lowest tire of local government of Bangladesh). 8. Improvement of rural transport safety including safety assessment; awareness, advocacy and educational campaign and capacity building. 9. Technical assistance support for the implementation of project activities including the design, supervision, monitoring and evaluation of the annual work programs and support for institutional development. 10. Implementation of social and environmental safeguards with regards to Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) and Environmental Management Framework (EMF). Conducting Independent Review for Resettlement program and Environmental Auditing for environmental components 4.0 Floods of 2004 and 2007 After the devastating floods in 2004 and 2007, additional monies of an amount 41.64 USD were pooled, with an additional objective to facilitate rehabilitation of rural roads, markets, bridges and small jetties which had been damaged by the floods. The 2004 and 2007 floods had caused major dislocations in people's lives, and the revival of the economy in part depended on the rehabilitation of the rural infrastructure network. Implementation Support was also provided for technical assistance for design, supervision, monitoring of rehabilitation works of roads, bridges / culverts, markets and ghats damaged by 2004 and 2007 floods in the project area. 5.0 Project Implementation Details Design and Documentation: The consultants prepared the contract documents and designs for the project. However, these were based on LGED standards and experience gained on other rural development projects. During implementation the targets set forth earlier in different components were, in reality increased, and based on primarily because of devaluation of taka against SDR and actual requirement. 5.1 Improvement of UZRs and Union Roads (URs): Improvement and upgrading of 1638 km of UZRs and URs in the 21 districts of the project area to full all-weather bitumen surfaced standard, including the construction of 10,977.79 linear meters of drainage structures on these roads; and tree planting along them. 5.2 The planning and implementation of a coordinated system of maintenance of the 2,123.64 km of road network in the project area, comprising UZRs and URs. The project provided specialized support as well as procured equipment / accessories for LGED’s RIMU in order to strengthen the capacity of it further. It put the credible effort to mainstream the computerization of maintenance management using updating the data of Road and Structure Database Management System (RSDMS). 33 5.3 Construction of Structures on Union Roads (SURs). The initial targets for construction of about 15,000 m culverts and small bridges were exceeded to about 15,956 meters, and were carried out within the project timeframe. The drainage structures were built on existing rural roads in the project districts. These also corrected drainage problems created by the existing rural roads. This involved community participation in the selection of the structures and financial contribution by the local governments. Interest from local communities was very high, and an efficient implementation by the LGED allowed this component to be ahead of schedule. In view of the growing demand of the rural communities, local bodies and beneficiaries, and the benefits derived from the implementation of this component, the physical targets were increased. Construction of 15,956 linear meters drainage structures (culverts and small bridges) on existing union/village roads in the project area, with special emphasis on local participation in planning, financing, and implementation. The structures were selected through a participatory process involving local bodies and local communities, who contributed 5% ~10% of the cost (depending on the incidence of poverty), and use was made of labor intensive technologies requiring the employment of landless poor and disadvantaged women. 5.4 Improvement of Growth Centerl Markets. The Project improved 123 GCMs (versus PAD target of 150). The Project successfully finished the component within time and quality standards. The quality of the design and of the works were improved continuously (for example, systematic inclusion of latrines for men and women, inclusion of women's corners with shops reserved for women, testing of tube wells for arsenic, effective supervision of the local contractors, etc). While the construction phase was very successful, the operation and management of the markets still need improvement. The project trained and assisted the Market Management Committees (MMCs) that supervise the markets and leaseholders in charge of toll collection, cleaning and guarding. The lease value of the markets after improvement has shown a favorable impact registering a figure of about 17% although collusion among the potential leaseholders that depress the bid price for the rights to collect tolls from theusers had also been noticed in some cases. The concerted and pragmatic steps of the undertaken by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MoLGRDC) had improved the market leasing procedures. 