Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00002744 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H0960 IDA-H6960 TF-53437) ON A IDA GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5.4 MILLION (US$ 7.9 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND US$ 1.95 MILLION PHRD CO-FINANCING GRANT TO THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC FOR A DISASTER HAZARD MITIGATION PROJECT November 30, 2013 Sustainable Development Department Kyrgyz Republic Country Unit Europe and Central Asia Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective October 31, 2013) Currency Unit = Som 1US$ = 48.5 Som 1 XDR = 1.54 US$ FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB Asian Development Bank BGR Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources CAS Country Assistance Strategy CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CPS Country Partnership Strategy DEMFMTM Department of Emergency Monitoring and Forecasting and Mining Tailings Management DHMP Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project DPM Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring EA Environmental Assessment ERC Emergency Response Center EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EIR WB Extractive Industries Review (2004) EMMMP Environmental Management, Monitoring and Mitigation Plan (TP3 removal) EMP Environmental Management Plan EU European Union FA Financing Agreement GEF Global Environment Facility IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IDA International Development Association ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report KG Kyrgyz Government JEP Joint Environmental Program (EU) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MEE Ministry of Ecology and Emergencies later renamed as MES MES Ministry of Emergency Situations MOF Ministry of Finance NATM National Agency for Tailings Management NMRP National Management and Response Plan NP DRR National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction O&M Operation and Maintenance PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PHRD Japan Policy and Human Resources Development Fund PIP Project Implementation Plan PIU Project Implementation Unit POE Panel of Experts RF Results Framework RFP Resettlement Framework Policy SDR Special Drawing Rights TACIS Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States TP Tailings Pond UNDP United Nations Development Program UMWIP Uranium Mining and Wastes Isolation and Protection (Component 1) WB World Bank WD Waste Dump Vice President: Laura Tuck Country Director: Saroj Kumar Jha Sector Manager: Kulsum Ahmed Project Team Leader: Katelijn Van den Berg ICR Author Gotthard Walser ICR Team Leader: Craig Meisner KYRGYZ REPUBLIC DISASTER HAZARD MITIGATION PROJECT Contents A. Basic Information........................................................................................................ i B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................... i C. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................ i D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... ii E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ...................................................................................... ii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................................................... vi H. Restructuring (if any) ............................................................................................... vii I. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................ vii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 1.1 Context at Appraisal ............................................................................................. 1 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) .................................................................................................................... 2 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification.............................................................................................. 3 1.4 Main Beneficiaries ................................................................................................ 4 1.5 Original Components (as approved) ..................................................................... 5 1.6 Revised Components ............................................................................................ 6 1.7 Other significant changes ...................................................................................... 6 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 9 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ................................................. 9 2.2 Implementation ................................................................................................... 10 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization .... 15 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance ................................................................ 16 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase .............................................................. 18 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 19 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ....................................... 19 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives .............................................. 20 3.3 Efficiency ............................................................................................................ 22 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ............................................................ 22 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts .......................................... 23 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops ... 24 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 25 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 25 5.1 Bank Performance ............................................................................................... 25 5.2 Borrower Performance ........................................................................................ 27 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 28 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 30 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 31 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 32 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 55 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 57 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 59 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 61 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 62 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 84 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 86 MAP .............................................................................................................................. 87 A. Basic Information Disaster Hazard Country: Kyrgyz Republic Project Name: Mitigation Project IDA-H0960,IDA- Project ID: P083235 L/C/TF Number(s): H6960,TF-53437 ICR Date: 11/27/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: KYRGYZ REPUBLIC Original Total XDR 4.70M Disbursed Amount: XDR 5.40M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 5.40M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Emergency Situations Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Government of Japan Policy and Human Resource Development (PHRD) German Geological Survey (BGR) Global Environmental Facility (GEF) B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 10/28/2003 Effectiveness: 09/28/2004 09/28/2004 Appraisal: 04/19/2004 Restructuring(s): Approval: 06/15/2004 Mid-term Review: 06/01/2007 07/26/2007 Closing: 03/31/2010 12/31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory i Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 20 20 Other Mining and Extractive Industries 65 65 Sub-national government administration 15 15 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Natural disaster management 33 33 Other environment and natural resources management 17 17 Pollution management and environmental health 33 33 Water resource management 17 17 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Laura Tuck Shigeo Katsu Country Director: Saroj Kumar Jha Dennis N. de Tray Sector Manager: Kulsum Ahmed Joseph R. Goldberg Project Team Leader: Katelijn Van den Berg Joop Stoutjesdijk ICR Team Leader: Craig M. Meisner ICR Primary Author: Gotthard Walser F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) ii Within the context of the country's longer-term interests in disaster hazard mitigation, the development objective of the proposed Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project (DHMP) is to: (i) minimize the exposure of humans, livestock, and riverine flora and fauna to radionuclides associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps in the Mailuu-Suu area; (ii) improve the effectiveness of emergency management and response by national and sub-national authorities and local communities to disaster situations; and (iii) reduce the loss of life and property in key landslide areas of the country. These objectives will be accomplished through key mitigation measures designed to: (i) isolate and protect abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps from disturbance by natural processes such as landslides and floods, and from leaching and dispersal processes associated with ground- and surface-water drainage; isolate long- standing hazards and prevent their disturbance; (ii) create an effective disaster management and response system; and (iii) develop a system to detect and warn against active landslide movements in about 20 key hazard areas. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Project Development Objectives were not revised, but the key indicators were revised and re-aligned as part of the June 2011 Additional Financing. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Dropped Indicator 1: Evidence that applicable parameters are below hazardous Indicator 1 : thresholds for humans and livestock in samples of soil, water and air from monitored sites in the Mailuu-Suu area. Toxic and radioactive Value parameters intermittently quantitative or above Below threshold Qualitative) Internationally accepted thresholds. Date achieved 10/01/2004 03/31/2010 Indicator dropped as part of Additional Financing and replaced by revised Comments Indicator 1 below as a valid proxy to measure impact during life of the project as (incl. % impact in groundwater downstream can only be measured long after project achievement) closure. Revised Indicator 1: Discontinuation of pollution infiltration of radionuclides and Indicator 2 : associated heavy metals into the groundwater from selected high-risk mine tailings and waste dumps Discontinuation of Fully Achieved. Value No remediation measures pollution Discontinuation of quantitative or undertaken to discontinue infiltration of pollution Qualitative) pollution. radionuclides and infiltration of associated heavy radionuclides and iii metals associated heavy into the metals into the groundwater groundwater from from selected high-risk mine high-risk tailings and waste mine tailings and dumps (e.g. waste TMF03, WD01, dumps. WD02, WD05, WD06, TMF2 and TMF13). Date achieved 06/09/2011 12/31/2012 11/26/2013 Comments Target Achieved. Including the works on surface drainage, landscaping and (incl. % greening for the destination TMF 06 and TMF 03, WD01 and WD02 which were achievement) finalized after Grant closure through government resources. Evidence that a disaster hazard monitoring, warning and response system is Indicator 3 : functioning and being used effectively by cooperating national, oblast, and raion authorities, and local communities. Emergency Response Emergency Centers Response established Centers established and operative in Considerable around the Bishkek, Osh, Value No evidence of improved evidence of clock and the Jalalabad, Naryn, quantitative or effectiveness, as system improved response time Batken, Izigul and Qualitative) not in place. effectiveness for all Talas (all oblasts) inventoried operative around potential the clock and the landslide areas response time lies lies below 24 below 24 hrs. hrs. Date achieved 10/01/2004 03/31/2010 06/09/2011 11/26/2013 Fully achieved. Ministry of Emergency Situations has national responsibility for Comments early warning and emergency response and the communications and emergency (incl. % response centers are established and operative as was evidenced during achievement) avalanche and earthquakes. Evidence that real-time landslide monitoring, warning and response systems are Indicator 4 : functioning and being used effectively by cooperating national, oblast, and rayon authorities, and local communities. Twenty landslide Five landslide Five landslide areas have been monitoring monitoring and surveyed and and warning warning systems monitoring and systems installed and Value warning systems installed and population trained Not functioning, not quantitative or have been installed population in its use. After being used. Qualitative) in an estimated ten trained in their theft, monitoring of the landslide use. Fully system was areas. Local operational replaced by population has and monitored community based been trained in by local system in all 5 sites iv response to authorities and but only operational warnings. MES. in 1 landslide area. Date achieved 10/01/2004 03/31/2010 06/09/2011 11/26/2013 Comments Incompletely achieved. The target value was revised as after the surveying of the (incl. % 20 landslides the costs per landslide exceeded the estimated costs due to the high achievement) complexity of the selected high risk sites. Target value was adjusted to five sites. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Revised 2011: Progress towards improved isolation and protection, as per design, of uranium mining wastes from disturbance by natural processes such as Indicator 1 : landslides, floods, and leaching and dispersal by ground- and surface-water drainage in Mailuu Suu area Necessary interventions Necessary for all priority interventions for all Value No isolation (no design Full isolation (as tailings and priority tailings and (quantitative ready) per design) waste dumps waste dumps agreed or Qualitative) agreed and and works ongoing works ongoing or completed. or completed. Date achieved 10/01/2004 03/31/2010 06/09/2011 11/26/2013 Comments (incl. % Interventions fully achieved as evidenced during ICR mission (September 2013). achievement) Original: Evidence of improved capacity for timely and appropriate response to disasters by cooperating national and sub-national authorities Indicator 2 : Revised (2011). Ability to communicate within MES improved as a step towards effective emergency Management. Capacity to Considerable communicate Capacity to Value improvement in between the communicate (quantitative No Improvement timely and new Osh, between Osh, or Qualitative) appropriate Bishkek and Bishkek and all response all oblasts in oblasts in place. place. Date achieved 10/01/2004 03/31/2010 06/09/2011 11/26/2013 Comments Fully achieved. Communication equipment is installed, maintained, functional (incl. % and in frequent use. achievement) Original. Evidence that completed landslide monitoring systems passed initial Indicator 3 : testing, and their effectiveness was verified by technical and social audit teams. Value Full completion; Dropped (quantitative Not completed Testing Dropped (2011) (2011) or Qualitative) satisfactory; v Potential effectiveness verified. Date achieved 10/01/2004 03/31/2010 06/09/2011 11/26/2013 Comments (incl. % Refer to PDO indicator 3 above. achievement) Evidence of proactive and effective management of emerging problems, and Indicator 4 : timely and honest reporting of progress and concerns. Satisfactory rating Value of PIU Dropped (quantitative PIU established Dropped (2011) management (2011) or Qualitative) effectiveness Date achieved 10/01/2004 03/31/2010 06/09/2011 11/26/2013 Comments According to IDA mission's Aide Memoires, the PIU performed in a satisfactory (incl. % to moderately satisfactory way during project implementation. However, dropped achievement) as component indicator. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 06/28/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 09/10/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 12/29/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.25 4 06/09/2005 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.38 5 01/07/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.49 6 08/17/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.78 7 03/09/2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.16 8 09/06/2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.44 9 02/22/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.79 Moderately 10 12/12/2008 Satisfactory 2.25 Unsatisfactory 11 10/07/2009 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.48 12 02/11/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.62 13 11/07/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.59 14 04/20/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.22 15 12/14/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.97 16 06/27/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.46 17 12/26/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.43 vi H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable I. Disbursement Profile vii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. The Kyrgyz Republic is located on the northern side of the Himalaya range and most of its territory is occupied by the Tien Shan Mountains, made of a series of east-west trending high mountains belts separated by lower intra-mountain basins. Most of the territory is known to be tectonically active and prone to seismic activity and to related natural hazards, such as landslides. Within the country, a series of mining districts are located within this belt 1 . Ore districts – including uranium - had been exploited during decades, particularly before the 1991 independence, with little regard to either economic viability or environmental impact, and are characterized by a legacy of environmental damages. 2. Focus of the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project (DHMP) was on the interaction between natural hazards - landslides, earthquakes and floods related to seismic movements - and quite an important mining environmental legacy – poorly managed tailings and waste dumps, implying a significant risk for destruction of these mining facilities and implying high risks for contamination and life affecting effects, particularly in areas of earlier uranium mining. Strong negative impact was foreseen on health, or life, of affected communities, as well as on economic activities, both within the mining areas and over long distances downstream (for example, the fertile Fergana valley in neighboring Uzbekistan downstream the main project area; the border is located 30 km downstream Mailuu-Suu). 3. After independence (1991), the institutional and technical capacity of the Ministry of Ecology and Emergencies (MEE) –later renamed as Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), responsible to manage these issues, was considerably reduced. It did not have adequate human resources, infrastructure or modern operational procedures in place, or sufficient levels of resources allocated to carry out its mandates. Emergency intervention criteria had not been developed in detail, and there was no well- defined system of functions and responsibilities between the various departments in MEE and regional and local administrations to allow for quick and effective intervention in case of emergencies. 4. In 1996-1998, a survey of the uranium mining legacy in the CIS was funded by the EU Commission's TACIS program, which identified Mailuu-Suu – the main project area - as one of the foci of urgent environmental action. In Mailuu Suu, there was active uranium mining from 1946 until 1968 that left behind 23 radioactive tailings and 13 waste rock dumps which were constructed within the flood plain of the Mailuu-Suu River (a tributary of the Naryn River, which flows into the Syr Darya). Being mountainous, the Mailuu-Suu area is prone to floods and landslides, and is in a seismically active area. More than 200 places around Mailuu-Suu were identified where potentially active slippage areas are home to historically-active landslides. During the last 10 years an increase in landslide activity had been observed, possibly due to a cycle of wet weather and a large number of seismic events. Two of these landslide areas, named Tectonic and Koi-Tash, presented a high potential for further activation and slippage down the valley slopes and threatened the integrity of a number of mine tailings. A few tailings were earlier slightly damaged by landslides and also river erosion It was clear that a major landslide could seriously damage tailings or push them into the Mailuu-Suu River, which could then wash the dangerous substances through Mailuu-Suu town, and possibly further downstream to the Ferghana Valley, with over 6 million people in three countries, as well as major rice and cotton irrigation areas. Landslides could also threaten to block the river, which could submerge tailings and cause major flooding in Mailuu-Suu. Any 1 There are 7 inventoried areas with significant environmental mining legacies with radioactive waste in the Kyrgyz Republic, of which Mailuu Suu, part of the project area, which most needed interventions to reduce the environmental impacts generated by abandoned uranium mines (from UNDP’s Kyrgyzstan Uranium Tailings, 2008). 1 such event could cause long-term downstream contamination, potentially preventing the use of river water for drinking and irrigation, and could cause potential damage to the socioeconomic structure of the upper part of the Ferghana Valley. Government and a number of international organizations recognized the urgency of interventions in this area. 5. This concern for urgency for interventions by Government and several international organizations is also shown by the execution of a report by TACIS in 2003 specifically focusing on the Remediation of Uranium Mining and Milling Tailings in the Mailuu-Suu district to focus on evaluation of measures to reduce the radiological exposure of the population and prevent environmental pollution by radionuclides and heavy metals in case of loss of tightness of dams and damage to dumps and heaps from mining. The study undertook radiological and borehole monitoring of the tailings, radon monitoring, and identified short term and long terms measures to reduce the hazards of the tailings. Slow release of radionuclides and other hazardous wastes like heavy metals and arsenic occurred to the ground- and surface-waters of the Mailuu-Suu area, due to continued drainage and seepage from tailings and waste rock dumps. 6. Rationale for Bank assistance. Government was concerned about the impact of various disaster hazards on the economy and the population. Various pieces of legislation and strategies had been prepared, but lack of technical and financial resources did not allow for their comprehensive implementation. Major disasters could affect growth in agriculture, mining, tourism, and other sectors, and subsequently derail poverty reduction, which was the overarching theme of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, Report No. 25708; approved on May 15, 2003). The CAS objectives were closely linked to the priority objectives of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS). Due to the country’s topography and geology, natural hazards such as landslides are often hard to prevent, but Government was interested as a minimum in improving the capacity to monitor and predict potential disasters, and in improving its ability to provide rapid warning against potential hazard events. The Government was committed to improve the situation in the Mailuu-Suu area and to mitigate major environmental and health hazards with respect to radioactive contamination, thereby alleviating current and potential risks to the local population. 7. There was little country experience in dealing with natural disasters and tailings rehabilitation in an adequately coordinated and comprehensive manner and the World Bank had established a history of assisting in environmental management activities and developing natural disaster reconstruction and mitigation programs. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 8. Within the context of the country's longer-term interests in disaster hazard mitigation, the development objectives of the proposed Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project (DHMP) were to: (i) minimize the exposure of humans, livestock, and riverine flora and fauna to radionuclides associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps in the Mailuu-Suu area; (ii) improve the effectiveness of emergency management and response by national and sub-national authorities and local communities to disaster situations; and (iii) reduce the potential loss of life and property in key landslide areas of the country. These objectives were to be accomplished through key mitigation measures designed to: (i) isolate and protect abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps from disturbance by natural processes such as landslides and floods, and from leaching and dispersal processes associated with ground- and surface-water drainage; isolate long-standing hazards and prevent their disturbance; (ii) create an effective disaster management and response system; and (iii) develop a system to detect and warn against active landslide movements in key hazard areas. 9. Key performance indicators were: 1 (i): Evidence that applicable parameters are below hazardous thresholds for humans, livestock and riverine flora and fauna in samples of soil, water and air from 2 monitored sites in the Mailuu-Suu area (via technical audit reports); 1(ii): Evidence of high satisfaction rates among the local population in the Mailuu-Suu area regarding project outputs via sample surveys (in preparation for the ICR stage); 2(i): Evidence that a disaster hazard monitoring, warning and response system is functioning and being used effectively by cooperating national, oblast, and raion authorities, and local communities (via technical audit reports); 2(ii): Evidence of high satisfaction rates among national and sub- national authorities and the public living in hazard areas regarding disaster preparedness operations and benefits (via brief sample surveys in preparation for ICR stage); and 3) Evidence that real- time landslide monitoring, warning and response systems are functioning and being used effectively by cooperating national, oblast, and rayon authorities, and local communities (via technical and social audit reports). 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 10. The Project Development Objectives were not revised, but the key indicators were revised and re- aligned as part of the June 2011 Additional Financing processing. The following changes were made to the PDO indicators: - PDO indicator 1(i) “Evidence that applicable parameters are below hazardous thresholds for humans, livestock and riverine flora and fauna in samples of soil, water and air from monitored sites in the Mailuu-Suu area”, was changed to “discontinuation of pollution infiltration of radionuclides into the groundwater from selected high-risk mine tailings and waste dumps” to be used as a valid proxy PDO indicator to measure the impact of public health outcomes during the life of the project. Figure 1 Conceptual scheme of the structure of groundwaters aquifers in the areas of uranium mineralization and tailings of Mailuu-Suu. Observe in the center of the section the outcropping of mineralized rocks at the level of the Mailuu-Suu river, representing a non antropogenic likely source of contamination. - The rationale for the change was that, due to the slow groundwater recharge and flow velocities, the impact of the remediation measures on the groundwater downstream of potential pollution sources would only be measurable (long) after project closure. This approach was corroborated by the risk assessment conducted as part of the detailed design of the mitigation measures during the beginning of Project implementation. This identified leaching and dispersal processes associated with ground- and surface water drainage, and subsequent infiltration into the ground, as the key exposure pathway for radionuclides into drinking water and thus the human population. In addition, the existence of natural uranium mineralization underground which might 3 affect the quality of water and could not be removed, as, for example the fact that rocks of the mineralized formation are exposed at the level of the tailings pond nr 3 (see Fig. 1 2). - The target for PDO indicator 2(i) was revised from “Considerable evidence of improved effectiveness” to “Emergency Response Centers established and operative around the clock and the response time for all inventoried potential landslide areas lies below 24 hours”. The original second part of the target for this indicator “the National Emergency Management and Response Plan is in place, staff has been made aware of it and has been trained, as necessary. The plan is accepted and used by relevant authorities” was downgraded from PDO indicator level to Intermediate indicator but not included in the Results Framework as it would not be possible to properly measure such target. This second part of the target was not part of the original PAD Results Framework, but was included in the ISR reporting. - The target for the PDO indicator 3 was revised from “Twenty landslide areas have been surveyed and monitoring and warning systems have been installed in an estimated ten of the landslide areas. Local population has been trained in response to warnings” to “Five landslide monitoring and warning systems installed and population trained in their use. Fully operational and monitored by local authorities and MES”. In total, there are 300 landslide areas in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. Pilot landslides were selected on the basis of a risk assessment and prioritization. The reduction of the number of landslide monitoring systems resulted from focusing on the highest risk-ranked sites, which at the same time were the geologically and geo- technically most complex landslide areas. Due to this technical complexity, the cost of the single real-time landslide monitoring system, including the maintenance of the original technologically based system (taking also into account the cost of replacing vandalized facilities), was higher than estimated and thus only five pilot sites could be selected. 11. In addition, the June 2011 modified results framework does not take into account two PDO indicators related to the “evidence of high satisfaction rates among the local population in the Mailuu-Suu area regarding project outputs via sample surveys” and “evidence of high satisfaction rates among national and sub- national authorities and the public living in hazard areas regarding disaster preparedness operations and benefits” (PDO indicators 1(ii) and 2(ii)). While there was insufficient funding remaining at Project Closure to undertake specific population satisfaction surveys due to the additional materials discovered that had to be relocated (from Tailings pond No.3), there is however abundant reference in the Project Implementation Unit’s (PIU) reports and Bank supervision Aide Memoires referring to community outreach. The output/intermediary results indicators were also modified as follows, as part of the Additional Financing: - the intermediate indicator and target related to Component 2 were re-phrased in a more concrete way related to the set-up of a communication system and ability to communicate in case of natural hazard as a step towards effective emergency management; - the third indicator and target related to the set-up of the landslide monitoring system was dropped because of similarities with the related outcome indicator 3; and, - the indicator and targets related to the performance of the PIU (Component 3) were not mentioned in the Additional Financing. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 12. According to the PAD, the primary target beneficiaries would include: (i) people (population 2 Frank Wagner, Hagen Jung, Sven Altfelder, Thomas Himmelsbach/Impact of Uranium Mill Tailings on Water Resources in Mailuu Suu, Kyrgistan. IAEA-UMREG meeting / Vienna 7.11.2012 (IAEA UMREG web-site). 4 estimated at 28,000 inhabitants), livestock, and riverine flora and fauna of the Mailuu-Suu area exposed to radionuclides and contamination associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps (Component l) and (ii) people living near potential disaster hazard areas, including those living near some of the major landslide areas in the country (Component 2). 