Country Report on Poland
Road Safety Management Capacity Review

June, 2013
# Table of Contents

Currency Equivalents .................................................................................................................. 6
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. 6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................. 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 8
OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................... 14

1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 15
   1.1 Poland’s Transport and Health Policy Context ................................................................. 15
   1.2 The Global Road Safety Situation .................................................................................. 16
   1.3 The Safe System Approach ............................................................................................. 16
   1.4 The EU context .................................................................................................................... 17

2 REVIEW DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................. 22
   2.1 Aims of the Review ............................................................................................................. 22
   2.2 Background to Review ...................................................................................................... 22
   2.3 Review Methodology and Timetable ................................................................................ 23

3 ROAD SAFETY SITUATION AND INSTITUTIONS IN POLAND ............................................ 25
   3.1 Background and National Situation .................................................................................... 25
   3.2 Institutional context: current road safety management systems and institutions at the national level ........................................................................................................................................... 25
   3.3 Road safety organization in self-government and linkages to national administration 26
   3.4 Non-governmental road safety organizations .................................................................. 28
   3.5 Trends in road traffic fatalities and injuries at national level ............................................. 28
   3.6 Casualties by road user group: vehicle occupants, motorcyclists, bicyclists, pedestrians. ......................................................................................................................................................... 30
   3.7 Road safety risk factors ...................................................................................................... 30
   3.8 Road safety performance and self-government: Crashes across Voivodships ............... 33
   3.9 Summary of key fatal and injury crash factors in Poland. ................................................ 34

4 KEY REVIEW FINDINGS ON ROAD SAFETY MANAGEMENT CAPACITY ....................... 35
   4.1 Creating an evidence-based approach .............................................................................. 35
   4.2 Road safety management capacity and organization of road safety activity ............... 36
       4.2.1 Capacity for institutional management functions .................................................. 36
4.2.2 Capacity for interventions ................................................................. 40
4.2.3 Capacity for results ................................................................. 41
4.2.4 Summary ................................................................................. 41
4.2.5 Detailed findings ..................................................................... 42

5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO CAPACITY FOR INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS ................................................................. 54
5.1 Results focus ............................................................................. 54
  5.1.1 Political leadership ................................................................. 54
  5.1.2 Lead Agency responsibilities .................................................. 55
  5.1.3 Creating national results focus ............................................. 56
5.2 Coordination and Promotion ...................................................... 58
  5.2.1 Partner agencies in national government ................................ 58
  5.2.2 National/self-government linkages and cooperation ............ 58
  5.2.3 Other Stakeholders in road safety ........................................ 59
5.3 Legislation ..................................................................................... 60
5.4 Funding and resource allocation ................................................ 61
5.5 Monitoring, evaluation and research ......................................... 62

6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO CAPACITY FOR INTERVENTIONS ......................................................................................... 64
6.1 Road network ............................................................................. 64
6.2 Speed management ..................................................................... 65
6.3 Road users .................................................................................. 66
6.4 Vehicles ....................................................................................... 67
6.5 Emergency services and Post-crash care ................................... 67

7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO CAPACITY FOR RESULTS ...................................................................................... 68
7.1 Final outcome data ..................................................................... 68
7.2 Intermediate outcome data ......................................................... 68
7.3 Output data .................................................................................. 69

8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................... 70
REFERENCES ................................................................................. 76
Annexes:
ANNEX 1: World Bank Guidelines for capacity reviews ..........................................................79
ANNEX 2: List of people and organizations consulted ..............................................................80
ANNEX 3: Table of brief descriptions of roles of National Government agencies and entities
related to road safety ...............................................................................................................83
ANNEX 4: List of Research Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations ..........84
ANNEX 5: Information systems and data system requirements ..............................................85
ANNEX 6: The “Roads of Trust” Program ..............................................................................88
ANNEX 7: Road administrative categories and scopes of responsibility of the road
administrations ......................................................................................................................93
ANNEX 8: Role and Structure of Lead Agency .....................................................................94
ANNEX 9: Recommendations for Investment in Road Safety Actions to provide early wins
and sustainable support for road safety activities ..............................................................96
ANNEX 10: Agenda and List of Participants for Workshop on 24th April 2013 to discuss
draft Capacity Review Report ..........................................................................................103

Figures:
Figure 1. Road traffic fatality rates in EU countries 2001 and 2011 .................................18
Figure 2. Examples of unsafe roadsides in Poland: non-traversable ditches and trees close to
roadsides with no sealed shoulder ....................................................................................30

Tables:
Table 1. Trends in road traffic fatalities in EU countries 2001-2011 ...............................17
Table 2. Road Crashes, Vehicle Fleet, and Population in Poland, 2001-2011 ..............29
Table 3. Fatalities per population, Numbers of Fatalities and Injured people in 2001 and 2011
by Voivodships ..................................................................................................................33
Table 4. Key risk factors in Poland, for each pillar in the National Road Safety Program ....34
Table 5. Strategic review of current road safety management capacity in Poland ........42
Table 6 Summary of recommendations ..........................................................................72

Boxes:
Box 1. Major tasks of WORD’s regulated in Road Traffic Act ......................................28
Box 2. The key roles of a Lead Agency ..............................................................................55
Currency Equivalents

Currency Unit = Zloty (PLN)

US $ 1.00 = 3.3239 PLN
EUR 1.00 = 4.3348 PLN
(As of June 26, 2013)

Abbreviations

BAC  Blood Alcohol Concentration
BDWIK  Roads and Bridges Research Institute’s Integrated Transport Database
CEPIK  Central Database of Vehicles and Drivers
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC  European Commission
ETSC  European Transport Safety Council
EU  European Union
EuroNCAP  European New Car Assessment Program
EuroRAP  European Road Assessment Program
FUA  Functional Urban Areas
GB  Great Britain
GDDKiA  General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways
GITD  General Inspectorate of Road Transport
GNP  Gross National Product
GUS  Central statistical Office
IRTAD  International Road Traffic and Accident Database/ International Traffic Safety and Analysis Group
IRTAD  International Traffic Data and Analysis Group
MP  Member of Parliament
NGO  Non-governmental Organization
NRSC  National Road Safety Council
NRSP  National Road Safety Program
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PIMOT  Motor Industry Institute
PKP PLK S.A.  Polish Railway Lines
POBRD  Polish Road Safety Observatory
R&D  Research and Development
RRSC  Regional Road Safety Council
RS  Road Safety
RSAP  European Road Safety Action Plan
RSC  Road Safety Council
SEWIK  National Crash Injury System
SNRSC  Secretariat of National Road Safety Council
UN  United Nations
UNECE  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
WHO  World Health Organization
WORD  Voivodship Traffic Training Center
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The report was prepared by the World Bank Team which consists of: Radosław Czapski (Task Team Leader – Senior Infrastructure Specialist), Soames Job (Senior International Road Safety Expert – Global Road Safety Solutions, former Head of Road Safety Council of New South Wales and Australian Road Safety Council), Kate McMahon (Independent Road Safety Consultant, former Head of Road Safety Strategy in the Great Britain Department for Transport), Jarosław Giemza (Consultant – Road Safety Expert).

The team would like to thank the peer reviewers: Fei Deng (Senior Transport Specialist), Veronica Ines Raffo (Senior Infrastructure Specialist), George A. Banjo (Senior Transport Specialist) and Said Dahdah (Transport Specialist)

The team members are honored to have been entrusted, by the Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy, to review Poland’s road safety management system and to have been involved in supporting the development of the new Road Safety Program for 2014-2020.

Special thanks go to Maciej Mosiej, the Head of the Secretariat of National Road Safety Council for his continuous assistance in the conduct of the Review and his leadership in the development of the new Road Safety Program and to the whole Secretariat of National Road Safety Council

The team acknowledges and thanks all the participants and institutions that took a part in this Review for their critically informative contributions. We are grateful to all stakeholders for their frank and open engagement in the Review. In the annexes we listed all the persons and institutions that we met during the Review. Apologies if we missed any persons or institutions, we are grateful to the as well.

Finally, we thank Tawia Addo-Ashong and Marc Shotten of the Global Road Safety Facility and the staff of the World Bank Warsaw Office for their support.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

The global and European context

Nearly 1.3 million people die each year on the world's roads and between 20 and 50 million suffer non-fatal injuries. Over 90% of these fatalities occur in low-income and middle-income countries. In March 2010, the United Nations proclaimed the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020 with the goal of stabilizing and then reducing global road deaths. The Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020 is based on the Safe System approach that is founded on the principle of shared responsibility for building in safety. It encourages countries to implement activities according to five pillars: Road safety management, Safer roads and mobility, Safer vehicles, Safer road users, and Post-crash response.

The EU average reduction in road deaths over the period 2001-2011 was 45%, but the reduction in Poland was only 24%. In 2001 Poland’s fatality rate was the same as in Belgium and Estonia, and lower than the rates in Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Portugal, but by 2011 all these countries had improved their positions and Poland became the country with the highest rate, 110 per million population compared with the EU average of 60. It is clear from these figures that other EU countries with comparable levels of risk have made progress that Poland has failed to achieve. This relative worsening of Poland’s position in the EU highlights the need for urgent action.

Poland is a signatory to the UN Declaration on road safety and as a member of the EU Poland is obliged to follow EU specific policies and EU road safety policy is described in the document entitled Towards a European road safety area: policy orientations on road safety 2011-2020. It proposes also to continue with the target of halving the overall number of road deaths in the European Union by 2020 starting from the baseline of 2010. The recently announced target for Poland for 2020 is consistent with this EU target and the UN Decade of Action target. The new National Road Safety Program also adopts the five pillars from the Global Plan (see above) and adds a “Safe speed” pillar in recognition of the major problem of speed related crashes in Poland.

The aims of the Review

The purposes of the Review are to provide a capacity review of road safety management and recommendations on key strategic actions which will:

- guide future road safety management within Poland in the context of the implementation of the NRSP developed in parallel with this Review,
- highlight the need for action on road safety to decision makers, stakeholders, and the general public,
- guide the use of relevant EU funds, Poland’s investment at all levels of Government, and other resources in road safety, and
- promote road safety efficacy through early wins in road safety interventions

---

1 WHO (2011)
2 COM (2010) 389
3 Announced on 9 January 2013 by the Ministers of Transport and the Interior at launch for consultation of National Road Safety Program
guide potential future World Bank investments,

The road safety situation in Poland

At the National level, the key Ministers of Government with road safety responsibilities are the Minister for Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy, the Minister for Interior which includes responsibility for Police, Minister of Justice, and the Minister for Health. All levels of self-government (as well as the National Government) are responsible for their own roads within the total network. The building, management, and maintenance of roads are the responsibility of the road owner, which may be at any level of Government. Thus all levels of government are critical for road safety delivery, especially within the Safe System principles. Self-government road safety policy and strategy is influenced by national strategy, with a number of voivodship governments having developed their own road strategies based on the previous national strategy, GAMBIT.

The Review describes in detail the organization of road safety responsibilities in Poland, including data systems and organization of driver training and testing.

Whilst the relatively poor performance of Poland between 2001 and 2011 put Poland at the bottom of the European league, in 2012 deaths fell by 15% to 3,571, and the fatality rate fell from 110 per million population to 93, still well above the EU average in 2011 of 60. Pedestrian deaths are a major contributor to the road toll (34%), and thus addressing pedestrian safety will be critical in substantially reducing the road toll of Poland. Car drivers and passengers account for 48% of fatalities, and the major crash types contributing to the toll are head-on crashes (20% of the annual toll), side impact crashes (17%), and impact with an object such as a tree or pole (17%). Rollovers and rear-end crashes each contribute significantly, but less than 10% of fatalities. Cyclists account for 8% of deaths, despite their share of traffic being only 1%. Moped riders’ and motorcyclists’ deaths make up 9% and are growing.

Poland’s road toll is not only a human tragedy, but also a substantial burden on the entire economy. The costs of rescue, emergency care, rehabilitation, lifetime care of permanently disabled victims, property damage, lost work time through the injury and death of productive members of society are not well researched for Poland, but can be expected to be as high as 2% of GNP.5

Key crash risk factors are:

- Unforgiving roadsides;
- Lack of sealed shoulders;
- Undivided roads allowing head-on crashes;
- Lack of facilities for safe mobility of pedestrians and cyclists;
- Speed limits on both rural and urban roads above international good practice;
- Lack of enforcement of speed limits leading to high levels of speeding;
- Low use of seat belts and child restraints;
- Risky behavior such as speeding drinking and driving, driving while tired, and mobile phone use;
- High average age of vehicles and lack of modern safety features.

4 Jamroz, (2012)
5 WHO (2013)
Key findings on road safety management capacity

Creating an evidence-based approach

It became clear during the course of the Review that data availability is a key issue in Poland that should be highlighted in discussion of road safety management capacity. Good data availability is an essential element in meeting the requirements of a results focused approach to road safety management. The Review found that Poland does not have a well-coordinated road safety data system. Crash data are the responsibility of the police who provide detailed data to the Transport Ministry for the national crash database. However, access to data below national level is patchy, and some authorities have difficulty in obtaining data at a level of detail that would be required for understanding and addressing road safety problems.

At national level there is analysis that is sufficient to indicate key priorities and that illustrates trends and crash types, but in-depth analysis that would lead to a better understanding of the reasons for Poland’s poor road safety record is lacking. This lack of an adequate evidence-base extends to understanding of the outcomes of policy and implementation of road safety measures at all levels of government. There is little systematic monitoring, evaluation and routine collection of before and after data which means that the results of road safety activity are not known.

Capacity for institutional management functions

It is a well-established requirement for effective road safety management that a country should have a well-organized and resourced Lead Agency. Although the National Road Safety Council has been in existence since 1993 it has never been resourced in a way that would enable it to fully fulfill the role of a Lead Agency. The National Road Safety Program, GAMBIT 2005, did contain a Vision Zero and a target to reduce fatalities by 50% between 2003 and 2013, however, the lack of a Lead Agency with the resources and responsibility for ensuring that the GAMBIT program was implemented has led to under-achievement and failure to meet its target. The roots of the problem are the way that road safety is organized without clear leadership, accountability, responsibility, or sound coordination between levels of government and under-resourcing of road safety activity.

The decentralized system of government has created a need for coordination that has not been fully addressed. The absence of clear leadership from a central Lead Agency has meant that there has been a lack of effective partnership working between and within different levels of government to deliver road safety efficiently. A number of government agencies do not genuinely manage their responsibilities for road safety - few have targets, strategies, action plans, performance indicators, clear accountability and responsibility. Despite the existence of Regional Road Safety Councils, self-governments report that they do not support road improvement works based on road safety alone. Rather they may add a little road safety to road works approved for other reasons. Traffic flow considerations dominate expenditure, even in the building of new roads, and gminas report that apparent road safety improvement works are more likely to be based on complaints and representations from residents than on crash data analysis.

The absence of effective road safety leadership has also resulted in little cooperation or communication across government agencies, and across self-governments. This has resulted in duplication of effort, overlapping functions in some areas with other areas of action left

---

6 Peden et al (2004); Bliss and Breen (2009)
unaddressed, and lack of learning from each other leaving each voivodship, powiat and gmina relatively isolated to develop its own approach without the benefit of relevant experiences from other self-governments.

The current legislative and regulatory framework for road safety is inadequate for current needs and has not adjusted adequately and sufficiently quickly to changing conditions. The legislative process is very lengthy, there is a lack of expertise in government departments and public consultation is not always sufficiently considered. Legislative changes, such as revisions to speed limits, are not focused on road safety objectives and made without sufficient evidence of the effects.

Insufficient resources, both financial and skilled manpower related, have meant that the previous road safety strategy, GAMBIT, has not been able to be fully implemented and its targets were not achieved. There is duplication and inefficiency in use of funds leading to sub-optimal decisions based on insufficient evidence. Cost-benefit analysis is not used routinely to establish priorities and to ensure good safety value for money. Monitoring and evaluation of road safety programs is scarce, so that measures are often implemented without clear analysis of the “before” situation or systems to collect “after” data in order to evaluate results. This means that sub-optimal schemes may be repeated and scarce resources wasted. This is particularly striking in road safety education with initiatives that focus primarily on young children rather than those at highest risk. Multiple agencies provide education without coordination or sharing of resources or evaluation of results.

There is a lack of a systematic communication strategy to promote road safety and to increase awareness of risk and improve behavior. Public interest in and demand for road safety improvement is lacking in Poland and there is an absence of pressure from the population to reduce the high level of crash risk. Road safety is not seen by Governments at all levels as being their concern because they do not believe that the community sees road safety as being largely the responsibility of government. While the community is deeply concerned about road safety, the problem may not be seen as the responsibility of government. While the community is deeply concerned about road safety, the problem may not be seen as the responsibility of government. There is some good road safety advocacy by NGOs, but it is patchy. Public education campaigns and media information strategies are under-developed, lack coordination and are not providing public and media support for road safety. A revolution is needed in the way that the Polish population understands risk and acknowledges the need to accept shared responsibility for reducing the toll of death and injury on the roads.

**Capacity for interventions**

Existing capacity to implement interventions that are cost-effective and evidence-based in terms of their costs and benefits is reduced due to the lack of coordination described above resulting in an absence of effective partnerships, dissemination of good practice and sharing of knowledge and resources.

The quality of the road network is below international benchmarks, and analysis by EuroRAP shows that in 2009-2011 68% of the national road network is classified as very high or high risk. Technical standards are outdated, and speed limits are set too high on many roads. Enforcement is inadequate with 84% of drivers in urban areas and 94% on rural roads exceeding the speed limit. Tolerance margins on camera enforcement are high. EU programs are focused on adding capacity rather than improving safety standards on existing roads.
The vehicle fleet has an average age of 12-13 years which means that although vehicles conform to basic EU safety standards only newer vehicles benefit from advanced safety features. Despite periodic checking at vehicle test stations there is a culture of neglect of vehicle condition and no regulation of spare parts.

The new National Road Safety Program includes a schedule of proposed activities under each of six pillars: management system, safe people, safe roads, safe speed, safe vehicle, and rescue and post-accident care. The activities are divided into three groups: Engineering and technology; supervision and sanctions; and education. This is a good start but work is required to convert what is a broad outline of proposed measures into an implementable program. In particular there is a need to set out the projected costs and benefits of the proposals, how they will be implemented, the proposed timescale, and who will be in the lead. The proposals are wide-ranging and need to be ordered by priority. Consideration also needs to be given to what legislation will be required to assure sustainable progress.

**Capacity for results**

The shortcomings in the road safety management system described above and the lack of resources for implementation of the GAMBIT program are illustrated by the failure to make sufficient progress in reducing the toll of road death and injury in the last decade. A clear focus on results is impeded by inadequacies in the availability and coordination of crash data, and the lack of information on key indicators such as seat belt wearing. This lack of intermediate outcome data means that policy monitoring is inadequate and outcomes in terms of casualty trends cannot be related to particular measures.

If the new target in the National Road Safety Program of no more than 2,000 deaths by 2020 is to be achieved the road safety management system will need to be much more strongly focused on implementation of the RS Program to produce results. The new program has good support from Ministers of Transport and the Interior, and the Prime Minister has indicated support for the speed camera program. This high level support is a very positive factor that will facilitate action of the National Road Safety Program (NRSP). In addition, there are welcome signs that the Secretariat of National Road Safety Council (NRSC) is being strengthened.

However, there is an urgent need for action. The new Lead Agency and the NRSC need to have their capabilities enhanced quickly and also must be given much greater responsibility and powers in directing road safety activity and coordinating the work at regional level. There is a substantial risk that resources will not be made available either at sufficient scale or quickly enough to make significant progress. The new Lead Agency and the NRSC need to establish some quick wins and to demonstrate that it is able to fulfill the role of a Lead Agency. There is a danger of a lack of momentum leading to little change in the status quo.

While the poor road safety performance of Poland is in some part due to rapid motorization, this has also occurred in other countries which have achieved much stronger road safety gains. Government has been greatly concerned by the road toll and this has motivated the present Review. Poland has made some effective moves to address road safety with automated speed enforcement, drink-driving laws, and highway engineering safety treatments. However, even within existing limitations, much more can be done.

This report recommends a coordinated series of actions to address these systemic problems, beginning with the creation of a functional, appropriately resourced and empowered Lead
Agency, and continuing with commitment of resources and actions by all levels of Government, to address Poland’s economically and socially devastating road toll.

The new National Road Safety Program that was launched by Ministers for consultation on 9th January 2013 recognizes the need for concerted action to reduce the numbers of people killed and injured on Poland’s roads. This is a very positive and encouraging step forward and lays the foundation for a new approach to road safety.

Summary of recommendations

The Review contains detailed recommendations for capacity improvements for both the immediate establishment phase and for ongoing development in the growth phase post review. The table in section 8 summarizes these recommendations for easy reference, but does not include much of the detail that can be found in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Review Report, and these sections should be read in order to obtain full understanding of the recommendations.
OVERVIEW

Poland faces a serious road safety situation exacerbated by rapidly increasing motorization, leaving Poland as the worst performing road safety country in the EU. Road safety will deteriorate unless well-orchestrated and appropriately funded evidence-based action is taken.

In the context of the long term challenges, and Poland’s successes, in development and transition from the ‘Eastern Block’ to membership of the UE, rapidly increasing freight and passenger traffic volumes, together with limited resources for road modernization and road safety management fragmented over four levels of Government, the road safety risks are high and outcomes are costly in human as well as purely economic terms.

The key stakeholders fully recognize the gravity of the Poland’s road safety problem and the need for further development in strategic planning, coordinated evidence-based action, and improved road safety management capacity. While professional capacity is highly developed for both research and Government delivery of road safety projects, this exists only in a small number of individuals, and is not effectively coordinated and harnessed to deliver broad road safety. Below national level there is a real need for road safety capacity strengthening to provide greater expertise and to improve coordination in order to deliver cost-effective road safety improvements.

If technical assistance can be put in place to improve leadership, management structures, and the evidence base for management, to allow the delivery of an appropriately funded results-focused national road safety strategy, then Poland could move forward quickly to prevent substantial death, serious injury, and economic loss.

The recent launch of a new National Road Safety Program for 2013-2020 is a welcome first step towards new action to reduce the toll of death and injury on Poland’s roads, and this Review will consider the management requirements for implementation of this Program, as well as reviewing the current status.

The targets of the new National Road Safety Program, a 50% reduction in deaths by 2020 and a 40% reduction in injuries, are within Poland’s reach, but will require clear commitment to the target by national government and self-government. Essential requirements are substantial resourcing of the Lead Agency and of national and self-government road safety efforts, improved management and leadership of road safety, strong policy decisions by government, and greater capacity for, and commitment to road safety with emphasis on evidence based resource allocation, road safety management capacity must match road safety ambition.

The present report takes account of the broad provisions of the National Road Safety Program (NRSP) in making its recommendations, which are designed to allow Poland to achieve the strong management capacity which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for delivery of the targets set by the program. A separate report that is complementary to this Review has been produced by the World Bank to provide comments on the detailed content of the NRSP.
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Poland’s Transport and Health Policy Context

Poland’s transport goals are contained in the Transport Development Strategy up to 2020. The main goal is to increase transport accessibility as well as improvement of safety and efficiency of the transport sector through the creation of a coherent, sustainable and user-friendly transport system at a national, European and global scale. This goal is supported by two strategic objectives:

1. Creation of an integrated transport system;
2. Creation of conditions for smooth functioning of transport markets and the development of efficient transport systems.