5.5 Rehabilitation / Construction of River Jetties (Ghats). Following consultations with the community and considering hydrological factors, the number of `ghats' was reduced to 32 from a target of 45 in the PA. The revised target has been achieved. It is however difficult to estimate the socioeconomic impact of this component, even though the benefits of improving river transport facilities are considered high. 34 5.6 Training: The Project Management Unit (PMU) of the LGED, in coordination with the Central Training Unit (CTU) of the LGED, provided inputs and resources for conducting various types of training for the LGED staff, contractors and local authorities within the project area. During the project period, a total of 23 training courses, workshops and seminars were organized. A total of 12,859 participants received training during this period, including 48 LGED engineers who received overseas training. The results of IS impact assessment study show that the training program has contributed to ensuring the quality of different project components as well as to build up the LGED's capacity and update the skills of its staff. Meanwhile LGED has mobilized dedicated resources both manpower as well as budget from revenue head. It is progressively introducing a systematic training monitoring system within the LGED. 5.7 Quality Control : In addition to LGED and Consultant’s regular supervision, the project carried out Quality Assurance Audit through the consultants. The audit observations revealed many good things like improvement of compliance record, adequacy and frequency of the tests performed while recommended some areas which needed further attention. They emphasize the need for preparing Quality Assurance manual 5.8 Tree planting : Tree plantation was carried out along 905km length of the roads and this provided employment opportunity to a considerable number of destitute women. These women employed under "Labor Contracting Societies (LCS)" were also responsible for the maintenance of the plants. This was anexcellent program benefiting both destitute women and it favorably contributed towards improvement of the environment. 5.9 Participation : Participation by the local community in the selection, planning, design, implementation and maintenance of improved infrastructure was an important component of the project. The guideline of user’s participation prepared under last project was duly followed. However, it appeared that more training will be required for the management of ghats and markets and more transparency is required in financial matters. 5.10 Land Acquisition : Land acquisition problems caused some delay towards physical progress at the early stages of the project but the matter was improved and there was no significant problem regarding disruption to the progress of the work after the initial stage. The nature of work of the project did not require extensive land acquisition and only 302 hectares of land were acquired. LGED and the consultants staff worked together closely to expedite payments of compensation and sort out related problems/issues. 5.11 Environmental & Social Issues : The project did not have a major environmental impact due to the nature of the works. Roads were improved using the existing alignment and little new land was required. Trees were planted on road slopes, embankments were planted with grass, and drainage was improved through construction of bridges/culvert on roads. In the markets and ghats drainage was improved, clean drinking water was provided and garbage disposal and sanitation facilities were provided. The issue of 35 arsenic in tube wells for drinking water was addressed by testing and only few tube wells were found to have an arsenic content in excess of the tolerance limit and appropriate measures were taken. 5.12 Training : A total of 23 local training courses were held during the project period and 12859 personnel received training. Training was imparted on the following issues/topics:  Orientation Session on introduction of IDA safeguards including Social & Environmental Issues and concerns.  Training on Resettlement Framework (RF) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP).  Training on Environmental Management Framework (EMF) inclusive Environmental Management Plan or / Environmental Codes of Practice (ECP)  Basic Course on Participation/Skills Development on Participatory approach.  