13. An estimated 3 million population living in the upper Ferghana Valley (of Uzbekistan) were considered secondary beneficiaries as potential disturbance of the uranium mine wastes and rocks in the Mailuu-Suu area by major landslides or floods could result in serious regional contamination downstream. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 14. The project comprised three components. Component 1 – Uranium Mining Wastes Isolation and Protection (US$7.43 million or 63% of total IDA funds, 69% of total project funds) included funding for works, goods, and services for interventions to isolate and protect abandoned uranium mining wastes and rocks in the Mailuu-Suu area from disturbance by natural processes such as landslides and floods, and leaching and dispersal by ground- and surface-water drainage. The component was divided into two separately and clearly differentiated types of activities. Five “early” activities were already clearly defined at appraisal and could be implemented with limited remaining preparatory and design work and were identified to contribute to the prevention of an environmental disaster and show an early visible impact. In parallel, investigations and designs were planned in order to determine larger mitigation measures of some of the most dangerous tailings and/or landslides 3. 15. These five early activities (US$3.34 million) for investigations, designs, and construction works included: (i) removal of the unstable top on the south side of the landslide (referred to as ‘Tectonic Triangle’) to reduce the risk of impact on uranium Tailing No. 3 (see map in Annex 2) in case of movement of the soil mass; (ii) inspection of all 23 tailings and 13 waste rock dumps, and development and implementation of required urgent interventions; (iii) design and construction of a surface water drainage system around the upper boundary of the Koi-Tash Landslide to capture and remove water runoff, so as to reduce the risk of landslide reactivation; (iv) installation of Global Positioning Systems (GPS), piezometers, extensometers, and seismic monitoring stations on Tectonic and Koi-Tash Landslides, and linkage through radio systems to central early warning system in Mailuu-Suu and surrounding villages; and (v), design and construction of river bank protection works along priority sections of the Aylyampa-Sai and Mailuu-Suu Rivers to prevent erosion of tailings, in particular Nos. 1,2,4,5,8 and 18. 16. In parallel to the above interventions, investigations and a feasibility and design study were to be undertaken to determine the subsequent necessary remediation works. Based on the detailed assessments 3 At Project Appraisal, the complex nature of the problems in the Mailuu-Suu region was known, including the interaction of manmade and natural hazards (i.e., uranium mine tailings and landslides/floods). A range of alternatives were considered for implementation within the project as it was clear that there were not sufficient resources available to solve all the potential risks. However it was decided that, rather than waiting with a project until all the possible activities would have been fully prepared and sufficient funds have been made available from various interested donors, to start the assistance as soon as possible. The main thrust of the project was therefore separated into short-term actions that could be implemented quickly and more long-term solutions that required further feasibility investigation to confirm optimum utilization of available resources under the project and to prepare documentation to attract additional donor funds. It was also stated that despite the fact that not all issues would likely to be solved with the available project funds, at the completion of the activities proposed within this project the high likelihood risks would have been significantly reduced and the institutional capacity to deal with disaster management improved. GEF Funds were later added to the Project and were reported in separate Implementation Completion Memorandum. 5 of the 23 tailings ponds and 13 waste dumps and risks assessments of each object, remediation actions with high priority were to be identified and low priority remediation measures. The selection would done according to the assessment of the risks shown by each of the 36 identified sites, and such selection was executed based on the following criteria: (i) endogeneous geotechnical risks (instability of the waste facility itself which may lead to release of contaminated material); (ii) exogeneous geotechnical risk (risk of external forces such as floods and landslides to damage the facility and lead to release of contaminated material); (iii) radio-ecological risk to the population (including all relevant exposure pathways); and (iv) eco-toxicological risk to the population through the water pathway. The identified high-priority remediation measures for the most dangerous tailings and/or landslides would be included in the project (final results of the implemented measures are shown in Annex 2). The lower priority remediation measures were to be left for follow up works. A team of international and national consultants would carry out these investigations, surveys, studies, risk assessments and designs for all activities and would be also responsible for construction supervision. The firm would work together with local design institutions, government agencies and experts in order to maximize local experts in project implementation, and ensure transfer of knowledge and training of local specialists in the preparation of modern state-of-the art designs, identification and prioritization of remediation measures based on risk assessment and in modern construction supervision practices. 17. Component 2 – Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring (DPM; US$3.38 million or 29% of total IDA Funds, 21% of total project funds) was to fund the provision of works, goods, and services (mainly financed by the Japan PHRD grant) to: (i) improve the national system for disaster management, preparedness, and response that can be administered and implemented effectively by national and sub- national authorities, and local communities; (ii) establish real-time systems to detect and warn against active landslide movements in key hazard areas, and provide equipment for seismic measurements; and (iii) set up a monitoring system in Mailuu-Suu. In particular the project would include: (a) capacity building (US$2.44 million) to strengthen the ability of the ministry, administrations at various levels, and local communities to fulfill better their duties and functions, create better awareness, and be better prepared in case of disasters. Spreading knowledge on disaster preparedness and encouraging government agencies and local communities was to be a specific focus within the project areas (Mailuu-Suu and villages near the selected landslide areas) and preparation of regulations and a National Management and Response Plan (NMRP); (b) landslide monitoring and warning systems and seismic measurement equipment (US$0.43 million) for those landslide areas which were identified as being able to cause major human disasters in case of unloading of the landslides; and (c) monitoring system in Mailuu-Suu (US$0.51 million) to implement and support Component 1 interventions. 18. Component 3 – Project Management (US$0.95 million or 8% of total IDA funds, 11% of total project funds) was to fund the provision of staff and the operations of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), responsible for timely and effective management and implementation of the project. 1.6 Revised Components 19. The components were not revised. 1.7 Other significant changes 20. Design, scope and scale of Component 1. The main part of the project funds were dedicated to the remediation works related to the old tailings ponds (TP) and waste dumps (WD) in and around Mailuu-Suu. An inventory of the sites had been carried out during project preparation – particularly in 6 coordination with the 2003 EU TACIS program. It was evident at the preparation stage that only high risk sites in need of urgent remediation within the area could be considered under the DHMP 4, as dealing with all sites would require a long timeframe and exceed the available financial resources. In addition, some of the existing sites did not show an immediate impact and their remediation might not have made economic sense at that stage. A key activity therefore at the start of project implementation was to prioritize, on the basis of detailed site investigations and risk assessment, the most significant contamination sources, and carry out the risk analysis for the tailing ponds and waste dumps and prioritize the important interventions needed to minimize exposure, as well as identify the type of interventions required 5 (see paragraph 16). This was in parallel to the five “early” activities that were already defined at appraisal and where implementation already had started to contribute to the prevention of an environmental disaster and show an early visible impact (see paragraph 15). 21. As frequently in similar environmental remediation projects, additional detailed and expensive investigations and risk assessments were required before actual starting of the handling of the contaminated materials and restoration or removal of the sites. A risk assessment and a prioritization study was carried out until 2005 in order to select the sites presenting the higher risks of contamination or landslide in the areas where the population or water resources would be exposed – as it was out of question that all mine tailings and waste dumps in the area could be handled (see map in Annex 2) due to limited resources and the emergency focus of the project. In 2006, these sites were selected and detailed surveys and the engineering planning could start, as a basis for contracting the civil remediation works. Of the existing 36 sites identified, 15 were selected and remediated 6 – in addition to the broader and “early” activities, such as strengthening of riverbanks, the partial removal of unstable materials at the top of a landslide area dominating Tailing Pond No. 3 (TP3; the so-called “Tectonic Triangle”) and infrastructure works to remove Waste Dump No.5 (WD5) and TP3. As this sequence and adjustment were part of and built into the project, they would not classify as changes to the design of Component 1, and the flexibility built in the project mechanisms is certainly commendable. 22. Design, scope and scale of Component 2. The second sub-component, related to the establishment of a real-time system to detect and warn against active landslide movements in key hazard areas, had to be revised, including with respect to the associated outcome indicator (see paragraphs 10 and 11). The activity was properly implemented and stations at five sites were equipped with automated instruments. However, the whole approach to the set-up of stations connected to a center for remote warning had to be revised in 2011 because of two reasons: a) the cost of the equipment, its installation and maintenance proved to be more complex and expensive than expected; and b) once installed, the stations were vandalized. Considering the costs implied by the replacement of the instruments, a decision was made to select a different technology, using low cost community-based monitoring approach. The five communities where the vandalized stations were placed were trained how to monitor landslides and alert the authorities in case of danger. Training materials were prepared with visual and easy to understand explanations on landslides and monitoring techniques. The first training sessions were oriented towards village elders and community representatives and a simplified presentation was prepared for school children in one of the key landslide risk area, Taram Bazar. The ICR mission visited a school in the Taram Bazar area –one of the five sites-, in which teachers and older students were training younger pupils in order to spread the knowledge about landslides recognition and occurrences. The issue 4 36 sites had been identified in the 2003 TACIS report (23 TPs and 13 WDs). 5 An example is the Tailings Pond 3. While clearly identified as a very significant source of contamination, it had still to be assessed whether remediation on site or the removal of the tailings material would be the most efficient intervention. The detailed investigations and risk assessment showed that full removal represented a better option. 6 Other activities which reduced the impacts of other sites, for example strengthening of riverbanks (e.g., of the Aylampa river, a west side affluent of the Maillu-Suu river, south of the city, affecting TPs 1, 4 and 23) or on the Kara Agach river, a west side affluent, upstream the city, affecting WD 6 and others. See map in Annex 2. 7 of vandalizing risk had been discussed during project preparation, but the government had opted in the “high tech/high cost” option. 23. Restructurings, Additional Financing and financing reallocation. As often in this type of environmental remediation projects, the volume of works, and in particular the amount of waste materials present in Waste Dump No. 1 and Mine Tailing No. 3 – and related time and costs – proved to be higher than originally estimated, which caused an increase of funding requirements leading to the World Bank Additional Financing (AF) of US$1.0 million equivalent (approved in June 2011) and re-allocation of funds in March 2012 that was processed as a 2nd level restructuring. 24. Extension of closing date. The project, due to the political events in 2010, increased volume of the Component 1 works, unfavorable weather conditions and slower than expected progress in the remediation works, had to be extended three times for a cumulative period of 2 years and 9 months, in March 2010, March 2012 and finally September 2012 from the original closing date of March 31, 2010 to December 31, 2012. All three extensions were processed as 2nd level restructuring, and the extension on September 2012 was approved by the Regional Vice President. 25. Timeline. The evolution of the project, including adjustments introduced, are summarized in the following Table. Date Event Reference June 2004 Project Approval by WB Board Minutes of Board Meeting, PSR September 2004 Project Effectiveness Effectiveness Letter 2005 – 2006 Implementation of early interventions under component 1, Aide Memoires and Project reports including risk assessment February 2006 Risk assessment, prioritization and selection of Geoconsult/Wisutec report 2006 7 interventions under component 1 June 2006 Inauguration of the Emergency Response Centers (ERC, Aide memoire, September 2006, Project component 2.1) report 2006 2007 – 2013 Implementation of selected works on priority sites under Aide Memoires, Project and consultants Component 1 reports July 2008 Feasibility Study and EIA for new design of TP relocation Geoconsult/Wisutec feasibility study and of TP3 EIA, 2008 8 June 2009 Relocation of Ministry of Emergency Situations to Osh March 2010 Extension from March 31, 2010 to March 31, 2012 Extension Letter September 2010 Automated landslide monitoring stations dysfunctional and Aide memoire September 2010 decision for community based new approach (component 2.2) June 2011 Additional Financing; 2nd level restructuring (PDO indicator Project Paper 1 and targets for PDO1, 2 and 3) March 2012 Extension from March 31 to September 30, 2012 Extension Letter September 2012 Extension from September 30 to December 31, 2012 Extension Letter December 2012 Project Closure Wisutec final report, 2012 ISR December 2012 September 2013 Completion of Component 1 ICR ICR mission 7 Geoconsult/Wisutec, 2006. Conceptual Study – Remediation of Waste Dumps and Tailings Ponds . DHMP Report. 8 GeoConsult/Wisutec, 2008. Relocation of TP3/TP18 to TP6, Environmental Impact Assessment (including an Environmental Management, Mitigation and Monitoring Plan). DHMP Report. 8 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 26. Soundness of background analysis. For the most part, the prevailing overall project context, as well as the sites conditions, were correctly diagnosed during Project preparation, which took place during the period of October 2003 to April 2004. Project preparation benefitted from the comprehensive work (2003/2004) in the Mailuu-Suu under the TACIS program of the European Commission, which provided most of the needed background information for the initial planning of remediation works in the area. The background analysis included reviews of existing analytical work, as well as the preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment, carried out and disclosed during Project preparation. Environmental issues to be addressed by the Project were prioritized, based on these studies’ findings. The PAD contained an elaborate assessment of the Government’s capabilities – or lack of - to address environmental liabilities as well as procedures to respond to natural hazards, with a thorough evaluation of the institutional and regulatory framework, both at the national and international levels through coordination with experts. 27. Assessment of risks. The risks identified in the PAD (Section C.5, p.16) were overall properly identified 9 and addressed. However, in hindsight, a few risks were underestimated or not fully acknowledged, such as the risk to install high tech/high costs stations for landslide monitoring and the risk of longer than expected implementation time due to short construction season in Mailuu-Suu area together with the specific nature of the uranium mine tailing remediation works for which there are few capable contractors in the country. For this more mitigation measures could have been designed upfront, in particular assessing options for vandalized landslide monitoring stations and focusing on clearly defined closing plans, clearly indicating when relocation of radio-active materials could stop and when covering and drainage measures should start to “close” the site. Also the risk that capacity building and preparation of National Management and Response Plan, including study tours and training, would be insufficient for evidence of improved capacity for timely and appropriate response to disasters by cooperating national and sub-national authorities should have been acknowledged and incorporated in the risk section for the Project. Still, many risks were reasonably identified, based on previous projects experience, such as such as resistance by local communities in Mailuu-Suu to the relocation of the mine tailing material over the public road. The preparation work, which was quite comprehensive, included work by other donor organizations, and the project could navigate surprisingly well through many difficulties. Project design took into account existing experiences from post-disaster, reconstruction emergency remediation projects, particularly with respect to project management, public communication/ transparency/ awareness building and institutional strengthening, which are key pillars to ensure sustainability of the interventions and correctly identified risks related to cost overruns, O&M budget allocations and local population. 28. Incorporation of lessons learned. Numerous lessons learned in Central Asia and/or from post- disaster projects funded by the World Bank were incorporated into the project design and certainly contributed to the comparatively robust management capacity of the project, which survived the sudden relocation of the implementing agency during implementation. A particularly positive point – even if sometimes perceived as a “costly” option by the government – was the solid incorporation of international experts into the project. Another positive aspect was the integrated approach selected for prioritization, risk management and clean-up interventions. Experience sharing through visiting areas with similar 9 E.g. controversy could develop surrounding intervention measures; occurrence of a major disaster before the project can organize mitigation; unsatisfactory O&M budgetary allocations; national and local authorities do not work together to solve hazard mitigation problems; local population unconcerned, and unwilling to support hazard mitigation activities in project areas. 9 intervention situations, such as the Wismut area in Germany, assisted the understanding of the Kyrgyz' experts of the issues at stake and facilitated implementation of the Project. More and wider experience sharing (f.i. Romania, Spain or the US) could have provided further benefits. However, the international experts who participated in project preparation and implementation brought this experience, which without doubt helped to ensure quality designs, appropriate environmental and health procedures, in particular radiological monitoring of the workers and construction supervision procedures. 29. However, at the time of appraisal, the Bank had still relatively little experience on interventions specifically related to environmental mining legacy and tailings closure, which possibly caused the slow start and an underestimation of time requirements for the studies and surveys still necessary to get to works design and technical specifications for contracting. This issue is not unique to the DHMP and has been experienced in similar project of that same generation (e.g., the Zambia Copperbelt Environment Project). 30. Implementation arrangements were straightforward at the Government level, as the implementing agency was the Ministry of Ecology and Emergencies (MEE). later renamed as the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), and particularly its Department for Emergency Monitoring and Forecasting, and Mining Tailings Management 10 (DEMFMTM) which would oversee the Project Implementation Unit (PIU). The latter would be composed by a manager, fiduciary and technical specialists, and would be supported by technical international firms responsible to prepare the required studies as well as helping in supervising implementation. This strong framework critically facilitated project planning and implementation. A National Emergency Management Committee (NEMC) was established with membership from relevant ministries and agencies involved in disaster emergency management and response, responsible for overseeing the Project implementation and resolving any issue related to inter-governmental agency coordination of the Project activities. 2.2 Implementation 31. Government and MEE/MES 11 commitment. During project implementation, the Kyrgyz Republic was affected by political and economic turmoil, particularly in 2005 and 2010, resulting in changes of government. Surprisingly, according to the project records, these problems had only an indirect impact on implementation, certainly causing delays in civil works execution and also affecting mostly policy orientations of the institutions, for example: - the lack of formal government adoption of the National Management and Response Plan (NMRP), under Component 2 of the project, due to government changes12. The lack of formal government adoption however did not impact the implementation of the other activities under the Project. 10 The Kyrgyz Government restructured this initial institutional framework in the early phase of project implementation, setting up a Ministry of Emergency Situation (MES), which was later relocated from Bishkek to Osh. The PIU eventually was relocated to Osh as well. Out of the DEMFMTH, a National Agency for Management of Tailings was set up in 2012, responsible for the management of mining environmental liabilities in the country, and overseeing the project activities. 11 The former Ministry of Ecology and Emergenciess (MEE) was restructured into the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) in 2005. The MEE departments involved with the environment are now part of the State Agency for Environment Protection and Forestry. The remaining departments of MEE and the Department of Civil Defense have been merged into MES. MES Head Quarters were relocated to Osh in 2009. 12 In order for the Government to formally approve the plan, a Government resolution was required. While the reconciliation process with the respective Ministries was completed, the process had to be repeated due to the changes in Government and plan had been resubmitted to the Interim Government. However, the recurring elections in the country made it necessary to go through the reconciliation process a number of times and final formal Government adoption did not take place. 10 - the relocation of the Ministry of Emergency Situations to Osh in 2009, which caused the need to build up a new PIU, originally based in Bishkek, from the ground. This relocation caused the project to be downgraded to U status. The project was upgraded once the new PIU was fully established again. 32. However, government commitment at all levels, including ministerial, was maintained under the different authorities, which ensured the success of most project components, including: - the establishment of an adequate institutional framework for the management of environmental legacies in line with good international practices (creation of the National Agency for Tailings Management, under the MES) - Completion of Component 1 activities under full government budget after closure of the IDA Grants and maintenance of the sites (for several years now, with respect to earlier completed works) - The maintenance and functioning of the Emergency Response Centers (ERC). Project implementation – Component 1 33. Capacity building. An important activity of the project which allowed its implementation and to achieve its objectives, as well as to manage environmental liabilities in the long-term, relates to the continuous capacity building, including both on-the-job training and the organization of workshops, courses or stages at foreign facilities (e.g., extensive training of laboratory staff for monitoring purposes in Ukraine). Compared with the pre-DHMP situation, the institutional set-up was improved, the management capacity by government staff developed (including technical, environmental and social aspects), as well as the capacity of local private firms (contractors, labs, design institutes, etc.) to deal with tailings. 34. Risk based selection of interventions. A key activity at the start of the project – identified as part of the early activities identified in the PAD (see Section 1.5) - was to prioritize, on the basis of a risk assessment, the most significant contamination sources and select, the most important interventions needed to make a difference, as well as identify the type of interventions necessary 13. 13 An example is the Tailings Pond 3. While clearly identified as a very significant source of contamination, it had still to be assessed whether remediation on site or the removal of the tailings material would be the most efficient intervention. The risk assessment showed that removal represented a better option. 11 35. A risk assessment and a prioritization study was carried out in 2005/06 in order to select the sites presenting the higher risks of contamination or landslide in areas where the population or water resources would be exposed – as it was out of question that all mine tailings and waste dumps in the area could be handled (see map in Annex 2) due to limited resources and the focus of the project. In 2006 the sites were selected; and detailed surveys and the engineering planning could start, as a basis for contracting the works. Of the existing 36 sites identified, 15 were selected and remediated14 – in addition to broader activities, such as strengthening of riverbanks, which reduced the impacts from other sites where no direct other works were taken place, the partial removal of unstable materials at the top of a landslide area dominating TP3 (the so-called “Tectonic Triangle”) and infrastructure works to remove WD5 and TP3. 36. In order to achieve a credible classification of individual sites (high priority, low priority or no need for remediation, for more details see Tables 1 and 2 in Annex 2), an Figure 2. Schematic sequence of the overall methodology assessment and comprehensive decision process applied under component 1 of the DHMP (source was implemented (see Figure 2). Based on the Geoconsult/Wisutech report, 2006). national legal background and the international best practice, the criteria applied were as follows: - the effective dose for the population should be below 1 mSv/a15; - uncontrolled release of mining and milling wastes (dump and tailings material) due to erosion cannot be tolerated; and, - threat to humans, livestock or property due to structural instability of waste storage facilities (endogenous failure such dam or slope collapse, destruction by exogenous events such as landslides or seismic activity) must be prevented. 37. Remedial actions were deemed necessary for sites which, in their state prior to the Project, did not satisfy any of these conditions. These objects were rated as high-priority. An important criterion in the 14 Other activities which reduced the impacts of other sites, for example stremgthening of riverbanks (e.g. of the Aylampa river, a west side affluent of the Maillu-Suu river, south of the city, affecting TPs 1, 4 and 23) or on the Kara Agach river, a west side affluent, upstream the city, affecting WD 6 and others. See map in Annex 2. 15 The amount of radiation or the `dose' received by people is measured in millisieverts (mSv). The Sievert belongs to the international system of metric units. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP, http://www.icrp.org) recommends limiting artificial irradiation of the public to an average of 1 mSv (0.001 Sv) of effective dose per year, not including medical and occupational exposures. The Earth's crust is made up of materials that are naturally radioactive. Uranium, for instance, is dispersed throughout rocks and soil, mostly at very low concentrations. They nearly all emit gamma rays which irradiate the whole body more or less uniformly. The radiation doses vary according to the rocks and soils of the area and the building materials in use but the global yearly average is 0.46 millisieverts. For comparison, radiation levels inside the US capitol building are 0.85 mSv/a, because of the uranium content of the granite structure. 12 decision process was the added value to the society which could be achieved as a "side-effect" of remediation (or, conversely, the public nuisance which comes from a remediation option). This comparatively "soft" criterion could play a decisive role, especially regarding the acceptance of the overall remediation strategy by public stakeholders and affected population groups. This was a clear factor for the decision to relocate the entirety of the materials of Waste Dump no 1 to Waste Dump no 2 when the amount of disposed materials were higher than originally estimated. 38. The activities planned under component 1 have been completed (98% at Closing Date, 100% at ICR), in spite of many difficulties, including delays in preparatory planning and surveys, periodic difficulties to monitor the contractors, difficulties by the PIU and the supervision consultant team16 to make timely and sound decisions for timely implementation, and, not less, harsh and lengthy winter conditions and accompanying muddy and rainy spring conditions in several instances, including during the critical 2011/12 winter season. 39. Monitoring of waters. The monitoring of water parameters is not relevant anymore due to change of the indicator for PDO 1 following the restructuring in June 2011 (see paragraph 10 above). However, it is and will be a critical instrument to control surface and ground waters in Mailuu-Suu, and the establishment of a suitably 17 equipped local monitoring laboratory and detailed and specifically defined monitoring program, including detailed training, represents one of the great achievements of the project. At first, the monitoring was executed with the support of the German Geological Survey (BGR) during the period 2006 to 2008, using foreign laboratories. Measurements were then carried out in January and May 2015 18. The laboratory established in Mailuu-Suu is now able to continue monitoring using local equipment and properly trained staff, which is much more sustainable. 40. Also, sporadic hostility from communities caused implementation delays, e.g., in 2010 during which activities progressed at a slow pace. Key concerns were related to relocation of radio-active materials, preferences to relocate the materials much further away from the town and requests for direct financial assistance as a financial compensation scheme for living in such area was available during Soviet times. These conflicts were overcome through improved communication and consultation, the Additional Financing, which provided sufficient funds to fully relocate Waste Dump No. 1 and pro-active initiatives to bring the required national and international expertise by the PIU, the government and head of the villages and community groups. Project implementation – Component 2 41. Subcomponent 2.1: the key activity under Component 2 was the capacity building to strengthen the ability of the MEE/MES, administrations at various levels, and local communities to fulfill better their duties and functions, create better awareness, and be better prepared in case of disasters. Spreading knowledge on disaster preparedness and encouraging government agencies and local communities was a specific focus within the project areas (Mailuu-Suu and villages near the selected landslide areas) and preparation of regulations and a National Management and Response Plan (NMRP). 