There are ten main interventions envisaged in the Strategy:

- Development of efficient and multimodal connections between Warsaw and all provincial cities as well as between Warsaw and other European cities;
- Development of efficient transport connections between provincial cities and major urban centres in the country and in Europe;
- Development of internal transport system of functional urban areas (FUA) and its integration (e.g. collision free crossroads, ring roads, public transport);
- Development of transport connections of sub-regional centres and rural areas with urban and provincial centres; improvement of local connections;
- Strengthening of transport connections providing access from provincial cities to areas with specific characteristics and potentials of development (tourism, industry, culture, environment, etc.);
- Strengthening of transport connections of Eastern Poland (one of the areas of the lowest transport accessibility in Poland) with the areas of major development perspectives;
- Development of transport connections to improve communications from border areas to centres of growth and jobs, in particular in the areas along the EU’s external border; development of cross-border network;
- Developing and integrating public transport systems by- for example - creating infrastructure of road and rail transport interchanges to improve shuttle mobility in local and regional levels;
- Creation and development of road traffic safety infrastructure;
- Reservation of areas for potential investments in infrastructure which can be the subject of strategic planning after 2020.

The number of fatalities is one of the indicators with a goal of reduction to 2000 in 2020 compared with 3907 in 2010.

In addition, the National Health Program for 2007-2015 recognizes road accidents as one of society’s health problems and has a strategic objective to reduce the frequency of accidents and to limit their effects in terms of injuries and their severity by undertaking preventive actions.

---

*Adopted on 22 January 2013 by Polish Council of Ministers.*
2010 Global Burden of Disease data show that road traffic injuries are the first cause of death for children aged 5-14 years accounting for 20.42% of all deaths, and the second cause of death for the 15-49 age group at 10.19%.

1.2 The Global Road Safety Situation

About 1.24 million people die each year on the world's roads and between 20 and 50 million suffer non-fatal injuries. Over 90% of these fatalities occur in low-income and middle-income countries. In 2004, road traffic injury was ninth in the leading causes of death, but it is estimated by WHO that by 2030, without concerted action, road traffic will be at fifth place ahead of such diseases as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS resulting in an estimated 2.4 million deaths each year. Road traffic injuries are already among the three leading causes of death for people between 5 and 44 years of age. The economic consequences of motor vehicle crashes have been estimated between 1% and 3% of the respective GNP of the world countries, reaching a total over $500 billion.

In March 2010, the United Nations proclaimed the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020 with the goal of stabilizing and then reducing global road deaths. Resolution 64/255 also invites all Member States to set their own national road traffic casualty reduction targets to be achieved by the end of the Decade, in line with a global plan of action to be prepared by the World Health Organization and the United Nations regional commissions, in cooperation with other partners in the United Nations Road Safety Collaboration.

The Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020 is based on the Safe System approach and it encourages countries to implement activities according to five pillars: Road safety management, Safer roads and mobility, Safer vehicles, Safer road users, and Post-crash response. In March 2013, WHO published the second Global Status Report on Road Safety that showed that there has been no overall reduction in the number of people killed on the world’s roads since the first Status report in 2009. However, at the same time traffic has grown by 15% so that actions to improve global road safety have at least mitigated any rise in deaths. Deaths fell in 88 countries between 2007 and 2010, but rose in 87. Therefore, significantly more action is needed to make roads safer in all countries. In many countries road safety laws need to be made more comprehensive and enforcement needs to be strengthened. Only 28 countries, covering 7% of the world’s population, have comprehensive road safety laws on five key risk factors: drinking and driving, speeding, and failing to use motorcycle helmets, seat-belts, and child restraints. Results for Poland in the report show that these laws do exist, but the level of enforcement is variable.

1.3 The Safe System Approach

The Safe System approach seeks to identify and rectify the major sources of error or design weakness that contribute to fatal and serious road crashes and to mitigate the severity and consequences of crashes. A key principle is that the road transport system must be designed to accommodate human failings that lead to error and crash risk. Road design must take account of the biomechanical limits of the human body and better manage crash forces down to levels which are not beyond those the human body can withstand. This can be achieved for example by determining speed limits that allow the use of the road to occur without death.

---

8 UN (2010)
9 WHO (2011)
10 WHO (2013).
even in the event of human error. But this does not mean that road users are no longer to be responsible for their actions or that they can ignore traffic rules and especially speed limits.

The principle of shared responsibility underpins the Safe System approach for reducing crash risk. This means that system designers are responsible for building in safety; road users must abide by the rules; and continued efforts must be made to improve user compliance through information and enforcement. System design includes licensing policy, fleet operating policies, road and roadside design and maintenance, vehicle design and regulation, speed limits, new road rules, and land use planning that takes account of safe transport access in decisions on developments such as schools, housing, and shopping centres. Road Safety decisions should not be taken in isolation but should be aligned with broader community values – economic, human & environmental health, and consumer goals. A Safe System approach requires a more coordinated and systematic approach to road safety management and this Review aims to make recommendations that are consistent with such an approach.

1.4 The EU context

Table 1 below shows for all EU countries road crash deaths in 2010 and 2011 compared with 2001, together with population based fatality rates. In June 2003, the EU Commission adopted its third European Road Safety Action Plan (RSAP)\(^\text{11}\) which included a target to halve the number of road deaths by 2010 compared with 2001. The EU average reduction in road deaths over the period 2001-2010 was 43%, but performance varied between countries with four improving by less than 30%, including Poland at 29%, fifteen achieving reductions in the range 30-50% and eight exceeding the target of 50% reduction.

### Table 1. Trends in road traffic fatalities in EU countries 2001-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>% Change 2010-2011</th>
<th>% Change 2001-2011</th>
<th>Deaths per million population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>-45.4</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>840*</td>
<td>875*</td>
<td>+4.2</td>
<td>-41.1</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>-12.8</td>
<td>-34.9</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>+18.3</td>
<td>-27.5</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-47.0</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>221*</td>
<td>-13.3</td>
<td>-48.7</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>+29.4</td>
<td>-49.2</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>292*</td>
<td>+7.4</td>
<td>-32.6</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8,162</td>
<td>3,992</td>
<td>3,970*</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-51.4</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6,977</td>
<td>3,648</td>
<td>4,002*</td>
<td>+9.7</td>
<td>-42.6</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>1,087*</td>
<td>-13.6</td>
<td>-42.2</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
<td>-48.5</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-54.9</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,691</td>
<td>4,090</td>
<td>3,800*</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-43.2</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{11}\) http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/index_en.htm
Whereas on average for the EU as a whole road deaths fell by 45% between 2001 and 2011, in Poland fatalities rose in 2011 so that the reduction for 2001-2011 was only 24%. In 2001 Poland’s fatality rate was the same as in Belgium and Estonia, and lower than the rates in Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Portugal, but by 2011 all these countries had improved their positions and Poland became the country with the highest rate, 110 per million population compared with the EU average of 60. It is clear from these figures that other EU countries with comparable levels of risk have made progress that Poland has failed to achieve. This relative worsening of Poland’s position in the EU highlights the need for urgent action.

Figure 1 below illustrates the trends in fatality rates.

**Figure 1. Road traffic fatality rates in EU countries 2001 and 2011**

![Road traffic fatality rates in EU countries 2001 and 2011](source: ETSC PIN Report 6 June 2012)
As a member of the EU Poland is obliged to follow EU specific policies and EU road safety policy is described in the document entitled *Towards a European road safety area: policy orientations on road safety 2011-2020*\(^\text{12}\). EU road safety policy aims to reduce disparities between member states and to provide citizens with a more uniform level of road safety within the EU. It proposes also to continue with the target of halving the overall number of road deaths in the European Union by 2020 starting from the baseline of 2010. The recently announced\(^\text{13}\) target for Poland for 2020 is consistent with this EU target.

The Commission has identified seven objectives for the next decade:

1. Improve education and training of road users;
2. Increase enforcement of road rules;
3. Safer infrastructure;
4. Safer vehicles;
5. Promote the use of modern technology to increase road safety;
6. Improve emergency and post-injuries services;
7. Protect vulnerable road users.

The document also provides a general governance framework and objectives for the implementation of European road safety policy which should guide national or local road safety strategies:

- Priority to monitoring the full and correct implementation of the EU road safety acquires by Member States;
- Setting up an open cooperation framework between Member States and the Commission to implement road safety policy and monitor the progress achieved;
- Development by Member States of national road safety plans;
- Improved monitoring through data collection and analysis;
- Increase understanding of crashes and risks.

The last three of these principles are highly relevant for the development of road safety policy in Poland.

In the framework of these policy orientations, the European Commission (EC) considers that the three following actions should be undertaken as a priority:

- the establishment of a structured and coherent cooperation framework which draws on best practices across the Member States, as a necessary condition to implement in an effective manner the road safety policy orientations 2011-2020,
- a strategy for injuries and first aid to address the urgent and growing need to reduce the number of road injuries,
- the improvement of the safety of vulnerable road users, in particular motorcyclists for whom crash statistics are particularly worrying.

---

\(^{12}\) COM (2010) 389

\(^{13}\) Announced on 9 January 2013 by the Ministers of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy and the Interior at launch for consultation of National Road Safety Program
The strategic importance of road safety is also confirmed in the 2011 Transport White Paper: Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system\(^{14}\), which describes current EU overall transport policy.

**European Union initiatives**

The EU is providing significant support in development of road infrastructure in Poland. It is estimated that approximately EUR 20 billion will be spent on road infrastructure in 2007-2013.

The EU is also sponsoring the so called Road Safety Charter Program, which supports voluntary road safety improvement projects developed by any public or private sector institutions or NGOs. EU financial assistance is also used for exchange of local and international knowledge related to safe infrastructure solutions, and also for development of the centralized speed enforcement program currently being implemented by the government.

**World Bank Country Assistance for Poland**

The World Bank has been supporting transport development in Poland since the early 90’s. The World Bank led a first joint review of the road safety situation in Poland in the early 90s with participation of the EBRD and the EC. Some institutional recommendations from this Review were subsequently implemented in Poland. An example of such changes was the introduction of the National Road Safety Council.

During subsequent loans supporting development of the road sector in Poland, the World Bank has promoted roads construction and modernization with emphasis on safe road infrastructure (construction of roundabouts, traffic calming, separation of pedestrian or bicycle traffic from vehicles, improvements in vertical and horizontal marking, etc.)

The last series of three Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Loans (total value USD 350 million implemented in 2005-2011) was on one hand supporting rehabilitation of over 2,500 km of national roads with the inclusion of improvements in infrastructure safety, but on the other hand comprised also explicit road safety institutional and communication components.

These loans were used among others for:

- purchasing speed cameras;
- purchasing specialized road safety emergency vehicles for Fire Brigade;
- purchasing vehicles for Road Inspectorate;
- purchasing alcohol testing devices;
- nationwide public communication campaigns on seatbelts, drink-driving, young-drivers, child restraints, speeding and safe infrastructure;
- team of experts providing technical assistance to National Road Safety Council;
- campaigns aimed and improved speed limits enforcement on the most dangerous national roads;
- technical supervision of the “black spot” elimination program, when individual “black spots” were gradually turned into permanent safe infrastructure solutions;

\(^{14}\) COM(2011) 144
Involvement of other donors

Many other external donors were and are actively supporting road safety in Poland. For example Switzerland is currently supporting Police by financing specialized road safety training, knowledge exchange between Swiss and Polish traffic Police units and learning Swiss good practices in road safety. Swiss assistance is used mainly in South-Eastern regions, where road safety fatality rates are among the highest in Poland. The program is expected also to co-finance purchase of several new vehicles equipped with modern speed cameras to be used by Police in South-Eastern regions of Poland.
2 REVIEW DESCRIPTION

2.1 Aims of the Review

Poland, with the support of the World Bank, is undertaking a broad review of its road safety performance, future road safety management and directions through the development of the National Road Safety Program 2013-2020 (NRSP), and with the support of this road safety capacity review.

The primary objective of this project is to carry out a capacity review of road safety management in Poland broadly following the World Bank country guidelines for capacity reviews. The Review is based on information provided, research and direct observation of Poland’s road safety situation, conference presentations, and extensive discussions held with the key road safety stakeholders in Poland. The Review has been conducted in parallel with the development of the National Road Safety Program and takes account of its strategic approach in making recommendations. The purposes of the Review are to provide a capacity review and identification of key strategic actions, which will:

- guide future road safety management within Poland in the context of the implementation of the NRSP,
- highlight the need for action on road safety to decision makers, stakeholders, and the general public,
- guide World Bank investments,
- guide the use of relevant EU funds and other resources in road safety, and
- promote road safety efficacy through early wins in road safety interventions.

The general objectives of the World Bank and the Government in these projects are to help Poland enhance its strategic framework and improve management capacity for road safety. This will facilitate improved efficiency and sustainability of road safety activities in Poland and contribute to the achievement of the ambitious road safety goals set at the UN and EU levels. The targets for 2020 in the National Road Safety Program are in line with the EU goals.

The intermediate objective is to improve road safety institutional capacity by reviewing road safety management capacity in Poland in accordance with the safe system approach and international best practice, and recommending necessary improvements in the coordination and management of road safety activities in Poland.

The expected outcomes of the Review are better capacity of key stakeholders to plan, coordinate, manage, monitor and deliver effective road safety activities; and the sharing of best practices and international experience in road safety strategic planning and management based on the Safe System approach.

2.2 Background to Review

The conduct of a systematic review of road safety management capacity is a mandatory first step in determining an integrated multi-sectoral framework for dialogue and partnership between different partners on a potential road safety improvement program including road

---

15 Bliss and Breen (2009)
16 UN (2010), COM(2010) 389
safety related investments, according to the World Bank Global Road Safety Facility Guidelines (Bliss & Breen, 2009). This Review delivers this critical step.

The substantial road safety problems faced by Poland are well recognized, and motivate both this Review and the strategic program development work. Poland has experienced rapid motorization over the last decade, and is now the worst road safety performing country in the EU in terms of the international measure of deaths per 100,000 people. More detail of Poland’s road safety situation is provided in the next Chapter.

Minister Nowak, the Minister of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy, has identified road safety as an area of Government priority for improvement and is committed to the Review and strategy development processes. While the process of program development is led by the Secretariat of National Road Safety Council (SNRSC) the World Bank is providing some technical assistance support along the way. World Bank focuses in parallel on undertaking systemic road safety management capacity review. The strategy development process has already led to key road safety policy improvements, including improved management of speeding, and this Review will facilitate further improved road safety management and delivery.

2.3 Review Methodology and Timetable

The Review drew on an understanding of the national road safety situation in Poland developed, in part, from the processes of this Review, analysis of existing road safety data, and the recently completed Capacity Review of the City of Warsaw. It also informs, and is informed by, the development of the NRSP. The review process was based on the steps described in the World Bank’s country guidelines for capacity reviews (Bliss & Breen, 2009). These steps are described in Annex 1. The Review was conducted in accordance with a Safe System approach.

In order to deliver synergies with the NRSP development process, work to review and comment upon the NRSP that was published for consultation in January 2013, is being carried out concurrently with the capacity review. In addition, the proposals in the Program are being taken into account in the recommendations for management capacity improvements, and recommendations for investment in road safety actions to provide early wins, including engagement with civil society.

The strategic planning element of the work began in July 2012, and led to a planning workshop for the strategic program development in August 2012. Following extensive consultation and input from many road safety agencies, stakeholders, and experts the National Road Safety Program 2013-2020 was released for further consultation on 9 January, 2013.

Meetings and consultation for the Road Safety Capacity Review began in August 2012, with more extensive meetings across all levels of government and self-government occurring in August, and November-December 2012, and January, 2013.

On-site reviews of road safety management capacity were carried out on behalf of the World Bank by Soames Job (Global Road Safety Solutions), Kate McMahon (Independent Road Safety Consultant, former Head of Road Safety Strategy in the GB Department for Transport), Radoslaw Czapski, and Jaroslaw Giemza (World Bank, Warsaw). Marc Shotten of the Global Road Safety Facility of the World Bank also assisted with meetings in
November. Meetings were held with many Government and self-government stakeholders, non-governmental stakeholders, research institutions, and private sector companies as outlined in Annex 2.

Additional information gathering and road safety safe systems promotional processes included:

1. Attendance at two conferences to hear research and practice papers, and for the review team to present papers. Conferences were:
2. Informal review of roads, speed limits, and roadside infrastructure within Warsaw, Wroclaw, Krakow, Olsztyn, Torun, and many hundreds of kilometers of rural National highways and self-government managed roads.
3. Review of crash data (for which the help of Police is acknowledged).
4. Small scale observational surveys in many suburbs of the above cities and rural roads, of:
   a. seat belt and child restraint usage rates,
   b. motorcycle helmet wearing rates and
   c. bicycle helmet wearing rates.
5. Review of other sources of information, including published research as well as policy and strategy documents from Poland, the EU, and other relevant organizations.

A workshop to present the report and its findings was held on April 24, 2013. The feedback from the workshop was strongly positive and clearly aligned with the key themes of the Review. In particular, the working group reports back to the plenary sessions of the workshop acknowledged problems with relevant data and lack of shared access, and strongly supported the need for a Lead Agency, recognizing that there must be an executive body held accountable for road safety, not a committee or council. There was also strong support for the need to improve coordination, the need for evaluation of programs and evidence based decisions, the critical role of speed management in road safety and the need to change tolerances on enforcement, and the need for safer vehicles. There was strong agreement that the funding issue must be addressed for sustainable improvement.

A few concerns were raised: the report could be interpreted as suggesting the people are not concerned about road safety and this is not correct, and the report could go further in management of voivodships. These have been addressed in the final report.

Some written comments, mainly on terminology and other factual points, were received after the workshop and have been taken into account. The agenda and attendance list for the workshop are in Annex 10.
3 ROAD SAFETY SITUATION AND INSTITUTIONS IN POLAND

The Inception Report for the Capacity Review\textsuperscript{17} contains further information on the current situation in Poland and is complementary to this Review report.

3.1 Background and National Situation

Geography

Poland is a middle income country\textsuperscript{18} with a population of 38.6 million. Poland covers an area of 312,685 square kilometers, making it the sixth largest country in Europe. It is located in North-Eastern Europe, and borders Germany, Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The geography is predominantly plains which are commonly rich fertile land supporting substantial agricultural production, with a large frontage to the Baltic Sea in the North and some low mountain ranges (the best known being the Tatra Mountains in the South). Poland occupies a central position in Northern Europe which generates significant international traffic movement.

Administration

The political development of Poland is consciously moderated by the country’s recent history of communist rule, and return to democratic government since the Solidarity movement. Thus, self-government is critical, and Poland has four levels of elected Government which operate with significant but not complete independence: National, Voivodships, Poviats, and Gminas.

3.2 Institutional context: current road safety management systems and institutions at the national level

At the National level, the key Ministers of Government with road safety responsibilities are the Minister for Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy, the Minister for Interior which includes responsibility for Police, Minister of Justice, and the Minister for Health.

The key road safety related organizations within National Government include:

- Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy; including:
  - Department of Road Transportation - responsible for driver licensing, vehicle registration and vehicle technical inspection system
  - Department of Roads and Motorways – responsible for engineering standards of public roads and overseeing of GDDKIA
  - Secretariat of National Road Safety Council (NRSC) – responsible for National Road Safety Program;
- National Road Safety Council (NRSC) with membership from National Government agencies and Self-Government, responsible for co-ordination and high level strategic decisions in road safety
- Ministry of Interior;
- Ministry of Justice;
- Ministry of Health;

\textsuperscript{17} Job, McMahon, Czapski & Giemza, J. (2012)
\textsuperscript{18} Peden et al (2004)
• Ministry of Education;
• Police
• General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA) with responsibilities for the national road network;
• General Inspectorate of Road Transport (GITD)
• State Fire Brigade
• Ambulance Services

The functions of national government organizations are summarized in Annex 3. In addition, a number of research organizations are partly funded by the National Government and are listed in Annex 4.

3.3 Road safety organization in self-government and linkages to national administration

Self-government is composed of 16 Voivodships, 374 Poviats, and 2479 Gminas. The Voivodships were rationalized in 1999, from 49 to 16, and are headed by a Marshall, who is elected by the elected Parliament of the Voivodship. Poviat governments are responsible for smaller areas within the Voivodships, which includes rural areas (314 rural poviats) and bigger cities (66 municipal Poviats). Within poviats are included the smallest administrative units called Gminas. Poland has 2,479 rural or municipal Gminas.

All levels of self-government (as well as the National Government) are responsible for their own roads within the total network. The building, management, and maintenance of roads are the responsibility of the road owner, which may be at any level of Government. Thus all levels of government are critical for road safety delivery, especially within the Safe System principles.

The total road network comprises over 412,263 km of roads, of which 18,607 km are national roads (administered by the National government). Poland has 28,461 km regional roads, 126,172 poviat roads and 232,880 km Gminas roads which account for 95.5% of the total network, though the national network carries much more traffic per kilometer of road\(^19\). In addition, and also critical to road safety, there are National Police and Municipal Guards, with responsibilities for enforcement of on-road behavior. Although the role of municipal guards in on-road enforcement is quite limited, Municipal Guards may be authorized to manage speed camera programs. Locations for cameras managed by Municipal Guards must be approved by the Police, General Inspectorate of Road Transport (GITD)\(^20\). In March 2013 Minister of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy has signed Ordinance on the conditions of the location, the way of marking and measuring of speed measurement equipment\(^21\). The ordinance has introduced additional requirement and conditions for repeatable road safety analysis of the locations of speed cameras in order to use them in places where they could have positive effect to increase road safety. Every location where speed camera will be used either on national road or sub-national road network, will be deemed to meet the conditions described in ordinance. Every next 40 months after the completion of road safety analysis the next assessment should be done to confirm the

\(^{19}\) Transport- Activity Results in 2011, Central Statistical Office (GUS), 2012
\(^{20}\) Act amending the Road Traffic Act (Dz.U. 1997 Nr 98 poz. 602) and other laws, was approved on October 29, 2010
\(^{21}\) Ordinance on the conditions of the location, the way of marking and measuring of speed measurement equipment was signet on March 14, 2013
legitimacy of usage of speed control device in particular place. On the subnational level the governments are responsible for over 200 speed camera devices in whole Poland. Due to new ordinance they will obliged to prepare such location analysis, which should be agreed with General Inspectorate of Road Transport and the respective Police commander. However the largest speed camera program is managed nationally by the General Inspectorate of Road Transport, which currently operates 300 speed cameras. General Inspectorate of Road Transport is also obliged by Minister of Transport ordinance to monitor and assess impact of speed cameras on road safety in places where they are used to enforce speed limits.

Crash data collection is uniform and collated at a national level. Data are collected by Police at Poviat level. Poviat level data are collated by Voivodship Police offices and sent to the Police Headquarters in Warsaw. The crash data at each administrative level are available to the relevant Government for analysis and use in road safety management. These data are used by Police management at each level, and sometimes by self-government. A number of voivodships appear to make use of the crash data for their area, although road management activity for the gminas appears to be more responsive to local community views and submissions than to crash data.

Self-government road safety policy and strategy is influenced by national strategy, with a number of voivodship governments having developed their own road strategies based on the previous national strategy, GAMBIT. However, while road safety activity by self-government maintains a substantial degree of autonomy, it is influenced by National Government. Standards for roads (signage, intersection specifications, etc.) are set at the National level by the Ministry of Transport, Construction, and Maritime Economy in the form of Ministry ordinances. They are mainly focused on maintaining national road standards, which should be adhered to by each level of self-government.