Orientation Workshop on Participation.  Refresher Course on Participation.  Project Disbursement and Accounts with Computerized Financial Management.  Road & Road Structure Maintenance.  Laboratory Testing of Construction Material.  Training on Basic Road Safety  Workshop on Transport Safety  Other Training / Workshop  Training of Contractors  Specification of Works, Work Supervision.  Training on Procurement of Works.  Assessment & Planning Workshop at Market/Ghat  Workshop on PBMC  Hands-on Training on Technical Data Collection for preparation of BOQ of PBMC  Workshop on Rural Road Maintenance Policy  Workshop on Consultation & Orientation on Environmental Management Framework for RTIP-II  Workshop on ICT-MIS Strategy and Action Plan  Workshop on Project Monitoring System, Web-based Software & UFMS  Training on Gender & Development In addition, the project consultants provided some training in participation, maintenance and equipment management. The volume of training provided under the project was considerable. However, follow-up training is essential and the LGED training unit will ensure that a comprehensive program of follow up training is implemented in the longer term. In addition to the local training, overseas training has been imparted on the following subjects:  Monitoring & Evaluation of Project 36  Training on HDM-4  Environmental & Natural Resource Planning and Management  Study tour on FDIC Contract and Others  ARM of IRFTD, India  Modeling, Analyzing and Design of Bridge Structures in AIT, Bangkok, Thailand  Participation in Transport Forum and Learning Events  Training on Advanced Contract Management and e-Procurement  Training on Performance Based Maintenance Contract (PBMC) and Road Safety The total number of participants was 48 attending 9 no. of courses 5.13 Institutional Development Component: The Institutional Strengthening Action Plan (ISAP) implementation status as the project approaches closure is rated satisfactory. The Financial Management improvements, updating IT-ICT-MIS strategy and capacity, and organizational and staffing enhancements, consistent with the 2009 Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) recommendations have substantially been achieved. Basic Training on road safety conducted by two former directors of Accident Research Institute, BUET has also been completed. 5.14 Local Government (LG) Capacity Building: The LG Improvement Plan (LGIP) is substantially and satisfactorily completed. Implementation progress in the two most substantive elements Basic Training (BT); and the subsequent on-site Intensive Strengthening (IS) ‘training and support services’ phase has mostly completed. However, the third LGIP phase, involving take-up by participating LGIs of local Infrastructure Maintenance Assistance, could not be implemented because the impact of the 2009 and 2010 LG elections. LGIs lacked incentive to participate in LGIP which required cost- contribution from LGIs for an IMA compared to the country-wide Local Government Support Program (LGSP) or similarly GOB-funded programs which provide for block- allocation grants for similar purposes without any such LGI cost-contribution requirement. 5.15 Rural Transport Safety Component: Achievement of this component is rated highly satisfactory. The RTSC had three major areas (i) Safety Assessment and Mitigation: 5 roads (3 pilots and 2 controls) were chosen from 3 regions based on selected criteria. Their safety deficiencies were identified and appropriate engineering measures were undertaken accordingly. These included treatment of junctions, widening at bends, providing super elevation ,cross-fall, signage, markings, passenger sheds, bus-stops, street lights at the market places/built-up areas, pedestrian crossings, guard posts, retro- reflective paints at rails and rail posts etc. Local people were involved in the design and implementation of safety schemes through structured participatory approaches. (ii) Awareness, Advocacy and Education: the community education included information campaign, awareness rising etc by Community Road Safety Groups (CRSG). (iii) Capacity Building: Basic training on road safety was imparted to local government representatives, motorized or non-motorized drivers. Limited enforcement incorporated in the management of traffic in market places by the village police. Performance of different entities 37 (a) Contractors: Contracts for the implementation of the project activities were largely small to medium which had attracted many local contractors to undertake the work. In case of large contracts, their performance varied and