42. The NMRP covers the full range of requirements in anticipation of or in response to major 16 The long-term supervision contract between the PIU and the international technical firm specialized in remediation of uranium tailings has been critical to the success of the component. However the relationship has been sometime challenging for different reasons, including the perceived high cost of the activity, and caused at times negative effects regarding reporting (no detailed final report has been produced, for example, for the remediation works at WD1 and 2, and TP3 and 18) and decision making. 17 Using low maintenance costs and easy to understand measurement equipment 18 Voitsekhovych O.V., 2012. Site specific water quality monitoring program development at the Mailuu-Suu Uranium Production Legacy Site in Kyrgyz Republic. Project report. 13 disasters, accidents and other emergencies. It also provides the basis to initiate long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. The NMRP establishes interagency mechanisms for government involvement in, and coordination of, domestic incident management operations. This includes coordinating structures and processes requiring: (i) support on a national basis for incidents of national importance; (ii) support for incidents of regional or rayon significance; and (iii) support to incidents at a village or community level. It distinguishes between incidents that require a national response and the majority of incidents occurring each year that are handled by responsible local government or agencies through other established authorities and existing Plans. In addition, the NMRP: (i) recognizes and incorporates the various jurisdictional and functional authorities including local and regional governments; (ii) details the specific management roles and responsibilities of the MES and other departments and agencies; and (iii) establishes the multi-agency organizational structures and processes required. The Plan is applicable to all government departments and agencies that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations in the context of actual or potential disasters. This includes organizations which have a role to play, such as community-based groups or NGOs. 43. While the plan was prepared as part of the project, due to the Government changes, the plan could not be formally adopted by the Government yet. However, the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (NP DRR) is supported by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction19 and other international organizations, as part of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. It includes many of the elements of the NMPR, for example the set-up of a communication network involving government, civil society and international organizations, and including preparedness and response plans. The NP DRR and NMRP are not yet fully functioning at the latter level and the MES continues to work on its implementation. 44. Subcomponent 2.2 – Based on the screening of landslide areas, risk assessments and prioritization, five pilot landslide areas were selected for installing real-time landslide monitoring systems. These, automated monitoring systems, with data transferred to computers in the community at risk were installed and became operative in 2007. Later however, all of these sites became dysfunctional as a result of vandalism and theft of instruments and infrastructure (not an uncommon feature in similar projects in developing countries worldwide) 20. As a result of these events, the Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring (DPM) component initiated a low cost/low tech approach for landslide monitoring and early warning in 2011. Training, awareness raising and landslide monitoring materials were implemented in the five areas where the automated monitoring systems became dysfunctional. The training of and discussion with the elders and decision makers was carried out for adult community members and school in Taram Bazar 21 which is of specific landslide risk. In addition, a repeater information and training campaign was delivered to the school children in summer 2012. 45. Subcomponent 2.3 - Monitoring system in Mailuu-Suu. The radiological analytical laboratory in the local branch of the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Commission was established, installed and put into operation by a team of international experts hired by the project and recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Local staff from the laboratory and the monitoring department in the Ministry of Emergency Situations was internationally trained, and a detailed specific monitoring program developed, and practiced with the designated staff responsible for sampling and monitoring. Due to the very specialized nature of the laboratory equipment which is required for radiological 19 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNUSDR; http://www.unisdr.org/partners/countries/kgz) 20 This potential risk was suspected but Government at the time of project design opted for implementing the so-called high tech/high cost option 21 During the ICR mission, the school directly threatened by a potential landslide was visited, and teachers as well as students were implementing the measures they had had been trained for. 14 monitoring in a low costs-low capacity environment the procurement and installation of the equipment took longer than planned. Since 2012, Mailuu-Suu has now the capabilities to undertake analyses of gross radioactive substances and the radiation levels in water and groundwater samples, thus enabling a more precise picture of Mailuu-Suu’s risk situation regarding surface water and drinking water. However, the long-term sustainability of the laboratory and regular state monitoring would require further institutional and financial strengthening by the Government. 46. Project management under Component 3 worked reasonably well most of the time, in spite of being frequently the cause of implementation delays. Difficulties included: (i) a high turn-over of staff, particularly during the initial stages of the project, and at the time of the relocation of the MES and the PIU from Bishkek to Osh in 2009 when the entire staff had to be renewed and management functions were stopped for about 6 months; (ii) temporary procurement problems around 2007; and (iii) more frequently, problems in consultants and contractors supervision. However, the Ministries’ commitment to implement the project was key in solving, together with the Bank team, these issues. 47. No changes in PDOs or project activities were proposed at Mid-term Review (August 2007). At that time, only a few sites had been rehabilitated in Mailuu-Suu under component 1 and the main works, including TP3 and 18, and WD1 and 2 were still at the planning stage. Most activities under component 2 were on track. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 48. M&E Design: The M&E Design depended on technical and social audit reports, sample surveys, project progress reports and supervision and evaluation mission reports. There were no indicators for which a quantitative baseline or target value was defined. There was also somewhat of a disconnect between the scope and budget of the activities and the ambitious PDO and its indicators, which caused the project indicators to not comprehensively cover the actual scope of the Project together with the fact that not all tailing ponds and waste dumps would be subject to remediation under the Project. In addition, in an area as dilapidated as Mailuu-Suu, it would be difficult to obtain high satisfaction from population, in particular as there was direct financial compensation available during Soviet times for residents in the area. Likewise for high satisfaction for disaster preparedness which population can typically only evaluate during the times of disasters and measuring disaster response and is otherwise an abstract term. The project’s monitoring indicators were revised and realigned in 2011 when detailed data became available from the detailed design and the extensive environmental and geotechnical site investigations, executed as part of the design for remediation works, and in order to monitor better actually measurable results rather than less concrete targets. 49. M&E Implementation: During implementation of Component 1 and after compilation of evidences from the different studies, it appeared that there was a disconnect between PDO 1(i) (see paragraph 8 and 10) and its indicator, which would be difficult to measure, if at all, during implementation and probably a long time after the ICR. In addition, due to the natural background of an area located within a uranium mining district (see Fig. 1), not all sources affecting quality of waters could be removed by the Project. The indicators, and related targets, were consequently modified in June 2011 Additional Financing in order to be able for the project to measure results, introducing the concept of discontinuation of contamination infiltrations at the selected processed sites, rather than monitoring the impact on the water system. In addition, the targets for the two indicators applying to Component 2 were also modified in June 2011 to use more concrete facts and based on the actual situation. 50. In addition to the Results Framework, the PIU used a number of relatively strong instruments to follow-up the progress on both Components 1 and 2, including the PDOs, and reported progress regularly in its quarterly and annual reports. 15 51. For Component 1, an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared on the basis of the project EIA (2004) and a site specific EMP was drafted in 2008 regarding the removal of TP3 and its relocation at the TP6 site. Both included physical as well as qualitative indicators and were implemented carefully. With respect to Component 2, a M&E plan was set up with the support of an international consultant. Results were reported regularly in the PIU’s quarterly reports. The supervisor final report summarizes the main interventions and their respective results data22. 52. Monitoring of rivers and groundwaters in the Mailuu-Suu area. A laboratory was installed and equipped in Mailuu-Suu to monitor waters, and a series of weather as well as monitoring wells were established under the project. During the period of 2006-2008, a water monitoring network was set up (including about 36 measurement points and additional wells) with the support and funding of the Geological Survey of Germany (BGR). Measurements upstream, at different Tailing Ponds or Waste Dumps drainage location and downstream were regularly carried out. 53. The importance of the role played by national and international consultants regarding monitoring and evaluation has to be emphasized, for example through the Panel of Experts (PoE) regarding the relocation of TP3, or by IAEA experts regarding the overall management of tailings and wastes and the radiological monitoring, or ensuring that national and international standards were applied. M&E was mostly rated as moderately satisfactory to satisfactory during project implementation. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 54. Procurement. Procurement management was rated satisfactory in project ISRs. The ratings were downgraded twice during project life, to moderately unsatisfactory in 2007 as a result of preparation of bids and bidding procedures which appeared to have been unrealistic and caused delays (several procurement packages had to be canceled for reason of bids that by far exceeded the cost estimates) and tendered again; and in 2009, as a result of the collapse of the PIU following its relocation to Osh. Apart from a period of PIU relocation, it had adequate procurement staff. 55. Financial management. Financial management arrangements were mostly rated as satisfactory in ISRs during the project life. Due to the resignation of the PIU during its relocation to Osh, the FM rating was downgraded temporarily. Financial Management Reports (FMRs) and audit reports were prepared and delivered on time. Audit reports were unmodified (clean) for all years of implementation. There was one issue related to the payment of taxes related to consultants’ contracts under the PHRD Grant which was resolved through the use of MES counterpart funds. The Management Letter for the final audit report highlighted an issue related to a financing gap that developed between early October and early December 2012, due to unanticipated additional works carried out by Contractors in diversion from design and without sufficient analysis of financial consequences. The Bank has received adequate clarifications from the Government that the issue will be resolved through increase of counterpart funds for the remaining part of the works executed after the Closing Date of the Grants. 56. Safeguards. The project was not expected to result in any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible environmental or negative socio-economic impacts and the environmental screening category 22 WISUTEC, November 2012. Assessment of the status of remediation projects financed by DHMP and current state of all relevant objects of former Uranium mining in the area of Mailuu Suu with recommendations for further actions 16 was assessed as “B23”. An EIA and an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) were prepared, financed by the EU-funded Joint Environmental Program (JEP). All safeguard documents, including the EIA and a Resettlement Framework Policy (RFP) were disclosed in April 2004, both in the Kyrgyz Republic, at the MEE (now MES), and at the Bank Infoshop, and public consultations organized. They were re-disclosed in March 2011 as part of preparation of the Additional Financing. 57. Compliance with safeguards policies has been rated as satisfactory during the whole project life and no significant issues are mentioned in the ISRs or Aide Memoires. This result is due to the strong involvement of national and international specialists 24 in project overlook during implementation, including experts support to the Bank team. 58. Among the Bank’s Operational Policies (OP) for Safeguards, three policies were triggered. These were (i) Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), (ii) Safety of Dams (OP 4.37), and (iii) International Waters (OP 7.50). A fourth policy, Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), was triggered in 2008 when families living on WD5 (Kara Arash area) had to be relocated before the removal of the waste dump. 59. OP 4.12. A RFP had been prepared during project preparation, but the policy was not formally triggered until 2008, when several families were resettled, as they had been living on the WD5 radioactive waste deposit. Meanwhile, all resettlement activities envisaged under the original project had been successfully concluded and no major grievances or complaints were recorded. 60. The project addressed Tailing Dams safety and applied OP 4.37 - Safety of Dams. The preparation team included the necessary expertise (including geo-technical, risk management, hydrology and seismic) to review the tailing dams, which was done in sufficient depth. Included in the preparation team was a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen expertise with regard to broader risk management associated with the radiological risks related to the tailings. Safeguards and mitigations measures were included in the EMP, and implemented accordingly. Examples of description of works can be found in the supervisor final report regarding the design and implementation of tailings dam stability, in particular the largest one, TP6. 61. The project triggered OP 7.50 - Projects on International Waterways, as the Mailuu-Suu River flows into the Naryn River, which is an international waterway. Project interventions were foreseen to improve the quality of water flows to downstream riparian states. A notification letter was nevertheless sent in February 2004 to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to inform these riparian states about the proposed interventions. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan responded in writing, and have reiterated their support to the project activities. 62. As agreed in the Grant Agreement, the decision to remove TP3 materials would trigger the preparation of a site specific EIA, and the contracting of a Panel of Experts (PoE) to oversee and provide advice regarding removal planning and implementation. The EIA, as well as an Environmental Management, Monitoring and Mitigation Plan (EMMMP) were prepared during in 2007/2008, including consultations at the local and national levels. The PoE included a Waste Safety (provided by the IAEA), a Geotechnical and a Tailings Relocation specialist, who provided recommendations which were incorporated in the TP3 documents and taken into account during implementation. 23 The project, today, would probably be categorized as an “A”, considering the potential implications to deal with mining dams However, it can be said that the prepared safeguard documents were comprehensive and would be acceptable for a category “A” project. 24 Particular mention has to be made to the strong continuous cooperation between the project, the Bank team and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), from preparation to closure. 17 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 63. The remediation measures for the tailings and waste dumps have been designed, using international best practices, for robust performance and minimal maintenance and monitoring requirements after finalization of the works and a detailed monitoring program that can use the locally established and trained laboratory has been prepared. The Government has put in place the institutional set-up for the maintenance of the waste dumps and mine tailings by transferring them to the established National Agency for Tailings Management (NATM) who will have the responsibility for maintenance of the tailings and waste bodies. Maintenance works on the cleaning of drainage ditches along the mine tailings were already observed during the ICR mission. Also the Government finalized the remainder of the works at the Mine Tailing Facilities Nos. 3 and 18 and Waste Dumps Nos. 1 and 2 with government resources after the Closing Date and full utilization of the Grants. 64. Budget and staffing challenges remain, however, both for the regular maintenance of the mine tailings and waste dumps as well as for long-term monitoring of drainage, river and groundwater. Such monitoring program is a critical activity to ensure the safety to use water for drinking or irrigation purposes in Mailuu-Suu as well as downstream. Regular state monitoring would indicate whether there exist potential additional sources of contamination 25 which should be dealt with. The monitoring 26 laboratory and a detailed program have been set up under the project, but continued funding for regular execution is a challenge. The Ministry has applied for additional support from the International Atomic Energy Agency in this area. In addition, the community-based landslide monitoring system needs more resources and continued retraining of the communities from the Ministry of Emergency Situations to become fully functional in all the critical landslide areas. 65. Considering the potential additional sources of contamination, as well as – mainly – the existence of natural uranium mineralization underground which might affect the quality of waters and could not be removed (see Fig. 1), there is also an important need for interventions in the water distribution area to address the problem with quality of drinking water in a more comprehensive way, i.e., by upgrading the existing water catchment station upstream and improving the distribution system. 66. As the objective of the project was to focus on the highest priority interventions, there remains a need for continued remediation works in the area for the tailing ponds and waste dumps not included in the high priority category and as part of the 2005 risk assessment, for example TP2, 8, 13, 14 and possibly TP18 27; as well as WD7 and 12 (see Annex 2). This need for further intervention measures dealing with uranium mining rehabilitation is not only present in Kyrgyz Republic, but affects all countries with uranium legacy issues. In order to better deal with these issues in the countries in Central Asia, the IAEA has established a Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites (CGULS) specifically for the IAEA member states of Central Asia to provide a forum for information exchange and provision of technical advice and coordinate the actions of the members to maximize synergies and avoid duplication of efforts. 25 Many tailings and waste sites not included under the high-risk priority list of the project are still present in the area, not to mention the possibility that some natural occurrence of uranium mineralization which cannot be removed might constitute important sources of contamination. 26 Voitsekhovych O.V., 2012. Site specific water quality monitoring program development at the Mailuu-Suu Uranium Production Legacy Site in Kyrgyz Republic. Project report. 27 A particular case of works which might be needed in the future is the potential removal of TP18 – a smaller deposit, possibly resulting from a spill-over from TP3, on the banks of the Mailuu-Suu river, a short distance downhill the removed TP3 (see Annex 2) - the Government and the Bank team agreed, after long evaluations and discussions, that these materials did not represent a significant risk and were left in place after coverage As there was insufficient funding and time remaining under the Project, removal would have been unfeasible anyway. A team of IAEA experts visiting the area at the time of the ICR mission expressed they would recommend its removal under a potential follow-up operation. 18 In order to increase financial support for increasing remediation activities and systematic management of risks associated with uranium production legacy sites, the UN General Assembly Second Committee approved a draft resolution on November 14, 2013, calling upon the international community to help Central Asian states clean up uranium tailing ponds dating back to Soviet times. This resolution would underscore the value of regional co-operation and would call upon the international community to share knowledge on remediation of uranium and other radio-active tailings. The nine co-sponsors of the draft resolution included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. 67. In addition, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is presently working to develop mining (mostly gold and base metals) industry and improve the management of the sector. Environmental Management, including monitoring and mine closure are important elements of such a development and will increase public support for mining activities. Combined mining and environmental management represents an opportunity to further build up on the experience gained under the project and contribute to the economic development of the country while addressing community concerns related to mining and increasing public support. 68. Under the project, a lot of experience has been gained regarding the management of mining environmental liabilities, both by government regulators and technical staff, as well as by local contractors. Such an experience is being shared through workshops and conferences as there is a high demand for sharing experiences of actual radio-active mine tailing rehabilitation in Central Asia as this project is the only one in the region with demonstrable experience of both planning and implementation with accompanying technical information of radio-active mine tailing management. The demand for such sharing of experiences can be witnessed by the regional conference which was organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to "Strengthen the capacity to respond to Emergency and Risk Assessment in the Kyrgyz Republic and promote regional dialogue to establish cooperation”, where the Ministry of Emergency Situations shared their detailed mining rehabilitation experiences. Further sharing of experience with other countries in Central Asia is planned for the next CGULS meeting at IAEA in Vienna. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 69. Relevance of objectives and design. The Project’s objectives remain highly relevant, as well as the premise that environmental sustainability is a prerequisite to a flourishing local, regional and national economy. The relevance of the Project’s design reflects proper diagnosis at the time of appraisal, as well as consistency with both the Project’s stated objectives and the Kyrgyz Republic’s development priorities during the Project’s lifetime. 70. The project’s objective and design remain highly relevant to the current Kyrgyz Republic’s development and environmental priorities to ensure environmental safety. The Mid-term Development Program of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2012-2014 specifically mentions ensuring environmental safety and comprehensive safety of the population and the territory from natural disasters and catastrophes as one of the key objectives, while referring to the high altitude characteristic of the overwhelming majority of the country (96%) which predetermines high vulnerability of ecosystems to natural and anthropogenic influences and the need for coordination of measures to ensure radiation safety within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is also evidenced by the establishment of the Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites (CGULS; see paragraph 68 above. 71. The project’s objectives also remain consistent with the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy’s 19 (CPS) FY14-FY17 third area of engagement for better management of scarce natural resources and physical infrastructure, while at the same time taking into account climate change, environmental sustainability, and regional considerations. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 72. The PDO consisted of three parts: (i) minimize the exposure of humans, livestock, and riverine flora and fauna to radionuclides associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps in the Mailuu-Suu area; (ii) improve the effectiveness of emergency management and response by national and sub-national authorities and local communities to disaster situations; and (iii) reduce the potential loss of life and property in key landslide areas of the country. The overview of achievements of the PDO indicators is outlined below. 73. PDO Indicator 1 - Discontinuation of pollution infiltration of radionuclides and associated heavy metals into the groundwater from selected high-risk mine tailings and waste dumps. Satisfactory. The interventions planned and completed under PDO1 (Component 1), included elaborate and detailed geotechnical and environmental site investigations and risk assessment focusing on the high-risk mine tailings and waste dumps. The resulting cleanup and remediation measures were implemented with good quality, completeness and according to the design. The completion report submitted by the international construction supervisor 28confirms that the infiltration of pollutants such as radionuclides and associated heavy metals into the groundwater from these objects has discontinued (e.g., TP3, WD1, WD2, WD5, WD6, TP2, TP13 and others, see Annex 2). At the Closing Date, the remaining works included surface drainage, landscaping and greening on some sites (TP3 and TP6), which have been completed during the Implementation Completion period by September 2013. Thus the Project fully met this PDO Indicator which was – in the sense of pollution management and the mitigation of risks for community health and safety – the key priority of the project. Also, activities such as the isolation of hazardous mine wastes stored at abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps, and their protection from disturbance by natural processes, such as landslides and floods, and from leaching and dispersal processes associated with ground- and surface-water drainage were the most complex challenges in the project. Among all project activities Component 1 required the highest level of engineering and scientific expertise, and posed the key challenge regarding supervision, oversight and decision-making. Consequently, the largest portion of the project’s resources was allocated to the mine tailing and waste dump remediation. 74. PDO indicator 2 - Evidence that a disaster hazard monitoring, warning and response system is functioning and being used effectively by cooperating national, oblast and raion authorities, and local communities. Moderately Satisfactory. The target value for this PDO indicator of “Emergency Response Centers established and operative around the clock and the response time for all inventoried potential landslide areas lies below 24 hrs” has been fully achieved, as Emergency Response Centers (ERC) are established in Bishkek, Osh, Jalalabad, Naryn, Batken, Issyk-Kul and Talas and operative around the clock and the response time of the Oblasts is now less than 24 hours as the reliable communication system allows the national, oblasts and raion authorities to communicate directly and to coordinate a response within a day. The Ministry had determined the establishment of the Emergency Response Center network as a high priority task designed to ensure that activities of the Unified State Emergency Prevention and Rehabilitation System, the Inter Ministerial State Emergency Committee and the activities of the Ministry of Emergency Situations can be coordinated during natural and man-caused emergencies. The system allows the ERC system to transfer to satellite communication link which provides for 28 WISUTEC, November 2012. Assessment of the status of remediation projects financed by DHMP and current state of all relevant objects of former Uranium mining in the area of Mailuu-Suu with recommendations for further actions. 20 responsiveness and reliable communication modes, with a back-up communication system available as well. This reliable communication system was established – and operated and maintained now for about 7 years under the MES and already demonstrated its significant usefulness in cases of disaster and flooding events and harsh winter conditions affecting populations and cattle (emergency fodder feeding) and many avalanches disasters in the winter of 2011/2012. 75. The National Management and Response Plan developed under this component, including the extensive capacity building, training and study tours, covers the full range of requirements in anticipation of or in response to major disasters, accidents and other emergencies. It also provides the basis to initiate long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. The NMRP establishes interagency mechanisms for government involvement in, and coordination of, domestic incident management operations. The Plan is applicable to all government departments and agencies that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations in the context of actual or potential disasters. This includes organizations which have a role to play, such as community-based groups or NGOs. Due to the frequent government changes, the plan could not be formally adopted by Government yet, for which reason the PDO indicator is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. While the plan could not yet be formally adopted, the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (NP DRR) supported by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, including the set-up of an inter-ministerial management Secretariat and involving the participation of NGOs, Civil Society Organizations and multi- and bi-lateral aid organizations 29, includes many of the elements of the NMPR and the MES continues to work on its implementation. Facilitation for the implementation of the NMRP is further supported by the Bank/Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery through a Grant to: (i) Improve Countrywide Operations of Management Center of Crisis Situations: (ii) Develop the National Integrated System of Information and Warning of the Population; and (iii) Implement the Single State Emergency Dispatcher 30. 