Marshal Offices in every 16 Voivodships supervise driver testing centers (WORDS), which provide all driver testing for car and motorcycle licensing. Again, the operation of these testing centers is significantly governed by nationally uniform policy and legislation covered also in Road Traffic Act. Box 1 defines tasks of WORD. The standards and requirements for testing are set nationally in the Act and applied by each 49 of the WORDs, whose structure was connected to the old administrative system, changed in 1999. However the functioning of every WORD could be strongly influenced by local regulations in form of Statute of every WORD, prepared by Marshal Offices. The scope of Statutes of WORD’s can be different in other Voivodships (priorities, structure, scope of road safety activities, etc.), which causes that some WORD’s can be more active than others. The legislation of the WORDs also requires that any financial surplus of WORD’s (from regulated fees for testing and other possible economic activity of WORD’s) should be spend on road safety measures determined by every WORD director. Thus, the WORDs fund various road safety programs including education on road safety for young children and equipment for traffic police.

---

22 Road Traffic Act was approved on June 20, 1997 (Dz.U. 1997 Nr 98 poz. 602) and since then it was revised many times
**Box 1. Major tasks of WORD’s regulated in Road Traffic Act**

- co-operation with the Regional Road Safety Council;
- cooperation with Starosta’s of Poviat on the supervision of the drivers training;
- organization of national driving licenses examinations
- conducting of qualification courses for new drivers;
- conducting 3-day training workshops for examiners;
- conducting of courses:
  - for teachers engaged in school activities for students applying for the cycling licenses
  - on road safety
  - for people who should be re-educated in road safety
  - for people who should be re-educated in road safety with strong emphasis on prevention against drinking and drug driving
- organization of trainings for students applying for the card cycling;

*Source: Road Traffic Act*

### 3.4 Non-governmental road safety organizations

The road safety climate of Poland is also influenced by a number of private sector, non-government, and part-Government funded organizations. These include a full range of organizations: private sector companies which influence road safety (such as vehicle manufacturers, freight haulage companies, and bodies such as the Association of Motor Vehicle Producers); large NGOs\(^{23}\) (such as the Polski Zwiazek Motorowy, Automobil Klub Polski and the Polish association collaborating with the Global Road Safety Partnership); and smaller volunteer run road safety NGOs. There are also numerous research institutions and Universities which may receive funding for Government for road safety research and advice (including the Motor Transport Institute, the Roads and Bridges Institute, and the National Institute of Public Health [National Institute of Hygiene] and a number of technical universities especially including those in Gdansk and Krakow).

### 3.5 Trends in road traffic fatalities and injuries at national level

While Poland’s road traffic fatality rate declined from 14 per 100,000 people in 2001 to around 11 per 100,000 people in 2011, this rate of decline was one of the smallest in Europe. Thus, as shown in Figure 1 in Section 1, Poland was in 2011, the most recent year for which data are available for all EU countries, the worst performer within the EU and the only country with more than 100 deaths per million inhabitants. However, there was a significant improvement in 2012 with deaths falling by nearly 15% to 3,571, and an improved population based rate of 9 fatalities per 100,000.

It is necessary to be cautious in interpreting a change based on one year’s crash data without further information such as traffic flow and economic factors, however in the International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group (IRTAD) Road Safety Annual Report 2013,

---

\(^{23}\) See Annex 4
published by the OECD in May 2013\textsuperscript{24}, these good results are largely attributed to the implementation, since 1 July 2012, of the new speed camera system. The Minister’s public and highly publicized commitment to strong road safety action in launching the National Road Safety Program for consultation may also have contributed. Road safety improvements often follow announcements even before the announced actions are taken, because many motorists assume the actions will be taken very quickly after the announcement. Although there is the possibility of a regression to the mean\textsuperscript{25} effect following the increase in 2011, the saving of over 600 lives in the year is a promising start for the renewed approach to road safety. The commitment to speed the speed camera program was reaffirmed early in 2013 with extensive media coverage of the Capacity Review team’s press conferences on the irrefutable evidence for the road safety benefits of speed cameras in Warsaw at the Ministry of Transport and at the Parliament House. Such extensive media coverage with more balanced reporting, rather than the previous focus on the revenue raised by speed cameras, is a strong reminder to motorists to abide by the speed limit in order to avoid speed camera detections and penalties. The continuing roll out of the speed camera program and the media coverage of it can be expected to further reduce the road toll.

The data in Table 2 are based on crashes reported to the police. The 2013 Global Status Report on Road Safety\textsuperscript{26} includes estimates of fatalities adjusted for under-reporting based on death registration data. For Poland the WHO estimate that in 2010 road traffic deaths were 4,509 compared with the reported total of 3,907, a difference of 15%, and the fatality rate per 100,000 population was estimated to be 11.8. The 2013 IRTAD report also includes an estimate of under-reporting based on a pilot study by the Motor Transport Institute of data from 2008-2010 that suggests that the number of deaths in road crashes could be between 3% and 25% higher than the number reported to the police.

Poland, like much of Eastern Europe, has experienced significant growth of motorization: numbers of vehicles increased by 56% from 2001 to 2010, while the population of Poland has remained relatively stable (See Table 2). While annual fatalities and injuries have reduced, numbers of collisions have increased slightly.

Table 2. Road Crashes, Vehicle Fleet, and Population in Poland, 2001-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of road crashes</th>
<th>No. of fatalities</th>
<th>No. of injured</th>
<th>No. of collisions</th>
<th>No. of passenger cars('000)</th>
<th>Population ('000)</th>
<th>Fatalities/100,000 population</th>
<th>No. of passenger cars/1,000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>53,799</td>
<td>5,534</td>
<td>68,194</td>
<td>342,408</td>
<td>10,503</td>
<td>38,632</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>53,559</td>
<td>5,827</td>
<td>67,498</td>
<td>358,807</td>
<td>11,029</td>
<td>38,219</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>51,078</td>
<td>5,640</td>
<td>63,900</td>
<td>367,700</td>
<td>11,244</td>
<td>38,191</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>51,069</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td>64,661</td>
<td>424,938</td>
<td>11,975</td>
<td>38,174</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>48,100</td>
<td>5,444</td>
<td>61,191</td>
<td>401,440</td>
<td>12,339</td>
<td>38,157</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>46,876</td>
<td>5,243</td>
<td>59,123</td>
<td>411,727</td>
<td>13,384</td>
<td>38,126</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>49,536</td>
<td>5,583</td>
<td>63,224</td>
<td>386,934</td>
<td>14,589</td>
<td>38,116</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>49,054</td>
<td>5,437</td>
<td>62,097</td>
<td>381,520</td>
<td>16,080</td>
<td>38,136</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{24} IRTAD (2013)

\textsuperscript{25} Regression to the mean refers to the statistical tendency of numbers to return to closer to the long term mean following a sudden, unexplained increase or decrease.

\textsuperscript{26} WHO (2013)
3.6 Casualties by road user group: vehicle occupants, motorcyclists, bicyclists, pedestrians.

Pedestrian deaths are a major contributor to the road toll (34%), and thus addressing pedestrian safety will be critical in substantially reducing the road toll of Poland. Car drivers and passengers account for 48% of fatalities, and the major crash types contributing to the toll are head-on crashes (20% of the annual toll), side impact crashes (17%), and impact with an object such as a tree or pole (17%). Rollovers and rear-end crashes each contribute significantly, but less than 10% of fatalities. Cyclists account for 8% of deaths, despite their share of traffic being only 1%. Moped riders’ and motorcyclists’ deaths make up 9% and are growing.

3.7 Road safety risk factors

Roadside infrastructure is critical to crash outcomes. For example, in Poland 9% of crashes into protective barriers resulted in a fatality, whereas 25% of crashes into trees resulted in a fatality. Undivided roads with a single lane in each direction carry a high risk of off-road and head-on crashes, and contribute the large majority of fatalities (89% in 2011) and injuries (83%) in Poland. (These figures include pedestrians). The risk of many of these roads is also increased by unforgiving roadsides, often with narrow or non-existent sealed shoulders, and trees or unforgiving drains (too steep to traverse) close to the roads. These features are not uncommon on high traffic volume roads, including parts of the national road network (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Examples of unsafe roadsides in Poland: non-traversable ditches and trees close to roadsides with no sealed shoulder

Source: WB pictures

Jamroz, (2012)
EuroRAP analyses of risk on national roads in 2009-2011 showed that 34% of the network is classified as very high risk (“black” sections) and 34% is high risk (“red” sections). 14% of the national network is classified as low or very low risk. 48% of fatal and serious crashes took place on the “black” sections of roads.

**Speed**

Speeding is well recognized as the key factor in road related trauma in best quality research and reviews, including by world leading authorities: the World Health Organization and the OECD. Speed increases both the severity of a crash and the probability of a crash occurring (through reducing capacity to stop in time; reducing maneuverability in evading a crash; making it impossible to negotiate curves and corners at speeds above that which simple physics will allow for the friction available; and causing others to misjudge gaps, for example by allowing less gap to cross the road than expected because the vehicle is travelling above the speed limit).

Speeding is a common behavior in Poland and the most frequent cause of fatal crashes in Poland. From 2009 to 2011 speeding caused almost 4,000 deaths (30% of all fatalities), and more than 42,000 injuries (27% of all injuries). However, it is likely that these figures are an under-estimate of the contribution of speeding to trauma in Poland, as in other countries. This is based on the experience of other countries that reductions in trauma achieved at locations of effective speed enforcement are often larger than the original estimates of the contribution of speeding.

**Speed limits**

Speed limits in Poland are well above those dictated by Safe System Principles, above current international best practice, and running counter to the trend of reducing speed limits. For example, in areas of pedestrian activity Safe System principles dictate speeds of 30km/h (or prevention of pedestrian access to the road), and many countries have adopted these limits for town and city centers, with the Netherlands leading this movement. In 1957 Netherlands moved to lower urban speed limits to 50km/h and in 1983 began lowering to 30km/h. In 1998 15% of urban streets were 30km/h but by 2008 the large majority of urban streets had 30km/h limits. In contrast, limits below 50 km/h are rare in Poland. Germany has improved its road toll by removing the unlimited speeds on many of its motorways, most states of Australia have 90, 100 or 110 limits on motorways, and Tasmania and Sweden have broadly reduced rural road speed limits.

The evidence shows that reducing speed limits reduces crashes, injuries and deaths while increasing limits increases crashes, injuries and deaths.

**Speed enforcement**

Effective speed enforcement has been shown repeatedly to reduce the toll of deaths and injuries, with studies of speed cameras in particular showing substantial road safety benefits. Surveys, as opposed to media driven complaints, often reveal high levels of compliance and the benefits of speed cameras.
support for speed cameras in the community, for example in USA, Australia, and Great Britain.

At the beginning of 2012 Poland’s program of speed cameras on National roads consisted of 315 fixed cameras and 29 cars with mobile speed cameras managed by the General Inspectorate of Road Transport. Police operated 1 900 mobile speed control hand devices and 390 cars with mobile speed cameras, which are deployed on all roads. The National Program, as announced in January 2013, includes a substantial expansion of automated enforcement of speeding. General Inspectorate of Road Transport is planning to install 100 fixed cameras in 2013 and 200 cameras in 2014-2015.

Enforcement tolerances

When introducing into Polish law the regulations allowing for automatic speed management and ticketing the traffic law specified that speed limits are to be measured with tolerances of +/- 10 km/h. This in practice was publicized and understood by general public as an implicit permission to increase speed by 10 km/h above any speed limit. While indeed in most countries any speed measuring equipment is usually calibrated with some tolerances, the level of tolerance is usually set by internal regulations of Police or any other relevant institutions. Since they are usually not known to the general public there is no psychological effect among drivers resulting in exceeding speed limits by the “legal” tolerance level knowing that equipment will not “capture” such cases.

People and behavior

Age and gender are well recognized contributors to road trauma risk. Age is a major risk factor, with a dramatic increase in risk of death and of being the driver in a fatal or injury crash, from the age of licensing (18 years in Poland) and continuing through to age 24, followed by a gradual decline in trauma risk. In Poland the highest population based fatality rates are in the 18-19 and 20-24 age groups, lowest between 40 and 59, with a gradual rise in the older age groups. The latter is likely to be an increasing problem as the population ages and the proportion of older people with driving licences increases. Males have always been substantially over-represented in crashes both as driver and as victims, and this is likely to be the case in Poland as elsewhere. The effect of gender on risk in Poland is, however, lacking analysis and is not mentioned in the NRSP.

A number of additional factors, shared with many countries, also contribute to Poland’s road toll. Critical among these are the high risk experienced by pedestrians, and the lack of seat belt use by many vehicle occupants. Risk to cyclists is contributed to by lack of bicycle facilities on urban roads, riding on high speed roads, often in poor lighting conditions but without any or adequate lighting on the bicycle, and low rates of helmet wearing.

Despite a low alcohol limit of 0.02g/l BAC, drink-driving remains a significant problem. In 2011, drivers who were over the limit were involved in 4,972 road crashes (12.4% of all crashes), in which 559 people were killed (13.3% of all fatalities) and 6,075 people were injured (12.3% of all injuries).

37 Retting et al (2008)
38 Walker et al (2009)
40 Job (1999); Peden (2009).


**Vehicles and exposure**

Since 1990, Poland has experienced a rapid rate of motorization, with the fleet rising from 9 million vehicles to more than 23 million vehicles in 2010. Motorization—the number of vehicles/1,000 inhabitants—increased by 61% over the 2000-2010 period. Passenger numbers almost doubled accompanied by an increase in annual vehicle/km and a rapid expansion of road freight.

Vehicle safety standards, design and manufacture have improved steadily over recent years, yet Poland lags behind in capturing these benefits because of the slow turnover of the vehicle fleet. Thus, for Poland trauma risk is exacerbated by the age of the vehicle fleet: 45% of vehicles are more than 15 years old whereas according to the Used Car Market Report the average age of cars in Western Europe is 7-8 years.

In addition, though sound data on use, most likely further complicated by changes in data collection methodology are lacking, motorcycle use appears to be increasing. This adds further to road safety exposure due to the much greater risks of serious injury and death for motorcycle occupants compared with car occupants.

### 3.8 Road safety performance and self-government: Crashes across Voivodships

Table 3 shows the change of road safety level in the last 10 years in all 16 Voivodships. Although all regions have managed to reduce the numbers of road crashes, fatalities and injuries, performance has been variable with reductions in deaths over the period ranging from 8% to 35%.

**Table 3. Fatalities per population, Numbers of Fatalities and Injured people in 2001 and 2011 by Voivodships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voivodship</th>
<th>Fatalities per 100,000 population</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolnośląskie</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kujawsko-pomorskie</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubelskie</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubuskie</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Łódzkie</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Małopolskie</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazowieckie</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opolskie</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podkarpackie</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podlaskie</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomorskie</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śląskie</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Świętokrzyskie</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmińsko-mazurskie</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wielkopolskie</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zachodniopomorskie</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.9 Summary of key fatal and injury crash factors in Poland.

Poland shares with the rest of the world a number of risk factors for severe crash involvement, as well as some factors not so common in well performing road safety countries. Key risk factors are listed below for each for the roads, speed, people, and vehicle pillars.

Table 4. Key risk factors in Poland, for each pillar in the National Road Safety Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Critical Risk Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safe Roads</td>
<td>Unforgiving roadsides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Roads</td>
<td>Lack of sealed shoulders and tactile edge lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Roads</td>
<td>Undivided roads allowing head-on crashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Roads</td>
<td>Unsafe pedestrian access to roads, with insufficient safe crossing amenity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Roads</td>
<td>Lack of separation of vulnerable road users (especially bicycles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Speeds</td>
<td>Rural and freeway speed limits above those set by Safe System Principles, and above international good practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Speeds</td>
<td>Urban speed limits above those set by Safe System Principles, and above international good practice for protection of vulnerable road users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Speeds</td>
<td>Speeding is common in Poland, reflecting lack of effective deterrence from enforcement- in terms of low probability of detection and insufficient penalties if detected speeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe People</td>
<td>Being young and male greatly add to risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe People</td>
<td>Seat belt and child restraint usage rates are below well managed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe People</td>
<td>Bicycle helmet usage rates are poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe People</td>
<td>Contributions of alcohol and drugs to crashes are significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe People</td>
<td>Mobile phone use while driving is common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe People</td>
<td>Contribution of fatigue to crashes is widely accepted, but is difficult to establish in most circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Vehicles</td>
<td>Average age of vehicles is high, reducing access to modern safety features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Vehicles</td>
<td>Promotion of EuroNCAP rating and vehicle safety is minimal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank
4 KEY REVIEW FINDINGS ON ROAD SAFETY MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

The Capacity Review of Poland is unusual in that it is being carried out in parallel with the production of a new Road Safety Program for Poland for 2013-2020. Previous capacity reviews have preceded the development of a road safety strategy and have been an input into the process. The new Road Safety Program was launched for public consultations 43 at a Press Conference by the Ministers of Transport and of the Interior on 9th January 2013. Therefore the Review findings that follow, whilst describing the current situation regarding road safety management, also take account of the new Program and review the management capacity that will be needed to implement it successfully.

4.1 Creating an evidence-based approach

It became clear during the course of the Review that data availability is a key issue in Poland that should be highlighted in discussion of road safety management capacity. Good data availability is an essential element in meeting the requirements of a results focused approach to road safety management. The Review found that Poland does not have a well-coordinated road safety data system. Crash data are the responsibility of the police who provide detailed data to the Transport Ministry for the national crash database. This enables analysis at national level on trends in numbers of crashes and casualties by severity, as well as information on road user type, age, road type, and crash circumstances and causes. However, access to data below national level is patchy, and some authorities have difficulty in obtaining data at a level of detail that would be required for understanding and addressing road safety problems. For example there is difficulty in relating crash data to driver data (e.g. age, length of time licensed, penalty points held), and to vehicle data (e.g. age, engine capacity), and to accurate location.

Crash data are not systematically shared to facilitate analysis and best use of evidence. This means that a strong evidence base for diagnosis and treatment of the road safety problem is lacking. At national level there is analysis that is sufficient to indicate key priorities and that illustrates trends and crash types, but in-depth analysis that would lead to a better understanding of the reasons for Poland’s poor road safety record is lacking. Of particular relevance in the context of the development of the new Program is an apparent lack of analysis of the contribution of policy changes and other factors to the trend in casualties over recent years.

A Road Safety Observatory, Polskie Obserwatorium Bezpieczeństwa Ruchu Drogowego (POBRD), is being developed by the Motor Transport Institute and is expected to start operating as the national observatory in Poland before the end of 2013. The development is supported by EU funding, but the longer term funding and sustainability is uncertain. It is important that the Observatory’s database should be accessible and should provide a good and easily useable resource for road safety crash data analysis.

This lack of an adequate evidence-base extends to understanding of the outcomes of policy and implementation of road safety measures at all levels of government. There is little systematic monitoring, evaluation and routine collection of before and after data which

43 Expected to last at least until March 31, 2013
means that the results of road safety activity are not known. There is a lack of cost-benefit analysis to assess road safety programs and to prioritize measures. This situation is exacerbated by the cessation in 2008 of any collection of intermediate outcome data such as seat belt wearing rates and levels of drunk driving.

The creation of a sound evidence base for understanding of the current situation and past trends, for producing targets for the future that are founded on analysis of what could be achieved through a well-informed strategic approach to future policy, and for monitoring and evaluation of implemented measures, is a fundamental requirement that should be given high priority.

In recognition of the importance of data quality and availability to provide a strong evidence base for policy development and evaluation, a further study of data requirements is in progress and will supplement and complement the findings of this Review. The report will review current data and future data needs including the setting up of the new Road Safety Observatory and assuring its continuity and effective use. Annex 5 includes general recommendations for improvement of crash data systems, and describes this project.

4.2 Road safety management capacity and organization of road safety activity

4.2.1 Capacity for institutional management functions

Results focus

It is a well-established requirement for effective road safety management that a country should have a well-organized and resourced Lead Agency. 44 Although the National Road Safety Council has been in existence since 1993 it has never been resourced in a way that would enable it to fully fulfill the role of a Lead Agency.

The National Road Safety Program, GAMBIT 2005, did contain a Vision Zero and a target to reduce fatalities by 50% between 2003 and 2013, and an implementation plan for national, regional and local road safety programs. However, the lack of a Lead Agency with the resources and responsibility for ensuring that the GAMBIT program was implemented has led to under-achievement and failure to meet its target. The roots of the problem are the way that road safety is organized without clear leadership, accountability, responsibility, or sound coordination between levels of government and under-resourcing of road safety activity.

A number of partner agencies within government are critical to the delivery of road safety and the achievement of the target of a 50% reduction in fatalities by 2020 set in the National Road Safety Program. These include the Ministry of Transport, Secretariat of NRSC and Departments responsible for Roads and Motorways as well as Road Transport issues (driver licensing, vehicle standards and registration, public and heavy transportation, etc.), Police, GDDKiA, Finance, Health, Education, Fire Brigades, and General Inspectorate of Road Transport, Ministry of the Interior, the Voivods and different sub-national government levels (Voivodship, Poviat and Gmina level).

The Parliamentary Road Safety Group also serves an important commentary and advocacy function, within the Parliament and to the community. The Chair of the Group (Beata Bublewicz, MP) achieves regular coverage in the media, and thus there is value for education and promotion of road safety in facilitating a well-informed road safety group.

44 Peden et al (2004); Bliss and Breen (2009)
Below national level there is an absence of an evidence-based targeted approach with clear setting of priorities. The lack of the critical Lead Agency role in policy guidance, accountability and coordination has meant that multiple agencies have defined their own scope of work leading to poor selection of priorities and duplication of effort. Whilst some good work exists the lack of clear focus on results suggests that the situation is sub-optimal and there is considerable room for improvement.

The recently announced new National Road Safety Program 2013-2020 restates the vision of “Zero fatalities on Polish roads”, and includes goals to reduce the annual number of “fatalities by at least 50%”, and “seriously injured by at least 40%” by 2020 based on 2010. These goals are a laudable aspiration but they are top down targets unsupported by analysis of possible future trends or projections of the contribution to come from specific policy areas. It is therefore difficult to assess how they are to be achieved. There is also a lack of intermediate outcome objectives and targets.

If the new national targets are to be achieved there will need to be a focus on targets at regional level and a much clearer focus on the contribution from and management responsibilities of the different agencies at all levels of government. In order to ensure delivery of the target reductions in deaths and injuries, understanding of the contributions of various elements of the Program to road toll reductions, and management to those contributions will be necessary.

Coordination

The decentralized system of government described in section 3 has created a need for coordination that has not been fully addressed. The absence of clear leadership from a central Lead Agency has meant that there has been a lack of effective partnership working between and within different levels of government to deliver road safety efficiently.

A number of agencies see themselves as performing their own role well but blame others for poor overall performance. Co-ordinated and co-operative activity for road safety from these agencies is critical, and mistrust would be reduced by more open dialogue, objective and publicly available monitoring of performance, and unified leadership.  

Co-operation and coordination are present but can be improved: agencies report difficulties for one institution in obtaining data from another; agencies also report insufficient co-operation between those responsible for post-crash care at the scene of the crash.

A number of government agencies do not genuinely manage their responsibilities for road safety - few have targets, strategies, action plans, performance indicators, clear accountability and responsibility.