many of these required additional time to complete. Nevertheless, the performance of ICB contractors were worst suggesting international bidding is not suitable for geographically dispersed sites. (b) Consultancy for the Project: The project had following consultancies These consultants worked closely with LGED personnel in the preparation of design, supervision and monitoring of construction works and certified the satisfactory completion of all the works to the required quality standard. Favorable comments about the generally good quality of work indicated the satisfactory performance of DSMC under the project. (c) Project Management : An LGED Project Management Unit (PMU) was formed at the Head Office in Dhaka to plan and implement the project. The 21 district offices were responsible for implementation of project work in the respective districts including supervision, measurement and payment. The consultants played a role in evaluating tenders but PMU was responsible for awarding those. Supervision was done jointly for implementing all components of the project. In general, the performance of PMU was satisfactory in spite of the delays caused by extensive flooding in 2004 and 2007, abnormal price hike and scarcity of the construction materials especially during 2008, and political turmoil. That is why the PMU was compelled to cancel about 73 contracts which were re-awarded and completed within the stipulated period of time. (d) World Bank, the financiers : The World bank monitored the progress of the project by means of annual evaluations and regular liaison between the project management unit and the World Bank officials. During the Annual Review Missions, all aspects of the project were discussed and amendments to project requirements were made. The local World Bank officials made site visits to inspect the progress of the works. The Review Missions were very successful in identifying problems and proposing for their solutions. The timing of the missions was appropriate and time spent in the field was sufficient. Overall performance of the World Bank was highly satisfactory. They happened to be spontaneous in providing decisions/comments and all other matters related to the project implementation. 6.0 Operation & Maintenance and sustainability: In course of implementation of the project activities, operational plan of assets procured and resources created has been prepared and it is being applied. The activities being undertaken under this plan have facilitated proper use of the assets/resources and ensured sustainability of those in future. The operational plan has included, inter-alia, the following issues. 38  maintenance of roads routine maintenance, periodic maintenance and emergency maintenance.  maintenance of bridges/culverts routine maintenance, periodic maintenance and emergency maintenance.  operation and maintenance plan of growth centres/markets.  operation and maintenance plan of ghats.  operation and maintenance of construction and laboratory equipment.  operation and maintenance of vehicles. 7.0 Manuals, Guidelines and Documents prepared: A number of manuals, guidelines and documents have been prepared under this project and these have been used. Further use of the documents will contribute to the institutional development of LGED, Local Government Institutes (LGIs) and other stakeholders. The documents cover the technical and other professional areas and the list is given below:  Rural Road Maintenance Policy  Environmental Assessment Guidelines for LGED Projects  Environmental Codes of Practice (ECP)  Manual for Environmental Supervision and Monitoring & Guidelines for Environmental Screening and Categorization of Sub-project  Guidelines for Assessment of Rural Transport Safety  Training Manual for UP Representatives 8.0 Lessons learnt, Proposals and Recommendations: Some lessons learnt through implementation of the project and a few proposals and recommendations based on the lessons learnt are indicated below: Contracts : The performance of small to medium contracts were reasonably satisfactory while the same for large contracts were mixed. Some of the large contracts did not perform well primarily because the main contractors were absent i.e. they won the contract and sold it to someone else. The overall performances of 2 out of 4 ICB contracts were not also satisfactory. LGED had to cancel about 73 contracts due to poor performance. “One road one contract� approach could be followed. Roads: The consultants followed LGED’s Design Standards for Roads and Bridges. These Standards do not keep adequate features for road safety. In addition to that in some cases the protective work designed by the consultant was not cost-effective. In-depth