76. PDO indicator 3 - Evidence that real-time landslide monitoring, warning and response systems are functioning and being used effectively by cooperating national, oblast, and rayon authorities, and local communities (via technical and social audit reports). Moderately Unsatisfactory. The PDO indicator 3 has been incompletely achieved. The target value of the indicator – the setting up of five automated landslide monitoring stations equipped with remote control - was initially completed by 2007, but then did not recover from severe setbacks related to theft and vandalism of the equipment. The high costs per site and complex management of the automated stations and apparent difficulty in maintaining the system and protect the equipment against theft prompted project to find and implement a different approach to a more sustainable solution. A community-based landslide monitoring system, with simple, robust, low-tech methods was designed and established and piloted at the five sites. The support and uptake of the head of villages and communities was lower for this low cost community-based landslide monitoring system except at Taram Bazar where this low tech/low costs landslide monitoring and warning system was sustainable due to involvement of school children below the landslide area, a high participatory attitude and degree of engagement and interest and follow up trainings and involvement of teachers. At the time of the ICR mission, the system was operational in Taram Bazar and monitored by local authorities and 29 According to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNUSDR; http://www.unisdr.org/partners/countries/kgz), the main objective of Kyrgyzstan National Platform is to establish effective disaster risk management mechanism, develop and integrate program-targeted risk reduction activities into the national country development programs. It is targeted to advance and implement disaster risk reduction (DDR) policies at all levels, coordination, analysis and consultation in the key sectors, which require joint and coordinated actions involving all parties. It will provide for a process to involve all parties, including state authorities, local administrations, international organizations, non-government organizations, civil society. The Secretariat has been established under the coordination of the MES to provide organizational and technical support for the Inter-ministerial Commission on Civil Protection of the Kyrgyz Republic, in order to address issues of interaction of this commission, and support for the Disaster Response Coordination Unit, which is represented by international organizations and civil society. 30 GRDRR Grant N TF099788 21 MES, but needs scaling up to other high landslide risk areas and villages. A positive aspect is that the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic now possesses a model and template and all training materials which could be easily replicated and deployed at other landslide areas (the information and training documentation is available at MES and government staff has been trained). 3.3 Efficiency 77. The original PAD includes an economic analysis (PAD Annex 9) based on the benefits of the reduced annual probability of avoided loss due to reduced probabilities of failures of landslides and tailings and the probability of flooding. However, while landslides involving precariously placed uranium tailings at Mailuu-Suu over a 30 year period, killed people and destroyed buildings, the benefits in the Project Appraisal Document were based on the assumptions of with and without project of failures of landslides and to a certain extent fairly theoretical. 78. For that reason, for the ICR a cost effectiveness approach has been used to compare the costs of the remediation works at the mine tailings and waste dumps in Mailuu-Suu site with similar remediation works in other countries, since there are no comparable works and therefore costs comparisons in the Kyrgyz Republic. 79. The comparison is based on the information from the amount of materials relocated from Tailings Pond No. 3 and Waste Dump No. 1 and the total value of the contract. Based on this information, the total costs for the specific remediation works on TPs and WDs represent US$ 25 per m3 of tailings material and US$ 7 per m3 for waste dump material. Data for other countries range from less than US$2 to about US$225, with an average varying from US$27 to 124 per cubic meter, depending of the country and characteristics 31. The large range of unit costs is due to economies of scale achieved in very large clean- up projects as well as the varying stringencies of national regulations in countries that have had clean-up programs. The costs at Mailuu-Suu are reasonable in this comparison. In addition, the project follow a risk based assessment in order to determine the highest priority mine tailings and waste dumps in order to focus the funds on the maximum reduction of risk and only relocate materials with high priority and with focusing on the closing plans also to stop relocating based on risk assessment rather than to remove all materials present, including rocks. The time of preparation was efficient, and while implementation was longer than foreseen, given the political events, harsh winters and rainy conditions during spring and winter sufficiently efficient. Efficiency is therefore rated as Satisfactory. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 80. The Project was successful in achieving its project development objective of minimizing the exposure of humans, livestock, and riverine flora and fauna to radionuclides associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps in the Mailuu-Suu area by focusing on the highest priority mine tailings and waste dumps, which was the primary focus of the project and to which the major part of the project funds were allocated. Moreover, the project successfully introduced in the Kyrgyz Republic an approach for addressing mining-induced environmental remediation according to international good practice, with special emphasis on a risk-based approach. This approach was a novelty in the Central Asian region and had not been previously tested. The most important achievements of the project in this respect were the strategic prioritization of interventions according to a risk assessment methodology, and 31 Based on data from the German Bundesministerium fur Wissenschaft (Ministry of Science), Studienreihe Nr. 90 (1999). The costs in this study are estimated on a per ton basis, and they have been recalculated estimating a density of 1.7 per ton. Prices updated to present day USD. 22 during remediation the constant updating of the risk situation, with a final evaluation of the residual risk, and the analysis of the incremental risk reduction, and cost, that further remediation activities would entail. This approach became especially important towards the end of the cleanup activities, when a “cut- off” point needed to be determined, and the questions answered “how clean is clean enough”, i.e., an acceptable and sustainable remediation goal determined. This final risk assessment in itself constituted an innovative approach in Kyrgyzstan and opened a new methodological perspective for remediation and pollution management projects. The project also led to the establishment of a functioning Emergency Response Center network between the different provinces in Kyrgyz Republic and the development of the National Management and Response Plan, including the extensive capacity building, training and study tours, covering full range of requirements in anticipation of or in response to major disasters, accidents and other emergencies. The establishment of real-time landslide monitoring, warning and response systems was not successful and only one community-based landslide monitoring system could be put in place. However, by learning from the failure of the initial “hi-tech” approach under Component 2 MES piloted successfully a more robust, community based, low-tech approach, with much higher levels of community ownership and participation, and thus a higher degree of technical effectiveness, cost efficiency, replication potential and sustainability. 81. Relevance of the objective is rated as Highly Satisfactory and the design is rated Moderately Satisfactory, largely due to the disconnect between the scope and budget of the activities and the ambitious PDO and its indicators, which caused the project indicators to not comprehensively cover the actual scope of the Project. Part one of the objective related to the exposure reduction to radionuclides associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste dumps is rated as Satisfactory and successfully introduced in the Kyrgyz Republic a methodology for addressing mining-induced environmental problems according to a risk-based methodology, meaning that, in addition to addressing a critical part of potential or existing contamination sources in the project area, the project developed an integrated approach for tackling similar environmental issues rather than dealing with them in a piecemeal fashion. Part two of the objective related to the disaster hazard monitoring, warning and response system is rated Moderately Satisfactory and the third part of the objective related to landslide risk monitoring is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. However, it can be said that the project also introduced in the Kyrgyz Republic on a pilot basis a low technology and low cost community based methodology which could easily be replicated in other areas of the country. Efficiency is rated as Satisfactory. As a result, the overall Project Outcome is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 82. One of the higher objectives of the project was to contribute to poverty reduction through an improved management of natural hazards risks and, applied to the Mailuu- Suu area, addressing mining environmental liabilities. No specific survey or study could be carried out at project end regarding these issues, as all funds were required to complete the relocation and remediation works at the tailing ponds and waste dumps and such direct link between addressing mining environmental liabilities and poverty reduction would be difficult to establish in an evidenced-based manner. It can be mentioned that the construction of the service road at the right bank of the Mailuu-Suu River, riverbank strengthening, reconstruction of metal bridge and bridge passage over the Kara-Agach River all contributed to improvement of access to the settlements located upstream the Mailuu-Suu town, such as Kara-Agach, Sary-Bee, Kolmo and Kopuro-Basshi and this contributed subsequently to improving economic well- being of the local population and ensured flood protection for the Kara-Agach population. 23 (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 83. The project contributed to the following institutional changes and strengthening: - Monitoring and management of radiation safety and of mining environmental liabilities. As this was the first project in Central Asia actually implementing physical remediation measures for radio-active mine tailing and waste dumps, a lot of capacity has been built at government level, technical staff, contractors and engineers how to manage these environmental liabilities in line with good international practice. Knowledge development regarding how to address mining environmental liabilities, particularly those related to uranium mining, including assessment and monitoring capacity, as well as a better understanding and application of international standards as also been a result of the Project and such experience is now being shared through workshops and conferences as there is a high demand for sharing experiences of actual radio-active mine tailing rehabilitation in Central Asia. - Under the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the following departments and networks have been created: o a "National Agency for Atomic and Radiation Security" was established under the Ministry responsible for the development of new legislation on radiation safety, regulation of radiation safety, national implementation of IAEA guidelines, and for the development of project proposals for external funding; o a National Agency for Tailings Management (NATM) responsible for the management and maintenance of the mine tailings and waste dumps; o a communication network involving local, regional and national authorities - The establishment of an improved institutional framework for the management of natural hazards in general (training and capacity building). The National Management and Response Plan developed, including the extensive capacity building, training and study tours, covers the full range of requirements in anticipation of or in response to major disasters, accidents and other emergencies. It also provides the basis to initiate long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. The NMRP establishes interagency mechanisms for government involvement in, and coordination of, domestic incident management operations. - Awareness by communities regarding the identification and monitoring of landslide risks, though more needs to be done. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 84. As part of the implementation of activities under Component 1, a number of civil works had to be carried out to move materials from sites to other locations where they had to be deposited, particularly in the case of WD5 and TP3 which were integrated in a re-designed TP6 (see map, Annex 2). A road and two bridges, one of them over the Mailuu-Suu river (see Fig. 3, Annex 2) were build, which proved to facilitate access to settlements located upstream of the Mailuu-Suu city. The road, as it was constructed, also provides a protection against flooding to the village of Kara Agach on the western bank of the river. Both measures contribute to economic benefit of the population, improving the transport of goods from and to upstream villages, and protecting private properties in the Kara Agach case. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 85. While beneficiary surveys or end-of-Project stakeholder workshops did not take place due to project funds depletion, extensive stakeholder consultations were held during Project preparation (e.g., as part of the EIA process) and implementation. Based on project reports and Aide Memoires, it appears that the various stakeholders were generally supportive of the project, with strong participation after 2010 under the landslides monitoring subcomponent. Under Component 1, the population of Mailuu-Suu 24 expressed concerns from time to time (e.g., regarding the planned intervention of WD 1 and 2, located immediately above the city). All the concerns were responded through workshops held during implementation and lot of information about radiation safety and radiation safety monitoring. The project communication specialist, based in Mailuu-Suu, facilitated communication with the communities. It was also in direct response to community concerns that the additionally discovered materials on waste dump #1 were decided to be fully removed to Waste Dump No. 2 located further away from the town and based on which the Additional Financing was prepared and approved. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 86. At project completion, all infrastructure investments and clean-up activities were complete and the assets created were of good quality. Sustainability of outcomes is based on: (i) robust and low maintenance design for the remediation of the mine tailings and waste dumps; (ii) established Agency for Tailings Management under the Ministry of Emergency Situations now owns the mine tailings and waste dumps in the Mailuu-Suu area and the responsibility for further maintenance; (iii) developed detailed state radiological monitoring program for water and soil monitoring with supply of laboratory equipment to the laboratory in Mailuu-Suu which only requires low costs for maintenance and operation. 87. As mentioned, a key challenge will be represented by the continuous and reliable provision of the state budget required for the monitoring and maintenance activities over the longer term 32 . Detailed monitoring and monitoring programs have been established and staff trained extensively. Also, their implementation is part of a clear mandate for the National Agency for Tailings Management. A positive indication of Government commitment to sustain operation and maintenance (O&M) under its own budget at the project site is shown by the fact that maintenance of some of the earlier constructed drainage facilities next to the mine tailings have been undertaken the last four years and the closure plan for TP 3 and 6 have been implemented successfully after the Closing Date and end of World Bank financing in December 2012. However, during the ICR mission, the MES authorities were still negotiating with the Ministry of Finance the required budget for the coming year and there exists a risk they do not obtain the sufficient resources to keep the O&M programs on-going at the adequate level. 88. The risk to the development outcomes are rated as low for Component 1. Regarding Component 2 on the one hand, a realistic O&M framework has been specified and Government has been committed thus far, on the other hand, there is the risk for future underfunding of the O&M programs; therefore the overall development outcome risk is rated as moderate. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 89. Project Design. Bank performance during Project preparation was Moderately Satisfactory. The Project team was very efficient during the preparation phase in preparing a comprehensive and coherent plan, within a comparatively short period of time (8 months from concept review to Board approval), 32 As an example, monitoring would require an estimated 50,000 USD/year, based on the mentioned Voitsekhovych O.V., 2012 report. 25 building up on an earlier detailed inventory 33 of the Mailuu-Suu environmental liabilities. The initial work program was well thought, incorporating the implementation of well identified urgent remediation works and, in parallel, the carrying out of a risk assessment and prioritization study which produced a clear blue print for an integrated approach to address the required interventions under Component 1. The team was supported by a competent team of international experts with extensive experience in the management of radioactive tailings. Project preparation documentation was readily available and detailed, as was the PAD. 90. However, in hindsight, the M&E framework showed some weaknesses, including: (i) there was a disconnect between the initial outcome indicators, the planned interventions and the natural background of radionuclides (and other heavy metals contaminants) under Component 1, as an improvement of the water standards could only be measured after a longer period following project closure and not within a realistic time frame, if at all, considering the natural background concentrations of radionuclides, heavy metals, salinity and hydrocarbons present in the Mailuu-Suu area. These indicators and targets were revised in 2011 to provide a more realistic monitoring framework, based on the discontinuation of contamination sources at the selected high risk sites (see paragraph 10 and section 2.3 above); (ii) some of the targets under all indicators were relatively vague and difficult to objectively measure. However, it would have been difficult to have such precise M&E framework at the outset, given the mentioned limited experience of the Bank in such projects and the novelty of such projects in the Central Asia region. 91. Another, already mentioned weakness corresponds to the second sub-component of Component 2, related to landslide monitoring, under which the planned high tech/high costs option failed and had to be replaced by the more realistic approach through the community based low tech/low costs option. As mentioned, the risk34 of poor maintenance, neglect and vandalism was not specifically identified in the PAD even if discussed with the Government during preparation and the potential lack of support by local authorities regarding the community/based solution might have been later underestimated. This said, the Bank was instrumental and worked closely and consistently with the Recipient to find a remedy / substitute for the failed landslide monitoring systems. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 92. Overall quality of implementation support. Positive and successful aspects of Project supervision were noted over the whole implementation period. These included: - Flexibility by the task team to adapt to changing circumstances (e.g., the adjustment related to the monitoring of landslides) - Team’s trusted partnership with the Government authorities and the PIU, facilitating their discussions with consultants and contractors, as well as the management of fiduciary matters, including safeguards, procurement, disbursement and financial management - Systematic participation of international technical experts in the task team regarding (uranium) tailings management and site restoration, as well as landslides - Constructive relationships with consultants and contractors when it came to facilitate decision making related to implementation of works. A particular positive example is related to the removal of the complex TP 3 materials (see Annex 2), as the team facilitated the identification of solutions to resolve a transportation bottleneck, which allowed to finalize the removal in time - Team’s persistence, through frequent supervision missions and close follow-up, in completing the project plans which allowed for the achievement of the outcomes. As examples, it 33 Ref. to the 2004 EU Commission’s TACIS report, already mentioned earlier. 34 As mentioned, the identification of risks in the PAD was otherwise realistic. 26 can be mentioned the solution, together with the Government, difficult implementation arrangements such as the successive re-contracting of PIU staff; as well as preparation of the necessary amendments during the final phase of the project (Additional Financing, extensions, etc). - High level of technical expertise in team, resulting in hands-on, highly substance-oriented missions with very concrete technical discussions and joint elaboration of solutions to especially complex problems and situations. This technical capacity of the Bank team was recognized and highly appreciated by the Client. - Proactive networking of Bank team with other international organizations to bring additional expertise and perspectives to the project. These organizations included the Federal Agency for Geosciences and Resources (Germany) as well as IAEA (Vienna). 93. Supervision would include the following short-comings in terms of follow-up of the M&E framework – for example, insufficient funding remained for surveys on stakeholder satisfaction (in preparation for ICR) as these funds were allocated for the finalization of the relocation and remediation works for mine tailing 3 and waste dump 1. In a general way, while community relationships represented a continuous activity during implementation, as reflected in the project documents, e.g., through communications, consultations and workshops, more might have been done, (e.g., the set-up of a formal information center as well as regular surveys; communication with local authorities).For these reasons, the rating of Bank supervision is Moderately Satisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory 94. The Project was well designed as Disaster Hazard and Mitigation Project and was prepared efficiently and with high input of relevant international experts, there could have been more emphasis on the landslide monitoring component and a more realistic M&E framework. During implementation, the Bank responded proactively to issues that arose during implementation and adapted to the unpredictable circumstances in the country and inherent to this type of operation with numerous and frequent detailed technical support to the Government regarding project implementation. The Bank proved a highly flexible and creative partner to the Recipient, more emphasis could still have been given to community outreach and stakeholder and public satisfaction surveys. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 95. Overall, the Government was supportive of the Project and its objectives, which constituted a critical factor to success. As mentioned, in spite of two major country/government crises in 2005 and 2010, with major changes, support to the project seems to have been continuous with comparatively shorter periods of interruption of works. Before and during preparation as well as during implementation, priority was permanently given to improving the natural hazards and environmental liabilities management in Mailuu-Suu. MES and the Government are working on the set-up of a National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (NP DRR). In addition the Government showed its commitment to the project and its objectives through, for example: (i) the continuous provision of counterpart funds during implementation; (ii) the set-up and implementation of maintenance programs for the mine tailings and waste dumps during the latter part of the project, as well as after closure, under own funds. Outside the political/government events, there were general delays in the works of the Contractor which caused implementation delays and the closing plans for the sites should have been agreed to earlier. On this basis the Government performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. 27 (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 96. The project was managed by a PIU under the MES (later under the National Agency for Tailings Management (NATM), depending of MES). MES was committed at all stages to the project objectives, for example in: - Solving problems related to the PIU staff, either at project start or after relocation of the ministry to Osh - Hosting and maintaining since 2006 the Emergency Response Centers system, which proved its usefulness at several opportunities (e.g., the harsh winter conditions affecting populations and cattle and many avalanches disasters in 2011/2012) - Setting up the National Agency for Tailings Management who will be in charge of environmental liabilities management in the future - Implementing maintenance of rehabilitated sites starting in 2010, and completing interventions as well as the closure plan after project end in December 2012 until present (September 2013) 97. The PIU – in spite, again of high turnover difficulties at the beginning of the project, or following the decision to move it to Osh – operated in general in a satisfactory way. The PIU team was mostly constituted by management specialists, including for the fiduciary functions, and was supported regarding the technical aspects by a team of international consultants contracted for the whole life of the project. It also included a communication specialist, based in Mailuu-Suu, who dealt with community relationships. No particular major problem was mentioned with respect to procurement or financial management besides temporary problems which could generally be solved. The unit produced comprehensive quarterly and annual reports agreed in the Grant Agreement, including M&E aspects, and used the project Results Framework, regarding indicators, and the Environmental Management Plan (EMP), regarding implementation criteria, as its main monitoring tools. 98. However, some limitations were mentioned in the mission Aide Memoires, particularly with respect to consultants and contractors supervision. As mentioned, several difficulties regarding works implementation under contracts had to be solved with the support of the Bank team in order to facilitate or unblock bottlenecks. At the very end of the project, it appears that project management showed a strong weakening 35, as the focus was on continuing removal of TP3, rather than starting the closure of the sites according to the closure plan, which resulted in a moderately unsatisfactory ultimate rating for project management. However, at the time of the ICR mission, all works, including the cover of the mine tailing and drainage had been completed, which would have resulted in a satisfactory rating. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 99. Considering the overall support, commitment and achievements of the Government, MES and the PIU regarding the project, as well as the mentioned shortcomings, the Borrower Performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 100. The DHMP represents a type of complex project which is not frequently implemented by the 35 According to the project final ISR, this rating was due to weak site supervision, poor control of Contractor's performance, poor management of the supervision Consultant and excessive tolerance towards interventions from MES, which resulted in delays and cost increases. At the time of the ICR mission, the works were all finalized in good condition. 28 Bank 36 or other donors because of the difficulty to deal with activities involving very specialized technical and scientific concepts as well as highly sensitive topics for communities such as mining environmental liabilities, not to mention radioactive ones, which might or might not affect them. In that sense, lessons from the project can provide a number of key lessons which would be important to include in the design of similar operations: - Communication and community participation. Strong emphasis on sustainability through community involvement should be made from the beginning. Communication and community participation is a key element in the design, implementation and sustainability of natural hazards and environmental liability remediation projects and baseline surveys should be executed in order to better understand the project’s impact on beneficiaries but also other qualitative aspects related to welfare, poverty reduction etc. Such beneficiary assessment can be a valuable tool in understanding the social gains made under a project and funds should have been clearly put aside in a separate category to ensure availability. Project design. o PDOs and key performance indicators are crucial. Stronger, specific and technically valid and consistent indicators and targets can help not only to monitor project progress properly, but also to react more quickly or adequately to events. The identification of proper baselines for subsequent impact evaluations should be established right from the beginning. Particularly in an operation involving specialized scientific concepts, such as uranium or heavy metals contamination. o The importance to involve international or national experienced specialist from preparation to closure has also been demonstrated under the DHMP in order to deal with scientifically or technically complex concepts. In order to ensure that such complex projects dealing with low radio-active materials can be designed, implemented and controlled properly, it is very important to involve consultants that have worked on similar projects in other countries to allow for sharing good international practices not only with government officials, but also with local design institutes, consultants and contractors. o Early Development of the plans to close the mine tailings and waste dumps, stop relocation works, based on risk assessment and design of covering, drainage and vegetation measures should be part of initial engineering planning. The closure plans of similar projects should be part of the initial or early engineering planning, in order to allow for sufficient time and clear guidelines to decide on the cut-off criteria based on risk assessment to determine when to stop the relocation of contaminated materials and what materials can be left safely at the original site, in line with international good practice. Such earlier agreement will strengthen the government capacity for assessing risks rather than unrealistic strict standards and can facilitate a smoother transition towards site closure procedures. o The time necessary for the preparation and implementation of relatively complex projects from a technical, institutional and communication point of view should not be underestimated, particularly when the occurrence of additional climatic or political interferences, or the potential for additional technical complexities, can be suspected. Such considerations should be considered when planning the necessary duration of such projects. In the case of the DHMP, the project included initial plan considered about 5.5 years (9/2004 to 3/2010), when the complete implementation of component 1 required a total of 9 years (including post-closure activities). 36 Examples of similar Bank project designed in the late 90s or early 2000s include Romania, Zambia and Argentina. 29 o Planning for low hanging fruits. Considering the duration of engineering preparation and planning mentioned above, the DHMP included a series of activities which could be undertaken at the very start (the “early activities”), and which contributed to generating confidence in the project commitment to improve the environmental and natural hazards management. Equivalent experiences to address “low hanging fruits” have been found in similar projects (e.g., the Zambia Copperbelt) with similar effects and should be taken into consideration on the design of this type of project. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 101. The Borrower’s Implementation Completion Report is provided in Annex 7 with a general satisfactory assessment of the Project, its implementation by the Government and the Bank’s assistance in preparation and implementation. (b) Cofinanciers 102. Co-financing included a Japan PHRD grant for capacity building (US$ 1.95 million), focusing on Priority interventions for Mailuu Suu component, strengthening of the institutional and technical capacity for disaster preparedness component and support for project implementation and long-term investment plan component and a GEF Medium-Sized Project grant (US $ 1.0 million) from the Global Environmental Facility. Details of the scope of the Grants are provided in Annex 8. The Closing Date of the PHRD Grant was March 31, 2010, the Grant was 100% disbursed, no comments were raised on implementation of the PHRD Grant. 103. The Global Environmental Objective of the GEF Grant was to protect the integrity of the Mailuu- Suu ecosystem by addressing trans boundary contamination of the Mailuu-Suu river and land degradation in the surrounding areas. The GEF Grant co-financed the two components under the IDA Grant: Component 1 – Uranium Mining Wastes Isolation and Protection; Component 2 – Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring (DPM), the Project Management Component was only financed by the IDA Grant. The Grant was extended from its original Closing Date in March 2010 as the delays impacting DHMP also impacted the GEF-Grant in the same manner. When the Grant closed on October 31, 2011, it was disbursed for 100%. For the GEF-Grant, a separate Implementation Completion Memorandum was prepared in line with the requirements and template of the Global Environmental Facility. (c) Other partners and stakeholders 104. Other partners also coordinated their funding in relation to project activities within the area on technical or social issues (e.g. ADB, BGR, EU, IAEA) and particularly the IAEA played an important role as a technical partner, contributing to the implementation of best practices and standards in project activities related to Uranium Mining Wastes Isolation and Protection Component. 30 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) Component 1 – Uranium Mining 6.346 8.43 132 Wastes Isolation Component 2 – Disaster 2.8388 3.38 119 Preparedness and Monitoring Component 3 – Project Management 0.8415 0.95 112 Total Baseline Cost 10.0263 12.76 127 Physical Contingencies 0.6383 included above n/a Price Contingencies 1.0967 included above n/a Total Project Costs 11.7613 12.76 108 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 11.7613 12.76 108 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Percentage of Source of Funds Estimate Estimate Cofinancing Appraisal (USD millions) (USD millions) IDA Grant for Debt Vulnerable (H096) 6.90 7.21 105 IDA Grant Additional Financing (H696) 0.00 1.06 n/a 37 JAPAN: Ministry of Finance - PHRD Grants Co-financing 1.95 1.95 100 Global Environment Facility (GEF) Co-financing 1.00 1.00 100 Borrower Co-financing 1.91 1.91 100 Parallel BGR 0.00 0.38 n/a financing 11.76 12.76 108 NB: The IDA Grants were expressed in SDR; fluctuations of the USD/SDR rate through time explain why disbursements exceed the initially equivalent amount in USD. 37 Disbursement represents 106% of the amount granted at the time of AF approval (June 2011) 31 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1 – Uranium Mining Waste Isolation and Protection (UMWIP) 1. This section provides a description of the outputs achieved under component 1 as well as the prioritization process based on a risk and cost-benefit assessment of the 36 tailings and waste sites inventoried in the Mailuu-Suu area, including a summary of the interventions implemented. The approach used under the DHMP is illustrated in Figure 1. Early activities 2. The sequence for the sites selection process was defined in the PAD, which included as well a series of early interventions which had been identified during preparation (see Figure 1), to be implemented in parallel with the prioritization of works as described further below. These interventions included: (i) removal of the unstable top on the south side of the Tectonic landslide to reduce the risk of impact on uranium Tailing No. 3 in case of movement of the soil mass; (ii) diversion of surface water around the Koi-Tash landslide area, to reduce risk of blockage of the Mailuu-Suu river; (iii) installation monitoring stations on the Tectonic and Koi-Tash landslides; and (iv), strengthening Figure 1. Decision making sequence regarding the of the riverbank along priority areas of the implementation of interventions in the Mailuu-Suu area. Aylyampa-Sai and Mailuu-Suu rivers to reduce the erosion risks of tailings or waste dumps located close to the streams. 3. All these activities were completed during the period 2005 to 2006/07 under the project and, until present, maintained by the Government (see Table 2), except at the Koi-Tash landslide as it was decided not to set-up of a drainage system as proposed initially (PAD p.8) because of the limited effect it would have on the landslide (MTR Aide Memoire July 2007). Risk assessment and prioritization process 4. Methodology. In order to achieve a credible classification of individual sites (high priority, low priority or no need for remediation), an assessment and comprehensive decision process was carried out. The overall approach is shown on Figure 2. Based on the national legal background and the international best practice, the criteria applied were as follows (see Figure 3): • the effective dose for the population should be below 1 mSv/a; • uncontrolled release of mining and milling wastes (dump and tailings material) due to erosion cannot be tolerated; and, • threat to humans, livestock or property due to structural instability of waste storage facilities (endogenous failure such dam or slope collapse, destruction by exogenous events such as landslides or seismic activity) must be prevented. 5. Prioritization. Remedial actions were deemed necessary for sites which, in their project state, did not satisfy any of these conditions. These objects were rated as high-priority. Objects which satisfied 32 these criteria might have deserved remediation, even though with lower priority. For example, the principle common in the field of radiation protection, requires that doses should be As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) which means that if doses which are below 1 mSv/a can be lowered further with comparatively little effort, this should be done if the corresponding funds are available (e.g., by covering objects). It is here where remediation costs and other, mainly socio-economic, consequences come in. 6. An important criterion in the decision process was the added value to the society which could be achieved as a "side-effect" of remediation (or, conversely, the public nuisance which comes from a remediation option). This rather "soft" criteria can play a decisive role, especially in the acceptance of the overall remediation strategy by public stakeholders and affected population groups. 7. Risks by toxic elements which are released by a tailings pond or waste dump to the environment via seepage water into the ground or surface water were deemed as negligible. Moreover, seepage was observed only at a few of the waste sites, and then in very small quantities. Remediation for reasons connected with groundwater contamination is only warranted if there is a demonstrable risk to the population today or, based on reasonable usage scenarios, in the foreseeable future. However, in the Mailuu Suu the population is supplied by a central, piped water supply network with the possible exception of house wells near TP 16 where samples had been taken and analyzed. The results from these analyses of tap and well water in houses around TP 16 clearly show that there is no elevated risk for the population provided that the seepage from TP 16 is not used. This can be ensured by piping the seepage into the Azbaz creek. Therefore, the water pathway does not constitute a decisive factor in determining the need for remediation. Risk Assessment Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the overall methodology applied under component 1 of the DHMP (source 8. In Table 1 below the risk assessment for the Geoconsult/Wisutec report, 2006). 36 sites inventoried is summarized. From the results shown on this Table, 13 objects (7 tailings ponds and 6 waste dumps) should be remediated with high priority, 10 objects should be remediated with lower priority and 14 objects needed no remediation. 9. The following risks were taken into consideration for the identification of high and low priority remediation activities: (i) endogenous geotechnical risk (instability of the waste facility itself which may lead to release of contaminated material into the hydrographic network); (ii) exogenous geotechnical risk (risk of external forces such as floods and landslides to damage the facility and lead to release of contaminated material into the hydrographic network); (iii) radio-ecological risk to the population (including all relevant exposure pathways); and (iv) eco-toxicological risk to the population through the water pathway. 10. The investigation of potential remediation options took international best available techniques 33 (BAT), EU and international guidelines and recommendations into account. As remediation measures, the following technical options have been considered: (i) relocation of wastes to a safer place; (ii) in-situ remediation, including a) reshaping of surface contour and covering and b) riverbed strengthening and erosion protection For the relocation of wastes, several site options were considered and compared using a cost-benefit analysis. Relocation to TP 6 was clearly preferable to all other options. Figure 3. Decision tree for the classification and prioritization of sites under the DHMP (source Geoconsult/Wisutec report, 2006). 11. The project's objective of reducing the potential risk of exposure to uranium and other radioactive substances for human population, livestock and ecosystems in Mailuu-Suu has been substantially achieved. The following map (Figure 4) shows the location of the sites of intervention and Table 1 below summarizes the works implemented. 12. In 2005/2006 at the beginning of the DHMP and as the basis for the later conducted remediation measures, a consultant firm 38 prepared a feasibility study for the Mailuu Suu Uranium Mining sites. On the basis of data, sampled by the EU TACIS Project (2003) and own data, the consortium made a risk assessment of all 36 sites, identified the high-priority objects for immediate actions and selected the best suitable technologies and technical solutions. Several technical sub-projects were defined, tendered and realized during implementation. 38 The German consortium GEOCONSULT-WISUTEC, with strong experience of the management of U tailings in the region of a Wismut in the former E Germany. The consortium was contracted by the PIU and was responsible for engineering planning and implementation supervision of Component 1 until Project closure. 34 13. A final report was prepared in 2012 by the supervision firm, summarizing the works accomplished and proposing recommendations for further activities, on the basis of an updated risk assessment 39. 14. Summary of works under Component 1 and recommendations. Because of the limited funds of the DHMP only the remediation of objects with the highest priority and related infrastructure measures could be finally carried out. Summarizing, the following works, including improved infrastructure, have been completed under the project’s component 1: - Relocation of material from the source area of the landslide area Tectonic (Triangle) - Relocation of WD 5 to TP 6, using of the material as dam for the storage cell - Riverbed strengthening of Aylampa Say river to protect the dams of TP 2 and TP 13 - Reshaping and riverbed strengthening of WD 6 - Relocation of WD 1 to WD 2 - Reshaping and water catchment and diversion measures on WD 2 - Relocation of TP 3 to TP 6, covering of TP 6 as storage cell - Water catchment measures and partial covering of “hot spots” on TP 5, TP 7 and TP 14 (rapid measures) - Positioning of warning signs on TP 5, TP 7, TP 14 and TP 16 (rapid measures) - Infrastructure measures o Erection of a new bridge crossing the Mailuu-Suu river near TP 6 (see picture below). o Construction of a new road on the west bank of Mailuu-Suu river o Construction of a new bridge crossing the Kara Agach river The following shows some pictures of the finalized works: 39 WISUTEC, November 2012. Assessment of the status of remediation projects financed by DHMP and current state of all relevant objects of former Uranium mining in the area of Mailuu Suu with recommendations for further actions. 35 River Diversion works at Waste Dump No 2 (where also Waste Dump No 1 has been relocated to) New bridge crossing, Mailuu Suu River 36 Engineered Mine Tailing Facility TP 6, including water diversion 37 Aylampa Say Erosion Protection with Reno Mattresses. 38 The figure below provides the overview of the map of Mailuu Suu with the intervention sites Figure 4 - Overview map of Mailu Suu with relevant intervention sites (Wisutec, Nov 2012) 15. From the same report, the supervision consultant recommended the following additional measures to be implemented in the short term, based on an updated risk estimation, in order to achieve a safer and sustainable situation: - TP 13 and TP 2 - relocation to a safer location (TP 1 and/or TP 4) - TP 16 - safeguarding of the water diverting system - TP 8 - dam toe, riverbed strengthening of the Mailuu-Suu river - TP 10 repair or new installation of the water catchment system - All objects with elevated radioactive radiation – erection of warning signs. - For the long-term regular, periodical maintenance measures on all objects are necessary. 16. Description by site of the implemented remediation measures. Of the 36 objects (13 waste 39 dumps and 23 tailings ponds) identified initially, 12 were found to need no intervention measures, and 10 for which remedial action was of lower priority. For the remaining 14 objects remediation was recommended with high priority. A second level of prioritization was needed to define a set of remedial measures which would fit into the available budget and time frame of the project. These measures, their results and recommendations are summarized in the Table 2 below. 40 Table 1 - Summary of remediation measures which were implemented during the current project, and further recommended measures of lower priority (modified, from Wisutec, November 2012) Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments Waste Dumps (WD) WD1 Due to active erosion by Kulmen Sai creek the - Relocation of the WD 1 waste to the upstream No additional action Completed downstream slopes of the dump were WD2 site . needed excessively steep and small slides occurred This project was concluded in 2013 The combined WD1 and 2 frequently. The materials were transported represented the second biggest downstream by the river, where they activity of the component. directly impacted the Mailuu- Suu river, as well as gardens, pastures etc. in the urban area of Mailuu Suu. Exposed to landslides. WD2 WD 2 is situated upstream of WD 1, on the left . Diverting the river from the foot of the WD2 site - Maintenance of the Completed embankment of the Kulmen Sai river. It was by an erosion resistant new river bed. To avoid water diverting system partially covered with an inert soil layer which erosion in turn has been vegetated by grass. Parts of the - Reshaping of WD2 (including materials from slopes were damaged by landslides and the WD1), riverbed bank strengthening slope toe was eroded by the Kulmen Sai river. WD3 A small waste dump situated NE of the town of No action under DHMP No action Mailuu Suu, close to TP 11. No imminent recommended geotechnical risks is identified. WD4 WD 4 is located far away from Mailuu Suu, No action under DHMP No action Even in the case of a slope high on the natural embankment slopes of the recommended failure (e.g., in case of a seismic Kulmen Say river. It is partly covered by grass. event), no significant It is geo-technically stable. environmental risks are to be expected (to water resources, population etc.). WD5 WD 5 was situated SW of the settlement of The dump was relocated to TP 6 and the mine No further actions are Works completed Kara Agach and closely surrounded by waste material was used as construction material necessary dwellings of the residential area. It reportedly for the dam of the storage cell on TP 6. Some material used to set up the consisted of unprocessed low grade ore, left Technological Road. One house after selection of high grade ore during a demolished and family manual sorting process. It was used to grow relocated. vegetables and cereals. Haystacks were another form of usage. Due to the elevated radiological risk which was caused by the close proximity to residential areas and the agricultural use of the dump, 41 Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments relocation to a safer site and subsequent covering was recommended as a remediation action. WD6 WD 6 is situated NW of the settlement of Kara WD 6 was re-profiled and an embankment - Regular control and Works Completed Agach on the left bank of the Kara Agach river. protection structure by Reno Mattresses was necessary maintenance The dump is partly covered by grass. The slope installed measures have to be One of the first remediation which is steeply inclined towards the river was done. The Reno measures in DHMP in 2007 subject to erosion and therefore unstable. Mattresses at Kara Contaminated material was eroded by the river. Agach are in general in good condition (November 2012) - But on the outer edge the first mattresses are being damaged. It should be repaired urgently. WD7 WD 7 is a small dump far upstream of the Kara No action under DHMP No remediation Agach river. There is only scarce vegetation on measures are necessary the waste surface. At the waste toe, erosion can be clearly seen but the radioactive inventory is very low. WD8 WD 8 is located between WD 6 and WD 7, on No action under DHMP On the long-term, it is the left bank of the Kara Agach river. It is required to protect the covered by grass vegetation and small shrubs. waste dump from The waste dump slope shows signs of failure, erosion, by riverbed so that waste material is sporadically released strengthening and/or a into the river. However, remediation measures suitably dimensioned are not urgent, as the amounts dislocated into retaining wall, and the river are relatively small flattening out the slope of the wastes. WD9 WD 9 is located uphill of WD 8. No imminent No action under DHMP No remediation Due to the remote location, geotechnical risks could be identified, neither measures are necessary. remedial action would require exogenous nor endogenous. WD 9 is covered construction of an access road by patchy grass vegetation.. which would in turn lead to extraordinarily high costs, compared with other objects in the area WD10 WD 10 is located uphill of WD 9. No imminent No action under DHMP No remediation 42 Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments geotechnical risks could be identified, neither measures are necessary. exogenous nor endogenous. Like WD 9, WD 10 is covered by patchy grass vegetation. WD11 WD 11 and 12 are situated NW of Kara Agach, No action under DHMP No urgent remediation Because of the relatively high WD12 on the right bank of the Kara Agach river, measures are necessary. surface contamination by erected on a relatively steep hillside. They are scattered ore it was covered by patchy vegetation and used for recommended to cap higher grazing of cattle contaminated parts by a cover of inert material. However because of the missing access road and the very high costs it was not realized. Tailings Ponds (TPs) TP1 TP 1 and TP 4 are safe with respect to landslide As TP 1 and TP 4 may be candidates as safe A long-term stable Studies completed risks from the hinterland. storage sites for TP 2 and TP 13 nearby, drilling reshaping of the dam of If erosion of the natural riverbanks by the works to characterize the suitability for this purpose TP 1 and a long-term Ayilampa Sai river continues unrestrictedly, have been carried out cover were there is a long-term risk that the toe of the dam recommended as of TP 1 may be eroded. Both tailings ponds remediation measures. have a cover of sandstone rubble and more or The free accessible less loamy components. Cattle graze the grass tailings on TP 1 have to on its surface be re-covered (as single measure or in connection with the relocation of TP 2/13). TP4 For the long term and Studies completed related to the relocation project, embankment Relating to the proposal of strengthening measures relocation TP 2/13 to TP 4, a are recommended short comparison of options and technical solutions has been prepared TP23 TP 23 is a very small tailings heap, located No action under DHMP In view of the small opposite of TP 1 and TP 4 at the Aylampa Say size of the tailings river (i.e., on the left bank). Large part of the pond, not only riverbed tailings is covered by glass waste from the /banks strengthening electric bulb factory, so that the tailings pond is but also the option of hard to recognize. What can be identified as relocation to TP 1 tailings pond, has a cover of sandstone rubble should be taken into 43 Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments with loamy components, and is patchily consideration. covered with grass. The dam toe is prone to erosion by the Aylampa Say river, but the consequences are limited due to the small size of the tailings pond. TP2, 13 TP 2 is located on the left embankment of the The riverbed strengthening measures were designed It is recommended to Completed for TP13, remains to Aylampa Say river. It is safe with respect to and performed in the years 2007/2008. The design relocate TP 2 and TP 13 be done for TP2 landslide risks from the hinterland. TP 2 has a was made to achieve and guarantee a durability of to the other, the safer cover of sandstone rubble and loamy the structure of at least 3 years. side of the Aylampa components. This TP contains a half-ring dam After heavy precipitations and floods in the spring Say river by using the towards the Aylampa Say river. The height of of the years 2011 and 2012 the beginning of existing tailings ponds the dam crest is approximately 10 m and has an damaging of the bank protection is visible TP 4 and/or TP 1 as overall slope of approximately 1:2.5. The An advancing damaging has to be feared, a sudden disposal sites. Aylampa Say river threatens to erode the dam fail of the construction is not excluded if an toe. The formerly installed bank protection exceptional rain event in the Aylampa Say valley structures (mainly concrete elements) have been should occur. It seems that the frequency of largely undercut and carried downstream by occurrence of such events increases as a result of flood events climate changes in the region. TP3 The former TP 3 area is located on the left bank Relocation to TP6 After the closure of the Completed, incl retention wall of the Mailuu Suu river, in a small valley The intervention started in May 2010 with whole project, measures and drainage opposite of the "Isolit" Factory . It covered a preparatory works (e.g. the construction of the for maintenance and re- surface of about 1.3 ha and contained approx. bridge crossing the Mailuu-Suu river near TP 6 – placing warning signs The relocation of TD3, 43,000 m³ of pure tailings and in total approx. see picture). After some delays due to the political and/or fences have to be combined with the building of 120.000 m³ contaminated material. Its distance situation as well as bad weather conditions in 2010 planned. TD6 represent the biggest from inhabited areas was 150-200 m. The and in spring 2011, the actual relocation of tailings investment under the project tailings body of TP 3 was partially saturated started in May 2011. The relocation was completed with water. in November 2012. TP 3 was identified as an object with the Measurements of gamma dose rate in the area of comparably highest potential risk of the former tailings pond show remaining elevated uncontrolled failure of structures and radioactivity on the pure rock surface. The natural destruction by earthquakes and/or the rock with former long lasting direct contact to the landslide area “Tectonic” coincident and tailings is impregnated or mineralized obviously with the highest radioactive inventory of all with fluids containing particles with elevated tailings ponds in Mailuu Suu. The object radioactivity. It is not feasible to remove all those comprised a risk of un-quantifiable radiological (natural) material. consequences in the long term. Therefore the decision was made to relocate the tailings and other contaminated material to a safe place (area of TP 6,) and equip the new deposit with a stable cover system. 44 Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments TP5 and As part of the so called “Rapid measures” As part of the so called “Rapid measures” initiated Maintenance of the Completed. Maintenance of TP7 initiated 2007 for all objects with defined but 2007 for all objects with defined but limited drainage system ditches done. Access issues limited measures (surface contamination, non- measures, the water catchment systems of both (cleaning of the ditches) (wire of fences stolen). functional water catchment systems, the water tailings ponds was repaired or new constructed. should be carried out catchment systems of both tailings ponds was The “hot spot” on TP 5 was covered and warning urgently and repaired or new constructed. The “hot spot” on signs were erected. continuously. The TP 5 was covered and warning signs were current situation of the erected. seepage pond next to the road is not satisfying and not sustainable. A better technical solution (relocation?) to avoid the seepage or discharge it into the river should be prepared. TP6 TP 6 is located on the right embankment of the Relocation of WD 5 and TP3 .Coveraged, drainage For the long-term safety Completed. Max 15mR/h river Mailuu Suu, at an elevation above the After the decision was made to remove TP3 to TP 6 of the dam the water river which makes it safe with respect to in spring 2008 the technical planning for the new diverting system has to erosion . TP 6 does not have an apparent dam engineered storage cell resulted in a dam be maintained structure, thus tailings deposition probably was construction using the material of the mine waste continuously. At least accomplished in a dry or pasty state. dump WD5 and the covering with inert material. once a year (after the No indications for stability problems, excessive The foreseen position of the dam was investigated rainy season) the surface erosion or external hazards by by drillings. situation has to be landslides or flooding were identified. Although As part of the detailed design, stability calculations checked and evaluated. the steep natural slopes behind TP 6 are were made with the result of evidence of stability potentially prone to isolated rock fall events, also against dynamic load of earthquakes. there are no serious geotechnical risks of dam In the course of the relocation of WD 5, the dam failure or landslides from the hinterland. TP 6 was built up in summer 2008. had a cover of sandstone rubble and more or From May 2011 to November 2012 the cell was less loamy components. filled with the tailings material of TP 3 and covered As result of a selection process TP 6 was with inert material from a quarry near Mailuu-Suu. identified as best suitable facility for a safe new storage site of the tailings material of TP 3. TP8 TP 8 is situated on the right bank of the Mailuu No action under DHMP Relocation to a safer Under the limited financial Suu river. A flooding hazard exists for the site frame conditions of the DHMP it lowest part of the TMF very close to the river, was not possible to find a which is only protected by gabions against the Because of the high feasible technical solution for 45 Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments water erosion. The toe of the dam will be costs and the technical the relocation. Main problems eroded by the Mailuu Suu river in case of a problems a relocation of are the missing safe storage flood events. the TP to a safer site is space (the TP 6 cell is used by TP 8 does not have an apparent dam structure, probably not feasible in TP 3 material to full capacity) thus tailings deposition probably was the near future. To and the eventually necessary accomplished in a dry or pasty state. TP 8 is reach a long term transport route through the town covered and vegetated with grass. The Gamma- stability for the tam toe, center of Mailuu Suu is refused scan shows that no contaminated material is on threatened by floods of by the local community (if the surface. the Mailuu Suu river, a storage on TP 1/4 would be Geotechnical long-term stability of TP 8, strengthening of the foreseen). particularly considering a seismic event, can be erosion protection achieved only with very high financial effort. system is Therefore it was recommended that TP 8 should recommended. be relocated to a safer disposal site. TP 9, TP TP 9, TP 10 and TP 19 are situated on a gently No action under DHMP The water catchment 10 and sloped area on the left side of the Mailuu Suu system of TP 10 has to TP 19 river between the towns Mailuu Suu and Kara be repaired or a new Agach, at the toe of a steep in the hinterland. technical solution The exogenous risk of a landslide, serious should be installed. rockfall or failure of the hinterland slope is considered sufficiently small. TP 9 and TP 10 have a cover of sandstone rubble and more or less loamy components vegetated with grass. TP 10 does not have an apparent dam structure, thus tailings deposition probably was accomplished in a dry or pasty state. The Gamma-scan (shows that there is no contaminated material on the surface. TP11 TP 11 is located on an elevated plain above No action under DHMP no urgent remediation Mailuu Suu, north of the Kulmen Sai river. It measures are needed. has a cover of sandstone rubble and more or less loamy components vegetated with grass. There are no geotechnical risks, neither exogenous nor endogenous which would require remediation action. The structural stability of the dam is sufficient. TP14 TP 14 is located at the Aylampa Sai river, quite In the frame of the so called “Rapid Measures” (see The investigation of the Completed The location of the remote NE from the town of Mailuu Suu. It has Attachment 2) the repair of the existing drainage dam by drillings should seepage line within the dam and a cover of sandstone rubble and more or less channels, remove of litter from drainage channels be catch up to have data the geomechanical properties of 46 Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments loamy components and is covered by grass. and build new drainage channels to divert surface for a safety calculation the dam material should There is no exogenous risk due to landslides runoff from reaching shallow depression (pond) on of the dam. investigated by drillings, as a from the hinterland. tailings surface was designed and performed in Regularly periodical precondition for the calculation It has a relatively high dam, which appears well 2008. maintenance measures of the long-term stability of TP engineered and maintained. On the plateau a In November 2012 the situation was satisfying, the are necessary. 