There are encouraging signs in the more central role being given to the National Road Safety Council and/or Secretariat, and in the high profile launch of the new NRSP jointly by the Ministers of Transport and the Interior. The requirements for a functioning road safety management system are described in the NRSP, and the need for both horizontal and vertical coordination by the NRSC is recognized. Similar coordination roles are proposed in the NRSP for the Voivodship Road Safety Councils, (RRSCs), including a mandatory requirement for cooperation between the Voivodship RSCs and the Voivodship Road Traffic Centers, WORDs.
Despite the existence of RRSCs, self-governments report that they do not support road improvement works based on road safety alone. Rather they may add a little road safety to road works approved for other reasons. Traffic flow considerations dominate expenditure, even in the building of new roads, and gminas report that apparent road safety improvement works are more likely to be based on complaints and representations from residents than on crash data analysis. Thus, while some voivodships maintain a results focus on road safety management, generally self-government road safety expenditure is delivering to a sub-optimal level. It is also proposed in the NRSP that the RRSCs should be supported by an executive secretariat and a research unit, and that at Poviat and Commune/Municipal (particularly in larger cities or communes) level the RRSCs should have similar management functions and coordination role locally.

Inconsistencies of process from one self-government to the next are not uncommon. The approaches of the voivodships to road safety differ markedly, as do the approaches of the gminas.

Making this layered structure of road safety management work to ensure that the right priorities are set and that results are achieved without duplication of effort will be challenging. This will require sufficient resources for the new Lead Agency (see below) and NRSC and for the Voivodship RSCs to make this plan a reality.

Legislation

The current legislative and regulatory framework for road safety is inadequate for current needs and has not adjusted adequately and sufficiently quickly to changing conditions. The NRSP proposes different legislative actions to regulate an integrated rescue system, pedestrian safety, and speed, together with stable financing of road safety. Analysis to define the necessary scope of legislative changes, and drafting amendments to relevant Acts and regulations is proposed. The need for effective consultation mechanisms to ensure that legislative changes take account of the needs of the lower levels of administration is recognized.

Funding and resource allocation

The need for improved resources for road safety has already been highlighted. This is recognized in the new Road Safety Program, and substantive discussion of how road safety can be financed in the future in a stable and sustainable manner is proposed. Options to be considered include, road charges and tolls for using road infrastructure, gasoline price surcharge, revenue from speed enforcement and from premiums for obligatory third-party vehicle insurance.

As important as securing financial resources is the need to ensure that the NRSC and the Voivodship RSCs are staffed with skilled personnel with access to reliable data systems and analytical capability. Resources for road safety are not sufficient, and yet are sometimes spent on duplication. Expenditure choices are sub-optimal due to lack of results focus, inefficiency, lack of co-ordination, selection of low benefit options for expenditure of resources based on emotive considerations and political expediency rather than a sound evidence base.
Promotion

There is a lack of a systematic communication strategy to promote road safety and to increase awareness of risk and improve behavior. Public interest in and demand for road safety improvement is lacking in Poland and there is an absence of pressure from the population to reduce the high level of crash risk. Road safety is not seen by Governments as being their concern because they do not believe that the community sees road safety as being largely the responsibility of government. This view has been expressed at each level of government. This reflects an advocacy and community awareness failure which allows governments to avoid their responsibility for provision of a safe road transport system.

Road safety advocacy is patchy and often apparently not undertaken by NGOs and agencies from which it might be reasonably expected. However, there is some good road safety advocacy by NGOs. NGO efforts could be better focused on promoting the importance of road safety to Poland, and promoting the responsibility of Government (as well as road users) in addressing the road toll. Such advocacy to and about government may be more fruitful for road safety than NGO work which replaces or supplements work government should be undertaking. This is especially concerning when the NGO is only able to provide a fragmented, irregular or localized delivery while government can provide the work on a systematic, standardized, broad basis (for example, see later section on school road safety education).

Strong advocacy regarding the responsibilities of government for delivery of a safe system may help to address commonly identified lack of political will for road safety based on the lack of pressure from the community for governments to address road safety. The media have the power to kill or save road safety solutions, and criticisms of road safety policy can become a means of self-promotion by media outlets by appealing to common misconceptions or an arena for scoring political points. However, in some instances the problem is simply that the media are not sufficiently informed by road safety experts. With better provision of the evidence base for decisions, media response can be changed, as the recent experience of media coverage of speed cameras in Poland demonstrates.

The need for public education campaigns is recognized in the RS Program in the Safe People and Safe Speed chapters, but the need for promotion of the Strategy aims and objectives is not mentioned. Speed policy in particular is strongly focused on enforcement but will achieve much more if communications can win public and media support. A revolution is needed in the way that the Polish population understands risk and acknowledges the need to accept responsibility for reducing the toll of death and injury on the roads.

Education

Current education initiatives focus primarily on younger children, and are often based on competitions and similar activities rather than development of skills, particularly for very young children who are not the group at highest risk. There is a lack of safety awareness education for older children, pre-drivers, drivers and riders, parents. Multiple agencies jostle to provide education in kindergartens and schools with no visible co-ordination and even more agencies calling for road safety education in schools, claiming it does not exist, while the Ministry of Education’s syllabus contains road safety education albeit spread over various subjects rather than presented as being purely road safety education. There is also no visible relationship between supply of materials for teaching students from various agencies, and the need for the materials, the logic of their connection to the stages of learning of the students or the relevance and importance of the teaching to road safety. Road safety is sometimes taught.
by well-meaning but pedagogically naïve presenters, unskilled in the learning needs of the
students they teach. Programs are not evaluated.

**Monitoring and evaluation**

There are significant deficiencies in data availability and quality, particularly below national
level, and an absence of regular detailed reports on the road safety situation. Monitoring and
evaluation of road safety programs is scarce, so that measures are often implemented without
clear analysis of the “before” situation or systems to collect “after” data in order to evaluate
results. This means that sub-optimal schemes may be repeated and scarce resources wasted.
Sharing of data and experience between different authorities is absent. In addition, within
self-governments available road safety data are not considered in making road investment
decisions, which are often based on residents’ concerns rather than objective evidence.

The Road Safety Program proposes improvements to the data collection system and the
creation of a network of observatories including the Polish Road Safety Observatory at the
Motor Transport Institute and regional observatories. It is not clear what the role of the latter
would be and a better plan might be to focus resources on the national Observatory whilst
ensuring that it has the capability to provide for the data requirements and analysis below
national level. Setting up regional observatories could lead to duplication of effort and is
unlikely to be as cost-effective as a well-resourced national observatory.

Improved crash data need to be supplemented by renewed focus on intermediate outcome
data. It is welcome that the Road Safety Program includes a schedule of program
implementation monitoring indicators that includes indirect indicators as well as crash data.

In addition to monitoring of final and intermediate outcomes, systems need to be established
to ensure that monitoring and evaluation is recognized as an integral part of safety programs
at all levels of government.

**Research and knowledge transfer**

There is existing high quality research capability in Polish universities and research institutes.
There is a wealth of road safety research and knowledge available from other countries and
Poland can draw upon EU information systems and research programs. Priority for road
safety research in Poland is to provide a better understanding of road safety risks and
mechanisms, and measures to address them, and to use such analysis to inform the road
safety program that will be needed if the 2020 targets are to be met.

**4.2.2 Capacity for interventions**

Existing capacity to implement interventions that are cost-effective and evidence-based in
terms of their known costs and benefits is reduced due to the lack of coordination described
above resulting in an absence of effective partnerships, dissemination of good practice and
sharing of knowledge and resources. Each entity seems to define its own scope of work, and
this may leave gaps in the required actions across the landscape of road safety.

The new Road Safety Program includes a schedule of proposed activities under each of five
pillars: Safe people, Safe roads, Safe speed, Safe vehicle, and rescue and post-accident care.
The activities are divided into three groups: Engineering and technology; Supervision and
sanctions; and Education. This is a good start but work is required to convert what is a broad
outline of proposed measures into an implementable program. In particular there is a need to
set out the projected costs and benefits of the proposals, how they will be implemented, the
proposed timescale, and who will be in the lead. The proposals are wide-ranging and need to be ordered by priority. Consideration also needs to be given to what legislation will be required.

There is a welcome emphasis in the new Program on the principles of a Safe System Approach to road safety management and on need to consider the contributions to risk of the road user, the road infrastructure and the vehicle systematically. This would be strengthened by discussion of the wider system in which road safety operates. For example, land-use planning in terms of the location and safe transport needs of developments needs to be taken into account, and synergies between transport and environmental and health policies developed. The high toll of pedestrian casualties is highlighted and could be addressed within the context of a sustainable transport policy.

4.2.3 Capacity for results

The shortcomings in the road safety management system in Poland set out above are illustrated by the relatively poor performance of Poland in reducing road casualties over the past decade. Although fatalities fell by 27% between 2003 and 2011, and provisional results for 2012 indicate a further decrease of 15%, to 3,571, it is most unlikely that the GAMBIT target of 2,800 deaths in 2013 will be met.

If the new target of no more than 2,000 deaths by 2020 is to be achieved the road safety management system will need to be much more strongly focused on implementation of the RS Program to produce results. The Program includes detailed schedules of priorities and direction of activities under each of the pillars. This is encouraging, but a much clearer focus on how this is to be achieved in terms of an action plan for the next 3-5 years is an urgent priority. The new Lead Agency and the NRSC need to have their capabilities enhanced quickly and also must be given much greater responsibility and powers in directing road safety activity and coordinating the work at regional level.

There is a substantial risk that resources will not be made available either at sufficient scale or quickly enough to make significant progress. The new Lead Agency and the NRSC need to establish some quick wins and to demonstrate that it is able to fulfill the role of a Lead Agency. There is a danger of a lack of momentum leading to little change in the status quo.

4.2.4 Summary

Poland’s position at the bottom of the EU league table has rightly led to renewed focus on the need to improve road safety. One of the reasons that the previous GAMBIT program failed to be implemented was lack of a Lead Agency with a clear remit and ability to drive action and coordinate activity as well as the lack of funding of road safety initiatives.

The new program has already received good support from Ministers of Transport and the Interior, and the Prime Minister has supported the speed camera program. This high level support is a very positive factor that will facilitate action on the NRSP. In addition, there are welcome signs that the NRSC is being strengthened. However, there is much to do to produce a program that is backed by a clear implementation plan. It will be challenging to gear up road safety activity at all levels of government within a national strategy with common goals. It will be critical for success to have a strong Lead Agency, backed up by legislation to ensure sustainability. It is essential that it is well resourced and able to establish and implement an action plan with clear goals, interim targets, and systems for monitoring and evaluation of results, and that it reports progress on a regular basis (See Annex 8 for
description of the role of the Lead Agency). The need for greatly strengthened road safety management capacity should not be underestimated, and as yet evidence is not available for how such a fundamental change in approach will be achieved.

Poland has now the opportunity to build on a program that includes much that is to be welcomed. There is sufficient knowledge of the key risks and priorities, and of the measures that have potential to produce results. The challenge is to put words into decisive, effective action.

4.2.5 Detailed findings

Table 5 sets out details of the Review’s findings of system capacity for road safety management across the dimensions of institutional management functions, interventions and results.

Table 5. Strategic review of current road safety management capacity in Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROAD SAFETY MANAGEMENT FUNCTION</th>
<th>STRATEGIC REVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results focus</strong></td>
<td>The National Road Safety Program, GAMBIT 2005, is formally still under implementation until 2013. However, the extent of implementation has been limited. GAMBIT included a Vision of “zero fatalities on Polish roads” and a Strategic Objective: “decrease by 50% in the number of fatalities in comparison to 2003, not more than 2,800 fatalities in 2013.” Although fatalities fell by 26.7% from 5,640 in 2003 to 4,189 in 2011, to meet the 2013 objective a further fall of 33% between 2011 and 2013 would be required which seems unlikely on current progress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GAMBIT 2005 included an implementation plan for three year operational programs with yearly realization plans, and sector road safety programs, as well as regional and local road safety programs. According to GAMBIT 2005, the National GAMBIT 2005 Program Chief Coordinator is the Transport Minister, and under the Road Traffic Act the Transport Minister is the Chairman of the National Road Safety Council (NRSC) which sets out the policies and coordinates road safety work of all key institutions. NRSC includes representatives of all key Ministries (Interior, Health, Education, Finance) the Commander in Chief of Police, Commander in Chief of Firefighters, the General Director for National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA) and General Inspectorate of Road Transport (GITD), as well as the Ministry of the Interior and the Voivods of all 16 Voivodships (regions).

However, the small number of professional road safety staff in the Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy and the Secretariat of the NRSC, limited legal responsibilities and powers, and limited sustainable funding has significantly limited the ability...
of these organizations to carry out the wide range of functions needed from a Lead Agency and coordinating body.

The lack of a fully functioning well resourced Lead Agency with the clear legal authority to make decisions, manage resources, and direct the activities of partner agencies, is a key problem that is at the heart of the lack of progress in delivering the objectives of GAMBIT 2005.

There are many small initiatives undertaken by different stakeholders (public authorities, media, NGOs). One of the significant undertakings in Poland in recent years was an initiative by GDDKiA called “Roads of Trust.” Started in 2007, the program aims to reduce the number of deaths on national roads by 75 percent between 2003-2013 (in accordance with GAMBIT goals). A pilot project on national road no. 8 resulted in a fall of 35% in fatalities since 2007. See Annex 6 for further details.

The limited implementation of GAMBIT 2005 and the failure to meet its strategic objectives has led to the preparation of a new National Road Safety Program/Strategy and Action Plan in parallel with this Capacity Review. The launch of the new National Road Safety Program 2013-2020 with strong Ministerial support is a very promising development. The restoration of Secretariat of the NRSC as a separate department of the Ministry of Transport is an important signal of Minister’s commitment. It may go even further towards creating a separate entity (Lead Agency), and the allowance for such institution to expand (at least with fixed-term staff) in order to deliver the new Road Safety Program/Strategy. However, it is not yet clear how the program will be financed and whether there is a strong enough management system in place to ensure successful implementation.

Ability to deliver results is made more difficult by a lack of understanding of road safety, and especially of safe systems, amongst some government officials, particularly below national government level, with over-focus on behavior change through education rather than all the elements of the road transport system. Within the national government there is a sound appreciation of the need for speed enforcement. However, more broadly there is a very mixed appreciation of the role of speed in serious crashes.

Coordination

The “self-government reform” that was introduced in 1990 established a new system of governance and set up gminas (communes). Decentralization was further reinforced in 1999 by the establishment of a new territorial structure creating powiats (counties) and voivodships (provinces/regions). The territorial reform shifted a significant number of public sector tasks from the central government to the subnational self-governments and
increased substantially their competences and resources. Roads, including responsibility for road safety, are administered at each level of government: National, voivodship, powiat and gmina. The roles of each category of administration are described in Annex 7.

In parallel with the development of the central coordination body NRSC, a nationwide decentralized road safety structure was brought into existence in the late 1990s, and regional road safety councils were set up in all 16 regions. They are presided over by regional governors and comprise representatives of lower administrative degrees, as well as police, fire brigade, education and roads at regional level. Regional road safety councils (RRSC) have been assigned an inventory of tasks similar to, though of lesser scope, than those of NRSC.

Despite these arrangements, the absence of clear leadership from a central Lead Agency has led to limited partnership development amongst agencies and the absence of clear multi-sector action plans. Few stakeholders (national and self-government) attempt to really manage road safety - few have targets, strategies, action plans, performance indicators, or clear accountability and responsibility. There is little evidence of development of effective delivery partnerships based on identification of crash injury risk and understanding of road safety problems, or of the development of multi-sectoral road safety strategies with clear goals.

This does not mean that road safety activity is absent and there are road safety programs in existence, but the lack of coordination and national/self-government leadership means that such programs are less efficient and effective than would be desirable. Work is fragmented in several ways:

- Each entity seems to define its own scope of work, and this may leave gaps in the required actions across the landscape of road safety. The lack of a lead allows agencies to define for themselves the areas of action they see as their own. Although there are limitations to this through legislated roles, these do not seem to be enough to ensure that the full range of activities is covered.
- Duplication of activity is not uncommon. Examples include a multiplicity of uncoordinated educational activities, multiple planned and in process development of databases, and apparent duplication of supply of equipment to Police by the Ministry of Interior and various WORDs. Agencies see themselves as doing their own job well but blame others for poor overall performance.

The new Lead Agency and the NRSC will need to be given a much more positive role in coordination of activity of the regional and local road safety councils.
### Legislation

Since 1999, Poland has had a parliamentary working group on road safety whose goal is to strengthen the development of the road safety legislative framework. Legislation contains very detailed regulations that become out of date but it is very difficult to make changes. Existing law often does not respond to needs or to new requirements such as harmonising the Polish system to EU directives, and updating fines in line with increased living standards and inflation. The legislative process is very lengthy, there is a lack of expertise in government departments and public consultation is not always sufficiently considered. Legislative changes, such as revisions to speed limits, are not focused on road safety objectives and made without sufficient evidence of the effects.

Technical standards, guidelines and regulations, for example for road design and speed limit criteria, have not been kept up-to-date and require review.

### Funding and resource allocation

GAMBIT 2005 indicated that about PLN 25 billion would be needed for its implementation but such funding has not been allocated. As yet there is no such estimate for the implementation of the NRSP. Financing for road safety comes from the following sources: budgets of national, regional and local authorities; regional road traffic centres (WORD’s) from charges for driving tests, educational courses for professional drivers; sectoral operational programs; local EU programs; international loans; National Road Fund. However, there is a lack of knowledge as to how much is actually spent at all levels of government, This needs to be established so that it could be considered how the current availability of funding could be more efficiently used to “get more for the same money”.

There is no dedicated funding for road safety and lack of funds is often cited as a problem in developing road safety programs, yet resources are sometimes spent inefficiently on duplication, inefficiency, lack of co-ordination, selection of poor value options for expenditure of resources based on emotive considerations and political expediency rather than sound evidence. Cost-benefit analysis is not used routinely to establish priorities and there is little monitoring to establish the cost-effectiveness of road safety measures.

### Promotion and education

Promotion is largely ad hoc and not focused in a coordinated or strategic fashion or well-targeted at high risk groups such as young male drivers. Campaigns are carried out at all levels of government without coordination that would provide greater impact. Road safety advocacy is patchy and not undertaken by NGOs and agencies to the extent to which it might be expected. Greater national coordination
would reduce the duplication of campaign creation across regions.

Road safety education for children is included by the Ministry of Education in the school syllabus but not as a specific separate topic. It is carried out by a variety of agencies at regional and local level, including the police. There is a lack of coordination and the potential for inefficiency as resources are not shared, risking overlap and duplication. There is a strong emphasis on kindergartens for very young children and a focus on classroom based activities and the use of traffic parks rather than more practical training in the real road environment. The high rate of pedestrian casualties suggests that pedestrian skills and knowledge of risk are inadequately addressed in education programs, particularly for older children who are most exposed to risk.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring and evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final outcome data systems</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Roads and Bridges Research Institute is developing its own integrated transport database (BDWIK), and a road safety observatory is being developed by the Motor Transport Institute.

Currently databases are not coordinated and combined effectively. This perpetuates the excessive focus on behavioral factors and causes of the crash rather than causes of the injury or death, because the behavioral factors are in the crash database, and so we can estimate how many fatalities are due to drink-driving, etc. However, there is no simple way to estimate how many serious crashes occur where there is a guard rail versus not; when the vehicle is 5 star EuroNCAP rated versus 2 star, or involving drivers with a history of speeding offences versus not. Thus road features, vehicle features, driver history, etc. cannot be readily associated with crash outcomes for research, policy or advocacy purposes. A sound connection between crash and hospital data would allow stronger assessment of crash costs overall and by type, location, speed limit, etc. allowing more precise evaluation of road safety programs and more precise selection of works for stronger benefits.

There are problems with availability of data provision by the police.
to local and regional government bodies. Annex 5 contains proposals for improvement of data systems. Analysis to produce a strong evidence base for action and monitoring of results of road safety programs are both insufficient leading to inefficiency in prioritisation and evaluation of outcomes. Such evidence is needed to build commitment of politicians and other decision makers and provide them with arguments for public debate and program expansion. Crash injury data are not routinely available from health system records although some pilot projects to link police and hospital data have taken place in two voivodships. Hospital casualty data logs injury severity but causation is not always available.

**Intermediate outcome data systems** Between 2002 and 2008 intermediate outcomes data were collected (e.g. systematic monitoring of vehicle speeds, seat belt use, and levels of drinking and driving) but lack of funding stopped this.

**Vehicle and driver registration systems** The Road Traffic Act also describes Vehicle and driver registration systems, which are under the control of the Ministry of Interior. It is a computer system (CEPIK) which includes a central database that collects data and information about vehicles, their owners. CEPIK includes also information about people possessing driving licence as well as information about people who lost the licence and have a driving ban. The Database includes also information about licensed driving instructors, licensed driving schools, licensed examiners and examination centers. The data are gathered by various institutions which are responsible for: issuing of driving licences (Poviats’), vehicle registration (Poviats’) and inspection of technical state of vehicles (Vehicle Inspection Stations in whole Poland monitored by Poviats’), Because the system has sensitive personal information about drivers and vehicles, the system is only accessible by a limited number of public institutions. Other institutions have to apply to the Ministry of Interior in order to obtain the access to data. The Ministry of Interior is planning to redesign the CEPIK system in order to include new elements required by recent changes in the Road Traffic Act. It will be the chance to make the new CEPIK system compatible with other road safety databases in order to better analyze various information which are relevant to evidence based road safety research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research and knowledge transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland has a long and proud history of world leading research in both pure and applied fields. More can be done to leverage this capacity for road safety. The principles of evidence based decision making, public accountability, and continuous improvement in road safety dictate that research and evaluation are critical elements of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
road safety management. In addition, Road Safety is not a unified discipline but rather an area of expertise into which people come with many different but relevant backgrounds. However, most staff learn road safety ‘on the job’.

Road safety research in Poland is currently undertaken by government agencies, research institutes, and academic institutions. While this mix is appropriate, the research is not guided by an overall research strategy, and is thus sometimes fragmented, some efforts are duplicated, and solutions known to be effective may be delayed by calls for unnecessary repetition of research in Poland. While some solutions to road safety, especially those that rely on socialized views and community attitudes, should be checked for local applicability, others are matters of physics and needed not be re-researched in each country.

Poland has several high quality transportation research institutes and universities that could contribute to data analysis and the implementation of road safety initiatives (e.g. the Institute for Transportation Sciences, Technical University of Gdansk, Motor Transport Institute) but they need to be more actively involved (See Annex 3).

The Motor Transport Institute has a full crash data set from 1990 and data are received on a monthly basis from the police for the official annual database. There are difficulties in getting data on driver and vehicle registrations. The Road Safety Observatory that is being developed will be operational at the end of 2013 and will improve research capability. However, there is no consistent government funding for road safety research, and while the Institute receives grants from the Ministry of Science, Ministry of Transport and some EU funds, it obtains most of its funding from other sources. The sustainability of the Observatory beyond 2013-14 is uncertain since EU funding is for its development not a permanent source of funds.

The Motor Industry Institute (PIMOT) has capacity for vehicle R&D though most of their activity is on type approval work. There is some safety research such as a project on pedestrian collisions, and work on child car seat certification, and some participation in collaborative EU projects. A new crash test facility is planned, and it would be possible to carry out physical simulation of crashes and post-crash testing of vehicles, but the best use of this facility needs to be assessed as vehicles are already subject to EU wide type-approval systems.