hydro-morphological studies were not undertaken in case of roads passing through low lying/haor areas. It was learnt that in cases where new pavement is to be constructed either by dismantling the existing pavement or an altogether new construction as also in the case of widening of embankment, one of the Sub-Base layer is recommended to be designed as 39 drainage layer, extending upto the embankment slopes. This would enhance the life of the pavement. All new structures should preferably be designed to the full formation width. Also the existing structures are recommended to be extended to full formation width. It was also learned that full width bituminous carpeting along with lined drain should be provided in such places. 25mm/40mm Premix Carpet has been specified with 7mm Seal Coat. Mix design for 30mm Dense Carpeting has been done by QAA in the LGED Central Laboratory at Dhaka, which meets the given design criteria. For 30mm Dense Carpeting, there is no need to have seal coat. Hence, there is saving in material and one operation of seal coat. Qualitatively 30mm Dense Carpeting would be better and cost effective and is therefore recommended for adoption after trials and modifications, if necessary. Contractors : There is a need to provide more training to the contractors and improve their capacities to become more professional and efficient. “One road one contract� approach and stricter enforcement of contract conditions will also help remove inefficient contractors and allow better contractors to expand their activities. Road Maintenance: This project has provided some equipment and vehicles for road maintenance. However routine maintenance of roads and bridges needs further attention. The approach of road maintenance assessment within LGED may be changed to HDM-4 gradually. Usually much time is elapsed in between preparation of the estimate and actual commencement of work, when further deterioration occurs resulting in revision of the contract too often. This can be avoided by putting a condition in the tender that the bidder must put the rates envisaging probable additional damage by the time he would commence the work. The results of the DANIDA assisted pilots could be scaled-up gradually Road shoulders: The maintenance of road shoulders is not up to the mark and "edge break" of the surfaced pavement is the most common form of initial pavement failure. The provision of "hard" shoulders has been beneficial but additional measures are required at locations where traffic travels frequently on the shoulders. This happens on sharp corners where vehicles tend to cut the corner by travelling on the un-surfaced shoulder. It is recommended that various shoulder treatments should be included on the next project to determine the most appropriate treatment on sharp corners. Quality Control Testing: The arrangement for carrying out quality control testing of construction is adequate. However, there is a room for improvement as far as the quality of testing is concerned. It is suggested that the LGED central laboratory may play a greater role in this regard by carrying out more regular correlation testing. In practice, this can be achieved by joint collection of samples on site, splitting the samples and testing separately. Test results can be compared and if there are any differences, the central laboratory staff may investigate the reasons and correct incorrect testing procedures. 40 The current manpower employed in the field is too overburdened. The system could further be improved by making UE responsible to conduct field tests and testing equipment available to them. Alternatively the Contractor should conduct field tests with his own equipment in the presence of Engineer’s Representative. Markets : The improvement and construction of growth centre markets has been a success. However, the management of the completed markets is not so satisfactory as shown by the generally inadequate maintenance. Although Market Management Committees have been legal status, they should receive more training to raise the awareness regarding their responsibilities & capabilities. Ghats : The Ghat Management Committees should also be activated by redefining their roles and responsibilities. They also need training program regarding the safety, operation and maintenance of ghats. Training: The project has successfully implemented a lot of training. However, there is a need to have follow up for monitoring effectiveness of training and the LGED training unit is to provide adequate follow-up training. Some of the Engineers posted to the training centers feel reluctant in discharging their duties due to lack of HRD knowledge and absence of incentives available in the unit. It is suggested that a core set up of dedicated engineers having HRD knowledge and committed to their jobs should be established along with a resourceful unit having sufficient incentives made available. 