14. However, TP 14 was not small pond was visible. Evidently the plateau water diverting system was in good shape, only at accessible to the drilling drainage has become ineffective several points parts of the steel grid of the Reno equipment so that these works Mattresses were damaged or stolen (vandalism) have been suspended. Due to its very remote location, any remediation measures would require a new access road to be constructed which leads to considerable extra costs. TP15 TP 15 is located on a relatively plain area far No action under DHMP No measures are from Mailuu Suu. No dam structure was necessary visible; the materials were probably deposited in a dry or pasty state. It is situated in a gently sloping, wide valley. It is completely covered with vegetation and has shallow slope angles of 5-10°. It has a cover of sandstone rubble and more or less loamy components and is covered by grass and shrubs. There are no geotechnical risks, neither exogenous nor endogenous which would require remediation action. TP16 TP 16 is located left from the Azbaz creek, NW No action under DHMP The water catchment The repair of the drainage was from Mailuu Suu. The tailings surface is (except posting of warning signs) and diverting system of foreseen as part of the “Rapid covered by sandstone rubble and more or less TP 16 should be Measures but could not loamy components and vegetated with grass. repaired and partially performed because of technical The tailings are contained behind a dam of new constructed. problems (very plain surface, approximately 40 m height with berms. The Urgent is the insufficient inclination) dam has been constructed erosion-proof, The safeguarding of the drainage channel leading away from the TMF existing outflow is blocked by a large landslide area ~150 m construction downstream of the facility. The landslide area has very large dimensions (l=1.5 km, w=100- 150 m) and affects the whole parallel valley. Immediately behind the tailings pond, the natural slopes have a relatively small elevation 47 Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments so that the risk to the tailings due to future landslides is assumed to be sufficiently low. TP 16 has no functional drainage system. In order to deviate the surface water from the plateau area, a separate surface water drainage (ridge) is necessary. Seepage water has been observed at the dam toe. Samples of this water have been analyzed for radionuclides. The results show a significant Uranium concentration. Seepage water is piped and discharged into the Azbaz creek which is a sufficiently safe precaution measure against the use of the seepage. People are located close to TP 16 and possibly use house wells or the river water for drinking, irrigation or cattle watering purposes. Analyses show that there is no health risk by using those water TP18 TP 18 is located between TP 3 and the Mailuu Because of the delays in the project progress, the To be assessed as part Covered. Suu river, downstream of the settlement of Kara financial situation and the fact that the radiation of a second phase Agach (see Figure 4). It is a very small area of survey did not monitor elevator radiation levels and Originally was planned to be around 2000 m², structurally not recognizable trial pits could not locate any mine tailing relocated to TP6, but re- as TMF and probably a spill of TP 3. A materials, the decision was made by the client that assessment needed (whether it quantity of approx. 5000 m³ contaminated the contaminated material of TP 18, if at all exists at all) material (tailings and subsoil) was estimated. It present, would not be hauled to TP 6 but instead is covered by sandstone rubble, with some direct access and fluvial erosion from the river loamy components, and vegetated by grass. could be prevented by additional protection There is a risk of tailings transport due to bank measures. erosion, however, no conspicuous tailings or waste material is visible. Landslide activation has been modeled and concluded not to risk pushing remaining small quantities of TP3 and potentially TP18 to the river. TP17, TP 17 is a very small impoundment on the left No action under DHMP No measures are TP20, bank of the Mailuu Suu river, opposite of the necessary TP21 Isolit factory (partly destroyed due to the recent and landslide), downstream of the settlement of TP22 Kara Agach. The tailings pond has been largely covered by the recent landslide. The tailings are still in 48 Site Situation in 2005 Measures implemented/changes Recommendations Comments place, but are hardly recognizable as such. The naturally formed cover by inert soil may well be considered a safe cover, and therefore further remediation measures are not necessary. The small tailings ponds 20 and 21 are located on the right embankment of the Mailuu Suu river, while TP 22 is located on the opposite (left) embankment, slightly downstream from TP 20 and 21. There are no imminent endogenous geotechnical risks 49 Component 2 – Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring (DPM) 17. Sub-component 2.1 – Capacity building. The objective was to contribute to the improvement of the national system for disaster management, preparedness, and response to achieve a more effective administration and implementation by national and sub-national authorities, and local communities. Spreading knowledge on disaster preparedness and encouraging government agencies and local communities to work together consisted in the most important activity under component 2 (about 70% of its budget), as the international experience shows that the best results are achieved when there is effective cooperation between citizens, civil society groups, and regional and local authorities. The main activities included: (i) preparation of a National Management and Response Plan (NMRP); (ii) training, awareness programs and provision of equipment for more effective communication within MES at central and regional level as well as a number of study tours. 18. Institutional framework. The project contributed to the establishment of an improved institutional framework for the management of natural hazards through training and capacity building, the set-up of a communication network involving local, regional and national authorities, and awareness by communities regarding the identification and monitoring of landslide risks. 19. Awareness building and training campaigns about disaster preparedness and management were carried out in different parts of the country, as well as in Mailuu-Suu (an area also prone to earthquakes, flooding and landslides). Starting in 2007, workshops were conducted on emergency management and response for officials of MES and ministries and agencies members of Inter- ministerial Committee (established in 2006). Materials used for the workshops included draft documents such relevant regulations improvement, functional evaluation of MES system, the draft National Emergency Management and Response Plan and a manual on “Essential Principles of Comprehensive Emergency Management”. Training also reached out to the rayon level, including regional MES staff, emergency commissions at rayon administrations, as well as to local authorities. At the community level, workshops trained and built awareness of the population on early emergency response, particularly on risk analysis and assessment and on landslide risk issues. A set of training materials on emergency response and management have been prepared, which constitute a base for seminars at the central and oblast levels for national and regional authorities as well as for NGOs and local communities. 20. In September 2006 representatives of the MES, the Government and the PIU made a study tour to the Asian Disaster Reduction Center. 21. The government approval process of the National Emergency Management and Response Plan was restarted a number of times (as part of an important participatory process with all stakeholders, including participation by numerous national and international experts) and discussed at the level of the Government, involving all ministries concerned due to the frequent government changes. In parallel, MES is focusing to establish a National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (NP DRR), with broadly similar objectives as the NEMRP including the set-up of an inter-ministerial management Secretariat and involving the participation of NGOs, Civil Society Organizations and multi- and bi-lateral aid organizations40. 40 According to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNUSDR; http://www.unisdr.org/partners/countries/kgz), the main objective of Kyrgyzstan National Platform is to establish effective disaster risk management mechanism, develop and integrate program-targeted risk reduction activities into the national country development programs. It is 50 22. The draft NMRP (2008) covers the full range of requirements in anticipation of or in response to major disasters, accidents and other emergencies. It also provides the basis to initiate long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. The NMRP establishes interagency mechanisms for government involvement in, and coordination of, domestic incident management operations. This includes coordinating structures and processes requiring: (i) support on a national basis for incidents of national importance; (ii) support for incidents of regional or rayon significance; and (iii) support to incidents at a village or community level. It distinguishes between incidents that require a national response and the majority of incidents occurring each year that are handled by responsible local government or agencies through other established authorities and existing Plans. In addition, the NMRP (i) recognizes and incorporates the various jurisdictional and functional authorities including local and regional governments; (ii) details the specific management roles and responsibilities of the MES and other departments and agencies; and (iii) establishes the multi-agency organizational structures and processes required. The Plan was meant to be applicable to all government departments and agencies that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations in the context of actual or potential disasters. It also included the participation of organizations which have a role to play, such as community-based groups or NGOs. 23. Sub-component 2.1 objective was to improve the national system for disaster management, preparedness, and response that can be administered and implemented effectively by national and sub-national authorities, and local communities. As part of the component, Emergency Response Centers established were set up and equipped with data and communication facilities. They were inaugurated by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic in June 2006. They are operative around the clock and the response time for all inventoried potential landslide areas lies below 24 hrs. A communication network at the local level was also set up. The ERCs function as follows: • Receiving from population, and communicating threats or facts of emergencies to general public; • Analyzing and validating the received information, communicating it to the managing bodies, duty and dispatching services, territorial federal executive bodies whose scope of responsibilities includes responding to the received information; • Notifying the Government, oblast authorities, the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Kyrgyz Republic, heads of the MES oblast offices, and duty and dispatching services in accordance with the established procedure; • Collecting from duty and dispatching services, environmental surveillance and monitoring services, oblast emergency monitoring and prevention centers information about threats or facts of emergencies, current situation and activities by the emergency response teams and facilities, and distributing such information among managing bodies, duty and dispatching services and territorial executive bodies; • Processing and analyzing information about emergency situation, determining its targeted to advance and implement disaster risk reduction (DDR) policies at all levels, coordination, analysis and consultation in the key sectors, which require joint and coordinated actions involving all parties. It will provide for a process to involve all parties, including state authorities, local administrations, international organizations, non- government organizations, civil society. The Secretariat has been established under the coordination of the MES to provide organizational and technical support for the Inter-ministerial Commission on Civil Protection of the Kyrgyz Republic, in order to address issues of interaction of this commission, and support for the Disaster Response Coordination Unit, which is represented by international organizations and civil society. 51 scope and clarifying data received from duty and dispatching services engaged in responding to emergencies, notifying such services of transferring to top-level operating mode; • Online strategic decision-making. 24. ERCs were used in the following disaster events: • In 2009, earthquake in Nura village (Alai district, Osh oblast); • Distribution of food for cattle in winter period in 2012 in Alai district of Osh oblast; Chatkal district of Jalal-Abad oblast; • During the annual snow avalanches, the Ministry of Emergency Situations cleans the roads and helps the affected population, for example, the road sections cleaning at the Bishkek-Osh road. 25. After preparation of the National Emergency Management and Response Plan (as part of an participatory process with all stakeholders, including participation by numerous national and international experts and awareness building campaigns about disaster preparedness and management were carried out in different parts of the country, as well as in Mailuu-Suu) and discussed at the level of the Government, involving all ministries concerned, MES started to work on the set-up of a National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (NP DRR), with broadly similar objectives as the NEMRP including the set-up of an inter-ministerial management Secretariat and involving the participation of NGOs, Civil Society Organizations and multi- and bi-lateral aid organizations 41. 26. Sub-component 2.2 Landslide Monitoring and Warning System- dealt with the establishment of a real-time system to detect and warn against active landslide movements in key hazard areas, and provide equipment for seismic measurements. Up to 2007, automated systems had been installed in five landslide areas different areas. Computers, where all information was gathered, are installed at control points in the village councils or schools. All five systems had been launched and tested. The local population was aware of the warning systems and monitoring appeared to have been a continuing activity. 27. Unfortunately, afterwards, all 5 monitoring systems were found to be strongly deteriorated and dysfunctional due to the theft of parts, particularly the transmission wires. The Ministry of Emergency Situations investigated the damaged systems and identified the scope of work for repair. However, considering the costs and the probability to have to face similar vandalism events, the Government, with the support of the Bank team conceptualized a low cost - low tech community based approach for landslide monitoring and early warning that would be prepared and implemented over the remaining project period. Decision was also made at that time to develop the community based landslide monitoring pilots, including at Taram Bazar, where a landslide area is threatening a large school. The system in Taram Bazam is still operating at the 41 According to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNUSDR; http://www.unisdr.org/partners/countries/kgz), the main objective of Kyrgyzstan National Platform is to establish effective disaster risk management mechanism, develop and integrate program-targeted risk reduction activities into the national country development programs. It is targeted to advance and implement disaster risk reduction (DDR) policies at all levels, coordination, analysis and consultation in the key sectors, which require joint and coordinated actions involving all parties. It will provide for a process to involve all parties, including state authorities, local administrations, international organizations, non- government organizations, civil society. The Secretariat has been established under the coordination of the MES to provide organizational and technical support for the Inter-ministerial Commission on Civil Protection of the Kyrgyz Republic, in order to address issues of interaction of this commission, and support for the Disaster Response Coordination Unit, which is represented by international organizations and civil society. 52 time of the ICR mission. 28. Subcomponent 2.3 addressed the setting up of a monitoring system in Mailuu-Suu. It included: - the establishment of a monitoring network for surface and ground waters (set up with the cooperation of the German Geological Survey – BGR) during the period 2006 to 2008 (including monitoring of water parameters during that period); - the installation of two water gauging station, one upstream at the town water facility and one downstream of Mailuu-Suu. The latter was then relocated at the laboratory in town. - The radiological analytical laboratory in the local branch of the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Commission was delivered, installed and put into operation by a team of experts hired by the project. Local staff was trained, and a monitoring program developed for the community, and practiced with the designated staff responsible for sampling and monitoring. Mailuu-Suu now has the capabilities to undertake analyses of gross radioactive substances and the radiation levels in water and groundwater samples, thus enabling a more precise picture of Mailuu-Suu’s risk situation regarding surface water and drinking water. 53 Table 3 - Summary of landslide control measures and infrastructure which were implemented and realized as part of the project Landslides Control Tectonic Triangle Unloading. Removal of the The unloading of Tectonic Triangle was Continuous monitoring Completed unstable top on the south side of the landslide implemented between March and November 2006. area (referred to as ‘Tectonic Triangle’) to The total earth removal was about 30,000 m3. The reduce the risk of impact on uranium Tailing completed works have placed the section of the No. 3 in case of movement of the soil mass. Tectonic landslide area that was immediately overhead of tailing #3 within permissible limits of landslide displacement. Drainage and monitoring system established Monitoring system installed Koi-Tash Landslide Monitoring and Early Monitoring system installed Continuous monitoring Completed Warning System The set-up of a drainage system Development of a landslide monitoring and was proposed (PAD p.8) but it early warning system in October 2006, was decided not to implement it proposing the use of optical targets and an for the limited effect it would automatic theodolite (Geo Robot) to measure have on the landslide risk (MTR surface displacement; piezometers for Aide Memoire July 2007). groundwater monitoring; and inclinometers for subsurface deformation monitoring. Infrastructure Bridge on the Mailuu-Suu river Built as part of removal of TP3 and access to TP6 Maintenance Completed Infrastructure insufficient to remove TP3 materials and access TP6 Bridge on Kara Agash river Maintenance Completed Infrastructure insufficient to remove WD5 and TP3 materials and access TP6 Technological road Built as part of removal of TP3 and access to TP6 Maintenance Completed Infrastructure insufficient to remove WD5 and TP3 materials and access TP6 54 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 29. The original PAD based the economic analysis based on the benefits of the reduced annual probability of avoided loss due to reduced probabilities of failures of landslides and tailings and the probability of flooding. However, while landslides involving precariously placed uranium tailings at Mailuu-Suu in Kyrgyzstan over a 30 year period, killed people and destroyed buildings 42 , the benefits in the preparation Project Appraisal Document were based on the assumptions of with and without project probabilities of failures of landslides and to certain extent fairly theoretical. 30. For that reason, for the Implementation Completion Report a cost effectiveness approach has been used to compare the costs of the remediation works at the mine tailings and waste dumps in Mailuu-Suu site with similar remediation works in other countries, since there are no comparable works and therefore costs comparisons in the Kyrgyz Republic. 31. The comparison is based on the information from the amount of materials relocated from Tailings Pond no 3 and Waste Dump no1 and the total value of the contract. Based on this information, the total costs for the specific remediation works on TPs and WDs represent 25 USD per m3 of tailings material and 7 USD/m3 for waste dump material. Data for other countries range from less than USD1.7 to about USD255, with an average varying from USD27 to 124 43 per cubic meter, depending of the country and characteristics (based on data from the German Bundesministerium fur Wissenschaft (Ministry of Science), Studienreihe Nr. 90 (1999, updated to comparable prices). The large range of unit costs is due to economies of scale achieved in very large clean-up projects as well as the varying stringencies of national regulations in countries that have had clean-up programs. The costs at Mailuu Suu are reasonable in this comparison. 32. Based on the comparison report for decommissioning and clean-up costs of uranium producting projects on international basis 44 , the 14 uranium producing countries were investigated with regard to rehabilitation costs. The accumulated and estimated costs for the decommissioning and rehabilitation of the uranium-producing plants referred to in this study 45 amount to about US$ 3.7 billion (cost basis: 1993). The resulting specific rehabilitation costs range from a minimum of US$ 0.12 per lb of U3O8 (Canada) and US$ 0.12 per ton of tailings (South Africa), to a maximum of approximately US$ 40 per lb of U3O8 (Sweden) and US$ 68 per ton of tailings (UMTRA Title I Program, USA). This 42 KNAPP, R.B., RICHARDSON, J.H., ROSENBUERG, N., SMITH, D.K., TOMPSON, A.F.B., SARNOGOEV, A., DUISEBAYEV, B., JANECKY, D., “Radioactive tailings issues in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan”, 9th Internat. Conf. on Tailings and Mine Waste, Fort Collins, Colorado 27-30 January 2002, AA Balkema, Lisse (2002). 43 Original costs per ton have been translated into costs per m3, estimating a density of 1.7 kg/m3 for the tailings and wastes materials. 44 Kosten der Stillegung und Sanierung von Urangewinnungsprojekten im internationalen Vergleich - Einflußgrößen und Abhängigkeiten - Auszug aus dem Abschlußbericht zum Forschungsauftrag Nr.37/93, im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft durchgeführt von Uranerzbergbau GmbH, BMWi Studienreihe Nr.90, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft , Bonn 1995 [Comparison of Decommissioning and Cleanup Costs of Uranium Producing Projects on an International Basis; with summaries in English, French, Spanish, and Russian] 45 They represent a cumulative uranium production until and including 1992 of approximately 1.14 million tons of uranium or nearly 3 billion pounds of uranium oxide (U3O8). This corresponds to approx. 63% of the entire cumulative world production of uranium. This production is accompanied by about 1,681 million tonnes of processing residues. 780 million tonnes thereof are related to plants which produced or still produce uranium as a by-product. 55 large range indicates that costs depend on numerous factors having different effects. Decommissioning and Cleanup Costs of Uranium Producing Projects Total Cost Production Tailings Country million US$ US$/t t U (incl.1992) million t (1993) tailings Australia, total 54,225 98.7 85.10 0.86 (f) 49,625 18.7 63.30 3.39 Bulgaria (d) 21,871 23.0 173.10 7.53 Canada 257,702 160.6 77.10 0.48 Czech Republic (d) 101,901 48.8 433.33 8.88 France 70,038 31.4 128.45 4.09 Gabon 21,446 6.5 30.13 4.64 Germany, total 218,463 West 650 0.2 15.15 75.76 East 217,813 160.0 7,878.79 49.24 Hungary 19,970 19.0 78.40 4.13 Namibia 53,074 350.0 53.20 0.15 Niger 56,845 17.2 79.87 4.64 South Africa 143,305 700.0 81.97 0.12 Spain 1,145 1.2 14.82 12.35 Sweden 200 1.5 20.98 13.99 USA, total (e) 310,000 222.9 2,428.96 10.90 UMTRA Title I 56,000 31.3 2,140.00 68.37 UMTRA Title II 254,000 191.6 288.96 1.51 SUBTOTAL (a) 901.0 3,596.79 3.99 SUBTOTAL (b) 780.0 103.74 0.13 TOTAL 1,141,276 1,681.0 3,700.53 2.20 Source: http://www.wise-uranium.org/udcos.html. Costs of Uranium Mill Tailings Management 56 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Anarkan Akerova Counsel LEGCF Country Lawyer Joseph R. Goldberg Consultant C3PDR Sector Manager Naushad A. Khan Consultant ECSO2 Procurement CTRFC- Financial Hannah M. Koilpillai Senior Finance Officer His Management Piotr Krzyzanowski Consultant ECSSD Technical Advisor Ainura Kupueva Operations Officer ECSEN Operations Officer John Otieno Ogallo Sr Financial Management Specia ECSO3 Finance Officer Social Development Norval Stanley Peabody Consultant EASIS Consultant Agricultural Bekzod Shamsiev Senior Agriculture Economist SASDA Specialist Nikolai Soubbotin Senior Counsel LEGAM Legal Task Team Leader Joop Stoutjesdijk Lead Irrigation Engineer SASDA preparation and first phase supervision Hiwote Tadesse Operations Analyst ECSEG Operation Analyst Junior Professional Jyldyz Wood Junior Professional Associate ECSSD Associate Supervision/ICR Anarkan Akerova Counsel LEGCF Legal Financial Galina Alagardova Financial Management Specialis ECSO3 Management Specialist Lynette Alemar Senior Program Assistant ECSSD Program Assistant Irina Goncharova Procurement Specialist ECSO2 Procurement Ainura Kupueva Operations Officer ECSEN Operations Officer Nurbek Kurmanaliev Procurement Specialist ECSO2 Procurement John Otieno Ogallo Sr Financial Management Specia ECSO3 Finance Officer Social Norval Stanley Peabody Consultant EASIS Development Specialist Task Team Leader Wolfhart Pohl Lead Environmental Specialist AFTSG supervision Irina Sarchenko Program Assistant CMGSF Program Assistant Katelijn Van den Berg Senior Environmental Economist ECSEN Task Team Leader Craig Meisner Senior Environmental Economist ECSEN ICR TTL Gotthard Walser Consultant ECSEN ICR author 57 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks (including travel and consultant costs) Lending FY04 198 Total: 198 Supervision/ICR FY05 55 FY06 56 FY07 78 FY08 72 FY09 60 FY10 75 FY11 90 FY12 102 FY13 42 FY14 25 Total: 655 58 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) 33. While there was no more funding available towards the end of the project to execute the planned stakeholder and beneficiary surveys as the funds were needed to finalize the relocation works of the mine tailing and the closing of the site (cover, drainage etc, for which the government also increased the counterpart financing at the end of the project), implementation of a consistent communication and participation strategy, including the set-up of an information center in Mailuu-Suu, has contributed to facilitate the understanding of the population of real risks versus perceived risks of such abandoned mine tailings and waste dumps and what can be done to manage and reduce these risks. 34. These engagements, consultations and information exchange with the communities is also anticipated to lead to easier maintenance of the mine tailings and waste dumps in the future (e.g., avoid vandalism of fences or materials) of the tailings or waste dumps, etc.) and in the case of the landslide monitoring, participation of the school in Taran bazar has shown the definitive advantages of low tech/low costs options over the more sophisticated, expensive but easily subjective to theft option selected at project start. 35. In the first quarter of 2008, the Consultant held training workshop for the government officials and representatives of the civil society on handling radioactive substances by the example of the Mailuu-Suu project activities for isolating and protecting uranium mining wastes. The Consultant also held the similar training in Mailuu-Suu town for the local authorities, civil sector and contractors based on the specific case of relocating Waste Dump No.5 and Tailings No.3 and 8. In the second quarter of 2008, the Consultant held a series of meetings with the Mailuu-Suu community in order to clarify all issues on transferring the radioactive materials to Tailing No.6. 36. The public protest from June to September 2010 has hampered relocation of Tailing No.3 to Tailing No.6 and relocation of the remaining part of wastes from Waste Dump No.1 (in 2009 just a half of the wastes have been relocated from Waste Dump No.1 – 79.0 thousand cubic meters). Four outreach campaigns on the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project (DHMP) were arranged for the population of villages Sary-Bee and Kara-Zhygach, and Mailuu-Suu town with the PIU staff, WISUTEC representatives, experts of the Ministry of Emergency situations of the Kyrgyz Republic, and representatives of the local administration involved. 37. A good response from the local population represented by the Head of the rural Administration of Sary-Bee and the head of the villages has been obtained concerning construction of the service road at the right bank of the Mailuu-Suu River, riverbank strengthening, reconstruction of metal bridge and bridge passage over the Kara-Agach River contributed to improvement of access to the settlements located upstream the Mailuu-Suu town, such as Kara-Agach, Sary-Bee, Kolmo and Kopuro-Basshi. This contributed to improving economic well-being of the local population and ensured flood protection for the Kara-Agach population. Population was satisfied with relocation of the remaining part of waste from Waste Dump No.1 and with strengthening the banks of the artificial canal of the Kulmen-Sai River. The population remains concerned about TP18 though. 59 60 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) N/A 61 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA Grant - H096-KG; PHRD Grant - TF053437; GEF Grant - TF055171; IDA Grant - H6960-KG) On June 15, 2004, the Board of Executive Directors of the International Development Association (IDA) has approved the Grant in the amount equivalent to 4,700,000.00 Special Drawing Rights (SDR 4,700,000) aimed to finance the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project. The Development Grant Agreement (Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project), dated July 23, 2004, between the Kyrgyz Republic and the International Development Association (IDA Grant No.H096-KG), as well as the Letter of Agreement on the Japanese Grant indented to assist in the financing of the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project (PHRD Grant No.TF053437) had been ratified by the Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 296 dated September 8, 2004. The Letter of Agreement, dated August 12, 2005, between the Kyrgyz Republic and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on Issuing Global Environmental Facility Grant (GEF Grant No.TF055171) indented to assist in the financing of the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project had been ratified by the Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 472 dated October 18, 2005. The Project effectiveness date: September 28, 2004. The Agreement, dated August 4, 2011, between the Kyrgyz Republic and the International Development Association (IDA Grant No. H6960-KG) for the purpose of providing additional financing for the Original Project (Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project) in the amount of USD 1.0 million, had been ratified by the Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 13-1356 dated November 1, 2011. 