The Roads and Bridges Institute is also a significant contributor to road safety research, and has developed processes for costing crashes and helped in updating Accident Data Sheet.
**INTERVENTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design and operation of the road network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Road standards</strong> In 2010 the total road network comprised over 416,000 km of roads, including, 18 607 km of national roads. Regional and communal governments account for over 95 percent of the total network, while the central government oversees the rest (motorways and national roads). Over 80% of roads are paved. The overall road network is sparse with density and accessibility below EU benchmarks. Poland’s road network density is about 87.5 km per 100 km² for all roads, which is below the EU-15 level of 111.8&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;. The motorway and expressway network is currently under development along the international North-South and East-West transit routes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quality of the road network is still below international benchmarks. The World Economic Forum evaluates the current quality of Poland’s road infrastructure network about 2 on a scale from 1 (underdeveloped) to 7 (extensive and as efficient as the world’s best). Although government has taken some actions to address the inadequate network quality, since 2009 the share of roads in unsatisfactory or bad condition stabilized at around 40 percent in spite of high investment outlays allocated to national roads. This was most likely due to the fact practically all the funds were used for construction of high standard roads (motorways, expressways and bypasses) leaving relatively small amounts for continuation of the systematic revitalization subprogram with associated road safety improvements. EuroRAP inspection of national roads showed that in 2009-2011 68% of the network was classified as very high or high risk.

Current technical standards are outdated, and debate continues regarding the appropriateness of a single set of standards for all roads, applicable to national roads through to gmina roads. Advantages include uniformity for drivers and standardization of solutions to an evidence base, but the disadvantage is lack of flexibility to meet local conditions. The solution may be greater sensitivity to the needs of low speed, highly pedestrianized urban roads, and other road situations rather than the abandonment of standards. GDDKiA has committed to consultation with self-government to address this in the revision of standards. This should include wide consultation with all levels of self-government.

Speed limits are set too high on many roads and do not take account of the road layout and quality and the use and function of the road. The motorway limit of 140 km/h is higher than in other EU countries. In urban areas, the limit of 50km/h (60km/h between 11pm and 5am) is too high in areas of high pedestrian activity. In addition, enforcement is inadequate with 84% of drivers in urban

---

areas and 94% on rural roads exceeding the speed limit. Where cameras are used, the tolerance margins are high (+30 km/h). The criteria, guidelines, rules and technical regulations for setting speed limits are unclear and possibly outdated. A review of speed limits has been announced and it is important that it should take account of best international practice and relate it to Polish road conditions.

Joint funding of EU programs forces commitment of funds from Poland. This may draw resources away from the best road safety expenditure of funds towards adding capacity rather than improving safety standards on high risk roads.

| Conditions of entry and exit to the road network for vehicles and users | Vehicles In 2011 there were 24 million registered vehicles of which 18 million were cars, and the average age was estimated to be 12-13 years in 2009. New cars and second-hand cars imported from other EU member states conform to regulations requiring fitment of basic safety features: seat belts, ABS, driver airbags. Newer models may also include modern technology such as the electronic stability program, but the high average age of the fleet means that such equipment is likely to have limited penetration. (However, there is a potential safety problem if significant numbers of right-hand drive cars were to be brought into Poland from the UK by returning workers.) The Motor Industry Institute carries out technical vehicle tests for type approval of vehicles based on UNECE and EU directives, and carries out research into vehicle safety construction. There is no type approval or national regulation for spare parts and equipment can be added without any checks. The Motor Transport Institute has estimated that more than half of spare parts, and fluids such as brake fluids, may be of sub-standard quality. Technical condition of vehicles is periodically checked at MOT test stations, but an audit by the Supreme Audit Office found deficiencies. Moreover, there is a culture of neglect of vehicle condition, particularly with regard to lighting defects. Users Driver training is legally regulated at national level, while testing is carried out by Voivodship Traffic Training Centers (WORDS) which are under the jurisdiction of regional self-governments. They are also responsible for testing of driving instructors, and also train school teachers. Driving schools are private enterprises. A minimum of 30 hours training is required before the driving test, and the instructor decides when a candidate

---

46 GUS (2011)  
47 Motor Transport Institute estimate  
48 Motor Transport Institute (2009)  
49 NIK (2011)  
50 NRSP (2013)  
51 Act on Vehicles Drivers was approved on January 5, 2011 (Dz.U. 2011 nr 30 poz. 151) and had few changes since then.
is ready and provides a certificate of readiness for test. Accompanied practice with parents is not permitted. There is a multiple choice theory test which has a pass rate of 75%. The practical test takes 40 minutes and must cover a route that enables a checklist of required abilities to be tested. Only 30% pass first time. A new driving test came into force in January 2013 and includes a computerized section in the theory test. There is no system of graduated licensing that would reduce the risk of new drivers through post-test restrictions on e.g., driving at night, carrying passengers and zero alcohol limit.  

WORDS also participate in road safety education events for children with municipal guards and police, and presentations for adults on seat belts, and crash effects.

| Compliance with safety standards and rules in the road environment | Seat belt use has been compulsory in both front and rear seats since 1991, but wearing rates are lower than in other EU countries at 78% in the front and 47% in the rear. 53 (Although such data have not been collected since 2008, the team’s informal surveys suggest that there is room for considerable improvement in child restraint and seat belt and usage rates, especially in the back seat.) Excessive speed and inadequate enforcement of speed limits, together with speed limits that are often inappropriate for the use of the road, particularly in urban areas, lead to speed being a factor in 43% of crashes. More than 50% of drivers exceed speed limits, rising to 85% in small and medium size towns 54. This is recognized and highlighted in the new road safety strategy as the key priority for action. A large increase in automatic detection cameras is planned and the law will be amended to modify penalty procedures. It is also proposed to improve the management of speed enforcement. Drink-driving continues to be a problem and in 2007 14% of deaths involved alcohol. Enforcement is inadequate and the level of prosecutions is low. Although drink-drive penalties are high, they are usually suspended, and their value as a deterrent is diminished. |
| Emergency medical services | Both the EU emergency number, 112, and 999 are in use for medical emergencies and dispatch centres coordinate requests for ambulances. There is a two-tier system of ambulances with about 45% able to offer advanced treatment with skilled medical personnel. There is a lack of efficient coordination between emergency services. Fire brigade vehicles, unlike police vehicles, |

---

52 OECD (2006) (2)
53 World Bank (2011)
54 Gaca et al (2006)
are well equipped with medical equipment. In hospital emergency treatment services are not sufficiently developed, and lack a good triage system.55

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social costs</strong></td>
<td>Estimates of the socio-economic costs of road traffic crashes in Poland have been made for the NRSC that include medical costs, lost output, damage costs and cost of administration, but exclude the costs of human suffering. The estimate is that road crashes in 2011 cost the society was around 20.1 billion zloty56.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final safety outcomes - fatalities and serious injuries</strong></td>
<td>Data systems are not coordinated and combined effectively. This perpetuates the excessive focus on behavioral factors and causes of the crash rather than causes of the injury or death, because these are in the crash database, and so Police can estimate how many fatalities are due to drink-driving, etc. Thus road features, vehicle features, etc. cannot be readily associated with crash outcomes for research or promotion to the public. The lack of coordination of data sources and limitations on the provision and use of crash data mean that particularly below national level there is poor understanding of crash risk, and a lack of knowledge on causes and locations of crashes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate safety outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Information on key indicators such as seat belt wearing is no longer available because monitoring has been discontinued. This lack of intermediate data means that policy monitoring is not possible except in terms of the overall number of casualties which means that outcomes cannot be related to particular measures. A EuroRAP risk mapping for the national road network has been carried out (see above) but the results have not been used to identify a program of remedial action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 World Bank (2011)
| Program outputs | Monitoring and evaluation of safety programs is limited. Progress measurement is based largely on national crash data, and there is a lack of before-and-after data collection for monitoring and evaluation of policy. Regular provision of data on a wide range of indicators is needed to improve this situation. |
5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO CAPACITY FOR INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

This section follows the format in the World Bank Guidelines for conducting management capacity reviews, and focuses on the capacity to carry out the necessary institutional management functions to ensure progress in achieving road safety improvements in accordance with the recommendations of the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention.

Recommendations start with the key elements needed to carry out the management functions that are essential in order to achieve a results focus with an ambition to improve road safety, and recommendations grouped under each of the key Institutional Management functions follow:

- Coordination and Promotion;
- Legislation;
- Funding and resource allocation;
- Monitoring, evaluation and research.

The recommendations are divided into two implementation phases. The Establishment phase (recommendations E1, 2,…) covers those recommendations that are high priority for implementation in order to establish the core road safety management requirements. They provide the necessary capacity on which further capacity building in the Growth phase (recommendations G1,2…) can build.

Sections 6 and 7 that follow contain recommendations on capacity for implementing interventions and capacity to achieve results in terms of outputs and outcomes. Section 8 contains a table that summarizes all the recommendations.

5.1 Results focus

5.1.1 Political leadership

Objective: Achieving the critical high level political support and provision of resources for delivery of the National Road Safety Program.

Establishment Phase

Recommendation E1:

a. The NRSC should be restructured to be a political entity with politicians as members, chaired by the Prime Minister with the Minister for Transport as the Deputy Chair, to provide the highest level of support. Membership should include the relevant national Ministers, the Voivodship Marshalls, and the head of the new Lead Agency (see below).

b. The NRSC should aim to facilitate delivery of the Program by providing a Council through which political will and direction can be consistently maintained;

c. Bi-partisan support for road safety should be encouraged through offering and encouraging all party leaders to sign the National Road Safety Program;

d. A formally recognized Parliamentary bi-partisan road safety committee should be established from MP with a genuinely evidence focused commitment to road safety. The role of the committee would be to hold inquiries into specific aspects of road safety, as selected by the NRSC, and provide advice to Government;
Each relevant Minister should agree a budget, with the NRSC and with approval by the PM, to be dedicated to road safety, provide an account of how it will be spend, and allow monitoring of the expenditure on the committed agreed road safety work.

5.1.2 Lead Agency responsibilities

Objective: Creating a Lead Agency, which has the capacity to effectively lead, monitor and manage road safety

The review team considered a number of options for the creation of a Lead Agency, including location of the Agency within Police, within GDDKiA, within Ministry of Transport, and from the NRSC Secretariat.

Placement within Police or GDDKiA may result in a focus narrowed by the larger agency within which the lead is placed. This would not be a comfortable fit with the need for the Lead Agency to lead and manage delivery of road safety across the breadth of safe system elements required. The NRSC Secretariat is positioned within Government to be a sound independent Lead Agency. However, it currently lacks the formal authority, resources, skills and staff.

The move of the NRSC Secretariat from being part of the Ministry of Transport to being a separate entity is an important signal from the top levels of Government, along with the allowance for the NRSC Secretariat to expand (with limited duration staff) in order to facilitate delivery of the new Road Safety Program.

Box 2. The key roles of a Lead Agency

The first recommendation of the World Report to identify a Lead Agency within Government "stresses the importance of accountable institutional leadership which derives from a designated legal authority that confers the power to make decisions, manage resources and coordinate the efforts of all participating sectors of government.

Lead agencies can take different institutional forms, but they share common functions and resourcing requirements. They must be adequately funded and publicly accountable for their performance. They must also actively engage and collaborate with all groups in society that can contribute to improved safety outcomes. Their effectiveness is considerably enhanced by strong and sustained political support for the initiatives they promote. From: World Bank Country Guidelines (Bliss & Breen, 2009).

The Lead Agency usually takes responsibility for:

- coordination within government, both horizontally and vertically at national, regional and local level;
- coordination of delivery partnerships between government partners and stakeholders, professional, non-governmental, business sectors and parliamentary groups and committees;
- ensuring a comprehensive legislative framework;
- securing sustainable sources of annual funding and creating a rational framework for resource allocation;
- high-level promotion of the road safety strategy across government and society;
- Regular and ongoing monitoring and evaluation, and reporting to Government;
- Strategic leadership of research and knowledge transfer.

Annex 8 provides more details of the roles under each of these core functions.

Source: Bliss & Breen (2009)
Recommendations on creation and role of Lead Agency

Establishment Phase

Recommendation E2: Establish a Lead Agency for road safety as an independent entity not within any other agency, and initiate the necessary legal processes to provide the capacity (staff, funding, accountability, responsibility, influence and powers to manage road safety across the levels of government) to effectively lead, monitor and manage road safety delivery nationally. See box above for the key roles of a Lead Agency and further detail in Annex 8.

Recommendation E3: The Lead Agency should subsume the role of the NRSC Secretariat, in order to allow a close working relationship with the revised NRSC, including the provision of expert advice and evidence base for high level decisions. Initial staff complement of around 20 is necessary to deliver the initial functions required, with numbers rising as business develops. The World Bank will provide advice on the structure and development of the Agency.

Growth Phase

Recommendation G1: In order to function fully as a Lead Agency with all necessary policy, monitoring, management, research and analysis capabilities, the new entity will require to have its role enshrined in legislation and will need a substantial expansion of staff, expertise, authority, and budget. It is estimated that at least 50 staff would be needed for full functioning.

Recommendation G2: The Lead Agency would appropriately also hold the crash database and road safety observatory, along with the expertise to conduct analysis of it. It is essential that the road safety observatory be held by the Lead Agency, in order to allow ready access to relevant public sector data for evidence based policy setting and performance monitoring. This may require the transfer of some research and analysis capacity and expertise from existing research institutes. In particular, the Motor Transport Institute is planning for the development of a road safety observatory, but as confirmation of the above concerns, the Institute reports difficulty in accessing relevant data. Careful consideration should be given to the transfer of the road safety observatory creation and management functions and the relevant staff from the Institute to the Lead Agency. This will allow the Lead Agency to control the road safety observatory and to obtain much needed research and analysis capacity efficiently without creating new positions duplicating the work of the Institute.

Recommendation G3: As soon as it has the capacity, the road safety Lead Agency should undertake the task of providing technical and evidence based advice to the Parliamentary Road Safety Committee, at the request of its Chair.

5.1.3 Creating national results focus

Objective: Creating results framework for delivery, coordination and monitoring of national road safety program and targets

57 As a guide the equivalent entity in NSW Australia had around 90 staff (excluding the research facility of Crash lab).

58 International experience demonstrates that a non-government of quasi-Government body would face great challenges in obtaining and holding the full database requirements for a sound observatory (including databases on driver records, road features, vehicle safety features and ratings, as well as the crash database) not least due to privacy issues.
Establishment phase

**Recommendation E4:** In further development of the Road Safety Program that is based on a top-down aspirational target the following issues should be addressed:

- Is there an understanding of the reasons underlying past performance e.g. the rise in 2011 and the fall in 2012 as well as the longer-term trend?
- How is the target to be achieved? What are the casualty savings estimated to be achieved from the various measures that are proposed?
- Has any forecasting been carried out to assess what the likely level of casualties would be in 2020 on current trends and therefore the scale of the gap to be filled with new policy action?
- What budget will be made available for road safety and how will it be allocated?
- Will the Voivodship RSCs be charged with producing regional targets in line with the national target?

**Recommendation E5:** Partner agencies must adopt responsibility for the management of their deliverables for road safety, and collaborate with the Lead Agency in monitoring of their performance. Road safety management arrangements should be reviewed against good international practice.

**Recommendation E6:** Improve understanding of the contributions of various elements of the Program to road toll reductions, and the contribution of management to achieving results. This will require assignment of responsibility for the actions, monitoring, and revised action if target reductions are not achieved. There are two main options for major casualty reductions: a dramatic increase in expenditure on infrastructure improvements, and speed management to reduce the toll of speeding through reductions in speed limits and increased enforcement. These are discussed further in section 6 below.

**Recommendation E7:** The operating systems within government must be sufficiently flexible and agile as to allow for the implementation of substantial policy changes within months and to increase confidence in the ability of the system to adapt to the necessary policy changes. Lead Agency should develop a list of possible policy changes and require all agencies to review their operating systems to ensure the implementation of all anticipated policy shifts within the National Road Safety Program.

Growth phase

**Recommendation G4:** Agencies to provide estimates of timeframes for implementation and begin adjusting inflexible systems where long timeframes are identified.

**Recommendation G5:** Rigorous requirements for evidence based decisions are needed for all road safety delivery agencies:

a. Consideration should be given to benefit: cost ratio analysis for selection of road safety programs and projects.

b. The above will require sound costings of road trauma, which are being undertaken and should be supported.

**Recommendation G6:** Create a national road safety results focused culture across government, with a road safety evidence base and results dissemination championed by the Lead Agency.
5.1.3.1 Staff capacity and training

**Recommendation G7**: Staff capacity building and knowledge transfer are needed. Formal training in road safety is recommended across all relevant sectors of government. Training should ensure upgraded engineering knowledge, audit capacity, and road safety management capabilities. A number of courses for formal training in road safety exist now (e.g., at Delft University in the Netherlands, or Monash University, Australia), and research training in road safety exists in many universities, including in Poland.

5.2 Coordination and Promotion

**Objective: Increasing multi-sectoral collaboration**

5.2.1 Partner agencies in national government

Section 4 has described the partner agencies within government that are critical to the delivery of road safety in Poland.

*Establishment phase*

**Recommendation E8**: The Lead Agency should provide leadership and management in consultation with partner agencies in order to increase multi-sectoral collaboration, coordination and trust within and between the Government partner delivery agencies of national government by:

- Assigning clear roles to the partner agencies, which avoid duplication and ensure that all activities required are explicitly within the responsibilities of an agency
- Assigning accountability and responsibility for delivery
- Providing valid precise key performance indicators, by which road safety delivery by each agency will be measured;
- Setting performance targets and monitoring achievement of these targets;
- Providing public reports to Parliament on the results of the monitoring, along with recommendations for any corrective actions necessary to ensure delivery of the National Road Safety Program.

*Growth phase*

**Recommendation G8**: Duties and accountabilities of partner agencies related to road safety should be better described in Road Traffic Act and heads of agencies should be held more accountable.

5.2.2 National/self-government linkages and cooperation

Self-governments are primary partner agencies without whom the National Road Safety Program has little chance of success because self-government control 95% of Poland’s roads, and over 50% of fatalities occur on these roads. Thus, major improvements to safety on these roads are necessary to achieve the 2020 target.

**Objective: Improving the capacity of self-governments to contribute to the achievement of the national target**

59 GDDKiA is already taking action in this area to provide their engineers with access to international best practice through attendance at international conferences.
**Establishment phase**

**Recommendation E9:** Self-governments must be galvanized for effective road safety action if the National Road Safety program target is to be met. This should include facilitation of self-government to set and implement ambitious road safety targets in line with the National Program targets.

**Recommendation E10:** The Voivodship Councils should be supported by an executive secretariat and a research unit. At Poviat level the RSCs should have similar management functions and coordination role locally.

**Growth phase**

**Recommendation G9:** Self-governments should commit to the same management processes and leadership as the partner delivery agencies within national government allowing the Lead Agency (in consultation with self-government) to provide leadership and management of the self-government agencies for road safety, by:

a. Assigning clear roles to the partner agencies, which avoid duplication and ensure that all activities required are explicitly within the responsibilities of an agency;
b. Balancing the degree of independence of self-government against the need for unified, effective, efficient action for road safety across all road authorities.
c. Assigning accountability and responsibility for delivery;
d. Providing valid precise key performance indicators, by which road safety delivery by each agency will be measured;
e. Setting performance targets and monitoring achievement of these targets;
f. Providing public reports to Parliament on the results of the monitoring, along with recommendations for any corrective actions necessary to ensure delivery of the National Road Safety Program.

**Recommendation G10:** Capacity improvements for self-governments are needed to improve skills to manage and deliver road safety through structural change to improve management; staff training; knowledge transfer through exchange of experience at conferences and meetings.

5.2.3 **Other Stakeholders in road safety**

NGOs, the media, the private sector and the wider community are important to the success of the road safety program. Business and industry, especially those involved in vehicle manufacture or with significant road freight, or significant other road usage, are important players in road safety.

**Objective: Improving role of civil society in creating demand for increased road safety**

**Establishment phase**

**Recommendation E11:** Engage the NGO sector and civil society in promotion of, and understanding of, road safety. NGOs may contribute more to road safety through advocacy for stronger government action, rather than by attempting to perform functions more suitably performed by government.

**Recommendation E12:** Establish a communications strategy to alert the community and promote road safety effectively and systematically. This should include co-ordination of messages and promotion within regions to reduce duplication of message creation across
voivodships, and capture efficiencies. Communications should be targeted at specific high risk groups for example young male drivers.

**Recommendation E13:** The media have a critical role to play in road safety, and governments and road safety agencies, especially the Lead Agency, should treat media as a potential partner by establishing a closer more collaborative relationship. Effective media can be a powerful communications tool for road safety action in itself. Actions should include:

a. The sound evidence base for road safety actions should be presented to the media in briefings and discussions;

b. Presentations of research results, such as crash data analyses, rates of speeding, seat-belt use and community attitudes;

c. Increased use of paid media for road safety messages.

**Growth phase**

**Recommendation G11:** Road safety will be enhanced by all NGOs, politicians and political commentators by encouraging bi-partisan Parliamentary support and commitment to road safety.

**Recommendation G12:** Government should strengthen road safety partnerships with industry and business, and facilitate and reward sound safety culture through such policies as making road safety culture and performance a factor in the letting of government tenders.

**Recommendation G13:** Private sector employers should be required to address on-road safety as a part of workplace safety and to have a duty of care to employees driving as part of their work.

**5.3 Legislation**

Agencies acknowledge the need for better coordination and collaboration, and this will in part require stronger powers for leadership of road safety.

**Objective:** Ensuring that the necessary program of legislation is developed and taken forward.

**Establishment phase**

**Recommendation E14:** Establish a high level multi-sectoral legislative working group reporting to the Lead Agency, to review and advice on legislative and regulatory change.

**Recommendation E15:** Ensure that the Lead Agency has the necessary powers and capacity to facilitate, monitor, and report on delivery partnerships by bringing forward any necessary legislation.

**Growth phase**

**Recommendation G14:** Strengthen intergovernmental horizontal and vertical coordination, accountability, and motivation by making performance targets for road safety part of the employment contracts for heads of, and senior executives of, all relevant agencies.
5.4 Funding and resource allocation

Objective: Substantially increasing the funding exclusively dedicated for road safety, at all levels of government in order to deliver the target of a 50% reduction in fatalities by 2020.

The Review has not attempted to estimate the funding that would be needed to deliver the target. The NRSC Secretariat is producing an Action Plan for delivery of the National Road Safety Program, which should contain crash estimates and the Review Team are providing advice on this. The recommendations that follow concentrate on the broader issues of resource allocation and revenue raising.

Establishment phase

Recommendation E16: Begin the development of a national framework for sustainable road safety funding, based on benefit cost ratios to be used by all agencies for prioritization of road safety resource expenditure.

Recommendation E17: Develop a cost-benefit schedule for the measures in the NRSP to show the resources required and the benefits to be achieved and in order to prioritize measures that will make the most cost-effective contribution to achieving the targets. In particular the resources needed for a major infrastructure improvement program and for action to reduce travel speeds through reductions in speed limits and increased enforcement need to be assessed. (See section 6 below)

Recommendation E18: Speed camera revenue should be committed to road safety works by all levels of government. While not sufficient by itself, this would help fund road safety and would reduce public and media accusations of revenue-raising. Since this recommendation was made to Government, the Minister for Transport has announced the adoption of this policy by the National Government.