41 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A 42 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Project Appraisal Document, May 2003 Credit Agreement, June 2003 Project Paper, December 2007 Financing Agreement, February 2008 Aide-Memoires (2002 – 2012) Back-to-office reports and letters to Government (2002 – 2012) Country Assistance Strategy Implementation Status Reports Borrower’s Completion Report, September 2012 Socio-Economic Monitoring and Evaluation Report of RTIP (Final), June 2010 Assessment of Progressive Impacts of Institutional Strengthening Strategy, October 2012 Final Report on the “TA Services to support implementation of ISAP of LGED� under RTIP. June 2008 LGED Annual Report 2010-2011 43 IBRD 39657 88°E 89ºE 90°E 91°E 88°E 89ºE 90°E 91°E BANGLADESH BANGLADESH BHUTAN B H U TA N RURAL TRANSPORT RURAL TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (RTIP) IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (RTIP) PROJECT DISTRICTS FLOOD REHABILITATION COMPONENT Panchagar PROJECT DISTRICTS Panchagar FLOOD REHABILITATION COMPONENT BANGLADESH BANGLADESH PROJECT DISTRICTS PANCHAGAR DISTRICT CAPITALS PANCHAGAR DISTRICT CAPITALS DIVISION CAPITALS DIVISION CAPITALS LA LA 26°N NATIONAL CAPITAL 26°N LM LM Thakurgaon NILPHAMARI Thakurgaon NILPHAMARI NATIONAL CAPITAL ON ON Nilphamari Lalmonirhat Nilphamari Lalmonirhat THAKURGAON DISTRICT BOUNDARIES THAKURGAON IRH IRH DISTRICT BOUNDARIES AT AT Kurigram DIVISION BOUNDARIES Kurigram Rangpur Rangpur DIVISION BOUNDARIES KURIGRAM INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES KURIGRAM Dinajpur RANGPUR Dinajpur RANGPUR INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES DINAJPUR DINAJPUR INDIA 92°E INDIA 92°E Gaibandha Gaibandha GAIBANDHA GAIBANDHA JOYPURHAT JOYPURHAT Joypurhat SHERPUR Joypurhat SHERPUR Sunamganj Sunamganj 25°N NAOGAON Sherpur NETROKONA SYLHET 25°N 25°N NAOGAON Sherpur NETROKONA SYLHET 25°N BOGRA Jamalpur Sylhet BOGRA Jamalpur Sylhet Naogaon Netrokona SUNAMGANJ Naogaon Netrokona SUNAMGANJ Bogra JAMALPUR Bogra JAMALPUR Mymensingh Mymensingh NOWABGANJ RAJSHAHI MYMENSINGH SYLHET NOWABGANJ RAJSHAHI MYMENSINGH SYLHET Nowabganj Nowabganj Jamuna Jamuna RAJSHAHI DHAKA Kishorganj MOULVI BAZAR Moulvi Bazar RAJSHAHI DHAKA Kishorganj MOULVI BAZAR Moulvi Bazar G Rajshahi Natore Sirajganj HABIGANJ G Rajshahi Natore Sirajganj HABIGANJ an ge TANGAIL KISHORGANJ an ge TANGAIL KISHORGANJ s NATORE SIRAJGANJ s NATORE SIRAJGANJ Tangail Habiganj Tangail Habiganj PABNA GAZIPUR PABNA GAZIPUR Pabna NARSINGDI Pabna NARSINGDI INDIA I N D I A 24°N Gazipur na 24°N 24°N Gazipur 24°N na Narsingdi Brahmanbaria Narsingdi Brahmanbaria gh gh Kushtia Kushtia Me Me Manikanj BRAHMAN Manikanj BRAHMAN KUSHTIA DHAKA KUSHTIA DHAKA Meherpur MANIKGANJ BARIA Meherpur MANIKGANJ BARIA MEHERPUR Rajbari NARAYNGANJ MEHERPUR Rajbari NARAYNGANJ Chuadanga RAJBARI DHAKA Naraynganj Chuadanga RAJBARI DHAKA Naraynganj CHUADANGA Jhenaidah Faridpur CHUADANGA Jhenaidah Faridpur Magura MUNSHIGANJ Munshiganj COMILLA Magura MUNSHIGANJ Munshiganj COMILLA JHENAIDAH FARIDPUR Gange Comilla JHENAIDAH FARIDPUR Gange Comilla s s MAGURA MAGURA RI RI INDIA INDIA AC H H A AC H H A SARIATPUR CHANDPUR SARIATPUR CHANDPUR Madaripur Sariatpur Chandpur Madaripur Sariatpur Chandpur Jessore Narail Jessore Narail K H AG R K H AG R MADARIPUR Khagrachhari MADARIPUR Khagrachhari JESSORE NARAIL JESSORE NARAIL GOPALGANJ GOPALGANJ 23°N KHULNA Gopalganj LAKHIMPUR Feni FENI 23°N 23°N KHULNA Gopalganj LAKHIMPUR Feni FENI 23°N BARISAL Lakhimpur BARISAL Lakhimpur Khulna Noakhali Khulna Noakhali Satkhira PEROJPUR RANGAMATI Satkhira PEROJPUR RANGAMATI KHULNA Jhalukathi Barisal Bhola CHITTAGONG KHULNA Jhalukathi Barisal Bhola CHITTAGONG SATKHIRA Bagerhat Rangamati Kaptai SATKHIRA Bagerhat Rangamati Kaptai JHALUKATHI NOAKHALI JHALUKATHI NOAKHALI Perojpur Lake Perojpur Lake BAGERHAT BAGERHAT BARISAL CHITTAGONG BARISAL CHITTAGONG PATUAKHALI PATUAKHALI Patuakhali BHOLA Chittagong Patuakhali BHOLA Chittagong Barguna Bandarban Barguna Bandarban BARGUNA BARGUNA 22°N 22°N s 22°N s 22°N n ge n ge Ga Ga the BANDARBAN the BANDARBAN Mo ut h s of COX’S Mo ut h s of COX’S BAZAR BAZAR Cox's Bazar Cox's Bazar 0 25 50 Kilometers 0 25 50 Kilometers Bay of Bengal Bay of Bengal 0 25 50 Miles MYANMAR 0 25 50 Miles MYANMAR 21°N This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. 21°N 21°N This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. 21°N The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 89°E 90°E 91°E 92°E 89°E 90°E 91°E 92°E NOVEMBER 2012