62 ABBREVIATIONS SDR Special Drawing Rights CIS Commonwealth of Independent State IDA International Development Association GEF Global Environmental Facility PIU Project Implementation Unit DFA Development Financing Agreement MES Ministry of Emergency Situations NCB National Competitive Bidding EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EMP Environmental Management Plan FMR Financial Management Report ERC Emergency Response Center PDO Project Development Objectives ADB Asian Development Bank BGR Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources CAS Country Assistance Strategy CPS Country Partnership Strategy DHMP Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project EU European Union FA Financing Agreement IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency JEP Joint Environmental Program (EU) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOF Ministry of Finance TMA Tailings Management Agency O&M Operation and Maintenance PHRD Japan Policy and Human Resources Development Fund PIP Project Implementation Plan UNDP United Nations Development Programme WB World Bank 63 64 Project Details IDA Date of Approval: September 8, 2004 Date of Signing: July 23, 2004 Effectiveness Date: September 28, 2004 Original Closing date: March 31, 2010 Revised Closing date: March 31, 2012 Revised Closing date: September 30, 2012 Revised Final Closing Date: December 31, 2012 IDA Grant H096-KG Loan Amount: SDR 4,700,000 (equivalent to USD 6,900,000) Date of Signing July 23, 2004 IDA Grant H6960- KG Amount of Grant Allocated: SDR 681,159.42 (equivalent to USD 1,000,000) Date of Signing August 4, 2011 GEF Grant TF055171 (co-financing) Loan Amount: USD 1,000,000 Date of Signing August 12, 2005 PHRD Grant TF053437(co-financing) USD 1,950,000 Date of Signing July 23, 2004 Share of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic USD 1,100,000 Total: USD 11,960,000 DISBURSED, AS OF TODAY Amount of the Financing Allocated since the Beginning of the Project, as of April 01, 2013, in USD million Total, including: USD 13.242 million IDA financing USD 7.22 million Additional IDA financing USD 1.06 million PHRD financing USD 1.949 million GEF financing USD 1.0 million Financing by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic USD 2.012 million Rating Result: S (Satisfactory) Sustainability: S (Satisfactory) Impact of institutional development: HS (Highly Satisfactory) Banks’ performance: HS (Highly Satisfactory) Borrowers’ Performance: S (Satisfactory) Quality at the initial stage: M (Moderate) 65 Project Description Original Objectives The Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project provided financial assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic with the aim to minimize the potential negative impact of landslides and uranium tailings in Mailuu-Suu area. The problems of uranium mining wastes disposal included accumulation in the environment of the radioactive and toxic substances continuously seeping from the tailings and waste rock dumps. High levels of radioactivity had been observed in water and bottom sediment samples from the Mailuu-Suu River. All Project activities were aimed at minimizing the risk of contamination spreading from the tailings and waste rock dumps, and minimizing the risks of the most potentially damaging landslides in Mailuu-Suu area. Physical Parameters of the Tailings and Waste Rock Dumps of Mailuu-Suu Area Description Qty Total area (1,000m²) Total amount of the landfilled wastes (million m³) Tailings 23 497.6 2.095 Waste Rock Dumps 13 109.2 0.868 Total 36 606.8 2.963 3 The Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project (DHMP) was focused on the linkages between the natural disasters, such as landslides, earthquakes and floods associated with the seismic activity, and significant environmental heritage of the mining industry – poorly managed tailings and waste rock dumps imply significant risk of damaging such mining facilities and have high risks of environmental pollution and negative impacts on the population’s health and safety, especially in those areas where uranium have been previously produced. Adverse effects on life and health of the population of the affected settlements as well as on the economic activities both within the mining areas and within the long-distanced downstream areas 66 (e.g., at the area of highly productive Ferghana Valley of the neighboring Uzbekistan – downstream the main project area; the border is 30 kilometers downstream from the Mailuu-Suu River) have been predicted. Since Independence in 1991, institutional and technical capacity of the Ministry of Ecology and Emergencies (MEE) responsible for such issues has been reduced considerably. The Ministry had no sufficient personnel, infrastructure or modern operational procedures, neither the resource sufficient to carry out its mandates. Criteria for taking measures in case of emergency have not been elaborated. There was no a well-defined system of functions and responsibilities distribution between the MEE departments and oblast and local administrations that would allow to respond quickly and effectively to emergency events. The concern of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic about the problems with landfilling uranium mines has been recognized by the world public. Repeated missions by the World Bank experts and their reports have served as the project justification. As per the WB classification, the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project has been classified as category ‘B’. The assumption was that the DHMP implementation would improve social and economic indicators of the Mailuu-Suu Region. Project Objectives: • minimize the exposure of humans, livestock, and river flora and fauna to radionuclides associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps in the Mailuu-Suu area; • improve the effectiveness of emergency management and response by national and regional authorities and local communities to disaster situations; and • reduce the potential loss of life and property in key landslide areas of the country. Implementing agency is the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Kyrgyz Republic. At the preliminary project appraisal stage, the Kyrgyz Government considered the National Strategy for Sustainable Human Development, adopted in May 1997, as the appropriate framework for risk management of disaster hazards. The overall objective of the government policy in this area was to reduce the vulnerability of the population and the economy to hazardous processes. In this respect, five specific goals have been set: (i) to provide timely warning to the public of the threat of natural and manmade disasters; (ii) to reduce and mitigate human and material losses from natural disasters; (iii) to establish a single monitoring system to ensure safety of the population; (iv) to improve disaster preparedness by training the population; and (v) to improve rescue services preparedness against disasters. Revised objectives Project objectives have been revised in June 2011 under Additional Financing Agreement and were as follows: minimize the exposure of humans, livestock, and river flora and fauna to radionuclides associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps in the Mailuu-Suu area based on technical data and experience gained during the Project implementation. The reasons for changes were:  Relocation of additional volumes of radioactive waste rock from Waste Dump 1 to Waste Dump 2 (2nd stage, a half of the volume of radioactive waste rock from Waste Dump 1 have been relocated in 2009).  Construction of the protective structures for the service road along the Mailuu-Suu River damaged during heavy rains in spring and summer of the year 2010.  Establishment of monitoring system “Discontinuation of pollution infiltration of radionuclides and associated heavy metals into the groundwater from the selected high-risk mine tailings and waste dumps” to be used as an effective substitution for PDO indicator to measure the impact of public 67 health outcome during the life of the project, instead of the evidence that applicable parameters are below hazardous thresholds for humans and livestock in samples of soil, water and air from the monitored sites in the Mailuu-Suu area. Original Components This Project with the total estimated cost of USD 11.96 million consisted of three components: Component 1 - Uranium Mining Wastes Isolation and Protection Component 2 - Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring Component 3 – Project management Top priority activities: Subcomponent А1 - Tectonic Landslide Unloading; Subcomponent А2 - Tailings and Waste Rock Dumps Inspection and Rehabilitation; Subcomponent А3 - Koi-Tash Landslide – Diversion of Surface Water Runoff; Subcomponent А4 - Landslide Monitoring and Early Warning Systems; Subcomponent А5 – Riverbank Strengthening along Aylyampa Sai and Mailuu-Suu Rivers Activities for long-term improvement of the situation: Subcomponent А6 – Tailing Number 3; Subcomponent А7 - Koi-Tash Landslide The goals and objectives would be achieved through implementing the key emergency mitigation measures aimed at:  isolation and protection of the abandoned uranium mining wastes from disturbance by natural processes such as landslides, floods, and leaching and dispersal by ground- and surface-water drainage  establishment of an effective disaster management and response system which would be appropriate for national, regional and subordinated authorities and local communities;  development of the real-time landslide monitoring and warning system in key hazard areas; Component 2 – Improvement of Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring The Component would include: • Capacity Building • Monitoring System in Mailuu-Suu area • Warning and communication system, and exchange of information • Technical, social and environmental audit • Operating costs for ERC equipment This Component would provide goods, works and services to: (i) improve the national system for disaster management, preparedness, and response that can be administered and implemented effectively by national, regional and subordinated authorities, and local communities; (ii) establish real-time systems to detect and warn against active landslide movements in key hazard areas, and provide equipment for seismic measurements; and (iii) set up a monitoring system in Mailuu-Suu area. 68 Following the terms and conditions of the Grant Agreement, the PIU submitted quarterly reports on project implementation to the World Bank, and the Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic to the Ministry of Emergency Situations, which was the Implementing Agency for the Project. Component under this Component remained unchanged Strengthening the environmental regulatory framework Besides International Conventions/Agreements ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic, a number of international Central Asia agreements regarding cooperation in management and conservation of natural resources, as well as dealing with trans-boundary matters concerning natural disasters, including uranium mine tailings and water resources distribution, have been signed. Agreements that are of the vital importance for the project are as follows:  Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on joint efforts to rehabilitate areas of tailings and waste rock dumps that have trans-boundary impact had been signed in Tashkent on April 5, 1996;  Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on using water and power resources of Syr Darya River basin had been signed in Bishkek on March 17, 1998. This Agreement related to cooperation in mitigating adverse impacts of the spring floods, mud flows and other disasters;  Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on cooperation in n the field of environmental protection and management had been signed in Bishkek on March 17, 1998;  Resolution by the Council of Prime Ministers of the CAEC States dated June 17, 1999, on Implementing Agreement Between the Governments of the CAEC States on Joint Efforts to Rehabilitate Areas of Tailings and Waste Rock Dumps that Have Trans-Boundary Impact, dated April 5, 1996, had been signed in Bishkek on June 17, 1999;  Bishkek Declaration signed in Bishkek on October 10, 2003, by the Heads of delegations of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and supported by the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation and others, on cooperation and collaboration in dealing with legacy issues of the uranium mines, waste dumps and tailings. Project Design and Quality at the Initial Stage At the project preparation stage a comprehensive site inventory has been carried out in coordination with the EU-TACIS-2003 and under the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Project carried out in 2004. During the project preparation it was obvious that the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project could cover only areas of the highest risk and in need of urgent environmental recovery 46 as the activities covering all areas would have required periods longer than those acceptable for the WB projects and beyond the resources available. 46 As per the TACIS-2003, 36 sites had been selected (23 storage facilities and 13 waste rock dumps). 69 Risk assessment and activities prioritization have been analyzed before 2005 in order to select the areas of high risks of pollution or landsliding where the population or water resources could be affected since processing of tailings and waste rock dumps at such areas was impossible because of the limited resources and focus of the project. In 2006 the areas have been selected and it became possible to start with detail surveys and engineering planning as a basis for contracting and procurement of the works. Project appraisal The main project outcome indicators included: (i) Evidence that the applicable parameters are below hazardous thresholds for humans, livestock, and river flora and fauna in samples of soil, water and air from monitored sites in the Mailuu-Suu area; (ii) Evidence of high satisfaction rates among the local population in the Mailuu-Suu area; (iii) Evidence that a disaster hazard monitoring, warning, and response system is functioning and being used effectively by cooperating national, oblast, and district (rayon) authorities, and local communities; (iv) Evidence that real-time landslide monitoring and warning systems are functioning and being used effectively by local communities. In May 2005, the contract for design and supervisory services had been signed with the Consortium – GeoConsult (Austria), WISUTEC and DMT (Germany) – as part of Component 1 implementation. Survey consultant has provided the list of the sites for which it was required to take long-term measures concerning the waste rock dumps and tailings (Conceptual Report) As result of competitive bidding, the contract for services under Component 2 has been awarded to Scott Wilson Ltd in cooperation with Crown Agents (Great Britain) and William Lettis & Associates (WLA) Inc. (USA). Amount of the contract was GBP 523,941. This company also provided its services under the ADB-financed project for reducing vulnerability of the poor population to disasters (amount of the contract was GBP 326,075.00). In December 2006 the company had provided the inception report. International Geotechnical Expert (Luciano Minetti) assisted the Design Consultant in carrying out stability analysis. International Consultant in cooperation with the local experts held additional selection of the international regulatory and legal documents, technical standards and rules applicable for the landslide unloading. A panel of international and local consultants has implemented investigations, surveys, researches and projects for all activities of the components. Consultants’ services would be financed by the co-financing PHRD Grant. 70 Panel of Independent Experts Based on the feasibility and design study to be carried out for Tailing No. 3, it was concluded that the preferred option for the long-term solution is re-location of the material, and a Panel of Independent Experts had been established to review the results and recommendations of the study. The Panel included a Geotechnical Expert and a Dam Safety Specialist. In March 2007, based on Project Implementation Plan, terms of reference had been prepared for the Panel of Independent Experts as it was decided to relocate Tailings No.3 and 18 to Tailings No.6 that would require additional expert appraisal of the materials and documents, including EIA documents. The terms of reference had been prepared for the Panel of Independent Experts (International Consultants) specialized in geotechnics, methods and ways of radioactive material relocation, and safety requirements for such works. In April 2007, the contracts was signed with three experts (Fabrizio Pelli, Geotechnical Expert, Mike Fossit, Expert for Tailings Relocation, and Peter Vagit, Expert for Wastes Safety) who, in general, were expected to complete their tasks specified in the Terms of reference within four missions. The first mission had been completed in April 2007. The Panel of Independent Experts had surveyed Tailings No. 3, 18, 6, 11 and 15 in Mailuu-Suu Town and had examined materials of the Feasibility Study for Tailing No. 3 Rehabilitation. In April, a meeting of the specialists from the MES, World Bank, Panel of Independent Experts and supervisory bodies was held to discuss implementation of long-term rehabilitation activities for Tailing No. 3 in Mailuu-Suu. All Mailuu-Suu sites had been investigated in parallel with the WB mission. The second scheduled mission of the Panel of Independent Experts was held in May, 2008, with the purpose to discuss the detailed project for relocating Tailings No. 3 and 18. Outcomes and Objectives Achieved The project was aimed at achieving the set objectives and outcomes by implementing two components. Performance Indicators and the progress are provided in the Annex 1. Outcomes for the activities within each component are presented below: Component - Uranium Mining Wastes Isolation and Protection Tailings and waste rock dumps within the Mailuu-Suu area had been inspected under Component 1 and General Rehabilitation Concept had been prepared. Based on national and international regulations and standards, as well as on up-to-date practices of tailings rehabilitation, design and construction supervision consultant consultants had analyzed the risk to which the abandoned 23 uranium mine tailings and 13 waste rock dumps in the Mailuu-Suu area were exposed. The following activities have been completed for Component 1: 1. Consulting services for designing and supervision On May 20, 2005, as soon as technical and financial appraisal was over, the contract had been signed with the Consortium – GeoConsult (Austria), WISUTEC (Germany) – with amount of the contract of USD 1,177,500. Under this contract, design and survey works for riverbank strengthening along the Aylyampa-Sai River, equipment installation for monitoring and early warning systems for Tectonic and Koi-Tash Landslides, rehabilitation of Waste Dump No.6, rehabilitation of Waste Dumps No.1 and No.2, and for relocation of Waste Dump No.5 had been presented. Design and survey works for constructing service road between the Izolit Plant and Tailing No.6 had been completed. Design and survey works for relocation of Tailings No.3 and 18 and preparation of bidding documents had been completed. 71 2. Tectonic Landslide have been partially unloaded Under this Component, a complete package of the project documents on landslide unloading had been provided and the works for landslide unloading had been monitored. Luciano Minetti, an international consultant hired specifically for this purpose, had provided an active support in preparing project documents. Based on these project documents a tender was held and a contract was signed with Naryngidroenergostroy JSC for landslide unloading. Landslide unloading works started in mid-April, 2006 and was completed in November 2006. About 30,000 cubic meters of soil was excavated. 3. Construction works under fixed-term maintenance of the tailings and waste rock dumps Tailings No. 5, 7, 14 and 16 and Waste Dumps No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 11 have been rehabilitated. In June 2007, a tender for construction works under fixed-term maintenance of the tailings and waste rock dumps was held. As result, the contract for these works was awarded to Naryngidroenergostroy JSC. Works ware started in September 3, 2007 and completed in September 2008. 4. Koi-Tash Landslide – Diversion of Surface Water Runoff Tender for installing equipment of the monitoring and early warning systems for Tectonic and Koi-Tash Landslides was held in November-December 2006. Unfortunately, no foreign or local companies had submitted tender offers. PIU and the Consultant has simplified equipment specifications and the bidding documents have been approved by the Bank. However, as in the first case, no contracting companies had showed their interest in the tender. The tender was canceled. 5. Temporary riverbank strengthening dams have been constructed along the Aylyampa Sai River to protect Tailings No. 2 and 13. As these works were recognized as high-cost activities, it was decided to construct temporary riverbank strengthening dams along the Aylyampa Sai River. Considering urgency of the matter due to spring flood, it was decided to sign an addendum to a contract with Naryngidroenergostroy JSC. The works was started in May and completed in August 2006. The Consultant had executed a proper supervision over the construction works along the Aylyampa Sai River. On October 30, 2007, the World Bank approved construction of medium-term protective structure along the Aylyampa Sai River by Kerbenzholkurulush JSC. Period of contract execution was set as three months. As of the end of March 2008, all works have been completed. The length of protective structure was 185 running meters. 6. Rehabilitation of Waste Dump No.6 Contract for rehabilitation of Waste Dump No.6 was awarded through tendering to Naryngidroenergostroy JSC. The amount of the contract was KGS 5,296,006. The contract was signed on November 15. The works at this site have been completed in August 2007. Riverbank protective structures along the Kara Agach River with length of 228 running meters have been constructed. 7. Relocation of Waste Dump No.5 Waste Dump No.5 has been relocated from Kara-Agach village. The tender was held in October- November 2007. The works have been completed in December 2008 by the contracting company Kerbenzholkurulush JSC. The waste rock dump with volume of 65.2 thousand cubic meters has been transferred to the Tailing No.6 site. 72 8. Service road between Izolit Plant and Tailing No.6 Tender for procurement of works was held in May 2007. IDA approval of the Evaluation Report on awarding the contract to the construction company Kerbenzholkurulush JSC was received on June 2, 2007. As of the end of February 2008, all works at this site have been completed. 9. Rehabilitation of Waste Dumps 1 and 2 along Kulmen Sai River In September, rehabilitation works for Waste Dump 1 and 2 were put out to tender. On December 3, the contract was signed with LOI Company. The works have been completed in May 2009. A half of the material (69 thousand cubic meters) from Waste Dump 1 has been relocated. In May 2011, Rehabilitation of Waste Dumps 1 and 2 along the Kulmen Sai River Project (Relocation of additional volume), DHMP/WORKS-16, was put out for National Competitive Bidding. The company Kerbenzholkurulush JSC won this National Competitive Bidding. The works have been completed in 2012. Implementation of the activities aimed at long-term improvements: 10. Preparatory works for tailings relocation. These works have been distinguished from the relocation of Tailings No. 3 and 18 in order to speed up starting of the works. On April 29, 2009, a tender for preparatory works for relocating Tailings No. 3 and 18 was held and tender offers were opened. As there occurred a delay in approving Tender Evaluation Report by the World Bank, it was decided during the Bank mission held in November 2009 to include the preparatory works into the scope of works under Relocation of Tailings No. 3 and 18. Preparatory works included reconstruction of the metal bridge, bridge passage over the Kara-Agach River and water conduit reconstruction. 11. Relocation of Tailings No. 3 and 18 to Waste Dump No.6. In the period from January to March 2010, International Competitive Bidding was held. On April 7, 2010, the contract with LOI Company was signed. Relocation works have been completed in December 2012. Component 2 - Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring 1. Capacity Building Capacity building program would be implemented to strengthen the ability of the MES, administrations of different levels, and local communities to fulfill their duties and functions, build better awareness and be better prepared in case of disaster. At the beginning of 2007, the consultant delivered training on emergency management and response for the MES officials (members of the working group), ministries and offices that are members of the Inter-Agency Commission for Emergency Prevention and Response established in March 2006. To deliver the training, the consultant used the best materials on the legislation improvement, functional evaluation of the MES system, the National Emergency Management and Response Plan, and the Guidelines for Integrated Emergency Management. In the 2nd quarter, the training seminars continued for the members of the working group participating in the discussion of the other materials set prepared by the consultant. Within the current quarter, the consultant proceeded with delivering training at the district (rayon) level where he consulted officers of the district offices of the MES, district emergency commissions under district state administrations, as well as the officials of the local authorities where pilot communities selected by the ADB are situated. The consultant also delivered training (3 seminars) for the local population on the early emergency response, in particular, risk analysis and assessment, and landslide hazard. In the 2nd quarter of 2008, the consultant provided the PIU with the set of training materials for civil servants related to emergency management and response that would become the basis for a series of training seminars at the central and oblast levels. Civil servants of the ministries and offices, officials of the local public administrations, and municipal officials would be invited to participate in the seminars. 73 Based on the designed state strategy on awareness and dissemination of the materials related to the management and timely response, the consultant had to expand the range of those involved in training, namely engage local communities and NGOs. For those purposes, the consultant had prepared a separate set of training materials aimed at the wide public including NGOs and local communities. To some extent, the materials had been prepared under the ADB project. The training materials were prepared by the consultant in quarter 1 of 2008 to deliver training to the public, and to be used by the PIU to hold training seminars at central and district levels. The draft of the National Emergency Management and Response Plan was discussed at the working seminar in September 2007 in the light of other reports, particularly: • Emergency management cycles. • Types of emergencies by cycles. • Inter-agency cooperation by emergency cycles. • National Plan and Guidelines for Emergency Management and Response. • National Plan and legal framework. • Socio-economic disaster impact assessment. • Resettlement strategy in case of emergency. In September 2006, the representatives of the MES and the Government, and the PIU were on a study tour on the natural disaster management and early response to the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (Japan, September 19 – 27, 2006). The MES made the development of the Emergency Response Centre (ERC) regional network a top priority in its development program. The ERC is intended to support the operation of the unified state system for emergency prevention and response, and ensure the activities of the inter-agency state commission for emergency situations and emergency authorities to address the challenges related to prevention and response to large-scale natural and man-made emergency situations on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. The following activities related to the ERC were performed in 2006: the ERC offices in Bishkek and Osh were renovated; the furniture, communications system, and computers were provided. Video conferencing equipment was installed at Bishkek and Osh ERCs. The Virtual Private Network (VPN) Bishkek - Osh was installed. The main information transmission network is Ethernet of the MES consisting of local area networks at Bishkek and Osh ERCs cities connected by a direct communication channel via the KyrgyzTelecom JSC networks. In 2008, the MES funded construction of the MES administration building for Jalal-Abad oblast where the ERC was located for which the video conferencing equipment was purchased and installed. In 2009, the MES administration building was constructed for Talass oblast to have the ERC located, video conferencing equipment purchased and installed. Today, the video conferencing equipment is installed at seven Emergency Response Centers of the MES, namely: - in Bishkek, Osh, Jalal-Abad, Talass, Naryn, Batken, and Karakol. There is a mobile station (KAMAZ-based). Monitoring System in Mailuu-Suu A comprehensive monitoring system covering climatic, seismic, hydrological, geo-chemical, and environmental parameters in Mailuu-Suu will be developed and implemented to support and complement Component 1 interventions, determine the baseline situation, and measure project outcomes. The interventions will include a weather station, a river flow gauging station, water quality monitoring devices, and radon capture devices. 74 In November 2006, the Terms of Reference for providing consulting services on measuring the baseline water quality in the Mailuu-Suu area was drafted. The draft Terms of Reference was agreed with the IDA head office in 2007. In 2008, the PIU, IDA, and BGR continued to exchange ideas. The timelines assumed were 8 - 10 months. A potential consultant would have to cooperate closely with the BGR team, and rely significantly on the laboratory basis of the municipal Center for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision whose capacities were strengthened through the project funds. The consultant would be required to design and implement a water quality monitoring system in Mailuu-Suu. The monitoring focus will be the impact of tailings and waste rock dumps on the water (rivers, springs, groundwater). On top of everything else, sampling locations would have to be attached directly to the bodies of tailings and waste rock dumps. Water quality monitoring was to be performed before the project commenced, during the project implementation phase, upon the project completion, and prospective monitoring. The monitoring system designed for the project had to be closely linked to the monitoring system designed by the BGR experts. Under the mission of the World Bank that took place on September 12 - 15, 2010, it was decided that the Terms of Reference for the consultant for measuring the baseline water quality with the help of the “Wisutec” LLC experts should be finalized. The proposal by “Wisutec” LLC was forwarded to the World Bank through the DHMP implementation unit for approval in December 2010. After the proposal was approved by the World Bank, a tender for consulting services would be arranged. Water Quality Monitoring In February 2008, the consultant submitted the final version of the technical specifications for a small laboratory and automatic water quality monitoring stations considered by the PIU, and tender documents for purchase of equipment were prepared in March. The following equipment was purchased for the small laboratory of the municipal Center for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision: an automatic water sampler, the technical specification on the small laboratory envisages a spectrophotometer for determining the uranium content in water samples (determines concentrations of more than 40 micrograms per liter). The equipment enables to measure such basic water parameters as the pH value, electrical conductivity, reduction potential, and the dissolved oxygen content. In addition, the consultant submitted the technical specifications for two automatic water quality monitoring stations. Based on the results of the tender for purchase of the equipment for the laboratory and two automatic water quality monitoring stations, the contracts were awarded to the Chu Environmental Laboratory. The contractor accomplished the delivery and the works in May 2008. The values of the contracts were KGS 3.6 mln. and KGS 3.75 mln., respectively. Health Data Processing and Outreach A research had been earlier conducted to define if there might be any connection between the activity of uranium mines in the Mailuu-Suu area and the diseases related thereto, for example cancer. The consultant examined the possibility of gaining a better understanding of the impact that tailings could have on people’s health. The research monitoring could provide qualitative information on the health and improve the data accounting system and the system for disseminating data among the general public. In quarter 2 of 2006, a geochemist arranged the meetings and consultations required in Mailuu-Suu city. A small-scale health care program was designed by the consultant in July 2007. In September 2007, the program was transferred to the municipal Center for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision, municipal medical institutions, and other shareholders so that they could review the program, make comments and suggest options for its improvement. In May 2008, a seminar was arranged in Mailuu-Suu to discuss the 75 program and design activities for implementation thereof. In the future, four municipal medical institutions headed by the municipal Center for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision would have to actively support the program. The population residing in the neighboring villages of Nooken area and Mailuu-Suu city was surveyed under these activities, and the outcomes of these surveys were submitted to the DHMP implementation unit in November 2010. Long-Term Water Quality Monitoring The current situation in Mailuu-Suu should be taken into account when introducing a local system for monitoring the uranium content and other water parameters. The attributes of the existing water monitoring system are lack of equipment, shortage of skilled personnel, and underdeveloped infrastructure. The World Bank proposed the Terms of Reference for the long-term Monitoring Radionuclides and Heavy Metals in Water Sources of Mailuu-Suu Program. The World Bank approved the procurement plan and the Terms of Reference designed by the consultant of “Wisutec” LLC for the long-term water monitoring in Mailuu-Suu on October 12, 2011. On October 31, 2011, the consultant selection process was completed. In January 2012, the consultant submitted an initial report and a draft of the technical specifications for a small laboratory and automatic water quality monitoring stations considered by the PIU. Tender documentation for purchase of equipment was prepared in March. The procurement process for laboratory equipment in Mailuu- Suu was completed on July 31, 2012 and August 14, 2012. The contract for UMF procurement was signed with Tekhnotsentr LLC, Russia, on August 2, 2012. As far as other laboratory equipment is concerned, the contracts were concluded on August 16, 2012, with the local companies, namely “Ilim” “Research and Production Association” LLC, “Rosse –Techno” LLC, and “Delta-Lot” LLC. The laboratory equipment for the municipal Center for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision in Mailuu-Suu was delivered. River Stations in Mailuu-Suu One gauging station was planned to be constructed for measuring the Mailuu-Suu river flow. The data was required for the monitoring system installed in Mailuu-Suu to monitor the river flow in different seasons of the year. This was important as there were cases recorded of different substances washed out of tailings and waste rock dumps and further falling into the river. In quarter 3 of 2006, the consultant undertook a study to determine the place where the gauging station would be constructed, which was subsequently agreed with the PIU and the MES staff. The consultant submitted the final technical specifications in January 2007. The design and estimate documentation for the gauging station was submitted to the PIU in September 2007. The tender took place in November, and the contract for KGS 3,899,886 was awarded to Kochkorataayiylkurulush JSC. The construction began in January 2008. The gauging station was commissioned in September 2008. 