Growth phase

Recommendation G15: The National Government’s commitment of substantial resources to road safety is critical. Analysis of the hard economic cost of crashes to Poland is an important element for funding decisions, but the adoption of the safe systems approach means that road safety must command higher priority for funding.

Recommendation G16: The Lead Agency for road safety will need to monitor the road safety expenditure of agencies to ensure that funds are genuinely going to road safety, not related road infrastructure works which are not specifically road safety oriented, or other activities which are not genuinely road safety focused. Benefit-cost ratio analysis is recommended for the selection and approval of projects.

Recommendation G17: Funding of road safety must be sustainable, and in addition to general taxation, and as recommended above, revenue from speed cameras, other revenue sources should be investigated and determined. These may include a road safety levy on insurance, fuel taxes, and licence and vehicle registration levies.

Recommendation G18: Self-governments must increase the resources they allocate to road safety through:

a. Stronger public accountability for deaths and injuries on local roads, leading to more demand for genuine road safety works;
b. Performance and project tied funding by national government (this may occur with funds sought from international sources, but needs to occur even without such funding sources);
c. Specified percentages of budgets to be dedicated to genuine road safety works selected based on road safety benefit-cost ratios;
d. Dedication of all fine revenue from self-government run speed cameras to road safety works (combined with expansion of speed camera programs for improved speed management.

**Recommendation G19:** The source of, and expenditure of, funding provided by WORDs for road safety could be improved by:

a. Increasing the fee for a license test. This has two benefits: first, it increases the incentive for learner drivers to obtain sufficient training before attempting the test, and second it provides more profit for road safety use;
b. Managing the expenditure of the funds systematically, and on an evidence base, with policy on the expenditure of funds developed with national consistency.
c. Reviewing current road safety activities and capabilities of WORDS and developing their road safety programs to ensure that they accord with priorities and best practice.
d. Considering the better coordination of the activities of WORDs within each Voivodship to improve efficiency.

**Recommendation G20:** Review the joint funding of EU programs in order to allow more effective road safety gains from these projects, by focusing them on replacing the high crash rate roads, and ensuring that the new infrastructure is safe (with shoulder barriers, median separation, and safe system based speed limits).

### 5.5 Monitoring, evaluation and research

**Objective:** Ensuring that the necessary data collection, analysis, and research systems are in place in order to provide a strong evidence base for policy development, monitoring, evaluation, and refinement.

**Establishment phase**

**Recommendation E19:** Establish a multi-sectoral data working group to oversee the development of data systems. Annex 5 sets out proposals for improvements to the crash database.

**Recommendation E20:** A multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary research strategy should be developed to guide research to maximize its relevance to policies and strategic decisions. In considering what research is necessary, greater appreciation of the broad similarities of road safety problems from country to country may be helpful. Work is already proceeding on this recommendation.

**Recommendation E21:** Actions for road safety are often not evaluated, and thus failures can be perpetuated, and successes may go unnoticed or not be effectively defended from attack because the evaluation has not been done. Evaluations should be an integral part of road safety projects and programs, and should be planned from the initiation of the project, including ensuring that any data required are considered and collected before the program begins as well as after its implementation.
Growth Phase

Recommendation G21: For behavior change programs, there is a dearth of intermediate outcome data for assessment of the extent of problems and evaluation of road safety programs to address them. A systematic annual comparable data collection process is needed to determine levels of speeding in each level of speed zone, drinking and driving, seat belt usage, child restraint usage, bicycle and motorcycle helmet usage, and the proportion of the vehicle fleet which is 4 or 5 star EuroNCAP rated.

Recommendation G22: There are fourteen state research institutes across various areas, in addition to a number of technical universities which conduct research. A review of activities, value, overlaps, and adjustment of partnerships which create collaborations that remove competition, will be helpful to road safety, and may also be helpful to other areas of endeavor related to research. Development of road safety research expertise in centers of excellence should be encouraged.

Recommendation G23: Publicly accessible annual multi-disciplinary national road safety conferences should: review the road safety performance of the last year; allow analyses of performance to be presented from independent experts, researchers and auditors; and allow dissemination on successes and failures. Strong media presence should be encouraged to improve public understanding and government accountability.
6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO CAPACITY FOR INTERVENTIONS

6.1 Road network

Road infrastructure improvement is expensive but a critical area of road safety improvement emphasized within the safe system framework. The most successful countries in the world in road safety have made major gains through improved safety of road infrastructure. The particular focus of the most successful countries has been on preventing injury (not crashes) when vehicles leave the carriageway. The focus has not been on the road surface or guidance to the driver. The pattern of Poland’s toll, with the vast majority of fatalities occurring on undivided one lane each way roads, suggests that the same approach will be successful in Poland. It is recognized that such a program will be costly and will therefore require a large increase in funding which may need to be phased, and accompanied by speed management to reduce risk on high risk roads (see section on speed management below). See Annex 9 for more detailed recommendations.

Objective: Delivering major contribution of infrastructure to achieving the target through a cost-effective program of infrastructure improvements

Establishment phase

Recommendation E22: Commission analysis to establish high risk sections of roads that have the potential to deliver significant casualty savings including, in particular, areas of high pedestrian risk, as a contribution to target achievement, and draw up a cost program of infrastructure safety improvements.

Recommendation E23: Review evidence from latest EuroRAP risk mapping of national roads in order to develop program to eliminate very high risk sections.

Growth phase

Recommendation G24: Secure funding for phased implementation of high priority infrastructure measures, including improved pedestrian facilities and speed reduction measures, that will make a major contribution to achieving the target.

Recommendation G25: Carry out comprehensive EuroRAP road inspection of the road network to supplement the existing national road risk mapping using the latest methodology to provide Star Ratings based on road attributes, and draw up a program to implement its recommendations for safety infrastructure improvements.

Debate continues in Poland regarding the appropriateness of a single set of standards for all roads, applicable to national roads through to gmina roads. Advantages include uniformity for drivers and standardization of solutions to an evidence base, while the key disadvantage identified is the lack of consideration of technical standards for local low speed roads. Thus, self-governments report that they feel forced to ignore the standards.

Recommendation G26: Maintenance of the principle of a uniform set of standards is recommended. However, concerns of self-government must be addressed, including via the following:

a. Greater sensitivity to the needs of low speed, highly pedestrianized, and other unique road situations;
b. Close consultation between GDDKiA and all levels of self-government. (GDDKiA has committed to consultation with self-government).

**Recommendation G27:** Review and revise land use planning policy in relation to impacts on road safety, especially in relation to safe provision for pedestrian traffic as well as vehicular traffic generated by developments. Ensure that at all levels of government land use planning decisions take account of the need for safe pedestrian access, particularly in urban areas in location of facilities such as schools, shops and healthcare.

### 6.2 Speed management

Nearly half of Polish drivers exceed speed limits and excessive speed or failure to adjust speed to prevailing road conditions is the cause of nearly one-third of fatal crashes.\(^{60}\) The need for speed management is rightly highlighted in the NRSP. The evidence for the road safety gains of speed cameras is undeniable (see earlier review of evidence). Improved management of speed, through speed limit reductions and enforcement, yields large and immediate road safety gains, and complements a program of infrastructure improvements by managing the risk on unsafe infrastructure. Further recommendations on detailed speed management are in Annex 9.

**Establishment phase**

**Recommendation E24:** Review speed limits and travel speeds and draw up a program for systematic reductions of speed limits where appropriate, combined with enforcement to reduce traffic speeds, in accordance with road use and characteristics following best international practice.

**Recommendation E25:** Carry out public consultation and communication on proposals for speed management, including information on risk due to speeding, criteria for speed limit choice, camera locations, expected benefits, in order to gain wide public and media support.

**Recommendation E26:** Begin implementation of program of reduced speed limits and increased enforcement in high risk locations for speed related crashes in order to demonstrate quick wins. Pay particular attention to reducing and enforcing speed limits in areas of high pedestrian activity.

**Growth phase**

**Recommendation G28:** Fully implement speed management program on national roads. Gminas report reluctance to install speed cameras for political reasons. Thus, concern with local popularity dominates consideration of saving of lives and injuries.

**Recommendation G29:** High levels of speed enforcement are critical for road safety on roads managed by all levels of government. Increased use of speed cameras by each level of government should be encouraged, including through:

a. Better promotion of the causal role of speeding in crashes;
b. Better promotion of the costs of speed related crashes;
c. Accountability for road safety in self-government;
d. Provision of funding contingent on appropriate road safety actions and outcomes;

---

\(^{60}\) National Road Safety Program 2013-2020
e. Commitment of funds raised by cameras to road safety works for all levels of government;

The National government should work with self-governments in areas which do not use speed cameras in order to persuade them of the road safety benefits of the cameras. As a last resort, there could be highly publicized provision of speed cameras on self-government roads by the National government with funds going to the national government road safety program. This will have the effect that the local choice not to use speed cameras still results in cameras, but without the local benefit of funds for road safety.

6.3 Road users

Enforcement is a key element of successful behavior change together with public information to support it. The commitment to increase traffic police to 10% of the police force is valuable for road safety, and police at various levels report progress towards this target. However, there are still concerns expressed by many that corruption occurs, and penalties can be avoided. Corruption and the perception that corruption exists and thus that penalties can be avoided both harm road safety. Deterrence can only be effective when the penalty is seen as unavoidable. Further detailed recommendations are in Annex 9.

Establishment phase

Recommendation E27: Develop a communication strategy for public information to increase risk awareness and to maximize the benefits of deterrence by increasing support for enforcement, targeting a specific small set of behaviors.

Recommendation E28: The planned increase in Traffic Police should be accompanied by:

- Specific additional allocations of resources including vehicles, speed enforcement equipment, and regularly maintained breath testing equipment.
- Aggressively pursuing and managing corruption. Monitoring and management of the number of tickets issued may be helpful.

Growth phase

Even within behavior change programs, there are significant problems, including:

a. Lack of evidence based action, with a preference for emotional choices and politically convenient priorities for expenditure;

b. Unwarranted faith in education alone as a successful means of changing established adult and adolescent behavior;\(^{61}\)

c. Uncoordinated programs of road safety education by multiple agencies (see Section 4);

d. Excessive focus on young children, rather than a focus on those for whom behavior change would be most beneficial;

e. Training of young children to ride mopeds which is likely to increase exposure to high risk (riding a moped) which will outweigh any (unproven) benefits of the training;

f. Focus on, and faith in, car handling skills training. It does not help safety.\(^{62}\)

**Recommendation G30:** Behavior change programs and policy must be based on sound evidence, in a complex environment in which apparently “self-evident solutions” often fail, and not just to the point of doing no good, but sometimes doing harm.

**Recommendation G31:** The content and delivery of Road safety education in primary schools should be reviewed with a view to greater coordination and improved syllabus including a greater focus on older children who are more exposed to risk.

### 6.4 Vehicles

The core management capacity problem in relation to vehicles is that the extent to which vehicle failures cause crashes is seen as the main relevance to road safety, whereas the contribution of improved vehicle standards to reducing crash and injury risk, and the need to improve the safety standards of the whole vehicle fleet is under appreciated. This is a major missed opportunity.

**Growth phase**

**Recommendation G32:** Across government greater appreciation is needed of:

a. the value to be found in safe vehicles, as a source of improved road safety. Vehicles with high EuroNCAP ratings provide much better protection in a crash than low rated vehicles, significantly increasing the chances of survival and reducing injury severity;

b. The policy mechanisms by which the vehicle fleet can be made safer.

**Recommendation G33:** Government fleet purchase policy should selectively favor safer vehicles by purchasing only the safest EuroNCAP rated vehicles in each class in order to:

- Improve safety for government employees, delivering both road safety and occupational health and safety gains;
- Send a message to the community that road safety matters and that safe vehicle choice will contribute to improving road safety;
- Improve the fleet of second-hand vehicles as the government goes into the used market;
- Apply pressure on local manufacturers to produce safe vehicles.

**Recommendation G34:** Promote EuroNCAP ratings and car safety to the public as a key factor in vehicle choice, and ensure that ratings are readily available.

### 6.5 Emergency services and Post-crash care

**Growth phase**

**Recommendation G35:** Emergency services are providing reasonable response times, but management capacity would be improved by:

a. Collaboration across services to ensure delivery of the single emergency number.

b. Better co-ordination of the alert systems to each agency—ambulance, fire and police

---


c. Clearer guidelines for co-operation at crash scenes for the key agencies involved.

Recommendation G36: Review emergency service provision via analysis of hospital trauma cases and other relevant data.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO CAPACITY FOR RESULTS

The critical role of a results focus for successful management of road safety is recognized in the *World Report*[^63] issued by the World Health Organization, and is a key element of the country guidelines for implementation of the *World Report* recommendations,[^64] which notes that a critical element of the road safety management system is “the specification of desired results and their expression as targets in terms of final outcomes, intermediate outcomes, and outputs (p.12).”

7.1 Final outcome data

See section above on research and evaluation for related recommendations and Annex 5 for detailed recommendations on data systems.

*Establishment phase*

**Recommendation E29:** In order to provide evidence for overall road toll assessment and for evaluation of specific projects, which may be vehicle, user, speed or road based, ensure that data are readily available on:

- annual road deaths and injuries both transport and health sectors
- deaths and injuries by all road user types, age groups
- deaths and injuries by location, road feature, vehicle details, and driver details.
- crash causation factors e.g. speed, drink-drive, road layout and condition etc.

**Recommendation E30:** Set improvement targets on all the above measures.

7.2 Intermediate outcome data

**Recommendation E31:** In order to provide evidence for evaluation of specific projects, which may be vehicle, user, speed or road based, ensure that data are readily available on:

- vehicle speeds,
- safety of infrastructure (ratings, presence of barriers, etc.),
- seatbelt wearing rates,
- motorcycle and cycle helmet wearing rates,
- vehicle fleet safety standards, age of vehicles, traffic volumes.
- drives with illegal levels of alcohol.

**Recommendation E32:** Set improvement targets on all the above measures.

7.3 Output data

Outputs will vary with projects. See discussion above on performance indicators.

**Recommendation E33:** At the planning stage of all projects, appropriate output data for performance measurement should be agreed, and collected. See Annex 5 on data systems for recommendations on setting these performance indicators.

**Recommendation E34:** Arrange independent audits of road safety programs to go to the Lead Agency (and the World Bank for input).

**Recommendation E35:** Set improvement targets on all output measures.
8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The key conclusions of this review of road safety management capacity in Poland are:

1. Although progress has been made in reducing road traffic deaths Poland has performed less well than other EU countries and is at the bottom of the EU league table.

2. The key crash risk factors are:
   - Unforgiving roadsides;
   - Lack of sealed shoulders;
   - Undivided roads allowing head-on crashes;
   - Lack of facilities for safe mobility of pedestrians and cyclists;
   - Speed limits on both rural and urban roads above international good practice;
   - Lack of enforcement of speed limits leading to high levels of speeding;
   - Low use of seat belts and child restraints;
   - Risky behavior such as drinking and driving and mobile phone use;
   - High average age of vehicles and lack of modern safety features.

3. Data availability is a key issue and there is a lack of coordination of data sources and inadequate access to data below national level. This lack of an adequate evidence base for policy development and monitoring extends to a lack of understanding of the outcomes of policy and implementation of road safety measures at all levels of government. To address this concern with data a separate study is in progress that will provide detailed recommendations. The Terms of reference are shown in Annex 5.

4. A well organized and resourced Lead Agency does not exist and its lack underlies the failure to implement the previous road safety program, GAMBIT. The roots of the problem are the way that road safety is organized without clear leadership, accountability, responsibility, or sound coordination between levels of government and under-resourcing of road safety activity.

5. The decentralized system of government has created a need for coordination that has not been fully addressed. The absence of clear leadership from a central Lead Agency has meant that there has been a lack of effective partnership working between and within different levels of government to deliver road safety efficiently.

6. The current legislative and regulatory framework for road safety is inadequate for current needs and has not adjusted adequately and sufficiently quickly to changing conditions.

7. There is a lack of a systematic communication strategy to promote road safety and to increase awareness of risk and improve behavior. Public interest in and demand for road safety improvement is lacking in Poland and there is an absence of pressure from the population to reduce the high level of crash risk.

8. Existing capacity to implement interventions that are cost-effective and evidence-based in terms of their costs and benefits is reduced due to the lack of coordination resulting in an absence of effective partnerships, dissemination of good practice and sharing of knowledge and resources.
9. The poor quality of road infrastructure relative to international standards and the high average age of vehicles, together with poor compliance with traffic rules all contribute to the high toll of death and injury.

10. Improvements are needed in the coordination of emergency services and in post-crash emergency medical care.

11. A clear focus on results is impeded by inadequacies in crash data and lack of information on key intermediate indicators such as seat belt wearing. This means that policy monitoring is inadequate and the outcomes in terms of crash data cannot be related to the implementation of particular road safety measures.

12. There is an urgent need to support the implementation of the National Road Safety Plan by setting up a well-resourced Lead Agency with the responsibility and powers to manage and coordinate road safety activity across all levels of government.

13. The NRSC needs to be restructured to be a political entity with politicians as members, chaired by the Prime Minister with the Minister for Transport as the Deputy Chair, to provide the highest level of support. Membership should include the relevant national Ministers, the Voivodship Marshalls, and the head of the new Lead Agency.

14. A formally recognized Parliamentary bi-partisan road safety committee should be established.

15. The Review makes a wide range of other recommendations for improvements to capacity for institutional management functions, interventions, and results that are summarized in Table 6 on page 73.

16. These recommendations are divided into two groups: an Establishment phase group of key recommendations that are high priority for rapid implementation, and a Growth phase group that are also high priority to build on the achievement of early action in the establishment phase.

17. The most important areas for early action to ensure that there is a road safety management system in place to facilitate the final development and implementation of the NRSP are:
   1. Establishing and empowering a Lead Agency: recommendations E1-3, E5, E8
   2. Galvanizing and coordinating road safety activity at all levels of government: recommendations E9,10.

However, it is the view of the review team that a focus on these key areas should not exclude the implementation of other recommendations in a phased program.
### Table 6 Summary of recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment Phase: high priority for urgent implementation</th>
<th>Growth Phase: to build on progress in Establishment Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional management functions: results focus</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1. Restructure NRSC, encourage bi-partisan support, set up Parliamentary road safety committee, and get agreed budget for road safety in order to achieve high-level political support and provision of resources to deliver Road Safety Program.</td>
<td>G1. Enshrine role of Lead Agency in legislation, and ensure the necessary expansion of staff, expertise, authority and budget building staff level up to at least 50 when fully functioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2. Create Lead Agency as an independent entity with capacity to effectively lead, monitor and manage road safety.</td>
<td>G2. Lead Agency to have responsibility for crash database and expertise for analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4. Develop Road Safety Program based on analysis of past performance, and how the target is to be achieved.</td>
<td>G4. Identify long term timeframes for implementation of measures and ensure flexibility of systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5. Partner agencies to adopt responsibility for management of road safety deliverables in collaboration with Lead Agency.</td>
<td>G5. Introduce cost-benefit analysis for decision-making based on sound costings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6. Improve understanding of the contributions of Program elements to casualty reduction and contribution of management to achieving results.</td>
<td>G6. Create road safety results based culture across government with evidence base and results dissemination championed by the Lead Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7. Ensure that operating systems in government are sufficiently agile and flexible to achieve rapid policy implementation.</td>
<td>G7. Provide formal training in road safety to build staff capacity and knowledge transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional management functions: coordination</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8. Lead Agency to provide leadership and management in consultation with partner agencies by assigning clear roles, accountability and responsibility with performance targets and monitoring.</td>
<td>G8. Duties and accountabilities of partner agencies related to road safety should be better described in Road Traffic Act and heads of agencies should be held more accountable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9. Self-governments must be galvanized for effective road safety action to meet the National Road Safety program target, including facilitation of self-government to set ambitious road safety targets in line with the National Program targets.</td>
<td>G9. Self-governments should commit to the same management processes and leadership as the partner delivery agencies within national government allowing the Lead Agency (in consultation with self-government) to provide leadership and management of the self-government agencies for road safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E10. The Voivodship Councils should be supported by an executive secretariat and a research unit in road safety. At subnational level the RSCs should have similar management functions and coordination role locally.</td>
<td>G10. Capacity improvements for self-governments are needed to improve skills to manage and deliver road safety through structural change to improve management; staff training; knowledge transfer through exchange of experience at conferences and meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E11. The NGO sector and civil society should be engaged in the promotion and understanding of road safety and contribute through advocacy for stronger government action.</td>
<td>G11. Road safety will be enhanced by all NGOs, politicians and political commentators by encouraging bi-partisan Parliamentary support and commitment to road safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E12. Establish a communications strategy to alert the community and promote road safety effectively and systematically. This should include co-ordination of messages and promotion within regions to reduce duplication of message</td>
<td>G12. Government should strengthen road safety partnerships with industry and business, and facilitate and reward sound safety culture through such policies as making road safety culture and performance a factor in the letting of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E13.</td>
<td>Governments and road safety agencies should treat the media as a potential partner by establishing a closer, more collaborative relationship in order to facilitate communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional management functions: legislation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Institutional management functions: funding and resource allocation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E14. Establish a high level multi-sectoral legislative working group reporting to the Lead Agency, to review and advise on legislative and regulatory change.</td>
<td>G15. The National Government’s commitment of substantial resources to road safety is critical. Analysis of the hard economic cost of crashes to Poland is an important element for funding decisions, but the adoption of the safe systems approach means that road safety must command higher priority for funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E15. Ensure that the Lead Agency has the necessary powers and capacity to facilitate, monitor, and report on delivery partnerships by bringing forward any necessary legislation.</td>
<td>E16. Begin the development of a national framework for road safety funding, based on benefit cost ratios to be used by all agencies for prioritization of road safety resource expenditure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional management functions: funding and resource allocation</strong></td>
<td>G17. Road safety funding needs to be made sustainable by exploring new revenue sources such as levies on insurance, fuel taxes and licences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E16.</td>
<td>G16. The road safety expenditure of agencies should be monitored by the Lead Agency to ensure that funds are genuinely going to road safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E17. Develop a cost-benefit schedule for the measures in the NRSP to show the resources required and the benefits to be achieved in order to prioritize measures that will make the most cost-effective contribution to achieving the targets.</td>
<td>E18. Speed camera revenue should be committed to road safety works. While not sufficient by itself, this would help fund road safety and would reduce public and media accusations of revenue-raising. Since this recommendation was made to Government, the Minister for Transport has announced the adoption of this policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E20. Develop a multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary research strategy to maximize the relevance of research to policy development and strategic decisions.

E21. Make evaluation an integral part of road safety projects and programs planned for from the initiation of the project and ensuring that the necessary data are collected both before the start and after implementation.

E22. Commission analysis to establish high risk sections of roads that have the potential to deliver significant casualty savings as a contribution to target achievement, and draw up costed program of infrastructure improvements.

E23. Review evidence from latest EuroRAP risk mapping of national roads in order to develop program to eliminate very high risk sections.

E24. Review speed limits and travel speeds and draw up program for systematic reductions of speed limits where appropriate, combined with enforcement to reduce traffic speeds, in accordance with road use and characteristics following best international practice.

E25. Carry out public consultation and communication on proposals for speed management, including information on risk due to speeding, criteria for speed limit choice, camera locations, expected benefits, in order to gain wide public and media support.

E26. Begin implementation of program of reduced speed limits and increased enforcement in high risk locations for speed related crashes in order to demonstrate quick wins.

E27. Develop a communication strategy for public information to increase risk awareness and to maximize the benefits of deterrence by increasing support for enforcement, targeting...
a specific small set of behaviors. doing no good, but sometimes doing harm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E28.</th>
<th>The planned increase in Traffic Police should be accompanied by specific allocation of resources and aggressively pursuing and managing corruption.</th>
<th>G31.</th>
<th>The content and delivery of Road safety education in primary schools should be reviewed with a view to greater coordination and improved syllabus including a greater focus on older children who are more exposed to risk.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Capacity for interventions: vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G32.</th>
<th>Increase across government appreciation of the contribution of safer vehicles to road safety and the policy mechanisms to achieve this.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G33.</td>
<td>Government fleet purchase policy should selectively favor safer vehicles by purchasing only the safest EuroNCAP rated vehicles in each class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G34.</td>
<td>Promote EuroNCAP ratings and car safety to the public as a key factor in vehicle choice, and ensure that ratings are readily available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Capacity for interventions: emergency services and post-crash care

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G35.</th>
<th>Improve collaboration across services through delivery of a single emergency number, better coordination of alert systems, and clearer guidelines for cooperation at crash scenes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G36.</td>
<td>Review emergency service provision via analysis of hospital trauma cases and other relevant data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Capacity for results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E29.</th>
<th>Ensure that final outcomes can be evaluated through availability of disaggregated data on deaths and injuries including road user type, crash circumstances and causation factors.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E30.</td>
<td>Set improvement targets on all the above measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E31.</td>
<td>Ensure that intermediate outcomes can be monitored through availability of data on indicators including vehicle speeds, infrastructure safety features, wearing rates of seat belts and helmets, drink-driving, and vehicle standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E32.</td>
<td>Set improvement targets on all the above measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E33.</td>
<td>At the planning stage of all projects, appropriate output data for performance measurement should be agreed, and collected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E34.</td>
<td>Arrange independent audits of road safety programs to go to the Lead Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E35.</td>
<td>Set improvement targets on all output measures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank
REFERENCES


21. Motor Transport Institute (2009) Research under development project No. N R10 0017 06/2009 under the title *Development of a system of research and evaluation of spare parts, sub-systems and automotive liquids used in motor vehicles to ensure use safety*, financed by the National Centre for Research and Development


26. OECD. 2006 (2). *Young drivers The road to safety Report of the Transport Research Centre*, ECMT Paris


ANNEX 1: World Bank Guidelines for capacity reviews

The World Bank has produced guidelines for implementing the recommendations of the World report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention. Implementing the recommendations requires capacity building at the country level to create the resources and tools necessary to reduce traffic deaths and injuries.

An important first step is to conduct a road safety management capacity review to determine the current strengths and weaknesses, and to identify how to overcome capacity weaknesses.

A country capacity review is conducted through nine distinctive steps:

1. Set review objectives
2. Prepare for review.
3. Appraise results focus at system level.
4. Appraise results focus at interventions level.
5. Appraise results focus at institutional management functions level.
6. Assess Lead Agency role and identify capacity strengthening priorities.
7. Specify investment strategy and identify Safe System implementation projects.
8. Confirm review findings at a high-level workshop.

High-level country commitment to the review is important for its success. The review must be conducted by experienced internationally recognized road safety specialists with senior management experience at country and international level. An inception report to set out the basic elements of the road safety management system and to provide available data on road safety results and trends is an important first step. A detailed consultation schedule of meetings with key personnel should be drawn up.

The Guidelines include a series of checklists to guide appraisal:

1. Results focus at system level.
2. Planning, design, operation and use of the road network.
3. Entry and exit of vehicles to and from the road network.
4. Entry and exit of road users to and from the road network.
5. Recovery and rehabilitation of crash victims from the road network.
6. Coordination.
7. Legislation.
8. Funding and resource allocation.
10. Monitoring and evaluation.
11. Research and development and knowledge transfer.
12. Lead Agency role and institutional management functions.

Bliss and Breen (2009)
### ANNEX 2: List of people and organizations consulted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maciej Mosiej</td>
<td>National Road Safety Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarosław Waszkiewicz</td>
<td>Ministry of Transport, Director of Road and Motorways Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Bańczak-Mysiak</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, Deputy Director, Department of Defence Matters, Crisis Management and Medical Emergency Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadeusz Czapiewski</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, Chief Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksander Tynelski</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education, Head of the General Education Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Dakowicz-Nawrocka</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education, Deputy Director, Department of School Curricula and Textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danuta Pusek</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education, Department of School Curricula and Textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zofia Piber</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education, General Education Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacek Zalewski</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior, Director of Analysis and Supervision Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Sowiński</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Kusyk</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior, Deputy Director, Department for State Registers and IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomasz Darkowski</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Director, Criminal Law Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcin Kowal</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Head, Criminal Law Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bożena Pacholczyk</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Representatives of Ministry in NRSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcin Flieger</td>
<td>General Road Transport Inspectorate, Director of Automatic Speed Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michal Tomaka</td>
<td>General Road Transport Inspectorate, Speed Camera Control System Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert Jednorowski</td>
<td>General Road Transport Inspectorate, Deputy Director of Inspection Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrzej Maciejewski</td>
<td>General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways, Deputy General Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katarzyna Kwiecień</td>
<td>General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways, Traffic Management Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krzysztof Knyż</td>
<td>Mazovia Voivodship, Secretary of Regional Road Safety Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mieczysław Reksnis</td>
<td>City of Warsaw, Director of Road and Public Transportation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogdan Wojtyński</td>
<td>National Institute of Public Health (PZH), Head of the Centre of Monitoring and Analyses of Population Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paweł Goryński</td>
<td>National Institute of Public Health (PZH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elżbieta Buczk-Stec</td>
<td>National Institute of Public Health (PZH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leszek Rafalski</td>
<td>Road and Bridge Research Institute, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agata Jaździk-Osmólska</td>
<td>Road and Bridge Research Institute, Head of Transport Economy Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomasz Kula</td>
<td>Road and Bridge Research Institute, Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tadeusz Dzienis  Road and Bridge Research Institute, Division Manager, Division of Management and Telematics Systems
Leszek Kornalewski  Road and Bridge Research Institute, Head of Division, Division of Management and Telematics Systems
Marek Fidos  Police Headquarter, Director of Traffic Safety Department
Rafał Kożłowski  Police Headquarter, Deputy Director of Traffic Safety Department
Bogusław Pijanowski  Automotive Industry Institute, Deputy Director
Andrzej Muszyński  Automotive Industry Institute, General Director
Jerzy Wicher  Automotive Industry Institute, Professor, Vehicle Safety Laboratory
Leon Prochowski  Automotive Industry Institute, Professor
Ryszard Krystek  Motor Transport Institute, Professor
Maria Dąbrowska-Loranc  Motor Transport Institute, Head of Road Safety Unit
Dariusz Marczyński  National Fire Brigades, Director of National Center of Rescue Services and Defense of Population
Andrzej Szkłarski  Regional Road Safety Center (WORD) in Warsaw, Director
Krzysztof Piskorz  Regional Road Safety Center (WORD) in Olsztyn, Head of Road Safety Unit
Adam Kołodziejski  Deputy Commander of Police Voivodship Headquarter in Olsztyn
Grzegorz Matczyński  Director of Volunteer Fire Brigades Association in Warmia-Mazury Voivodship
Beata Nasiadka  Deputy Major of Nidzica
Piotr Pawłowski  City of Oleśnica, Deputy Major
Zbigniew Rybak  City of Oleśnica, Secretary of the City
Leszko Goliński  City of Oleśnica, Head, Department of Architecture and Construction
Krzysztof Fink  City of Oleśnica, Director of Road Department
Artur Szewczyk  Poviát Police, Oleśnica, Road Safety Manager
Edward Jakimiak  WORD Wrocław, Deputy Director
Jarosław Fit  WORD in Wrocław, Head of Road Safety Unit
Marek Pelczar  Dolnośląskie Voivodship Police Headquarter, Head of Road Traffic Department
Jerzy Łuźniak  Dolnośląskie Voivodship, Deputy Marshall
Mariusz Jagodziński  Dolnośląskie Voivodship, Secretary of Regional Road Safety Council
Jacek Basczyk  Road and Railways Administration in Wrocław, Director of Voivodship
Elwira Nowak  Wrocław City Hall, Deputy Director, Infrastructure Department
Mariusz Malczewski  Wrocław City Hall, Infrastructure Department
Grażyna Nosek  Wrocław City Hall, Infrastructure Department
Andrzej Brzoza  Wrocław City Hall, Infrastructure Department
Marzena Baczynska  Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodship in Toruń, Deputy Director of Road Infrastructure Department
Mariusz Staszczyk  WORD in Toruń, Director
Robert Olszewski  Police Voivodship Headquarter in Toruń, Head of Traffic Safety Unit
Dariusz Kurzawa  Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodship in Toruń, Vice President
Rafał Rewoliński  Voivodship Road Transport Inspectorate in Bydgoszcz, Deputy Director
Sebastian Borowiak  Road Administration in Bydgoszcz, Deputy Director
Romuald Chałas  Automobilclub of Poland, President
Janusz Popiel  Alter Ego Association – NGO, President
Bartłomiej Morzycki  Global Road Safety Partnership in Poland, President of the Board
Jacek Wojciechowicz  Global Road Safety Partnership in Poland, Member of the Board
Paweł Widel  General Motors, Director of Governmental Relation Department
Elżbieta Leszko  Honeywell, Director Health and Safety Department
### ANNEX 3: Table of brief descriptions of roles of National Government agencies and entities related to road safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Roles and Responsibilities relevant to Road Safety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Road Safety Council (NRSC)</td>
<td>Co-ordination of road safety across the levels of government, and high level strategic decisions in road safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>Strategy setting for transport; legislation on driver licensing; vehicle registration, roads technical standards, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Strategy setting for Police, crash data management; legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Strategy setting for courts and dealing with traffic offenders; legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Strategy setting for Health Care System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Strategy setting for delivery of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways (GDDKiA) with responsibilities for the national road network;</td>
<td>Maintenance and development of national road network; standards for roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>On road enforcement and management of traffic incidents; crash data collection, collation, distribution of access to others; analysis; and reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Inspectorate of Road Transport (GITD),</td>
<td>Operation of automated enforcement; inspection of heavy vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fire Brigade</td>
<td>Operation of emergency response involving fire; first response treatment and removal of people trapped in vehicles by crashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance Services</td>
<td>Treatment and transport of injured people to hospital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 4: List of Research Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations

Government funded research organizations

1. Instytut Transportu Samochodowego
2. Instytut Badawczy Dróg Mostów
3. Przemysłowy Instytut Motoryzacji
4. Narodowy Instytut Zdrowia Publicznego - Państwowy Zakład Higieny

Key Road Safety Non-Governmental Organizations

1. Polski Czerwony Krzyż
2. Partnerstwo dla Bezpieczeństwa Drogowego (Global Road Safety Partnership)
3. Polski Związek Motorowy
4. Automobil Klub Polski
5. Stowarzyszenie „Droga i Bezpieczeństwo”
6. Fundacja „Jedź bezpiecznie”
7. Stowarzyszenie Alter Ego
8. Fundacja „Marsz Zebry”
9. Miva Polska
10. Fundacja „Krzyś”
11. Fundacja „Kierowca Bezpieczny”
12. Fundacja „Zielony Liść”
13. Fundacja Rozwoju Inżynierii Lądowej
14. Stowarzyszenie Przyjaciół Integracji
15. Polskie Stowarzyszenie Motorowe
ANNEX 5: Information systems and data system requirements

Section 4.1 and Table 5 described the current situation regarding data systems and some deficiencies both in the provision and use of data that have led to the evidence base for road safety policy being under-developed. Some broad recommendations for action are set out in Sections 6 and 7, and some proposals for early action are in Annex 9. This Annex aims to consider these issues in more detail and to make recommendations to improve crash database management. In addition, a thorough review of the wider data requirements for the future and how they might be met is in progress and the Terms of Reference are included below.

A5.1 Recommendations for improvement of crash data

Crash data

The Capacity Review has identified a need for:

- Reduced duplication of crash databases.
- Better coordination of data sources and databases.
- Improvement of access to crash data at all levels of administration.
- Improvement of data to include accurate information on location and on contributory factors to causation of crashes and of injuries and deaths.
- Inclusion in crash databases of road infrastructure factors i.e. road features such as barriers, pedestrian facilities; and vehicle factors such as age, make and model etc.
- Access to drivers and vehicle information and linking such data to crash data.
- Access to penalty points statistics and linking it to drivers, their age, sex, place of residence, etc.
- Better information on injury severity and access to health services and costs databases.
- Improving structure and access to data on costs of accidents (direct and indirect

Recommended steps in crash database management are:

a. Police should continue to be responsible for the collection of crash data.
b. The Lead Agency should manage the database, taking account of the requirement to protect sensitive personal data.

c. The database could be enhanced through a review process which should be focused on ensuring that road safety activities can be evaluated more precisely by use of the database, and that road safety trends can be examined to a deep and detailed level in the search for understanding of the problems and likely solutions. The review should consider what revisions are necessary to ensure the database is serving a primary research and evaluation function (as well as a primary legal function regarding responsibility for crashes, as used by Police). This will include a focus on what additional information should be collected, which would help us to understand the problem in terms of what caused the injury or death, not just what error caused the crash, and what could have been done at that location to avert the injury or death (not just avert the crash).

d. Crash data need improved location coding (GPS, with effective training in usage) in order to allow better selection of works for road safety based on sound crash location information.
e. The crash database, and related road safety databases should be made fully accessible (within limits of privacy considerations) to the many stakeholders, and duplication of efforts in maintaining databases should be avoided

f. Current practice by Police is that as each new year of crash data are collected one year of older data are dropped from the system. Thus, although a database back to 1990 is held by the Road Traffic Institute, long term trends and comprehensive research evaluations of programs are limited. This practice should be discontinued in favor of maintaining a long term crash database.

A5.2 Road Safety Information Systems Development project Terms of Reference

Diagnosis, quality assurance, and strategic guide for crash data and other data collection and analysis

Background

Upon request from the Polish Secretariat of National Road Safety Council (SNRSC) and the Ministry of Transport (MoT), the World Bank declared support in preparation of a long-term Program/Strategy (the Program) and a two-year Action Plan and by undertaking a national level Road Safety Capacity Review (RSCR). As part of this broader review process, the World Bank is able to provide assistance to facilitate improvement to international best practice in a number of specific areas of road safety. One key area identified as open to such improvement with Bank help, is the development of best practice in data collection, analysis, and policy development driven by the results of these information collection processes.

Objective

The aim of the input supported by the Bank for this element of work is to facilitate and advise on:

1. Good quality collection of crash data (e.g., additional variables to be collected);
2. broader quality access to, and analysis of, crash data;
3. Good quality collection of other data of critical relevance to road safety policy, programs and projects (e.g., vehicle speeds in various speed zones; seat belt wearing rates);
4. Good quality access and analysis of other data of critical relevance to road safety policy, programs and projects including development of relevant indicators for monitoring;
5. Sound development of policy, programs and projects based on the results of these data analyses;
6. Sustainable capability for Poland to maintain these processes with limited further input from the Bank.

Methods

The project will include extensive consultation with the key stakeholders: collectors, holders, analyzers, and users of road safety information. Based on understanding of best practice availability and use of data and evidence internationally, safe system principles (which
highlight the need for certain data for policy development), as well as a deeper understanding of what information and data are collected, held, analyzed, and employed by whom and for whom in Poland, we propose to provide recommendations on:

1. Crash data collection variables
2. Proposed list of additional regular data collections and analyses required to guide policy and programs, and to monitor, evaluate and refine policy and programs once implemented
3. Proposed agencies which should have access to these data, as well as analytical capabilities and responsibilities.

**Deliverables**

Deliverables are:

1. Draft report on crash and other data collection, analysis and use to aid road safety efforts in Poland, drawing on best international practice, making recommendations to improve and expand these processes and uses in Poland;
2. Final revised report
3. Mentoring and training in the use of data and evidence for road safety leadership, persuasion, policy development, and program deployment.
ANNEX 6: The “Roads of Trust” Program.

Roads of Trust – GDDKiA program for 2007-2013

Idea

„Roads of Trust” is a program intended to protect human life and health on national roads, implemented since 2007 by General Directorate of Roads and Highways. Since 2010, implementation of the program has been co-financed by the European Union from the funds of European Regional Development Fund within the framework of Infrastructure and Environment Operating Program.

The program has been designed as a comprehensive program of roads safety improvement on national roads in Poland, operated by GDDKiA, combining engineering solutions with social communication.

Strategic objective of the program is to reduce the number of fatalities on national roads by 75%, by the year 2013.

The national roads network, managed by General Directorate of National Roads and Highways, is approximately 18 thousand kilometers in length. Although this is only about 5% of total length of all the roads in Poland, they stand for approximately 40% of total load carried on all the public roads in Poland.

Organizers of the program expect partnership cooperation from road users, in form of adjusted travelling speed, prudent behavior, observance of principles and regulations, and in a longer perspective – developing rational and lasting positive attitudes in road traffic.

Actions undertaken in 2007-2009 under the motto „Safe eight–eighty eight”

This program stems from a pilot program “Safe No. Eight”, implemented between July and December 2007 on national road number 8 – the longest (approx. 600 km) and most dangerous transport route in Poland, using funds from a World Bank loan. Within the framework of the pilot project, GDDKiA has conducted intensified engineering works along the entire length of the route. Almost a hundred poles were raised for speed cameras, in cooperation with the police, based on experience of France and Nordic countries, where within a few years from installation of automated speed control systems number of fatalities has decreased by 30%. The Police has used the poles to install fixed and mobile speed cameras. An intensive information and education campaign was also conducted, targeted to drivers travelling along Route 8, pertaining to actions undertaken, with a particular emphasis on speed management. As a result of undertaken actions, number of fatalities on national road No. 8 has decreased by 41% in 2009 as compared to 2007. In 2008, another edition of the program was implemented, under the name “Eight safe Roads”. Actions similar to those undertaken on Route 8 were implemented on further eight national roads, numbered 1 to 9. In 2009, further 88 national roads were included in the program, and since then the campaign is conducted on all national roads.

A special modernization program was implemented on roads, focusing on improving roads safety. In many sections, paving is being replaced, intersections reorganized, roundabouts built, traffic lights installed, traffic is calmed by building traffic islands and narrowing the carriageway optically, shoulders are lit, safe pedestrian crossings are designed, overpass crossings are built, protective barriers are installed. Other actions include installation of
additional traffic lights, renovation of bus bays, construction of sidewalks and bicycle paths. In most dangerous places, speed is limited to 50 km/h. In order to enforce this limit, well-marked speed cameras are installed on national roads. Within the framework of the program educational activities are also conducted, aimed to change dangerous behaviors in road traffic.

**Communication within the framework of „Roads of Trust” program – since 2010**

Since 2010, when the program was transformed into “Roads of Trust”, information, promotional and educational activities were intensified, particularly those, objective of which is to modify dangerous attitudes and behavior in road traffic. With this aim in mind, General Directorate of National Roads and Highways is conducting campaigns utilizing non-standard ways of reaching the public, such as e.g. happenings, during which road accidents are simulated on the shoulder: there are smashed cars, extras playing the victims, firefighting trucks, police cars, ambulances and road services; a simulated rescue activity is also conducted, which simultaneously constitutes an exercise for all the emergency services.

The campaign uses innovative campaigns implemented previously: *You are the cause, you are the victim* and *Bad habits of good drivers.*

**2010 campaign – You are the cause, you are the victim.**

Creative line of the campaign implemented in 2010 was based on true stories of persons who caused road accidents. Its objective was to present a number of consequences, stemming from death or serious injury caused to other road users. The campaign focused on reasons for accidents and their consequences:

- psychological (traumatic experiences, which are difficult to forget and accept, depression often involving suicide attempts etc.),
- social (ostracism, work problems, addictions etc.) or legal (court sentences, lifelong ban on driving etc.).

Narrators of the stories were the people, so the primary sender of the message was a person, whose credibility was built on their own tragic experiences. This allowed to make the message strongly emotional, which attracted the attention of the public and involved them emotionally, and in the final result – increased the scope and impact of the campaign.

The image of consequences resulting from dangerous behavior on the road has become the motivation to change the behavior. Messages focused on persons who caused accidents and their fate have reversed the set of values, to which road safety campaigns usually refer to. By showing the array of possible losses resulting from causing an accident, the campaign appealed to egoism of the viewer, not their altruism.

Through their emotional value, messages have influenced the attitudes of road users, contributing to permanent reduction of number of fatalities. Therefore, the campaign has supported the objective of reducing the number of fatalities in road accidents, and in this sense, has achieved synergy with engineering changes continued, albeit sadly on a lesser scale, on national roads by GDDKiA.

The innovative communication style was also noticed by the broader public, as confirmed by prestigious awards of national marketing industry, awarded to the campaign: Golden Eagle, Kreatura and Media Trendy.
2011-12 campaign Bad habits of good drivers

The campaign continued the emotional angle, while supplementing the communication with rational messages. That is why the campaign:

1) raised awareness of risks related to irrational behavior on the roads,
2) increased the level of knowledge and skills, and
3) encouraged self-assessment.

These three areas of influence on road users are key for roads safety improvement, and through that – for effective support to the objective of “Roads of Trust” program – reducing the number of accidents and in particular the number of fatalities and severe injuries suffered on national roads.

Bad habits of good drivers – there is a bit of perverse thinking to the slogan. It does not disqualify those, who consider themselves good drivers even though they are not. It does not ridicule or stigmatize them. It shows, however, that almost all of us are burdened by bad habits, live with unverified beliefs, myths about roads safety, and despite that never lose their confidence on the road.

One very important factor for safety is the self-awareness of traffic participants – ability to correctly assess oneself, one’s psychological and physical condition, one’s strengths and weaknesses. That is why the campaign uses the emotional message in order to provoke the message recipients to assess their own behavior on the roads.

The campaign looks at the road accidents through the filter of actual emotions, experienced by roads safety professionals. Work experiences of the selected protagonists are stripped of professional formalism and become truly shocking accounts about human drama and tragedy, experienced every day: about accident victims and perpetrators, as well as their families, The message is very emotional, sometimes shocking in its realism and truth of the world presented in the story; it gives the public an impulse to assess their behavior, attitudes and convictions with respect to behavior on the road.

While the emotional message is intended to convince the audience to engage in self-assessment, the role of rational message, included in the campaign, is to increase their knowledge and skills related to participation in road traffic, as well as making them aware of the risks involved.

Availability of new and modernized infrastructure as well as building trust with respect to technical condition and signage on the roads is a permanent element of rational communication throughout the campaign; it also builds the GDDKiA brand. This results from the fact, that implementation of those solutions is also an integral element of the “Roads of Trust” program.