3. Warning, Communications, and Information Exchange Systems Landslide Monitoring and Early Warning Systems A large number of locations were under a serious threat of very large landslides. Landslides were of great concern to the MES, the local authorities, and the residents living in the nearby valleys as the potential threat of landslides was constant, and in case of any, it would cause people’s deaths. The design was prepared by consultant Minetti in 2004. It was him together with the PIU personnel who designed technical specifications for geotechnical instrumentation (piezometers, extensometers, georobots, etc.) in 2005. A tender for goods and works procurement was arranged in May 2006, and the contract was awarded to “Chu Environmental Laboratory” LLC amounting 76 to KGS 9,640.8 thousand (about US$ 250 million). The works commenced in June 2006. The central control units were located in the buildings of respective municipal and rural authorities, and the data was recorded on a continuous basis. Every community where control units were installed (computation), had 2 specialists trained who had participated in the process of construction, installation, and debugging. Every specialist was awarded a certificate confirming their qualifications. In December 2006, all of the facilities were accepted by special commissions, and acceptance certificates were issued. Construction works on the landslide monitoring and early warning systems in Osh and Jalal-Abad oblasts completed: geotechnical equipment for early landslide warning was installed, namely 6 piezometers and 10 extensometers in set with the radio equipment, for 5 pilot landslides in 3 localities including: 1) Taran–Bazar school in Taran-Bazar village, Suzak district, Jalal-Abad oblast; 2) Gulcha – 2002; 3) Gulcha transport base in Gulcha village, Alay district, Osh oblast; 4) Kok-Yangak Center; 5) Kok-Yangak Capital mine in Kok- Yangak. The landslide monitoring and early warning systems were installed in 2006 and transferred to the balance of ayiylny districts where the systems were located. The instrumentation was well adjusted and was functioning in accordance with the technical parameters set. However, soon after, the systems were broken and stolen by the local population. In 2007, the equipment was reinstalled and commissioned. Unfortunately, as of today, these landslide monitoring and early warning systems are out of operation. Those events resulted in the following: in 2011, under the Component “Emergency Preparedness and Monitoring”, the low-cost approach to landslide monitoring and early warning was put into practice. The materials on training, outreach and landslide monitoring were introduced to the five pilot sites where the computerized monitoring systems had ceased to function. Training and discussion sessions were arranged for the public and decision-makers as well as the school children in Taran-Bazar which is most exposed to landslide hazard. In addition, another training and outreach campaign were arranged for the school children in the summer of 2012. Most distinguished participants were defined and rewarded with valuable prizes. Technical, Social and Environmental Audits In 2008, Terms of Reference for all the three types of audits were drafted and submitted for approval to the World Bank headquarters. Given the permanent technical supervision provided by the consultant, PIU, and the World Bank technical expert during design, construction and operation of the facilities within the warranty period, and inspections conducted by the relevant authorities, and as agreed by the World Bank mission, it had been decided that no additional technical audit was need. The mid-term social and environmental audits were scheduled for 2012. ERC Equipment Operating Costs The ERC equipment operating costs are the responsibility of the Ministry of Emergency Situations as the Emergency Response Center has been transferred to the balance of the Ministry. Component 3 - Project Management The component provided adequate financing to the personnel and activities of the Project Implementation Unit. Experienced international management consultants were engaged at the very beginning for the period of up to one year to provide assistance to the PIU staff on the project implementation, and arrange on-site training for the PIU personnel. That improved the knowledge and skills of the staff, and allowed to quickly and adequately implement the project to the full extent. 77 The required vehicles and office equipment were purchased to facilitate the PIU activities. Little repair was done in the offices in Bishkek, Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Mailuu-Suu. Additional operating costs (operation and maintenance of vehicles, travel and subsistence costs of the PIU personnel, office and computer supplies, and other expenses) would be largely covered by the project funds. Several technical and social audits would be conducted during the project implementation phase to evaluate the project implementation and PDO indicators achievement. Annual independent audits were also financed under the component. The project implementation proceeded successfully for the most of the time though delays occurred. The difficulties were as follows: • high employed turnover, particularly at the initial stages of the project and in 2009, in the period when the MES and the PIU were relocated from Bishkek to Osh (the period when the personnel had to be completely replaced, and administrative functions were suspended for almost 6 months); • short-term procurement problems in 2007; • more frequent problems related to supervising the activities performed by consultants and contractors. However, the commitment of the Government to the project implementation was the key to solving the problems, the World Bank team participating. Project Implementation Unit A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was established under the Implementing Agency to implement the project. The Unit included substantive and auxiliary personnel, namely a manager, a financial manager, a design engineer, a marketer, a monitoring specialist, a civil engineer, a public relations officer, a disbursement specialist, an office manager, a translator/interpreter, and drivers. Office supplies and equipment required by the PIU was purchased. Activities by International Consultant, PIU advisor. Bernard Velz (Germany), the consultant selected, completed all the three phases of consulting services provision within 2005 – 2006. Technical support was provided to the PMU and concerned the issues on the project management effectiveness, documentation maintenance file system creation, and financial and technical monitoring development. Jointly with the PMU, work schedules were developed for international and local companies engaged in project and tender documentation design. The contract amounted to US$ 151,000. PIU staff. In 2005, the PIU was established in Bishkek and consisted of seven professionals and several auxiliary staff (drivers, and a secretary). In accordance with the order of the MES dated May 15, 2009, the PIU was transferred to Osh. A new PIU director was assigned. As due to family and other reasons, relocation to Osh was impossible, the manager, the disbursement specialist, the cashier, the interpreter/secretary, the design engineer, the ICT specialist, and the marketer were dismissed on June 15, 2009. In August -September 2009, the key positions of the Project Implementation Unit were staffed, and the auxiliary personnel was in place. Audits. To audit the Disaster Hazard Mitigation project, on February 27, 2006, the contract was concluded with the “Jacobs Audit” amounting to US$ 3,800. The auditing services were delivered in June 2006. The contract for DHMP signed for 2007 amounted to US$ 4,600; the contract value in 2008 made US$ 5,500; and US$ 5,300 in 2009. To audit the DHMP 2010, the contract was signed with “Marka Audit”, and the amount contracted was US$ 5,984; the amount of the contract for 2011 was US$ 5,984; and the contract for 2012 amounted to US$ 5,984. 78 Renovation of PIU Offices. Offices in Bishkek and Mailuu-Suu were renovated in May 2005. The office in Osh was renovated in October – November 2009. PIU Equipment. In 2007, the contracts of purchase were concluded for purchasing 3 vehicles, furniture, computers, and office equipment. In 2009, one “Chevrolet Niva” was purchased from the local company “ABM cars”. Critical Analysis Performed by the World Bank, Government, and the Technical Support Group Appraisal of the World Bank and Other Partners’ Performance World Bank Key decisions facilitating the project implementation The project implementation was closely monitored by the Bank team which greatly assisted in the following: - design the legislation necessary to perform the activities planned under the components of the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project; - design the tender documentation, terms of reference, environmental management plans, etc.; - disseminate the information related to the project by involving the Bank representatives in various workshops; - acquire timely response to our technical requirements or requests for assistance on issues related to the World Bank procedures; - successfully share the WB knowledge with the PIU regarding the transfer of radioactive waste, management, etc., as well as the procurement procedures; - ensure that the project implementation was properly funded by the government; - provide timely support, when additional IDA funding was provided for the Mailuu-Suu River bank protection along the service road and for transfer of additional volume of Waste Dump No.1; - acquire timely approval for project extension. A joint analysis of the activities from the beginning of 2006 performed by the World Bank and the entities responsible for the project implementation showed that it would be not possible to have the planned activities on the project whose closing date had been determined March 31, 2010, accomplished. So, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic formally requested of the project extension with the closing date identified December 31, 2012. The request was acceded by the Bank, and the project was closed at the end of 2012. Co-financing included the PHRD grant by the Government of Japan for capacity building (US$ 1.95 mln.) and a GEF grant request for financing medium-sized projects (US$ 1.0 mln.). Other partners, to a certain extent, also coordinated funding of the project activities related to technical and social issues (for example, ADB, BGR, EU, IAEA, and UNDP). It should be mentioned that the IAEA played an important role as a technical partner that promoted introduction of the best practices and standards within project activities envisaged by Component 1. No comments were received from the co-financing organizations. World Bank’s Key Decisions Preventing Project Implementation Not available. World Bank’s Supervision Evaluation The Bank played a key role in the identification, preparation and evaluation of this project. 79 The Bank provided support during the project implementation phase by monitoring and / or implementing support missions, as well as analyzing and providing permits or, if necessary, providing comments and recommendations on the procurement documents prepared by the DHMP implementation unit. Supervisory and support missions were carried out two times a year, on a fairly regular basis. The missions were pragmatic, each including site visits and programs and operations analyses, and the key personnel of the DHMP implementation unit had a lot to learn. When the PIU was relocated from Bishkek to Osh, the World Bank team contributed greatly to the PIU capacity restoration, it particularly concerned the administration, financial management and procurement procedures. A special contribution that should be noted was the assistance of the World Bank Infrastructure Consultant: not only did the Consultant provide technical advice during the Bank missions on the project, but the DHMP implementation unit was provided with written recommendations on the types of construction works had to be taken account when designing technical specifications for the upcoming construction contracts and conducting monitoring visits to the sites. It should be also mentioned that the World Bank team did its best in ensuring that the funds required for the project implementation were provided by the government. Taking the aforementioned into account, we consider the Bank’s performance as highly satisfactory. Appraisal of the Government Performance at Project Implementation Key decisions facilitating the project implementation In general, the Government did support the Project and objectives thereof, which became one of the decisive factors for success. As already mentioned, in spite of the two serious financial crises of 2005 and 2010 accompanied by significant changes in the state administration, the support provided to the project seemed to be continuous with relatively short work stoppages. Before and during the project preparation and during project implementation, the focus was on continuous improvement of the natural disaster prevention and mitigation measures and fulfillment of environmental damage restoration commitments (particularly in Mailuu-Suu, the area situated downstream from the river basin in Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan). The fact that the final decision regarding the approval of the National Emergency Prevention and Response Plan (see Par. 68 above) was frozen led to some doubts about the Government’s commitment to fulfill its obligations on introducing potential disasters prevention and response measures. However, the MES and the Government worked on the National Platform of the Kyrgyz Republic for Disaster Risk Reduction, which confirmed the Government’s commitments. In addition, the Government proved its commitment to the project and the project objectives by continuously providing counterpart funding during the project implementation; and designing and implementing technical management and monitoring programs during the last stage of the project and after the project had been closed at its own expense. 1. The project was implemented by the PIU under the MES (later under the Tailings Management Agency (TMA) subordinated to the MES). The MES maintained its commitment to the project objectives at all the project phases. Some of the issues concerned the following: - the PIU personnel at the beginning of the project and after the MES had been relocated to Osh; - location of and functioning support, starting from 2006, to the ERC system which proved to be useful (for example, severe winter of 2012 which affected the population, and numerous cases of landslides that took place in 2011-2012.) 80 - establishment of the Tailings Management Agency which would be responsible for fulfilling the environmental damage obligations; - technical maintenance of the rehabilitated areas, starting from 2010, completion of the activities, and implementation of the closure plan, i.e. after closing the project in December 2012 until today (November 2013). 2. Still, in spite of great difficulties with staff turnover at the beginning of the project and after the decision taken on relocation to Osh, the PIU performance was satisfactory, on the whole. The PIU team, for the most part, consisted of the experts specializing in management, including experts on fiduciary issues, and the international consultants with whom the contracts had been concluded for the duration of the project, provided assistance on the technical aspects. The team also included a public relations specialist with the home base in Mailuu-Suu whose job was to deal with local communities. No serious or specific challenges were mentioned with regard to procurement, and financial management beside short-term challenges that, in general, were resolvable. The PIU would draw comprehensive quarterly and annual reports as agreed in the Grant Agreement including M&E reports, and would use the indicators of the Project Performance Matrix and performance criteria of the Environment Management Plan as the main tools for monitoring. 3. However, some restrictions were mentioned in the Aid Memoires on the Mission. They particularly referred to consultants and supervision of activities undertaken by contractors. As already mentioned, several issues associated with contracts execution had to be resolved by involving the World Bank team to correct or eliminate the deficiencies. At the end of the project, it could be seen that the project management had significantly worsened, as the focus was on the transfer of Storage Facility No.18, which had not been agreed upon, instead of focusing on the implementation of the closure plan, as a result, the project management was evaluated as moderately unsatisfactory. However, based on the Implementation Completion and Results Report mission, all the activities performed including the closure plan had been completed, which could lead to a satisfactory evaluation. Key decisions preventing project implementation - Adverse weather conditions, political events that took place in the country in 2005 – 2010; PIU office relocation from Bishkek to Osh in 2009; the population protesting from June to September 2010 against relocation of Tailing No.3 to Tailing No.6. Four outreach campaigns on the DHMP were arranged for the population residing in villages Sary-Bee and Kara-Zhygach, and Mailuu- Suu with the PIU staff, “Wisutec” LLC representative, experts of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Kyrgyz Republic, and representatives of the local administration involved. Timely co-financing No payments were delayed by the Government, except the last ones of 2012. Government changes and impact on monitoring and evaluation ­ Based on the decision of the Government, the Ministry of Emergency Situations was relocated to Osh in 2009, so was the PIU which was originally based in Bishkek. As the PIU key personnel refused to relocate, a new PIU had to be established. The relocation adversely affected the project status, and it only improved when the new PIU started working in full force. ­ Considering the support, commitment and accomplishments of the Government, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the PIU, as well as the above mentioned drawbacks, the Borrower performance was evaluated as satisfactory. 81 Key Lessons Learnt The DHMP refers to the type of complex projects that are not often implemented by the Bank or other donors due to the difficulties of the activities associated with highly specialized technical and scientific concepts, and such sensitive topics for communities, for example the obligation to restore environmental damage caused by mining enterprises, not to mention radioactive enterprises, that may affect their interests. In this sense, the project has provided a positive experience from which the Bank and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic could learn some lessons to consider them when developing similar projects in the future: Communities Interaction and Participation. From the very beginning of the project, the focus has to be made on sustainability through community participation. The DHMP has proved that the interaction and participation of communities is one of the key elements of the design, implementation and sustainability of natural disasters and the responsibility of projects for preservation and restoration of the environmental situation. o In case of activities on restoration of the environmental situation under Component 1: implementation of the coherent interaction and participation strategy including for example a proactive information center established in Mailuu-Suu could help the population to better understand the current plans, and simplify future maintenance (for example, avoid damages to fences or materials) of tailings or waste rock dumps, etc. o In case of landslide monitoring (Component 2): involving the school in Taran-Bazar highlighted certain advantages of unsophisticated / low cost options in comparison with the technically advanced and more expensive options selected at the beginning of the project. o Indeed, the integrity of interaction, training or awareness–building shall be provided within the institutional system making it a function, for example TMA / MES, as well as within municipal authorities or local schools administrations. Such capacity development shall be the incorporated in the project plan from the very beginning. Project design. o The importance of involving as many experienced international and internal experts as possible from the design phase till the project closing time for the projects associated with complex scientific or technical concepts was proved by the DHMP. o Monitoring and maintenance sustainability. Project closing plans of similar projects should be integrated into the initial or early engineering planning phase to have sufficient time and clear rules for strengthening of the state capacity at the local, district, oblast and national level to smoothly move over to the project closing and ensure adequate long- term monitoring and maintenance of the project. o The time required for design and implementation of the relatively complex, in terms of technical, institutional or communications aspect, projects should not be underestimated. It particularly refers to the cases where we can assume probable additional climatic or political circumstances or other technical difficulties. Taking the DHMP as an example, the project implementation time targeted was 2004 – 2010, but in fact, given the project modifications, the project was extended to 2012, i.e. 9 years (including the time for post- project activities). Productivity and Quality Evaluation of the World Bank - Government Relations at the Project Implementation The Government has completed the activities that remained to be performed after the project closing-up, and established an institutional tool aimed to ensure proper maintenance of the 82 Mailuu-Suu area and the communications system for natural disasters. Pilot landslide monitoring system at the community level is still operating, which is almost a year after the project was closed. Despite the commitment of the current Government to fulfill its obligations and the focus on the natural disasters, as well as the improvement of the ecological situation in the Mailuu-Suu area, only in a longer term will it be possible to see whether the performance indicators of the Tailings Management Agency (TMA), local government bodies, and local communities are observed both in terms of the budget allocation when dealing with priorities in the economy and development and in terms of adequate staffing. Today, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is working to develop the mining sector (related mainly to gold and basic metals extraction) and improve the management of the sector. Environment protection management including monitoring and mining sites closure is an important element of such development. Joint activities on arranging mining operations and environment measures could provide the opportunity to further develop the experience gained through the Project, and contribute to the economic development of the country. The Project contributed in acquiring great experience by public officials, technical staff and local contractors in fulfilling their commitment to restore the environmental damage caused by mining companies. Such experience should be shared through workshops and conferences. 83 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders The Disaster Hazard Mitigations was supported by a co-financing Grant from PHRD in the amount of US$1.95 million and a Grant from the Global Environmental Facility in the amount of US$1.0 million. In addition, as indicated in this ICR, there was substantial technical and parallel financial support from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria. Purpose of the PHRD Grant was to co-finance the DHMP project for the following activities: Priority interventions for Mailuu Suu component Provision of technical assistance to: (i) review all relevant standards and norms, including technical standards related to emergency activities and together with staff of the MEE and related agencies, assist counterparts in the development of new standards and norms in line with international norms, and train the Kyrgyz specialists in interpreting these standards; (ii) carry out necessary field surveys and investigations (e.g., topographic, geomorphologic, seismic, and hydrological); (iii) build capacity and train personnel of MEE and design agencies of the Recipient in internationally accepted best-practice methodologies for investigation, risk analysis, identification, and analysis of potential design solutions for the various urgent priority tailings and landslide issues to be addressed under the Project; (iv) provide knowledge and skills to counterparts in the review of design options for the various priority interventions planned under the Project (civil works, installation of monitoring equipment, etc.) and with the assessment of design parameters, design options, and costs; and (v) introduce modem design methods and build capacity of relevant agencies of the Recipient to prepare environmental assessments for the various interventions planned under the Project, including skills development in construction supervision to ensure that construction follows design specifications. Strengthening the institutional and technical capacity for disaster preparedness component. Provision of technical assistance to: (i) review the current functions of the NEE and regional administrative agencies involved in emergency situations and design, management, organizational, administrative, and functional programs and processes to create more effective entities and prepare a plan detailing operational procedures of MEE before and during emergencies, including alerting, warning, activation, and emergency declaration standards including design procedures and systems for the collection and analysis of flood, seismic, landslide and other disaster data and develop dissemination systems; (ii) review existing legislation and regulations governing disaster affairs and civil defense, and support the drafting of necessary legislation and regulations for the implementation of the national emergency management and response plan; (iii) provide on-the-job training to staff of the MEE and regional administrative offices that would be involved in emergency management and response; and (iv) develop and provide country-wide training in a robust public education and hazard awareness program to inform residents regarding the nature of risk and appropriate actions to be taken at the time of an emergency. Support for Project implementation and long-term investment plan component. Provision of technical assistance to build capacity for long-term mitigation solutions for Mailuu- Suu landslides and tailings by assisting MEE's technical staff to carry out technical surveys and investigations and determine all possible alternatives for long-term mitigation of the landslide and tailings problems, before selecting preferred solutions, in particular, alternative interventions for long-term tailings and landslide stabilization through field investigations (e.g., topographic, geomorphologic, seismic, and hydrological). The Closing Date of the PHRD Grant was March 31, 2010 and the Grant was 100% disbursed. 84 The global environmental objective of the GEF Grant was to protect the integrity of the Mailuu- Suu ecosystem by addressing transboundary contamination of the Mailuu-Suu river and land degradation in the surrounding areas. The GEF Grant co-financed the two components under the IDA Grant: Component 1 – Uranium Mining Wastes Isolation and Protection; Component 2 – Disaster Preparedness and Monitoring (DPM), the Project Management Component was only financed by the IDA Grant. The Grant closed on October 31, 2011 and the grant was disbursed 100%. For the GEF-Grant as separate Implementation Completion Memorandum was prepared in line with the requirements and template of the Global Environmental Facility. 85 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents • Final Report of EC-TACIS Project on Remediation of Uranium Mining and Mining Tailings in Mailuu-Suu District Kyrgyzstan, (Consortium SCK-CEN-Gester-Quarch, Mol Belgium, May 2003) • JV Geoconsult- Wisutec: Feasibility Study on remediation of waste dumps and tailings ponds, February 2006. 86 IBRD 33219R 70 72 74 76 78 80 KAZAKHSTAN To Almaty To Almaty To Dzhambul KAZAKHSTAN To Dzhambul Kant Tyup Kara- BISHKEK Balta Tokmok Tala Cholpon-Ata s TALAS C H U I Balykchi KARA KOL Lake Issyk-Kul TA L A S Orto-Tokoy Dam 1580 m Peak Pobedy 7439 m 42 Tunuk Chu ISSYK-KUL Enilchek Barskaun 42 al atk m Ch Shyirak ko Toktogul P is Lake Toktogul JALALABAD Reservoir Sonkul Lake Chorvoq Kara-Say n ry Kara-Kul Na TASHKENT Tash- For Detail, Na r yn Ala-Buka Kumyr See IBRD 33220 NARYN Ugyut U Z B Mailuu-Suu hi E K I q irc Ch S T NARYN He uk an a rt A -A Al a -B To xk Angren N Kok- Dzhangak k Ke Namangan Sy ar ya rD rD JALALABAD y A k sa ar Andizhan Sy ya Andijen Dam Uzgen Kek-Aigyp C H I N A Ku Oy-Tal Karakum rsh Lake Fergana OSH ab Gul'cha 78 80 Alay-Kuu Papan Kyzyl-Kiya Dam To Taxkorgan 40 Sulyukta O S H KYRGYZ REPUBLIC BATKEN 40 Ravat Khaidarken DISASTER HAZARD MITIGATION PROJECT B AT K E N u Sary-Tash 76 LANDSLIDE AREAS l- Su K y zy 45˚E 60˚E 75˚E 90˚E DEGREES OF LANDSLIDE HAZARDS: RIVERS Daraut-Korgan RUSSIAN F E D E R AT I O N To Dushanbe UNSTABLE LANDSLIDE AREAS, LAKES WITH EXTREME RISK OF COLLAPSE MAIN ROADS UNSTABLE LANDSLIDE AREAS, NATIONAL CAPITAL To Murgab WITH MEDIUM RISK OF COLLAPSE K A Z A K H S TA N OBLAST (REGION) CAPITALS POTENTIAL LANDSLIDE AREAS, Lake WITH INCREASED EVIDENCE SELECTED CITIES Balkash TAJIKISTAN Aral Sea 45˚N OF INSTABILTIY RAYON (DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES Ca Sy sp Da OBLAST (REGION) BOUNDARIES r KYRGYZ ian GEORGIA ry a REPUBLIC ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN UZBEKISTAN INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES TURKEY TURKMENISTAN Sea TAJIKISTAN CHINA This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information IRAQ AFGHANISTAN shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank I RA N 0 50 100 150 Kilometers GSDPM Map Design Unit Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. PAKISTAN 30˚N KUWAIT 0 25 50 75 100 Miles SAUDI INDIA NEPAL 70 72 74 A RA B I A NOVEMBER 2013 IBRD 33220R This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. GSDPM Map Design Unit 0 1 2 KILOMETERS 6 7 5 Sary Biye Village Kara-Agach Village Koi-Tash Landslide V Tectonic Landslide 18 3 8 9 19 10 11 16 I II Kulmen Sai River 14 Mailuu-Suu Town Aylyampa Sai River 23 1 4 2 13 K Y RG Y Z REP UBL IC DISASTER HAZARD MITIGATION PROJECT Mailuu-Suu River MAILUU-SUU AREA: TAILINGS, WASTE DUMPS, AND LANDSLIDES UNSTABLE LANDSLIDES WITH RUSSIAN RUSSIAN EXTREME RISK OF COLLAPSE FEDERATION FEDERATION OLDER LANDSLIDES THAT ARE RE-ACTIVATED AZERBAIJAN Aral Sea KAZAKHSTAN OLD STABLIZED LANDSLIDES Caspian UZ ANCIENT LANDSLIDE SLOPES Lake MONGOLIA Sea TUR BE Balkash KM TAILINGS KI E ST AN ROCK WASTE DUMPS N IST Mailuu- Suu KYRGYZ AN REP. TOWNS AND VILLAGES ISLAMIC TAJIKIS TA ROADS REPUBLIC CHINA N OF IRAN RIVERS AFGHANISTAN CONTOURS NOVEMBER 2013