National Experiment on national roads - „Weekend without fatalities”

An important element correlated with the Roads of Trust program was the project called National Experiment on national roads „Weekend without fatalities”. It was conducted twice, in 2010 and 2011, using World Bank loan funds. The project was organized jointly with partners actively involved in roads safety improvement: National Roads Safety Council, Ministry of Health, Headquarters of State Firefighting Brigades, Police Headquarters, PKP PLK S.A. (railway infrastructure manager), Headquarters of Military Police, Airborne
Emergency Services, as well as Chief Inspectorate of Roads Transport. Minister of Infrastructure held honorary patronage. The campaign enjoyed strong support from national and regional media as well as various institutions and associations involved in activity aimed at roads safety improvement.

Within the framework of the project, implemented during a holidays weekend with increased car traffic, educational activities were conducted – in the media, disseminating knowledge about practical aspects of roads safety, as well as during family education picnics. In Inowroclaw, Załuski, Łódź and Warsaw, as well as many other towns, the participants were able to see for themselves, using special platforms, what could happen when seatbelts are not fastened, as well as how the driver’s body behaves when the car rolls on its roof. Participants of the happenings had an opportunity to attend a first aid course, verify their knowledge of traffic rules using electronic simulators, as well as try their skills at driving a bus or a truck. Finale of the National Experiment was held in Warsaw in Szczęśliwicki Park.

Participants of the National Safety Experiment included many Voivodship Drivers Examination Centers, which during the June 24-26 2011 weekend also conducted educational activities. Efficient cooperation of all services has shown that a synergy is possible between engineering, educational, traffic supervision and emergency services activities.

Unfortunately, the promotional activities did not translate into a noticeable reduction in number of fatalities during the „Weekend without fatalities” project. This probably was one of the reasons why the project was not repeated in 2012.

Results

A good starting point would be the statistics of accidents and fatalities on national roads (managed by GDDKiA) for 2006.

In comparing the roads statistics for 2011 and 2006, one can clearly see the reduction in number of accidents, fatalities and severe injuries; however achieving a 75% reduction by 2013 does not seem probable.

Table: Accidents statistics on national roads in Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of accidents</td>
<td>9 722</td>
<td>8 589</td>
<td>8 096</td>
<td>7 991</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of fatalities</td>
<td>1 962</td>
<td>1 461</td>
<td>1 416</td>
<td>1 513</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of injured</td>
<td>13 406</td>
<td>11 955</td>
<td>11 263</td>
<td>10 728</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police

Costs

Estimated cost of the program in terms of its “soft” part, i.e. campaigns and promotion-information activities amount to approximately 30 million PLN ($9 million).

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to estimate infrastructure-related costs, as renovation and modernization activities undertaken on roads covered by the program were conducted within the framework of annual repair budgets of GDDKiA and were not monitored in detail. Based on data supplied by GDDKiA it is estimated, that costs related to infrastructure safety
improvement within the framework of „Roads of Trust” program amounted to approximately 80 million PLN ($25 million) in 2007, approx. 280 million PLN in 2010 and approx. 140 million PLN ($46 million) in 2011.

Commentary

The program doubtlessly was, and still remains, an important element of activities conducted by the government via GDDKiA in order to improve safety, primarily on national roads. Unfortunately, its scope did not cover self-government roads administered by local authorities; they were practically excluded from infrastructure improvement activities and only included in limited scope in promotion and information activities (mostly by way of inviting representatives of self-government authorities and local partners to participate in conferences or to cooperate in organizing various promotion and information events).

The program has evolved from its original idea, back from „No.8-8-88” program in 2007-9, which by design was intended to include both infrastructure improvement related activities and education-information activities. With time, it has evolved into a promotion-information-education program, using various media and communication methods.

One of the weaker points of the program seems to be insufficient emphasis on results and analysis of specific results of activities conducted as well as analysis of causality between activities undertaken and actual improvement of roads safety. The program’s potential related to possibility of systematic improvement of roads infrastructure and advancing analyses in this scope was in time dominated by its promotion and communication aspects.

This is confirmed by a noticeable change in the program’s profile in 2010. As the loans from World Bank and European Investment Bank expired and EU co-financing was gained, the program was practically reduced to information, promotion and educational activities only. Tasks related to improving roads infrastructure for increased safety were no longer included in the program.

Despite those reservations, the program seems to be a good and inspiring example for serious roads administrations (national or local) which should place strong emphasis on improving safety of the roads infrastructure they manage. Systematic implementation of such programs, accompanied by results analysis and drawing conclusions from implementation of various solutions, should play an important role in roads safety improvement.
ANNEX 7: Road administrative categories and scopes of responsibility of the road administrations

The following definitions are based on definitions used for statistical reviews, in the Statistical Yearbook of Mazowieckie Voivodship for 2008.

A. **National roads** include (i) current and future motorways and expressways, (ii) international roads, (iii) other major roads of national importance, (iv) approach roads to border crossings, (v) roads that are alternatives to toll motorways, (vi) bypasses around large urban agglomerations, and (vii) roads with a military significance. GDDKiA manages all national roads.

B. **Regional/voivodship roads** include roads with significance to the voivodship providing access to national roads and connecting important towns within region. **Voivodships** are owners and operators of their respective road networks.

C. **District roads** include roads other than listed out above, linking district capital cities with commune capital towns and commune capital cities with other cities. **Districts** are owners and operators of all district roads.

D. **Towns with district rights** are owners and operators of all roads located within their respective borders excluding expressways and motorways managed by GDDKiA.

E. **Communal roads** are of local importance, not falling under other categories, supplementing road networks and carrying local traffic, excluding inner and private roads. **Communes** are owners and operators only and exclusively of the communal roads.
ANNEX 8: Role and Structure of Lead Agency

The World Bank Guidelines\(^1\) set out the role of the Lead Agency and contain examples of how lead agencies are structured in a range of countries. The Lead Agency role is described under each of the seven institutional management functions:

- Results focus;
- Coordination;
- Legislation;
- Funding and resource allocation;
- Promotion;
- Monitoring and evaluation;
- Research and development and knowledge transfer.

**Results focus: summary of Lead Agency role**
1. Appraising current road safety performance through high-level strategic review;
2. Adopting a far-reaching road safety vision for the longer-term;
3. Analyzing what could be achieved in the medium term;
4. Setting quantitative targets by mutual consent across the road safety partnership;
5. Establishing mechanisms to ensure partner and stakeholder accountability for results.

**Coordination: summary of Lead Agency role**
1. Horizontal coordination across central government;
2. Vertical coordination from central to regional and local levels of government;
3. Specific delivery partnerships between government, non-government, community and business at the central, regional, and local levels;
4. Parliamentary relations at central, regional and local levels.

**Legislation: summary of Lead Agency role**
1. Reviewing the scope of the legislative framework;
2. Developing and updating legislation needed for the road safety strategy;
3. Consolidating legislation;
4. Securing legislative resources for road safety.

**Funding and resource allocation: summary of Lead Agency role**
1. Ensuring sustainable funding sources;
2. Establishing procedures to guide the allocation of resources across safety programs.

**Promotion: summary of Lead Agency role**
1. Promotion of a far-reaching road safety vision or goal;
2. Championing and promotion at high level;
3. Multi-sectoral promotion of effective interventions and shared responsibility;
4. Leading by example with in-house road safety policies;
5. Developing and supporting safety rating programs and the publication of their results;
6. Carrying out national advertising;
7. Encouraging promotion at the local level.

\(^1\) Bliss and Breen (2009)
Monitoring and evaluation: summary of Lead Agency role

1. Establishing and supporting data systems to set and monitor final and intermediate outcome and output targets;
2. Transparent review of the national road safety strategy and its performance;
3. Making any necessary adjustments to achieve the desired results.

Research and development and knowledge transfer: summary of Lead Agency role

1. Developing capacity for multi-disciplinary research and knowledge transfer;
2. Creating a national road safety research strategy and annual program;
3. Securing sources of sustainable funding for road safety research;
4. Training and professional exchange;
5. Establishing good practice guidelines;
6. Setting up demonstration projects.

The diagram below shows a possible structure for a Lead Agency

![Diagram showing the structure of a Lead Agency for Road Safety](image)
ANNEX 9: Recommendations for Investment in Road Safety Actions to provide early wins and sustainable support for road safety activities

This Annex is based in part on the preceding analyses and recommendations, as well as being connected to the Draft National Road Safety Program. Thus, what follows is not a comprehensive list of short and medium term priorities. Rather the recommendations for actions are focused on achieving early wins in the directions set by this Capacity Review and by the National Road Safety Program. In particular, this Annex supplements the recommendations in Sections 5-7 of the Capacity Review.

Early wins produce critical gains in momentum and ownership of road safety. Thus, short term points of focus should have most of the following features:

- Evidence identifies that road safety benefits will be delivered
- Road safety benefits can be demonstrated
- The benefits can be systematically and legitimately attributed to the actions taken
- The work can be undertaken quickly
- The benefits can be expected to occur within a reasonable timeframe
- With success, the program of works can be extended.

Demonstration projects are an important part of early wins. Demonstration projects provide effective road safety actions on a few selected roads or for a specific demographic of the community (such as young drivers), with publicity, commitment, and rigorous evaluation. Such projects show the power of effective road safety actions, and demonstrate to the community and to government and non-government stakeholders that road safety can be managed and reduced with appropriate safety system actions.

Management structural change including setting up Lead Agency

Recommendation 1: Establishment of the Lead Agency for road safety with significant resourcing should be an early priority. Initial commitment should be to a significant staff complement. See Section 5.1.2 in the main report for the full range of recommendations regarding the Lead Agency. (Annex 8 provides a possible structure for such an agency.)

Coordination across all levels of government

Lead agencies for road safety always depend on partner agencies for delivery of programs. Thus co-ordination of those partners is critical. See Section 5.2 in the main report for the full range of recommendations on coordination.

Recommendation 2: As an early action, establish a multi-sectoral working group with representatives of all levels of government, chaired and supported by the Lead Agency. The working group should address the relevant recommendations of the previous chapter of this Review and advice national and self-government on:

a. How to progress the earlier recommendations;
b. principles of engagement for road safety and actions by all levels of self-government;
c. processes for increasing commitment to road safety, and accountability for road safety performance on self-government roads;
d. requirements for increased capacity for road safety within self-government.
e. the requirements for the operating systems within government to ensure sufficient agility as to allow for the implementation of substantial policy changes within months.

**Recommendation 3:** The National Road Safety Program outcome target must be shared. As an early action with ongoing maintenance, responsible agencies should develop targets for road safety projects, in collaboration with the Lead Agency. These targets must be monitored to ensure delivery of sufficient improvement as to allow the National Road Safety Program target to be delivered.

**Strengthening data collection, analysis, monitoring and evaluation**

Sections 5.5 and 7 in the main report contain recommendations on data and research, and the detailed recommendations for improved data systems are in Annex 6.

**Recommendation 4:** As an early priority establish a program for replicable nation-wide data collection on intermediate outcome variables: seat belt use, child restraint use, bicycle and motorcycle helmet use, and speeds.

**Recommendation 5:** As a medium term action, increase research and analysis capacity within the Lead Agency, and move the crash database to the Lead Agency.

**Recommendation 6:** As a medium term action, review the national estimates of economic costs of road crashes with a view to moving to willingness to pay estimates including social costs.

The following sections include detailed proposals for specific actions to provide early wins, and supplement the broader recommendations in Section 6 in the main report.

**Road network improvements**

**Recommendation 7:** Establish a funded program of demonstration projects on high casualty crash rate national non-dual carriageway roads. The program should:

- a. Select locations based on serious crashes per kilometer of road length, not per vehicle kilometer of travel;
- b. target off-road and head-on crashes;
- c. focus on infrastructure measures such as wire rope and other barriers, speed limit reviews, and intensive speed enforcement;
- d. include evaluation process from the start to ensure evaluation of crash outcomes is possible.

Amenities for pedestrians are often inadequate in urban areas of Poland, providing insufficient time to cross, forcing pedestrians to wait in the median and thus cross in 2 stages (thus taking twice as long to cross), and exposing pedestrians to unreasonable risk with high vehicle speeds, and the psychologically naïve allowance of green vehicle right turn arrows as the same time as, and in conflict with, green walk signs. All these features discourage pedestrians from obeying traffic law, and illegal and unsafe pedestrian crossing behavior is common in cities throughout Poland. Nonetheless it is important to focus on infrastructure and avoid victim blaming and exclusive focus on behavior. The National Road Safety Program covers this point well.
Pedestrians are identified as a major victim group and this is supported by the evidence. The management of speed of vehicles will help pedestrians, as will better driver behavior at zebra crossings. In 2011, over 470 pedestrians were killed at zebra crossings, though this may reflect excessive speed in many cases rather than lack of a sound right-of-way rule. Both should be addressed.

Recommendation 8: As an early win, establish a funded program of demonstration projects in pedestrian casualty crash areas. The program should focus on the provision of safe crossing opportunities, physical prevention of crossing at unsafe locations, infrastructure to manage speeds to a level which provides protection for pedestrians, speed limit reviews, and speed enforcement (see speed section).

Recommendation 9: As a medium term action, establish a funded program for the instillation of roundabouts, which reduce collision severity, slow traffic when correctly installed to require a significant change of angle in negotiating the intersection, and thus improve safety for pedestrians.

Recommendation 10: As an early win, establish a policy of providing forgiving roadsides on all divided carriageway roads. These roads encourage higher speeds, and yet may have quite unforgiving roadsides in the event of even a small driver error. See photos in Figure 9.1 below.

Figure 1: Examples of high speed divided roads in Poland, with appropriate median separation treatments, one with and one without shoulder protection for vehicles leaving the roadway

Source: World Bank
Driver regulation, training testing and behavior change

Recommendation 11: Develop multi-sectoral programs to increase the use of seat-belts (including making their use mandatory by taxi drivers), child restraints, and helmets.

Recommendation 12: As an early priority, increase costs of license testing, and rationalize the expenditure of profits of WORDs on effective road safety programs.

Recommendation 13: As an early priority, introduce stronger penalties for speeding by young drivers. The threat of license loss is generally effective for young drivers. The lack of coordination in Road Safety Education is described in Section 4 of the main report.

Recommendation 14: The perceived lack of road safety education in schools should be addressed, and content should be evidence based. This should include the following:

a. The Ministry of Education could provide courses called road safety, or otherwise promote, as well as ensure, the provision of road safety education in schools.

b. It is more effective for teachers with the relevant skills and understanding of the learning needs of their students to teach road safety. Alternatively, if staff from another agency are to provide road safety teaching, then that agency should provide training throughout the country in the interests of a uniform standards, and the staff providing the road safety teaching should receive additional training on teaching and learning.

c. Road safety education in primary schools should move away from classroom and model traffic environments to roadside training of pedestrian skills that has proved successful elsewhere. (See bibliography for reference.)

d. There should be a greater focus on older children who are more exposed to risk.

e. Though popular and often seen as self-evidently useful, evidence suggests that provision of driver training (and by extension, motorcycle or moped training) in schools does no road safety good and can result in driving/riding at an earlier (less safe) age thus increasing crash rates. Provision of such training in schools should be reconsidered, in favor of teaching of understanding of risk and peer pressure.

Road traffic law and enforcement

Recommendation 15: More general deterrence of drink-driving through stronger enforcement would further improve drink-driving rates in Poland, and a substantially sized random breath test program is needed as a medium term action. Increased and regularly maintained equipment are necessary for this action.

Recommendation 16: The planned increase of traffic police to 10% of the total force will require specific additional allocations of resource. Sufficient vehicles, speed enforcement equipment and regularly maintained breath testing equipment are critical as early priorities.

Recommendation 17: An overall promotional campaign including a communications strategy and paid advertising should be carried out to promote increased enforcement, to maximize the benefits of general deterrence. This should target a specific small set of road user behaviors.

Recommendation 18: Other countries have found that drugs are an increasing problem for road safety. On this basis expanded drug testing regimens are often recommended. However, the extent of the problem is not established in Poland. As a medium term action, research
drug involvement in crashes in Poland through examination of drug presence (especially illicit drugs) in the blood of dead drivers and riders.

**Speed limits and enforcement**

As outlined in Section 6.7 of the main report, substantial decreases in speed limits and actual travel speeds to manage the risk on unsafe infrastructure, together with a major program of expenditure on infrastructure improvements, are likely to be needed if the casualty reduction targets in the NRSP are to be met. A policy of monitoring of progress was recommended, where and when expenditure and works are not providing the required reduction in trauma based on crash data, further systematic reductions of speed limits and travel speeds (via enforcement and promotion), to keep the toll in line with projected targets, may be required. This will both motivate expenditure and manage the road toll.

**Recommendation 19:** Major communications and paid advertising campaigns, should be a first priority action in support of extra speed enforcement in order to explain the need and gain public support for the program through understanding of the benefits.

Speeding is a major risk factor in determining injury severity, particularly for pedestrians, with small increases in impact speed producing large increases in probability of death (see figure below).

*Figure 2: The relationship between impact speed and probability of death, for various crash types.*

**Recommendation 20:** In order to allow for the delivery of the necessary speed reductions, a large number of speed cameras may be necessary, including covertly operated mobile cameras. Until progress with road infrastructure improvements are monitored, it is not possible to estimate the required numbers.

**Recommendation 21:** Speeding is a major contributor to the road toll, and enforcement should be broader than sign-posted cameras. Thus, it is critical that police maintain a strong level of speed enforcement using mobile devices. This should be an early priority action, accompanied by a strong communications campaign of this policy.

**Recommendation 22:** Pedestrians are 33% of Poland’s road toll, and thus must be addressed urgently. As soon as possible, reduce speed limits in urban environments to provide greater safety for pedestrians, vulnerable road users and others, and ensure enforcement levels are sufficient to deliver high levels of compliance.
Recommendation 23: Improved speed management provides quick, inexpensive road safety gains. A program of reviewing and reducing speed limits, and commitment to more systematic reductions where the road toll does not reduce, should be early actions.

Recommendation 24: As an assurance to the public that reductions are not to trick motorists with enforcement, a one month amnesty on speed camera fines for lowered speed limits would be appropriate, in which the penalty is replaced by a warning letter of the new speed limit. This should not apply to drivers who would have been fined under the application of the previous limit.

Recommendation 25: Speeding penalties are often not sufficient to deter drivers. Demonstrably increased penalties for speeding (with strong publicity) should be an early action.

Recommendation 26: Speed camera penalties can be avoided, delayed or reduced by claiming not to know the driver. Deterrence is greatly harmed by this, and through public awareness which reduces general deterrence. Thus the harm extends well beyond those cases where the fine is actually avoided. As an early action, a review of the enforcement and legal systems around speed camera infringement processes should be initiated to close the loopholes, so that penalties are certain, and seen as certain. This may require significant additional penalties for owners not nominating drivers. Stronger regulation for loss of license as a penalty will also help, with reduced discretion by the prosecutor.

Recommendation 27: As a medium term action, on road safety engineering projects which are fully paid from speed camera revenue signage should be erected stating the cameras as the source of funds. This has many advantages: this will advertise works for safety, advertises the commitment of funding to safety, increase credibility that the commitment is being honored, and reminds drivers of cameras.

Recommendation 28: As a medium term action, establish public accountability on spend of all fines on road safety. Invite a bipartisan taskforce to provide policy and scrutiny on this, with technical guidance from the Lead Agency.

Recommendation 29: Young drivers are largely over-represented in serious (fatal and serious injury) crashes. Much tougher penalties for young driver speeding with strong assurances to stop penalty avoidance are likely to be effective. In particular, the treat license loss for any instance of speeding is a sound deterrent for young drivers. This has a number of advantages: it is inexpensive, it is effective (but must be well publicised), is warranted by the evidence, and can be effectively evaluated against other changes by virtue of targeting this specific group.

Recommendation 30: Greater emphasis should be placed on the risks related to speeding, and risk taking generally, in driver training.

Vehicle standards

Recommendation 31: As a medium term action review and revise policies on registration and insurance, to create incentives for people to buy safer cars, and disincentives for keeping older less safe vehicles.
**Recommendation 32:** Better data on the safety features of vehicles are needed. A system for collection of these data within the vehicle registration system is recommended. This should include driver and passenger airbags, electronic stability control, and other features as they become available on the market.

**Recommendation 33:** Increase monitoring and management of vehicle inspections, through spot checks on the roadworthiness of vehicles which have passed inspection and improved management to reduce vehicle owners shopping around for the least rigorous inspection. Inspection businesses which pass vehicles inappropriately should not be allowed to continue to operate.

**Emergency services**

Emergency response and health care systems are the key players in the post-crash arena of road safety management, capable of reducing death and disability. These elements are typically managed quite separately from the other pillars of road safety, because emergency response and rehabilitation are part of the broader healthcare system while the other pillars of road safety management are core elements of the transport system, in which road safety is generally placed.

**Recommendation 34:** As an early action, establish single emergency number, and strongly promote it.

**Recommendation 35:** As a medium term action, establish a committee under the responsibility of Lead Agency of all involved emergency services to improve collaboration and clarify their detailed roles at crash scenes. Work to be completed in six months and implemented in one year.

**Recommendation 36:** Increase night time availability of helicopter rescue services.
ANNEX 10: Agenda and List of Participants for Workshop on 24th April 2013 to discuss draft Capacity Review Report

Agenda

Workshop, April 24, 2013

9:30 - 10:00 Registration/coffee
10:00 - 10:15 Welcome
10:15 - 10:25 Outline of workshop aims and process
10:25 - 11:00 Overview of process of development, and key outputs, of the Draft Capacity Review Report: Radosław Czapski, Professor Soames Job, Kate McMahon.
11:00 - 12:00 Four break-out groups focusing on each area of recommendations:
   A. Recommendations For Improvements To Capacity For Institutional Management Functions
   B. Recommendations For Improvements To Capacity For Interventions
   C. Recommendations For Improvements To Capacity For Results
   D. Recommendations For Investment In Road Safety Actions To Provide Early Wins And Sustainable Support For Road Safety Activities
12:00 - 12:30 Reports back from groups A & B
12:30 - 13:30 Lunch
13:30 - 14:00 Reports back from groups C & D
14:00 - 15:40 Presentations and discussion/feedback/suggestions
15:40 - 16:00 Conclusions and next steps
# List of Participants

**Workshop April 24, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Katarzyna Kwiecień</td>
<td>General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pawel Goryński</td>
<td>Institute of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Krzysztof Kuszewski</td>
<td>Institute of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rafał Halik</td>
<td>Institute of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Łukasz Majchrzak</td>
<td>Main Inspectorate of Road Transport in Poland (GITD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ewa Denysiuk</td>
<td>Main Inspectorate of Road Transport in Poland (GITD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tadeusz Czapiewski</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Michał Marek</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Adam Sowiński</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pawel Długolęcki</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dorota Cabaińska</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ewa Mierzińska</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Danuta Pusek</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Łuasz Kamiński</td>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Jerzy Grzesik</td>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Robert Garbarczyk</td>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ilona Buttler</td>
<td>Motor Transport Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ryszard Krystek</td>
<td>Motor Transport Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Paulina Karbowy</td>
<td>National Road Safety Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Konrad Romik</td>
<td>National Road Safety Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Piotr Kostrzewa</td>
<td>National Road Safety Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Agata Ogowska</td>
<td>National Road Safety Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Maciej Mosiej</td>
<td>National Road Safety Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Borys Burzawa</td>
<td>National Road Safety Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Katarzyna Kosińska</td>
<td>Office of Beata Bublewicz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Józef Syc</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Leszek Jankowski</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Agata Jaździk-Osmólska</td>
<td>Road and Bridge Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Andrzej Urbanik</td>
<td>Road and Bridge Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Radosław Czapski</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Kate McMahon</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Soames Job</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Jarosław Giemza</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>